CrimPro

Manuel Isip v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 170289 June 26, 2007

This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Court of Appeals decision affirming, with modifications, Manuel Isips conviction for Estafa.

Facts
This case involves multiple criminal cases involving spouses Manuel Isip and Marietta Isip for
several counts of Estafa.
Sometime in 1982 spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced to Atty. Leonardo Jose.
Manuel Isip was engaged in the brokerage and trucking business; Marietta Isip was engaged in
the business of buying and selling jewelry of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by
gamblers; and Atty. Leonardo Jose was an employee of the Bureau of Customs but was on leave
at the time he was introduced to the spouses Isip.
Spouses Isip needed a bigger capital to finance their growing operations so they convinced Atty.
Jose to be their capitalist. Atty. Jose agreed to this.
On February 3, 1984 at Atty. Joses residence in Caridad, Cavite City spouses Isip received a 6
carat mens ring from Atty. Jose valued at P200,000 with the condition that they are going to sell
it on commission and if they are not able to sell it, they have to return the ring.
The Isips did not return the ring or its proceeds. Instead, Marietta Isip issued 2 checks worth
P50,000 each as partial payment for the jewelry.
On later dates, the Isips and Atty. Jose would meet in Atty. Joses residence in Cavite where Atty.
Jose would give them a piece of valuable jewelry for them to sell. However, the Isips would
always fail to return the proceeds or the jewelry. Instead, they would always issue a check to
Atty. Jose.
All the checks were deposited on April 6, 1984 but were all dishonoured due to insufficiency of
funds.
Trial ensued. The RTC of Cavite found the spouses Isip guilty on multiple counts of Estafa. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. On appeal to the Supreme Court, spouses Isip
contends that Atty. Isip had his residence in Ermita Manila at Plaza Towers Condominium. They
also alleged that it was in Manila that the transactions were made because Atty. Jose and his late
wife reside in Manila, and convenience alone suggests that the transactions happened in Manila.
Therefore, the RTC of Cavite does not have jurisdiction over the case and the court should have
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue
W/N the RTC of Cavite had jurisdiction over the criminal case of spouses Isip.

Held
Yes, the RTC of Cavite had jurisdiction.
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
If evidence adduced during trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.
Spouses Isip argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone
unerringly suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. However, the fact that Cavite
is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that the transaction was entered in Manila. It is
not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one
day,to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry from Atty. Jose.
Atty. Jose had sufficiently shown that the transactions took place in his ancestral home in Cavite
City when he was on approved leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs. Spouses Isip on the
other hand failed to sufficiently prove that the transactions happened in Manila.

WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 21275
dated 26 October 2004 dated 26 October 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED.


CrimPro: Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional

Landbank of the Philippines v. Belisata
G.R. No 127198, May 16, 2005

This is a Petition for Review1 assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated July 5, 1996 which
ordered the DAR and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the
amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the States acquisition of private
respondents properties under the land reform program.

Facts:
respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for
their agricultural lands in Arayat, Pampanga.
the trial court rendered the assailed decision which ordered DAR ad Land Bank of the Philippines
to pay the lands subject to acquisition by the State under the land reform program the amount of
30.00 per square meter as just compensation.
DAR and LBP filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court.
o LBP failed to file a timely appeal and the assailed Decision became final and executory.
o Trial court denied petition because LBP lost remedy in law due to its own negligence.
LBP was contesting that Belisata should have sought reconsideration of the DARs valuation of
their properties and they fail to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for just
compensation directly with the trial court.
Issue:
WON Belisata has failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he filed the petition with the trial
court

Held & Ratio:
NO.
records reveal that Belisata did write a letter to DAR secretary objecting to the land valuation and
requested a conferences for the purpose of fixing the just compensation. However, the letter was
left unanswered.
As ruled in the case of Philippine Veterans Bank V CA, DARs jurisdiction refers to
administrative proceedings while regional trial courts jurisdiction refers to judicial proceedings.
Primary jurisdiction in determining preliminary manner of just compensation under
agrarian reform matters is vested in DAR but such determination is subject to challenge
before the courts.
Resolution of just compensation for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is essentially a
judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

Criminal Procedure (Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional)

BONIFACIO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BR. 149
G.R. No 184800 May 5, 2010

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the issuance of RTC of Makati, Br. 149 an order that
denied the petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them for libel.


