EN BANC

[G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO, accused.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita
[1]
finally did away with frustrated rape
[2]
and allowed only
attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in our statute books. The instant case lurks at the
threshold of another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering almost every attempt
at sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the contrary view were to be adopted. The
danger there is that that concept may send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the
opportunity bares itself, to better intrude with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since after all any
attempted fornication would be considered consummated rape and punished as such. A mere strafing of
the citadel of passion would then be considered a deadlyfait accompli, which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the offense were already present and
nothing more was left for the offender to do, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime
and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential;any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that entry of the labia or
lips of the female organ, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to
warrant conviction for consummated rape. We distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape
where there was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were performed as
the offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.
[3]
The inference that
may be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for rape to be
consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to its consummated
stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia or lips of
the female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a
conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the female organ was
considered synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora,
etc.,
[4]
the crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation
to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, andnot just mere touching in the ordinary
sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of the
requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the
lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed amounts merely to attempted
rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed either in
its attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would exist between the
two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably spells the
difference between life and death for the accused - a reclusive life that is not even perpetua but
only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on another
level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but consummated rape, what then would constitute
attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus limited only to consummated rape and acts of
lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer be possible in light of the view of those who disagree
with this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a
quo to the extreme penalty of death,
[5]
hence this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.
[6]

As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 oclock in the afternoon, Ma.
Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor
of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo
Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer
located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was
busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"
[7]
prompting Corazon to
rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her childrens room kneeling before Crysthel
whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to
his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina. Horrified, she cursed the
accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled
up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and
shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their
compound, to chase the accused.
[8]
Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered
Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised by
their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical
examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was
noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthels body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5
cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed
the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his
refusal to run an errand for her.
[9]
He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to
ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was
in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and
accused him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself from hitting back when he realized she
was a woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second
floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente punched him
and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of Conrado
Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to explain as he reasoned out that the
accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead
pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives and
neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or
possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him guilty of
statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his
victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that
her narration should not be given any weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible
statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He claims that it was
truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthels younger sister was also in the
room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their presence
alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode happened within the family compound where
a call for assistance could easily be heard and responded to, would have been enough to deter him from
committing the crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what could be
taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid
description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the
alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that the absence of any
external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthels private parts more than bolsters his
innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw
Primo with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were
supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina." The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided
in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually
molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion perpetua to death, to the single indivisible penalty of
death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7) years old. We have said often
enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an
essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge.
[10]
But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the
penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or
the pudendum.
In People v. De la Pea
[11]
we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attackers
penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the
presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an
erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's vagina, the
Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the
accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached
the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva,
[12]
or that the penis of the
accused touched the middle part of her vagina.
[13]
Thus,touching when applied to rape cases does not
simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis
on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient
and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.
[14]
As
the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath themons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some
degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or
the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal
area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc.
The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within
the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer
convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles
and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many
sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora.
[15]
Jurisprudence dictates that
the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated,
[16]
and not merely for the penis to stroke
the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons
pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis,
there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female
organ,"
[17]
but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into
the labia of the pudendum,"
[18]
or "the bombardment of the drawbridge."
[19]
But, to our mind, the case at
bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the
citadel of passion."
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving
that Primos penis was able to penetrate Crysthels vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that
Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of
her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she saw
upon entering her childrens room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on the
vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and
sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon
Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling position, which Corazon described thus:
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused is pinning
down the victim, while his right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is spreading the
legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primos kneeling position rendered an
unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and the victim
would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primos penis supposedly reaching Crysthels
external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo
would have hidden his movements from Corazons sight, not to discount the fact that Primos right hand
was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from Corazons view. It is the burden of the prosecution
to establish how Corazon could have seen the sexual contact and to shove her account into the permissive
sphere of credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what was done to her daughter. It is
required that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect,
thus we cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved.
To hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite her timely
appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with mans instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and
persist in satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already been
discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal behavior or reaction of
Primo upon learning of Corazons presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid being caught
literally with his pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more than enough
opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to conceal his evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer to the question of the
court -
Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus -
Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir.
[20]

This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape in
this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primos penispenetrating her vagina,
however slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration,
[21]
obviously induced by a
question propounded to her who could not have been aware of the finer distinctions
between touching and penetration. Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to this reply of a four
(4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped as her sex and whose language is bereft of
worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation that because the penis of the accused touched her organ
there was sexual entry. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim's organ the penis of
the accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as the
prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate Crysthel.
[22]
Corazon did
not say, nay, not even hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an erection.
[23]
On the
contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he
had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primos penis having breached Crysthels vagina is belied by the child's
own assertion that she resisted Primos advances by putting her legs close together;
[24]
consequently, she
did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her.
[25]
Thus, she only
shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where penetration was not fully established,
the Court had anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony
that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia
minora was already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible.
[26]
None was shown
in this case. Although a child's testimony must be received with due consideration on account of her
tender age, the Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be true,
acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on
the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated rape;
worse, be sentenced to death.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external
signs of physical injuries on complaining witness body to conclude from a medical perspective that
penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the absence of complete
penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no
medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim.
[27]

In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects
complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the
manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous
results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the
labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this,
the thin line that separates attempted rape from consummated rape will significantly disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape - and only of attempted rape - are present in
the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the
offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower
is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years, in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty
of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found
guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., in the result.




