ICTJ Book Peru CVR 2014 PDF

Abbreviated Version of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
HATUN WILLAKUY
P E R U
IMAGES: The paintings that appear on the cover and chapter openings of the 2014 edition of Hattun Willakuy
were created by Mauricio Delgado Castillo, a Peruvian artist based in Lima. The works form part of his 2006 ex-
hibition Between Flowers and Misfortunes (Entre fores y infortunios), which presents images of Perus internal
armed confict atop fower prints. His generosity in sharing these works in order to help illuminate this history is
greatly appreciated. Cover Viudas y vidas 2006 Mauricio Delgado Castillo, Chapter 1 Mam Macha
2006 Mauricio Delgado Castillo, Chapter 2 La detencin eterna III 2006 Mauricio Delgado Castillo, Chap-
ter 3 La detencin eterna I 2006 Mauricio Delgado Castillo, Chapter 4 No tenamos culpa de nada o
s? 2006 Mauricio Delgado Castillo, Chapter 5 La detencin eterna II 2006 Mauricio Delgado Castillo,
Chapter 6 Instantes eternos y repetibles 2006 Mauricio Delgado Castillo, Chapter 7 Muchos del pueblo
han muerto 2006 Mauricio Delgado Castillo, Chapter 8 Vivos los llevaron, vivos los queremos! 2006
Mauricio Delgado Castillo
Abbreviated Version of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
HATUN WILLAKUY
P E R U
Hatun Willakuy: Abbreviated Version of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Transfer Commission Members
Javier Ciurlizza Contreras
Arturo Perata Ytajashi
Flix Retegui Carrillo
Publication Coordinator
Flix Retegui Carrillo
Editing Coordinator
Estrella Guerra Caminiti
The content of this publication is a translation of the Abbreviated Version of the Peruvian Final Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission frst published in Spanish in February 2004. It was prepared by the Transfer Commission at the
request of the commissioners at their fnal session on August 31, 2003. If additional information is required please refer to
the full report available in Spanish at the Commissions website (www.cverdad.org.pe.). The original translation from Spanish
into English was carried out under the auspices of the Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontifcia Univer-
sidad Catlica del Per with funding from the Center for Civil and Human Rights of the University of Notre Dame.
Under Laws 27806 and 27927, this text, entitled Hatun Willakuy, is a public document. The content may be reproduced in
full or in part as long as properly credited.
This edition is a joint collaboration of the Center for Civil and Human Rights of the University of Notre Dame, the Insti-
tuto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontifcia Universidad Catlica del Per, and the International Center for
Transitional Justice.
Spanish Edition: February 2004
English Edition: August 2010 and May 2014
Graphic Design
Matt Lemmond of Lemmond Design
Infographics
Carla Gonzales
Matt Lemmond of Lemmond Design
Images
Mauricio Delgado (Exhibition Entre Flores y Infortunios, 2006)
Translation
Lucien Chavin
Barbara J. Fraser
Revision of Translation
Lisa Meissner
Transfer Commission of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru
Toms Ramsey 925, Magdalena
Lima, Peru
www.cverdad.org.pe
Contents
Ten Years Later ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Preface.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT ..........................................................................................................................................................................9
Chapter 1: The Events: The Magnitude and Scope of the Confict ............................................................................................................................................................. 11
Foreign Towns Within Peru ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 14
Legal Dimension of the Events .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 18
Magnitude and Complexity of Crimes and Human Rights Violations .............................................................................................................................................. 26
Periods of the Internal Armed Conict ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 43
Internal Armed Conict and the Regions .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................53
Chapter 2: Subversive Organizations ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 69
Communist Party of PeruShining Path..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................70
Tpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................122
Chapter 3: Civilian Governments in the First Decade of the Violence........................................................................................................................................ 151
Administration of President Fernando Belaunde Terry and the Popular Action Front ...................................................................................152
Administration of the Peruvian Aprista Party .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 162
Chapter 4: State Security Forces .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 177
Police Forces ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 178
Armed Forces ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 188
Chapter 5: The Administrations of Alberto Fujimori......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 225
PART TWO: LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE ............................................................................................................................................... 243
Chapter 6: The Factors that Made the Violence Possible ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 245
PCP-SLs Decision to Begin the Conict .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................246
Long-term or Historical Factors in the Conict ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................248
Institutional Factors ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 250
Circumstantial Factors........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 251
Duration of the Conict.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................252
Cruelty in the Conict ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 254
Defeat of Subversive Groups.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 256
Chapter 7: The Consequences of the Confict ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................261
Psycho-social Consequences................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 262
Sociopolitical Consequences.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 275
Socio-economic Consequences ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 283
Chapter 8: The CVRs Proposals: Toward Reconciliation ..........................................................................................................................................................................................303
Institutional Reforms............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................304
Comprehensive Plan for Reparations.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 309
National Plan for Forensic Anthropological Investigation .........................................................................................................................................................................................312
Mechanisms for Following up on the CVRs Recommendations................................................................................................................................................................ 315
General Conclusions .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................331
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................355
Acknowledgements......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 359
Presentation
From 2001 to 2003 the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) conducted a far-reaching
investigation of crimes and human rights violations committed during the 20-year internal armed con-
ict (1980-2000) and the underlying causes and enduring consequences of the collective violence. Te
CVRs Final Report, released on August 28, 2003, stands out as one of the strongest and more encompass-
ing reports in the now robust tradition of truth commissions around the world.
Tis report was immediately followed by an abbreviated version drafted by the Transfer Commission of
the CVR. In the last decade, this version, bearing the title Hatun Willakuya Quechua name meaning
great storyhas made the ndings and recommendations of the CVR accessible to a broader Spanish-
speaking audience in Peru and beyond. Today, three institutions have joined eorts to make it available
to a wider public through the publication of this English version of Hatun Willakuy. Te Center for Civil
and Human Rights of the University of Notre Dame, the Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos
de la Ponticia Universidad Catlica del Per, and the International Center for Transitional Justice are
proud of this endeavor, which will allow a larger share of practitioners, stakeholders, scholars and public
ocials around the world to benet from a truth-seeking experience that deserves to be better known.
We are convinced that its availability will have an important impact both in academia and on the ground.
As we have said, the work of the Peruvian CVR and its Final Report represent a strong example of aca-
demic rigor and commitment to the cause of human rights. Te contributions of the truth commission to
justice and reparations, as well as its impact in the Peruvian national debate, are signicant. Equally im-
portant is the inuence of the Peruvian example in the eld of transitional justice, as other truth commis-
sions around the world have studied it, seeking inspiration and practical answers to concrete questions.
Many eorts have been brought together to create this edition. We are glad to mention that it benets from
the powerful visual work of Peruvian artist Mauricio Delgado Castillo. Over the last 10 years many artists
and writers have reected on the eects of the violence on Peru, in critical dialogue with the ndings of the
CVR. Delgados work is a thought-provoking illustration of the cultural impact of the commission.
We invite you to read in these pages the story of the violence perpetrated in Peru and to learn about the coun-
trys quest for justice and truth. We are convinced that through our acquaintance with diverse national ef-
forts, the international community becomes better prepared to confront impunity, ocial silence and indif-
ference toward violence, repression and widespread abuses. Te content of Hatun Willakuy speaks for itself.
Daniel Philpott
Center for Civil and Human
Rights of the University of
Notre Dame
Salomn Lerner Febres
Instituto de Democracia y
Derechos Humanos de la
Pontifcia Universidad
Catlica del Per
David Tolbert
International Center for
Transitional Justice
New York, May 2014
Ten Years Later
Te presentation to English-speaking audiences of the abbreviated version of the Final Report of the Peru-
vian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) is a signicant opportunity to share more widely the
lessons learnt by Peru during its reckoning with its violent and authoritarian past through an extensive
truth-seeking process. I am certain that if in the realm of transitional justice and democratization we
need illumination from dierent national examples, Perus quest for truth has some interesting features,
namely its exploration of historical truth and its reection on the structural changes needed to consoli-
date a democratic regime once and for all, 180 years after its founding as a Republic.
Te CVR was established in June 2001 as a component of Perus transition to democracy after 8 years of
authoritarian rule and 20 years of armed violence that had resulted in widespread and heinous human
rights violations. Te armed struggle began in 1980, when a subversive organization known as the Shin-
ing Path started a peoples war aimed at tearing down the State and building a communist regime. Te
terrorist methods used by the Shining Path, mainly against peasant rural populations when they opposed
its plans, were readily imitated by State security forces under the tragic assumption that terror is best
countered by terror. As a result, the poorest of the Peruvian population found themselves exposed to mas-
sive and often-indiscriminate violence that resulted in thousands of killings and massacres, forced disap-
pearance, torture, sexual violence, forced displacement and other gross violations. Te violence unleashed
by these armed actors was compounded by old conicts and resentments in rural territories and the emer-
gence of minor armed actors, among them a tiny subversive organization, El Movimiento Revolucionario
Tpac Amaru, and several paramilitary groups and death-squads acting with the militarys tacit approval.
As in so many other societies experiencing armed conict, Peruvian victims never had a chance to be heard
or to demand their rights during those years. Although 12 years of the conict had taken place under
formally democratic regimes, the constitutional State powers never showed a serious interest in developing
a policy to protect human rights. Victims were instead further victimized by a State and a society that fre-
quently stigmatized them as terrorists and were ready to rationalize human losses as the price to be paid to
defeat a subversive threat. It may be unnecessary to remark that the Shining Path and other subversive orga-
nizations showed the same contempt for victims, who counted only as the blood toll to be paid to carry out
revolution and social change. When Peru fell under Alberto Fujimoris authoritarian rule in the 1990s and
the already-weak democratic institutions of government collapsed under the strain of political manipulation
and corruption, opportunities to respond to the plight of victims shrank even more dramatically.
Te political transition that started in 2001 was thus a twofold task. Peru needed to reestablish the rule
of law and government checks and balances that had been shattered by the authoritarian regime, but it
also had to provide a rapid and thoughtful response to thousands of victims of countless crimes carried
out over twenty years of an internal armed conict. To that eect, a truth commission was created with
the mission of shedding light on crimes and human rights violations that were committed, providing
an interpretation of the underlying causes of the violence, contributing to justice and proposing recom-
mendations for a reparations policy and institutional reforms. As complex and multifaceted as it was, this
mission appeared to the Commission as a single powerful ethical mandate: to pay respect to thousands
of victims, to recognize them and to give them the public voice that violence and exclusion had denied
them throughout Peruvian history.
Te Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission was released on August 28,
2003, after 26 months of investigations. Tis included interviewing roughly 17,000 victims, holding pub-
lic hearings and reconstructing hundreds of instances of atrocities through forensic and social research.
Tat report, ocially submitted to the President of the Republic, the National Parliament and the Na-
tional Chief Prosecutor oce, was oered to the Peruvian society in a public ceremony in Ayacucho, the
region where the armed violence had started and which had experienced the highest death toll and most
1
widespread abuses and human suering. Te abridged version that we present here in English transla-
tion, Hatun Willakuy, originally published a few months after the Final Reports release, was part of the
CVRs dissemination strategy, aimed at raising awareness and challenging the prevailing indierence of
Peruvian society to our collective tragedy and its consequences.
LEARNINGS AND SELF-TEACHINGS
Needless to say, the Peruvian quest for truth and justice, in as much as it was an authentic local expec-
tation and demand, drew inspiration from experiences in several other States that had chosen to look
into their dicult pasts over the cynical alternative of institutional neglect and imposed silence. In our
region, Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala had already proven the restorative power of truth
as a means to open a more promising path to democracy. Tey had also exemplied, sometimes in an
extremely dramatic way, the challenges that truth seeking entails. Te quest for truth not only requires
a vast institutional and social commitment and eort but also the determination necessary to overcome
the prevailing indierence of society and resist hostility from those who would prefer that victims remain
silent and habituated to abuse and denigration.
In many respects, Perus truth-seeking eorts reect some of the strongest principles and best practices
developed and honed through two decades of national experiences: the elaboration of legal frameworks
attuned to international law in order to better grasp the dierent types of crimes and thus make better
contributions to victims right to justice; the balancing of an indispensable fact-nding approach with
a historical assessment of the political, economic, cultural and psychological root causes of the violence
and atrocities; the necessary ability to organize a massive and swift statement-taking process that must be
technically eective and at the same time sensitive and respectful to victims suering; and the design of
reparations proposals that factor in the dierent types of crimes and the equally diverse types of victims.
Te results produced by the CVRs inquiry attest to the eectiveness and soundness of the internation-
al expertise accumulated over past decades, as truth, memory and justice have come to be recognized
as necessary components of any valuable political transition. Learning, adapting, innovating and cre-
ating methods and approaches attuned to our particular context yielded ndings and recommenda-
tions that were quickly recognized as scientically sound and were accepted and valued by victims,
civil society and international institutions.
But those results also showed that every society confronting the burdensome and often catastrophic lega-
cy of abuse must address singular challenges and rely on its own cultural resources in order to adequately
grasp the unique nature of its history of violence and its consequences.
While the armed violence in Peru emerged from the particular political ambitions and decisions of spe-
cic actors, it also had strong ties to a set of beliefs and attitudes woven into the fabric of Peruvian
society. It was the task of the CVR to make those ties visible in order to provide a more encompassing
understanding of the past and a rmer explanation of the challenges and obligations that lay ahead. To
do that, our investigation took particular roads and our research methodology paid special attention to
the cultural dimensions of abusive behaviors: we tried to grasp the inner motivations beyond the explicit
political ones and to probe into the subjective meaning of the abuse and humiliation suered by victims;
we sought to understand the dynamics leading to violence and emerging from violence in a multicultural
society where hierarchies and prejudices sowed in Colonial times lurked behind State actions, attacks
by subversive organizations against destitute Quechua-speaking Peruvians and the cynicism too-often
expressed by mainstream public opinion.
Racism is the concept that adequately summarizes these attitudes and beliefs, according to the CVR;
therefore, it had a salient role in our interpretation of the period under inquiry, in addition to the neces-
sary clarication of facts that led us to state that crimes against humanity had been perpetrated both by
State and non-State actors. Tus, it not only informed our version of root causes but also helped us to pro-
2
vide a deeper understanding of patterns of criminal behavior and, evidently, to point out the enormous
future challenges in terms of giving satisfaction to victims, making institutional reforms and starting a
slow but honest transformation of our collective self-identities and social relations.
A SHARED LONG-TERM MISSION
Te pursuit of truth and justice is a never-ending mission. Roughly four decades after the rst truth
commissions emerged as a means to provide acceptable measures of justice where justice seemed a chime-
ric hope, they have become a frequent demand of victimized populations, human rights organizations,
international actors and of everyone aware of the deep moral connotations of the democratic principle.
Truth seeking and the exertions of justice are thus an ecumenical dialogue, a realm of international parlance
where dierent nations share their particular eorts to make politics and policy pay homage to moral sense.
When the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created some new dimensions of the ex-
amination of traumatic pasts were just emerging, namely the necessity of developing specic approaches to
shed light on womens experiences during war and authoritarianism the gender approachand to pay due
attention to marginalized groups and minorities and to their particular stance and expectations in the wake
of violence and mass abuse. Te CVR made signicant eorts to address those dimensions and to reect on
the exigencies that gender and cultural diversity pose to justice and democracy.
In the decade since the CVR nished its work, many more truth commissions have been created and a
great deal of actions, reections and research about the plight of indigenous peoples, women and minori-
ties has taken place. I would be proud to believe that our work has been a relevant voice in that dialogue
and that through the publication of Hatun Willakuy in the English language many other aspects of our
work will be better known and will enrich a conversation that is always evolving, that is always facing new
challenges. It is essential to keep our discussion alive for several reasons. A chief reason is that constant
discovery and discussion of our various endeavors, of our diverse eorts to shed light on a terrible past, is
a way of keeping the sense of urgency, the sense of grieving that victims experience each and every day.
Tat sense is our call to enlightened solidarity; therein dwells our call to action.
Former President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
March 2014, Lima, Peru
3
Preface
Te history of Peru is marked by arduous and painful times. None, however, are as deserving of a mark
of shame and dishonor as the fragment of history that we are obligated to recount in these pages. Te
nal two decades of the 20th century areto put it bluntlya stain of horror and dishonor on the
Peruvian state and society.
We were asked to investigate and make public the truth about the twenty years of political violence that
began in Peru in 1980. Now that our work has nished, we can report a fact that, while shocking, still
does not fully convey what occurred: Te Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisin de la Verdad
y Reconciliacin, CVR) has concluded that the number of deaths during those two decades probably ex-
ceeds 69,000 Peruvian men and women who were killed or forcibly disappeared at the hands of subversive
organizations or state agents.
We were given the task of recording and gathering, one after another, year upon year, the names of
Peruvians who are no longer with us. Tis number is too great to enable our nation to continue talking
about errors or excesses committed by the people who directly participated in these crimes. It is also too
overwhelming for authorities or citizens to plead ignorance as their defense. Tis report thus exposes a
double scandal: assassinations, disappearances and mass torture on the one hand, and on the other the
apathy, ineptitude and indierence of those who could have stopped this human catastrophe but did not.
We have said that the numerical data is overwhelming, but inadequate. Tat is true. No number can
express the inequalities, responsibilities and methods of horror experienced by the Peruvian people. Nor
can it illustrate the experience of suering that was indelibly inicted on the victims. In the Final Report,
we nish the task that we were assigned, as well as the obligation that we voluntarily assumed: to publicly
expose the tragedy as the work of human beings who inicted suering on other human beings.
Tree out of every four victims were peasant men or women who spoke Quechua as their native language.
Te victims, as Peruvians well know, form part of a population that historically has been ignored by the state
and by urban society, the latter of which has enjoyed the benets of our political community. Te CVR has
not uncovered evidence, as some sources have claimed, that this was an ethnic conict. Tere are, however,
grounds for stating that those two decades of destruction and death would not have been possible were it not
for the profound disdain for the countrys most dispossessed people, as demonstrated by both the members
of the Communist Party of PeruShining Path (Partido Comunista del Per Sendero Luminoso, PCP-SL) and
state agents. Tis disdain is woven into the fabric of every moment of Peruvian daily life.
Te 17,000 testimonies freely given to the CVR have allowed us to reconstruct, even if only in rough
form, the story of the victims. It is overwhelming to hear in these testimonies, again and again, the racial
insults and verbal abuse of the poor that were like an abominable refrain preceding the beatings, rapes,
kidnappings of sons and daughters, and executions conducted at point blank range by a soldier or police
ocer. It is equally reprehensible to hear the leaders of subversive organizations explain how it was stra-
tegically opportune, as part of their war against the state, to annihilate this or that peasant community.
5
A great deal has been written about the persistent cultural, social and economic discrimination in Peru.
Yet, state authorities and common citizens have done little to combat these stigmas in our society. Tis
report shows the country and the world that it is impossible to live with hatred, that this is a disease that
carries with it very tangible harm. From this day forward, the names of the thousands of people who died
and disappeared are recorded in these pages so that we can remember them.
No one can hide behind the defects of our society or the events of our history in order to evade their
responsibility. It is trueand this is one of the principal lessons of this reportthat there exists a general
crime, that of omission, which involves all of us who allowed events to happen without asking questions
during the years of violence. We are the rst to recognize this. At the same time, however, we caution
that there are concrete responsibilities that must be faced, and that Peru, like any society that has lived
through this kind of experience, cannot allow impunity to reign. Impunity is incompatible with the
dignity of a democratic nation.
Te CVR has found numerous people responsible for crimes and human rights violations, and it will let the
country know of this through the pertinent channels, respecting the requirements and restrictions found
in Peruvian law for accusing someone of a crime. Te CVR calls on and encourages Peruvian society to de-
mand that the criminal justice system act immediately, without vengeance, but earnestly and unwaveringly.
Nevertheless, the Final Report goes far beyond assigning guilt for particular actions. We have found that
the crimes committed against the Peruvian population were not, unfortunately, perpetrated by perverse
individuals who acted outside the norms of their institutions. Our eldwork, complemented by the tes-
timonies we received and a meticulous documentary review, obligates us to categorically denounce the
perpetration of massive crimes that were coordinated or planned by the organizations or institutions that
intervened directly in the conict.
We demonstrate in these pages how the destruction of villages and the annihilation of people were part
of the strategy of the PCP-SL. Te enslavement of defenseless populations, systematic abuse, and use of
assassination to instill fear were also part of the methodology of horror used by the groups members to
attain an objective powerthat was more important to them than human life.
Te primacy of such strategic reasoning, with the willingness to trample peoples most fundamental
rights, was a death sentence for thousands of Peruvian citizens. We found this willingness, rooted in the
PCP-SLs doctrine, to be indistinguishable from the nature of the organization over those twenty years.
We have encountered this strategic reasoning in the statements made by the organizations representa-
tives, who did not hide their willingness to inict death and the most extreme forms of cruelty as tools
for achieving their objectives. As a result of its inherently criminal and totalitarian characteristics, which
scorn all humanitarian principles, the PCP-SL is an organization that has no place in the democratic and
civilized nation that Peruvians want to build.
Faced with this challenge, the state and its agents had the duty to protect the populationwhich is its
supreme goalwith the weapons of the law. It is clear that the order that democratic peoples support and
demand is not that of concentration camps, but that which ensures the right to life and the dignity of
all people. Te people charged with defending order, however, did not understand this. In the course of
our investigations, and based on the norms of international law that regulate the civilized life of nations,
we have concluded that during certain periods and at certain times the armed forces were involved in
systematic or widespread human rights abuses, and that there are grounds for the accusation of crimes
against humanity, as well as violations of international humanitarian law.
As Peruvians, we are ashamed to have to state this, but it is the truth and we have the obligation to make it
known. For years, the forces of order forgot that human beings are the supreme end of order. Instead, they ad-
opted a strategy of massive violation of the rights of Peruvians, including the right to life. Extrajudicial execu-
tions, forced disappearances, torture, massacres, sexual violence against women and, due to their recurring na-
ture and widespread occurrence, other equally condemnable crimes conrm a pattern of human rights abuses
6
that the Peruvian state and its agents must recognize in order to take a step towards rectifying their actions.
So much death and so much suering could not have occurred simply because institutions or organiza-
tions were blind to what was happening. For these crimes to have been committed there had to have been
a level of complicity, or at least consent, among those in command with the power to stop them. Te
political class that governed or had some level of power during this time owes substantial explanations
of its conduct to Peru. We have reconstructed this history and we are convinced that the situation would
not have been so grave were it not for the indierence, passivity or simple ineptness of those who held the
highest public oces during this time. Tis report therefore assigns responsibility to the political class,
which, we must remind them, has yet to fully assume its responsibility for the misfortune suered by the
very citizens whom it wanted, and may still want, to govern.
It is painful, but true: those who sought the votes of their fellow Peruvian citizens for the honor of gov-
erning our state and our democracy, those who pledged to uphold the Constitution, readily ceded to the
armed forces the powers bestowed on them by the nation. As a result, the institutions of our recently
installed democracy came under the care of the military. Tis fed the notion that constitutional principles
are noble but inadequate for governing a people who, in the end, were looked down upon to the point of
ignoring their cries; thus replicating the practice that can be found throughout our history of relegating
to obscurity the voices of the most humble.
* * * * *
In a country such as ours, combating this obscurity is a powerful form of carrying out justice. We are
convinced that recovering the truth about the pasteven a truth as harsh as the one we were charged with
uncoveringis a way of drawing ourselves closer to the ideal of democracy that Peruvians proclaim with
such vehemence, yet practice with such inconsistency.
When the CVR began its work, Peru was once again vigorously attempting to recover its lost democracy.
For this earnestness to have meaning and a future, however, we believe it is indispensable for us to re-
member that our democracy was not lost of its own accord. Democracy was abandoned little by little by
those who did not know how to defend it. A democracy that is not resolutely exercised on a daily basis
loses the allegiance of its citizens and falls, without a tear being shed. In this moral vacuum, in which
dictatorships thrive, reason is lost and concepts are inverted, depriving citizens of all ethical orientation:
states of emergency become the norm, massive abuses become simple excesses, imprisonment is the price
of innocence and, nally, death is confused with peace.
Peru is again on the path to building a democracy. Tis is due to the eorts of those who dared not believe
the ocial truth propagated by the dictatorial regime, those who were not afraid to call the dictatorship a
dictatorship, corruption corruption, and a crime a crime. Tese upright acts, which were echoed by millions
of Peruvians, demonstrated the ecacy of the truth. We must make a similar eort now. If the truth helped
us unmask the ephemeral nature of an autocracy, it must now show its power and purify our republic.
Tis purication is indispensable to achieve a society that is reconciled with itself, with the truth and with
the rights of each and every one of its members. A society reconciled with its potential.
Te Final Report speaks of shame and dishonor, but its pages also record acts of courage, seless gestures
and signs of dignity that show us that human beings are essentially magnanimous. Te report tells of
people who did not renounce the authority and responsibility conferred upon them by their neighbors; of
those who chose not to abandon, but defend their familiestransforming their work tools into weapons;
of those who were unjustly imprisoned; of those who assumed their responsibility to defend the nation
without violating the law; and of those who refused to be uprooted and defended life. Such people are to
be found at the heart of our memory.
We present this story as a tribute to these men and women. We present it as a testament to those who
7
are no longer with us and to those who have been forgotten by the nation. Te history recounted here
is a history of our people, of who we were and who we must no longer be. Tis story is about what we
need to do. Tis story begins today.
President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
February 2004, Lima, Peru
8
PART ONE
Te Tragedy and Tose Responsible for It
Te Events: Te Magnitude and Scope of the Conict
C H A P T E R 1
Te internal armed conict fought in Peru between 1980 and 2000 lasted longer, extended over more
territory and had higher human and economic costs than any other conict in the countrys history since
independence. Its death toll was vastly higher than those of the war of independence or the war with
Chilethe principal armed conicts fought by the country.
During its investigation, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisin de la Verdad y Reconcili-
acin, CVR) received testimonies that enabled it to identify by name 23,969 people who were either killed
or disappeared during the internal armed conict. Nevertheless, statistical calculations and estimates
demonstrate that the number of victims in the conict was 2.9 times greater than the recorded dead and
disappeared. Using a methodology known as Multiple Systems Estimation, the CVR calculates that the
number of Peruvians killed or disappeared in the internal armed conict was probably closer to 69,000.
1

Based on this statistical methodology, the CVR estimates that 26,259 people were killed or disappeared
in the department of Ayacucho between 1980 and 2000 as a result of the internal armed conict. If the
proportion of victims calculated for Ayacucho, which is based on its population in 1993, were extended
to the entire nation, the internal armed conict would have taken the lives of 1.2 million people in all of
Peru. Tis would have represented approximately 340,000 victims in Lima, equivalent to the projected
total populations of the districts of San Isidro, Miraores, San Borja and La Molina in 2000.
Te statistics shed light on much more than just the intensity of the violence. Tey also demonstrate the
ethnic-cultural inequalities that are still prevalent in our nation. Te violence did not aect all Peruvians
in the same way, but had an unequal impact on dierent geographic areas and social classes.
Te immediate and fundamental cause of the internal armed conict was the decision of the Commu-
nist Party of Peru Shining Path (Partido Comunista del PerSendero Luminoso, PCP-SL) to launch its
peoples war against the state. Tis decision was made at a time when Peruvian society was beginning a
transition to democracy, which had broad support from the countrys citizens, as well as the main politi-
cal parties and civil society movements, after 12 years of military dictatorship.
Unlike other internal armed conicts in Latin America, where state agents were responsible for the great-
est loss of human life
2
especially of unarmed civiliansin the case of Peru it was the principal sub-
versive group, the PCP-SL, that caused the largest number of casualties, above all among the civilian
population. According to the testimonies received, the PCP-SL was responsible for 54 percent of fatalities
reported to the CVR.
3
Te groups strategy was based on the systematic and massive use of extreme vio-
lence and terror and a deliberate disregard for basic norms of war and principles of human rights.
Faced with the violence unleashed by the PCP-SL, the state had the obligation to defend the constitu-
tional order and its citizens within the framework of unconditional respect for the rule of law and basic
human rights. Paradoxically, the periods of the most intense conict, during which the majority of vic-
tims died and in which state agents committed the most human rights violations, corresponded to the
periods when the country was governed by democratically elected civilian governments.
Te state was incapable of stopping the growth of armed subversion, which expanded throughout most
of the nation within a few years.
4
Civilian governments accepted the militarization of the conict and,
giving up their role, allowed the armed forces to take charge of the counter-insurgency eort. While it
was inevitable and lawful that the elected governments would declare states of emergency and use the
military to combat subversion given the magnitude of the events, the CVR found that this was done
1 The calculation of 69,280 victims has a 95-percent accuracy rate, with the lower calculation at 61,007 victims and the higher calculation
77,552 victims.
2 For example, the cases of the military dictatorships in Argentina and Chile, or the internal conficts in Central America (Nicaragua, El
Salvador and Guatemala).
3 Along the same lines, it is important to mention that, with respect to the CVRs statistical estimate on the total number of victims, the PCP-
SL was responsible for 46 percent of the deaths and disappearances.
4 The CVR received testimonies about deaths and disappearances in the armed confict from all departments except Moquegua and Madre
de Dios. In Tacna (1) and Tumbes (4), the numbers of victims reported to the CVR were in single digits.
Chapter 1
12
without taking necessary precautions to prevent the trampling of peoples fundamental rights. Worse
still, for long periods of time civilian authorities disregarded accusations of human rights violations com-
mitted by security forces in the areas hardest hit by the conict. In addition, there are several cases in
which authorities facilitated and guaranteed impunity for the people responsible for these violations. State
agents, the armed forces and police, self-defense patrols and paramilitary groups were responsible for 37
percent of deaths and disappearances reported to the CVR. Of these cases, members of the armed forces
were responsible for more than 75 percent of victims.
Te response of the armed forces to the subversive threat was unprecedented in the militarys conduct
prior to 1980. During the 12-year dictatorship between 1968 and 1980, the Peruvian military committed
relatively few gross human rights violations compared to military dictatorships in other countries in the
region, especially Chile and Argentina.
It should be noted that during the decades of violence there was relatively wide media coverage of the events
and the human rights violations that were being committed. Tis was due to the existence of a free press
(there were specic areas and moments during the violence when the press was attacked), human rights
groups and various investigations by the legislature and judiciary. Nevertheless, press reporting and investi-
gations had little impact on the eective application of sanctions against those responsible for these actions.
Te CVR has found, nevertheless, that there was a bias in the way information was collected and inves-
tigations carried out. Te systematic documentation of accusations was inadequate, and there were insuf-
cient eorts to document and identify victims of events attributed to subversive groups.
5
As a result, the
investigations by the CVR determined that, of the victims who had been identied,
6
less than 5 percent
of the deaths or disappearances were attributed to the PCP-SL. Because of this, earlier projections by
both ocial and private institutions underestimated the responsibility of this subversive organization in
relation to the number of fatalities.
It is important to analyze the two decades of political violence as a process with dierent levels of inten-
sity and geographic scope, and as one that mainly aected areas and social classes that were far removed
from the countrys political and economic power structures. Te population in several areas remained un-
der military control for long stretches even after the armed subversive threat had subsided. Te distance
from the decision-making centers of power, especially in a country that is extremely centralized in the
capital, allowed for the problem of violence, which aected the daily lives of thousands of Peruvians, to
be overlooked by the public and private sectors for several years.
Te analysis of this period of violence must also consider certain elements of the countrys history in the nal
decades of the 20th century. Among the dierent problems, it is important to highlight the severe economic
crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led to a period of hyperination unparalleled in Peruvian
history.
7
Te country also experienced a deep political crisis that weakened political parties and paved the
way for the rise of political outsiders, the so-called independents. A corollary to this political crisis was
the coup of April 1992 and, years later, in November 2000 the presidents decision to abandon oce in the
midst of one of the most serious corruption scandals in the nations history. Another factor to consider is
that during the decades of violence, Peru also faced two military conicts with Ecuador, in 1981 and 1995.
One element of utmost importance during this period was the expansion of drug tracking, which
coincided with the rise and spread of subversion, and the repression unleashed by state security agents
to control it. Te spread of coca crops destined for the drug trade, particularly in the jungle regions, cre-
ated areas where the state reduced its presence, while irregular armed groups linked to drug tracking
emerged. By the mid-1980s, the Upper Huallaga Valley had become one of the principal scenes of the
5 This bias was due to the institutional defnition of the organizations that documented violent actions, which were geared toward
registering and investigating human rights violations committed by state agents.
6 These include victims whose names and cases have been documented by institutions and systematically recorded in a database. See, for
example, La desaparicin forzada de personas en el Per 1980-1996, Ombudsmans Report #55. Lima: Human Rights Ombudsman, 2001.
7 The annual infation rate in 1990 was 7,658 percent.
The Events: The Magnitude and Scope of the Confict
13
internal conict, causing the Huallaga River to be transformed into the largest common grave in the
country. As a result, all the parties to the conict in this zone were aected by drug tracking and the
accompanying corruption.
FOREIGN TOWNS WITHIN PERU
So, my town was a town, I dont know
a foreign town within Peru.
8
In the thousands of testimonies recorded by the CVR, it is common to encounter phrases that shed
light on the sense of exclusion and indierence experienced by the people and communities that were
the principal victims of the internal armed conict. Many of them felt that for the rest of the country,
especially in the principal centers of economic and political power, what happened in their towns, homes
and families was happening in another country.
For many years, the modern, urban Peru of Lima was indierent to the regions hardest hit by the vio-
lence, which were the poorest and farthest removed from the capital. Even when the conict began aect-
ing the countrys principal cities with force in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was dicult to reconcile
the experience and memory of the violence in such dierent worlds. When television coverage began
to focus attention on the tragedy, the emblematic images of the victims shown on the screen were not
Quechua-speaking peasants but urban Spanish-speakers.
When shown on a map of Peru, the intensity of the violence appears like a dark stain that spreads
throughout the highlands and jungle regions in the central part of the country. Te greatest number of
victims was recorded in these areas.
9
8 CVR. Public hearings on cases in Ayacucho, April 8, 2002. Testimony of Primitivo Quispe.
9 The fatalities include people who remained disappeared as a result of the armed confict when the Final Report was fnished.
0 8,000 12,000
AYACUCHO
JUNIN
HUNUCO
HUANCAVELICA
APURIMAC
SAN MARTN
LIMA CALLAO
PUNO
UCAYALI
CUSCO
OTHERS
4,000
FIGURE 1
PERU 1980-2000: NUMBER OF DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED
TO THE CVR, ACCORDING TO DEPARTMENT WHERE EVENTS OCCURRED
Chapter 1
14
Te countrys main cities, particularly those along the coast, were not at the center of the conict, al-
though actions perpetrated in those cities had a signicant impact on public opinion. Te principal loss
of human life during the 20 years investigated by the CVR was taken on by the nations poorest regions.
As Figure 1 shows, the department of Ayacucho registered the highest number of deaths and disappear-
ances reported to the CVR (more than 40 percent). Together with Ayacucho, the departments of Junn,
Hunuco, Huancavelica, Apurmac and San Martn registered 85 percent of the victims recorded in the
testimonies received by the CVR. According to statistics from the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), the people living in these departments in 2002 accounted for only 9 percent of the income of
all Peruvian families (UNDP, 2002).
Tere was an obvious relationship between social exclusion and the intensity of the violence. It was not a
coincidence that the four departments hardest hit by the internal armed conict (Apurmac, Ayacucho,
Huancavelica and Hunuco) are ranked by dierent studies (INEI 1994a; UNDP, 2002) as among the
ve poorest departments in the country. As Figure 2 shows, more than 35 percent of the fatalities were
recorded in districts that, according to the 1993 census, were among the poorest 20 percent in the coun-
try, while less than 10 percent of the victims were in the wealthiest 20 percent of districts. Tis does not
mean that poverty was the principal cause of the armed internal conict, but it does show that when the
violent process erupted, the poorest sectors were the most vulnerable and aected.
It is known that social exclusion and poverty in Peru have the face of a rural peasant. It was precisely in
rural areas and among poor people where the largest number of deaths and disappearances occurred, not
only at the national level but also within the departments that were hardest hit by the internal armed
conict (see Figure 3). Te proportion of deaths and disappearances reported to the CVR in rural zones
is nearly three times greater than the proportion of persons living in these zones, according to the 1993
census. Similarly, 55 percent of the dead and disappeared worked in farming-related activities, nearly
double the percentage of the economically active population nationwide employed in agriculture in 1993,
which stood at 28 percent.
Nevertheless, the cultural dierences between the victims and the rest of the country are even more dra-
matic. According to the 1993 census, while only one-fth of the population spoke Quechua or another
indigenous language, more than 75 percent of the dead and disappeared reported to the CVR spoke a
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
POVERTY RANKING
POOREST 2 4 3 WEALTHIEST
SOURCE: CVR, INEI
FIGURE 2
PERU 1980-2000: PERCENTAGE OF DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED
TO THE CVR, ACCORDING TO THE POVERTY RANKING OF THE DISTRICTS
WHERE THE EVENTS OCCURRED (METHOD: NBI 1993 CENSUS)
15
language other than Spanish as their mother tongue. In the three hardest hit departments, the proportion
of people who spoke Quechua or another indigenous language was always the greatest among the fatali-
ties reported to the CVR of the entire population (see Figure 4). In addition, the victims reported to the
CVR had educational levels below the national average. While close to 40 percent of the economically
active population above age 15 did not have a high school education, according to the 1993 census, the
number rose to 68 percent among the victims documented by the CVR.
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
HUNUCO PERU AYACUCHO JUNN
CVR 1993 CENSUS
SOURCE: CVR, INEI
FIGURE 3
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES IN RURAL
ZONES REPORTED TO THE CVR AND THE RURAL POPULATION RECORDED
IN THE 1993 NATIONAL CENSUS IN RURAL ZONES, ACCORDING TO THE
HARDEST HIT DEPARTMENTS
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
SOURCE: CVR, INEI
HUNUCO PERU AYACUCHO JUNN
CVR 1993 CENSUS
FIGURE 4
PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE WHO DID NOT SPEAK SPANISH AS A NATIVE LANGUAGE:
COMPARISON BETWEEN DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED TO THE CVR
AND THE POPULATION OVER AGE 5 IN THE 1993 CENSUS, ACCORDING TO THE
HARDEST HIT DEPARTMENTS
Chapter 1
16
Te intensity of the violence was not distributed evenly during the internal armed conict, and not all
regions were aected at the same time.
As Figure 5 shows, the levels of violence peaked in 1984 and 1989, marking dierent phases in the armed
conict. Te 1984 peak was the most intense period and provoked the greatest number of deaths and
disappearances recorded by the CVR (19 percent of the victims). Tis was part of the initial phase of
the conict and was concentrated primarily in the department of Ayacucho. Tere was a noticeable rise
in the violence in 1983, following the governments decision in December 1982 to put the armed forces
FIGURE 5
PERU 1980-2000: NUMBER OF DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES
REPORTED TO THE CVR, ACCORDING TO YEAR
1990 1985 1980 2000 1995
3000
2000
1000
4000
5000
0
1990 1985 1980 2000 1995
N
U
M
B
E
R

O
F

D
E
A
T
H
S

A
N
D

D
I
S
A
P
P
E
A
R
A
N
C
E
S
N
U
M
B
E
R

O
F

D
I
S
T
R
I
C
T
S
3000
1500
0
400
100
200
300
4500
0
FIGURE 6
PERU 1980-2000: NUMBER OF DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED TO
THE CVR AND NUMBER OF DISTRICTS WHERE THE EVENTS OCCURRED, BY YEAR
17
in charge of combating subversion. After a period of declining fatalities, which reached its low point in
1986, the levels of violence began to increase again until they peaked for a second time in 1989. Te levels
of violence would remain relatively high until 1992, when Abimael Guzmn Reinoso was arrested and
the central direction of the PCP-SL fell into disarray. While the levels of violence in this second phase
were not as high as in 1984, the conict expanded over a wider area of the nation.
Figure 6 compares the intensity of the violence with the expansion of the conict to dierent geographic
areas.
10
Tis shows that after the decline in violence between 1985 and 1986, not only did the number
of deaths and disappearances reported to the CVR begin to increase, but so too did the geographic area
where the violent acts were committed. As can be seen, 1984 was the year with the highest number of
victims, while more areas were aected by the internal armed conict between 1989 and 1992.
Figure 7 shows that as the importance of the south-central region (formed by the department of Ayacucho
and neighboring provinces in the departments of Huancavelica and Apurmac) began to decline, so did
the number of victims in rural areas and those whose native language was Quechua. Tis demonstrates
that the conict involved not only dierent geographic areas, but also complex social realities. It is im-
portant to note, however, that at the times when the conict was most intense, the absolute majority of
victims lived in rural areas and spoke a native language.
As was stated earlier, approximately 69,000 people were killed in the internal armed conict, according
to the CVRs calculations. Tese calculations may seem unlikely to be a considerable sector of Peruvian
society, nevertheless, the country needs to accept the truth that the Peru that is rural, Andean, Quechua,
Ashninka, peasant, poor and with little formal education bled for years without the rest of nation paying
attention to the true dimension of the tragedy of this foreign land within Peru.
10 The indicators used are the number of deaths and disappearances reported to the CVR for intensity of the violence (left vertical axis) and
the number of districts where violent acts left behind victims (right vertical axis).
1990 1985 1980 2000 1995
50%
25%
75%
100%
0%
% RURAL
% SOUTH-CENTRAL
% QUECHUA
FIGURE 7
PERU 1980-2000: PERCENTAGE OF DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED
TO THE CVR BY INDICATORS, ACCORDING TO THE YEAR EVENTS OCCURRED
Indicators: Quechua as native language (% Quechua); Events in rural zones
(% Rural); Events in south-central region (% South-Central)
Chapter 1
18
Tese are the Peruvians who are missing from our nation, the most invisible, but who are not any less real: the
Quispes, Huamns,
11
Mamanis, Taypes, Yupanquis, Condoris, Tintimaris and Metzoquiaris. Although they
are too often excluded and removed from other Peruvians, they demand to be treated with respect and justice:
Seores, chaymi uqa munani kachun respeto, kachuny manchakuy, masque imayrikulla
kaptiykupas, wakcha pobri kaptiykupas, campesino totalmente uqaaykuchu kaniku,
huk real llapas killapi ganaq, mana ni pipas kanikuchu. Seores, chayta ya justiciyata ma-
akuykiku. [Sirs, I want there to be respect. I want there to be fear of God. We are only
humble people, orphans and poor, peasants earning just a few coins a month. We may be no
one, sirs, but this is the justice we seek.]
12
LEGAL DIMENSION OF THE EVENTS
Determination of the events
An analysis of the information gathered by the CVR not only illustrates how the armed actors in the
conict targeted the countrys least protected and historically most marginalized population, it also dem-
onstrates and helps observers understand the scope of the criminal conduct practiced by the various actors
in a generalized and systematic manner during certain periods and in certain areas. Te CVR oers the
country a global vision of the events that allows us to see the legal consequences of what happened and
identify those who may be responsible for it.
In its legal examination of the events, the CVR took into account a body of irrevocable human rights
recognized by the international community. Tese are imperative norms of international law in general,
included in international human rights law, international humanitarian law or international criminal law.
Tis body of irrevocable rights is derived from and based on the dignity of the human being.
In accordance with the Fourth Final Provision and Article 3 of the Peruvian Constitution, in place since
1993, this body of irrevocable rights determines how the contents and scope of all the rights recognized
in the Constitution must be interpreted, and is part of the set of specic fundamental rights that are
recognized at the constitutional level in our legal system.
Peru has ratied the principal universal and regional treaties that today form the body of international
human rights law at the international and inter-American levels.
Te existing body of human rights legislation has specic implications for Peru. First, according to the
principles of international law, no state can invoke provisions of national law as justication for failing
to comply with a treaty or the imperative norms of general international law (jus cogens). Second, human
rights treaties dier from other treaties on a central point: the goal is the protection of the fundamental
rights of human beings (IACHR, OC2/82, N 29). Tird, human rights violations perpetrated by a
state cease to be an internal issue within the exclusive competence of the state involved.
Besides the general implications already mentioned, every state has other specic obligations under inter-
national human rights law. Tese are the obligations to respect and guaranteei.e., to ensure that they
are respectedthe rights and liberties recognized by human rights and humanitarian treaties in general.
As a consequence of the obligation to guarantee the rights in these treaties, the state must prevent, inves-
tigate and sanction all violations of recognized rights, and ensure, when possible, the re-establishment of
the violated right and oer reparation for the harm produced by the violation of a fundamental human
right. In this case, the state should take legal action against anyone, whether a public ocial or a private
individual, who is responsible for the violation, with no exceptions.
11 Quispe and Huamn were the two most common last names among the victims registered in the CVRs database.
12 CVR. Public hearings in Huanta, Ayacucho, April 11, 2002. Testimony of Ms. Sabina Valencia.
19
Tere have been legal debates about whether agents who are not employed by the state may violate human
rights. Jurisprudence indicates that the conduct of non-state agents is regulated by the norms of interna-
tional humanitarian law, as only states have the prerogative to sign and ratify international treaties.
Te CVR believes that this debate is not, and should never be, relegated exclusively to the legal sphere.
Te objection, which is based on the contents of the instruments and the competencies of dierent legal
bodies, has no value in the social sphere. In other words, it does not create meaningful rules for people
who are concerned, not about problems related to the competencies of these bodies, but rather are con-
cerned about the ethical criteria that should be used to judge terrorist actions. We cannot expect to solve
an ethical problem with a legal argument.
Te CVR maintains that terrorist actions cannot be classied as violations of international human rights
instruments because these instruments are based on treaties and therefore refer only to the responsibility
of states. Nor can they be judged by international courts specializing in these areas, because these courts
are not competent to judge terrorist crimes. Tis, however, does not mean that terrorist crimes cannot be
classied as human rights violations.
International humanitarian law (IHL), in its contemporary form, covers what were originally two branch-
es of the so-called rights of war. Tese are the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention. Te rst
concerns the rules that apply during hostilities; the second outlines the humanitarian rules that apply
to the various parties to a conict regarding their relationship with people who are not directly involved
in the hostilities, prisoners who have surrendered or are no longer in combat, and non-military targets.
Peru has ratied the main international treaties that currently form the core of IHL, specically the four
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and the two Additional Protocols of June 8, 1977.
According to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and, more recently, the International
Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, both of which conrmed the judgment of the Inter-
national Nuremberg Tribunal (1945-1946), war crimes and serious violations of IHL, as well as those
included in Article 3 Common, are sanctioned by the imperative norms of international law, which are
obligatory for states and individuals without exception.
Te rights and prohibitions enunciated in Article 3 Common, which cover all types of internal armed
conict, are obligatory for state and non-state agents at all times and in all places. In addition, the norms
of IHL do not justify or authorize the use of terrorist actions or methods, or the organization of armed
groups that commit actions of this nature. Nor do they justify, in any case or under any circumstance,
the death or injury that these groups may provoke.
Two important clarications are necessary here. Te rst refers to the automatic application of Article 3
Common and, in general, the norms that govern any kind of armed conict. As the International Committee
of the Red Cross has stated, an explicit declaration of war is not a necessary prerequisite for their application.
Te second clarication is that the application of IHL during an internal armed conict does not aect
the national or international legal status of the insurgent or armed groups or their members.
13

Following this argument, the CVR believes that the concurrent application of international human
rights law and international humanitarian law is essential for classifying certain acts as crimes and hu-
man rights violations.
An armed force or armed group is morally disqualied if, by the way it ghts, it commits terrorist actions or any
other crime against humanity. If it resorts to such actions, it is stating that its goal is not to end the conict, but
to exterminate the enemy. In addition, armed subversion has no moral justication in states that guarantee the
13 The last paragraph of Article 3 Common of the Geneva Conventions states: The application of preceding provisions shall not afect the
legal status of the Parties to the confict.
Chapter 1
20
basic freedom of citizens, because it destroys the existing public arenas that, within the framework of respect
for human rights, allow for non-violent strategies to bring about rationally acceptable changes.
Te International Criminal Court Statute, adopted by the international community in Rome (1998) at
the end of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, took eect for the signatory parties,
including Peru, on July 1, 2002. Te statute cannot be applied retroactively.
While the International Criminal Court cannot judge events that occurred before its statute took eect,
it is still vitally important for the international community. To a great extent, its denitions of dierent
international crimes codify common international norms, thus contributing to greater legal precision in
the case of crimes against humanity.
Te Rome Statute also rearms the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia regarding the classication of certain transgressions of international humani-
tarian law, such as war crimes, committed during internal armed conicts.
While not attempting to invoke the competency of the International Criminal Court in relation to the events
that took place in Peru or to directly apply its mandate to these events, the CVR will use denitions supplied by
the Rome Statute, because they facilitate a better understanding of the context of certain international crimes.
Fundamental rights of the person cannot
be derogated even during armed conficts
Since World War II, the international community has been establishing, with increasing clarity, the ex-
istence of imperative norms of general international law, which hold that fundamental rights cannot be
derogated even in the course of an international war or during an internal armed conict.
Tese norms are even more precise in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)
and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). In the case of war, public danger or other
emergency, the CCPR (Article 4) states that no derogation of articles [] may be made under this provi-
sion, and the ACHR (Article 27) states that the foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension
of the following articles [...]. States are also banned from suspending judicial guarantees (habeas corpus
and civil rights protection) which are indispensable for the protection of rights that cannot be derogated.
Recognition by the international community of a body of intangible and non-derogable fundamental rights
for all human beings, without exception, which cannot be derogated at any time or in any place, is a relatively
recent historical event of the utmost importance to all peoples of the world. Tese norms are grounded in the
convictions that arose from the horrors of past centuries, the common belief that they are inherent to all hu-
man beings and that all human beings are equal, which means that these norms cannot be waived, cannot
be derogated and intangible. States of exception or emergency are not and cannot be accepted as an empire of
arbitrary action where anything is permitted, not as the negation of the rule of law but as a special form of it.
Invalidity of amnesty and other procedural obstacles
with respect to crimes and human rights violations
Te Inter-American Court of Human Rights has expressly declared that amnesty laws, which are meant
to ensure impunity for violations of international law and grave human rights abuses, are incompatible
with the American Convention on Human Rights because they lack legal eects.
14
Tis position was
further dened through a judgment handed down by the court.
Te courts judges unanimously ruled that the decision in the judgment on the merits in the Barrios Altos
14 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, judgment of the Barrios Altos case (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al vs. Peru), of March 14, 2001.
Paragraph 51, No. 4.
21
case has general eects.
15
In compliance with the Inter-American Courts decision, Peruvian courts have
either continued or started criminal proceedings against the presumed authors of the crimes committed in
Barrios Altos, as well as against people implicated in other cases who have beneted from the amnesty laws.
Te judgment of the Inter-American Court opened a new chapter in the ght against impunity and is
consistent with earlier jurisprudence and consultative opinions issued by the court. Te doctrine estab-
lished by the court is based on the principle of international law, according to which obligations imposed
by international law must be fullled in good faith and for which internal law cannot be invoked as a
reason for non-compliance with international law.
Te Inter-American Courts decision to reject amnesty laws follows a trend in international law that consid-
ers the prescription of criminal prosecution on the grounds that the statute of limitations has expired to be
incompatible with the states obligations. In the Barrios Altos case, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights declared that all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures
designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation
and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations.
16
According to international law
governing human rights, the state cannot use norms that the state itself has passed to avoid its international
obligations to investigate, try and sentence parties responsible for serious human rights violations.
Te corollary to the important limitations imposed on the sovereignty of states by the universal decla-
ration of the rights of people after World War IIincluding the proscription of jus ad bellum and the
protection of the fundamental rights of all human beings at all times and in all placesis the recognition
within international law of the limits of the states sovereign power in these areas.
Tere should be a uniform interpretation of the diverse constitutional articles that could pose a conict: a
personalist option, the right to justice, the obligation of the state to guarantee full respect of human rights,
and the power to grant amnesties. Te approach to constitutional provisions determines, as the Constitu-
tional Tribunal has armed, that the power to grant amnesties is not absolute, but has a specic limitation:
the defense of the person with respect for human dignity and with the full protection of human rights.
The classifcation of certain crimes and human
rights violations as systematic or widespread
Faced with a situation in which illicit actions caused tens of thousands of deaths, the CVR had to deter-
mine whether these were isolated acts that were unavoidable in the context of the internal armed conict,
or the result of a systematic or generalized practice on the part of state and non-state agents.
Te systems for protecting human rights pay special attention to situations that reveal constant and
systematic violations of human rights (United Nations, 1967) or a generalized pattern of human rights
violations (OAS, 1965).
In the case of Peru, the human rights branches of the United Nations and the Organization of American
States have stated that torture and forced disappearances during the period being analyzed were not
isolated acts, but were part of a systematic practice. Besides the references to torture and forced disap-
pearances, the CVR believes that certain terrorist actions also constitute systematic practices and are not
isolated acts or actions that are dicult to avoid in an internal armed conict.
By virtue of its mandate, the CVR had to examine crimesunderstood as a synonym for violations of
the Peruvian Criminal Codecommitted by terrorist groups. Tis was a unique element of the Peruvian
case, in that agents with no links to the state were responsible for thousands of human rights violations
15 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits of the Barrios Altos case (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al
vs. Peru), of September 3, 2001. Section VII, Number 2.
16 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, judgment of the Barrios Altos Case, of March 14, 2001. Paragraph 41.
Chapter 1
22
that could also be classied as a systematic or widespread practice.
Te criminal oenses committed by terrorist groups involved in the internal armed conict must be
considered in light of the standards of international criminal law and in accordance with the norms of
international humanitarian law.
Crimes against humanity refer to actions against a persons life and physical integrity, acts of torture and
other actions against individual freedom. To meet this denition, they must be committed against the civil-
ian population systematically or repeatedly during times of peace or within the context of an armed conict.
Te term systematic, according to international jurisprudence and the International Law Commission, is
dened as a plan or policy that could result in the repeated or continuous commission of inhumane acts.
17

