This document discusses recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) as they relate to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) standard. It provides background on how RAGAGEP has been addressed by organizations like the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and American Petroleum Institute (API). It also describes how OSHA has enforced RAGAGEP through inspection programs. Key points include:
- RAGAGEP play an important role in PSM but the standard does not incorporate specific codes, allowing flexibility.
- Early industry guidance described using internal and external GEP/RAGAGEP for safe facility design and operations.
This document discusses recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) as they relate to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) standard. It provides background on how RAGAGEP has been addressed by organizations like the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and American Petroleum Institute (API). It also describes how OSHA has enforced RAGAGEP through inspection programs. Key points include:
- RAGAGEP play an important role in PSM but the standard does not incorporate specific codes, allowing flexibility.
- Early industry guidance described using internal and external GEP/RAGAGEP for safe facility design and operations.
This document discusses recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) as they relate to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) standard. It provides background on how RAGAGEP has been addressed by organizations like the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and American Petroleum Institute (API). It also describes how OSHA has enforced RAGAGEP through inspection programs. Key points include:
- RAGAGEP play an important role in PSM but the standard does not incorporate specific codes, allowing flexibility.
- Early industry guidance described using internal and external GEP/RAGAGEP for safe facility design and operations.
This document discusses recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) as they relate to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) standard. It provides background on how RAGAGEP has been addressed by organizations like the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and American Petroleum Institute (API). It also describes how OSHA has enforced RAGAGEP through inspection programs. Key points include:
- RAGAGEP play an important role in PSM but the standard does not incorporate specific codes, allowing flexibility.
- Early industry guidance described using internal and external GEP/RAGAGEP for safe facility design and operations.
The document discusses RAGAGEP (recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices), how it relates to OSHA's Process Safety Management standard, examples of RAGAGEP noncompliance cited by OSHA, and the role RAGAGEP plays in process safety management.
RAGAGEP refers to industry consensus codes and standards. The PSM standard requires employers to comply with RAGAGEP and document which RAGAGEP they follow. RAGAGEP is important for equipment design, inspection, and testing as required by the PSM standard.
Examples provided include noncompliance with NFPA 30 for ventilation system design, not following RAGAGEP for pressure vessel modification, and disabling or bypassing safety interlocks.
RAGAGEP 101
Lisa A. Long, James R. Lay, Michael L. Marshall, and Jeffrey J. Wanko
US Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037; [email protected] (for correspondence) Published online 6 November 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI 10.1002/prs.11637 Recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEPs) play an important role in the Occupa- tional Safety and Health Administrations Process Safety Management standard (29 CFR 1910.119). Since 2007, OSHA issued numerous RAGAGEP-related citations under the Petroleum Renery Process Safety Management and PSM Covered Chemical Facility National Emphasis Programs. Even though the PSM standard became effective over 20 years ago, noncompliance with PSMs RAGAGEP require- ments remains an issue. This article reviews RAGAGEP basics from OSHAs perspective, using examples from national emphasis program inspections to illustrate common RAGA- GEP compliance problems. VC 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 156161, 2014 Keywords: recognized and generally accepted good engi- neering practice; RAGAGEP; OSHA; process safety manage- ment; PSM; consensus codes and standards INTRODUCTION Good engineering practice (GEP) has always been part of the foundation of safe operations in the chemical industry. GEP is a part of all aspects of chemical processing including the design of equipment, the overall process, and the man- machine interface. This article on recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice (RAGAGEP): Provides background information; Describes how RAGAGEP evolved from early industry descriptions, the Process Safety Management (PSM) pro- mulgation process, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) interpretations, and later industry publications; Illustrates how other federal agencies use GEP and RAGAGEP; Describes OSHAs enforcement of RAGAGEP in the Petro- leum Renery Process Safety Management National Emphasis Program (Renery NEP) and Process Safety Management Covered Chemical Facility National Emphasis Program (ChemNEP); Documents examples of OSHA citations related to RAGA- GEP; and Provides incidents in which RAGAGEP noncompliance was a causal factor. BACKGROUND Prior to the enactment of OSHAs Process Safety Manage- ment of Highly Hazardous Chemicals Standard (PSM) [1], OSHA primarily enforced GEP through specic consensus standards incorporated by reference into existing OSHA standards. For