Facts
- Private respondent Jessie John Gimenez (on behalf of the Yuchengco Family) filed a criminal
complaint for 13 counts of libel against the officers, trustees, members of Parents Enabling
Parents Coalition, Inc (PEPCI) and the administrator of the website (pepcoalition.com).
- Gimenez alleged that upon accessing some websites (pacificnoplan.blogspot.com,
[email protected], pepcoalition.com), he was appalled to read numerous articles,
maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by the accused containing highly derogatory
statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengko Family, YGC and
particularly, Malayan.
- The Secretary of Justice opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the
accused could not be charged with libel under Art. 353 of the RPC.
- Petitioners filed a motion to quash on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati
RTC and that the acts complained are not punishable by law.

Issue (related to criminal jurisdiction)
Whether or not the Makati RTC has proper jurisdiction over the case.

Held
No. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This
principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360 (persons responsible for libel),
as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil
aspects of such cases.

The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two
places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or
2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the
present case opted to lay venue by availing of the second. Thus is stated that the offending article was
first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In other words, it is considered
the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as
basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address
of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publication. This pre-
condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of
Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel
suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of
being accessed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The RTC of Makati is directed to quash the amended information.
Block B 2017 Digests
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

VALDEPEAS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-20687 April 30,, 1966

This is an appeal by Maximo Valdepeas from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the
CFI of Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of abduction with consent.

Facts

Ester Ulsano, a minor of 17 years, assisted by her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, filed a criminal
complaint for forcible abduction with rape against Maximino Valdepeas with the Justice of the
Peace Court of Piat, Cagayan.
The complaint was forwarded to the CFI of Cagayan which rendered judgment finding Valdepeas
guilty as charged.
Upon appeal, the CA modified the decision, convicting him of abduction with consent and reduced
the penalty imposed. However, upon consideration and new trial, the court set aside its decision and
remanded the case to the CFI for the reception of additional evidence.
After retrial, the CFI rendered another decision, reiterating the CAs finding and judgment of
conviction for abduction with consent.
In filing his motion for reconsideration, Valdepeas raised for the first time the issue of the lower
courts jurisdiction. It is his theory that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filed by
either Ester Ulsano or her mother and that, accordingly, the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over
his person or over the crime of abduction with consent and had, therefore, no authority to convict him
of said crime.

Issue

WON the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
action for the offense of abduction with consent.

Held

YES. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without
warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case at bar, it is not claimed that
petitioner had been apprehender or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Never,
within the period of 6 years that had transpired until the CA rendered its last decision had Valdepeas
questioned the judicial authority of any of the courts over his person. He is therefore deemed to have
waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person.

On the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is and may be
conferred only by law. While it is true that Art 344 of the RPC provides that the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, the provision does not determine the
jurisdiction of courts over the said offenses. The complaint required in Art 344 is merely a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties.

The gist of Valdepeass claim is that some elements of forcible abduction which are not included in
abduction with consent, and, not alleged in the complaint filed. These are Esters virginity and minority.
The 2
nd
element is clearly set forth in the complaint, which states that Ester is 17 years old and a minor.
Block B 2017 Digests
As for the 1
st
element, the virginity mentioned in Art 343 of the RPC is not limited to its material sense
but should include the abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation. The complaint in this case
alleges that Ester was unlawfully taken against her will. This allegation implies that she is a minor living
under her parents roof, and hence, single. This leads to the presumption that she is a virgin, apart from
being virtuous and having a good reputation.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximo
Valedpeas.
Criminal Procedure Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009

Before this Court is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No.
27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.

Facts
- Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu. On January 14,
1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance amounting to PhP71,095 in order to pay for seminar
expenses of the Health and Environmental Protection committee she headed.
- Almost two years had past but no liquidation had been made so the city auditor, Manolo Tulibao, issued
a demand letter on December 22, 1995.
- The Commission on Audit submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Visayas (OMB-Visayas) on May 17, 1996, with the recommendation that Amante be further
investigated to ascertain whether charges could be filed against her under PD 1445, or The Auditing
Code of the Philippines.
- The OMB-Visayas recommend the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds on
September 30, 1999.
- The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) found probable cause to indict Amante and filed an
Information with the Sandiganbayan on May 21, 2004, accusing her of violating Section 89 of PD 1445
(committing an offence in relation to office).
- The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
- Amante filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion for reinvestigation on November 18, 2004,
stating that the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) was an incomplete proceeding
considering that she had already liquidated the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which was not
included at the time of the investigation since the liquidation papers were still in the process of
evaluation.
- Amante also argues that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because she
was only a local official with a salary grade of 26, and RA 8429 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall
have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position classified as Grade 27 or
higher.
- The OSP filed its Opposition arguing that Amantes claim of settlement is more of a defines and should
be established during trial, not in a motion for reinvestigation. As for the jurisdiction issue, the OSP
contends that she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City at the time relevant to
the case, which made her fall under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
- The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case involving a Sangguniang Panlungsod
member where the crime charged is related to office, even if it is not in violation of RA 3019, RA 1379, or
any of the felonies mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 2, Title VII of the RPC.

