EN BANC

JUANITO A. GARCIA and

ALBERTO J. DUMAGO,

G.R. No. 164856

Petitioners,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus -

CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,
INC.,
Respondent.

TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 20, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Juanito A. Garcia and Alberto J. Dumago assail the

December 5, 2003 Decision and April 16, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69540 which granted the petition for
certiorari of respondent, Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), and denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, respectively. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and in view of the

foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. The
assailed November 26, 2001 Resolution as well as the January 28, 2002
Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
[NLRC] is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Consequently, the Writ of Execution and the Notice of
Garnishment issued by the Labor Arbiter are hereby likewise
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

The case stemmed from the administrative charge filed by PAL

against its employees-herein petitioners after they were allegedly caught
in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel
and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Centers Toolroom Section on
July 24, 1995.

After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners on October 9, 1995 for

transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline, prompting them to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages which was, by Decision of
January 11, 1999, resolved by the Labor Arbiter in their favor, thus
ordering PAL to, inter alia, immediately comply with the reinstatement
aspect of the decision.

Prior to the promulgation of the Labor Arbiters decision, the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed PAL (hereafter
referred to as respondent), which was suffering from severe financial
losses, under an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver, who was subsequently
replaced by a Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver on June 7, 1999.

From the Labor Arbiters decision, respondent appealed to the

NLRC which, by Resolution of January 31, 2000, reversed said decision
and dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Resolution

of April 28, 2000 and Entry of Judgment was issued on July 13, 2000.

Subsequently or on October 5, 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued a

Writ of Execution (Writ) respecting the reinstatement aspect of his
January 11, 1999 Decision, and on October 25, 2000, he issued a Notice
of Garnishment (Notice). Respondent thereupon moved to quash the Writ
and to lift the Notice while petitioners moved to release the garnished
amount.

In a related move, respondent filed an Urgent Petition for

Injunction with the NLRC which, by Resolutions of November 26, 2001
and January 28, 2002, affirmed the validity of the Writ and the Notice
issued by the Labor Arbiter but suspended and referred the action to the
Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action.

Respondent elevated the matter to the appellate court which issued

the herein challenged Decision and Resolution nullifying the NLRC
Resolutions on two grounds, essentially espousing that: (1) a subsequent
finding of a valid dismissal removes the basis for implementing the
reinstatement aspect of a labor arbiters decision (the first ground), and
(2) the impossibility to comply with the reinstatement order due to
corporate rehabilitation provides a reasonable justification for the failure
to exercise the options under Article 223 of the Labor Code (the second
ground).

By Decision of August 29, 2007, this Court PARTIALLY

GRANTED the present petition and effectively reinstated the NLRC
Resolutions insofar as it suspended the proceedings, viz:

Since petitioners claim against PAL is a money claim for their

wages during the pendency of PALs appeal to the NLRC, the same
should have been suspended pending the rehabilitation proceedings.
The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, as well as the Court of Appeals should
have abstained from resolving petitioners case for illegal dismissal and
should instead have directed them to lodge their claim before PALs
receiver.
However, to still require petitioners at this time to re-file their
labor claim against PAL under peculiar circumstances of the case that
their dismissal was eventually held valid with only the matter of
reinstatement pending appeal being the issue this Court deems it
legally expedient to suspend the proceedings in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED
in that the instant proceedings herein are SUSPENDED until further
notice from this Court. Accordingly, respondent Philippine Airlines,
Inc. is hereby DIRECTED to quarterly update the Court as to the status
of its ongoing rehabilitation. No costs.
SO ORDERED. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

By Manifestation and Compliance of October 30, 2007, respondent

informed the Court that the SEC, by Order of September 28, 2007,
granted its request to exit from rehabilitation proceedings.

In view of the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings, the

Court now proceeds to resolve the remaining issue for consideration,

which is whether petitioners may collect their wages during the

period between the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement pending
appeal and the NLRC decision overturning that of the Labor Arbiter,
now that respondent has exited from rehabilitation proceedings.

Amplification of the First Ground

The appellate court counted on as its first ground the view that a
subsequent finding of a valid dismissal removes the basis for
implementing the reinstatement aspect of a labor arbiters decision.
On this score, the Courts attention is drawn to seemingly divergent
decisions concerning reinstatement pending appeal or, particularly, the
option of payroll reinstatement. On the one hand is the jurisprudential
trend as expounded in a line of cases including Air Philippines Corp. v.
Zamora, while on the other is the recent case of Genuino v. National
Labor Relations Commission. At the core of the seeming divergence is
the application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code which
reads:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect
is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of
a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided herein. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The view as maintained in a number of cases is that:

x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor

Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee
during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On
the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal
period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the
employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for
he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during
the period. (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)

In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided

by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon
reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a
restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the
order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply
therewith.