example, OSHAs 29 CFR 1910.106 standard, Flammable and Combustible Liquids, incorporates the Ameri- can Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pres- sure Vessel Code, Section VIII1968. However, when OSHA issued the PSM standard in 1992, it used a different strategy to enforce GEP. Notably, the PSM standard does not incorporate any GEP. Rather, the PSM standard includes nonspecic requirements that employers comply with RAGAGEP in equipment design and in inspec- tion and testing. A phrase that is common in the industry relating to man- agement system performance is Say what you do and do what you say. OSHAs PSM standard parallels this philoso- phy in that it is largely a performance standard. The PSM standard sets forth a management system framework upon which employers build. The design and maintenance of the process is an essential part of the standard in which RAGA- GEP plays a critical role. The PSM standard is a set of requirements for employers with processes containing highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) intended to prevent releases. The PSM standard is not prescriptive because of the number and types of indus- tries, facilities, chemicals, and technologies covered by the standard. Employers have latitude to develop and initiate the required management systems in a manner that is exible and takes into account the attributes of their covered proc- esses and equipment while still achieving safe operations. Specically for RAGAGEP, the PSM standard: 1. Allows employers to select appropriate RAGAGEP for their processes; 2. Requires employers to document the RAGAGEP to which they comply (Say what you do); and Requires employers perform (do what you say) to the provisions of the chosen RAGAGEP and document compli- ance with the chosen RAGAGEP. EARLY RAGAGEP RECOGNITION American Institute of Chemical Engineers One of the rst authoritative references on the use of GEP as a guideline in the chemical processing industry was by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) Disclaimer: This paper represents the views of the authors. Although the authors based the paper on OSHA programs, it does not represent ofcial OSHA policy. This article originally presented at the 9th Global Congress on Pro- cess Safety, San Antonio, TX, 29 April to 1 May 2013. VC 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.2) June 2014 156 Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) in 1989. In the Guidelines for Technical Management of Chemical Process Safety [2], CCPS provided guidelines on how to use external and internal GEP to achieve safe facilities. Some of the guid- ance by CCPS related to GEP included: Management of standards, codes, and regulations as a necessary part of chemical process safety activities; Application of external codes, standards, and regulations to the layout, design, and operation of chemical plants and the protection of equipment, employees, and the public; Means of deciding which codes, standards, and guidelines the facility follows; A table listing of some example external codes/regula- tions including ASME - Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Code for Pressure Piping (B31), American Petroleum Institute (API)RP 520/521 Pressure Relieving Systems, AIChEDesign Institute for Emergency Relief Systems Procedure for Emergency Venting Sizing, OSHA29 CFR 1910, etc.; Clear documentation of the chosen codes, standards and guidelines so that those involved in design and mainte- nance know which RAGAGEP to follow. Means of documenting the reason for deviating from a code or standard. The facility seeking to use an alternative approach should demonstrate that the approach is at least as safe as the chosen code or standard; Development of internal standards to complement exter- nal codes and design practices; Developing and instituting internal standards to achieve consistency in design, where appropriate, and to safely operate and maintain the facilities; and Management commitment to following all chosen RAGA- GEP whether internally- or externally-developed. American Petroleum Institute In January 1990, API issued Recommended Practice (RP) 750, Management of Process Hazards [3]. RP 750 states the following with respect to GEP: The mechanical design information should include design codes employed (Section 2.3.1); The mechanical design should be consistent with the applicable consensus codes and standards in effect at the time the design is prepared or, in the absence of such codes and standards, recognized and generally accepted engineering practices (Section 2.3.2); When the mechanical design is not consistent with appli- cable consensus codes and standards, the deviation and its design basis should be documented (Section 2.3.2); When a process hazards analysis or other review reveals that existing equipment is designed and constructed in accordance with consensus codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use, procedures should be implemented to ensure that the equipment is t for serv- ice (Section 2.3.2); Facilities should establish inspection and testing programs for critical equipment. Such programs should include test- ing and inspection procedures in accordance with com- mon standards and codes, such as API 510 or the API Guide for the Inspection of Renery Equipment. (Section 8.5(a)). OSHA Proposed PSM Rule In 1990, OSHA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the PSM rule [4]. The NPRM proposed regula- tions including some related to RAGAGEP, however, the NPRM contained no background information on the genesis or intent of the specic RAGAGEP requirements. The NPRM contained the following language on RAGAGEP: 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(F)The employer shall develop and maintain a compilation of written