(Specifically, whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.)

Held
Yes. The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public
officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is
contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the
time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. Since the present case
was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. The law enumerates
violations of three offenses RA 3019, RA 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the RPC. In order
for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over a case, these enumerated offences must be committed by
officials of the executive brach occupying positions with a salary grade of 27 or higher. However, those
whose salary grade is classified as 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan if
they hold positions enumerated by the same law. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law
provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection
(a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let
the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
!"#$#%&' )"*+,-.",/ 0."#1-#+2#*% *3 4&%-#5&%6&7&%

Serrana v. Sandiganbayan
January 22, 2008, G.R. 162059

!"#$%&

Seiiana was appointeu by Piesiuent Estiaua as stuuent iegent of the 0niveisity of
the Philippines. Seiiana pioposeu a pioject that involveu the ienovation of the
vinzons' Ball Complex. In lieu with this, he soliciteu the amount of 1SN pesos fiom
the piesiuent in oiuei to funu the saiu pioject.

The ienovation pioject faileu to mateiialize. The succeeuing stuuent iegent fileu a
case of malveisation of funus against Seiiana befoie the 0mbuusman. The
0mbuusman then fileu a case against Seiiana befoie the Sanuiganbayan. Seiiana
fileu to quash the infoimation aiguing that the Sanuiganbayan has no juiisuiction
ovei hei. Sanuiganbayan uenieu hei motion.

(%%)*&
- Whethei oi not the Sanuiganbayan has juiisuiction ovei Seiiana - a stuuent
iegent accuseu of estafa.

+*,-&
. Yes. The Sanuiganbayan has juiisuiction ovei hei. The Sanuiganbayan's
juiisuiction is not uefineu by the Anti-uiaft anu Coiiupt Piactices Act (which was
citeu by Seiiana) but by Piesiuential Beciee 16u6 (the law which cieateu the
Sanuiganbayan). Sanuiganbayan has juiisuiction ovei cases of estafa as seen in
Section 4(B) of PB 16u6. Lastly, Sanuiganbayan has juiisuiction ovei a stuuent
iegent because its function is similai with that of a uiiectoi oi membeis of boaiu of
tiustees.

Block B 2017 Digests
CrimPro, Part I, Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

ESQUIVEL v OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 137237, September 17, 2002

This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus seeks to annul and set aside the
Ombudsman resolution finding prima facie case against petitioners; supplemental petition assails the
Sandiganbayan for taking cognizance of cases outside its jurisdiction

Facts
PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are with the Regional Intelligence
and Investigation Division (RIID) of San Fernando, Pampanga
They charged petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother,
Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel, barangay captain of Brgy. Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest,
arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats
March 14, 1998: Eduardo was at his parents house when petitioners disarmed him of his Cal. 45
service pistol and was brough to the Jaen Municipal Hall; on their way to the town hall, Mayor
Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him
Upon reaching the municipal hall, Mark Esquivel shoved Eduardo into a hut
Catacutan, he arrived to verify what happened to his teammate, but he was likewise threatened
Mayor Esquivel continued to strike Eduardo, but eventually released him
Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and threatened
because of jueteng and tupada raids the Mayor believed he was a part of
PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman
After a preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the impugned
resolution recommending that both Mayor Esquivel and Barangay Captain Mark Esquivel be
indicted for less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats
Separate informations for these crimes were filed with the Sandiganbayan
Petitioners filed a petition with the SC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan

Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses filed against the petitioners

Held
Yes. Although municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned in RA 7975, in Rodrigo, Jr.
vs. Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan, it was held that municipal
mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Even if Barangay Captain
Mark Anthony Esquivel claims that he is not a municipal mayor and is thus outside the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction, RA 7975 (as amended by RA 8249) provides that it is only when none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher that exclusive original jurisdiction will
be vested in the trial courts. Under the Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27.
Thus, being the co-accused in the criminal case, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion
in assuming jurisdiction over said case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed as the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
municipal mayors, as held in previous SC decisions, and in cases where there is a co-accused falling under
salary grade 27 or higher

