Unequal Justice

1969
VOLUME 121 JUNE 2008 NUMBER 8

2008 by The Harvard Law Review Association

ARTICLE
UNEQUAL JUSTICE
William J. Stuntz
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................................1970
I. EQUALITY AND LOCAL POLITICS..................................................................................1975
A. Laws Limits, Bureaucracys Bias .................................................................................1975
B. Criminal Justice in the Gilded Age ..............................................................................1982
1. The South...................................................................................................................1983
2. Northern Cities ..........................................................................................................1986
II. THE RISE OF INEQUALITY..............................................................................................1997
A. Local Democracys Decline ............................................................................................1997
B. Lenity and Severity ........................................................................................................2010
C. Violence and Drugs.........................................................................................................2019
D. Federalism........................................................................................................................2025
III. EQUALIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE ..................................................................................2031
A. Police Funding................................................................................................................2032
B. Jury Trials ........................................................................................................................2034
C. Vague Substantive Law ..................................................................................................2036
IV. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................2040

1970
UNEQUAL JUSTICE
William J. Stuntz

Inequality is a core feature of American criminal justice, but its causes remain obscure.
Official racism has declined even as the black share of the prison population has risen.
The generation that saw the rise of enormous, racially skewed punishment for drug crime
followed the generation that saw the rise of civil rights for black Americans and racially
integrated police forces. What explains these trends? One answer the decline of local
democracy has received too little attention in the growing literature on this subject.
A century ago outside the South, high-crime city neighborhoods were largely self-
governing; residents of those neighborhoods decided how much criminal punishment to
impose, and on whom. Those locally democratic justice systems were both remarkably
effective and surprisingly egalitarian. During the latter half of the twentieth century,
local democratic control over criminal justice unraveled. Residents of high-crime cities
grew less powerful; suburban voters, legislators, and appellate judges grew more so.
Prison populations fell sharply, then rose massively. The effects of both the fall of
criminal punishment and its subsequent rise were disproportionately felt in urban black
neighborhoods. The justice system grew less equal, and less just.
Parts I and II of the Article explore these trends. Part III turns to the future, and asks
what steps might be taken to reverse them. I suggest three changes: better-funded local
police forces, more trials to locally selected juries, and more vaguely defined crimes (to
give those juries opportunities to exercise judgment). Those changes would make urban
criminal justice more democratic, more lenient and more egalitarian.
INTRODUCTION
merican criminal justice is rife with inequality. African Ameri-
cans constitute 13% of the general population,
1
but nearly half of
a record-high prison population.
2
The imprisonment rate for Latino

Henry J. Friendly Professor, Harvard Law School. I thank Dan Epps, Mike Klarman,
Adriaan Lanni, Dan Richman, David Sklansky, Carol Steiker, Jim Whitman, and participants in
the Harvard Criminal Justice Colloquium for exceptionally helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Jessee Alexander-Hoeppner, Josh Goodbaum, Saritha K. Tice, Tara Ramchandani, and Andy
Stuntz provided excellent research assistance. Remaining errors are my responsibility.

1
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 14 tbl.13 (2007) (showing total population of 296,410,000 and a
black population of 37,909,000). The 2007 Statistical Abstract is available online at http://www.
census.gov/compendia/statab/2007/2007edition.html (last visited May 12, 2008); previous editions
are available online at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html (last visited May
12, 2008). Henceforth, annual volumes of the Abstract will be cited as [year] STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT.

2
See Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1233, 1255 tbl.3 (2005). On the prison populations size, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS:
ONLINE, tbl.6.28.2006 (showing prison population of 1.5 million in 2005, more than seven times
the figure in 1970), available online at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook (last visited May 12,

A

2008] UNEQUAL JUSTICE 1971

males is almost triple the rate for white males; black men are locked
up at nearly seven times the rate of their white counterparts.
3
The dif-
ferentials in drug punishment are even larger: of every 100,000 black
Americans, 359 are imprisoned on drug charges; the analogous figure
for whites is 28.
4
Drug offenders are far more equally distributed:
9.7% of Americas black population uses illegal drugs; the analogous
figure for whites is 8.1%.
5

Those data suggest a justice system hard-wired for punitive racism.
The truth is more complex. A mere thirty-five years ago, imprison-
ment rates across the Northeast and Midwest were comparable to or
below those in Scandinavian countries today;
6
the number of African
American prisoners was one-eighth todays figure.
7
Even now, the po-
lice clear more violent crimes in small cities than in large ones, more
in suburbs than in small cities, and more in small towns and rural ar-
eas than in suburbs.
8
In other words, the justice system solves (and
hence punishes) violent crimes most often in places with the fewest
poor people and black people.
9
One-third of violent felony defendants

2008). The online version of the Sourcebook will henceforth be cited as ONLINE SOURCEBOOK;
the Sourcebooks annual volumes will be cited as [year] SOURCEBOOK.

3
ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.33.2005.

4
Among Latinos, the drug imprisonment rate is 127 per 100,000. The figures on drug prison-
ers by race appear in ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.0001.2003. The general popu-
lation figures used to calculate rates appear in 20042005 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1,
at 14 tbl.13.

5
OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS
FROM THE 2005 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: NATIONAL FINDINGS 22
(2006), available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k5nsduh/2k5results.pdf.

6
In 2001, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden imprisoned 58, 58, and 69 inmates per 100,000
population, respectively. GORDON BARCLAY & CYNTHIA TAVARES, INTERNATIONAL COM-
PARISONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2001, at 7 tbl.B (2003), available at http://
www.csdp.org/research/hosb1203.pdf. In 1972, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York imprisoned
50, 32, and 64 inmates per 100,000 population, respectively. 1975 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at
642 tbl.6.17.

7
In 2005, the number of black prisoners was just over 631,000. See ONLINE SOURCE-
BOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.33.2005; 2007 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.13. In
1970, that number was fewer than 82,000. See MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN, HISTORICAL
CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 18501984, at 65 tbl.3-31 (1986); 1972
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 16 tbl.15.

8
The data appear in FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, tbl.25 (2005). From 1995 forward, annual volumes of
Crime in the United States are available online at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm#cius. Earlier
volumes in the series, which dates to the 1930s, are titled UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS. Hence-
forth, volumes in this series will be cited as CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: [year] or UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORTS: [year], depending on which title is used for the relevant volume.

9
As of 2002, 51.5% of Americas black population lived in central cities, while 36% lived in
metropolitan areas outside central cities, and a mere 12.5% lived outside metropolitan areas.
Among non-Hispanic whites, the comparable figures were 21%, 57%, and 22%. JESSE
MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, THE BLACK POPULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 2002, at 2 fig.2 (2003). On the link between race and concen-
trated poverty, see ALEMAYEHU BISHAW, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE,

1972 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1969

in the seventy-five most populous counties nearly half of whom are
black and the large majority of whom are poor
10
have the charges
against them dismissed.
11
A mere 8% of federal fraud defendants, a
group that is much wealthier and whiter,
12
achieve the same result.
13

In all categories of criminal cases, indigent defendants are more likely
to win dismissals than defendants who hire their own lawyers.
14

These are not the hallmarks of an adjudicative system bent on locking
up young men in poor black neighborhoods.
What accounts for this strange set of patterns? Official racism
15
is
an unlikely explanation for a massive rise in black punishment that
took hold in the generation after the civil rights movement. The rise
of populist politics
16
appears not to fit the relevant trends: populism
and the politics of crime were as potent a mix in George Wallaces day
as in our own but the prison populations in Wallaces Alabama and
in Ronald Reagans California were low and falling, not high and ris-
ing.
17
The culture of control and governing through crime, David

AREAS WITH CONCENTRATED POVERTY: 1999, at 8 fig.4 (2005). For evidence that race, but
not poverty, is a strong negative predictor of clearance rates, see Janice L. Puckett & Richard J.
Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate Analysis of a More Complete
Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171 (2003).

10
Among defendants charged with violent felonies in large metropolitan counties, 44% are
black, and only 28% are white. ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.5.52.2002. 83% of
those defendants are poor enough to qualify for court-appointed counsel. CAROLINE WOLF
HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 5
tbl.7 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.

11

12
Not only in the collar: 65% of federal fraud defendants are white; fewer than 30% are black.
Id. tbl.5.18.2003. 43% of such defendants pay for their own lawyers, well over twice the rate for
defendants charged with violent felonies. HARLOW, supra note 10, at 3 tbl.3.

13

14
HARLOW, supra note 10, at 6 tbl.10. In nearly all categories of cases, defendants with
court-appointed counsel receive shorter prison sentences. Id. at 9 tbl.18.

15
For the classic account of racism as the cause of Americas punitive turn, see MARC
MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999). Cf. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADIC-
TIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 89118 (2003) (noting that jurisdictions with a
history of lynching carry out executions at much higher rates than other jurisdictions).

16
On the connection between massive, discriminatory punishment and the rise of the populist
politics of crime, see SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DE-
MOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOURE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001) [hereinafter ZIMRING
ET AL., THREE STRIKES].

17
In 1962, the year Wallace was first elected Governor of Alabama, that states imprisonment
rate was 166 per 100,000. See 1964 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 11 tbl.8, 159
tbl.216. Fourteen years later, the states imprisonment rate had fallen to 83; Wallace and his wife
Lurleen governed the state for eleven of those fourteen years. 1991 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2,
at 637 tbl.6.72. Californias imprisonment rate stood at 146 in 1966, the year before Reagans
governorship began. See 1968 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 12 tbl.11, 159 tbl.237.
That figure fell to 84 in 1972. 1991 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 637 tbl.6.72. By comparison,
in 2005, Alabamas and Californias imprisonment rates and the rate for the nation as a whole
stood at 591, 466, and 491, respectively. ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.29.2006.


Garlands and Jonathan Simons apt labels for the growing use of
criminal punishment to manage the nations poor,
18
capture the char-
acter of contemporary drug enforcement but not the enforcement of
laws against criminal violence or white-collar crime:
19
in those areas,
rich suspects do badly and poor ones do surprisingly well.
Another explanation does better: inequality of all these varying
sorts arose, in large measure, because of the decline of local democratic
control over criminal justice outcomes. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, when local politics governed the amount and
distribution of criminal punishment, the justice system was stable, rea-
sonably lenient, and surprisingly egalitarian. Prison populations were
much smaller than todays, and varied little across place and time.
Outside the South, the groups most likely to be the targets of discrimi-
natory punishment blacks, women, and poor immigrants
achieved results as favorable as native-born white men, or nearly so.
No legal rules commanded those results; rather, political equilibrium
produced them. In the twentieth centurys second half, that equilib-
rium unraveled. Suburban populations mushroomed, diluting poor
city neighborhoods electoral power; big-city police forces grew more
professionalized, hence more detached from the streets they patrol.
Crime became a live issue in state and national elections, shifting po-
litical power from high-crime cities to the safer suburbs and country-
side. The constitutional law of criminal procedure expanded dramati-
cally, shifting legal authority from locally elected trial judges to state
and federal appellate courts.
As local control faded, variation of all kinds across place, time,
and demographic category exploded. In the 1950s, 1960s, and early
1970s, Northern prison populations fell sharply, in the midst of an un-
precedented crime wave. The balance of the twentieth century saw an
unprecedented punishment wave, while urban crime remained stub-
bornly high.
20
Both the lenient turn of the centurys third quarter and
the punitive turn of its last quarter struck high-crime cities, and black
neighborhoods within those cities, especially hard. So did the rise of
massive, racially disparate drug enforcement. And so did the under-

18
See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME:
HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A
CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).

19
Jim Whitmans theory explains not only the punitive turn in general, but the harsh charac-
ter of the law of white-collar crime as well. According to Whitman, American-style harsh jus-
tice flows from a decision to level down rather than level up to treat high-status criminals like
low-status ones, instead of the other way around as in Europe. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN,
HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMER-
ICA AND EUROPE (2003) [hereinafter WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE].

20
See infra p. 2011 (Table 5).


punishment of urban violence, as police and prosecutors substituted
cheap drug cases for more expensive violent crime cases.
21
These var-
ied trends are linked: all flow, in large measure, from the decline of lo-
cally self-governing justice systems in high-crime cities.
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means would have understood the con-
nection. Seventy-five years ago, Berle and Means made famous the
separation of ownership from control in the world of business corpora-
tions.
22
Thanks in part to their book, reducing the agency cost that
inheres in control by non-owner managers and ownership by non-
controlling shareholders is corporate laws primary goal. Contempo-
rary American criminal justice faces the same governance problem,
but in worse form. After all, managers have good reason to see that
the corporations they run remain profitable: their jobs depend on it.
The detached managers of urban criminal justice systems are in a dif-
ferent position. To the suburban voters, state legislators, and state and
federal appellate judges whose decisions shape policing and punish-
ment on city streets, criminal justice policies are mostly political sym-
bols or legal abstractions, not questions the answers to which define
neighborhood life. Decisionmakers who neither reap the benefit of
good decisions nor bear the cost of bad ones tend to make bad ones.
Those sad propositions explain much of the inequality in American
criminal justice.
How are the relevant trends to be reversed? The core principle is
the same as in the law of corporations: reduce agency cost; place more
power in the hands of residents of high-crime city neighborhoods
for they feel the effects of rising and falling rates of crime and punish-
ment, just as shareholders feel the effects of rising and falling corpo-
rate profits. Make criminal justice more locally democratic, and jus-
tice will be both more moderate and more egalitarian. Three moves
are key, and all can be accomplished without radical change in the
structure of the system or the legal doctrines that govern it: put more
police officers on city streets, try more criminal cases to locally selected
juries, and define criminal prohibitions more vaguely so jurors can
exercise judgment instead of rubber-stamping prosecutors charging
decisions. The federal government can and should advance those
goals by changing the character of the federal contribution to state and
local law enforcement: less federal law, more federal budget dollars.
The balance of the Article is organized as follows. Part I explains
the link between criminal justice equality and local politics, both in the
abstract and historically. Part II traces the late-twentieth-century col-

21
See infra section II.C, pp. 201925.

22
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).


lapse of the egalitarian justice system that once governed Northern cit-
ies. Part III turns to the future, exploring some means by which a
measure of equality in this crucial sphere of governance might be re-
covered. Part IV concludes.
I. EQUALITY AND LOCAL POLITICS
Localism and democratic politics seem antithetical to egalitarian
criminal justice. Localism means difference and variation: tough en-
forcement here and lax enforcement there, moralist legal doctrine in
one place and libertarian rules in another. A criminal justice system
under the thumb of voters and politicians is a system prone to act on
majoritarian prejudices. Taken together, local control of criminal jus-
tice institutions and political control of those institutions would appear
to maximize discrimination, not equality.
History suggests the opposite conclusion: when Americas criminal
justice system was more localized than it is today, the variation in im-
prisonment rates was much smaller than it is today. So was the degree
of change over time, and so were racial disparities in criminal punish-
ment (based on the limited data available). Outside the South, the
Gilded Age the era of Lochner
23
and laissez-faire saw the rise of
the most egalitarian criminal justice in American history. That more
egalitarian justice system was both more localized and more democ-
ratic than our own. Local power over criminal punishment was exer-
cised by local jurors, by locally elected government officials, and by
voters from the neighborhoods where crime and punishment alike
were concentrated. In our time, centralized democratic power seems
associated with discrimination and severity.
24
In the past, local de-
mocratic control of criminal justice appears to have produced equality
and lenity.
This Part seeks to explain those surprising truths. I begin with a
brief discussion of the limits of the two alternatives to politics as a
means of guaranteeing criminal justice equality: legal doctrine and bu-
reaucracy. Next comes a discussion of Lochner-era criminal justice: an
age of brutal discrimination in the South, but one that produced a sur-
prisingly large measure of egalitarianism in Northern cities.
A. Laws Limits, Bureaucracys Bias
In order to identify and combat inequality, one must first know
what the term means. My definition is conventional: an egalitarian

23
The reference, of course, is to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

24
The leading scholarship on Americas punitive turn has emphasized the role of democratic
politics in producing it. See sources cited supra notes 16, 1819. Centralization has not played a
large role in that story: an important gap in the literature.


justice system treats morally like cases alike.
25
Because race does not
alter offenders moral desert, black drug dealers should be as likely as
white ones to be arrested and prosecuted, and should receive the same
punishments when convicted. Because wealth creates no moral enti-
tlement to the laws protection, crimes that victimize the poor should
trigger arrest and punishment at the same rate as crimes that victimize
the rich. The Fourteenth Amendment, with its promise of the equal
protection of the laws,
26
seems to guarantee as much yet the justice
system does not fulfill the Constitutions promise. Why not? Why
have courts and legal doctrine proved unable to provide even a modest
measure of criminal justice equality? There are two answers. First,
judges lack the information needed to identify race- and class-based
inequalities when they happen. Second, judges lack the remedial tools
to rectify those inequalities.
The key missing information concerns missing cases: the many
crimes that do not yield arrests, prosecutions, and convictions. In or-
der to redress the massive discrimination that appears to afflict drug
enforcement, judges need to know about the black and (especially)
white drug dealers who have escaped arrest. That information does
not exist. The data noted in this Articles first paragraph illustrate the
point: we know, at least roughly, the number of black and white drug
users, but no one knows the numbers and locations of black and white
drug dealers and it is dealers, not users, who swell the nations
prison population. The problem extends beyond drug cases: demo-
graphic information about criminals who commit uncharged crimes of
all kinds is sparse, and it is hard to see how any legal system could
make it otherwise.
Hard as inequality is to identify and prove, remedying it through
litigation seems harder still. If a large corporation hires too many
white job applicants and too few blacks, a court can order the hiring
of more applicants from the victimized group. At worst, a few people
who deserve to keep their jobs will lose them (and likely find equiva-
lent work elsewhere), while a few qualified-but-not-stellar applicants
will get jobs that others might have done slightly better. Error costs
are low. Remedying unequal criminal punishment is far more disrup-
tive. Imagine a judicial holding that a given states drug punishment

25
There are nearly as many moral theories of equality as there are moral theories. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS RAE, EQUALITIES 133 (1981) (finding more than one hundred definitions). As Peter
Westen has explained, however, these different theories are merely substantive variations on the
common, formal principle that likes should be treated alike. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539 n.8 (1982); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Substance of
Equality, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1350, 135864 (1991) (reviewing PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF
EQUALITY (1990)) (explaining the relationship between that principle and substantive equality).

26
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 1.


practices violate the Equal Protection Clause. What happens next?
Courts might order police to arrest and prosecutors to charge more
white drug suspects but which ones? What should officials say to
the crime victims whose crimes are never investigated because the po-
lice were busy rounding up drug suspects whom residents of the rele-
vant communities do not want to punish? Prosecutors might not try
hard to win convictions in cases they preferred not to bring in the first
place. What happens if the additional white defendants win their
cases? Such questions have no good answers.
The logical alternative is to spare members of the victimized group.
But how many, and which ones, and what is to be the mechanism by
which they are selected? Those questions likewise have no good an-
swers. The criminal justice system is not designed to identify marginal
convictions that can be overturned at little cost if the need arises.
Even were it otherwise, judges might reasonably fear the consequences
of freeing large numbers of drug prisoners from neighborhoods where
street-level drug trafficking causes the most damage.
27
And discrimi-
natory drug enforcement is an easy matter compared to discriminatory
enforcement of violent felonies and felony thefts: imagine the political
consequences of a judicial order freeing a large bloc of burglars or ar-
sonists, car thieves or rapists.
Perhaps because defining and enforcing criminal justice equality
seems so difficult, courts have been quick to embrace legal substitutes.
Vagueness doctrine requires reasonably specific crime definition,
28

which is supposed to reduce inequality by reducing the range of en-
forcement discretion.
29
The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,
plus the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause, oblige police
officers, prosecutors, and trial judges to follow procedures designed to
protect criminal suspects and defendants against abuse and exploita-
tion. Those procedures apply to all, regardless of skin color and social
class. But their raison dtre is the prevention of class and race dis-
crimination the protection of suspects and defendants who lack the

27
A comprehensive remedy for discriminatory drug enforcement would probably require the
widespread dismissal of drug charges in poor black neighborhoods, given the high concentrations
of poor blacks among drug defendants. See ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.5.52.2002
(showing a three-to-two ratio of black to white drug defendants in metropolitan counties); id.
tbl.6.0001.2003 (showing a two-to-one ratio of black to white drug prisoners in state penitentia-
ries); HARLOW, supra note 10, at 5 tbl.7 (84% of drug defendants in metropolitan counties are
poor enough to receive state-paid counsel).

28
Sufficiently specific to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to under-
stand what conduct [the law] prohibits. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (plu-
rality opinion).

29
For the best explanation of the link between specificity and discrimination, see John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 214
18 (1985).


political and financial power to protect themselves.
30
Both vagueness
doctrine and the law of constitutional criminal procedure amount to
equal protection doctrine in disguise.
Unfortunately, these ersatz equality rules work no better than di-
rect legal mandates. Legislators can define broad crimes as specifically
as narrow ones,
31
and thereby create as much enforcement discretion
as they wish without violating the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Pro-
tective procedures make criminal trials more expensive; more expen-
sive trials make guilty pleas more valuable to prosecutors and also
to poor defendants, whose lawyers cannot afford to take many cases to
trial.
32
The consequence is more plea bargaining, and hence (again)
more discretionary power for prosecutors. That does not advance the
cause of equal justice. Laws fundamental problems in this area the
absence of good data on crimes never prosecuted, the judiciarys lim-
ited array of remedial tools are not susceptible to doctrinal fixes.
If the law cannot command criminal justice equality, perhaps a
centralized bureaucracy can do so. Well-run government agencies, one
might suppose, are good at handling large numbers of cases without
generating disparities like those Americas dysfunctional justice system
creates. Most Western justice systems are run by apolitical national or
provincial bureaucracies,
33
and those countries do not have massive,
racially skewed prison populations.
34
Perhaps institutional design and
criminal justice outcomes are linked. It might be so: but it is worth
noting that those justice systems did not face the combination of
American-style crime rates and serious racial or ethnic divisions before

30
On the link between Warren-era criminal procedure doctrine and class discrimination, see
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 37986, 44546 (2000);
and Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1, 6266 (1996). On the relationship between that doctrines origins and race discrimination,
see Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48
(2000) [hereinafter Klarman, Racial Origins].

31
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
55961 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics].

