M.C.a. (Sem - IV) Paper - III - Network Security

Syllabus
MCA Sem-IV, Paper - III

Network Security
1. Introduction:
Attacks, Services and Mechanisms, Security Attacks, Security
Services, Integrity check, digital Signature, authentication, has
algorithms.
2. Secret Key Cryptography:
Block Encryption, DES rounds, S-Boxes
IDEA: Overview, comparison with DES, Key expansion, IDEA
rounds, Uses of Secret key Cryptography; ECB, CBC, OFB,
CFB, Multiple encryptions DES.
3. Hash Functions and Message Digests:
Length of hash, uses, algorithms (MD2, MD4, MD5, SHS) MD2:
Algorithm (Padding, checksum, passes.) MD4 and 5: algorithm
(padding, stages, digest computation.) SHS: Overview, padding,
stages.
4. Public key Cryptography:
Algorithms, examples, Modular arithmetic (addition,
multiplication, inverse, and exponentiation) RSA: generating
keys, encryption and decryption. Other Algorithms: PKCS,
Diffie-Hellman, El-Gamal signatures, DSS, Zero-knowledge
signatures.
5. Authentication:
Password Based, Address Based, Cryptographic
Authentication. Passwords in distributed systems, on-line vs off-
line guessing, storing. Cryptographic Authentication: passwords
as keys, protocols, KDCs Certification Revocation, Inter-
domain, groups, delegation. Authentication of People:
Verification techniques, passwords, length of passwords,
password distribution, smart cards, biometrics.
6. Security Policies and Security Handshake Pitfalls:
What is security policy, high and low level policy, user issues?
Protocol problems, assumptions, Shared secret protocols,
public key protocols, mutual authentication, reflection attacks,
use of timestamps, nonce and sequence numbers, session
keys, one-and two-way public key based authentication.
7. Example System:
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Kerberos: purpose, authentication, serer and ticket granting
server, keys and tickets, use of AS and TGS, replicated servers.
Kerberos V4: names, inter-realm authentication, Key version
numbers.
Kerberos V5: names, realms, delegation, forwarding and
proxies, ticket lifetimes, revoking tickets, multiple Realms.
8. Network Security:
Electronic mail security, IP security, Network management
security.
9. Security for electronic commerce: SSL, SET
10. System Security:
Intruders and Viruses, Firewalls, Intrusion Detection
Tutorials:
1. Numerical problems on DE, IDEA, MD2, MD5, Diffie-Helman
and El-Gamal Signatures.
2. Comparative study of network security tools.
3. Vulnerability tools: Nessus, Retina, Wireshark, Nmap.
4. Packet Sniffers: Tcpdump, Ettercap, Dsniff.
Term Work: Term work/Assignment: Each candidate will submit a
journal in which at least 10 assignments based on the above
syllabus and the internal test paper. Test will be graded for 10
marks and assignments will be graded for 15 marks.
References:
1. Atul Kahate, Cryptography and Network Security, McGraw Hill.
2. Kaufman, c., Perlman, R., and Speciner, M., Network Security,
Private Communication in a public world, 2
nd
ed., Prentice Hall
PTR., 2002.
3. Stallings, W.,.Cryptography and Network Security: Principles
and Practice, 3
rd
ed., Prentice Hall PTR.,2003.
4. Stallings, W. Network security Essentials: Applications and
standards, Prentice Hall, 2000.
5. Cryptography and Network Security; McGraw Hill; Behrouz A
Forouzan.
6. Information Security Intelligence Cryptographic Principles and
App. Calabrese Thomson.
7. Securing A Wireless Network Chris Hurley SPD.

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1
INTRODUCTION
In this unit, we are going to learn about the following topics:
1.Attacks
1.1. Active Attacks
1.2. Passive Attacks
2.Security attacks
2.1. Application Level
2.2. Network Level
2.3. Cookies
3.Services and mechanisms
4.Security services
4.1. Confidentiality
4.2. Authenticity
4.3. Availability
4.4. Auditability
4.5. Access Control
4.6. Integrity
4.7. Non-repudiability
5. Integrity check
6. Digital signature
6.1. Concept and Implementation
7. Authentication
8. Hash algorithms
1. ATTACKS:
In the cryptographic literature, there are two types of attacks
namely Passive and Active. The first is a passive adversary, who
can eavesdrop on all network communication, with the goal of
learning as much confidential information as possible. The other is
an active intruder, who can
Modify messages at will,
Introduce packets into the message stream, or
Delete messages.
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Attacks
Passive attacks Active attacks
Interception
Readig the
message
content
Traffic
analysis
Masquerade/
fabrication
Message
replay
modification
Denial of service/
interruption of
availability
Message
1.1. Active Attacks
This type of attack requires the attacker to be able to
transmit data to one or both of the parties, or block the data
stream in one or both directions. It is also possible that the
attacker is located between the communicating parties. The
attacker even can stop all or parts of the data sent by the
communicating parties. This attacker can try to take the
place of the client (or server) when the authentication
procedure has been performed. As the server will not detect
the origin of the data without the help of integrity check
mechanism, a clever programmer can, with not too much of
effort, implement a system like a gateway (bridge) between
two subnets. (On the Internet there are thousands of these
computers.)
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Alice
(talnet client)
Bob
(talnet server)
Mallet
(active intruder)
Figure 1.0: Active attack
The following are examples of different attacks this person could
impose.
Inserting his own data into the data stream.
Playback of data from another connection.
Playback of data that had previously been sent in the
same and opposite direction on the same connection.
Deletion of data.
Man-in-the-middle attack -In this attack, the intruder sits in
the middle of the communication link, intercepting messages
and substituting them with his own messages. In this way,
he tries to fool the parties to believe they are talking to each
other directly, while they really are talking to the attacker
him-selves.
There are three basic levels of issues, which will lead to the further
loopholes. They are:
Interruption,
Modification and
Fabrication
1.1.1 Interruption:
This attack can also be called as masquerade attack. This
attack is possible by the user who will be pretending like a
legitimate user and attack the system. For example any employee
is sending the message to the working staff members by taking the
name of his manager. He can send the message for conducting
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meetings in a particular time with his employee, which is actually a
forged message. It relates with the reputation of the users.
1.1.2. Modification:
Modification can be further divided into two categories.
1. Replay attacks
2. Alterations
Both the above-mentioned attacks are dealing with the
confidentiality of the message. If the changes are made and the
reflection is not projected in the original copy then it relates to the
integrity problem of the same message.
Replay attacks can take place by sending the same message
twice. For example when
User A sends a message stating that transfer Rs.10, 000 from
Account A to Account B. This message is watched by another user
C and the same message is sent once again by user C on behalf of
A. In that scenario, Rs.20, 000 will be debited from account A
instead of Rs.10, 000, without his notification. This transaction will
create an integrity problem in such a way that the account detail
with A shows Rs10, 000 as balance and bank transaction says the
account balance of A is zero.
1.1.3. Fabrication:
Denial of Service attack is belonging to this category.
Denial of Service Attacks:
A denial-of-service attacks or DoS attack is an attempt to
make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. The
basic purpose of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack is simply to
flood/overhaul a network so as to deny the authentic users
services of the network. A DoS attack can be launched in many
ways. The end result is the flooding of a network, or change in the
configurations of routers on the network. In general terms, DoS
attacks are implemented by either forcing the targeted computer(s)
to reset, or consume its resources so that it can no longer provide
its intended service or obstructing the communication media
between the intended users and the victim so that they can no
longer communicate adequately.
It is not easy to detect a DoS attack because there is nothing
apparent to suggest that a user is launching a DOS attack, and is
actually not a legal user of the system. This is because in a DoS
attack, it is up to the server to detect that certain packets are from
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an attacker, and not from a legitimate user to take an appropriate
action. This is not an easy task. Failing this, the server would fall
short of resources (memory, network connections, etc.) and come
to a grinding halt after a while.
1.1.3.1 Various other forms of DoS attack is given below.
Buffer Overflow Attacks
SYN Attack
Teardrop Attack
Smurf Attack
1.1.3.1.1 Buffer Overflow Attacks:
It is the most common kind of DoS attack. It is simply to send
more traffic to a network address. The attacker may be aware that
the target system has a weakness that can be exploited or the
attacker may simply try the attack in case it might work. A few of
the better-known attacks based on the buffer characteristics of a
program or system include:
Sending e-mail messages that have attachments with 256-
character file names to Netscape and Microsoft mail
programs.
Sending oversized Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) Packets(this is also known as the Packet Internet or
Inter-Network Groper(ping) of death)
Sending to a user of the Pine e-mail program a message
with a "From" address larger than 256 characters.
1.1.3.1.2. SYN Attack
When a session is initiated between the Transport Control
Program (TCP) client and server in a network, a very small buffer
space exists to handle the usually rapid "hand-shaking" exchange
of messages that sets up the session. The session-establishing
packets include a SYN field that identifies the sequence in the
message exchange. An attacker can send a number of connection
requests very rapidly and then fail to respond to the reply. This
leaves the first packet in the buffer so that other, legitimate
connection requests can't be accommodated. Although the packet
in the buffer is dropped after a certain period of time without a reply,
the effect of many of these bogus connection requests is to make it
difficult for legitimate requests for a session to get established. In
general, this problem depends on the operating system providing
correct settings or allowing the network administrator to tune the
size of the buffer and the timeout period. The client sends a SYN
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(synchronization) request to the server which indicates that the
client is requesting for a TCP connection with the server. Sample
SYN Attack scenario is explained below.
1. The server responds back to the client with an
acknowledgement, which is technically called as SYN ACK.
2. The client is then expected to acknowledge the server's SYN
ACK. This is shown in the Figure below:
The completion of these steps indicates that a TCP
connection has been established between the client and
server and is ready for exchange of data.
Here is the junction point where an attacker would create a
DoS attack keeping in mind the three basic steps required to
establish a TCP connection.
The attacker as a client would purposely go on performing
step 1 wherein it will go on sending requests but will not
acknowledge later in step 3 for any of those packets, which
the server has sent as acknowledgement. This would result
degrade the performance of the server and would come to a
halt.
1.1.3.1.3. Teardrop Attack
This type of denial of service attack exploits the way that the
Internet Protocol (IP) requires a packet that is too large for the next
router to handle be divided into fragments. The fragment packet
identifies an offset to the beginning of the first packet that enables
the entire packet to be reassembled by the receiving system. In the
teardrop attack, the attacker's IP puts a confusing offset value in
the second or later fragment. If the receiving operating system does
not have a plan for this situation, it can cause the system to crash.
1.1.3.1.4. Smurf Attack
In this attack, the executor sends an IP ping (or "echo my
message back to me") request to a receiving site the ping packet
Acknowledge the SYN ACK
SYN request
CLIENT
SERVER
SYN ACK
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specifies that it be broadcast to a number of hosts within the
receiving site's local network. The packet also indicates that the
request is from another site, the target site that is to receive the
denial of service. (Sending a packet with someone else's return
address in it is called spoofing the return address.) The result will
be lots of ping replies flooding back to the innocent, spoofed host. If
the flood is great enough, the spoofed host will no longer be able to
receive or distinguish real traffic.
1.1.3.1.5Physical Infrastructure Attacks
Here, someone may simply snip a fiber optic cable. This kind
of attack is usually mitigated by the fact that traffic can sometimes
quickly be rerouted.
Distributed Denial of Service Attack:
Distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) occurs when
multiple compromised systems flood the bandwidth or
resources of a targeted system, usually one or more web
servers. These systems are compromised by attackers using
a variety of methods.
The major advantages to an attacker of using a distributed
denial-of-service attack are that multiple machines can
generate more attack traffic than one machine, multiple
attack machines are harder to turn off than one attack
machine, and that the behavior of each attack machine can
be stealthier, making it harder to track down and shut down.
These attacker advantages cause challenges for defense
mechanisms.
It is important to note the difference between a DDoS and
DoS attack. If an attacker mounts an attack from a single
host it would be classified as a DoS attack. On the other
hand, if an attacker uses a thousand zombie systems to
simultaneously launch smurf attacks against a remote host,
this would be classified as a DDoS attack
1.2.Passive attacks
A passive attack on a cryptosystem is one in which the
cryptanalyst cannot interact with any of the parties involved,
attempting to break the system solely based upon observed data
(i.e. the cipher text). This can also include known plaintext attacks
where both the plaintext and its corresponding cipher text are
known.
The passive attacks can take place in the following ways:
Eavesdropping: The unauthorized capture of
transmitted data either by some form of line tapping or
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from the compromising emanations broadcast by the
electrical signals in the line is known as
eavesdropping. Radio, optical and microwave signals
can be similarly intercepted covertly.
Traffic Analysis: An analysis of the traffic down the
line can, in many circumstances, reveal much to an
outsider. The number, size, frequency and times of
messages sent, their sources and their destination
can be leaked from these types of analysis.
A passive attack is an attack where an unauthorized
attacker monitors or listens in on the communication
between two parties. The figure below illustrates a
passive attack where Eve monitors the
communication between Alice and Bob.
Alice
(talnet client)
Bob
(talnet server)
Eve
(passive eavesdropper)
Figure 1.1: Passive attack
2. There are two levels of practical side attacks.
(a) Application b) Network Level Attacks
Cookies are also come under practical side attacks.
2.1 Application Level Attacks:
These attacks happen at an application level in the sends
that the attacker attempts to access, modify or prevent access to
information of a particular application, or the application itself.
Example of this are trying to obtain someone's credit card
information on the Internet, or' changing the contents of a message
to change the amount in a transaction, etc.
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2.2 Network level attacks:
These attacks generally aim at reducing the capabilities of a
network by a number of possible means, these attacks generally
make an attempt to either slow down, or completely bring to halt, a
computer network. Note that this automatically can lead to
application level attacks, because once someone is able to gain
access to a network, he/she is able to access/modify at least some
sensitive information.
2.3. Cookies:
The Internet uses HTIP protocol, which is stateless.
Suppose that the client sends an HTIP request for a Web page to
the server. The web server locates that page on its disk, sends it
back to the client, and completely forgets about this interaction. If
the client wants to continue this interaction, it must identify itself to
the server in the next HTIP request. Otherwise, the server would
not know that this same client and sent an HTIP request earlier.
Since a typical application is likely to involve a number of
interactions between the client and the server, there must be some
mechanism for the client to identify itself to the server each time it
sends a HTIP request to the server. For this, cookies are used.
They are a popular mechanism of maintaining the state information
i.e. identifying a client to a server. A cookie is just one or more
pieces of information stored as text strings in a text file on the disk
of the client computer i.e. Web browser.
These attacks take two main forms:
(a) Packet Sniffing (also called as snooping)
(b) Packet Spoofing.
Since the protocol used in this communication is called as Internet
Protocol (IP), other names for these two attacks are: (a) IP sniffing
and (b) IP spoofing. The meaning remains the same.
Distinguish between packet sniffing/IP Sniffing and packet
spoofing/IP Sppofing.
(a) Packet Sniffing:
Packet sniffing is a passive attack on an ongoing
conversation. An attacker need not hijack a conversation, but
instead, can simply observe i.e. sniff packets as they pass by.
Clearly, to prevent an attacker from sniffing packets, the information
that is passing needs to be protected in some ways. This can be
done at two levels:
i. The data that is traveling can be encoded in some ways.
ii. The transmission link itself can be encoded.
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(b) Packet Spoofing:
In this technique, an attacker sends packets with an
incorrect source address. When this happens, the receiver i.e. the
party who receives the packets containing a false source address
would inadvertently send replies back to the forged address (called
as spoofed address) and not to the attacker.
This can lead to three possible cases:
i. The attacker can intercept the reply- If the attacker is between
the destination and the forged source, the attacker can see the
reply and use that information for hijacking attacks.
ii. The attacker need not see the reply-If the attacker's intention
was a Denial of Service (DOS) attack, the attacker need not bother
about the reply.
iii. The attacker does not want the reply- The attacker could simply
be angry with the host. So it may put that host's address as the
forged source address and send the packet to the destination. The
attacker does not want a reply from the destination, as it wants the
host with the forged address to receive it and get confused.
Explain the security services and mechanisms:
3. Services and Mechanisms:
4. Communication Security Services
Confidentiality
Data Confidentiality
Traffic Confidentiality
Data Integrity
Authentication
Data Origin Authentication
Peer Authentication
Access Control
Non-Repudiation
Non-Repudiation of Origin
Non-Repudiation of Reception
Audit
Availability an after-thought but increasingly important
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4.1 Confidentiality:
It is the protection of information from disclosure to
unauthorized entities such as organizations, people, machines and
processes. The information includes data contents, size, existence,
communication characteristics, etc.
4.1.1. Protection Mechanisms
Data Encryption
Symmetric (Secret-Key)
Asymmetric (Public-Key)
4.2 Integrity:
It is the protection of data against creation, alteration,
deletion, and duplication, re-ordering by unauthorized entities such
as organizations, people, machines and processes.Integrity
violation is always caused by active attacks.
4.2.1 Protection Mechanisms
Message Digests (Hashing)
Sequence Numbers
Nonce ID (Random Number)
Time Stamps
4.3. Authentication:
Communicating entities are provided with assurance &
information of relevant identities of communicating partners such as
people, machines and processes.Personnel Authentication requires
special attention.
Password
Manual
One-Time Password
Key Sharing
Manual
Symmetric Key (Tickets)
Asymmetric Key (Certificates)
Challenge Response
Nonce Based
Zero Knowledge Proof
4.4. Access Control:
This is the protection of information resources or services
from access or use by unauthorized entities (organizations, people,
machines, processes).
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Privileges rights to access or use resources or
services
Principles entities own access control privileges
Subjects entities exercise access control privileges
Objects / Targets resources or services
accessed/used by subjects
Delegation transfer of access control privileges
among principals
Authorization transfer of access control privileges
from principals to subjects
Access Control Lists (ACLs)
Object Based Specification-Ex.: UNIX File
System
Capabilities
Subject Based Specification
Issue Tickets/Certificates
4.5 Non-Repudiation:
This service is the protection against denial of participation
by communicating entities in all or part of a communication
o Time Stamp
o Digital Signature
4.6. Audit:
Recording & analyses of participation, roles and actions in
information communication by relevant entities is known as audit.
Syslog
Intrusion Monitors / Sensors
Common Intrusion Detection Framework
(CIDF)
Common Information Model (CIM)
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3. Well known Security Mechanisms are listed below:
Encipherment with Secret / Public Key
Cryptography
Data Integrity with One-Way Hash Function
Authentication with Public-Key Challenge/Response
Access Control
Digital Signature with Public-Key Cryptography
Traffic Padding
3.1. Secret/Public key cryptography:
In public-key cryptography, there are two keys: a private key
and a public key. The receiver keeps the private key. The public
key is announced to the public. Imagine Alice wants to send a
message to Bob. Alice uses the public key to encrypt the message.
When Bob receives the message, the private key is used to decrypt
the message. In public-key encryption/decryption, the public key
that is used for encryption is different from the private key that is
used for decryption. The public key is available to the public; the
private key is available only to an individual.
3.1.1. One-Way Hash Function:
One way hash - A fixed length output string is generated
from a variable length input. The reverse of the function is almost
impossible to perform. A one way hash is also called a message
digest, cryptographic checksum, message integrity check (MIC),
and manipulation detection code (MDC).
3.2. Public Key Challenge-Response Authentication:
Challenger sends a challenge of random number to
Responder
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Responder creates a response by digitally signing the
challenge with its private key and returns the response to
the Challenger
Challenger processes the response with public key of
legitimate Responder and compare it with original
challenge
Single security services may need to be implemented by
multiple and different security mechanisms.
Compare the security services and security mechanisms:
Security Services Security Mechanisms
Data Confidentiality Mechanism I:Encipherment
Symmetric (Secret-Key) Cipher
Asymmetric (Public-Key) Cipher
Traffic flow confidentiality Mechanism I:Encipherment
Traffic padding, routing control
Data Integrity Mechanism II: One-Way Hash
Function
Message Digest / Digital Hash
Authentication Mechanism III: Challenge +
Response
Nonce (Random Number) Based
Zero-Knowledge Proof
Nonrepudiation Mechanism II: One-Way Hash
Function
Digital signature, data integrity,
notarization
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Access control Access control
Availability Data integrity and authentication
exchange
3.3 Security services /Principles of security:
Generally the security issues can be classified into the
following categories.
1. Confidentiality
2. Authenticity
3. Availability
4. Auditability
5. Access Control
6. Integrity
7. Non-repudiability
These three are the basic levels of issues, which will lead to
the further loopholes.
3.3.1 Confidentiality:
Basically the threats can be in the area of network or in the
area of application. Mainly the insiders who are having full access
with the computer system create the application levels of threats.
This can be easily detected can be avoided by using suitable
mechanisms. Even though the application level threats are easy to
detect, this is also creating high level of problems to the system.
The network levels of attacks are dangerous because of the major
business transactions that are happening through the Internet. This
is maintaining the actual secrecy of the message. The message
that is traveling through the network should not be opened by any
of the third parties who are not related with the transaction.
CONFIDENTIALITY
AUTHENTICITY INTEGRITY
SECURITY
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Nowadays majority of the bank transactions are happening
through the network. So that confidentiality issue is creating lot of
problems related with network, software and data.
The confidentiality related issues could be belonging to any
one of the following categories:
1. IP Spoofing
2. Packet sniffing
3. Alteration of message
4. Modification of message
5. Man-in-middle
6. Brute force attack
7. Password cracking
3.3.2. Authenticity:
This can be defined as an identity for a user to assure that
the message is coming from the right person. This is also an
important issue along with confidentiality which may lead to the
further security threats. This can be assured by any of the following
factors:
1. Something you have (like tokens, credit card, passport
etc).
2. Something you know (like PIN numbers, account
number etc).
3. Something you are (like fingerprints, signatures etc).
Generally with the computer system passwords are the
very simple authentication mechanism, which help the system to
authenticate a particular person. The people can use one-time
passwords and key technology to assure authenticity during
message transaction.
Various issues related to authenticity includes
1. Stealing password
2. Fake login screen
3. Information leakage Etc.
3.3.3 Availability:
This can be defined as keeping the right information or
resources available to the right person at the right time. This can
happen either with the data or with the hardware resources. This
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will stop the person from accessing various resources by flooding
the network.
There is a complexity with the availability of the resources and
data. Because it can be identified as a issue only when the following
conditions are existing in the system.
1. The resources are completely available up to the users
expectation.
2. The content is present in a usable format.
3. The access rights are used in a proper way.
The actual problem related with availability can be identified
only when the above-mentioned things are assured before the
problem identification. This is a very serious issue, which will totally
stop the process and may lead the user to an idle condition without
allowing him to proceed with the further process. The main problem
related with the availability is DOS attack & DDOS attacks.
Flooding the network path by sending continuous packets, this will
create a heavy traffic in the network, does this. This stops the right
people accessing right information at the right time.
3.4. Access Control:
This is an issue, which is dealing with the hardware
resources, software and data. This is helping the operating system
to allow access to a particular resource or data only to an
authorized person. In this way it is interrelated with the authenticity
and availability. Because the authenticated users will be allotted
with certain kinds of rights like Read, Write, Read/Write, Owner
etc. These rights will be maintained by the operating system in a
tabular format or in a linked list format. First the users authenticity
has to be verified and then the authentic users rights will be
verified against the table.
USERS/FILES FILE1 FILE2 FILE3
USER1 RW - W
USER2 O RW W
USER3 - OR OW
The attacks related to authenticity and availability can also
create the problem related with access control. Attacks related to
access control are as follows
1. Intrusion
2. DDOS
3. Interference
4. Inference Etc.
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The issues related with authenticity can be resolved by using
hash algorithms.
3.5. Non-repudiability:
This is another issue, which is related with authenticity and
integrity. Repudiability means refusing. This is an issue, which is
actually created by the sender who is participating in the
transaction. After sending a message a sender can refuse that he
was not sending that message. This is done intentionally to create
problems at the receivers side, which creates confusion to the
receiver. This can be done from either side. It may also be
from the receiver side. The receiver can deny after receiving the
message that he doesnt receive any message. The non-
repudiability related issues can happen in any of the following three
ways.
1. Proof of origin
2. Proof of receipt
3. Proof of content
This can be assured by using digital signatures along with
the hash algorithms. If the proper authenticity and integrity is
achieved then the problems related with non-repudiability can be
minimized. All above-mentioned issues are the basic issues of
network security. Apart from these various other threats like natural
disasters, attacks, software modifications are also creating
problems with networks. But majority of the attacks are coming
under the basic issues of the network. Wherever the problems are
available accordingly solutions are also present. It is the
responsibility of the user to categorize the problem and identify the
suitable solution.
Generally the solutions can be categorized as follows.
a) Security Issues
b) Security Objectives
c) Security Techniques
SECURITY
ISSUE
SECURITY OBJECTIVE SECURITY
TECHNIQUE
Confidentiality Privacy of message Encryption
Authentication Origin Verification Digital Signatures
Challenge-response
Passwords
Biometric devices
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Non-repudiation Proof of origin, receipt
and contents
Bi-directional hashing
Digital signatures
Transaction
Certificates
Time stamps
Confirmation services
Access controls Limiting entry to
authorized users
Firewalls
Passwords
Biometric devices
Explain the concept of Digital Signature:
7. Digital Signatures:
Consider the situation in which if X is sender & Y receiver,
then X encrypts the message with Y's public key and on receiving,
Y decrypts with his own private key. This method only ensures
secure communication between the two. Now consider another
situation. If X is sender and Y is receiver, X encrypts the message
using his own private key! On receiving, Y decrypts it using X's
public key. The purpose behind this move is 'authentication'. It is
clear that, only X knows his private key. So, when Y receives this
message (encrypted with X's private key), it is an indication or proof
that it has originated only from X and none else! Remember that in
earlier scheme, the purpose was only 'confidentiality' and the origin
of message was not the concern. Now, one may say that if
someone else wants to intercept this communication it should be
easy. That is anyone can decrypt the message who knows X's
public key. This is true, but then it will not be possible for anyone to
again encrypt this message as only X knows his private key. Thus
receiver here will not be fooled that message came from X This
scheme confirms the origin of the message. So, in this case X
cannot deny that he has sent the message to Y, because it was
encrypted with X's private key, known only to X.
The above discussion forms the basis for the concept called
Digital Signature In case of our normal operations, we make
use of our (handwritten) signatures. These are used to confirm the
'origin' or the 'authentication' of the individual. In the Internet world,
it would be difficult to use any such method in practice. Hence the
concept of 'Digital signatures' was evolved. This technique is vitally
important in the E-commerce concept used in the Internet. It proves
as a valid mechanism for 'authenticity' of individual. Most of the
financial transactions done over Internet make use of this method.
22
7.1. Techniques of Digital signatures:
Actual working of Digital signatures involves the use of a
concept called 'Message digest' or 'hash'. Message digest is
something like the summary of original message. (works similar to
the CRC checksum concept) This is basically used to verify the
'integrity' of data i.e. to ensure that the message has not been
modified after it was sent by sender and before it reaches the
receiver. The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) was developed by
NIST first in 1991. It suggests using the SHA-1 algorithm for
calculating the message digest. This digest is further used for
performing Digital signatures, by using the algorithm called Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA). In DSA, message digest is encrypted
with the sender's private key to form the Digital Signature (DS).
This signature is transmitted further along with the original
message. It is also possible to use the earlier RSA algorithm for
performing digital signatures. RSA is prominently used over DSA as
DSA turns out to be more complicated.
5. Integrity Check:
Integrity check is ensuring that the receiver of the message
should be able to tell the message was not modified. To achieve
this key exchange and digital signature are used. 5.1.
Implementation of Integrity Check through Digital Signature:
(both sender and receiver side)
Senders Side:
1. If X is the sender, the SHA-1 algorithm is used to first
calculate the message digest (MD 1) of original message.
2. This MD1 is further encrypted using RSA with X's private
key. This output is called the Digital Signature (DS) of X.
Message
Digest
#
X
Message
Digest
Algorithm
Senders
Private Key
Digital
Signatur
e
Public key
Cipher
23
3. Further, the original message (M) along with the Digital
signature (DS) is sent to receiver.
4. After the digest has been created, it is encrypted (signed)
using the sender's private key. The encrypted digest is
attached to the original message and sent to the receiver.
Receivers Side:
1. Y thus receives the original message (M) and X's
digital signature. Y uses the same message digest
algorithm used by X to calculate the message digest
(MD2) of received message (M).
2. Also, Y uses X's public key to decrypt the digital
signature. The outcome of this decryption is nothing
but original message digest (MD1) calculated by X.
3. Y then compares this digest MD1 with the digest MD2
he has just calculated in step 4. If both of them are
matching, i.e. MDl = MD2, Y can accept the original
message (M) as correctly authenticated and assured
to have originated from X. whereas, if they are
different, the message shall be rejected.
24
The implementation is depicted below.
This method turns out to be foolproof. Even if an attacker
intercepts anywhere in between, it is not likely for him to again sign
the modified/read message, as only X in this case will know the
private key! Hence, even if intercepted, this method remains very
much secure and reliable!
5.2. Properties of Digital Signature:
Digital signature does not provide privacy. If there is a need
for privacy, another layer of encryption/decryption must be applied.
Digital signatures can provide
1. Integrity, Authentication, and Nonrepudiation.
1. Integrity The integrity of a message is preserved because if
Eve intercepted the message and partially or totally changed it, the
decrypted message would be unreadable.
2. Authentication We can use the following reasoning to
show how a message can be authenticated. If Eve sends a
message while pretending that it is coming from Alice, she must
use her own private key for encryption. The message is then
decrypted with the public key of Alice and will therefore be non-
readable. Encryption with Eve's private key and decryption with
Alice's public key result in garbage.
3. Nonrepudiation Digital signature also provides for non-
repudiation. Bob saves the message received from Alice. If Alice
25
later denies sending the message, Bob can show that encrypting
and decrypting the saved message with Alice's private and public
key can create a duplicate of the saved message. Since only Alice
knows her private key, she cannot deny sending the message.
6. Authentication
The receiver of the message should be able to be sure of the
origin of the message. It requires a digital signature (One way hash,
public key algorithm, and symmetric algorithm) or a public key
algorithm. The following functions are associated with
authentication service.
Salting is the act of combining a user password with a random
value as a countermeasure to a dictionary password attack. The
combined values are encrypted and stored on the system along
with the salt value. A random number string is combined with
the user password before a one way function is applied to it.
The salt value and the one way function result are stored on the
host that authenticated the user. The password is not stored on
the host.
SKEY is a one way function authentication mechanism. A
limited set of numbers are generated by using the function on a
random number, then use the function on each result for a given
number of times. The generated numbers are used only once
for login.
8. Hash Function:
A hash function is any well-defined procedure or
mathematical function that converts a large, possibly variable-sized
amount of data into a small datum, usually a single integer that may
serve as an index to an array. The values returned by a hash
function are called hash values, hash codes, hash sums, or
simply hashes. Hash functions are mostly used to speed up table
lookup or data comparison tasks such as finding items in a
database, detecting duplicated or similar records in a large file,
finding similar stretches in DNA sequences, and so on.A hash
function may map two or more keys to the same hash value. In
many applications, it is desirable to minimize the occurrence of
such collisions, which means that the hash function must map the
keys to the hash values as evenly as possible. Depending on the
application, other properties may be required as well. Although the
idea was conceived in the 1950s the design of good hash functions
is still a topic of active research.
More about hash functions and hash algorithms will be dealt
in Unit-3.
26
Questions for practice:
1) What is the classification of attacks? Compare and contrast both
the types.
2) Explain about active attacks in detail.
3) Explain about passive attacks in detail.
4) What are the variations of Dos attack? Explain them.
5) Explain about DDoS attacks. How zombies can be used to
create DDos?
6) Explain the practical side of attacks in detail.
7) State how cookies can be harmful to system?
8) Compare security services and service mechanisms.
9) Explain about Challenge-Response Authentication
mechanism.
10) What are the principles of security? Explain.
11) What is integrity check? How can it be implemented? Explain.
12) Define salting process.
13) What is Skey? How can it be used as a security measure?
14) Explain how authentication service can be implemented? List
the protocols used for authentication.
15) Define Hash Function briefly.
16) Explain Denial of Service attack? How can this attack be
carried out on a internet enabled networked system?
17) What are the differences between Packet sniffing and Packet
spoofing?
18) You are assigned a job of system administrator of a company.