safety informa- tion. . .information pertaining to the equipment in the pro- cess shall include. . ..Design codes employed; 1910.119(d)(3)(ii)The employer shall document that equipment complies with applicable codes and standards, such as those published by the ASME, API, AIChE, ANSI, ASTM, and NFPA, where they exist; or RAGAGEPs; 1910.119(d)(3)(iii)For existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or prac- tices that are no longer in general use, the employer shall determine and document that the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner; 1910.119(j)(3)(ii)Inspection and testing procedures shall follow applicable codes and standards, such as those pub- lished by ASME, API, AIChE, ANSI, ASTM, and NFPA, where they exist; or RAGAGEPs; and 1910.119(j)(3)(iii)The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable codes and standards, or, more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience. OSHA FINAL RULE ON PSM AND RAGAGEP In 1992, OSHA promulgated its PSM regulation containing some, but not all, of the RAGAGEP provisions listed in the NPRM. The preamble to the PSM rule explains that the phrase recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices included both appropriate internal standards and applicable published codes and standards. The preamble to the nal PSM standard [5] describes how and why RAGAGEP became part of the regulation: (57 FR 6375) As part of the process safety information the employer is required to document that the process equipment being used complies with applicable consen- sus codes and standards, where they exist; or must be consistent with recognized and generally accepted engi- neering practices. OSHA modied the paragraph 1910.119(d)(3)(ii) from the NPRM by eliminating the specic list of codes and stand- ards producing organizations. OSHA stated that the discussion in paragraph (j), Mechan- ical Integrity, section of the preamble describes the rea- sons for the change from the specic list of required codes and standards. (57 FR 63906391) OSHA explained the intent of pro- posed paragraph (j)(3)(ii) was an effort to assure that inspections and tests are performed properly. Many commenters to the NPRM, though, objected to OSHAs inclusion of a list of consensus documents in the regulation. While OSHA believed the lists in the proposed (d)(3)(ii) and (j)(3)(ii) were not exhaustive nor attempts at incorporation by reference, OSHA published the nal rule without lists. The following RAGAGEP rules show the nal text of the existing RAGAGEP standards. Bolded text represents lan- guage added to the nal standards following the comment period and the struck-through portion represents language removed: 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(F)The employer shall develop and maintain a compilation of written safety informa- tion. . .information pertaining to the equipment in the Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.2) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs June 2014 157 process shall include. . ..Design codes and standards employed; 1910.119(d)(3)(ii)The employer shall document that equipment complies with RAGAGEPs. 1910.119(d)(3)(iii)For existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or prac- tices that are no longer in general use, the employer shall determine and document that the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner; 1910.119(j)(4)(ii)Inspection and testing procedures shall follow RAGAGEPs. And 1910.119(j)(4)(iii)The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers recommendations and GEPs, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience. Appendix C to the PSM Final Rule Appendix C to the PSM Final Rule, Compliance Guide- lines and Recommendations for Process Safety Management (Non-Mandatory), contains information for the regulated community related to RAGAGEP. Appendix C states the fol- lowing with respect to the design of equipment: The information pertaining to process equipment design must be documented. In other words, what were the codes and standards relied on to establish GEP. These codes and standards are published by such organizations as the Ameri- can Society of Mechanical Engineers, API, American National Standards Institute, National Fire Protection Association, American Society for Testing and Materials, National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, National Association of Corrosion Engineers, American Society of Exchange Manu- facturers Association, and model building code groups. In addition, various engineering societies issue technical reports which impact process design. For example, the AIChE has published technical reports on topics such as two phase ow for venting devices. This type of technically rec- ognized report would constitute GEP. Note, the codes and standards listed above are examples and not mandatorythe employer selects the appropriate RAGAGEP with which to comply. The following excerpt from Appendix C discusses RAGA- GEP as it relates to mechanical integrity inspections and tests: Also, applicable codes and standards such as the National Board Inspection Code, or those from the American Society for Testing and Material, API, National Fire Protection Associ- ation, American National Standards Institute, American Soci- ety of Mechanical Engineers, and other groups, provide information to help establish an effective testing and inspec- tion frequency, as well as appropriate methodologies. The applicable codes and standards provide criteria for external inspections for such items as foundation and sup- ports, anchor bolts, concrete or steel supports, guy wires, nozzles and sprinklers, pipe hangers, grounding connections, protective coatings and insulation, and external metal surfa- ces of piping and vessels, etc. These codes