32
On the docket pressure faced by court-appointed counsel, see STANDING COMM. ON LE-
GAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASSN, GIDEONS BROKEN PROMISE: AMER-
ICAS CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 1011, 16, 1718 (2004), available at http://
www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf; Mary Sue Backus &
Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J.
1031, 103436, 105359 (2006); and Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address
Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 173435 (2005).

33
See Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, 36 CRIME & JUST. 1, 3536 (2007); see
also WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 1315, 199202 (linking strength of state bu-
reaucracies with lenity of criminal justice outcomes).

34
Some European prison populations may be racially skewed, but they cannot fairly be called
massive. Across the E.U., the average imprisonment rate in 2001 stood at 87 per 100,000. BAR-
CLAY & TAVARES, supra note 6, at 7 tbl.B. In the same year, the imprisonment rate in the United
States stood at 470. ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.28.2006.


the last generations wave of North African and Middle Eastern immi-
gration.
35
A generation hence, Europes centralized criminal justice
bureaucracies might appear as discriminatory as the political agencies
that run Americas system.
To see why that depressing conclusion is plausible, it helps to com-
pare two kinds of centralized power: political and bureaucratic. Na-
tional politicians controlling criminal law enforcement face two obvi-
ous discriminatory temptations. They might use their power to
overpunish minorities, because doing so is popular with the majority
of voters. Or, they might devote too much time and energy to a small
number of politically salient criminals like O.J. Simpson or Kenneth
Lay, and pay too little attention to low-salience crimes against poor or
minority victims. These two tendencies, toward racism and populism,
are precisely the ones that the literature on the politics of crime identi-
fies as the sources of discriminatory criminal justice.
36

Centralized, apolitical bureaucrats probably are less prone to those
two forms of discrimination. But the bureaucrats face another tempta-
tion: to skew enforcement in favor of the rich say, by ignoring rich
criminals offenses, or by policing wealthy neighborhoods more care-
fully than poor ones. As generations of political scientists have taught,
regulatory capture is common in the realm of bureaucratic governance:
when well-funded groups have important interests at stake, they often
find it easy to convince allegedly impartial bureaucracies to serve the
groups selfish ends.
37
That insight is rarely applied to crime and
criminal justice, but it applies as readily to those fields as, say, to envi-
ronmental regulation. Despite criminal laws banning the employment
of illegal immigrants, a host of businesses continue to rely on off-the-
books immigrant labor; prosecution for such behavior is rare.
38
De-

35
Several of the essays in ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION: COMPARATIVE AND
CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Michael Tonry ed., 1997) [hereinafter ETHNICITY, CRIME,
AND IMMIGRATION], play this theme. See Hans-Jrg Albrecht, Ethnic Minorities, Crime, and
Criminal Justice in Germany, in ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION, supra, at 31; Josine
Junger-Tas, Ethnic Minorities and Criminal Justice in the Netherlands, in ETHNICITY, CRIME,
AND IMMIGRATION, supra, at 257; Martin Killias, Immigrants, Crime, and Criminal Justice in
Switzerland, in ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION, supra, at 375; Peter L. Martens, Im-
migrants, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Sweden, in ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION,
supra, at 183; see also SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES (Michael
Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001).

36
See sources cited supra notes 1516, 18.

37
See, e.g., Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990); Richard A. Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974).

38
See Spencer S. Hsu & Kari Lydersen, Illegal Hiring is Rarely Penalized, WASH. POST, June
19, 2006, at A1. For a summary of the available enforcement data, see Michael J. Wishnie, Pro-
hibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LE-
GAL F. 193, 20911.


spite draconian money laundering statutes, the bureaucratized federal
justice system almost never prosecutes bankers or those who operate
other apparently legitimate businesses.
39
These enforcement patterns
are classic examples of capture: the industries that benefit the most
from cheap immigrant labor have more clout than the mass of ordi-
nary citizens who wish to see immigration laws enforced, just as banks
have more influence than voters who want to see drug financing net-
works destroyed. Were the justice system centrally controlled by apo-
litical agencies like the FBI,
40
such examples would likely multiply.
Likewise, bureaucrats tend to minimize effort, and maximize lei-
sure. Drug cases in poor city neighborhoods are cheap for police and
prosecutors; investigating and prosecuting drug crime in well-off sub-
urbs is a good deal more expensive.
41
Were Americas justice system
more bureaucratized, the disparities in drug enforcement might grow,
not shrink.
Of course, Americas justice system already is bureaucratized, but
the most important bureaucracies police forces and district attor-
neys offices are governed by local politics and politicians. That
sounds like bad news if ones goal is a more egalitarian justice system.
After all, for much of American history, the exaltation of local elector-
ates was the creed of racists. Federal law Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,
42
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
43
the Voting Rights Act of
1965
44
drove the legal movement for civil rights. State and local
power were key sources of resistance to that movement. Surely local
politics is the last place to look for egalitarian law enforcement.
Yet local politics and politicians have two crucial advantages in
this area. First, poor blacks are a larger fraction of urban electorates
than of state or national voting populations.
45
Residents of poor, high-

39
That is the central claim of Mariano-Florentino Cullar, The Tenuous Relationship Between
the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 311 (2003). As Cullar notes, the money laundering statutes are often used to
prosecute drug dealers, see, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Rodrguez, 318 F.3d 268 (1st Cir. 2003),
and sometimes used to ratchet up the punishment of ordinary frauds, see, e.g., United States v.
Trost, 152 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Reynolds, 64 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 1995). Re-
cently, those statutes have been used to attack terrorism, with little success. See David Zaring &
Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359, 140918 (2007). Rarely
are money laundering statutes used for their intended purpose.

40
On the FBIs insulation from political oversight, see Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal
Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 79396
(1999).

41
See William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 128187 (1999) [hereinafter Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy].

42
347 U.S. 483 (1954).

43
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42
U.S.C.).

44
Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

45
See sources cited supra note 9.


crime neighborhoods should find it easy to join the governing coali-
tions of their cities; wielding influence in state legislative hallways or
on Capitol Hill is bound to be harder.
46
This point is especially impor-
tant given the demographics of poverty in the United States. Gener-
ally speaking, the white poor are dispersed, not concentrated. Outside
the South, the black poor are concentrated, not dispersed, and the
largest concentrations are in cities.
47
Giving cities less power over
criminal justice, and giving state and national governments more,
means shifting power from urban blacks to suburban whites: hardly a
recipe for egalitarian criminal justice.
The second advantage does not depend on the demographics of
poverty or race; it applies as much to rich white suburbs as to poor
black neighborhoods in large cities. With respect to crime and crimi-
nal punishment, residents of all neighborhoods have two warring in-
centives. On the one hand, they want safe streets on which to walk
and drive and go about their business; they want to travel to parks
and sporting events and grocery stores without fearing for their lives
and property. On the other hand, they are loath to incarcerate their
sons and brothers, neighbors and friends. The desire for order and the
longing for freedom, anger at crime and empathy for the young men
whom police officers arrest and prosecutors charge both forces are
powerful, and they push in opposite directions. Anyone who has been
the victim of a serious crime knows the desire to see perpetrators pun-
ished that seems to be part of our nature.
48
At the same time, all those
who have seen neighbors sons, or their own, behind bars know the

46
A decade ago, Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares noted this fact and its implications for the
portions of constitutional criminal procedure that regulate policing. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey
L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998). Ka-
han and Meares were right but their point extends farther. Not just Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment law, but constitutional law generally regulates local law enforcement agencies more strin-
gently than state and federal ones. Yet the groups whose interests constitutional law allegedly
protects minorities and the poor have more political power over local governments than
over state and national ones.

47
For news stories noting this pattern in three metropolitan areas, see Kiljoong Kim, Where
Do Chicagos Poor White People Live?, BEACHWOOD REP. (Chicago), Sept. 11, 2006, http://www.
beachwoodreporter.com/politics/where_chicagos_poor_white_peop.php; Christopher Tidmore,
Public Housing Redevelopment Sparks Multi-City Protest and Lawsuit, LA. WKLY. (New Or-
leans), July 3, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.louisianaweekly.com/weekly/news/articlegate.
pl?20060703b; Margery Austin Turner, Segregation by the Numbers, WASH. POST, May 18, 1997,
at C3. For a brief discussion of the more general pattern, see, for example, David R. Williams,
Poverty, Racism, and Migration: The Health of the African American Population, in RACE, POV-
ERTY, AND DOMESTIC POLICY 311, 32022 (C. Michael Henry ed., 2004). For evidence of the
much higher levels of concentrated poverty in the African American population, see BISHAW, su-
pra note 9, at 8 fig.4.

48
See, e.g., WENDY KAMINER, ITS ALL THE RAGE: CRIME AND CULTURE (1995) (dis-
cussing the link between capital punishment and popular rage at crime and criminals).


agony incarceration imposes on local communities.
49
Local political
control over criminal justice harnesses both forces, without giving
precedence to either.
The balance between those warring incentives looks quite different
when power over criminal punishment is given to voters and officials
outside the communities where crimes happen and punishment is im-
posed. Anger and empathy alike are weaker forces when they come
from voters who see crime on the evening news than when they flow
from voters lived experience. When both forces are weak, small
changes in either can produce large systemic consequences: no coun-
tervailing force checks the trend toward more or less punishment. Ex-
treme variation becomes the norm, stable equilibrium the exception.
The system oscillates not between moderate levels of mercy and retri-
bution, but between wholesale indifference and unmitigated rage.
When that happens, we see what Americans have seen over the past
fifty years unfathomable lenity, followed by unimaginable severity.
B. Criminal Justice in the Gilded Age
If the preceding discussion is right, criminal justice systems gov-
erned by local politics should achieve more egalitarian results than jus-
tice systems that are more centralized, legalized, and bureaucratized.
That hypothesis sounds backward: after all, American criminal justice
is governed by local politics unlike the rest of the world, we elect
prosecutors and trial judges, and urban police forces are answerable to
the elected mayors and council members who govern their cities. The
results can hardly be called egalitarian. Yet the hypothesis is probably
correct. Notwithstanding the role local politics plays in it, American
criminal justice is more centralized, more legalized, and less locally
democratic than first appears. The true test of the effect of local de-
mocracy on criminal justice equality is not to be found in todays jus-
tice system, but in the justice system of the Gilded Age: the half-
century between the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of the
Great Depression.
Those fifty years are not known for their egalitarianism. The
Gilded Age was the era of robber barons and sweatshops, a time when
the power of the trusts dwarfed the clout of labor unions or govern-
ment regulators.
50
In the world of legal doctrine, it was the age of
constitutionalized laissez-faire, when any interference with business or

49
See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 85198 (2006).

50
For the classic view, see JACK BEATTY, AGE OF BETRAYAL: THE TRIUMPH OF MONEY
IN AMERICA, 18651900 (2007); MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934). For
more nuanced views of the era, see SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE
(3d ed. 1993); REBECCA EDWARDS, NEW SPIRITS: AMERICANS IN THE GILDED AGE, 1865
1905 (2006).


any government effort to improve the lot of the poor risked judicial
invalidation.
51
Last but certainly not least, it was an age when Jim
Crows strange career began, when black voting in the South all but
ceased and the grip of a second slavery grew steadily tighter.
52
Yet
criminal justice was egalitarian far more so than in our own time,
and probably more so than at any time in American history. These
propositions did not hold true in the South, and probably did not hold
true everywhere in the North. But in most Northern cities, policing,
criminal litigation, and criminal punishment appear to have been both
a good deal less discriminatory and a great deal more lenient toward
poor and working-class offenders than today. The key to this surpris-
ingly egalitarian justice system was local democracy.
1. The South. The justice system of the post-Reconstruction
South was neither democratic nor egalitarian. Private terrorism
played roles that well-funded law enforcement agencies played in the
North;
53
the consequence was a strange mix of anarchy and authori-
tarianism. Black crimes against whites were punished brutally, often
without the niceties of due process.
54
White offenders who victimized
blacks regularly went unpunished
55
and, frequently, so did black
criminals who harmed other blacks.
As the following table indicates, this anarchic social order was far
from orderly. The table lists the policing and homicide rates police
officers and murders per 100,000 population in three Northern and
three Southern cities in the mid-1930s:

51
The sentence in the text describes the reality a bit too starkly. For a more nuanced discus-
sion of Lochner-era doctrine, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).

52
The classic treatment is the one from which the phrase in the text is borrowed. See C.
VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 1974).

53
On the rise of that system of privatized terrorism and its victory over the federal govern-
ments efforts to protect newly freed slaves, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICAS
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 18631877 (1988); LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT
SOUTH CAROLINA KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 18711872 (1996). On the character of Jim Crow
law enforcement, see JOHN DITTMER, BLACK GEORGIA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1900
1920 (1977); NEIL R. MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF
JIM CROW (1990); HORTENSE POWDERMAKER, AFTER FREEDOM: A CULTURAL STUDY IN
THE DEEP SOUTH app. D (1939).

54
The white Souths approach to legal process when prosecuting black defendants was com-
plicated. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw lynching the ultimate rejection
of legal procedure reach its peak. Later, the decades following World War I saw a marked
trend toward adherence to legal forms, as Michael Klarman has noted. See Klarman, Racial Ori-
gins, supra note 30, at 5558. Nevertheless, when black defendants were in the dock, white
Southerners commitment to following the appropriate formal procedures was, in a word, formal:
black defendants were routinely denied the practical benefits of the procedural rights that the
Southern justice system pretended to honor. See id.

55
On the different treatment afforded the two different classes of interracial crime, see MI-
CHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 11735, 15258, 22532, 26786 (2004).


TABLE 1. POLICING AND MURDER RATES IN 1937,
SELECTED CITIES
56

City Policing Rate Murder Rate
Boston 292 1.6
Detroit 238 4.6
New York 251 4.5
Atlanta 125 39.3
Houston 98 21.3
Memphis 93 12.8

These figures capture a key reality of law enforcement in the pre
air conditioning, precivil rights South: the regions poverty. All gov-
ernment services were underfunded by comparison to the wealthier
Northeast and Midwest.
57
That fact left Southern cities with fewer
police officers to contain crime than in the North, and with more crime
to contain.
58

Underfunded Southern law enforcement agencies mostly ignored
black neighborhoods, which led to racially skewed crime data like
those reported in Hortense Powdermakers study of Mississippi homi-
cides in the 1930s.
59
Three-fourths of the states murder victims were
black, as were two-thirds of the killers. White killers victims were ra-
cially mixed: 63% white, 37% black. By comparison, nineteen of every
twenty black killers killed black victims. Punishment rates were low
by our standards, but aside from black-victim cases, they were very
high by comparison with Northern cities in the same period.
60
One-

56
All rates in the Tables are per 100,000 population. The numbers of homicides and urban
police officers are taken from UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1937, supra note 8, at 19799 tbl.108;
and UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1938, supra note 8, at 71 tbl.51, respectively. For the cities
populations, see 1941 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 2728 tbl.30.

57
As long ago as 1855, Bostons policing rate stood at 153 per 100,000. See ROGER LANE,
POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 18221885, at app. III (1967) [hereinafter LANE, POLICING
THE CITY]. A century later, Houstons policing rate was less than two-thirds of that figure 96
per 100,000. See 1961 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 16 tbl.10; UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: 1956, supra note 8, at 29 tbl.13. Rates are calculated using city populations extrapo-
lated from those of the nearest decades.

58
Today, the wealth gap between North and South has narrowed considerably and so have
the gaps in murder and policing rates. In 2005, Atlanta had a higher policing rate than either
Boston or Detroit, and a significantly lower homicide rate than Detroit. See CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2005, supra note 8, tbls.8, 78.

59
The data cited in the text appear in POWDERMAKER, supra note 53, at app. D.

60
In late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Chicago, a mere 22% of homicide cases
ended in conviction. JEFFREY S. ADLER, FIRST IN VIOLENCE, DEEPEST IN DIRT: HOMI-
CIDE IN CHICAGO, 18751920, at 11516 (2006). Given the large number of black-victim cases
and the low levels of law enforcement in black neighborhoods, it seems likely that well over half
of Mississippis white-victim cases led to conviction and punishment.


third of the murders Powdermaker studied led to criminal convictions,
and that figure undoubtedly differed depending on the races of killers
and, especially, victims. Killers of whites could expect a serious effort
at arrest, prosecution, and punishment. Killers of blacks white ones
to be sure, but many black killers as well were more likely to escape
detection. That is why prison populations in the Jim Crow South were
almost certainly whiter than the offender population, and sometimes
whiter than the general population.
61

Poverty fed inequality. Egalitarian law enforcement requires the
money needed to pay for it, and Southern governments found it harder
to raise revenue than their Northern counterparts. Crime rates were
much higher in the South than in the North partly because Southern
criminals faced lower odds of detection than Northern ones which
in turn was partly due to small budgets for Southern law enforcement
agencies. The undemocratic character of Southern government rein-
forced these tendencies. Not only were blacks barred from voting
throughout the Jim Crow South; in many places, so were poor
whites.
62
Thus, the portions of the population that suffered the most
from both crime and criminal punishment were frozen out of political
power.
63
Naturally, equal justice was in short supply. The Gilded Age
South more nearly resembled a weak authoritarian state, able to do lit-
tle save for oppressing blacks, than any form of democracy we know
today. Jim Crows history does not support the proposition that local
democracy promotes egalitarian criminal justice, but neither does it
negate that proposition.

61
In 1950, South Carolinas population was nearly 40% black, 1953 STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT, supra note 1, at 36 tbl.25, yet more than two-thirds of the states imprisoned felons were
white. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STA-
TISTICS: PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS: 1950, at 55 tbl.21. According
to the same sources, in the eleven states of the old Confederacy except Georgia (for which data are
missing), 44% of imprisoned felons were black, compared to 24% of the general population. By
comparison, in the Northeast, 29% of prisoners were black, compared to only 5% of the general
population. The conclusion is inescapable: Jim Crow held the black imprisonment rate down.

62
The poll tax, common in most of the South during the first half of the twentieth century,
was the most obvious means of biracial disenfranchisement but not the only one. For the classic
discussion, see V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 578618 (1949).
The effect of those restrictions on white turnout rates was dramatic. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER,
THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH 18801910, at 22431 (1974).

63
Since the 1930s, the Southern state with the highest ratio of police officers to population has
been Louisiana which, thanks to Huey Long, is also the state with the strongest political tradi-
tion of government officials competing for the votes of the poor. In 1937, New Orleans had 175
police employees per 100,000 population, see UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1938, supra note 8, at
71 tbl.51; 1942 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 27 tbl.25 far higher than the rate in
other Southern cities, see supra p. 1984 (Table 1). Today, Louisiana has the highest policing rate
in the nation. Its neighbors Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas are all in the bottom half of state
policing rates. See CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006, supra note 8, tbls.77, 78.


2. Northern Cities. Northern cities were far less discriminatory,
as three pieces of evidence suggest. First, criminal defendants in the
demographic groups most likely to suffer discrimination women,
blacks, and poor immigrants seem to have achieved litigation out-
comes nearly as good as the outcomes native-born white men achieved.
Second, imprisonment rates were stable: in an age of great social and
political change, prison populations neither exploded nor collapsed.
Third, those populations varied remarkably little across jurisdictional
boundaries; differences in population-adjusted imprisonment rates
were much smaller than in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries.
Begin with the treatment of what would now be called suspect
classes. In the early 1900s, no one had heard of battered womans
syndrome; east of the Mississippi River, women could not yet vote.
64

Even so, more than 80% of Chicago women who killed their husbands
escaped punishment among white women, the figure topped 90%
thanks to the new unwritten law permitting women to defend
themselves on the same terms as men.
65
This law consisted mostly
of jury preferences, but the preferences were clear enough to lead the
local States Attorney to opine that a wife may murder her husband
in Cook County with impunity.
66
A half-century before the womens
movement transformed the law of self-defense, female defendants were
achieving the results the movement sought without the help of the le-
gal and medical arguments on which their late-twentieth-century sis-
ters relied.
67

As historian Jeffrey Adler notes, black women who killed their
husbands fared worse, probably due to a combination of race and sex
biases.
68
The existence of such biases is no surprise. What is surpris-
ing is the weakness of the racial bias in Northern cities in the Gilded
Age. After an exhaustive study of early-twentieth-century Philadel-
phia homicides, Roger Lane concluded that black murder defendants
did about as well as white ones:

64
See ANNE F. SCOTT & ANDREW M. SCOTT, ONE HALF THE PEOPLE: THE FIGHT FOR
WOMAN SUFFRAGE 16668 (1975). Illinois granted women a limited right to vote in 1913. See
SHERNA BERGER GLUCK, FROM PARLOR TO PRISON: FIVE AMERICAN SUFFRAGISTS TALK
ABOUT THEIR LIVES 297 (1985); SCOTT & SCOTT, supra, at 166.

65
ADLER, supra note 60, at 112. Even if one counts only white women who were arrested for
homicide, a mere 11% were convicted. Id. at 329 n.141. On the character and power of the un-
written law, see id. at 10817.

66
Id. at 112 (internal quotation mark omitted).

67
Favorable results were not limited to self-defense claims. Women who murdered their chil-
dren, a surprisingly common scenario in turn-of-the-century Chicago, were almost never prose-
cuted. See id. at 9299.