Criminal Procedure: Dismissal of the Complaint because of inordinate delay

TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988
Petitioner seeks to annul the resolution and to enjoin of the Tanodbayan and of the Sandiganbayan
from continuing with the "People of the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad." Trial.
Facts
Antonio de los Reyes (Department of Public Information, Bureau of Broadcasts) filed a
formal report with Presidential Security Command charging petitioner, who was then
Secretary of the Department of Public Information with graft and corruption. (SALN, giving
benefits to family members, received check)
No action was taken on said report.
In October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly know n that petitioner had
submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on
December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan.
The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-w hich was around two months
after petitioner Tatad' s resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the
complaint to the CI S, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report
On J une 16, 1980, the CI S report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the
filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
Antonio L. Cantero.
By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits w ere in the case was already
for disposition by the Tanodbayan.
However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the
Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the corresponding criminal informations against the
accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on
June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
Issue
Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy
disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Held
He was deprived. The long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation
cannot be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. N o. 911) prescribes a ten-day
period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination.
While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory,"
yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for
the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law
The inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close
to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar. Three out of the five charges against the petitioner w ere for his
alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No.
3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such
"painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
the preliminary investigation.
The absence of a preliminary investigation can be correcting by conducting such an investigation.
But undue delay in conducting a preliminary investigation cant be corrected.

Block B 2017 Digests
Criminal Proceedings, Part I. Dismissal of the Complaint because of Inordinate Delay

CERVANTES v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 108595 May 18, 1999

The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
seeking to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, First Division, that denied petitioner's
motion to quash the information against him for violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act 3019, and to
restrain or enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with his arraignment and trial.

The motion is based on the ground that the filing of the information against petitioner over six (6) years
after the initial complaint with the Tanodbayan (predecessor of the Ombudsman) violated his right to speedy
disposition of the case, and that the acts charged in the information do not constitute an offense.

Facts
March 1986: one Pedro Almendras filed with the office of the Tanodbayan (predecessor of the
Ombudsman) a sworn complaint against Alejandro Tapang for falsification
o In the complaint, Almendras alleged that Tapang made him sign a piece of paper in blank
on which paper a salaysay was later inscribed stating that complainant (Almendras) had
been paid his claim in the amount of Php17,594.00, which was not true.
o He stated that he sought the help of petitioner Elpidio Cervantes who worked as analyst in
the office of labor arbiter.
October 1986: Cervantes filed with the office of the Tanodbayan an affidavit stating that he had
nothing to do with the blank paper that Almendras signed.
May 1992: Six years after the filing of the initial complaint, Special Prosecutor Luz Quinones-
Marcos filed an Information charging Cervantes together with Ruiz and Tapang with violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019
October 2, 1992: petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, a motion to quash and motion to recall
warrant of arrest on the ground that:
o (a) petitioner filed with the office of the Special Prosecutor a motion for reinvestigation;
o (b) that the case against Cervantes "has prescribed" due to unreasonable delay in the
resolution of the preliminary investigation, and
o (c) that the acts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash for
violation of the right to speedy disposition of the case.

Held
Yes. Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the information for violation of
petitioners constitutional right to speedy disposition of the case in the level of the Special Prosecutor,
Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. It took
the Special Prosecutor six (6) years from the filing of the initial complaint before he decided to file an
information for the offense with the Sandiganbayan.

It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless
of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided
that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him.


Block B 2017 Digests
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and ANNULS the minute resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, dated December 24, 1992, in Criminal Case No. 17673. The Court directs the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case, with costs de oficio.
Criminal Procedure
Department of Justice vs. Liwag
G.R. No. 149311 February 11, 2005.
Doctrine of Concurrent Jurisdiction; Concurrent Jurisdiction of DOJ and Ombudsman in complaints
involving same facts, accused, and circumstances. Differences in power of DOJ and Ombudsman;

Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the DOJ and NBI challenging the order
RTC Manila Judge Liwag. Judge Liwag had issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the conduct of a
preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice Panel due to an already ongoing investigation by the
Ombudsman.

On January 8, 2001 a certain Mary Ong allegedly a member of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) filed a complaint-affidavit against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson and PNP Colonel
Michael Ray B. Aquino and other PNP officials and private individuals before the Ombudsman.