and standards also provide information on methodologies for internal inspection, and a frequency formula based on the corrosion rate of the materials of construction. Also, erosion both inter- nal and external needs to be considered along with corro- sion effects for piping and valves. Where the corrosion rate is not known, a maximum inspection frequency is recom- mended, and methods of developing the corrosion rate are available in the codes. Internal inspections need to cover items such as vessel shell, bottom and head; metallic linings; nonmetallic linings; thickness measurements for vessels and piping; inspection for erosion, corrosion, cracking and bulges; internal equipment like trays, bafes, sensors and screens for erosion, corrosion or cracking and other decien- cies. Some of these inspections may be performed by state or local government inspectors under state and local statutes. However, each employer needs to develop procedures to ensure that tests and inspections are conducted properly and that consistency is maintained even where different employ- ees may be involved. Appropriate training is to be provided to maintenance personnel to ensure that they understand the preventive maintenance program procedures, safe practices, and the proper use and application of special equipment or unique tools that may be required. This training is part of the overall training program called for in the standard. FURTHER GUIDANCE ON RAGAGEP Center for Chemical Process Safety In 2006, CCPS published, Guidelines for Mechanical Integrity Systems [6] which discusses RAGAGEP extensively what it is, how it is used, application to different classes of equipment, design, fabrication, construction/installation, inspection, testing, and maintenance activities. The text con- tains the following information on RAGAGEP: A description of RAGAGEP with many examples; Facility-develop internal standards provided by the manu- facturer or licensor of a process and often these are based on RAGAGEP; Recognition that to effectively use RAGAGEP, facility man- agement must determine which practices are available and then assess the applicability of each practice to their facility; and Several chapters that address the applicability and use of RAGAGEP for detailed operations, for example, vessel design and fabrications, in-service piping inspections, RAGAGEP for instrumentation and controls, RAGAGEP for prime movers, etc. Incorporation of Consensus Standards In federal regulation, use of the terms recognized and gen- erally accepted good engineering practices and RAGAGEP ori- ginated with OSHA. However, the Federal government has long encouraged the use of voluntary consensus standards in regulatory affairs. The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, as interpreted by the Ofce of Management and Budgets (OMBs) Circular Number A-119 [7], instructs agencies to use voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards except where inconsis- tent with law or otherwise impractical. In addition, OMB A- 119 states that many voluntary consensus standards are appropriate or adaptable for the governments purposes. OMB A-119 denes standards and technical standards as: 1. Common and repeated use of rules, conditions, guide- lines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, and related management sys- tems practices. 2. The denition of terms; classication of components; delineation of procedures; specication of dimensions, materials, performance, designs, or operations; measure- ment of quality and quantity in describing materials, processes, products, systems, services, or practices; test methods and sampling procedures; or descriptions of t and measurements. OMB further denes voluntary consensus standards as standards developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, both domestic and international. These DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.2) 158 June 2014 Published on behalf of the AIChE bodies must have attributes including openness, balance of interest, due process, an appeals process, and consensus, dened as general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity, with a process for attempting to resolve objections by inter- ested parties. Circular A-119 also denes other types of standards as non-consensus standards, industry standards, Company standards, or de facto standards developed in the private sector but without the full consensus process. Government agencies regulating HHCs use voluntary con- sensus standards in a variety of ways. For example, Section 6(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 [8] gave the nascent OSHA a two-year window in which to by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health standard any national consensus standard, and any established Federal standard. . . The 6(a) provision enabled OSHA to quickly establish a basic suite of protective standards. National con- sensus standards incorporated by reference into regulations under this provision of the OSH act are listed in 29 CFR 1910.6 Incorporation by reference. Examples include the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Unred Pressure Vessels, Including Addenda (1969), incorporation by reference approved for OSHA standards 1910.261, 1910. 