Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 162243 December 3, 2009
HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Petitioner,
vs.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 164516
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171875
THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (formerly Hon. Elisea G. Gozun), in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP), Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial
court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President
Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
Since the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, and since
the 1969 Document itself has a proviso requiring compliance with the laws and the Constitution, the
issues in this Motion for Reconsideration are the following: (1) firstly, is the 1969 Document a
contract enforceable under the Non-Impairment Clause of the Constitution, so as to make the signing
of the IFMA a ministerial duty? (2) secondly, did PICOP comply with all the legal and constitutional
requirements for the issuance of an IFMA?
To recall, PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an
application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In the
middle of the processing of PICOPs application, however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings
with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus
1
against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP
seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute
and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to
[I]ssue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA
No. 43, as amended; b) to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber
from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioners
pulp and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the
government and PICOPs predecessor-in-interest; and c) to honor and respect the Government
Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and
agreement dated July 29, [1969] between the government and PICOPs predecessor-in-interest. x x x.
2

On 11 October 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOPs Petition for Mandamus, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Mandamus is hereby GRANTED.
The Respondent DENR Secretary Hon. Heherson Alvarez is hereby ordered:
1. to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and/or documents to PICOP and issue the
corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA
No. 43, as amended;
2. to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said
area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioners pulp and
paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the
government and PICOPs predecessor-in-interest; and
3. to honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP
strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29, 1999 (sic) between the
government and PICOPs predecessor-in-interest (Exhibits "H", "H-1" to "H-5", particularly
the following:
a) the area coverage of TLA No. 43, which forms part and parcel of the government
warranties;
b) PICOP tenure over the said area of TLA No. 43 and exclusive right to cut, collect
and remove sawtimber and pulpwood for the period ending on April 26, 1977; and
said period to be renewable for [an]other 25 years subject to compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber
concessions; and
c) The peaceful and adequate enjoyment by PICOP of the area as described and
specified in the aforesaid amended Timber License Agreement No. 43.
The Respondent Secretary Alvarez is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum of P10 million a
month beginning May 2002 until the conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, to IFMA is formally
effected and the harvesting from the said area is granted.
3

On 25 October 2002, the DENR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
4
In a 10 February 2003
Order, the RTC denied the DENR Secretarys Motion for Reconsideration and granted PICOPs
Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction.
5
The fallo of the
11 October 2002 Decision was practically copied in the 10 February 2003 Order, although there was
no mention of the damages imposed against then DENR Secretary Alvarez.
6
The DENR Secretary
filed a Notice of Appeal
7
from the 11 October 2002 Decision and the 10 February 2003 Order.
On 19 February 2004, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed
8
the Decision of the
RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification that the order
directing then DENR Secretary Alvarez "to pay petitioner-appellee the sum of P10 million a month
beginning May, 2002 until the conversion to IFMA of TLA No. 43, as amended, is formally effected
and the harvesting from the said area is granted" is hereby deleted.
9

Challenging the deletion of the damages awarded to it, PICOP filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration
10
of this Decision, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a 20 July 2004
Resolution.
11

The DENR Secretary and PICOP filed with this Court separate Petitions for Review of the 19
February 2004 Court of Appeals Decision. These Petitions were docketed as G.R. No. 162243 and
No. 164516, respectively. These cases were consolidated with G.R. No. 171875, which relates to the
lifting of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the execution pending appeal of the foregoing
Decision.
On 29 November 2006, this Court rendered the assailed Decision on the Consolidated Petitions:
WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 162243 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it affirmed the RTC Decision granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries
Corp. of the Philippines (PICOP) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition in G.R. No.
164516 seeking the reversal of the same Decision insofar as it nullified the award of damages in favor
of PICOP is DENIED for lack of merit. The Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing the lifting of the
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in favor of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources is
DISMISSED on the ground of mootness.
12