Te term widespread characterizes the conduct, not the agent; that is, the widespread commission of an
act in no way implies that all individual agents are implicated in it. Te term widespread, according to the
sources cited indicates that the acts be directed against a multiplicity of victims. Tis requirement excludes an
isolated inhumane act perpetrated by someone acting on his or her own and directed against a single victim.
18

* * * * *
Te CVR is convinced that the crimes and human rights violations committed by subversive organizations
and state security forces were far from being simple excesses, that is, isolated mistakes and errant behavior
that strayed from the typical conduct of the armed actors. On the contrary, these violations reected deliber-
ate courses of action. Te internal armed conict was especially onerous because of the application of war
strategies that often assumed it was necessary to commit acts that constituted serious infractions of interna-
tional humanitarian law, crimes against humanity, and violations of Perus legal and constitutional norms.
On the part of the PCP-SL, its ideology led it to apply extremely violent and brutal tactics that were car-
ried out, not only with complete disregard for elemental humanitarian values, but without considering
the reality of the situation in the country. Te organization refused to change essential elements of its
strategy, believing that an increasingly widespread and intensive conict would favor its cause.
On the part of State agents, these actors considered democracy and respect for human rights to be ob-
stacles instead of a legitimate course of action in the ght against subversion. Te abdication of civilian
power allowed the weight of the design and implementation of the anti-subversive strategy to fall into the
hands of the armed forces, which were guaranteed diverse forms of impunity, which were later institu-
tionalized through a general amnesty after democracy was lost.
Nevertheless, the political cost of practices such as extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances, as
well as the need for greater eciency in combating subversion, led the security forces to review their strat-
egies. While this changed the pattern of existing human rights violations, it still left serious unresolved
problems in terms of the judicial process and system of incarceration.
Te CVR has identied patterns of crimes and human rights violations that were committed by both sub-
versive organizations and anti-subversive forces as part of their respective strategies. Te crimes and violations
17 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, sentence against Dusko Tadic, May 7, 1997, paragraph 648. Also see the
International Law Commissions Draft Code of Ofenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, paragraphs 94 and 95. Along
these same lines, see the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which declared: The concept of widespread may be defned as massive,
frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims. The concept of
systematic may be defned as thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial public
or private resources. There is no requirement that this policy must be adopted formally as the policy of a state. There must however be some
kind of preconceived plan or policy. Case of Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, September 2, 1998.
18 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, sentence against Dusko Tadic, May 7, 1997, paragraph 648. Also see the International
Law Commissions Draft Code of Ofense Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, paragraphs 94 and 95. In this sense, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, stated that The concept of widespread may be defned as massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out
collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims. Case of Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, September 2, 1998.
23
found and documented include the following: forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, assassinations
and massacres, inhumane and degrading treatment, sexual violence against women, violations of due process,
kidnappings and hostage-takings, violence against children, and the violation of collective rights.
The attribution of individual responsibilities
Te determination of responsibilities is necessary for justice to be served. Because justice has various
dimensions, the CVR went beyond the strict limits of criminal responsibility in determining responsibil-
ity for crimes. Te CVR did not have a jurisdictional function. Jurisdiction, by its nature, is exercised as
a function of stated law, which includes the determination of responsibilities as denitive and dening
within the framework of international human rights standards. Te CVRs mandate was restricted to
providing information to enable the competent sectors to make the determination.
Te CVR was established to identify, where possible, presumed responsibility for the crimes and human
rights violations that it was charged with clarifying. To this end, it gathered evidence to declare the presumed
responsibility of individuals for crimes or human rights violations. Te elements stem from testimonies,
various documents to which it had access and from the research carried out in the course of its investigation.
In general terms, the CVR made all reasonable eorts to ensure that the people who were cited as presum-
ably responsible for crimes were given the opportunity to present their version of the events. Te CVR
made certain that the person was heard or at least called to oer testimony. All of the people mentioned as
presumably responsible for crimes were given the opportunity to oer their perspective on what happened
through a document equivalent to the right of rebuttal.
Te specic nature of the violence in Peru must be taken into account when assigning responsibilities.
Unlike other truth commissions, the Peruvian Commission had to deal with a considerable number of
crimes committed by non-state agents, that is to say, the PCP-SL and the Tpac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tpac Amaru, MRTA). Tis posed various technical challenges
that were resolved by the CVR based on the following:
From the CVRs point of view, there is no dierence between crimes and human rights violations,
regardless of whether they were committed by state agents or non-state groups;
Te determination of responsibility in certain cases takes into consideration the chain of command
and hierarchical structures that existed when the crimes were committed;
Special mention must be made of the evaluation of crimes committed by paramilitaries and self-
defense committees. Te CVR considers the former to be part of a state apparatus, while in the latter
case, the analysis was carried out on a case-by-case basis, verifying the relationship that existed be-
tween the self-defense committee and state authorities at the time the crime was committed.
It is important to highlight, as a summary of the Final Report, the following criteria relative to the cases
presented by the CVR:
Te cases form part of a much broader and complex whole that is consistent with patterns of systematic
and widespread crimes, and human rights violations. As such, each of these events must be considered
as a crime against humanity in light of the International Criminal Court Statute.
Te forced disappearance of people, in particular, is an ongoing crime, which means that the case is
governed by the law in eect at the time that the accusation is presented, not necessarily the one in
eect when the crime was committed. It is neither legal nor moral to reduce a disappearance to the
category of a simple kidnapping, even if the disappearance occurred before 1991.
Te courts must take into account not only aggravating circumstances contemplated in the Criminal
Chapter 1
24
Code, but also elements of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. In par-
ticular, judges and prosecutors must consider the provisions of the Rome Statute to systematically in-
terpret the content of criminal actions, as well as the circumstances under which they were committed.
Te CVR has dened the criteria for attributing responsibility by a reasonable and proportionate use of
the causal relationship between an individual and the act committed by that person. Tis was based on
the determination of established patterns, as well as the presumed perpetrators position in connection
with the group or apparatus within which the act was committed. Similarly, the CVR used the most
advanced and widely accepted criminal doctrine for determining when responsibility can be attributed
to an individual. Tis was based on the provisions of the Rome Statute and the theory of dominion of
events and the organized apparatus of power. Te CVR suggests that the courts take into consideration
Articles 25 through 28 of the Rome Statute, which provide the most complete and consistent approach
to the question of who should be accused of committing a crime. Tis is complemented by the use and
application of the theory of the dominion of events in relation to the organized apparatus of power.
Te majority of the events examined under the CVRs mandate fall within the category of complex crimes,
in which the author and participants were part of an organization. In nearly all of these cases, the problem
revolves around the responsibility of the leaders who, while not directly carrying out the action, participated
to some degree (conceiving, planning, leading, ordering or preparing the crime). Tese are not new prob-
lems. Criminal doctrine has had to respond creatively when attempting to prosecute organized criminal
behavior. It is relevant in these cases to study the organization and its structure or chain of command.
To resolve these dilemmas, criminal doctrine has developed diverse approaches: intermediate authorship,
joint authorship, collateral authorship, inducing authorship or necessary cooperation. Te most common
response in comparative jurisprudence is linked to intermediate authorship and joint authorship.
Application of the theory of the dominion of events requires:
Tat there be an organized power apparatus with a rigid hierarchical structure;
Verication of the feasibility of eective responsibility of intermediate authorship, which implies that
there is a consistent dimension within the organization;
Responsibility of the author, which is derived from the eective control of the person in charge;
Tat the power apparatus not be linked to the juridical order, having opted instead for the criminal route.
Te human rights violations committed by the Peruvian state generally occurred during democratically
elected regimes, which included periodic elections, freedom of expression, and the guarantee of consti-
tutional rights. Te application of the theory cannot be mechanical, nor can it alone be used to assign
responsibility for grave human rights violations to those who were holding political power. Except for
the period ushered in by the coup of April 5, 1992, the Final Report details the way in which consistent
patterns of human rights violations were committed by state agents within a context of democracy. Te
combination of constitutional democracy and human rights violations requires a detailed analysis of the
relationship between the specic violation and the chain of command. Te patterns of human rights
violations included in the Final Report correspond, in many cases, to the political-military commands
or military commander in a zone or sub-zone placed under a state of emergency for reasons of national
security. Te Final Report, and other sources, describes repeatedly how the rule of law and constitutional
guarantees were suspended in the emergency zones. It is fair to assume that on many occasions these
regional or local structures acted outside the Constitution and in violation of the law.
Continuing along this line of reasoning, there are dierences between the PCP-SL and the MRTA, as
well as between these organizations and state agents. Te PCP-SL was an organized power apparatus that
was outside the law. Its objective was to destroy the state that upheld the law. In no way can it be consid-
ered a guerrilla group that was ghting a totalitarian regime in a war of national liberation. Moreover, its
actions contributed to the organizations illegality, even if the political motivations behind these actions
25
are recognized. Jurisdictional bodies, therefore, must take into account the theory of the dominion of
events to determine the criminal responsibility of the Shining Paths leaders.
19
Tere are dierences and
similarities between the MRTA and PCP-SL. Te dierences are mainly related to the strategic basis of
their actions, the actions themselves and the consequences they produced. Te theory of the dominion
of events, therefore, can be applied more readily to the kidnappings carried out by the organization than
to other actions. In these cases, as has been stated, there are elements to arm that the MRTAs central
leadership directly planned, conceived and organized these crimes.
Te assigning of responsibility to self-defense committees covers the material events, as well as the leaders of these
organizations. Depending on the specic case, this responsibility may also extend to the military leaders in the
zone in question when there is evidence of the eective subordination of these committees to military authorities.
THE MAGNITUDE AND COMPLEXITY OF
CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
An examination of the crimes and human rights violations covered under the CVRs mandate raises questions
about the reasons behind these events. Underlying these actions were ideologies, political will and strategies,
some of which were aimed at achieving the acquiescence or submission of the civilian population at any cost.
To understand the unprecedented magnitude of the conict, it is useful to analyze the strategies chosen
by the actors and their consequences. Understanding these strategies, however, does not allow for a moral
excuse or a legal explanation of any sort for the crimes committed. Likewise, the dierent proportional
participation in the number of fatalities (see Figure 8) cannot attenuate the moral and political responsi-
bility of the various agents who inicted harm on the civilian population.
Crimes and human rights violations resulting from the PCP-SLs strategy
In the case of the party that initiated the conict, the Communist Party of PeruShining Path (PCP-SL)
developed a strategy that consciously incorporated terror as a method for reaching its objectives and ex-
19 Responsibility falls to the head of the PCP-SL, the Central Committee and Regional Committees, such as the Metropolitan Lima Committee.
FIGURE 8
PERU 1980-2000: NUMBER OF DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED TO THE
CVR, ACCORDING TO THE PARTIES RESPONSIBLE, BY YEAR EVENTS OCCURRED
STATE AGENTS
SHINING PATH
1990 1985 1980 2000 1995
1500
1000
500
2000
2500
0
Chapter 1
26
plicitly rejected the rules of international law. Te Shining Paths ideology, encapsulated in the so-called
Gonzalo Tought, was based on an extreme version of Manichaeism that considered all institutions or
social groups outside its control to be absolute enemies, thereby turning them into valid military targets.
Authorities, civil society leaders, business people, religious men and women, and political leaders at any
level of the electoral spectrum were considered legitimate targets of the organizations violent actions.
Te PCP-SLs rhetoric unequivocally stated that human rights were an ideological construction of the ex-
isting social order and, as such, were of no value in guiding the organizations actions. Te PCP-SL reject-
ed the idea that individuals had rights as human beings and stated that all humanitarian considerations
were secondary to the need of the oppressed sectors, which they claimed to represent, to take power.
Te principal strategic objective of the Shining Paths actions was the total destruction of existing politi-
cal structures and the creation of institutions under its direct control through which it would exercise
total control over state powers. Te strategy foresaw eorts by the armed forces to re-establish orderthe
military violently destroyed many of the PCP-SLs original base committeesand also anticipated a
bloody and prolonged confrontation to determine supremacy.
With the objective of totally and radically destroying local power, whether state or traditional, and con-
structing support bases, the PCP-SL opted for a policy of selective assassinations and, in order to repress
all resistance, a policy of disproportionate retaliation. Assassinations were seen as a way of ghting,
indistinguishable from other tactics normally used in internal armed conicts, such as sabotage, armed
propaganda and ambushes of small and isolated military units.
Similarly, the PCP-SL opted to quickly form armed units in those areas where it managed to replace lo-
cal authorities. To accomplish this, the organization did not hesitate to use forced recruitment, including
that of minors. Tis form of violence, which explains the large number of kidnappings and forced disap-
pearances attributed to the PCP-SL, generated a series of collateral violations, such as sexual violence,
slavery, torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Nevertheless, the armed units organized by the PCP-SL were not aimed at defending the support bases
they created, because the organizations strategy was based on provoking disproportionate repression by
security forces that would result in massive damage. Te strategy assumed that the population would
reject the security forces, and that this rejection would translate into support for the PCP-SLs cause.
When it was necessary to maintain the populations logistical support for important military units, the
PCP-SL opted for a policy of forced displacement and slavery that kept the civilian population (which it
called the masses) on the move to escape the states presence, with no regard for the inhumane condi-
tions to which people were subjected in these improvised camps.
Te dierences between the PCP-SLs military strategy and that normally followed by other insurgent
groups in Latin America explains its propensity to carry out extremely brutal actions and permanently em-
ploy violence as a way of setting an example. Even when the PCP-SL carried out actions generally used by
other armed groups in internal conicts, it did so with calculated cruelty to create a generalized sense of fear
that would supposedly benet its goal of provoking a disproportionate response from its demoralized enemy.
Provocation was a constant in the PCP-SLs tactics. For it to be eective, the PCP-SL had to indoctrinate
its militants with a fatalistic understanding of their lives. Te so-called Gonzalo Tought elevated to
the category of scientic truth the concept that the population had to pay a blood quota in order to
achieve the Shining Paths triumph. Tis meant that militants had to be willing to sacrice their own
lives, even if this did not result in a military advantage and only ended in their own destruction.
Te PCP-SLs strategy remained unchanged throughout the conict, varying only quantitatively
when the organization expanded to new zones or increased the intensity of its actions, such as during
armed strikes. Situations that raised questions about the strategys eectiveness, due to resistance
27
from the local population or actions by the state, led not to a review of the strategy, but to increased
violence. Tis can be seen in the response to communities that rejected the PCP-SLs political ideas.
Unable to accept that they had not won over the population, the PCP-SL called for massive confron-
tations between its armed columns and self-defense groups, which it saw as feudal vassals rather
than what they really werea desperate response from people who had decided to assume the states
role and defend themselves.
Figure 9 shows the distribution over the years of the principal cases of crimes and human rights violations
committed by the PCP-SL that were reported to the CVR. Te graph shows two major cycles of violence
unleashed by the subversive organization. Te rst, between 1982 and 1985, was the most intense. Nearly
one-third of the assassinations committed by the PCP-SL that were reported to the CVR occurred during
these years. Tis rst cycle of intense violence in the internal armed conict was mainly concentrated in
the department of Ayacucho and was linked to three processes:
Te PCP-SLs attempt to impose its model of social and state structures on the Ayacucho countryside
through its popular committees;
Te increasing resistance (especially after 1983) of the peasant population in Ayacucho to the PCP-SLs
totalitarian ideas;
Te intervention of the armed forces in the internal armed conict and the subversive organizations
strategy of provoking the military into committing violent and indiscriminate acts of repression.
Te violent repression by the security forces, which resulted in thousands of innocent victims in Aya-
cucho, dealt a serious blow to the PCP-SLs political and military apparatus. Te subversive organization
retreated from the battleelda strategy that was planned in anticipation of a violent reaction from the
stateand began penetrating other social and geographic areas outside Ayacucho. Between 1985 and
1987, the PCP-SL attempted to create support bases (bases de apoyo) and spread its war to the central,
northeastern and southern Andes, as well as to urban areas, by trying to link up with coca growers in the
Huallaga Valley and peasant communities in Apurmac, Huancavelica and Junn. It also intensied its
political work among radical university groups, particularly in the cities of Huancayo and Lima.
1990 1985 1980 2000 1995
KIDNAPPINGS
TORTURE
ASSASSINATIONS
FIGURE 9
PERU 1980-2000: METHODS USED BY THE PCP-SL IN ITS SUBVERSIVE STRATEGY.
PERCENTAGE OF DISTRIBUTION OF CASES, BY YEAR (EACH DOTTED LINE
REPRESENTS 6% OF THE CASES REPORTED TO THE CVR)
Chapter 1
28
Another cycle of intense violence was unleashed in these new areas beginning in 1988. Te magnitude of
the crimes and human rights violations committed by the subversive organization during this period was
sparked by causes similar to those of the rst cycle. Nevertheless, this time resistance from the popula-
tion, authorities and civil society leaders came much earlier and was much stronger, which can be seen in
the successful resistance by peasant communities in Puno and by the spread of rural peasant patrols and
self-defense committees. At the same time, the state and security forces designed a new anti-subversive
strategy that reinforced intelligence gathering, called for much more selective attacks and involved the
peasant population in the anti-subversive ght.
As Figure 9 shows, the distribution of the principal crimes committed by the PCP-SL and reported to the
CVR follows an extremely synchronized pattern. Te organization used assassination and torture on a
massive scale as part of its methods in the armed struggle, and employed kidnapping to forcibly recruit
followers. Tese methods created fear among the population and were part of a terrorist strategy. At the
same time, the systematic and widespread use of these methods constituted grave crimes against human-
ity which are condemned by Peruvian and international law.
As Table 1 shows, the correlation
20
among assassinations, torture and kidnappings committed by the
PCP-SL between 1980 and 2000 is high and positive, which suggests that these practices were committed
simultaneously and consistently over time.
Following a rationale that included assassinations, provocation, a gradual increase in the levels of violence
and the transformation of old community disputes into armed conicts, the PCP-SL developed a strategy
that was very costly in terms of human lives and unprecedented in the history of internal armed conicts
in Latin America. Te high proportion of killings attributed to the PCP-SL (54 percent of the victims
reported to the CVR) does not compare to the ndings of other truth commissions in countries that ex-
perienced internal armed conicts. In no other case was the percentage of victims attributed to insurgent
groups greater than 5 percent of the total number of deaths.
According to the ideology and practices established by the PCP-SLs main leaders, the value of human
lifeof its enemies or its own combatantswas relative. Nevertheless, it is necessary to highlight what
occurred when the principal leaders of the PCP-SL were arrested and faced with the same decisions they
demanded of their followers. Abimael Guzmn and his closest followers, who had rejected all dialogue
with constitutional governments during the 1980s, not only did not resist arrest, but accepted a series of
privileges from their captors and began negotiations with a dictatorial regime in exchange for political
concessions that translated into their strategic capitulation.
20 This statistical correlation indicates the close association of the two variables, that is, the levels at which changes in one variable infuence
the other. Pearsons coefcient r is a way of measuring this association: the closer the coefcient is to the unit (+1 or -1) the greater the
association between the two variables. A positive association that is close to the indicated unit indicates that the two variable directly infuence
one another. For example, kidnapping is closely linked to assassination. A negative association indicates the opposite relationship. For example,
when the incidence of legal arrests is higher, the incidence of torture is lower.
TORTURES
KIDNAPPINGS
0.90
0.98
ASSASSINATIONS
0.89
-
TORTURES
TABLE 1
CORRELATION OF THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OVER THE YEARS OF
ASSASSINATIONS, TORTURE AND KIDNAPPINGS PERPETRATED BY THE
PCP-SL AND REPORTED TO THE CVR (PEARSONS R COEFFICIENT)
29
Crimes and violations caused by the MRTAs strategy
Te magnitude of the PCP-SLs crimes should not overshadow a review of the actions of the other armed
group active during the period of the CVRs investigation, the Tpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(Movimiento Revolucionario Tpac Amaru, MRTA). Te MRTA, which arose with the idea of becoming
a kind of armed branch of social movements, followed an insurrectionist strategy comparable to that of
other Latin American groups with which it had contact.
Te MRTAs military strategy combined urban armed agitation with ambushes and the organization of
armed military columns in the countryside. Because it never established links to the social movements
it claimed to represent, however, the organization faced serious economic challenges that it attempted to
resolve through tactics such as kidnapping. Kidnapping, which was also used by other armed groups in
Latin American, was employed even though it is specically banned by the international humanitarian
law the MRTA claimed to respect.
Faced with slow growth, increasing levels of violence and militarization, the MRTA had little opportu-
nity to develop its own armed strategy. It therefore began adopting tactics used by the PCP-SL, including
the assassination of people with no military connections for the sole purpose of teaching the population
a lesson. Victims of MRTA assassinations included a leader of the Ashninka indigenous people for his
alleged actions against MIR guerrillas in 1965; retired government employees with no links to the admin-
istration in power at the time; business people; kidnapping victims; and people the MRTA considered
disreputable. Tis conduct was echoed within the organization, and assassination became a way for the
MRTA to resolve its internal conicts in the months before its principal leaders were arrested.
In addition, the MRTAs eorts to control fronts in rural areas inevitably led to confrontations with the
PCP-SL that complicated the conict even further, creating new risks for the civilian population and
increasing the number of victims.
While the MRTAs responsibility for fatalities is proportionately low (1.5 percent of the deaths and disap-
pearances reported to the CVR), the organizations armed activity undeniably increased the suering of
the Peruvian people, added to the number of human rights violations and further weakened democratic
order and the social movement it claimed to defend.
Crimes and human rights violations caused
by the strategies of state agents
Te Peruvian state was not prepared to deal with the armed subversion launched by the PCP-SL. For a
long time, authorities believed they were dealing with a guerrilla insurgency similar to that of 1965. or
with one that resembled other armed groups in Latin America. As a result, the initial police response was,
above all, a reaction to the PCP-SLs attacks. Te police forces initial eorts did not have time to mature
or produce results before authorities decided to put the armed forces in charge of the anti-subversive ght.
Te immediate result of this decision, which was adopted without a comprehensive strategy for deal-
ing with subversion on dierent frontsideologically, politically, economically and militarilywas the
abdication of civilian authority in a broad swath of territory that was placed under a state of emergency,
creating a drastic worsening of the violence that increased the number of casualties to levels unparalleled
during the remainder of the internal armed conict.
Te PCP-SL remained an unknown organization. Tere was little information about the sectors where it
operated, who its militants were and where they came from, or the ideological dierences that separated
it from other groups. State agencies compensated for this lack of information by targeting entire popula-
tions as potential enemies because they lived in the area where the subversive group operated. People from
Ayacucho, Quechua speakers, university students and left-wing politicians became suspects by association.
Chapter 1
30
Similarly, the anti-subversive units were trained only in technical and military areas, with an emphasis on pre-
paring the soldiers physically to operate in complex geographic areas. Teir preparation was not seen as ideologi-
cal and political training for troops that would have to win over the civilian population, such as avoiding abuses
that might alienate it, but as an indoctrination based on blind loyalty and a willingness to commit acts of cruelty.
Te situation was complicated by racism within the armed forces, which replicated patterns that existed
in the overall rural-urban relationship in Peru. Military ocers generally came from urban areas, and
the cultural and social dierences between the ocers and the population were immense and produced
a general disdain for the people they were supposed to win over and defend. In many cases, instead of
protecting the population of Ayacucho from the PCP-SL, the armed forces acted as though they were
trying to protect Peru from that population.
Although the PCP-SL had taken up arms against a democratic regime, the civilian governments, with
some notable exceptions, did not use the legitimacy of democracy to confront and defeat subversion
ideologically. Instead, civilian leaders abdicated their authority in favor of a military response over which
they could not exercise any signicant control. Appointing military commanders in the emergency zones
as political-military authorities was equivalent to a decision by civilian leaders to organize the anti-
subversive ght in such a way that only the military leaders were responsible for the dirty work that
inevitably stemmed from conict. Civilian authorities tended to ignore and silence accusations of abuses
instead of assuming their responsibility for designing a truly democratic anti-subversive strategy.
Te concept of a state of emergency lost its meaning, and this exceptional measure became a permanent
xture in various parts of the country, leading to the suspension of constitutional guarantees. Te perma-
nent nature of the state of emergency weakened Peruvian democracy and created a climate that permitted
human rights abuses to occur.
Te policy of indiscriminately giving control to the military was re-examined during the early months of
the administration of President Alan Garca Prez, who took a critical view of the eorts of his predeces-
sor, Fernando Belaunde Terry. Perhaps the most important developments came in 1985 and 1986, with
the creation of the Peace Commission and a willingness to address the serious human rights abuses com-
mitted by the armed forces. Tat period ended after the prison massacres in June 1986, which reduced
the possibilities of a democratic alternative to the anti-subversive strategy and played into the Shining
Paths strategy of provocation and polarization. Te conict not only spread to other zones, but also grew
increasingly complicated, reaching a point where the viability of the Peruvian state was in doubt and
creating conditions for massive human rights violations and terrorist actions.
Congress attempted to reorient the states anti-subversion actions, and there were congressional investiga-
tions into the accusations of human rights abuses. Unfortunately, these initiatives were carried out by a
small minority in Congress and did not have a signicant impact on the way in which civilian authorities
assumed responsibility for the conict.
Te military and police forces did their own assessment and reoriented their strategy based on the rec-
ognition that the population was caught in the crossre and that the state had to adopt measures to win
over the population. Te security forces reduced the number of indiscriminate actions and started to
emphasize intelligence work and identication of the social sectors where the PCP-SL was trying to win
supporters. Te state security apparatus, however, did not use legal methods to arrest or process suspects.
It continued to carry out extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances, but did so more selectively.
A new change in strategy came after the arrest of the top PCP-SL leaders, the implementation of new laws
to undermine the internal loyalty of subversive groups and the growing national and international focus
on practices such as extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances. Te most common human rights
violations after this change included arbitrary arrest, violation of due process and the mass incarceration
of innocent people who spent long years behind bars.
31
Figure 10 shows the methods applied by state agents during the dierent stages of its anti-subversive strategies.
21
A large percentage of the extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances and torture reported to the
CVR were concentrated in the rst stage of the conict, between 1983 and 1984, when the armed forces
were given control over internal order and anti-subversive eorts in the department of Ayacucho. Tis
stage was characterized by a widespread and indiscriminate strategy of repression, especially in the rural
areas of Ayacucho. During these years, members of the security forces hit hard at certain segments of
the population with the objective of eliminating potential PCP-SL militants. Tey eliminated suspects
and presumed collaborators, and, in many cases, these peoples social and family networks in an eort to
show peasants the high cost they would pay if they supported subversion. Some of these practices were
widespread and constituted crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law
and Perus laws and Constitution.
Te intensity of the internal armed conict subsided somewhat in 1985, reected in a lower number
of crimes and human rights abuses by state agents. Given the continued existence of subversion and its
spread to other regions, between 1985 and 1989 state agents in charge of the anti-subversive strategy
evaluated their actions and designed a new strategy aimed at combating armed subversion more directly.
Greater emphasis was placed on gathering intelligence on subversive organizations, which led to more
selective operations to eliminate presumed members of subversive organizations, and an eort to actively
involve organized peasant communities in self-defense committees to ght subversion.
Members of self-defense committees, who were not state agents but acted under the guidance of or ac-
quiesced to state agents, produced a signicant number of human rights abuses. Tis was also true of
paramilitary groups, particularly the Rodrigo Franco Command (Comando Rodrigo Franco).
As a result of the strategic changes made during the second phase, there was an absolute decrease in ex-
trajudicial executions (compared to 1983-1985). Forced disappearances increased, however, particularly
between 1989 and 1992. Te change in strategy was also related to the new areas of conict opened up by
21 The data on extrajudicial executions, disappearances and torture were provided in testimonies analyzed by the CVR. The information on
ofcial arrests by security forces came from the following sources: data from 1983-1992 was provided by the National Anti-Terrorism Bureau
(Communiqu 55-DIRCOTE-COMASE of March 13, 2003); data from 1993-2000 was provided by the National Registry of Detained and Sentenced
Inmates from the Attorney Generals Ofce (Communiqu 106-2003-MP-FN-RENADESPPLE).
1990 1985 1980 2000 1995
OFFICIAL ARRESTS
TORTURE
FORCED DISAPPEARANCES
EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS
FIGURE 10
PERU 1980-2000: METHODS USED BY STATE AGENTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
SUBVERSION. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY YEAR (EACH LINE
REPRESENTS 6% OF THE CASES REPORTED TO THE CVR)
Chapter 1
32
subversive organizations, especially in urban areas where operations to eliminate alleged subversives were
more secretive and involved actions such as forced disappearances. Tis practice was also linked to torture
as a way of obtaining information about the subversive organizations plans and structures.
One of the high points of this stage was the arrest of the principal leaders of the subversive organiza-
tions, including the founder and leader of the PCP-SL, Abimael Guzmn Reinoso, who was caught in
September 1992 thanks to intelligence work by the National Police. Te arrest led to the Shining Path
leaders strategic capitulation, the demoralization of many of his followers and the quantitative success of
a program to disarm presumed subversives through a legal mechanism known as repentance.
Te third phase in the anti-subversive eort was characterized by a substantial increase in the number
of arrests of alleged subversives and a rapid decline in the number of extrajudicial executions and forced
disappearances. Tere was, however, a notorious increase in the number of cases in which the detainees
right to due process was violated.
Information obtained through the arrests of the top subversive leaders, as well as that provided by mem-
bers of these organizations who accepted the repentance laws enacted by former President Alberto
Fujimoris administration, led to the arrest of thousands of people accused of belonging to the PCP-SL
and the MRTA.
22
Many of these detainees were processed without a minimum respect for due process
and with insucient evidence.
Numerous mistakes were made within the system created to try people accused of terrorism and treason
during this time, eventually leading the state to establish a mechanism for pardons, which allowed hundreds
of innocent people to be released from prison.
23
Te Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that this
system violated due process in Peru. In a January 2003 ruling, Perus Constitutional Tribunal struck down
as unconstitutional most of the anti-terrorism legislation passed under the Fujimori administration.
Troughout these three major strategic cycles, the security forces systematically used torture as an interroga-
tion technique to obtain information from alleged subversives or as a form of punishment and intimidation.
As Figure 10 shows, the pattern of torture during the period investigated by the CVR remained constant
during the times when executions, then forced disappearances, and nally legal arrests were at their peak.
According to the results shown in Table 2, there is a signicant correlation in the distribution of cases
reported to the CVR involving extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances and acts of torture com-
mitted by state agents between 1980 and 2000. Inversely, there is a weak correlation between cases of
22 According to the Attorney Generals Ofce, the years with the highest number of ofcial arrests were 1993 (4,085 arrests) and 1994 (4,948 arrests).
23 Between 1996 and 1999, the state pardoned 502 people who were unjustly imprisoned. This mechanism, however, did not cover all cases
of innocent people in prison (Human Rights Ombudsman, 2000).
0.76
0.96
-0.17
TORTURE
DISAPPEARANCES
OFFICIAL ARRESTS
.87
0.19
TORTURE
-0.15
DISAPPEARANCES
TABLE 2
CORRELATION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF DISTRIBUTION OVER THE YEARS
OF EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS, DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE AND OFFICIAL
ARRESTS PERPETRATED BY THE STATE AGENTS AND REPORTED TO THE CVR
(PEARSONS R COEFFICIENT)
33
arrests with executions and disappearances, as well as a weak correlation with cases of torture.
Te state security forces naturally had an advantage over the subversive organizations, as they had the rule
of law at their disposal. Te security forces, however, did not use these mechanisms and frequently con-
sidered them an obstacle to their actions. Te CVR believes that if civilian authorities had not abdicated
their responsibility, the state security forces would have been in a better position to adapt more rapidly to
the strategic challenges of subversion without having to inict so much harm on the civilian population.
In addition, the impunity under which they operated only served to encourage the security forces to use
strategies that included human rights abuses.
It is important to note that the judicial system did fulll its obligation to apply the law to those responsible
for committing human rights violations. In the vast majority of cases, the Supreme Court ceded jurisdic-
tion over accusations of abuses to the military courts. Tis decision was based on the idea that crimes such
as torture, forced disappearance and extrajudicial execution were crimes committed in the line of duty.
Once in the military courts, these cases were usually dropped. In the handful of cases that were tried, the
sentences were almost always lenient. Te Fujimori administration even found a way to bypass the generally
acquiescent judicial authorities by forcing an amnesty law through the Democratic Constituent Congress.
Under Fujimori, the abdication of civilian authority took on a dierent face, adhering toor rather sub-
mitting tothe armed forces strategic and political vision. Te alliance between the Fujimori govern-
ment and a sector of the armed forces closed all the doors for oversight and opened the way for widespread
impunity for human rights abuses and rampant corruption.
Te PCP-SLs military strategy, despite the fascination it held for its followers and the ideological mystica-
tion that attempted to portray it as a scientic advancement with universal validity, remained unchanged
throughout the conict. Te PCP-SL did not respond to any sort of controls, because ideologically it did not
recognize the concept of human rights, even if that would have helped improve its public image.
Te complexities of the strategic changes adopted by the state throughout the anti-subversive ght gave
way to two mutually exclusive orientations, each associated with a certain pattern of human rights viola-
tions with dierent levels of severity:
Te rst orientation resulted in the more frequent use of methods, such as extrajudicial execution or
forced disappearance, that were aimed at physically eliminating people considered to be subversives,
collaborators or sympathizers, and in many cases their social or family networks;
Te second orientation led to the arrest of presumed members of subversive groups, and rapid sum-
mary proceedings that resulted in violations of due process.
Te CVR attempted to verify statistical information related to these two orientationsthe elimination
0.96
0.99
0.91
-0.08
ELIMINATION
DISAPPEARANCES
TORTURE
OFFICIAL ARRESTS
VARIABLES
-0.08
0.30
0.99
-0.12
ARREST
TABLE 3
ORIENTATIONS: ELIMINATION OR ARREST. INFLUENCE OF THE
VARIABLES IN EACH ORIENTATION (PEARSONS R)
Chapter 1
34
of presumed subversives or their arrestby analyzing
24
their correlation with cases of extrajudicial execu-
tions, forced disappearances, torture and arrests registered annually. Tis analysis revealed the principal
components of the two orientations. Table 3 demonstrates the correlation of each variable (extrajudicial
executions, forced disappearances, torture and legal arrests) with the two orientations (elimination or ar-
rest of people accused of belonging to armed subversive groups).
As the table shows, the rst orientation has a positive correlation with executions, forced disappearances
and torture, while the second is particularly associated with arrests and, to a lesser degree, torture. Tis
conguration of the principal components indicates that torturealthough more frequently in the orien-
tation geared toward eliminating opponentswas a common practice in both orientations and persisted
despite the changes in strategy. Te results are consistent with the accusations received by the CVR: prac-
tices such as extrajudicial execution and forced disappearance were related to a strategy designed to elimi-
nate presumed subversives and were strongly linked to acts of torture suered by the victims before they
were killed or disappeared. Te orientation centered on the arrest of presumed subversives is not as closely
linked to executions and disappearances, but does have a signicant correlation with cases of torture.
A nal step in this analysis is a diagram showing the distribution of actions to determine in which years
or periods the two orientations peaked. Figure 11 shows the distribution of the years investigated by the
CVR, reecting the degree of emphasis by state agents on the elimination or arrest of alleged subversives.
25

Te intersecting axes form four quadrants encompassing the years investigated by the CVR. Tese quad-
rants represent the four kinds of strategies used in the anti-subversive ght.
In a certain sense, quadrant A represents a lack of strategies, or periods in which state agents neither
eliminated nor arrested alleged subversives because there was no clear strategy for dealing with armed
subversion (1980, 1981 and 1982). Tis quadrant also includes the years in which the subversive threat
24 This was done with a factorial analysis, which is designed to determine the general factors underlying the evolution of multiple variables.
25 The values of each axis were calculated using the regression method. They represent standard values of the location of each case (practice
employed each year) along the axes.
L
E
S
S
E
R

E
M
P
H
A
S
I
S

O
N

A
R
R
E
S
T
S
G
R
E
A
T
E
R

E
M
P
H
A
S
I
S

O
N

A
R
R
E
S
T
S
LESSER EMPHASIS ON ELIMINATION
GREATER EMPHASIS ON ELIMINATION
A D
B C
-4
-4
4
-4
4
-4
4
4
84
83
85
93
94
95
92
89
90
91
88
96
97 98
99
00
81
82
86 87
80
FIGURE 11
DISTRIBUTION OF YEARS INVESTIGATED ACCORDING TO PRINCIPAL ORIENTATIONS
35
declined considerably and the state did not carry out signicant repressive actions (1998, 1999 and 2000).
Quadrant B represents the years when large numbers of alleged subversives were eliminated, but few ar-
rests were made. During these years, the anti-subversive strategy implicated grave human rights violations
and state agents carried out actions aimed at eliminating presumed subversives, people considered to be
collaborators or sympathizers, and their family and social networks. As the graph shows, the highest peak
is in 1984, followed by 1983. According to information gathered by the CVR, the greatest number of
deaths attributed to state agents was registered during these years.
Quadrant C represents a change in strategy. It shows a tendency to combine the physical elimination of
people suspected of participating in subversion with an increase in the number of legal arrests. Tis strat-
egy was most prevalent between 1989 and 1992.
Quadrant D represents periods during which legal arrests increased, which corresponded to a decrease
in the number of cases of extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances reported to the CVR. Te
year with the highest peak is 1994, when the highest number of arrests was made. Tis result is consistent
with the situation that resulted after the arrest and capitulation of Abimael Guzmn, which allowed the
police to dismantle the PCP-SLs organization.
Years with levels at or near zero on each axis may represent points at which the strategies changed. It is im-
portant to highlight that the years 1986, 1987 and 1988 are located near the intersection of both axes. Tose
years represented intermediate periods in the internal armed conict, during which the country witnessed a
relative decline in the intensity of the conict before a resurgence of a new wave of human rights violations.
Te quadrants in Figure 11 can also be read as a temporary roadmap that was followed by state agents
in the anti-subversive eort. Te sequence would be from Quadrant A to Quadrant B, followed by
the intersection of the axes, then Quadrant C, Quadrant D and nally Quadrant A again. In other
words, the roadmap moves from uncertainty to indiscriminate violence, followed by a transition to more
selective forms of violence, another transitionthis time represented by mass arrestsand nally a de-
cline in all levels given the virtual end of PCP-SL activities.
Profles of the victims
Te testimonies received by the CVR indicate that the principal actors in the internal armed conict
employed a number of dierent practices to select their victims from certain populations.
As Figure 12 shows, the violence did not aect men and women in the same way and was not uniformly
distributed among age groups. Men between ages 20 and 49 accounted for the majority of the deaths
(more than 55 percent) reported to the CVR, while women accounted for 20 percent of the victims.
A comparison of the victims ages to those of the estimated population of Peru in 1985 shows even more
vividly the concentration of victims between the ages of 20 and 49 (see Figure 13).
While the 20 to 49 age group represented only 38 percent of the population,
26
66 percent of the dead and
disappeared reported to the CVR were in that age group. Considering that 75 percent of the victims over
age 15 were married or living with a partner, the internal armed conict principally aected men who
were the heads of householdsthe population that has the largest number of dependent children, and
that bears the principal economic and political responsibility in their communities.
Another indicator is the number of individual executions or assassinations. When people are assassinated
or executed in small groups, it generally means that the perpetrators have taken the time to identify spe-
cic victims. As Figure 14 shows, the majority of people assassinated or executed by the parties in the con-
26 As a reference, the CVR used the age estimates projected by the INEI for the Peruvian population in 1985.
Chapter 1
36
20 - 29
60 - 69
40 - 49
10 - 19
30 - 39
50 - 59
70+
0 - 9
AGE % OF DEATHS & DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED TO THE CVR % OF THE 1985 POPULATION
10% 20% 30% 40% 0% 30% 40% 20% 10% 0%
FIGURE 13
DOUBLE HISTOGRAM: RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION, BY AGE GROUP, OF DEATHS
AND DISAPPEARANCES BETWEEN 1980 AND 2000 REPORTED TO THE CVR
AND THE ESTIMATED PERUVIAN POPULATION IN 1985
20 - 29
60 - 69
40 - 49
10 - 19
30 - 39
50 - 59
70+
0 - 9
AGE MEN WOMEN
0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 1000
FIGURE 12
PERU 1980-2000: NUMBER OF DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES
BY SEX AND AGE REPORTED TO THE CVR
37
ict (68 percent) were killed in operations or actions involving fewer than ve victims. By comparison, in
the case of the armed conict in Guatemala, more than half of the people assassinated between 1969 and
1995, particularly in Mayan communities, were killed in groups of more than 50 (Ball et al, 1999: 65-
67). Te level of indiscriminate violence in Guatemala led the Commission for Historical Clarication of
Guatemala to classify as genocide the violence unleashed against the Maya by state agents.
In Peru, the selection of victims reected the importance placed on forced disappearance by state agents.
Disappearance involves removing a specic person from his or her environment so as to cover up hu-
man rights abuses (arbitrary arrest, torture, sexual violence). Forced disappearances generally end in
extrajudicial executions. Te CVR has determined that between 1980 and 2000, forced disappearances
represented 61 percent of the deaths attributed to state agents.
Women and children killed in the internal armed conict were generally the victims of indiscriminate
violence, such as massacres or the razing of communities. As the number of people killed in an operation
or incursion increases, so too does the percentage of deaths of women and children under age 15. Women
represent 14 percent of individual assassinations or executions, while children under age 15 represent 2
percent. When the target is a group of 10 or more people, however, the percentage of female victims rises
to 31 percent and the percentage of minors to 21 percent.
It is important to remember that, as with other investigations of internal armed conicts (Ball et al, 1999:
94-98), there is signicant underreporting of victims of minor age because only identiable victims are
registered. In cases of group assassinations, minor victims are generally underreported by witnesses be-
cause children are not as well known in the community as adults.
Te way in which the principal actors in the internal armed conict selected victims indicates that the
victims matched a prole or had characteristics that would make them targets. Te prole is closely
linked to the actors objectives and strategies.
As has been stated earlier, the CVR has concluded that the internal armed conict was initiated by the
PCP-SLs attempt to seize power through armed struggle by destroying the institutions of the Peruvian
state and installing a totalitarian regime.
Within this strategy of taking power through armed struggle, the PCP-SL attacked people who, in its
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1 VICTIM 2-4 VICTIMS 10+ VICTIMS 5-9 VICTIMS
FIGURE 14
PERU 1980-2000: PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE ASSASSINATED OR
EXTRAJUDICIALLY EXECUTED REPORTED TO THE CVR, ACCORDING
TO SIZE OF THE GROUP IN WHICH THEY DIED
Chapter 1
38
view, represented the old state. In practice, this meant that people who held positions of relative impor-
tance or had a certain level of social or political leadership in their communities were seen as potential
enemies and therefore victims of the PCP-SLs actions.
One indicator of this strategy is that the second most important targets of the PCP-SLs violent actions,
after peasants, were local authorities and civil society leaders in conict zones. Tese targets included
mayors, town council members, sub-prefects, governors, lieutenant governors, justices of the peace, civil
society leadersetc. According to testimonies received by the CVR, approximately 1,503 people, or 23
percent of the PCP-SLs victims reported to the CVR, were local authorities or civil society leaders.
Te assassination of a large number of local authorities, the majority of whom were members of the po-
litical parties that formed the legal political system ushered in by the return to democracy in 1980, was
a massive blow to political participation in the areas aected by the internal armed conict. An entire
generation of local political leaders was intentionally eliminated by the PCP-SL as part of its strategy to
create a power vacuum that it would later ll with its own militants.
While the people who held political posts or leadership roles in their communities were the most vis-
ible targets of the PCP-SLs armed action, the mechanisms for selecting targets were more subtle and
depended on the levels of local power and social status that existed in the rural communities where the
internal armed conict unfolded.
According to the testimonies compiled by the CVR, 57 percent of the PCP-SLs victims were farm-
ers. Tis percentage, however, does not reect the nuances between relatively prosperous farmers and
impoverished peasants, or between those with links to local or regional power networks (economic and
political) and those who were completely excluded from the system. Tese nuances are dicult for urban
Peruvians to perceive, because the massive economic, political and social dierences between rural and
urban Peru lead to a uniform conception that all rural areas are poor and precarious.
Tese subtle dierences in the rural world of the Andes and the jungle are not understood or precisely
measured in the socio-economic categories that are generally applied in quantitative studies. Tey de-
pend, in large measure, on relative and specic social dierences in each individual case, and it is dicult
to nd a standard that can be uniformly applied. Nevertheless, these relative dierences are what created
the conicts in rural society that the PCP-SL tried to use to its advantage. Te various in-depth studies
carried out by the CVR demonstrate the importance of these factors in the PCP-SLs strategy and its
methods for selecting the victims of its so-called revolutionary armed actions.
When applied to rural Peru, the stress on the hyper-ideologized world found in Gonzalo Tought deter-
mined those sectors that had relatively greater connections to the market and to the political and institu-
tional networks at the regional and national levels were enemies of the proletariat and peasants or agents
of the feudal and bureaucratic state and therefore had to be destroyed. Tis occurred in the context of
major transformations in rural Peruvian society that began in the second half of the 20th century, including
the agrarian reform process undertaken in the 1970s, which profoundly changed the old divisions between
masters and Indians, peasants and landowners, basically eliminating the rural oligarchy in the Peruvian
countryside. Gonzalo Tought twisted the new state of social relationships in the countryside to t into
its ideological categories, thereby creating articial targets for the armed actions of its militants.
Te political work of marshalling support led the PCP-SL to recruit heavily among young people of peas-
ant ancestry, principally in Ayacucho. Many of these young people had beneted from the expansion of
high school and university education between 1960 and 1980, thus increasing their expectations of being
able to climb the social ladder. However, the scant economic opportunities in their communities turned
these expectations into frustrations, making the radical social and political change oered by the PCP-SL
attractive to many young residents of Ayacucho. Te Shining Path also oered young people an impor-
tant role in the new social order it planned for Peru. Where it was unable to attract young supporters, the
PCP-SL used forced recruitment in communities.
39
By dening the conict according to its own interpretations, the PCP-SL developed a prole of its victims
in terms of its own armed actions as well as the reaction it hoped to provoke from the security forces.
Because the internal armed conict was unconventional, and the PCP-SL militants mingled with local
populations, the security forces selected their victims based on the general characteristics of those they be-
lieved had the greatest propensity for supporting subversion. Tis can be seen in the following testimony
of a young university student who was detained on terrorism charges in 1991 and eventually pardoned:
[In the National Anti-Terrorism Bureau, DINCOTE] the police ocers told me my prole
was ideal for a member of the Shining Path: I was the son of people from Ayacucho, more or
less spoke Quechua, studied at the UNMSM [San Marcos National University] and lived in
Callao. [...] Finally, in Canto Grande [prison], when I was assigned to the Shining Path cell-
block, they said to me, You are the son of Ayacuchans, you speak Quechua more or less, you
study at San Marcos and you live in Callao. You t the prototype, why dont you join us?
27
Figure 15 shows the ages of the victims killed or disappeared by the principal actors in the conict. Te
largest number under age 30 were victims of state agents, while the PCP-SL assassinated or disappeared
more people over the age of 40.
Taking into account the victims age proles, it can be concluded that the internal armed conict pro-
voked by the PCP-SL was also a generational conict, in which young people of rural descent, who were
27 CVR. Testimony 100191.
FIGURE 15
PERU 1980-2000: PERCENTAGE OF DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES
BY AGE GROUP AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE AS REPORTED TO THE CVR
STATE AGENTS
SHINING PATH
70+
60 - 69
50 - 59
40 - 49
30 - 39
20 - 29
10 - 19
0 - 9
A
G
E

G
R
O
U
P
S
10% 20% 30% 40% 0%
Chapter 1
4 0
generally better educated than their parents, saw subversion as a way to violently remove older people
from their positions of power and prestige in their communities. Of the victims between the ages of 20
and 29 reported to the CVR, the percentage of high school educated people killed or disappeared by state
agents was higher than the percentage killed by the PCP-SL (35 percent vs. 22 percent).
A conrmation of this prole of the PCP-SL militant or sympathizer can also be seen in the socio-demo-
graphic characteristics of people serving sentences on terrorism charges in the countrys prisons.
Te CVR interviewed slightly more than 1,000 people serving prison sentences on terrorism charges.
As Figure 16 shows, more than half were between the ages 20 and 29 when they were arrested. In ad-
dition, 45 percent of those detained on terrorism charges who gave testimony to the CVR had some
level of higher education.
Beyond the similarities between the proles of people killed or disappeared by state agents and those
serving sentences on terrorism charges, it is evident that there was a widespread, systematic strategy of
selecting targets based on general characteristics (age group, education level). Tis inevitably led to serious
human rights abuses, because even if victims t the prole, that did not mean they were Shining Path
militants. And even if the victims were PCP-SL members, extrajudicial execution and forced disappear-
ance are illegal under Peruvian law.
While it is clear that being a young adult and having a relatively high level of education were central ele-
ments of the prole used by state agents in the anti-subversive strategy, other variables are also associated
with the repression.
As Figure 17 shows, the majority of the people killed or disappeared by state agents were born in the de-
partment of Ayacucho. Most of the people imprisoned on terrorism charges, however, were from Lima or
other departments that were not as heavily aected by the internal armed conict as Ayacucho.
In addition, while more than 70 percent of the people who were executed or disappeared spoke Quechua
or another indigenous language as their native tongue, only 24 percent of the people in prison on terror-
ism charges share this characteristic.
50+
40 - 49
30 - 39
20 - 29
<19
A
G
E

G
R
O
U
P
S
20% 40% 60% 0%
FIGURE 16
INMATES HELD ON TERRORISM CHARGES WHO GAVE TESTIMONY
TO THE CVR, PERCENTAGE BY AGE GROUP AT TIME OF ARREST
4 1
Te probability that the states anti-subversive action would conclude with a serious human rights abuse or
the application of anti-terrorism legislation, was not uniform for all social groups. Te consequences were
more serious and the mistakes more often irreversible in the more marginalized sectors of Peruvian society.
PERIODS OF THE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT
To provide a more detailed explanation of the internal armed conict, the CVR analyzed the intensity
and scope of the violence in relation to the internal logic of the events and the strategies used by the actors
directly implicated in the process, as well as the dierent positions adopted by representatives of politi-
cal and social sectors. Tat analysis recreated the context of the principal actions and decisions adopted,
and took into account the dierent options available to the principal actors at the time, in order to avoid
interpreting past events in light of information that was unavailable when the events occurred.
Te internal armed conict can be organized into ve denite periods that do not necessarily correspond
to the terms of the governments that ran the country between May 1980 and November 2000.
28
Tere
were not always substantial changes in strategy from one president to the next. In fact, the decisions about
anti-subversive strategy adopted by one administration had consequences for the next.
In addition, as noted above, the principal actions and the majority of the events investigated by the CVR
28 The process analyzed by the CVR covers the fnal months of the government of General Francisco Morales Bermdez (May 17 to July 28,
1980) and the administrations of Fernando Belaunde Terry (July 28, 1980, to July 28, 1985), Alan Garca Prez (July 28, 1985, to July 28, 1990),
and Alberto Fujimori Fujimori (July 28, 1990, to April 5, 1992; April 5, 1992, to July 28, 1995; July 28, 1995, to July 28, 2000; and July 28, 2000, to
November 20, 2000).
AYACUCHO
JUNIN
HUNUCO
HUANCAVELICA
APURIMAC
SAN MARTN
LIMA CALLAO
PUNO
UCAYALI
CUSCO
OTHERS
EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION OR DISAPPEARANCE INMATES
0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 60% 40% 20%
FIGURE 17
BIRTH DEPARTMENT OF PEOPLE EXTRAJUDICIALLY EXECUTED OR
DISAPPEARED BY STATE AGENTS REPORTED TO THE CVR AND INMATES
SERVING SENTENCES ON TERRORISM CHARGES WHO GAVE TESTIMONY
TO THE CVR (PERCENTAGE BY DEPARTMENT)
Chapter 1
4 2
occurred in areas that were out of sight for most Peruvians and were not followed closely by the national
media. Breaking down the period between 1980 and 2000 provides an interpretation of the conict itself,
the strategies employed by the principal actors, the victims and the consequences, taking into account
the context in which the actions unfolded. By analyzing the process in this manner, the CVR attempted
to move away from ocial versions of the violence, such as those created by the Shining Path to justify
the peoples war (guerra popular) or those used during the rst administration of Alberto Fujimori to
launch a political attack against the so-called traditional parties.
While any attempt to organize events involves some level of discretion in selecting the criteria used to dene
the dierent stages, the CVR has dened periods that show the events as part of a national process, and
reect its own ndings and research. Using this approach, the CVR has established the following periods:
Te start of armed violence (May 1980December 1982), which began with the rst act of violence
committed by the PCP-SL in Chuschi, Cangallo, on May 17, 1980, and ran through December 29,
1982, when the president put the armed forces in charge of combating subversion in Ayacucho;
Te militarization of the conict (January 1983June 1986), which began with the installation of the
political-military command headed by General Roberto Clemente Noel Moral in Ayacucho on Janu-
ary 1, 1983, and ran through the prison massacres on June 1819, 1986;
Te nationwide spread of the violence (June 1986March 1989), from the June 1986 prison massacres
through March 27, 1989, the date of the attack by the PCP-SL and drug trackers on the police sta-
tion in Uchiza, in the department of San Martn;
Te extreme crisis, subversive oensive and state counteroensive (March 1989September 1992),
which began immediately after the PCP-SL attack on the Uchiza police station and ended with the
September 12, 1992, arrest in Lima of Abimael Guzmn and many of the PCP-SLs leaders by a special
unit of the anti-terrorism police;
Te decline of subversive activity and the rise of authoritarianism and corruption (September 1992
November 2000), which began with the arrest of Abimael Guzmn and other PCP-SL leaders, and
ended with Alberto Fujimoris decision to ee the country in November 2000.
The First Period: The Start of Armed Violence
(May 1980December 1982)
Te internal armed conict suered by the country began with the PCP-SLs decision to declare war on
the Peruvian state. Te start of the Shining Paths armed struggle was marked by the symbolic action of
publicly burning ballot boxes in the district of Chuschi (Cangallo, Ayacucho) on May 17, 1980, which
coincided with the general elections. As a result of this action, the PCP-SL marginalized itself from the
democratic process that began that day, and launched a violent campaign with the goal of destroying the
Peruvian state and subjecting Peruvian society to an authoritarian and totalitarian regime.
At rst, the PCP-SL engaged in sporadic attacks against private and public property, as well as armed
propaganda. Te seriousness of its actions slowly increased until militants began carrying out systematic
assassinations and attacks on local police forces. Te goal was to provoke a violent reaction from the state
to create an internal armed conict.
Te rst Shining Path actions were seen as isolated events with little national impact. Te reaction was a mix
of concern and dismissal, which allowed the PCP-SL to grow in certain areas of the departments of Ayacucho
and Huancavelica. In 1980 and 1981, public attention was focused on the transition to a civilian government
after 12 years of military dictatorship and the new governments rst steps. Te PCP-SLs initial actions were
viewed with suspicion by legal left-wing parties, with some of the groups believing that the attacks were actu-
ally actions by state agents to sabotage the left, as had happened in other Latin American countries.
4 3
While several radical left-wing groups had discussed the possibility of armed conict, the phenomenon
created by the PCP-SL caught state security forces o guard. In general, the security forces were expecting
a repeat of the guerrilla actions that had occurred in 1965. Te anti-subversive training they had received
prepared them for that type of action or, at best, confrontation with armed groups similar to those active
in other Latin American countries at the time. Intelligence work at the time was misguided because the
security forces were unable to clearly dene the nature of the enemy. Te possibilities for avoiding the
eventual course of events were limited because of the subversive organizations small size, its similarity
to other radical left-wing groups advocating armed insurgency, and its limited military capacity before
1980. Nevertheless, as in 2003, the debate over the supposed lack of intelligence information was im-
portant to those involved in the political transition at the start of the 1980s. Representatives of Popular
Action (Accin Popular, AP), blamed the lack of preparation and inadequate intelligence about the new
subversive threat on the outgoing military government headed by General Francisco Morales Bermdez.
In August 2002, Luis Percovich, interior minister in the AP government, stated:
What is most serious is that they not only avoided responsibility for having discovered and
not combated this movement early on, but they to deal with it at the critical moment. Tey
dismantled the Interior Ministry. I dont know if the armed forces kept any documentation.
I think they did as a matter of esprit de corps, but the constitutional government found
nothing when it arrived [].
29