68
See id. at 15355. Black child-killers either did not exist or were ignored by the authorities.
Id. at 15253.


While Philadelphia was . . . the northernmost of southern cities, . . . [the
citys justice system] seems to have been largely free of systematic preju-
dice in determining guilt or innocence. Elderly black men and women,
survivors of The Great Migration north in the era of World War I and
after, recall the justice system as essentially fair. . . . [I]n most identifiable
measures of discrimination, such as degree of charge and conviction rate,
neither blacks nor those with Italian [surnames] seem to have differed sig-
nificantly from others brought to the dock.
69

The early twentieth century saw the beginnings of the mass migration
of Southern blacks to Northern cities, prompting bloody race riots and
a resurgent Ku Klux Klan as strong in parts of the North as in the
South. Even so, Northern cities treatment of black defendants ap-
pears to have been essentially fair.
The famous story of Ossian Sweet captures the phenomenon.
Sweet was a black doctor who had the audacity to buy a house in a
white Detroit neighborhood in 1925. A white mob surrounded his
house and shots were fired from inside, where several of Sweets rela-
tives and friends were armed. One of the shots killed a white
neighbor. All eleven people in the house, including Sweet and his wife,
were charged with murder.
70
Clarence Darrow took the case and ar-
gued self-defense, invoking the long history of violence against blacks
by white mobs. The case was tried twice, both times to all-white ju-
ries;
71
in his closing arguments, Darrow questioned whether white ju-
rors could fairly judge black defendants charged with doing violence
to a white man. The first jury hung; the second acquitted.
72
The
judge in both trials was Frank Murphy, who went on to become
Mayor of Detroit and Governor of Michigan before Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt appointed him to head the Justice Department, and later to the
Supreme Court.
73
Notice: a black man was acquitted of killing a
white man by an all-white jury, in a case in which the victim was un-
armed and the defense all but admitted the killing. The judge who

69
Roger Lane, On the Social Meaning of Homicide Trends in America, in 1 VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 55, 7071 (Ted Robert Gurr ed., 1989) [hereinafter Lane, Homicide Trends]; see also
ROGER LANE, ROOTS OF VIOLENCE IN BLACK PHILADELPHIA, 18601900 (1986) [hereinafter
LANE, BLACK PHILADELPHIA].

70
See KEVIN BOYLE, ARC OF JUSTICE: A SAGA OF RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND MURDER
IN THE JAZZ AGE 2043, 19394 (2004) (discussing Sweets background and the events surround-
ing the house purchase, the shooting, and the filing of criminal charges).

71
Id. at 266, 316.

72
In the first trial, all eleven defendants were tried; in the second trial, Ossian Sweets brother
Henry believed to be the shooter was tried alone. Id. at 29299, 33136.

73
One of Murphys biographers reports that the trial was the most intense emotional experi-
ence of his life. RICHARD D. LUNT, THE HIGH MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT: THE POLITI-
CAL CAREER OF FRANK MURPHY 26 (1965).


presided over the case was rewarded for that outcome, not punished.
74

To anyone familiar with American criminal litigation in the last thirty
years, the story sounds wildly implausible.
Black defendants like Sweet did not avoid conviction because they
lived in racially enlightened times: a Klan rally in nearby Dearborn,
Michigan in 1924 drew upwards of fifty thousand.
75
Rather, black
defendants benefited from the fact that all defendants fared better
than their counterparts today. Adler notes that a mere 22% of turn-of-
the-century Chicago homicides led to criminal convictions.
76
In Ala-
meda County, California in the same era, fewer than 60% of felony tri-
als ended in conviction; in cases in which defendants made bail, the
conviction rate fell below 30%.
77
Comparable figures today are much
higher.
78
Turn-of-the-century defendants success rates were even bet-
ter than appears from the figures just cited, because many fewer
criminal defendants pled guilty a century ago than today. In metro-
politan counties today, 65% of felony cases end with a guilty plea, and
those pleas represent 95% of felony convictions.
79
In turn-of-the-
century Alameda County, the analogous figures were 41% and 63%,
respectively
80
and the figures in the Northeast and Midwest were
probably a good deal lower.
81
In todays justice system, felony trials
are rare events, acquittals rarer still. In Northern cities a century ago,
both trials and acquittals were common. Women and blacks fared

74
Murphy later lost an election due to his stance on crime, but it was not black crime that
prompted his defeat. In 1938, Murphy was running for reelection as Michigans Governor; his
lenient treatment of sit-down strikers in automobile factories was a major issue, and Murphy lost
in a close race. See id. at 15160. In late 1930s America, being seen as soft on industrial labor
unions carried a higher political price tag than acquitting black criminals.

75
BOYLE, supra note 70, at 142. For a discussion of the Klans role in Detroit politics at the
time, see id. at 24, 14043.

76
ADLER, supra note 60, at 11516.

77
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 18701910, at 166 tbl.5.8
(1981).

78
More than 80% of murder arrests in metropolitan counties lead to conviction. ONLINE
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.5.57.2002. In felony cases that go to trial, the conviction rate is
75%. Id.

79
Id.

80
See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 77, at 166 tbl.5.8.

81
Guilty pleas play no part in Adlers account of Chicago homicide cases partly because
pleas make less interesting stories, but probably also because pleas were less common in the
Northeast and Midwest than on the West Coast. Throughout this period, Californias imprison-
ment rate was double that of most states in the Northeast and Midwest. See CAHALAN, supra
note 7, at 30 tbl.3-3. Criminal convictions must have been more numerous in California than in
the nations Northeastern quadrant, and guilty pleas are an efficient litigation tool for prosecutors
who must convict large numbers of criminal defendants.


well in that older justice system because defendants as a whole fared
well.
82

A large fraction of the many acquittals in this period were won by
defendants from poor or working-class immigrant communities.
Adlers book about violence in turn-of-the-century Chicago is a com-
pendium of stories of homicides by that citys immigrant poor, who
needed no Clarence Darrow to win their cases: vague, generic self-
defense arguments . . . nearly always persuaded jurors.
83
Bar fights,
disputes over card games, and drunken brawls regularly produced de-
fense victories. Those victories rarely flowed from doubts about the
killers identity.
84
Rather, Adlers Chicago juries were exercising pow-
ers of moral evaluation
85
powers the substantive law of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries vested in fact finders, not just
in legislatures and appellate courts.
Acquittals of working-class white immigrants may seem less sur-
prising than victories by husband-killing white women and homicidal
black men. But white immigrants of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries held a lower political status than twenty-first-
century Americans might suppose. The bulk of the immigration in
this period came from Southern and Eastern Europe; Catholics and
Jews were a larger fraction of immigrants than in the past.
86
Both
groups were subject to substantial religious prejudice, a major factor
in the Klans rise during the 1920s.
87
In context, the success of the
poor immigrants Adler discusses is almost as remarkable as the suc-
cesses enjoyed by women and blacks.

82
Adler explicitly makes the link with respect to women. ADLER, supra note 60, at 11516.
Taken together, his evidence and Roger Lanes analysis suggest the same conclusion with respect
to black defendants as well. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

83
ADLER, supra note 60, at 116.

84
See, e.g., id. at 637 (discussing the many Chicago homicides that arose from drunken
brawls in public places in front of dozens of witnesses).

85
Much like the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English juries that are the subject of
JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF
THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2008) [hereinafter WHITMAN, REASONABLE DOUBT]. Like turn-of-
the-century Chicago juries, English juries of centuries past tended to resolve doubts in favor of
acquittal; as in old Chicago, those doubts often had more to do with moral desert than with the
facts of the case at hand. See id. at 159200; see also ROGER LANE, VIOLENT DEATH IN THE
CITY: SUICIDE, ACCIDENT, AND MURDER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 66
(2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter LANE, VIOLENT DEATH IN THE CITY] (Philadelphia juries were
usually quite tolerant of assaultive behavior and were always greatly influenced by moral or so-
cial rather than purely legal considerations.).

86
JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM,
18601925, at 6467 (rev. ed. 2002).

87
Id. at 28586, 29094. Politicians and some scholars argued that Southern and Eastern
Europeans belonged to a different race than immigrants of the past; fears of inundation by immi-
grants of inferior racial stock were common. Id. at 13157.


Nationwide data on litigation outcomes do not exist for this period.
Still, what little evidence we have tends to confirm the proposition
that, outside the South, Adlers Chicago and Lanes Philadelphia rep-
resent the rule, not the exception. The key evidence comes from the
combination of imprisonment rates and homicide rates, which suggest
that criminal punishment was both stable and moderately lenient
throughout the relevant period. Table 2 presents the murder rate, the
imprisonment rate, and the number of prisoner-years per murder in
1904, 1910, and at ten-year intervals beginning in 1923. Under each
heading, the first figure is the rate for New York, using New York
Citys murder rate and New York states imprisonment rate, while the
second figure is the rate for the nation as a whole.
88

TABLE 2. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN NEW YORK
AND IN THE UNITED STATES
89

Murder Rate Imprisonment
Rate
Prisoner-Years per
Murder
Year N.Y. U.S. N.Y. U.S. N.Y. U.S.
1904 4.2 8.3 71 69 16.9 8.3
1910 5.4 7.9 78 75 14.4 9.5
1923 4.8 8.8 58 74 12.1 8.4
1933 7.2 9.8 74 109 10.3 11.1
1943 2.7 5.1 112 103 41.5 20.2
1953 4.0 4.8 107 108 26.8 22.5
1963 7.0 4.6 101 114 14.4 24.8
1973 22.0 9.8 71 96 3.2 9.8
1983 22.7 8.6 172 179 7.6 20.8
1993 26.6 9.5 354 359 13.3 37.8
2003 7.4 5.7 339 482 45.8 84.6

88
For New York, the figure on prisoner-years per murder is only a rough approximation, be-
cause the murder rate is the citys and the imprisonment rate is the states. States, not cities, run
Americas penitentiary system, so city-level imprisonment data are, for the most part, nonexistent.

89
Through 1973, both New Yorks homicide rate and the nations are taken from data and
estimates collected by the late Eric Monkkonen and used in ERIC H. MONKKONEN, MURDER
IN NEW YORK CITY (2001). The data are available through the National Archive of Criminal
Justice Data, at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/03226.xml. After 1973,
homicide rates are taken from the relevant volumes of the UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra
note 8. Imprisonment rates up to 1923 come from CAHALAN, supra note 7, at 30 tbl.3-3. Subse-
quent imprisonment rates for the United States as a whole come from ONLINE SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 2, tbl.6.28.2006. New Yorks imprisonment rates from 1933 to 1963 are taken from the
relevant volumes of the STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1; later rates appear in 1991
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 637 tbl.6.72; and ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2,
tbl.6.29.2006. To calculate prisoner-years per murder, I divided the imprisonment rate by the
murder rate.


New Yorks murder rate was lower in the early twentieth century
than today,
90
while its prison population was a small fraction of to-
days. Moderate punishment coexisted with modest levels of criminal
violence. And the punishment was moderate: substantially more se-
vere than in the 1970s, far more lenient than today. Neither impris-
onment rates nor punishment per unit crime changed dramatically in
the early 1900s; levels of criminal punishment were relatively stable.
91

Not so in the centurys last forty years, when murders nearly quadru-
pled before falling sharply, imprisonment quintupled, and prisoner-
years per murder fell by more than 90%, then multiplied fourteen
times. Instability suggests inconsistency the same crimes received
very different treatment at different times. Early-twentieth-century
criminal punishment appears to have been more consistent.
New York was typical. In the last half of the twentieth century,
imprisonment rates varied massively throughout the Northeast and
Midwest, both over time and between jurisdictions.
92
States in those
regions incarcerated similar (and similarly low) percentages of their
populations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sug-
gesting that the patterns Adler and Lane discovered in Chicago and
Philadelphia were typical of their regions. Other regions differed:
Southern prison populations varied more widely, both over time and
across jurisdictional boundaries as Table 3 shows. The table re-
cords the imprisonment rates per 100,000 population for two sets of
five neighboring states, North and South:

90
Much lower: a large fraction of the homicides of generations past would not be so classified
today, because high-quality emergency medical care would save the victims lives. JAMES Q.
WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 16 (rev. ed., Vintage Books 1985) (1975).

91
The era of stable imprisonment rates ended in the 1930s, with the first of Americas two
twentieth-century punitive turns. Imprisonment peaked at 137 per 100,000 in 1939, followed by a
sharp drop as millions of young men were drafted into the army. See ONLINE SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 2, tbl.6.28.2006.

92
See id. tbl.6.29.2006.


TABLE 3. IMPRISONMENT RATES, SELECTED STATES, 18801910
93

State 1880 1890 1904 1910
Pennsylvania 43 45 39 46
Ohio 40 45 53 54
Indiana 63 65 69 88
Illinois 60 54 47 46
Michigan 72 53 54 57
Virginia 50 70 80 104
North Carolina 58 88 33 32
South Carolina 26 70 47 56
Georgia __ 94 80 101
Alabama 31 72 97 158

Notice that the lowest and highest imprisonment rates come from
the South along with the largest ranges of variation. Alabamas
rate quintupled and North Carolinas fell by almost two-thirds; none
of the Northern states imprisonment rates varied by as much as 40%
in either direction. Southern criminal justice, which was designed for
inequality, produced highly variable prison populations. Inmate popu-
lations in the North were far more stable, and what little evidence we
have suggests surprisingly low levels of discrimination against vulner-
able groups.
94
Variation and discrimination seem to travel together.
So do stability and equality, perhaps joined by moderately lenient
treatment for criminal defendants. Southern criminal justice systems
had the former set of characteristics, Northern systems the latter.
Why was Northern criminal justice both stable and relatively leni-
ent? There are four related answers. First, Northern cities were well-
policed, at least by the standards of the time. The reasons for the link
between relatively high levels of policing and relatively low and stable
punishment levels are unclear. But it seems increasingly plain that
such a link exists. Today, jurisdictions with the most police officers

93
The figures in Table 3 are taken from CAHALAN, supra note 7, at 30 tbl.3-3. Georgias im-
prisonment rate in 1880 is unavailable.

94
The evidence goes beyond Adlers and Lanes studies. Data on sentences broken down by
demographic group are nearly nonexistent for the early twentieth century, but data from mid-
century support the picture painted in the text. Across the Northeast and Midwest, whites were
punished more severely than blacks for murder and drug crime; blacks were punished more se-
verely than whites for manslaughter, fraud, and rape. Overall, blacks served longer sentences,
but not by a large margin. In the South, the median time served by white offenders was 18
months; for blacks, the median was 21 months. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS: PRISONERS RELEASED FROM STATE AND
FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS: 1952 AND 1953, at 32 tbl.7A. The chief difference between the re-
gions was one that those data do not capture: the selection of cases for prosecution. Many more
black-on-black crimes were prosecuted and punished in the North than in the South.


tend to have the lowest imprisonment rates and the smallest rates of
increase in imprisonment.
95
The same was true a century ago: cities in
the Gilded Age South had much smaller police forces than their
Northern counterparts; the South also saw both higher and more vari-
able punishment levels than the North.
96
Those propositions are likely
connected.
Second, then-prevailing procedural rules made criminal trials cheap
and therefore common. Because jury trials were more common than
today, defense victories were bound to be more common as well.
97

Acquittals were less newsworthy, so prosecutors paid a smaller politi-
cal price for them and were less eager to avoid them than today. Note
the logic: less elaborate trial procedures helped defendants not the
government by making both trials and acquittals more ordinary
events.
Third, substantive criminal law was both less clearly defined and
more favorable to defendants than todays legal doctrine. Defendants
rarely have occasion to challenge the application of todays bright-line
criminal liability rules, in large part because those rules seem designed
to foreclose defense arguments. That was not the case a century ago.
Statutory conduct terms, mens rea standards, and affirmative defenses
all invited such arguments rather than foreclosing them. When the
terms of criminal statutes were insufficiently hospitable to such argu-
ments, courts filled the gap through common lawmaking. An example
makes the point. Like many of its neighbors, Michigan passed a local-
option law banning liquor in counties that approved the ban; to dis-
courage evasion, the legislature forbade not only selling alcoholic bev-
erages but also giving them away. The Michigan Supreme Court soon
established a defense for those who served liquor in their homes as an
exercise of a decent hospitality to their guests.
98
Analogous doctrines
in todays law of controlled substances (the analogue to early-
twentieth-century liquor laws) are unimaginable.
Such doctrines were everywhere in the criminal law of the Gilded
Age. Another Michigan doctrine held that mutual fights in which both
sides were willing participants were not crimes.
99
According to the

95
William J. Stuntz, Accountable Policing 4546 & tbl.3 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Harvard Law School Library). The data used are taken from CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2004, supra note 8, tbls.8, 78; and ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2,
tbl.6.29.2004.

96
See supra p. 1984 (Table 1), p. 1992 (Table 3).

97
See supra notes 7681 and accompanying text.

98
The quoted phrase is from People v. Bedell, 127 N.W. 33, 36 (Mich. 1910) (Ostrander, J.,
concurring); the leading case for the doctrine in question was People v. Peterson, 120 N.W. 570
(Mich. 1909).

99
See People v. Yund, 128 N.W. 742, 744 (Mich. 1910). For a decision rejecting the doctrine,
see People v. Sherman, 166 N.W.2d 22 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).


common law definition used in most states, burglary defendants could
prevail if the targeted place was not a dwelling, if the break-in did not
happen at night, or if the defendant formed the intent to commit a fel-
ony only after going inside.
100
Rape defendants won if their victims
failed to resist with all their might.
101
Proof of mens rea meant proof
of moral fault, not just the intent to carry out ones physical actions.
102

In the late twentieth century, self-defense doctrine seemed to bar de-
fenses for battered women who killed their batterers.
103
The less doc-
trinally developed version of the defense that applied in early-
twentieth-century Chicago awarded victory not only to abused women,
but to virtually any homicide defendant who could offer a better rea-
son for his or her crime than greed or hatred.
104
With open-
ended doctrines like these, criminal trials were genuine morality plays,
with jurors serving as both judge and Greek chorus. Jurors went well
beyond determining witnesses credibility:
105
they were moral arbiters,
assessing both the propriety of defendants conduct and the propriety
of punishing it.
As Jim Whitman has shown, in English legal history, that open-
ended power to pass judgment and to assign blame was long associ-
ated with lenity.
106
Likewise in Gilded Age America: local juries hesi-
tated to send their neighbors to prison when the law offered multiple
ways to avoid doing so. Surprisingly, lenity and predictability seem to
have coincided. The unwritten law excusing wives who killed abu-
sive husbands, the pattern of acquittals for bar fights that escalated to
homicide, the unofficial defense granted automobile drivers in cases of
vehicular homicide
107
because of their consistency, these patterns

100
See, e.g., People v. Sparks, 47 P.3d 289, 293 (Cal. 2002) (describing traditional common law
definition).

101
See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 110521 (1986) (discussing cases).

102
Chief Justice Tafts opinion in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) a case in
which proof of moral fault was not required makes the point. Balint was charged with violat-
ing the Harrison Act; his only possible defense was that he did not know the conditions the Act
placed on drug sales. Taft reasoned that Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an
innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the
drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided. Id. at 254. His opin-
ion makes sense only on the assumption that moral blameworthiness was a prerequisite for crimi-
nal liability: that, save for a few unusual cases, the government must prove the defendant knew
enough about the relevant facts and law to render his behavior culpable.

103
See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Womens Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV.
393 (1988).

104
See ADLER, supra note 60, passim.

105
Cf. George Fisher, The Jurys Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575 (1997).

106
So much so that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof was needed to reassure
reluctant eighteenth-century English jurors that they could convict plainly guilty defendants
without jeopardizing their souls. See WHITMAN, REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 85, at 125
200.

107
See ADLER, supra note 60, at 21112.


amounted to the functional equivalent of legal doctrine.
108
Perhaps
consistency flowed from transparency: these unwritten legal standards
emerged from public trials, not behind-closed-doors plea bargains.
The fourth answer follows naturally from the first three: political
control over policing and prosecution was in the hands of the same
groups who were most often victimized by and charged with serious
crime. Big-city police forces were governed by big-city political ma-
chines that in turn relied on the votes of the working-class immigrants
whose streets most needed patrolling.
109
Officers were not so much
professional law enforcers as holders of patronage jobs, rewards for the
machines supporters.
110
They lived in the same communities as the
young men they arrested, attended the same churches, depended on
the same networks for help when hardship struck. Urban machines
likewise selected the district attorneys who prosecuted criminal cases
and the judges who tried those cases. Last but not least, working-class
voters exercised power in the jury box as well as the ballot box. The
common law vicinage requirement held that the jury was to be se-
lected from the community in which the crime happened.
111
The
norm today is county-wide selection
112
and because most metropoli-
tan counties include vast suburbs, high-crime city neighborhoods have
little control over the juries that try crimes committed on their streets.
Before the rise of the automobile, more localized selection practices

108
That is one reason why government officials objected to these patterns so strenuously. See
id. at 112, 21215.

109
See, e.g., M. Craig Brown & Barbara D. Warner, Immigrants, Urban Politics, and Policing
in 1900, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 293 (1992) (showing strong negative correlation between machine con-
trol of city politics and the level of arrests for alcohol-related offenses). The one major city with
both a high level of machine control and a high level of alcohol arrests was Philadelphia, in which
the political machine was Republican and relied on native-born voters for its support. Id. at 301
& tbl.2. Elsewhere, the reigning machines Republican and Democratic alike depended on
immigrant votes, and generally avoided strict enforcement of alcohol regulations.

110
See ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 1722 (1977); Mark Haller, Historical
Roots of Police Behavior: Chicago, 18901925, in 5 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HIS-
TORY: POLICING AND CRIME CONTROL 244 (Eric H. Monkkonen ed., 1992); Eugene J. Watts,
The Police in Atlanta, 18901905, in 5 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: POLIC-
ING AND CRIME CONTROL, supra, at 908. Cf. LANE, POLICING THE CITY, supra note 57, at
213 (noting the difficulty upper-class Republicans in Boston had in controlling the local police
force even when they won local elections).

111
For the standard historical discussion, see William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Crimi-
nal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1944). Custom, not law, de-
termined the size of the community. In England, locally selected juries were a functional neces-
sity, since local knowledge informed jury decisionmaking. Steven A. Engel, The Publics
Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1674 (2000). Local knowl-
edge was still an important part of jury decisions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. The limits of urban transportation and the necessities of urban machine politics pushed in
the same direction. But these forces shaped the practice of jury selection, not its legal form. Con-
sequently, evidence of particular selection practices is hard to come by.

112
See Engel, supra note 111, at 1705 n.242.


were probably the norm:
113
would-be jurors could not easily transport
themselves across large metropolitan counties.
Nowhere was the power of local democracy more evident than in
battles over vice. Between 1870 and 1930, Americans fought a series
of vice wars: against pornography,
114
gambling,
115
prostitution,
116
nar-
cotics
117
and, above all, alcohol.
118
As in the late twentieth centurys
drug war, these vice crusades invariably led to state and federal legis-
lation seeking to stamp out the relevant markets. The similarity ends
there. In todays drug war, offenders face sentences far more severe
than anything bootleggers or pimps faced eighty or a hundred years
ago. State and federal drug laws have been enforced most aggressively
in poor city neighborhoods.
119
Enforcement of late-nineteenth- and
early-twentieth-century vice laws in Northern cities was usually lax
and often nonexistent.
120
(In the South, such laws were often enforced
disproportionately against blacks.
121
) In the one field in which federal
law battled for control over criminal justice, local officials fought back,
usually taking the side of the working-class populations that indulged

113
This proposition is surprisingly hard to support, because records of jury selection practices
in the past are thin. For a rare discussion of the scope of the community from which urban juries
were actually drawn in generations past, see People v. Jones, 510 P.2d 705 (Cal. 1973), which ad-
dressed jury selection under the Los Angeles system of judicial districts.