On 18 January 2006, PICOP filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration, based on the following
grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT WITH
PRESIDENTIAL WARRANTY SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ON 29 JUNE
1969 ISSUED TO PICOP IS A MERE PERMIT OR LICENSE AND IS NOT A CONTRACT,
PROPERTY OR PROPERTY RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION
II.
THE EVALUATION OF PICOPS MANAGEMENT OF THE TLA 43 NATURAL FOREST
CLEARLY SHOWED SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE FOR KEEPING THE NATURAL
FOREST GENERALLY INTACT AFTER 50 YEARS OF FOREST OPERATIONS. THIS
COMPLETES THE REQUIREMENT FOR AUTOMATIC CONVERSION UNDER SECTION 9 OF
DAO 99-53.
III.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT, IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF
FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, MISAPPRECIATED THE
EVIDENCE, TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY, WHEN IT RULED THAT:
i.
PICOP FAILED TO SUBMIT A FIVE-YEAR FOREST PROTECTION PLAN AND A SEVEN-
YEAR REFORESTATION PLAN FOR THE YEARS UNDER REVIEW.
ii.
PICOP FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PAYMENT OF FOREST CHARGES.
iii.
PICOP DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT FOR A CERTIFICATION FROM THE
NCIP THAT THE AREA OF TLA 43 DOES NOT OVERLAP WITH ANY ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN.
iv.
PICOP FAILED TO HAVE PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH AND APPROVAL FROM THE
SANGUNIAN CONCERNED, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 27 OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.
v.
PCIOP FAILED TO SECURE SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1586.
IV
THE MOTIVATION OF ALVAREZ IN RECALLING THE CLEARANCE FOR AUTOMATIC
CONVERSION HE ISSUED ON 25 OCTOBER 2001 WAS NOT DUE TO ANY SHORTCOMING
FROM PICOP BUT DUE TO HIS DETERMINATION TO EXCLUDE 28,125 HECTARES FROM
THE CONVERSION AND OTHER THINGS.
On 15 December 2008, on Motion by PICOP, the Third Division of this Court resolved to refer the
consolidated cases at bar to the Court en banc. On 16 December 2008, this Court sitting en banc
resolved to accept the said cases and set them for oral arguments. Oral arguments were conducted on
10 February 2009.
PICOPs Cause of Action: Matters PICOP Should Have Proven to Be Entitled to a Writ of Mandamus
In seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of an IFMA in its favor, PICOP relied on a 29
July 1969 Document, the so-called Presidential Warranty approved by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in favor of PICOPs predecessor-in-interest, Bislig Bay Lumber Company, Inc. (BBLCI).
PICOPs cause of action is summarized in paragraphs 1.6 and 4.19 of its Petition for Mandamus:
1.6 Respondent Secretary impaired the obligation of contract under the said Warranty and Agreement
of 29 July 1969 by refusing to respect the tenure; and its renewal for another twenty five (25) years, of
PICOP over the area covered by the said Agreement which consists of permanent forest lands with an
aggregate area of 121,587 hectares and alienable and disposable lands with an aggregate area of
approximately 21,580 hectares, and petitioners exclusive right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber
and pulpwood therein and the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the said area as described and
specified in petitioners Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 guaranteed by the Government,
under the Warranty and Agreement of 29 July 1969.
13

4.19 Respondent is in violation of the Constitution and has impaired the obligation of contract by his
refusal to respect: a) the tenurial rights of PICOP over the forest area covered by TLA No. 43, as
amended and its renewal for another twenty five (25) years; b) the exclusive right of PICOP to cut,
collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood therein; and c) PICOPs peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the said area which the government guaranteed under the Warranty and Agreement of
29 July 1969.
14

The grounds submitted by PICOP in its Petition for Mandamus are as follows:
I
Respondent secretary has unlawfully refused and/or neglected to sign and execute the IFMA contract
of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion
of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA.
II
Respondent Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing
to sign and execute PICOPs IFMA contract, notwithstanding that PICOP had complied with all the
requirements for Automatic Conversion under DAO 99-53, as in fact Automatic Conversion was
already cleared in October, 2001, and was a completed process.
III
Respondent Secretary has impaired the obligation of contract under a valid and binding warranty and
agreement of 29 July 1969 between the government and PICOPs predecessor-in-interest, by refusing
to respect: a) the tenure of PICOP, and its renewal for another twenty five (25) years, over the TLA
No.43 area covered by said agreement; b) the exclusive right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and
pulpwood timber; and c) the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the said area.
IV
As a result of respondent Secretarys unlawful refusal and/or neglect to sign and deliver the IFMA
contract, and violation of the constitutional rights of PICOP against non-impairment of the obligation
of contract (Sec. 10, Art. III, 1997 [sic] Constitution), PICOP suffered grave and irreparable
damages.
15