Asked about those issues, Morales Bermdez responded:
Some elements of the Shining Path, individuals with certain leanings, were detected, but
at no time [in 1979 and 1980] was there intelligence information that told us be careful,
theres a problem here. Tat never, ever happened, I swear on my life. [] A system [of
intelligence] had been established and the generals who served me were the commanding
generals under Belaunde, so how is it that the government did not have the intelligence to
end this problem? It is impossible. I called Belaunde, the commanders of the three military
branches and the intelligence service, and they didnt have that information. What! All the
intelligence services had the information because they compared information.
30

Te PCP-SL could not have asked for better conditions for developing its plans and correcting its mis-
takes than those that existed in the rst 30 months studied by the CVR. President Belaundes decision to
have the police forces handle the rst Shining Path actions was the reaction of a newly installed civilian
government that could not turn to the military right away without looking weak and ceding the consti-
tutional imperatives of a democratic regime.
Te PCP-SL began its self-styled peoples war against the state with a series of bombings of public in-
stitutions in dierent areas of the country, but with a special emphasis on Ayacucho. While burning the
ballot boxes in Chuschi was seen as an isolated act, smaller attacks were carried out in other areas, such
as Lima and La Oroya.
In the weeks after the May 17, 1980 attack, groups of Shining Path cadres tossed incendiary bombs at the
tomb of General Juan Velasco, and at the municipal oces in San Martn de Porres. By July 28, when the
government changed hands, various propaganda actions and the theft of dynamite and weapons had been
registered. During that time, the military government did not respond directly to the PCP-SL. Tere was
a partial blackout, due to the destruction of an electricity tower in Huancavelica, and a bombing at Popu-
lar Actions headquarters in Pasco on the day Fernando Belaunde was sworn in as president. In general,
the media rarely covered the PCP-SLs initial propaganda actions, which seemed irrelevant compared to
the important debates related to the transfer of power from a military to a civilian regime.
29 CVR. Interview with Luis Percovich, Interior Minister during the AP government. Lima, August 28, 2002.
30 CVR. Interview with General Francisco Morales Bermdez. Lima, October 3, 2002.
Chapter 1
4 4
Te incoming president found a country that was radically dierent from the one he had governed during
his rst term (1963-68), and he had to deal with entirely new political and social actors. Te AP govern-
ment did not have to deal with a right-wing APRA-UNO congressional coalition like the one Belaunde
had faced during his rst administration, but with a left-wing bloc that was unprecedented in its radical
positions and size. In the social sphere, the administration was faced for the rst time with strong union
organizations, such as the Unied Union of Education Workers of Peru (Sindicato Unitario de Traba-
jadores en la Educacin del Per, SUTEP), the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (Confederacin
General de Trabajadores del Per, CGTP), the Peasant Confederation of Peru (Confederacin Campe-
sina del Per, CCP) and the Mining Federation (Federacin Minera), which had gained unprecedented
strength through their struggles against the military government and maintained close links to left-wing
sectors in Congress and the opposition media.
Te AP government, like the majority of the countrys actors, did not understand the challenge that the
PCP-SL and its peoples war posed to the state. For several years, the issue did not occupy an important
spot on the state agenda. It was seen as a criminal matter that would be dealt with by neutralizing the
terrorist criminals. At the time, however, factors unrelated to the internal war were aecting the polices
performance. Te principal problems were widespread corruption caused by drug tracking and internal
tensions among the dierent police divisions (Civil Guard, Republican Guard, and Investigative Police of
Peru), which were fueled by the corporate identities cultivated by each branch. Troughout its ve years
in oce, the AP administration insisted on linking the PCP-SL with the legal left, to the point that it re-
fused to release militants of the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU) who were jailed on terrorism charges.
Te PCP-SL, meanwhile, used all available political opportunities to continue building its organization
without any signicant alterations to its original plans. Te state and Peruvian society responded in ways
that were unrelated to the subversive threat. Some sectors refused to separate the PCP-SL from the legal left,
while left-wing sectors saw the dirty war as an inevitable response of the state. Te Investigative Police of
Peru arrested several hundred members of the PCP-SL, almost all of them in urban areas. In rural areas,
however, progress was nearly impossible given the small number of ocers and the precariousness of rural
police stations. Te PCP-SLs presence was never limited to only a few provinces in Ayacucho. From the start
of the conict, the organization placed a great deal of emphasis on Lima. In the words of Abimael Guzmn:
We saw it like this. We had been pondering the work in Lima. Is Lima important? It is
important. Te reason: Ayacucho is the cradle, Lima is the catapult. Te party, for various
reasons, will make the leap to Lima in a few years. When we focus on Lima, we will nd a
large city with people from dierent provinces from throughout the country. Working there
means working in the entire nation, which is why it becomes the catapult. But it cannot be
a city conquered at the start, but during the nal phase.
31
Te principal opposition force in the political system, the American Progressive Revolutionary Alliance (Alian-
za Progresiva Revolucionaria Americana, APRA), also known as the Peruvian APRA Party (Partido Aprista
Peruano, PAP), also underestimated the importance of the rise and development of the Shining Path peoples
war. Between 1980 and 1985, APRA lawmakers harshly criticized the APs policy, but proposed no alterna-
tives to the administrations anti-subversive strategy. Aware of the traditional rivalry between APRA and the
military, the partys leaders operated with discretion to avoid any confrontation with the armed forces.
Two events associated with the PCP-SL gave the conict a new dimension. In March 1982, in an attack
unparalleled at the time, and planned by the PCP-SL Central Committee, a Shining Path unit raided the
prison in Huamanga, releasing militants held there. PCP-SL cadres were able to escape because of an inad-
equate police response and the fact that soldiers stationed in the city were unable to act without direct orders
from Lima. Te prison break changed the way analysts viewed the Shining Paththey began viewing it as
a much greater threat. For some army generals, such as Sinesio Jarama, the situation took on a much more
31 CVR. Interview.
4 5
serious tone, and from his base in Huancayo, General Noel began gathering intelligence from the eld. On
the other side of the aisle, the radical left-wing militants who would go on to form the MRTA told the CVR
that the prison raid convinced them that the conict had changed and that there was no turning back.
Hours after the attack and the escape of the PCP-SL inmates, a group of ocers from the Republican
Guard, the police unit in charge of prison security at the time, went to the hospital in Huamanga and,
in retaliation, executed three Shining Path militants who were recovering from unrelated injuries. Te
combination of actions, the prison attack and the assassination of hospitalized PCP-SL militants, gave
the PCP-SL its rst media victory. Even while it was condemned, the organization was presented in the
media as both a guerrilla force and the victim of undeniable police brutality.
Te PCP-SL capitalized on the abuses committed by police ocers stationed in Ayacucho for anti-sub-
versive operations that occurred several months later. In September, Edith Lagos (one of the Shining Path
militants freed during the prison raid) was killed in a shootout with police. Her death sparked massive
demonstrations in Huamanga, including a Mass celebrated by the bishop of Ayacucho. Her funeral ended
with a huge burial procession that included Shining Path symbols. In death, Edith Lagos became one of
the best-known PCP-SL gures. While she was not an important leader in the organization, her image as
a young rebel (she was 19 at the time of her death) put a face on the unknown PCP-SL. Te image was
such that a congress of APRA youth in Ayacucho adopted her name, and that Armando Villanueva del
Campo, one of APRAs historic leaders, was strongly criticized in the press in the late 1980s for allegedly
having visited her tomb in Huamanga.
Human rights abuses were a subject of national political debate from the initial stage of the conict. One of
the rst discussions was motivated by a protest by Catholic bishops who denounced the police for torturing
Edmundo Cox Beuzeville after his arrest on July 6, 1981, in Cusco. Cox, a PCP-SL militant, he was the
nephew of a prominent Catholic bishop. Te administration reacted harshly to the bishops criticism, want-
ing to know why the Church had not taken such a strong stand on abuses committed during the military
government. Two issues became clear after the Cox incident. First, members of the Shining Path attempted
to maintain the organizations clandestine nature by denying at all costs that they were members (this was
the golden rule), while using the democratic institutions they did not believe in as a way of defending their
human rights and tarnishing the image of the security forces. Second, the government saw accusations of
human rights abuses as an opposition ploy, and therefore not a problem that needed to be addressed.
Te police forces demonstrated throughout 1982 that they were incapable of controlling the spread of the
PCP-SL in rural zones like Ayacucho. At the same time, they were unable to improve their poor public
image. Tis translated into constant pressure on the government to deal more forcefully with the Shin-
ing Paths provocations. On December 27, 1982, President Belaunde gave the PCP-SL 72 hours to lay
down its weapons. Te PCP-SL did not comply, and so on December 30 the government handed control
of the Ayacucho emergency zone to the armed forces. Army General Roberto C. Noel Moral, who had
been prefect of Lima in 1979 and head of the Army Intelligence Service for two years, took on the role
of political-military commander in the zone. Noel recalled the task he was given in the following terms:
In the National Defense Council, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Sta told the president of the
republic that his orders had been followed [as] Supreme Head of the Armed Forces, Supreme
Head of the Republic, President of the Nation, [according to] Article 118 of the Constitution.
Te general in charge of the Joint Chiefs of Sta told the president that, to ensure that nothing
got in the way of the plans, he had asked the Commander General of the 2nd Infantry Divi-
sion to make a presentation to the council, so I made a presentation to the council. At 5 p.m.,
the president decided to end the event, and he told me, General, your plans are approved, but
you will act with the support of the police forces. So I said to the head of the Joint Chiefs of
Sta, Whats going on? No one said anything, so I took the microphone and I said, Mr.
President, excuse me, I want to ask a question, because you have changed the mission. Am I or
am I not going to ght? President Belaunde told me, General, you go into combat with all
Chapter 1
4 6
your energy and all the support of the constitutional government. Tank you.
32

At the time, the PCP-SLs violence was aimed at representatives and supporters of the old order in the
initial areas of the armed conict, principally the departments of Ayacucho and Apurmac.
Second Period: Militarization of the Confict
(January 1983June 1986)
Te conict took a new turn with the direct participation of the armed forces in the ght against the
PCP-SL. In several areas of the country, the military would remain in charge for more than 15 years. Tis
change meant a militarization of the conict. At no other time in the 20th century had the country
witnessed the creation of political-military commands to lead the states response to subversion. At the
same time, the PCP-SL created what it called the peoples guerrilla army (ejrcito guerrillero popular),
carrying out guerrilla attacks on police stations and ambushing military patrols, while never abandoning
its terrorist tactics, such as selective assassinations and bombings.
Te murder of eight journalists in Uchuraccay, four weeks after the armed forces were put in charge of the
ght against the PCP-SL, led to a turning point in the conict, as the national media published graphic
images of the violence that had gripped the highlands of Ayacucho and neighboring departments. In the
following months, as the unconventional armed tactics became more prominent, the number of victims
and human rights violations grew exponentially. Tis period was marked by the largest number of victims
registered in the conict.
When the armed forces were put in charge of combating subversion, they lacked an adequate understand-
ing of the Shining Path and its strategy. Tey saw the organization as part of a larger communist con-
spiracy attacking the country. According to this logic, all left-wing militants were equally responsible for
the PCP-SLs actions and there were no dierences based on international political divisions. For example,
20 years after the conict, General Noel stated during an interview with the CVR that the military had
foiled a supposed Shining Path attack on July 26, 1983, that was planned to commemorate the 30th
anniversary of the assault on the Moncada Fort in Cuba by rebel forces.
33
Tat kind of action would be
unthinkable for a Maoist organization like the PCP-SL, which would never celebrate that anniversary, as
it did not consider the Cuban experience a revolutionary process.
General Noel had serious disputes with the media, particularly after the events in Uchuraccay. He claimed
that the media was tacitly encouraging subversive activity when it questioned the armed forces actions.
Noels successor, Army General Adrin Huamn Centeno, was relieved of duty in August 1984, the year
in which the largest number of victims was registered during the 20-year period studied by the CVR. Te
decision to replace Huamn, however, was due not to the increased violence, but to his criticism of the
government, which he claimed was not oering enough support for the anti-subversive campaign. Hua-
mn, a Quechua speaker of peasant descent, took over the political-military command and immediately
focused on improving social conditions in peasant communities as a way of stopping subversion. Te po-
litical opposition seconded his criticism that civilian authorities had not adequately addressed the needs
of peasant communities. In an interview with the CVR, one former government ocial, Luis Percovich
Roca, explained the decision to relieve Huamn: He [Huamn] wanted to bypass civilian authority [].
He wanted to run things according to his own criteria. He gave the impression that he did not agree with
what the civilian government was doing. It reached the point where he was making comments aimed at
undermining the civilian government.
Tis phase of the militarization produced massive human rights abuses attributed to the security forces, such
as the massacre in Socos (Sinchis of the former Civil Guard, November 1983), Pucayacu (Navy, August 1984),
32 CVR. Interview. March 18, 2003.
33 Fidel Castros attack on the Moncada Fort in 1953 was one of the historic moments of the Cuban Revolution.
4 7
Putis (Army, December 1984) and Accomarca (Army, August 1985). Te PCP-SL also committed some of
its worst atrocities during this period, such as the massacres in Lucanamarca and Huancasancos (April 1983).
Te MRTA formally launched its armed actions in 1984, presenting itself as part of the Peruvian left
and explicitly distancing itself from the Shining Path (its militants wore uniforms, lived in guerrilla
camps, took credit for their actions...etc.). Tis organization, rst formed in 1982 by the merger of
two left wing partiesthe Movement of the Revolutionary Left-Te Militant (Movimiento de Izqui-
erda Revolucionaria-El Militante, MIR-EM) and the Marxist-Leninist Socialist Revolutionary Party
(Partido Socialista Revolucionario - Marxista Leninista, PSR-ML)took two years to prepare for its
armed struggle.
Te ocial line on the internal war changed with the election of President Alan Garca. For the rst
time, the government criticized the human rights abuses being committed by the armed forces and cre-
ated a Peace Commission to address the problem of violence. Te administration attempted to change
the purely military approach to ghting subversion. Te most dicult point came with the decision to
relieve the head of the second military regionDivision General Sinesio Jaramaand the political-military
commander in Ayacucho, Wilfredo Mori, after the events in Accomarca. Despite his criticism of the anti-
subversion eorts, Garca did not strike down Legislative Decree 24150, signed by Belaunde in June 1985,
which regulated (and increased) the powers of the political-military commanders, who had previously
operated without any constitutional support.
Garca dened his governments position in the following terms:
We had two stages in the analysis of the Shining Path. Te rst was a very vague analysis
during the government of Fernando Belaunde. Without knowing what it was or the scope of
what was to come, we viewed it from sociological standpoint, as having been stimulated and
motivated by misery. Naturally, we were a bit tolerant with this explanation. And perhaps
we were a bit paternalistic in the sense that we said that they were poor people who have
been abandoned for so many centuries and are reacting this way so that the centralized,
white society will understand and oer a solution. As of July 28, it wasnt that we changed
perspectives or attitudes, but we now had the job of administering. We had to deal with calls
from the people to stop the blackouts in Lima, to stop the killing, to stop all the bad news
in the newspapers.
34