On March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn-statements alleging the same facts as
those she disclosed to the Ombudsman. NBI Director Wycoco in a letter to DOJ Sec. Perez recommended for
an investigation into allegations of Kidnapping for ransom and murder against Lacson, Aquino, et. al.

Lacson, Aquino et. al averred that the complaint in the DOJ should be dismissed. They cited the ruling in Uy
vs. Sandiganbayan where the SC ruled for the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner DOJ however denied their motion to dismiss.

On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued an order prohibiting the DOJ from conducting a preliminary
investigation against Lacson and Aquino.

The DOJ now brings the matter before the SC to challenge Judge Liwags order.

Issue:

W/N The DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the
Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances. (NO.)

Held:
The SC held that the settled rule is that the agency that first takes cognizance of a case shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. (Carlos v. Angeles)

The power of the DOJ is Statutory, that of the Ombudsman is Statutory and Constitutional.

By virtue of Sec. 13, Art. XI of the Constitution the Ombudsman is vested with plenary power and primary
jurisdiction to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and employees.

By virtue of RA 6770, the ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and authorizes the ombudsman to take over the investigation at any stage from any government investigating
agency.

The power of the DOJ on the other hand, comes as an extension of the executive branch and is covered by
the 1987 Administrative Code. The DOJ has general jurisdiction over cases involving violations of the penal
code, but such jurisdiction cannot diminish the Constitutionally vested plenary power of the independent
Ombudsman.

The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction (capability) to deal with the same subject
matter, it does not mean that both the DOJ and Ombudsman are co-equal or that both may be the venue of
investigations on the exact same matters. This is to avoid multiplicity in proceedings, conflicting resolutions,
unnecessary expenditures, and to promote an orderly administration of justice.

Wherefore, the petition of the DOJ is DISMISSED.
Criminal Procedure Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

LAZATIN v. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009

This resolves the petition for certiorari praying that Ombudsmans disapproval of the Office of the
Special Prosecutors Resolution, recommending the dismissal of the criminal cases filed against
petitioner, be reversed and set aside.

Facts:
The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint-
affidavit charging Carmelo Lazatin, Marino Morales, Angelito Pelayo, and Teodoro
David(petitioners) with illegal Use of Public Funds and violation of Section 3(a) and (e) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint alleged that:
There were irregularities in Lazatins use of his Countrywide Development Fund(CDF) for the
year 1996(i.e. he was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF).
He signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer.
He received 18 checks amounting P4,868,277.08.
With the help of other petitioners, he was able to convert his CDF into cash.
The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau(EPIB) conducted a preliminary
investigation and issued a Resolution recommending the filing of 14 counts of Malversation of
Public Funds and violation Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for each of the petitioners.The
Ombudsman approved the Resolution.
28 Informations were filed against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners filed Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which were granted by the
Sandiganbayan(Third Division).
The Office of the Special Prosecutors(OSP) submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution,
recommending the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of
evidence.
Ombudsman ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs(OLA) to review the OSP Resolution.
The OLA recommended the disapproval of the resolution in a Memorandum and the
Ombudsman adopted said Memorandum.
The cases were returned to the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion when it overturned the OSPs
Resolution.

Held:
No. There would be grave abuse of discretion if the Ombudsmans exercise of power had been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. In the case at bar, the Ombudsman only acted in
accordance with R.A. no. 6770, which grants it prosecutorial powers and places the OSP under its office.
The constitutionality of said statute had long been settled upon in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,
wherein it was held that the Congress may transfer some powers to the Ombudsman or may place the
OSP under said office. Petitioners also failed to show any strong, compelling reason to convince the
Court to disregard the doctrine of stare decisis in deciding the issue of this case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Criminal Procedure Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

ANGELES v. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ
G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173 March 21, 2012

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court to determine whether
the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of its discretionary
powers to investigate and prosecute criminal complaints.