The opposite view is articulated in Genuino which states:

If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal
upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the
employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll
reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case was
pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the
dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer
under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and
company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work
during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the
compensation received for actual services rendered without need of
refund.
Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed
on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause,
then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the
fallo of the September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision. (Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)

It has thus been advanced that there is no point in releasing the

wages to petitioners since their dismissal was found to be valid, and to do
so would constitute unjust enrichment.
Prior to Genuino, there had been no known similar case containing
a dispositive portion where the employee was required to refund the
salaries received on payroll reinstatement. In fact, in a catena of cases,
the Court did not order the refund of salaries garnished or received by
payroll-reinstated employees despite a subsequent reversal of the
reinstatement order.
The dearth of authority supporting Genuino is not difficult to
fathom for it would otherwise render inutile the rationale of reinstatement
pending appeal.
x x x [T]he law itself has laid down a compassionate policy
which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on labor and the working man.
xxxx
These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so
much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and
meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force,
which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity.
Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability.
xxxx
x x x In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees,
the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its
execution pending appeal.
xxxx
x x x Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power),
the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal,
of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that
saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal

may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger

to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee
and his family.

The social justice principles of labor law outweigh or render

inapplicable the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment espoused by
Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr. in his Separate Opinion. The
constitutional and statutory precepts portray the otherwise unjust
situation as a condition affording full protection to labor.
Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into the
mundane realities of human experience, the refund doctrine easily
demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm,
more than help, a dismissed employee. The employee, to make both ends
meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the
pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case
of a final unfavorable decision. It is mirage of a stop-gap leading the
employee to a risky cliff of insolvency.

Advisably, the sum is better left unspent. It becomes more logical

and practical for the employee to refuse payroll reinstatement and simply
find work elsewhere in the interim, if any is available. Notably, the
option of payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer, even if the
employee is able and raring to return to work. Prior to Genuino, it is
unthinkable for one to refuse payroll reinstatement. In the face of the
grim possibilities, the rise of concerned employees declining payroll
reinstatement is on the horizon.

Further, the Genuino ruling not only disregards the social justice
principles behind the rule, but also institutes a scheme unduly favorable
to management. Under such scheme, the salaries dispensed pendente lite
merely serve as a bond posted in installment by the employer. For in the
event of a reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision ordering reinstatement,
the employer gets back the same amount without having to spend
ordinarily for bond premiums.

This circumvents, if not directly

contradicts, the proscription that the posting of a bond [even a cash

bond] by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.
In playing down the stray posture in Genuino requiring the
dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries in
case a final decision upholds the validity of the dismissal, the Court
realigns the proper course of the prevailing doctrine on reinstatement
pending appeal vis--vis the effect of a reversal on appeal.
Respondent insists that with the reversal of the Labor Arbiters
Decision, there is no more basis to enforce the reinstatement aspect of the
said decision. In his Separate Opinion, Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr.
supports this argument and finds the prevailing doctrine in Air
Philippines and allied cases inapplicable because, unlike the present case,
the writ of execution therein was secured prior to the reversal of the
Labor Arbiters decision.
The proposition is tenuous. First, the matter is treated as a mere
race against time. The discussion stopped there without considering the
cause of the delay. Second, it requires the issuance of a writ of execution
despite the immediately executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of

the decision. In Pioneer Texturing Corp. v. NLRC, which was cited in

Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines, Inc., the Court observed:
x x x The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award [by the Labor
Arbiter] for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending
appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e.,
to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even
pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ
of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award
would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and
intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement
order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and
its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance
or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on
the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the
issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and
noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the
requirements of Article 224 [including the issuance of a writ of
execution] were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the
executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by
Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In
enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid
and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary
to achieve its specific purpose. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in
the light of the purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be
remedied. x x x In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of
a labor decision under Republic Act No. 6715, Congress should not be
considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. x x x (Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order
of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of
the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the
higher court. It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter's order of
reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either readmit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to

exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employees
salaries.

Amplification of the Second Ground

The remaining issue, nonetheless, is resolved in the negative on the
strength of the second ground relied upon by the appellate court in the
assailed issuances. The Court sustains the appellate courts finding that
the peculiar predicament of a corporate rehabilitation rendered it
impossible

for

respondent

to

exercise

its

option

under

the

circumstances.
The spirit of the rule on reinstatement pending appeal animates the
proceedings once the Labor Arbiter issues the decision containing an
order of reinstatement. The immediacy of its execution needs no further
elaboration. Reinstatement pending appeal necessitates its immediate
execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its
noble purpose. At the same time, any attempt on the part of the employer
to evade or delay its execution, as observed in Panuncillo and as what
actually transpired in Kimberly, Composite, Air Philippines, and Roquero,
should not be countenanced.