Te Garca administrations main idea was to defeat subversion by taking away possible peasant sup-
port through development policies directed at this sector and at areas of extreme poverty. Te APRA
government was overly optimistic that the countrys economic growth during the rst two years of its
administration had stopped the PCP-SL, because of the decline in armed actions in 1985 and 1986. Te
Party also assumed that its grassroots appeal would reduce the PCP-SLs possibilities for expansion.
Tat policy may have seemed successful at the start, given the Shining Paths decision to pull back after
the military oensive in 1983 and 1984, and the unilateral ceasere declared by the MRTA when the
APRA took power.
Te relationship between the government and the armed forces was tense at rst, but the situation gradu-
ally changed as accusations of human rights abuses did not provoke a reaction within the administration.
Tis was evident during an uprising at Limas Lurigancho prison in October 1985. Te APRA govern-
ment assumed no responsibility in the case. Te nal moment in this stage was the massacre of inmates
in several prisons (June 18-19, 1986), which had an impact on all the actors in the conict, and brought
to Lima rsthand images of massacres that, until then, had seemed far removed from the capital. In
practical terms, the prison massacre ended the APRA governments attempt to develop its own internal
security strategy.
34 CVR. Interview. May 7, 2003.
Chapter 1
4 8
The Nationwide Spread of Violence
(June 1986March 1989)
Te militarization prompted by the escalation in the PCP-SLs action, the armed forces participation in the an-
ti-subversive ght and the MRTAs entrance into the conict created a new context in which the armed actors
developed their own strategies in the eld. Beginning in 1986, however, it was clear that the armed conict was
no longer limited to the departments where actions had been carried out initially, but had spread nationwide.
In the wake of the prison massacre, the PCP-SL gradually increased its oensive, expanding to new fronts out-
side of Ayacucho, such as Puno, Junn and the Huallaga Valley. At the time, the organization claimed to have
entered a new stage, which it called developing the guerrilla war and conquering support bases in rural areas
to expand its peoples war. In urban areas, principally in Lima, the Shining Path developed a strategy based
on the selective assassination of authorities to instill terror and weaken the state. An extremely important attack
was staged against Domingo Garca Rada, President of the National Elections Board, while preparations for a
possible presidential runo in 1985 were still under way. Te PCP-SL began targeting members of the ruling
party. One example, also in Lima, was the assassination of Rodrigo Franco in 1987. According to the PCP-SLs
logic, Franco was killed to impede the consolidation of the bureaucratic model of APRA fascism.
Te MRTA suspended its cease-re with the Garca government and opened a new guerrilla front in the
San Martn department in 1987, staging actions to attract the greatest publicity. Te MRTA move came
only three months after the administrations attempt to nationalize the countrys banks, which had pro-
duced a major backlash against the government. TV coverage of the MRTA campaign was enormous,
taking advantage of the widespread media opposition to the APRA government. MRTA leader Vctor
Polay, who had been a close colleague of Garcas in the APRA in the 1970s, became a well-known gure
through the media. While the MRTA campaign grabbed headlines, however, it did not have much of a
military impact and was quickly turned back by the army.
Te PCP-SL held its rst party congress in three separate sessions between February 1988 and June 1989.
An interview with the PCP-SLs leader, Abimael Guzmn, was done at some point between these sessions
and published in the weekly El Diario. In the interview, Guzmn oered the most complete explanation
to date of his organization and its goals. Te interview also helped dispel all rumors of his death, which
had been announced periodically by authorities and the press over the years.
Discussions about the reorganization of the police forces began in 1985, sparking intense debate over an
initial proposal to retire a large number of ocers. While the decision to reform the police forces was not
directly linked to the internal armed conict, several of the changes were aimed at improving coordination
of anti-subversive eorts. Tese changes included a merger of the general police command and regional
commands, direct mediation of conicts among the various police forces, reinforcement of the Interior
Ministrys oversight capacities, and the unication of several specialized units into the Special Operations
Bureau (Direccin de Operaciones Especiales, DOES). Despite these priorities, which included the creation
of the Interior Ministrys General Intelligence Bureau, little attention was focused on the Anti-Terrorism
Bureau (Direccin contra el Terrorismo, DIRCOTE), a unit that had gained experience, especially in Lima,
since its creation in 1981 as part of the State Security Bureau within the Investigative Police.
While these discussions were under way, accusations surfaced in 1988 linking members of certain police units,
such as the DOES Delta Group, to the paramilitary group that would, unfortunately, call itself the Rodrigo
Franco Command (Comando Rodrigo Franco, CRF). Tis was the rst time in the internal war that attacks
were attributed to a paramilitary group. Te CRF was blamed for killing Manuel Febres Flores, the attorney
for Osmn Morote, a PCP-SL leader arrested that year by DIRCOTE ocers. Dierent sources tied the group
and its actions to APRA and members of the police force under the control of Agustn Mantilla, the most
powerful gure in the Interior Ministry during the ve-year APRA government. Te CVR believes that the
Rodrigo Franco Command was not a centralized organization, but a loose-knit group that involved dierent
actors who were not necessarily linked to each other, but who were tapped to carry out criminal activities.
4 9
In addition, there were a number of problems with the creation of the Defense Ministry in 1987. Despite
eorts, the ministry was unable to exert control over the Joint Chiefs of Sta. Te new ministry did not
reduce the military branches control over national defense issues.
A period of hyperination and generalized economic mismanagement caused the government to lose the
political initiative, which was assumed by the right-wing opposition. Tis became particularly apparent
after the failed attempt to nationalize the countrys banking system. Te administration also abandoned
its attempts to control anti-subversive policy, leaving the armed forces free to dictate policy in the emer-
gency zones. Te government did, however, maintain a specialized police intelligence and investigative
operation, especially in Lima and other cities, that resulted in important arrests, like that of Osmn Mo-
rote. Te political situation grew more dicult with the spread of strikes and social protests.
Te divisions within the United Left in 1989 ended the important electoral presence the left had main-
tained since 1978. Tese divisions seriously aected the parties in the left-wing alliance, leaving the most
radical parties that did not support armed subversion without representation in the democratic system.
While they were opposed to the Shining Path, those parties also refused to support the governments anti-
subversive policies because they did not trust the armed forces.
Te attack on the police base in Uchiza in March 1989 was one of the largest military operations under-
taken by the PCP-SL, and was carried out with the cooperation of drug trackers. Te lack of a state
response to assist the beleaguered police ocers further weakened Garcas government and forced him
to create a political-military command in the area. General Alberto Arciniega was put in charge, and he
developed a new army strategy aimed at isolating the PCP-SL from peasant communities.
Extreme Crisis, Subversive Ofensive, State Counterofensive
(March 1989September 1992)
One of Perus most dicult years as an independent nation came in 1989. Te economic crisis, almost
unprecedented in the countrys history, reached its worst point, and the internal armed conict grew in-
creasingly violent. Another change in the internal war occurred in 1989, due principally to the decisions
and actions of the two main forces.
During its rst congress, the PCP-SL dened the need to reach a strategic equilibrium to shake the en-
tire nation as the new objective of the peoples war. To do this, the subversive organization proposed
concentrating the bulk of its oensive on urban areas, principally Lima. Te Shining Path dramatically
increased its attacks and terrorist actions, hardening its approach to the population in the highlands and
jungle, while mobilizing its urban bases for more violent, visible and frequent attacks in the cities. Tis
decision led to the second peak in the number of victims during the internal war.
At the same time, the armed forces began applying a new comprehensive strategy that resulted in a
decrease in the overall number of human rights violations, but also in far more premeditated actions.
Tis new strategy was detailed in Directive 017 of the Joint Chiefs of Sta for the Interior Ministry (DVA
017 CCFUERZAS ARMADAS-PE-DI). Te directive, which was signed in December 1989 by General
Artemio Palomino Toledo, laid out two strategic decisions for military actions during the remainder of
the conict. First, the armed forces were reorganized into anti-subversion fronts, which were no longer
divided by military regions but based on an analysis of PCP-SL actions. Second, on fronts where drug
tracking also existed, the mission was to separate subversion from drug tracking and combat drug
trackers who supported subversion or received protection from subversives.
As part of that strategy, the decision was made to foment and support the formation of self-defense com-
mittees in the highland areas where the population had already begun to combat the PCP-SL. Tese
changes dened the nal stage of the conict. Te armed forces strategy of focusing on the departments
of Junn and Pasco as the center of gravity for anti-subversive operations pushed the conict toward the
Chapter 1
50
Mantaro front beginning in 1989. Tis central zone was the scene of an intense application of the new
strategy of selective elimination, particularly in 1990. Tat policy was applied to the PCP-SLs peoples
committees (comits populares), as well as to cells in universities and urban shantytowns.
Te MRTA, meanwhile, got caught in a downward spiral from which it would never emerge. In April
1989, one month after the Shining Path attack on the Uchiza police base, the MRTA decided to launch
a major military operation in the central highlands. Te plan was to take over a major city as a way of
achieving a nationwide impact. Te organization needed to demonstrate strength because of the major
blow it suered earlier in the year when its founder, Vctor Polay, was arrested in the city of Huancayo. In
order to take Tarma, the city that was chosen for its military operation, the MRTA moved some of its best
ghters to the central highlands. Te operation failed, ending in a confrontation with the armed forces in
Molinos on April 28, 1989. Te treatment of MRTA guerrillas who had surrendered demonstrated to the
organization that the armed forces did not distinguish between the subversive organizations. Te MRTA
retaliated a few months later by assassinating retired Army General Enrique Lpez Albjar in Lima.
With municipal and regional elections scheduled for 1989, and the campaign for the next years presi-
dential election already under way, the countrys political forces began to mobilize, exposing the limits
of the threat to the state posed by the Shining Path and the MRTA. Local and regional elections were
successfully held throughout the country, which represented a failure for the PCP-SL, who had called for
a boycott of the elections.
In March 1990, with the presidential election only a month away, the government formed the Special Intel-
ligence Group (Grupo Especial de Inteligencia, GEIN) within DIRCOTE. While DIRCOTEs operational
groups, such as the Delta groups, continued the legal work of investigating attacks and terrorist actions in
Lima, the GEIN engaged exclusively in undercover intelligence operations, keeping suspected subversives
under surveillance in the hope that they would eventually lead to the principal gures in the two organiza-
tions. On June 1, shortly before the government changed hands, the GEIN scored its rst major victory,
raiding a safe house where Abimael Guzmn had recently been living. Information obtained in the raid pro-
vided valuable leads, and is considered the beginning of the end of the Shining Path (Jimnez 2000: 721).
Strictly speaking, the new government did not design a new anti-subversive strategy. Alberto Fujimori basi-
cally maintained the comprehensive strategy that had been developed by the armed forces, proposing legal
initiatives to complement the approach. He also accepted the political-military plan designed by a sector
within the armed forces, which called for a democratic system that t the needs of the anti-subversive eorts.
Te PCP-SL, which was suering important setbacks in rural areas, expanded quickly in Lima amid the
general political and economic crisis. Te MRTA attempted a dialogue with the new government after
the organizations leaders escaped from Limas Castro prison in June 1990. Te organization kidnapped
a lawmaker from Fujimoris party to give it an edge, but the administration rejected talks. In 1991, more
than half the Peruvian population was living under a state of emergency. Tat year, the MRTA launched
several oensives in dierent areas of the country, trying to show that it had recovered as a result of the
prison escape. In November, the administration passed a package of legislative decrees that sparked erce
debate in Congress, starting the clock ticking for the next coup.
On April 5, 1992, Fujimori led a coup that violated the constitutional order. Te Fujimori government
passed a series of anti-terrorism laws (Legislative Decrees 25475, 25499, 25659 and 25744) that disre-
garded the minimum guarantees of due process. In addition, several other laws were passed to augment
the power of the military, vastly increasing the role of the armed forces in the emergency zones and in the
ght against subversion. Te legislation increased the security forces discretionary power, thus reducing
democratic controls over anti-subversive actions. Serious human rights abuses by state agents continued,
including those perpetrated by the death squad known as the Colina Group (emblematic cases at-
tributed to this group include the massacres in Barrios Altos and La Cantuta University), which began
operating in the early 1990s. Taking advantage of the broad powers it was given under the new laws, the
51
National Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional, SIN) began planning and carrying out
actions on its own, using personnel from the armed forces.
Te PCP-SLs assassination of Mara Elena Moyano, a grassroots leader and local politician, represented an-
other turning point of sorts. While her murder demonstrated the cruelty with which the PCP-SL was capable
of acting, it also revealed the vulnerability of grassroots organizations that tried to confront the subversives in
the early 1990s. Te organization led by Guzmn Reinoso intensied its oensive in the capital with numer-
ous terrorist attacks, the most serious of which was the bombing of an apartment building on Tarata Street in
Limas Miraores district in July 1992. Te car bomb killed 25 people and injured another 150. By increasing
its terrorist activities, the PCP-SL leadership believed that it could provoke a possible United States military
intervention, which would transform the conict from an internal war to one of national liberation.
Amid this extreme crisis, the police ocers working in the DIRCOTEs special units surprised the coun-
try by arresting most of the high-ranking subversive leaders, strategically defeating subversion and ter-
rorism. Among those arrested were Vctor Polay Campos, caught by the Special Detectives Brigade, and
Abimael Guzmn Reinoso, captured by the GEIN.
Decline of Subversive Action, Rise of Authoritarianism and Corruption
(September 1992November 2000)
Te arrest of Abimael Guzmn and other subversive leaders marked the defeat of the PCP-SL, which
had begun to decline three years earlier when the organization was forced out of its traditional areas of
operation by the security forces and self-defense committees. Te lack of national leadership to ll the
vacuum created by Guzmns arrest was evident in the quick decrease in terrorist actions. Te Shining
Paths principal objective in this phase was to present the image that the organization was unaected by
the arrests, while concentrating on a campaign to save the life of President Gonzalo.
In October 1993, from his prison cell on the Callao Navy Base, and after discussions with other Shining
Path leaders facilitated by Alberto Fujimoris government, Abimael Guzmn proposed a peace accord
with the state. Te accord was never reached, but it served as a propaganda tool for Fujimori on the eve
of the referendum to approve the 1993 Constitution. Te Shining Path leaders position was accepted by
the majority of the organizations militants, overshadowing factions that wanted to continue the peoples
war. Te Fujimori government, however, did not attempt to establish a denitive peace or respond to the
proposals oered by Guzmn. In practice, there was a rupture in the PCP-SL, with part of the organiza-
tions leadership rejecting the peace accord proposed by Guzmn.
Te MRTA, meanwhile, continued military actions in San Martn and part of the central jungle. Under the
leadership of Nstor Cerpa, who took over after Polays arrest, the organization launched important attacks
on cities such as Moyobamba and attempted to develop urban guerrilla cells. Although it did not seem to
be as crippled as the Shining Path, the MRTA was unable to overcome serious internal disputes, the inex-
perience of its cadres,
35
and the eects of the repentance law. Externally, the organization was aected by
the collapse of left-wing parties and the oensive against subversive organizations that was launched by the
State and backed by the media. Given this situation, the MRTA decided that its priority was to rebuild its
national leadership by attempting to free its jailed members. Unable to repeat the prison break from Castro,
the organization decided to plan a kidnapping that could be used to exchange hostages for its jailed leaders.
At the same time, the Fujimori government continued to play up its image as a hard-line regime that would
make no concessions to subversives by enacting a new legal framework and strengthening its relationship
with the armed forces. Despite the obvious decline in the number of subversive actions, which the admin-
istration highlighted in its ocial propaganda, the regime did not reduce the number of emergency zones,
and maintained the anti-subversive structures even though there was no longer a subversive threat.
35 In the tradition of revolutionary organizations, the term cadre refers to a militant capable of training and recruiting new members.
Chapter 1
52
In concrete terms, the pacication policy basically meant jailing the largest possible number of subver-
sives and holding them under extreme conditions in maximum-security prisons, as well as isolating the
remaining armed columns. Te peace accord proposed by Guzmn and the Shining Path leadership
provided Fujimori with political capital while lowering tensions in the prisons. Te PCP-SL, however, did
not disappear. Vladimiro Montesinos was in charge of conducting the personal interviews with Guzmn,
Elena Iparraguirre and other PCP-SL leaders, in a role as an academic interlocutor. Tose conversations,
which were framed by political interests, were interrupted in 1995. It is important to note that neither
Fujimori nor General Nicols Hermoza Ros (the most important military gure at the time) met with
the PCP-SL leaders. Interviews with the Shining Path leaders were not conducted by members of DIN-
COTE, which was largely deactivated after Guzmns arrest, or by army intelligence experts working
with the SIN, such as General Eduardo Fournier.
Te constant accusations of human rights abuses took a new turn with the July 1993 discovery of com-
mon graves holding the remains of nine students and a professor who had been disappeared from La Can-
tuta University. Te Fujimori Government not only refused to assume any responsibility, but attempted
to discredit and harass the people who had located and reported the common grave. Using the SIN as its
principal political apparatus, the government continued implementing a series of legislative changes that
eliminated the separation of powers in order to guarantee impunity for state agents implicated in human
rights violations. Te majority, held by Fujimori supporters, in the Democratic Constituent Congress
allowed the administration to use dierent spokespeople to downplay the accusations and, most impor-
tantly, pass an amnesty law in 1995 that protected state agents who committed human rights abuses,
thereby guaranteeing full impunity.
Corruption continued throughout the decade with the objective of ensuring the administrations perma-
nence in power. Te government used the military structure for electoral and political gain, maintaining
the anti-subversive strategy even though subversion had been reduced drastically. Te nal actions of the
internal conict, which ended successfully for the government, were hyped-up in the media for political
gain. Te threat of terrorism was also used to manipulate the population through fear. Anti-subversive
operations, therefore, were not aimed at arresting subversive leaders and decisively ending the actions of
the PCP-SL and the MRTA. At best, they were propaganda tools used by the regime; at worst, they were a
way of distracting public attention from the excesses and crimes that were being reported with increasing
frequency. Te propaganda and distraction were largely possible because the administration had gradu-
ally gained near complete control over the mass media, which was bought-o with state funds.
Te nal high-impact actions of the internal war were successfully exploited by the government for their
own gain. Te assault on the Japanese ambassadors residence in Lima in December 1996 by an MRTA col-
umn commanded by the groups leader, Nstor Cerpain which 72 hostages were held for more than four
monthsended with the hostages being rescued during the Chavn de Huntar mission. After military set-
backs in the border conict with Ecuador in early 1995, the government used the hostage rescue as a way of
regaining legitimacy. In addition, in July 1999, after a massive and highly publicized operation, PCP-SL leader
scar Ramrez Durand, Feliciano, was arrested near the city of Huancayo. Ramrez Durand was a dissident
Shining Path leader who had rejected the peace accord proposed by Guzmn and continued ghting the
peoples war that had been launched in 1980. He was the last high-ranking PCP-SL leader still at-large.
More interested in remaining in power and proclaiming his hard-line position on subversion, Fujimori
paid little attention to the anti-subversion policy and did not oer a nal solution to the problem of sub-
version, which continued to exist in remote areas of the country that were also home to drug tracking.
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT AND THE REGIONS
Te internal armed conict evolved dierently in the countrys distinct geographic regions.
While the history of two decades of violence analyzed by the CVR involved organizations with central-
53
ized decision-making and leadership structuresthe PCP-SL and the MRTA on the one side, and the
security forces on the otherthe intensity of the violence, the forms of violence employed and the con-
guration of the actors diered greatly from region to region. While the various actors had a sporadic
presence in some areas, in others they wiped out lives, destroyed infrastructure, altered residents daily
routines and launched long periods of horror, suering and uncertainty. In addition, in regions with high
levels of violence, the conict evolved according to dierent timelines, depending on the strategies used
and the ways in which the population was involved.
Te diversity of the history of violence in the regions is related to the particular characteristics of each region be-
fore the conict, as well as the objectives and strategies of the armed groups in the areas where they were active.
Te CVR dened ve large regions where the internal armed conict was most intense:
Te south-central region, formed by the department of Ayacucho, the provinces of Acobamba and
Angaraes in the department of Huancavelica, and the provinces of Andahuaylas and Chincheros in the
department of Apurmac. Te internal armed conict began here with a level of violence unparalleled
in the rest of country. Te largest number of victims came from this region;
Te northeast region, formed by the departments of Hunuco, San Martn, Ucayali (particularly the
provinces of Padre Abad and Coronel Portillo) and Loreto. Te armed conict lasted longest in this
region and was complicated by other factors, especially those linked to the drug trade;
Te central region, formed by the departments of Junn and Pasco, and the provinces of Huancavelica,
Tayacaja, Huaytar, Churcampa and Castrovirreyna in the department of Huancavelica. Located be-
tween Ayacucho and Lima, this was a strategic region for supply and communication routes to the
capital. It included the major hydroelectric complex for the national energy grid, as well as numerous
mining companies. It also served as a rest area for subversives operating in the jungle.
CENTRAL
REGION
SOUTH-CENTRAL
REGION
NORTHEASTERN
REGION
SOUTHERN
ANDES
METROPOLITAN
LIMA
OTHER
20% 40% 60% 0%
FIGURE 18
REPORTED TO THE CVR, BY REGION WHERE THEY OCCURRED
Chapter 1
54
Metropolitan Lima, the seat of power and the economic center of the nation. It was permanently
targeted from the start of the conict because of what it represented, and because of the national and
international attention focused on attacks in the capital. It was also the place where national strategies
were planned, and a focal point for agitation and organization in low-income neighborhoods.
Te southern Andes, formed by the departments of Cusco and Puno, and the provinces of Abancay,
Grau and Cotabambas in the department of Apurmac.
Tese regions were home to 91 percent of the victims reported in testimonies received by the CVR, as
well as the most widespread destruction of infrastructure and the greatest deterioration of organizations,
trust, relationships and solidarity within civil society (see Figure 18).
Ground Prepared and the Seeds of the
Confict in the Regions Before 1980
Te PCP-SL and the MRTA were able to establish a greater presence in some regions more than in others.
Te coastal region (with the exception of Lima), which is home to the most populated departments, is
listed in the category of others in Figure 19, representing less than 10 percent of the victims reported to the
CVR. Tis category also includes a large part of the lower jungle region, the northern jungle (Amazonas,
northern Cajamarca and part of Loreto) and the southern jungle (Madre de Dios), as well as most of the
provinces in the departments of Ancash, Cajamarca and Arequipa.
Te CVRs investigations show that the subversive organizations achieved their greatest control, and had
an important and long-lasting presence, in areas where they could take advantage of chronic conicts
among dierent sectors of the population or between residents and the state.
During the second half of the 20th century, Peruvian society experienced the most profound and radical
demographic, economic, political and social changes in the nations history. In the 1950s, a process of mass
rural migration began, particularly from the highlands, with Lima as the principal pole of attraction. At the
same time, peasant mobilizations altered traditional land-owning structures, changing rural demographic
patterns and power structures. Policies to protect industries and encourage investment (industrial develop-
ment and agrarian banks, protectionist taris, etc.) transformed the national economy, particularly the life,
economy and demographic importance of Lima. Massive modernization projects were also undertaken, in-
cluding large irrigation projects along the coast, which changed the landscape, economy and demographics
of the region. A highway into the jungle, which was started in the 1960s, had a similar impact. Te promise
of modernity, however, bypassed a large part of the highlands. Tere were no important investments, no
highway links and no massive hydroelectric projects. In the highlands, modernization, or part of it, was
manifested by the agrarian reform and the expansion of educational opportunities.
In many ways, these changes meant unequal levels of modernization and development in the dierent re-
gions of the nation. While there were signicant changes in the daily lives and expectations of the major-
ity of the population, the limitations of the Peruvian modernization process allowed old conicts to linger
and created new social problems, as well as individual and group frustrations. Te violent process that
was launched in 1980 occupied those spaces where the limitations of modernity had generated the most
signicant conicts or frustrations, preparing the terrain for subversive groups to take root and grow.
The northeast: integration, highway, colonization and drug trafcking
A telling example of the incomplete process of modernization, which aected peoples lives by disrupt-
ing their traditional patterns, but did not integrate them into a new context of development and social
welfare, can be seen in the northeast region. Te northeastern jungle is an area of colonization, and its
population multiplied several times over last half of the century as people from the impoverished central
and northern highlands migrated there. Tis migration produced a huge gap between the demands and
expectations of the expanding population and the capacity of economic and state structures to respond.
55
Te massive eort to build the Marginal Highway through the jungle in the 1960s was an attempt not
only to incorporate the resources of the Amazon Basin into the national economy, but also to satisfy the
demands for land in the highlands and on the coast, and redirect internal migration away from Lima.
Besides investing in the highway, the government actively promoted colonization by awarding land titles
as a way of expanding the agricultural frontier.
During the 1970s, this growing migrant population, which was rural, ethnically mixed, poor and eager
to progress, settled in areas that lacked basic public services and internal communication routes and did
not form part of the axis of regional development promoted by the state. As a consequence of this pro-
cess, dozens of small towns were formed, creating a disorganized society without public institutions to
guarantee security or order.
Two parallel stories emerged from this area. Te rst was in the Huallaga Valley, where drug tracking,
with its own economy, culture and norms, took the place of the state. Te second was in the provinces of San
Martn, which had links to the coast through Jan-Chiclayo. While licit agriculture developed there, there
were also constant regional battles to improve the terms of economic exchange with the rest of the nation.
In both areas, because of drug tracking or the pressure of social movements, the conicts between the
state and local populations were particularly intense, especially between 1978 and 1982. Tese conicts
created the immediate context in which the subversive groups put down rootsthe PCP-SL in the coca-
growing areas and the MRTA in San Martn.
The Ashninkas and colonists in the central jungle
Unlike the northeast region, the central jungle, which is closer to the capital, had stronger links to the
national economy and a more consolidated network of urban areas. Te population also grew rapidly in
the 1960s as colonists, mainly from the central highlands, moved to the area.
Te region is home to the one of the largest lowland indigenous peoples, the Ashninkas, who inhabit an
area from the Gran Pajonal Plains in the north to the province of La Convencin, Cusco, to the south.
In addition to the Ashninkas, there are also smaller communities of Yanesha and Notmasiguenga indig-
enous peoples. Te process of colonization in the region, which dates back many years, gained speed with
the expansion of road systems, sparking numerous conicts between indigenous people and squatters
over natural resources and land titles.
Unlike other lowland Amazonian societies, the native communities in the central jungle are not isolated
from the rest of the nation. Tey have links to urban areas and commercial zones and maintain smooth
relationships with the colonists (despite constant conicts over territorial boundaries), as well as the na-
tional educational system. Catholic and Protestant missionariesthe Summer Institute of Linguistics
(SIL)have had a presence in the region for many years through schools, bilingual education programs,
health care centers, etc. Many communities have received outside nancial support to build schools or
community centers, purchase farm animals and equipment, radios, electric water pumps, tools, chain-
saws, medical and dental supplies and, in one case, to build an airstrip. Te communities also received
assistance for members to be trained in agricultural techniques or as health-care promoters.
Te PCP-SL recruited people who functioned as a kind of link between the native communities and na-
tional societycolonists from Ayacucho, bilingual teachers, health promoters and even indigenous lead-
ersto inltrate a society that was a blend of very traditional organizations and a modern economy that
had not fully arrived. Its message of equality, justice and, especially, social welfare went over well with
clan elders, and the Shining Path took root among the population, reorganizing it around the war eort.
Te complex relationship between the MRTA and the Ashninka population in the area around Oxa-
pampa, which ended in open conict, was the only case in the central jungle in which the conict be-
tween Ashninkas and colonists mixed with the internal armed conict.
Chapter 1
56
Andean modernization: the cities, universities,
market economy and mining
Unlike the jungle and coastal regions, the highlands were not the focus of any major modernization projects.
Without any resource to attract national or foreign investment or a dynamic economic poledue mainly
to the sparse and poorly constructed road systemAyacucho showed visible signs of economic depression
midway through the 20th century, with among the lowest per-capita income and greatest migration in
comparison to other departments. A traditional center for landowners in the region, the city of Huamanga
was the undisputed seat of regional power. Te landowners, however, lost most of their social and economic
power amid the regions poverty and depression. Peasant movements, the sale of haciendas to workers and,
nally, the agrarian reform eroded this groups inuence and weight in the city and surrounding areas.
An educational initiative, the reopening of the San Cristbal de Huamanga National University (Univer-
sidad Nacional San Cristbal de Huamanga, UNSCH) in 1959, revitalized the city and connected it to the
modernization process in the rest of the country. Te reopening of the UNSCH attracted professors and
students from outside the region, and Huamanga became a focal point of cultural, political and economic
development in the region. Te university fostered progressive ideas and was removed from traditional
sectors at a time when the old landowning class was disappearing.
After a nearly 50-year hiatus, the UNSCH was viewed as a modern educational organization in terms of
its structure and academic conception. Without the administrative problems faced by other state universi-
ties, the UNSCH focused on training technicians, researchers and teachers to solve the regions problems.
Tis high-quality, modern approach was sustained by the rapid growth of the university, which expanded
from 228 students in 1959 to 6,059 in 1980. While that growth led to a deterioration of university ser-
vices, it did provide young people from rural areasthe children of peasant familiesthe opportunity
to envision a new social mobility for their families and communities.
Te importance of education as a tool for progress and social mobility, and the universitys role as a re-
gional institution, were manifested in the most important social protests in the region. Te governments
decision in 1966 to cut the universitys budget sparked major demonstrations and led to the creation of
the Ayacucho Defense Front. Tis was followed by an uprising in 1969 in Huamanga and Huanta against
a decree by the military government to limit free education, a protest that was violently repressed.
Like other universities around the country, San Cristbal was a center for the radical ideas of the 1960s
and 1970s. Without the presence of other institutions or cultural inuences, the university had a virtual
monopoly on public opinion and helped mold a common perception among the population. Its inuence
as a modern educational institutionat least in its rhetoricextended to the National University of the
Center of Peru in Huancayo, and UNSCH professors, as well as Shining Path leaders, were invited to
oer presentations to students and unions there during the 1970s.
Te UNSCH was the place where the PCP-SL and its leader, Abimael Guzmn Reinoso, got their start.
Te PCP-SLs presence at the UNSCH after a split with the Communist Party of Peru-Red Flag (Partido
Comunista del Peru-Bandera Roja, PCP-BR) came just at the moment when the university was expanding
rapidlywith enrollment rising from 1,500 students in 1968 to 3,319 in 1971. Te strong PCP-SL pres-
ence in the UNSCH Education Department spread to Guamn Poma de Ayala High School, allowing
the organization to inuence the teachers union (SUTE) in Huamanga, and to occupy the new teaching
positions that were being created by the expansion of education in the region, particularly in rural areas.
Other regions of the highlands that were aected by the violence, although with less intensity than Aya-
cucho, had also undergone urbanization in the 1950s and 1960s, accompanied by the modernization of
their universities. One example is the city of Cusco and San Antonio de Abad National University. Like
the UNSCH, the university expanded by increasing access for students from poor urban to rural sectors,
and increased enrollment was accompanied by a decline in services. Tere were also attempts to develop
57
the same radical ideas that had taken root in Ayacucho.
Unlike Huamanga, Cusco was a much more complex society and achieved a higher level of economic
activity and modernity through tourism. While there were only 6,903 tourist arrivals in Cusco in 1954,
the number increased to 176,000 by 1975. Expansion of the hotel business, arts and crafts industry and
restoration eorts followed that trend.
Cusco was also characterized by the urbanization of poverty and a depressed rural economy. While local
authorities complained that tourism was not beneting the city, and that the major benets were being
reaped by tour operators in Lima and abroad, the presence of this dynamic activitywhich generates
ideas and services around a highly mobile, foreign populationwas a counterbalance for the city, its
university and its young people who, although radical, did not join the subversives ranks or collaborate
in their war against the State.
Modernization in Puno was also concentrated in urban areas. Between 1950 and 1960, Puno experienced
a combination of excessive rain and ooding followed by intense droughts. Amid these natural disasters,
the Corporation to Foment and Promote the Social and Economic Development of Puno was set-up in
1961, and operated until 1972 as an autonomous administrative agency responsible for organizing and
planning development in the department. Its work, however, was only reected in the modernization of
the city of Puno, the departmental capital.
As part of this modernization, the creation of a university in Puno was seen as an example of progress. In 1961,
the government created the National Technical University of the Highlands. Te university expanded rapidly
in the 1970s, attracting the children of peasant families who saw it as an opportunity for social mobility.
Te city of Puno, however, was neither the most dynamic nor the only urban area in the department
to modernize. Tanks to the inuence of a railway and the opening of the Caracoto cement factory in
1963, the city of Juliaca became the modern expression of provincial sectors linked to the peasant world.
Tis led to the formation of a mixed-race and indigenous class of merchants that replaced the declining
landowning class. In addition, the southern provinces in the department, which were home to primarily
Aymara indigenous farmers organized in a network of communities that extended to the Bolivian border,
and who had a smaller presence in commerce, were uninterested in radical rhetoric. As a result, the pres-
ence of subversion in Puno was sporadic in urban areas and concentrated basically in rural areas that had
once been under the control of large livestock operations.
Te central region was of fundamental importance. Located between Ayacucho and Lima, it supplied food
and energy to the capital and its industrial base. Te region was formed by a network of urban areas (the
cities of Huancayo, La Oroya, Cerro de Pasco, Tarma and Jauja), mining activity (large state-owned com-
panies, active unions and warehouses full of explosives), and a highly dierentiated rural area that included
urbanized communities linked to the markets of the Mantaro Valley. In addition, there were communities
in conict with the state-owned companies, as well as extremely poor communities at higher altitudes, such
as in Pasco, dedicated principally to animal herding. Control of the central region was a strategic objective
of both the PCP-SL and the MRTA. While they failed in their attempts to inltrate the communities with
ties to the Mantaro Valley, they carried out actions in the highland communities and the cities, particularly
Huancayo. Tis was evident at the university in Huancayo, where the student body was extremely radical,
and which was the scene of open conicts between the two subversive organizations.
Te mining cities of La Oroya and Cerro de Pasco were the targets of frequent attacks. Te subversive
groups attempted to take advantage of union disputes, but they failed in that eort as well as in their
eorts to inltrate the unions. Faced with rejection by the union movement, the PCP-SL harassed and
assassinated important leaders of the mine workers union. Other union leaders were targeted by the
Rodrigo Franco Command. Te mining sector and its unions were hit hard, but they never capitulated
politically to subversion. In contrast, the regions universities proved fertile ground, and the confronta-
tional discourse was successful in attracting young people, many of whom were from rural backgrounds.
Chapter 1
58
In Cerro de Pasco, where the PCP-SLs presence was felt from the early years of the armed conict, Daniel
Alcides Carrin National University became a politically important center for spreading the PCP-SLs
rhetoric and for recruiting future militants. At the National University of the Center of Peru in Huan-
cayo, the presence of the PCP-SL and the MRTA was not as strong, but was extremely violent.
Metropolitan Lima: urbanization, industrialization and marginalization
Lima, the center of political and economic power in the country, was one of the most violent areas. Many
of the subversive actions in the citysuch as the assassination of high-level government authorities, po-
litical leaders, military ocers and businesspeople, as well as car bombings, the downing of power lines
and attacks on shopping centers and nancial institutionswere motivated by the attention they would
provoke. Trough these kinds of terrorist actions, the subversive organizations, especially the PCP-SL,
saw the capital as a sound box for magnifying the impact of their actions, and creating a feeling of panic
and the sense that the security forces had lost control.
Metropolitan Lima was the center of the countrys industrial base and had the largest concentration of work-
ers. It was also the destination of much of the rural migration, with millions of Peruvians seeing their hopes
turned to frustration after abandoning their communities for the capital. Besides providing heightened
visibility for their actions, Lima was also an area of intense propaganda and recruitment for the subversive
organizations, particularly in the shantytowns ringing the city. Capturing the working classthe subjects
of the revolution in communist ideologyand the residents of the poverty belt that surrounded the center
of national power was the political and military strategy of the armed subversive groups.
Te modernization of Metropolitan Lima was a process of industrialization encouraged by policies pro-
tecting local industries, but combined with unplanned and uncontrolled urbanization. Urban migration
far exceeded the capacity of the economys formal sectors to absorb so many new workers, and the city
was unable to integrate the new population into its existing infrastructure and social services. In addition,
the import-substitution model hit a crisis in the 1980s, generating more unemployment and a deteriora-
tion of labor unions. Tat was the backdrop against which the internal armed conict unfolded in Lima.
Te armed insurgent groups undertook a systematic campaign to inltrate shantytowns with the goal
of winning over local leaders of unions, and neighborhood and subsistence organizations, such as soup
kitchens. Te shantytowns along the three major routes into Limathe Central Highway, the Pan-
American Highway North and the Pan-American Highway Southwere key to the subversive strategy,
seen as a kind of steel belt that would be used to strangle the nations political and economic center.
It is important to highlight the importance of the legal left, reected in the United Left coalition, and the
political change in 1980 that ushered in municipal elections. For the rst time, the districts in Metropoli-
tan Lima elected their own leaders and began exercising local control. In the new urban areas, which were
in the process of expanding and were plagued by inadequate basic services, the political ght to control
local government was intense. In the shantytowns, the left moved from its traditional role in unions and
neighborhood organizations to running local governments. Between 1980 and 1983, practically all the
districts of Limas eastern, northern and southern cones were governed by the left.
Te rise of the left provoked an open conict with the subversive organizations. Te armed groups saw
the left, other political groups and social organizations in the shantytowns as competition. Te states
anti-subversive eorts, which attempted to eliminate organizations and potential focal points of social
demands, also hit hard at the legal left and existing social organizations.
Lima, a city formed by migrants in marginal districts operating within the informal economy, was the
scene of an armed conict that was much less visible than the bombings of strategic symbols and the se-
lective assassinations of representatives of the state and political parties. Nevertheless, both the visible and
invisible strategies touched the lives of millions of people and added considerably to the dramatic number
of dead left by the internal armed conict.
59
Conficts in the wake of agrarian reform
Te armed conict unfolded in an important context in rural areas. Te subversive groups attempted
to take control of the countryside and create a support base among peasants for military and political
reasons. Inspired by the Maoist tradition, the PCP-SL began waging its war from the countryside to the
city. In the wide, sparsely populated highlands, where there were few police ocers, they could move
with relative ease. Controlling the area required support bases, which is why one of the organizations
principal objectives was to win over the peasant population politically. With rural support bases, the
PCP-SL militants moved like sh in the water, to use one of Abimael Guzmn Reinosos expressions.
Not all rural areas were receptive to the armed groups rhetoric and actions. Rural societies where peasants
had beneted from the agrarian reform (valleys along the coast, in the north of Cajamarca and the Sa-
cred Valley in Cusco) or areas with well-established ties to the market (the Mantaro Valley, for example)
tended to remain on the margins of the violence.
Te regional histories analyzed by the CVR demonstrate that PCP-SL was successful in inltrating ex-
tremely poor peasant communities that did not have links to the market or that had not beneted from
the agrarian reform because there was nothing to redistribute. It also had an impact in some communities
that were aected by the agrarian reform, but where the process had created new forms of disenfranchise-
ment or reopened old conicts.
Te infrastructure and high-quality livestock of cooperatives created by the agrarian reform, especially the
Public Interest Farming Cooperatives (Sociedades Agrcolas de Inters Social, SAIS), were the targets of system-
atic attacks aimed at destroying them. What was surprising about these attacks is that many of the armed ac-
tions to destroy the SAIS had broad support, and in many cases local peasant communities took an active part.
Te central highlands, the department of Puno, the highlands of the La Libertad department and the
southern reaches of the Cajamarca department experienced important developments in the livestock in-
dustry from the start of the 20th century. Te relationship between the ranchesislands of technological
development including improved livestock, and pastures that required few workersand the poor peas-
ant communities around them that continued to use over-grazed pastures had been conictive for years.
From early on, the communities had been demanding property rights to the pastures used by the modern
ranches. Te agrarian reform, which began in 1969, recognized the demands of the peasant communi-
ties, but did not divide up the large ranches or redistribute land to the communities. Instead, it fused
the ranches into large state-owned companies, the SAIS, which beneted workers and colonizers. Te
SAIS were created as a kind of business venture that incorporated the communities as partners without
decision-making power, but with the right to receive a portion of the companies prots.
Te companies economic power deepened the social divisions in the areas where they operated. Tis was
complicated by the economic depression of the late 1970s and the move to dismantle the control mechanisms
imposed during the Velasco years, which led to accusations of corruption and nancial mismanagement.
In the early 1980s, the communities that formed the Agrarian Production Cooperatives on the coast and in
the inter-Andean valleys decided to eliminate the cooperatives and divide the land into individual parcels.
Te property rights of the SAIS, however, were much more complicated. While they accused managers of
corruption and questioned the eciency of the operations, the direct beneciaries also feared the peasant
communities, which continued to demand land rights. Tis gave rise to a conict with no viable solution.
Te countrys largest and most technologically advanced SAIS were located in the highlands of the Junn
department (the Canipaco and Alto Cunas river basins). Te companies economic prosperity, however, did
not translate into improved standards of living for the participating communities. When the PCP-SL began
its actions in this area around 1987, it found fertile ground among the communities where the SAIS leaders
were accused of corruption and of selling o land at articially low prices. Amid this situation, in which the
SAIS managers lacked legitimacy, and farmers were questioning the way lands were managed, partner com-
Chapter 1
6 0
munities again began demanding rights to the land, arguing that the agrarian reform had not produced the
benets they had been promised. With its pledge of order and justice, as well as the death of corrupt ocials
and other antisocial elements, the PCP-SL quickly won converts to its political cause. SAIS installations
were the targets of systematic attacks by PCP-SL militants. Many of the SAIS managers and technicians
were assassinated, infrastructure destroyed and livestock distributed or, in some cases, slaughtered.
A similar situation, although on a smaller scale, occurred with the SAIS in the northern part of the
country, such as those located in Santiago de Chuco, Huamanchuco, Cajabamba and San Marcos in the
departments of La Libertad and Cajamarca.
In the provinces of Azngaro and Melgar, in the northern part of the department of Puno, the internal
armed conict also revolved around the control of pastures. Te situation, however, was much more
complex in these areas. Te Departmental Peasant Federation of Puno, legal left-wing parties and social
organizations linked to the Catholic Church were also present, and clashed with the subversives as well
as the police and armed forces. By the mid-1980s, the PCP-SL attempted to take advantage of the situ-
ation and militarize the conict over the restructuring of land ownership, which pitted peasants against
the managers of state-owned livestock companies and the central government. While the PCP-SL was
unsuccessful in its eorts to win over peasant organizations, that conictthe repression of peasant
mobilizations by state forcesand the ght between the legal left and the PCP-SL, created conditions in
which the subversives were able to establish some bases of support. Te department became another scene
of conict in 1989, although on a scale that was less intense than that of the central highlands.
One particular case in the conict over agrarian reform occurred in Andahuaylas, in the department
of Apurmac. Land problems there had been resolved by 1980, when the internal armed conict began.
Nevertheless, the solutionthe lands from old haciendas had been given to peasantshad resulted in
an intense conict between the state and the communities. Te agrarian reform process in the zone had
been extremely slow, hampered by bureaucracy, local inuences and a lack of political interest. In 1974,
ve years after the reform was announced, the large landowners continued to control the haciendas. Tat
year, the Provincial Peasant Federation of Andahuaylas called on its member communities to apply the
reform on their own, taking over lands and evicting the landowners. As a result, 68 of the 118 haciendas
in the province were taken over simultaneously by thousands of peasant farmers. An attempt to put down
the land takeovers failed, giving way to a long and conictive process in which the authorities responsible
for agrarian reform attempted to promote the SAIS model, while farmers demanded that the land be di-
vided up among individuals and communities. In 1978, after new protests, conicts and arrests, authori-
ties turned over the lands. Te situation propelled the leaders of the Federation and the land occupations,
such as Julio Csar Mezzich and Lino Quintanilla, toward the more radical position of the PCP-SL, and
they joined the subversives in the early 1980s, facilitating the organizations expansion in the zone.
Extreme rural poverty: privatization of power and community conficts
Te sector of rural society hardest hit by the internal armed conict was the most marginalized. Tat is
where the PCP-SL began, won over sympathizers, controlled territory and created numerous peoples
committees. It was in those areas that the PCP-SL achieved its greatest success in implementing its strat-
egy of creating a new power. It is also where the most violent attacks on the civilian populationby both
the subversives and the armed forcesoccurred, and where the greatest loss of human life and destruc-
tion of families and communities were recorded.
Tese sectors were considered irrelevant to the national economy and the states development plans. Te
state was absent and did not guarantee access to infrastructure or basic public services. It also failed to
fulll its role in guaranteeing peace and security and protecting property. Tese were poor, rural commu-
nities where the majority of residents spoke Quechua and were illiterate. Because of that, they had never
taken part in elections. Tey were cut o from markets, immersed in their own problems, destabilized by
land disputes and subjected to abuse.
6 1
Tis was the area known as the Indian stain, and included the south-central highlands (Ayacucho,
Apurmac and Huancavelica) and the highland provinces of Cusco. Te highlands of Pasco and the area
of Junn known as the Tulumayo River basin shared those characteristics, as well as the violence spread
by the internal armed conict.
In these areas of rural poverty, while the population was organized in communities (with numerous
internal problems), the only hope for progress was though individuals who migrated or had access to
education. Teachers or children who studied in provincial capitals, with the prestige this carried, were
the only link to progress. While each community experienced the process dierently, teachers in local
schools and visits by young university students were channels used by the PCP-SL to enter communities.
It legitimized its presence with a political message of equality that appealed to the ideals of social justice,
and was accompanied by the implementation of an extremely authoritarian form of social order, which, to
the satisfaction of residents, eliminated antisocial behavior, theft and livestock rustling. In these societies,
where there were high levels of internal violence and resentment over lack of access to resources, assas-
sinations, and the distribution of goods and livestock belonging to the rich (local residents with greater
resources and, generally, more power), and landowners who still lived in the areas, attracted peasants to
a political cause that was presented in the most elemental terms. It proposed an egalitarian society that
would impose strict authoritarian justice and that would be run by educated people.
Tese societies, however, were unaware of the changes that the country had been undergoing in the second
half of the 20th century. In Ayacucho, particularly in the Pampas River basin (provinces of Vctor Fajardo,
Cangallo, Huancasancos and Vilcashuamn) and in the northern provinces (Huanta, Huamanga and La
Mar), the traditional hacienda system of the mid-20th century still existed. Most of the haciendas were
unprotable, however, having fallen behind in a more modernized economy. In the 1970s, with greater mo-
bility and temporary migration among peasants, many of the haciendas were purchased by communities or
their workers, who later created new communities on the lands. Many of the communities in Vilcashuamn
were created in this way. In Vctor Fajardo, the only hacienda still operating when the agrarian reform began
had been in the hands of peasant farmers for some time. Tus, a process had been under way since the mid-
20th century in which families in peasant communities had been increasing their property by acquiring
pieces of collapsing haciendas. Tis expansion, however, had created conicts between communities and
inequalities within them, depending on who had more access to monetary resources and a closer relation-
ship with the former hacienda owners. Te old power of the landowner, with control over authorities and
justice, was partially replaced by peasant farmers who had some access to resources.
As with the landowners, whose personal power was not replaced by modern state bureaucracythe
exception being the short period between 1970 and 1975 when the state created the National Social
Mobilization System (SINAMOS), a network of authorities that reached all the communities in the na-
tionpower remained in the hands of local agents who often used it for their own benet.
Amid the conicts created by this new inequality
36
in access to resources, and its links with local power
structures, the PCP-SLs message and practices took root. Te weak presence of the state, represented by
justices of the peace, appointed lieutenant governors and widely dispersed police stations that were incapable
of combating theft and livestock rustlers, was quickly eliminated by the subversives through harassment,
threats and assassinations. Te new power was established in the vacuum that had so easily been created.
Tis was repeated in many other areas, rst in Pasco and Tulumayo in the early years, and later in Cusco
and Apurmac. Greater access to education as a way of getting ahead, which created greater social dif-
ferentiation, along with the abuse of local power and the subversives control of problems, like livestock
rustling, helped subversion spread in the second half of the 1980s.
Diverse situations of conict and discontent allowed the PCP-SL to spread. In some cases, old conicts
36 This is probably irrelevant to an outside observer, for whom a person who was considered rich in this context would be a poor person in
the lowest quintile of income distribution in the country.
Chapter 1
6 2
between communities and district capitals, which monopolized local power and were home to wealthier
residents, sparked attacks and assassinations (peoples trials) (jucios populares) that were supported by
poorer sectors. In others, the peasant farmers lack of acceptance of the new power preached by the
PCP-SL created a kind of generational conict, pitting younger people, who had more education but
little access to resources and who were attracted the PCP-SLs message, against older adults (their parents),
whom they considered reactionaries.
Te response to the PCP-SLs new power in the countryside was an implacable counter-insurgency ef-
fort. Tis was particularly true when the armed forces were put in charge of the anti-subversive ght in
1983 and attempted to destroy the support bases and peoples committees organized by the PCP-SL.
Even before the anti-subversive campaign was launched, however, peasant communities showed signs of
resisting the totalitarian plan that the PCP-SL was attempting to impose through blood and re. When
the state changed its approach from indiscriminate repression to a more selective strategy aimed at win-
ning over the local population, self-defense committees were formed. In coordination with the security
forces, these committees helped expel the PCP-SL from the Andean provinces, forcing the subversive
group to move toward urban areas and the jungle region.
The spread of violence in the regions
Te internal armed conict did not spread to all regions at the same time. Te expansion to dierent parts of
the country was related to the initiative of the subversive organizations and their attempts to take advantage
of regional social conicts, hoping to turn them into confrontations with the state and its authorities.
As Figure 19 shows, the rst ve years the violence and its victims were concentrated mainly in the south-
central region, particularly the department of Ayacucho. As has been mentioned, during these years and
in these areas, the PCP-SL took advantage of conicts between communities and between generations
within communities, to impose an egalitarian, autarkic order based on its totalitarian ideology. Te reac-
tion of the armed forces, provoked by the PCP-SLs actions (assassinations, bombings, attacks on police
stations and ambushes of military patrols), as well as the subversives increasingly intense use of violence
to impose their new order on communities where they had established support bases and peoples
SOUTHERN
ANDES
OTHERS
CENTRAL REGION
NORTHEASTERN REGION
SOUTH-CENTRAL REGION
METROPOLITAN LIMA
1990 1985 1980 2000 1995
40%
20%
80%
60%
100%
0%
FIGURES 19
BY REGION AND YEAR AS REPORTED TO THE CVR
6 3
committees, made 1983-84 the bloodiest period in the conict in the region and in the country as a
whole (see Figure 5 on and Figure 20 below).
Te intense counterattack launched by the state in the south-central region weakened the PCP-SLs pres-
ence there, provoking an expansion of the organizations actions to other areas. By committing wide-
spread and systematic human rights abuses in the Ayacucho region in 1983 and 1984, state agents helped
create the imageespecially among the most radical sectors of young people at national universities in
Lima and in the provincesthat the subversive groups were challenging an illegitimate power that did
not hesitate to unleash harsh repression against the people. Tat image was used by the PCP-SL to win
over supporters in new regions and contributed to the MRTAs decision to begin its armed actions in the
cities and, above all, in the northeastern and central areas of the country.
New regions became the principal scenes of the conict beginning in 1986 and throughout the rest of
the 1980s. Around 1986, the PCP-SL and the MRTA launched a number of actions in Lima, attempting
to use the city as a sound box to magnify the impact. An example was the prison riot and subsequent
massacre of PCP-SL inmates in the Lurigancho, El Frontn and Santa Brbara prisons in June 1986.
In other regions, the subversive groups attempted to take advantage of conicts created by the restructur-
ing of the SAIS and confrontations among member communities, managers and the central government,
rst in Puno (with little success) and later in Junn. In the central jungle region, the PCP-SL in the
south (Ene Valley) and the MRTA in the north (Oxapampa) tried to control new areas where tensions
between indigenous communities and colonists were high. In the northeast, the MRTA tried to identify
with the demands of farmers in the department of San Martn, while the PCP-SL worked to control the
coca-growing areas of the Upper Huallaga Valley, acting as a middleman between coca farmers and drug
trackers, and replacing the state in the role of enforcing social control.
2000 1990 1980
METROPOLITAN LIMA
2000 1990 1980
SOUTHERN ANDES
2000 1990 1980
OTHERS
2000 1990 1980
SOUTH-CENTRAL REGION
2000 1990 1980
NORTHEASTERN REGION
2000 1990 1980
CENTRAL REGION
30%
20%
10%
0%
30%
20%
10%
0%
FIGURE 20
BY YEAR AND REGION AS REPORTED TO THE CVR
Chapter 1
6 4
A period of extreme crisis began at the end 1980s, with a new peak in the violence coming between 1989
and 1992. Except for the south-central region, during this period the regions aected by the violence reg-
istered the highest number of victims reported to the CVR. Te largest number of districts aected by the
violence was registered in 1989. Te principal areas of the conict during this period were the central and
northeastern regions and Metropolitan Lima. As noted above, this period was also marked by a change
in the states anti-subversive strategy, which became more focused and selective, and which was aimed at
winning over the population in areas where the subversive organizations were active.
Te intensity of the conict was related to three dierent dynamics in the central region. First, the PCP-
SL oensive against the SAIS was winding down in the Alto Cunas and Canipaco areas, as well as in the
highlands of the Concepcin and Huancayo provinces. Te result was the destruction of the SAIS, which
was carried out with the participation of communities that had not beneted from the agrarian reform.
Tat was followed by a brief period of PCP-SL control over the region. Te subversive hegemony lasted
about four months, until the armed forces and the recently organized peasant self-defense committees, or
rondas campesinas, responded with force.
Second, in the city of Huancayo, the PCP-SL managed to establish itself as the main hegemonic force in its
battle against the MRTA and other political organizations (principally on the left) for control of the Nation-
al University of the Center of Peru. Tat was accompanied by a wave of assassinations and terrorist attacks in
the city and surrounding communities. Faced with such violence, the security forces undertook a vast cam-
paign of selective repression between 1991 and 1992, reected in the forced disappearance and extrajudicial
execution of dozens of university students and sta suspected of having ties to subversive organizations.
Te third process in the central region involved eorts by the subversive organizations to gain control over
lowland indigenous communities (mainly Ashninkas) and settlements of colonists.
Tere was a direct confrontation between the MRTA and the Ashninkas in 1989 and 1990. In the
mid-1960s, the area around Oxapampa had been the scene of the development of a guerrilla movement
inspired by the Cuban Revolution, which included members of the Revolutionary Left Movement (Mov-
imiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR). Te MIR would later form part of the MRTA. At that time,
one of the principal Ashninka leaders, Alejandro Caldern, collaborated with the Peruvian Army in the
arrest of the MIR guerrillas. Nearly 25 years later, in 1989, the MRTA decided to make Alejandro Calde-
rn pay for his earlier collaboration, assassinating him and two other Ashninka leaders. Te murders
unleashed a war between the Ashninkas and the MRTA militants in the province of Oxapampa, and the
MRTA was practically eliminated from the region.
Te MRTA suered multiple setbacks in the region in 1989. Weakened by its confrontations with the PCP-
SL and the arrest of its leader, Vctor Polay Campos, the subversive group attempted to strike a high-impact
blow by taking over the city of Tarma in April 1989. Te MRTA assigned its top military personnel to the
region, but its militants were crushed by the army in a battle in an area known as Molinos.
Te PCP-SL, meanwhile, attempted to consolidate support bases and areas of refuge for combatants in
the central jungle region in the early 1990s, penetrating the province of Satipo through the Ene River
and its tributaries to the south. To do so, the subversive group began capturing groups of Ashninkas and
colonists, unleashing a long process of violence that would lead to the enslavement and extermination
of entire indigenous communities, and violent confrontations with self-defense committees and security
forces. Te local population was caught in the crossre. Te PCP-SLs presence in Ashninka territory
was a tragedy for the indigenous people. Te CVR believes that what transpired there must be further
investigated to determine whether the crimes constituted genocide.
Te rugged terrain in this part of the country allowed the PCP-SL to maintain a presence in high, inac-
cessible jungle areas for years. In 2003, some of those areas still shelter remnants of the PCP-SL faction
that continued the armed struggle despite the peace accord called for in 1993 by Abimael Guzmn.
6 5
Te northeastern region was another main area of ghting between 1989 and 1992. As has been stated,
the PCP-SL attempted to consolidate its control over the population in the Huallaga Valley by imposing
its version of social order to regulate the relationship between drug trackers and coca-growing farmers
and to protect the farmers from state actions. Tat control also meant imposing its brand of social jus-
tice, imparting harsh reprisals for what the group considered antisocial behavior. Following its national
strategy, the PCP-SLs principal eort was to create support bases among the coca-growing farmers and
violently repress any opposition, which led to a high number of victims.
Te complexity of drug tracking, and the amount of money involved, had an important impact on the
PCP-SLs local strategy, which was reected in the greater level of autonomy apparently exercised by the
Huallaga Regional Committee in relation to the organizations central command. It is not surprising
that drug money had a corrupting eect on the normally rigid discipline of the PCP-SL militants, despite
their fundamentalism, just as it had on the armed forces and the National Police. Nevertheless, it is im-
possible to refer to the subversive phenomenon in the region using the simplistic term narco-terrorism,
as that fails to distinguish between very dierent actors, logic and motivation (those of an illicit economic
activity and those of a political cause aimed at taking power through violence) that require specic mea-
sures in order to be combated eectively.
In an eort to deal more eectively with the armed groups in the northeast, beginning in 1989, the
anti-subversive strategy no longer included an anti-drug component and focused exclusively on identify-
ing and eliminating subversives. Tese changes allowed the security forces to avoid confrontations with
coca-growing farmers, which opened the door somewhat for the creation of the self-defense committees.
Important confrontations between the security forces and subversive groups occurred between 1989 and
1993. According to the list of military losses in the internal armed conict provided by the armed forces,
nearly 45 percent of the deaths occurred in operations in the northeast region.
37
Nevertheless, the anti-subversive strategy applied in the area also resulted in systematic human rights
abuses, especially torture and forced disappearances.
As Figure 20 shows, unlike other regions where peaks were recorded in specic years (1984 or 1989), the
intensity of the conict in the northeast region remained high between 1989 and 1993. Hundreds of
testimonies received by the CVR describe the intensity of the violence in this part of the country, which
may have turned the Huallaga River into the nations largest common grave.
While the south-central region was not the principal scenario of the conict between 1989 and 1992,
the violence continued in a number of areas, especially the provinces of Huanta and La Mar, and in the
Apurmac River Valley. Tis zone was the scene of intense activity by self-defense committees, which,
together with the security forces, forced the PCP-SL to move toward the high jungle and more remote
areas of Ayacucho, Cusco and Junn.
In the early 1990s, the states new anti-subversive strategythe eort to win over the local population
and the self-defense committees actions put the subversive groups on the defensive, and in a much more
precarious position in most rural areas. As a result, the PCP-SL Central Committee decided to intensify
the organizations actions in urban areas, particularly the in capital, to create a situation of panic and
extreme crisis for the Peruvian state, which was already weakened by a spiral of hyperination. Te PCP-
SL oensive in Lima reached its peak in 1992 with a wave of bombings. It also ended that year with the
arrest of the organizations principal leaders.
In 1993, weakened and without leadership, the remaining PCP-SL cells were reduced to small areas. Nev-
ertheless, the situation was still complicated. Te principal scenes of the conict in this nal stage were
in the northeast region. Between 1993 and 1994, the eects of the repentance law, together with the
37 In contrast, less than 20 percent of the military losses in the confict occurred in actions in the south-central region, even though this
region accounted for the highest number of deaths and disappearances reported to the CVR.
Chapter 1
6 6
armed forces cleanup operations along the left bank of the Huallaga River (an area known as Venenillo,
where several confrontations occurred and where there is evidence of extrajudicial executions), further
weakened the PCP-SL in the region.
Despite Abimael Guzmns capitulation in 1993, the PCP-SL factions that were still in favor of the armed
struggle continued to maintain support bases in isolated areas of the Huallaga Valley, the central jungle
(Satipo province) and the Apurmac River Valley north of Ayacucho. Tey carried out sporadic propagan-
da actions and some armed incursions, but on a very limited basis. Tese isolated areas were important for
prolonged resistance, but they also limited the subversive organizations ability to coordinate a national
strategy or stage signicant actions.
Today, the groups that continue the armed struggle are weak and do not constitute a threat to the stabil-
ity of the Peruvian state. In addition, the conicts massive cost in human lives has caused certain sectors
of the population, which might have been attracted to the PCP-SLs cause early on, to lose interest in the
idea of social transformation through violence. Nevertheless, many of the regional and local conicts
related to the truncated processes of modernization and integration, which the subversive organizations
manipulated and used to justify the imposition of totalitarianism and their idea of social change on thou-
sands of Peruvians, continue to exist.
See Crimes and Human Rights Violations graphic, at 320.
See Timeline of the Internal Armed Conict (1980-2000) graphic, at 322.
6 7
Subversive Organizations
C H A P T E R 2
Te Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (Partido Comunista del PerSendero Luminoso, PCP-SL),
which took up arms against the Peruvian state and society while the country was returning to democracy
after 12 years of military dictatorship, is the principal actor responsible for the tragedy described in the
preceding pages. Te PCP-SL was not the only group to challenge the nations decision to have a democrati-
cally elected government. Te Tpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tpac
Amaru, MRTA) rose up in arms in 1984. While their approaches were dierent, as explained below, both
organizations committed grave human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity, which left thou-
sands dead and had painful repercussions for the Peruvian population, especially the poorest sectors.
COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERUSHINING PATH
Te subversive and terrorist organization that calls itself the Communist Party of Peru, and is also known
as the Shining Path (PCP-SL), launched a war on the Peruvian state and society in May 1980. Troughout
the conict, the PCP-SL committed violent actions that can be categorized as crimes against humanity, and
was responsible for the highest number of victims caused by the internal armed conict. Te Shining Path
was responsible for 54 percent of deaths and disappearances reported to the CVR during its investigation.
Based on our calculations, the CVR estimates that this subversive group was responsible for 31,331 deaths.
1
The origins of the Community Party of PeruShining Path
Te PCP-SL got its start during the internal purges within Marxist-Leninist revolutionary parties by
aligning itself with a dogmatic and sectarian ideology that emphasized the notion of vanguard as the
principal force of revolution, and violence as the way of achieving it.
Te Shining Path adopted Lenins thesis of the construction of a party of select and secret cadres, an
organized vanguard that could impose a dictatorship of the proletariat through armed struggle. From
Stalina minor gure within the historic processes recognized by the PCP-SLthe subversive organiza-
tion inherited the simplication of Marxism as dialectic materialism and historic materialism,
2
as well as
the thesis of a single party and personality cult around the leader. From Mao Zedong, the PCP-SL took the
idea of how power is achieved in semi-feudal nations: a prolonged peoples war from the countryside to the
city.
3
Above all, however, the PCP-SL borrowed from Mao the notion that the peoples war is inevitable for
achieving socialism and that cultural revolutions are a necessary step after the triumph of the revolution.
Te PCP-SL arose through successive divisions within Peruvian communist and socialist parties, which
reected the dispute within the international communist movement. Te most important split stemmed
from the rupture between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s over the issue of violence as a
necessary step for revolution. While the parties aligned with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
until that time the hegemonic power within the communist worldaccepted the thesis of peaceful tran-
sition to socialism proposed by the party in 1956, the followers of the Chinese Communist Party, led by
Mao Zedong, held onto the idea of violence and the need for a peoples war.
Tis dispute was reproduced in dierent countries and on dierent scales. In Peru, it led to a split in the
Peruvian Communist Party. Te majority of the countrys union organizations remained in line with the
Soviet position, while younger members, teachers and some sectors of the peasantry opted for the Maoist
approach. To distinguish themselves, each faction used the name of its newspaper: PCP-Unity was the
pro-Soviet faction, while PCP-Red Flag represented the pro-Chinese faction.
At the time of the schism, Abimael Guzmn Reinosowho would become the founder, ideologue and
1 The calculations have a 95-percent accuracy rate, with numbers possibly ranging from a low of 24,823 to a high of 37,840 people, which
would represent at least 46 percent of the fatalities in the internal armed confict.
2 Made popular by books on Marxism published in the Soviet Union.
3 In these cases, peasants were considered the principal force and the proletariat, which had been given the central role in Marxist
revolutions, became the leadership force of the revolution.
70
Chapter 2
highest leader of the PCP-SLwas the head of the Regional PCP Committee in Ayacucho, known as the
Jos Carlos Maritegui Committee. Guzmn came down on the side of the PCP-Red Flag, led by the
lawyer Saturnino Paredes. Te unity among the Maoists lasted only a short while. In 1967, the younger
members of the party and an important sector of the base organizations within the teachers union separated
from Red Flag and formed the Communist Party of PeruRed Homeland. Guzmn remained in the group
led by Saturnino Paredes, even though he had already formed his own red faction in Ayacucho.
A conict soon ensued between Guzmn and Paredes, and a new division occurred between late 1969
and February 1970. Paredes scored a victory in the short term, remaining in control of the majority of the
PCP-Red Flags base groups, while Guzmn was isolated with his Ayacucho Committee. Te Guzmn
faction also lost a large number of its base groups that had been established among peasant communities,
in theory the most important sector for a Maoist party. Te PCP-SL emerged in 1970 with its foundations
in the Jos Carlos Maritegui Regional Committee in Ayacucho, taking its name from a slogan used
among students in Huamanga for the Shining Path of Maritegui.
According to Guzmn, the organization had only 12 militants in Ayacucho and 51 militants in the entire na-
tion after the split with Paredes. Nevertheless, the new party was able to survive at the university in Huamanga,
and throughout the 1970s it was one of many small, radical, left-wing parties that fought to lead the recon-
struction and refoundation of the Communist Party and, in some cases, to prepare for the armed struggle.
The PCPSL in the 1970s
To better understand the PCP-SLs actions over the next decade, it is necessary to consider two important
issues: (a) the construction of its ideological and pedagogical plan; and (b) the absolutely vertical and
oppressive relationship between the party and society or between the party and the masses, to use the
organizations terminology.
Dominant ideology
After the schism with the PCP-Red Flag, the Shining Path maintained its presence among students, uni-
versity professors and schoolteachers in Ayacucho. At the UNSCH, Guzmn concentrated on refound-
ing the PCP by focusing the political struggle on allegiance to the thinking of Jos Carlos Maritegui,
who was recognized as the legitimate source of ideology by the entire Peruvian left.
Between 1971 and 1972, PCP-SL cadres formed the Maritegui Center for Intellectual Work (Centro
de Trabajo Intelectual Maritegui), which was led by Guzmn, to carry out an exhaustive review of the
Marxist classics and the works of Jos Carlos Maritegui. After nearly two years of intensive study, the
PCP-SL produced a publication that converted Maritegui, a versatile thinker who was uninterested in
systematic thought, much less orthodoxy, into the forerunner of Maoism and the founder of general
line orthodoxy. Te publication covered all possible issues, from Maritegui and the problem of litera-
ture to Maritegui and the military problem.
4
Te transformation of Maritegui into the forefather of
Maoism was presented by the PCP-SL as a development of Mariteguis thinking. From then on, the
Shining Path talked about Maritegui and his development, but without mentioning who was respon-
sible for this developmentAbimael Guzmn.
Armed with an ideology, PCP-SL militants concentrated on spreading what they believed was a manual
for Marxism throughout the university. It was a simplistic vision that was easily transmitted to students.
At the same time, the Shining Path developed what it called a pedagogical project. Te main eorts were
aimed at controlling the UNSCH Student Federation, expanding the reach of the Guamn Poma School
to the University and participating in the teachers strike in 1973. Te PCP-SL began to spread through-
out the region as students graduated and were sent out as teachers to secondary schools in dierent district
4 Among the issues analyzed were: Outline for the Study of Marxist Philosophy, Application of the Materialistic Dialectic to Society, The
Peoples War, Outline for Studying the Thinking of Jos Carlos Maritegui (Maritegui Center for Intellectual Work, Ayacucho, 1973).
71
and provincial capitals. While this was occurring, the Shining Path tried to develop its national connec-
tions, particularly in Lima, through the Enrique Guzmn National Teachers College and, in Huancayo,
at the National University of the Center of Peru.
Verticality as a principle
During the third plenary session of its Central Committee in 1973, the PCP-SL decided to come out of its
seclusion in the university. To do this, it decided to create generating organizations, internal movements
that were considered to be organizations generated by the proletariat, in the dierent elds in which the
party operated. Te PCP-SL went about building cells, which were generally small but ideologically solid
and closely linked to the party. In this manner, it created the Classist Neighborhood Movement (Mov-
imiento Clasista Barrial), Grassroots Womens Movement (Movimiento Feminino Popular), Classist Workers
and Laborers Movement (Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores Clasistas) and Poor Peasants Movement
(Movimiento de Campesinos Pobres), among other groups that would gain notoriety in the coming decade.
Te members of these organizations were called masses, which distinguished them from the cadres.
Both the masses and the cadres, however, had to submit to democratic centralism and adhere to
Maritegui, that is, the party. Under this structure, society was absolutely subordinated to the party,
which decide[ed] everything without exception. Te only thing that existed outside of the PCP-SL and
the organizations of the masses that it controlled were its enemies. Once the armed struggle began, the
masses had to submit to the partys scientic direction or pay a high price. Tis concept would lead
to the future militarization of society proposed by the PCP-SL, a concept the CVR believes played a
signicant role in increasing the number of victims of the internal armed conict.
The great rupture: Reconstitution and armed struggle
Between 1977 and 1979, the PCP-SL made a major break with the predominant social and political
dynamics of the country and transformed into a fundamentalist group with a potential for terrorist acts
and genocide. For PCP-SL militants, this rupture meant the reconstitution of the [Communist] Party
and the decision to move forward with the armed struggle. Te issue of reconstitution was particularly
important in the Shining Paths ideological denition at that time. In 1975, the party had decided that:
[T]o reclaim the Path of Maritegui is to Reconstruct the Communist Party, his Party; to
work for its ideological-political construction, developing the fundamentals given by its
founder and, simultaneously, to work for its organizational construction, readjusting the
organic and political structures. Reconstructing the Party today, in summary, is to push for
its reconstitution by Reclaiming Maritegui and aiming for the development of the peoples
war (PCP-SL 1975).
In March 1977, the PCP-SLs Central Committee held its second National Meeting of Generating Or-
ganizations and addressed the issue of building the party under the banner of Constructing the Armed
Struggle. Te PCP-SL believed that the reconstruction of the party had progressed suciently and that
it had enough trained cadres to initiate the peoples war. Te task of drafting a National Construction
Plan was assigned to the National Coordinating Committee.
Before launching its peoples war, however, the PCP-SL had to deal with a number of intense internal
struggles, because a sector of its leadership favored social protest and taking advantage of political open-
ings that were emerging during the transition to democracy after nearly 12 years of military dictatorship.
Guzmn needed to defeat this sector in order for his plans to prevail in the party. To do so, he imposed
on the party a number of radical denitions, including: (a) converting ideology into a kind of religion;
(b) seeing militancy as a kind of purication and rebirth; and (c) identifying revolutionary activity with
72
Chapter 2
terrorist violence. Tese ideas were expressed in four important texts published in 1979 and 1980.
5
Te
rst important element visible in the texts is the change in Guzmn himself. He began to use religious
referencesspecically biblical referencesto attack his enemies, as well as to oer a message of faith and
hope to his followers, most of whom were young adults. Te publication, For a New Flag, began with
the biblical phrase, [m]any are called, but few are chosen. Tat was followed by, [t]he wind carries
o the leaves, but the seeds remain []. How can the seeds stop the mill? Tey will be turned to dust.
Guzmn states that the god of this bible is matter, and that the movement towards communism is inevi-
table. Trough shrewd use of rhetoric, Guzmn seems to embody this movement:
[T]he earth has needed fteen billion years to generate communism. How long will man
last? Much less than the simple blink of an eye; we are nothing more than a pale shadow
and we aim to rise up against this process of matter [...] arrogant bubbles, is that what we
want to be? An innite particle that wants to rise up against fteen billion years? What ar-
rogance, what decay!
In this exhortation, Guzmns rivals not only appear as insubordinate to the leader, but opposed to the universe.
In Guzmns discourse, the rise of the party is a cosmic event. At the start of the 20th century, the pur-
est light began to emerge, a resplendent light, a light that we hold in our breasts, in our souls. Tis light
was fused with the earth and mud became steel. Light, mud, steel, and the PARTY emerged in 1928 [...]
(capital letters are in the original). Tus militancy in the party is a religious experience, which implies
both a collective and an individual rupture. Two ags [struggle] in the soul, one black and the other
red. We are the left, we must provoke a holocaust of the black ag. To do this, it is necessary to cleanse
our souls, cleanse ourselves thoroughly [...] enough of rotting individual water, abandoned waste. It is
a purication that allows for rebirth in a privileged work, but one fraught with pitfalls. Te enemy is
within; therefore, as internal struggles arise, and the start of the armed struggle approaches, the tone of
the discourse grows frenetic:
6

We need to pull up the poisonous weeds, which are pure venom, cancer of the bones that
corrupt us; we cannot allow this, it is decay and sinister and we cannot permit it, even less
so now [...] we must expel these sinister vipers [...] we cannot allow cowardliness or treason,
they are poisonous snakes [...] We will begin to burn, to drain this puss, this venom, burning
is urgent. It exists, and this is not good, it is harmful, it is a slow death that will consume
us [...] Tose who are in this situation are the rst to face the re, to be pulled up, squeezed
like pimples. If this does not happen, the poison will spread. Venom, purulence that must
be destroyed [...] (PCP-SL 1980b).
Tis tone is an indication of the future struggle between two lines within the PCP-SL, the verbal slaughter-
ing among the militants to remain within the party structure that now has as its pinnacle Abimael Guzmn.
Te opponents who believed the armed struggle was an inappropriate option appear as non-believers: Some
have such little faith, charity and hope [...] we have taken the three theological virtues to interpret them.
Paul said, men of faith, hope and charity. Tis is an argumentative process in which the speaker defeats
all resistance and molds things to his image and likeness, more as a potter than a blacksmith, because, as
he would repeat in the years to come when discussing those who did not see the light of the party: It will
not be easy for them to accept it [...] they require overwhelming acts [...] it needs to be hammered into their
head, their speculations must be torn to pieces, their souls forced to dwell in the reality of our homeland.
5 The frst text is called For a New Flag and was read during the IX Plenary on June 7, 1979. Peru celebrates Flag Day on that date, and
the presentation of the text was an explicit challenge to the State and its symbols eleven months before the start of the armed struggle. The
second text is On Three Chapters of our History, and was presented on December 3, 1979 at the First National Conference of the PCP-SL to
forge the events of the First Campaign of the First Division of the Peoples Guerrilla Army. The third text, We Begin Tearing Down Walls and
Unleashing the Dawn, was presented on March 28, 1980, during the Central Committees Second Plenary Session. The fourth textthe most
importantwas entitled We Are the Initiators. It was read during the closing ceremony of the PCP-SLs First Military School on April 19, 1980,
less than one month before the armed actions began.
6 The tone allows one to understand why Guzmn believed that the essence of the cultural revolution is to change the soul (PCP-SL 1991a: 2-3).
73
Te discourse announces the methodology that the Shining Path would employ with the so-called mass-
es. For the class enemies, the prospects are much worse:
Te people will become furious, will take up weapons and will rebel, putting a noose around
the neck of imperialism and reactionary forces; they will be grabbed by the throat, choked
and, when necessary, strangled. Te esh of the reactionaries will wither and be shredded,
and the black scraps will be submerged in the mud, what remains will be burned [...] and
the wind will scatter the ashes across the land so that all that is left is the sinister reminder
of what should never return, because it will not and cannot return (PCP-SL 1980b).
Te virulence of the language foreshadowed the violence to come, because after the meeting called for the
Beginning of the Armed Struggle (Inicio de la lucha armada, ILA), the destruction of [the party] had been
averted. Te reconstruction of the party has concluded and the militants are now alchemists of the light:
We are a rising torrent at which they will launch re, stones and mud; but our power is great.
We turn everything into our re, the black re will become red and red is the light. Tis is
who we are, this is Reconstitution. Comrades, we are reconstituted (PCP-SL 1980b).
What comes next is the apocalypse. Te participants in the First Military School, which was held in Lima
and not in Chuschi, as the PCP-SLs ocial history maintained for many years, signed an agreement stating:
Te communists of the Partys First Military School, a symbol of the end of times of peace
and the start of the peoples war, are on the verge of ghting as the initiators, under the
direction of the party and bound to the people, to forge the invincible legions of steel of the
Red Army of Peru. Te future is in the barrel of our guns! Te armed revolution has begun!
Glory to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung! Long live the Communist Party of Peru! For the
path of Comrade Gonzalo, we begin the armed struggle! (Gorriti 1990: 67)
What Guzmn dened as the reconstitution of the Communist Party and its militarization not only led
to the initiation of the armed struggle, but constituted a decisive step in the cult of personality created
around him. Maritegui was slowly forgotten and the development of his thinking became the guid-
ing thought of Guzmn, who had not yet proclaimed himself President.
Of all of the meetings summarized above, the one that stands out most clearly is the IX Plenary of the
Central Committee, held between May and July 1979. At the plenary, Guzmn was recognized as the
Head of the Party and the Revolution, which is much more important than the title of General Secre-
tary, which he always disdained. At the plenary, in a move replicating Maos actions during the Cultural
Revolution, Guzmn purged the Central Committee and formed the Permanent Historic Committee,
which was authorized to guide the party during crisis. Tis committee included Guzmn; Augusta La
Torre, or Nora, his wife; and Elena Iparraguirre, or Miriam, his future sentimental partner. Tat was
the leadership committee that launched the ILA the following year.
* * * * *
It is generally accepted that the PCP-SL began exclusively in Ayacucho. Since 1970, however, the PCP-
SL had small cells of militants in Lima and other cities. On November 14, 1972, the June 14 Regional
Committee met to begin building the generating organizations among workers in dierent sectors. After
the third plenary session in February 1973, the Metropolitan Committee decided to strengthen its work
among sectors of the petit bourgeois, which led to the formation of the Lima aliates of the Maritegui
Center for Intellectual Work, the Grassroots Womens Committee, which later became the Grassroots
Womens Movement in May 1973, and the Center for Worker Self-Education.
Te partys work in Lima did not have clear direction, and Guzmn would criticize the committee
for taking on obvious working-class nuances. In June 1975, Guzmn, now in Lima, decided that
74
Chapter 2
the partys urban work would be guided by the formation of a broad front of masses, with the idea
of workers as leaders, neighborhoods as masses. One sector, however, insisted that it was necessary
to strengthen the partys presence in the union movementimpart more ideology to the working
classso that it could be the principal motor of the revolution, which is not in Maoist dogma. Tis
internal debate took place during the rise of the union movement, which reached its peak with the na-
tionwide strikes of 1977 and 1978. Te Shining Path, however, distanced itself from the unions, which
it considered revisionist.
In November 1975, during the fth plenary of the Central Committee, which was part of the VI Na-
tional Conference, Guzmn expelled the Bolshevik faction from Lima, considering it part of the liq-
uidation of the left.
7
In the following years, the PCP-SL carried out very little work in Lima. On May
11, 1976, the rst PCP-SL workers cell clandestinely passed out iers in various Lima districts. Tat same
year, amid internal struggles, the party held the XIII Convention of the Metropolitan Coordinating
Committee. It decided that the Grassroots Womens Movement and the Revolutionary Student Front, as
well as the Center for Worker Self-Education, would become pillars of the reconstruction of the party in
Lima to prepare for the peoples war. Te party began to create support groups and reinforce its work in
certain universities, particularly in San Marcos and La Cantuta. In addition, it once more analyzed the
role that the cities would play in the peoples war.
Unlike Ayacucho, however, not all party members in Lima recognized Abimael Guzmns absolute lead-
ership. Some members believed it was necessary to strengthen the organization and disagreed with the
idea of launching the armed struggle in the short term. Tese were the people, according to Guzmn, who
wanted to unfurl the black ag at the historic IX Plenary in 1979. He saw the party leaders in Lima
as part of the opportunistic right-wing line opposed to armed struggle. Tat sector would be violently
attacked and expelled from the party.
After the Central Committees IX Plenary Session, the PCP-SL agreed to intensify its eorts to recruit
new workers. Shortly thereafter, during the First National Conference of the Central Committee held
between November and December 1979, the Metropolitan Committee began implementing its plan to
form armed groups without weapons. Finally, between April 2 and 19, 1980, the First Military School,
led personally by Guzmn, was held in Limas eastern sector. At the end of the event, the participants
agreed to carry out the rst of six military plans designed by the PCP-SL that would be launched between
May 1980 and November 1999.
8
Tese military plans were:
First plan: Begin the armed struggle (May 17 to December 1980)
Second plan: Begin the guerrilla war (January 1981 to January 1983)
Tird plan: Conquer support bases (May 1983 to September 1986)
Fourth plan: Develop support bases (November 1986 to July 1989)
Fifth plan: Develop support bases for the conquest of power (August 1989 to August 1992)
Sixth plan: Construct the conquest of power (September 1992 to November 1999)
9
7 That is, they used far left-wing language but with no practical application that would allow the party to progress. See the explanation of
this process in PCP-SL 1986a.
8 The Party, in the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee, has defned the development of the militarization of the Party through
actions; it agrees that through belligerent actions the Party will unleash the powerful and recognized vanguard of the working class of Peru, the
recognized center of the Peruvian revolution. The Second Plenary Session has agreed to a plan to initiate the armed struggle that will solve an
unresolved problem: the start of armed struggle (PCP-SL 1980a).
9 The sixth military plan was mentioned by Guzmn when he was presented to the press on September 24, 1992, after his arrest on
September 12. At that time, Guzmn called on his organization to proceed with the plan. The end of this plan was supposed to come in
November 1999. The arrest of scar Ramrez Durand, Feliciano, in 1999 marked the defnitive end of this plan.
75
Development of the Shining Paths So-Called Peoples War
The beginning
On May 17, 1980, in the town of Chuschi in Ayacucho, ve armed ghters wearing hoods broke into the build-
ing where ballot boxes and voter rolls were being stored for national elections, scheduled for the next day, burning
11 of the boxes. Te event merited little attention in the daily newspapers in Lima. Te PCP-SL, however, took
credit for the action and stated that it was the start of the armed struggle, which included the rst phase of the
plan to initiate the armed struggle mentioned above as well as the second phase, to begin the guerrilla war.
Te rst phase of the Shining Paths war lasted from the attack in Chuschi until December 29, 1982, the day
the armed forces were called up to ght subversion in Ayacucho. As will be seen, while actions were carried
out in dierent parts of the country, the rst stage of the armed conict was concentrated in what the PCP-
SL called the Principal Regional Committee, which included the provinces in northern Ayacucho, as well as
Andahuaylas, in Apurmac and the department of Huancavelica, except Tayacaja province.
Tis stage was marked by the Shining Paths military advance. It began with the armed groups without weap-
ons, which got their weapons by stealing dynamite from isolated mines or taking guns after attacks on police
ocers. Te objective was to form guerrilla detachments. In mid-1981, the organization stepped up its ac-
tions and began assaulting police stations. On March 3, 1982, cadres attacked the jail in Huamanga, the most
important military action during this period. Te attack included the main detachments formed by the PCP-
SL in the Principal Regional Committee. Attacks on police stations would multiply in the coming months,
rst in isolated district capitals and later in important towns like Vilcashuamn, where several ocers were
killed in a second attack on the police station on August 22, 1982. On December 3, 1982, Abimael Guzmns
birthday, the PCP-SL ocially launched the peoples guerrilla army (Ejrcito Guerrillero Popular, EGP).
10

Shortly thereafter, the armed forces were sent to Ayacucho to take over the anti-subversive eort.
On the political front, after the agreements reached during the IX Plenary and the launching of the ILA,
the most important decision was the approval of the second military plan, to begin the guerrilla war,
which lasted from January 1981 until January 1983, and consisted of campaigns called conquer weapons
and resources, beat the countryside with guerrilla actions, and strike to advance toward the construc-
tion of support bases. Two decisions in the development of this plan must be highlighted because they
demonstrated the extremely violent path the PCP-SLs peoples war would take.
Te rst decision was the agreement in May 1981 on the so-called quota (of blood) necessary for the
triumph of the revolution. Guzmn incited his followers to live their lives on their ngertips and to be
willing to die. Furthermore, he told them that they had to be willing to kill for the revolution and that this
had to be done in the most brutal way. Tis brutality began to manifest itself almost immediately in the as-
saults on police stationsthrowing acid in the faces of the ocers guarding the police station in Tambo, in
Ayacuchos La Mar provinceand also in the attacks on state authorities and community leaders.
Te second decision was to beat the countryside (to the PCP-SL, beat meant raze and leave nothing
behind), creating a power vacuum and forming the peoples committees that would constitute the seeds
of the PCP-SLs new power. Te decision to direct violence at the peasant society where it wanted to
establish its base fueled resentment that the subversive group was unable to contain and created the condi-
tions for rebellion among the people who were supposed to be its main alliespoor Ayacucho peasants.
1980-1982: Surprising progress
Te PCP-SL was an unexpected enemy for both the outgoing and incoming governments. Tere were
10 The peoples guerrilla army was formed by three kinds of forces: principal, local and base. An important situation is how President
Gonzalo conceives of the Peoples Guerrilla Army incorporating the peoples militias formed by three forcesPrincipal, Local and Basewhich
act mainly in the countryside, and in urban areas as a complement. This is the great leap toward the sea of armed masses (PCP-SL 1988c).
76
Chapter 2
warnings about the organization, however, that went unheeded. In October 1979, the military com-
mander in Ayacucho, apparently acting on his own initiative, undertook a special intelligence operation
and found evidence of Shining Path inuence in Vilcashuamn and Vischongo. Tere was no evidence
of traditional guerrilla activitytraining camps or caches of weaponsso he did not pay much atten-
tion. In addition, in the months leading up the burning of the ballot boxes in Chuschi, Navy and Army
intelligence cables reported subversive propaganda in Pomacocha, Vilcashuamn and Vischongo, as well
as the possibility of acts of sabotage, confrontations with the security forces and probable attacks on
C[ivil] G[uard] police stations (Gorriti 1990: 82). Grati appeared in Ayacucho and in surrounding
towns announcing the start of the peoples war. In Lima, the PCP-SL announced the war on May 1
through a pamphlet, Celebration of May 1 by the Revolutionary Proletariat, which was prepared by
the Movement of Workers, Laborers and Peasants. No one paid attention to these warnings, which were
overshadowed by the rst presidential election campaign in 17 years and months of social agitation.
Besides attacks and assaults, ideology was the most important weapon in the Shining Paths arsenal. Te
militants who embraced the party line did not need weapons. Tis is clear from a Central Committee
document that states that its military organization is based on men, not weapons (PCP-SL 1989b). Tis
explains one of the banners of the ILA, which claimed that the party was beginning the war unarmed
and that the militants were responsible for procuring their own weapons. Te party had such excessive
condence in its ideology that it believed that modern weapons were unnecessary for the peoples war.
On August 8, 1980, three months after burning the ballots in Chuschi, the PCP-SL leadership evaluated
the rst few months of the armed struggle. Guzmn exuded enthusiasm as he underscored the successes:
Te Initiation Plan, its application and the rst results of the rst actions are brilliant and a
resounding success of transcendental importance and repercussion [] the application of the
plan to start the armed struggle [] has shaken the country, placing the Party at the center of
the class struggle, in the center of the political arena [] we have entered a superior form of
struggle, the armed struggle, to destroy the old order and build a new society (PCP-SL 1980c).
His discourse took on messianic tones when he talked about the future of the war:
It will be long but fruitful; cruel but brilliant; hard but vigorous and omnipotent. It is said that
the world is transformed by the barrel of a gun, and we are doing it []. For all Communist
Parties there comes the time to assume their role as the vanguard of the proletariat with arms
to tear away the centuries, let out a resounding war cry and storm the heavens, the shadows
and the night. Te old and rotting walls of the reactionaries begin to crumble, crack and bend
like leaves in the tender and new ames; young but crushing bonres. Te peoples war is start-
ing to sweep away the old order, to inevitably destroy it, and from the old will rise the new,
and, like a glorious Phoenix, communism will be born forever (PCP-SL 1980c).
Te state did not have a planned response to the rst stage, mainly because of an inadequate analysis of
the problem. While some members of the armed forces blamed the legal left for the problem, left-wing
politicians accused the head of the Joint Chiefs of Sta and the Army Intelligence Service of using the
dynamite attacks to orchestrate a campaign against them. Te ruling party insisted that the violence was
part of an international conspiracy.
Te PCP-SL intensied its actions in 1981, including carrying out assaults to obtain weapons. Te sense
of urgency in the police forces was reinforced early in the year when it became clear that rural police sta-
tions were quickly becoming the principal targets of Shining Path attacks. At the time, the PCP-SL was
a highly disciplined organization with an ecient communication network and centralized leadership.
77
Te PCP-SL began carrying out its second military plan, to begin the guerrilla war, in January 1981.
11