Explain how will you try to secure your own network from the
following agents that pose a threat to the security:
1) Worms
2) Hackers
3) Cookies
4) Employees

27
2
SECRET KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
Algorithm Types
Block encryption
Stream Vs Block Encryption
Algorithm Modes
ECB
CBC
CFB
OFB
DES Algorithm
Double and Triple DES
Meet-in-Middle
IDEA Algorithm
1. Algorithm Types and Modes
An algorithm defines what size of plain text should be
encrypted in each step of the algorithm. The algorithm mode
defines the details of the cryptographic algorithm, once the type is
decided.
1.1. Algorithm Types
We have been talking about the transformation of plain text
message into cipher text messages. Regardless of the techniques
used, at a broad level, the generation of cipher text from plain text
itself can be done in two basic ways, stream ciphers and block
ciphers. This is shown in Fig. 2.1.
Fig.2.1 Type of Cipher
Algorithm Types
StreamCiphers
Block Ciphers
28
1.1.1. Stream Ciphers
In Stream Ciphers, the plain text is encrypted one bit at a
time. Suppose the original message (plain text) is pay 100 in ASCII
(i.e. text format). When we convert these ASCII characters to their
binary values, let us assume that it translate to 01011100
(hypothetically, just for simplicity, in reality, the binary text would be
much larger as each text character takes seven bits). Suppose the
key to be applied is 10010101 in binary. Let us also assume that
we apply the XOR logic as the encryption algorithm. XOR is quite
simple to understand. As shown in fig. 2.2 in simple terms, XOR
produces an output of 1 only if one input is 0 and the other is 1. The
output is 0 if both the inputs are 0 or if both the inputs are 1 (hence
the name exclusive).
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
Fig.2.2 Functioning of XOR logic
We can see the effect of XOR in fig. 2.3.
As a result of applying one bit of key for every respective bit
of the original message, the cipher text is generated as 11001001
in binary (ZTU91 ^% in text). Note that each bit of the plain text is
encrypted one after the other. Thus, what is transmitted is
11001001 in binary, which even when translated back to ASCII
would mean ZTU91 ^%. This makes no sense to an attacker, and
thus protects the information.
Note:
Stream Cipher technique involves the encryption of one plain text
bit at a time. The decryption also happens one bit at a time.
010111001 plain text
100101011 XOR
operation with the key
Cipher text
Fig. 2.3 Stream Ciphers
In text format In binary format
Pay 100
XTU01 ^%D 11001001
29
Another interesting property of XOR is that when used twice,
it produces the original data. For example, suppose we have two
binary numbers A=101 and B=110. We now want to perform an
XOR operation on A and B to produce a third number C, i.e.:
C = A XOR B
Thus, we will have: C = 101 XOR 110
= 011
Now, if we perform C XOR A, we will get B. That is:
B = 011 XOR 101
=110
Similarly, if we perform C XOR B, we will get A. That is:
A = 011 XOR 110
= 101
This reversibility of XOR operations has many implications in
cryptographic algorithms, as we shall notice.Note: XOR is
reversible when used twice, it produces the original values. This
is useful in cryptography.
1.1.2. Block Ciphers
In Block Ciphers, rather than encrypting one bit at a time, a
block of bits is encrypted at one go. Suppose we have a plain text
FOUR_AND_FOUR that needs to be encrypted. Using block
cipher, FOUR could be encrypted first, followed by _AND_ and
finally FOUR. Thus, one block of characters gets encrypted at a
time. During decryption, each block would be translated back to the
original form. In actual practice, the communication takes place
only in bits. Therefore, FOUR actually means binary equivalent of
the ASCII characters FOUR. After any algorithm encrypts these,
the resultant bits are converted back into their ASCII equivalents.
Therefore, we get funny symbols such as Vfa%, etc. In actual
practice, their binary equivalents are received, which are decrypted
back into binary equivalent of ASCII FOUR. This is shown in 2.4.
30
Plain text
Cipher text
(a) The encryption process at the senders end
Cipher text
Plain text
(b) The decryption process at the receivers end
Fig.2.4 Block Cipher
An obvious problem with block ciphers is repeating text. For
repeating text patterns, the same cipher is generated. Therefore, it
could give a clue to the cryptanalyst regarding the original plain
text. The cryptanalyst can look for repeating strings and try to break
them. If succeeds in doing so, there is a danger that a relatively
large portion of the original message is broken into, and therefore,
the entire message can then be revealed with more effort. Even if
the cryptanalyst cannot guess the remaining words, suppose she
changes all debit to credit and vice versa in a funds transfer
message, it could cause havoc! To deal with this problem, block
ciphers are used in chaining mode, as we shall study later. In this
approach, the previous block of cipher text is mixed with the current
block, so as to obscure the cipher text, thus avoiding repeated
patterns of blocks with the same contents.
Note:
Block Cipher technique involves encryption of one block of
text at a time. Decryption also takes one block of encrypted text at
a time. Practically the blocks use in the block cipher generally
contains 64 bits or more. As we have seen, stream ciphers encrypt
one bit at a time. This can be very time consuming and actually
unnecessary in real life. That is why block ciphers are used more
-AND-
Encrypt
*yT1x
Decrypt
-AND
FOUR
Encrypt
VFa%
FOUR
Encrypt
VFa%
Decrypt
FOUR
Decrypt
FOUR
*yT1x VFa% VFa%
31
often in computer based cryptographic algorithms as compared to
stream ciphers. Consequently, we will focus our attention on block
ciphers with reference to algorithm modes. However, as we shall
see, two of the block cipher algorithm modes can also be
implemented as stream cipher modes.
3. Algorithm Modes:
An algorithm mode is a combination of a series of the basic
algorithm steps on block cipher, and some kind of feedback from
the previous step. There are four important algorithm modes,
namely, Electronic Code Book (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB) and Output Feedback (OFB). This
is shown in the following figure. The first two modes operate on
block cipher, whereas the latter two modes are block-cipher
modes, which can be used as if they are working on stream cipher.
1. Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode:
Electronic Code Book (ECB) is the simplest mode of
operation. Here the meaning plain text message is divided into
blocks of 64 bits each. Each such block is encrypted independently
of the other blocks. For all blocks in a message, the same key is
used for encryption. This process is shown in fig. 2.5
AlgorithmModes
Electronic Code
Book (ECB)
Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC)
Cipher Feedback
(CFB)
Output Feedback
(OFB)
These two modes work on
block ciphers
These two modes work on
block ciphers acting as
stream ciphers.
32
Plain text block 1 Plain text block 2 Plain text block n
key key key
Cipher text block 1 Cipher text block 2 Cipher text block n
At the receivers end, the incoming data is divided into 64-bit
blocks, and by using the same key as was used for encryption,
each block is decrypted to produce the corresponding plain text
block. This process is shown in fig. 2.6
key key key
In ECB, since a single key is used for encrypting all the
blocks of a message, if a plain text block repeats in the original
message the corresponding cipher text block will also repeat in the
encrypted message. Therefore, ECB is suitable only for encrypting
small messages, where the scope for repeating the same plain text
blocks is quite less.
2. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode:
We saw that in the case of ECB, within a given message (i.e. for
a given key), a plain text block always produces the same cipher
text block. Thus, if a block of plain text occurs more than once in
the input, the corresponding cipher text block will also occur more
than once in the output, thus providing some clues to a
cryptanalyst. To overcome this problem, Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) mode ensures that even if a block of plain text repeats in the
input, these two (or more) identical plain text blocks yield totally
Encrypt
Encrypt Encrypt
Step 1 Step 2 Step n
Decrypt
Decrypt Decrypt
Step 1
Step 2 Step n
33
different cipher text blocks in the output. For this, a feedback
mechanism is used, as we shall learn now.
Chaining adds a feedback mechanism to a block cipher. In
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), the results of the encryption of the
previous block are fed back into the encryption of the current block.
That is, each block is used to modify the encryption of the next
block. Thus each block of cipher text is dependent on the
corresponding current input plain text block, as well as all the
previous plain text blocks.
The encryption process of CBC is depicted in fig. 2.7 and
described thereafter.
plain text block Plain text block 2 Plain text block n
Key key key
1. As shown in the figure, the first step receives two inputs: the first
block of plain text and a random block of text, called as
Initialization Vector (IV).
a. The IV has no special meaning: it is simply used to make
each message unique. Since the value of IV is randomly
generated, the likelihood of it repeating in two different
messages is quite rare. Consequently, IV helps in making
the cipher text somewhat unique or at least quite different
from all the other cipher texts in a different message.
Interestingly, it is not mandatory to keep IV secret it can be
known to everybody. This seems slightly concerning and
confusing. However, if we relook at the operation of CBC, we
will realize that IV is simply one of the two inputs to the first
encryption step. The output of step 1 is cipher text block 1,
which is also one of the two inputs to the second encryption
Step 1
Step 2 Step n
Encrypt
Encrypt
Encrypt
I
XOR XOR
XOR
34
step. In other words, Cipher text block 1 is also an IV for step
2! Similarly, Cipher text block 2 is also an IV for step 3, and
so on. Since all these cipher text blocks will be sent to the
receiver, we are actually anyway sending all IVs for step 2
onwards! Thus, there is no special reason why the IV for
step 1 should be kept secret. The key used for encryption is
what needs to be kept secret. However, in practice, for
maximum security, both the key and the IV are kept secret.
b. The first block of cipher text and IV are combined using XOR
and then encrypted using a key to produce the first cipher
text block. The first cipher text block is then provided as a
feedback to the next plain text block, as explained below.
2. In the second step, the second plain text block is XORed
with the output of step 1, i.e. the first cipher text block. It is
then encrypted with the same key, as used in step 1. This
produces cipher text block 2.
3. In the third step, the third plain text block is XORed with the
output of step 2, i.e. the second cipher text block. It is then
encrypted with the same key, as used in step 1.
4. This process continues for all the remaining plain text blocks
of the original message.
Remember that the IV is used only in the first plain text block.
However, the same key is use for encryption of all plain text blocks.
1. The Cipher text block 1 is passed through the decryption
algorithm using the same key, which was used during the
encryption process for all the plain text blocks. The output of
this step is then XORed with the IV. This process yields
Plain text block 1.
2. In step 2, the Cipher text block 2 is decrypted, and its output
is XORed with Cipher text block 1, which yields Plain text
block 2.
3. This process continues for all the Cipher text blocks in the
encrypted message.
35
The decryption process is shown in fig. 2.8
key key key
3.Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode:
Not all applications can work with blocks of data. Security is also
required in applications that are character-oriented. For instance,
an operator can be typing keystrokes at a terminal, which need to
be immediately transmitted across the communications link in a
secure manner, i.e. by using encryption. In such situations, stream
cipher must be used. The Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode is useful in
such cases. In this mode, data is encrypted in units that are smaller
(e.g. they could be of size 8 bits, i.e. the size of character typed by
an operator) than a defined block size (which is usually 64 bits).
Let us understand how CFB mode works, assuming that we
are dealing with j bits at a time (as we have seen, usually, but not
always, j=8). Since CFB is slightly more complicated as compared
to the first two cryptography modes, we shall study CFB in a step-
by-step fashion.
Step 1: Like CBC, a 64-bit Initialization vector (IV) is used in the
case of CFB mode. The IV is kept in a shift register. It is encrypted
in the first step to produce a corresponding 64-bit IV cipher text.
This is shown fig. 2.9.
Decrypt
Decrypt
Decrypt
Step 1 Step 2 Step n
I
XOR XOR
XOR
36
Key
Step 2: Now, the leftmost (i.e. the most significant) j bits of the
encrypted IV are XORed with the first j bits of the plain text. This
produces the first portion of cipher text (say C) as shown in fig. 1.5.
C is transmitted to the receiver.
Step 3: Now, the bits of IV (i.e. the contents of the shift register
containing IV) are shifted left by j positions. Thus the rightmost j
positions of the shift register now contain unpredictable data. These
rightmost j positions are now filled with C. This is shown in fig. 2.10.
Left shift IV by j
Positions
Move j bits of C into the
Rightmost side of IV
Step 4: Now step 1 through 3 continue until all the plain text units
are encrypted. That is, the following steps repeat:
IV is encrypted.
The leftmost j bits resulting from this encryption process are
XORed with the next j bits of the plain text.
The resulting cipher text portion (i.e. comprising of the next j
bits of the cipher text) is sent to the receiver.
IV Encrypt
Encrypted IV
First j bits of the
Encrypted IV
First j bits of the
plain text
Cipher text 1
XOR
IV
IV C
37
The shift register containing the IV is left-shifted containing
the IV.
Fig. 2.11 shows the overall conceptual view of the CFB
mode.
key key key

At the receivers end, the decryption process is pretty similar, with
minor changes.
4.Output Feedback (OFB) mode:
The Output Feedback (OFB) mode is extremely similar to
the CFB. The only difference is that in case of CFB, the cipher text
is fed into the next stage of encryption process. But in the case of
OFB, the output of the IV encryption process is fed into the next
stage of encryption process. Simply draw the block diagram of the
OFB process, as shown in fig. 2.11.
IV (Shift Register IV (Shift Register IV (Shift Register
Encrypt
Encrypt
Encrypt
Take just the
leftmost 8 bits
Take just the
leftmost 8 bits
Take just the
leftmost 8 bits
XOR
XOR XOR
Plain text j bits
Plain text j bits
Plain text j bits
Cipher text j
bits
Cipher text j bits
Cipher text j
bits
38
key key key
DES (Data Encryption Standard) Cipher Algorithm
DES Cipher - A 16-round Festal cipher with block size of 64 bits.
DES stands for Data Encryption Standard. IBM developed DES in
1974 in response to a federal government public invitation for data
encryption algorithms. In 977, DES was published as a federal
standard, FIPS PUB 46.
Algorithm:
Step 1: 64 bit plain text blocks are handed over to the initial
permutation (IP) function.
Step 2: IP is performed on the plain text.
Step 3: IP produces 2 halves; say LPT and RPT, both of 32 bit
each.
Step 4: Perform 16 rounds of encryption process each with its own
key.
Rounds are defined as follows in the algorithm:
4a: Key transformation 4b: Expansion Permutation (EP)
4c: S-Box Substitution
IV (Shift Register
Encrypt
Take just the
leftmost 8 bits
XOR
Plain text j bits
IV (Shift Register
Encrypt
Take just the
leftmost 8 bits
XOR
Plain text j bits
IV (Shift Register
Encrypt
Take just the
leftmost 8 bits
XOR
Plain text j bits
Cipher
text j bits
Cipher
text j bits
Cipher
text j bits
39
4d: P-Box Permutation 4e: XOR and Swap.
Step 5: LPT and RPT are rejoined finally and a Final Permutation
(FP) is performed on the combined block. Step 6: The result of this
process produces 64-bit cipher text.
Diagrammatical representation:
Explanation of the algorithm:
Comparing the IP table performs IP. It happens only once, and it
happens before the first round. It suggests how the transposition
in IP should proceed, as shown in the IP table.
In the rounds, step 1 is key transformation.
That is achieved by
1. Shifting the key position by considering the Round Table.
2. Compare the Compression Table to get the sub key of 48
bits.
Step 2 is Expansion Permutation (EP).
In this step, the 32-bit RPT is expanded to 48 bits as it of key
length. The process is shown as under:
The 32-bit text is divided into 8 blocks of 4 bits each. Then by
adding 2 bits extra, that is the first bit of the block 1 is the last bit of
the block 8 and the last bit of the block 8 is the first bit of the 7
th
block the 48-bit text is obtained.
Plain Text(64 Bit)
IP
LPT RPT
16 Rounds
FP
Cipher Text
40
Diagram for the same is as below:
Input Block 1 (4 bits) Input Block 2 (4 bits) Input Block 8 (4 bits)
Output Block 1 (6 bits)
Output Block 2 (6 bits) Output Block 8 (6 bits)
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 43 44 45 46 47
48
29 30 31 32 1 2 3
4
5 6 7 8
After this expansion it will be compared with the Expansion
Permutation Table.
Step 3 in Round is S-Box Substitution.
1. This step reduces 48 bits RPT into 32 bits because
LPT is of 32 bits.
2. It accepts 48 bits, does some XOR logic and gives 32
bits.
IP
LPT RPT
16 Rounds
FP
Cipher Text
41
The 48 bits key (Result of Step 1) and the 48 bits of RPT
(Result of Step 2) will be XOR and the output will be 48 bits
Input block and that will be given as the input for the S-Box
Substitution.
The 48-bit block text will be divided into 8 blocks of 6 bits
each.
Decimal equivalent of the first and last bit in a block denotes
the row number and decimal equivalent of the bit 2,3,4 and 5
denotes the column number of the S-Box Substitution table.
Check the value and take the binary equivalent of the
number.
The result is 4-bit binary number.
For example if the 6-bit number is 100101 then the first and
last bit is 11 and the decimal equivalent of the number is 3.
The remaining bits are 0010 and the decimal equivalent of
the number is 2. If it is the first block of input, then check the
3
rd
row 2
nd
column value in the Sbox-1 substitution table. It is
given as 1 in the table. Binary equivalent of 1 is 0001.
The input 100101 of 6-bit is now reduced to 0001 after
S-Box Substitution.
42
1 0 0 1 0 1
(02) 0010 column
number
11 Row Number (03)
Compare 3
rd
Row 2
nd
Column in S-box -1
1 0 0 0
Original 64 bit Plain Text Block
32 bit Left Plain Text Block 32 bit Right Plain Text Block
Next Round
32 bit Left Plain Text Block 32 bit Right Plain Text Block
XOR
(1)Key Transformation
(not involved directly)
(2)Expansion
permutation
(3)S-box Substitution
(4)P-box Substitution
Binary
Equivalent
43
Step 4 in Round is P-Box Permutation.
In this step, the output of S-Box, that is 32 bits are permuted
using a p-box. This mechanism involves simple permutation that is
replacement of each bit with another bit as specified in the p-Box
table, without any expansion or compression. This is called as P-
Box Permutation. The P-Box is shown below.
16 7 20 21 29 12 28 17 1 15 23 26 5 18 31 10
2 8 24 14 32 27 3 9 19 13 30 6 22 11 4 25
For example, a 16 in the first block indicates that the bit at position
16 moves to bit at position 1 in the output.
Step 5 is XOR and Swap
The untouched LPT, which is of 32 bits, is XORed with the
resultant RPT that is with the output produced by P-Box
permutation. The result of this XOR operation becomes the new
right half. The old right half becomes the new left half in the process
of swapping.
At the end of 16 rounds, the Final Permutation is performed
only once. This is a simple transposition based on the Final
Permutation Table.
The output of the Final permutation is the 64-bit encrypted
block.
4. Multiple Encryptions with DES:
4.1. Improving the Security of DES
You can improve the security of DES by performing multiple
encryptions, known as super encryption. The two most common
ways of doing this are with double encryption (Double DES) and
with triple encryption (Triple DES).
While double DES appears to add significant security,
research has found some points of attack, and therefore experts
recommend Triple DES for applications where single DES is not
adequate.
1. Double DES:
In Double DES, each 64-bit block of data is encrypted twice
with the DES algorithm, first with one key, then with another, as
follows:
1. Encrypt with (key 1).
2. Encrypt with (key 2).
44
Plaintext (key1) (key2) ciphertext:
Double DES is not significantly more secure than
single DES. In 1981, Ralph Merkle and Martin Hellman published
an article in which they outlined a so-called "meet-in-the-middle
attack. The meet-in-the-middle attack is a known plaintext
attack which requires that an attacker have both a known piece of
plaintext and a block of that same text that has been encrypted.
(These pieces are surprisingly easily to get.) The attack requires
storing 2
56
intermediate results when trying to crack a message that
has been encrypted with DES (a total of 2
59
bytes), but it reduces
the number of different keys you need to check from 2
112
to 2
57
.
"This is still considerably more memory storage than one could
comfortably comprehend, but it's enough to convince the most
paranoid of cryptographers that double encryption is not worth
anything. In other words, because a message encrypted
with DES can be forcibly decrypted by an attacker performing an
exhaustive key search today, an attacker might also be able to
forcibly decrypt a message encrypted with Double DES using a
meet-in-the-middle attack at some point in the future.
2. Triple DES:
This is a known variant of DES and is very easy to
implement given an implementation of DES. Its strength lies in the
new key length of 168 bits which addresses the biggest weakness
with standard DES albeit with an unorthodox key length like
standard DES.
The dangers of the Merkle-Hellman meet-in-the-middle
attack can be circumvented by performing three block encryption
operations. This method is called Triple DES.In practice, the most
common way to perform Triple DES is:
1. Encrypt with (key1).
2. Decrypt with (key2).
The advantage of this technique is that it can be backward
compatible with single DES, simply by setting all three keys to be
the same value.
To decrypt, reverse the steps:
45
For many applications, you can use the same key for both
key1 and key3 without creating a significant vulnerability.
Triple DES appears to be roughly as secure as single DES would
be if it had a 112-bit key. How secure is this really? Suppose you
had an integrated circuit which could perform one million
Triple DES encryptions per second, and you built a massive
computer containing one million of these chips to forcibly try all
Triple DES keys. This computer, capable of testing 10
12
encryptions
per second, would require:
2
112
= 5.19 x 10
33
encryption operations
5.19 x 10
33
encryption operations / 10
12
operations/sec
= 5.19 x 10
21
sec
= 1.65 x 10
14
years.
This is more than 16,453 times older than the currently
estimated age of the universe (approximately 10
10
years).
Apparently, barring new discoveries uncovering fundamental
flaws or weaknesses with the DES algorithm, or new breakthroughs
in the field of cryptanalysis, Triple DES is the most secure private
key encryption algorithm that humanity will ever need.
"Meet in the middle" example:
Let us assume that we are given a message M, its
encryption C, and double DES was employed, i.e. C = Ek1 (Ek2
(M)). One calculates Ek2 [M] for all K2 and stores these values in a
hash table. One then computes E1 k1 [C], for all k1 looks for
collisions in the hash table that can be investigated further. This
approach uses time at most 257 so it is only marginally more
expensive than single DES. On a more pessimistic note the
procedure also uses 256 memory and that might be harder to come
by.
Breaking DES:
Given a set of known plaintexts and crypto texts, it is
possible to analyze the pairs and construct and reduce the number
of keys it is necessary to check. Examples of such an approach
are:
1. Differential crypto-analysis.
2. Linear crypto-analysis.
The former algorithm can successfully crypt-analyze DES by
seeing 247 chosen plaintexts, the latter algorithm, however,
requires 243 message blocks, which is 246 bytes, or 64 Tera
bytes.
46
5. IDEA ALGORITHM AND ITS WORKING:
The IDEA in perceived as one of the strongest cryptographic
algorithms. It was launched in 1990 and underwent certain changes
in names and capabilities as shown in table.
Year Name
1990 Proposed Encryption Standard(PES)
1991 Improved Proposed Encryption Standard(IPES)
1992 International Data Encryption Algorithm(IDEA)
One popular email privacy technology known as Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) is based on IDEA.
(1) IDEA is block cipher.
(2) IDEA is reversible like DES , i.e. the same algorithm is used for
encryption and decryption.
(3) It uses both confusion and diffusion for encryption.
Algorithm:
(1) Consider the input plain text of 64 bits.
(2) Divide the input plain text into 4 portions each of size 16 bits
(Say p1 to P4).
(3) Now perform 8 rounds of algorithm.
(a) In each round 6 sub-keys are generated from the original
key. Each of the sub-keys consists of 16-bits. These six sub-keys
are applied to four input blocks P1 to P4.Thus for first round, we
have 6 keys say k1 to k6;for second round , we have k7 to
k12.Finally for eight round we have keys k43 to k48.
(b)Multiply, add and XOR the plain text blocks with sub keys.
(4) Perform an output transformation in sub-keys.
(5) Combine all the 4 blocks of output transformation to get the
cipertext of 64 bits.
47
K6
K1
k6
1. Details of first round in IDEA:
The initial key consists of 128 bits from which 6 sub-keys k1
to k6 are generated for the first round.
Since k1 to k6 consist of 16 bits each, out of the original 128
bits, the first 96 bits(6 sub-keys * 16 bits per sub key) are used
for the first round. Thus at the end of the first round, bits 97-128 of
the original keys are unused.
Round 1
Input Plain Text(64 bits)
P1 P2 P3 P4
K1
.
.
K6
K1
.
.
K6
K1
.
.
K6
Round 2
Round 3
a
Output Transformation (4 sub key)
Output Cipher Text (64 bits)
C1 C2 C3 C4
48
2. Details of second round in IDEA:
In 2
nd
round 31 unused bits are used. For second round we
still require(96-31=65) more bits.But the original key 128 bits are
exhausted.
Now IDEA uses the techniques of key shifting. At this stage
the original key is shifted left circularly by 25 bits that is , the 26
th
bit
of original key moves to the first position and becomes the first bit
after the shift, and the 25
th
bit of the original key moves to the last
position and becomes the 128
th
bit after the shift
3. Details of one round in IDEA:
1. Multiply P1 and k1
2. Add P2 and K2
3. Add P3 and k3
4. Multiply P4 and k4
5.XOR the results of steps 1 and 3.
6. XOR the results of steps 2 and 4.
7. Multiply step 5 and k5
8. Add steps 6 and step 7.
9. Multiply the result of step 8 and k6.
10. Add steps 7 and 9.
14 .XOR the results of steps 4 and 10.
4. Details of output Transformation:
(1)The output transformation is a onetime operation. It takes place
at the end of the 8
th
round.
(2)It is 64 bit value divided into 4 sub-blocks (say R1 to R4 each
consisting of 16 bits).
Step 1: Multiply R1 and k49.
Step2: Add R2 and k50.
Step3: Add r3 and k51.
Step 4: Multiply r4 and k52.
49
Multiply Add Add Multiply
A Symmetric Cryptosystems Comparison Table
Cipher Security Speed (486 pc) Key length
DES low 400 kb/s 56 bits
Triple DES good 150 kb/s 112 bits
IDEA good* 200 kb/s 128 bits
Triple IDEA very good* ~100 kb/s 256 bits
* The algorithm is believed to be strong
** The algorithm itself is good, but it has a built-in weakness
1) Distinguish between block and stream cipher.
2) Explain the algorithm modes in detail. Compare the four
different modes.
3) Explain DES, one of the symmetric cryptosystem algorithms
in detail.
4) Explain IDEA and its working in detail.
5) What are the variations of DES? How they can improve the
security?
6) Discuss the problems with DES and its variations. Give
example.
7) Compare symmetric cryptosystems and explain the features.

R1
K50 K50 K50
c1 c1 c1 c1
R2 R3 R4
K49
Output Cipher Text (64 bit)
50
3
HASH FUNCTIONS AND MESSAGE
DIGESTS
Meaning of Hash
Requirements of Hash
Idea behind Hash
MD2 algorithm
MD4 algorithm
MD5 algorithm
SHS
MAC
HMAC
3.1. Signing the Digest:
We said before that public-key encryption is efficient if the
message is short. Using a public key to sign the entire message is
very inefficient if the message is very long. The solution is to let the
sender sign a digest of the document instead of the whole
document. The sender creates a miniature version or digests of the
document and signs it; the receiver then checks the signature on
the miniature. To create a digest of the message, we use a hash
function. The hash function creates a fixed-size digest from a
variable-length message, as shown in Figure.
51
1. Requirement of a message digest
We can summarize the requirements of the message digest
concept, as follows:
Given a message, it should be very easy to find its
corresponding message digest. Also for a given message, the
message digest must always be the same.
Given a message digest, it should be very difficult to find the
original message for which the digest was created.
Given any two messages, if we calculate their message digests,
the two message digests must be different.
Another basis of message digest is that it should not give
any clue or indication of the original message. i.e. it should not be
possible to revert back to original message from the digest. Also,
for a given message it's digest should be the same always.
Different algorithms are used to convert original message into its
message digest.
2. Idea of a Message Digest.
The concept of message digests is based on similar
principles. However, it is slightly wider in scope. For instance,
suppose that we have a number 4000 and we divide it by 4 to get
1000 Thus, 4 can become a fingerprint of the number 4000.
Dividing 4000 by 4 will always yield 1000. If we change either 4000
or 4, the result will not be 1000.
Another important point is, if we are simply given the number
4, but are not given any further information; we would not be able to
trace back the equation 4 x 1000 = 4000. Thus, we have one more
important concept here. The fingerprint of a message (in this case,
the number 4) does not tell anything about the original message (in
this case, the number 4000). This is because there are infinite other
possible equations, which can produce the result 4.
Another simple example of message digest is shown in fig.
Let us assume that we want to calculate the message digest of a
number 7391753. Then, we multiply each digit in the number with
the next digit (excluding it if it is 0), and disregarding the first digits
of the multiplication operation, if the result is a two-digit number.
Thus, we perform a hashing operation (or a message digest
algorithm) over a block of data to produce its hash or message
digest, which is smaller in size than the original message. Actually,
the message digests are not so small and straightforward to
compute. Message digests usually consist of 128 or more bits. This
52
means that the chance of any two-message digests being the same
is anything between 0 and at least 2128. The message digest
length is chosen to be so long with a purpose. This minimizes that
the scope for two messages digests being the same.
After the digest has been created; it is encrypted (signed)
using the sender's private key. The encrypted digest is attached to
the original message and sent to the receiver.
The popularly used ones are MD5 or Message Digest 5
(developed by Rivest) a modified version of earlier MD4, MD3 and
MD2, while the first one was simply MD, and the SHA (Secure
Hash Algorithm) developed by National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NISI) in 1993. SHA-l is promoted & prominently used
than the MD5 algorithm.
Among several functions are called MD5 (Message Digest 5)
and SHA-I (Secure Hash Algorithm I). The first one produces a
120-bit digest. The second produces a 160-bit digest.
Note that a hash function must have two properties to
guarantee its success. First, hashing is one-way; the digest can
only be created from the message, not vice versa. Second,
hashing is a one-to-one function; there is little probability that two
messages will create the same digest.
3.2 MD2 algorithm:
The algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length
and produces as output a 128-bit "fingerprint" or "message digest"
of the input. It is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to
produce two messages having the same message digest, or to
produce any message having a given prespecified target message
digest. The MD2 algorithm is intended for digital signature
53
applications, where a large file must be "compressed" in a secure
manner before being signed with a private (secret) key under a
public-key cryptosystem such as RSA. The reference
implementation of MD2 is more portable.
1. Terminology and Notation
In this document, a "byte" is an eight-bit quantity. Let x_i
denote "x sub i". If the subscript is an expression, we surround it in
braces, as in x_{i+1}. Similarly, we use ^ for superscripts
(exponentiation), so that xî denotes x to the i-th power. Let X xor
Y denote the bit-wise XOR of X and Y.
2. MD2 Algorithm Description
We begin by supposing that we have a b-byte message as
input, and that we wish to find its message digest. Here b is an
arbitrary nonnegative integer; b may be zero, and it may be
arbitrarily large. We imagine the bytes of the message written down
as follows:
m_0 m_1 ... m_{b-1}
The following five steps are performed to compute the message
digest of the message.
Step 1. Append Padding Bytes
The message is "padded" (extended) so that its length (in
bytes) is congruent to 0, modulo 16. That is, the message is
extended so that it is a multiple of 16 bytes long. Padding is always
performed, even if the length of the message is already congruent
to 0, modulo 16. Padding is performed as follows: "i" bytes of value
"i" are appended to the message so that the length in bytes of the
padded message becomes congruent to 0, modulo 16. At least one
byte and at most 16 bytes are appended. At this point the resulting
message (after padding with bytes) has a length that is an exact
multiple of 16 bytes.
Let M [0 ... N-1] denote the bytes of the resulting message,
where N is a multiple of 16.
Step 2. Append Checksum
A 16-byte checksum of the message is appended to the
result of the previous step. This step uses a 256-byte "random"
permutation constructed from the digits of pi. Let S[i] denote the i-th
element of this table. Do the following:
54
/* Clear checksum. */
For i = 0 to 15 do:
Set C[i] to 0.
end /* of loop on i */
Set L to 0.
/* Process each 16-word block. */
For i = 0 to N/16-1 do
/* Checksum block i. */
For j = 0 to 15 do
Set c to M[i*16+j].
Set C[j] to S[c xor L].
Set L to C[j].
end /* of loop on j */
The 16-byte checksum C[0 ... 15] is appended to the
message. Let M[0] with checksum), where N' = N + 16.
Step 3. Initialize MD Buffer
A 48-byte buffer X is used to compute the message digest.
The buffer is initialized to zero.
Step 4. Process Message in 16-Byte Blocks
This step uses the same 256-byte permutation S as step 2
does.
Check out these exercises.