After the labor arbiters decision is reversed by a higher

tribunal, the employee may be barred from collecting the accrued
wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement
pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer.

The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that
the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its
reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employers unjustified
act or omission. If the delay is due to the employers unjustified refusal,
the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the
reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision.
In Genuino, there was no showing that the employer refused to
reinstate the employee, who was the Treasury Sales Division Head,
during the short span of four months or from the promulgation on May 2,
1994 of the Labor Arbiters Decision up to the promulgation on
September 3, 1994 of the NLRC Decision. Notably, the former NLRC
Rules of Procedure did not lay down a mechanism to promptly effectuate
the self-executory order of reinstatement, making it difficult to establish
that the employer actually refused to comply.
In a situation like that in International Container Terminal
Services, Inc. v. NLRC where it was alleged that the employer was willing
to comply with the order and that the employee opted not to pursue the
execution of the order, the Court upheld the self-executory nature of the
reinstatement order and ruled that the salary automatically accrued from
notice of the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement until its ultimate
reversal by the NLRC. It was later discovered that the employee indeed
moved for the issuance of a writ but was not acted upon by the Labor
Arbiter. In that scenario where the delay was caused by the Labor
Arbiter, it was ruled that the inaction of the Labor Arbiter who failed to
act upon the employees motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
may no longer adversely affect the cause of the dismissed employee in
view of the self-executory nature of the order of reinstatement.

The new NLRC Rules of Procedure, which took effect on January

7, 2006, now require the employer to submit a report of compliance
within 10 calendar days from receipt of the Labor Arbiters decision,
disobedience to which clearly denotes a refusal to reinstate. The
employee need not file a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution
since the Labor Arbiter shall thereafter motu proprio issue the writ. With
the new rules in place, there is hardly any difficulty in determining
the employers intransigence in immediately complying with the
order.
In the case at bar, petitioners exerted efforts to execute the Labor
Arbiters order of reinstatement until they were able to secure a writ of
execution, albeit issued on October 5, 2000 after the reversal by the
NLRC of the Labor Arbiters decision. Technically, there was still actual
delay which brings to the question of whether the delay was due to
respondents unjustified act or omission.
It is apparent that there was inaction on the part of respondent to
reinstate them, but whether such omission was justified depends on the
onset of the exigency of corporate rehabilitation.
It is settled that upon appointment by the SEC of a rehabilitation
receiver, all actions for claims before any court, tribunal or board against
the corporation shall ipso jure be suspended. As stated early on, during
the pendency of petitioners complaint before the Labor Arbiter, the SEC
placed respondent under an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver. After the
Labor Arbiter rendered his decision, the SEC replaced the Interim
Rehabilitation Receiver with a Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver.

Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order, the

implementation of the order of reinstatement is ministerial and
mandatory. This injunction or suspension of claims by legislative fiat
partakes of the nature of a restraining order that constitutes a legal
justification for respondents non-compliance with the reinstatement
order. Respondents failure to exercise the alternative options of actual
reinstatement and payroll reinstatement was thus justified. Such being
the case, respondents obligation to pay the salaries pending appeal, as the
normal effect of the non-exercise of the options, did not attach.

While reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing

threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee
and his family, it does not contemplate the period when the employercorporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored state of being
resuscitated in order to survive.

The parallelism between a judicial order of corporation

rehabilitation as a justification for the non-exercise of its options, on the
one hand, and a claim of actual and imminent substantial losses as ground
for retrenchment, on the other hand, stops at the red line on the financial
statements. Beyond the analogous condition of financial gloom, as
discussed by Justice Leonardo Quisumbing in his Separate Opinion, are
more salient distinctions. Unlike the ground of substantial losses
contemplated in a retrenchment case, the state of corporate rehabilitation
was judicially pre-determined by a competent court and not formulated
for the first time in this case by respondent.

More importantly, there are legal effects arising from a judicial

order placing a corporation under rehabilitation. Respondent was, during
the period material to the case, effectively deprived of the alternative
choices under Article 223 of the Labor Code, not only by virtue of the
statutory injunction but also in view of the interim relinquishment of
management control to give way to the full exercise of the powers of the
rehabilitation receiver. Had there been no need to rehabilitate, respondent
may have opted for actual physical reinstatement pending appeal to
optimize the utilization of resources.

Then again, though the

management may think this wise, the rehabilitation receiver may decide
otherwise, not to mention the subsistence of the injunction on claims.