114
See DONNA I. DENNIS, THE RISE OF AMERICAN EROTICA: PRODUCING AND POLIC-
ING PORNOGRAPHY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript
at ch. 7, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).

115
See David Skeel & William J. Stuntz, The Puzzling History of the Criminal Law of Gam-
bling (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).

116
There were two different battles against prostitution. The first was fought locally, where
occasional crusades prompted backlash from the silent army of customers, LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 331 (1993), leading to a re-
turn to quiet tolerance. See Haller, supra note 110, at 257 (describing lax enforcement in turn-of-
the-century Chicago). The second battle was the federal drive to stamp out the so-called white
slave traffic. See, e.g., Mara L. Keire, The Vice Trust: A Reinterpretation of the White Slavery
Scare in the United States, 19071917, 35 J. SOC. HIST. 5 (2001).

117
For the best discussion of the crusade against opium that took hold in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, see GEORGE FISHER, MARRIED TO ALCOHOL: THE DRUG
WARS MORAL ROOTS (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at chs. 78, on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) [hereinafter FISHER, MARRIED TO ALCOHOL].

118
See, e.g., EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMER-
ICA (1996); FISHER, MARRIED TO ALCOHOL, supra note 117; DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING
NATIONAL PROHIBITION (2d ed., Kent State Univ. Press 2000) (1979).

119
Proving that the laws have been more aggressively enforced in the poorer sections of cities is
difficult, perhaps impossible though the demographics of the drug defendant population sug-
gest as much. For evidence that drug defendants are disproportionately poor, see HARLOW, supra
note 10, at 5 tbl.7. For evidence that drug defendants are disproportionately black, see supra
notes 45 and accompanying text. Finally, for evidence that the black population is both poorer
and more urbanized than the white population, see supra note 9.

120
See BEHR, supra note 118, at 17593 (discussing lack of enforcement in Chicago);
MICHAEL A. LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN: PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK CITY 16070 (2007)
(discussing local opposition to enforcement in New York).

121
See MARTHA BENSLEY BRUERE, DOES PROHIBITION WORK? 11213 (1927).


in the relevant vices. The lenient locals won most of those battles
against their more severe federal and state adversaries. In the larger
and more important realms of violent felonies and felony thefts, local
control was unchallenged.
II. THE RISE OF INEQUALITY
The power of high-crime city neighborhoods over criminal justice
in those neighborhoods fell sharply during the course of the twentieth
centurys second half. Rising suburban populations exercised more
power over local elections than in the past; city voters exercised less.
Entrepreneurial national politicians discovered that they could use ur-
ban crime to win votes not in cities, but in suburbs and small towns.
The constitutionalization of criminal procedure and the combined ex-
pansion and growing specificity of substantive criminal law have,
taken together, made prosecutors more powerful and local juries less
so. Todays professionalized urban police forces have left officers de-
tached from the neighborhoods they serve.
The trends just described arose precisely when black neighbor-
hoods became the focus of criminal justice in Northern cities. That
combination was bound to produce more racial inequality and injus-
tice. Other crime and policing trends reinforced that sad result. As
urban violence escalated, police clearance rates for violent felonies
plummeted and large illegal drug markets arose, in poor city
neighborhoods as elsewhere. Beginning in the 1970s, lawmakers, po-
lice officers, and prosecutors alike began to use drug prosecutions as
an indirect means of attacking urban violence. That misguided substi-
tution fed rising inequality. The federal government should have miti-
gated that trend but instead aggravated it, by enacting draconian fed-
eral sentencing rules that local prosecutors could use to induce
favorable (from prosecutors point of view) plea bargains. Had the
federal government made less law and spent more money on local po-
licing, the trend might have been very different. But federal police
spending has been light, while substantive lawmaking has been heavy.
The predictable consequence has been more criminal punishment,
more unequally distributed.
A. Local Democracys Decline
Three pairs of trends led to the demise of the locally democratic
criminal justice systems of the Gilded Age. The first pair began in the
1930s and 1940s: the rise of the symbolic politics of crime and the con-
sequent expansion of state and federal criminal liability. The second
pair of trends took hold after World War II: the growing geographic
concentration of violent crime in poor black neighborhoods in North-
ern cities, and the coincident growth of white suburbs surrounding
those cities. The third pair of trends a legal change and the politi-


cal response to it arose in the 1960s, and picked up steam in the
decades that followed. The legal change was the constitutionalization
of criminal procedure. The political response was the bidding war
that broke out beginning in the late 1960s between politicians on the
right and those on the left, as the two sides sought the votes of blue-
collar whites by vying to see who could punish black crime most se-
verely. Each of these trends reduced the power of urban voters over
crime and punishment close to home.
Begin with symbolic politics. Today, politicians seeking state and
national office routinely use salient crimes as political symbols.
122

That tactic was all but unknown before the 1930s. When lawmakers
debated criminal prohibitions, both sides in the relevant debates as-
sumed that the point of the prohibitions was to stamp out the banned
conduct not to take a public stand against it while ignoring the
conduct in practice. That state of affairs began to change in the wake
of Prohibition: a criminal justice disaster for which national politicians
and federal officials bore political responsibility. New Dealera politi-
cians did not wish to repeat the disaster, but they did want to find
ways to capitalize on public concern about crime. How can one claim
credit for fighting crime without bearing responsibility if the fight
fails? A pair of young men on the rise FBI Director J. Edgar Hoo-
ver and Manhattan District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey answered
that question in the same manner at about the same time. Thus was
born the modern politics of crime.
The solution was to go after not crimes but criminals: pick a few
high-profile bad guys who can be taken down, then take them down as
publicly as possible. Call it the John Dillinger strategy.
123
In the
1950s, Hoovers FBI institutionalized that strategy with its Ten Most
Wanted list, which soon became a fixture in American post offices.
124

(Hoover could have made a fortune in advertising.) Dewey was more
successful still. An ambitious young lawyer on the make, he became
Americas first celebrity prosecutor the Rudy Giuliani of his day,

122
See, e.g., ZIMRING ET AL., THREE STRIKES, supra note 16, at 194223; Sara Sun Beale,
Whats Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors
Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997). For
an argument that American-style symbolic politics has spread beyond our borders, see Tim New-
burn & Trevor Jones, Symbolic Politics and Penal Populism: The Long Shadow of Willie Horton,
1 CRIME, MEDIA, CULTURE 72 (2005).

123
Dillingers capture and death in 1934, at the hands of FBI agents, helped to make the Bu-
reaus reputation and Hoovers. See BRYAN BURROUGH, PUBLIC ENEMIES: AMERICAS
GREATEST CRIME WAVE AND THE BIRTH OF THE FBI, 193334, at 40216 (2004). On Hoo-
vers use of battles against high-profile criminals to raise his own political profile, see RICHARD
GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 18993, 196209
(1987).

124
On the Ten Most Wanted list, see The FBIs Ten Most Wanted Fugitives: Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/topten/tenfaq.htm (last visited May 12, 2008).


only bigger by charging and convicting Richard Whitney, the dis-
graced head of the New York Stock Exchange, and Lucky Luciano,
then New Yorks leading Mafia don.
125
Dewey became a national
hero: Time magazine put him on its cover in early 1937;
126
by the
summer of 1939 (Dewey was then a 37-year-old local prosecutor who
had never won an election outside Manhattan), he was the leading
candidate to succeed Franklin D. Roosevelt in the White House, more
popular than FDR himself.
127
But for Adolf Hitler, Whitneys and
Lucianos convictions might have made Dewey President eight
years before his upset loss to Harry Truman.
Other politicians noticed. SEC Chair William O. Douglass cru-
sade against Wall Street in the late 1930s,
128
Estes Kefauvers nation-
ally televised Senate hearings on links between the Mafia and big-city
Democratic machines in the early 1950s,
129
Robert Kennedy and the
1959 Senate Rackets Committee hearings that exposed Jimmy
Hoffa,
130
even Joe McCarthy and his efforts to expose subversion in
the State and Defense Departments
131
these exercises in the sym-
bolic politics of crime were Deweys descendants, Hoovers heirs.
Douglas and McCarthy, Kefauver and Kennedy won fame and power
not by fighting crime but by talking about it. The tactic worked:
Douglas became the youngest Supreme Court Justice since Joseph

125
See RICHARD NORTON SMITH, THOMAS E. DEWEY AND HIS TIMES 176206, 24950
(1982). Dewey convicted Luciano of multiple counts of conspiracy to commit prostitution. Id. at
20506. The prostitution charges seem an obvious law enforcement tactic now, but the tactic
was at least somewhat novel then: most prosecutors probably assumed that voters would attach
no value to such convictions. Dewey saw that the political payoff from criminal prosecution
depended more on the identity of the defendant than on the law that formed the basis of the
conviction.

126
See Fight Against Fear, TIME, Feb. 1, 1937, at 14.

127
SMITH, supra note 125, at 285 (reporting Gallup Poll results showing Dewey as the choice
of 50% of Republicans for his partys presidential nomination, and giving Dewey 58% in a head-
to-head matchup with FDR). Dewey won most of the primaries in 1940 and led on the first three
ballots of the Republican convention, before losing to Wendell Willkie on the sixth ballot.
CHARLES PETERS, FIVE DAYS IN PHILADELPHIA 57108 (2005); SMITH, supra note 125, at
294314.

128
See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS 12454 (2003).

129
JOSEPH BRUCE GORMAN, KEFAUVER: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 74102 (1971); WIL-
LIAM HOWARD MOORE, THE KEFAUVER COMMITTEE AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME:
19501952 (1974).

130
For a critical view of Kennedys work on the Rackets Committee, see Paul Jacobs, Extra-
curricular Activities of the McClellan Committee, 51 CAL. L. REV. 296 (1963).

131
The literature on McCarthyism is massive. For a good general discussion of the Wisconsin
Senators work and legacy, see JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE
UNITED STATES, 19451974, at 196205, 26470 (1996) [hereinafter PATTERSON, GRAND
EXPECTATIONS].


Story, and was nearly chosen as FDRs running mate in 1944.
132
Ke-
fauver eliminated a sitting President from the presidential race in 1952
and was a leading contender for his partys presidential nomination
that year and in 1956.
133
Kennedy became Attorney General on the
strength of a reputation for doggedness earned in the Hoffa hear-
ings.
134
McCarthy, a dissolute drunk, was for a time one of the most
powerful men in the United States.
These creative politicians changed the governance of Americas
justice system. Before Hoover and Dewey, the politics of crime mostly
resembled the politics of fixing potholes: local voters governed local of-
ficials who administered the relevant government services locally.
State legislators and members of Congress were small players; aside
from the occasional vice war, substantive criminal law was not the
subject of high-profile legislation. Beginning in the 1930s, that ceased
to be true. The Lindbergh kidnapping prompted a federal criminal
statute,
135
just as the rise of celebrity gangsters led to the National
Firearms Act
136
and the Anti-Racketeering Act.
137
These bills were
not designed to stamp out kidnapping or to regulate the firearms trade;
rather, they were tools used to exploit the publicity surrounding fa-
mous crimes like Bruno Hauptmanns
138
and famous criminals like
John Dillinger and Pretty Boy Floyd.
139
Over time, state legislators
came to embrace the same practice, as shown by the wave of anti-
carjacking laws that followed a famous Maryland crime in 1992.
140

132
On Douglass Supreme Court appointment, see MURPHY, supra note 128, at 16575. On
the 1944 vice-presidential nomination, see id. at 21130. The man who was chosen to run with
FDR, Harry Truman, became President upon Roosevelts death in April 1945. PATTERSON,
GRAND EXPECTATIONS, supra note 131, at 137. It could easily have been Douglas.

133
GORMAN, supra note 129, at 10359, 21165. In 1952, crime not only made Kefauvers
name, but also served as his key campaign issue. See id. at 142.

134
Of course, the fact that his brother was the President whose campaign he had managed had
something to do with the appointment. Still, but for the Rackets Committee hearings, the selec-
tion would have been politically impossible. For a good discussion of Kennedys appointment and
the reasons for it, see VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE xii-xx (1971).

135
Pub. L. No. 72-189, 47 Stat. 326 (1932); see also HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL
MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 47879 (1937).

136
Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 922 (2000) and
26 U.S.C. 5861 (2000)).

137
Pub. L. No. 73-376, 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (replaced by the Hobbs Act, which is codified at 18
U.S.C. 1951 (2000)).

138
Hauptmann was convicted of first-degree murder for the kidnapping and killing of the
Lindberghs infant son. Russell B. Porter, Hauptmann Guilty, Sentenced to Death for Murder of
the Lindbergh Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1935, at A1.

139
See SIMON, supra note 18, at 4649; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 626
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the National Firearms Act as targeting weapons char-
acteristically used only by professional gangsters like Al Capone, Pretty Boy Floyd, and their
henchmen).

140
See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 31, at 53132 & nn.10710.


Laws like these give prosecutors more cards to play in plea bargaining
sessions, and thereby give jurors fewer opportunities to exercise the
discretion that characterized criminal justice in early-twentieth-century
Northern cities. Such laws also make the justice system more central-
ized, less locally governed.
Which leads to the second pair of trends: the rise of black crime in
Northern cities and the coincident rise of middle-class white suburbs
surrounding those cities. The first half of the twentieth century saw
black crime rates in the North rise sharply, becoming a large multiple
of white crime rates.
141
As Roger Lane has explained, industrialization
provided economic opportunity for young white men who controlled
their antisocial impulses, and taught those same young men the disci-
pline essential to orderly urban life. Blacks were largely excluded
from the markets that offered the best opportunities for upward mobil-
ity save for the years immediately before and during World War II,
when the gap between black and white crime rates narrowed substan-
tially. After the war, economic discrimination took hold again, and
black crime returned to its earlier path.
142

Initially, rising black crime did not have dramatic effects on crime
rates in Northern cities because those cities black populations were
small.
143
After the war, that story changed as Table 4 shows. The
Table records the murder rate and the black percentage of city popula-
tion for selected Northern cities and for the nation as a whole, at ten-
year intervals:

141
See ADLER, supra note 60, at 127 fig.6; Lane, Homicide Trends, supra note 69, at 7072 &
tbl.2.2. The size of the racial disparity in Northern prison populations in 1950, see supra note 61,
suggests a large disparity in crime rates. Marvin Wolfgangs famous study of juvenile crime in
Philadelphia likewise found such a disparity. See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELIN-
QUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972).

142
For a good, brief exposition of this argument, see Lane, Homicide Trends, supra note 69, at
5664, 7074. William Julius Wilson used a similar argument to explain the high levels of vio-
lence and drug crime in urban black neighborhoods of the 1980s and 1990s. See WILLIAM
JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 2233 (1987); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS:
THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 2123, 5561 (1996).

143
See ADLER, supra note 60, at 134, 239 (blacks accounted for less than 5% of Chicagos
population in 1920); Lane, Homicide Trends, supra note 69, at 72 tbl.2.2 (black Philadelphians
were 5% of that citys population in 1900, rising to 10% by 1928).


TABLE 4. MURDER RATE AND BLACK SHARE
OF GENERAL POPULATION
144

City 1950 1960 1970 1980
Boston 1.4 5% 3.9 9% 17.8 16% 16.4 22%
Chicago 7.1 14% 10.3 23% 24.1 33% 28.9 40%
Cleveland 6.8 16% 9.6 29% 36.1 38% 46.2 44%
Detroit 6.1 16% 9.0 29% 32.7 44% 45.7 63%
New York 3.7 9% 5.0 14% 14.1 21% 25.7 38%
Philadelphia 5.9 18% 7.5 26% 18.1 34% 25.8 38%
United States 5.3 10% 4.7 11% 8.3 11% 10.7 12%

As the black share of the urban Norths population grew, so did the
murderousness of Northern city streets. Violent crime became increas-
ingly localized in cities with large black communities.
Meanwhile, the white suburbs surrounding those cities exploded.
Both local district attorneys and trial judges are elected county-wide in
the United States; metropolitan counties typically include both cities
and close-in suburbs. The suburban share of those counties popula-
tions rose in the generation after the war and cities share declined.
In 1940, Chicagoans were 70% of the population of the Chicago met-
ropolitan area; by 1980, their share had fallen to 42%.
145
Atlantas
percentage of its metropolitan population fell from 58 to 21 during
those same forty years; Clevelands fell from 69 to 30, Detroits from
68 to 28.
146
Wherever counties included both urban and suburban
voters, the mix of those two categories changed: suburban voters grew
more numerous, and city voters less so. White suburbanites power
over local prosecutors and trial judges grew, even as those officials fo-
cused a larger share of their attention on crime in urban black
neighborhoods.

144
I use Eric Monkkonens data for the figures on the United States, and for New Yorks mur-
der rate in 1950. See MONKKONEN, supra note 89. Homicide data for the other cities are taken
from UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1950, supra note 8, at 9599 tbl.35; UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS: 1960, supra note 8, at 129 tbl.38; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1970, supra note 8, at 185
tbl.60; and UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1980, supra note 8, at 97127 tbl.6. City population
data, including the black percentage of various cities populations, come from CAMPBELL GIB-
SON & KAY JUNG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL CENSUS STATISTICS ON POPULA-
TION TOTALS BY RACE, 1790 TO 1990, AND BY HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1790 TO 1990, FOR LARGE
CITIES AND OTHER URBAN PLACES IN THE UNITED STATES, tbls.5, 14, 22, 23, 33, 36 & 39
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076.html. The
black percentages of the United States population for the relevant years are taken from 1962
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 24 tbl.15; and 1982 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra
note 1, at 21 tbl.24.

145
See 1951 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, tbls.55 & 56; 1981 STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT, supra note 1, tbls.23 & 24.

146


Of course, white residents of metropolitan areas had always gov-
erned their black neighbors, even in the North: recall that Ossian
Sweet was freed by a white lawyer, white jurors, and a white judge.
Before the mid-twentieth century, though, that fact had smaller ef-
fects on Northern criminal justice than one might suppose. Black
neighborhoods accounted for a small fraction of Northern cities popu-
lations. The neighborhoods that dominated urban crime working-
class white neighborhoods, mostly European immigrants and their off-
spring also governed urban policing and, to a large degree, urban
criminal justice generally. The lenient doctrines and practices used in
blue-collar white neighborhoods spilled over to urban blacks.
147
The
growth of large, high-crime black neighborhoods in Northern cities,
along with the coincident explosion of white suburbs surrounding
those cities, made that egalitarian equilibrium hard to maintain.
The third pair of trends the rise of constitutional criminal pro-
cedure and the consequent rise of bidding-war politics made it
harder still. Before 1950, procedural litigation was a small share of
criminal litigation. Criminal procedure doctrines were, by contempo-
rary standards, simple and spare. The growth of state constitutional
law in the 1950s
148
began to change that state of affairs. The criminal
procedure revolution of the 1960s obliterated it, and thereby changed
the politics of crime. As the risk of pro-defendant constitutional rul-
ings grew, so did politicians incentives to find ways to evade those rul-
ings. Broader and more specific criminal prohibitions made guilty
pleas easier to extract; tougher sentencing rules did the same. Coinci-
dentally or not, criminal liability grew both broader and more rule-like
after the Warren Court decisions of the 1960s, and severe sentencing
rules multiplied.
149
Those changes added to the power of the state and

147
See supra pp. 198789, 199596.

148
See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Courts Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 137982, 1394, 1411
(2004). Curiously, commentary in the 1950s paid little attention to state-law developments, focus-
ing instead on the more modest changes in federal constitutional law. See, e.g., Walter V. Schae-
fer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1956).

149
On the rise of rule-based sentencing in the states, see ZIMRING ET AL., THREE STRIKES,
supra note 16; and Symposium, Sentencing: Whats at Stake for the States?, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
933 (2005). On the rise and (apparent) fall of detailed and severe sentencing rules for federal
cases, see Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315 (2005). On the breadth of substantive criminal law, see
DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 354
(2008). On the link between breadth and specificity, see Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra
note 31, at 51519, 55961, 57879. For an argument linking substantive laws breadth to the
post-1960 expansion of constitutional criminal procedure, see William J. Stuntz, The Political
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 80207 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, Po-
litical Constitution].


national electorates who choose legislators, and reduced the power of
the local communities from which criminal juries are drawn.
Had these trends taken hold in the Gilded Age, big-city police
forces would have reduced their impact. That didnt happen. Instead,
urban police forces grew more professionalized, hence more distant
from the city neighborhoods officers patrolled. Police unions grew
more powerful, overturning the patronage hiring practices of the past.
Meritocratic hiring and seniority-based protections took hold just
when the older style of police hiring would have helped black job
applicants.
150

Pro-defendant criminal procedure doctrines were not responsible
for white power over urban policing. But those doctrines were at least
partly responsible for the rise of the punitive politics of crime at the
national level. This point requires a brief detour. Before the 1960s,
conservative politicians were either indifferent toward crime or mildly
libertarian in their attitudes toward criminal defendants. Conservative
Republican President William Howard Taft opposed Prohibition;
151
his
son Robert criticized the Nuremberg prosecutions.
152
Save for the fa-
thers fondness for trust-busting and the sons late-career flirtation
with McCarthyism,
153
neither Taft ever sought to make political hay
from crime. For political conservatives, that stance was natural.
Criminal punishment is an especially intrusive form of government
regulation. Spending on criminal justice including prison spending
is redistributive: money spent to warehouse poor criminals comes
disproportionately from rich taxpayers pockets. Conservative politi-
cians dislike government regulation and redistributive spending.
Two conservative governors in the liberal 1960s George Wallace
and Ronald Reagan upended that tradition.
154
Before Wallace,
Southern politicians chief goal with respect to crime was to keep the

150
On the professionalizing trends in mid-twentieth-century policing, see FOGELSON, supra
note 110, at 16792; DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 3438 (2008)
[hereinafter SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY].

151
See Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be Revived?, 51 DUKE L.J.
1513, 1540 n.109 (2002).

152
On then-Senator Tafts criticism of the Nuremberg trials on rule-of-law grounds, see JAMES
T. PATTERSON, MR. REPUBLICAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT A. TAFT 32629 (1972). Tafts
libertarianism ran deep: while serving in the Ohio legislature, he opposed Klan-sponsored legisla-
tion banning dancing on Sundays and mandating Bible readings in public schools. See id. at 96
97, 10002.

153
See id. at 44549 (discussing the relationship between Senators Taft and McCarthy).

154
Interestingly, neither Wallace nor Reagan had deep roots in American conservatism. Wal-
lace grew to political maturity as a liberal populist and ally of Big Jim Folsom, one of the
Souths most liberal mid-century politicians. See STEPHAN LESHER, GEORGE WALLACE:
AMERICAN POPULIST 8183, 99101 (1994). Before his ideological conversion, Reagan was a
proNew Deal Democrat. MATTHEW DALLEK, THE RIGHT MOMENT 1, 2932 (2000).


federal government away from it.
155
Wallace sought to keep the fed-
eral government away from civil rights but when the subject was
crime, he focused not on states rights but on black criminals, and
(even more) on the liberal white judges who allegedly protected them.
His 1968 stump speech included these lines: If you walk out of this
[hall] tonight and someone knocks you on the head, hell be out of jail
before youre out of the hospital, and on Monday morning theyll try
the policeman instead of the criminal.
156
As race riots struck many
American cities, Wallace bragged about Alabamas version of social
peace: They start a riot down here, first one of em to pick up a brick
gets a bullet in the brain.
157
Such racially charged rhetoric won votes:
Wallace ran strong races in three Democratic presidential primaries in
1964; four years later, he carried five states and won 13% of the popu-
lar vote on a third-party ticket.
158

Reagan was more subtle instead of rhetorical bullets to the head,
Reagan noted sadly that [o]ur city streets are jungle paths after
dark
159
and also more effective. In his 1966 campaign for Califor-
nias governorship, Reagan took Wallaces tough-on-crime rhetoric,
made it more respectable,
160
and used it to draw blue-collar Democrats
across the partisan aisle in huge numbers: enough to win by a million-
vote margin against a seemingly unbeatable opponent.
161
In doing so,
Reagan married two political constituencies that his contemporaries

155
Two generations of Southern members of Congress fought to prevent federal anti-lynching
legislation. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF
THE SENATE 187202, 21218 (2002). During his Dixiecrat campaign for the White House,
Strom Thurmond told New Yorkers that federal civil rights legislation would be as much an af-
front to his state as a federal ban on gangland murders would be to theirs. ZACHARY KARA-
BELL, THE LAST CAMPAIGN: HOW HARRY TRUMAN WON THE 1948 ELECTION 224 (2000).

156
POWE, supra note 30, at 410 (quoting Wallace) (internal quotation marks omitted).

157
Dan T. Carter, Legacy of Rage: George Wallace and the Transformation of American Politics,
62 J. S. HIST. 3, 11 (1996) (quoting Wallace) (internal quotation mark omitted).

158
See MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM ROOSE-
VELT TO REAGAN 43436, 44951 (1990); LESHER, supra note 154, at 28485, 295, 30304.

159
DALLEK, supra note 154, at 195 (quoting Ronald Reagan, Speech Announcing Candidacy
for Governor of California (Jan. 4, 1966)) (internal quotation mark omitted). The jungle refer-
ence was a clear piece of racial code. Reagan wasnt that subtle.

160
One of Reagans key tactics was to link urban rioting with disorder on college campuses
a largely white crime problem. See id. at 18589, 19596. That move helped him appeal to white
racists without identifying himself as one of them. Reagans gifts at that enterprise were consid-
erable. See, e.g., LOU CANNON, GOVERNOR REAGAN: HIS RISE TO POWER 122, 13233, 139
40 (2003) (discussing Reagans opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964); id. at 26368 (detailing
Reagans efforts to appeal to Wallace supporters during his 1968 campaign for the Republican
presidential nomination).

161
Reagans opponent Pat Brown, the two-term Democratic governor and father of
Reagans successor, Jerry Brown was known as the giant killer because of his two previous
gubernatorial victories. DALLEK, supra note 154, at 1316, 2023. Brown won the office in 1958
by beating then-Senator William Knowland, a leading presidential contender before his defeat.
Four years later, Brown won reelection by beating former Vice President Richard Nixon.


thought were incompatible: economic conservatives who had opposed
the New Deal and unionized workers who had formed its core base of
support.
Partisan politics was transformed. To Northern and Western poli-
ticians of the 1950s and early 1960s, blacks and procivil rights whites
were the swing voters for whose allegiance the two parties competed.
Dwight Eisenhower won 40% of the black vote in 1956; Richard
Nixon won nearly a third in 1960.
162
While blacks were the object of
partisan competition, blue-collar whites were generally seen as a core
part of the Democratic base.
163
Reagan intuited that, thanks to the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations support for civil rights, blacks
and white liberals were now solidly Democratic; yesterdays swing
voters didnt swing anymore. Rising crime, falling punishment, and
liberal Supreme Court decisions protecting criminal defendants pro-
cedural rights had created a new set of swing voters: blue-collar
whites. That changed electoral configuration gave conservative Re-
publicans the opportunity to build a national majority, just when that
opportunity seemed most distant.
The Warren Courts criminal procedure decisions were crucial to
that process, in three respects. First, those decisions allowed politi-
cians to attack black crime indirectly by condemning the white judges
who protected black criminals, not the criminals themselves. That
gave conservative politicians a chance to appeal to more than racist
whites. Second, the Court made street crime violent felonies and
felony thefts: classic state-law crimes a national political issue for
the first time in American history. One reason crime played a larger
role in national politics in the last decades of the twentieth century
than ever before
164
is that national politicians could talk about the
kinds of crime that voters most feared: not Mafia corruption or labor
racketeering
165
but robbery and burglary, murder and rape. Earlier
generations had assumed that only local officials concerned themselves
with such crimes. Earl Warren changed that political equation.
Third, because the Court was the Court, crime talk was cheap talk:
politicians couldnt change the constitutional rulings that prompted so

162
On Eisenhowers vote, see DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 19301970, at 158 (1982); on Nixons, see BARONE, supra note
158, at 557.

163
Democrats won the large congressional majority they held throughout the 1960s in the off-
year election of 1958, in which Republican candidates throughout the country campaigned for
anti-union right-to-work laws. See BARONE, supra note 158, at 30104.

164
For the best discussion to date, see SIMON, supra note 18.

165
The focus of Estes Kefauvers Senate hearings in 19501951 was Mafia influence over big-
city Democratic machines. Robert Kennedy first won fame as chief counsel to the Senate commit-
tee holding hearings on labor racketeering in the late 1950s the same hearings that made
Jimmy Hoffa a household name. See supra pp. 19992000.


much controversy, so their criticisms were unburdened by the need to
exercise governing responsibility.
Reagan and Wallace exemplified that last point. Californias im-
prisonment rate fell by nearly half during Reagans two terms in Sac-
ramento.
166
Alabamas imprisonment rate did likewise under Wal-
lace.
167
Neither of these tough-on-crime governors did anything to
reverse those trends. Their tough rhetoric was just that: rhetoric, with
no discernible policy implications. Like Kefauvers hearings and Hoo-
vers Ten Most Wanted list, the conservative politics of crime was an
exercise in political symbolism that seemed to have no substantive
consequences.
But symbols do not remain purely symbolic for long; substantive
consequences have a way of catching up to them. When conservatives
like Reagan, Wallace, and Nixon
168
won blue-collar white votes by at-
tacking soft judges and (indirectly) black criminals, liberal politicians
were forced to respond. Liberal Democratic President Lyndon John-
son supported and signed legislation that funneled money to local po-
lice and purported to overrule Miranda v. Arizona:
169
the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
170
the first of what be-
came a long series of federal crime bills targeting urban street crime.
171

Liberal Democratic presidential candidate Robert Kennedy made
tough measures against urban disorder a centerpiece of his campaign
for his partys nomination.
172
Jimmy Carter embodiment of the
Southern left in the early 1970s presided over a 40% increase in
Georgias imprisonment rate as governor, while neighboring Ala-
bamas prison population stagnated.
173
Liberal Republican Governor
Nelson Rockefeller proposed ramped-up penalties for heroin offenders;
the so-called Rockefeller laws became the model for the next wave of

166
Californias imprisonment rate fell from 146 in 1966 to 84 in 1972. See supra note 17.

167
Between 1962 and 1976, Alabamas imprisonment rate fell from 166 to 83. See supra note
17. George and Lurleen Wallace won all four of the gubernatorial elections during those fourteen
years.

168
Like Wallace and Reagan before him, Nixon was no life-long conservative. In 1960, he
sought the White House by running to the left, seeking and winning Nelson Rockefellers support
and angering Barry Goldwater and the Republican right in the process. See BARONE, supra note
158, at 330. In 1968, Nixon switched sides, winning longtime segregationist Strom Thurmonds
support at the cost of alienating the procivil rights Rockefeller wing of the party. See id. at 442.
The law and order issue played a key role in that right turn, and in Nixons subsequent victory.
See MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE
CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 16278 (2005).

169
384 U.S. 436 (1966).

170
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197. For the story of Johnsons involvement with this legisla-
tion, see FLAMM, supra note 168, at 13241.

171
See NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL INITIATIVES,
19601993 (1994).

172
See FLAMM, supra note 168, at 14850.

173
See 1991 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 637 tbl.6.72.


tough state drug statutes.
174
The same year Rockefeller signed the
laws that bore his name, New Yorks imprisonment rate turned up af-
ter fifteen years of decline.
175

For the balance of the 1970s as liberal Democrats controlled
Congress, two-thirds of state legislatures, the large majority of gover-
norships, and nearly all big-city mayoralties prison populations rose
steadily, after falling throughout the country in the preceding dozen
years.
176
Americas punitive turn did not come from the political right,
at least not initially. Rather, the rise in punishment came from the
lefts response to the rights rhetoric.
177
That response soon bred its
own response. Once liberal politicians like Johnson and Kennedy em-
braced punitive politics, the rights bluff had been called. Conserva-
tive politicians had two choices: they could back down, cede the crime
issue to their liberal opponents and admit that their tough rhetoric was
cheap talk. Or they could follow suit, and ramp up punishment still
more.
They followed suit. Reagan was once again a key player, the model
for his party and for his ideological camp. As Governor, he had spe-
cialized in combining tough talk with soft policy, or no policy at all.
As President, his walk matched his talk: he signed into law the most
draconian piece of drug legislation to date;
178
partly as a consequence,
the federal imprisonment rate doubled in the 1980s.
179
In an increas-
ingly conservative age, state prison populations saw similar trends.
180

The conservative politics of crime remained symbolic at its core but
the symbolism worked only if conservatives were seen as tougher than
liberals. What began as a political bluff had become a bidding war.

174
See Alan Chartock, Narcotics Addiction: The Politics of Frustration, PROC. ACAD. POL.
SCI., May 1974, at 239, 24248.

175
The Rockefeller laws were signed in 1973. New Yorks imprisonment rate fell in at least ten
of the preceding fifteen years (data concerning two of the remaining five years are missing). For
the data, see the annual volumes of STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1. 1973 saw the first of
twenty-seven consecutive increases in that rate. 1991 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 637
tbl.6.72; 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 501 tbl.6.29.

176
Between 1972 and 1980, the nations imprisonment rate rose by half, after falling by 22% in
the preceding eleven years. See ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.28.2006.

177
Cf. SIMON, supra note 18, at 4952 (discussing Robert Kennedys posture toward crime); id.
at 90101 (same, regarding Lyndon Johnson).

178
For the best account, by far, of the passage of the federal legislation that mandated the hun-
dred-to-one crack/powder sentencing ratio meaning, possession of one gram of crack cocaine is
punished as severely as possession of one hundred grams of cocaine powder see David A.
Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995) [hereinafter
Sklansky, Cocaine and Race].

179
In 1980, the year before Reagan took office, the federal imprisonment rate was 9 per
100,000. By 1989 the year Reagan left the White House the federal imprisonment rate had
risen to 19. ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.29.2006.

180
From 1980 to 1989, the state imprisonment rate rose from 130 to 253. Id.


The bidding war continued through the 1990s, when liberal De-
mocrats faced the same problem that conservative Republicans faced
in the 1980s, and embraced the same solution. Ann Richards served as
the Democratic Governor of Texas from 1991 to 1995; she followed
Republican Bill Clements and was replaced by Republican George W.
Bush. Under Clements and Bush, Texass imprisonment rate rose 29%
and 5%, respectively; under Richards, it rose 128%.
181
Democrat Mel
Carnahan replaced Republican John Ashcroft as Missouris Governor
in 1993. In Ashcrofts two terms in office, Missouris prison popula-
tion grew more slowly than the nations; in Carnahans two terms, the
number of Missouri prison inmates grew almost twice as fast as the
national average.
182
Democrat Douglas Wilders four years in the Vir-
ginia statehouse saw that states imprisonment rate increase 46%.
Under Wilders Republican replacement George Allen, who cam-
paigned on a promise of ending parole
183
imprisonment fell 2%.
184

The moment that best captured both liberals dilemma and their
response to it came shortly before the New Hampshire primary in
1992. Then-Governor Bill Clinton, falling in the polls, returned to Ar-
kansas to supervise the execution of a mentally retarded black inmate
named Ricky Ray Rector.
185
It worked: Clinton finished a close sec-
ond in New Hampshire, and went on to win the White House. The
Rector execution was Clintons gruesome answer to the elder George
Bushs use of Willie Horton to defeat Michael Dukakis four years ear-
lier. The character of the answer captures the relevant political dy-
namic. This was no philosophical argument between opposing sides;
rather, it was a war of images in which, strangely, both sides sought to
send the same message. As the Horton and Rector incidents illus-

181
See id. The figures in this paragraph were calculated using the imprisonment rates re-
ported in the Online Sourcebook as of December 31 of the relevant years. Since governors usually
begin their terms in early January, there is a nearly year-long time lag between the beginning of
each new governors term and the imprisonment rate which, in the text, I attribute to that gover-
nors administration. The time lag is consciously chosen; it ordinarily takes at least a year for
state-level policy decisions to have significant effects on the relevant states imprisonment rate.

182
From 1985 to 1993 Ashcrofts term as Missouris governor the states imprisonment
rate rose from 194 to 308, an increase of 59%, while the nations imprisonment rate rose from 200
to 350: a 75% increase. Id. In Ashcrofts second term, imprisonment rose a mere 15%; in his last
two years in office, the rise was less than 1% compared to a 13% increase in the nation as a
whole. Id. From 1993 to 2001 Carnahan died in October 2000; a Democratic successor served
the balance of his second term Missouris imprisonment rate rose from 308 to 509, an increase
of 65%; the nations imprisonment rate rose 34% during those eight years. See id.

183
Donald P. Baker, Winner Talks Tough, Cites Mandate for Change, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
1993, at A1.

184

185
See Christopher Lydon, Sex, War, and Death: Covering Clinton Became a Test of Character
For the Press, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., MayJune 1992, at 57, 60.


trated, the politics of crime had devolved into a game of can-you-top-
this.
Bush probably found Lee Atwaters Horton ad distasteful,
186
and
Clinton may have felt similarly about Rectors execution. If so, the
two presidents distaste highlights an important feature of late-
twentieth-century politics: right and left alike supported criminal jus-
tice policies that, in principle, they found repugnant. The Reaganite
right disbelieved in big government, yet helped create a prison system
of unprecedented scope and size. The Clintonian left opposed racially
discriminatory punishment, yet reinforced and expanded the most ra-
cially skewed prison population in American history. The source of
this conflict between politics and principle was the same on both sides.
Crime policy was not a means of addressing crime and the policys
consequences for the poor blacks who were both victimized by crime
and punished for it were, politically speaking, irrelevant. Each side
supported punitive policies because the other side had done so, and
because changing course seemed politically risky.
Such political stances worked because the votes that mattered most
the votes for which the two parties competed, the ones most likely
to switch sides if the other sides crime posture seemed more attractive
were not the votes of crime victims and their friends and neighbors,
much less of criminal defendants and their friends and neighbors.
They were the votes of those for whom crime was at once frightening
and distant, those who read about open-air drug markets and the lat-
est gang shootings in the morning paper. Neighborhood democracy
faded, and was replaced by a democracy of angry neighbors. The con-
sequence was much more criminal punishment, distributed much less
equally.
B. Lenity and Severity
The last half of the twentieth century saw two dramatic turns in
criminal justice. The second is famous: the generation-long punitive
turn that drove American prison populations into the stratosphere.
The first is less well known: a generation-long lenient turn that saw
criminal punishment collapse in Northern cities, in the midst of an un-
precedented crime wave. Table 5 captures the magnitude of these two
opposite trends. The Table lists the city homicide rate and state im-
prisonment rate for seven cities: two each from the South, Northeast,
and Midwest, and one from the West Coast. Notice the difference be-
tween the two Southern cities and the rest:

186
Even Atwater appears to have found it distasteful, after the fact. See John Brady, Im Still
Lee Atwater, WASH. POST MAG., Dec. 1, 1996, at 16, 45 (discussing Atwaters deathbed apology
for his treatment of the Horton issue).


TABLE 5. CITY HOMICIDE RATE AND STATE IMPRISONMENT
RATE, SELECTED CITIES, 19502005
187

City 1950 1972 1991 2005
Atlanta 30.5 155 52.8 174 50.9 342 20.9 533
Houston 15.3 77 22.5 136 36.5 297 16.3 691
Boston 1.4 55 16.6 32 19.7 143 12.9 239
New York 3.7 103 21.9 64 29.5 320 6.6 326
Chicago 7.1 91 21.6 50 32.9 247 15.6 351
Detroit 6.1 135 41.5 94 59.3 388 39.3 489
Los Angeles 3.2 98 17.6 84 28.9 318 12.6 466

In Atlanta and Houston, the lenient turn never happened; punish-
ment and crime rose in tandem through the 1950s and 1960s.
188
In the
following three decades, Southern prison populations kept rising while
crime rates plateaued, then fell to something like mid-century levels.
In the rest of the country, imprisonment rates fell by one-third or more
during the 1950s and 1960s, while criminal violence rose through the
roof. In some places, punishment per unit crime appears to have fallen
by more than 80%: a stunningly large decline.
189
Then, beginning in
the mid-1970s, punishment rose through the roof yet crime kept ris-
ing. Just when no one thought it could happen crime fell substantially

187
The left column under each year notes the relevant citys homicide rate; the right column
notes the relevant states imprisonment rate. For New Yorks homicide rate in 1950, I use Eric
Monkkonens data. See MONKKONEN, supra note 89. For the other listed homicide rates, see
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1950, supra note 8, at 9498 tbl.35; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
1972, supra note 8, at 218 tbl.76; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1991, supra note 8, at 11250
tbl.8; and CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, supra note 8, tbl.8. City populations for 1972
(used in computing city homicide rates) are extrapolated from the populations for 1970 and 1980,
which can be found in GIBSON & JUNG, supra note 144, tbls.5, 11, 14, 22, 23, 33 & 44, as can city
populations for 1950. Georgias imprisonment rate in 1950 is taken from CAHALAN, supra note
7, at 30 tbl.3-3. For other states 1950 imprisonment rates, see 1952 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note 1, at 14 tbl.11, 146 tbl.175. For later imprisonment rates, see 1991 SOURCEBOOK, su-
pra note 2, at 637 tbl.6.72; and ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.29.2006.

188
Georgia did experience a brief period of declining prison populations but it lasted a mere
six years and was quickly reversed. In 1964, the states imprisonment rate stood at 168 per
100,000. 1966 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 11 tbl.9, 162 tbl.232. By 1970, that rate
had fallen to 111. 1972 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 11 tbl.10, 161 tbl.264. Two
years later, the imprisonment rate had risen to 174. 1991 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 637
tbl.6.72.

189
In Boston, Detroit, and New York, prisoner-years per murder fell by 90% or more. The ac-
tual drop in punishment per unit crime was no doubt smaller, since imprisonment rates are state-
wide while the homicide rates in Table 5 are city-wide. If the drop in imprisonment was felt most
where crime rates were lowest, then falling punishment in high-crime cities was less extreme than
the figures suggest. Still, it was extreme enough.


beginning in 1992.
190
Even after what Frank Zimring calls the great
American crime decline
191
of the 1990s, violent crime in Northern cit-
ies remains much higher than the pre-1960 historical norm.
If a common theme runs through these cross-cutting trends, the
theme is instability. The last half of the twentieth century was an age
of disequilibrium: rising and falling crime plus steeply rising punish-
ment in the South, unprecedented crime increases coupled with equally
unprecedented punishment decreases and increases in the North. It
was also an age of inequality but this time, the geographic focus of
the inequality was the procivil rights North, not the Jim Crow South.
In the South, the paradigmatic victim of discriminatory criminal
justice in mid-century America was Emmett Till, the black teenager
from Chicago who was murdered for whistling at a white woman in
the inaptly named town of Money, Mississippi in 1955.
192
Surprisingly,
Tills white killers were charged with the crime and brought to trial;
less surprisingly, they were swiftly acquitted.
193
The basic story of the
Till case the justice system failed to protect a black victim from his
white victimizers had long been common in the South. That form
of discrimination was declining by mid-century, as the prosecution of
Tills killers illustrated. South Carolinas imprisonment rate almost
tripled during the 1940s and 1950s; North Carolinas rate doubled, and
Virginias nearly did so.
194
The largely privatized system of law en-
forcement that had long ignored crimes against black victims the
system Hortense Powdermaker described in her study of Depression-
era Mississippi
195
was dying, and increasingly populous Southern
prisons were a sign of its demise. Less discriminatory law enforcement
meant more punishment for crimes victimizing blacks, which in turn
meant rising levels of black incarceration:
196
in the mid-twentieth-

190
See generally THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds.,
2000).

191
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2007).

192
STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL 15
23 (1988).

193
Id. at 2224, 3348. Shortly after their acquittal, the killers confessed to the author of an
article published in Look magazine; the consequent story detailed how they committed the crime.
Id. at 5155.

194
CAHALAN, supra note 7, at 30 tbl.3-3.

195

196
Race-specific imprisonment data from the Jim Crow South are hard to come by, but the
available evidence supports the claim in the text. Between 1937 and 1964, the annual number of
blacks admitted to state prison rose 79% in North Carolina, 43% in South Carolina, 94% in Flor-
ida, and 58% in Texas. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, PRISON-
ERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS AND REFORMATORIES: 1937, at 28 tbl.22; FED. BU-
REAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS: STATE PRISONERS: ADMISSIONS
AND RELEASES, 1964, at 23 tbl.A8. Between the 1940 and 1960 censuses, the black population
rose 14% in North Carolina, 2% in South Carolina, 71% in Florida, and 28% in Texas. See 1965
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 26 tbl.23.


century South as in the twenty-first-century Northeast, most crime
was intraracial.
197

While inequality was falling in the South, it was rising in the North
in two distinct ways, serially. First, punishment in high-crime
cities all but collapsed, in the midst of the worst crime wave in Ameri-
can history. As Table 5 suggests, prison populations fell most in the
places where that crime wave crested highest: throughout the urban-
ized Northeast and Midwest.
198
Taken together, those trends were
revolutionary. After the early 1970s, Americans saw a revolution of a
different sort, as imprisonment rates soared. The number of white
inmates shattered records. The number of black inmates shattered
communities.
199

The consequences of these two turns were disproportionately felt
in black neighborhoods. During the 1960s, imprisonment fell more
among whites (26%) than among blacks (19%)
200
but that fact may
be due chiefly to Southern trends,
201
and the massive crime wave that
coincided with falling punishment was focused on mostly black inner
cities, not on the white suburbs. In the five non-Southern cities listed
in Table 5, the murder rate rose an average of 562% between 1950 and
1972. In the nation as a whole, murders rose 77% during those
years.
202
The combination of skyrocketing crime and falling punish-
ment hit Northern cities, and black neighborhoods within them,
hardest.
The second trend is more familiar: after abandoning black
neighborhoods in the 1950s and 1960s, Northern law enforcement
agencies punished young men in those neighborhoods in numbers
never before seen reinforcing a trend that was already underway in
the South. Strangely, the same political and legal changes that helped
cause the lenient turn of the twentieth centurys third quarter also re-
inforced the punitive turn of its last quarter.
With respect to politics, the preceding section tells the story. Sub-
urban voters cared less about urban crime than did the residents of
city neighborhoods; falling punishment in an era of rising crime was

197
See, e.g., POWDERMAKER, supra note 53, at 39596.

198
See CAHALAN, supra note 7, at 30 tbl.3-3, 38 tbl.3-10. Cahalans figures show that the big-
gest imprisonment drops came in the Midwest and West, as well as in New York the largest
state in the Northeast.

199
For the best discussion to date, see WESTERN, supra note 49.

200
See CAHALAN, supra note 7, at 65 tbl.3-31.

201
Black imprisonment was rising in the South during Jim Crows last days. See sources cited
supra note 196. State-level demographic data on prison populations during these years are sparse,
but it could well be that, in the Northeast and Midwest, the decline in black imprisonment out-
stripped the decline in white imprisonment.

202
In 1950, the murder rate for the United States as a whole stood at 5.3 per 100,000; by 1972,
that rate had risen to 9.4. See sources cited supra note 89.


the natural consequence of suburban indifference. Both the number of
urban police officers per unit population and the urban arrest rate rose
during the 1960s,
203
even as prison populations fell. Those facts sug-
gest that prosecutors and judges, not police officers, were the chief rea-
sons for declining punishment. Then as now, urban police forces
worked for city governments; prosecutors and trial judges were usually
elected county-wide. The officials who cared most about suburban
voters preferences drove punishment levels down.
204

After the early 1970s, indifference gave way to anger; voters sought
something more tangible than tough rhetoric about urban crime. Lo-
cal district attorneys responded.
205
Voters in poor city neighborhoods
might have limited the turn toward more punishment, but they were
outvoted by the suburbs. Local juries might have made the punitive
turn less punitive by acquitting large numbers of defendants, as Chi-
cago juries had done two generations before. But changes in substan-
tive law made acquittals harder to win, and the rising number of
guilty pleas left few trials in which to win them. Fiscal cost might
have signaled that the punishment wave had gone too far, but thanks
to nineteenth-century institutional arrangements, state taxpayers paid
for prison beds while local voters chose the prosecutors who filled
them.
206
To the suburban voters who chose big-city district attorneys,
criminal punishment was nearly a free good. Naturally, they bought
too much of it.
While states paid the tab for growing prison populations, no com-
parable subsidy swelled the ranks of urban police forces. Local gov-
ernments pay 90% of the cost of policing in their jurisdictions, and

203
According to FBI data, the number of police employees per 100,000 urban population stood
at 189 in 1960; the city arrest rate stood at 4762 per 100,000. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1960,
supra note 8, at 95 tbl.20, 105 tbl.31. By 1969, the former number had risen to 216, and the latter
to 4876. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1969, supra note 8, at 127 tbl.37, 148 tbl.49.

204
To some degree, falling criminal punishment was due to liberal prosecutors and judges
ideological aversion to incarcerating criminals. For a good account of this skeptical ideology, see
GARLAND, supra note 18, at 4651. But suburban voters indifference was crucial: without
it, those liberal prosecutors and judges would have lacked the freedom to indulge their lenient
preferences.

205
Between 1974 and 1990, the number of local prosecutors in the United States rose from
17,000 to 20,000 an increase of 18%. Between 1978 and 1991, the number of felony charges
filed in state court more than doubled. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 9 n.19, 25 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz,
Uneasy Relationship], and sources cited therein.

206
This crucial fact was ignored in the legal literature until Robert Misners brilliant article
highlighted it. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996). For an interesting discussion of the interjurisdictional competition
that these institutional arrangements foster, see Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Jus-
tice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831 (2005).


that percentage has been stable over time.
207
Predictably, police budg-
ets have grown much more slowly than prison budgets. The number
of prison inmates per unit population more than tripled in the 1970s
and 1980s; the number of urban police officers per capita held
steady.
208
Police officers and prison cells are substitutes: alternative
means by which governments spend money to battle crime. In the last
thirty-five years, the mix of those two alternatives has changed radi-
cally: in 1970, there were more than twice as many local cops as in-
mates; today, there are more than twice as many inmates as local
cops.
209
Local governments largely determine the character of the mix
cities and counties hire and pay for the police officers who patrol
their streets, and local district attorneys decide whom to prosecute and
for what charges. But those same local governments pay for only one
of the two alternatives.
Notice: The decline of local democracy did not inevitably produce
more punishment, nor did it inevitably produce less. As in the early-
twentieth-century South, it produced both: first much less punishment,
then vastly more. The crucial regulating mechanisms that governed
Northern cities justice systems in the Gilded Age juries selected
from the local population, prosecutors elected by city voters (because
suburban populations were small), police forces ruled by urban ma-
chines that depended on working-class immigrant votes for their sur-
vival faded or disappeared. Bureaucratic detachment, legal proce-
dure, and symbolic politics took their place. The consequences were
poor crime control, rapidly changing punishment practices, and mas-
sive inequality.
Far from checking political excess, constitutional law encouraged it
in both directions. The key mechanism was price. Protective pro-
cedures adopted in the 1960s raised the price law enforcers paid for ar-
rests and convictions when urban violence was already rising, and
when punishment for it was falling. Urban arrests fell sharply in the

207
For the current figures, see ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.1.4.2003. For budget
data from the early 1970s, see 1974 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 33 tbl.1.2.

208
On the imprisonment data, see 1991 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 637 tbl.6.72. Accord-
ing to FBI data, the number of urban police officers per 100,000 population rose from 204 in 1970
to 211 in 1974; in 1989 it stood at 210. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1970, supra note 8, at
163 tbl.51; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1974, supra note 8, at 236 tbl.57; UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: 1989, supra note 8, at 238 tbl.66.

209
The numbers of prison inmates and police officers per 100,000 population in 1970 were 96
and 204, respectively. ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.28.2006; UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: 1970, supra note 8, at 163 tbl.51. In 2005, the analogous numbers were 491 and 230.
ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.28.2006; CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005,
supra note 8, tbl.71.


decades first half,
210
after Mapp v. Ohio
211
imposed the Fourth
Amendments exclusionary rule on state courts. The drop in impris-
onment accelerated in the decades second half,
212
when most of the
key Court decisions regulating criminal trials took hold. After 1970,
when political pressures began pushing punishment levels up, proce-
dural doctrine changed again: this time, making both arrests and con-
victions cheaper for the government. The law made punishment more
costly when there was too little of it, and cheaper when there was far
too much.
The first step in that progression is straightforward. The level of
procedural regulation, both of policing and prosecution, was already
on the rise when the 1960s began: state appellate courts were rapidly
adopting protective procedures like the exclusionary rule and state-
appointed lawyers before the Supreme Court required them to do
so.
213
The Court accelerated that process, beginning in 1961 with
Mapp. Later in the decade, the Justices constitutionalized the right to
counsel (on appeal as well as at trial),
214
the right to discovery,
215
the
law of self-incrimination,
216
the right of compulsory process,
217
the
right to a jury trial,
218
and the right to be free from double jeopardy.
219

These decisions did not transform state-court criminal processes: all
the procedural elements just mentioned already existed; indeed, most
had existed for centuries, which explains their inclusion in the Bill of
Rights. The chief effect of Warren-era criminal procedure decisions
was to raise the level of legal uncertainty. The boundaries of rights
that had been long settled became hotly contested. Contested doctrine
attracts litigation. Procedural claims mushroomed.
220

210
In 1961, the FBIs city arrests data showed 4776 arrests per 100,000 urban population; by
1964, that figure had fallen to 4325. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1961, supra note 8, at 97
tbl.23; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1964, supra note 8, at 123 tbl.30.

211
367 U.S. 643 (1961).

212
Illinoiss imprisonment rate stood at 90 per 100,000 in 1960, falling to 78 in 1965, then
dropping to 57 in 1970. New Yorks imprisonment rate fell from 109 in 1957 to 97 in 1965, then
fell to 66 in 1970. Georgias rate was 178 in 1959 Southern prison populations were larger than
Northern ones declined to 170 in 1964, then fell sharply to 111 in 1970. Californias imprison-
ment rate rose in the early 1960s, from 137 in 1960 to 146 in 1966, before dropping to 87 in 1971.
These data are taken from the relevant volumes of the STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1,
and from 1992 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 609 tbl.6.59.

213
See Lain, supra note 148, at 137982, 138999.

214
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (trials); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (appeals).

215
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

216
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

217
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).

218
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

219
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).

220
I have explained this dynamic elsewhere. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 205,
at 3552.


These destabilizing court decisions arose from egalitarian motives:
the Justices saw the Bill of Rights as a procedural Equal Protection
Clause, a means of assisting poor black suspects and defendants as
they battled a criminal justice system run by and for wealthier
whites.
221
To a surprising degree, the Justices egalitarian goals were
fulfilled. Not only did arrests fall in the 1960s arrests of black sus-
pects fell more, and in a time of rising black crime.
222
Imprisonment
rates fell too, at a time when rich criminal defendants were a rare
breed. And the trial process grew friendlier to poor defendants, at
least as a relative matter. A large number of studies across a wide
range of jurisdictions over a period of several decades show that indi-
gent criminal defendants defendants poor enough to receive state-
paid lawyers achieve as good or better outcomes as defendants who
hire their own lawyers.
223
The criminal procedure decisions of the
1960s explain that surprising result.
But pendulums that swing in one direction tend to swing back.
The very doctrines that raised the cost of policing and prosecution cre-
ated political pressure to reduce those costs. The consequence was a
more streamlined process than the one that existed before Earl Warren
and his fellow Justices crafted their constitutional revolution.
The character of the relevant procedural rules offered a ready
means of reducing the legal tax Warren and his colleagues had im-
posed on law enforcers. That tax consisted almost entirely of proce-
dural rights exercised by individual suspects and defendants. In
American law, individuals who hold legal rights may use them as they
wish: rights are like alienable property interests, waivable at will by
rightholders. Cutting Warrens procedural taxes was easy: one need
only establish generous waiver rules, and help police and prosecutors
to induce as many waivers as possible. After 1970, the Supreme Court
took the first step, while legislators took the second. Police officers

221
Race is the familiar subtext of Warren-era criminal procedure doctrine. See sources cited
supra note 30. David Sklansky persuasively argues that a less familiar subtext police oppres-
sion of gay Americans likewise influenced the criminal procedure decisions of the 1960s. See
David Alan Sklansky, One Train May Hide Another: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of
Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2008). Notice that both subtexts concern ine-
quality: the central theme of the law of criminal procedure.

222
According to the FBIs city arrest data, the arrest rate fell 9% from 1961 to 1964; the rate of
black arrests fell 12%. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1961, supra note 8, at 97 tbl.23; UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORTS: 1964, supra note 8, at 123 tbl.30. As a percentage of the urban black
population, black arrests fell 18%. See 1976 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 18 tbl.19.
By 1969, the overall arrest rate was slightly higher than in 1961 but the black arrest rate was
6% lower. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1969, supra note 8, at 127 tbl.37.

223
For a recent example, see HARLOW, supra note 10. Older studies to the same effect are dis-
cussed in Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained
Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 36578
(1991).


and prosecutors reaped the benefit: dramatic rises in rates of arrest,
prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment.
Fourth Amendment law bars intrusive searches without probable
cause and, sometimes, a warrant. If the target of the search consents
to it, however, the warrant and probable cause requirement go by the
boards. Post-1970 Supreme Court decisions make obtaining consent
easy: police need only ask; if the circumstances suggest that police re-
quests are the functional equivalent of commands,
224
so much the bet-
ter.
225
Fifth Amendment law bars the interrogation of arrested sus-
pects without a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the
suspects rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel.
226

Such waivers are easily induced, given the generous Miranda waiver
doctrines the post-Miranda Court has crafted.
227
The various trial
rights the Constitution guarantees apply only to defendants who take
their cases to trial. Guilty pleas waive those rights, and the state is
free to use even extortionate threats to induce pleas.
228

In all these areas, constitutional law establishes procedural hurdles
the state must clear but also creates cheap alternatives if clearing
those hurdles seems too costly. The net result is to make searches, in-
terrogations, and criminal prosecutions cheaper, not more expensive.
Mike Seidman captured the dynamic in a brilliant article about
Miranda doctrine in the early 1990s.
229
Before Miranda, courts re-
viewed police interrogation under a voluntariness standard. Since that
decision, judges have relied on Mirandas warnings and invocation
rules to ensure that confessions are the product of suspects free choice.
Consequently, Seidman notes, confessions that might have been sup-
pressed before Miranda are routinely admitted today.
230
Before Mapp
v. Ohio, the probable cause requirement applied to local police
searches but was not rigorously enforced, because of the absence of a
binding exclusionary rule. In the age of consent searches, probable

224
For a study showing that most people do think that even people who are unusually well-
informed about their legal rights see David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at
the Fourth Amendments Seizure Standard, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming Jan.
2009).

225
See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973);
Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT.
REV. 153.

226
E.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 42028 (1986) (explaining the meaning of these terms).

227
See William J. Stuntz, Mirandas Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 98286 (2001) (summariz-
ing Miranda waiver doctrines).

228
See, e.g., Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459 (10th Cir. 1995) (prosecutors threatened to imprison
defendants parents if defendant refused to plead guilty; plea was held voluntary); United States
v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (prosecutors threatened to imprison defendants wife if
defendant refused to plead guilty; plea was held voluntary).

229
Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992).

230
Id. at 74247.


cause rarely applies police need no cause once they have consent:
and today, they nearly always have consent.
231
Before the 1960s,
criminal trials were more casual than today, but still common. Todays
more elaborate trials are rare events.
232
Fourth Amendment searches,
police station confessions, and criminal convictions alike are probably
cheaper now than before Warren and his colleagues crafted their pro-
cedural code. The law of criminal procedure raised the cost of policing
and prosecution when that cost was already too high, and lowered it
when the cost was already too low. The consequence was to make
both the punishment drop of the 1960s and the punishment rise of the
following three decades larger and more destructive.
C. Violence and Drugs
Consider a recent story about a Boston gang bust:

Authorities said yesterday they are keeping a promise to prosecute 25
members of a violent street gang they hold responsible for 57 shootings
and six slayings in Dorchester and Mattapan in two years.
The Lucerne Street Doggz, who authorities said have about 40 mem-
bers ranging in age from 18 to 28, now face federal and state gun and
drug trafficking charges that could keep some jailed for up to 40 years.
We told them we wanted them to put their guns down, Police Com-
missioner Edward F. Davis said at a press conference . . . .
The ones that continued are being prosecuted today, Davis said.
We are following through on the warning that was issued.
. . .
Seeking to break the gangs grip and improve the quality of life for
residents, authorities said, they held two meetings last year involving gang
members, police, job training groups, members of the 10 Point Coalition,
and law enforcement.
During the meetings, dubbed Operation Ceasefire, authorities detailed
the prison sentences that courts can impose for crimes involving guns and
drugs, according to an affidavit by Boston police Sergeant John J. Ford.
233

231
See Nadler, supra note 225, at 20810.

232
In a 1962 study of criminal litigation in twenty-eight counties, the author found a plea rate
of 74% for defendants with court-appointed lawyers and 48% for defendants with retained coun-
sel. See 1 LEE SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN
STATE COURTS: A FIELD STUDY AND REPORT 2223 tbls.3, 4 (1965). (The latter category was
a good deal larger then than it is now. See infra note 266.) Forty years later, a study of criminal
litigation in seventy-five metropolitan counties found that 95% of felony convictions were ob-
tained by guilty plea. ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.5.57.2002.

233
John R. Ellement, Officials Say Vow Kept with Arrests, BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 2007, at
B4.


The reason for the bust was the spate of shootings for which the Lu-
cerne gang is responsible. But the crimes charged are selling drugs,
and buying and selling unregistered guns.
That story is not unusual, and not limited to Boston. For the past
generation, drug and gun crime (by gun crime, I mean offenses in-
volving gun registration and licensing, not the use of guns to commit
violent felonies) have been used as means of battling violent crime. As
Tracey Meares, Neal Katyal, and Dan Kahan have noted, prosecutors
regularly justify drug prosecutions as surrogates for violent crime
charges even when the drug in question is marijuana.
234
The pattern
is especially clear in the federal system. Bill Clinton instructed the
FBI to treat gangs like the Lucerne Street Doggz as it had treated the
Mafia,
235
and charging proxy crimes was a key means of taking down
Mafia families, dating back to Robert Kennedys tenure in the Justice
Department.
236
The Lucerne story illustrates the degree to which the
pattern has taken hold in local prosecutors offices as well.
The historical norm was very different. During Prohibition, unre-
lated charges like the tax charge that sent Al Capone to prison were
sometimes used to target bootleggers,
237
but alcohol charges were not
used to target more traditional crimes. The other vices that federal
and state law have forbidden over the years were used strategically
against high-profile mobsters, like Lucky Luciano or the various Mafia
defendants who faced federal gambling charges but Mob cases were
rare, and nearly all of them were federal. With few exceptions, violent
felonies were enforced straight-up, as is proved by the high acquittal
rates in homicide cases that were common a century ago. Charges like
those in the Lucerne case were unknown. Why did that state of affairs
change?
There are three answers: coincidence, a changed political structure,
and law enforcement necessity. Mass markets for illegal drugs arose
just after the wave of violence that swamped Northern cities, and just
when political pressure was forcing big-city prosecutors to ramp up
criminal punishment. For urban police looking to increase their arrest
numbers and urban prosecutors seeking higher conviction rates, drug

234
Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1178 &
n.22 (2004).

235
Nancy E. Marion, Symbolic Policies in Clintons Crime Control Agenda, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 67, 97 (1997).

236
See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Essay, Al Capones Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 59899 (2005) (quoting
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors Conference (Oct. 25,
2001) (noting and endorsing this policy)). This approach has made the federal law of gun registra-
tion and possession a de facto federal law of violent crime. See Daniel Richman, The Past, Pre-
sent, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 277 (2006).

237
Including Capones brother Ralph. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 236, at 584 n.2.


cases were a godsend. As for political structure: local electorates seem
to like transparent charging practices meaning, the crimes charged
are the reasons for criminal punishment. That is probably why drug
sentences are so much more severe in urban black neighborhoods than
in wealthier and whiter suburbs.
238
Suburban drug cases are prose-
cuted directly, not as a substitute for other crimes. In the suburbs,
criminal justice remains a locally democratic enterprise. Not so in
high-crime cities.
The third reason law enforcement necessity requires explana-
tion. Police clearance rates in violent crime cases were high in the
past
239
because the cases were easy. Killings tended to follow a few
simple fact patterns; identifying the killer was not hard. As Roger
Lane has noted, that state of affairs changed beginning in the mid-
twentieth century: both stranger killings and robbery-murders rose,
and the friends-and-family killings that had dominated homicide sta-
tistics in the past declined sharply.
240
Clearance rates fell.
241

As evidence-gathering in violent crime cases grew more difficult,
the law of criminal procedure placed more restrictions on it. Confes-
sions and eyewitness testimony are crucial to the prosecution of many
violent felonies. Thanks to changes in the relevant bodies of constitu-
tional law, confessions became a good deal harder for the police to ob-
tain in the 1960s.
242
As for eyewitness testimony, criminal violence is
frightening, not only to its victims but to those who see and hear it as
well; witnesses fear becoming victims themselves if they testify. The
rise of violent urban gangs in the last generation is partly attributable
to gangs skill at silencing would-be witnesses.
243
Both the rise of po-

238
More whites than blacks are convicted of drug felonies in state courts. See ONLINE
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.5.45.2004. Yet the ratio of black to white drug prisoners in state
penitentiaries is more than three to two. See id. tbl.6.0001.2004.

239
See, e.g., LANE, VIOLENT DEATH IN THE CITY, supra note 85, at 81 (noting that 91% of
homicides were cleared in mid-twentieth-century Philadelphia, a figure very close to that re-
ported for other cities in the same period).

240
See Roger Lane, Murder in America: A Historians Perspective, 25 CRIME & JUST. 191,
20810 (1999).

241
See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Mirandas Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 106670 & figs.12
(1998).

242
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
At the same time, silence became a more viable litigation strategy. See Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965).

243
For a telling example, see SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UN-
DERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE URBAN POOR 30218 (2006). In these pages, Venkatesh tells
the story of a gang murder; the victims brother witnessed the killing and was left alive. Never-
theless, no one was ever prosecuted for the homicide. Not long afterward, Venkatesh asked a lo-
cal minister whether Big Cat, leader of the local gang, was responsible. The ministers answer
was telling: If I say yes, youll ask me how do I know. . . . I know, we know, the community
knows. Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted).


lice interrogation doctrine and the rise of urban gangs made violent
crime cases harder to build, and harder to win especially in high-
crime city neighborhoods.
In earlier generations, these problems might have produced proce-
dural reforms designed to make policing and prosecution of violent of-
fenses easier. But constitutional law bars the most obvious reforms.
Miranda grants savvy suspects the right to be free from all police
questioning, not merely the coercive kind and that right cannot be
undone by mere politicians.
244
The same is true of the right to con-
front the states witnesses,
245
which forces American prosecutors to
build cases on live testimony rather than the written case files Euro-
pean prosecutors use.
246
Drug law seemed to offer a ready solution to
these problems. Physical evidence the drugs themselves, the para-
phernalia used to consume them, the cash used to buy them is om-
nipresent in drug cases, making eyewitness testimony unnecessary. Po-
lice investigation is cheap: a single street stop or buy-and-bust might
produce multiple arrests, with many fewer man-hours than in a rob-
bery or homicide investigation. And drug markets in poor city
neighborhoods were and are associated with the high rates of violence
in those neighborhoods.
247
For all these reasons, the substitution of
drug prosecutions for violent felony cases was natural.
Drug laws passed in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s facilitated that
substitution. Draconian sentences far beyond anything attached to
vice crimes in the past were attached to possession of even small quan-
tities of selected drugs and the drugs selected for such severe treat-
ment were those used and sold in poor black neighborhoods.
248
The
definitions of the relevant crimes were mechanical; no open-ended de-
fenses or mens rea arguments were made available to the unlucky de-
fendants charged with drug offenses.
249
For the first time in American
history, state criminal statutes carrying severe criminal punishments

244
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

245
See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).

246
The confrontation right exacerbates class-based inequality by raising the cost of prosecuting
violent offenders in poor neighborhoods. See William J. Stuntz, Comment, Inequality and Adver-
sarial Criminal Procedure, 164 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 47, 50 (2008).

247
See, for example, William J. Stuntz, Essay, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1795, 181315 (1998) [hereinafter Stuntz, Race and Drugs], and sources cited therein. See also
Richard H. Blum, Drugs, Behavior, and Crime, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Nov.
1967, at 135, 145 (concluding that drug use by big-city slum-dwelling males was associated with
violence and other forms of criminality, but that drug use in the population at large was not asso-
ciated with non-drug crime).

248
For the legal side of this equation, see Sklansky, Cocaine and Race, supra note 178. On the
character of the relevant drug markets, see Stuntz, Race and Drugs, supra note 247, at 180415.

249
See infra section III.C, pp. 203639.


were designed not to define the prohibited conduct, but to make pun-
ishment for other conduct easier.
That proposition makes sense of several otherwise puzzling features
of drug enforcement and drug politics. Both the timing and demo-
graphics of drug punishment track violent crime, not drug crime. The
thirty years after 1960 saw an unprecedented explosion in criminal vio-
lence. The thirty years after 1970 saw an unprecedented explosion in
drug punishment.
250
As for demographics, blacks are imprisoned for
drug crime at thirteen times the rate of whites.
251
Rates of illegal drug
use vary little across the races.
252
Rates of criminal violence vary
much more: in 2006, the murder rate among whites stood at 3.1 per
100,000; among blacks, the analogous figure was 23.7.
253
Clearance
rates by race of the offender are unavailable, but clearance rates for
violent crimes vary by population density: rates are lowest in large cit-
ies and highest in small towns, with suburbs in between.
254
That
tracks, inversely, the distribution of the black population: in the places
where the most blacks live, clearance rates for violent crimes are low-
est; in the whitest areas, clearance rates are highest.
255

The link between drug enforcement and violent crime also explains
the absence of large-scale political opposition to contemporary drug
laws, despite the draconian punishments those laws impose on drug
offenders. Much milder punishments for other vices prompted much
more political opposition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. That earlier age was more moralist than ours: early-
twentieth-century Americans criminalized all forms of extramarital
sex;
256
twenty-first-century Americans make adult consensual sex a
constitutional right.
257
Yet Prohibition proved politically unsustain-
able, while the drug war is politically untouchable. During Prohibi-
tion, leading politicians like New Yorks Al Smith and Marylands Al-
bert Ritchie (each of whom won his states governorship four times)

250
In 1970, there were roughly ten prisoners incarcerated for drug crimes per 100,000 popula-
tion. See CAHALAN, supra note 7, at 30 tbl.3-3, 45 tbl.3-17. In 2002, that figure stood at 102.
See ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbls.6.0001.2002, 6.29.2006.

251
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

252

253
The number of murders, by race of offender, appears in CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES:
2006, supra note 8, Expanded Homicide Data tbl.3. The general population for 2006, by race, ap-
pears in 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at tbl.6. The rates stated in the text assume
that murders by offenders of unknown race were committed by whites and blacks in the same
proportion as murders by offenders whose race is known.

254
See CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006, supra note 8, tbl.25.

255
See MCKINNON, supra note 9, at 2 fig.2.

256
See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 483 (1917) (upholding Mann Act conviction
for transporting a young woman across state lines for the purpose of debauchery . . . to wit, that
the aforesaid woman should be and become his mistress and concubine).

257
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).


publicly criticized the nationwide ban on alcohol sales;
258
aside from
former Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke,
259
no major American politi-
cian has made opposition to drug criminalization an important part of
his or her political profile. Local resistance to the vice wars of a cen-
tury ago was common. Not so with respect to the drug war. If drug
enforcement isnt a response to criminal violence, these political facts
seem inexplicable.
There is more. Politicians and judges alike worried obsessively
about the chronically inconsistent enforcement of the Eighteenth
Amendment, and about what those enforcement patterns said about
the rule of law in America.
260
Voters worried too: Prohibition fell not
because of the opposition of the wet Northeast, but with the conniv-
ance of the dry farm belt.
261
A critical mass of Prohibitions support-
ers evidently concluded that repeal was preferable to uneven enforce-
ment. Drug enforcement has been plagued by inconsistency and
discrimination far worse than anything Prohibition produced. Yet the
drug wars supporters still refuse to abandon their cause. Everything
about the war on drugs and the politics associated with it makes sense
only on the assumption that drugs were not the wars primary target.
Violence was.
So, in the many cases in which direct punishment for violence was
impossible, drug laws made indirect punishment easy. That increased
both the size and the racially disproportionate character of state prison
populations in two mutually reinforcing ways. First, the use of drug
charges as a substitute for violent felony charges increased sentences
for non-violent drug crimes. Drugs were not solely proxy crimes; a
large fraction of incarcerated drug offenders were suspected of drug
crimes and nothing else. But the laws authorizing their punishment
were designed with violent offenders in mind. So nonviolent drug of-
fenders were, in effect, punished both for the crimes they committed
and for the violence of the drug markets in which they participated.

258
Concerning Smith, see LERNER, supra note 120, at 22754. Concerning Ritchie, see, for
example, Effects of a Groundswell, TIME, Sept. 29, 1930, at 16, 17; From Anne Arundel Town,
TIME, May 24, 1926, at 8.

259
See Baltimore Mayor Supports Legalization of Illicit Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1988, at
B4.

260
See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administra-
tive State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 83137 (2006).

261
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the wet candidate in the 1932 presidential election, was both nomi-
nated and elected by the dry parts of the country. For an account of Roosevelts nomination and
the role Prohibition played in it, see STEVE NEAL, HAPPY DAYS ARE HERE AGAIN 23649
(2004). In the general election, Herbert Hoover, a dry Republican, ran nearly even with Roosevelt
in the wet Northeast. Roosevelt, a (newly) wet Democrat, carried the dry West by a two-to-one
margin. See OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF
THE CONGRESSIONAL AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 8, 1932 (1933), avail-
able at http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/1932election.pdf.


Since poor city neighborhoods had the most violent drug markets,
262

residents of those neighborhoods received the most severe drug sen-
tences. The use of drug crime as a (partial) proxy for violence
amounted to a sentencing enhancement for black drug crime.
Second, because drug punishment was and is a poor tool for deter-
ring violence, violence levels remained high even as drug punishment
escalated which reinforced political support for tough drug punish-
ment: a vicious circle. Recall the Lucerne Street bust. The gun and
drug charges filed in that case may track gang members history of
criminal violence, but only in the aggregate. The gang was targeted
because of the many acts of violence its members committed, and (at
least in part) because of the many acts of violence members of other
Boston gangs committed. But no gang member knows which particu-
lar acts of violence prompt such targeting. From the point of view of
any individual offender, the odds that any particular shooting will lead
to a later drug trafficking prosecution must be very low. Meanwhile,
the gains from the shooting, or at least a large share of them venge-
ance, status within the gang, a reputation for toughness are cap-
tured by the perpetrator. One reason why violence by drug-dealing
gangs remains high is that, from the point of view of the perpetrators,
it pays.
The upshot is massive drug punishment that deters neither violence
nor drug crime. Its dominant incentive effect has more to do with
politics than with crime. From its inception, the drug war has been
fueled by violence in urban black neighborhoods. Continued violence
means a continuing supply of the symbols on which the symbolic poli-
tics of crime feeds. Politically speaking, the drug war is self-sustaining
as long as it continues to create casualties. Tragically, those are never
in short supply.
D. Federalism
For most of American history, the federal government played a mi-
nor role in American criminal justice. It plays a large role now, and
the wrong one. In todays justice system, the federal government is a
key source of law both procedural and substantive in state
criminal cases. It should be a key source of money, especially for cash-
strapped urban police forces.
Begin with the law of constitutional criminal procedure. That law
makes it easier for criminal defendants to threaten expensive, drawn-
out litigation. Defendants with the money to pay for high-priced law-
yers can make that threat credibly.
263
Poor defendants cannot: their

262
See Stuntz, Race and Drugs, supra note 247, at 181315.

263
Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 205, at 2731.


lawyers face unimaginably severe docket pressure, and so must plead
out the vast majority of cases.
264
Thanks to the crime wave of the
1960s and after, local district attorneys likewise face heightened docket
pressure.
265
That fact raises the value of rich defendants ability to
draw out criminal litigation. These propositions guarantee rising ine-
quality. The generation after the constitutional revolution in criminal
procedure saw a sharp rise in the percentage of criminal defendants
poor enough to qualify for state-paid lawyers.
266
As criminal trials
grew both more expensive and rarer, the pool of criminal defendants
grew poorer, and guilty pleas grew more common: a recipe for the
massive, class-biased prison populations Americans know today.
The Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrines that the Supreme
Court imposed on local police after 1960 have similar distributive ef-
fects. Under the governing Fourth Amendment law, inhabitants of de-
tached houses receive more protection than apartment dwellers, driv-
ers of cars more than passengers on city buses or subways, office
workers more than factory workers.
267
Miranda doctrine gives defen-
dants the right to opt out of police questioning but only if they
know enough to say the right words at the right time. Poor and poorly
educated suspects do badly under that regime. Those who do best are
recidivists and rich suspects: the former disproportionately invoke
their Miranda rights;
268
the police do not bother to question the latter.
Those are strange results for bodies of law designed to promote
equality as criminal procedure doctrine is, according to the conven-
tional understanding.
269
The strangeness has more to do with the de-
signers than with the design. Supreme Court Justices have no particu-
lar expertise at the enterprise of crafting rules for policing and criminal
litigation. Few have extensive criminal litigation experience, fewer still
in state cases. The Justices have no means of gathering evidence about
the effects of the procedural rules they craft. And constitutional law is
easy to make but hard to change, which means that legal errors tend
to be uncorrectable. That would be no bad thing if the relevant doc-

264

265
See supra note 205.

266
Entering the 1980s, fewer than half of felony defendants were poor enough to qualify for
state-appointed counsel; by 1992, the indigency rate had risen to 80%. See STEVEN K. SMITH &
CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, INDI-
GENT DEFENSE 1, 4 (1996); ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY 33
(1986).

267
For an explanation, see Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 41, at 126774.

268
According to Richard Leo, a suspect with a felony record is nearly four times more likely to
invoke his Miranda rights than a suspect with no criminal record, and nearly three times more
likely than a suspect with only misdemeanor convictions. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interroga-
tion Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 28687 (1996).

269


trines rested on timeless truths. But criminal procedure is filled with
rules that rest on changeable and contested empirical assumptions.
The rise of new surveillance technologies alters the balance between
law enforcement need and individual privacy. Because of the rise of
violent urban gangs, the Confrontation Clauses emphasis on live wit-
ness testimony has become a barrier to prosecuting ordinary homi-
cides. Technological and social change is a constant which means
that legal flexibility is essential. Constitutional law is anything but
flexible.
Federal substantive law should not suffer from these failings.
Members of Congress are much better positioned than Supreme Court
Justices to gather useful information, to experiment and innovate, and
to correct the inevitable mistakes. And their mistakes appear to have
smaller consequences, since the statutes that define federal crimes and
sentences do not apply in state courts, where most crimes are prose-
cuted. Yet federal substantive law may have worse consequences than
the law of criminal procedure. The federal share of the prison popula-
tion is about 11%; the federal government prosecutes roughly 7% of all
felony cases and a fraction of 1% of misdemeanors.
270
The punitive
character of federal substantive law accounts for the difference. That
is why white-collar defendants achieve worse outcomes than defen-
dants charged with thefts and violent felonies.
271
The white-collar de-
fendants are charged federally; theft and violent crime defendants are
overwhelmingly charged in state court.
More important, the federal criminal code increases state prison
populations: broad federal liability rules and severe federal sentences
allow local prosecutors to induce guilty pleas more easily, with harsher
sentences than defendants would otherwise accept. These effects are
strongest where the gap between federal and state sentences is most
substantial: gun and drug cases.
272
That gap should surprise. Federal
criminal law is far more severe than that of most states, as the per-
centages cited in the preceding paragraph show but it should
be about average in terms of sentencing severity. That is the natural
consequence of blending electorates with different preferences: the
national electorate is more moderate than the most extreme state elec-

270
See ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbls. 6.29.2006, 5.44.2004, 5.17.2004; Stuntz, Po-
litical Constitution, supra note 149, at 782 n.5, and sources cited therein.

271

272
In 2000, the average federal sentence for drug trafficking was seventy-five months; the av-
erage state sentence was thirty-five months. MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURT, 2000, at 3 (2003). Severe federal sentences for gun crimes are the cause of programs like
Project Exile that use federal gun charges as a tool for combating urban violence. See Daniel C.
Richman, Project Exile and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 ARIZ. L.
REV. 369 (2001).


torates. Instead of moderation, federal criminal law produces immod-
erate severity. Why?
The answer stems from two facts. First, federal criminal law is
mostly optional: it criminalizes conduct that state law already covers
fraud, extortion, robbery, racketeering, drug crime.
273
Second, the
law enforcement bureaucracy that enforces federal crimes is small: the
number of local prosecutors is five times the number of Assistant U.S.
Attorneys.
274
The ratio of state to federal cases is even larger: the
number of state-court felony convictions is fifteen times the number of
federal felony convictions.
275
The bureaucracys small size means that
federal criminal prohibitions have small fiscal consequences. The op-
tional nature of federal criminal prohibitions makes them useful vehi-
cles for sending symbolic messages. Both facts push toward greater
severity.
Ironically, so does federal law enforcers restraint. Because federal
agents and prosecutors tend to reserve tough federal statutes for seri-
ous misconduct recall the Lucerne Street bust, which led to federal
gun and drug charges as well as state drug charges Congress faces
little pressure to make those statutes less tough. That reinforces the
congressional tendency to err on the side of severity when drafting
criminal prohibitions and sentencing rules. One more characteristic of
federal criminal lawmaking contributes to that tendency. Over the
past forty years, as budget pressure on local law enforcement agencies
has increased, federal criminal law has become increasingly focused on
crimes committed by groups: conspiracy, enterprise crime and racket-
eering, terrorism, and so on. Such crimes are more costly to investi-
gate and prosecute than one-on-one criminal transactions; it seems
natural that the part of the justice system that enjoys the most gener-
ous funding has taken over responsibility for the most expensive
cases.
276

Criminal organizations, even small ones, are usually good at hiding
information. In order to penetrate them, prosecutors need the coopera-
tion of some of their members: especially the marginal members, the
ones who are least culpable (since prosecutors want to punish the most
culpable). To win that cooperation, prosecutors must be able to
threaten those marginal members of the organization with serious

273
See 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343 (2000) (mail and wire fraud); id. 1951 (extortion and robbery);
id. 1962 (racketeering); 21 U.S.C. 841 (2000) (drug possession).

274
The number of U.S. Attorneys and AUSAs stands at roughly 5700. ONLINE SOURCE-
BOOK, supra note 2, tbl.1.79.2006. The number of district attorneys and assistants is approxi-
mately 27,000. Id. tbl.1.86.2006.

275
There are roughly 73,000 federal felony convictions each year, id. tbl.5.17.2004, compared to
1.1 million state-court felony convictions each year, id. tbl.5.44.2004.

276
Cf. Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 205, at 2931 (explaining the federalization of
white-collar criminal litigation on this ground).


criminal punishment. Which explains the otherwise puzzling character
of the federal law of organized crime even by the standards that
apply elsewhere in federal criminal law, the offenses used to prosecute
criminal organizations are stunningly broad.
277
Federal statutes tar-
geting group crimes are designed to overpunish the defendants who
fall within their terms, because threats of excessive punishment are the
chief means by which federal law enforcers extract information about
their targets. The laws are written for their threat value. Severe laws
make for more effective threats.
Another kind of federal law influenced state criminal punishment
in the opposite direction: toward lenity and equality, not severity and
discrimination. In 1968, Congress created the Law Enforcement Assis-
tance Administration (LEAA), a federal agency designed to funnel
money to urban police forces. LEAA money soon dried up; local gov-
ernments were left to fend for themselves.
278
A quarter-century later,
Congress tried again, passing the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994,
279
one portion of which was prompted by then-
President Clintons pledge to put another 100,000 police officers on
city streets.
280
Both times, the infusion of federal money was short-
lived.
281
Both times, it was modest: the vast majority of police spend-
ing remained with local governments.
282
Both times, more federal aid
led to a short-term increase in the number of police officers per unit
population in the nations cities. And both times, higher policing rates
appear to have pushed punishment rates down. Figure 1 tracks the
annual rate of change in the nations imprisonment rate and in its ur-
ban policing rate. The latter figure is shown with a one-year delay:
the change in the rate of policing in any given year appears together
with the change in the next years imprisonment rate.

277
For a celebratory survey, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Or-
ganized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095 (1995). The law of
terrorism fits the pattern. See Robert M. Chesney, Anticipatory Prosecution in Terrorism-Related
Cases, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (John L. Worrall & M.
Elaine Nugent eds., forthcoming 2008).

278
For the LEAAs origins and history, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE
POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, 19681978 (1980). On the agencys demise due to Carter Administration
budget cuts, see Charles R. Babcock, By Bits and Pieces, a Crime-Fighting Program Nears Ex-
tinction, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1980, at A3.

279
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).

280
Title I of the Act appropriated $8.8 billion over six years to help local police forces hire
more officers. For a good discussion and analysis of the Act, see Harry A. Chernoff et al., Essay,
The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527 (1996).

281
On the LEAAs demise, see sources cited supra note 278. On the drying up of Clintons
100,000 cops money, see Daniel Richman, The Right Fight, BOSTON REV., Dec. 2004Jan.
2005, at 6.

282
See 1974 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 33 tbl.1.2; 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 4
tbl.1.3.


FIGURE 1.
283

The two curves appear to move in opposite directions: more police
officers are correlated with fewer prisoners. This is not simply a by-
product of crime trends. The effect appears to hold both in the late
1960s and 1970s when crime was rising steeply and in the 1990s
and this decade, when crime rates have fallen substantially. Police of-
ficers and prison cells are substitutes, alternative means by which gov-
ernments spend money to battle crime. In the last thirty-five years,
the mix of those two alternatives has changed radically. The size of

283
Annual imprisonment rates for the period covered by Figure 1 appear in ONLINE
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.28.2006. The data used to calculate annual policing rates ap-
pear in the relevant volumes of UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 8, each of which con-
tains a table identifying the number of full-time law enforcement officers in the set of reporting
cities, along with those cities total population. I calculated the year-by-year percentage changes
in imprisonment and policing rates.
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
P
e
r
c
e
n
t

C
h
a
n
g
e
Change in U.S. Imprisonment Rate
Change in Urban Policing Rate, One Year Delay


local police budgets is one reason for that radical change, and those
budgets are strained in part because of the dearth of federal aid. Fed-
eral and state governments pay a majority of local school budgets;
284

local governments pay 90% of the cost of local police.
285
Had there
been more federal legislation like the 1968 and 1994 Acts, those data
would differ. Imprisonment rates might differ as well.
Those two bursts of federal aid for local police not only helped to
reduce criminal punishment; they appear to have reduced the level of
police discrimination as well. In the late 1960s, discrimination chiefly
took the form of underenforcement in urban black neighborhoods. In
the four years after the 1968 Act was passed, urban black arrests rose
16%.
286
By the mid-1990s, the prison population had topped one mil-
lion; the chief problem was overenforcement. In the balance of the
Clinton Administration, black arrests in cities fell 26%.
287
If federal
law makes the justice system more discriminatory, federal budget dol-
lars appear to make it less so.
III. EQUALIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
No one chose the unequal justice system Americans know today.
Rather, that system arose from a great many shortsighted choices and
more than a few well-intentioned ones, made by a wide range of actors
over a long period of time. Retracing those path-dependent steps is
impossible. Undoing the damage may be impossible as well, at least in
the near term. Thankfully, more modest goals are also more achiev-
able: stop the downward slide toward ever more inequality; avoid
making a bad situation worse and look for ways to make it margin-
ally better. The bodies of law that define crime and the institutional
arrangements through which those laws are enforced may be unable to
guarantee genuinely equal justice. But laws and institutional design
can guarantee a measure of moderation. History suggests that mod-
eration and equality travel together, reinforce one another.
So how does one induce moderation? Place more power in the
hands of residents of those neighborhoods where the most criminals

284
See CRECILLA COHEN & FRANK JOHNSON, NATL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPT OF EDUC., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SEC-
ONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 200102, at 1 (2004).

285
See ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.1.4.2003.

286
Arrests of white suspects rose 13% during the same years. See UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS: 1968, supra note 8, at 129 tbl.36; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1972, supra note 8, at 140
tbl.42. Both that figure and the figure in the text are based on the numbers of arrests per 100,000
urban population. Changes in the rates of white and black arrests as a percentage of white and
black urban populations, respectively, probably differ slightly from the figures just cited.

287
See CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1995, supra note 8, at 235 tbl.49; CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2001, supra note 8, tbl.49. The same sources show that the white arrest rate
fell only 16% in those six years.


and crime victims live. Because residents of those neighborhoods suf-
fer so much from crime, they are unlikely to support abandonment of
the sort that Northern cities experienced in the 1950s, 1960s, and early
1970s. Because those same residents suffer so much from mass incar-
ceration, they are also unlikely to support the mindless severity of the
1980s, 1990s, and this decade. Those propositions fit the historical
track record: when high-crime cities have exercised the most control
over criminal justice within their borders, punishment levels have been
more moderate and discrimination less pervasive than today.
There are (at least) three ways to make high-crime city neighbor-
hoods self-governing without radical changes in legal doctrine or po-
litical structure. First, give more state and federal money to urban po-
lice forces. Second, increase the number of criminal cases tried by
locally selected juries. Third, define frequently prosecuted crimes to
include open-ended culpability terms, so that jurors might have room
to exercise judgment in the cases they hear. These reforms are emi-
nently achievable; none requires large-scale revision of existing law.
Taken together, they would make American criminal justice more de-
mocratic, and more equal.
A. Police Funding
According to FBI data, Americas policing rate rose 17% between
1989 and 1999.
288
Based on the Bureaus city arrest data, the black
arrest rate fell 17% during those ten years; white arrests fell a mere
6%.
289
Between 1995 the year after Congress passed a watered-
down version of Clintons 100,000 cops proposal and 2005, black
arrests dropped 30%, compared to a 17% fall in the white arrest
rate.
290
Raising the level of urban policing apparently makes the pool
of arrestees less racially tilted. Better still, more cops on city streets
correlates with fewer young men in prison cells. Early-twentieth-
century Southern cities had much smaller police forces than their
Northern counterparts; Southern prisons incarcerated a much larger
share of their states populations than their Northern counterparts.
291

288
See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1989, supra note 8, at 238 tbl.66; CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1999, supra note 8, at 293 tbl.71.

289
In 1989, white arrests per 100,000 urban population stood at 4074; the analogous figure for
black arrests was 2164. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1989, supra note 8, at 199 tbl.44. By
1999, white arrests per 100,000 urban population had fallen to 3821, while the analogous rate for
black arrests had fallen to 1790. See CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1999, supra note 8, at 239
tbl.49.

290
In 1995, the FBIs city arrest figures reported 4187 white arrests and 2195 black arrests
per 100,000 urban population. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1995, supra note 8, at 235
tbl.49. In 2005, the analogous table reported 3467 white arrests and 1544 black arrests per
100,000 urban population. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, supra note 8, tbl.49.

291
See supra pp. 1984 (Table 1), 1992 (Table 3).


When the size of urban police forces rose sharply in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the decline in Americas prison population accelerated.
When policing rates kicked up again in the 1990s, the growth in im-
prisonment slowed dramatically.
292

Increasing the number of police officers would have another egali-
tarian result: it would redistribute police attention across crimes. Vio-
lent felonies are underenforced in poor neighborhoods; drug crimes in
those same neighborhoods are punished too harshly. Increasing the
police-to-population ratio would address both problems. New Yorks
experience in the 1990s tends to support that hypothesis: the citys po-
licing rate rose by more than a third, clearance rates for non-drug felo-
nies also rose sharply, and felony drug arrests fell.
293
That combina-
tion is natural: massive levels of drug punishment exist in part as a
substitute for direct enforcement of violent crimes. More personnel
help to correct the latter problem, and thereby also reduce the size of
the former.
There is one more reason why more money for urban police would
tend to reduce the level of criminal justice inequality. The community
policing movement has made urban police forces more attentive to lo-
cal needs and preferences than a generation ago,
294
and far more atten-
tive than urban prosecutors are today. Spending more on urban polic-
ing means more funds for the government entity that pays the most
attention to residents of high-crime neighborhoods. That would make
criminal law enforcement more locally democratic. In this sphere of
governance, equality and local democracy go hand in hand.
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 took
a helpful step in that direction by tying federal aid to community po-
licing initiatives. The response was promising: the late 1990s saw both
the biggest crime reductions and the smallest imprisonment increases
in a generation.
295
But the federal subsidies were too modest. Bill

292
See supra p. 2030 (Figure 1).

293
New Yorks policing rate rose from 367 officers per 100,000 population in 1990 to 508 in
1997. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1990, supra note 8, at 101 tbl.6, 278 tbl.72; CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES: 1997, supra note 8, at 146 tbl.8, 347 tbl.78. During those same years, the
ratio of non-drug felony arrests to index crimes (violent felonies plus felony thefts) improved dra-
matically from 14% to 25% and felony drug arrests fell 13%. See Jeffrey Fagan et al.,
Neighborhood, Crime, and Incarceration in New York City, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71,
76 tbl.1 (2004).

294
The literature on community policing is massive; even a fair sampling would be too much
for a single footnote. For insightful discussions from two different perspectives, the first celebra-
tory and the second mildly skeptical, see Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1593 (2002); and SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 150, at 82105, 11424.

295
In 1994, when the legislation was enacted, the nations homicide rate stood at 9 per 100,000.
By 2000, that rate had fallen to 5.5, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2001, supra note 8, tbl.1
the steepest decline in homicides in sixty years, according to Eric Monkkonens data. See sources
cited supra note 89. The late 1990s also saw the nations imprisonment rate rise 21%, see


Clinton promised to put another 100,000 cops on city streets; in the
end, the federal government paid for something in the vicinity of one-
sixth that number, and only for a few years.
296
Clintons original
number is a reasonable goal: were it achieved, Americans would have
roughly 310 police officers per 100,000 population;
297
by comparison,
the analogous figure in EU countries is 337.
298
The cost of an addi-
tional 100,000 police officers is not trivial, but neither is it prohibitive.
Total spending for local police stands at $58 billion per year;
299
a one-
sixth increase in the number of officers (that is what 100,000 more po-
lice officers represent)
300
might be expected to cost as much as $15 bil-
lion per year. By comparison, total government spending on criminal
justice stood at $185 billion in 2003, of which $61 billion was spent on
corrections.
301
If, as appears to be the case, hiring more police officers
would reduce the number of prison inmates, the net spending increase
would be smaller than first appears and a small price to pay for a
more equal justice system.
B. Jury Trials
Jury trials ruled the justice system of Americas past; plea bargain-
ing took place in the shadow of substantive law as defined by trial
verdicts. In todays justice system, pleas are an autonomous adjudica-
tive process.
302
Prosecutors not juries and trial judges govern
the content of plea bargains, and suburban voters govern local prose-
cutors. Empowering voters in high-crime cities requires fewer pleas
and more jury trials. The surest road to fewer pleas and more trials is

ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbl.6.29.2006: the smallest six-year increase since prison
populations began their upward climb in 1973. See 1991 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 637
tbl.6.72.

296
The 1994 legislation appropriated $8.8 billion over six years for aid to local police forces.
See supra note 280. Using 2000 budget figures, that amount paid for just under 18,000 local po-
lice officers per year during those six years. See 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 4 tbl.1.3, 37
tbl.1.26.

297
As of 2004, there were 731,903 full-time state and local police officers in the United States,
plus an additional 86,627 federal officers (not counting federal prison guards). See ONLINE
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, tbls.1.27.2004, 1.72.2004. That total amounted to 279 officers per
100,000 population. See 2007 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 7 tbl.2. Adding 100,000
officers would have increased the nations policing rate to 313. See id.

298
BARCLAY & TAVARES, supra note 6, at 18 tbl.3.

299

300
See id. tbl.1.29.2004.

301
See id. tbl.1.2.2003.

302
For an explanation of criminal trials limited effect on guilty pleas in a justice system like
ours, see William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Laws Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004). For the classic discussion of (federal) plea bargaining as an autono-
mous system of adjudication, see Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Jus-
tice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).


to make trials cheaper and pleas more expensive, from prosecutors
point of view.
Reducing the cost of criminal trials would require radical change in
both the quantity and content of criminal procedure doctrine. Raising
the cost of guilty pleas, by contrast, is a simple matter. Military courts
(along with a few state appellate courts) offer a useful model: they re-
view the factual basis of guilty pleas with great care, and with little
deference to the pleas themselves.
303
That should be the norm every-
where.
304
Stringent appellate review, with reversal in cases of what
the military calls improvident pleas,
305
would amount to a procedural
tax on pleas. Tax anything and one is likely to see less of it. Plus,
military-style review of guilty pleas would make the pleas that remain
more accurate a large social gain.
Fewer pleas would mean both fewer prosecutions and more trials.
More trials could reduce the incidence of discriminatory punishment,
but that happy state of affairs is likely to come to pass only if changes
are made in the law of jury selection. Current Equal Protection and
fair cross-section doctrine encourages juries that represent the jurisdic-
tion from which jurors are drawn:
306
usually, the relevant county. If
the goal is to protect the interests of residents of high-crime city
neighborhoods, that is the wrong pool. Jury selection in large cities
should be neighborhood-based, and the number of peremptory chal-
lenges should be substantially reduced.
307
The latter change would
remove the need for the expensive, elaborate, and largely ineffective
body of law barring the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges;
eliminating that body of law would make criminal trials cheaper: a
large collateral benefit.
Fewer peremptories and more localized jury selection might make
convictions harder to obtain. That is no bad thing in a system as

303
For representative examples, see United States v. Coffman, 62 M.J. 676 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. 2006); United States v. Oglivie, 29 M.J. 1069 (A.C.M.R. 1990). For a state court case apply-
ing a similar standard to the review of a guilty plea, see State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785
(Iowa 1999).

304
The Supreme Court took a step in this direction with its decision in Halbert v. Michigan,
125 S. Ct. 2582 (2005). Halbert held that indigent defendants who plead guilty are constitution-
ally entitled to state-paid counsel on direct appeal, id. at 259094 a necessary condition of the
kind of review the military employs.

305
See, e.g., Coffman, 62 M.J. 676.

306
Fair cross-section doctrine requires that jury venires represent the general population of the
relevant jurisdiction. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). Batson doctrine forbids the use
of peremptory strikes against potential jurors because of their race or sex. See Snyder v. Louisi-
ana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

307
More radical changes in jury selection might be needed. If jurors are chosen based on voter
rolls and drivers licenses and if the urban poor appear more rarely on those lists, different means
of selection might be a useful means of increasing jury representation among the urban poor.


stacked in the governments favor as ours is. If a prosecutor cannot
convince a dozen residents of a high-crime neighborhood that one of
their neighbors should be punished, punishment is probably unwise
and could well be unjust. Current jury selection rules facilitate con-
viction in such cases, instead of obstructing it.
C. Vague Substantive Law
In 1995, Paul Butler famously some would say infamously
argued for the subversion of American criminal justice
308
through
jury nullification.
309
Butler maintained that far too many young black
men were being sent to prison for nonviolent drug offenses, and urged
black jurors to respond by refusing to convict black defendants in
drug cases, regardless of the governing law and the evidence. The first
of Butlers two claims is a truism. Yet even the liberal New York
Times,
310
not to mention a bevy of academic opponents,
311
criticized
the second. Butlers own words explain why: jury nullification is
subversion; it undermines the rule of law.
312
If black jurors will not
convict black drug defendants, the law of controlled substances will
differ for blacks and whites. Race-based substantive law seems a poor
response to criminal justice racism.
But all is not as it seems. For most of American history, white ju-
rors exercised the power that Butler suggests black jurors exercise to-
day: the power to acquit despite proof of intentional criminal conduct.
The label nullification did not attach to that power. On the contrary,
substantive criminal law invited the kinds of discretionary judgment
that Butlers critics would call lawless. Extralegal mercy was not ex-
tralegal; it was part and parcel of crime definition.
313
Butlers critics
ignore that fact, and also this one: the mens rea standards and conduct
lines that invited jurors to exercise mercy in the past have all but dis-
appeared. Nowhere is that more true than in the criminal law of con-
trolled substances. Once prosecutors file charges and the defense loses

308
Paul Butler, Essay, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 680 (1995).

309
See id.; Paul Butler, Black Jurors: Right to Acquit?, HARPERS MAG., Dec. 1995, at 11.

310
See Editorial, When Jurors Ignore the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1997, at A16.

311
For a sample of the academic criticism, see Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Delibera-
tion, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 14552; Andrew D. Leipold, Essay, The Dangers of Race-Based
Jury Nullification: A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1996); Nancy S.
Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 93648 (1999); Frank I.
Michelman, Foreword: Racialism and Reason, 95 MICH. L. REV. 723, 73334 (1997).

312
As Darryl Brown has explained, those propositions are (to say the least) debatable. See
Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1997). But
they remain the conventional wisdom. For an aggressive, smart defense of that conventional wis-
dom, see Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253 (1996).

313


the inevitable motion to suppress, jury nullification is the only means
of avoiding disproportionate or otherwise undeserved criminal pun-
ishment. Nullification became a much-debated topic during the last
generation not because jurors grew less respectful of the law, but be-
cause the law grew less respectful of arguments that might prompt the
exercise of mercy.
The older state of affairs, the one Butlers proposal seeks to repli-
cate, is nicely captured by Justice Robert Jacksons famous opinion in
Morissette v. United States.
314
The defendant took spent bomb cas-
ings metal tubes used by military pilots in practice bombing runs
from government land and sold them for scrap, realizing some eighty
dollars in the transaction. Because these events happened in 1948,
when military bases filled with unused equipment dotted the country-
side, Joe Morissette was charged with theft of government property.
315

Morissette evidently knew what the casings were and clearly knew
they were found on government land. Save for the fact that anyone
might care to prosecute him, there was no pertinent fact about which
he could plausibly claim mistake. Nor could he raise a claim-of-right
defense, since he had no preexisting contractual or property interest in
the bomb casings. Jackson nevertheless overturned Morissettes con-
viction, reasoning that no jury had found criminal intent
. . . wrongfully to deprive another of possession of property.
316
The
words criminal and wrongfully (neither of which appear in the
relevant statute) do all the work in that phrase: the kind of intent
Morissette lacked was not cognitive or motive-based; it was moral. In
Morissette, proof of criminal intent meant, roughly, proof of the kind
and level of moral fault that one ordinarily associates with theft.
Compare Morissette with United States v. Hunte.
317
Cheryl Hunte
had the poor judgment to have a boyfriend, Joseph Richards, who was
a known drug dealer.
318
Hunte joined Richards and one of his col-
leagues for a road trip during which Richards picked up several thou-
sand dollars worth of marijuana. Hunte made none of the plans, par-
ticipated in neither the relevant negotiations nor the drugs packaging
and, save for smoking one joint, did not handle the drugs. Most im-
portant of all, Hunte neither funded the drugs purchase nor stood to
gain from their sale. She was simply along for the ride.
319
Even so, a
Seventh Circuit panel affirmed her conviction for possession of mari-
juana with intent to distribute and conspiracy to do the same, on the

314
342 U.S. 246 (1952).

315
Id. at 24748.

316
Id. at 276.

317
196 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 1999).

318
Id. at 689.

319
See id. at 68990.


ground that there was some nexus between the defendant and the
drugs.
320

Hunte captures the mechanical nature of contemporary drug law.
Distribution is proved by proving possession of more than user quan-
tity, and (as Cheryl Hunte learned to her dismay) possession may be
constructive only. Worse, drug law state and federal alike as-
signs punishment based on the weight of the drugs found in the defen-
dants possession. That principle leads to decisions like Whitaker v.
People,
321
in which the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the twenty-
year prison sentence of a mule carrying a suitcase full of metham-
phetamine on a Greyhound bus. David Whitaker was charged with
importing methamphetamine into the state and with possession with
intent to distribute the drug.
322
The government was not required to
prove that Whitaker knew how much methamphetamine he carried,
nor that he knowingly crossed a state border,
323
nor that he stood to
make a large profit from his errand. (Major dealers rarely travel on
Greyhound buses.) As in Hunte, both liability and punishment rested
on the drugs, and on the defendants proximity to them.
Drug laws like those at issue in Hunte and Whitaker make both
convictions and draconian prison sentences nearly automatic. All
plausible mitigating arguments I was traveling with my boyfriend; I
had no idea how much I was carrying; at worst, Im a small player in
a large criminal enterprise are deemed out of bounds. Claims like
the one that carried the day in Morissette are unheard of. Butler had
it right: nullification is the only means of limiting unjust punishment
in such cases.
Drug law is more extreme than criminal law as a whole, but the
trend in the field runs in the same direction: toward more specifically
defined offenses, broader criminal liability, and more severe punish-
ments. The second and third trends are old news. The first is at once
poorly understood and terribly important. The premise of vagueness
doctrine is that uncertain criminal liability promotes unmerited and
discriminatory criminal punishment: that vaguely defined crimes are
the governments friend and defendants enemy. The criminal law of
drugs teaches the opposite lesson. That law is filled with bright lines;
even its few standards function like rules: the seemingly vague some
nexus requirement in Hunte means that everyone in the vicinity
of the drugs loses. Not coincidentally, no other class of criminal cases
has seen such grossly excessive punishments, or such discriminatory
enforcement.

320
Id. at 692.

321
48 P.3d 555 (Colo. 2002).

322
Id. at 557 & n.1.

323
See id. at 55859.


Reintroducing a measure of vagueness to American criminal law
would change that state of affairs, by inviting the kinds of jury ver-
dicts Butler encouraged without the stigma of nullification. Any of
three less-than-radical changes would advance that goal. First, courts
could reestablish the older concept of mens rea: save when legislators
expressly impose strict liability, proof of a guilty mind or criminal
intent the kind of intent that Justice Jackson found lacking in
Morissette is required in every case.
324
Second, judges might apply
generally a legal principle at the core of racketeering doctrine: when
the culpability of defendants charged with a given offense varies
widely, the least culpable members of the group should be excused.
325

Third, courts might import into American law the German legal doc-
trine that permits any defendant to claim that, though his conduct fits
the definition of the relevant offense, it was not sufficiently wrongful
to merit punishment.
326

Any of those changes would make criminal liability more legally
uncertain yet also, paradoxically, more predictable. A century ago,
American criminal law was filled with standards of the sort described
in the preceding paragraph. Prison populations were more stable and
punishment less discriminatory than in our own time. The explana-
tion for that surprising truth is simple: when prosecutors have enor-
mous discretionary power, giving other decisionmakers discretion pro-
motes consistency, not arbitrariness. Discretion limits discretion;
institutional competition curbs excess and abuse. Vague liability rules
once were, and might be again, part of a well-functioning system of
checks and balances.
327

324
No doubt legislators would impose strict liability more often. But expressly legislated strict
liability would be more transparent than the current regime, which has the functional character of
strict liability but retains formal mens rea standards. Plus, at least sometimes, legislators would
permit the older mens rea standard to stand which would be a large gain for the cause of equal
justice.

325
The leading case is United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994), in which the court held
that an errand boy for a Mob boss could not be found to have participate[d], directly or indi-
rectly, in the conduct of [the] affairs of the bosss criminal enterprise under 18 U.S.C. 1962(c).
Id. at 43.

326
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 77998 (2d ed. 2000).

327
That proposition probably applies as well to sentencing rules as it does to liability rules.
Especially federal sentencing rules: bright-line, severe sentencing rules make for more effective
threats in plea negotiations and, over the past generation, federal sentencing law has been fa-
mously rule-like and severe. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOS A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998). Recent changes in federal sen-
tencing doctrine increase district judges power over federal sentences. See Gall v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 586 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007); United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005). Over time, that should reduce federal laws effect on state-court plea bar-
gains: a step toward both lenity and equality.


IV. CONCLUSION
Equal justice under law the phrase resonates because of its
seeming redundancy. Unequal justice is an oxymoron; law makes jus-
tice both equal and just. Those four words are really a long-winded
substitute for one: justice. Or so the familiar line goes.
That familiar line misleads, because it misperceives the relationship
between equality and law. Legal doctrine is not the only means, and
in a criminal justice system like ours not the best means, of ensuring
rough equivalence in the treatment doled out to black and white of-
fenders, or to rich and poor ones. On the contrary: as Americas
criminal justice system has grown more law-bound, both the quality
and equality of criminal justice have declined. Law is a centralizing
force in criminal justice; the key to a more egalitarian justice system is
greater local control. The rise of broader and more specific criminal
offenses shifted power over punishment from local jurors to state and
national voters. The rise of an elaborate constitutional law of criminal
procedure shifted power from local politicians to state and federal ap-
pellate judges.
Changes in the politics of crime reinforced those centralizing
trends. Thanks in part to Warren Court criminal procedure decisions,
state and national politicians came to use rising urban crime as a po-
litical wedge to win the votes of non-urban voters. Liberal Democ-
rats and conservative Republicans alike played that game; because
they did so, poor urban neighborhoods power over the fate of their
young men declined. From the perspective of those who pay for the
never-ending battle against crime in the coin of safety and freedom,
criminal justice is no longer an exercise in self-government not
something residents of high-crime neighborhoods do for themselves,
but something people who live elsewhere do to them. If we are ever to
see a greater measure of equality in Americas unsystematic criminal
justice system, that must change.
More law more carefully defined crimes, more elaborately pro-
tective procedures is not the answer. Rather, the need is for more
politics: not the kind in which images of furloughed prisoners swing
national elections, but the kind that happens locally, where crime and
punishment alike cut deepest. When police chiefs and (especially)
prosecutors listen to those who live in the places we call war zones
and heed their wishes, American criminal justice may, at long last,
grow more equal. And more just.

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1969

VOLUME 121 JUNE 2008 NUMBER 8

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