Facts
Petitioner Judge Adoracion Angeles was the Presiding Judge of Branch 121 of Caloocan City
RTC, while private respondent Emmanuel Velasco was a senior state prosecutor at the
Department of Justice.
Judge Angeles filed a criminal complaint against Velasco with the Ombudsman for:
o Giving unwarranted benefit to the accused in a criminal complaint for smuggling
by failing to present a material witness;
o Engaging in private practice by insisting on the re-opening of child abuse cases against
petitioner;
o Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on the child
abuse Complaint was conducted.
The Ombudsman dismissed the charges against respondent Velasco. After evaluation of facts and
evidence presented by complainant, there was no cause to conduct preliminary investigation or an
administrative adjudication.
o 1
st
charge of suppression of testimonial evidence in connection with smuggling case:
Ombudsman dismissed the charge on the ground that petitioner had no sufficient personal
interest in the subject matter. Petitioner was neither a party nor the presiding judge in the
said criminal case. Petitioner acted based on his discretion as prosecutor.
o 2
nd
charge of private practice: Dismissed on the ground of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Petitioner should have elevated her concern to the DOJ which
had primary jurisdiction.
o 3
rd
charge of falsification of private document: Dismissed. The Ombudsman said the
issue should have been raised earlier. To add, mere presentation of the alleged falsified
document did not in itself establish falsification.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Ombudsman for lack of
merit.
Hence, the present Rule 65 petition.

Issue
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco.

Held
No.

Power of the Court over the Ombudsmans Exercise of its Investigative and Prosecutorial
Powers: The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists a reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty, and thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. As a general rule, the Court doesnt interfere with
the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling
reason. Such reasons are absent in this Petition. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutorial powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Ombudsman will hamper the functions of the office and the courts. The rationale for the
plenary powers of the Ombudsman which is virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention is to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Ombudsmans Evaluation of Evidence:
The determination of grave abuse of discretion as the exception to the general rule of non-interference in
the Ombudsmans exercise of its powers is precisely the province of the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
In this Petition, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion that calls for the Courts exceptional
divergence from the general rule.

The burden of proof to show grave abuse of discretion is on petitioner, and she has failed to discharge this
burden. She merely stated why she did not agree with the findings of the Ombudsman. Petitioner passed
upon the SC the factual findings of the Ombudsman. However, the Court is not a trier of facts.

Although the Court diverged from some of the conclusions reached by the Ombudsman, it found that its
dismissal of the charges against respondent Velasco was arrived at with a rational deliberation. The
Ombudsman did not overstep the boundaries of its plenary powers and acted within its permissible limits.
Court did not find any arbitrariness or abuse that was so gross and patent in the manner it exercised its
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSED the petition for certiorari filed by Judge Adoracion Angeles and
AFFIRMED the Joint Orders of the Ombudsman.


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Criminal Procedure, Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

ANGELES v. MERCEDITAS GUTTIEREZ
G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173 March 21, 2012

This is a petition to declare whether ot not the Ombudsman committed a GADALEJ

Facts
! Petitioner Judge Angeles was a presiding judge in the RTC of Caaloocan City
! Respondent Velasco was a senior state prosecutor at the DOJ
! February 20, 2007: Angeles filed a criminal complaing against Velasco with the Ombudsman for
the ff. acts allegedly committed:
o Giving an unwarranted benefit to the accused in a criminal case by failing to present a
material witness. He allegedly tried to supress the testimony of the witness.
o Engaging in private practice by insisting on reopening of child abuse cases against
petitioner
o Falsifying a public document
! The Ombudsman dismissed the case against respondent Velasco. It stated that there was no cause
to conduct a preliminary investigation or an administrative ajudication with regard to the charges.
o Accdg to the Ombudsman, Velasco acted based on his discretion as prosecutor and his
appreciation of the evidence in the case and any lapse in his judgment cannot be a source
of criminal liability.
o The ombudsman dismissed the 2
nd
charge on Velasco saying that it should first be filed
with the DOJ
o On the falsification, which was also dismissed, the Ombudsman said that issue should
have been raised earlier when petitioner filed her Petition for Review of the Resolution of
respondent.
! Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Ombudsman.
! Hence this petition.

Issue
WON the Ombudsman committed a GADALEJ in dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco.

Held
No. SC dimissed the petition. As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans
exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reasons. Such reasons
are clearly absent in the instant Petition.

We reiterate that the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed,
including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives due deference to
the Ombudsmans decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on the criminal
charges levelled against respondent Velasco.

The determination of grave abuse of discretion as the exception to the general rule of non-interference in
the Ombudsmans exercise of its powers is precisely the province of the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
However, we highlight the exceptional nature of that determination.
In this Petition, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion that calls for the Courts exceptional
divergence from the general rule



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WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorarifiled by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
We AFFIRM the two Joint Orders of the Ombudsman in Case Nos. OMB-C-C-07-0103-C and OMB-C-
A-O7-0117-C dated 21 March 2007 and 30 June 2008, respectively.