262, and 1910.263(i)(24)(ii); and API 650 (1966) Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage, 3rd Ed., incorporation by reference approved for 1910.106(b)(1)(iii)(a)(2). Since OSHAs incor- poration by reference provision expired in 1974, the agency has followed the rule making process referenced in section 6(b) of the OSHA Act, including for updating references to more recent versions of national consensus standards. Incor- poration of consensus standards by reference has benets to both OSHA and the regulated community. However, OSHA must incorporate a specic version of a standard. When the consensus standard is updated, OSHAs incorporated stand- ard becomes dated and can only be updated through the rulemaking process. Commenters on OSHAs ANPRM real- ized this, and this resulted in a different approach, the intro- duction of the RAGAGEP concept. OSHA RAGAGEP ENFORCEMENT OSHA RAGAGEP Policy In the past, OSHA issued enforcement policy related to RAGAGEP. The rst milestone enforcement policy related to RAGAGEP was a 2000 OSHA Letter of Interpretation (LOI) to the Instrument Society of America [9]. In this LOI, OSHA stated the following regarding the agencys RAGAGEP policy: 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(F) requires an employer to document which design codes and standards are used for SIS as well as all covered equipment; 1910.119(d)(3)(ii) requires an employer to document that SIS comply with RAGAGEP; 1910.119(j)(4) requires an employer to conduct inspection and testing on process equipment, including SIS, in accordance with RAGAGEP; If an employer documents compliance with ISA S84.01 for SIS in accordance with 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(F) and it meets all S84.01 and other OSHA PSM requirements related to SIS, OSHA considers the employer in compliance with PSM requirements for SIS. OSHA issued a second important RAGAGEP enforcement policy LOI in 2010 [10]. In this LOI related to blast resistant structures, OSHA reiterated its policy for enforcing the RAGAGEP sections of the PSM standard. OSHA RAGAGEP Enforcement Because Process Safety information and, specically, com- pliance with RAGAGEP is such an important part of a strong PSM program, OSHA emphasizes this in both the Renery and Chem NEPs. Both NEPs rely on focused questions and compli- ance guidance that Compliance Ofcers can ask to help assess compliance with the standard. The Renery NEP contains both static and dynamic (or changing) questions. OSHA published the static questions in the NEP while the dynamic questions changed periodically and limited to distribution within OSHA. The Renery NEP static questions focus on the following areas with respect to RAGAGEP: Relief Systems/Blowdowns Does the PSI contain information on the RAGAGEP used? Does the PSI contain the RAGAGEPs required design parameters? Do the relief valves comply with the RAGAGEP? Are intervening valves appropriate and adequately controlled? Do the valves/blowdowns relieve to a safe location? Are blowdown alarm systems in accordance with RAGAGEP? Is blowdown quench water system in accordance with RAGAGEP? Does the relief testing program comply with RAGAGEP? Frequency Personnel qualications Testing procedures Testing blowdown alarms Facility Siting Pressure vessels/Piping Does the PSI contain information on the RAGAGEP? Are the safeguards properly designed? Does the testing and inspection comply with RAGAGEP Bonded liners Thickness measurement locations Corrosion under insulation Testing frequency Personnel qualications Testing basis Injection points Appropriate testing locations It is important to note that OSHA also uses RAGAGEP compliance questions in it dynamic list of inspection priority items in both its Renery and Chem NEPs. OSHA analyzed citation data from the Renery and Chem NEPs to determine the most frequently cited standards and any trends. In both enforcement efforts, the most frequently cited PSM sub-element is 1910.119(d)(3)(ii)the requirement that employers document that equipment complies with RAGAGEP. Of these citations, most common areas cited involved valves and facility siting. The following list outlines some of the valve-related issues cited while enforcing the Renery NEP: Valves between pressure vessel and relief device not locked open or controlled. Relief device appropriate back pressure not maintained. Relief device inlet line pressure drop or chattering problems. Relief devices not installed on pressure vessels. Relief devices not appropriately sized for the circumstances. Valves inaccessible. Valves inoperable. The following list outlines to two most frequent concerns regarding facility siting: Facilities not compliant with RAGAGEP chosen by the facility, and Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.2) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs June 2014 159 Structures either unprotected by adequate separation or building construction from consequences of HHC release such as re, explosion, or toxic releases. In the case of facility siting, citations often reference mul- tiple on-site structures including control rooms and other buildings. In many cases, siting studies identied issues that the facility had not resolved in a timely manner. OSHA also commonly cites the failure to document RAGAGEP in Chemical NEP inspections. However, due to the larger variety of facility types inspected, it is difcult to determine trends. The following list is a sample of RAGAGEP violations found during Chemical NEP inspections: Safety interlocks do not follow RAGAGEP RAGAGEP not documented for equipment (glass lined vessels, piping, rupture disks, chemical hoses, pumps) RAGAGEP not documented for ventilation systems design Ammonia system labeling not in accordance with RAGAGEP Chlorine alarm systems not designed in accordance with RAGAGEP Piping supported did not follow RAGAGEP Corrosion rates not calculated in accordance with RAGAGEP Chlorine did not have shut-off valves in accordance with RAGAGEP Relief devices not designed in accordance with RAGAGEP PSM explicitly requires employers to document that the equipment complies with RAGAGEP at the time the process was originally built. However, employers should stay abreast of current engineering codes, standards, and practices. Changes in codes, standards, and practices often result when industry