Petitions for Mandamus are governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Section 3 of which provides:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent. (Emphasis supplied.)
PICOP is thus asking this Court to conclude that the DENR Secretary is specifically enjoined by law
to issue an IFMA in its favor. An IFMA, as defined by DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-
53,
16
is -
[A] production-sharing contract entered into by and between the DENR and a qualified applicant
wherein the DENR grants to the latter the exclusive right to develop, manage, protect and utilize a
specified area of forestland and forest resource therein for a period of 25 years and may be renewed
for another 25-year period, consistent with the principle of sustainable development and in accordance
with an approved CDMP, and under which both parties share in its produce.
17

PICOP stresses the word "automatic" in Section 9 of this DAO No. 99-53:
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Applicants. The applicants for IFMA shall be:
(a) A Filipino citizen of legal age; or,
(b) Partnership, cooperative or corporation whether public or private, duly registered under
Philippine laws.
However, in the case of application for conversion of TLA into IFMA, an automatic conversion after
proper evaluation shall be allowed, provided the TLA holder shall have signified such intention prior
to the expiry of the TLA, PROVIDED further, that the TLA holder has showed satisfactory
performance and have complied in the terms of condition of the TLA and pertinent rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
18

This administrative regulation provision allowing automatic conversion after proper evaluation can
hardly qualify as a law, much less a law specifically enjoining the execution of a contract. To enjoin is
"to order or direct with urgency; to instruct with authority; to command."
19
"Enjoin is a mandatory
word, in legal parlance, always; in common parlance, usually."
20
The word "allow," on the other hand,
is not equivalent to the word "must," and is in no sense a command.
21

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion
of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court.
22

The execution of agreements, in itself, involves the exercise of discretion. Agreements are products of
negotiations and mutual concessions, necessitating evaluation of their provisions on the part of both
parties. In the case of the IFMA, the evaluation on the part of the government is specifically mandated
in the afore-quoted Section 3 of DAO No. 99-53. This evaluation necessarily involves the exercise of
discretion and judgment on the part of the DENR Secretary, who is tasked not only to negotiate the
sharing of the profit arising from the IFMA, but also to evaluate the compliance with the requirements
on the part of the applicant.
Furthermore, as shall be discussed later, the period of an IFMA that was merely automatically
converted from a TLA in accordance with Section 9, paragraph 2 of DAO No. 99-53 would only be
for the remaining period of the TLA. Since the TLA of PICOP expired on 26 April 2002, the IFMA
that could have been granted to PICOP via the automatic conversion provision in DAO No. 99-53
would have expired on the same date, 26 April 2002, and the PICOPs Petition for Mandamus would
have become moot.
This is where the 1969 Document, the purported Presidential Warranty, comes into play. When
PICOPs application was brought to a standstill upon the evaluation that PICOP had yet to comply
with the requirements for such conversion, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR
and instead filed a Petition for Mandamus, insisting that the DENR Secretary had impaired the
obligation of contract by his refusal to respect: a) the tenurial rights of PICOP over the forest area
covered by TLA No. 43, as amended, and its renewal for another twenty-five (25) years; b) the
exclusive right of PICOP to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood therein; and c) PICOPs
peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the said area which the government guaranteed under the
Warranty and Agreement of 29 July 1969.
23