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Criminal Procedure: Review of Decisions of the Ombudsman

ANTONINO VS. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 144492 December 18, 2008

This is a Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner, former Congresswoman assailing that portion of the
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing the case against private respondents.

Facts
! Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President Macapagal on October 3, 1963.
The pertinent provision of which states that a certain parcel of land is withdrawn from sale or
settlement and reserved for recreational and health resort site purposes, under the administration
of the municipality of General Santos, to be known as the Magsaysay Park.
! Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation No. 168 which provided that
certain portions of the land embraced in Proclamation No. 168 are excluded from the operation of
168, which established the recreational and health resort reservation situated in General Santos
and declared the same open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act thus,
leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 168 and is therefore reserved
for recreational and health resort site purposes.
! Private respondents were issued Certificates of Titles over portions of Lot X.
! Petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against the respondents for
violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of RA No. 3019 and for malversation of public
funds or property through falsification of public documents. This concerns the alleged conspiracy
involving respondents to cheat and defraud the city government of General Santos through the
illegal disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park in violation of law and its charter.
! The Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the charges against the respondents. Petitioner
filed MR which was denied by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman held that since the criminal
Information were already filed and the cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan and
the regular courts of General Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.

Issue
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction in the exercise of his prosecutor functions, by dismissing the charges against the
respondents.

Held
No. The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Well-
settled is the rule that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate otherwise. The
rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. A contrary rule would
encourage a number of petitions seeking the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman, which would hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that
courts would be swamped by a deluge of cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant. Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is
not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to
warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In this respect, petitioner fails.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
Criminal Procedure, Review Decisions of the Ombudsman

Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No 146731 January 13, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio is a utility worker at the Cebu State College of Science and
Technology, College of Fisheries Technology (CSCST-CFT), Carmen, Cebu

Private respondent Servando Bernante is an Assistant Professor

March 30, 1998: Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct, falsification of
public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation against Bernante before the office of
the Executive Dean of CSCSCT-CFT
- Executive Dean indorsed the administrative complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman for the
Visayas
- Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for
falsification of public document.

Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-painting of obscene and unprintable words
against her on the walls of the CSCST Campus

Enemecio also claimed that Bernante shouted defamatory words against her while she was inside the
school premises

Enemecio further asserted that that Bernante made it appear in his leave application that he was on
forced leave from May 15 to 21, 1996 and on vacation leave from May 22 to 31. In truth, Bernante
was serving a 20-day prison term for his conviction of the crime of slight physical injuries

The Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing the administrative complaint against Bernante. On the
same date, the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint against Bernante finding no probable
cause

Enemecio filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the
Ombudsmans resolution dismissing the criminal case against Bernante

Applying the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, the appellate court dismissed Enemecios petition for having
been filed out of time. The appellate court also stated that the proper remedy available to Enemecio
was a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65

Enemecio contended that Fabian declared void only Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of
AO No. 07 insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court.

Enemecio asserted that the other provisions of Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7 of AO
No. 07, including the final and unappealable character of orders, resolutions or
decisions exonerating a respondent from any criminal liability, still stand.

Enemecio stated that she filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals
because she considered Bernantes absolution from the administrative complaint in OMB-VIS-
ADM-98-0201 as already final and unappealable. As there was no adequate remedy of appeal,
Enemecio claimed that her only recourse was a petition for certiorari before the appellate court
under Rule 65.

The appellate court stated that what Fabian declared void was Section 27 of RA 6770, which
authorized appeals to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. Under the Fabian ruling, the appellant should take such appeal in administrative
disciplinary cases to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals added that it follows
that the power to review decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained by the Supreme
Court under Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner availed of the wrong remedy

Held:
YES. It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals a certiorari petition
assailing the Ombudsmans Resolution and Order dismissing the criminal case, not the administrative
case against Bernante. For this reason, the appellate court in its 7 December 2000 Resolution rectified
itself and stated that Fabian does not apply to Enemecios petition as the Fabian ruling applies only to
administrative disciplinary actions.