For i = 0 to N'/16-1 do
/* Copy block i into X. */
For j = 0 to 15 do
Set X[16+j] to M[i*16+j].
Set X[32+j] to (X[16+j] xor X[j]).
Set t to 0.
55
/* Do 18 rounds. */
For j = 0 to 17 do
/* Round j. */
For k = 0 to 47 do
Set t and X[k] to (X[k] xor S[t]).
end /* of loop on k */
Set t to (t+j) modulo 256.
Step 5. Output
The message digest produced as output is X[0 ... 15]. That
is, we begin with X[0], and end with X[15].
This completes the description of MD2.
Summary
The MD2 message-digest algorithm is simple to
implement, and provides a "fingerprint" or message digest of a
message of arbitrary length. It is conjectured that the difficulty of
coming up with two messages having the same message digest is
on the order of 2^64 operations, and that the difficulty of coming up
with any message having a given message digest is on the order of
2^128 operations. The MD2 algorithm has been carefully
scrutinized for weaknesses. It is, however, a relatively new
algorithm and further security analysis is of course.
3..3. MD4 algorithm:
Executive Summary
The algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length
and produces as output a 128-bit "fingerprint" or "message digest"
of the input. It is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to
produce two messages having the same message digest, or to
produce any message having a given prespecified target message
digest. The MD4 algorithm is intended for digital signature
applications, where a large file must be "compressed" in a secure
manner before being encrypted with a private (secret) key under a
public-key cryptosystem such as RSA.
The MD4 algorithm is designed to be quite fast on 32-bit
machines. In addition, the MD4 algorithm does not require any
large substitution tables; the algorithm can be coded quite
compactly. The MD4 algorithm is being placed in the public domain
for review and possible adoption as a standard.
56
1. Terminology and Notation:
In this document a "word" is a 32-bit quantity and a "byte" is
an eight-bit quantity. A sequence of bits can be interpreted in a
natural manner as a sequence of bytes, where each consecutive
group of eight bits is interpreted as a byte with the high-order (most
significant) bit of each byte listed first. Similarly, a sequence of
bytes can be interpreted as a sequence of 32-bit words, where
each consecutive group of four bytes is interpreted as a word with
the low-order (least significant) byte given first.
Let x_i denote "x sub i". If the subscript is an expression, we
surround it in braces, as in x_{i+1}. Similarly, we use ^ for
superscripts (exponentiation), so that xî denotes x to the i-th
power.
Let the symbol "+" denote addition of words (i.e., modulo-
2^32 addition). Let X <<< s denote the 32-bit value obtained by
circularly shifting (rotating) X left by s bit positions. Let not(X)
denote the bit-wise complement of X, and let X v Y denote the bit-
wise OR of X and Y. Let X xor Y denote the bit-wise XOR of X and
Y, and let XY denote the bit-wise AND of X and Y.
2. MD4 Algorithm Description
We begin by supposing that we have a b-bit message as
input, and that we wish to find its message digest. Here b is an
arbitrary nonnegative integer; b may be zero, it need not be a
multiple of eight, and it may be arbitrarily large. We imagine the bits
of the message written down as follows:
m_0 m_1 ... m_{b-1}
The following five steps are performed to compute the
message digest of the message.
Step 1. Append Padding Bits
bits) is congruent to 448, modulo 512. That is, the message is
extended so that it is just 64 bits shy of being a multiple of 512 bits
long. Padding is always performed, even if the length of the
message is already congruent to 448, modulo 512. Padding is
performed as follows: a single "1" bit is appended to the message,
and then "0" bits are appended so that the length in bits of the
padded message becomes congruent to 448, modulo 512. In all, at
least one bit and at most 512 bits are appended.
57
Step 2. Append Length
A 64-bit representation of b (the length of the message
before the padding bits were added) is appended to the result of
the previous step. In the unlikely event that b is greater than 2^64,
then only the low-order 64 bits of b are used. (These bits are
appended as two 32-bit words and appended low-order word first in
accordance with the previous conventions.)At this point the
resulting message (after padding with bits and with b has a length
that is an exact multiple of 512 bits. Equivalently, this message has
a length that is an exact multiple of 16 (32-bit) words. Let M [0 ... N-
1] denote the words of the resulting message, where N is a multiple
of 16.
Step 3. Initialize MD Buffer
A four-word buffer (A, B , C, D) is used to compute the
message digest. Here each of A, B, C, D is a 32-bit register. These
registers are initialized to the following values in hexadecimal, low-
order bytes first):
word A: 01 23 45 67
word B: 89 ab cd ef
word C: fe dc ba 98
word D: 76 54 32 10
Step 4. Process Message in 16-Word Blocks
We first define three auxiliary functions that each take as
input three 32-bit words and produce as output one 32-bit word.
F(X,Y,Z) = XY v not(X) Z
G(X,Y,Z) = XY v XZ v YZ
H(X,Y,Z) = X xor Y xor Z
In each bit position F acts as a conditional: if X then Y else
Z. The function F could have been defined using + instead of v
since XY and not(X)Z will never have "1" bits in the same bit
position.) In each bit position G acts as a majority function: if at
least two of X, Y, Z are on, then G has a "1" bit in that bit position,
else G has a "0" bit. It is interesting to note that if the bits of X, Y,
and Z are independent and unbiased, the each bit of f(X,Y,Z) will be
independent and unbiased, and similarly each bit of g(X,Y,Z) will be
independent and unbiased. The function H is the bit-wise XOR or
parity" function; it has properties similar to those of F and G.
58
Check out these exercises.
For i = 0 to N/16-1 do
/* Copy block i into X. */
For j = 0 to 15 do
Set X[j] to M[i*16+j].
/* Save A as AA, B as BB, C as CC, and D as DD. */
AA = A
BB = B
CC = C
DD = D
/* Round 1. */
/* Let [abcd k s] denote the operation
a = (a + F(b,c,d) + X[k]) <<< s. */
/* Do the following 16 operations. */
[ABCD 0 3] [DABC 1 7] [CDAB 2 11] [BCDA 3 19]
/* Round 2. */
a = (a + G(b,c,d) + X[k] + 5A827999) <<< s. */
/* Round 3. */
a = (a + H(b,c,d) + X[k] + 6ED9EBA1) <<< s. */
/* Then perform the following additions. (That is,
increment each of the four registers by the value it had before
this block was started.) */
A = A + AA
B = B + BB
C = C + CC
D = D + DD
59
Note:
The value 5A...99 is a hexadecimal 32-bit constant, written
with the high-order digit first. This constant represents the square
root of 2. The octal value of this constant is 013240474631. The
value 6E..A1 is a hexadecimal 32-bit constant, written with the high-
order digit first. This constant represents the square root of 3. The
octal value of this constant is 015666365641.
Step 5. Output
The message digest produced as output is A, B, C, and D.
That is, we begin with the low-order byte of A, and end with the
high-order byte of D. This completes the description of MD4.
Summary:
The MD4 message-digest algorithm is simple to implement,
and provides a "fingerprint" or message digest of a message of
arbitrary length. It is conjectured that the difficulty of coming up with
two messages having the same message digest is on the order of
2^64 operations, and that the difficulty of coming up with any
message having a given message digest is on the order of 2^128
operations. The MD4 algorithm has been carefully scrutinized for
weaknesses. It is, however, a relatively new algorithm and further
security analysis is of course justified, as is the case with any new
proposal of this sort.
3.3. MD5 algorithm:
In cryptography, MD5 (Message-Digest algorithm 5) is a
widely used, partially insecure cryptographic hash function with a
128-bit hash value. As an Internet standard (RFC 1321), MD5 has
been employed in a wide variety of security applications, and is
also commonly used to check the integrity of files. An MD5 hash is
typically expressed as a 32 digit hexadecimal number. MD5 was
designed by Ron Rivest in 1991 to replace an earlier hash function;
MD4.In 2007 a group of researchers including Arjen Lenstra
described how to create a pair of files that share the same MD5
checksum.
1. MD5 Algorithm Description:
We begin by supposing that we have a 1000-bit message as
input, and that we wish to find its message digest. The following
five steps are performed to compute the message digest of the
message.
60
Step 1. Append Padding Bits:
bits) is similar to 448, modulo 512. That is, the message is
extended so that it is just 64 bits timid of being a multiple of 512 bits
long. Padding is always performed, even if the length of the
message is already similar to 448, modulo 512.Padding is
performed as follows: a single "1" bit is appended to the message,
and then "0" bits are appended so that the length in bits of the
padded message becomes congruent to 448, modulo 512. In all,
atleast one bit and at most 512 bits are appended.
Step 2. Append Length:
A 64-bit representation of 1000 (The message length
excluding padded one) is appended to the result of the previous
step. In the unlikely event that the message length is greater than
2^64, then only the low-order 64 bits of b are used. At this point the
resulting message (that is message+padding+length) has a length
that is an exact multiple of 512 bits. Equivalently, this message has
a length that is an exact multiple of 16 (32-bit) words.
Step 3: Divide the input into 512-bit blocks:
Now, we divide the input message into blocks, each of
length 512 bits.
Step 4. Initialize MD Buffer/Chaining Variables
A four-word buffer (A, B, C, D) is used to compute the
message digest. Here each of A, B, C, D is a 32-bit register. These
registers are initialized to the following values in hexadecimal, low-
order bytes first):
A: 01 23 45 67
B: 89 ab cd ef
C: fe dc ba 98
D: 76 54 32 10
Step 5. Process Message in 16-Word Blocks:
5.1: Copy the four chaining variables into four corresponding
variables a, b, c, and d. The Algorithm considers the combination of
abcd as a 128-bit single registers. This is useful for holding
intermediate as well as final results.
5.2: Divide the current 512-bit block into 16 sub blocks of 32-bit
each.
61
5.3: Now we have 4 rounds. In each round, we process all the 16
sub-blocks.
The inputs to each round are:
All the 16 sub-blocks. Say M[0] to M[15] of 32 bits.
The variables a, b, c and d of 32 bits.
Some constants t, an array of 64 elements. Say t[1] to t[64].Since
there are four rounds, we use 16 out of the 64 values of t in each
round.
The process of rounds:
A process P is first performed on b, c and d. This process P is
different in all the four rounds.
The variable a is added to the output of the process P.
The message sub-block M[I] is added to the output of step 2.
The constant t[k] is added to the output of step 3.
The output of step 4 is circular-left shifted by s bits. The value of s
keeps changing.The variable b is added to the output of step 5.
The output of step 6 becomes the new abcd for the next round.
62
One MD5 Operation:
We define four auxiliary functions that is Process P in our
context, that each take as input of three 32-bit words and produce
as output one 32-bit word.
a b c d
Process P
ADD
ADD
ADD
SHIFT
ADD
M [I]
T [K]
a b c d
63
Round 1 =(b and c) or (not (b)) and d
Round 2 = (b and d) or (c and (not(c)))
Round 3 = b xor c xor d
Round 4 = c xor (b or not (d))
Summary:
The MD5 message-digest algorithm is simple to implement,
and provides a "fingerprint" or message digest of a message of
arbitrary length. It is conjectured that the difficulty of coming up with
two messages having the same message digest is on the order of
2^64 operations, and that the difficulty of coming up with any
message having a given message digest is on the order of 2^128
operations. The MD5 algorithm has been carefully scrutinized for
weaknesses. It is, however, a relatively new algorithm and further
security analysis is of course justified, as is the case with any new
proposal of this sort.
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
The concept of MAC is quite similar to that of a message
digest. However, there is one difference. As we have seen, a
message digest is simply a fingerprint of a message. There is no
cryptographic process involves in the case of message digests. In
contrast, a MCA requires that the sender and the receiver should
know a shared symmetric key, which is used in the preparation of
the MAC. Thus, MAC involves cryptographic processing. Let us
assume that the sender A wants to send a message M to receiver
B. A and B share a symmetric (secret) key K. which is not known to
anyone else. A calculates the MAC by applying key K to the
message M.
1. A then sends the original message M and the MAC h1 to B.
2. When b receives the message B also uses K to calculate its
own MAC h2 over M.
3. B now compares h1 with h2. If the two matches, B concludes
that the message M has not been changed during transit
However, if h1 not equals h2, B rejects the message
realizing that the message was changed during transit.
64
The significance of a MAC is as follows:
1. The MAC assures the receiver (in this case, B) that the
message is not altered. This is because if an attacker alters the
message but doesnt not alter the MAC (in this case, h1), then
the receivers calculation of the MAC (in this case h2) will differ
from it. Why does the attacker then not also alter the MAC?
Well, as we know, the key used in the calculation of the MAC (in
this case K) is assumed to be known only to the sender and the
receiver ( in this case, A and B). Therefore, the attacker does
not know the key K, and therefore cannot alter the MAC.
2. The receiver (in this Case, B) is assured that the message
indeed came from the correct sender (in this case, A). Since
only the sender and the receiver (A and B, respectively, in this
case) know the secret key ( in this case, K), no one else could
have calculated the MAC( in this case, h1) sent by the sender (
in this case, A).
Interestingly, although the calculation of the MAC seems to
be quite similar to an encryption process, it is actually different in
one important respect. As we know, in symmetric key cryptography,
the cryptographic process must be irreversible. That is, the
encryption and the decryption are the mirror images of each other.
However, note that in the case of MAC, both the sender and the
receiver are performing encryption process only.
We have already discussed two main message digest
algorithms, namely MD5 and SHA-
1. Can we reuse these algorithms for calculating a MAC, in their
original form? Unfortunately, we cannot reuse them, because
they do not involve the usage of a secret key, which is the basis
of MAC. Consequently, we must have a separate practical
algorithm implementation for the MAC. The solution is HMAC, a
practical algorithm to implement MAC.
SHS Padding stage or HMAC algorithm:
Introduction:
HMAC stands for Hash-based Message Authentication
Code. HMAC has been chosen as a mandatory security
implementation for the Internet Protocol (IP) security, and is also
used in the Secure Layer(SSL) protocol, widely used on the
Internet.
65
The fundamental idea behind HMAC is to reuse the existing
message digest algorithms, such as MD5 or SHA-1. Obviously,
there is no point in reinventing the wheel. Therefore, what HMAC
does it to work with any message digest algorithm? That is, it treats
the message digest as a black box. Additionally, it uses the shared
symmetric key to encrypt the message digest, which produces the
output MAC.
How does HMAC work?
Let us now take a look at the internal working of HMAC. For
this, let us start with the various variables that will be used in our
HMAC discussion.
MD = The message digest/hash function used (eg. MD5, SHA-1,
etc)
M = The input message whose MAC is to be calculated
L = The number of blocks in the message
b = The number of bits in each block
K = The shared symmetric key to be used in HMAC
Ipad = A string 00110110 repeated b/8 times
Opad = a string 01011010 repeated b/8 times
Armed with these inputs, we shall use a step- by-step approach to
understand the HMAC operation.
STEP 1: Make the length of K equal to b
The algorithm starts with three possibilities, depending on the
length of the key K:
Length of K < b
In this case, we need to expand the key K to make the length of
K equal to the number of bits In the original message block (i.e. b).
For this, we add as many as 0 bits as required to the left of K, For
example, if the initial length of K = 170bits, and b = 512, then add
342 bits, all with a value 0, to the left of K, We shall continue to cal
this modified key as K.
Length of K = b
In this case, we do not take any action, and proceed to step2.
Length of K > b
66
In this case, we need to trim K to make the length of K equal
to the number of bits in the original message block (i.e. b). For this,
we pass K through the message digest algorithm (H) selected for
this particular instance of HMAC, which will give us a key K,
trimmed so that its length is equal to b.
Step 1 of HMAC
Step 2: XOR K with ipad to produce S1
We XOR K (i.e. output of Step 1) and ipad to produce a
variable called as S1.
Step 3: Append M to S1
We now take the original message (M) and simply append it
to the end of S1 (which was calculated in Step 2).
Step 4: Message digest algorithm
Now the selected message digest algorithm (e.g. MD5, SHA-
1, etc.) is applied to the output of Step 3 (i.e. to the combination of
S1 and M). Let us call the output of this operation as H. This is
shown in Fig. 4.37.
Step 5 : XOR K with opad to produce S2
Now, we XOR K (the output of Step1) with opad to produce
a variable called S2, This is shown in Fig. 4.38.
Step 6: Append H to S2
Length of K < b
Compare
the length
of k and
D
Length of k=b
Length of K > b
Append 0 bits to
the left of K so that
its length = b
Do Nothing
Hash K to reduce
its length to b
67
In this step, we take the message digest calculated in step 4
(i.e. H) and simply append it to the end of S2 (which was calculated
in Step 5).
Step 7: Message digest algorithm
Now, the selected message digest algorithm (e.g. MD5,
SHA-1, etc.) is applied to the output of Step 6(i.e. to the
concatenation of S2 and H). This is the final MAC that we want.
Disadvantages of HMAC
It appears that the MAC produces by the HMAC algorithm
fulfills our requirements of a digital signature. Form a logical
perspective, firstly we calculate a fingerprint (message digest) of
the original message, and then encrypt it with a symmetric key,
which is known only to the sender and the receiver. This gives
sufficient confidence to the receiver that the message came from
the correct sender only and also that it was not altered during the
transit. However, if we observe the HMAC scheme carefully, we will
realize that it does not solve our entire problem. What are these
problems?
1. We assume in HMAC that the sender and the receiver only
know about the symmetric key. However, we have studied in
great detail that the problem of symmetric key exchange is
quite serious, and cannot be solved easily. The same problem
of key exchange is presently the case of HMAC.
2. Even if we assume that somehow the key exchange problem
is resolved. HMAC cannot be used if the number of receivers
is greater than one. This is because, to produce a MAC by
using HMAC, we need to make use of a symmetric key. The
symmetric key is supposed to be shared only by two parties:
one sender and one receiver. Of course, this problem can be
solved if multiple parties (one sender and all the receivers)
share the same symmetric key. However, this resolution leads
to a third problem.
3. The new problem is that how does a receiver know that the
message was prepared and send by the sender, and not by
the other receivers? After all, all the co-receivers also know
the symmetric key. Therefore, it is quite possible that one of
the co-receivers might have created a false message on
behalf of the alleged sender, and using HMAC; the co-receiver
might have prepared a MAC for the message, and sent the
message and the MAC as if it originated at the alleged sender.
There is no way to prevent or detect this.
68
4. Even if we somehow solve the above problem, one major
concern remains. Let us go back to our simple case of one
sender and one receiver. Now, only two parties the sender
(say A, a bank customer) and the receiver (say B, a bank)
share the symmetric key secret. Suppose that one fine day, B
transfers al the balance standing in the account of A to a third
persons account, and closes As bank account. A is shocked,
and files a suit against B. In the court of law, B argues that A
had sent an electronic message in order t perform this
transaction, and produces that message as evidence. A
claims that she never sent that message, and that it is a
forged message. Fortunately, message produced by B as
evidence also contained MAC, which was produced on the
original message. As we know, only encrypting the message
digests of the original message with the symmetric key shared
by A and B could have produced it- and here is where the
trouble is. Even though we have a MAC, how in the world are
we now going to prove that the MAC was produced by A or by
B? After all, both know about the shared secret key. It is
equally possible for either of them to have created the original
message and the MAC.
As it turns out, even if we are able to somehow resolve the
first three problems, we have no solution for the fourth problem.
Therefore, we cannot trust HMAC to be used in digital signatures.
1) What is message digest? Explain the idea behind digest.
2) List the pre-requisites for message digest.
3) Explain the concept of hash and prove how hash can be
used to check the integrity.
4) Compare SHA-1 and MD5.
5) State and explain MD2 algorithm.
8) Explain about the SHS Padding stage or HMAC algorithm in
detail.
9) State and explain the problems of HMAC.
10) What are the issues need to be addressed by HMAC? Also
explain how it solves those issues.
11) Compare Message digest and HMAC.
12) State the advantages of HMAC.

69
4
PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
Introduction
Modular arithmetic
Meaning
Addition
Multiplication
Inverse Exponentiation
RSA:
Generating keys
Encryption
Decryption.
Other Algorithms
PKCS
Diffie-Hellman.
El-Gamal signatures
DSS
Zero-knowledge signatures
4.1 Introduction:
The Public-Key Cryptography Standards are specifications
produced by RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems
developers worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the
deployment of public-key cryptography. First published in 1991 as a
result of meetings with a small group of early adopters of public-key
technology, the PKCS documents have become widely referenced
and implemented. Contributions from the PKCS series have
become part of many formal and de facto standards, including
ANSI X9 documents, PKIX, SET, S/MIME, and SSL.
4.2 Modular Arithmetic
Meaning:
Modular (often also Modulo) Arithmetic is an unusually
versatile tool discovered by K.F.Gauss (1777-1855) in 1801. Two
numbers a and b are said to be equal or congruent modulo N iff
70
N|(a-b), i.e. iff their difference is exactly divisible by N. Usually a,b,
are nonnegative and N a positive integer. We write a = b (mod N).
When we write n mod k we mean simply the remainder when
n is divided by k. Thus
25 = 1 mod 3,
15 = 3 mod 4,
13 = 3 mod 5
12 = 2 mod 5.
It is an important fact, which again is most clearly seen using the
theory of cosets that modular arithmetic respects sums and
products. That is,
(a+b) mod n = (a mod n)+ (b mod n) and
(ab) mod n = (a mod n)(b mod n)
The set of numbers congruent to a modulo N is denoted [a]
N
.
If b [a]
N
then, by definition, N|(a-b) or, in other words, a and b
have the same remainder of division by N. Since there are exactly
N possible remainders of division by N, there are exactly N different
sets [a]
N
. Quite often these N sets are simply identified with the
corresponding remainders: [0]
N
= 0, [1]
N
= 1,..., [N-1]
N
= N-1.
Remainders are often called residues; accordingly, [a]'s are also
known as the residue classes.
It's easy to see that if a = b (mod N) and c = d (mod N) then
(a+c) = (b+d) (mod N). The same is true for multiplication. These
allows us to introduce an algebraic structure into the set
{[a]
N
: a=0,1,...,N-1}:
By definition,
1.[a]
N
+ [b]
N
= [a + b]
N
2.[a]
N
[b]
N
= [a b]
N
Subtraction is defined in an analogous manner
[a]
N
- [b]
N
= [a - b]
N
And it can be verified that thus equipped set {[a]
N
:
a=0,1,...,N-1} becomes a ring with commutative addition and
multiplication. Division can't be always defined. To give an obvious
example,
[5]
10
[1]
10
= [5]
10
[3]
10
= [5]
10
[5]
10
= [5]
10
[7]
10
= [5]
10
[9]
10
= [5]
10
.
[5]
10
[2]
10
= [5]
10
[4]
10
= [5]
10
[6]
10
= [5]
10
[8]
10
= [5]
10
[0]
10
= [0]
10
.
71
An Introductory Example
Everyone knows that set of integers can be broken up into
the following two classes:
The even numbers (..., 6, 4, 2, 0, 2, 4, 6,...); and
The odd numbers (..., 5, 3, 1, 1, 3, 5,).
There are certain generalizations we can make about the
arithmetic of numbers based on which of these two classes they
come from. For example, we know that the sum of two even
numbers is even. The sum of an even number and an odd number
is odd. The sum of two odd numbers is even. The product of two
even numbers is even, etc.
Modular arithmetic lets us state these results quite precisely,
and it also provides a convenient language for similar but slightly
more complex statements. In the above example, our modulus is
the number 2. The modulus can be thought of as the number of
classes that we have broken the integers up into. It is also the
difference between any two "consecutive" numbers in a given
class.
Now we represent each of our two classes by a single
symbol. We let the symbol "0" mean "the class of all even numbers"
and the symbol "1" mean "the class of all odd numbers". There is
no great reason why we have chosen the symbols 0 and 1; we
could have chosen 2 and 1, or 32 and 177, but 0 and 1 are the
conventional choices.
The statement "the sum of two even numbers is even" can be
expressed by the following:
0 + 0 0 mod 2.
Here, the "" symbol is not equality but congruence, and the
"mod 2" just signifies that our modulus is 2. The above statement is
read "Zero plus zero is congruent to zero, modulo two." The
statement "the sum of an even number and an odd number is odd"
is represented by
0 + 1 1 mod 2.
Those examples are natural enough. But how do we write "the sum
of two odd numbers is even"? It is the (at first strange looking)
expression
1 + 1 0 mod 2.
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Here the symbols "" and "mod 2" are suddenly very important! We
have analogous statements for multiplication:
0 0 0 mod 2,
0 1 0 mod 2,
1 1 1 mod 2.
In a sense, we have created a number system with addition
and multiplication but in which the only numbers that exist are 0
and 1. You may ask what use this has. Well, our number system is
the system of integers modulo 2, and because of the previous six
properties, any arithmetic done in the integers translates to
arithmetic done in the integers modulo 2. This means that if we
take any equality involving addition and multiplication of integers,
say
12 43 + 65 78 = 5586,
Then reducing each integer modulo 2 (i.e. replacing each
integer by its class "representative" 0 or 1), then we will obtain a
valid congruence. The above example reduces to
0 1 + 1 0 0 mod 2,or 0 + 0 0 mod 2.
More useful applications of reduction modulo 2 are found in
solving equations. Suppose we want to know which integers might
solve the equation 3a 3 = 12.
Of course, we could solve for a, but if we didn't need to know
what a is exactly and only cared about, say, whether it was even or
odd, we could do the following. Reducing modulo 2 gives the
congruence
1a + 1 0 mod 2, or a 1 1 mod 2,
so any integer a satisfying the equation 3a 3 = 12 must be
odd. Since any integer solution of an equation reduces to a solution
modulo 2, it follows that if there is no solution modulo 2, and
then there is no solution in integers. For example, assume that a
is an integer solution to 2a 3 = 12, which reduces to 0 a + 1 0
mod 2,or 1 0 mod 2. This is a contradiction because 0 and 1 are
different numbers modulo 2 (no even number is an odd number,
and vice versa). Therefore the above congruence has no solution,
so a couldn't have been an integer. This proves that the equation
2a 3 = 12 has no integer solution.
73
Less trivially, consider the system of equations
6a 5b = 4,
2a + 3b = 3.
Modulo 2, these equations reduce to
0 + 1b 0 mod 2,
0 + 1b 1 mod 2.
This says that b is both even and odd, which is a
contradiction. Therefore we know that the original system of
equations has no integer solutions, and to prove this we didn't even
need to know anything about a.
As shown by the preceding examples, one of the powers of
modular arithmetic is the ability to show, often very simply, that
certain equations and systems of equations have no integer
solutions. Without modular arithmetic, we would have to find all of
the solutions and then see if any turned out to be integers.
Of course, there is nothing special about the number 2. Any
integer (except 0) will work for the modulus m. We now give the
mathematical definition of congruence. Let m 0 be an integer. We
say that two integers a and b are congruent modulo m if there is
an integer k such that a b = km, and in this case we write a b
mod m. Notice that the condition a b = kmfor some integer k"
is equivalent to the condition "m divides a b".
In the previous section we used the modulus m = 2.
Although we wrote congruences using only 0 and 1, really any
integers are valid. Modulo 2, all of the even numbers are congruent
to each other since the difference of any two even numbers is
divisible by 2:
... 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 ... mod 2.
Also, every odd number is congruent to every other odd
number modulo 2 since the difference of any two odd numbers is
even:
... 5 3 1 1 3 5 ... mod 2.
Therefore, anywhere we wrote "0" we could have written any
other even number, and similarly "1" could have been replaced by
any odd number. For example, instead of writing 0 1 + 1 0 0
mod 2, an equally valid statement would have been
10 (13) + 27 6 122 mod 2.
74
Let's now look at other values for the modulus m. For
example, let m = 3. All multiples of 3 are congruent to each other
modulo 3 since the difference of any two is divisible by 3. Similarly,
all numbers of the form 3n + 1 are congruent to each other, and all
numbers of the form 3n + 2 are congruent to each other.
... 9 6 3 0 3 6 9 ... mod 3.
... 8 5 2 1 4 7 ... mod 3.
... 7 4 1 2 5 8 ... mod 3.
How about when m = 1? The difference of any two integers
is divisible by 1, so all integers are congruent to each other
modulo 1:
... 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 ... mod 1.
For this reason, m = 1 is not very interesting, and reducing
an equation modulo 1 doesn't give any information about its
solutions. The modulus m = 12 comes up quite frequently in
everyday life, and its application illustrates a good way to think
about modular arithmetic the "clock arithmetic" analogy. If it's
7:00, what time will it be in 25 hours? Since 25 1 mod 12, we
simply add 1 to 7:
7 + 25 7 + 1 8 mod 12.
So the clock will read 8:00. Of course, we don't need the
formality of modular arithmetic in order to compute this, but when
we do this kind of computation in our heads, this is really what we
are doing.
With m = 12, there are only 12 numbers ("hours") we ever
need to think about. We count them 1, 2, 3... 10, 11, 12, 1, 2...
starting over after 12. The numbers 1, 2, ..., 12 represent the twelve
equivalence classes modulo 12: Every integer is congruent to
exactly one of the numbers 1, 2, ..., 12, just as the hour on the
clock always reads exactly one of 1, 2, ..., 12. These classes are
given by
12n +1, 12n +2, 12n +3... 12n +11, 12n as n ranges over the
integers.
Of course, the minutes and seconds on a clock are also
modular. In these cases the modulus is m = 60. If we think of the
days of the week as labeled by the numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, then
the modulus is m = 7. The point is that we measure many things,
both in mathematics and in real life, in periodicity, and this can
usually be thought of as an application of modular arithmetic.
75
Most of the cryptosystems uses modular arithmetic for its
encryption and decryption. For the key distribution problems and
algorithms, they used modular arithmetic. That is why it is important
for us to know about the fundamentals about modular arithmetic.
Let us see the algorithms that support modular arithmetic.
4.2.1. Why asymmetric key cryptography?
In a real practical life, key distribution is the biggest problem
in symmetric key cryptography.
Problem of Key distribution in Symmetric Key cryptography:
As in case of symmetric key cryptography, the key that has
to be used for both encryption and decryption should be the 'same'
this leads to a problem that how the two parties requiring secure
communication can 'agree' or 'decide' upon a common key, without
letting any third person know about it? There can be many ways in
which the two parties will try to communicate assuming it is secure,
but it may not be so. e.g. even if they exchange letters, seal
envelopes into locked boxes, talk over open media for the common
key, or send the key along with the locked boxes, whatever may be
the means used, it turns out to be practically non-viable or difficult
to implement.
That is to say, there are very much chances of intercepting
the communication between two parties if any of these methods are
used. This is called the 'problem of key distribution'.
In order to come out of this problem, one good solution was
given by two scientists jointly known as 'Diffie-Hellman key
exchange algorithm'.
1. The Diffie-Hellman Key exchange algorithm:
Whitefield Diffie and Martin Hellman, in 1976 have come out
with a good solution to the problem of key distribution as mentioned
above. The steps of this algorithm are given in Unit-6. (It must be
noted, that this is NOT an encryption or decryption algorithm but is
only used for agreeing upon a. symmetric key. Once it is done,
some specific algorithm should be used for the purpose of
encryption/decryption.) Let us analyze the problems with the
algorithm now.
2. Problems with the algorithm:
Although, it is seen that this algorithm turns out to be a good
solution to the above mentioned key distribution problem, still it
does not solve all the problems! This is because the algorithm can
76
fail if a hacker makes what is called as the man-in-the-middle
attack. This way, even though the two parties will feel that they are
talking to each other, practically they are in-turn communicating
with the hacker as he places himself in between them and switch
back and forth the communication.
For example,
1. Alice wants to communicate with Bob securely. For this
purpose, she sends the values of n and g to Bob. Let n=11 and
g=7.
2. Alice does not realize that the attacker Tomis listening quitely ;to
the conversation between her and Bob.Tom simply picks up the
values of n and g, and also forwards them to Bob as they
originally were.
Alice Tom Bob
N=11,g=7 N=11,g=7 N=11,g=7
3. Now, let us assume that Alice, Tom and Bob select random
numbers x and y.
Alice Tom Bob
X=3 x=8,y=6 y=9
4. Alice calculates A and Bob calculates B whereas Tom calculates
both A and B to play the role of man in middle.
Alice Tom Bob
A=g
x
mod n A=g
x
mod n B= g
y
mod n
=7
3
mod 11 =7
8
mod 11 =79 mod 11
=343 mod 11 = 5764801 mod 11 = 40353607 mod 11
=2 = 9 =8
B = g
y
mod n
= 7
6
mod 11
= 117649 mod 11
= 4
5. Alice send her A2 to Bob. Tom intercepts it and send his A 9 to
him.