In sum, the obligation to pay the employees salaries upon the

employers failure to exercise the alternative options under Article 223 of
the Labor Code is not a hard and fast rule, considering the inherent
constraints of corporate rehabilitation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY DENIED. Insofar

as the Court of Appeals Decision of December 5, 2003 and Resolution of
April 16, 2004 annulling the NLRC Resolutions affirming the validity of
the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment are concerned, the
Court finds no reversible error.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby

certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Justices Marina L. Buzon, Sergio L. Pestao (ponente) and Jose C. Mendoza

comprised the [Former] Fourteenth Division of the appellate court.
Rollo, pp. 47-48.
Juanito A. Garcia and Alberto J. Dumago were employed as aircraft
inspector and aircraft furnisher master, respectively.
Particularly, Chapter II, Section 6, Articles 46 (Violation of
Law/Government Regulations) and 48 (Prohibited Drugs).
Records, Vol. 1, p. 167. The dispositive portion of the Decision penned by
Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin Reyes reads:
WHEREFORE, conformably with the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the respondents guilty of illegal suspension and illegal dismissal and
ordering them to reinstate complainants to their former position without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges. Respondents are hereby further ordered to pay
jointly and severally unto the complainants the following:
Alberto J. Dumago - P409,500.00 backwages as of 1/10/99
34,125.00 for 13th month pay
Juanito A. Garcia

- P1,290,744.00 backwages as of 1/10/99

107,562.00 for 13th month pay

[t]he amounts of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 to each complainant as and by way

of moral and exemplary damages; and
[t]he sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award as and for attorneys
fees.
Respondents are directed to immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of this
Decision. However, in the event that reinstatement is no longer feasible, respondent is hereby
ordered, in lieu thereof, to pay unto the complainants their separation pay computed at one
month for [e]very year of service.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Records, Vol. 1. pp. 174-186.

Id, at 209. A second look at the antecedents of the main case reveals that
petitioners went on certiorari to the Court of Appeals to challenge the finding
of the validity of their dismissal. By Resolutions of August 10, 2000 and
November 5, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the petition docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 59826 and denied reconsideration thereof on technical grounds.
By Decision of June 8, 2005, the Court reversed the two resolutions and
remanded the case to the appellate court for further proceedings. vide rollo, pp.

218-219; Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160798, June 8, 2005,
459 SCRA 768. The appellate court, by Decision of March 28, 2008 and
Resolution of July 11, 2008, dismissed the petition.

Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 164856, August 29, 2007, 531
SCRA 574, 582-583. Penned by Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
Rollo, pp. 250-257.
G.R. No. 148247, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 59.
G.R. Nos. 142732-33, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 342.
Supra note 10 at 72-73.
Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, 449 Phil. 437, 446 (2003).
Supra note 11 at 363-364. The Court therein sustained the NLRCs reversal of
the Labor Arbiters decision but cancelled the NLRCs award of salaries
accruing from the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement pending appeal.
Composite Enterprises, Inc. v. Caparoso, G.R. No. 159919, August 8, 2007,
529 SCRA 470; Kimberly Clark (Phils), Inc. v. Facundo, G.R. No. 144885,
July 26, 2006 (Unsigned Resolution); Sanchez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124348,
February 7, 2001 Unsigned Resolution; International Container Terminal
Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 360 Phil. 527 (1998).
Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, supra at 445 citing Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. NLRC,
200 SCRA 246 (1991).
LABOR CODE, Article 223, par. 3.
345 Phil. 1057 (1997) which established the doctrine that an order or award
for reinstatement is self-executory, meaning that it does not require a writ of
execution, much less a motion for its issuance.
G.R. No. 161305, February 9, 2007, 515 SCRA 323.

Supra note 18 at 1075-1076.

Supra note 12.
Kimberly Clark (Phils), Inc. v. Facundo, supra.
Supra, where the 3 months salary was delayed because the employer filed
another baseless motion to quash writ of execution.

Supra, where the employer did not release the salaries despite agreeing on
payroll reinstatement, awaiting the resolution of its unmeritorious Motion to
be Allowed to pay Separation Pay in lieu of Reinstatement.
Supra, where the employer did not at all comply with the standing writ of
execution.
Supra, where the employer refused to comply with the writ of execution,
arguing that it filed a petition for review before the Court.
Supra.
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. NLRC, supra.
REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE NLRC (2005), Rule V, Sec. 14
and Rule XI, Sec. 6.
Petitioners state that respondent ignored their letter of June 14, 1999,
prompting them to file a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution [of the
Labor Arbiters January 11, 1999] and to Cite the Respondents in Contempt
of November 11, 1999, rollo, pp. 78-85, 169.
Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra note 8.
Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, supra note 13.
PRES. DECREE No. 902-A, Sec. 6 (c), as amended.