PICOP is, thus, insisting that the government is obligated by contract to issue an IFMA in its favor
because of the 1969 Document.
A contract, being the law between the parties, can indeed, with respect to the State when it is a party
to such contract, qualify as a law specifically enjoining the performance of an act. Hence, it is
possible that a writ of mandamus may be issued to PICOP, but only if it proves both of the following:
1) That the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause; and
2) That the 1969 Document specifically enjoins the government to issue the IFMA.
If PICOP fails to prove any of these two matters, the grant of a privileged writ of mandamus is not
warranted. This was why we pronounced in the assailed Decision that the overriding controversy
involved in the Petition was one of law.
24
If PICOP fails to prove any of these two matters, more
significantly its assertion that the 1969 Document is a contract, PICOP fails to prove its cause of
action.
25
Not even the satisfactory compliance with all legal and administrative requirements for an
IFMA would save PICOPs Petition for Mandamus.
The reverse, however, is not true. The 1969 Document expressly states that the warranty as to the
tenure of PICOP is "subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as
with existing policy on timber concessions." Thus, if PICOP proves the two above-mentioned matters,
it still has to prove compliance with statutory and administrative requirements for the conversion of its
TLA into an IFMA.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
PICOP uses the same argument that the government is bound by contract to issue the IFMA in
its refusal to exhaust all administrative remedies by not appealing the alleged illegal non-issuance of
the IFMA to the Office of the President. PICOP claimed in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial
court that:
1.10 This petition falls as an exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The acts of
respondent DENR Secretary complained of in this petition are patently illegal; in derogation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner against non-impairment of the obligation of contracts; without
jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; and moreover, the failure or refusal of a high government
official such as a Department head from whom relief is brought to act on the matter was considered
equivalent to exhaustion of administrative remedies (Sanoy v. Tantuico, 50 SCRA 455 [1973]), and
there are compelling and urgent reasons for judicial intervention (Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA
306 [1976]).
Thus, if there has been no impairment of the obligation of contracts in the DENR Secretarys non-
issuance of the IFMA, the proper remedy of PICOP in claiming that it has complied with all statutory
and administrative requirements for the issuance of the IFMA should have been with the Office of the
President. This makes the issue of the enforceability of the 1969 Document as a contract even more
significant.
The Nature and Effects of the Purported 29 July 1969 Presidential Warranty
Base Metals Case
PICOP challenges our ruling that the 1969 Document is not a contract. Before we review this finding,
however, it must be pointed out that one week after the assailed Decision, another division of this
Court promulgated a Decision concerning the very same 1969 Document. Thus, in PICOP Resources,
Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation,
26
five other Justices who were still unaware of
this Divisions Decision,
27
came up with the same conclusion as regards the same issue of whether
former President Marcoss Presidential Warranty is a contract:
Finally, we do not subscribe to PICOPs argument that the Presidential Warranty dated September 25,
1968 is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.
An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the
governments commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees
PICOPs peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of
raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and
remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as
mineral resources, occurring within the concession.
The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and FMA No.
35. We agree with the OSGs position that it is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify
PICOPs rights under its timber license. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, this Court held:
"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or a privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it a property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation'
(C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither
is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x"
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:
"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983,
125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
cannot be invoked.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring
PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would
result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.
28

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality on 14 February 2007. A Second Motion for
Reconsideration filed by PICOP was denied on 23 May 2007.
EPILOGUE AND DISPOSITION
PICOPc cause of action consists in the allegation that the DENR Secretary, in not issuing an IFMA,
violated its constitutional right against non-impairment of contracts. We have ruled, however, that the
1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause, much less a contract
specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue the IFMA. The conclusion that the 1969
Document is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause has even been disposed of in
another case decided by another division of this Court, PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation,
94
the Decision in which case has become final and executory. PICOPs
Petition for Mandamus should, therefore, fail.
Furthermore, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the 1969 Document is a contract
recognized under the non-impairment clause, and even if we assume for the sake of argument that the
same is a contract specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue an IFMA, PICOPs Petition for
Mandamus must still fail. The 1969 Document expressly states that the warranty as to the tenure of
PICOP is "subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with
existing policy on timber concessions." Thus, if PICOP proves the two above-mentioned matters, it
still has to prove compliance with statutory and administrative requirements for the conversion of its
TLA into an IFMA.
While we have withdrawn our pronouncements in the assailed Decision that (1) PICOP had not
submitted the required forest protection and reforestation plans, and that (2) PICOP had unpaid
forestry charges, thus effectively ruling in favor of PICOP on all factual issues in this case, PICOP
still insists that the requirements of an NCIP certification and Sanggunian consultation and approval
do not apply to it. To affirm PICOPs position on these matters would entail nothing less than
rewriting the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act and the Local Government Code, an act simply beyond
our jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of PICOP Resources, Inc. is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.