In return , Bob sends his B 8 to Alice. Tom intercepts it and
send his B 4 to Alice.
Based on these values, all the three persons now calculate
their keys.
77
Alice Tom Bob
K1=Bx mod n
=43 mod 11
=64 mod 11
=9
K1=Bx mod n
=88 mod 11
=16777216mod 11
=5
k2=Ay mod n
=26 mod 11
=64 mod 11
=9
K2=Ay mod n
=99 mod 11
=387420489 mod 11
=5
As we can see, the MITM attack can work against the Diffie-
Hellman Key exchange algorithm, causing it to fail. This is plainly
because the person in middle makes the actual communicators
believe that they are talking to each other, whereas they are
actually talking to he man-in-the middle, who is talking to each of
them.
The second problem is regarding the no. Of keys required.
In our example, we have just seen the situation of only two
communicating parties. What would be the situation if a third party
say 'third' is added!
One must think of the situation when communication
between first-second, second-third as well as third-first must be
secure! This would obviously require three keys! Then assume how
many keys would be required to securely communicate between
1000 people that to independently?
To find out this answer, one formula is used. It says, the total
no. of keys required to securely communicate between 'n'
individuals is = n (n-l) / 2. Hence in our example for 1000 people,
1000(999)/2 = 499500 keys would be needed. This certainly
increases the complications further.n order to recover from these
problems, the second technique (mentioned in the beginning)
comes into picture, i.e. the Asymmetric Key cryptography. This
states that two types of keys would be required, one each for
encryption and decryption.
78
4.2.2. Generating Keys:
1. The concept of Public key and Private key:
The Asymmetric key cryptography is also known as a 'public
key cryptography', which uses a key-pair rather than a single key.
The importance of this scheme is that only one key-pair is required
to securely communicate between any numbers of other parties. (
unlike the huge no. of keys that we've seen with earlier method.)
Hence, one problem is overcome right away. One of these two keys
is called public key (which can be announced to the world) and
another is private key (obviously to be kept with oneself). This is to
be followed by everyone who wants to communicate securely.
2 .The working of public and private keys:
Asymmetric key cryptography (using public and private keys)
works as under:
Consider the scenario, X wants to send a message to Y,
without having to worry about its security.
1. Then X and Y should each have a private key and a public key.
X should keep its private key secret.
Y should keep its private key secret.
X should inform Y about its public key.
Y should inform X about its public key
(Both now have their own set of keys ready. )
2. When X wants to send message to Y, X encrypts with Y's public
key (as it is known to everyone)
3. X then sends this message to Y.
4. Then, Y decrypts this message using his own private key
(known only to Y)
[This ensures in this case, that the message can be encrypted &
sent by anyone, but can only be decrypted by Y. Hence, any
interception will not result in knowing the sensitive information
as key is only with Y.]
Similarly, on the other side, if Y wants to send the message to
X, reverse method is performed.
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5. Y encrypts the message using X's public key and sends this to
X
6. On receiving the message, X can further decrypt it using his
own private key.
The basis of this working lies in the assumption of large
prime number with only two factors. If one of the factors is used for
encryption process, only the other factor shall be used for
decryption.
The best example of an asymmetric key cryptography
algorithm is the famous RSA algorithm (developed by Rivest,
Shamir and Adleman at MIT in 1978, based on the framework
setup by Diffie & Hellman earlier).
In public-key encryption/decryption, the public key that is
used for encryption is different from the private key that is used for
decryption. The public key is available to the public; the private key
is available only to an individual. Public-key encryption/
decryption has two advantages.
First, it removes the restriction of a shared symmetric key
between two entities (e.g., persons) that need to communicate with
each other. A shared symmetric key is shared by the two parties
and cannot be used when one of them wants to communicate with
a third party. In public-key encryption! Decryption, each entity
creates a pair of keys; the private one is kept, and the public one is
distributed. Each entity is independent, and the pair of keys created
can be used to communicate with any other entity.
The second advantage is that the number of keys needed
is reduced tremendously.
In this system, for I thousand users to communicate, only 1
thousand pairs of keys i.e. 2000 keys are needed, not 4,99,500, as
was the case in symmetric-key cryptography.
3.. Public-key cryptography also has two disadvantages.
The big disadvantage is the complexity of the algorithm. If
we want the method to be effective, the algorithm needs large
numbers. Calculating the cipher text from plaintext using the long
keys takes a lot of time. That is the main reason that public-key
cryptography is not recommended for large amounts of text.
Public-key algorithms are more efficient for short messages.
The second disadvantage of the public-key method is that
the association between an entity and its public key must be
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verified. If Alice sends her public key via an email to Bob, then Bob
must be sure that the public key really belongs to Alice and nobody
else.
4.3. RSA Algorithm:
1. Generate two large random primes, p and q, of approximately
equal size
2. Calculate N = PXQ
3. Select the public key that is the encryption key E such that it is
not a factor of (p-1)(q-1).
4. Select the private key that is the decryption key D such that the
following equation is true:
(DXE) mod (P-1) X (Q-1)=1
5. For encryption, calculate the cipher text CT as CT=PT
E
mod N.
6. Send CT as the cipher text to the receiver.
7. For decryption, calculate the plain text PT as PT=CT
D
mod N.
A very simple example of RSA encryption:
This is an extremely simple example using numbers you can
work out on a pocket calculator (those of you over the age of 35
can probably even do it by hand).
1. Select primes p=11, q=3.
2. n = pq = 11.3 = 33
phi = (p-1)(q-1) = 10.2 = 20
3. Choose e=3
Check gcd(e, p-1) = gcd(3, 10) = 1 (i.e. 3 and 10 have no
common factors except 1),
and check gcd(e, q-1) = gcd(3, 2) = 1
therefore gcd(e, phi) = gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = gcd(3, 20) = 1
4. Compute d such that ed 1 (mod phi)
i.e. compute d = e
-1
mod phi = 3
-1
mod 20
i.e. find a value for d such that phi divides (ed-1)
i.e. find d such that 20 divides 3d-1.
Simple testing (d = 1, 2, ...) gives d = 7
Check: ed-1 = 3.7 - 1 = 20, which is divisible by phi.
5. Public key = (n, e) = (33, 3)
Private key = (n, d) = (33, 7).
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This is actually the smallest possible value for the modulus n
for which the RSA algorithm works.
Now say we want to encrypt the message m = 7,
c = m
e
mod n = 7
3
mod 33 = 343 mod 33 = 13.
Hence the ciphertext c = 13.
To check decryption we compute
m' = c
d
mod n = 13
7
mod 33 = 7.
Note that we don't have to calculate the full value of 13 to the power
7 here. We can make use of the fact that
a = bc mod n = (b mod n).(c mod n) mod n
so we can break down a potentially large number into its
components and combine the results of easier, smaller calculations
to calculate the final value.
One-way of calculating m' is as follows: -
m' = 13
7
mod 33 = 13
(3+3+1)
mod 33 = 13
3
.13
3
.13 mod 33
= (13
3
mod 33). (13
3
mod 33).(13 mod 33) mod 33
= (2197 mod 33).(2197 mod 33).(13 mod 33) mod 33
= 19.19.13 mod 33 = 4693 mod 33
= 7.
4.4. Other Algorithms
4.4.1. DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD (DSS):
When a message is received, the recipient may desire to
verify that the message has not been altered in transit.
Furthermore, the recipient may wish to be certain of the originator's
identity. Both of these services can be provided by the DSA. A
digital signature is an electronic analogue of a written signature in
that the digital signature can be used in proving to the recipient or a
third party that the message was, in fact, signed by the originator.
Digital signatures may also be generated for stored data and
programs so that the integrity of the data and programs may be
verified at any later time.
Explanation: This Standard specifies a Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) appropriate for applications requiring a digital rather than
written signature. The DSA digital signature is a pair of large
numbers represented in a computer as strings of binary digits. The
digital signature is computed using a set of rules (i.e., the DSA) and
a set of parameters such that the identity of the signatory and
integrity of the data can be verified. The DSA provides the
capability to generate and verify signatures. Signature generation
makes use of a private key to generate a digital signature.
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Signature verification makes use of a public key which corresponds
to, but is not the same as, the private key. Each user possesses a
private and public key pair. Public keys are assumed to be known
to the public in general. Private keys are never shared. Anyone can
verify the signature of a user by employing that user's public key.
Signature generation can be performed only by the possessor of
the user's private key.
A hash function is used in the signature generation process
to obtain a condensed version of data, called a message digest
.The message digest is then input to the DSA to generate the digital
signature. The digital signature is sent to the intended verifier along
with the signed data (often called the message). The verifier of the
message and signature verifies the signature by using the sender's
public key. The same hash function must also be used in the
verification process. Similar procedures may be used to generate
and verify signatures for stored as well as transmitted data. The
procedure is given in fig 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Using the SHA with the DSA
1. USE OF THE DSA ALGORITHM
The DSA is used by a signatory to generate a digital
signature on data and by a verifier to verify the authenticity of the
signature. Each signatory has a public and private key. The private
key is used in the signature generation process and the public key
is used in the signature verification process. For signature
83
generation and verification, the data which is referred to as a
message, M is reduced by means of the Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA. An adversary, who does not know the private key of the
signatory, cannot generate the correct signature of the signatory. In
other words, signatures cannot be forged. However, by using the
signatory's public key, anyone can verify a correctly signed
message.
A means of associating public and private key pairs to the
corresponding users is required. That is, there must be a binding of
a user's identity and the user's public key. This binding may be
certified by a mutually trusted party. For example, a certifying
authority could sign credentials containing a user's public key and
identity to form a certificate.
2. SIGNATURE GENERATION:
The signature of a message M is the pair of numbers r and s
computed according to the equations below:
r = (g
k
mod p) mod q and
s = (k
-1
(SHA (M) + xr)) mod q.
In the above, k
-1
is the multiplicative inverse of k, mod q; i.e.,
(k
-1
k) mod q = 1 and 0 < k
-1
< q. The value of SHA (M) is a 160-bit
string output by the Secure Hash Algorithm. For use in computing,
this string must be converted to an integer. As an option, one may
wish to check if r = 0 or s = 0. If either r = 0 or s = 0, a new value of
k should be generated and the signature should be recalculated.
The signature is transmitted along with the message to the verifier.
3. SIGNATURE VERIFICATION:
Prior to verifying the signature in a signed message, p, q
and g plus the sender's public key and identity are made available
to the verifier in an authenticated manner. Let M', r' and s' be the
received versions of M, r, and s, respectively, and let y be the
public key of the signatory. To verifier first checks to see that 0 < r'
< q and 0 < s' < q; if either condition is violated the signature shall
be rejected. If these two conditions are satisfied, the verifier
computes
w = (s')
-1
mod q
u1 = ((SHA(M')w) mod q
u2 = ((r')w) mod q
v = (((g)
ul
(y)
u2
) mod p) mod q.
If v = r', then the signature is verified and the verifier can
have high confidence that the received message was sent by the
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party holding the secret key x corresponding to y. If v does not
equal r', then the message may have been modified, the message
may have been incorrectly signed by the signatory, or the message
may have been signed by an impostor. The message should be
considered invalid.
Applicability: This standard is applicable to all Federal
departments and agencies for the protection of unclassified
information that is not subject to section 2315 of Title 10, United
States Code, or section 3502(2) of Title 44, United States Code.
This standard shall be used in designing and implementing public-
key based signature systems which Federal departments and
agencies operate or which are operated for them under contract.
Adoption and use of this standard is available to private and
commercial organizations.
4. RANDOM NUMBERGENERATIONFOR THE DSA
Any implementation of the DSA requires the ability to
generate random or pseudorandom integers. Such numbers are
used to derive a user's private key, x, and a user's per message
secret number, k. These randomly or pseudo randomly generated
integers are selected to be between 0 and the 160- bit prime q (as
specified in the standard).
Applications: The DSA authenticates the integrity of the signed
data and the identity of the signatory. The DSA may also be used in
proving to a third party that data was actually signed by the
generator of the signature. The DSA is intended for use in
electronic mail, electronic funds transfer, electronic data
interchange, software distribution, data storage, and other
applications which require data integrity assurance and data origin
authentication.
Implementations: The DSA may be implemented in software,
firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof. NIST (National
Institute of Standards and Technology) is developing a validation
program to test implementations for conformance to this standard.
Qualifications: The security of a digital signature system is
dependent on maintaining the secrecy of users' private keys. Users
must therefore guard against the unauthorized acquisition of their
private keys. While it is the intent of this standard to specify general
security requirements for generating digital signatures,
conformance to this standard does not assure that a particular
implementation is secure. The responsible authority in each agency
or department shall assure that an overall implementation provides
an acceptable level of security. This standard will be reviewed
every five years in order to assess its adequacy.
85
Waiver Procedure: Under certain exceptional circumstances, the
heads of Federal departments and agencies may approve waivers
to Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). Waiver shall
be granted only when:
a. Compliance with a standard would adversely affect the
accomplishment of the mission of an operator of a
Federal computer system; or
b. Compliance with a standard would cause a major adverse
financial impact on the operator which is not offset by
Government-wide savings.
Agency heads may act upon a written waiver request
containing the information detailed above. Agency heads may also
act without a written waiver request when they determine that
conditions for meeting the standard cannot be met. Agency heads
may approve waivers only by a written decision which explains the
basis on which the agency head made with required finding(s).
ElGamal Signature Scheme:
Introduction.
Before discussing the ElGamal signature scheme, let's first
talk about the ElGamal public key scheme. ElGamal is based on
the problem of Discrete Logarithms in the group (Z
p
*, ). Let p be a
prime and let be a primitive element in Z
p
*. The set of all
plaintexts P = Z
p
*, the set of all ciphertexts C = Z
p
* x Z
p
*, and the
set of all keys K = {(p, , a, ) :
a
mod p}. p, , and make up
the public key and the private key is p, , and a. Alice chooses a
secret random number k in Z
p-1
, and given m as the plaintext to be
encrypted we have:
Encryption
e
k
(m, k) = (y1, y2), where
y
1
=
k
mod p and
y
2
= (m *
k
) mod p
Decryption
m = d
k
(y
1
, y
2
) = y
2
(y
1
a
)
-1
mod p, for all y
1
, y
2
in Z
p
*
(notice the multiplicative inverse (y
1
a
)
-1
)
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Cryptosystem Example.
Let p = 7, = 2, a = 5, m = 6 and k = 4. Alice computes the
following:
= 2
5
mod 7 = 4
y
1
= 2
4
mod 7 = 2
y
2
= [6(4
4
)] mod 7 = 1536 mod 7 = 3
Alice then sends (2, 3) to Bob, and Bob decrypts the ciphertext as:
m = [3(2
5
)
-1
] mod 7
= [(3 mod 7)(32
-1
mod 7)] mod 7
= [3 * 2] mod 7 = 6
The ElGamal signature scheme is as follows:
Again let p be a prime and let be a primitive element in Z
p
*.
The set of all plaintexts P = Z
p-1
, the set of all ciphertexts C = Z
p-1
x
Z
p-1
, and the set of all keys K = {(p, , a, ) :
a
mod p}. p, ,
and make up the public key and the private key is p, , and a.
Alice chooses a secret random number k in Z
p-1
, and given m as
the plaintext to be signed we have:
Signing
sig
k
(m, k) = (y
1
, y
2
), where
y
1
=
k
mod p and
y
2
= [(m - a * y
1
)(k
-1
)] mod (p - 1)
Verification:
ver
k
(m, (y
1
, y
2
)) y
1
y2
*
y1
=
m
mod p
Signature Example.
Let p = 17, = 2, a = 4, m = 6 and k = 3. Alice computes the
following signature:
= 2
4
mod 17 = 16
y
1
= 2
3
mod 17 = 8
y
2
= [(6 - 4 * 8)(11)] mod 16 = -286 mod 16 = -14 mod
16 = 2
Alice then sends (6, 8, 2) to Bob, and Bob verifies the signature as:
2
6
[(8
2
)(16
8
)] mod 17 2
6
mod 17 = [(8
2
)(16
8
)] mod 17
= 13 It checks.
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Security:
If the attacker can compute the value a = log
, then
ElGamal signatures can be forged. As long as p is chosen carefully
and is a primitive element modulo p, then solving the Discrete
Logarithm problem in Z
p
* is infeasible. Additionally, k must be
secret, only used once and random. As shown above, ElGamal can
also be used for encryption as well, but the messages should be
relatively small in size.
5. Zero-Knowledge Signatures
ZK-SSH - A Zero Knowledge Implementation for OpenSSH
1. Motivation
SSH provides a secure way of accessing remote systems.
This goal can only be achieved if it incorporates user authentication
which ensures the identity of a user. Several methods like public
key, password and host-based authentication methods are
implemented in OpenSSH. Public key systems like RSA and DSA
provide a reasonable level of security in regard to properties like
transferability and impersonation. Nevertheless, these challenge
response methods leak in polynomial time information to a third
party making it easier to impersonate another party. Although this is
nothing to be really afraid of, this problem does not exist when a
zero knowledge user authentication protocol is used. Therefore, a
zero knowledge protocol was chosen implemented for usage with
OpenSSH.
2. Idea behind zero knowledge
Imagine that Alice knows a secret and wants to prove this to
Bob. Of course she could just reveal the secret to Bob, but then he
would know the secret too. Instead Alice does something like this:
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Alice knows the secret password for Alibaba's cave. Alice
goes into the cave and randomly chooses the left or right corridor.
Then Bob enters the cave and tells Alice from which corridor she
should walk out from. Let's say Bob picked the left corridor. If Alice
chooses the left corridor at the beginning, she can just walk the
same way back and does not even have to use the password. If
she is standing on the right side, she has to use the password, the
magic wall opens and she also can walk into the left corridor.
At this point Bob is not very impressed. Alice had a 50%
chance of already being in the left corridor. So she could have
passed the test, even without knowing the password. So Bob plays
the same game another round. If Alice passes the test again, Bob
is a little more convinced. After a sufficient amount of rounds Bob
will believe that Alice knows the secret to Alibaba's cave. For
example, after 10 rounds of playing this game, Alice has got a
chance of (1/2) to the power of 10, or in numbers 0.0009765625%
to pass the test if she does not know the secret. We shall use these
facts in a decisive manner below.
Every process of encryption and decryption is necessarily
associated with a 'key'- the combination used for encryption and/or
decryption, and an algorithm i.e. the rules or steps used for both
encryption and decryption. The requirement of 'same' key as in
case of 'symmetric' key cryptography leads to a common problem
called 'problem of key distribution', i.e. how the two parties should
agree upon a 'common' key that has to be used for the process.
This is as described below.
4.6. PKCS
In cryptography, PKCS refers to a group of public Key
Cryptography Standards devised and published by RSA Security.
RSA Data Security Inc was assigned the licensing rights for
the patent on the RSA asymmetric key algorithm and acquired the
licensing rights to several other key patents as well.As such, RSA
Security and its research division, RSA Labs, were interested in
promoting and facilitating the use of public-key techniques. To that
end, they developed the PKCS standards. They retained control
over them, announcing that they would make
changes/improvements as they deemed necessary, and so the
PKCS standards were not, in a significant sense, actual industry
standards, despite the name. Some, but not all, have in recent
years begun to move into "standards track" processes with one or
more of the relevant standards organizations.
The Public-Key Cryptography Standards are specifications
produced by RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems
developers worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the
89
deployment of public-key cryptography. First published in 1991 as a
result of meetings with a small group of early adopters of public-key
technology, the PKCS documents have become widely referenced
and implemented. Contributions from the PKCS series have
become part of many formal and de facto standards, including
ANSI X9 documents, PKIX, SET, S/MIME, and SSL.
PKCS Standards Summary
Version Name Comments
PKCS #1 2.1
RSA
Cryptography
Standard
Defines the mathematical properties
and format of RSA public and private
keys, and the basic algorithms and
encoding/padding schemes for
performing RSA encryption, decryption,
and producing and verifying signatures.
PKCS #2 - Withdrawn
No longer active. Covered RSA
encryption of message digests, but was
merged into PKCS #1.
PKCS #3 1.4
Diffie-Hellman
Key Agreement
Standard
A cryptographic protocol that allows
two parties that have no prior
knowledge of each other to jointly
establish a shared secret key over an
insecure communications channel.
PKCS #4 - Withdrawn
No longer active. Covered RSA key
syntax, but was merged into PKCS #1.
PKCS #5 2.0
Password-
based
Encryption
Standard
Refer RFC 2898 and PBKDF2.
CS #6 1.5
Extended-
Certificate
Syntax
Standard
Defines extensions to the old
v1 X.509 certificate specification.
Obsolete by v3 of the same.
PKCS #7 1.5
Cryptographic
Message
Syntax
Standard
Used to sign and/or encrypt messages
under a PKI. Used also for certificate
dissemination. Formed the basis
for S/MIME, which is as of 2009 based
on RFC 3852, an
updated Cryptographic Message
Syntax Standard (CMS). Often used
for single sign-on.
PKCS #8 1.2
Private-Key
Information
Syntax
Standard.
Used to carry private certificate key
pairs (encrypted or unencrypted).
90
PKCS #9 2.0
Selected
Attribute Types
Defines selected attribute types for use
in PKCS #6 extended certificates,
PKCS #7 digitally signed messages,
PKCS #8 private-key information, and
PKCS #10 certificate-signing requests.
PKCS #10 1.7
Certification
Request
Standard
Format of messages sent to
a certification authority to request
certification of a public key.
See certificate signing request.
PKCS #11 2.20
Cryptographic
Token
Interface
(Cryptoki)
An API defining a generic interface
to cryptographic tokens (see
also Hardware Security Module). Often
used in single sign-on, Public-key
cryptography and disk encryption
systems.
PKCS #12 1.0
Personal
Information
Exchange
Syntax
Standard
Defines a file format commonly used to
store private keys with
accompanying public key certificates,
protected with a password-
based symmetric key. PFX is a
predecessor to PKCS#12.
This container format can contain
multiple embedded objects, e.g.
multiple certificates. Usually
protected/encrypted with a password.
Can be used as a format for the Java
key store. Usable by Tomcat, but NOT
by Apache.
PKCS #13
Cryptography
Standard
(Under development.)
PKCS #14
Pseudo-
random
Number
Generation
(Under development.)
PKCS #15 1.1
Cryptographic
Token
Information
Format
Standard
Defines a standard allowing users
of cryptographic tokens to identify
themselves to applications,
independent of the application's
Cryptoki implementation (PKCS #11) or
other API.
(Source: www.wikipedia.org)
91
Questions:
1. What is modular arithmetic? Explain it in detail. How it can be
used in cryptography?
2. RSA Algorithm is the best one in generating public keys and
private keys as well as the robust one in cryptographic world-
Explain this statement.
3. Prove RSA Algorithm with example.
4. Explain Elgamal Signature Scheme in detail.
5. Explain how DSS ensures verification and validation.
6. State the properties and applications of DSS,
7. What is PKCS? State the standards of PKCS.
8. Discuss the problems with Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
9. Explain Bucket-Brigade Attack or MITM attack in detail.
10. What do you understand by Zero knowledge signature?
Explain in detail.
11. How zero-knowledge proof will be efficient when it is integrated
with SSH?

92
5
AUTHENTICATION
1. Password based
1. Distributed systems,
2. On-line vs. off-line guessing,
3. Storing.
2. Cryptographic authentication:
1. Passwords as keys,
2. Protocols
3. KDCs,
3. Address based :
1. Certification Revocation,
2. Inter-domain, groups, delegation.
3. Authentication of People
4. Verification techniques
1. passwords, length of passwords, password distribution,
2. Smart cards
3. Biometrics
1. Password based authentication:
Passwords to the systems are something like the keys to the
front doors. A front door is likely to be the first that is attacked by an
intruder. Making use of login-name & password is an easy & cheap
method of authentication, and is the most widely used. The
passwords and the corresponding usernames are stored with the
server database. Whenever the user enters into the system, the
password entered by the user will be forwarded to the server and
the verification with the database will be performed and the
authentication will be completed. The storage of password with the
server and the transmission password from the client to the server
may create security breach. The various types of attacks possible
with the password are discussed below.
1.1 On-line vs. off-line guessing:
Certain techniques are cracking the password directly by
creating some hackers programme or by creating the fake login
screen. This will attack the password directly either by using certain
93
permutation combination or by the support of the dictionary. The
passwords can also be attacked offline by using social engineering
techniques or by casual discussions with the user. The following
are some methods which will attack the password either offline or
online.
1. Direct Approach: This method apparently seems to be very
easy but yet is very ineffective, since nobody is going to disclose
the password easily to anyone. Still, intruders use this as the first
method & try their luck & then go for more difficult ones. This
attack is performed in such a way that the intruders will try with
the various keywords, which are directly related with the user
like name, relatives name, organization, city, designation etc.
Normally user will select the passwords which can be easily
remembered by them and which are directly related with them.
The intruders will use this loophole and directly attack the
password.
2. Dictionary based attacks: Hackers may use ready-made
dictionaries for checking the passwords of systems, using
special software. This method is somewhat difficult and time
consuming, but not very sure. The main problem with this
method is that the dictionary will be containing only the
meaningful combination of characters, whereas the password
can be of any combination of characters. The average of
success will be very less with this method.
3. Brute force attacks: This involves using several combinations
of keys such as alphabets, numbers, special characters etc. for
a specific no. Of digits & comparing or applying them to guess
passwords. Normally the possibility of getting the password is
very easy with this method. Because of the possibility of the
password is the only combination of the keys available within the
keypad. By combining the same keys with various combinations
the passwords can be easily cracked. This refers to the process
of trial and error method with lots of permutations and
combinations. Of course this is most tedious and time
consuming, but surer method of getting passwords.
4. Using fake / login: Sometimes, if the attacker is an insider, or is
someone who can get a direct access, then the attacker may
keep a fake login program running on a terminal, which feels
legitimate to unknown users. When someone logins, he gets an
invalid login message, and the password is meanwhile collected
somewhere, which is available for the attacker. Windows
prevents from this attack, by requiring Ctrl-Alt-Del keys before
login. Another way to protect is to always lock the terminal while
going away from it.
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5. Packet sniffing: As another attempt, attackers may intercept
the packets flowing through the network. Some protocols let out
the passwords in clear text while transmitting, which may be
grabbed by attackers sniffing the packets. Although this is also
tedious, it may work out sometimes. Packet sniffing is a form of
wiretap applied to computer networks instead of phone
networks. It came into vogue with Ethernet, which is known as a
"shared medium" network. This means that traffic on a segment
passes by all hosts attached to that segment. Ethernet cards
have a filter that prevents the host machine from seeing traffic
addressed to other stations. Sniffing programs turn off the filter,
and thus see everyones traffic.
Today's networks are increasingly employing "switch"
technology, preventing this technique from being as successful
as in the past. It is still useful, though, as it is becoming
increasingly easy to install remote sniffing programs on servers
and routers, through which a lot of traffic flows.
Today's networks may already contain built-in sniffing modules.
Most hubs support the RMON standard, which allow the intruder
to sniff remotely using SNMP, which has weak authentication.
Many corporations employ Network Associates "Distributed
Sniffer Servers", which are set up with easy to guess
passwords. Windows NT machines often have a "Network
Monitoring Agent" installed, which again allows for remote
sniffing.
A packet sniffing is very difficult to detect. Stealing Passwords is
related to being able to retrieve the password of some different
user using a service and accessing the service on that user's
behalf. It may deal with the stealing of one user's password.
To avoid such password attacks the password need to be
protected from the place of storage to the way of transfer. The
following are some methods which helps the protection of
password.
1.2 Storing password:
1. Users authentication information is individually configured
into every server the user will use.
2. Another location called authentication storage node, stores
user information and servers retrieve that information when
they want to authenticate the user.
3. Another location is called as authentication facilitator node.
This location stores the user information and a server that
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wants to authenticate user will send the information received
from the user to the AF node.
4. Encrypted password:
Normally with any networking system the password from the
node to the server will always travel in a plain text format. In
the same way within the server database also the password
will be stored in a plain text format. It will be easy for any
hacker to crack the password. To avoid this kind of attack
one should keep the password in an encrypted format. Any
encryption method can be used to encrypt the password.
2. Cryptographic based authentication:
2.1 Introduction to Basic Encryption and Decryption:
The term 'Cryptography' means the concept of encryption
and decryption together. Cryptography is the technique in which the
original 'plain text' message is 'encrypted' i.e. converted into a
coded form called 'cipher text' at the sender's end, which is then
transmitted to the receiver. The receiver then 'decrypts' i.e.
converts the 'cipher text' back into the 'plain text' to get the original
message back.
Cryptography is also called as an art or technique to achieve
secure communication between the communicating parties by
encoding the messages between them such that no third party can
gain anything useful out of interception.
Various techniques are utilized for this purpose of cryptography.
Broadly these techniques fall into two categories.
1) Symmetric key cryptography: - in which the 'key' element
used, is the 'same' for both encryption as well as decryption
and
2) Asymmetric key cryptography - in which the 'key' element
used, is different for both encryption as well as decryption.
Symmetric key cryptography is also known as 'private or
secret key cryptography'
Whereas
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Asymmetric key cryptography is also known as 'public
key cryptography', (please refer to section 5.6 of these
notes for details)
The techniques used in symmetric key cryptography are as
below.
2.2 Asymmetric Key Cryptography:
In public-key cryptography, there are two keys: a private key
and a public key. The receiver keeps the private key. The public
key is announced to the public.
Imagine Alice, as shown in Figure 29.20, wants to send a
message to Bob. Alice uses the public key to encrypt the message.
When Bob receives the message, the private key is used to decrypt
the message.
In public-key encryption/decryption, the public key that is
used for encryption is different from the private key that is used for
decryption.
The public key is available to the public; the private key is available
only to an individual.
2.2 Protocols:
Various protocols are used for providing the authentication
mechanism.
Authentication protocols overview:
Authentication is a fundamental aspect of system security. It
confirms the identity of any user trying to log on to a domain or
access network resources. The server authentication enables
single sign-on to all network resources. With single sign-on, a user
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can log on to the domain once, using a single password or smart
card, and authenticate to any computer in the domain.
Authentication types:
When attempting to authenticate a user, several industry-
standard types of authentication may be used, depending on a
variety of factors.
Authentication
protocols
Description
Kerberos V5
authentication
A protocol that is used with either a password
or a smart card for interactive logon. It is also
the default method of network authentication
for services.
SSL/TLS
authentication
A protocol that is used when a user attempts
to access a secure Web server.
NTLM
authentication
A protocol that is used when either the client
or server uses a previous version of
Windows.
Digest
authentication
Digest authentication transmits credentials
across the network as an MD5 hash or
message digest.
Passport
authentication
Passport authentication is a user-
authentication service which offers single
sign-in service.
All the above mentioned types will be discussed in detail in
the various sections of this chapter.
2.3 The advantages & disadvantages of key techniques:
Public-key encryption/decryption has two advantages.
First, it removes the restriction of a shared symmetric key
between two entities (e.g., persons) that need to communicate with
each other. A shared symmetric key is shared by the two parties
and cannot be used when one of them wants to communicate with
a third party. In public-key encryption! Decryption, each entity
creates a pair of keys; the private one is kept, and the public one is
distributed. Each entity is independent, and the pair of keys created
can be used to communicate with any other entity.
The second advantage is that the number of keys needed
is reduced tremendously.
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In this system, for I thousand users to communicate, only 1
thousand pairs of keys i.e. 2000 keys are needed, not 4,99,500, as
was the case in symmetric-key cryptography.
Public-key cryptography also has two disadvantages.
The big disadvantage is the complexity of the algorithm. If
we want the method to be effective, the algorithm needs large
numbers. Calculating the cipher text from plaintext using the long
keys takes a lot of time. That is the main reason that public-key
cryptography is not recommended for large amounts of text.
Public-key algorithms are more efficient for short messages.
The second disadvantage of the public-key method is that
the association between an entity and its public key must be
verified. If Alice sends her public key via an email to Bob, then Bob
must be sure that the public key really belongs to Alice and nobody
else.
One point needs to re-mention that if your private key were
made public you would Get Bankrupted in no time!
3. Address based authentication
3.1. KDCs
One way to make things manageable is to use a trusted
node known as Key Distribution Center (KDC).The KDC knows
keys for all nodes. If a new node is installed in the network, only
that, new node and the KDC need to be configured with a key for
that node. If node wants to talk to node , talks to the
KDC(securely ,since and the KDC share a key),and asks for a
key with which to talk to .The KDC authenticates ,chooses a
random number R to be used as a key to be shared by and
for their conversation ,encrypts R with the key the KDC shares
with and gives that to . The KDC also encrypts R with the key
the KDc shares with and gives that to . With the instruction that it
is to be used for conversing with .(Usually ,the KDC will not bother
to actually transmit the encrypted R to but rather will give it to
to forward to .)the encrypted message to that the KDC gives to
to forward is often referred to as a ticket. Besides containing R,
the ticket generally contains other information such as an expiration
time and s name. KDCs make key distribution much more
convenient .when a new user is being installed into the network ,or
when a users key is suspected of having been compromised
,theres a single location(the KDC) that needs to be configured .The
alternative to using a KDc is installing the users information at
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every server to which the user might access. There are some
disadvantages to KDCs, though:
The KDC has enough information to impersonate anyone to
anyone .If it is compromised, all the network resources are
vulnerable.
The KDC is a single point of failure .If it goes down, nobody
can use anything on the network (or rather, nobody can start
using something on the network-keys previously distributed
can continue to be used).It is possible to have multiple
KDCs which share the same database of keys, but that
means added complexity and cost for extra machines and
replication protocols, and added vulnerability, since there are
now more targets that need to be protected.
The KDC might be a performance bottleneck, since
everyone will need to frequently communicate with it. Having
multiple KDCs can alleviate this problem.
Certificate Revocation:
The PKI method distributes the certificates using third
parties. These certificated are providing the additional security
mechanism to the existing message exchange. For certificate
status to be determined, public key infrastructure (PKI) certificate
revocation information must be made available to individuals,
computers, network devices, and applications attempting to verify
the validity of certificates. Traditionally, a PKI uses a distributed
method of verification so that the clients do not have to contact the
Certification Authority (CA) directly to validate the credentials
presented. Instead, clients connect to alternate resources, such as
Web servers or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
directories, where the CA has published its revocation information.
Without checking certificates for revocation, the possibility exists
that an application or user will accept credentials that have been
revoked by a CA administrator.
Certificates are issued with a planned lifetime, which is
defined through a validity start time and an explicit expiration date.
For example, a certificate may be issued with a validity of one day,
thirty years, or even longer. Once issued, a certificate becomes
valid when its validity time has been reached, and it is considered
valid until its expiration date. However, various circumstances may
cause a certificate to become invalid prior to the expiration of the
validity period. Such circumstances include change of name (for
example, requiring to change the subject of a certificate due to an
employees change of name), change of association between
subject and CA (for example, when an employee terminates
employment with an organization), and compromise or suspected
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compromise of the corresponding private key. Under such
circumstances, the issuing CA needs to revoke the certificate.
There are several mechanisms to represent revocation
information. RFC 3280 defines one such method. This method
involves each CA periodically issuing a signed data structure called
a certificate revocation list (CRL). A CRL is a list identifying revoked
certificates, which is signed by a CA and made freely available at a
public distribution point. The CRL has a limited validity period, and
updated versions of the CRL are published when the previous
CRLs validity period expires. Each revoked certificate is identified
in a CRL by its certificate serial number. When certificate-enabled
software uses a certificate (for example, for verifying a remote
user's digital signature), the software should not only check the
certificate signature and time validity, but it should also acquire a
suitably recent certificate status to ensure that the certificate being
presented is not revoked. Normally, a CA will automatically issue a
new CRL on either a configured, regular periodic basis (for
example, daily or weekly), or the CRL can be published manually
by a CA administrator
There is a potential disadvantage with CAs .Suppose Fred is
given a certificate with an expiration time a year in the future and
then Fred is fired .Since Fred is now a disgruntled ex-employee, it
would be nice to alert the network not to allow him access .With
KDCs, it is easy-merely delete his key from the KDC. With CAs,
though it is not as straight forward to deny access to someone once
he is given a certificate. It is common practice to put an expiration
date in a certificate .The certificate becomes invalid after that day.
The typical validity interval is about a year. A disgruntled ex-
employee can do a lot of damage in a year, even without a machine
gun. But you wouldnt want validity intervals much smaller than that,
because renewing certificates is a nuisance.
The solution is similar to what was done for credit cards.
When the bank issues a credit card, it prints an expiration date,
perhaps a year in the future. But sometimes a card is reported is
stolen, or the bank might for some other reason like to revoke it.
The credit card company publishes a book of credit card numbers
that stores should refuse to honour .these days, most stores are
hooked to computer networks where they check the validity of the
card. But in ancient times, merchants needed to rely on the hook of
that credit card number, which was presumably published
frequently.
3.3 BIOMETRICS
Biometrics are the another way to ensure the security
mechanism. This authenticates the user by verifying either the one
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which the user possesses or the one which user has as a physical
features. The one which the user possesses may be a smart card
or SID chip. The one which the user has may be his fingerprints or
the facial expressions. There are variety of Biometrics devices
available. All are too expensive to be in everyday use, but in some
cases the costs are coming down to where we may see these.
Technology available today includes:
Retinal Scanner. This is device that examines the tiny blood
vessels in the back of your eye. The layout is as distinctive
as a fingerprint and apparently easier to read. These devices
are quite expensive and have a psychologically threatening
user interface.
Fingerprint readers. This would seem an obvious
technology since fingerprints have been used as a method of
identification for many years. For some reason, automating
this technology has never been very successful, though
there are devices available.
Face recognition. Looking at a digitized picture of a person,
a computer can measure facial dimensions and do a good
job of recognizing people just dont show up at work with a
black eye and a swollen jaw.
IRIS scanner. Like a retinal scanner, this maps the
distinctive layout of the iris of your eye. It has the major
advantage of having a less intimidating user interface- rather
than requiring you to look into a laser device; iris scans can
be done with a camera several feet away and might even be
done covertly.
Handprint readers. These are more widely used than
fingerprint readers. They measure the dimensions of the
hand: finger length, width, and so on. They arent as
accurate as fingerprints, but they are less expensive and
less problem-prone.
Voiceprints. It turns out that its possible to do a frequency
spectrum analysis of someones eyes and get identification
nearly as accurate as a fingerprint. This technology is in use,
but has not caught on in spite of the fact that it should be
fairly cheap. It can be defeated with a tape recording, and it
may refuse to authenticate someone whose voice has
shifted due to illness.
Keystroke timing. The exact way in which people type is
quite distinctive and experiments have been done with
identification based on the way people type. There is a
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problem that various injuries can throw off timing, and the
networks that connect terminals and computers tend to loose
the keystroke timing information before it reaches a
processor that can use it.
Signatures. There is a classic human form of authentication,
and there are human experts quite adept at determining
whether two signatures were produced by the same person.
Machines thus far have not been able to duplicate that
ability. However, when not just the signature is recorded, but
the actual timing of the moments that go into scribing the
signature, there is sufficient information for authentication
and some systems use this method, with the user signing on
an electronic tablet.
ADDRESS - BASED AUTHENTICATION
Address-based authentication doesnt rely on sending
passwords around the network, but rather assumes that the identity
of the source can be inferred based on the network address from
which packets arrive. It was adopted early in the evolution of
computer networks by both UNIX and VMS.
On UNIX, the Berkeley rtools support such access; on VMS,
similar functionality is called PROXY. The general idea can be
implemented in various ways.
Machine B might have a list of network addresses of
equivalent machines. If machine A is listed, then any
account name on A is equivalent to the same account name
on B. If a request from A arrives with the name John Smith,
then the request will be honored if it for anything that the
account John Smith on B was allowed to do. This has the
problem that the user has to have the identical account
name on all systems.
Machine B might instead have a list of <address, remote
account name, local account name>. If a request arrives
from address A with name Jekyll, then the database is
scanned for the matching entry, say <A, Jekyll, Hyde>. Then
the request is honored provided the local account Hyde is
authorized to do the request.
UNIX implements two account mapping schemes:
/etc/hosts.equiv file. There is a global file which implements
the first scheme above. The file/ etc/hosts.equiv on a
machine A contain a list of computers that have identical
user account assignments. Suppose a computer B is listed
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in /etc/hosts.equiv. Suppose A receives a request with
account name Smith, and Bs address in the source address
field of the network header. If an account with the name
smith exists in machine A, the request will be given the same
privileges as the local user Smith. The /etc/hosts.eqiv file is
useful in managing corresponding accounts in bulk on
machines with common accounts and common
management.
Per-user .rhosts files. In each UNIX users home directory,
there can be a file named .rhosts, which contains a list of
<computer, account> pairs that are allowed access to the
users account. Any user Bob can permit remote access to
his account by creating a .rhosts file is his home directory.
The account names need not be the same on the remote
machine as they are on this one, so Bob can handle the
case where he has different account names on different
systems. Because of the way the information is organized,
any request that is not for an account named the same as
the source account must include the name of the account
that should process the request. For instance, if the local
account name on system A is Bob and the request is from
computer B, account name Smith, the request has to specify
that it would like to be treated with the privileges given
account name Bob.
There is a centrally managed proxy database that says for
each remote computer <computer, account> pair what
account(s) that pair may access, usually with one of them
marked as the default. For example, there might be an entry
specifying that account Smith from address B should have
access to local accounts Bob and Alice, where the account
Bob might be marked as the default.
The VMS scheme makes access somewhat more
user-friendly than the UNIX scheme in the case where a
user has different account names on different systems.
Generally (in VMS) the user neednt specify the target
account in that case. In the rare case, where a user is
authorized to access multiple accounts on the remote
computer a target account can be specified in the request to
access an account other than the default.
Address-based authentication is safe from
eavesdropping.
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Verification techniques:
Passwords:
Today's networks are increasingly employing "switch"
technology, preventing this technique from being as successful as
in the past. It is still useful, though, as it is becoming increasingly
easy to install remote sniffing programs on servers and routers,
through which a lot of traffic flows.
Today's networks may already contain built-in sniffing
modules. Most hubs support the RMON standard, which allow the
intruder to sniff remotely using SNMP, which has weak
authentication. Many corporations employ Network Associates
"Distributed Sniffer Servers", which are set up with easy to guess
passwords. Windows NT machines often have a "Network
Monitoring Agent" installed, which again allows for remote sniffing.
A packet sniffing is very difficult to detect. Stealing
Passwords is related to being able to retrieve the password of
some different user using a service and accessing the service on
that user's behalf. It may deal with the stealing of one user's
password.
Thus the attacker can do the following:
- Use the resources of the user if its the system password
- Use the service if it's a web service password
- Use the financial resources of the user, if the password is of
some financial institution etc.
A password stealer's main motto is to get unauthorized access
into a genuine user's account and use the service illegally.
But this activity may take a major advancement if the stealer
happens to access the entire password file for all users of a
given system or service. This means that the passwords of
many different users cab be misused.
Usually, passwords are simple. Either they are day-to-day
usage terms or some words with which the user is associated.
For an attacker keen on stealing password, a simple brute force
attack, covering different words from the dictionary is enough.
Thus, necessary precautions have to be taken in order to
avoid important passwords from getting stolen. We should be
careful that we take into account the following major points of
consideration.
105
Never reveal our password to anybody. Especially, when
that same password coincides with the password of some
different service, which is very important.
Password files should be placed separately in a different
server (Password server) and not be a part of the Web
Server.
Passwords should be a mixture of alphabets, numbers and
special symbols such that it is not a part of the daily usage
dictionary, which can be detected through brute force attack.
As network administrators a minimum of say 3 attempts
must be kept for a user entering wrong password. This will
cut down the chances of brute force to a greater extent.
Various methods to prevent from password stealing:
1. One time password:
This is the basic method, which will use different password
with every access. As the passwords are easily cracked by the
systems, this method will help the user to protect the password
from the hackers. Every time the password will change. Before the
hackers use any method to crack the password, the user will
change the password.
2. Encrypted password:
Normally with any networking system the password from the
node to the server will always travel in a plain text format. In the
same way within the server database also the password will be
stored in a plain text format. It will be easy for any hacker to crack
the password. To avoid this kind of attack one should keep the
password in an encrypted format. Any encryption method can be
used to encrypt the password.
3.4 Smart Cards
3.4.1. Introduction:
A Smart Card is a plastic card the size of a credit card with
an integrated circuit built into it. This integrated circuit may consist
only of EEPROM in the case of a memory card, or it may also
contain ROM, RAM and even a CPU.
Organizations are steadily migrating toward this technology.
The days are numbered for a single mainframe used for computing
every directive. Today, the delegation of tasks is being transferred
to small, but dedicated smart cards. Their usefulness may soon
106
exceed that of the standard computer for a variety of applications
due, in part, to their portability and ease of use.
A smart card is a mini-computer without the display screen
and keyboard. Smart cards contain a microchip with an integrated
circuit capable of processing and storing thousands of bytes of
electronic data. Due to the portability and size of smart cards they
are seen as the next generation of data exchange.
Smart cards contain an operating system just like personal
computers. Smart cards can store and process information and are
fully interactive. Advanced smart cards also contain a file structure
with secret keys and encryption algorithms. Due to the encrypted
file system, data can be stored in separated files with full security.
3.4.2 Architecture:
1. Most smart cards have been designed with the look and feel of a
credit or debit card, but can function on at least three levels (credit -
debit - personal information). Smart cards include a microchip as
the central processing unit, random access memory (RAM) and
data storage of around 10MB.
2. The smart card is an electronic recording device. Information in
the microchip can instantaneously verify the cardholder's identity
and any privileges to which the cardholder may be entitled.
Information such as withdrawals, sales, and bills can be processed
immediately and if/when necessary; those records can be
transmitted to a central computer for file updating.
3. Smart cards are secure, compact and intelligent data carriers.
Smart cards should be regarded as specialized computers capable
of processing, storing and safeguarding thousands of bytes of data.
4. Smart cards have electrical contacts and a thin metallic plate just
above center line on one side of the card. Beneath this dime-sized
plate is an integrated circuit (IC) chip containing a central
processing unit (CPU), random access memory (RAM) and non-
volatile data storage.
5. Data stored in the smart card's microchip can be accessed only
through the chip operating system (COS), providing a high level of
data security. This security takes the form of passwords allowing a
user to access parts of the IC chip's memory or
encryption/decryption measures which translate the bytes stored in
memory into useful information.
6. Smart cards typically hold 2,000 to 8,000 electronic bytes of data
(the equivalent of several pages of data). Because those bytes can
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be electronically coded, the effective storage capacity of each card
is significantly increased.
7. Magnetic-stripe cards, such as those issued by banks and credit
card companies, lack the security of microchips but remain
inexpensive due to their status as a single-purpose card.
8. Smart cards can be a carrier of multiple records for multiple
purposes. Once those purposes are maximized, the smart card is
often viewed as superior and, ultimately, less expensive.
9. The distributed processing possible with smart cards reduces the
need for ever-larger mainframe computers and the expense of local
and long-distance phone circuits required to maintain an on-line
connection to a central computer.
10. Smart cards are defined by the ISO 7816 standards.
3.4.3. Security aspects:
1. The microprocessor on the smart card is there for security. The
host computer and card reader actually "talk" to the
microprocessor.
2. The microprocessor enforces access to the data on the card. If
the host computer read and wrote the smart card's random access
memory(RAM), it would be no different than a diskette..
3. Smarts cards may have up to 8 kilobytes of RAM, 346 kilobytes
of ROM 256 kilobytes of programmable ROM, and a 16-bit
microprocessor.
4. The smart card uses a serial interface and receives its power
from external sources like a card reader. The processor uses a
limited instruction set for applications such as cryptography.
3.4.4. Applications:
Credit cards
Electronic cash
Computer security systems
Wireless communication
Loyalty systems (like frequent flyer points)
Banking
Satellite TV
Government identification
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3.4.5.Types of Smart Cards
Contact Cards and Contactless Cards
Contact Cards require insertion into a smart card reader with
a direct connection to a conductive micro-module on the surface of
the card.
Contact less Cards require only close proximity (a few
inches) of a reader.
Categories of Smart Cards
Integrated Circuit (IC) Microprocessor Cards: Allow for
adding, deleting, or manipulating information in memory,
allowing for a variety of applications and dynamic read/write
capabilities. Most Smart Cards in use for mobile applications
are of this type.
IC Memory Cards: Can store data, but do not have a
processor on the card.
Optical Memory Cards: Can only store data, but have a
larger memory capacity than IC memory cards.
QUESTIONS:
1. Explain the need of passwords
2. What are the various methods to store the password
3. Write a short note on certificate revocation
4. What are the various applications of smart cards.
5. Write in detail about the functions and advantages of smart
cards
6. Write in detail about the various ways to implement biometrics
7. Write a short note on address based authentication
8. Write a short note on cryptographic based authentication
9. What are the various authentication protocols
10. Explain in detail about the key technology used with
authentication.

109
6
SECURITY POLICIES & SECURITY
HANDSHAKE PITFALLS
What is security policy
High and low level policy, user issues
Protocol problems
Assumptions
Shared secret protocols
Diffie-Hellman Algorithm
Public key protocols
Mutual authentication
Reflection attacks
Use of timestamps
Nonce and sequence numbers
Session keys
One-and two-way public key based authentication.
Hash Function
Collection
Properties
2Way Authentication
6.1. Security Policy:
Definition:
A security policy is the set of decisions that collectively,
determines an organization's attitude toward security.
A security policy defines the boundaries of acceptable
behavior and what the response to violations should be.
Security policy is the set of decisions/rules & regulation written
or verbally understood that collectively determines Organizations
posture towards security. It delimits the boundaries, specifies
acceptable & non acceptable behaviors, dictates what is ethical and
what is non-ethical states the degree of seriousness of the offence
and also mention the consequences of the actions if it is violated. It
110
focuses on different stack holders and satisfying their requirements
in an efficient way.
Organization differs in their Culture, Structures and Strategy.
Thus Security Policy will also differ from organization to
organization.
Security Policy will decide on the following issues.
o What legal course of action will you follow if attacked?
o What will be considered as a cognizable crime?
o Can anyone be sued?
o Infringing on someone elses rights?
To devise a security policy you must yourself several
question?
1. What resources are you trying to protect?
2. Who would be interested in attacking you?
3. How much security can you afford?
Your security policy may determine what legal course you
have to take if you are ever attacked. You must first decide what is
and is not permitted. To some extent, this process is driven by the
business or structural needs of the organization. Thus, some
companies may issue a verdict that bars the personal' use of
corporate computers. Some companies wish to restrict outgoing
traffic, to guard against employees exporting valuable data. Other
policies may be driven by technological considerations.
In general, Computer security means keeping anyone from
doing anything, which is unwanted or undesired, relating to
computers & peripherals. It is the way of protecting your precious
assets in terms of information or resources.
6.1.1. Picking a security policy:
A 'Security Policy' describes your plan, methodology to
safeguard your assets or what measures / precautions you take (or
do not take) in order to keep your assets secured. A security policy
differs from organization to organization. All the decisions are then
based on this formulated policy. The first step here is to perform a
Risk Analysis. It is a process of examining all your risks & then
finding a cost-effective decision to recover from it. A few important
steps in this are:
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1. Finding out what resources you wish to protect: Resources
may include: Physical resources like printers, monitors,
keyboards, drives, modems etc. & Logical resources like source
& object programs, data, utilities, operating system, applications
etc.
What resources are you trying to protect? The answer to this will
dictate the host specific measures that are needed. Machines
with sensitive files may require extra security measures:
Stronger authentication, keystroke logging and strict auditing, or
even file encryption. If the target of interest is the outgoing
connectivity, the administrator may choose to require certain
privileges for access to the network. May be all such access
should be done through a proxy that will perform extra logging.
2. Find out who can disrupt them & in what ways: The threats
to your assets may include
Physical threats to the resources such as stealing,
malfunctioning devices,
Logical threats such as unauthorized access to data,
information, resources
Unintended disclosure of your information.
3. Who is interested in attacking you?
Outsiders as well as insiders may form the collective answer
here.
What kind of security therefore must be provided differs from
the type of attacker you are planning against.
4. How much Security can you afford?
Part of the cost of security is direct financial expenditures, such
as the extra routers, firewalls, software packages, and so on.
Often, the administrative costs are overlooked. There is another
cost, however, a cost in convenience and productivity, and even
moderate. Too much security can hurt as surely as too little can.
Annoyed by increases in security, people get frustrated. Finding
the proper balance therefore is essential.
5. How to decide on the user levels and the privileges? What
Stance do you take?
The stance is the attitude of the designer. It is determined by the
cost of failure and the designers estimate of that likelihood. It is
also based on the designer's opinions of their own abilities. At
one end of the scale is a philosophy to correct it only when
mistake happens and the other one is taking preventive
measures so that no mistake occurs.
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6.1.2. Experiment in Picking a Security Policy:
What is a policy should I have while surfing?
Let us do a practical experiment
1. Open Internet Explorer
2. Click on tool
3. Click on Internet Options
4. Click on Security
5. Click on Custom Level
6. Click on Default levels
Study the following levels.
1. High
2. Medium
3. Medium-low and
4. Low
High:
The safest way to browse,
but also the least functional
Less secured feature are disabled
Appropriate policy for sites
that might have harmful contents
Medium-Low
Same as Medium but with
prompts
Most content will run
without prompts
Unsigned ActiveX controls
will be downloaded
Appropriate for sites on
local Network (Intranets)
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Medium
Safe browsing & still
functional
Prompts before
downloading potentially
unsafe content
Unsigned ActiveX controls
will be downloaded
Appropriate for most
Internet sites
Low
Minimam safeguards and warning
promts provided
Most content is downloaded and
run without prompts
All active contents can run
Approariate for site that you
absolutely trust.
The problems reported by the organization may be from
different areas. The problems that affect the privacy and security of
the organization are to be resolved. To resolve them, one has to
aware of those problems to analyze the scenario completely. Let us
discuss about those problems first.
6.1.3. Problems with protocols:
Sometimes, the protocol used in the networks also has
certain limitations or problems contained in them, which prevent the
applications from doing the appropriate things. Since they work
from behind the applications, this may increase the vulnerability.
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An example of such failure is the TCP protocol failure. TCP
provides the circuits or paths for the IP datagrams. These may be
sent across the network. The attackers checking for the packets
can get information about the source IP. Similarly the IP is a
stateless and unreliable protocol. No guarantee of delivery of
packets can be given for it. It is possible for attackers to send
packets using any known or valid source address. This is called
source address spoofing. Although the operating system controls
this, still it cannot be relied on.
All the classes of attacks discuss situations in which
everything was working properly, but trustworthy authentication was
not possible. Here, in Protocol failures, we consider the reverse: i.e.
areas where the protocols themselves are inadequate, thus
denying the application the opportunity to do the right thing.
Secure protocols must rest on a secure foundation. Consider
SSH, which is a fine protocol for secure remote access. SSH has a
feature where a user can specify a trusted public key by storing it in
a file called authorized keys (local file). Then, if the client knows the
private key, the user can log in without having to type a password.
IN UNIX, this file typically resides in the .ssh directory in the user's
home directory. Now, consider the case in which someone uses the
Ssh to log into a host, an attacker can spoof the replies to inject a
fake authorized keys file.
The authorized keys file introduces another type of vulnerability.
If a user gets a new account in a new environment he typically
copies all of the important files there from an existing account,
including the .ssh directory, so that all of the .ssh keys are available
from the new account. However, the user may not realize that
copying the authorized keys file means that this new account can
be accessed by any key trusted to access the previous account.
6.1.4. Symmetric-key algorithms/shared secret key protocols:
Symmetric-key algorithms are a class of algorithms for
cryptography that use trivially related, often identical, cryptographic
keys for both decryption and encryption. The encryption key is
trivially related to the decryption key, in that they may be identical
or there is a simple transformation to go between the two keys. The
keys, in practice, represent a shared secret between two or more
parties that can be used to maintain a private information link.
Other terms for symmetric-key encryption are secret-key, single-
key, shared-key, one-key, and private-key encryption. Use of the
last and first terms can create ambiguity with similar terminology
used in public key cryptography.
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6.1.5. Secret Key Exchange
For symmetric key cryptography to work for online
communications, the secret key must be securely shared with
authorized communicating parties and protected from discovery
and use by unauthorized parties. Public key cryptography can be
used to provide a secure method for exchanging secret keys online.
Two of the most common key exchange algorithms are the
following:
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement algorithm
RSA key exchange process
Both methods provide for highly secure key exchange between
communicating parties. An intruder who intercepts network
communications cannot easily guess or decode the secret key that
is required to decrypt communications. The exact mechanisms and
algorithms that are used for key exchange varies for each security
technology. In general, the Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement algorithm
provides better performance than the RSA key exchange algorithm.
6.2 Diffie-Hellman Key exchange algorithm:
Whitefield Diffie and Martin Hellman, in 1976 have come out
with a good solution to the problem of key distribution as mentioned
above. The steps of this algorithm are as given below.
Steps for algorithm:
Assume two parties viz. 'first' and 'second' want to
communicate securely.
1. Let 'first' and 'second' agree upon two large prime nos., say
n and g. These need not be kept secured. (i.e. everyone can
know these values.)
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2. 'First chooses another large random no. say x to calculate
another number A such that, A = g^xmod n. (Note, value of x
is only known to 'first'!)
3. This no. A is then sent by 'first' to 'second'.
4. 'Second also chooses another large random no. say y to
calculate another number B such that,
5. B = g^y mod n. (Note, value of y is only known to 'second'!)
6. This no. B is then sent by 'second' to 'first'.
7. Now, independently, 'first' calculates the key KI as: KI =
B^xmod n
8. Also, 'second' independently calculates the key K2 as: K2 =
A^y mod n
9. As it should be required here in symmetric key cryptography,
KI = K2.
Example:
Let us take an actual example, to illustrate above algorithm.
Assuming values such as n= 11, g=7, x=3 and y=6, we have
following equations:
1. Value of A=7^3mod 11 =343 mod 11 =2.
2. Value of B = 7^6mod 11 = 117649 mod 11 = 4.
3. Key KI = 4^3mod 11 = 64 mod 11 = 9.
4. And, Key K2 = 2^6mod 11 = 64 mod 11 = 9.
5. Thus, we find that KI = K2.
6. Hence the algorithm is proved.
6.2.1. The public-key protocol
This assumes the use of a public key algorithm. Here, Alice
(A) and Bob (B) use a trusted server (S) to distribute public keys on
request. These keys are:
K
PA
and K
SA
, respectively public and private halves of an
encryption key-pair belonging to A
K
PB
and K
SB
, similar belonging to B
K
PS
and K
SS
, similar belonging to S. (Note this has the
property that K
SS
is used to encrypt and K
PS
to decrypt).
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The protocol runs as follows:
A requests B's public keys from S
S responds with public key K
PB
alongside B's identity, signed
by the server for authentication purposes.
A invents N
A
and sends it to B.
B requests A's public keys.
Server responds.
B invents N
B
, and sends it to A along with N
A
to prove ability to
decrypt with K
SB
.
A confirms N
B
to B, to prove ability to decrypt with K
SA.
At the
end of the protocol, A and B know each other's identities, and know
both N
A
and N
B
. These nonces are not known to eavesdroppers.
6.2.2. An attack on the protocol
Unfortunately, this protocol is vulnerable to a man-in-the-
middle attack. If an impostor I can persuade A to initiate a session
with him, he can relay the messages to B and convince B that he is
communicating with A. Ignoring the traffic to and from S, which is
unchanged, the attack runs as follows:
A sends N
A
to I, who decrypts the message with K
SI
I relay the message to B, pretending that A is communicating
B sends N
B
I relay it to A
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A decrypts N
B
and confirms it to I, who learns it
I re-encrypt N
B
, and convince B that he's decrypted it. At the
end of the attack, B falsely believes that A is communicating with
him, and that N
A
and N
B
are known only to A and B.
6.2.3. Security mechanisms can be combined / embedded with
protocols:
Timestamp
Nonce
Sequence Numbers
1. Timestamp and its usage:
A timestamp is a sequence of characters, denoting the date
and/or time at which a certain event occurred. A timestamp is the
time at which an event is recorded by a computer, not the time of
the event itself. In many cases, the difference may be
inconsequential: the time at which an event is recorded by a
timestamp (e.g., entered into a log file) should be very, very close
to the time of the occurrence of the event recorded. This data is
usually presented in a consistent format, allowing for easy
comparison of two different records and tracking progress over
time; the practice of recording timestamps in a consistent manner
along with the actual data is called time stamping.
Timestamps are typically used for logging events, in which
case each event in a log is marked with a timestamp. In file
systems, timestamp may mean the stored date/time of creation or
modification of a file.
Assumptions:
Every timestamp value is unique and accurately represents
an instant in time. No two timestamps can be the same. A higher-
valued timestamp occurs later in time than a lower-valued
timestamp.
Examples of timestamps:
2005-10-30 T 10:45 UTC
2007-11-09 T 11:20 UTC
Sat Jul 23 02:16:57 2005
1256953732
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2.Nonce and Sequence Numbers:
In security engineering, a nonce is an abbreviation
of number used once (it is similar in spirit to a nonce word). It is
often a random or pseudo-random number issued in
an authentication protocol to ensure that old communications
cannot be reused in replay attacks. For instance, nonces are used
in HTTP digest access authentication to calculate a MD5 digest of
the password. The nonces are different each time that the 401
authentication challenge response code is presented, and each
client request has a unique sequence number, thus making replay
attacks and dictionary attacks virtually impossible.Some also refer
to initialization Vectors as nonce for the above reasons. To ensure
that a nonce is used only once, it should be time-variant (including
a suitably granular timestamp in its value), or generated with
enough random bits to ensure a probabilistically insignificant
chance of repeating a previously generated value. Some authors
define pseudo-randomness (or unpredictability) as a requirement
for a nonce.
3 .Mutual authentication or two-way authentication:
Mutual authentication or two-way authentication (sometimes
written as 2WAY authentication) refers to two parties authenticating
each other suitably. In technology terms, it refers to a client or user
authenticating themselves to a server and that server
authenticating itself to the user in such a way that both parties are
assured of the others' identity. When describing online
authentication processes, mutual authentication is often referred to
as website-to-user authentication, or site-to-user authentication.
Typically, this is done for a client process and a server process
without user interaction.
Mutual SSL provides the same things as SSL, with the
addition of authentication and non-repudiation of the client
authentication, using digital signatures. However, due to issues with
complexity, cost, logistics, and effectiveness, most web applications
are designed so they do not require client-side certificates. This
creates an opening for a man-in-the-middle attack, in particular for
online banking.
Mutual Authentication is a security feature in which a client
process must prove its identity to a server, and the server must
prove its identity to the client, before any application traffic is sent
over the client-to-server connection. Support for mutual
authentication is provided by the security support provider
interface (SSPI) and is exposed directly through the SSPI APIs and
services that layer upon SSPI, including RPC and COM+.
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Not all security packages available to SSPI, nor all services running
Windows 2000, support mutual authentication. An application must
request mutual authentication and a supporting security package to
obtain mutual authentication.
Mutual authentication requires that the client and server
prove their respective identities to each other before performing any
application functions. Identity can be proved through a trusted third
party and use shared secrets, as in Kerberos v5, or through
cryptographic means, as with a public key infrastructure. Each party
is identified by a principal name.
Secure Shell (SSH) public key authentication can be used by
a client to access servers, if properly configured. These notes
describe how to configure OpenSSH for public key authentication,
how to enable a ssh-agent to allow for passphrase-free logins,
and tips on debugging problems with SSH connections. Password
free logins benefit remote access and automation.
Public key authenticate can prevent brute force SSH attacks,
but only if all password-based authentication methods are disabled.
Other options to protect against brute force SSH attacks
include pam_tally, or port knocking. Public key authentication does
not work well with Kerberos or OpenAFS, which require a
password or principal from the client.
Definition of terms used:
Client: the system one types directly on, such as a laptop or
desktop system.
Server: anything connected to from the client. This includes
other servers accessed through the first server connected to.
Note: Never allow root-to-root trust between systems. If
required by poorly engineered legacy scripts, limit the access of the
public keys, and if possible only allow specific public keys to run
specific commands. Instead, setup named accounts for users or
roles, and grant as little- root access as possible via pseudo.
6.2.4. Reflection Attack:
It is a method of attacking a challenge-response
authentication system that uses the same protocol in both
directions. That is , the same challenge-response protocol is used
by each side to authenticate the other side. The essential idea of
the attack is to trick the target into providing the answer to its own
challenge.
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The general attack outline is as follows:
1) The attacker initiates a connection to a target.
2) The target attempts to authenticate the attacker by sending it
a challenge.
3) The attacker opens another connection to the target, and
sends the target this challenge as its own.
4) The target responds to the challenge.
5) The attacker sends that response back to the target on the
original connection.
If the authentication protocol is not carefully designed, the target
will accept that response as valid; thereby leaving the attacker with
one fully-authenticated channel connection and the other one is
simply abandoned.
Some of the most common solutions to this attack are described
below:
The responder sends its identifier within the response so, if it
receives a response that has its identifier in it, it can reject it.
1. Alice initiates a connection to Bob.
2. Bob challenges Alice by sending a nonce.B->A:N
3. Alice responds by sending back her identifier and the nonce
encrypted using the shared key Kab. AB:{A,N}Kab
4. Bob decrypts the message, makes sure that it is from Alice
and not a message he had sent in the past by finding A in it
and not B and if the nonce is the same as the one he sent in
his challenge, then he accepts the message.
5. But, it requires the initiating party to first respond to
challenges before the target party responds to its
challenges.
Require the key or Sequence Numbers
A fundamental notion in the design is that every octet of data
sent over a TCP connection has a sequence number. Since every
octet is sequenced, each of them can be acknowledged. The
acknowledgment mechanism employed is cumulative so that an
acknowledgment of sequence number X indicates that all octets up
to but not including X have been received. This mechanism allows
for straight-forward duplicate detection in the presence of
retransmission. Numbering of octets within a segment is that the
first data octet immediately following the header is the lowest
numbered, and the following octets are numbered consecutively. t
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is essential to remember that the actual sequence number space is
finite, though very large. This space ranges from 0 to 2**32 - 1.
Since the space is finite, all arithmetic dealing with sequence
numbers must be performed modulo 2**32. This unsigned
arithmetic preserves the relationship of sequence numbers as they
cycle from 2**32 - 1 to 0 again. There are some subtleties to
computer modulo arithmetic, so great care should be taken in
programming the comparison of such values. The symbol "=<"
means "less than or equal" (modulo 2**32).
The typical kinds of sequence number comparisons which the
TCP must perform include:
(a) Determining that an acknowledgment refers to some
sequence number sent but not yet acknowledged.
(b) Determining that all sequence numbers occupied by a
segment have been acknowledged (e.g., to remove the
segment from a retransmission queue).
(c) Determining that an incoming segment contains sequence
numbers which are expected (i.e., that the segment
"overlaps" the receive window). In response to sending data
the TCP will receive acknowledgments.
The following comparisons are needed to process the
acknowledgments.
Sequence Signal Description
SND.UNA oldest unacknowledged sequence
number
SND.NXT next sequence number to be sent
SEG.ACK acknowledgment from the receiving
TCP (next sequence number
expected by the receiving TCP)
SEG.SEQ first sequence number of a segment
SEG.LEN the number of octets occupied by
the data in the segment (counting
SYN and FIN)
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SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN-1 last sequence number of a segment
RCV.NXT next sequence number expected on
an incoming segments, and is the
left or lower edge of the receive
window
RCV.NXT+RCV.WND-1 last sequence number expected on
an incoming
segment, and is the right or upper
edge of the receive window
SEG.SEQ first sequence number occupied by
the incoming segment
SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN-1 last sequence number occupied by
the incoming segment
6.2.5. Session Key:
A session key is a single-use symmetric key used
for encrypting all messages in one communication session. A
closely related term is traffic encryption key or TEK, which refers
to any key used to encrypt messages as opposed to different uses,
such as encrypting other keys (key encryption key)
Session keys introduce complication in a crypto system,
normally to an undesirable end. However, they also help with some
real problems, which is why they are used. There are two primary
reasons for session keys:
First, several cryptanalytic attacks are made easier as more
material encrypted with a specific key is available. By limiting
the material processed using a particular key; those attacks are
made more difficult.
Second, asymmetric encryption is too slow for general purpose
use, but many otherwise good encryption algorithms require that
keys be distributed securely before encryption can be used.
All secret key algorithms have this undesirable property. By
using asymmetric encryption to distribute a secret key for
another, faster, symmetric algorithm, it's possible to improve
overall performance considerably. Like all cryptographic keys,
session keys must be chosen so that they are unpredictable by
an attacker. In the usual case, this means that they must be
chosen randomly. Failure to choose session keys (or any key)
properly is a major (and too common in actual practice) design
flaw in any crypto system.
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One-Way and Two-Way public key based authentication:
6.2.6. One-way Hash Function:
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic
procedure that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-
size bit string, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that an
accidental or intentional change to the data will change the hash
value. The data to be encoded is often called the "message", and
the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply
digests.
The ideal cryptographic hash function has four main properties:
it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message,
it is infeasible to find a message that has a given hash,
it is infeasible to modify a message without changing its hash,
it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same
hash.
Cryptographic hash functions have many information
security applications, notably in digital signatures, message
authentication codes (MACs), and other forms of authentication.
They can also be used as ordinary hash functions, to index data
in hash tables, for fingerprinting, to detect duplicate data or
uniquely identify files, and as checksums to detect accidental data
corruption. Indeed, in information security contexts, cryptographic
hash values are sometimes called (digital)
fingerprints, checksums, or just hash values, even though all
these terms stand for functions with rather different properties and
purposes.
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6.3. Applications of hash functions:
Hash tables:
Hash functions are primarily used in hash tables, to quickly
locate a data record (for example, a dictionary definition) given
its search key (the headword). Specifically, the hash function is
used to map the search key to the hash. The index gives the place
where the corresponding record should be stored. Hash tables, in
turn, are used to implement associative arrays and dynamic sets.
In general, a hashing function may map several different
keys to the same index. Therefore, each slot of a hash table is
associated with (implicitly or explicitly) a set of records, rather than
a single record. For this reason, each slot of a hash table is often
called a bucket, and hash values are also called bucket indices.
Thus, the hash function only hints at the record's location
it tells where one should start looking for it. Still, in a half-full table,
a good hash function will typically narrow the search down to only
one or two entries.
1. Caches
Hash functions are also used to build caches for large data
sets stored in slow media. A cache is generally simpler than a
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hashed search table, since any collision can be resolved by
discarding or writing back the older of the two colliding items.
2. Bloom filters
Hash functions are an essential ingredient of the Bloom filter,
a compact data structure that provides an enclosing approximation
to a set of keys.
3. Finding duplicate records
To find duplicated records in a large unsorted file, one may
use a hash function to map each file record to an index into a
table T, and collect in each bucket T[i] a list of the numbers of all
records with the same hash value i. Once the table is complete, any
two duplicate records will end up in the same bucket. The
duplicates can then be found by scanning every bucket T[i] which
contains two or more members, fetching those records, and
comparing them. With a table of appropriate size, this method is
likely to be much faster than any alternative approach (such as
sorting the file and comparing all consecutive pairs).
4. Finding similar records
Hash functions can also be used to locate table records
whose key is similar, but not identical, to a given key; or pairs of
records in a large file which have similar keys. For that purpose,
one needs a hash function that maps similar keys to hash values
that differ by at most m, where m is a small integer (say, 1 or 2). If
one builds a table of T of all record numbers, using such a hash
function, then similar records will end up in the same bucket, or in
nearby buckets. Then one need only check the records in each
bucket T[i] against those in buckets T[i+k] where k ranges
between -mand m.
5. Finding similar substrings
The same techniques can be used to find equal or similar
stretches in a large collection of strings, such as a document
repository or a genomic database. In this case, the input strings are
broken into many small pieces, and a hash function is used to
detect potentially equal pieces, as above.
6. Geometric hashing
This principle is widely used in computer
graphics, computational geometry and many other disciplines, to
solve many proximity problems in the plane or in three-dimensional
space, such as finding closest pairs in a set of points, similar
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shapes in a list of shapes, similar images in an image database,
and so on. In these applications, the set of all inputs is some sort of
metric space, and the hashing function can be interpreted as
a partition of that space into a grid of cells. The table is often an
array with two or more indices, and the hash function returns an
index tuple. This special case of hashing is known as geometric
hashing or the grid method. Geometric hashing is also used
in telecommunications to encode and compress multi-dimensional
signals.
6.3.1. Properties of Hash Functions:
Good hash functions, in the original sense of the term, are usually
required to satisfy certain properties listed below.
1. Low cost
The cost of computing a hash function must be small enough
to make a hashing-based solution advantageous with regard to
alternative approaches. For instance, binary search can locate an
item in a sorted table of n items with log
2
n key comparisons.
Therefore, a hash table solution will be more efficient than binary
search only if computing the hash function for one key cost less
than performing log
2
n key comparisons. One advantage of hash
tables is that they do not require sorting, which keeps the cost of
the hash function constant regardless of the rate at which items are
added to the data set.
2. Determinism
A hash procedure must be deterministic meaning that for
a given input value it must always generate the same hash value.
In other words, it must be a function of the hashed data, in the
mathematical sense of the term. This requirement excludes hash
functions that depend on external variable parameters, such
as pseudo-random number generators that depend on the time of
day. It also excludes functions that depend on the memory address
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of the object being hashed, if that address may change during
processing although sometimes rehashing of the item can be done.
3. Uniformity
A good hash function should map the expected inputs as
evenly as possible over its output range. That is, every hash value
in the output range should be generated with roughly the same
probability. The reason for this last requirement is that the cost of
hashing-based methods goes up sharply as the number
of collisions pairs of inputs that are mapped to the same hash
value increases. Note that this criterion only requires the value to
be uniformly distributed, not random in any sense. A good
randomizing function is usually good for hashing, but the converse
need not be true.
Hash tables often contain only a small subset of the valid
inputs. For instance, a club membership list may contain only a
hundred or so member names, out of the very large set of all
possible names. In these cases, the uniformity criterion should hold
for almost all typical subsets of entries that may be found in the
table, not just for the global set of all possible entries. When testing
a hash function, the uniformity of the distribution of hash values can
be evaluated by the chi-square test.
4. Variable range
In many applications, the range of hash values may be
different for each run of the program, or may change along the
same run (for instance, when a hash table needs to be expanded).
In those situations, one needs a hash function which takes two
parameters the input data z, and the number n of allowed hash
values. A common solution is to compute a fixed hash function with
a very large range divide the result by n, and use the
division's remainder. If n itself a power of 2, this can be done by bit
masking and bit shifting. When this approach is used, the hash
function must be chosen so that the result has fairly uniform
distribution between 0 and n1, for any n that may occur in the
application. Depending on the function, the remainder may be
uniform only for certain n, e.g. odd or prime numbers.
5. Data normalization
In some applications, the input data may contain features
that are irrelevant for comparison purposes. For example, when
looking up a personal name, it may be desirable to ignore the
distinction between upper and lower case letters. For such data,
one must use a hash function that is compatible with the
data equivalence criterion being used: that is, any two inputs that
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are considered equivalent must yield the same hash value. This
can be accomplished by normalizing the input before hashing it, as
by upper-casing all letters.
6. Continuity
A hash function that is used to search for similar (as
opposed to equivalent) data must be as continuous as possible;
two inputs that differ by a little should be mapped to equal or nearly
equal hash values. Note that continuity is usually considered a fatal
flaw for checksums, cryptographic hash.
7. Two-way public key based authentication:
Mutual authentication and two-way authentication is one and
the same and we discussed about mutual authentication in the
earlier sessions. The diagram below depicts the process of two-way
authentication.
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1. What is security Policy? Explain the meaning of security policy?
What are the questions to be asked while framing a security
policy?
2. How security policy can be used for organizational effectiveness
towards security?
3. What are the problems faced by the secret-key exchange
algorithms? Explain.
4. State and explain the Diffie-Hellman Key exchange algorithm.
5. The protocols, rules for the communication, may lead to further
problem in client-server terminology-Explain this statement.
6. Explain the concept of public- key protocols in detail. Also state
the possible attacks on the protocol.
7. What is mutual authentication? How 2Way authentication is
achieved in cryptography? Explain.
8. Name and explain the attack is in challenge-response
authentication. Also suggest some solutions for the same.
9. Explain the requirement of sequence numbers in authentication.
10. Explain some of the applications of hash functions.
11. State and explain the properties of the hash functions.
12. What is one-way authentication? How it is achieved in
cryptography? Explain.
13. Compare and contrast one-way and two-way public key based
authentication.
14. Write a short note on the following:
Nonce
Session keys
Time Stamps
Computer Security Terms
Ciphertext - Text or data that has been enciphered such that
unauthorized persons should be unable to read it.
Decipher - The act of taking text that is enciphered so
unauthorized persons cannot read it and processing it into
plain text or data that can be read or used.
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Encipher - The act of taking plain text or data and processing
it into ciphertext so unauthorized personnel cannot read it or
use it.
MAC - Message Authentication Code
MDC - Manipulation Detection Code
MIC - Message Integrity Check
One way hash functions - A function that can be easily
performed one way but is difficult or impossible to reverse.
Plaintext - Normal text or data, before the enciphering
process or after the deciphering process.
Salting - Adding random data to a password prior to
performing a one way hash on it. This is a means of stopping
a dictionary attack.

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7
EXAMPLE SYSTEM
1. Kerberos:
1. Purpose
2. Authentication
3. Server and ticket granting server
4. keys and tickets, use of ASS and TGS, replicated servers
2. Kerberos V4:
1. Names,
2. Inter-realm authentication,
3. key version numbers
3. Kerberos V5:
1. Names. Realms,
2. Delegation, forwarding and proxies
3. Ticket lifetimes, revoking tickets, multiple realms
1. Kerberos:
1.1 Purpose:
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol. It is designed
to provide strong authentication for client/server applications by
using secret-key cryptography. A free implementation of this
protocol is available from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Kerberos is available in many commercial products as
well.
The Internet is an insecure place. Many of the protocols
used in the Internet do not provide any security. Tools to "sniff"
passwords off of the network are in common use by malicious
hackers. Thus, applications which send an unencrypted password
over the network are extremely vulnerable. Other applications rely
on the client to restrict its activities to those which it is allowed to
do, with no other enforcement by the server.
Some sites attempt to use firewalls to solve their network
security problems. Unfortunately, firewalls assume that the hackers
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are always from the outside, which is often a very bad assumption.
Most of the really damaging incidents of computer crime are carried
out by insiders. Firewalls also have a significant disadvantage in
that they restrict the usage of internet by the users.
Kerberos was created by MIT as a solution to these
network security problems. The Kerberos protocol uses strong
cryptography so that a client can prove its identity to a server (and
vice versa) across an insecure network connection. After a client
and server have used Kerberos to prove their identity, they can also
encrypt all of their communications to assure privacy and data
integrity as they go about their business.
The first published repot on Kerberos listed the following
requirements;
1. Secure: Kerberos should be strong enough that a potential
opponent does not find it to be the weak link.
2. Reliable: Kerberos should be highly reliable and should
employ distributed server architecture, with one system able
to back up another.
3. Transparent: The user should not be aware that
authentication is taking place, beyond the requirement to
enter a password.
4. Scalable: The system should be capable of supporting large
numbers of clients and servers.
Two versions:
Version 4
Version 5
1.2 Keys:
1. Keys: Privacy through Encryption
Kerberos messages are encrypted with various encryption
keys to ensure that no one can tamper with the clients ticket or with
other data in a Kerberos message.
Possible Kerberos keys include:
2. Long-termkey
This is a key which is known only to the target server and the
KDC with which the clients ticket is encrypted.
3. Client/server session key
A short-term, single-session key that is created by the KDC
and used to encrypt the client-to-server and server-to-client
messages after identity and authorization have been confirmed.
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4. KDC/user session key
The KDC and the user share a secret encryption key as well,
which is used, for example, to encrypt the message to the client
containing a session key.
1.3 Four parties:
Alice ---- he client workstation
Authentication Server AS) ------- Authenticates the user during
login
Ticket Granting Server TGS) ------- Issues tickets to certify proof of
identity
Bob ------ he server offering services such as network printing. File
sharing or an application program.
TGS is to certify to the servers in the network that a user is really
what he claims to be.
1.4 How Kerberos works
The Kerberos Authentication System uses a series of
encrypted messages to prove to a verifier that a client is running on
behalf of a particular user. The Kerberos protocol is based in part
on the Needham and Schroeder authentication protocol but with
changes to support the needs of the environment for which it was
developed. Among these changes are the use of timestamps to
reduce the number of messages needed for basic authentication,
the addition of a ``ticket-granting'' service to support subsequent
authentication without re-entry of a principal's password, and
different approach to cross-realm authentication (authentication of a
principal registered with a different authentication server than the
verifier).
The remainder of this section describes the Kerberos
protocol. The description is simplified for clarity; additional fields are
present in the actual protocol. Readers should consult RFC 1510
for a more thorough description of the Kerberos protocol.
1.4.1 Kerberos Encryption
Though conceptually, Kerberos authentication proves that a
client is running on behalf of a particular user, a more precise
statement is that the client has knowledge of an encryption key that
is known by only the user and the authentication server. In
Kerberos, the user's encryption key is derived from and should be
thought of as a password; we will refer to it as such in this article.
Similarly, each application server shares an encryption key with the
authentication server; we will call this key the server key.
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Encryption in the present implementation of Kerberos uses
the data encryption standard (DES). It is a property of DES that if
cipher text (encrypted data) is decrypted with the same key used to
encrypt it, the plaintext (original data) appears. If different
encryption keys are used for encryption and decryption, or if the
cipher text is modified, the result will be unintelligible, and the
checksum in the Kerberos message will not match the data. This
combination of encryption and the checksum provides integrity and
confidentiality for encrypted Kerberos messages.
1.5 The Kerberos Ticket
The client and server do not initially share an encryption key.
Whenever a client authenticates itself to a new verifier it relies on
the authentication server to generate a new encryption key and
distribute it securely to both parties. This new encryption key is
called a session key and the Kerberos ticket is used to distribute it
to the verifier.
The Kerberos ticket is a certificate issued by an
authentication server encrypted using the server key. Among other
information, the ticket contains the random session key that will be
used for authentication of the principal to the verifier, the name of
the principal to whom the session key was issued, and an
expiration time after which the session key is no longer valid. The
ticket is not sent directly to the verifier, but is instead sent to the
client who forwards it to the verifier as part of the application
request. Because the ticket is encrypted in the server key, known
only by the authentication server and intended verifier, it is not
possible for the client to modify the ticket without detection.
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1.5.1 Application request and response
Messages 3 and 4 in figure 1 show the application request
and response, the most basic exchange in the Kerberos protocol. It
is through this exchange that a client proves to a verifier that it
knows the session key embedded in a Kerberos ticket. There are
two parts to the application request, a ticket (described above) and
an authenticator. The authenticator includes, among other fields:
the current time, a checksum, and an optional encryption key, all
encrypted with the session key from the accompanying ticket.
Figure 1: Basic Kerberos authentication protocol (simplified)
Upon receipt of the application request, the verifier decrypts
the ticket, extracts the session key, and uses the session key to
decrypt the authenticator. If the same key was used to encrypt the
authenticator as used to decrypt it, the checksum will match and
the verifier can assume the authenticator was generated by the
principal named in the ticket and to whom the session key was
issued. This is not by itself sufficient for authentication since an
attacker can intercept an authenticator and replay it later to
impersonate the user. For this reason the verifier additionally
checks the timestamp to make sure that the authenticator is fresh.
If the timestamp is within a specified window (typically 5 minutes)
centered around the current time on the verifier, and if the
timestamp has not been seen on other requests within that window,
the verifier accepts the request as authentic.
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At this point the identity of the client has been verified by the
server. For some applications the client also wants to be sure of the
server's identity. If such mutual authentication is required, the
server generates an application response by extracting the client's
time from the authenticator, and returns it to the client together with
other information, all encrypted using the session key.
1.6 Authentication request and response
The client requires a separate ticket and session key for
each verifier with which it communicates. When a client wishes to
create an association with a particular verifier, the client uses the
authentication request and response, messages 1 and 2 from figure
1, to obtain a ticket and session key from the authentication server.
In the request, the client sends the authentication server its claimed
identity, the name of the verifier, a requested expiration time for the
ticket, and a random number that will be used to match the
authentication response with the request.
In its response, the authentication server returns the session
key, the assigned expiration time, the random number from the
request, the name of the verifier, and other information from the
ticket, all encrypted with the user's password registered with the
authentication server, together with a ticket containing similar
information, and which is to be forwarded to the verifier as part of
the application request. Together, the authentication request and
response and the application request and response comprise the
basic Kerberos authentication protocol.
1.6.1 Obtaining additional tickets
The basic Kerberos authentication protocol allows a client
with knowledge of the user's password to obtain a ticket and
session key for and to prove its identity to any verifier registered
with the authentication server. The user's password must be
presented each time the user performs authentication with a new
verifier. This can be cumbersome; instead, a system should support
single sign-on, where the user logs in to the system once, providing
the password at that time, and with subsequent authentication
occurring automatically. The obvious way to support this, caching
the user's password on the workstation, is dangerous. Though a
Kerberos ticket and the key associated with it are valid for only a
short time, the user's password can be used to obtain tickets, and
to impersonate the user until the password is changed. A better
approach, and that used by Kerberos, is to cache only tickets and
encryption keys (collectively called credentials) that will work for a
limited period.
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The ticket granting exchange of the Kerberos protocol allows
a user to obtain tickets and encryption keys using such short-lived
credentials, without re-entry of the user's password. When the user
first logs in, an authentication request is issued and a ticket and
session key for the ticket granting service is returned by the
authentication server. This ticket, called a ticket granting ticket, has
a relatively short life (typically on the order of 8 hours). The
response is decrypted, the ticket and session key saved, and the
user's password forgotten.
Subsequently, when the user wishes to prove its identity to a
new verifier, a new ticket is requested from the authentication
server using the ticket granting exchange. The ticket granting
exchange is identical to the authentication exchange except that
the ticket granting request has embedded within it an application
request, authenticating the client to the authentication server, and
the ticket granting response is encrypted using the session key
from the ticket granting ticket, rather than the user's password.
Figure 2 shows the complete Kerberos authentication
protocol. Messages 1 and 2 are used only when the user first logs
in to the system, messages 3 and 4 whenever a user authenticates
to a new verifier, and message 5 is used each time the user
authenticates itself. Message 6 is optional and used only when the
user requires mutual-authentication by the verifier.
Figure 2: Complete Kerberos Authentication Protocol
(simplified)
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2 Kerberos Version 4:
2.1. Key concepts:
KDC (Key Distribution Centre):
This is physically securing the node with complete
authentication database. The KDC shares a secret key, known as a
master key, with each principal. When Alice informs the KDC that
she wants to talk to Bob, the KDC invents a session key Kab for
Alice and Bob to share, encrypts Kab with Alices master key for
Alice, encrypts Kab with Bobs master key for Bob, and returns all
this information to Alice. The message consisting of the session key
Kab encrypted with Bobs master key is known as a ticket to Bob.
The session key Kab together with the ticket to Bob are known as
Alices credentials to Bob.
1. Ticket Granting Ticket(TGT):
During the initial login, the workstation, on Alices behalf,
asks the KDC for a session key for Alice. The KDC generates a
session key Sa, and transmits Sa to the workstation. The KDC also
sends a ticket granting ticket which is Sa encrypted with the KDCs
master key.
2. Ticket Granting Server (TGS):
Other than TGTs which are received from KDC, the other
tickets are all received from the TGS. TGS has to have the same
database as the KDC. So in Kerberos, the TGS and KDC is really
same thing. It would be easier to understand Kerberos if the
documentation didnt refer to two different entities and two sets of
protocol messages that basically do the same thing.
3. Session Key and Ticket-granting Ticket (TGT)
The messages between a host and the KDC can be
protected using the principals master key. For every request to
KDC from the principal needs the session key. It insists on principal
retyping in the password. It is important to remember the principals
password and the principals master key derived from the
password.
To avoid potentially too much exposure to password/master
key it is necessary at initial login, a per principal session key SB (for
Bob) is requested from KDC.SB has a limited valid time period. A
TGT for Bob is also issued by the KDC, which includes the session
key SB and Bobs identification information; all encrypted using the
KDCs master key.
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Bobs Kerberos client (e.g., the login host) decrypts and remembers
the SB, for subsequent message with KDC and the TGT, for
reminding/convincing KDC to use SB with it as well. It is not
necessary to remember or store the password. Every new request
to KDC must include TGT in the request message and the new
tickets from KDC must be decrypted with SB.
Login:
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2.2 Realms:
It is very difficult to have a single KDC for an entire network.
With replicated KDCs the bottleneck problems can be eliminated
and the single point of failure can be easily identified. But whoever
manages the KDC can access every users master key, and
therefore access everything that every user can access. Everyone
must also trust the physical controls around every replica of the
KDC, and there would have to be widely dispersed replicas to
ensure availability and convenience.
Because of this reason the network are divided into realms.
Each and every realm has its own KDC database. There can be
multiple KDCs in a realm, but they would be equivalent, have the
same KDC, aster key, and have the same database of principals
master keys. Two KDC/s in different realms, would have different
KDC master keys and totally different principals master key
databases, since they would be responsible for a different set of
principals.
2.3 Key components:
1. Realm = One organization or one trust domain
2. Each realm has its own set of principles including KDC/TGT
3. Each Principal's name = Name + Instance + Realm
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4. Each principle is of 40 characters each with null terminated.
5. Instance = Particular Server or Human role (administrator, game
player)
6. In V4, both realms should have a direct trust relationship and
chaining prohibited
Interrealm authentication:
3. Kerberos V5:
3.1Name:
1. Kerberos V5 contains two components: REALM and the
NAME.
2. The Name component contains a type and a varying number
of arbitrary strings.
2. This arbitrary string field serves the purpose of INSTANCE
field with kerberos4.
3. The REALMS field can be DNS standard names or X.500
names, and the syntax allows for other name types as well.
3.2 Delegation of rights:
One way delegation could be provided is for Alice to send
bob her master key (in an encrypted message to bob.), allowing
him to obtain tickets to whatever resources he might need on Alice
behalf. That is clearly not desirable, since it would allow bob forever
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be able to impersonate Alice. These mechanisms are inconvenient
and /or insecure and therefore undesirable but they wouldnt work
with Kerberos (either V4 or V5). Kerberos V5 explicitly allows
delegation by allowing Alice to ask for TGT with a network layer
address different from hers. As a matter of fact it allows Alice to
specify multiple addresses to include (in which case the ticket can
be used form any of the specified addresses), or allows Alice to
request that no address be included (in which case the ticket can
be used for any address.) Kerberos V5 supports two forms of
limited delegations:
1. Alice can give Bob tickets to the specific services he will need to
access on her behalf (rather than giving him a TGT, which will allow
him to request tickets to any services.)
2. When requesting a ticket or TGT that she intends to give Bob,
Alice can request that the field AUTHORIZATION-DATA be added
to the ticket or TGT.
The fields is not interpreted by Kerberos, but it instead
application-specific, which means it is left up to the application to
define and use the field. The intention is that the field specifies to
the application restrictions on what Bob is allowed to do with the
ticket. If the field is a TGT Alice gives to bob, the field will be copied
by the KDC into any ticket bob gets using that TGT. OSF/DSE
security and windows 2000 make extensive use of this field. There
are two flags in a TGT involving delegation permission.
One indicates that a TGT is forward able, which means that
it can be exchanged for a TGT with a different layer address. This
gives Alice permission to give bob a TGT, with which bob can
request ticket to any resources on Alice behalf. When Alice uses a
forward able TGT to request a TGT to be used from bobs network
layer address, she also specifies how the FORWARDABLE flag
set, and then bob will be able to use that TGT to obtain a TGT from
some other entity Carol, allowing Carol to act on Alices behalf. The
other flag that the TGT is proxiable, meaning that it can be used to
request tickets for use what a different network layer address than
the one in the TGT. This gives Alice permission to get tickets that
she can give to Bob, but not a TGT for use by bob. The Kerberos
documentation refers to tickets Alice gives to bob for use on her
behalf for her PROXY TICKETS.
3.3 Ticket Lifetime:
In Kerberos V5, tickets can be issued with virtually unlimited
life times. The time stamp format is an ASN.1- defined quantity that
is 17 octets long. Although it has a virtually unlimited lifetime, it is
only in seconds, and Kerberos V5, in some cases, would have
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preferred time expressed down to micro-seconds. Long- lived
tickets pose serious security risk, because once created they
cannot be revoked. So V5 has a number of mechanisms for
implementing revocable long-lived tickets. These mechanisms
involve use of several timestamp fields in tickets.
1. START-TIME time the ticket becomes valid.
2. END-TIME time the ticket expires.
3. AUTHTIME time at which Alice first logged in, that is, when
she was granted an initial TGT. AUTHTIME is copied from a
initial TGT into each ticket she requests based on the TGT.
4. RENEW-TILL latest legal end-time.
3.3.1. Renewable Tickets:
Rather than creating a ticket valid for say, 100 years, the
KDC can give Alice a ticket that will be valid for 100years, but only
if she keeps renewing it, say once a day. Renewing a ticket
involves giving the ticket to the KDC and having the KDC reissue it.
If there is some reason to want to revoke Alice privileges, this can
be done by telling the KDC not to renew any of the Alices tickets.
The KDC is configured with the maximum validity time for a ticket,
say a day. If there is a reason for Alices ticket to be valid for longer
than that time, then when Alice requests the ticket, the KDC sets
the RENEWABLE flag inside the ticket. The RENEW-TILL time
specifies the time beyond which the ticket cannot be renewed. The
END-TIME specifies the time at which the ticket will expire. When
ALICE gives the KDC a renewable ticket and requests that it be
renewed, the KDC does this by changing END-TIME to be the
maximum ticket lifetime as configured into the users entry in the
KDC database, added to the current time.
3.3.2 Postdated Tickets:
Postdated tickets are used to run a batch job at sometime in
the future. Suppose you want to issue a ticket starting a week from
now and good for two hours. One possible method is to issue a
ticket with an expiration time of one week plus two hours from the
present time, but that would mean the ticket would be valid form the
time it was issued until it expired. Kerberos instead allows a ticket
to become valid at some point in the future. Kerberos does this by
using the START-TIME timestamp, indicating when the ticket
should first become valid. Such a ticket is known as postdated
ticket. In order to allow a revocation of the postdated ticket
between the time it was issued and the time it became valid, theres
an invalid flag inside the ticket that the Kerberos sets in the initially
issued postdated ticket. When the time specified START-TIME
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occurs, Alice can present the ticket to the KDC and the KDC will
clear the invalid flag. This additional step gives the opportunity to
revoke the postdated ticket by warning the KDC. If the KDC is
configured to revoke the postdated ticket, the validation request will
fail.
QUESTIONS:
1. Write a short note on Kerberos
2. What are the various types of Kerberos
3. Explain the concept of interrealm authentication with Kerberos
4. Give an example for the Kerberos system.
5. What are the various types of tickets with Kerberos V5.
6. Explain about the various keys used with Kerberos.

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8
NETWORK SECURITY
1. Email security
SMTP: (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol)
PGP :(Pretty Good Privacy)
PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail)
2. IP security
Introduction
Security Architecture
Encapsulating Security Payload
3. Network Management security
Overview
Management Information Base (MIB)
Security
1. Electronic mail security:
Nowadays the electronic mail transactions are getting the
importance because any user can send message to another user
which may contain video, music, pictures etc. The wide usage of
Email system has increased the need of security with the same. An
email message consists of two parts:
1) Contents (OR) body
2) Headers
Various protocols are used with email transaction to provide the
security services such as:
1. Origin Authentication
Making sure you know who the message came from.
2. Content Integrity
Ensuring the message has not been altered after being sent.
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3. Non-Repudiation
Making sure the originator cannot deny sending a message
at a later date
4. Encryption
Encoding the content of the message to prevent
unauthorized reading.
The following protocols are supporting the secured email
transaction.
SMTP(Simple Mail Transfer Protocol)
PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail)
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)
1.1SMTP: (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol)
This SMTP is mainly used for email communications. The
senders end gives the email message to the local SMTP server.
This server in turn transfers the message to the receivers SMTP
server. This SMTP protocol works on top of TCP/IP.
Three steps:
1. Sender to Sender SMTP
2. Sender SMTP to receivers SMTP
3. Receivers SMTP to receiver.
Characteristics:
1. It is very simple architecture.
2. It uses human understandable ASCII test format.
3. The receivers end can access the SMTP server by using
any other simple email protocols like Post Office Protocol
(POP), Internet Mail Access Protocol (IMAP) etc.
Detailed steps:
1. Based on the clients request, the server sends a Ready for
Mail (RFM) reply, indicating that it can accept an email
message from the client.
2. The client then sends a Hello command to start the session.
Sender Senders
SMTP
Receivers
SMTP
Receiver
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3. The server then sends back an acknowledgement by
sending its own DNS name.
4. The client now sends one or more email messages to the
server.
5. The email transfer begins with a MAIL command.
6. The recipient allocates buffers to store the incoming email
message and sends back an OK response to the client.
7. The client now sends the list of the intended recipients of the
email message by one or more RCPT command( One per
recipient)
8. After all RCPT commands, the client sends a DATA
command, to indicate that the client is ready to start
transmission.
9. The server responds back with start mail input message
which indicated that it is ready to accept the email message
10. The client sends the email message an identifier provided by
the server to indicate that the transmission is over.
Some of the more common SMTP security provisions include:
o Checking the IP address of a device attempting connection
and refusing to even start an SMTP session unless it is in a
list of authorized client devices.
o Restriction of certain commands or features, such as e-mail
relaying, to authorized users or client servers. This is
sometimes done by requiring authentication via the SMTP
extention AUTH before the command will be accepted.
o Limiting the use of commands such as EXPN to prevent
unauthorized users from determining the e-mail addresses of
users on mailing lists.
o Checking the validity of envelope information before
accepting a message for delivery. Some servers will first
verify that the originator's e-mail address is valid before
agreeing to accept the MAIL command. Many will check the
recipient's address and refuse the message if delivery is not
to a local mailbox. Others use even more advanced
techniques.
o Limiting the size of e-mail messages that may be sent or the
number that may be sent in a given period of time.
o Logging all access to the server to keep records of server
use and check for abuse.
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1.2PGP :(Pretty Good Privacy):
Introduction:
Phil Zimmerman introduced the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
protocol.
Characteristics:
1. It supports the basic requirements of cryptography.
2. It is quite simple to use and its source code and
documentation is completely free to use.
3. It is more widely used comparing to PEM.
4. It mainly supports Encryption, Non repudiation and integrity
of the message.
How PGP works?
PGP combines some of the best features of both
conventional and public key cryptography. PGP is a hybrid
cryptosystem. When a user encrypts plaintext with PGP, PGP first
compresses the plaintext. Data compression saves modem
transmission time and disk space and, more importantly,
strengthens cryptographic security. Most cryptanalysis techniques
exploit patterns found in the plaintext to crack the cipher.
Compression reduces these patterns in the plaintext, thereby
greatly enhancing resistance to cryptanalysis. (Files that are too
short to compress or which don't compress well aren't
compressed.)
PGP then creates a session key, which is a one-time-only
secret key. This key is a random number generated from the
random movements of your mouse and the keystrokes you type.
This session key works with a very secure, fast conventional
encryption algorithm to encrypt the plaintext; the result is cipher
text. Once the data is encrypted, the session key is then encrypted
to the recipient's public key. This public key-encrypted session key
is transmitted along with the cipher text to the recipient.
Decryption works in the reverse. The recipient's copy of PGP
uses his or her private key to recover the temporary session key,
which PGP then uses to decrypt the conventionally-encrypted
cipher text.
The combination of the two encryption methods combines
the convenience of public key encryption with the speed of
conventional encryption. Conventional encryption is about 1, 000
times faster than public key encryption. Public key encryption in
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turn provides a solution to key distribution and data transmission
issues. Used together, performance and key distribution are
improved without any sacrifice in security.
Steps in PGP:
1. Digital Signature
2. Compression
3. Encryption
4. Digital enveloping
5. Base 64 encoding.
Step1: Digital signatures:
A digital signature serves the same purpose as a
handwritten signature. However, a handwritten signature is easy to
counterfeit. A digital signature is superior to a handwritten signature
in that it is nearly impossible to counterfeit, plus it attests to the
contents of the information as well as to the identity of the signer.
The basic manner in which digital signatures are, Instead of
encrypting information using someone else's public key, user
encrypts it with his own private key. If the information can be
decrypted with users public key, then it must have originated from
the very same user.
Step 2: Compression:
An improvement on the above scheme is the addition of a
one-way hash function in the process. A one-way hash function
takes variable-length input in this case, a message of any length,
even thousands or millions of bits and produces a fixed-length
output; say, 160-bits. The hash function ensures that, if the
information is changed in any way even by just one bit an
entirely different output value is produced.
PGP uses a cryptographically strong hash function on the
plaintext the user is signing. This generates a fixed-length data item
known as a message digest Then PGP uses the digest and the
private key to create the "signature." PGP transmits the signature
and the plaintext together. Upon receipt of the message, the
recipient uses PGP to recompute the digest, thus verifying the
signature. PGP can encrypt the plaintext or not; signing plaintext is
useful if some of the recipients are not interested in or capable of
verifying the signature.
Step 3: Encryption:
The compressed output of step 2 is encrypted with a
symmetric key. Normally IDEA algorithm in CFB mode is used.
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Step 4: Digital enveloping:
The output of step 3 is now encrypted with the receivers
public key. The output of step 3 and step 4 together form a digital
envelope.
PGP certificates:
A digital certificate is data that functions much like a physical
certificate. A digital certificate is information included with a
person's public key that helps others verify that a key is genuine or
valid. Digital certificates are used to thwart attempts to substitute
one person's key for another.
A digital certificate consists of three things:
A public key.
Certificate information. ("Identity" information about the user,
such as name, user ID, and so on.)
One or more digital signatures.
The purpose of the digital signature on a certificate is to state
that the certificate information has been attested to by some other
person or entity. The digital signature does not attest to the
authenticity of the certificate as a whole; it vouches only that the
signed identity information goes along with, or is bound to, the
public key.
Certificate formats
A digital certificate is basically a collection of identifying
information bound together with a public key and signed by a
trusted third party to prove its authenticity. A digital certificate can
be one of a number of different formats.
PGP recognizes two different certificate formats:
PGP certificates
X.509 certificates
PGP certificate format
A PGP certificate includes (but is not limited to) the following
information:
The PGP version number this identifies which version of
PGP was used to create the key associated with the
certificate.
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The certificate holder's public keys the public portion of
your key pair, together with the algorithm of the key: RSA,
DH (Diffie-Hellman), or DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm).
The certificate holder's information this consists of
"identity" information about the user, such as his or her
name, user ID, photograph, and so on.
The digital signature of the certificate owner also
called a self-signature; this is the signature using the
corresponding private key of the public key associated with
the certificate.
The certificate's validity period the certificate's start
date/ time and expiration date/ time; indicates when the
certificate will expire.
The preferred symmetric encryption algorithm for the
key indicates the encryption algorithm to which the
certificate owner prefers to have information encrypted. The
supported algorithms are CAST, IDEA or Triple-DES.
One unique aspect of the PGP certificate format is that a
single certificate can contain multiple signatures. Several or many
people may sign the key/ identification pair to attest to their own
assurance that the public key definitely belongs to the specified
owner.
Trust models
In relatively closed systems, such as within a small
company, it is easy to trace a certification path back to the root.
However, users must often communicate with people outside of
their corporate environment, including some whom they have never
met, such as vendors, customers, clients, associates, and so on.
Establishing a line of trust to those who have not been explicitly
trusted by your CA is difficult.
Companies follow one or another trust model, which dictates
how users will go about establishing certificate validity. There are
three different models:
Direct Trust
Hierarchical Trust
A Web of Trust
Direct Trust:
Direct trust is the simplest trust model. In this model, a user
trusts that a key is valid because he or she knows where it came
from. All cryptosystems use this form of trust in some way. For
example, in web browsers, the root Certification Authority keys are
directly trusted because they were shipped by the manufacturer. If
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there is any form of hierarchy, it extends from these directly trusted
certificates.
In PGP, a user who validates keys herself and never sets
another certificate to be a trusted introducer is using direct trust.
Direct trust
Hierarchical Trust:
In a hierarchical system, there are a number of "root"
certificates from which trust extends. These certificates may certify
certificates themselves, or they may certify certificates that certify
still other certificates down some chain. Consider it as a big trust
"tree." The "leaf" certificate's validity is verified by tracing backward
from its certifier, to other certifiers, until a directly trusted root
certificate is found.
.
Hierarchical trust
Web of Trust:
A web of trust encompasses both of the other models, but
also adds the notion that trust is in the eye of the beholder (which is
the real-world view) and the idea that more information is better. It
is thus a cumulative trust model. A certificate might be trusted
directly, or trusted in some chain going back to a directly trusted
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root certificate (the meta-introducer), or by some group of
introducers.
Perhaps you've heard of the term six degrees of separation,
which suggests that any person in the world can determine some
link to any other person in the world using six or fewer other people
as intermediaries. This is a web of introducers.
It is also the PGP view of trust. PGP uses digital signatures
as its form of introduction. When any user signs another's key, he
or she becomes an introducer of that key. As this process goes on,
it establishes a web of trust.
In a PGP environment, any user can act as a certifying
authority. Any PGP user can validate another PGP user's public
key certificate. However, such a certificate is only valid to another
user if the relying party recognizes the validator as a trusted
introducer.
1.3 PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail):
Introduction:
1. This is an email security standard adopted by the Internet
Architecture Board(IAB) to provide secure electronic mail
communication over the Internet .
2. This was initially developed by the Internet Research Task
Force(IRTF) and Privacy Security Force(IETF) PEM working
Group.
3. PEM specifications are covered by RFC numbers 1421 to
1424.
4. This provides three main cryptographic functions: Encryption,
Non-repudiation, Message integrity.
1. PEM functions:
Canonical Conversion
Digital Signature
Encryption
Base 64 Encoding
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2. Canonical conversion:
PEM transforms each email message into an abstract,
canonical representation. This representation will allow the
communication among the systems regardless of its architecture
and the operating system of the sending and the receiving
computers. This step is essential because in the internetworking
system works on different architecture and operating system.
3. Digital Signature:
This works in a typical model by using any message digest
algorithm such as MD2, MD5 etc. The message digest is then
encrypted with the senders private key to form the senders digital
signature.
4. Encryption:
The original email and the digital signature are encrypted
together with a symmetric key.
This method uses DES or DES-3 algorithm in CBC mode.
5. Base 64 encoding:
This is the last step in PEM. This process transforms
arbitrary binary input into printable character output. In this
technique, the binary input is processed in blocks of 3 octets or 24
bits are considered to be made up of 4 sets, each of 6 bits. Each
such set of 6 bits is mapped into an 8 bit output character in this
process.
2. IP Security
2.1 Introduction:
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a protocol suite for securing
Internet Protocol (IP) communications by authenticating and
encrypting each IP packet of a data stream. This security
mechanism is very important because IP packets are transffered in
a plain text format.
Two levels of security in this scheme:
1. Offer security at the IP packet level itself.
2. Implementing the higher level security mechanisms,
depending on the requirements.
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Levels of Security:
The Internet Architecture Board(IAB) prepared a report
called as security in the Internet architectre(RFC1636). The
outcome of the report and the study conducted by IAB , in 19995
IETF publiched five security based standards related to IPSec.Ipv4
supports all the standards mentioned by IETF.
2.2 Security architecture
Internet Key Exchange (IKE and IKEv2) to set up a security
association (SA) by handling negotiation of protocols and
algorithms and to generate the encryption and authentication
keys to be used by IPsec.
Authentication Header(AH) to provide connectionless
integrity and data origin authentication for Ipdatagrams and
to provide protection against replay attacks.
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) to provide
confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless
integrity, an anti-replay service (a form of partial sequence
integrity), and limited traffic flow confidentiality.
Application Layer
Transport Layer
Internet Layer
Data Link Layer
Physical Layer
Secondlevel of security
First level of security
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Authentication Header
Authentication Header (AH) is a member of the IPsec
protocol suite. It provides authentication, integrity and an optional
anti-replay service. The IPSec AH is a header in an IP packet,
which contains a cryptographic checksum for the contents of the
packet. This is simply inserted between the IP header and any
subsequent packet contents.
AH operates directly on top of IP, using IP protocol number 51.
AH packet datagram:
0 - 7 bit 8 - 15 bit 16 - 23 bit 24 - 31 bit
Next header Payload length RESERVED
Security parameters index (SPI)
Sequence number
Authentication data (variable)
Meaning:
Next header
The Next Header is an 8-bit field that identifies the type of
the next payload after the Authentication Header. The value
of this field is chosen from the set of IP Protocol Numbers
defined in the most recent "Assigned Numbers.
Payload length
Size of AH packet.
RESERVED
Reserved for future use (all zero until then).
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Identifies the security parameters, which, in combination with
the IP address, then identify the security association
implemented with this packet.
Sequence number
A monotonically increasing number, used to prevent replay
attacks.
Authentication data
Contains the integrity check value (ICV) necessary to
authenticate the packet; it may contain padding.
2.3 Encapsulating Security Payload
This provides data confidentiality. The ESP protocol also
defines a new header to be inserted into the IP packet. ESP
Processing also includes the transformation of the protected data
into an unreadable, encrypted format. Normally the EXP will be
inside the AH.
ESP packet format:
0 - 7 bit 8 - 15 bit 16 - 23 bit 24 - 31 bit
Sequence number
Payload data (variable)
Padding (0-255 bytes)
Pad Length Next Header
Authentication Data (variable)
Field meanings:
Identifies the security parameters in combination with IP
address.
Sequence number
A monotonically increasing number, used to prevent replay
attacks..
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Payload data
The data to be transferred.
Padding
Used with some block ciphers to pad the data to the full
length of a block.
Pad length
Size of padding in bytes.
Next header
Identifies the protocol of the payload data. The value of this
field is chosen from the set of IP Protocol Numbers defined
in the most recent "Assigned Numbers" .
Authentication data
Contains the data used to authenticate the packet.
2.4 Modes of operation
IPsec can be implemented in a host-to-host transport mode,
as well as in a network tunnel mode.
1. Tunnel mode:
In tunnel mode, an encrypted tennel is established between
two hosts. In this mode IPSec protects the entire IP datagram. It
takes an IP datagram , adds the IPSec header and trailer and
encrypts the whole thing. IT then adds new IP header to this
encrypted datagram.
2. Transport mode
In transport mode, only the payload (the data you transfer) of
the IP packet is encrypted and/or authenticated. The routing is
intact, since the IP header is neither modified nor encrypted;
however, when the authentication header is used, the IP
addresses cannot be translated, this will invalidate the hash
value.. The transport and application layers are always secured
by hash, so they cannot be modified in any way. Transport
mode is used .
3. Network Management:
A network management system comprises:
Network elementsSometimes called managed devices,
network elements are hardware devices such as computers,
routers, and terminal servers that are connected to networks.
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AgentsAgents are software modules that reside in network
elements. They collect and store management information
such as the number of error packets received by a network
element.
Managed objectA managed object is a characteristic of
something that can be managed. For example, a list of
currently active TCP circuits in a particular host computer is
a managed object. Managed objects differ from variables,
which are particular object instances. Using our example, an
object instance is a single active TCP circuit in a particular
host computer. Managed objects can be scalar (defining a
single object instance) or tabular (defining multiple, related
instances).
Management information base (MIB) -- A MIB is a collection
of managed objects residing in a virtual information store.
Collections of related managed objects are defined in
specific MIB modules.
Syntax notationA syntax notation is a language used to
describe a MIB's managed objects in a machine-
independent format. Consistent use of a syntax notation
allows different types of computers to share information.
Internet management systems use a subset of the
International Organization for Standardization's (ISO's) Open
System Interconnection (OSI) Abstract Syntax Notation
(ASN.1) to define both the packets exchanged by the
management protocol and the objects that are to be
managed.
Structure of Management Information (SMI) -- The SMI
defines the rules for describing management information.
The SMI is defined using ASN.1.
Network management stations (NMSs) -- Sometimes called
consoles, these devices execute management applications
that monitor and control network elements. Physically, NMSs
are usually engineering workstation-caliber computers with
fast CPUs, megapixel color displays, substantial memory,
and abundant disk space. At least one NMS must be present
in each managed environment.
PartiesNewly defined in SNMPv2, a party is a logical
SNMPv2 entity that can initiate or receive SNMPv2
communication. Each SNMPv2 party comprises a single,
unique party identity, a logical network location, a single
authentication protocol, and a single privacy protocol.
SNMPv2 messages are communicated between two parties.
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An SNMPv2 entity can define multiple parties, each with
different parameters. For example, different parties can use
different authentication and/or privacy protocols.
Management protocolA management protocol is used to
convey management information between agents and
NMSs. SNMP is the Internet community's de facto standard
management protocol.
3.1 Overview
The Simple Network Management Protocol, also known as
SNMP, is a vital protocol for Network Administrators. The SNMP
Protocol uses IP with UDP or TCP. The SNMP protocol allows an
Administrator to request information about one or more network
devices hardware, software or configuration from a single point of
management.
The SNMP Protocol has two sides, the agent and the
management stations. The agent sends data about itself to the
management station. The management station collects data from
all the agents on the network. The protocol is not identical on each
side. The agent sends alerts called traps and answers requests that
were sent by the management station. The management station
catches and decodes the traps. The management station also
requests specific information from the agent.
The agent is a server, router, printer, bridge or workstations.
Any network device that can use the IP protocol can be an SNMP
agent. The software written to monitor the agents hardware and
send alerts is primarily the responsibility of the vendor. The initial
design of the SNMP protocol called for every vendor to define the
same hardware variables in their SNMP alerts. This was so any
type of management station could decode the alerts. Todays
technologically advance hardware is too different to follow this
design. This is why vendors are responsible for SNMP agent
software. This has also caused the development of SNMPv2 and
SNMPv3.
The SNMP agent will monitor hardware and send a trap is
any problems occur. For example, if a network printer runs low on
toner or a server has a hard drive go bad, a trap will be sent to the
management station. The management station catches the trap
and acts on the trap as configured by the administrator. The
administrator could configure the management station to send an e-
mail or have the administrator paged.
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The management station may also send a request to the
agent. In this case the SNMP agent will reply to the management
station with the specific data. For example the management station
may wish to view the agents hardware event log and see the
current BIOS level. The agent will reply with SNMP packets
containing the hardwares events and BIOS level. The information
is passed through requests and replies with the use of the MIB or
the Management Information Base.
The management station is responsible for decoding the
SNMP packets and providing an interface to the administrator. The
interface can be a GUI or command line. The interface is the key to
the SNMP protocol. The single point of management for
administering several network devices.
3.2 Management Information Base (MIB)
SNMP lets TCP/IP-based network management clients use
a TCP/IP-based internetwork to exchange information about the
configuration and status of nodes. The information available is
defined by a set of managed objects referred to as the SNMP
Management Information Base (MIB). The subset of managed
objects that make up the TCP/IP portion of the MIB is maintained
by each TCP/IP node. SNMP can also generates trap messages
used to report significant TCP/IP events asynchronously to
interested clients.
SNMP applications run in a network management station
(NMS) and issue queries to gather information about the status,
configuration, and performance of external network devices (called
network elements in SNMP terminology). For example, HP Open
view software is an example of a network management station, and
a Cisco 4500 Router with its SNMP agent enabled could be
considered an example of a network element. The following
picture is indicating the simple architecture.
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SNMP agents run in network elements and respond to NMS
queries (GETs). In addition, agents send unsolicited reports (called
traps) back to the NMS when certain network activity occurs. These
traps can spawn events such as e-mail alerts, automatic pages or
network server parameter modifications.
For security reasons, the SNMP agent validates each
request from an SNMP manager before responding to the request,
by verifying that the manager belongs to an SNMP community with
access privileges to the agent.
An SNMP community is a logical relationship between an
SNMP agent and one or more SNMP managers. The community
has a name, and all members of a community have the same
access privileges: either read-only (members can view
configuration and performance information) or read-write (members
can view configuration and performance information, and also
change the configuration).
All SNMP message exchanges consist of a community name
and a data field, which contains the SNMP operation and its
associated operands. You can configure the SNMP agent to
receive requests and send responses only from managers that are
members of a known community. If the agent knows the
community name in the SNMP message and knows that the
manager generating the request is a member of that community, it
considers the message to be authentic and gives it the access
allowed for members of that community. Thus, the SNMP
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community prevents unauthorized managers from viewing or
changing the configuration of a router or other SNMP manageable
device.
In summary, the SNMP Management program performs the
following operations:
The GET operation receives a specific value about a
managed object, such as available hard disk space from the
agent's MIB.
The GET-NEXT operation returns the "next" value by
traversing the MIB database (tree) of managed object
variables.
The SET operation changes the value of a managed object's
variable. Only variables whose object definition allows
READ/WRITE access can be changed.
The TRAP operation sends a message to the Management
Station when a change occurs in a managed object (and that
change is deemed important enough to spawn an alert
message).
3.3 Security
Security is important when using SNMP. Because SNMP
agents broadcasts information and in some agents changed,
security must not be overlooked. The initial version of SNMP now
referred to, as SNMPv1 did not have a very good implementation of
security. SNMP faces all the standard threats of any network
application: Modification of Information, Masquerade, Message
Stream Modification, and Disclosure.
SNMPv1 used only one form of security, community names.
Community names are similar to passwords. Agents can be set to
reply to queries only received by accepted community names. In
SNMPv1 the community name was passed along with the data
packet in clear text. This allowed anyone to ease drop and learn the
SNMP community name or password.
SNMPv2 brought a lot of extra security. First of all everything
in the packet except for the destination address is encrypted. Inside
the encrypted data is the community name and source IP address.
The agent can now decode the encrypted data packet and use the
accepted community name and accepted source IP address to
validate the request. This type of security is referred to as party and
context. Party referring to a specific machine or person and context
referring to a name or string associated with the party. SNMP uses
DES (Data Encryption Standard) for encrypting the data packets.
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SNMPv3 provides the latest architecture for SNMP security.
It incorporates an SNMP context engine ID to encode and decode
SNMP contexts. The context engine ID could take more time than
allowed to explain. In short it matches a context name with an
object and the security requires the object and context to match.
SNMPv3 provides three levels of security. The highest level is with
authentication and privacy. The middle level is with authentication
and no privacy and the bottom level is without authentication or
privacy.
The perfect example of why SNMP security is important is its
ability to reboot devices. Administrators cannot let that ability be
violated. The latest version of SNMP have brought security a
long way from clear text.
Questions:
1. Write a short note on Network management security .
2. Define the following
a) SMTP
b) PGP
c) PEM
3. Write in deail about the Email security mechnism
4. Explain the need for Mangemnt Information Base
5. Write in detail about SNMP

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9
SECURITY FOR ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE
1. SECURE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION (SET)
1. Introduction
2. Sample SET session
3. Objectives
4. SET participants
5. SET process
2. SECURE SOCKET LAYER (SSL)
1. Introduction
2. Protocol stack
3. Position of SSL in TCP/IP
4. Three sub protocols
1) Handshake Protocol
2) Alert Protocol
3) Record Protocol
1. SET protocol:
1.1Introduction:
Secure Electronic Transaction(SET) is an open encryption
and security specification that is designed for prtoecting credit card
transactions on the Internet. The initial work in this area was started
by Mastercard and Visa in the year 1996. In 1998 with the jont
ventrue of companies like IBM, Microsoft ect the first generation of
SET compliant products appeared in the market. This protocl is
providing a tramendous help towards the ecommerce business
transaction.
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Basic services:
1. It provides a secure communication channel among all the
parties involved in an e-commerce transaction.
2. It provides authentication by the use of digital certificates .
3. It ensures confidentiality, because the information is only
available to the parties involved in a transaction and that tooo
only when and where necessary.
1.2 A Sample SET Session
Before getting into details of SET, we shall take a simple
example to describe how SET works from the consumer's
perspective.
1. The consumer accesses the merchant's web site, goes through
the various goods on display and selects what he or she wants.
Perhaps there is a virtual shopping cart where he or she drops
all the items to be purchased. At the end, the customer
proceeds to the virtual checkout counter. A screen pops up
giving details, including the cost of all the items the shopper is
purchasing, plus taxes and shipping costs.
2. Then the screen asks for the payment method and the
consumer chooses to pay through a credit card using SET.
3. Immediately, special software on the consumer's PC called
Digital Wallet is invoked, and it asks the customer to choose
one credit card from the many he or she possesses.
4. The consumer chooses a card, and the electronic transaction
using SET is underway. A few seconds later, there is a
confirmation that this order has been processed.
1.3 Objectives of SET
SET addresses seven major business requirements
1. Provide confidentiality of payment information and enable
confidentiality of order information that is transmitted along with
the payment information.
2. Ensure the integrity of all transmitted data.
3. Provide authentication that a cardholder is a legitimate user of a
branded payment card account.
4. Provide authentication that a merchant can accept branded
payment card transactions through its relationship with an
acquiring financial institution.
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5. Ensure the use of the best security practices and system design
techniques to protect all legitimate parties in an electronic
commerce transaction.
6. Create a protocol that neither depends on transport security
mechanisms nor prevents their use.
7. Facilitate and encourage interoperability among software and
network providers.
1.4 SET participants:
There are mainly six entities involved in SET. The next
section briefly discusses these entities.
1. Certificate Authority (CA)
The Certificate Authority (CA) issues and manages digital
certificates that provide proof of identity of all parties involved in a
SET transaction. It manages the creation and distribution of digital
certificates for cardholders, merchants and payment gateways.
2. SET Payment Gateway
The payment gateway is the bridge between SET and the
existing payment network. The payment gateway translates SET
messages for the existing payment system to complete an
electronic transaction.
3. SET Merchant Point of Sale Server
A merchant offers goods or services for sale in the Internet
and accepts electronic credit card payments. Merchant that accepts
payment cards must have a relationship with an acquirer. The
merchant Point of Sale Server provides an interface between the
cardholder and the acquirer payment gateway.
4. Cardholder and Electronic Wallet
Cardholder is an authorized holder of a payment card
supported and issued by an issuing bank. Cardholders use
electronic wallets to store digital representations of credit cards and
make purchases with them. SET ensures that the interactions the
cardholder has with a merchant keep the payment card account
information confidential.
5. Acquiring Bank
An acquirer is the financial institution that establishes an
account with a merchant and processes payment card
authorizations and payments.
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6. Issuing Bank
The issuing bank establishes an account for a cardholder
and issues the payment card to the cardholder. The issuer
guarantees payment for authorized transactions using the payment
card.
Card holders:
Card holder is the authorized holder of the card that has
been issued by an Issuer.
Merchant:
A merchant is a person or a organization that wants to sell
goods or services to cardholders.
Issuers:
The issuer is a financial institution that provides a payment
card to a cardholder.
Acquirer:
This is a financial institution that has a relationship with
merchants for processing payment card authorizations and
payments. The acquirer also provides electronic funds transfer to
the merchant account.
Payment Gateway:
This can be taken up by the acquirer or an organization as a
dedicated function. This processes the payment messages on
behalf of the merchant. The payment gateway acts as an interface
between SET and the existing card payment networks for payment
authorization.
1.5 SET process:
The customer opens a MasterCard or Visa bank account. Any
issuer of a credit card is some kind of bank.
The customer receives a digital certificate.. This electronic file
functions as a credit card for online purchases or other
transactions. It includes a public key with an expiration date. It
has been through a digital switch to the bank to ensure its
validity.
Third-party merchants also receive certificates from the bank.
These certificates include the merchant's public key and the
bank's public key.
The customer places an order over a Web page, by phone, or
some other means.
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The customer's browser receives and confirms from the
merchant's certificate that the merchant is valid.
The browser sends the order information. This message is
encrypted with the merchant's public key, the payment
information, which is encrypted with the bank's public key
(which can't be read by the merchant), and information that
ensures the payment can only be used with this particular
order.
The merchant verifies the customer by checking the digital
signature on the customer's certificate. This may be done by
referring the certificate to the bank or to a third-party verifier.
The merchant sends the order message along to the bank.
This includes the bank's public key, the customer's payment
information (which the merchant can't decode), and the
merchant's certificate.
The bank verifies the merchant and the message. The bank
uses the digital signature on the certificate with the message
and verifies the payment part of the message.
The bank digitally signs and sends authorization to the
merchant, who can then fill the order.
2. SSL Protocol (Secure Socket Layer):
2.1 INTRODUCTION:
This is an internet protocol for secure exchange of
information between a web browser and a web server. It provides a
secure pipe between the web browser and the web server. This
protocol was developed by Netscape Corporation developed in
1994. The SSL is supporting two basic security services:
1. Authentication
2. Confidentiality
Authenticating the client and server to each other: the SSL
protocol supports the use of standard key cryptographic
techniques (public key encryption) to authenticate the
communicating parties to each other. Though the most
frequent application consists in authenticating the service
client on the basis of a certificate, SSL may also use the
same methods to authenticate the client.
Ensuring data integrity: during a session, data cannot be
either intentionally or unintentionally tampered with.
Securing data privacy: data in transport between the client
and the server must be protected from interception and be
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readable only by the intended recipient. This prerequisite is
necessary for both the data associated with the protocol
itself (securing traffic during negotiations) and the application
data that is sent during the session itself. SSL is in fact not a
single protocol but rather a set of protocols that can
additionally be further divided in two layers:
1. the protocol to ensure data security and integrity: this layer is
composed of the SSL Record Protocol,
2. the protocols that are designed to establish an SSL
connection: three protocols are used in this layer: the SSL
Handshake Protocol, the SSL ChangeCipher SpecPprotocol
and the SSL Alert Protocol.
2.2The SSL protocol stack :
The SSL protocol stack:
SSL uses these protocols to address the tasks as described
above. The SSL record protocol is responsible for data encryption
and integrity. As can be seen in Figure 2, it is also used to
encapsulate data sent by other SSL protocols, and therefore, it is
also involved in the tasks associated with the SSL check data. The
other three protocols cover the areas of session management,
cryptographic parameter management and transfer of SSL
messages between the client and the server. Prior to going into a
more detailed discussion of the role of individual protocols and their
functions let us describe two fundamental concepts related to the
use of SSL.
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2.3 Position of SSL in TCP/IP:
2.4 Three sub-protocols:
1. Handshake protocol
2. Record Protocol
3. Alert Protocol
2.4.1.Handshake protocol:
The handshake protocol constitutes the most complex part
of the SSL protocol. It is used to initiate a session between the
server and the client. Within the message of this protocol, various
components such as algorithms and keys used for data encryption
are negotiated. Due to this protocol, it is possible to authenticate
the parties to each other and negotiate appropriate parameters of
the session between them.
The process of negotiations between the client and the
server is illustrated in Figure 4. It can be divided into 4 phases
separated with horizontal broken lines. During the first phase, a
logical connection must be initiated between the client and the
server followed by the negotiation on the connection parameters.
The client sends the server a client_hello message containing data
such as:
Version: The highest SSL version supported by the client,
Random: data consisting of a 32-bit timestamp and 28 bytes
of randomly generated data. This data is used to protect the
Application Layer
SSL Layer
Transport Layer
Internet Layer
Data Link Layer
Physical Layer
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key exchange session between the parties of the
connection.
Session ID: a number that defines the session identifier. A
nonzero value of this field indicates that the client wishes to
update the parameters of an existing connection or
establish a new connection on this session. A zero value in
this field indicates that the client wishes to establish a new
connection.
CipherSuite: a list of encryption algorithms and key
exchange method supported by the client.
The server, in response to the client_hello message sends a
server_hello message, containing the same set of fields as
the client message, placing the following data:
Version: the lowest version number of the SSL protocol
supported by the server,
random data: the same fashion as used by the client, but the
data generated is completely independent,
session ID: if the client field was nonzero, the same value is
sent back; otherwise the servers session ID field contains
the value for a new session,
CipherSuite : the server uses this field to send a single set of
protocols selected by the server from those proposed by the
client. The first element of this field is a chosen method of
exchange of cryptographic keys between the client and the
server. The next element is the specification of encryption
algorithms and hash functions, which will be used within the
session being initiated, along with all specific parameters.
The set of encryption algorithms and key exchange method sent in
the CipherSuite field establishes three components:
the method of key exchange between the server and client,
the encryption algorithm for data encryption purposes,
a function used for obtaining the MAC value.
The server begins the next phase of negotiations by sending
its certificate to the client for authentication. The message sent to
the client contains one or a chain of X509 certificates. These are
necessary for authentication of both the server and the certification
path towards a trusted certification official of the certificating body
for the server. This step is not obligatory and may be omitted, if the
negotiated method of key exchange does not require sending the
certificate (in the case of anonymous Diffie-Hellman method).
Depending on the negotiated method of key exchange, the server
may send an additional server_key_exchange message, which is
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however not required in the case when the fixed Diffie-Hellman
method or RSA key exchange technique has been negotiated.
Moreover, the server can request a certificate from the client. The
final step of Phase 2 is the server_done message, which has no
parameters and is sent by the server merely to indicate the end of
the server messages. After sending this message, the server waits
for a client response. Upon receipt of the message, the client
should verify the servers certificate, the certificate validation data
and path, as well as any other parameters sent by the server in the
server_hello message. The clients verification consists of:
Validation date check of the certificate and comparison with
the current date, to verify whether the certificate is still valid,
checking whether the certifying body is included in the list of
trusted Certifying Authorities in possession of the client. If
the CA, which has issued the servers certificate is not
included in the CAs list, the client attempts to verify the CA
signature. If no information about the CA can be obtained,
the client terminates the identification procedure by either
returning the error signal or signalling the problem for the
user to solve it.
Identifying the authenticity of the public key of the CA which
has issued the certificate: if the Certifying Authority is
included in the clients list of trusted CAs, the client checks
the CAs public key stated in the servers certificate with the
public key available from the list. This procedure verifies the
authenticity of the certifying body.
checking whether the domain name used in the certificate
matches the server name shown in the servers certificate.
Upon successful completion of all steps the server is
considered authenticated. If all parameters are matched and the
servers certificate correctly verified, the client sends the server one
or multiple messages. Next is the client__key_exchange message,
which must be sent to deliver the keys. The content of this
message depends on the negotiated method of key exchange.
Moreover, at the servers request, the clients certificate is sent
along with the message enabling verification of the certificate. This
procedure ends Phase 3 of negotiations.
Phase 4 is to confirm the messages so far received and to
verify whether the pending data is correct. The client sends a
change_cipher_spec message (in accordance with the pending
SSL ChangeCipher Spec), and then sets up the pending set of
algorithm parameters and keys into the current set of the same.
Then the client sends the finished message, which is first protected
with just negotiated algorithms, keys and secrets. This is to confirm
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that the negotiated parameters and data are correct. The server in
response to the client sends the same message sequence. If the
finished message is correctly read by either party this confirms that
the transmitted data, negotiated algorithms and the session key are
correct. This indicates that the session has been terminated and
that it is possible to send the application data between the server
and the client, via SSL. At this point the TCP session between the
client and the server is closed, however a session state is
maintained, allowing it to resume communications within the
session using the retained parameters.
It is worth noticing that both Phases 2 and 3 are used by
both parties to verify the authenticity of the servers certificate and
possibly the clients certificate during the handshake step. If the
server cannot be successfully authenticated by the client on the
basis of the delivered certificate, the handshake terminates and the
client will generate an error message. The same will occur at the
server if the clients certificate authenticity cannot be confirmed.
2.4.2 The Record protocol:
This protocol evolves after the successful completion of the
handshake protocol. This protocol provides two services to an SSL
connection.
1. Confidentiality
2. Integrity
The SSL record protocol involves using SSL in a secure
manner and with message integrity ensured. To this end it is used
by upper layer SSL protocols. The purpose of the SSL record
protocol is to take an application message to be transmitted,
fragment the data which needs to be sent, encapsulate it with
appropriate headers and create an object just called a record,
which is encrypted and can be forwarded for sending under the
TCP protocol. The first step in the preparation of transmission of
the application data consists in its fragmentation i.e. breaking up
the data stream to be transmitted into 16Kb (or smaller) data
fragments followed by the process of their conversion in a record.
These data fragments may be further compressed, although the
SSL 3.0 protocol specification includes no compression protocol,
thus at present, no data compression is used.
At this moment, creation of the record is started for each data
portion by adding a header to it, possible information to complete
the required data size and the MAC. The record header that is
added to each data portion contains two elementary pieces of
information, namely the length of the record and the length of the
data block added to the original data.
In the next step, the record data constructed consists of the
following elements:
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primary data,
some padding to complete the datagram as required,
MAC value.
MAC is responsible for the verification of integrity of the
message included in the transmitted record. It is the result of a
hash function that follows a specific hash algorithm, for example
MD5 or SHA-1. MAC is determined as a result of a hash function
that receives the following data:
MAC = Hash function [secret key, primary data, padding, sequence
number].
A secret key in creation of MAC is either a client write MAC
secret or a server write MAC secret respectively, it depends on
which party prepares the packet. After receiving the packet, the
receiving party computes its own value of the MAC and compares it
with that received. If the two values match, this means that data
has not been modified during the transmission over the network.
The length of the MAC obtained in this way depends on the method
uses for its computing. Next, the data plus the MAC are encrypted
using a preset symmetric encryption algorithm, for example DES or
triple DES. Both data and MAC are encrypted. This prepared data
is attached with the following header fields:
Content type: identifies what payload is delivered by the
packet to determine which higher protocols are to be used
for processing of data included in the packet. The possible
values are change_cipher_spec, alert, handshake, and
application_data that refer to the appropriate protocols.
Major version : establishes the main portion of the protocol
version to be used. For SSL 3.0, the value is 3,
Minor version : establishes the additional portion of the used
version of the protocol. For SSL 3.0 the value is 0.
With the addition of fields, the process of record preparation is
completed. Afterwards, the record is sent to the targeted point. The
entire process of preparation of the packet to be sent is illustrated
in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Creating a packet under SSL record protocol
2.4.3 Alert protocol:
The Alert Protocol is used by parties to convey session
messages associated with data exchange and functioning of the
protocol. Each message in the alert protocol consists of two bytes.
The first byte always takes a value, warning (1) or fatal (2) , that
determines the severity of the message sent. Sending a message
having a fatal status by either party will result in an immediate
termination of the SSL session. The next byte of the message
contains one of the defined error codes, which may occur during an
SSL communication session.
QUESTIONS:
1. Explain the objectives of SET protocol
2. Write in detail about the process involved in SET protocol
3. Give a sample SET session and explain each step involved in
detail
4. Wrtie a short note on SSL protocol
5. Define the following
a) Alert protocol
b) Record protocol
c) Handshake protocol

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10
SYSTEM SECURITY
1. Intruders and Virus
Virus development
Components
Structure
Types
2. Firewalls
Introduction
Need
Protection
Limitations
3. Intrusion Detection
Introduction
Types
1. Intruders:
Intruders are the people who get the access to the system or
the files by using various following methods by which create harm
to the system and the programs.
Social Engineering:
Social Engineering is hacker speak for tricking a person
into revealing some vital information. In other words, Social
Engineering is a practice of cheating people into revealing sensitive
data on a computer system, often on the Internet.
This is like an art, a special tool of the attacker in which he
plays the psychological tricks at the target in order to gain the
important information. All this happens without the knowledge of the
target, i.e. the target does not know at all that he/she is giving some
vital information to the hacker.
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There are various methods, which are used by hackers for social
engineering. Some of which are described below:
1. Using personal conversation: By talking directly with the
target, the hacker tries to grab some important information. The
hacker may have a friendly chat with the user and pretend like a
friendly person and grab the details by getting the confidence of
the user. To achieve the same the hacker will start the
conversation by himself giving his own details. As the
conversation is initiated by the user himself, this is more
dangerous since the hacker may be revealing himself in the
process. This needs the communication skill and convincing
capability to the hacker. But this is the easiest method among
all. This technique is often used to trick a business into
disclosing customer information, and is used by private
investigators to obtain telephone records, utility records, banking
records and other information directly from junior company
service representatives.
2. Through Telephonic conversation: Using this, the hacker may
pose as a top official, network administrator & may persuade the
target in giving vital information about them. As the hacker is
staying away from the user and using telephone as a medium to
precede the conversation, this method is not revealing the
hacker directly and is the safer method. This needs the
capability of taking the conversation further with the name of the
legitimate user. This is somewhat easier than first method and
is much widely used.
3. By chatting with the target: In this kind of method, the hacker
keeping himself secret, can chat & make good friendship with
the target & then using trickier questions can gain the required
information. This is the well known and widely used method
among the various users.
4. By sending anonymous mails: It is possible to send mails
without needing a sender's address or by using some address,
which looks official and legitimate enough to fool the target in
giving key information. This is also widely used technique.
Bugs and Backdoors:
A bug may refer to some kind of problem in the software,
which is undesired by its author. It may mean some sort of
limitation in the software, which does not allow it to do the
appropriate work. These are the loopholes or vulnerabilities in the
program, which make it less secure.
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Hackers, who know about these loopholes, can misuse it or
use it for their own benefit whereas some of them may disclose it to
make everyone aware about it.
One solution for this is to keep the software always updated
with bug fixes, which are normally provided by its developer.
For example, added virus databases in an antivirus utility,
service packs for operating systems etc. One should use them
regularly in order to stay away from the new viruses or
vulnerabilities.
A bug is something in a program that does not meet its
specification. They are thus particularly hard to model because, by
definition, which assumptions if any will fail. The effect of a bug is
not necessarily limited to ill effects or abuses of the particular
service involved. Rather, the entire system can be penetrated
because of one failed component. There is no perfect defense, but
there are steps one can take to shift the odds.
The administrator should be checking for all the input
correctness at every point.
If the program has fixed size buffers of any sort, then it
should be made sure that they do not overflow.
If we use dynamic memory allocation, prepare for memory or
file system exhaustion, and proper recovery strategies,
which may need memory or disk space, too.
Backdoors:
Another type of security vulnerability is due to the backdoors
(also called as trapdoors).
A backdoor is a feature of a program that can be used to
make it act in some way that the person who is running it did not
intend. Among IRC-related programs, bots, clients and scripts can
have backdoors. An important point to note is that some backdoors
are intentional and some are not. It is easy for someone who
doesn't really understand what he's doing to put unwanted
backdoors. In clients and bots, which are usually written in C, the
bugs or backdoors tend to be harder to find and exploit. The line
between an unintended backdoor and a bug are rather thin. A
backdoor if it can be used to make the bot do something specific,
and just a bug if it can be used only to make the client or bot
disconnect (ping timeout, or excess flood).
Another type of security vulnerability is due to the backdoors
(also called as trapdoors). These are the programs which when
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stored on the target systems, may allow easy access to hackers or
give them sufficient information about the target to carry out the
attacks. There are several backdoor programs used by the hackers.
These are like automated tools, which carry out the destructive jobs
for the hackers. Trojan horse programs may also come into this
category. In order to save from the backdoors, cleaner solutions are
also available (which work in similar manner as the antivirus
utilities).
Back doors are shortcut entry points to software or networks
i.e. entry without going through authentication mechanisms.
Designers for convenience in error detection while compiling
might create them and hackers taking advantage of bugs or
weaknesses in the program might create inadvertently left
unclosed or such backdoors.
The only solution for backdoor attacks is double and triple
checking of every piece of software before implementation.
A back door is a feature of a program that can be used to
make it act in some way that the person who is running it, did not
intend to do it.
Authentication Failures:
This error message indicates that the authentication process
between your local computer and the remote host computer has for
some reason failed. The most common cause for failed
authentication is an incorrect password, likely caused by a typing
mistake.
Also the user name may be incorrect. So it is necessary to
check that the typing has been done correctly.
One possible reason for authentication failure is that the
remote host computer may have been configured to require several
authentication methods to be used. For example both password
and public key authentication could be used for increased security.
Even if the password is typed incorrectly, some other required
authentication method could have failed. A relatively common
situation is one where the remote host computer is expecting
public-key authentication and the user has not sent the public key
to the host. It may also be possible that the user account on the
remote host computer has been disabled or that the remote host
computer is having temporary problems causing errors with the
login procedure.
Try to connect again and carefully type in your user name
and password. If after a couple of retries you are sure that you have
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entered both of them correctly, contact the system administrator of
the remote host computer
Authentication can be stated as the method of validating the identity
of genuine or authorized users.
Something that you know:
The very first and the foremost are your user-id and passwords.
The next can be your personal matters such as your date of
birth, your mothers maiden name, your pets name etc.
These are simple to use and require no special hardware;
user-id and password continue to be the most popular method of
authentication.
Something that you have:
Image of persons face
Retina or iris
Fingerprints
Hand geometry
Digital Signature
Something that you are:
This is the actual physical feature of the user like the
fingerprints or the way the user communicates (Voice) or the way
that the user looks (Image) etc. These are the natural qualities of
the user, which cannot be changed or misused even by the user
himself.
There are various methods used for this purpose, but the
most commonly used one is by way of login name and passwords.
In order to keep your authentication method foolproof, some strict
policies have to be adopted. But, still the authentication failure is
one of the ways in which the intruders can penetrate into the
systems.
Authentication
Something
that you
Know
Something
that you
Have
Something
that you
Are
Some place
where you
Are
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Firstly the passwords have to be properly designed using all
the available rules. Sometimes, if the password is stored in some
user database in clear text, then the intruder can easily intercept it
another example of authentication failure is by way of a fake login
program run on a terminal.
One more form of authentication attack may come from the
remote login programs. Protocols like rlogin, telnet is vulnerable to
this. If these are available on for your host, intruders may keep
retrying till they are lucky and get a chance to penetrate these
systems. Hence, normally it is advised to turn often-remote login
features for added security.
Most of the attacks that take place are as a result of some
authentication failure. But authentication failures or authentication
race refers to the tactic of beating a one-time password scheme
that works with many security systems.
Usually a one-time password is a good technique of
ensuring that the password even if intercepted and understood will
not have any significance since its not going to be used again. But
even then eavesdroppers can easily pick up a plain password on
an unencrypted session and they may take a shot at single time
passwords also.
For this we assume an example of a password that contains
only digits and is of known length. The attacker initiates ten
connections to the desired service. Each connection is waiting for
the same unknown password. The valid user connects and starts
typing the correct password.
The attack program watches this, and relays the correct
characters to its ten connections as they arc typed. When anyone
digit remains to be entered, the program sends a different digit to
each of its connections, before the valid user can type the last digit.
Because the computer is faster, it wins the race, and one of the
connections is validated. These authentication schemes often allow
only a single login with each password, so the valid user will be
rejected, and will have to try again. Of course, in this case the
attacker needs to know the length of the password.
1. VIRUS
Viruses have restricted propagating mechanisms and are
parasitic in nature (need other host programs to propagate). Most
of them carry a payload that is the action(s) they perform after
infection.
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There is nothing magical about computer viruses. A virus is
simply a computer program, which is stored somewhere on the
disk. But unlike the other programs, this program is not available
separately. It will try to hide itself by attaching to some legitimate
program. Still, it is to be called a computer program. There is very
much similarity between a computer virus and a biological virus.
Both invade the body/machine and attach to cell / program and
once lodged, they monitor the activity of the host in order to
replicate themselves.
1.1 Why viruses are developed?
The virus programs are normally written with an objective of
destructive effects. A virus cannot do anything that was not written
into its program. It is the creation of intelligent computer
programmer but with the harmful intentions. There are other
harmful programs like worms, Trojan horses etc. A program is not a
virus unless it has the ability to replicate itself.
There are several ways and intentions with which the viruses
are written. These range from complete destruction of host system,
to simple pass-time nuisance activities. Sometimes viruses are
used to stop from copying legitimate programs, or just to prove
someone's knowledge, to simply make fun out of it & so forth.
1.2 Overview:
When an infected file (any file that has the virus attached) is
executed, the virus also gets executed, thereby infecting that
system. It does this by making copies of itself and attaching or
injecting them into other files available .The impact varies from low
to high levels. Most viruses typically destroy specific file types,
either by deleting the contents of the file or by encrypting the
contents with a random key and corrupting the boot sectors /
metadata areas / file system tables (FAT tables in Windows / inode
metadata in Linux).
Certain viruses merely executes certain instruction sets
which in turn could enable or disable certain functionality; slow
down all the processes by consuming CPU cycles and even
memory.
Another category of viruses could disable the existing
defense mechanisms such as Antivirus software or firewall thereby
permitting other malicious programs to infect the system.
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1.3 Components of Virus:
There are 3 parts:
a. Infector
b. Replicator
c. Payload
a. Infector:
This is the section of the viral code, which infects some part
of the system when triggered for the first time. That happens when
the virus enters a system first. The infector part may decide to
infect a file system or a system sector or an application.
b. Replicator:
The Replicator is that section of the virus, which has the Job
of making the virus replicate or duplicate such that every time the
viral code is triggered or executed, the virus gets a chance to
replicate. Usually the infection at a proper place like the system
sector leaves a better chance of replication more number of times.
Replicators are crucial in deciding the strength of the virus overall.
c. Payload:
This the section, which can determine the amount of
damage or harm the virus can cause to the system or its resources.
Usually it is a direct implication of the Replicator. Because
explicator will be able to replicate a specific number of times, so the
payload will be greater. Depending on how much the payload is,
the virus goes into the attack phase. Usually a higher payload
means that the virus can easily overcome the system and its
resources can be easily overcome by the virus.
1.4 Structure of Viruses
A virus can be pre-pended or post-pended to an executable
program, or it can be embedded in some other fashion. The key to
its operation is that the infected program, when invoked, will first
execute the virus code and then execute the original code of the
program.
Program V: =
{ goto main ;
1234567;
subroutine infectexecutable : =
{
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loop;
file : = get- random- executable-file:
if(first-line-of-file=1234567)
then goto loop
else prepend V to file;
}
subroutine do-damage :=
{ whatever damage is to be done}
subroutine trigger-pulled :=
{Return true if some condition holds}
Main: main-program: =
{Infect executable;
if trigger pulled then do damage;
goto next;}
next:
}
In this case, the virus code, V, is prepended to infected
programs, and it is assumed that the entry point to the program,
when invoked is the first line of the program.
An infected program begins with the virus code and works as
follows. The first line of code is a jump to the main virus program.
The second line is a special marker that is used by the virus to
determine whether or not a potential victim program has already
been infected with this virus. When the program is invoked, control
is immediately transferred to the main virus program. The virus
program first seeks out uninfected executable files and infects
them.
Next, the virus may perform some action, usually detrimental
to the system. This action could be performed every time the
program is invoked, or it could be a logic bomb that triggers only
under certain conditions. Finally, the virus transfers control to the
original program. If the infection phase of the program is reasonably
rapid, a user is unlikely to notice any difference between the
execution of an infected and uninfected program.
Here is a simple structure of a virus. In the infected binary, at
a known byte location in the title, a virus inserts a signature byte
used to determine if a potential carrier program has been previously
infected.
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V()
{
infectExecutable( );
if(triggered ( ))
{
doDamage( );
}
jump to main of infected program;
}
Void infectExecutable ( )
{
file = chose an uninfected executable file;
prepend V to file/void doDamage( )
{
int triggered( )
{
return (some test? 1: 0);
}
}
}
The above virus makes the infected file longer than it was,
making it easy to spot. There are many techniques to leave the tile
length and even a check sum unchanged and yet infect. For
example, many executable tiles often contain long sequences of
zero bytes, which can be replaced by the virus and re-generated. It
is also possible to compress the original executable code like the
typical Zip programs do, and uncompress before execution and pad
with bytes so that the check sum comes out to be what it was.
A virus such as the one just described is easily detected
because an infected version of a program is longer than the
corresponding uninfected one. A way to thwart such a simple
means of detecting a virus is to compress the executable file so
that both the infected and uninfected versions are of identical
length.
1.4.1 Logic for a Compression Virus
Program CV: =
{goto main;
01234567;
Subroutine infect-executable: =
{Loop:
File: = get-random-executable-file;
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if(first-line-of-file = 01234567) then goto loop;
(1) Compress file;
(2) prepend CV to file;
}
Main: main-program: =
{If ask-permission then infect-executable;
(3) Uncompress rest-of-file;
(4) Run uncompressed file;}
}
Life Stages of a virus:
1.4.2 Life Stages of a Virus
There arc 3 stages to a Virus Life Cycle:
a. Infection Phase
b. Replication Phase.
c. Attack Phase
1.4.3 Infection Phase:
When the virus executes it has the potential to infect other
programs. What's often not clearly understood is precisely when it
will infect the other programs. Some viruses infect other programs
each time they are executed; other viruses infect only upon a
certain trigger. This trigger could be anything; a day or time, an
external event on your PC, a counter within the virus, etc. Virus
writers want their programs to spread as far as possible before
anyone notices them.
You can never be sure the virus simply hasn't yet triggered
its infection phase.
Many viruses go resident in the memory of your PC in the
same or similar way as terminate and stay resident (TSR)
programs. TSRs are programs that executed under DOS but stayed
in memory instead of ending. This means the virus can wait for
some external event before it infects additional programs. The virus
may silently lurk in memory waiting for you to access a diskette,
copy a file, or execute a progran1, before it infects anything. This
makes viruses more difficult to analyze since it's hard to guess what
trigger condition they use for their infection.
Resident viruses frequently take over portions of the system
software on the PC to hide their existence. This technique is called
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stealth. Polymorphic techniques also help viruses to infect yet avoid
detection.
1.4.4 Replication Phase:
This is the phase where the virus replicates or duplicates or
infects more system files, so that its strength is increased enough
to attack the system and over come the system's protective
resources.
Replication is an important phase, because with proper
replication, the attack phase of the virus can become that much
more lethal. Hence, replication is planned around some trigger,
which the viral code needs to trigger its duplicate. In order to do
this, virus is placed in an executable file or the system sector.
Usually in an executable file, the virus will be able to replicate only
if the executable file is executed. Hence, the system sector is a
good bet, since every time if the system boots and the boot sector
is where the viral code is placed, then the virus gets a chance to
replicate every time.
1.4.5 Attack Phase:
Many viruses do unpleasant things such as deleting files or
changing random data on your disk, simulating typos or merely
slowing your PC down. Just as the infection phase can be triggered
by some event, the attack phase also has its own trigger.
Viruses often delay revealing their presence by launching
their attack only after they have had ample opportunity to spread.
This means the attack could be delayed fur days, weeks, months,
or even years after the initial infection.
Usually, viruses can be also triggered to attack under the
arrival of a specific time. In that case, the virus constantly checks
whether the pre-decided time of attack has arrived or not. If it has,
then the virus unleashes the attack phase and starts doing what it
is meant to do.
1.5. SUBTYPES and WORKING
Classification of viruses can be done as follows:
1. Memory Based (How they live (stay) in memory)
2. Target Based (How they spread to others)
3. Obfuscation Technique Based (What they do to hide)
4. Payload Based (What they do after infection)
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191
1.5.1. Memory Based classification:
One method of classifying viruses is based on the way they
operate in the memory. There are six subtypes according to this
classification (Szor, 2005, chap. 5), namely,
1. Resident (In memory)
2. Temporary Resident (In memory temporarily)
3. Swapping Mode (Only a part loaded in memory temporarily)
4. Non-Resident (Not in memory)
5. User Process (As a user level process)
6. Kernel Process (As a process in the kernel)
1.5.2. Target based classification
1. Appending Virus
2. Prepending Virus
3. Overwriting Virus
4. Cavity Virus
5. Compressing Virus
6. Amoeba Virus
7. EPO Virus
8. Companion Virus
9. Code Virus
Viruses can be divided into nine (9) Subtypes,
1. No Obfuscation
2. Encryption
3. Oligomorphism
4. Polymorphism
5. Metamorphism
6. Stealth
7. Armoring
8. Tunneling
9. Retro
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2. Firewall:
2.1. Introduction:
What are firewalls?
The Internet is a vital and growing network that is
changing the way many organizations and individuals communicate
and do business. Using the Internet we can get connected to any
other computer, no matter how far the two are located from each
other on the network. However, the Internet suffers from significant
and widespread security problems. Many agencies and
organizations have been attacked or probed by intruders, with
resultant high losses to productivity and reputation. In some cases,
organizations have had to disconnect from the Internet temporarily,
and have invested significant resources in
correcting problems with system and network configuration. Sites
that are unaware of or ignorant of these problems face a significant
risk that network intruders will attack them. Even sites that do
observe good security practices face problems with new
vulnerabilities in networking software and the persistence of some
intruders. But this facility usually may be a nightmare for network
support staff, which is left with a very difficult job of trying to protect
the corporate networks from a variety of attacks. At a broad level,
there are two kinds of attacks:
1. Most corporations have large amounts of valuable and
confidential data in their networks. Leaking of this critical
information to competitors can be a great setback.
2. Apart from the danger of the insider information leaking out,
there is a great danger of the outside elements (such as viruses
and Worms) entering a corporate network to create havoc.
Some of the problems with Internet security are a result of
inherent vulnerabilities in the services (and the protocols
that the services implement), while others are a result of
host configuration and access controls that are poorly
implemented or overly complex to administer.
Additionally, the role and importance of system
management is often short-changed in job descriptions,
resulting in many administrators being, at best, part-time
and poorly prepared.
We will talk about these problems in detail.
193
2.3 Need of firewall
The Internet, like any other society, is plagued with the kind
of jerks who enjoy the electronic equivalent of writing on other
people's walls with spray paint, tearing their mailboxes off, or just
sitting in the street blowing their car horns. Some people try to get
real work done over the Internet, and others have sensitive or
proprietary data they must protect. Usually, a firewall's purpose is to
keep the jerks out of your network while still letting you get your job
done.
Many traditional-style corporations and data centers have
computing security policies and practices that must be adhered to.
In a case where a company's policies dictate how data must be
protected, a firewall is very important, since it is the embodiment of
the corporate policy. Frequently, the hardest part of hooking to the
Internet, if you're a large company, is not justifying the expense or
effort, but convincing management that it's safe to do so. A firewall
provides not only real security--it often plays an important role as a
security blanket for management.
Lastly, a firewall can act as your corporate `àmbassador''
to the Internet. Many corporations use their firewall systems as a
place to store public information about corporate products and
services, files to download, bug fixes, and so forth. Several of these
systems have become important parts of the Internet service
structure(e.g.: UUnet.uu.net, whitehouse.gov, gatekeeper.dec.com)
and have reflected well on their organizational sponsors.
The following list summarizes the primary benefits of using a
firewall.
Protection from Vulnerable Services
Controlled Access to Site Systems
Concentrated Security
Enhanced Privacy
Logging and Statistics on Network Use, Misuse
Policy Enforcement
2.4. What can a firewall protect against?
Some firewalls permit only email traffic through them,
thereby protecting the network against any attacks other
than attacks against the email service. Other firewalls
provide less strict protections, and block services that are
known to be problems.
194
Generally, firewalls are configured to protect against
unauthenticated interactive logins from the `òutside'' world.
This, more than anything, helps prevent vandals from
logging into machines on your network. More elaborate
firewalls block traffic from the outside to the inside, but
permit users on the inside to communicate freely with the
outside. The firewall can protect you against any type of
network-borne attack if you unplug it.
Firewalls are also important since they can provide a single
``choke point'' where security and audit can be imposed.
Unlike in a situation where someone dialing in with a
modem is attacking a computer system, the firewall can act
as an effective ``phone tap'' and tracing tool. Firewalls
provide an important logging and auditing function; often
they provide summaries to the administrator about what
kinds and amount of traffic passed through it, how many
attempts there were to break into it, etc.
This is an important point: providing this ``choke point'' can
serve the same purpose on your network as a guarded gate
can for your site's physical premises. That means anytime
you have a change in ``zones'' or levels of sensitivity, such
a checkpoint is appropriate. A company rarely has only an
outside gate and no receptionist or security staff to check
badges on the way in. If there are layers of security on your
site, it's reasonable to expect layers of security on your
network.
2.5. Advantages of the Firewall:
A firewall prevents unauthorized Internet users from
accessing a private network connected to the Internet.
It enforces a security policy by allowing a single point for
implementing and controlling all security decisions to be
made.
It filters, monitors, and logs the sessions between any two
networks. As a result, your exposure to the Internet is also
limited.
2.6 Limitation of the Firewall:
The main limitations of a firewall can be listed as follows:
Insider's intrusion: A firewall system is designed to thwart
outside attacks. Therefore, if an inside user attacks the
internal network in some way, the firewall cannot prevent
such an attack.
195
Direct Internet traffic: A firewall must be configured very
carefully. It is effective only if it is the only-entry point of an
organization's network. If, instead, the firewall is one of the
entry-exit points, a user can bypass the firewall and
exchange information with the Internet via the other entry
exit points. This can open up the possibilities of attacks on
the internal network through those points. The firewall
cannot, obviously be expected to take care of such
situations.
Virus attacks: A firewall cannot protect the internal network
from virus threats. This is because a firewall cannot be
expected to scan every incoming file or packet for possible
virus contents. Therefore, a separate virus detection and
removal mechanism is required for preventing virus attacks.
Alternatively, some vendors bundle their firewall products
with anti virus software, to enable both the features out of
the box.
It needs specialized skills to configure, and many attacks
occur because of badly configured policies on a firewall.
3. Intrusion Detection System (IDS):
3.1 Introduction:
An intrusion detection system (IDS) monitors network traffic
and monitors for suspicious activity and alerts the system or
network administrator. In some cases the IDS may also respond to
anomalous or malicious traffic by taking action such as blocking the
user or source IP address from accessing the network.
IDS come in a variety of flavors and approach the goal of
detecting suspicious traffic in different ways. There are network
based (NIDS) and host based (HIDS) intrusion detection systems.
There are IDS that detect based on looking for specific signatures
of known threats- similar to the way antivirus software typically
detects and protects against malware- and there are IDS that
detect based on comparing traffic patterns against a baseline and
looking for anomalies. There are IDS that simply monitor and alert
and there are IDS that perform an action or actions in response to a
detected threat. Well cover each of these briefly.
3.2 TYPES:
NIDS
Network Intrusion Detection Systems are placed at a
strategic point or points within the network to monitor traffic to and
from all devices on the network. Ideally you would scan all inbound
196
and outbound traffic, however doing so might create a bottleneck
that would impair the overall speed of the network.
HIDS
Host Intrusion Detection Systems are run on individual hosts
or devices on the network. A HIDS monitors the inbound and
outbound packets from the device only and will alert the user or
administrator of suspicious activity is detected
Signature Based
A signature based IDS will monitor packets on the network
and compare them against a database of signatures or attributes
from known malicious threats. This is similar to the way most
antivirus software detects malware. The issue is that there will be a
lag between a new threat being discovered in the wild and the
signature for detecting that threat being applied to your IDS. During
that lag time your IDS would be unable to detect the new threat.
Anomaly Based
An IDS which is anomaly based will monitor network traffic
and compare it against an established baseline. The baseline will
identify what is normal for that network- what sort of bandwidth is
generally used, what protocols are used, what ports and devices
generally connect to each other- and alert the administrator or user
when traffic is detected which is anomalous, or significantly
different, than the baseline.
Passive IDS
A passive IDS simply detects and alerts. When suspicious or
malicious traffic is detected an alert is generated and sent to the
administrator or user and it is up to them to take action to block the
activity or respond in some way.
Reactive IDS
Reactive IDS will not only detect suspicious or malicious
traffic and alert the administrator, but will take pre-defined proactive
actions to respond to the threat. Typically this means blocking any
further network traffic from the source IP address or user.
One of the most well known and widely used intrusion
detection systems is the open source, freely available snort It is
available for a number of platforms and operating systems including
both Linux and Windows. Snort has a large and loyal following and
there are many resources available on the Internet where you can
acquire signatures to implement to detect the latest threats.
197
There is a fine line between a firewall and an IDS. There is
also technology called IPS Intrusion Prevention System. An IPS
is essentially a firewall which combines network-level and
application-level filtering with a reactive IDS to proactively protect
the network. It seems that as time goes on firewalls, IDS and IPS
take on more attributes from each other and blur the line even
more.
Essentially, your firewall is your first line of perimeter
defense. Best practices recommend that your firewall be explicitly
configured to DENY all incoming traffic and then you open up holes
where necessary. You may need to open up port 80 to host web
sites or port 21 to host an FTP file server. Each of these holes may
be necessary from one standpoint, but they also represent possible
vectors for malicious traffic to enter your network rather than being
blocked by the firewall.
That is where your IDS would come in. Whether you
implement a NIDS across the entire network or a HIDS on your
specific device, the IDS will monitor the inbound and outbound
traffic and identify suspicious or malicious traffic which may have
somehow bypassed your firewall or it could possibly be originating
from inside your network as well.
IDS can be a great tool for proactively monitoring and
protecting your network from malicious activity, however they are
also prone to false alarms. With just about any IDS solution you
implement you will need to tune it once it is first installed. You
need the IDS to be properly configured to recognize what is normal
traffic on your network vs. what might be malicious traffic and you,
or the administrators responsible for responding to IDS alerts, need
to understand what the alerts mean and how to effectively respond.
QUESTIONS:
1. Explain the role of intruders
2. Discuss about the structure of virus
3. What are the various types of virus
4. Why do we need firewall
5. Explain the advantages of firewalls
6. What are the limitations of firewalls
7. Why do we need intrusion detection system
8. What are the various types of IDS
9. What are the various intrusion techniques

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