Regulation of The Legal Profession

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REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Frank H. Stephen and James H. Love
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom
© Copyright 1999 Frank H. Stephan and James H. Love
Abstract
This chapter reviews the contribution which economists, and others using
economic modes of reasoning, have made to the analysis of the regulation of
law firms. It particularly focuses on the analysis of self-regulation by the
profession. The chapter begins by rehearsing the traditional cartel argument
against self-regulation and its links with the modern private interest theory of
regulation via capture theory. This is contrasted with the market failure view
of regulation which in the context of the professions focuses on the information
asymmetry between the professional and the client. There is then a brief
discussion of the merits of self-regulation and inter-profession competition
before turning to an examination of the instruments by which professional
regulation is exercised: control of entry, control of advertising or other means
of competition, control of fee levels, control of fee contracts and control of
organisational form. In this context, prominence is given to recent empirical
studies which test the effects of these regulatory controls or their removal. The
focus throughout is on what the economics literature has had to say on the
regulation of the practice of law. Thus more general treatments of the
economics of the law firm are not discussed.
JEL classification: L12, L43, L44, L84, L51, M37
Keywords: Legal Profession, Regulation, Advertising, Entry Restrictions, Fee
Levels, Fee Contracts, Empirical Studies
1. Introduction
In most jurisdictions one or more of the following is regulated in some manner:
a. the provision of advice about the law for financial reward;

b. the use of specific professional titles indicating expertise in legal matters;
c. the right to appear on behalf of one of the parties before the courts.
Whilst ultimately governed by statute and subject to oversight by some

public official (judge, civil servant or politician) this regulation is frequently
enforced and delimited by the profession itself (see further below). This article
reviews the contribution which economists, and others using economic modes
987
988 Regulation of the Legal Profession 5860
of reasoning, have made to the analysis of such regulatory regimes. We begin

by rehearsing the traditional cartel argument against self-regulation and its
links with the modern private interest theory of regulation via capture theory.
This is contrasted with the market failure view of regulation which in the
context of the professions focuses on the information asymmetry between the
professional and the client. There is then a brief discussion of the merits of
self-regulation and inter-profession competition before turning to an
examination of the instruments by which professional regulation is exercised:
control of entry, control of advertising or other means of competition, control
of fee levels, control of fee contracts and control of organisational form. In this
context we give prominence to recent empirical studies which test the effects
of these regulatory controls or their removal. The focus throughout is on what
the economics literature has had to say on the regulation of the practice of law.
Thus more general treatments of the economics of the law firm are not
discussed.
A. Regulation of Professions, Capture and Cartels
2. Economists’ Views
Economists, traditionally, have been highly critical of many aspects of

professional regulation and self-regulation in particular (see, for example,
Arnauld, 1972; Arnauld and Friedland, 1977; Benham and Benham, 1975;
Faure et al., 1993; Friedman and Kuznets, 1945; Kessel, 1958; Lees, 1966;
Leffler, 1978). Self-regulation is characterised as, potentially, having the effect
of a cartel: by controlling entry to the market and setting an agreed price above
the competitive price, members of the profession earn economic rents.
Restrictions on advertising and prohibitions on using fee-levels to attract
business restrain competition from ‘breaking out’ between existing suppliers.
It has been argued that restricting fee competition, particularly by publishing
mandatory or recommended fee scales, reduces competition and innovation and
is against the public interest (Arnauld, 1972; Arnauld and Friedland, 1977;
Domberger and Sherr, 1989; Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1970; Van
den Bergh and Faure, 1991). Whilst the earlier literature was written from a
price theory/industrial organisation perspective, more recently critics have
adopted a capture theory or public choice perspective (Van den Bergh and
Faure, 1991; Faure, 1993; Van den Bergh, 1993). This is not surprising since
in the development of the private interest theory of regulation from capture
theory Posner (1974) made a direct link with the theory of cartels. Indeed,
self-regulation has been described as the ultimate form of regulatory capture
(Kay, 1988). From this perspective the regulation of markets for professional
services is seen to arise or at least is sustained because it is in the interests of
the members of the profession. It legitimises or enforces their cartel-like

behaviour.
3. Market Failure and Information Asymmetry
An older, though nowadays less fashionable, view of regulation is that it arises

from a public interest in remedying market failure (Noll, 1989).
Notwithstanding the origins or motivations underlying regulation, many would
argue that there is a potential market failure in many professional markets.
The particular market failure that applies to professional markets in general,
and the markets for legal services in particular, is that of information
asymmetry. The asymmetry is between the professional on the one hand and the
client on the other. For most clients legal services are credence goods (Darby
and Karni, 1973) as opposed to search or experience goods. The client is
usually less well informed about the nature of legal problems and their
remedies than the lawyer and often relies on the lawyer to define the problem
in the first place as well as recommending a course of action and implementing
it (but see further below). Quinn (1982) distinguishes between two roles: the
agency function (defining the client’s needs and selecting appropriate
strategies) and the service function (using technical expertise to implement the
chosen strategy). Normally in the legal context the lawyer performs both
functions. Thus there is a potentially severe principal-agent problem
(potentially encompassing supplier-induced demand). The lawyer as agent has
a pecuniary interest in recommending expensive strategies which he/she will
be paid to implement. This demands some protection for the (infrequent)
consumer of personal professional services (see, for example, Arruñada, 1996;
Dingwall and Fenn, 1987; Evans and Trebilcock, 1982; Faure, 1993; Faure et
al., 1993; Federal Trade Commission, 1984; Helligman, 1993; Herrmann,
1993; Kritzer, 1990; Levmore, 1993; Matthews, 1991; Smith and Cox, 1985;
Sykes, 1993; Wolfram, 1984). Under these conditions the market will fail to
produce the socially optimum quantity of the professional service. Protection
of consumers frequently takes the form of regulation of the profession and its
markets. In certain circumstances, contingent fee contracts may mitigate or
overcome some aspects of this problem (see further Part E below).
It is important to recognise that the informational asymmetry identified here
does not apply to all clients of lawyers. Many commercial clients are repeat
purchasers in the market for legal services. Therefore they are able to acquire
experience and knowledge of the market which reduces the asymmetry between
lawyer and client. They are less in need of the agency function than infrequent
purchasers. Furthermore in the case of repeat purchasers, lawyers must be
aware of the loss of future business from behaving opportunistically. They must
also be aware of reputational effects which may arise from social networks even
where individual consumers are not repeat purchasers. Thus the information
asymmetry argument does not carry over to all segments of the market for legal
services (Hudec and Trebilcock, 1982; Trebilcock, 1982). It has its principal
relevance in the market for private clients and small businesses. Thus although
the information asymmetry argument is now well recognised its application
must be sensitive to the circumstances of the market concerned.
Recently, Emons (1997) has analysed a model of behaviour in a credence
good market where, essentially, the service function cannot be provided
separately from the agency function. He describes this as a situation of
‘profound economies of scope between diagnosis and treatment’. Consumers
attempt to infer sellers incentives from observation of market data. The analysis
demonstrates that market equilibria inducing non-fraudulent behaviour can
exist.
The information asymmetry between professional and client also gives rise to
another potential source of market failure due to the client’s inability to judge,
ex ante, the quality of the professional. In the extreme this can give rise to a
‘lemons’ problem (Akerlof, 1970). The use of licensing to avoid this problem
is analysed in Leland (1979). The author concludes that the optimal supply of
quality will not be produced in a market with asymmetry between client and
supplier and that minimum quality standards may solve the problem. Clearly
it will be in the interests of the profession to avoid a ‘lemons’ problem arising.
However, Leland’s analysis suggests that if the setting of minimum standards
is by the professional group itself it is likely to be set too high.
4. Professional Self-Regulation
Dingwall and Fenn (1987) consider a number of possible responses to the