Also known as the the great wave, this plan was carried out in two stages. Te rst wave of the second
military plan involved opening guerrilla zones to serve as support bases, while the second wave was
called begin the guerrilla war. Te rst wave ended in April 1981. Attacks moved from targeting state
oces in rural communities to downing high-tension electricity towers in the Mantaro Interconnected
Hydroelectric System in the central highlands, the countrys main source of power.
Te Shining Path began the second wave, which lasted from May through July 1981, and included three
phases and three objectives: conquer weapons and resources, beat the countryside with guerrilla actions
and strike the enemy. According to Guzmn, the party was surprised at the ease with which it was able
to create a power vacuum in the vast area where it operated. Tis success, however, forced the PCP-SL to
make a decision that was not originally included in the ILA, and which distanced it from the Maoist experi-
ence, by creating peoples committees in areas where power vacuums emerged. A third wave was under-
taken between August and September, basically replicating the characteristics of the rst and second waves.
At the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee in May 1981, the PCP-SL specied the initial plans
for the development of the guerrilla war and agreed to intensify the levels of violence. If the goal was to
create a power vacuum, then it was necessary to apply a plan of selective assassinations. In addition, if the
number of actions had to be increased, it was necessary for militants to become bolder and to take on greater
challenges. Tis referred to the quota that had to be paid. Te plan also included inciting the state to
respond disproportionately to the PCP-SLs actions as a way of unmasking its anti-democratic character.
By the end of 1981, the cadres in the PCP-SLs detachments had acquired a certain level of military ex-
perience. On October 11, 50 people, led by armed subversives, overran the police station in Tambo, in
Ayacuchos La Mar province, killing three ocers and stealing two machine guns and three revolvers.
Te call to obtain weapons by striking at the police forces was carried out in the countryside and cities,
where ocers were killed for their revolvers.
On October 12, the government declared a state of emergency in ve of Ayacuchos seven provinces
(Huamanga, Huanta, Cangallo, La Mar and Vctor Fajardo), suspended constitutional guarantees re-
lated to personal liberties and security for 60 days and dispatched members of an anti-subversive police
brigadeknown as the Sinchisto Ayacucho. Te state continued with a disinformation campaign. Inte-
rior Vice Minister Hctor Lpez Martnez stated that the terrorist groups had international support and
blamed the subversive actions not only on the PCP-SL, but also on the PCP Pukallacta and the MIR
Stage IV, an organization that had ceased to exist in 1979.
In a second review of the war in February 1982, Abimael Guzmn cited as important achievements of the
peoples war having forged the temper of the party, the formation and construction of an armed force
led by the party and the great quantity and increasing quality of the armed actions.
Te country became aware of the magnitude of the problem with the attack on the jail in Huamanga
on March 2, 1982. According to Guzmn, the original idea was to coordinate prison breaks around the
country, but it was impossible to coordinate a project of that scope. Nevertheless, the action allowed 304
inmates (of whom approximately 70 were PCP-SL militants) to escape, including Hildebrando Prez
Huarancca and Edith Lagos. It was the most important military action undertaken by the PCP-SL at the
time and was carried out with surprising eciency. While the attack was under way, soldiers stationed in
Ayacucho remained at the Los Cabitos base on the outskirts of Huamanga, awaiting orders from Lima to
intervene. Te call never came.
Te security forces responded with violence. Republican Guard (Guardia Republicana, GR) ocers as-
sassinated three detained PCP-SL militants who were recovering from wounds at a hospital in Hua-
11 There are diferent names for the plan in existing bibliographic information. Begin the guerrilla war was the name used by Guzmn in an
interview with the CVR at the Callao Naval Base on October 21, 2002.
78
Chapter 2
manga. In April 1982, the government ordered inmates arrested on terrorism charges to be transferred to
El Frontn, an island prison o the coast of Lima, to prevent other assaults like the one in Huamanga.
Lima: Difcult complement
Documents from the PCP-SL show that during the IX Plenary in 1979, militants in the Metropolitan
Lima Committee were opposed to launching the armed struggle, but the party [...] smashed fully and
completely this opportunistic right-wing line (PCP-SL 1986a). Te party was militarized after that
purge. In the urban areas, this meant building groups without weapons and that from these burning
seeds will spring burning sunowers. Te most important work in the cities would be carried out by a
unied front. To do this, the PCP-SL proposed recruiting residents through generating organizations,
such as the Grassroots Womens Movement, Classist Movement of Workers and Laborers, Teachers
Movement, Peoples Intellectual Movement and the Movement of Peoples Artists. It was also at this time
that the party created the Peoples Support Committee (Socorro Popular), initially conceived to provide
medical and legal assistance to PCP-SL militants.
Te rst phase of this Shining Path campaign began to take shape in Lima in 1982. Among the actions
that created the most commotion in the capital were attacks on the high-tension electricity towers, which
caused widespread blackouts. Trough these and other attacks, the Metropolitan Committee gained im-
portance in the organization and began to expand its actions by strengthening its presence in universities
and extending its network to Limas shantytowns as well as in the workers unions in industries along the
Central Highway, the main route from the city to the central highlands.
Despite these actions, Guzmn believed that the so-called Metro was not suciently committed to the
armed struggle. Tis belief was reinforced by organizational problems and the inability to prepare large-scale
attacks, demonstrated by some signicant failures. Te Metro was still a problem for the organization.
The new power in the countryside and
the participation of the armed forces
Te rst campaign, to beat the countryside (Strike 1), ended around October 1982. It was part of the
second military plan, to begin the guerrilla war, which was launched in July under the banner of the ght
against the exploitation of landowners and local power, and annihilate the forces of reaction. From Novem-
ber 1982 to March 1983, the PCP-SL carried out its second campaign, to shake the countryside (Strike 2),
which included distributing conscated land and forcing peasant communities to plant collectively.
Te subversive organizations actions, particularly attacks on the Civil Guard police stations, forced the
state to pull back from vast areas of the Ayacucho countryside as well as from some areas of Huancavelica
and Apurmac. Te PCP-SL began to present itself as the new local power.
Between 1980 and 1982, the PCP-SL formed a large number of peoples committees, the seed[s] of the
New State, which organized the communities social and economic life and attempted to impose a new
self-sucient economy. Beginning in 1982, the PCP-SL prohibited farmers from selling products and
closed some farmers markets, such as the one in Lirio in the province of Huanta and the market in Huan-
casancos. At its Second National Conference, held in 1982, the PCP-SL proposed:
[W]ith the formation of peoples committees we have taken another step in establishing new
productive relations, collective farming, collective work and collective harvest. One thing is
distributing lands, another is collective work, and in the country there is a tradition of this,
the ayni, and with this we are introducing the concept of mutual help and planting social-
ism. Te distribution of land happens when there is a certain level of grassroots support.
We have proposed organizing the entire community in collective work by convincing them
that it is right. Tere are individual and communal lands and both are worked collectively,
79
but whoever has more land has to pay a kind of tax and set aside part of the production for
the poorest families and another part to feed the army. We have suggested how to improve
production, because the peasants have to see the benets of the revolution, planting prickly
pear, improving seeds, cochineal and fertilizer. Tere is a Production Commissary to look
after the problems [of ] commerce, bartering, plowing and improving feed for guinea pigs.
We have proposed that the Support Bases be self-sucient and shown that the countryside
supplies all that is needed to live, what are missing are matches and kerosene, for the autar-
kic economy. Take over agriculture and livestock production. Where there is a lack of land,
open new lands and build terraces for planting. We can develop an economy and maintain
the New State based on our eorts. A policy directly related to the war.
Te peoples committees (Co. Po.) were formed by several commissaries. Te secretary commissary leads
the Co. Po., meets with the other four commissaries to establish the government plan and each carries
out the agreements. Te security commissary plans and proposes [the] defense plan for the Co. Po.,
organizes the security detail in daytime and nighttime shifts that include men, women and children [...].
Te production commissary is in charge of planning and organizing collective planting and distribut-
ing seeds. Te community aairs commissary applies elemental justice to resolve problems of damages
and conicts, and impose sanctions. Te peoples organizations commissary organizes the generating
organizations in the communities (PCP-SL 1989a).

In the area of Huancasancos, the production commissary led the razings
12
and distributed the goods
and animals, which the families were forced to receive:
[I]t was obligatory [to participate in the distribution] if you didnt receive the meat, you were
marked. We would go out of fearmen, women and even children. We all got something,
but it depended; for example, the ones who had fewer sheep got two kilos of meat. Tey
knew everything; some got one kilo, and others got half a kilo.
13
Te largest PCP-SL oensive in the early years of the internal conict came in July 1982: 34 terrorist
actions and 5 massive incursions in small communities, attacks on municipalities in Ayacucho, and the
assassination of the mayor and a businessman in Hualla, Vctor Fajardo, who were accused of being
snitches. Cadres attacked the GC police station in Vilcashuamn on August 22. Seven ocers were
killed in the ve-hour battle. Edith Lagos was killed on September 2 in Umacca, in the department of
Apurmac, in a shootout with members of the Republican Guard. Te auxiliary bishop of Ayacucho cele-
brated her funeral Mass, with approximately 10,000 people on hand for her burial. In the following years,
Lagos, who was 19 when she died, would become a kind of icon in the countrys south-central region.
Te growing sense that the government was losing control, which was fed by the assassinations of public
ocials and continuing assaults on police stations in Ayacucho, led to the decision to involve the armed
forces in combating the subversion. On December 27, 1982, President Fernando Belande gave a 72-hour
ultimatum for the terrorists to lay down their weapons before the armed forces were given control of
the emergency zone. Te PCP-SL did not comply. General Roberto Clemente Noel Moral was named
political-military commander of the new emergency zone, and on December 31, 1982, soldiers took up
positions in Ayacucho. Te Navy, under the leadership of Commander Juan Carlos Vega Llona, was given
control over the provinces of Huanta and La Mar. Te cruelest stage of the internal armed conict was
about to begin in the south-central highlands.
The PCP-SL between 1983 and 1985
Te PCP-SLs rst two military plansinitiate the armed struggle and begin the guerrilla warwere
carried out between May 1980 and January 1983. Within two years, the PCP-SL had established a solid
12 In striking, according to a PCP-SL document, the key is to raze. And razing means leaving nothing behind (PCP-SL 1982).
13 CVR. Testimony from a 45-year-old resident of Sacsamarca.
8 0
Chapter 2
presence in the Ayacucho countryside, and a signicant number of social sectors, particularly peasants, ei-
ther accepted or were neutral to its radical, autarkic plan. Tey were persuaded by the subversives message
about justice, without imagining the levels of violence to which they would be subjected in the coming years.
Te Navy took control of the province of Huanta on January 21, 1983. One of the rst steps it took there
was to group peasants into communities and organize Civil Defense Committees similar to the Strategic
Hamlets organized by the U.S. Army in Vietnam or the Civil Self-Defense Patrols in Guatemala. In
the majority of cases, the measure provoked resentment among the peasants, not only because of the
economic uncertainty created by having to move, but also because of the profound rivalries that existed
between communities that were now forced to live together.
Te PCP-SL did not retreat, despite the violent anti-subversive strategy launched by the military. On the
contrary, it decided to take a further step because Guzmn believed that the organization had won over
a solid social base among peasants in the previous two years:
How come they were unable to hit us hard, even with such a genocidal policy? How can
1983 and 1984 be explained? [...] Te relationship with the people has to be examined, the
kind of relation that existed.
14
Te PCP-SLs Central Committee met in March 1983 and agreed to move forward with the third military
plan, to conquer support bases. Four political tasks were decided at the meeting: general reorganiza-
tion of the party, formation of the peoples guerrilla army, formation of the organizing committee of
the Peoples Republic of the New Democracy, and formation of the Revolutionary Front to Defend the
People. In other words, the PCP-SL decided to begin building its new society.
In the Central Committee in March 1983, President Gonzalo further developed the idea
of building the Front-New State. He proposed levels at which the New State would be
organized: Peoples Committees, Support Bases and the Peoples Republic of the New De-
mocracy. Te work of the Support Bases and the Organizing Committee of the Peoples
Republic of the New Democracy are leadership, planning and organization, and each base
drafts its own specic plan.
Te Peoples Committees are the pillars of the New Statethey are Committees of the Uni-
ed Front, run by commissaries who take on state roles and are elected in Representative As-
semblies and are subject to removal. Tey remain clandestine and operate with commissions
directed by the Party and use the principle of thirds -one-third communists, one-third
peasants and one-third progressives-and are supported by the army. Tey apply the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, coercion and security by rmly and decisively exercising the violence
necessary to defend the New Power from its enemies and to protect the rights of the people.
Te Peoples Committees constitute the Support Bases and the Support Bases are the foun-
dation that the will support the Peoples Republic of the New Democracy, which is in for-
mation (PCP-SL 1988c).
Te party also dened the primary and secondary lines of the struggle, which was how the PCP-SL columns
would spread throughout the country with the objective of maintaining the organizations presence in areas
where the armed forces had assumed control over the population. Tey also dened four forms of struggle
and eleven procedures and agreed to defend, develop and construct the new power.
15
Plans were outlined
to expand the partys work by opening the Huallaga Front and by broadening the struggle in urban areas.
14 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, October 29, 2002.
15 In a plenary session in 1984, the party outlined 11 procedures: guerrilla action, counter-reestablishment, harvests, razings, ambushes,
sabotage of highway system, disruption of truck lines, disruption of airports, psychological war, harassment to break movements and selective
terrorism. The four forms of struggle were 1) agitation and propaganda, 2) sabotage, 3) selective annihilation and 4) guerrilla combat.
8 1
While the armed forces launched an energetic anti-subversive campaign in Ayacucho, Guzmn decided
to install peoples committees and replace local authorities with commissaries as the foundation for
creating the new power. Te peoples committees in each area formed a support base and the network
of support bases formed the Peoples Republic of the New Democracy in formation. According to
Guzmn, the committees were clandestine structures to protect the party militants.
Te police, unprepared for these conditions, were defeated. Te rst operation police ocers
carried out against us, an operation carried out in intervals, was condemned to failure because
of the amount of territory and the limited number of ocers involved. Tis forced the police
to leave the area. [...] What happened next? A power vacuum. What did we do? Tat was dis-
cussed at a party event, because everything was determined that way in an organization such
as ours. We proposed the creation of a state model. [...] But because we did not have sucient
forces to manage that, because it involved territory the size of a department, the power was
clandestine. It was a clandestine committee, it was not power that was openly installed. Tat is
how it began and how functions were assigned. It was a necessity dictated by circumstances.
16
In some cases, the authorities imposed by the PCP-SL had to prepare the population for the military
response the party leadership expected. Tis implied building an infrastructure where the peasants could
seek refugee when they retreated.
Te decision to form the Organizing Committee of the Peoples Republic of the New Democracy
indicates that the PCP-SL did not believe it was facing a State oensive that would defeat them. On the
contrary, it was at this time that Guzmn became President Gonzalo, the name he would use in all
party documents and the way party members would refer to him from then on. Te Shining Path began
to build its New State, and President Gonzalo was the undisputed leader of the new republic in for-
mation.
17
In addition, Guzmn was named President of the Party and President of the Military Commis-
sion. Te concentration of power was absolute.
Te concentration of power reects the image that Abimael Guzmn had of himself when he fought to
impose this decision and illustrates the role he believed he was destined to play in history. At a party meet-
ing, Guzmn recalled certain attributes of Mao Zedong that may shed light on his motivation:
We cannot forget that Chairman Mao was president of 800 million people and the reper-
cussions of his ideas were greater than that of Lenin; and he held three positions: President
[of the Chinese Communist Party], President of the Military Commission in the Armed
Forces, and Head of State. Tis is why he had 50,000 men to protect the leadership.
18
Tis vision of the historic role that Abimael Guzmn felt he was called to fulll fed a cult of personal-
ity around him that grew over the following years. At the start of 1983, he began to emulate the Tird
Sword of Marxism, at least within the organic structure of the PCP-SL. His concern for the universal
resonance of his ideas grew continuously throughout the years.
Beginning in 1983, when the third military plan, to conquer support bases, was launched, the party
militants adopted a much more coercive attitude toward the peasants. As a consequence, they increased
selective assassinations of opponents, including community authorities and peasants who were better o
economically, whom they labeled as enemies of the people. After community leaders were assassinated,
the organization installed young militants with little political formation to run communities. Tese new
leaders often mixed the eort to establish the new power with personal or familial interests. Teir ar-
rogance provoked an immediate rejection among the population:
16 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, January 27, 2003.
17 According to diverse testimonies, it was Guzmns wife, Augusta la Torre, Nora, who defended the proposal that he be named President
of the new state in formation.
18 Guzmn made these remarks during a preparatory meeting for the National Meeting of Leaders and Cadres.
8 2
Chapter 2
Because they named very young people, students with no life experience, they sometimes
got involved in their own kind of cannibalism, so the people wanted nothing to do with
them. Tat is how it started.
19
Te communities in the province of HuancasancosSancos, Lucanamarca and Sacsamarcaformed
one of the Shining Paths rst liberated zones. Beginning in 1982, they began building their new
power in these communities, forcing authorities to resign or face execution. Te PCP-SL was accepted
by some sectors of the population, because it imposed order and all people were equal:
Damn! Te people with money were sweeping the streets, everything was orderly, no one
slacked o. Tere were no longer any waqras, they were punished. Everything was clean and
orderly in those days.
20
Te punishment of powerful people who had committed abuses and the apparent elimination of dierences
between rich and poor are still stamped into the peasants memory. Te order imposed by the PCP-SL was sym-
bolized by the decision to force local residents who had some degree of power or wealth to clean communities.
Te peoples committees in Huancasancos were formed by young people between the ages 12 and 30 who
were in charge of maintaining order and controlling the movements of residents. Tey were drawn by
the PCP-SLs message oering them power and equality. Tese young men and women began to feel the
enormous power conferred upon them by the party; the illusion of always being obeyed fascinated them.
Traditional ideas about hierarchy were replaced by a discourse of equality: Tey [the young people] were
pleased at being called comrade, never sir, or amigo, nothing like that. Comrade! Tat was it.
21
Te
new order implied a radical transgression of traditional Andean structures, in which power was wielded
by elders who were respected by the population. Under the PCP-SL, youths, women and even children
replaced the elders:
[T]he new power, everyone was afraid because the students said they would kill anyone
who let them down, you had to obey the weapons. Te community had no authority over
them [...] the students were not the authority. Tey became activists, workers, with strong
interventionist language.
22
Teir word was law it was unbearable, said another community member.
Discontent increased when the PCP-SL restricted peoples movements and prevented them from leaving
or returning to the community. Tis occurred not only in Huancasancos, but in other areas where the
organization exercised control:
In the beginning, they were well behaved, but I dont think three months passed before they
started to pressure us and we could not move around, we could not go to Ayacucho or even
Vinchos to visit our relatives. Tey also prevented us from receiving visitors. All of this made our
lives impossible. We peasants are free and can go where ever we want, and that is what hurt us.
23
Te use of children in hostile actions was a widespread and systematic practice imposed by the PCP-SL
from the start of the peoples war, and it grew more intense after 1983.
Make children participate actively in the peoples war. Tey can carry out dierent tasks
that will make them understand the need to transform the world, [...] change their ideology
and let them adopt the ideas of the proletariat (PCP-SL 1988a).
19 CVR. Testimony of a self-defense patrol member from Chupacc.
20 CVR. Testimony of a 70-year-old resident of Sancos.
21 CVR. Testimony of a businessman from Sancos.
22 CVR. Testimony of a 68-year-old resident of Sancos.
23 CVR. Testimony of a resident of Paqcha, Vinchos, Huamanga.
8 3
Recruitment of young people was generally done through coercion, lies and violence. Many people par-
ticipated under pressure or out of fear of reprisals. When a community or family refused to hand over the
quota of children voluntarily, the PCP-SL took the children by force after threatening or assassinating
those who opposed them.
Te Shining Paths practice of kidnapping young people, interrupting peasants daily lives, undermining their
families livelihoods and the local economy, forcing them to attend assemblies and leave their herds unat-
tended, and restricting mobility combined to create a general sense of rejection among the communities. Tere
was also general resentment over the murder of authorities, the closing of farmers markets, forced systems of
production for family consumption and the conversion of people into masses to be managed by the party.
Te initial violent reactions in the communities began at the end of 1982. Te rst rejection of the Shin-
ing Path was probably the action by the Iquichanos in the highlands of Huanta, who killed seven PCP-SL
cadres in January 1983 in the community of Huaychao in response to the murder of community authori-
ties. Te testimonies of residents in this community recorded by the CVR show that the plan to construct
the New State was not well received by the peasant communities in the highlands surrounding Huanta.
Te authorities in Huaychao, including the lieutenant governor, varayocc and municipal leader, began to
argue [with the PCP-SL cadres], telling them that they were members of the government and that they
would not oppose the government.
24
Several days later, the country was stunned by the murder of eight journalists in the neighboring com-
munity of Uchuraccay. Te journalists had gone to report on the situation in Huaychao.
Tere was an uprising in Sacsamarca in February 1983, which marked the beginning of the end of the
Shining Paths control over the province of Huancasancos. Enraged by the abuses inicted by local PCP-
SL leaders, some residents got the subversives drunk and then beat and stoned them to death. Similar re-
actions were recorded in the following weeks in other communities in Huancasancos and Lucanamarca,
where community members also killed local PCP-SL leaders.
Te early rebellions against the PCP-SL were isolated and uncoordinated, however, and always provoked
a violent response by subversives. In the months following the murder of the journalists, the PCP-SL tar-
geted Uchuraccay, launching incursions on three occasionsMay 20, July 16 and December 24, 1983.
Of the 470 people registered in Uchuraccay in the 1981 census, 135 were killed in PCP-SLs reprisals
against the community. In all, one-third of the population was wiped out by the violent actions of the
PCP-SL as well as by confrontations with peasant patrols and disputes with neighboring communities.
On April 3, 1983, approximately 80 PCP-SL cadres, both men and women, launched a violent attack on
Lucanamarca. As the subversives moved down the hills, they killed men, women, children and elders. A
total of 69 people were executed. Some residents who escaped the massacre went to Huancasancos to ask
the Army for help. Others stormed the home of the parents of the local PCP-SL commander, whom they
had killed earlier, and murdered them.
Te PCP-SL claimed responsibility for the massacre in Lucanamarca in 1988, in an interview with Abi-
mael Guzmn published in El Diario, which was dubbed the interview of the century. In the interview,
Guzmn said the massacre was a decision by the PCP-SLs central command to quell the peasant rebellion.
25
Faced with the use of troops and a reactionary military action, we responded with an over-
whelming action: Lucanamarca. Neither they nor we will forget, because they witnessed a
response that they did not imagine, more than 80 were annihilated and that is real. Tere were
excesses, as we would state in 1983, but there are two sides to everything in life: our problem
25 According to scar Ramrez Durand, Feliciano, this was a decision made by Guzmn. He decided it. For me this was something that was
more in line with what the armed forces did. It was a signal for us to attack the civilian population, which began the divorce from us as they
withdrew support (CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, October 4, 2002.)
8 4
Chapter 2
was a strong blow to quiet them, to make them understand that things were not easy. In some
cases, like this one, it was the central leadership that planned the action and ordered things,
that is how it happened. Te main thing was for us to strike a massive blow and reprimand
them, making them understand that they were dealing with another kind of peoples combat-
ants, that they were not dealing with the kind of combatants that operated earlier, that is what
they understand. Te excess was the negative aspect. Understanding the war, basing our ideas
on what Lenin says, and taking into account Clausewitz, in the war of the masses, combat can
be excessive and express hatethe profound sense of hate of classes, of condemnation, that
was the root. Tat was clearly expressed by Lenin. Excesses can be committed, the problem is
to reach a point and not go beyond it, because if you go beyond it you can deviate. It is like an
angle, it can only open to a certain level and cannot go beyond that point. If we are going to
put restrictions, demands and prohibitions on the masses, in the end it is because we do not
want the waters to overow; here we needed the water to overow, for the landslide to wipe
everything away, certain that the water would return to the riverbed once it was over. I repeat,
this is explained perfectly by Lenin; and this is how we need to understand this excess. I insist
that the goal was to make them understand that we were a hard bone to chew, that we were
willing to do anything to gain everything (Guzmn 1988).
A willingness to do anything against unarmed civilians. Twenty years later, the CVR found no remorse among
the Shining Paths principal leaders. For them, these are things we said were mistakes, excesses that were
committed. But they were not a problem with the party line. Lucanamarca was one of the major events of
the peoples war, because it was the rst indiscriminate massacre and would set a pattern that characterized
the PCP-SLs actions, making the Shining Path the bloodiest subversive group in the history of Latin America.
In April 1984, when the PCP-SL was still implementing its third military plan, Guzmn announced the
start of the great leap plan, with a political strategy to establish and develop support bases through
four campaigns. Te campaigns included plans to put into place the widespread guerrilla war, extend our
zones, mobilize the masses and hit hard at the troops to withdraw the social base for their next reactionary
plan to defeat it (PCP-SL 1984).
Te security forces responded with brutal force to the escalation of the PCP-SLs actions. Among the best-
known cases is the murder of six young members of the Evangelical Presbyterian Church in Callqui on
August 1, 1984. Te following day, August 2, 1984, Jaime Ayala Sulca, a journalist from Huanta working
with the daily La Republica in Ayacucho, was detained and disappeared on the Navy base set up at the
local municipal stadium. On August 23, the bodies of 49 people were found in common graves in Pu-
cayacu, several kilometers north of the city of Huanta. All had been detained by the Navy in the Huanta
Stadium and then transported in a kind of caravan of death to an area in the province of Acobamba,
Huancavelica, where they were killed between August 16 and 19, 1984.
In September 1984, 117 men women and children were killed in the community of Putis, district of
Santillana, province of Huanta, allegedly by soldiers. It is important to highlight that the majority of the
communities in this zone had been forced by the PCP-SL, present in the area since 1983, to retreat to
the hills to avoid military patrols. Under the guidance of PCP-SL columns, they were placed in groups
in strategic spots among the hills. Tey were careful so that the people would not leave and warn the
military in San Jos de Secce. If they knew that someone planned to escape, they immediately slit their
throat.
26
Te peasants remained in the hills for six months. When the military base was established in
Putis, a group of peasants decided to surrender and went down to the community. Te soldiers made
them dig their own graves and then shot them. At the time that the CVRs Final Report was written, the
common grave in Putis was one of the largest in Ayacucho and possibly the entire nation.
PCP-SL documents circulating around the nation at the time, as well as the blows it was receiving from the
8 5
armed forces, revealed a complex reality. Guzmn minimized the reversals, writing about an inection in the
party. As was later learned, the PCP-SL strategy was to leave the population unprotected in the face of the mili-
tary counterattack. Te organization believed that the abuses committed by the security forces would provoke
a profound resentment in the population, which would later be used by PCP-SL detachments to regain control.
Te macabre dynamic of massacres that began in 1983 was part of a strategy designed by Abimael Guzmn to
oppose the re-establishment (of the old order) with a counter-reestablishment (of the Shining Paths control).
When the armed forces arrived, we had to undertake a dicult ght. Tey applied a strategy
to re-establish the old power, while we applied a strategy of counter-reestablishment to re-
launch the New Power. A cruel and merciless genocide was produced; we fought very hard.
Te reactionaries and the armed forces, in particular, thought they had us beat in 1984 [...]
but what was the result? Te peoples committees and support bases multiplied, this led us
to develop bases, which is where we are today (Guzmn 1988).
Te counter-reestablishment called for by Guzmn consisted of attempts to recover support bases in
zones close to where military bases were placed. Predictably, that decision led to worsening levels of vio-
lence and exposed the population to attacks from both sides. Curiously, Guzmn saw this as a creative
contribution to revolutionary military thought. Te number of dead during this period in the provinces
of Huanta and La Mar, in northern Ayacucho, was equal to the number of people who would die in all
of the remaining years of the internal conict.
In the mid-1980s, more and more peasants were dragged into the conict at a high social cost. From the
start, the PCP-SL had wanted to end neutrality among the population, and the military responded with
same tactic; as such, the peasants could not remain on the margins and were left to decide which side to join.
Nevertheless, peasant communities responded dierently in the face of the intensifying conict. Te
PCP-SLs re-establishment and counter-reestablishment strategy sparked an exodus of tens of thou-
sands of people, who ed their homes and their possessions to save their lives. Tose without resources or
contacts were the victims of incursions by the PCP-SL and the armed forces. When they talk about this
period, residents expressly recall the feeling of being at the mercy of events, subjected to the arbitrary de-
cisions of the armed actors: Viday carajo valenachu, quknin qamun wauchin, quknin qamun payakun
(Life was worth nothing, damn it. One comes to kill you; the other comes to hit you).
27
It was a kind
of nightmare from which, unfortunately, it was impossible to awaken. Were we even considered people?
It was like we were in a dream. [...] Te PCP-SL militants killed us, the soldiers killed us, who wants to
look at us now [all remember and weep].
28
In 1984, the military began pressuring communities to form peasant patrols. Te rst anti-subversive patrols
were formed in the province of Huamanga and the Apurmac River Valley. Tey quickly gained fame in the
ght against the Shining Path and achieved a level of strength that somewhat neutralized the subversives. Te
PCP-SL recognized the nefarious role the peasant patrols played in the peoples war. According to the
PCP-SL, the troops applied a corollary to the re-establishment strategy by using masses against masses.
Because of the PCP-SLs concept of peasants, it was impossible for the group to believe that the peasants
were acting of their own accord. If the peasants were revolting, they had to be inuenced by the military
and by the agents of the rotten feudal order.
In contrast to the province of Huamanga and the Apurmac Valley, the self-defense committees encouraged
by the armed forces did not prosper in the Huanta Valley in 1984, mainly because of the indiscriminate
military repression there. Faced with the pressure to join self-defense patrols, young people in the region
chose to migrate to the city of Huanta, the jungle or Lima. Communities in the south-central provinces
27 CVR. BDI-P17. Field notes. Anonymous informant.
28 CVR. BDI-P30. Focus group in Loqllapampa. Accomarca, Vilcashuamn, June 2002.
8 6
Chapter 2
MAP 1
AYACUCHO 1980-2000: PROPORTION OF DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES
REPORTED TO THE CVR, BY PERPETRATOR AND PROVINCE
OTHERS
PCP-SL
STATE AGENTS
LUCANAS
PARINACOCHAS
PAUCAR DEL
SARA SARA
HUANCA SANCOS
SUCRE
VICTOR FAJARDO
VILCAS
HUAMAN
CANGALLO
HUAMANGA
LA MAR
HUANTA
8 7
Cangallo, Vctor Fajardo and Vilcashuamnwere also reluctant to organize against the PCP-SL.
Te varying responses to the PCP-SL by Ayacucho peasants can be explained by the dierent ways in
which the subversives and soldiers acted in certain areas. In general, the PCP-SLs aggression against peas-
ant communities was much more brutal in the northern part of the department, while the most brutal
massacres in the central area were caused by the military (Umaro and Accomarca in 1985, and Cayara
in 1988). Nevertheless, in the long run the relationship between the State and peasant communities was
much better in Huanta and Huamanga than in Cangallo and Vctor Fajardo.
Available information indicates that the PCP-SL invested more eort in preparing its war in the central
provinces of the department, using, above all, access to education, which had been one of the principal
demands of peasant communities in decades past. Te PCP-SL had its laboratory for forming cadres in two
of the most important schools in Ayacuchos south-central region: the General Crdova School in Vilcash-
uamn and the Los Andes School in Sancos. In the Huanta Valley, the other zone where the Shining Path
remained strong until the end of the 1980s, the subversives built a solid base in schools and among students.
In other areas, such as the highlands of Huanta or the province of La Mar, where school attendance was not
as great, the links between the peasants and PCP-SL broke much earlier in the conict.
Unlike the case of the high Andean areas of Huanta and Huancasancos, the PCP-SL appears to have had
more respect for local authorities in the south-central region. In Vilcashuamn, one of the strategies to
protect its military base, and prevent possible incursions by security forces, was to install front authori-
ties. In other words, the PCP-SL maintained secret control, while the community president, governor
and other authorities acted as a facadeinforming military authorities that everything was normal in
their communities and reporting that the Peruvian ag was raised each Sunday morning in the district
capitals central square. Guzmn criticized this strategy from Lima, because he believed that it only
served to maintain the situation and was a refusal to combat the enemy.
Tus, there were dierent war scenarios in Ayacucho by the mid-1980s. In the valleys of the Pampas and
Qaracha Rivers, where the PCP-SL had managed to consolidate numerous support bases through early
indoctrination, the subversives were able to maintain a presence, although weak, into the 1990s.
In the highlands of the Huanta province, where the rst communities revolted against the PCP-SL, the
military installed several multi-community anti-subversive bases. One of these was in Ccarhuahurn,
the historic center of Iquicha. When the Navy arrived in the community in August 1983, it set up a civil-
defense committee based on the self-defense groups that had been established in the community at the
end of 1982, shortly before the assassination of the seven PCP-SL cadres in Huaychao. Te Navy installed
a 36-man detachment in the town, which grouped together eight annexesin this case, the annexes
joined of their own accordwith a total of 600 families (Coronel 1996: 51). Another enclave of resistance
was the former Chaca hacienda, located in the Huanta district of Santillana, which included seven neigh-
boring communities. While some residents moved to these multi-community centers, others migrated to
the valleys of Huanta, Tambo and the Apurmac River Valley or to the cities of Ayacucho and Lima. By
mid-1984, the highlands of Huanta were abandoned. Te displacement aected entire communities, and
about 68 communities simply ceased to exist.
In November 1983, families from 10 communities, which would later join others from Uchuraccay or
Iquicha, gathered in Ccarhuapampa, outside the town of Tambo, to form the rst multi-community
hamlet of displaced communities. From the start, Ccarhuapampa was organized around a civil-defense
committee that operated with a military mindset. Te committee established a strict protection system
that included restrictions on movement, issued passes for people to travel and physically punished anyone
who disobeyed the norms. More and more communities in the northern highlands of Ayacucho followed
suit and organized along the same lines.
Te Apurmac River Valley witnessed the formation of Anti-Subversive Civil Defense militias (Defensa Civil
Antisubversiva, DECAS), as the peasant self-defense patrols there were known. Te DECAS were the rst
8 8
Chapter 2
peasant groups to form a network that included an entire region, in this case the Apurmac River Valley.
By mid-1985, the armed forces and the DECAS had forced the PCP-SL columns to retreat from the zone.
One of the Shining Paths refuges in the area was the peoples committee, known as the Sello de Oro,
which was located in Simariva in the district of Santa Rosa. Te PCP-SL organized its peasant masses
in the area based on its idea of the New State. Nevertheless, it was a human shield that only existed
because of the PCP-SLs authoritarian way of wielding power.
Te fear of losing its social bases because of rejection from the communities and pressure from both the
military and the DECAS led the PCP-SL to further oppress the population it considered masses within
its peoples committees in the Apurmac River Valley.
Te families lived under plastic tarps, exposed to the elements and without clothing. Food was
an even bigger problem. In the nal years, they had virtually no salt, sugar, vegetables or grain to
eat. In the 10 years, about 100 children and adults died from lack of food (Del Pino 1999: 178).
On October 24, 1993, when the masses killed the PCP-SL commanders in Sello de Oro and turned
themselves in at the Santa Rosa Military Base, 100 percent were anemic; many had tuberculosis, severe
bronchitis and malaria. Many of the children between the ages of 2 and 3 were still unable to walk be-
cause of malnutrition (Del Pino 1999).
A similar way of controlling the population was through retreats in the area known as the Oreja de
Perro (literally the dogs ear because of its geographic shape) in the Ayacucho district of Chungui. Te
retreats were forced displacements from communities, in which the residents were taken to hide in the
hills or in the high jungle forest, where access was dicult. Tat meant that the PCP-SL moved its sup-
port bases to avoid military incursions. To the Shining Path, a support base was a group of several
peoples committees, which were communities where the local authorities had been forced to ee or
had been killed and replaced by commissaries. In the area to which the communities retreated, the
subversive organization imposed erce order and complete control, making life unbearable:
I was very sad. Tere were very few of us left in my base and we escaped to the highlands
where we ate potatoes. When we found out the Sinchis had left, those of us who remained
went back to Achira, where the Shining Path militants returned to organize us again. Tey
told us: We are many, like the sand in the river and the soldiers are like the big rocks in the
river. Te organization of the masses in my base was divided, with the women in charge of
cooking and bringing food to the adults who worked in the elds. Te adults and the young
people participated in the principal forces and were also farmers. We all worked for the
collective, there was no individualism. Te older children helped with what they could and
the younger ones were taught to read and write by the Shining Path member SF. He let us
sing and play. I was seven years old at the time. What hurts to remember is how the masses
died, because they could not escape from the military attacks. Te members of the Local
and Principal Forces almost never were killed. Te young people over 12 and the adults over
40 had the easiest time escaping from the military, but they could not ght. Tere were only
20 combatants armed with sticks, slingshots, two ries and two shotguns. Tat is how the
masses died until there were only a few of us left.
29
Between 1983 and 1985, Ayacucho continued to be the area hardest hit, but it was not the only depart-
ment to feel the eects of the peoples war. In Huancavelica, particularly in the provinces of Angaraes
and Acobamba, the PCP-SL applied its strategy of creating a vacuum in the countrysideassassinating
authorities who would not resign and attacking police stations. Tey also targeted the peasant popula-
tion, killing people accused of being snitches, although they did not raze communities. Te military,
however, attacked the PCP-SL columns in these areas more directly, killing numerous subversives.
8 9
In Pasco, particularly in the province of Daniel Alcides Carrin, the PCP-SL managed to establish a
large number of support bases. In 1983, the zone had not yet been declared under a state of emergency,
and the PCP-SL continued its strategy of shaking the enemy and assassinating local authorities and
landowners. In May 1983, a contingent of 200 peasants led by a PCP-SL platoon entered the district of
Pucar, haranguing the population and threatening local authorities. A month later, local authorities and
the principal of the local school, who had refused to resign, were assassinated in a second PCP-SL incur-
sion in the district. Four other authorities were killed in the neighboring hamlet of San Juan de Yacn. In
testimonies, residents said that there were adolescents and children among the PCP-SL troops and that
they marched wearing red armbands and shouting slogans praising President Gonzalo. Te district fell
into the hands of the PCP-SL, and scar Ramrez Durand, Feliciano, was the principal subversive leader.
Te province of Daniel Alcides Carrin was not declared an emergency zone until July 1984, when it was
placed under military control.
Another area of expansion at that time was the Mantaro Valley, where Shining Path cadres carried out
numerous acts of sabotage and inltrated the local university. Te PCP-SLs rst public appearance in the
area came on January 20, 1983, when four subversives burst into the student dining hall at the university
to ask for donations. Such events became commonplace at the university in the following years.
Municipal authorities and political parties were also the targets of attacks. Sal Muoz Menacho, mayor
of Huancayo and a member of the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU), was assassinated on July 16, 1984.
In March and April 1985, there were dynamite attacks against the party headquarters of Popular Action
(Accin Popular), the Popular Christian Party (Partido Popular Cristiano), the PAP and the IU, as well as
the Provincial Election Registry. Subversive actions continued to increase throughout the year.
In the central jungle, Ashninka indigenous people living in the Ene River Valley testied that they
rst heard about the party in their area in 1982. In 1984, the PCP-SL began penetrating the area
systematically, forcibly recruiting native communities and the heads of family clans. In October 1984,
the subversives attacked the Franciscan mission, a farm and neighboring homes in Cutivireni in the Ro
Tambo district of Satipo province. Te harassment and terrorist techniques used by the PCP-SL against
the Cutivireni mission were highlighted by the PCP-SL in a 1991 document:
Another situation with similar repercussions, and one that has been used often by the Pe-
ruvian reactionary [forces] as part of the psychological action they are using in the low-in-
tensity conict, is the action against the religious mission in Cutivireni and the Franciscan
[priest] Magnon, in the Ene Valley, who works with the Ashninkas. He [Magnon] has
worked in the region since the 1970s, but adopted a position against the ILA in 1980, tak-
ing a particularly strong stand in 1985 when the Party installed a support base in the place
and his followers began joining our ranks. He sent a written request to the reactionary army,
which installed an anti-subversive base. Te policy of our Party was to invite him to subject
himself to the New Power and to limit his work to strictly religious tasks and abstention
from counter-revolutionary activities. We carried out several acts of sabotage and razings
until we forced him to leave the place (PCP-SL 1991c).
In 1985, news that the PCP-SL was killing pimps and other criminals created some level of sympathy
among certain sectors of the population.
Te PCP-SLs violent actions in the Huallaga Valley began in 1983 with the murder of an employee of
the Agriculture Ministry and a high school student accused of collaborating with the police. In 1984, the
PCP-SL carried out two major incursions in the city of Aucayacu, attacking the police station and killing
20 ocers. On April 19, the mayor of Tingo Mara, Tito Jaime Fernndez, was assassinated, and on Sep-
tember 20 the mayor of Pumahuasi, a member of the Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP), was killed. Tat same
year, three cooperatives were attacked in the district of Crespo y Castillo. Shining Path columns attacked
the city of Tocache, the Experimental Farming Station in Tulumayo, the GC police station in Santa Luca
9 0
Chapter 2
and the Palma del Espino plantation and factory in Uchiza. As a result, the government declared a state
of emergency in the departments of Hunuco and San Martn.
In Lima, the PCP-SL campaign expanded gradually, with ups and down. Te operations in Metropolitan Lima
stabilized in 1981 and 1982, registered a peak in 1983, and then gradually increased over the following years.
Te urban campaign played the important role of placing the PCP-SL at the center of political attention. Al-
though at the time the organizations urban network included only a few detachments, their actions destroyed
the mythparticularly among the urban elitethat Lima was separate and distinct from the rest of Peru.
In 1984, the Metropolitan Committee was composed of a leadership cell and three zone committees: east,
west and center. Tere were two detachments: the special detachment, which carried out actions in the
eastern part of the city, and the central detachment. As generating organizations, the party formed the
Movement of Peoples Intellectuals, the Classist Movement of Workers and Laborers, the Classist Neigh-
borhood Movement and the Youth Movement.
Of the three organizational structures created by the PCP-SL at the start of the armed struggle (the Party,
the Army and the Front), the Front was the most important in urban activities. Te principal task was to
recruit people through the generating organizations, which were created taking into account the dierent
characteristics of the targeted population.
Even when the start of the armed conict appeared to be taking shape in Lima, serious criticism was
raised about the Metropolitan Committeeparticularly in 1985 when there was a noticeable reduction
in its actions compared to the rest of the country. Tat showed that the regional organization was not
responding to the criteria established by the central committee, and a series of bottlenecks are men-
tioned in the evaluations conducted by the party. Te leadership concluded that the Metro needed to be
reinforced to act as a sound box, given that any action in Lima, regardless of its magnitude, had national
and international repercussions.
The great leap
Te Tird Conference of the Central Committee, held in 1983, approved the Great Leap phase, which
corresponded to the third military plan, conquer support bases, and would last until September 1986.
Te phase was to begin in June 1984 and consisted of four campaigns:
Build the Great Leap (JuneNovember 1984)
Develop the Great Leap (December 1984April 1985)
Strengthen the Great Leap (JuneNovember 1985)
Finish the Great Leap (December 1985September 1986)
Tese campaigns were extremely important for the subversive activity in Lima. Under the banner of
militarize the party, the PCP-SL decided to totally revamp its various organizational levels. Because of
the weakness of operations in Lima, the reorganization focused especially on the capital. Te purpose was
to promote a growth strategy for zones and subzones, special detachments, centers of resistance, generat-
ing organizations and support groups.
A six-month pilot plan was devised for the Metro. Te goal was to launch a new stage of recruitment
of the masses in shantytowns, low-income neighborhoods and factories. In addition, special attention
was placed on attracting the petit bourgeois (intellectuals, artists, teachers and students). A particularly
important element was the recruitment of domestic employees, who could be used as informants.
9 1
It was during this stage that the Peoples Support Committee, a generating organization, began to acquire
importance. It would go on to overshadow the Metropolitan Committee.
Expansion of the armed confict
The situation in 1985, according to Guzmn
Despite the losses inicted on the subversives between 1983 and 1985, the PCP-SL not only maintained its pres-
ence in what it considered its principal front, Ayacucho, but also spread to new areas in the Peruvian highlands
and, with renewed condence in its forces, began an expansion in 1986 that would alarm the Peruvian state.
Expectation of a change in the states anti-subversive strategy was heightened with the inauguration of
Alan Garca on July 28, 1985. Abimael Guzmn, however, had no intention of oering a truce to the in-
coming administration. Instead, his plan was to undermine it as quickly as possible. He therefore dened
the partys fundamental strategy as unmasking the PAP to remove its progressive facade and ensure
the continued expansion of the peoples war.
Peru is burning, in the principal region, in the south, center, north, in Lima and in the northern
and southern areas around Lima. Tese actions, combined with our military actionssuch as
the re at Maruyforced the APRAs hand, as we expected, to declare a state of emergency in
the capital. It did that, and went even beyond what we expected, announcing a curfew.
Guzmn did not propose waiting for the PAP to show its repressive underside but insisted that the
governing party be forced to do so. Despite the new governments initial willingness to investigate the
massacres at Accomarca, Umaro and Bellavista and to punish those responsible, Guzmn saw the need to
provoke a violent repression. We must induce the APRA to genocide, was one of the agreements of the
IV Plenary. Tis is part of forcing the PAPs hand. It is not advocating death, but, as Marx stated, is part
of the reaction that occurs every day in a constant civil war (PCP-SL 1986b).
An uprising by PCP-SL inmates in June 1986 in several prisons in Lima led to a massacre that dashed any
hope of an anti-subversive strategy that respected human rights as President Garca had oered. Te action
actually favored the PCP-SL, as the massacre not only t into its strategy of inducing genocide, but also
strengthened the will to ght and fortied the role of the shining trenches of combat within the PCP-SL
strategy. While there was internal criticism that the quota had been too high, Guzmn argued that the
massacre of prisoners was a political defeat for the PAP government and, therefore, a victory for the PCP-SL.
Guzmns evaluation of the situation contradicted the opinions of his opponents within the PCP-SL. He
considered the strategy to have been a notable, resounding and complete success, while others held the
opposite opinion. Tere are reports that reveal a contradictory opinion, of people who do not see it as a
success but as a minimized (sic) situation, even something black and negative. Tat is the case with N. in
the north and H. in Cangallo, who expressed negative judgments; in the south there is similar pessimism
in Huancavelica, they express concern and dont know how to manage it (PCP-SL 1986c).
Guzmn wanted to consolidate the concentration of power he had achieved at the IV Plenary of the
Central Committee and accused dissidents of being on the fringes and opposing the partys decisions:
Te IV Plenary dened the specic political content of the First Campaign, which was to undermine
the show mounted by the PAP government. Both N. and H. have shown that they do not recognize the
IV Plenary (PCP-SL 1986c). According to Guzmn, his opponents were afraid of the PAP and that fear
had turned them against the partys leaders.
Te discrepancies with the dissidents suddenly became a serious threat to the party: Our mistakes redound
on the party to which we belong and which allows us to participate in the glorious task of transforming our
nation (PCP-SL 1986c). Te responsibility assigned to those who were suddenly considered enemies did
not stop with the party; instead, the threat they posed was given a global dimension. Our errors hamper
9 2
Chapter 2
the Peruvian revolution, the emancipation of the proletariat, and harm the development of the world revo-
lution. Te dissidents were crushed and forced to oer self-criticism three times. Te Central Committee
agreed to call attention to C. [comrade] Noem and learn a lesson so that these dicult situations are not
repeated. Te incident was attributed to situations of personal power (PCP-SL 1986c), and the Politburo
agreed not to open a full debate, but to learn the lesson that incidents such as these generate a separation
between the base and the leadership that exposes the revolution to serious riskslearn the lesson and never
generate actions that separate the base from the leadership, because this leads to defeat.
National deployment 1986-1989
Te perception of the PCP-SL as a monolithic organization that was highly structured, with smooth ties
between its leadership and the local and regional groups, must be nuanced by the specic conduct that
local and regional situations required of local commanders.
Because of their extreme ideology, PCP-SL leaders were unable to understand the errors in their strategy.
After six years of war, that blindness could be attributed to the way in which Abimael Guzmn imposed
his ideas on other leaders, who presented much more critical reports and interpretations that were based
on the actual situation in their regions and organizational structures.
In 1986, when the self-defense committees had turned the PCP-SL into the principal enemy and the tar-
get of their sweeps through villages, Guzmn did not seem to have understood the signicance of such
a massive mobilization of peasants against the partys cause. Te PCP-SL continued to see the peasant
patrols as nothing more than an armed retinue and canon fodder at the service of the armed forces,
and the peasants under their control simply as masses in service to the revolution.
Te situation of the peoples guerrilla army, according to an analysis by Guzmn in 1985, revealed a reduced
military capability, which was also seen in the statistics provided to PCP-SL leaders by the Cangallo-Fajardo
Zone Committee, also known as the fundamental committee of the Principal Regional Committee, Ayacucho.
Only 48 combatants formed the principal forcethe force capable of attacking police stations and am-
bushing military patrolsof the most important zone committee within the PCP-SL. Tis force was a
detachment of the peoples guerrilla army and was armed with weapons. Te local force, on the other
hand, only had basic weapons, while the base force, or masses, were unarmed.
While the anti-subversive forces increased their control over rural areas in south-central Peru between 1986
and 1989, the PCP-SL also demonstrated that it was capable of spreading its violence to the central, northeast
and southern Andean regions, as well as to the shantytowns of Lima, where it began an intense proselytizing
campaign. Guzmns tragic call to induce genocide became a cruel reality in new areas around the nation.
TABLE 4
CANGALLO-VCTOR FAJARDO ZONE COMMITTEE: NUMBER
OF COMBATANTS IN THE PEOPLES GUERRILLA ARMY IN 1985
TOTAL ZONE LOCAL FORCE BASE FORCE PRINCIPAL FORCE
1,471 TOTAL 205 1,310 48
SOURCE: PCP-SL POLITBURO, DOCUMENTS SEIZED BY DINCOTE
1,122 SUB-ZONE I 150 1,050 22
114 SUB-ZONE II 15 80 11
25 SUB-ZONE III 10 - 15
210 REINFORCEMENT 30 180 -
9 3
In the south-central region, the principal scene of PCP-SL activities between 1980 and 1985, the gradual
increase in the armed forces control was due to the establishment of anti-subversive bases and the con-
solidation of self-defense committees, which were established in areas that had originally opposed the
committees, such as the provinces of Vilcashuamn and Cangallo.
To counteract the military oensive, Guzmn proposed a series of actions:
[T]his third campaign is very important, it must be a clear demonstration that Ayacucho
continues to be the center of the armed struggle, that it continues and challenges the govern-
ment and the armed forces; the armed forces will eat their words and the new government
will be forced to apply an iron st. In that way we will remove the democratic facade, it
will be unmasked and they will once more debate how to combat us (PCP-SL 1985b).
Guzmn was referring to the third campaign of the Great Leap, the plan to develop the peoples war
that the PCP-SL had scheduled for July through November 1985. It was to end with the great leap sealed
in gold in 1986.
Te peasant patrols stepped up their activity in the jungle area of the Apurmac River Valley, where the
PCP-SL was trying to use its retreats as a way of dealing with the constant attacks by self-defense pa-
trolsstrengthening its camps, continuously mobilizing its forces, and increasing its pressure on the
masses and its violence against most of the people in the valley.
In the provinces of Huancavelica, which are in the south-central region, the partial pacication that
resulted from the establishment of anti-subversive bases in rural areas was similar to the situation in Aya-
cucho. In an analysis of the reports from the PCP-SL committees mentioned above, Guzmn wrote that
the principal base in Huancavelica was surrounded; see how to recover it.
An example of how Guzmn deceived his mid-level leaders was the report that he gave to the Huan-
cavelica zone committee after the events in Cayara: Erusco is the largest ambush so far, 30 members of
the armed forces dead, the sinister response of useless hate unleashed on the masses.
30