People v. Campuhan

Facts:
Defendant Primo Campuhan was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr. brother
of Corazon Plata Pamintuan. One afternoon when Corazon, mother of
the victim Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from second floor on their
house to prepare MILO chocolate drinks for her 2 daughters heard one
of her daughter cries: "Ayo'koAyo'ko" When she rush upstairs, she
saw Primo inside her children's room kneeling before Chrysthel whose
pajamas and panty were already removed, while his short pants were
down to his knees. She ran out and called for help. Primo was
apprehended by her brother and a certain cousin and was brought to
barangay officials. Primo asserted his innocence contending that the
4 year yr old child was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his
back, when he suddenly pulled the child down causing both of them to
fall down on the floor. It was that fallen position which the mother
of the victim saw. He claims that it was very truly inconceivable
that Corazon could give vivid description of the alleged sexual
contact and the touching of the sexual organs of the victim. He
asserts that the absence of any external signs of physical injuries
or of penetration of Crysthel's private parts more than bolsters his
innocence. Such assertion was manifested by the physical examination
of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-
genital physical injury was noted by the medico legal officer on
victim's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5
cm in diameter. The trial court then found the accused guilty of
statutory rape and sentenced him to death penalty with moral and
exemplary damages. Hence, an automatic review for the Supreme Court

Issue/s:
Whether the act of Primo constitutes consummated rape?

Held:
The Supreme Court held that it is necessary to carefully ascertain
whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial
threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was
consummated. It was supported by the physical examination results
that there were no external signs of physical injuries to conclude
in a medical perspective that penetration had taken place. Although
the absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not negate the
possibility of contact, Medico legal officer clarified that there
was no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between
the accused and the victim

Under Art.6 RPC provides that rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. All the elements of attempted rape are only present;
hence the accused should be punished for this.

The lower court decision was modified and the accused was found
guilty for ATTEMPTED RAPE.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990
EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH
SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.
Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.

REGALADO, J .:
This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique situation that
the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior,
was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.
Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner had been
employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth
grade where one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial instructions to its
students, Bobby Qua was imparted such instructions in school by petitioner.
1
In the course thereof, the couple fell in
love and on December 24, 1975, they got married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro,
City Judge of Iloilo.
2
Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16) years old, consent and
advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion Ong.
3
Their marriage was ratified in accordance with
the rites of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on January 10, 1976.
4

On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at Bacolod
City an application for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive and
unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical to the
best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the school."
5

Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976.
6
Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr.
of the National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for resolution, required the
parties to submit their position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits
7
were submitted by private respondent to
bolster its contention that petitioner, "defying all standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as school
teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation."
8
More
specifically, private respondent raised issues on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom
after school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.
On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal hearing,
rendered an "Award" in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the clearance to terminate the
employment of petitioner. It was held therein that
The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the respondent pointed out that
before the marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years her junior and during her
employment with petitioner, an amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the undisputed written testimonies of several witnesses convincingly
picture the circumstances under which such amorous relationship was manifested within the
premises of the school, inside the classroom, and within the sight of some employees. While no
direct evidences have been introduced to show that immoral acts were committed during these
times, it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired
and took place during these times. . . .
9

Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to.
10

On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission claiming denial of due process
for not having been furnished copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She further contended
that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher,
for a teacher to enter into lawful wedlock with her student.
11

On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter's
decision and ordered petitioner's reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific findings:
Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the student desk
inside a classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chin are of the same tenor.
No statements whatever were sworn by them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous
acts.
xxx xxx xxx
Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion of the Arbiter,
we could not deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking inside a room
after classes with lights on and with the door open.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was precipitated by immoral acts
which did not lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such gratuitous assertions of
immoral acts or conduct by herein appellant, no evidence to support such claims was introduced by
petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the the sequence of events from the beginning of the relationship
between appellant Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua up to the date of the filing of the present application
for clearance in search of evidence that could have proved detrimental to the image and dignity of
the school but none has come to our attention. . . .
12

The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977, reversed the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months salary
as financial assistance.
13

On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines.
14
After the
corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave,
rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision. Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to
work until the date of her actual reinstatement.
15

Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating reversals, one would think that this
decision of public respondent wrote finis to petitioner's calvary. However, in a resolution dated December 6, 1978,
public respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration
16
of herein private respondent and despite opposition
thereto,
17
reconsidered and modified the aforesaid decision, this time giving due course to the application of Tay Tung
High School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner as classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to
her six (6) months salary.
18

In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his manifestation/comment filed on
August 14, 1979 in this Court in the present case:
That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went further to view the
matter from the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate task of rearing and educating of
children whose interest must be held paramount in the school community, and on this basis, this
Office deemed it wise to uphold the judgment and action of the school authorities in terminating the
services of a teacher whose actuations and behavior, in the belief of the school authorities, had
spawned ugly rumors that had cast serious doubts on her integrity, a situation which was considered
by them as not healthy for a school campus, believing that a school teacher should at all times act
with utmost circumspection and conduct herself beyond reproach and above suspicion;
19

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid resolution of
public respondent, viz.:
1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim to the contrary,
was actually based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore, illegal.
2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when the hearsay affidavits of
Laddy Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee Bing, were admitted and considered
in evidence without presenting the affiants as witnesses and affording the petitioner the right to
confront and cross-examine them.
3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious misconduct or
breached the trust reposed on her by her employer or committed any of the other grounds
enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article 282) of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of
her employment.
20

We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. We do not agree. There is no denial
of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues
are resolved based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is recognized as not violative of
such right. Moreover, petitioner could have insisted on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she
did not do so, obviously because she was convinced that the case involves a question of law. Besides, said
affidavits were also cited and discussed by her in the proceedings before the Ministry of Labor.
Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community toward the teachers and to
strengthen the educational system, private respondent submits that petitioner's actuations as a teacher constitute
serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and
just ground to terminate her services. It argues that as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority
over her pupils inside the school campus, petitioner had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she
must not abuse such authority and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly
violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a "school official or teacher
should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student."
21

On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate her services as there is nothing wrong
with a teacher falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him. She argued
that she was dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua This contention was sustained in the aforesaid
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission thus:
. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for clearance was
filed only after more than one month elapsed from the date of appellant's marriage to Bobby Qua
Certainly, such belated application for clearance weakens instead of strengthening the cause of
petitioner-appellee. The alleged immoral acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these alleged
undignified conduct that triggered the intended separation, then why was the present application for
clearance not filed at that time when the alleged demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive?
22

After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the determination of the legality of the
dismissal hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts
which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and/or grave misconduct.
To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in
the light of prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the
very start, what is before us is a factual question, the resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.
Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual conclusions
arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ of certiorari if the same is
tainted by absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The findings of fact must be supported by
substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound thereby.
23

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and forcefully observed by him in his
original decision:
Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records referred to are
the affidavits attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by
appellee at the arbitration proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of
credit, leaving many question unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to
certain times of the day during off school hours when appellant and her student were found together
in one of the classrooms of the school. But the records of the case present a ready answer:
appellant was giving remedial instruction to her student and the school was the most convenient
place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of specific
immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and very important at
that, the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but
the disciplinenary action imposed by appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more,
the affidavits were executed only in August, 1976 and from all indications, were prepared by
appellee or its counsel. The affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee are clearly the product of after-
thought. . . . The action pursued by appellee in dismissing appellant over one month after her
marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts committed even much earlier, is open to basis of the
action sought seriously doubted; on the question. The basis of the action sought is seriously
doubted; on the contrary, we are more inclined to believe that appellee had certain selfish, ulterior
and undisclosed motives known only to itself.
24

As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to show that
immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it is
however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during those times."
25
In
reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations Commission observed that the assertions of immoral acts or conducts
are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support such claim,
26
a finding which herein public respondent
himself shared.
We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-face in the questioned resolution, which we hereby
reject, despite his prior trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is revealing however, is that the reversal of his original decision is inexplicably based on
unsubstantiated surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his assailed resolution in this wise:
. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing immoral acts inside the
classroom it seems obvious and this Office is convinced that such a happening indeed transpired
within the solitude of the classrom after regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and
Bobby Qua is the best proof which confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations
in that place during those times of the day. . . .
27

With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation
of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that
petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in
their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which
reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated
with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being
unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with and should not
be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the
burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so
would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It
being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably and
severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be
served by ordering her reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated December 6,
1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay
petitioner backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the
amount of one (1) month for every year of service.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.


CHUA QUA vs. CLAVE
G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in Tay Tung High School in Bacolod City to
her 16 years old student. The petitioner teacher was suspended without pay and was terminated of his employment for
Abusive and Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified School Teacher which was filed by a public respondent as a
clearance for termination.

ISSUE:

Was her dismissal valid?
Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage
between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and or grave misconduct?

SUPREME COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:
If the two eventually fell in love despite the disparity in their ages and academic level, this only leads to the truism that
the heart has reason of its own which reason does not know.
Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of Code of
Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took
advantage of her position to court her student. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual
societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.