information asymmetry problem. First, society could subsidise high quality
suppliers to ensure that they remain in the market. Secondly, penalties could
be imposed on those suppliers who do not meet some quality threshold. Thirdly,
entry to the market could be restricted to those meeting some minimum
standard. They consider the first implausible since it does not guarantee that
the higher quality service will actually be supplied. The second and third
response requires a regulatory agency which must avoid capture and be able to
do what the individual client cannot: assess quality and signal it to potential
consumers. Self-regulation can do the latter but runs the risk of being the
ultimate form of regulatory capture. However, they argue that if self-regulation
was so problematic why does it persist in most jurisdictions? If it were
inefficient someone would benefit from its removal otherwise democracy itself
would be inefficient.
Dingwall and Fenn (1987) see self-regulation as arising from the social
institution of trust: a social contract between society and the profession
mitigates the moral hazard problem arising from the information asymmetry.
However, they recognise that safeguards are required, particularly to ensure that
the profession does not operate as a cartel. They also feel that the various
professions will act as watchdogs on each other.
The case for self-regulation has been examined in detail also in Ogus
(1995). He points to a number of reasons why self-regulation might be preferred
to regulation by some body external to the profession. In particular,
self-regulation may reduce the cost of the regulator acquiring information and
makes adjustments to regulations easier. These benefits need to be compared
to the potential efficiency losses due to the potential for cartel-like behaviour.
Curran (1993) reports J.C. Miller, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission
in the Reagan administration, making similar arguments for self-regulation
(Miller, 1983). Even where regulation by a professional body is deemed an
appropriate solution Ogus (1995) has argued that the public interest would be
protected best by having a number of professional bodies in competition with
each other. As implied in the foregoing, in many jurisdictions the regulation of
a profession is in the hands of the members of the profession itself, either
nationally or locally. This is usually the case with the legal profession
(Arruñada, 1996; Curran, 1993; Dingwall and Fenn, 1987; Evans and
Trebilcock, 1982; Faure, 1993; Federal Trade Commission, 1984; Finsinger,
1993; Helligman, 1993; Herrmann, 1993; Lees, 1966; Ogus, 1993; Pashigian,
1979; Stephen, 1994; Stephen and Love, 1996; Stephen, Love and Paterson,
1994; Van den Bergh, 1993).
A more formal treatment of professional self-regulation is provided in
Shaked and Sutton (1981a) which examines the effects on welfare of a
self-regulating profession and also the effect on welfare of the existence of a
lower quality para-profession. Shaked and Sutton (1982) focuses on the
perceived quality of a profession and the availability of information. In
particular, information available to consumers is related to the size of the
profession: a larger profession increases the heterogeneity of information
available to consumers and increases the demand at a given price. A small
profession (whose quality is higher) will produce less information and reduce
demand. Thus increased quality may be associated with lower price. In this
work the motive force comes from the consumer side.
5. Alternatives to Self-Regulation
Regulation may not be the only solution to the information asymmetry problem.
Independent rating agencies have been suggested as a solution or the use of
repeat purchasers to perform the agency function on behalf of infrequent
purchasers (Stephen, Love and Paterson, 1994; Stephen and Love, 1996).
Others suggest that competition will generate its own quality signals (Klein and
Leffler, 1981; Leffler, 1978). Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) and Carr and
Mathewson (1990) suggest that the existence of partnerships with unlimited
liability signals the quality of legal advice to consumers because each partner
is willing to risk his/her wealth on the competence of the other partners (see
further below for the development of this argument). Even if the information
asymmetry problem is large its removal via professional self-regulation may
introduce other, greater, distortions (Curran, 1993).
6. Deregulation of Professional Service Markets
In both academic and policy discussion there has been a gradual shift against
regulation, a shift which has quickened in pace in recent years. Markets for
legal services have been the subject of varying degrees of deregulation in USA,
Europe and elsewhere (see, for example, Bowles, 1994; Cox, 1989; Curran,
1993; Domberger and Sherr, 1987; Faure, 1993; Federal Trade Commission,
1984; Helligman, 1993; Herrman, 1993; Ogus, 1993; Paterson and Stephen,
1990; Shinnick, 1995; Stephen and Love, 1996; and Scottish Home and Health
Department, 1989). In several jurisdictions there have been proposals by
government to remove the general exemption of professions from anti-trust or
restrictive practices legislation. However, not all such attempts have reached
the statute book (for example England and Wales, Ireland, Scotland, Spain).
7. Instruments of Self-Regulation
The current state of the discussion in the conceptual literature is such that
although some authors recognise the potential problem arising from the
asymmetry of information between client and professional, considerable
scepticism remains on whether traditional self-regulation is a solution to the
problem or a source of even greater welfare loss. The remainder of this paper
considers that part of the literature which examines the instruments used by
self-regulatory bodies for the legal profession to regulate the market. In
particular, we emphasise empirical studies of regulation and de-regulation. The
lack of discussion in the economics literature on some aspects of self-regulatory
systems such as complaints procedures, controls on quality of training and
requirements for continuing professional development and so on is reflected in
their absence in what follows.
Commentators (Cox, 1989; Curran, 1993; Domberger and Sherr, 1987,
1989; Evans and Trebilcock, 1982; Faure, 1993; Finsinger, 1993; Federal
Trade Commission, 1984; Scottish Home and Health Department, 1989;
Stephen, 1994; Stephen and Love, 1996; Stephen, Love and Paterson, 1994;
Van den Bergh, 1993) have identified a number of instruments typically used
by self-regulators of the legal profession which may work against the public
interest: (i) restrictions on entry; (ii) restrictions on advertising and other
means of promoting a competitive process within the profession; (iii)
restrictions on fee competition; and (iv) restrictions on organisational form. A
separate although connected literature has developed on restrictions on the
nature of fee contracts between lawyers and clients. This particularly focuses
on contingent fee contracts (see, for example, Clermont and Currivan, 1973;
Dana and Spier, 1993; Danzon, 1983; Fisher, 1988; Gravelle and Waterson,
1993; Halpern and Turnbull, 1981; Hay, 1996; Kritzer, et al., 1984; Lynk,
1990; Miceli, 1994; Miceli and Segerson, 1991; Rickman, 1994; Rubinfeld and
Scotchmer, 1993; Schwartz and Mitchell, 1970; Smith, 1992; Thomason, 1991;
Watts, 1994). We now discuss each of these methods of self-regulatory control
in turn.
B. Entry Restrictions
8. Entry to the Profession
Economists (for example Friedman and Kuznets, 1945; Leffler, 1978) have
criticised restrictions on entry to a profession or restrictions on providing a
particular service by persons not recognised by a particular professional body.
This can undoubtedly lead to supply shortages and hence the earning of
substantial economic rents by members the profession. However, it not only
requires a monopoly right for the profession over a particular service but also
numerical restrictions on entry to the profession. Thus an excess demand for
the services of the profession is maintained. The monopoly right ensures that
an adjustment in supply from outside the profession cannot take place in
response to the profession’s high incomes. In the most famous study, Friedman
and Kuznets (1945) estimated economic rents of 15-110 percent being earned
by professionals in the US during the 1929-36 period. This is the global effect
of self-regulation and is not solely attributable to entry restrictions.
Entry to the legal profession has continued to grow (for Europe see Bowles,
1994; Faure, 1993; Helligman, 1993; Herrmann, 1993; Ogus, 1993) for USA
see Curran (1993) and Lueck, Olsen and Ransom (1995). Indeed as Curran
(1993) points out the American Bar Association has been less successful than
its medical counterpart in limiting the growth of the profession. It has not
regulated the numbers qualifying to practice in the same way as the American
Medical Association. Of course, established members of the profession may
have an interest in encouraging an expansion of new entry to the lower reaches
of the profession as this might reduce the salaries paid to new entrants due to
excess supply. However, this argument only holds so long as the new entrants
to the profession are unable to provide the basis for an increase in the number
of law firms and thus compete away the rents earned by existing firms.
However, the absence of severe restrictions on entry to the profession in
general does not necessarily imply competition in specific service markets.
Professional service markets, particularly of a personal nature, tend to be
spatially localised. What may be important are geographical restrictions on
movement which imply barriers to entry into specific service markets for
existing members of the profession. In a number of jurisdictions lawyers may
only appear before courts in the local area to whose bar they have been admitted
(USA, Belgium, Germany, for example).
In the case of legal advice, even when there are no formal restrictions on
practising in a given locality, other restrictions on behaviour such as
prohibiting advertising may raise the cost of entry (through an inability to
quickly generate goodwill) and thus constitute a barrier to entering a specific
spatial market. Alternatively prohibitions on ‘undercutting’ or ‘supplanting’
existing suppliers may reduce the incentive to enter a local market where rents
are being earned. Thus, although there may be no formal barriers to entering
a local market, such markets may not be contestable.
9. Empirical Studies of Entry to the Profession
Economists’ empirical studies of the effects of such mobility restrictions for the
legal profession are restricted to the USA. They find, for example, that lack of
reciprocity between state bar associations leads lower numbers of practising
lawyers and higher lawyer incomes (Holen, 1965; Kleiner, Gay and Green,
1982; Pashigian, 1977). However, a recent empirical study by Lueck, Olsen and
Ransom (1995) finds little support for the view that licensing restrictions affect
the price of legal services. Their evidence suggests that it is what they describe
as ‘market forces’ which are most important. Licensing restrictions are proxied
by requirements to pass a state bar exam, state bar exam pass rates, state
residency requirements and requirement of an ABA recognised law school
degree. Although they find that there is a relationship between state lawyer
density, state bar exam pass rates and the requirement of an ABA recognised
degree the effect is in the opposite direction to that hypothesised by the capture
theory, that is, the lower the pass rate the higher is lawyer density, and the
latter is higher in states requiring an ABA recognised degree. Although the
authors argue that their evidence runs counter to the implications of the capture
theory they do find that the higher are state bar exam pass rates the lower are
lawyer fees.
10. Professional ‘Monopoly Rights’
The preceding paragraphs have focused on controls on entry to the legal

profession itself. Often, as discussed above, this has been accompanied by the
exclusive rights given to the legal profession over certain services. Many
writers commenting on the regulatory regimes governing the legal profession
draw attention to ‘monopoly rights’ in certain areas of work and criticise this
on a priori grounds. However, little empirical work has been done by
economists to estimate the effects of professional monopoly rights and the
existence of para-professions. This may be due, in part, to the absence of data
sets which allow variations in such monopoly rights either over time or location
to be studied. Even during the current deregulation wave there has been little
empirical work estimating the effects of relaxing monopoly rights.
Para-professions sometimes exist alongside professions with the right to
provide services which overlap with some of those provided by a profession.
There has been limited analysis of profession/para-profession interaction.
Shaked and Sutton (1981a) examines the effects on welfare of the existence of
a lower quality para-profession operating alongside a self-regulating profession.
Shaked and Sutton (1981b) looks at the viability of a para-profession when
there are consumers with different incomes but identical preferences. In this
context the para-profession’s viability depends on the relative sizes of the two
income groups of consumers.
A series of studies of the deregulation of legal services in England and
Wales between 1985 and 1992 which focuses on conveyancing (title transfer)
services provides some limited insights on the relaxation of a profession’s
monopoly rights and the impact of a para-profession. Until the mid-1980s
solicitors had the exclusive right to provide conveyancing services for financial
reward. This monopoly was revoked in 1985 and by 1987 the first licensed
conveyancers (non-solicitors licensed to provide these services) were offering
services in competition with solicitors in some areas of the country (Stephen
and Love, 1996; Stephen, Love and Paterson, 1994). Paterson et al. (1988)
report that solicitors surveyed in 1986 were reducing fees in anticipation of
licensed conveyancer entry. Later surveys, however, provide a more complex
picture of the effects of entry. Survey data for 1989 revealed solicitors’
conveyancing fees in a sample of locations where licensed conveyancers had
entered as compared to those where there were no licensed conveyancers were
lower (Love et al., 1992) and were less likely to involve price discrimination
(Stephen et al., 1993). These results appear to support the conventional view
that monopoly rights will operate to the disadvantage of clients of lawyers. A
subsequent survey conducted in 1992 and covering the same locations as the
earlier surveys produced results less conducive to the traditional economic
view. Both the conveyancing fees of solicitors in markets where there were
licensed conveyancers and those of licensed conveyancers had risen between

1989 and 1992 by more than those in markets where there were no licensed
conveyancers; in addition licensed conveyancers’ feeing practices were more
like those of solicitors than before (Stephen, Love and Paterson, 1994). There
is the suggestion that the threat of entry is a more powerful restraint on
solicitors’ behaviour than actual entry. Stephen and Love (1996) have sought
to explain these results by the fact that licensed conveyancers produce a limited
range of services and therefore have the same interest as lawyer conveyancers
in maintaining high fees and also that the risks to licensed conveyancers are
greater than those of solicitors. These results should caution against the
assumption that multiple professional bodies will necessarily be to the benefit
of consumers. However, the limited effects of removing a monopoly in a
restricted field, as in this case, may not carry over to a more general removal
of monopoly rights.
C. Restrictions on Advertising
11. Professional Advertising and Competition
The second tool used by self-regulated professions has been the restriction or
total ban on advertising by members of the profession. This has often been
accompanied by restrictions on other aids to competition such as quoting of fees
in advance of carrying out the work and so on (Cox, 1989; Curran, 1993;
Domberger and Sherr, 1987, 1989; Evans and Trebilcock, 1982; Faure, 1993;
Federal Trade Commission, 1984; Finsinger, 1993; Helligman, 1993; Herrman,
1993; Ogus, 1993; Paterson and Stephen, 1990; Scottish Home and Health
Department, 1989; Shinnick, 1995; Stephen, 1994; Stephen and Love, 1996;
Stephen, Love and Paterson, 1994). During the recent deregulation wave,
restrictions on lawyer advertising have been relaxed to varying degrees in
different jurisdictions. These deregulatory moves have been prompted by court
decisions, consumer lobby pressure and activities of competition authorities.
Economic analysis of restrictions on advertising by professionals has been
carried out from an economics of information perspective based on the insights
of Stigler’s (1961) analysis. Stigler argued that producer advertising was
equivalent to a large amount of search by a large number of consumers.
Consequently it reduced price dispersions and enhanced competition. Writers
on the professions therefore argued that restrictions on advertising by
professions imposed by self-regulatory bodies were designed to reduce
competition by increasing the cost of consumer search (see for example,
Benham and Benham, 1975). Removal of such restrictions would enhance
competition and be in the interests of efficiency. In the 1960s and 1970s severe
restrictions on advertising by lawyers was quite widespread (see for example,

Federal Trade Commission, 1984; Cox, 1989; Monopolies and Mergers
Commission, 1976; and contributions to Faure et al., 1993). Such severe
restrictions still applied in Belgium and Germany until recently. (Faure, 1993;
Herrmann, 1993).
It is frequently asserted by critics of professional advertising that
advertising will drive down the quality of services provided. Economists have
examined the relationship between advertising and quality. Rogerson (1988)
shows formally that even if price can communicate no information directly
about quality, it can do so indirectly because price serves as a positive signal of
quality when price advertising is allowed. Price advertising is therefore welfare
enhancing because it improves consumer choice. A problem arises, however,
if price advertising is undertaken exclusively, or at least principally, by
low-price/low-quality suppliers. Price advertising therefore becomes an adverse
signal on quality. This is a general argument, and does not depend on price
being a clear signal on quality. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (1992) point out that
consumers who are unable to assess quality ex ante (and possibly even ex post)
and who observe a low price for a non-standardised service may assume that
more knowledgeable purchasers have assessed the service as being of low
quality. Professionals are keen to avoid such adverse signals on quality, and so
Rizzo and Zeckhauser conclude that price advertising will be uncommon in
most professions. Thus not only may advertising have an effect on quality,
perceptions of quality may have an effect on the form of advertising chosen by
professionals.
12. Empirical Studies of Lawyer Advertising
An extensive empirical literature has developed on the restriction of advertising

of professional services and what happens to fee levels when such restrictions
are relaxed. A review of this literature is presented in Love and Stephen (1996).
The general thrust of the evidence from this literature is that restrictions on
advertising increase the fees charged for the profession’s services and that the
more advertising there is the lower are fees. The one study contradicting this
result is Rizzo and Zeckhauser (1992). Love and Stephen (1996) note a number
of limitations to these studies.
The empirical studies of advertising by members of the legal profession find
that law firms which advertised charged, on the whole, lower fees than those
that did not advertise (Cox, DeSerpa and Canby, 1982; Federal Trade
Commission, 1984; Schroeter, Smith and Cox, 1987; Love et al., 1992;
Stephen, 1994). Domberger and Sherr (1987, 1989) found that conveyancing
fees in England and Wales had fallen since advertising and fee quoting had
been permitted. Schroeter, Smith and Cox (1987), Love et al. (1992) and
Stephen (1994) found that the more advertising by lawyers there was in a
locality the lower were the fees charge by all lawyers in the locality (at least for
certain transactions). Stephen et al. (1992) found that that price discrimination
by solicitors was lower the more advertising there was in a market. However,
Love et al. (1992) for England and Wales and Stephen (1994) for Scotland
found that this result was only valid for some forms of lawyer advertising. The
other studies did not distinguish between different forms of advertising.
The hypothesis that non-price advertising will be much more common than
price-advertising is supported by evidence from the legal profession in the UK
and in the USA. Stephen, Love and Paterson (1994) show that within two years
of advertising being permitted, the percentage of English solicitors’ firms
which had advertised within the six months prior to an extensive survey was
46 percent; but only 2 percent of firms had advertised the price of any service.
Six years later (in 1992), the proportion of advertising firms had risen to 59
percent, but price advertising was carried out by just 4 percent of firms. In
Scotland, Stephen (1994) estimates that within three years of being permitted
to do so, over half of Scottish solicitors’ firms engaged in advertising, but less
than 3 per cent advertised the price of any service. The Federal Trade
Commission (1984) study of attorney advertising found similar low levels of
price advertising across US states.
Empirical work on the quality of legal services in the presence of lawyer
advertising does not present such a clear-cut view as that on fees. Love and
Stephen (1996) point out that there are variations in how quality is measured
in these studies. Muris and McChesney (1979) find that high advertising legal
clinics provided better quality services than traditional legal firms for a sample
transaction. However, since advertising only enters their analysis indirectly it
is difficult to judge the implications for policy on advertising. Murdock and
White (1985) conclude that advertisers are more likely to be low quality firms.
Thomas (1985) argues that such a conclusion is not warranted by Murdock and
White’s evidence. Cox, Schroeter and Smith (1986) find that quality is lower
in those localities with greater lawyer advertising but find no statistically
significant differences in the quality of work produced by advertisers and
non-advertisers. Domberger and Sherr (1989) found that quality (measured by
time taken) rose as a consequence of liberalisation of rules on advertising and
competition in England and Wales.
D. Regulation of Fees
13. Scale Fees
The third weapon in the armoury of the self-regulating profession is the

regulation of fees. Traditionally fees have been subject to control by the
profession itself, by the courts or by the state through mandatory fee schedules.
In some jurisdictions these mandatory scales have been transformed into
recommendations. During the recent deregulation wave even these
recommendations have been swept away and replaced by the market. Most
self-regulatory bodies, however, have retained powers to punish those who
charge ‘excessively’ low fees for bringing the profession into disrepute. In
Germany fees are still determined by State regulation (Herrmann, 1993). In
Belgium and the Netherlands a recommended fee schedule is produced by the
profession and in Belgium there is a recommended minimum (Faure, 1993;
Helligman, 1993). A recommended scale is still produced by the solicitors’
professional body in Ireland for conveyancing work (Shinnick, 1995) and one
was in operation in Scotland until 1985 (Stephen and Love, 1996). The
corresponding schedule was withdrawn in England and Wales in 1974,
although Domberger and Sherr, 1992) argue that it still influenced feeing
practices until the mid-1980s.
Observers of professional self-regulation are highly critical of scale fees:
In general, we regard a collective obligation not to compete in price, or a restriction

collectively imposed which discourages such competition, as being one of the most
effective restraints on competition. The introduction of price competition in the
supply of a professional service where it is not at present permitted is likely to be
the most effective single stimulant to greater efficiency and to innovation and
variety of service and price that could be applied to that profession. (Monopolies
and Mergers Commission, 1970, p. 78, see also Arnauld, 1972; Arnauld and
Friedland, 1977, and Domberger and Sherr, 1989, 1992)
However, economists are generally sceptical about the ability of cartels to

avoid their members selling output at prices below those agreed by the cartel.
This practice has become known in the economics literature as ‘chiselling’ (see,
for example, Cohen and Cyert, 1965, pp. 245-246). As has been pointed out
many times (for example Stigler, 1966; Layard and Walters, 1978) the ability
of a cartel to enforce its rules is inversely related to the number of members.
Professional ‘cartels’ have many members.
Scale fees are often ‘recommended’ (Monopolies and Mergers Commission,
1970, pp. 21, 22; Arnauld, 1972, p. 498; Shinnick, 1995) rather than
mandatory or State-enforced charges. It is often argued that even where they

are ‘mere’ recommendations they have the effect of raising fees:
There appears to us to be little difference between so-called mandatory and

recommended scales in their practical effect ... although disciplinary action could
not be taken specifically for breach of a recommended scale, the fact that the fees
charged were not in accordance with the scale might in some circumstances be
quoted in support of a charge of breach of some other rule .... such that the
established practitioner would not depart more readily from a ‘recommended’ scale
than from a mandatory scale. (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1970, p. 22,
see also Arnauld, 1972, p. 498)
14. Empirical Studies of Fee Schedules
In contrast to the considerable empirical research on the role of advertising (as

discussed above) there would appear to have been little on the impact or
effectiveness of recommended fee scales. This is somewhat surprising given the
conflicting a priori positions taken by commentators on professional regulation
and the writers of general treatises on microeconomics.
Arnauld and Friedland (1977) examined the relationship between the
incomes of a sample of lawyers and (inter alia) the minimum fee recommended
(where there was one) for a simple transaction for a sample of lawyers in
California and Pennsylvania. They found that lawyer income rose as the
recommended fee rose. It should be noted that the dependent variable here is
lawyer income not the fee for the standard transaction. For this to imply that
fees also rose, demand for the standard transaction must be inelastic. Arnauld
and Friedland, however, argue that the influence of fee schedules on prices may
be even greater than they demonstrate because high prices may induce entry
which will moderate the effect on lawyer incomes. Strikingly, they also suggest
that there may be widespread cheating on the fee schedule.
There is some limited evidence that such ‘cheating’ on recommended fee
schedules for lawyers does exist. Stephen (1993) reports evidence from a
sample of solicitors’ conveyancing bills for 1984, when a scale of recommended
fees was in force, that more than 40 percent of these solicitors charged
conveyancing fees below that recommended by the Law Society of Scotland.
Furthermore, statistically significant geographical patterns were identified in
the determinants of these fees even although the fee schedule applied to all
Scottish solicitors. However, this evidence must be qualified by the fact that
large numbers of solicitors failed to co-operate in this study suggesting that the
data analysed may not be representative of all solicitors.
Stronger evidence of chiselling is presented in Shinnick (1995). This paper

examines the conveyancing fees of a large sample of Irish solicitors. At the time
at which the survey was carried out the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland,
the self-regulatory body for solicitors in Ireland, published a recommended
scale of fees for conveyancing which applied throughout the country.
Considerable variation from the recommended fee was found. Econometric tests
reject the hypothesis that a single fee is charged throughout Ireland, indicating
that this variation was not random.
The limited empirical evidence available suggests that the strong
conclusions on scale fees arrived at on the basis of a priori reasoning by
academic observers and competition authorities reported above may not have
empirical support.
E. Restrictions on Fee Contracts
15. Contingency Fees
In many jurisdictions lawyers’ fees are regulated by prohibiting certain forms

of fee contract between lawyer and client. In particular, lawyers may be
prohibited from entering into contingent-fee contracts with clients. Under such
contracts the lawyer’s fee is contingent on the outcome of the case. The most
common form of contingent fee contract is that used between lawyer and
plaintiff in many civil cases in the United States. If the case is lost the lawyer
receives no fee but if it is won the lawyer receives a percentage of the damage
award to the client. Such contingent-fee contracts are prohibited in many
European jurisdictions (see Faure, 1993; Helligman, 1993; Herrmann, 1993;
Rickman, 1994) but changes are taking place (see, for example, Gravelle and
Waterson, 1993; Rickman, 1994) and Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1998, on
the introduction of conditional fees with a speculative mark-up in England and
Wales).
Lynk (1990) has argued that contingency fees are an interesting issue for
two reasons: their economic characteristics and their public policy implications.
Their economic characteristics have been studied to examine whether they
encourage lawyers to invest more or fewer hours in a case; the incentive to
settle out of court; and various aspects of the principal agent problem between
client and lawyer. The public policy issues focus on whether contingent fees
increase the volume of litigation and whether they improve access to justice by
removing wealth barriers. Both sets of issues have featured in the literature. A
number of authors have used the insight from the agency literature that tying
the agent’s remuneration to the outcome is optimal to advocate the superiority
of contingency fees in increasing the lawyer’s effort (Danzon, 1983; Halpern
and Turnbull, 1981; Hay, 1996; Rickman, 1994; Schwartz and Mitchell, 1970).
The incentive properties of contingent-fee contracts and hourly contracts more

generally have been analyzed by many writers (Clermont and Currivan, 1973;
Dana and Spier, 1993; Danzon, 1983; Fisher, 1988; Gravelle and Waterson,
1993; Halpern and Turnbull, 1981; Hay, 1996; Kritzer et al., 1985; Lynk, 1990;
Miceli and Segerson, 1991; Rickman, 1994; Rubinfeld and Scotchmer, 1993;
Schwartz and Mitchell, 1970; Smith, 1992; Swanson, 1991; Thomason, 1991).
16. Settlement Conflicts
In many jurisdictions a fundamental argument put against contingency fees is

that they conflict with the principle that lawyers should not have an interest in
the cases which they handle (see for example, Rickman, 1994; Faure, 1993 and
Helligman, 1993). Such a situation can produce a conflict of interest between
client and lawyer over when to settle. In particular, whether the plaintiff in a
tort case should accept an out of court settlement rather than go to court. This
argument neglects the fact that such a conflict of interest can still exist under
the conventional hourly-fee system; it is simply that the lawyer’s private
interest is reversed. Under an hourly-fee system the lawyer earns more the
greater the number of hours put into the case. It will thus be attractive to the
lawyer to continue the case provided that the hourly rate is greater than the
opportunity cost of the lawyer’s effort, that is, if super-normal profits are being
made. Consequently, the lawyer has an interest in convincing the client to
continue the case, ceteris paribus, rather than settle (Johnson, 1981). The
opposite may be true under a contingency fee. Here the lawyer receives a
predetermined share of any damages awarded but bears all costs incurred on
behalf of the client. Thus when a pre-trial offer is made by the defendant to
settle out of court the interests of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s lawyer can
conflict (Gravelle and Waterson, 1993; Johnson, 1981; Miller, 1987; Rickman,
1994; Schwartz and Mitchell, 1970; Swanson, 1991; Watts, 1994). Indeed, the
higher the offer the more likely the interests of plaintiff and lawyer are to
conflict under a contingent-fee system (Gravelle and Waterson, 1993).
The foregoing analysis implicitly assumes that the client relies totally on the
lawyer’s decision over settlement and that the lawyer is motivated by pure
self-interest. Gravelle and Waterson (1993) allow for the variation of this
assumption by incorporating a parameter in their model which varies as the
client is better informed or as the lawyer is more altruistic. They find that the
more informed the client is (or the more altruistic the lawyer is) the less likely
a given offer will be accepted pre-trial under a contingency fee. Indeed, if the
lawyer is more altruistic than selfish the probability of pre-trial settlement will
be lower under a contingency fee than under an hourly fee. This result
emphasises the crucial importance of the asymmetric information issue in
determining the choice of fee contract. Well-informed clients are likely to

prefer an hourly rate. Furthermore, the more imbued with a client service ethic
lawyers are (the more altruistic) the more suitable is the hourly-fee contract to
the client’s interest. There is some limited empirical evidence supporting this
result in that Kritzer (1990) reports that for a sample of tort and contract cases
where the plaintiff was an organisation 81 percent of the fee contracts were on
an hourly basis whilst when the plaintiff was an individual 59 percent of the fee
contracts were on a contingency basis. It is to be expected that organisations are
more likely to be experienced litigants than individuals.
Returning to the more standard setting where the lawyer is assumed to be
self-interested, Gravelle and Waterson’s (1993) result is somewhat modified if
the context is changed slightly and bargaining introduced to the model
(Rickman, 1994; Swanson, 1991). Under these circumstances, it is argued that
with the contingency fee contract the lawyer has a greater incentive to bargain
hard. The lawyer’s behaviour may be affected in ways other than hours at a
given effort level. Consequently even a relatively selfish lawyer settling out of
court may improve the client’s award as against that attainable under an hourly
fee contract where the incentive to bargain hard is less.
17. Volume of Litigation
It is frequently argued by those supporting the ban on contingency fees in

European jurisdictions that permitting contingency fees will increase the
volume of litigation. The higher volume of litigation in the US where
contingency fees are permitted is often cited in support of this view. However
most of the economic modelling suggests the opposite conclusion (Clermont
and Currivan, 1973; Dana and Spier, 1993; Danzon, 1983; Halpern and
Turnbull, 1981; Miceli, 1994; Miceli and Segerson, 1991; Rubinfeld and
Scotchmer, 1993). Miceli (1994) examines the impact of contingent fees on the
pursuit of frivolous cases and finds no support for the view that contingent fees
will encourage frivolous suits. Gravelle and Waterson (1993) develop a model
in which both the probability of accident and the probability of settlement are
endogenous. Thus they extend the model beyond the decision to litigate or settle
given that an accident has occurred to one where the care taken by potential
tortfeasors is influenced by the nature of contracts between potential victims
and their lawyers and thus post-accident behavior. They find that the effect of
a switch from hourly fee to a contingency fee has an ambiguous effect on the
volume of litigation in this model and on welfare.
18. Access to Justice
A number of authors argue that a benefit of contingency fees is that risk averse
or wealth-constrained victims of torts who under an hourly fee contract may be
unwilling to pursue a claim will now do so because the risk is shifted to their
lawyer. Some predict a consequent increase in the volume of litigation under
contingency fees (Miceli and Segerson, 1991; Rubinfeld and Scotchmer, 1993)
but Dana and Spier (1993) suggest that to the extent that victims may be
overoptimistic about their chance of success contingency fees may actually
reduce the number of suits. Neither of these views takes account of the
deterrence (or otherwise) effects of a change from hourly to contingent
contracts as predicted by Gravelle and Waterson (1993). However, it would
seem that victims are likely to be better off one-way-or-another under
contingency fees even although the overall welfare effects may be ambiguous.
F. Restrictions on Organizational Form
19. Choice of Organizational Form
Thus far in this paper we have discussed the relationship between lawyer and
client abstracting from the organisational form through which lawyers provide
their services. We have focused on lawyer-client relations and relations between
the profession as a whole and others in society. In most jurisdictions lawyers
provide their services to the public through ‘firms’. However the nature and
form of these law firms is regulated in many jurisdictions. Lawyers are not free
in their choice of organizational form. Some organizational forms are
prohibited. In this section we evaluate the economic rationale for such
regulation of organizational form. We begin by considering the factors which
might influence a lawyer’s choice of organizational form.
Increases in firm size can be justified on a number of grounds. The most
general of these is that economies of scale can be captured the greater the
output of the firm. Every introductory textbook in economics lists sources of
economies of scale. Principal among these are those emanating from
specialization of labor and more efficient use of capital. The former of these
may apply to legal services but the latter is more doubtful, at least where it is
physical capital that is involved. The physical capital requirements of legal
services are quite small and are likely to involve limited economies of scale.
Legal services are essentially human (rather than physical) capital intensive.
Provision of legal services through group practice allows specialization of
lawyers in particular aspects of law, therefore, lowering the cost of providing
services. Practices of lawyers with different specialties have the further benefit
of risk spreading. Different specialties may face different business cycles and
thus fluctuations in specialist income may be smoothed across the group.
Furthermore, economies of scope may exist when a client has a range of legal
service needs which can be serviced by specialists within the firm or when a
legal problem has dimensions involving a range of specialties. Economies of
scope are available to the sole practitioner but in the multi-lawyer firm they are
combined with economies of specialization. The more complex the issues the
more likely that specialists will dominate because the benefits of economies of
specialization outweigh the economies of scope to the sole practitioner.
Economies of scope or benefits from risk sharing in the multi-lawyer specialist
firm will lead to multi-lawyer firms dominating. Similar arguments apply
where the specialists involved are outside the legal profession in what is often
referred to as multi-disciplinary practice (MDP). It has often been argued that
clients would benefit from economies of scope where a professional firm
included lawyers, accountants, surveyors and so on; so-called ‘one stop
shopping’. We do not discuss this issue further here but a general discussion of
the issue in a different context may be obtained from Smith and Hay (1997).
Thus far we have only considered production costs. We have not considered
agency costs which may arise from the asymmetry of information between
client and lawyer. The analysis here may be helped by using Quinn’s (1982)
distinction between the agency function and the service function discussed
earlier in this paper. Earlier we pointed to the moral hazard problem that arises
after a lawyer performs the agency function in diagnosing a client’s legal
problem and recommending a course of action. This arises because it is
assumed that the same lawyer will perform the consequent service function.
The agency cost increases when it is recognized that there are economies of
specialization. Many circumstances will arise under which the lawyer
performing the agency function is not the least cost supplier of the service
function required. This may be particularly so in the sole practitioner firm.
In a multi-lawyer firm it is, perhaps, more likely that there will be a
specialist within the firm who is the least-cost provider of the service function.
The probability of this being so may increase the more lawyers there are in the
firm. However, the fewer the number of partners and the more specialized the
service function required the more likely that the firm will not be the least-cost
supplier. This may even be the more so if the firm is an MDP. Nevertheless, it
is likely that the lawyer performing the agency function will pass the client to
a specialist within the firm: first, because the lawyer providing the agency
function will share in the income of the firm generated from the provision of
the specialized services; secondly, because recommending the client to another
firm may mean that the client’s future business will also be lost.
In many jurisdictions there are restrictions on the organisational forms

which can be adopted by providers of legal services. Traditionally these
restrictions appear to have been motivated by a desire to keep at arm’s length
commercial or profit considerations on the part of lawyers, reflecting the
agency problem which has been a central consideration throughout this paper.
Thus for many years lawyers in most jurisdictions could only operate as sole
practitioners or in partnerships with other lawyers and could not incorporate
(see Bishop, 1989; Faure, 1993; Helligman, 1993; Herrmann, 1993; Ogus,
1993; Prichard, 1982, and Quinn, 1982). Furthermore, in the UK and Ireland
providers of legal services are divided into two distinct professions with their
own professional bodies and self-regulatory functions: solicitors and barristers
(in Scotland known as advocates). Until 1990 in the UK only barristers
(advocates) could appear before the higher courts and they could only take
instructions from a solicitor and not directly from a client (see Bowles, 1994,
and Ogus, 1993). There is a limited economic literature which examines such
restrictions on organisational form. We first examine the issues surrounded the
divided profession before moving on to the issue of firm size and organisational
form.
20. A Divided Profession
In England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland (each of which is a

separate legal jurisdiction) as well as the Republic of Ireland and certain states
in Australia, what is elsewhere a single legal profession is split into two
branches: solicitors and barristers (in Scotland, advocates). Solicitors provide
legal advice to the public on the whole range of legal matters and have rights
of audience in the lower courts. Barristers have rights of audience in the higher
courts and provide consultancy services to solicitors. The rules governing each
of the professions prohibits its members from practising as members of the
other profession. Judges (as opposed to magistrates) are drawn almost
exclusively from the ranks of barristers (advocates) (Bishop, 1989; Bowles,
1994; Ogus, 1993; Shinnick, 1995). Although rights of audience in the higher
courts in Scotland and England and Wales have changed recently as a
consequence of legislation to allow solicitors who meet certain tests of
experience in advocacy in the lower courts to appear in the higher courts, there
has been no move to fuse the professions. From an economic perspective the
question is whether the division into two professions is efficiency enhancing or
is a mere restrictive practice.
It should be noted that specialisation in advocacy may exist within a fused
profession. Within law firms some practitioners may specialise in court
advocacy while others specialise in diagnosis and case management. Some
firms may specialise in advocacy, particularly in the criminal field. Outside the
criminal field in-house advocates may lack expertise in a particular area of law
in spite of having enhanced advocacy skills. The issue then becomes whether
or not any benefits from formally separating the roles outweigh the costs.
Bishop (1989) analyses the separation into two professions as a prohibition
on vertical integration between successive stages in a production process: the
preparation of a case and its prosecution through advocacy in the courts. He
argues along lines similar to those of Quinn (1982) that the conflict between the
agency function and the service function is particularly severe due to the large
benefits which accrue from specialisation in trial advocacy. The existence of a
cadre of specialist consultants and litigators (barristers/advocates) removes the
temptation to supply higher cost in-house advocacy. Not only this, it may
provide competition in the downstream market. Thus one benefit of a divided
profession is that the client gets higher quality advocacy than would be
available from an in-house advocate. However, this benefit is not costless.
Bishop argues that the cost will be the dead-weight loss to sophisticated buyers
of legal services who do not require the intermediation of a solicitor. An
additional cost might be the differential transaction costs associated with
employing both solicitor and barrister rather than two solicitors within the same
firm. This would be the case if economies of scope existed when the two legal
advisors were from the same firm/office. An evaluation of the division in the
profession cannot be resolved on these a priori arguments. It is a question of
the relative magnitudes of the costs and benefits. However, their empirical
measurement is fraught with difficulty.
Ogus (1993) clearly doubts that the balance lies in favour of division but
adduces additional points against division. If, he argues, division were efficient,
why is it that when fusion is not prohibited we invariably observe fusion.
Further, enforced division removes choice from informed consumers who might
prefer lower quality but cheaper in-house advocacy to high quality but high
price external advocacy. On the other hand Bishop points out that in some
Australian states where there is fusion there is de facto separation as some
specialist pleaders operate, in effect, as barristers.
Bishop (1989) also discusses external effects which have a bearing on the
division issue. The first of these is that the division into two specialist branches
allows more effective policing of lawyer misbehaviour (particularly in the case
of barristers) due to a ‘club’ effect. This reduction in dishonesty will benefit
future honest litigants because it will reduce the cost of achieving justice.
However the implication is that Bishop regards the division of the professions
as an expensive means of achieving this benefit. The division may also allow
the monitoring of the performance of the members of each profession by the
members of the other. A further external effect is public capital formation
through the production of high quality precedent. The existence of highly
specialised and qualified advocates should produce better argued cases and
more valuable precedent. Furthermore the recruitment of the judiciary from the
ranks of the best of these specialist advocates, not only ensures that those
recruited to the bench have proven their worth as trial lawyers but should
further ensure high quality precedents. A final external effect identified by
Bishop (1989) is a lowering of the cost of judicial administration. Here the
main beneficiary is not the client but the trial judge. Poor advocacy places a
burden on the trial judge to ensure that the decision reached is not influenced
by inadequate advocacy. With highly specialised and skilled advocates this
problem does not arise. Barristers also act as gatekeepers to the courts. They
ensure that cases are sifted and well-prepared before reaching the court thus
reducing the cost of adjudication. Similar external effects are adduced by
Arruñada (1996) in his examination of Spanish Notaries.
It is not easy to find empirical evidence to test propositions like those of
Bishop. He cites the former Chief Justice of the United States, Warren Burger,
in support of the higher quality of advocacy and the higher quality of the
judiciary in England as compared to the US. However, Bishop does not regard
this testimony as determinative. He then discusses at length the spontaneous
evolution of barrister-like specialists in Australian states where there is de jure
a fused profession. The final sources of evidence cited by Bishop are the
extensive use of English precedents throughout the common-law world and the
choice of London and English law to settle international legal issues. Both of
these might be seen as suggesting a higher quality of legal services resulting
from specialisation in the branches of the profession.
Notwithstanding the above arguments Bishop does concede that it will only
be where the stakes are high that the higher cost of specialisation may be worth
incurring implying that rights of audience in lower courts should not be
restricted to specialist advocates.
21. Sole Practitioners, Partnerships and Incorporation
A more common organizational restriction in many jurisdiction is that