By 1986, the south-central region was not the only theater of war. Te conict had spread to other areas
of the country, particularly the central region, the Huallaga Valley and Puno.
Abimael Guzmn gave clear instructions to the Center Regional Committee in 1985:
[W]e must reclaim this principal axis [...] Develop the work around mining; develop the
peasant invasions, breaking the fences and letting their livestock graze; destroying the pro-
duction units, razing the SAIS so that they have no capital and can no longer repair the
system. Tis will allow us to move a large number of peasant masses. If they are unable to
move their livestock by breaking the fences and completing the invasion, then we will burn
the pastures (PCP-SL 1985b).
Beginning in 1987, there was a rapid increase in the levels of violence in the central region, exceeding that
of Ayacucho. Te high Andean zones of Canipaco and Cunas, and the Tulumayo basin on the eastern
slopes toward Satipo, became the principal scene of the destruction of the old state, with an increase
in attacks on police stations and in threats and assassinations of local authorities. In January 1988, the
rst peoples committee was installed in Chongos Altos (Canipaco), and the example spread through-
out the high Andean region. In Alto Cunas, subversives destroyed the SAIS and public institutions, like
PROCAD in San Juan de Jarpa. Te murder of authorities and other leaders, as well as people who were
considered well-o or abusive, was frequent.
In Tulumayo, on the eastern slope of the Andes, the PCP-SL started building peoples committees in
30 Meeting of the Huancavelica Zone Committee, September 21, 1988.
9 4
Chapter 2
three districts in 1988. By 1989, however, the presence of the principal force became more violent and
overbearing. Te demand for goods became frequent and the PCP-SLs measures more drastic. Tis cre-
ated the conditions that eventually led the PCP-SL to lose control.
In the Mantaro Valley, where the main cities are located, and in the mining zone of the Junn depart-
ment, the conict took on dierent characteristics. Peoples committees were not established, probably
because the zone had strong ties to markets. Te areas of violence were the cities and the mining camps,
while the principal target of sabotage was the electricity grid that supplied the country from the hydro-
electric plant in Quichuas, Tayacaja, on the Mantaro River.
Tere were numerous attacks on public institutions in the city of Huancayo. Te National University of
the Center of Peru was the scene of intense proselytizing, which was accompanied by acts of agitation and
armed propaganda in the surrounding shantytowns. Te organization also began calling armed strikes,
which were added as a fth form of struggle to the four that were already being used: agitation and pro-
paganda, sabotage, selective assassination and guerrilla combat.
Te increased violence led the government to declare a state of emergency in the department of Junn on
December 30, 1988, giving the Army responsibility for combating subversion.
Te PCP-SL attempted to take advantage of a number of mining union conicts in 1988, assassinating
union leaders who opposed the organization. Guzmn proposed concentrating the partys eorts in the
Mantaro Valley, although he recognized that the PCP-SL had been dealt serious blows in the region:
Where are we after the rst part, in which we were hit hard and which led to the process of
1989 and 1990? Was it simply in Cerro and, above all, in taking Yanahuanca and Chaupi-
huaranga? What should we think? Was it just a small thing? Did it make sense? Yes it made
sense, because it was part of our development. Have we progressed? Of course. Was it good?
Tey forced us to advance. Later, in the second phase of our work in the center, when we
took the provinces of Concepcin, Jauja and Huancayo, the higher regions, [] did that not
imply working in the Mantaro Valley? Tey hit us hard, committing genocide, forcing us
to pull back and retreat. Tey beat us, but did they wipe us out? No. Were they able to stop
us from moving to other places and developing? No. We expanded into a much wider area
with greater prospects [] they have not wiped us out, and since they have not annihilated
us, there is no denite defeat (PCP-SL 1991d).
Concerning his comments about taking of the provinces of Concepcin, Jauja and Huancayo, Guzmn
specied that he was referring to the upper regions, the high plains of those provinces where the PCP-
SL attacked the SAIS. Te party had much less success in the lower regions of those provinces, where
there were prosperous small haciendas, and in the cities, particularly Huancayo, where the PCP-SL placed
particular emphasis on the UNCP. Te PCP-SL took over the University on November 29, 1987, and be-
gan developing its organization and propaganda machine the following year, creating a spiral of violence
that would last until 1993.
One of the most important areas for the PCP-SLs organizational development at this time was the central
jungle, which was home to colonists and indigenous people, particularly the Ashninkas, a major lowland
indigenous people with 50,791 members, according to the 1993 Census. Te Ashninkas represent nearly
one-fourth of the countrys lowland indigenous population.
By October 1988, the department of Junn and the province of Oxapampa had been put under a state of
emergency. Te PCP-SL had organized numerous peoples committees in the Ene River Valley, where it
had support bases for its incursions. It expanded to the districts of Ro Tambo, Pangoa and Mazamari,
installing checkpoints in key areas to monitor river trac, and near Puerto Ocopa, capital of the Ro
Tambo district, which allowed access to the three large valleys (Ene, Tambo and Peren). Te Shining
9 5
Path had a presence throughout Satipo province. While its rst settlement was linked to colonists,
31
the
PCP-SL gained strength in certain native communitiesespecially Ashninka communitiesenrolling
the population, often through force, and razing communities that resisted.
In the northeastern region, particularly in the Huallaga Valley, the history of the PCP-SL demonstrates
the unique characteristics of its ties to coca-growing farmers and the rise in the price of illicit drugs made
from the coca leaf. Te Upper Huallaga is one of the few areas where the PCP-SL managed to control an
extensive amount of territory for a long period of time, between eight and twelve years. It is also the zone
with the highest number of deaths after Ayacucho, with the worst violence registered in the provinces of
Leoncio Prado (Hunuco) and Tocache (San Martn).
Te presence of drug-tracking organizations in the region forced the PCP-SL commanders to develop
a policy of coexistence that included charging fees for planes ferrying drug shipments, protecting drug
shipments and eventually forming alliances for territorial control. Beginning in 1987, the PCP-SL started
to create liberated zones, forcing the police to retreat from their stations. It forced the drug trackers to
disband their hit squads and created a system to regulate drug tracking and ensure that farmers received
a fair price for their coca.
In 1987, as drug tracking continued to spread, the PCP-SL launched a second phase, which included the
assassination of political leaders, mayors, community leaders and public authorities, as well as the destruc-
tion of public buildings, bridges and other infrastructure, and the takeover of towns and cities. It also held
peoples trials to publicly assassinate opponents. In the nal stage of this phase, subversive activities ex-
tended to two provinces in the Loreto department. Aguayta, capital of the province of Padre Abad, in the
department of Ucayali, became the PCP-SLs center of operations. At the start of the 1990s, an estimated
one-third of the principal and local forces of the peoples guerrilla army were active in the region.
In the southern Andes, a new front in the war was opened in 1986 in the highlands of Puno, where the
PCP-SL attempted to take advantage of tensions between communities and cooperatives created through
the agrarian reform. Tese tensions increased at the start of the Garca government. Te bishops of Puno
met with Garca and demanded a solution to the land problem to keep the tragedy that was unfold-
ing in Ayacucho from being repeated in their department. In 1986, the government passed a supreme
decree restructuring the cooperatives and ordering the redistribution of land. President Garca pledged
to redistribute 1.1 million hectares of land to the communities. Te initiative, however, was blocked
by sectors that would lose out in the deal, and the situation grew more explosive. Besides the questions
raised by technicians in charge of carrying out the land redistribution, there were also problems caused
by the creation of communities in formation, phantom entities created to circumvent the demands of
the peasant communities. At the end of 1985, tired of waiting for the central government to act, peasants
began a wave of land occupations in Azngaro and Melgar, which lasted through 1986. It was in that
social context that the PCP-SL decided to attack cooperatives, just as it had in the north (La Libertad and
Cajamarca) and in the center (Junn) of the country.
Subversive actions in Puno were concentrated in the provinces of Melgar and Azngarowhere the larg-
est number of deaths occurredand intertwined with the land takeovers sponsored by the Departmental
Peasant Federation of Puno. Te destruction of cooperatives and the harassment and murder of local
authorities continued in 1986 and 1987.
Meanwhile, the PCP-SL column led by Comrade Anselmo was practically eliminated in April 1987 as a
result of the murder of Zenobio Huarsaya, a peasant leader and left-wing mayor from the community of
Salinas. His murder, which provoked widespread opposition to the PCP-SL among peasants, helped lead
to the military defeat of the PCP-SL column. Nevertheless, only a year after the elimination of Anselmos
31 In this context, the term colonist refers to the non-indigenous population, especially people from the Andes who began migrating to
the central jungle region in the 1960s, when the State supported colonization of the jungle, promising incentives and access routes, like the
Marginal Highway.
9 6
Chapter 2
column, the PCP-SL set up a new column in Melgar and Azngaro, which began operating in May 1988
with the goal of destroying the SAIS. Tat column took over communities and hamlets in order to ex-
ecute enemies of the people and authorities who refused to step down. Using the same tactics it had ap-
plied in other areas, the PCP-SL created a power vacuum and began its plan of building the new power.
In January 1989, the PCP-SL column began an oensive to nish o the cooperatives and destroy the
Waqrani Institute of Rural Education, a training organization run by the Ayaviri Prelature. On January
20, the column attacked the Sollocota SAIS, but it was defeated by the local police.
Te PCP-SLs control also spread in the department of Apurmac, especially in the highland regions. As-
sassinations were recorded in the province of Aymaraes beginning in 1987, and there were attacks and
confrontations with security forces in the provinces of Antabamba and Cotabambas. Te Shining Path
set up peoples committees in Cotabambas, which became the rst province in the southern Andes to
be placed under a state of emergency to combat the PCP-SL, which had been assassinating lieutenant
governors, peasant leaders and livestock rustlers.
Subversive activity in the department of Cusco was also aimed at creating a power vacuum so that the
organization could ll the void with its new power.
In Metropolitan Lima and the surrounding area, there were two clear examples of increased PCP-SL ac-
tions in 1985: the attack on Domingo Garca Rada, President of the National Elections Board, on April
24, 1985; and a blackout followed by sabotage, including car bombings near the Presidential Palace and
the Palace of Justice, on June 7, as outgoing President Fernando Belande was hosting a state visit by
Argentine President Ral Alfonsn. It was the rst time the PCP-SL had used car bombs.
As noted above, the Peoples Support Committee began playing a much more important role in Lima at
this time. In addition, the 1986 prison massacres seriously shook the Metropolitan Committee and al-
lowed the Peoples Support Committee to displace it as the principal force.
In June 1986, there were coordinated uprisings by inmates accused of terrorism in the Lurigancho, El
Frontn and Santa Brbara prisons. Te uprisings ended with the intervention of the armed forces and
the massacre of inmates.
Te history of the prison uprising and subsequent massacre began unfolding a year earlier. As the PCP-
SL started the campaigns of the Great Leap, inmates in the Lima prisons, following orders from party
leaders, turned the jails into shining trenches of combat. On July 13, 1985, inmates in El Frontn,
Lurigancho and Callao prisons launched simultaneous uprisings, demanding that the government con-
sider them special prisoners. While they outwardly pressed for special benets, the real reason for
the uprising was to protest the decision to transfer inmates to a new maximum-security facility, Canto
Grande, which would have disrupted the communication network they had created within the prisons.
On October 4, the tension led to an intervention by the armed forces, which left 32 inmates dead in the
Lurigancho prison.
In keeping with their plan to induce genocide and unmask the fascist government of Garca Prez,
PCP-SL militants began a wave of selective assassinations. On October 24, 1985, they killed Miguel
Castro Castro, the warden of El Frontn. On January 15, 1986, a confrontation between inmates rela-
tives and the Civil Guard during the inauguration of the Canto Grande prison left 1 person dead and 14
injured. On January 31, a Civil Guard captain was assassinated, and on February 5, retired Army Com-
mander Rubn Izquierdo, who had worked for the intelligence service, was killed.
Te seriousness of these events led the government to declare a state of emergency in Lima and Callao on
February 7, 1986.
Tat decision was seen as a success by the PCP-SL leaders, who announced that we have forced him
[President Garca] to declare a state of emergency in the capital of the republic (PCP-SL 1986c). Accord-
9 7
ing to their calculations, the genocide they were expecting would soon begin, and the government would
have to impose terror on the poor neighborhoods, because in Las Casuarinas they will not knock on the
doors, they suck up [to people there]. If this kind of a plan is developed, it would imply [] a more favor-
able situation for us (PCP-SL 1986c).
In the wake of those events, selective assassinations became more frequent. Between January and May
1986, PCP-SL militants in Lima killed Navy Ocer Jos Alzadora, who had been stationed in Ayacucho
(March 14); Ica Prefect Manuel Santana Chiri (March 24); Navy Admiral Carlos Ponce Canessa (May
5); and retired Civil Guard Major Felipe Delgado, who had served in Ayacucho (May 9). On May 26,
subversives attempted to assassinate Alberto Kitasono, the PAPs national secretary.
After a peak in 1986, PCP-SL actions declined until 1988. Te fewest attacks in the capital during the 1980s
were registered during this period. Between November and December 1988, to commemorate the birthdays of
Guzmn and Mao, the Shining Path began a new stage. Te launch of new actions could have come earlier, but
the arrest of Osmn Morote on June 11, 1988, revealed the fragility of the PCP-SLs security systems in Lima.
Te PCP-SLs main presence in Lima between 1986 and 1988 was through the work of the Peoples Support
Committee. Tis organization, which until 1985 had only carried out tasks related to militants health, legal
assistance and some propaganda campaigns, was transformed into a party committee (comit partidiario)
and came under the direct control of the partys leadership. Guzmns decision to strengthen the Peoples
Support Committee stemmed from the weakness of the partys structure in Lima, the importance of the city
in the Shining Paths plan to create a front and the central committees doubts about the Metro.
Te Peoples Support Committee grew notably beginning in 1985, when, on orders from the leadership, it
militarized and created its own detachments and militias. It had a pyramid structure, and each level was
divided into three parts: Party, Army and Front.
In the northern provinces of the Lima department (Cajatambo, Oyn) and in the southern provinces of
Ancash (Ocros, Bolognesi), which was home to the Mid-Northern Zone Committee, the initial work of
reconnaissance and establishing contacts grew into actions aimed at taking direct control of territory and
creating a power vacuum by killing the authorities and attacking police stations. Nevertheless, as with
other areas, that stage ended with increasing conicts between communities and local PCP-SL com-
manders after the principal force withdrew.
1989-1992: The massive fight forward
From the start of the peoples war, the PCP-SL developed a deliberate and systematic personality cult
around its leaders. Unlike other historic processes, however, Guzmn himself played a key role in creating
the cult, declaring that the Head of the revolution (himself) was an irreplaceable guarantee of nal vic-
tory. Te personality cult was similar to the ones that grew up around Stalin and Mao Zedong, for whom
Guzmn publicly proclaimed his admiration. When referring to President Gonzalo, the PCP-SLs propa-
ganda machine employed only superlatives: the greatest living Marxist on the earth or the fourth sword
of Marxism.
32
In addition, the style of the partys debateswhich were based on a clash between two lines in which the
correct line, that of the proletariat, crushed the bourgeois erroneous line, and supporters of the latter were
publicly humiliated and forced to oer self-criticismreinforced Guzmans supremacy as the party leader.
Te clash between the two lines is transcendental, it is the class struggle within the party,
the motor of the party, because it is the contradiction within the party [...]
32 The frst three swords were Marx, Lenin and Mao; Doctor Guzmn (the title was constantly highlighted in party literature) was the
rightful successor. Although Guzmn maintains that there are no party documents referring to him as the fourth sword, that designation was
widely used by party militants and in the propaganda tools of the time, including El Nuevo Diario.
9 8
Chapter 2
How do we proceed? Reviewing our party experience, we are going to adopt the methods
used in the IX Plenary when we approved the ILA [...]
A rst method is piercing it, and the next is separating it. Te rst step, piercing, means
piercing and dening it within the party, which will be done by the following people: Com-
rades Nicols, Juana, Sara and Augusto. Te order implies responsibility, they must destroy
the positions, destroy them among themselves so that there is no trace of the gang, and
then dene the position to the party. Te second, separating and adopting a position, will
be done by Feliciano, Noem and Arturo. Te order implies responsibility, they need to
separate positions to ensure that there is no trace of convergence. Tey must rip to pieces the
nefarious criteria presented here, supported in the past, and take a position. After this, they
will be judged by the Congress (15 votes as 4 will not oer an opinion). Te Congress will
decide if the comrades supporting the rst or second methods have resolved the problem.
If the problem is not resolved, the Congress decides who signs the accords (PCP-SL 1988e).
Te gure of President Gonzalo was basically divine. Te party militants sacriced their individuality to
him through letters of subjugation in which they promised in writing to oer their lives for the partys
cause and its maximum leader. Tis unconditional support produced a kind of religious bond between the
cadres and their leader. A party militant jailed in Lima said when discussing the historic signicance of the
party leader, that he takes over the ego, moves the soul and enchants the spirit, giving the individual, as
part of the whole, a reason to live. As an individual I am nothing, but with the masses and applying Gonzalo
Tought, I can be a hero; physically dying for the revolution, I will live eternally (Roldn 1990: 116).
Toward the end of 1983, Abimael Guzmn was transformed into President Gonzalo for three basic rea-
sons: He was president of the Central Committee, President of the National Military Commission and
President of the Organizing Commission of the New Democratic Republic. President Gonzalo replicated
the structure of the Chinese Communist Party, in which Mao Zedong was president before taking power.
Te providential role played by President Gonzalo was consecrated by the PCP-SL within the partys
name. In January 1983, the partys ocial name became the Communist Party of Peru, Marxist-Lenin-
ist-Maoist-Guiding Tought.
33
Tat denition was fundamental for addressing any ideological discrep-
ancy that might arise. Te basic way of handling dierences was to turn to the partys orthodoxy, invok-
ing delity to the scientically established revolutionary principles. In that view, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
theory is science, and scientic understanding is supreme; everything else is wrong.
The frst PCP-SL congress in 1988: Gonzalo Thought
Te First PCP-SL Congress was held in 1988 under the absolute leadership of Guzmn. Eight years after
launching the armed struggle, the PCP-SL held its rst congress in Lima in three sessions: one at the end
of January and beginning of February 1988, the second in AugustSeptember 1988, and the third and -
nal session in June 1989. Abimael Guzmn called the party leaders together for a congress in the midst of
the armed conict, when he believed that conditions were ripe for consolidating his role as indisputable
head of the PCP-SL and for approving the declaration by which Gonzalo Tought would contribute
to the Peruvian revolution and, according to his logic, the world revolution.
Te surviving members of the Central Committee that had launched the armed conict participated in
the rst session of the First Congress, which was called the son of the peoples war and the party. Tey
included Augusta La Torre and Elena Iparraguirre, who were members of the Permanent Committee, as
well as leaders who had proven themselves in the eld, such as scar Ramrez Durand, Feliciano, who was
in charge of the Principal Regional Committee. Also present were the heads of the regional committees
33 In the years leading up to the armed struggle, Abimael Guzmn claimed he had given the PCP-SL an ideological identity, strategy and tactic
by creatively applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the specifc conditions of the Peruvian revolution, which he called the path of Maritegui
and its development. He would later talk about guiding thought.
9 9
and the partys principal organizations. Approximately 30 people, including participants and supporters,
attended the session. At the end of the third session of the First Congress, the party selected 19 full mem-
bers and 4 alternates for the Central Committee. Te end of the Congress was videotaped, and Guzmn
and the rest of the national leadership can be seen doing Zorbas Dance, from the movie Zorba the Greek.
Based on a review of the documents, the fundamental objective of the PCP-SLs First Congress was to
rearm Guzmns leadership and elevate Gonzalo Tought to party dogma, a proposal that produced
signicant debate among the participants. Guzmn, referring to himself in the third person, presented
the thesis that he was the bearer of a new kind of thinking that would allow for a scientic under-
standing of social and political phenomena as well as the development of the revolutionary struggle in
the country and in other nations. Guzmns central ideas about Gonzalo Tought, or rather, his own
way of thinking, were presented during the rst session of the party congress. It is enlightening to see
that Guzmn himself presented Gonzalo Tought and called on the other participants to accept it as a
continuation of the guiding thought used earlier.
When the document on the general political line was written and addressed in the CP, I main-
tained that the principal problem of this document is Gonzalo Tought. I reconrm this. Te
majority of you here present have been in open conict [...]. Gonzalo Tought is the creative
integration (I have not come here to talk about desire and whoever sees this as personal desire
is a bastard), the fusion of the universal truth that today is the Maoism for which we labor, the
Maoism against which they clash. Nothing is chance, everything has a cause. Tat they have
clashed with Maoism, that is the limit of stinginess, the stupidity of class.
In summary, as a transcendental and fundamental issue we need to approve the Foundation of Party
Unity: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo Tought, General Political Line and Program, and that is
what we are going to approve even if the heavens were to split open, that is something I am absolutely
certain that we will do.
34
In addressing the Congress, Guzmn returns to this idea over and over:
We need a CC [...] committed to studying the theory indicated by the party, because that is
the way we will penetrate the united formation we must have.
Why? Because of Marx, Lenin, Mao: Tey are the leaders of the world revolution, and who-
ever belongs to the party is a subsidiary.
A leader is a necessity [...] leaders are chosen in intense struggles [...] but a leader is only a
symbol of a revolution or of the world revolution. An example: the prisoners of war in the
Spanish Civil War kept up their optimism looking at an image of Lenin, these are things
we must understand.
Te First Congress allowed the party to move from Guiding Toughtthe improved continuation
of Mariteguis thinking and its developmentto Gonzalo Tought. Tere were criticisms, but they
were beaten down by Guzmn:
35

34 Guzmns presentation at the frst session of the First Congress.
35 If we look at, for example, the Interview [of the Century] the debate can be centered initially on the frst part and everyone has an
opinion. There are ideas that clash with each other, they are separated and diferentiated, isolated so that they can be reduced for attack, and
in this way the scope of education is broadened. They need to ofer self-criticism as many times as is demanded by the assembly. They need
to see the ideological, historical and social roots of their errors and deviations, and how to correct them. And those who criticize must also
ofer self-criticism and show that they are diferent from the others; those implicated could generate an LOD (lnea oportunista de derecha, or
opportunistic right-wing line), because each one will ofer something to structure it.
This is not a simple struggle between two lines, but a way developed so that it could be lived by the militants. It is aimed at ideas, at remolding
militants to the partys life in general; one has to adjust ones own ideas, to see what blocks the BUP (base de unidad partidaria, or foundation
of party unity), consider the circumstances, see the contents of the mistake and fnd the social, historical and class reasons for it; [analyze] the
attitudehow the class struggle is unfolding and see oneself not as an individual, but as part of a class. Apply what President Mao teaches us: a
confict of ideas. Speech by Guzmn during the second session of the First Congress, 1989.
10 0
Chapter 2
Compare President Gonzalo to Maritegui, and President Gonzalo to President Mao Tse
Tung [...] First, it is absurd to compare historical gures, we could never compare Marx with
Lenin or with President Mao [...]
To raise Maritegui to oppose Gonzalo Tought is to fail to understand that in the world
there exists Maoism [...] I have said that only through President Mao have I been able to gain
a greater understanding and appreciation for Maritegui.
Another thought [...] implies that there are other ways of thinking, and that runs counter
to Gonzalo Tought.
A higher fusion [...]. Other fusions? Tere is no other. Maritegui is not, because he is the fusion
of Marxism-Leninism with reality, and it is President Gonzalo who has proposed similarities be-
tween some of the theses presented by Maritegui and the laws established by President Mao.
36
Te formalization of Gonzalo Tought as an extension of the existing isms was the rst step. Guzmns
idea, we now know, was to later approve Gonzalism and institute it as a universally accepted doctrine
within revolutionary theory. Te PCP-SL, therefore, would be the birthplace of Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism and Gonzalism.
Ism has a clear meaning. Tought is nothing more than a collection of ideas, and ism is a
doctrine that correctly interprets all of the material in its three forms: nature, class struggle
and understanding. It is not a problem of terminology, the problem is whether or not it has
universal truth; if it is an ism, it has it [universal truth]; if it is not an ism, it does not.
Te First Congress discussed and approved Gonzalo Tought, not only as an application of a universal
truth, which is Maoism, but as the bearer of creative aspects that could become a contribution to
world revolutionary doctrine, a necessary condition for it to one day become Gonzalism.
In other words, the implicit objective of the PCP-SL Congress was to arm the leadership of Abimael
Guzmn, who was no longer just the head of the party, but its ideological inspiration, opposed to debate
because his words were irrefutable. With his thought now party dogma, the only thing militants were
allowed to do was repeat what President Gonzalo said.
See PCP-Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) graphic, at 324.
For the PCP-SL, the Congress that began in 1988 was the end of a long process of creating an omnipres-
ent leadership based on an internal dictator. From that time on, President Gonzalo had the sole power
to choose party leaders, independently of any formal process.
In the rst session of the Congress, the leadership was dened after the reports from the dierent com-
mittees and base groups were presented. Tat transcended party structures, as Guzmn not only saw
himself as the leader of the party but as the bearer of a way of thinking that was the culmination of the
praxis of millions of communists in the world, and which revealed the laws that guided the development
of nature, society and the thinking of all people. Gonzalo was the absolute leader of the PCP-SL and
secretly hoped to become a reference point for true communists around the world who had been left
without a leader after Maos death.
Some of the provincial leaders present at the Congress stated that Guzmns proposal was a negation
of Maritegui, and that by placing himself above Maritegui, Guzmn also put himself before Mao.
Te Congress was the scene of a debate in which those who opposed Guzmns proposalwhich was
camouaged as an initiative of the Politburowere forced to undergo a process of self-criticism using
the piercing method, facing erce criticism so that they would recognize that it had been an error to
36 Guzmn during the frst session of the First Congress.
10 1
question the canonization of Gonzalo Tought.
Te other signicant points approved at the Congress indicated that the PCP-SL was moving further
away from reality. If reality had been taken into account, Guzmn would have been forced to do two
things: First, go to the countryside, because the leadership must direct the war and the PCP-SLs war
was in the countryside (he only needed to recall Mao in Yenan); and second, present a plan that would
have permitted an alliance of forces strong enough to govern the country once the party came to power.
Te First Congress did approve a plan, but it was extremely general and basically repeated earlier pro-
posals, such as struggle against the bourgeois, totally and completely destroy the armed forces of the
enemy and destroy the bureaucratic, landowning state. In addition, the nal agreement to achieve
strategic equilibrium was dened as a military oensive without taking into account the force needed
for this or a plan for the future.
After the First Congress, the PCP-SL further dened the party with the tag principally added before
Gonzalo Tought in the ocial name, Communist Party of Peru, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, Principally
Gonzalo Tought.
Adopting position:
Te participants of the I Congress of the Communist Party of Peru adopt the following position:
For Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo Tought, for the Congress, for the fundamental
documents of the party and assuming the solemn commitment to study, debate and apply
them, for the brilliant success of the Congress, for the development of the peoples war in
the function of a world revolution, recognition and subjugation to the leadership of Presi-
dent Gonzalo, unifying center of the party and guarantee of its triumph, subjugation to his
leadership and the party (1988e).
Adopting Gonzalo Tought as the new orthodox principle created complications for the PCP-SL at the
international level, specically with the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (Movimiento Revolu-
cionario Internacionalista, MRI), an organization of small Maoist parties around the world that oered
the PCP-SL some support for its international propaganda even though it maintained discrepancies with
the thesis of Gonzalo Tought.
Finally, one of the conclusions of the First Congress would have crucial implications for the course of the
armed conict:
We must move from a guerrilla war to a war of movements. It is with this great plan that has
been denitively approved, not only its greatness but also its objectives and development,
that we will achieve strategic equilibrium.
37
One of the visible consequences of the First Congress was the regaining of the PCP-SLs presence in Lima.
After a noticeable decline in its actions in 1987-88, a new phase began in 1989 and increased in strength
until it peaked in 1992.
Determining factors in the renewal of the PCP-SLs actions in Lima were the adjustments made to its in-
ternal organization and the decision to move forward after the Congress approved the decision to ght
for strategic equilibrium. Te party had started to implement the fourth military plan, to develop sup-
port bases, and as part of that strategic framework it launched the Revolutionary Movement for Defense
of the People (Movimiento Revolucionario de Defensa del Pueblo, MRDP) in August 1987.
Te PCP-SL saw the movement as consolidating the dierent organizations active in Lima to provoke coor-
37 Third session of the First Congress, 1989.
10 2
Chapter 2
dinated actions (armed strikes) and move ahead with what they dened as the incorporation of the masses.
Te fundamental strategy for urban areas was organizing the work with the masses. Tis was to be carried
out by the MRDP through an unending war against revisionism. Te foundations for discussion of the
general political line, developed at the First Congress in 1988, stated:
Organize the masses so that they go beyond the legally established order, struggle to destroy
the old order and not maintain it. Tese are the three instruments of the revolution: Party,
which incorporates few; Army, which incorporates more; and State-Front, which gathers the
masses by leaps and progressively into peoples committees in the countryside and in the Revo-
lutionary Movement for Defense of the People in the cities. In this way, break the electoral
tradition of the revisionists and opportunists, which ignores the peasants and does not take
into account what is most important in the cities, power through the war (PCP-SL 1988a).
In this way, the PCP-SL had to take advantage of the demands being made by the population and infuse
them with the partys political objectives: We must develop the struggle in the function of Power, this is
the political principle of work with the masses (PCP-SL 1988a).
Te same document went on to highlight the role of the proletariat and the immediate political objective
for that sector: We cannot leave them in the hands of revisionism or opportunism. It was necessary to
sweep away the colossal mountain of trash. It emphasized that the shantytowns had always been im-
portant to the PCP-SL, reected in a 1976 directive that stated: take neighborhoods and shantytowns as
bases and the proletariat as leaders.
Tat meant mobilizing, politicizing, organizing and arming the people for combat. In other words,
the masses needed to be educated for the peoples war. In relation to the cities, the document stated:
In the cities, the work of the masses is carried out through the army and what matters is the
struggle for power, with local struggles as a necessary complement in the function of power,
obviously including diverse armed actions to solidify new forms of organization. We must
strengthen the Revolutionary Movement for Defense of the People (MRDP), gathering the
masses of workers, peasants, neighborhood groups and petit bourgeoisie, neutralizing the
mid-level bourgeoisie and incorporating the democratic forces in favor of the war. Te ob-
jective is to lead the masses to resistance and elevate their struggles to the peoples war to
block, undermine and attack the old state and serve the future insurrection by preparing a
specic peoples war as a complement in the cities. We will use the dual policy to develop
our own form, which is the most important, and penetrate all kinds of organizations. We
will apply the strategy of combat and resist (PCP-SL 1988a).
According to the document, there was a clear connection between the accelerated campaign in the high-
lands and the work of the PCP-SL in the capital. While the information presented above demonstrates
that the PCP-SL was still too weak to sustain a high-intensity conict in the city, its ability to mobilize
around specic political objectives appears to have been greater at this point than at any time in the past.
PCP-SL militants began to exert a visible presence in unions, neighborhood associations, student orga-
nizations, sporting clubs and other groups. In the same way, it strengthened its generating organizations,
always using the slogan, combat and defeat the revisionism and reformism that oppose the peoples war.
Tis was particularly evident in the industrial zone along the Central Highway. Te PCP-SL attempted to
inuence the unions by having members of the generating organizations run in internal union elections.
Te eorts to elect union leaders failed, however, because of the strong presence of the General Confed-
eration of Peruvian Workers and the United Left among workers in the area.
In mid-1987, after a phase of recruiting supporters through a campaign of discrediting union leaders,
10 3
who were accused of conciliatory revisionism, the PCP-SL began more direct actions that ranged from
handing out pamphlets at factory entrances to sabotaging the plants (as in the case of Nylon, Rayn,
Bata, Nissan and others along the Central Highway) and accusing union leaders of being traitors. In
addition, the subversives attempted to spark confrontations between the union movement and security
forces by inltrating protest marches and strikes to promote violence. At the same time, the PCP-SL tried
to create its own union base and recruit the heads of the union struggle commands (base gremial ) for
joint actions. Te party called its rst armed strike along the Central Highway on January 19, 1989.
Lima, in the words of Guzmn, was the drum of the PCP-SL actions, it was like a sound box with national
and international reverberations, which is why it became the principal scene for the partys high-impact ac-
tivities. It is also known that Guzmn and the rest of the PCP-SLs central leadership never left Lima, which
allowed them to have direct links to the Metropolitan Committee and the Peoples Support Committee.
1990-1991: Strategic equilibrium
After solidifying his leadership in the First Congress, Guzmn proposed an objective for the PCP-SL
that would have a direct inuence on the armed conict: He forced the Congress to approve what he had
outlined in several documents as strategic equilibrium.
[W]e began and solidied the armed struggle (ILA 80), today we begin conquering power
in all the country. We call this strategic equilibrium, and we specify it and highlight it
more than ever before: Equilibrium and preparation for the counteroensive; the enemy is
regaining positions to maintain its system so we must prepare the strategic oensive to build
the conquest of power. We have to insist on this, on how to solidify equilibrium with the
enemy (PCP-SL 1991d).
Te proclamation of strategic equilibrium in the revolutionary war was very important to Guzmn:
We are, since the Congress, proposing to build the conquest of power and we are building
this conquest. Strategic equilibrium is a political fact, not a mere statement; we are building
the conquest of power []. We have also embarked on preparing the strategic oensive by
Building the Conquest of Power, given that strategic equilibrium leads to the next stage, our
strategic oensive [] We insist, it is a material fact, real, it exists in matter, in society, in the
class struggle in this country, in the peoples war and it is reected in ideas. Make the people
know it and live it: We have entered the stage of strategic equilibrium (Guzmn 1988).
Tis idea did not take into account the changes in the armed forces anti-subversive strategywhich
had shifted from indiscriminate repression and the razing of communities in the red zones to selective
assassinations through intelligence work and the policy of winning back the population under the PCP-
SLs controlor the magnitude of the peasants rebellion against the party. It also ignored the weight of
the self-defense committees throughout the country, which were stronger at this point than in 1983-84
because they were receiving weapons from the state. In fact, the initial alliance between peasant commu-
nities and the PCP-SL had been broken in much of the countryside, and peasants were forming alliances
with the security forces at dierent levels and with varying amounts of independence depending on the
particular characteristics of the regions.
Tis reality went unnoticed by the PCP-SL leaders, for whom the party was the authentic representative
of the interests of the proletariat and the peasantry. For Guzmn and the top leadership, if the peasantry
was rising up against the PCP-SL that was a consequence of the intervention of outside agents, the yanau-
10 4
Chapter 2
mas (black heads), who were coerced and instigated by the military.
38

According to Guzmn, the PCP-SL had reached strategic equilibrium because it had always maintained
the initiative and had carried out its political and military plans. Guzmn was incapable of seeing any-
thing that contradicted his plans, including the selective elimination of PCP-SL militants and sympathiz-
ers that was part of the militarys new anti-subversive strategy. For Guzmn, this was only a desperate
move by the State to attempt to contain the victorious spread of the new power.
After the First Congress, the PCP-SL implemented the plan to achieve strategic equilibrium by increas-
ing the number of subversive actions. Tat plan, however, would lead to the partys defeat. In the words of
Feliciano: We left the Congress and we had to carry out operations, operations, operationsambushes
on military patrols and attacks on military outposts, which escalated the armed confrontations. Te PCP-
SL, however, did not have the forces to combat the military in each regional committee. Te PCP-SLs
bases or committees were able to survive as long as they were not mobilized or were used only to attack
other communities or recruit new followers. To achieve strategic equilibrium, however, the armed col-
umns of the peoples guerrilla army were forced to carry out constant attacks, which led to numerous
losses for the Principal Forces in each region. Tat dynamic eventually forced Feliciano to take refuge in
the Ene River area in 1992 in order to survive.
In short, Guzmn introduced a change that had massive consequences for the political line, just as the
PCP-SL was entering a critical phase from which it would not recover.
It is relevant to note that among the more than 100 theses put forth by Mao Zedong on the peoples
war, only one refers to strategic equilibrium, dened simply as a transition period from a defensive to
an oensive strategy. For Guzmn, however, strategic equilibrium became the central point of discus-
sion and the key element for the PCP-SL. What was implied by that decision? According to Guzmn,
it meant a dierent kind of military action in Ayacucho, which would include assaults on cities such as
Huanta and Ayacucho as well as an increase in actions in Lima. Te aim of his strategy was to surround
the cities from the countryside, but taking the countryside as a base and the city as a complement. In or-
der to achieve strategic equilibrium in the countryside, the emphasis had to shift from the Fundamental
Zone Committeethe provinces of Cangallo and Victor Fajardoto the Ayacucho Zone Committee
Huamanga, Huanta and La Marwhile in Lima the party needed to build the peoples committees for
the struggle, which were equivalent to the peoples committees in the countryside. Raucana and Mara
Parado de Bellido, shantytowns along the Central Highway, would be models for developing revolution-
ary support bases in the city.
At the start of 1989, the regional PCP-SL leaders reported serious diculties caused by, among other things,
the new relationship between the armed forces and the self-defense committees and the peasants opposition
to the PCP-SLs directives. Despite these reports, Abimael Guzmn forced the PCP-SL Congress to adopt
his proposal to ght to achieve strategic equilibrium as the central element of the new military plan.
Te notion of strategic equilibrium as an imminent possibility can be found in Abimael Guzmns
political and military analysis throughout the armed conict. Guzmn broke the elemental norms for
understanding conict with the armed forces, because he knew the PCP-SL had not achieved equilib-
rium with the States security forces. Years later, Guzmn would state that strategic equilibrium was not
centered on conict with the security forces, but instead on destroying the governance of the nation. In
1993, when he proposed conversations for a peace accord, which produced an internal division within
the PCP-SL, he stated that the organization was incapable of taking power: We prepared to induce the
participation of Yankee imperialism. Did we think we would take power in three or four years? No. And
38 Note the similarity between this situation and the one that existed at the start of the war, when President Belande blamed the violence
on the presence of outside agitators trying to destabilize Peru. In an interview on the Callao Naval Base, Abimael Guzmn, when asked about
the use of coercion with the masses and the precariousness of the number of followers he attracted, stated that, according to President Mao,
the active support of the masses was only needed immediately before taking power. Asked about his authoritarianism, he said that the question
refected a lack of knowledge of how to interpret the objective interests of the masses.
10 5
we did not think that Lima would become the center of combat (PCP-SL 1993a).
Te evolution of Guzmns ideas about strategic equilibrium are nothing more than a reection of his
cynicism and the manipulation he demonstrated during and after the First Congress.
[F]rom the point of view of power, we achieved a great leap. What was our goal? Te Peoples
Republic of Peru [...]
From the point of view of the development of the peoples war, we evolved this way: From
guerrilla war to a war of movements (with four key moments), and we reached strategic
equilibrium. As a consequence, through the plan followed and completed, including the
initial plan and the three campaigns of the peoples war, we achieved strategic equilibrium
and began preparing for insurrection in the cities.
Considering the plan to surround the city from the countryside, the initial plan, principally
strategic equilibrium and the development of the third campaign, we proposed transferring
the center of our eorts from the countryside to the city. How has this worked? It must be
studied very seriously taking into account concrete realities above all (PCP-SL 1993a).
From the military standpoint, his assessment was equally subjective: We are building the conquest of
power. Why has this become more urgent? We have passed the four key moments in the leap from guer-
rilla warfare to the war of movements and this demonstrates how the process is unfolding (PCP-SL
1993a). Tis position assumed that the subversive organization had a regular force (an army) that was
capable of moving from irregular actions or strategic defense (armed propaganda, sabotage, attacks,
terrorism, guerrilla warfare) to the rst stage of a regular war, the war of movements, with regular confron-
tations with security forces that included a military based on divisions (artillery, logistics, engineering,
etc.), even if it was not capable of defending territory and had to combine actions with guerrilla tactics.
Another of the changes is that guerrilla war becomes a war of movements, which is the principal war,
but this does not exclude guerrilla warfare as the fundamental action in the immediate term (PCP-SL
1993a). Tis would be the prelude to the nal stage of the revolutionary war, the strategic oensive, in
which armed actions would take on the characteristics of a war of positions and the subversives would be
in a position to defend territory.
For Mao Zedong, the transition from the countryside to the city as the principal scenario of war is associated
with highly developed military and political work in the countryside. Te idea of surrounding the cities,
and the fall of cities, is the nal stage of the war, the prelude to the nal victory. As is evident, these condi-
tions were not present in Peru at the end of the 1980s. On the contrary, the massive development of self-de-
fense committees throughout most of the country, and the peasant rebellion against the PCP-SLs peoples
power, were a clear setback for the subversive organization compared to the conditions in the mid-1980s.
Abimael Guzmns proclamation of strategic equilibrium represented a kind of ight to the future. Te
PCP-SL had to deal with the loss of strength in the countryside, given that massacres of peasant com-
munities were no longer useful for stopping an organized, armed rebellion against them by the peasantry.
Guzmans response was to intensify armed actions in the city.
In 1993, and already behind bars, Guzmn reinterpreted the oensive in Limareected in the num-
ber of car bombs detonated in the city between February and July 1992as an attempt to force the
United States to intervene in Peru. With that objective, he gave the PCP-SL militants a sense of false
expectation, encouraging them to continue their actions because power was just around the corner.
As part of his fantasy, before his arrest, Guzmn proposed changing the names of the PCP-SLs principal
structures: the EGP would become the Peoples Army of National Liberation, ready to ght the U.S. in-
vasion; the Republic of the New Democracy would become the Peoples Republic of Peru, given that the
Unied Front built to ght the imperialist army would include the nations bourgeoisie. For that reason,
10 6
Chapter 2
according to Guzmn, the massive car bombing on Tarata Street in Limas Miraores district was a mis-
take, because it undermined the PCP-SLs ability to recruit the nations bourgeoisie.
Te fth military plan, to develop support bases to serve the conquest of power, which was launched
after the First Congress, obeyed the order to achieve strategic equilibrium and move from the guerrilla
war to the war of movements. Actions were no longer carried out by columns but by battalions, even
though these existed in name only. A Shining Path battalion may only have had 5 armed ghters from
the principal force and 40 peasants from the local or support force. Feliciano summarized this stage with
one phrase: Abimael Guzmn was ghting a Nintendo war.
39
He talked about ctitious battalions and
campaigns and forced the peoples guerrilla army in dierent areas of the country to call on its strategic
reserves to ght the armed forces on unequal footing.
What led Guzmn to declare that the protracted warthe stage of strategic defensehad concluded,
cutting short the war of one hundred years that he had proclaimed in 1980? Te principal factors were
the organizations actions in Lima and its setbacks in the countryside. Between 1988 and 1989, the self-
defense patrols were extending throughout the country to take on the PCP-SL. Te partys advance in the
countryside was thus curtailed by massive resistance that could not be broken by razing communities or
assassinating peasants who no longer took its orders. Peasants established alliances with the armed forces
and, in many cases, turned to them for support and training to combat the PCP-SL.
Te second reason was the worsening social crisis and the evident signs of decay within the Peruvian state,
which Guzmn saw as an opportunity to provoke the collapse of the State and to force a U.S. military
intervention. Tis hypothetical intervention would allow the PCP-SL to transform the guerrilla war
into a war of national salvation.
A third reason that pushed the national leadership to proclaim strategic equilibrium was the expectation
created among PCP-SL militants that the Party would take power in the rst few years of the 1990s.
Te economic collapse and unraveling of Peruvian society that occurred during the second half of the
PAP governmentexpressed most vividly in hyperination, a moral crisis caused by accusations of ram-
pant corruption and the bankruptcy of the Stateled Guzmn to think that the moment had come to
39 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, May 28, 2002.
1990 1985 1980 2000 1995
ILA II PM III PM IV PM V PM VI PM
OFFENSIVE
STRATEGY
(YEAR?)
STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM DEFENSIVE STRATEGY
FIGURE 21
PERU 1980-2000: SHINING PATH MILITARY PLANS AND THE SCOPE
OF ASSASSINATIONS COMMITTED BY THE SUBVERSIVES, BY YEAR
10 7
take power. When he realized that he was wrong, he attempted to provoke a U.S. military intervention,
announcing the start of the fth military plan, to develop support bases to serve the conquest of power,
which was to be the nal stage before the triumph of the revolution. Te next stage, to construct the
conquest of power, was the sixth and nal military plan.
Based on the number of victims in the internal armed conict, the second peak coincided with
Guzmns order to reach strategic equilibrium as the immediate step before the strategic oensive that
would lead the party to power. Te Shining Path columns unleashed a much harsher campaign to control
the population in areas where militants were active, especially in the central region and southern Andes,
becoming less tolerant and more violent. Te cycle repeated itself, with a large number of deaths (al-
though fewer than from 1984-85), and the PCP-SL was either expelled from or defeated in those regions.
In short, the conict slowly moved from rural areas in the highlands to the cities and the jungle areas of
the Huallaga and Ene valleys. Signicantly, the event that closed this period, Abimael Guzmns arrest,
took place in Lima, the city the PCP-SL leader had never left throughout the entire conict.
1989-1992: Regional scenarios
During this period, the PCP-SL was lying in wait in Ayacucho, carrying out exemplary actions in
communities that organized self-defense committees. Te PCP-SL, however, had lost much of its sup-
port among the local population and did not have the repower to take on the armed forces. It did have
armed columns that were constantly on the move to avoid attacks and still had the capacity to launch
ambushessuch as the attack in Challhuamayo on June 19, 1992, when it dynamited a vehicle from the
municipality of Huancasancos, killing 17 people.
In the rural zones of the northern provinces (Huanta, Huamanga and La Mar), the PCP-SL attempted to
regain lost ground, constantly attacking the civil defense patrols between 1989 and 1990.
One of the worst massacres occurred in January 1990, when 48 people were killed by the PCP-SL in Acos-
vinchos. Two other massacres during this time were perpetrated by the Army: in May 1990, the Army de-
stroyed the village of Yahuar Machay (Ayahuanco), killing 47 people; and in January 1991, 18 corpses were
found after an Army incursion into San Pedro de Cachi. Tose were the last major destructive actions in the
region. After that, the violence in northern Ayacucho was basically conned to more urban areas.
In the Apurmac and Ene Valley, PCP-SL militants began seeking refuge in Viscatn, and along the Ene
River, in 1992 to escape a military oensive. Tey staged sporadic attacks on nearby communities. Tat
was the area to which Feliciano ed. Te proximity of drug trackers in the area allowed the PCP-SL to
obtain the economic resources that it would use to survive in the coming years.
In the central region, in the highland areas of Cunas and Canipaco, as well as in Tulumayo, a cycle of violence
similar to that of Ayacucho in 1984 and 1985 was unleashed. Communities that had once enthusiastically
embraced the PCP-SL, and were under the partys control, began forming alliances with the armed forces. Te
highest numbers of deaths and disappearances in the central regions during the armed conict were recorded
in 1989. It was within this context that the PCP-SL attempted to take control of the Mantaro Valley.
Tis was an extremely violent period in the urban areas of the valley, especially in the city of Huancayo:
82 percent of the deaths reported to the CVR in the Mantaro Valley occurred during these years. Te
PCP-SL columns turned to the cities after they were forced out of the highland communities. Acts of
sabotage and armed propaganda multiplied in the second half of 1989.
Te National University of the Center of Peru continued to be a focal point of violence for all the players
involved. People connected to the university and accused of belonging to the PCP-SL were the victims of
disappearances and extrajudicial executions by security forces and paramilitaries.
In 1989, the PCP-SL launched a major oensive aimed at decapitating the mining unions in the region, which
10 8
Chapter 2
they were never able to control. Te principal objective of the subversives, however, was the destruction of the
SAIS. Tey destroyed the SAIS in Cahuide, distributing land and livestock to member communities.
Guzmns idealized vision of an autarkic peasantryone that was removed from the marketplace and
only interested in subsistencewas not based on reality, not even in the most backward zones of Aya-
cucho and certainly not in the central highlands, where peasant communities had some of the strongest
ties to the market economy.
Te real result was that 17 communities in the Altos Cunas region reached an agreement with the mili-
tary and organized peasant patrols in 1990. Shortly thereafter they would be among the rst communi-
ties to receive the weapons handed over personally by then-President Alberto Fujimori.
Te self-defense committees slowly took control of the region and eventually expelled the PCP-SL. In
1992, in Alto Canipaco alone, the Army registered 1,568 civil defense patrol members, who had adopted
military-style organization and discipline. Social order was restored, and the communities once more
elected their own authorities. Te war was over for them.
In the central jungle, the armed conict expanded throughout Ashninka territory along the Ene and
Tambo rivers. Te PCP-SLs control over this zone resulted in the destruction of communities throughout
1989. According to reports received by the CVR, 62 percent of the deaths and disappearances recorded
in the central jungle region occurred between 1989 and 1992. Te region was strategically important to
the PCP-SL. Te Tambo, Ene and Pichis rivers were a natural corridor that allowed the subversives to
connect their work in the Ayacucho jungle and Apurmac River Valley with the Huallaga region. Te area
was also the natural refuge for PCP-SL militants when they had to retreat from the central highlands. Te
PCP-SLs presence in the region, however, was not only based on the coercion and terror inicted on the
indigenous communities. As had happened in other regions, a large number of Ashninkas voluntarily
joined the PCP-SL, believing that the subversives oered an eective strategy to help them defend their
communities and territories from colonists invading the region. Te PCP-SL wielded total control, using
even small children to carry out dangerous tasks as part of the process of forming future combatants.
Te Shining Path reached its peak in the region between 1989 and 1990. Te collapse of its power would come
after the arrest of Abimael Guzmn and the subsequent weakening of the party structure. Te escalation of
abuses by the PCP-SL began to provoke a reaction among the indigenous population, which the subversives
answered with increased violence. On August 18, 1993, in an incursion into the hamlets along the Sonomoro
River, PCP-SL militants murdered 62 Ashninka men, women and children and left another 2,500 homeless.
Te violence unleashed by the subversives and the State security forces had a common thread: Te level
of brutality in the interventions was proportionate to the isolation of the communities and the physical
and symbolic distances that separated them from the centers of power. Te indigenous populations in
the central jungle were as isolated as the people living in the regions of Chungui and Oreja de Perro in
Ayacucho, and the suering in both regions was tragically similar.
An estimated one-fth of the Ashninka people were displaced by the war, and their traditional social
structures were seriously aected. Te Ashninkas were also victims of the armed forces. Tere are multiple
accusations of human rights violations, abuses that were allowed because of ethnic and racial prejudices that
viewed enlisted soldiers from the highlands and coast as superior to the savagesor chunchosof the
jungle. Te impunity permitted because of these prejudices was compounded by the general suspicion that
the Ashninkas, most of whom lacked the required national identication cards, supported the subversives.
In the northeastern region, the PCP-SL attempted to use its solid bases in the Upper Huallaga to extend
to the Central Huallaga and dominate the southern part of the Bellavista and Mariscal Cceres provinces.
Faced with the need to solidify its territorial hegemony, the PCP-SL focused on the Ponaza and Mis-
kiyacu valleys in the Central Huallaga. Te subversives suered a serious setback in July 1991, when they
failed in an attempt to take the city of Tingo Mara by assault. Te case is exemplary of what had been
10 9
happening since the creation of the political-military command in Huallaga in 1989, which increased
military control at bases in Uchiza, Santa Luca, Tocache, Madre Ma, Tulumayo, Nuevo Progreso, Pi-
zana, Punta Arenas and other areas and a new military strategy that prioritized ghting terrorism over
eliminating coca crops. Te self-defense committees also began to spread in the region. As of 1992, the
strategy of encouraging the population to help in the war on terrorism had another important element,
the repentance law. Te new law not only reduced the number of subversives, but also increased the
amount of intelligence information in the hands of State agencies.
Te third phase for the PCP-SL in the region began with the arrest of Abimael Guzmn in September
1992 and with the legal norms that allowed militants to quit the party by repenting. Tat legislation
became an escape route for many PCP-SL militants, who had been pressured by their commanders and
forced to take part in a nal oensive for which they were unprepared. In addition, the price of coca
began to fall in 1989, and by 1995 it was at levels that did not allow farmers to cover the costs of plant-
ing it. But the fundamental reasons for the collapse of the PCP-SL in that region, as in others, were the
abuses and its attempt to control all aspects of peasant life, which led to resentment among the peasants,
followed by the subversives isolation and eventual defeat.
As in other regions, eorts by the armed forces and the military-supported self-defense committees not
only took territory away from the PCP-SL, but also increased the violence aecting the population as well
as the number of victims. During those years, the Navy was in charge of combating subversion in Ucayali
from its base in Aguayta.
Te conict took a dierent path in the southern Andes. In the highland provinces of Cusco (Canas,
Canchis and Chumbivilcas) and in the department of Apurmac, the number of victims reached a high
point in 1988. Te violence began to diminish after that, with the PCP-SL retreating after the installation
of anti-subversive bases in Antabamba and Haquira.
Te subversive organization continued selective attacks on members of the peasant civil-defense patrols,
which the PCP-SL saw as enemies even though they were originally created to prevent livestock rustling.
Te party also carried out selective assassinations of local authorities and continued to create its peoples
committees to install the new state.
Subversive activity continued to expand in Puno, with 65 percent of the deaths registered during the 20
years of armed conict occurring at this time. Te PCP-SLs principal force was located in the center of
the province of Azngaro, deploying from there to Melgar, Carabaya and Lampa. Despite its activities,
and the murder and intimidation of authorities, the PCP-SL never managed to control the rural zones,
where it came up against the Peasant Federation, left-wing parties and the social outreach programs of the
Catholic Church. Te PCP-SL was unable to establish peoples committees in Puno and had to depend
on a network of sympathizers. While this network allowed it to operate in a large area, it had the same
weakness as the central leadershipthe network collapsed as soon as its principal leader was removed
from action. Te network, however, was strong enough to oer the support needed for the PCP-SL to
stage a series of attacks in May 1989.
In January 1990, the PCP-SLs principal column suered a decisive loss, the failure to destroy the SAIS
in Sollocota during an attack. Tat failure led not only to the collapse of the principal column, but to
the unraveling of the support network. Similar military defeats were complemented by police intelligence
work, which allowed the security forces to arrest sympathizers who were lending support to the PCP-SL.
Te resolution of the struggle for land in favor of the peasant communities helped isolate the PCP-SL.
Te government gave 1,274 communities in Puno nearly 2 million hectares of pastures. As a result, the
communities were more interested in registering their new lands than in attacking police stations.
Te call for strategic equilibrium had greater importance in Metropolitan Lima as the plan was aimed at trans-
forming the city into the principal target of subversive activity. According to various PCP-SL documents, Lima
110
Chapter 2
was never considered the principal front; Guzmn himself states in several documents that he was unable to
control the activities of his own base groups. Although Gonzalo never left Lima, sometimes months would go
by without him having contact with the Lima regional structure, and he learned what the subversives were do-
ing in the capital by watching television. Te Shining Paths oensive in Lima, in accordance with the plan
for reaching strategic equilibrium, was out of his control, and he apparently was aware of that.
Te starting point for this new period in the capital came on November 3, 1989, during the development
of the rst campaign of the fth military plan, to develop bases to serve the conquest of power. During
this campaign, called to promote the development of support bases, the Revolutionary Movement for
Defense of the People organized an armed strike in Lima under the banner develop the boycott of the
1990 general elections. Tis was the start of the major terrorist oensive against the city.
Tree areas of actionsunions, universities and shantytownsand one methodarmed strikeswere
the PCP-SLs focus in Lima as of 1989.
In the unions, the subversives attempted to take control of the strikes called by workers. Te goal was not to help
workers attain their objectives, but to radicalize the protests as a way of creating conditions to feed the peo-
ples war. Te PCP-SL contributed to this by assassinating managers who the companies involved. Te result
was that the unions were destroyed without having achieved a positive response to their members demands.
In the universities, especially in San Marcos National University, the PCP-SL launched an intensive cam-
paign to win recruits who would spread the partys message and, eventually, become part of its military
detachments. At the La Cantuta Teachers College, the local organization was part of the PCP-SLs zone
structure and, as such, was involved in military actions.
Te PCP-SLs activities expanded to the shantytowns on the outskirts of the city, into the areas known as
cones. Te main target was the Eastern Cone, where the subversives engaged in intensive proselytizing,
following years of systematic penetration of shantytowns in the area. Te most important activity came
in 1990, when the party formed the Committee for the Peoples Struggle of Raucana, a land takeover
promoted by the PCP-SL, where it planned to install an open peoples committee that would announce
to the world the new power in Lima and the imminent triumph of the revolution. Te PCP-SL also
intensied its work in Villa El Salvador, in the Southern Cone. At the start of the 1990s, the Maoist
organization had gained signicant ground in Villa El Salvador and it began to control traditional orga-
nizations, such as the Self-Governing Urban Community, Womens Federation, and Association of Small
and Micro Enterprises. Te PCP-SLs objective in Villa El Salvador was to demonstrate the ineectiveness
of peaceful strategies for social change, undermine the left-wing parties the PCP-SL saw as its principal
rivals and enemies, and to guide social struggles toward an inevitable confrontation with the State. In the
Northern Cone, the PCP-SL took advantage of the shantytowns created by people eeing the political
violence in the countryside, attempting to use them as masses for its political goals.
Te armed strikes were planned, organized and carried out by the organizations that formed the Revo-
lutionary Movement for Defense of the People, of which the Peoples Support Committee was the main
group. Days before an armed strike, PCP-SL militants laid the groundwork by sabotaging or burning
buses to intimidate public transportation workers.
In 1992, the violence reached its high point. To reach strategic equilibrium, the PCP-SL needed to instill a
general climate of fear in Lima, the countrys economic and political center and its most visible point. Te
actions in the city had to come from the so-called steel belt (cordon de hierro) formed by the shantytowns
ringing Lima. Widespread terror was needed downtown and in the citys middle-class and business districts.
In the neighborhoods that formed the cones, the PCP-SL not only stepped up propaganda activities but
also increased pressure on local leaders (harassment, assassinations) in an eort to take over grassroots
groups, something it had failed to accomplish with the unions. Te CVRs research on Limas three cones
found that the PCP-SL, through its faade organizations, inltrated neighborhood assemblies in an at-
111
tempt to inuence participants and gear debate and actions toward a radical extreme. In the Northern
Cone, the Maoist group attempted to inltrate the new shantytowns with militants who posed as couples
or families when the lots were distributed. Te increased PCP-SL presence in neighborhood groups
combined with its violent actions and assassinations of local leaders opposed to the partycame when
the climate was favorable because of the hyperination that had marked the end of Garcas presidency
and the structural adjustment program instituted by the new administration of Alberto Fujimori.
Eorts to inuence neighborhood groups were more successful in Villa El Salvador than in Huaycn, the
two self-managed communities with the greatest levels of grassroots organizing. In Villa El Salvador, the
PCP-SL increased its activities throughout 1989 and 1990 with acts of sabotage and propaganda, includ-
ing burning buses and bombing the police station, the local oce of the ruling party and the power and
water utilities. Militants waged intensive propaganda campaigns in markets and schools and intercepted
trucks carrying food, distributing their cargo to residents. On February 14, the day of a PCP-SL armed
strike, Mara Elena Moyano, President of the Womens Federation, called a peace march. Te march at-
tracted few people, but the PCP-SL responded by detonating a 500-gram dynamite charge at the home of
former Villa El Salvador Mayor Michel Azcueta. Te next day, a PCP-SL assassination squad shot Mara
Elena Moyano and dynamited her corpse.
Why was Moyano eliminated? It is very good that this reactionary was unmasked. She was
eliminated not because she was a grassroots leader, but because she was a declared an open
agent of imperialism (PCP-SL 1992).
In Huaycn, a shantytown in the Eastern Cone that was created as a self-managed community under the
municipal government headed by the United Left, the PCP-SL found it very dicult to take root among the
population despite the constant pressure of its propaganda actions aimed at creating fear and projecting an im-
age of strength. Its actions included unannounced marches, passing out iers and taking over municipal loud-
speakers to broadcast its message. In the early 1990s, the PCP-SL increased its presence in the hills above Huay-
cn and its columns could often be seen moving through the area. It intensied its propaganda campaigns and
tried to gain legitimacy with the population by assuming security tasks that the State was not carrying out.
Te subversive organization had more success in Raucana, another small shantytown in the Eastern Cone. To
maintain order, the PCP-SL imposed strict rules and punishments that some people viewed as positive. Tis
public control by the committee for the peoples struggle (similar to the peoples committees in rural areas)
lasted until September 1991, when a military base was installed. Te base remained in place until 2000.
Nearly all of Limas poor districts experienced PCP-SL violence and were the victims of attempts to take over
local organizations. Te subversives killed 27 community leaders in 1992 alone. In commercial districts and
upper- and middle-class neighborhoods the only relationship between residents and the PCP-SL was violence,
whose only objective was terror. Te only tactics used were assassination squads, car bombs and armed strikes.
Tere was a decline in the levels of violence between August and September 1989, apparently as the sub-
versives prepared a campaign against the municipal elections held in November of that year. Subversive
actions began to increase again in October, but there was another downturn in December, which would
last until March 1990. Te number of actions began to increase once more as the May 1990 runo elec-
tions approached. Tat upswing would last until August 1990. Te principal targets of that campaign
were shopping centers and public transportation vehicles. Te highest levels of violence were recorded
in Lima in 1992. Te car bomb that exploded on Tarata Street in Miraores on July 16, 1992, with the
resulting death and destruction, was the most visible and dramatic action.
Guzmans arrest
Te event that would lead to the end of the armed conict transpired in Lima amid this climate of spi-
raling violence. On September 12, 1992, after years of painstaking work by the Anti-Terrorism Bureau
(Direccin Contra el Terrorismo, DINCOTE), Abimael Guzmn Reinoso was arrested in Lima.
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Chapter 2
Te arrest of the PCP-SLs top leadership followed a series of blows against the subversive organization
by security forces. Te arrests, along with the repentance law and the call for a peace accord, led to a
considerable decline in subversive activity.
Between 1990 and 1992, DINCOTEs Special Intelligence Group (Grupo Especial de Inteligencia, GEIN)
made a series of arrests that were crucial in dismantling the PCP-SLs central operations and its Metro-
politan Lima commands. While the subversive group attempted to demonstrate through armed actions
that it had not been weakened, the continual blows against it by the police took their toll.
On June 1, 1990, the GEIN got its rst major break with a raid on a house in Limas Northern Monterrico
neighborhood, where ocers seized books, archives, a model of the El Frontn prison and other documents
belonging to the PCP-SLs central committee. Te raid on the house, which apparently served as a mu-
seum, allowed the police to detain 31 members of the PCP-SL, including Sybila Arredondo. It was later
learned that the PCP-SL had held the First Congress in the house in 1988 and 1989. Among the documents
seized was a list of ve pseudonyms, contact points and telephone numbers of key leaders of the main PCP-
SL organizations. Te police were able to identify Luis Arana Franco, Manuel, who ran the Csar Vallejo
Preparatory Academy. Earnings from the academy were used to support the party leadership. Te raid also
helped identify Yovanka Pardav, Olga, and Jenny Rodrguez, Rita. All PCP-SL militants moved after the
raid except one, who used the name Ricardo. By tailing him, the police were led to Arana Franco.
Trough Arana Franco the police identied Anglica Salas, Luca, as well as Nelly Evans. Trough An-
glica Salas, ocers located a PCP-SL house on Buenavista Street, in the Chacarrilla del Estanque neigh-
borhood of the San Borja district, as well as another safe house in the Balconcillo neighborhood of La
Victoria. On September 19, the police struck at the subversive organizations propaganda apparatus and
arrested Deodato Jurez Cruzatt. He had been arrested in March 1995 with Tito Valle Travesao, Sybila
Arredondo and other PCP-SL militants, but had been released for lack of evidence.
On January 31, 1991, anti-terrorism ocers raided several safe houses used by the PCP-SL, including
the one on Buenavista Street. At the house, they arrested Nelly Evans and seized a videotape of Guzmn
dancing. Te tape would later be shown publicly by President Fujimori on national television. Te raids
enabled ocers to determine the identities of members of the PCP-SL Central Committee.
On May 8, 1991, the Anti-Terrorism Bureau dismantled the Peoples Intellectual Group, and in a raid on
June 1, 1991, on Casma Street, in the Rimac district, ocers arrested the people who formed the Metro-
politan Committee, including Mariela and Juan Carlos Rivas Laurente, Rosa Carmen Paredes Laurente,
Pastor Cocha Nevado, Rosaura Laurente Ochoa and Juan Manuel Yez Vega.
Te police dealt the party another blow on June 22, 1991, arresting Tito Valle Travesao when he arrived
from Ayacucho. Along with Valle Travesao, whom police ocers had been expecting for six months,
they arrested Yovanka Pardav. On June 23, Vctor Zavala Catao was arrested in the Santa Luzmila
neighborhood in the district of Comas. Tese arrests virtually dismantled the leadership of the Peoples
Support Committee. On November 27, 1991, ocers arrested four people, breaking up the Support
Committees Defense Department. Months later, on February 26, 1992, the police struck at its Health
Department, arresting 19 subversives in an operation known as Hippocrates I. Te Health Department
was headed by Francisco Morales Z., a medical student at San Marcos University.
On April 14, 1992, police launched an oensive to dismantle the network in charge of publishing El Diario,
a PCP-SL newspaper. Ocers raided several buildings in the Lima districts of San Juan de Miraores and
Surquillo, arresting 23 militants, including Jorge Luis Durand Araujo and Danilo Blanco. On June 21,
1992, ocers dismantled the partys logistics and economic units in a raid on the Csar Vallejo academy.
Tey arrested 11 teachers and 7 administrative sta members, including Arana Franco. During a riot at the
Canto Grande prison in May 1992, which was put down by security forces, a number of inmates were killed,
including Yovanka Pardav, Tito Valle Travesao, Janet Talavera and Deodato Jurez Cruzatt.
113
Te nal chapter in this sequence was the arrest of Abimael Guzmn, Elena Iparraguirre and Laura
Zambrano in September 1992.
The PCP-SL after the arrest of Abimael Guzmn
Guzmns arrest was catastrophic for the PCP-SL. Te myth of the PCP-SLs invincibility was destroyed,
and the image of success that Guzmn had cultivated was undermined even further by the circumstances
surrounding the arrest. It is important to recall that DINCOTE ocers had raided two safe houses where
Guzmn had lived for some time, seizing important information about him and his life. No one imagined at
the time that the feared President Gonzalo did not have a strong armed command protecting him. In the
operation that ended with Guzmns arrest, DINCOTE ocers were surprised when they met no resistance.
40
Te fall of the man whom the PCP-SL militants called President Gonzalo worsened the partys internal
political conicts and unleashed public conicts with the best-known representatives of the PCP-SL in
Europe. Tose conicts continue today.
Guzmn was presented to the world press on September 24, 1992, dressed in a striped prison suit and held in
a cage. From the cage, he called on PCP-SL militants to go forward with the planned revolutionary actions:
[W]e will continue carrying out the IV Plan of Strategic Development of the Peoples War to Take
Power, we will continue developing the VI Military Plan to Construct the Conquest of Power.
We must form the Peoples Liberation Front, we must form and develop a Peoples Liberation
Army from the Peoples Guerrilla Army. Tis is what we must do and this is what we will do!
Slightly more than four years had passed between the decision to adopt Gonzalo Tought as the ortho-
dox doctrine of the PCP-SL and Guzmns arrest. Tis contributed to the crisis that the arrest triggered
within the party, given that, in the PCP-SL, it was necessary to use the orthodox doctrine to distinguish
between the correct line of the proletariat and the incorrect line of the bourgeoisie as well as to sepa-
rate the cha from the wheat. Since the First Congress in 1988-89, this orthodox doctrine had ocially
been Gonzalo Tought. Guzmns arrest, therefore, deprived the PCP-SL of its ideological guiding
forcewhich was considered infallibleand forced the militants to use a thought whose creator was
jailed and isolated. Te nal blow, however, came two years after his arrest, when Guzmn asked Presi-
dent Fujimori to negotiate a peace accord.
Te new PCP-SL leadership did not change the organizations way of acting, but its terrorist actions were
no longer eective. Te party needed to adopt more violent and authoritarian practices to remain viable,
which only deepened its isolation and forced militants to seek refuge in areas far removed from the centers
of power. In addition, the continued terrorist acts helped unify the population; no longer paralyzed by fear,
people mobilized against terrorism. In the years that followed, the organization was also hit by the desertion
of militants, which was stimulated by the repentance law that encouraged members to abandon the party.
Te strategic change proposed by Guzmn, who announced that the war must end because of the new
conditions, and that the struggle was now for a peace accord, surprised the partys leadership. Two months
before his change was made public, the PCP-SLs Central Committee issued a public communiqu reaf-
rming its full, voluntary and unconditional subjugation to the just, correct and magisterial leadership
and rm embrace of the glorious, historic and transcendental discourse of 24-IX-92 (PCP-SL 1993b).
Te Central Committee rearmed its commitment to the Tird Plenary of the CC, personally led by
President Gonzalo, whose victorious application demonstrates its glorious, historic and transcendental
character, second only in importance to the Congress (PCP-SL 1993b).
Te decision by the PCP-SL leadership to continue applying the plans of the peoples war was sim-
40 According to statements by Guzmn at the Callao Naval Base, he did have a security detail. The problem was that it needed to be
mobilized, which was impossible because of the surprise nature of the raid.
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Chapter 2
ply aimed at following the instructions that President Gonzalo had issued from his cage. Based on
Guzmns discourse, the leaders still at large decided to:
Develop the second campaign to Construct the Conquest of Power under the banner of
Defense of the Leadership, Down with the Genocidal Dictator! Tis follows the First
Campaign, for which we must salute the Peruvian people, the combatants of the Peoples
Liberation Army and all the armed militants who have applied Gonzalo Tought against
wind and tide (PCP-SL 1993b).
Te PCP-SL leaders who were still free had no way of knowing that this position, which had been an-
nounced to the world, was no longer part of the plan being followed by President Gonzalo. Even when
the caged Guzmn launched his discourse about continuing the peoples war, he had already completely
changed his position and had adopted a new line in which he denied everything he had held to earlier.
Tis can be seen in the following testimony from Elena Iparraguirre:
Te public presentation in DINCOTE was aimed at maintaining action to keep up morale
and protect against dispersion. On San Lorenzo Island and in the custody of the Navy and
separated [from Elena Iparraguirre], on October 20, 1992, President Gonzalo began calling
on authorities to discuss a solution (PCP-SL 2003).
According to the document cited above, only one month after his arrest, Guzmn was asking the govern-
ment to negotiate the end of the war and to hold conversations to sign a peace accord. Te organizations
militants, unaware of their leaders actions, considered his call to continue the war a great political, military
and moral victory for the Party and the Revolution, dealing a massive blow to Yankee imperialism and the
genocidal-traitor Fujimori dictatorship (PCP-SL 1993b). During the following years, while Guzmn nego-
tiated with Vladimiro Montesinos, the governments academic interlocutor, to reach an accord, the still-
active PCP-SL leaders talked about the glorious victories of the peoples war and the unstoppable progress
of the Peruvian Revolution while the organization created by Abimael Guzmn was in its nal phase.
Days of uncertainty
Te unimaginable change in Abimael Guzmn put to the test the faith of his followers, who could not
believe that he was contradicting everything he had once preached. In the document, Let us begin to
tear down walls and unleash the dawn, dated March 28, 1980, Guzmn wrote: Tose who are called to
stand up, rise up in arms, embedding this in their will, respond: We are ready, guide us, organize and we
will act! Either we comply with what we have promised to do or we will be laughingstocks, liars and traitors
(emphasis added). In the Interview of the Century, published in July 1988, Guzmn rejected any pos-
sibility of negotiating under the current conditions in Peru:
[I]n diplomatic meetings the only things signed at the table are those gained in battle,
because no one hands over what has not already been lost (emphasis added), which is obvi-
ously understood. One could ask, has this moment arrived in Peru? No, this moment has
not arrived, so what reasons are there for dialogue? Dialogue is only aimed at stopping,
undermining the peoples war, nothing more. I insist [...] this is our condition: complete,
total and absolute surrender [of the State], but are they willing to do this? What they want
is our destruction, and dialogue is nothing more than cheap demagoguery (Guzmn 1988).
Te PCP-SL propaganda units attempted to minimize the blow, proclaiming that Gonzalo Tought is
free! Te idea was to put into practice what Guzmn had said from his cage. Te leadership at large held
to that position until Guzmn was shown on national television in October 1993 calling on the govern-
ment to start a peace conversation to end the war. Tat had an enormous impact on PCP-SL militants
who were still free, sowing confusion among the ranks.
Huge mistakes made by the terrorist organization allowed for the dismantling of the national leadership
115
and the collapse of the PCP-SL. First, as has been noted, was the proclamation of strategic equilib-
riumwhich implied a level playing eld with the statewhen the reality was much more adverse. Te
second element was the organizations growth, which brought with it the increased possibility of inltra-
tion, which is what eectively happened. Tird was the decision to send party and support militants into
the battleeld, which led to the arrest of some leaders and the seizure of valuable information by security
forces starting in mid-1990. Te videotape of the closing session of the First PCP-SL Congress not only
allowed the police to identify members of the Central Committee who had been unknown until then, but
also provided current images of historic leaders, like Abimael Guzmn. Finally, the scene from that video
that showed the PCP-SL leader dancing was extremely useful for the psycho-social campaigns developed
by the government as part of the anti-subversive strategy.
Nevertheless, Abimael Guzmns arrest was not only the product of errors committed by the PCP-SL.
Tose mistakes coincided with a signicant change in the anti-subversive strategy developed by DIN-
COTE, particularly by the intelligence work of the GEIN, which opted for the painstaking process of
identifying PCP-SL leaders to reach into the heart of the organization instead of being satised with peri-
odically presenting arrested mid-level leaders before television cameras. GEIN Commanders Marco Mi-
yashiro and Benedicto Jimnez played a key role. Police General Antonio Ketn Vidal allowed the team to
work, encouraging it and providing necessary resources. Te events of September 12, 1992, were the cul-
mination of that change in the anti-subversive strategy. (Abimael Guzmn, however, maintains that his
arrest was not the result of good police work, but of a tip from the director of the Csar Vallejo Academy,
Luis Arana Franco, Manuel, who provided the funds, as we have noted, to maintain the party leaders.)
Gonzalo Thought without President Gonzalo
Te fall of Abimael Guzmn deprived the PCP-SL of the principal element of its political-ideological
arguments. It is through a persistent, rm and astute struggle between two lines, defending the line of
the proletariat and defeating all contradictory lines, that Gonzalo Tought was forged, according to a
party text cited above. Tey were convinced that they were creating an invincible philosophy that would
guarantee absolute unity in the PCP-SL leadership and avoid schisms. Te only options for dissidents
were extreme self-criticism or disappearance. scar Ramrez Durand, Feliciano, oers a harsh opinion
about this structure: Guzmn [] imposed a totalitarian dictatorship on the Shining Path, and so-called
Gonzalo Tought does not allow criticism. Tose who did criticize suered drastic sanctions and even
death if they tried to leave the movement. He was the only one allowed to theorize (oer the line) and
the rest of us had to apply it (Ramrez Durand 2003).
Guzmn overestimated his ability to convince his followers. Te change he demanded of PCP-SL mili-
tants when he proposed the peace accord was too sweeping to receive unanimous support. It is possible
that this lack of objective judgment was a result of the personality cult that he had successfully cultivated
in the organization, a cult that made even him believe that his words had a kind of demiurgical power.
While a considerable number of the partys political leaders were arrested at about the same time as
Guzmn, the organizations military apparatus remained relatively intact. DINCOTE had already dis-
mantled the organization that published El Diario, the Association of Democratic Lawyers and the Peo-
ples Support Committeeall considered generating organizations of the party. Te collapse of the
Peoples Support Committee was a decisive blow to Guzmn, who had made that organization more
important than the Lima Metropolitan Committee in political management of the capital.
In May 1992, Yovanka Pardav, Tito Valle Travesao and Deodato Jurez Cruzatt were killed in the
uprising in the Canto Grande prison. Guzmn later told General Ketn Vidal that his best children,
referring to Valle Travesao and Jurez Cruzatt, were killed there. Guzmn was arrested with Elena Ipar-
raguirre, Miriam, who was a member of the Permanent Committee, as were Guzmn and Ramrez Du-
rand, Feliciano. Laura Zambrano was arrested with them. Ramrez Durand stated that his incorporation
into the Permanent Committee to replace Augusta La Torre, Guzmns deceased wife, was purely formal,
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Chapter 2
as he could not participate in meetings or decisions because he was active in the countryside. Te Perma-
nent Committee, therefore, was run only by Abimael Guzmn and his new romantic partner, Miriam.
A few weeks after Guzmns fall, police arrested Martha Huatay, who was in charge of reorganizing the
PCP-SL leadership. Te leaders of the Southern Zone Committee (Arequipa) and the Northern Zone
Committee were also caught.
In the following months, the PCP-SL attempted to show that the blow had not been very important by
launching a bloody oensive in the interior of the country. Te organization, however, was unable to carry
out the oensive that it had threatened to coincide with the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Colum-
bus arrival in the Americas. Te arrest of Abimael Guzmn, and a signicant number of PCP-SL leaders,
was accompanied by the seizure of abundant party materials and several computers containing data on the
organization. Te PCP-SL had to undertake an urgent reorganization process to avoid even greater blows.
scar Ramrez Durand reorganized the leadership with cadres who were still at large, but the police con-
tinued to strike at the organization and its actions diminished noticeably, leaving it with only two areas of
operation, the Upper Huallaga and Ene River valleys. Feliciano was arrested in 1999 and Artemio, the head
of the Huallaga Front, accepted Guzmns call for a peace accord. Strategic equilibrium had been only an
illusion. Guzmns political line, according to Feliciano, had led the PCP-SL down a dead-end path. Tat
is something that neither he nor his acolytes want to recognize. It was his own sectarian and ultra-leftwing
policies that led to the arrest of the leadership and the failure of the project (Ramrez Durand, 2003).
Guzmn, Montesinos and the peace accord
Te letters Abimael Guzmn wrote to President Fujimori oering to negotiate a peace agreement were
used by the government, which took advantage of them to ensure victory in a referendum on the new
Constitution that was drafted after the coup in April 1992. Te rst letter, which Fujimori made public
during a presentation before the United Nations in New York on October 1, 1993, had a major impact
and guaranteed victory in the referendum. In the letter, Abimael Guzmn openly praises the Fujimori
administration. Tat praise, however, raised suspicions even with the daily Expreso, the strongest defender
of the Fujimori government, which questioned the way in which the negotiations were being handled:
Guzmn agreed to put something in his letter that was not essential to its stated purpose.
One does not have to be wise to see that in addition to the principal objective, there is an-
other: consolidate the campaign for the yes vote [in the referendum]. From his Marxist
standpoint, Guzmn legitimizes the April 5 coup, which is absolutely ridiculous. Obviously,
Fujimori did not need Guzmns approval. Guzmns approval of the National Intelligence
Service is also unnecessary. Modesty dictates that we highlight that the peasant self-defense
committees and the resistance of the population, which decided the outcome of the war,
were already under way before Fujimori took power (Expreso 1993).
To be recognized as a negotiator, Abimael Guzmn had to acknowledge not only President Fujimori,
but also Vladimiro Montesinos. In a text dated February 7, 1993, and written at the Callao Naval Base,
Guzmn called Montesinos a person with versatile convergent concerns, a sharp and inquisitive mind
hungry for results, who makes ne instrumental use of his multi-faceted professional training as a soldier,
lawyer and sociologist. Tis and his special talent for issues related to power have allowed him to under-
stand the peoples war, an indelible mark in Peruvian history (PCP-SL 2003). Te most important letter
recognizing Montesinos, however, was signed by Guzmn, Elena Iparraguirre, Laura Zambrano, Osmn
Morote, Eduardo Cox, Martha Huatay, Vctor Zavala and others on November 3, 1993. Te letter reads:
For this reason, we express our recognition of Dr. Montesinos for his broad knowledge and astute un-
derstanding and his tenacious eort and dedication, from our point of view, to the cause of peace whose
progress requires decisive action from President Gonzalo as Head and Comrade Miriam as Leader of the
Communist Party of Perus Central Committee. With them and the other signatories as militants, we
state that the Party will always remember the fundamental role you [Montesinos] played and continue to
117
play in carrying out the historic, complex and dicult task of obtaining a Peace Accord and applying it
for the benet of the Peruvian people, nation and society (PCP-SL 2003).
41
Tis letter was one of the results of an operation negotiated between Guzmn and the National Intelli-
gence Service in which PCP-SL leaders were transferred from the Yanamayo prison in Puno to the Army
Intelligence Service installations in Lima between September 15, 1993, and January 8, 1994, so that
Guzmn could convince them to follow the new line he had proposed. Te strategy was successful, and
on October 28, 1993, the government released a letter signed by Osmn Morote, Martha Huatay, Rosa
Anglica Salas and Mara Pantoja. In the letter, these PCP-SL leaders supported the initiative started by
President Gonzalo and his partner, Elena Iparraguirre:
As militants of the Communist Party of Peru, subject to its leadership and the Central
Committee, and with full awareness and understanding of the undeniable historic need, we
support the letters written by President Gonzalo and Comrade Miriam that were sent to the
President of the Republic, Engineer Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, asking him to reach a Peace
Accord whose application would end the war that the country has lived through for more
than thirteen years. We accept this petition as our own and reiterate it.
42
According to Guzmn, only a week after his arrest he realized that the peoples war would not be successful,
which was why it was necessary to negotiate a peace accord to preserve the party by allowing for an orderly re-
treat. Iparraguirre came to the same conclusion on her own. Tey realized that they shared the same idea when
they were allowed to speak briey. On October 20, 1992, in the prison on El Frontn Island, Guzmn asked
the Navy ocers guarding him to tell the government that he wanted to begin peace negotiations.
What led Guzmn to ask for peace talks? A call to the Comrades of the Party, Combatants of the
Peoples Army and the Masses, which was dated September 22, 1992, but never circulated, contains
parts of the letters that he would send to Fujimori. In it, Guzmn takes credit for the successes of the 13
years of war. He later praises the government for its accomplishments, especially after the events of April
5, 1992. He goes on to call on his militants to analyze the current situation and the foreseeable future,
outlining the reasons why a peace agreement should be negotiated:
New, complex and very serious problems have arisen in world politics, in the country and in
the war in which we are involved, questions that pose fundamental problems for the leadership
of the Communist Party of Peru, and it is precisely at the leadership level where the Party has
received the sharpest blow [...] in essence, the peoples war is an issue of political leadership. Te
question of leadership is decisive and in our case it cannot be resolved quickly. As a consequence,
the events show that prospects for the peoples war will not develop but will only be maintained.
Based on this, under current circumstances the Party, and mainly its leadership, faces a new and
major decision, and just as we worked to forge the start of the peoples war yesterday, today we
must ght for a peace accord with the same conviction and resolution. Tis is an undeniable
historic necessity, which demands that we suspend the actions of the peoples war, except in ques-
tions of defense, with the corollary that the State also suspend it actions (PCP-SL 2003).
Guzmn would later refer to his arrest with the other members of the PCP-SL leadership as a strategic
turn in the development of the peoples war. Although Guzmn refers to new and complex problems
in world politics, the situation in the country and the war, these conditions are unimportant when
compared to his own arrest. In an interview with the CVR, Guzmn said that if all the members of the
PCP-SL had been arrested, but he had remained at large, he would have been able to rebuild the leader-
ship and continue with the war. In the opposite scenario, with him behind bars but the rest of the leader-
ship at large, it would have been impossible to continue the war.
41 This letter, dated September 13, 1993, reiterates the recognition of Montesinos ofered by Guzmn and Elena Iparraguirre in the name of
the PCP-SL. According to Guzmn and Iparraguirre, this testimony was taped and flmed by the National Intelligence Service.
42 This text was cited by daily newspapers on October 29, 1993.
118
Chapter 2
Guzmns position was presented to the jailed members of the PCP-SL leadership who were brought
together by the National Intelligence Service at the Callao Naval Base starting on October 8, 1993.
Tey agreed to accept his position. During the following weeks, the party leaders worked as a team to
formulate the new great decision and denition, which basically involved calling for the peace accord
and planning for the Second PCP-SL Congress. Guzmn paid particular attention to drafting the texts
so that they would convince the militants still at-large that the new line not only expressed the interests
of the party and the proletariat, but was in accordance with the dictates of the cosmos:
What should we do? Transform the negative into positive, pull what is good from the bad
and strengthen our optimism and defeat our pain, pessimism and doubts [...] It is not about
my life, but about the needs of the Party, the revolution, your life is nothing more than mat-
ter that is beautifully organized. It is only that, matter, and matter in a small quantity if we
compare it to the immense eternity of matter in motion, so place your life at the service of
the Party [...] this is the class position, not the other that is centered on the I, which is the
position of the bourgeoisie (PCP-SL 1993a).
Guzmn was aware that such as radical change from his long-standing position that negotiation meant
capitulation would be met with great resistance within the party, but he believed he would win over at
least a minority (he would have been satised with 10 percent) that would eventually grow into a majority.
We know that they can reject our position and that this would mean serious problems for
the Party. Tey could expel us or apply the highest penalties, but we believe that we have
once again put the Party in motion, that the struggle between two lines will sharpen and in
six months the left will retake the correct path. We believe that our opinion corresponds to
the objective reality, it is not the product of some elaborate abstract discussion, and therefore
it will be accepted (PCP-SL 1993a).
In the meantime, conversations were held that would lead to the two letters Guzmn sent to Alberto Fuji-
mori and Guzmns presentation on television surrounded by Elena Iparraguirre and four other members
of the party leadership. Guzmn proposed an end to military actions and that the peoples guerrilla
army would dissolve and destroy its weapons. Te peoples committees and the peasant masses were to
do the same, and in exchange they would receive a general amnesty and all the prisoners of war would
be released. He oered himself and Elena Iparraguirre as a guarantee of the accord.
Once again, Guzmns vision was unrealistic. While he always insisted that the negotiations reected the
correlation of forces, he proposed a peace accord that did not reect the situation in the country. After
the blows it had received, with its organization in disarrayleaderless and demoralized and faced with
a new oensive by the Statethe PCP-SL was in no position to demand negotiations on equal footing.
Moreover, because of his break with Feliciano, Guzmn had no way to guarantee that Feliciano would
end hostilities. Oering himself and Miriam as a guarantee for the accords, given that they were already
in prison, was oering the State something it had already achieved. If Montesinos continued negotiating
under those conditions, it was purely to achieve results that could be presented to the general public so as
to ensure a victory in the referendum on the new Constitution, written after the coup on April 5, 1992,
to legitimize the Fujimori dictatorship. Tis was achieved with the letters written by Guzmn, which the
government used to its full advantage:
Fujimori read the rst letter at the U.N. on October 1, 1993, responding with a complete
and direct No [to the peace accord]. Te second [letter] was released in Peru with ma-
nipulative positive comments. Instead of helping the comrades analyze it, this led them to
believe that is was a trick and they opposed it. Tey also refused to let us publicly defend our
position, which is something on which we had agreed (PCP-SL 1993a).
Montesinos suspended the conversations after Fujimori won the referendum, and from there we entered
119
a period of waiting or standstill.
43
In December, Guzmn requested that the talks be restarted on the
grounds that this would convincingly demonstrate [...] that in no way were the talks, as the opposition has
attempted to state, purely for electoral reasons or transitory. He also proposed calling on militants to sus-
pend military actions and, more importantly, to designate comrades in dierent trenches [prisons] around
the country, beginning with Lima, to push for the peace accord by mobilizing inmates and their families
to obtain public statements that the party and the masses have taken up the struggle for a Peace Accord.
Montesinoss only concession was to allow imprisoned PCP-SL leaders to move around the prisons so that
they could convince militants to fall in line behind Guzmns proposal. His goal was to force a schism
within the PCP-SL, which he achieved.
Te nal result of the conversation only surprised Guzmn and the militants who had adopted his posi-
tion. Finally, after a series of calls from Fujimori to give up and repent, campaigns by the armed forces
that included iers dropped in the emergency zones reading Gonzalo gave up, turn yourself in, and
constant attacks in the media, in December 1993 Fujimori declared a war on terrorism as an answer.
Fujimoris response came the same month that Guzmn attempted to jumpstart the conversations. Tat
eectively ended the negotiations: Tis led to a freezing of talks throughout 1994.
Montesinos briey restarted the conversations in mid-1995 to force Margie Clavo Peralta, one of the most
important leaders of the Proseguir faction of PCP-SL leaders still at-large, and two other leaders who
had recently been arrested to support Guzmns position. Guzmn and Iparraguirre got Clavo to join
them and hoped to use this to reinitiate the peace talks and strengthen their position within the PCP-SL.
Tey proposed that to achieve the pending objective, Clavo and the two other detainees be forced to
publicly oer self-criticism for continuing and to assume the call for the end of the peoples war [...]
through a peace accord.
44
Guzmn and Iparraguirre also proposed that they and the other leaders in
prison issue a public message, sign an ocial declaration ending the war and hold a new meeting of the
leaders in favor of the peace accord. Along those lines, Guzmn sent a message to militants by way of
his father-in-law, who lived in Sweden, proclaiming Clavos change of position as a success of the Party,
of the proletariat line led by President Gonzalo and the Central Committee, and calling for the Party
to ocially and publicly ask the government to begin direct talks.
45
Montesinos agreed only to the rst
point. Te issue was put to rest after Clavo and the other two detainees were shown in televised interviews
renouncing their position of continuing the peoples war.
It is clear that the idea of a Struggle for the Peace Accord was stillborn. Nevertheless, far from admit-
ting that he had been deceived, Guzmn embarked on the organization of his line to position ourselves
for the struggle between lines [between 1993 and 1999] so that the new strategy is accepted by the entire
party. Tis led to a schism in the PCP-SL between those in favor of the peace accord and those who
decided to continue the war, a position known as Proseguir (carry on). scar Ramrez Durand, the
most important leader of this dissident faction, is frank in his opinion:
About the peace accord, you know that this never existed. Montesinos fooled Guzmn as if he
were a newborn baby. He [Guzmn] sold out to the dictatorship so that he could live in prison
with his girlfriend [] Te dictatorship never wanted to dialogue with those who were still in the
armed struggle, because this served as a pretext for them to continue stealing from State coers
and maintaining the anti-terrorism legislation to repress the people (Ramrez Durand 2003).
As achievements of the negotiations during those months, Guzmn and Iparraguirre point to some
changes in prison conditions for PCP-SL inmates and a certain amount of room for the militants in
other jails to meet. Guzmn and Iparraguirre were allowed to meet for several hours a day to work
43 This and the following quotes are from the 1993 PCP-SL text: Guideline for conversations for a Peace Accord included in PCP-SL 2003.
44 Letter from Abimael Guzmn and Elena Iparraguirre to Doctor Vladimiro Montesinos. Callao Naval Base Prison, September 5, 1995 (PCP-SL 2003).
45 Concerning the self-criticism of Comrade Nancy and other comrades who maintained the Proseguir line. Callao Naval Base Prison,
November 25, 1995. (PCP-SL 2003).
120
Chapter 2
together on a history of the organization and were given access to documents in the partys archives
that had been seized by DINCOTE as well as Marxist texts from Guzmns library. Te interlocutor
[Montesinos] brought them newspapers and magazines when he visited and also allowed them to watch
television news programs. Tose conditions, suspended in 1994, were reinstated in 1995, and in 1997
they were given a radio and allowed to receive various publications, including Le Monde and Newsweek.
Montesinos may have opted to maintain these privileges as a way of keeping Guzmn from altering the
status quo that had been achieved (PCP-SL 2003).
For Guzmn, the principal achievement from the conversations with Montesinos was having spread a
great new strategy for the future IV stage of the Party [...] and the documents supporting this were al-
lowed out. From this new great strategy followed a new political line, a new general and tactical policy
and specic policies (PCP-SL 2003). He trusted that the militants who were still at large would accept
his peace plan, but did state:
[T]hey never made any of the responses public, except for a few supercial and subjective
comments that it was a trick and [...] they prohibited the documents that left the prisons
from being read, and they did not discuss the letters that were published [...] Later, in an
illegitimate event, they agreed that all those in favor of the accord were capitulators who
were on the margins and that it could not be Comrade Gonzalo or Miriam, because they
were driven crazy and brainwashed on the Naval Base (PCP-SL 2003).
According to Guzmn, these were simply pretexts by the leaders still at-large for rejecting the proposal
made by the imprisoned party leaders:
If they believed that it was trick, why didnt they politically unmask this creature that was
supposedly created by the SIN? Later, if it were capitulation, why didnt they expel the ca-
pitulators and the snitches they mentioned? And if anything had been done to aect the
health of the leaders, why didnt they denounce that and demand that health authorities and
national and international defenders verify it, or at least check with the International Red
Cross? (PCP-SL 2003).
In Guzmns interpretation of events, the conduct of the Proseguir leaders demonstrated that they
were part of an opportunistic right-wing line that wanted to change the leadership, line, Party and nature
of the war, usurping the name of President Gonzalo and the PCP [to] create the schismatic block that led
to the division in 1993 and developed a covert plan to disregard the leadership, waiting for the moment
and conditions to apply it (PCP-SL 2003). Following the Stalinist tradition, Guzmn said the dissidents
were right-wing elements that had always been present and had taken advantage of this opportunity to
spring into action (PCP-SL 2003).
After Montesinos convinced Guzmn to write the two letters to Fujimori, and had the other leaders agree
to his great decision of denition, the other leaders were returned to their prisons to begin implement-
ing the new party line. Guzmn and his partner remained on the Callao Naval Base, preparing their
documents. scar Ramrez Durand, Feliciano, was arrested in July 1999, basically bringing to an end the
PCP-SLs armed action. With that arrest, Guzmn believed that the peace accord was now inevitable
and formulated a new line, in place since 2000, calling for a political solution to the problems derived
from the war. Te new position recognized that there was no correlation of forces that would force the
government to sign an accord. Guzmn proposed a series of alternatives that could lead to an end to the
war and even stated that they might not depend on him.
From the peace accord to the political solution of the problems stemming from the war
Te position adopted by Abimael Guzmn in 1993, as well as his partys political line, can be explained
by the changes that the leaders who had met on the naval base introduced into the fundamental positions
of the PCP-SL. Of particular importance is the revision of the history of world revolution.
121
In the document on this issue, Guzmn implicitly recognized that the start of the armed struggle in 1980
was a mistake. Tis detail merits special attention. In 1979, when the PCP-SL was debating the start of
the peoples war, Abimael Guzmn stated: Marxism elevated to the great peak of Mao Zedongs thinking
has given us a new situation. We are entering the strategic oensive of world revolution, the next fty to one
hundred years will see imperialism and the exploiters swept way [emphasis added] (PCP-SL 1979d). Te
start of the armed struggle was part of a revolutionary oensive on an international scale. Tis position
was maintained until Guzmn was arrested. Even 10 years into the war, in 1989, he stated:
[O]n the economic front [revisionism, imperialism and world reaction] maintain that capi-
talism has found the solution to its problems, that it is not marching toward destruction;
they want the people of the world, the proletariat, to believe that capitalism is eternal. Politi-
cally, they want the people to remain dull, to think that they are stupid, and that the system
of bourgeois dictatorship is not heading toward ruin, that the bourgeoisie is not decaying
but ourishing, so as to perpetuate the bourgeois dictatorship (PCP-SL 1989c).
Guzmn changed his ideas after his arrest. Te document that he signed at the Callao Naval Base with
his followers shows that a mistake was made in his characterization of the world situation from a secular
perspective. In a change from earlier documents, this one claimed that the revolutionary wave of which
the PCP-SLs peoples war was part had actually ended with the defeat of the Cultural Revolution in
China in 1976, four years before Guzmn launched his war. Te PCP-SL began the peoples war in 1980
during a period of reection and not as part of the strategic oensive of world revolution that President
Gonzalo had preached (PCP-SL 1993a).
46
TPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
Although on a much smaller scale than the PCP-SL, the Tpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Mov-
imiento Revolucionario Tpac Amaru, MRTA) was also unquestionably responsible for the violence suf-
fered by Peru in the nal decades of the 20th century.
Te MRTA began its revolutionary war in 1984, four years after Peru had returned to democracy and
when the principal left-wing parties, despite their revolutionary rhetoric, were supporting the democratic
process, participating in elections and even holding elected oces.
To launch its subversive plan, the MRTA organized what it called the Tpac Amaru Peoples Army
(Ejrcito Popular Tupacamarista), which, unlike the PCP-SLs armed groups, included armed, uni-
formed columns concentrated in camps away from populated areas. Te MRTA claimed to respect
the Geneva Conventions in its armed actions and its treatment of prisoners. Te CVR, however,
found that the organization committed serious crimes and human rights abuses, particularly assas-
sinations and kidnappings. Te MRTA was responsible for 1.8 percent of deaths during the internal
armed conict.
See Revolutionary Movement Tpac Amaru (MRTA) graphic, at 325.
Background
Te MRTAs origins can be traced to a schism within the PAP in the 1950s, when a group of young
members led by Luis de la Puente broke with the party. Unhappy with the way the party was moving
away from its radical roots and with the pact it had made with the conservative government of President
Manuel Prado (1956-62), the dissidents formed the Rebel APRA (APRA Rebelde).
46 The document cited (PCP-SL 1993a) states that this period of refection would last three decades, and that the world revolutionary
movement would become active again around 2010. It was therefore necessary to pull back and wait. The peace accord proposal is framed
within this thesis.
122
Chapter 2
Te triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 encouraged a wave of radical politics throughout the con-
tinent and inuenced the Rebel APRA, which changed its name in 1962 to the Revolutionary Left Move-
ment (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR) and became part of a continental movement that be-
lieved in socialist revolution through armed struggle. In June 1965, the MIR launched a brief revolutionary
adventure that ended with the death of Luis de la Puente and the principal leaders over the next few months.
In the following years, the survivors spread out to a series of small organizations that kept the MIR
name. Tese groups evolved over the next decade and took dierent leanings, but they maintained the
common objective of reinitiating the armed struggle. Two of these groups, the MIR-Rebel Voice (MIR-
Voz Rebelde, MIR-VR) and the MIR-Fourth Stage (MIR-IV Etapa, MIR-IV), had a presence in various
organizations and grassroots movements by the end of the 1970s. It was a much smaller fringe group,
however, the MIR-Te Militant (MIR-El Militante, MIR-EM), that would join another organization a
few years later to form the MRTA.
Te other group grew out of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario,
PSR), which was founded in 1976 by radical Christian Democratic youth and military ocers who
supported the nationalism and reforms of General Juan Velasco Alvarados government (1968-1975).
Te PSR organized on two levels: a public front that successfully took part in electoral politics start-
ing in 1978, and a clandestine front, known as the Orga, which undertook conspiratorial actions
and ran the party apparatus. Members of the Orga quit the party in 1978, accusing those in the
public front of undermining the insurrectionist wing. Tey founded the Marxist-Leninist PSR (PSR
Marxista-Leninista, PSR-ML).
Te 1979 victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua breathed new life into Latin
Americas left-wing guerrillas and had a major impact on the Peruvian left, which faced a dicult choice.
Until 1978, nearly all left-wing parties believed that armed struggle was a legitimate way to take power
and most considered electoral politics synonymous with reformism and an abdication of the revolution-
ary cause. Te call for elections to a Constituent Assembly in 1978, and general elections in 1980, forced
many of the parties on the left to enter into a kind of transaction in which they decided to run candidates
while maintaining that this was just part of a larger revolutionary strategy or a tactical mechanism to
accumulate forces for the objective, which is revolution.
47
Between 1978 and 1980, PSR-ML and MIR-EM participated in dierent eorts to unify the left, in-
cluding formation of the United Left. Nevertheless, on May 18, 1980the date of the presidential elec-
tionsboth organizations released a public statement claiming that the prolonged pre-revolutionary
situation had not changed, because the causes were structural [and] implied preparing for a revolutionary
war (MRTA 1990: 15). Te communiqu did not take into account that the majority of voters had opted
for moderate, not radical, political options.
In Junejust weeks after the PCP-SL announced the start of its warthe PSR-ML and MIR-EM agreed
to join forces to prepare the conditions to unleash the revolutionary war (MRTA 1990: 67). One of
these conditions was achieving the broadest unity possible with left-wing parties and organizations.
Over the next two years, they attempted to convince other groupsespecially the two other MIRs (MIR-
VR and MIR-Fourth Stage), which had joined to form MIR-Conuence (MIR Conuencia, MIR-C)to
coordinate eorts to reinitiate the armed struggle.
Nevertheless, MIR-C and the Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguardia Revolucionaria, VR) were not
interested in joining forces with the others, and, in 1984, they established the Unied Mariateguist
Party (Partido Unicado Mariateguista, PUM). For the PSR-ML and MIR-EM, their reticence con-
rmed the lack of a clear revolutionary plan that had strongly inuenced reformism in the left
(MRTA 1990:25).
47 CVR. Interview with Alberto Glvez Olaechea, former MRTA militant. Huacariz Jail, Cajamarca, July 19-20, 2002.
123
Preparation for and start of armed actions (1982-1986)
On March 1, 1982, a dozen PSR-ML and MIR-EM leaders met in a central committee and concluded
that the conditions for reinitiating revolutionary violence existed. Tat judgment was inuenced by the
Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the guerrilla oensives in El Salvador and Guatemala as well as the
surge in the armed conict in Colombia. A national event, however, was the decisive factor, according
to Peter Crdenas, a former MRTA militant. We were in a clandestine meeting in Lima, there was a
blackout and we could not continue. We watched the news and found out what was going on. We could
not sit back with our arms crossed when this was happening in the country.
48
Crdenas was referring to
the PCP-SL attack on the prison in Huamanga on March 2, which took place in the middle of the PSR-
MLMIR-EM meeting. During the meeting, participants agreed that the central task was to develop
the armed struggle (MRTA 1990: 39). In addition, they adopted the name Tpac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement, agreeing to keep the name secret until the new party structure is prepared to support the
MRTA with weapons in hand (MRTA 1990: 40).
Troughout 1983, the MRTA worked on accumulating forces, which included assaults to obtain funds
and weapons, the political-military homogenization of schools and sending militants to dierent parts
of the country. Te next step was starting armed propaganda actions, such as the dynamite attack on
the U.S. Marines barracks in Lima to protest the U.S. invasion of Grenada.
49
Te movement also began
the construction of movements of the masses that would be incorporated into the revolutionary war
process (MRTA 1990: 43-44).
Te rst meeting of the MRTA Central Committee was held in Lima in January 1984. Te participants
agreed to undertake urban guerrilla actions and form a guerrilla army in the countryside. In addition,
they would make the organization known through armed propaganda. To that end, on January 22,
1984, an MRTA group attacked the police station in Villa El Salvador, in southern Lima. Te media gave
wide coverage to the appearance of a new subversive group. As the armed actions increased, the MRTA
began to gain a certain presence in factories and in the shantytowns ringing Lima. In Junn, the MRTA
was active at the National University of the Center of Peru as well as in some poor neighborhoods in
Huancayo and Jauja. At the end of 1983, approximately 20 MRTA militants were transferred to Paucar-
tambo, Cusco, to organize an armed column. Tat column, however, was routed on November 27, 1984,
a reversal for the group that also reected local opposition to the subversive movement.
In February 1985, during its Second Central Committee meeting, the MRTA rearmed that Peru was
living through a pre-revolutionary period. Tat view, however, did not reect what was happening in
the nation. A representative of the United Left had been elected mayor of Lima, and the left-wing coali-
tion controlled other important departmental capitals. Te PUM was one of the strongest parties in the
IU, with a strong presence in various grassroots organizations. Despite its radical rhetoric, the party did
not demonstrate any intention of joining the armed struggle. Finally, the PAP appeared headed for cer-
tain victory in the 1985 general elections. Tus, while broad sections of the population were expressing
themselves through political options within the democratic system, the MRTA was attempting to ripen
the pre-revolutionary period to create a revolutionary situation.
In the April 1985 elections, the MRTA presented a minimal political platform, calling for an end to rela-
tions with the International Monetary Fund, an increase in the minimum wage, amnesty for all political
prisoners and an end to the states of emergency (MRTA 1990: 71). It also called on voters to spoil their
ballots. Te proposals were accompanied by an attack against then-Labor Minister Joaqun Legua, and
the dynamite bombing of a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise in Lima in March 1985. A month after
the elections, in May 1985, the organization published MRTA and the Peruvian Revolution, in which it
48 CVR. Interview with Peter Crdenas Schulte. Callao Naval Base, August 27, 2002.
49 The attack took place on November 16, 1983. Actions of this nature, characteristic of the MRTA, were not always related to the countrys
internal armed confict. For example, on April 21, 1986, in solidarity with Libya in the wake of a U.S. bombing raid, the MRTA exploded a car
bomb at the U.S. ambassadors residence in Lima.
124
Chapter 2
dened its so-called revolutionary war of the people. Te principal objective of its strategy was the
conquest of political power [...] that would be achieved in a more or less prolonged revolutionary war
(MRTA 1990: 75). At the start of the war, the MRTA attempted to accumulate and develop revolution-
ary, ideological, political and military forces and focused its work on the construction of a vanguard
organization capable of uniting the masses of workers and guiding their struggles within the general
perspective of the struggle for power, as well as leading the armed struggle and incorporating the masses
of the working people (MRTA 1990: 75).
In June 1985, after actions in the cities of Chiclayo, Chimbote, Huancayo and Lima to commemorate
the 20th anniversary of the founding of MIRs guerrilla force, the MRTA decided that the armed propa-
ganda phase had been successfully completed and that they were ready to begin the harassment phase
with guerrilla characteristics (MRTA 1990: 79). Two actions marked the start of this phase. On July
12, MRTA militants attacked 7 police stations simultaneously in Lima, and on July 25 the organization
exploded a car bomb at the Education Ministry, causing damage but taking no lives. Tis was the rst
time they had used this kind of terrorist action.
Nevertheless, when Garca was inaugurated on July 28, the MRTAs highest leader, Vctor Polay Campos,
wearing a ski mask, held a widely covered press conference during which he announced the suspension
of MRTA military actions considering that the people had overwhelmingly placed their hopes in the
APRA Party (MRTA 1990: 95). Miguel Rincn, an MRTA leader, recalled that at the time the MRTA
leadership believed it was correct to oer the government a truce, demonstrating its exibility and will-
ingness to dialogue to nd solutions for our country and to avoid a bloodbath; the response was negative,
and the dirty war against us continued and intensied (2002: 14).
Te suspension of military actions was accompanied by a call for dialogue with the government and compli-
ance with several conditions, including release of all political prisoners [...], formation of a Peace Commission
and establishment of [a] minimum level of justice (MRTA 1990: 99). In this way, the MRTA attempted to
win the sympathy of the population that had voted for the PAP and the IU. It also wanted to dierentiate itself
from the PCP-SL and consolidate its political presence as an armed organization that took the initiative in the
political playing eld with an open, mature and politically aware attitude (MRTA 1990: 81).
Te unilateral suspension of armed actions caused concern among MRTA militants. For some regional lead-
ers, the move was a decision made only by the leadership in Lima. One day they come out and say, Were
oering a truce. But how, when did we talk about this? In addition, we had a long anti-APRA tradition and
this left a bad taste in our mouths (Mateo).
50
Te suspension of armed actions, however, allowed the MRTA
to restart its eorts to create a guerrilla column. It also sent a military command to Colombia at the end of
1985, forming the America Battalion together with Ecuadors Alfaro Vive Carajo! and Colombias M-19. Te
commandos took part in armed guerrilla actions in Colombia (MRTA 1990: 89-91).
Te MRTA held its Tird Central Committee meeting in Lima from February 9 to 14, 1986, making
a positive assessment of the events of 1985 and stating that the organization had conquered important
political space in the national arena and even on the international front. Despite its visibility in the local
press, the MRTA did not have signicant inuence in the political world, nor did it lead important social
movements. Te prison massacres occurred a few months later, on June 18 and 19. On August 7, Polay,
again wearing a ski mask, oered a second press conference to announce the end of the truce: Starting
today, the Tpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement considers the government of Alan Garca to be the
enemy of the people (MRTA 1990: 105). Te restart of hostilities was accompanied by a call to form a
front for democracy, justice and peace that would bring together all the democrats, patriots, progres-
sives, grassroots sectors of the APRA, IU and armed organizations to confront and defeat the militariza-
tion of the regime (MRTA 1990: 107). Te front was never formed.
50 CVR. Interview with Mateo, the pseudonym of a former MRTA leader imprisoned in a maximum-security prison. August 2003.
125
Unity with the MIR, spread of military actions and political work (1986-1988)
Te 18 months that followed the end of the ceasere were considered successful by the MRTA for several
reasons, including the unity reached with the MIR-VR and the establishment of the rst guerrilla front in
San Martn and a National Peoples Assembly that brought together unions and grassroots organizations
with some links to the MRTA.
Te initial conversations in 1982 with MIR-C had failed, but the group had a crisis in 1983. While one sector
joined the PUM, another, made up mainly of militants of MIR-VR, insisted on the need for armed struggle.
In 1985, this group organized the Revolutionary Peoples Commands (Comandos Revolucionarios del Pueblo,
CRP) and carried out a few armed propaganda actions. Alberto Glvez Olaechea, head of the MIR-VR, recog-
nizes that the advance of the PCP-SL was one of the elements that contributed to this decision:
We, as militants of MIR, a group with a guerrilla history and rituals honoring our heroes,
were not immune to a cause that raised questions for us and forced us to dene ourselves.
Talk became obsolete, and actions were what spoke. Tose of us who would later converge to
form the MRTA were pushed to do it, to some extent, by the [PCP-] SL (Glvez 2003: 23).
Te conversations between the MRTA and MIR-VR took a positive turn in 1986. On December 9, after
the First Unied Central Committee meeting, the two groups announced that they were joining forces.
While the MRTA had a more developed military structure, the MIR-VR had more political experience
in San Martn, Lambayeque, Ancash and La Libertad as well as some military experience with the CRPs.
Te MIR-VR agreed to accept the MRTA name as well as Vctor Polay as the Secretary General.
Te MRTA chose the department of San Martn for its rst guerrilla front, because the MIR-VR had
been working for some time to establish itself among corn and rice farmers, teachers and the Front to De-
fend the Interests of the People of San Martn (Frente de Defensa de los Intereses del Pueblo de San Martn,
FEDIP-SM) in the departments northern provinces. A total of 60 guerrillas, 30 each from the MIR-VR
and MRTA, formed what was known as the Northeastern Front. Responsibility for the Front fell to Vc-
tor Polay, which caused the rst tension with the MIR-VR.
Te attack on Tabalosos (Lamas) on October 8, 1987, marked the start of the political-military cam-
paign called Che Lives. Ten days later, an MRTA column took over the town of Soritor (Moyobamba).
Neither action, however, had national repercussions. Te next campaign was known as Tpac Amaru
Liberator. On November 6, 60 guerrillas took the town of Juanju (Mariscal Cceres), and the follow-
ing day the same column assaulted the town of San Jos de Sisa (El Dorado), meeting no resistance. Te
organization got the national publicity it was seeking through a TV interview with Vctor Polay. Te
government responded shortly thereafter, declaring a state of emergency in San Martn and sending a
large contingent of soldiers after the MRTA column, which managed to escape.
On December 9, the MRTA decided to end the Tpac Amaru Liberator campaign and decentralize
its forces. One group was sent to the eastern region, another was dispatched to the central region, and
37 guerrilla ghters remained in San Martn. According to Sstero Garca, Ricardo,
51
the column that
remained in San Martn was discovered by the Army in a short time and collapsed within weeks. Te
reconstruction of the Northeastern Front was slow, and it was not until the early 1990s that the subver-
sives were once again able to carry out any signicant actions. By 1991, the Northeastern Front had been
rebuilt and included approximately 400 armed ghters.
Despite the setbacks, the MRTA was upbeat about the Che Lives and Tpac Amaru Liberator cam-
paigns, which they believed conrmed their conversion into a real option for power (MRTA 1990:
136). Tat assessment overestimated their military force and underestimated the power of the State as
well as the strength acquired by the PCP-SL. Tis overly optimistic view also came shortly before the
51 Former MRTA leader who took advantage of the repentance law.
126
Chapter 2
arrests of Glvez Olaechea and Lucero Cumpa, the latter of whom was in charge of operations in Metro-
politan Lima and a member of the Central Committee. Although it was at its height, the MRTA began
demonstrating the characteristics that would mark its actions in the coming years, including a uctuation
between successes and failures, the inability to achieve sustained growth in any area of the country or
sector, an image of an armed group supported mainly by volunteers and the risks and condences placed
in media coverage of its actions as a way of accumulating political strength.
As the Northeastern Front began operations, the First Congress of the National Peoples Assembly (Asam-
blea Nacional Popular, ANP) was held in Villa El Salvador, bringing together union organizations and
radical sectors of the IU-UNIR, PUM, PCP-Unity and the UDP, an organization linked to the MRTA
at the time. According to Miguel Rincn:
Together with the compaeros from PUM, we led the group that wanted the ANP to become
a real opportunity for centralization [...] with a plan that not only included the most impor-
tant demands of the people, but that also incorporated revolutionary objectives that would
open the way for the people to struggle for power (2002: 15-16).
MRTA militants had participated in preparatory meetings for the ANP since 1986, attempting to link
the mobilizations of sectors within the ANP to the armed struggle. Te paradox here is that the organi-
zations strength increased as the union movements lost importance on the national level. Hit hard by
the crisis in industry because of the collapse of the import-substitution model, and the violence that the
MRTA itself was helping to stir up, the organizations in the ANP in 1987 were only a pale shade of the
groups that had stopped the country with massive national strikes in 1977 and 1978.
Without a clear evaluation of these weaknesses, the Second Unied Central Committee of the MRTA was
held in 1988. Te meeting reiterated the apocalyptic assessment of the national situation and, inuenced by
the victories of the Northeastern Front, agreed to open other guerrilla fronts because in Juanju we real-
ized that we must have the audacity and decisiveness to oer a national plan with weapons in hand; there is
no other way.
52
Te MRTA therefore began to restructure the Northeastern Front and opened an Eastern
Front (Ucayali, Pasco and Hunuco) and a Central Front (Junn and the jungle region of Pasco). At the
same time, some cadres were sent to explore the possibility of reopening a front in the southern part of the
country and to strengthen the organizations work in urban areas. It was also indispensable to tighten up the
organization and nance its war expenses, which the group opted to do by kidnapping, arguing that the
costs of the war should be paid by the high bourgeoisie and imperialism (Desco 1989: 244).
Te kidnappings were perpetrated in Lima by special forces. During their captivity, businesspeople were
kept in peoples prisonssmall, unhealthy cellsand were under constant supervision. Te rst kidnap-
ping was carried out in September 1987 (Jimnez 2000: 868). Months earlier, the rst internal settling of
scores came in a reprisal against former MIR-VR militants of the Northeastern Front who were unhappy
with the unication and had launched their own military plan. An MRTA revolutionary tribunal deter-
mined that they were traitors and located and executed them on October 30, 1988. Te Cusqun Cabrera
siblings were also accused of counter-revolutionary crimes. Rosa Cusqun, accused of treason and of being
a police informant, was killed on June 1, 1988, in the Arzobispo Loayza Hospital in Lima, where she was
recovering from wounds she had received in the rst assassination attempt two months earlier.
Meanwhile, the Eastern Front began operating without adequate knowledge of the terrain or sucient
prior proselytizing and organizing. After a few initial successes, on December 8, 1989, a subversive de-
tachment assassinated Alejandro Caldern, president of an important Ashninka organization (Apaty-
waka-Nampitsi-Ashaninka del Pichis, ANAP), for allegedly having committed a counter-revolutionary
crime when he was a young man. Te MRTA accused Caldern of having informed police authorities
of the whereabouts of Mximo Velando, a MIR guerrilla leader, in 1965. Calderns murder led to the
formation of the so-called Ashninka Army, which expelled the MRTA from its territory. While the
52 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, 2002.
127
MRTA admitted that killing Caldern was a mistake and withdrew its ghters without any combat,
53
the
damage was done. Te oensive launched by the Ashninka Army and State security forces dismantled
the Eastern Front. In 1991, there was no Eastern Front, there was no one. It disappeared as quickly as it
had appeared, (Lucas
54
). Te survivors moved to the Central Front.
Te central region was of particular importance in the MRTAs strategy. In September 1998, shortly
after the Second Unied Central Committee meeting, the organization attempted to reinstall an armed
detachment in the region. While the detachment had to deal with a hostile reaction from the PCP-SL
from the start, it moved forward with its plans and began armed actions in February 1989. After some
successes aimed at establishing a national presence and positioning the organization as an alternative to
the PCP-SL and the armed forces, the MRTA decided to take the city of Tarma as a way of regaining the
ground it had lost in San Martn. Te MRTA column was made up of 67 armed subversivesnearly all
of whom were drawn from the highland and central fronts. On the morning of April 28, on the border
between the districts of Huertas and Molinos (Jauja), two trucks carrying the MRTA detachment came
upon a military patrol. Te shootout left 58 MRTA militants dead.
55

Te blow received in Molinos basically ended the MRTAs work in the central region, but the organiza-
tions leadership did not fully understand the impact of what had happened. We did not have a clear idea
of the magnitude of this loss [...]. We thought we would recover quickly [] with some actions, with some
kind of campaign [...] the truth is, however, that the blow was so great that it deprived us of many things
(Mateo). For Glvez Olaechea, what happened in Molinos demonstrated a tendency in the MRTA that
prioritized immediate actions over more consistent, long-term work (2003: 36). In response to Moli-
nos, on January 9, 1990, the MRTA assassinated a retired general and former defense minister, Enrique
Lpez Albjar, shooting him while he was driving his own car without a security detail. Vctor Polay said
that the execution had been agreed upon by the revolutionary tribunal as a response to the murder of
MRTA prisoners and injured combatants in Los Molinos (1990: 19). Te action appeared to corroborate
what Manrique (1989: 175-80) had stated about the probable Senderoization of the MRTA, which was
also reected in the organizations decision to murder its own members in Chiclayo, Tarapoto and Lima.
A period of rebuilding the Central Front began with the transfer of small contingents of armed militants
from urban areas. While this eort coincided with the start of the peasant revolt against the PCP-SL and
the increased presence of the armed forces, a few detachments began operating again in early 1991.
Rebuilding the central leadership, hardening the line and rupture
(1989-1992)
On February 3, 1989, three months after the conict in Molinos, Vctor Polay was arrested in Huancayo.
Te problems caused by his capture were exacerbated by the arrest of Miguel Rincn in Lima on April
16.
56
As a result, Nstor Cerpa Cartolini took over leadership of the MRTA. Because most of its captured
leaders were in Limas Miguel Castro Castro prison, the MRTA began constructing a tunnel into the
prison that would take three months to build. On July 9, 1990, 47 inmates would escape through the
tunnel. Te escape once more thrust the organization into the national spotlight, inspired its militants
and burnished the image of its battered leadership.
With the reincorporation of Vctor Polay and Alberto Glvez, the MRTA held its Tird Unied Central
Committee meeting in September 1990. Te event did not go smoothly. After Alberto Fujimoris surpris-
ing victory in the run-o election earlier in the year, Polay entertained the idea of negotiating a political
solution to the armed conict with the new government. Te proposal, however, was not discussed at the
53 In July 1990, Vctor Polay recognized the mistake (MRTA 1990: 19).
54 CVR. Interview. Lucas is the pseudonym of a jailed MRTA leader. August 2003.
55 According to information provided by the Army, six soldiers were also killed. In addition, seven people living in surrounding villages were
detained and disappeared. Three others detained by the Army were later found dead and are believed to have been executed.
56 Glvez Olaechea was arrested in August 1987, and Peter Crdenas and Hugo Avellaneda were arrested at Jorge Chvez Airport in Lima in February 1988.
128
Chapter 2
meeting.
57
Te delegates did discuss major current events in light of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the
electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and peace accords in the rest of Central America. Te
MIR-VR representatives maintained that the socialist current was undergoing a profound crisis and that
the international rear guard had broken down completely. In addition, the PCP-SLs actions had under-
mined revolutionary violence, which was now rejected by the population. Tey claimed that the victory
of Ricardo Belmont in the Lima mayoral election in 1989 and Alberto Fujimoris presidential victory in
1990 demonstrated the collapse of traditional parties and politicians and a people without ideologies,
pragmatic and skeptical (Glvez 2003: 39). Tese factors required that the MRTA change tactics and
opt for a political solution. Polay, however, oered a dierent assessment. We believed that [retreat] was
not the most appropriate response, because it meant leaving the playing eld open to the [PCP-] SL.
58
It
was therefore necessary to impose dialogue on the government, to turn ourselves into a belligerent force
for dialogue. We needed to show the public that the MRTA had achieved a level of development and that
it was necessary for us to sit down at the table and negotiate with the government.
59
Te Central Committee decided to strengthen the Northeastern Front and open fronts in the north and
south so that conversations with the MRTA would be inevitable.
60
With this objective in mind, several
of the subversives who had escaped from Miguel Castro Castro prison were sent to dierent areas of the
country, and numerous members of its political structures and support groups were incorporated into the
military structure. Tis allowed the MRTA to consolidate the Northeastern and Central fronts quickly.
Nevertheless, internal tensions were heightened with the election of the new National Executive Committee.
Of the six members, four were from the original MRTA (including Polay Campos and Cerpa Cartolini) and
two were from the MIR-VR (Glvez Olaechea and Rodolfo Klein Samanez). Te election broke an agreement
between the two groups on the composition of the ruling committee. In addition, the responsibilities for the
regions and military fronts were given to the MRTA delegates. Te Northeastern Front went to Cerpa, who re-
placed the MIR-VRs Sstero Garca, Ricardo. Te same thing happened with the Southern and Central fronts.
Despite these dierences, in the following months the MRTA stepped up its actions in various parts of
the country with renewed military strength, culminating with the second assault on Juanju on Decem-
ber 24, 1991. According to the leaders of the subversive organization, the number of people willing to join
the MRTA was greater than the groups ability to incorporate them. For example, Francisco stated: Tere
was a lack of leadership. Tere were masses, there were combatants, but one leader cannot take charge of
100 people and there were hundreds of people. We didnt know what to do. Te lack of commanders led
some of the militants to take charge although they had little training. Tat led to tactics that included col-
lecting bribes from drug trackers in San Martn, assassinating dissidents, treating kidnapping victims
with extreme cruelty and, in general, accentuating the militaristic approach.
In August 1991, subversive commandos assassinated Orestes Dvila Torres, Germn, who had been Cer-
pa Cartolinis right-hand man. Months later, in January 1992, Andrs Sosa Chanam, a former MRTA
militant from the PCP-Unity, was murdered. Tese revenge killings led to Glvez Olaecheas resignation
from the MRTA in early 1992. He recalls, Tose who had been Robin Hoods at the beginning hardened
their positions with the blows of the war, and the law of an eye for an eye became a powerful temptation
(2003: 52). According to Polay, however, the image that the MRTA members were killing each other
was a consequence of the intelligence services manipulation of the media and comments by former mili-
tants that were exaggerated and did not reect reality; Furthermore, in the case of Beto Glvez [Olae-
chea], he was arrested and after a few months in jail he announced his resignation.
61

57 For Glvez Olaechea, Polays decision not to present the idea was meant to guarantee the support of ideological hard-line factions [such
as] Cerpa and Rincn and push out the MIR-VR (2003:39).
58 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, March 13, 2003.
59 Ibid. Nevertheless, through the intervention of Rep. Gerardo Lpez (Cambio 90), who was kidnapped and later released at the end of
September 1990, they proposed dialogue to Alberto Fujimori. The proposal was rejected.
60 CVR. Interview with Vctor Polay. Callao Naval Base, March 13, 2003.
61 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, 2003.
129
Te kidnappings perpetrated by the MRTA during this time grew increasingly brutal. One victim, Pedro
Antonio Miyasato, was found dead on April 22, 1992, and the body of David Balln Vera found was
found on February 23, 1993.
Te dierences between the MIR-VR and MRTA militants were irreconcilable. Glvezs resignation in
January 1992 was followed by that of Sstero Garca and 120 combatants of the Northeastern Front. Te
national MRTA leadership ordered the arrest of Sstero Garca, but he was saved by the Army. It is estimated
that the MRTA lost approximately 400 ghters during these internal conicts as well as in armed confronta-
tions with military forces. It also lost the military control it had exercised over some areas of San Martn.
After the coup on April 5, 1992, many MRTA militants, especially on the Northeastern Front, took advan-
tage of the repentance law and began turning in other militants. Te coup also reopened debate over the
viability of the armed struggle. Some militants insisted that it was time to stop the war, but once again the
idea of doing this from a position of strength prevailed. According to Miguel Rincn, the retreat needed
to be gradual, inicting strong blows to show the country and the world that the struggle continued [...]
show the dictatorship that it was not moving ahead with free rein and, with this, organize our retreat.
62
Te strategy was dicult to implement as Glvez Olaecheas second arrest at the end of 1991 was fol-
lowed by a series of other blows. Peter Crdenas Schulte was arrested on April 9, 1992. Two months
later, on June 9, Vctor Polay was arrested again in the Lima district of San Borja. By mid-year, only two
members of the leadership committee, Nstor Cerpa and Miguel Rincn, were still at-large. Cerpa again
took charge of the MRTA. After the arrest of Lucero Cumpa on May 1, 1993, in Tarapoto, the remaining
members of the detachment in San Martn agreed to accept the repentance law. Te Northeastern Front
disappeared. Te MRTAs actions were limited to the Central Front and its actions in Lima diminished.
Epilogue
Te rest is epilogue. According to Glvez Olaechea, Te conict came down to a war of apparatuses in
which the stronger apparatus, the State, won (2003: 53). Given the extreme situation, the MRTA be-
gan planning large-scale actions that would place it on the national map. Cerpa and Rincn were aware
that the MRTA was not going to take power, even more so after Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmn
announced from his prison cell that he was in favor of a peace accord. Instead, they opted to create a
situation of strength that would allow them to negotiate the release of their militants, the suspension of
hostilities and their eventual incorporation into legal political life. According to Miguel Rincn, It was
necessary to rescue the revolutionary cadres to continue the revolutionary struggle, but the government
had closed all possibilities for legal or political resolutions. Te militants release, therefore, would only
be achieved through a position of strength
63
With that goal in mind, they planned an assault on Congress, but the plot was discovered beforehand in
November 1995 and ended with the arrest of Rincn and 17 other subversives. Nevertheless, on December
17, 1996, Nstor Cerpa Cartolini, the remaining leader still at-large, led a group of 14 subversives in an as-
sault on the Japanese ambassadors residence in Lima during a reception attended by more than 600 people.
Most of the hostages were released within a few days, but 72 people remained prisoners for 136 days.
Finally, after more than four months of dierent levels of contact between the kidnappers and the govern-
ment, special forces launched a rescue mission, Chavn de Huntar, on April 22, 1997. All but one of
the hostages were freed. In addition, two of the commandos were killed as were all of the MRTA mili-
tants. Tat episode marked the end of the subversive organization.
62 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, March 25, 2003.
63 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, April 8, 2003.
130
Chapter 2
THE CASES OF CHUNGUI AND OREJA DE PERRO
Te district of Chungui is located in the extreme eastern corner of Ayacuchos La Mar province, border-
ing the departments of Apurmac and Cusco. Te violence unfolded in two dierent ways in the com-
munity of Chungui: to the west and to the east in the area known as Oreja de Perro (literally Dogs Ear,
because of its shape on the map). Te only land routes to Chungui are through San Miguel to the west
or Andahuaylas to the east. Te distance between the district and the city of Huamanga is approximately
seven hours by car. Te communities of Oreja de Perro have little contact with the district capital. Te
best route to Oreja de Perro is through Andahuaylas.
In the 1980s, the community of Chungui had access to considerable resources, thanks to the sale of coee
and cocoa in the farmers market in Sacharaccay, in the district of Anco, in La Mar province. Until the
1970s, residents of Chungui also received income from land rented to non-residents, especially in the jungle.
Oreja de Perro is linked to districts in the province of Andahuaylas (Apurmac), including Ongoy, Oco-
bamba and Andarapa. Commercial relations with Andahuaylas were based primarily on the sale of live-
stock. In general, traders from Ongoy and Andarapa would buy livestock in Oreja de Perro for resale in
the city of Andahuaylas. Many residents of Oreja de Perro would also travel to the districts of Andahuay-
las to sell their livestock themselves at the best price.
Chungui was characterized by a lack of haciendas and constant land conicts, especially in the jungle
zone. In contrast, Oreja de Perro was home to large haciendas that produced sugarcane alcohol. Te ha-
cienda system in Oreja de Perro had collapsed due to guerrilla activity in 1965 and land takeovers staged
in 1974 to protest the slow pace of agrarian reform in the provinces of Chincheros and Andahuaylas.
Border conicts intensied as land changed hands and new communities were formed. Te conict also
included conicts over pastures and arable land in the jungle, where the areas principal crops coee,
cocoa, sugarcane and coca were grown.
Te change in land ownership enabled local farmers to improve their earnings by directly managing crops,
pastures and livestock. Economic development increased because of trade with Andahuaylas and La Mar,
where livestock was sold and local farmers acquired products such as sugar and clothing. Another important
change during this time was the development of educational opportunities, as more schools were built in
the region. Te residents of Oreja de Perroespecially those with more economic resources, that is, more
livestockbegan sending their children to study in schools in Andahuaylas, Ongoy and Andarapa.
First stage: The PCP-SL infltrates the education system
Te principal vehicle for PCP-SL inltration in these communities was the education system. Te sub-
versive group took advantage of greater access to educational opportunities that these communities had
achieved in the wake of major changes in property structure in the 1960s and 1970s.
Te Shining Path began working in Chungui by recruiting young people in the schools. Between 1975
and 1980, the PCP-SLs Andahuaylas Zone Committee focused on forming young cadres and recruiting
high school students in Ongoy, Ocobamba and Andarapa. Te children of peasant farmers from com-
munities in Oreja de Perrosuch as Tastabamba, Oronqoy, Putucunay, Socco, Santa Carmen and Mol-
lebambaalso studied at these schools. My older brother studied in Ongoy [...] teachers from the party
took over the school. I also studied there, but only for one year because I was afraid; the teachers forced
me to paint grati and talk about that party; they [PCP-SL] talked about equality.
1
Te teachers at these
secondary schools were educated at the UNSCH, where they had contact with the PCP-SL.
1 CVR. BDI-I-P627. Chungui, Chungui. Woman, age 40.
131
Te Shining Paths presence in Oreja de Perro rst came to light because of an apparently isolated action. After
suering from a wave of robberies, wealthier residents of Mollebamba led a complaint in Andarapa. Simulta-
neously, on September 27, 1982, the police station in Erapata (district of Incahuasi, Cusco, on the right bank
of the Apurmac River) was attacked and one ocer was killed. Te National Police in Illahuasi (a district of
Andarapa, in the province of Andahuaylas in Apurmac) went to Mollebamba and arrested seven people.
The start of the armed confict
After working quietly through the schools, the PCP-SL began to form its principal force after declaring
the start of the armed struggle. Te principal force took over communities to form peoples committees.
Te local population recalls the PCP-SL entering Chungui in dierent ways, rst from Andahuaylas to Ore-
ja de Perro, and later, around 1984 after the Army had established its presence in Ayacucho, from Cangallo.
Te PCP-SL, however, had made earlier incursions into the communities in Oreja de Perro. Tese incur-
sions were from Andahuaylas and Chincheros and began in the second half of the 1970s. Tey were aimed
at proselytizing communities in Andarapa, Ocobamba and Ongoy, all of which are close to Oreja de Perro.
According to one testimony from a resident of Oreja de Perro, Te terrorism [subversion] rst began in
1982, when the subversives entered the community of Chapi. Tey burned down the sugarcane alcohol
factory and organized the people to support and follow them.
Massacre in Santa Carmen de Rumichaca
A group of armed, uniformed people entered the community of Santa Carmen de Rumichaca on December
8, 1982, looking for the local authorities.
2
Tey returned three days later and gathered the residents for an as-
sembly. People who claimed to be police ocersthey were actually PCP-SL militantsseparated the women
from the men in two classrooms and asked Who are the people in the peasant patrol, because they [are] going
to receive an award.
3
Te people who were part of the patrol were assassinated that night by the PCP-SL.
Te Shining Path brutally murdered the local authorities:
So we followed. All the people were gathered, even the children were gathered. A trader from
Talavera was there and they took away his tape player and they went to the school. I dont
know what they were doing, but the ladies were there and they were dancing to the music
with the children. Everyone was happy, dancing huaynos (traditional highland dance). Tat
was done so there would be noise and no one would hear the screams. I was in the kitchen
and there was a little window, so I could see what was happening. Tere were some people in
one meeting and others in a dierent room. I was hiding in my aunts kitchen and saw what
happened. We did not suspect this would happen. A man came, but he did not tell us who
he was. He wore a mask. Who could it have been? He asked our names and like idiots we let
him write down everything. Te other people with him also had things written down. Tey
had a big book and they called from a list. Tey called my father; they called out XZ and
asked for the person to repeat his name. Tey called XZ and my father said, Present, chief.
Tey said, ne, you are being called, run, run, they are calling for you there. He ran to the
school and several of them were waiting for him, maybe six or seven of them were waiting
for him near the wall. My father had just arrived and one of them grabbed him from behind
and began to kick him. My father tried to defend himself and then they stabbed him. Tey
stabbed him in the back and my father started punching and kicking and then pow, pow,
pow. Tey threw him on the ground and they kicked him. My father did not die, so they
stabbed him again in the stomach and the heart. My father cried out, Ay, no. He cried out
2 CVR. Testimony 201316. Chungui, La Mar, June 24, 2002.
132
Chapter 2
only three times. And then they called another man from the list. He said, Here, and ran
to the school. Tey kept calling and the men kept running. Eight people were killed. Te
eight people were the leaders. I think the president of the peasant patrol was PJ.
4
A week later, on December 15, a group of twelve uniformed people arrived when the residents of the Santa
Rosa peasant communityan annex of Santa Carmen de Rumichacawere in a community assembly.
Tey separated the men from the women. At 8 p.m., Tey killed my father with no explanation, stabbing
him in the head outside the school. Tey killed my sister the same way.
5
During a third incursion, the
subversives killed more than thirty people, including children and infants, and forced the people to ee
into the jungle, because they didnt want to live in their homes any longer. It was necessary to abandon
the village, because they said the repression would come to the zone and that would also make us suer.
The PCP-SL takes Chungui by storm
According to the testimonies of Chungui residents, the PCP-SL entered the community in 1983. Te
indoctrination stage ended that year, and the course of events changed in December when a column of
approximately thirty subversives arrived.
6
Tey came right to the school, to our classroom. Tey introduced themselves, saying, We
have come, we are in the armed struggle and we want you to study. Te things being done
by the Belande government must be stopped. Tere is no sugar, there is no kerosene, there
is nothing and the cost of living goes up every day. We have to change this; we are the last
option. We have to live in equality, and these miserable people who have money must die.
Te people have been chosen to govern. Te teacher left and they [PCP-SL] wrote a hymn
on the blackboard so that we could learn it.
7

On December 14, 1983, Leoncio, the President of Chungui, was heading to his potato elds on the other
side of town when he was detained by a group of subversives and stabbed to death.
8
Te same morning,
PCP-SL militants assassinated the justice of the peace in the community of Marco, which is close to
Chungui, hanging him from a tree. Finally, Ramiro, who was considered a well-o businessman, was
detained and killed by a group of twenty male and female subversives who used knives and axes to mur-
der him. Later, a member of the PCP-SL, David, told the population that those miserable residents, am
sucarun, were dead and had gone to see St. Peter.
Te PCP-SL then forced the population to celebrate. Tey distributed the merchandise that had belonged
to Ramiro, and they took clothing, fabric and tape players. Before leaving, they left a local resident,
Gregorio, in charge. Tey changed his name to Comrade Pepe.
9
Tey also chose as leaders: Justo, who
became David; Noel, whom they called Carlos; and other young people, such as Modesto.
Pepe was later identied as the leader who took charge when the community was forced to retreat.
10
Ac-
cording to information received in Oronqoy and Chungui the population did not rebel. Nevertheless, not
all resident followed; some hid on farms, while others ed to the city.
The PCP-SL and the Schools in Chungui
Te PCP-SLs presence in 1983 was not only more aggressive and open, but also more persistent. Te
4 CVR. BDI-I-P641. In-depth interview. Oronqoy, Chungui. Woman, age 37, witness to the massacre in Santa Carmen.
6 CVR. Testimony 202695. Chungui, La Mar, July 22, 2002.
7 CVR. BDI-I-P610. In-depth interview. Chungui, Chungui. Man, age 30.
8 CVR. Testimony 202660. Chungui, La Mar, September 24, 2002.
9 CVR. Testimony 202695. Chungui, La Mar, July 22, 2002.
133
subversives overran communities, killed authorities, and eliminated or punished anyone who represented
disorder (rustlers, womanizers, unfaithful women), the old state, illicit wealth or abuse.
In Chungui, the community assembly had approved spending community funds to build a secondary
school, Tpac Amaru II, in 1978. Te person behind the eort, Hel La Rosa, was born in Chungui and
believed it was necessary to develop educational opportunities in the community. She invited Chungui
natives living in Lima and Ayacucho to return to the community.
11
In both the primary and secondary
schools, the presence of teachers linked to the PCP-SL was extremely important for recruiting students
and indoctrinating young adults and their families, especially those from poorer areas. Besides the teach-
ers, there were young residents who maintained close ties with urban areas and supported PCP-SL eorts.
The New Power: Community retreats as strategy (1982-1987)
After gaining control of the population by using the methods described above, the Shining Path imposed one
of the worst tactics of the two decades of violenceforced retreats. Tese retreats were organized by the PCP-
SL not only to confuse security forces, but to create the support bases of the new state. Te population in
Oreja de Perro lived through forced retreats for nearly ve years. Between 1982 and 1987, the residents of
Oronqoy, Santa Carmen, Tastabamba, Putucunay and the other annexes were dispersed into groups in the jun-
gle and valley. Tey made us pull back quickly and they began to organize with the people they put in charge.
Tat is how the retreats started, and they spread us out here and there. We were completely organized.
12

Te PCP-SL ordered the population in Oreja de Perro to organize into four groups, which were supposed
to spread to surrounding areas.
During the retreat we had to leave. For example, those of us who lived in Oronqoy joined those
living in the lower area. We were organized in four groups, and each one was in a dierent place.
Before, we all lived on our own land in Puquiora, Jabas Huayco, Jerona, Sarachacra and Ccan-
jahua, but we also had our houses in town. In the retreats, we were separated from our place.
We were sent to Sarachacra, Ccanjahua, Puquiora and Accopampa, together with the people
from those places. Tere was a political commander and a military commander in each group.
13

A retreat was organized in Chungui two years later, in February 1984, when the Army was preparing
to launch an incursion in the zone.
Te soldiers began to come to the town [Chungui]. Te Shining Path told us that we had to
escape to the hills and jungle. Some people began to ee to the jungle. In 1984, we began
the retreats. It was the month when we harvested the potato crop in June. Tey made
us retreat during the middle of the harvest.
14

PCP-SL organization during the retreats
Within the Shining Paths organizational structure, the population recruited in the retreats was orga-
nized into support bases, which represented the PCP-SLs form of government in the zone. Te popula-
tion became what the PCP-SL called the masses, which were the peoples support bases for the PCP-SL
government. In addition, these families provided local forces for the party militants.
All the people in the masses were treated equally. Couples, widows and single mothers slept together with
the children who were not yet old enough to form part of the local force. Te women were in charge of
caring for orphans. As in other communities, there were abandoned children. When their parents died,
11 Minutes from community meeting in Chungui, 1977.
12 CVR. BDI-I-P638. In-depth interview. Huallhua, Anco. Man, age 58.
13 CVR. BDI-I-P657. In-depth interview. Oronqoy, Chungui. Man.
134
Chapter 2
we gave them food and clothing.
15
Te principal force was a traveling group that supervised the actions of the local force and the mass-
es throughout the zone. Tis group was also made up of young people, but the leaders were not from
the area. Tey were strangers, as the people in Chungui would say. In general, they had only a few
makeshift weapons and they did not wear uniforms. Tey tended to arrive with food and clothing for the
masses, which they obtained in raids on other communities. Tese goods were handed out when they
arrived to supervise the development of the armed conict in the zone.
We wore the little clothing we brought with us and the clothing that the group traveling
with Comrade Aurelio gave us. Tey gave us clothes and sandals. Comrade Aurelio would
give them to the commander of our group and he would hand them out as needed.
16

Instructions were handed down through a complex network of commanders, from the central leadership
through the regional and zone committees. Te groups were led by a political commander and a military
commander who named the people responsible for production, organization and oversight. Tere was
also a person in charge of the women. Te men were responsible for clearing the jungle to grow corn,
squash and sweet potatoes. Te population also began collecting fruit in the jungle, a task that was also
performed by children. Te elds were tended collectively and the crops distributed equally among all
members of the retreat. In theory, no one received more than anyone else, not even the commanders.
Te commanders had us bring food, told us what to plant and sent us to other places to deliver food
to the mobile group. We had lookouts to let us know what was happening [...]. Tere was also someone
in charge of the organization.
17
According to another testimony, We also planted on the outskirts of
Chapi. After setting up lookouts on the edges of the land, we burned o the brush to plant corn and
squash. Tat is what we ate. We also planted cassava and sweet potatoes.
18
Children aged 8 to 10 were called pioneer children. Tey helped their mothers fetch water, food and
rewood for the camps. Tey also attended peoples schools. One of the leaders taught them songs about
the internal armed conict as well as how to draw a hammer and sicklethe symbol of the revolution
and strategies for escaping a military incursion. All of the classes were oral and some graphics were used,
because most of the children did not know how to read or write.
Yes, I was with the pioneer boys and girls. Tey taught us songs and constantly told us that
we would take power and that that military would kill us if we escaped.
19
Tey did not teach us how to read or write; everything was verbal. Only they [subversive
leaders] had a notebook for drawing. Tey drew pictures of how to get away from the mili-
tary, how to dodge bullets, those kinds of things.
20
From an early age, children were taught about confrontations with security forces. Te PCP-SL became a
kind of protective blanket for them. When they reached the age of 12, boys and girls were separated from
their parents and incorporated into the local force, where they received training to join the principal
force. Only the best prepared and the strongest were recruited and trained to tolerate the tough condi-
tions that they would endure as part of the principal force. Tis group consisted mainly of young adults,
adolescents and some boys and girls of about age 12. Tey traveled through the jungle with political and
military commanders and slept in camps where they were tended to by the masses. Tey slept apart
from the masses, men and women together. Tey called this kning. We had to sleep close together,
16 CVR. BDI-I-P606. In-depth interview, Chungui, Chungui. Man, age 30.
18 CVR. BDI-I-P616. In-depth interview. Chungui, Chungui. Woman, age 50.
19 CVR. BDI-I-P667. In-depth interview. Oronqoy, Chungui. Man, age 38.
135
man, woman, man, woman. Tat is what they called kning.
21

A pregnant woman received no special treatment. She would be taken to a cave when she was about to give birth
and then returned to the masses. If the woman was part of the local force, she would live with the masses
during her pregnancy, but return to the force after the child was born. Te women in the jungle would give
birth in caves, and often, because of malnutrition, the children would be born retarded or would not survive.
22
As the violence worsened, communication among the three PCP-SL forces deteriorated, particularly be-
tween the principal force and the local force. As time went by, visits by the principal force became
more sporadic, which allowed the local force and the masses to gain more autonomy and power.
According to the interviews, most abuses came from the local force. Tese were abuses against their
own people, often ending in executions with rustic weapons, grenades or shotguns. Personal animosities
and family squabbles were also causes for executions in the name of the Shining Path. In addition, sexual
violence, theoretically prohibited and punishable by death, became more frequent.
Te PCP-SL imposed erce control and order. Te party did not forgive any form of betrayal or suspicion
of betrayal, and there was no room to question the new order.
Te [PCP-SL] would come to see if we were following orders, if we were well organized, if
everyone was eating the same thing. Tey came to see if we were making mistakes. Tose
who made mistakes were tied up and killed.
23

I was concerned because the comrades called an assembly and those who did not attend
would die. I went to the assembly very fearful. My husband and my father did not go, and
they were whipped until they became ill. Later, we had to cook together, because if they
found you cooking alone you were admonished and punished.
24
Life in the retreats was hell. One witness, who was seven years old at the time, tells how the masses suered
more than the principal force or the local force as they tried to survive and escape the security forces:
I was very sad. Tere were very few of us left in my base, and we escaped to the highlands
where we ate potatoes. When we found out the Sinchis had left, the survivors returned to
Achira, where the Shining Path militants came back to organize us again. Tey told us: We
are many, like the sand in the river and the soldiers are like the big rocks in the river. Te
organization of the masses in my base was divided, with the women in charge of cooking and
bringing food to the adults who worked in the elds. Te adults and the young people par-
ticipated in the principal forces and were also farmers. We all worked for the collective; there
was no individualism. Te older children helped where they could, and the younger ones were
taught to read and write by the Shining Paths SF. He let us sing and play. I was seven years old
at the time. What hurts to remember is how the masses died, because they could not escape
from the military attacks. Te members of local and principal forces were almost never killed.
Te young people over 12 and the adults over 40 had the easiest time escaping from the mili-
tary, but they could not ght. Tere were only 20 combatants armed with sticks, slingshots,
two ries and two shotguns. Tat is how the masses died until only a few of us were left.
25
Women with children could not hide or escape quickly. Escaping with children was harder. Tey caught you and
they killed you.
26
Te situation in the retreats got much worse when the soldiers arrived to eliminate the groups.
21 CVR. BDI-I-P665. In-depth interview. Oronqoy, Chungui. Man, age 33.
22 CVR. BDI-I-P643. Focus group of women. Oronqoy, Chungui. Woman, age 60.
23 CVR. BDI-I-P633. In-depth interview. Huallhua, Anco. Woman, age 60.
24 CVR. BDI-I-P608. In-depth interview. Huallhua, Anco. Woman, age 35.
25 CVR. Testimony 202014. Chungui, La Mar, March 22, 2003.
26 CVR. BDI-P633. In-depth interview. Huallhua, Anco. Woman, age 60.
136
Chapter 2
When they began the search, we would hide in the jungle, in holes, caverns, lagoons, etc.
We faced all kinds of hardships. In the end, only a few of us survived and we returned to
our village, even though they were searching for us and we were wanted. Later, we ed to
the cities. Only a few people have returned home over the years. Many people died of hunger
or were shot in the head, the body, etc., during those forced marches out of our villages.
Some people would fall when we had to run, breaking their legs. Tey would die. Others
lost their arms, their hands because of bullet wounds. We were injured and malnourished. I
can tell you that even today I am still malnourished; we do not eat well and have little blood.
Te women in the jungle had to give birth in the caves. Because of malnutrition, many of
the children were born retarded. Te children who did survive are still unhealthy and they
continue to suer from the eects of malnutrition. Many peoples children died of gunshot
wounds from the soldiers and many parents were assassinated by the subversives. Others
died when we were escaping; they fell into the rivers and were swept away. We went to dif-
ferent villages with nothing, with only the clothes on our backs. We didnt have blankets or
other clothes; thats how we would arrive. Te people from our village who returned earlier
took advantage of our absence and kept our animals and the things we left behind.
27
Te infants were malnourished and cried from hunger, so the leaders of the masses and the local forc-
es decided to eliminate them. In several of the camps in Oreja de Perro, mothers were forced to kill their
own children. Some smothered their children by holding them tightly against their chests. If a woman
refused to follow the order, the camps political leader would take the child by the feet and slam his or her
head against a rock. In other cases, they tied a rope around the neck and strangled the child. Te infants
were killed because their cries might attract military patrols.
Te mother had to kill her own child. She killed him in Patawasi. It was nighttime, and I dont
know where they left him or if they even buried him [...] he was only a baby, maybe about six
months old [...] He cried a lot. Tey called the mother and said, Pathetic woman, quiet your
son so he wouldnt alert the soldiers. Tey forced her to make him stop crying. Te woman
held him tightly against her breast and the baby smothered. He stopped breathing.
28
Presence of the Army
Te Army carried out its rst incursion in Chungui in March 1984, and a military base was established
the following month.
29

Te PCP-SL did not achieve control over the population. Several families returned to the community
immediately after the rst Army incursion and organized a civil defense patrol to combat the subversives.
Each time they went on patrol, the soldiers would be sandwiched between members of the civil defense
patrol, who would form columns in front of and behind the soldiers. When they brought in someone
from the jungle who had been arrestedin cases where they were brought in alivethe entire population
of Chungui was forced to line up and insult and hit the prisoner. If they refused, they were punished.
Te men who participated in the civil defense patrol in Chunguiall men and boys over age 14 had
to participatesay that the worst years of the armed conict were between 1984 and 1988, because of
the number of extrajudicial executions by the Army. Members of the civil defense patrols tried to avoid
responsibility for those actions, blaming the violence on soldiers or local residents who were killed.
Te captain blamed us and as punishment sent me o with two terrorists [PCP-SL mili-
tants]. Tey were hung from a tree and we started to light logs, sticks and trunks to burn
27 CVR BDI-I-P643.Focus group with women. Oronqoy, Chungui.
137
them, but they wouldnt die. Tey were naked, with their hands tied. Tat was our punish-
ment because we let some terrorists escape.
30
According to residents, Captain Samuraywho was in charge of the base in 1985was one of the cruel-
est and most violent commanders of the base in Chungui. Te rst president and vice president of the
civil defense patrol, Maurino Quispe and Jos Jaycur, respectively, were killed in 1985 on Captain Samu-
rays orders. Te reasons are unclear, but the people in Chungui believe that Captain Samuray ordered
them killed because he suspected that they were subversives.
Te communities of Oreja de Perro were also the scenes of incursions by the Sinchis based in Andarapa,
who entered the zone sporadically after 1982 to supervise the system of community lookouts, which had
disappeared from most communities after executions carried out by the PCP-SL in 1983. Te lookouts
existed only in Mollebamba, where they continued until they were transformed into a system of civil
defense patrols. A military base for the Apurmac region was established in 1985. Another base was estab-
lished in Pallqas in 1986, but it was moved to Chapi in 1987 after a PCP-SL attack.
Between February and March 1984, soldiers from the Army based in Andahuaylas entered Oreja de Perro
through Mollebamba, where they organized a civil defense committee. From then on, the Army and
members of the Mollebamba civil defense patrol carried out systematic incursions into Oreja de Perro.
Numerous massacres and razings of whole villages followed. Not a community or annex in the area was
spared from military incursions and what they impliedthe theft of property and animals, extrajudicial
executions and the destruction of homes. According to testimonies, the violence was carried out by sol-
diers and civil defense patrol members.
Te people from Mollebamba said, Kill them. Kill the thieves, kill the terrorists who stole
our food and massacred the people. Tats what the people from Mollebamba said.
31
People remember that the Armys attitude changed after Army Major Miguel Seminario was
named head of the base in Chapi between October and December 1987.
32
Tey said: Tis
major is from Ayacucho; he doesnt allow soldiers to beat detainees. He brought in people
who had ed to the jungle and repopulated Chapi before December 25, 1987.
33
Te central mission of the security forces was no longer to execute anyone they came across in the re-
treats. Te new mission was to save and rescue residents [from the PCP-SL].
34
Soldiers came from Chungui, Mollebamba, and civilians [civil defense patrols] also came
from the same places and annexes. Tey captured all of us, but they treated us well. Tey
said to us, Stop. Do not run away, we are not going to kill you. Tey took us to the elds,
where the potato crop was ready. We had a place near the elds that we had built, and the
women began to cook so we could eat potatoes. Tats when we began to recover from our
hunger. Next they took us to Chapi, where there were helicopters that transported the sol-
diers. After that we were happy, because they didnt kill us. Tey took statements from the
subversive leaders and then took them away in the helicopters. Tey were taken prisoner and
sent to jails in dierent places.
35
As of 1987, there were dierent factors that inuenced the Shining Paths failure in the zone. Te popu-
lation that had been forced to live in the retreats with the PCP-SL, the masses as well as the local
31 CVR. BDI-I-P619. In-depth interview. Hierbabuena, Chungui. Man, age 38.
33 CVR. Testimony 202678. Chungui, La Mar, November 5, 2002.
35 CVR. BDI-I-P606. In-depth interview. Chungui, La Mar. Woman, age 30.
138
Chapter 2
force, began deserting and showing up at dierent military bases. Living conditions in the jungle had
become unbearable. Te children died of hunger and thirst. Tey ate only squash seeds and raw corn, and
they didnt have salt. Malnutrition was chronic and death frequent. Te Army began to make signicant
incursions. Tey took charge of the people in the jungle and protected them from peasant patrols, which
often wanted to kill people, accusing them of being subversives. Tat was prohibited by military leaders.
Te base in Chapi was deactivated in 1988 and the people returned to Andahuaylas. A re-population
program began in 1992 so that people could return to Yerbabuena, Putucunay, Beln de Chapi, Oronqoy,
Santa Carmen, Chillihua and Tastabamba.
36

According to data recorded by the CVR, 1,381 people were killed or disappeared in Chungui between
1980 and 2000, representing nearly 17 percent of the population registered in the 1981 census.
Comparative data from the 1981 and the 1993 censuses in the district of Chungui show a 47.5 percent
decline in the population, from 8,257 people in 1981 to 4,338 in 1993. In the surrounding rural areas, the
population decreased by 51 percent, from 7,682 people in 1981 to 3,797 in 1993. Tere are no exact statistics
on how many of these people were displaced to other areas and how many were assassinated or disappeared.
THE CASE OF THE ASHNINKAS OF THE CENTRAL JUNGLE
Perus central jungle region is the ancestral home of the Ashninka, Ynesha and Nomatsiguenga indigenous
peoples. Te CVR estimates that of the 55,000 Ashninkas, approximately 6,000 were killed, 10,000 were
displaced from their communities in the Ene, Tambo and Peren River Valleys, and nearly 5,000 were enslaved
by the PCP-SL. In addition, 30-40 Ashninka communities disappeared during the internal armed conict.
1

Scenes of the internal armed confict in the central jungle
Four large areas in the central jungle region felt the impact of the internal armed conict in dierent forms.
Te rst was the Gran Pajonal plains (Ucayali), home of the Ashninka, where the PCP-SL was categori-
cally rejected. Te second included the province of Oxapampa (Pasco), which was home to Ashninkas
and colonists. Te MRTA had a strong presence in that area, but in the early 1990s, MRTA militants
assassinated Alejandro Caldern, the pinktzari (highest-ranking leader) and president of the Ashninka
organization Apatyawaka Nampitsi Ashninka (ANAP). He was killed for his alleged participation in the
1965 murder of Guillermo Lobatn, a MIR guerrilla leader at the time. Calderns death led to the forma-
tion of the Ashninka Army. Te MRTA admitted its mistake and pulled back from the region, carrying
out only sporadic attacks in urban areas and against Army bases. Te third zone included the province of
Chanchamayo (Junn), which was home to colonists, Ashninkas and Yneshas. Te MRTA was also very
active there, but was eventually displaced by the PCP-SL. Te PCP-SL presence, however, was mainly felt
through sporadic incursions. Te fourth zone included the province of Satipo (Junn), where the PCP-SL
arrived early in the conict. Te Satipo zone can be divided into three sub zones:
Te rst basically encompasses the districts of Ro Negro, Satipo and Mazamari and includes the
principal cities connected by the Marginal Highway and the rural hinterland. Tere are numerous
Ashninka and Nomatsiguenga indigenous communities as well as settlements of colonists.
Te second includes the district of San Martn de Pangoa, which is connected to the district of Ro Tambo
1 In 1995, the National Human Rights Coordinating Committee published a report on the disappearance of these communities.
139
through the upper Ene River basin. Te largest number of Nomatsiguenga communities is located here.
Te third is the district of Ro Tambo, where 97 percent of the population is Ashninka. Te Ene and
Tambo rivers link all of the communities. Te Ene River connects Ayacucho to the central jungle. It
is the continuation of the Apurmac River, which runs through the Ayacucho jungle region. Tis text
focuses on events in the area of the Ene and Tambo rivers.
First PCP-SL actions
Many Ashninka families began moving down the Apurmac River toward the Ene River in the 1960s to
escape pressure from colonists in the jungle of Ayacucho. Years later, another wave of colonists arrived to plant
coca along the left bank of the river, forming the Ene River Colonization Committee. Te rst PCP-SL cadres
arrived with the committee, eeing the military counter-oensive launched in Ayacucho in the early 1980s.
Between 1985 and 1988, PCP-SL commanders began killing alleged criminals and snitches among
colonists in the Ene Valley. Te Ashninkas reaction was a combination of fear and attraction, because
they considered many of the colonists to be land invaders and delinquents who had brought drug traf-
cking, prostitution and abuse to the area. Te Shining Path expelled a group of drug trackers from
the valley in those early years.
As in other areas, PCP-SL leaders initially approached Ashninka teachers and community leaders, who had
higher levels of education, contact with urban areas and mobility throughout the zone. Te visits became
much more frequent in 1988, and the PCP-SLs presence was widespread and open by 1989. Te command-
ers arrived each weekend to coordinate and raise awareness among community authorities.
Otica, the role of leaders and initial attraction to the PCP-SL
HP, a leader in Otica, was a well-known health-care promoter and technician, which allowed him to
travel frequently to various communities along the Tambo and Ene Rivers. HP was recruited by the PCP-
SL in the mid-1980s. Tanks to his credibility in Otica, HP won over the population for the PCP-SL.
HP told us about policies for the poor people, that everything could be dierent.
2
Te rst PCP-SL incursion in Otica took place on October 29, 1987. Te guerrillas sacked the health
post and the homes of people who worked for two non-governmental organizations. Te people of Otica
repudiated the attack, but HP convinced them that the PCP-SL incursion had been a mistake.
Tat year, HP was elected president of the community, and Javier, the PCP-SLs military commander and
the godfather of HPs child, began visiting Otica. Tey worked together to politicize the various clans.
Two other PCP-SL commanders arrived and began oering political courses. After a few months, HP
told the families that the PCP-SL was going to create a new state and that the community had to accept
it. He was the chief and you had to accept what he said. How could you not accept what the chief said?
3
Nevertheless, not all Ashninkas accepted the PCP-SL. Many did not understand the ideology, and
some who had lived in urban areas doubted the organizations promises. Others who had heard of assas-
sinations perpetrated by the PCP-SL were afraid of the subversives. Most colonists who disagreed with
the PCP-SL had already ed the valley, out of the fear. However, displacement to urban areas was not
an option for most of the Ashninkas, who did not have relatives in cities. In addition, the Ashninkas
traditionally sought refuge in the deep jungle rather than urban areas. Finally, the PCP-SL had encircled
the area, forced the closure of local airstrips and restricted river travel.
Te PCP-SL employed various methods to control the communities. One of the principal tools was fear.
2 CVR. Interview with Carlos. Otica, September 2002.
3 CVR. Meeting with women. Otica, November 2002.
14 0
Chapter 2
We will kill whoever does not support the party.
4
Te leaders and supporters acted as the partys thou-
sand eyes and thousand ears. A sense of mistrust spread throughout the community and even within
family groups. Te PCP-SL also convinced the Ashninkas that the military was trying to kill them. In
this way, the subversives were able to physically and psychologically isolate the communities. Te subver-
sives then began to recruit children between the ages of 10 and 15 as ghters. By 1989, the PCP-SL had
formed two peoples committees in Otica.
Te people no longer used [the form of address] noshninka,
5
but comrade. I would get angry when they
would greet me as comrade, but the people accepted it. One of them said we are living in the new state.
6

Te Shining Path increased the frequency of its incursions and attacks in the communities throughout
1989, targeting areas where there were religious missions, development projects or business operations.
On February 13, 1989, in Tzomaveni, the PCP-SL assassinated Isaas Charete, President of the Central
Ashninka Organization of the Ene River, which included all of the communities in the valley.
Exodus from Cutivireni
Te PCP-SL began indoctrinating the population and recruiting young people in Cutivireni in 1988.
Te incursions, attacks, forced recruitment of young people and assassinations increased until the
Ashninkas, who did not fall into step with the PCP-SL, ed to the deep jungle, to an area known as
Tzibokiroato. Tey were attacked there on several occasions. On November 14, the PCP-SL killed six
people in Cutivireni.
In September 1991, 169 Ashninkas, with the support of the Reverend Mariano Gagnon, a Franciscan
missionary priest, were airlifted to Matsiguenga territory on the other side of the Urubamba Mountains.
Tey found refuge in the community of Kiriketi and eventually established their own autonomous com-
munity. A group of Ashninkas still lives there, while others have relocated to the Tambo River area.
In 1991, the Army installed a base in Cutivireni and formed a self-defense committee. Cutivireni became
a place of refuge, a population center, that eventually housed more than 2,000 Ashninkas displaced
from their communities.
Armies or self-defense committees
By the end of 1990, the PCP-SL controlled the entire Ene River Valley and the headwaters of the Tambo
River up to the bend in the river at Poyeni. Tat area was called the frontier because it was where the
Ashninka Armyor Poyeni self-defense committeewas formed.
Te creation of armies was a traditional Ashninka practice. All of the adult males formed the indig-
enous self-defense committees or ovayeriite.
7
In the Ene River Valley, the Ashninka self-defense com-
mittees reported directly to the Army and the patrols formed by the colonists; in the Tambo River Valley
they were more autonomous. Each community in the Tambo River Valley created its own patrol, and all
participated in the central self-defense committee. