Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-62810 July 25, 1983
EULALIA MARTIN, petitioner,
vs.
GEN. FABIAN VER, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES and
GEN. HAMILTON DIMAYA, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, respondents.
Arturo V. Romero for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

PLANA, J .:
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by Eulalia Martin on behalf of her husband, Pvt.
Francisco Martin.
Pvt. Martin was an enlisted man in the Philippine Army. On or about April 14, 1981, when
he was still in the service, he allegedly sold two grenades to one Rogelio Cruz at P50.00
each, one of which exploded during a picnic in Laoag City on April 17, 1981 causing the
death of three persons, including Rogelio Cruz, and injuries to three others.
According to respondents, Pvt. Martin has admitted to Cpl. Lucio Tuppal, Philippine Army,
having sold the grenades to Rogelio Cruz in Laoag City, although this is denied by Pvt.
Martin.
After an initial investigation conducted by the Laoag City PC and INP authorities, a report
was submitted to the Ministry of National Defense which referred the matter to the Chief of
Staff, AFP, who in turn directed the Inspector General to conduct another investigation.
On May 5, 1981, Pvt. Martin was arrested and confined (restricted to barracks) at Fort
Bonifacio pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, infra. The following year, he was
discharged from the service effective as of May 5, 1982. On November 17, 1982 the instant
petition was filed. The following month, i.e., December 3, 1982, Pvt. Martin was charged for
violation of the 85th and 97th Articles of War, which read:
ART. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to
Soldiers.Any soldier who sells or wrongfully disposes of or willfully or
through neglect injures or losses any horse, arms, ammunition,
accouterments, equipment, clothing, or other property issued for use in the
military service, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
ART. 97. General Article.Though not mentioned in these articles, all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline
and all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service shall be
taken cognizance of by a general or special or summary court-martial
according to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the
discretion of such court.
The charge sheet stipulates the following charges:
CHARGE I: Violation of the 85th Article of War.
Specification: In that Private Martin assigned with the Headquarters and
Headquarters Service Battalion, First Infantry Division, Philippine Army on or
about 14 April 1981 at Laoag City wrongly disposed of by sale to Rogelio
Cruz two (2) grenades.
CHARGE II: Violation of the 97th Article of War.
Specification: In that Private Francisco Martin, ... on or about the month of
April 1981 at Laoag City, unlawfully and without authority had in his
possession two (2) hand grenades thus committing an act prejudicial to good
order and military discipline and of a nature that will bring discredit to the
military establishment.
The petitioner contends that having been discharged from the military service, he is no
longer subject to court-martial even if the offenses of which he is charged were committed
while he was still subject to military law. He therefore, concludes that his continued
detention pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War (which authorizes the
arrest/confinement of any person subject to military law who is charged with an offense
under the Articles of War) is illegal and he, accordingly, should be released. This posture
has no merit.
Generally, court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the military service of the Philippines
ceases upon discharge or other separation from such service. This however, is but a
general rule. The Articles of War in terms prescribe some exceptions designed to enhance
discipline and good order within the military organization. Thus, court-martial jurisdiction as
to certain cases of fraud and misappropriation of military hardware and other government
property is not extinguished by discharge or dismissal pursuant to the 95th Article of War.
ART. 95. Frauds Against the Government.Any person subject to military
law ...
Who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willingly misappropriates, applies to
his own use or benefit or wrongfully or knowingly sells or disposes of any
ordnance, arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, stores,
money, or other property of the Government furnished or intended for the
military service thereof ...
Shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by such
other punishment as a court-martial may adjudge, or by any or all of said
penalties. And if any person, being guilty of any of the offenses aforesaid
while in the service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine
Constabulary receives his discharge or is dismissed from the service, he shall
continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and sentence by a court-
martial in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had not received
such discharge nor been dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)
It was on the basis of the foregoing legal provision, among others, that this Court sustained
the court-martial of the petitioner in De la Cruz vs. Alcaraz, et al. after his reversion to
inactive status, for misappropriation of public funds committed while he was still in the active
military service. The Court, thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, said:
There is no question that although appellant had been reverted to inactive
(civilian) status in the reserve force of the Philippine Army, he is still
amenable to investigation and court-martial under the Artitles of War by the
Philippine Navy for alleged acts of misappropriation of government funds
committed while he was still in the active military service. As correctly held by
the Court below, appellant's case falls within the provisions of Article 95 of the
Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended), which provides
as follows: ...
The lower Court did not, therefore, err in refusing to enjoin appellant's
investigation by the naval authorities on charges that he had misappropriated
public property while he was still in the service of the Philippine Navy,
specially since petitioner admits that he is still a member of the Reserve
Force." (99 Phil. 130 at 131-132.).
We conclude that despite his discharge from the military service, the petitioner is still
subject to military law for the purpose of prosecuting him for illegal disposal of military
property, and his preventive detention thereunder pending trial and punishment for the
said offense committed when he was in the military service is lawful.
Alternatively, petitioner maintains that even assuming that the jurisdiction of the military
authorities to try and punish him was not abated by his discharge from military service, the
denial to him of his constitutional right to speedy trial (he having been confined from the
date of his arrest on May 5, 1981 up to December 3, 1982 when he was formally charged
a period of I year and 7 months) entitles him to be released on habeas corpus.
The fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution apply to all persons, including those
subject to military law, (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546; Cayaga vs.
Tangonan, 66 SCRA 216; Go vs. Olivas, 74 SCRA 230; Romero vs. Ponce Enrile, 75 SCRA
429.) To quote Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2:
The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and
under all circumstances.
It would indeed be parodoxical if military men who are called upon in times of the gravest
national crises to lay down their lives in defense of peace and freedom would be the very
people to be singled out for denial of the fundamental rights for which they risk their lives.
For denial of a constitutional right to the accused, the hearing tribunal may lose its
jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings. In such a case, habeas corpus would lie to
obtain the release of the accused. (Gumabon vs. Director, 37 SCRA 420; Acevedo vs.
Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247; Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183; Flores vs. People, 61
SCRA 331; Dacuyan vs. Ramos, 85 SCRA 487, Ventura vs. People, 86 SCRA 188; Romero
vs. Ponce Enrile, 75 SCRA 429; Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, supra; Go vs. Olivas, supra.)
In the case at bar, the petitioner claims that he has been denied his constitutional right of
speedy trial because the charges against him were filed only about 1 year and 7 months
after his arrest.
There was no such denial. As stated by this Court in a per curiam decision: "x... the test of
violation of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the
time the information is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of the information,
which in the instant case has not been without reasonable cause, is therefore not to be
reckoned with in determining whether there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial."
(People vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226 at 236.)
At any rate, whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to precise
quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative, consistent with
reasonable delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case. As expressed in
Barker vs. Wingo, 33 L. Ed 2d 101:
... the right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept
than other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be
quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to
pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when the right must be asserted
or considered waived ...
... a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is
subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant are weighed, and courts should consider such factors as length
of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion
of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, in
determining whether defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied ...
Returning to the case at hand, the criminal act imputed to the petitioner unfortunately
resulted in the death of three persons (including Rogelio Cruz who allegedly bought the
handgrenades from the petitioner) and very serious injuries to three others whose testimony
is vital to the preferment of charges and prosecution of the petitioner. It is therefore not
unreasonable to heed the claim of respondents that the delay complained of was
occasioned by the unavailability of witnesses, a claim which has not at all been challenged
or denied by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed, without prejudice to the
petitioner seeking his provisional release on bail from the military authorities or the Ministry
of National Defense. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro,
Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.