providers of legal services must operate as independent providers or in
partnership with other qualified lawyers. Even where incorporation is permitted
restrictions are frequently imposed maintaining unlimited liability and that the
directors of the firm must all be lawyers (see Bishop, 1989; Faure, 1993;
Helligman, 1993; Herrmann, 1993; Ogus, 1993; Prichard, 1982, and Quinn,
1982). However, some US states permit incorporation under limited liability
(Carr and Mathewson, 1988).
Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) have argued that professional partnership
accompanied by unlimited liability is a solution to the moral hazard problem
posed by the asymmetry between client and professional. The willingness of one
professional to risk his or her wealth by entering into such a partnership with
another professional signals to clients the trustworthiness of members of the
partnership and provides a guarantee that there will be mutual monitoring

among partners. Stephen and Gillanders (1993) present evidence that little
mutual monitoring takes place within UK law firms and that ex ante screening
of prospective partners is likely to dominate ex post monitoring. The
persistence of sole practitioner firms in legal practice also seems to run counter
to this signalling function of partnership: around 50 percent of law firms in the
US are sole practitioners and around 40 percent of solicitors’ firms in England
and Wales. However, Carr and Mathewson (1990) point out that the proportion
of sole practitioner firms in the US has been declining for a number of years.
Carr and Mathewson (1990) model the choice of organisational form for
law firms in a competitive market subject to information asymmetries. They
conclude that ‘partnerships dominate solo lawyers when client cases are large
and the detection of chiselling is low’ (p. 328). They also point out that for
large corporations it may pay to have in-house counsel to monitor legal
services. However, they find that limited liability becomes attractive as it
reduces the cost of capital to partnerships. In Carr and Mathewson (1988) they
argue that the increased cost of capital when unlimited liability is small leads
to inefficiently small law firms where complex cases are involved. They find
empirical support for this conclusion from differences in law firm size across
US states being related to whether or not limited liability is available. Their
regressions support the view that law firm size rises where limited liability is
permitted. Gilson (1991) suggests that the relationship runs in the opposite
direction because of the tax advantages of incorporation: large firms derive a
greater tax advantage from incorporation. Carr and Mathewson (1991) respond
that their empirical results allow for a distinction between incorporation and
limited liability since not all corporate law firms enjoy limited liability.
G. Conclusion
22. Summing Up
This chapter has reviewed the extensive economic literature on the regulation
of the legal profession. The case for regulation has been seen to be based on the
moral hazard problem which arises from the information asymmetry between
the lawyer and the infrequent user of legal services. The justification for
self-regulation is seen to be based on reducing the costs of regulation.
Nevertheless, much of the literature on self-regulation sees it working in the
interests of the members of the profession by raising fees and professional
incomes.
A number of instruments through which self-regulation operates to restrict
competition were identified. Theoretical work by economists tends to point to
these working in the interests of the profession and against the interests of
clients. The empirical literature testing such predictions is limited but produces
mixed support for the theoretical predictions. For example, whilst there is some
support from aggregate data for the view that restrictions on entry to the legal
profession lead to higher incomes for lawyers, the microeconometric evidence
on the effect of restrictions on fees runs counter to theory. The evidence from
the removal of the conveyancing monopoly in England and Wales is at least
ambiguous. Similarly, the limited empirical evidence on recommended scale
fees for solicitors suggests significant deviations from these scales. The
evidence on the effects of restrictions on advertising tends to support the theory,
although it has been suggested that when different types of advertising are
considered the evidence is less unambiguous. On the issues of contingent fees
and restrictions on organisational form the empirical evidence is very limited.
This survey of the literature suggests a need for more empirical studies. The
theoretical literature, on the whole, suggests fairly strong recommendations to
policymakers regarding self-regulation. On the other hand, the limited
empirical evidence does not always support such strong theoretical predictions.
More evidence would clarify whether the conflict arises from the limitations of
the current evidence or from the theory.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge constructive comments made by three

referees and the editors on an earlier draft of this survey. We also benefited
from comments made when aspects of this work were presented at Universidad
de Valencia and the Lord Chancellor’s Department Economics Forum. The
usual disclaimer applies.
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5860

REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

In most jurisdictions one or more of the following is regulated in some manner:

a. the provision of advice about the law for financial reward;

Whilst ultimately governed by statute and subject to oversight by some

of reasoning, have made to the analysis of such regulatory regimes. We begin

A. Regulation of Professions, Capture and Cartels

Economists, traditionally, have been highly critical of many aspects of

the members of the profession. It legitimises or enforces their cartel-like

3. Market Failure and Information Asymmetry

An older, though nowadays less fashionable, view of regulation is that it arises

Dingwall and Fenn (1987) consider a number of possible responses to the

6. Deregulation of Professional Service Markets

8. Entry to the Profession

9. Empirical Studies of Entry to the Profession

10. Professional ‘Monopoly Rights’

The preceding paragraphs have focused on controls on entry to the legal

licensed conveyancers and those of licensed conveyancers had risen between

11. Professional Advertising and Competition

restrictions on advertising by lawyers was quite widespread (see for example,

12. Empirical Studies of Lawyer Advertising

An extensive empirical literature has developed on the restriction of advertising

13. Scale Fees

The third weapon in the armoury of the self-regulating profession is the

In general, we regard a collective obligation not to compete in price, or a restriction

However, economists are generally sceptical about the ability of cartels to

mandatory or State-enforced charges. It is often argued that even where they

There appears to us to be little difference between so-called mandatory and

14. Empirical Studies of Fee Schedules

In contrast to the considerable empirical research on the role of advertising (as

Stronger evidence of chiselling is presented in Shinnick (1995). This paper

E. Restrictions on Fee Contracts

15. Contingency Fees

In many jurisdictions lawyers’ fees are regulated by prohibiting certain forms

The incentive properties of contingent-fee contracts and hourly contracts more

16. Settlement Conflicts

In many jurisdictions a fundamental argument put against contingency fees is

determining the choice of fee contract. Well-informed clients are likely to

17. Volume of Litigation

It is frequently argued by those supporting the ban on contingency fees in

18. Access to Justice

F. Restrictions on Organizational Form

19. Choice of Organizational Form

In many jurisdictions there are restrictions on the organisational forms

20. A Divided Profession

In England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland (each of which is a

21. Sole Practitioners, Partnerships and Incorporation

A more common organizational restriction in many jurisdiction is that

partnership and provides a guarantee that there will be mutual monitoring

The authors would like to acknowledge constructive comments made by three

Bibliography on Regulation of the Legal Profession (5860)

Settlement Incentives’, 90 Michigan Law Review, 2154-2189.

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