has discovered new hazards or new means of haz- ard control. If a the PHA team nds the process design does not adequately protect against a newly discovered or newly recognized hazard, employers should consider compliance with a more recent code or additional safeguards to ensure employees are protected. CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY INCIDENTS AND RAGAGEP Process safety incidents in the chemical and rening industries occur for many reasons. Investigators nd multiple broken barriers that result in a process safety incident. Bar- riers such as engineering and administrative controls often play a role in the prevention of chemical process incidents. Barrier design, operation, and maintenance are frequently based on RAGAGEP. Highlights of incidents reveal many employer failures regarding RAGAGEP allowing incident trajectories to con- tinue to harmful outcomes. Bellwood, IllinoisJune 14, 2006 The incident occurred when a mixture of ammable liquids boiled in an open-top kettle. Vapors escaped the ket- tle and owed into the processing room and into an adjoin- ing warehouse/general purpose room where it ignited. The ash re and deagration killed one and injured two. The facility installed the chemical processing area in direct communication with the general use area not in accordance with NFPA 30. In addition, the ventilation system was designed with only overhead point pick-up and not general ventilation with oor sweeps. Middleton, MassachusettsMarch 13, 2011 The release of acetone vapor into a congested workspace caused a deagration that nearly destroyed the building. The ventilation system design was not designed to sweep or remove ammable vapors from the room. The facility did not use NFPA 30 in its ventilation system design. The inad- equately designed ventilation allowed ammable vapors to accumulate. Houston, TexasApril 12, 2004 The employer modied a large pressure vessel for its operation. The modication involved cutting and subsequent replacing a large coupon in the vessel wall. The modication did not follow RAGAGEP for performing welding on a pres- sure vessel. After the facility placed the modied vessel into service, it failed at the welded coupon, ejected its contents, rocketed into a neighboring building, and caused a large re. Illiopolis, IllinoisApril 23, 2004 An explosion and re killed ve and injured three at this polyvinyl chloride facility. Many factors combined to cause a release of vinyl chloride monomer into the congested work- space. However, the facility had not designed and main- tained its safety interlocks in accordance with RAGAGEP as they were easily disabled or bypassed. When needed to pre- vent the release, the interlock was bypassed and the release occurred. Two of the most basic backbones of any process safety program are to design equipment in accordance with RAGA- GEP and to maintain, inspect, and test equipment in accord- ance with RAGAGEP. Given these two fundamental tenets of process safety, there is little doubt that contributing to most incidents are failures to adhere to these requirements. CONCLUSION The RAGAGEP concept as used by OSHA comprises hun- dreds of industry-published codes and standards and, possi- bly, many thousands of internally-produced practices and protocols. When promulgated, the PSM standard made man- datory that facilities adopt code and standards published for their industry or produce internal standards that meet similar requirements. The management system that OSHA envi- sioned with the PSM standard is no different from any qual- ity cycle (plan-do-check-act) and RAGAGEP plays a critical role. Because OSHA is not in a position to be expert in any industry, use of RAGAGEP is critical to the success of a per- formance standard such as PSM. Using the collective wisdom and experience of industry experts, RAGAGEP helps achieve safe operations throughout industries using HHCs. LITERATURE CITED 1. Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemi- cals, 29 CFR 1910.119, 57 FR 6356, February 24, 1992. 2. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Tech- nical Management of Chemical Process Safety, Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1989, pp 123127. 3. Management of Process Hazards, American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice 750, 1990. 4. 55 FR 2915029173, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, July 27, 1990. 5. 57 FR 6356, Preamble to OSHA PSM Final Rule, February 24, 1992. 6. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Mechanical Integrity Systems, Center for Chemical Pro- cess Safety, 2006. 7. Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Vol- untary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assess- ment Activities, OMB Circular A-119, Revised on February 10, 1998, available at: http://www.whitehou- se.gov/omb/circulars_a119/, accessed on February 13, 2013. 8. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 USC 651 678, December 1970. DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.2) 160 June 2014 Published on behalf of the AIChE 9. Compliance with PSM and ANSI/ISA-S84.01 for safety instrumented systems, Occupation Safety and Health Administration Letter of Interpretation, available at: http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_ document?p_table5INTERPRETATIONS&p_id523722, accessed on March 23, 2000. 10. Applicability of the PSM Standards Mechanical Integrity Requirements to Renery Structures, Occupational Safety and Health Administration Letter of Interpretation, available at: http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/ owadisp.show_document?p_table5INTERPRETATIO- NS&p_id527443, accessed on February 1, 2010. Process Safety Progress (Vol.33, No.2) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs June 2014 161