Even if we consider Enemecios petition before the Court of Appeals as questioning the dismissal of the
administrative case against Bernante, the action must also fail. Appeals from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions should be brought to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43. Where the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause in criminal cases is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65. Since Enemecio filed a
certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she availed of a wrong
remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be dismissed outright.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Criminal Procedure, Procedure before the Ombudsman

Enriquez v. Caminade
A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1966 March 21, 2006

Facts:

Imelda Enriquez charged Judge Caminade with Gross Misconduct, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Judgment and Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to criminal case, People v. Sherwin Que @ Bungol,
Anthony John Apura (case about murder and the petitioner is the mother of the victim)

Respondent Judge:

denied the motion for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused

set aside the assailed Resolution of the City Prosecutor on the bases of which the latest amended
information was filed

quashed the latest amended information

remanded the case to the City Prosecutor for completion of the preliminary investigation

Respondent ruled so because there was no preliminary investigation completed on accused Alvin Taggart
Pimentel Alvez and Alvin John Apura as they were denied the opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review before the information was filed in court

Complainant claims that respondent was grossly mistaken when he ruled, in effect, that the investigating
prosecutor cannot file a criminal information before the expiration of the 15-day period within which the
accused are allowed by the Revised Rules of Court to move for reconsideration or petition for review of
an adverse Resolution.

Respondent cited Sales v. Sandiganbayan

the filing of motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper
and that an information filed without first affording x x x accused his right to file motion for
reconsideration is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the the ruling in the case of Sales v. Sandiganbayan is applicable to the case at bar in terms of
procedure.

Held:
NO. A careful study of Sales reveals that it applies specifically to preliminary investigations conducted
before the Ombudsman. That case was decided in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, granting the accused fifteen days to move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an
adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation. The criminal case filed before respondents court was not
covered by the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman but by the Rules of Court, which had no
corresponding provision. The termination of a preliminary investigation upon the filing of an information in
court is a well-established procedural rule under the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Block B 2017 Digests
Criminal Procedure Part I

Dino v. Olivarez
GR No. 170447 December 4, 2009

In this case, the Court reversed its initial decision through a Motion for Reconsideration by the
respondent. It ruled that the City Prosecutor exceeded its authority by filing an Amended Information
despite the COMELECs suspension of its delegated authority.

Facts:
- Petitioner instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Olivarez
- After finding probable cause in Joint Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor and City Prosecutor
of Paranaque City, two (2) Informations were filed before the RTC against respondent
- Respondent filed an appeal of the Joint Resolution to the Law Department of the COMELEC
- Law Department of the COMELECC directed the city prosecutor to transmit and elevate the
entire records of the case and suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until
final resolution of said appeal by the COMELEC En Banc
- Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the two Informations on the ground that they charged more
than one offense. On the other hand, Assistant Prosecutor filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Informations which charge respondent with only one offense.
- Judge Madrona denied the respondents Motion to Quash and reset the arraignment, with a
warning that the arraignment would proceed without any more delay
- Respondent failed to appear in court during the arraignment and ordered the arrest of the
respondent and the confiscation of the cash bonds
- However, through COMELEC Resolution No. 7457, the Commission revoked the authority of
the City Prosecutor of Paranaque to prosecute the case, designating therein the Law
Department of the COMELEC to prosecute the case
- In the Supreme Courts initial decision, they found that the public prosecutor of Paranaque did
not exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC, since the delegated authority was not yet
revoked when the said amended Informations were filed. Hence, this motion for reconsideration
by the respondent
- Respondent argues that the directive of the COMELEC to the public prosecutor of Paranaque to
transmit the entire records of the case to the COMELEC Law Department is a revocation of the
prosecutors delegated authority.

Issue: WON the city prosecutor defied the order or directive of the COMELEC when it filed the amended
Informations

Held/ Ratio:
YES. Article IX, Section 20 of the Constitution and Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, granted
the COMELEC the power to investigate and prosecute election cases and may avail itself of the assistance
of other prosecuting arms of the government. Also, COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives COMELEC an
authority to revoke or withdraw such delegation, or revise, modify and reverse the resolution of the
prosecutor.

When the COMELEC Law Department ordered the transmission of the records of the case, it had the
effect of SUSPENDING the authority of the City Prosecutor. The Court, in its initial decision,
overlooked the fact that the order issued was with the authority of the COMELEC En Banc. Hence, it was
as if the COMELEC En Banc was the one that ordered the prosecutor to transmit the records and suspend
further implementation of the questioned resolution. By filing the Amended Information, the City

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Prosecutor of Paranaque clearly exceeded the legal limit of its delegated authority, thus, VOID and of
NO EFFECT.

This suspension of delegated authority was made permanent and this delegated authority was revoked by
COMELEC Resolution No. 7457.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Pablo Olivarez
is GRANTED, and our assailed decision dated 23 June 2009 isRECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89230
is REINSTATED. The amended informations filed by the City Prosecutor of Paraaque on 28 October
2004 are declared VOID and of NO EFFECT.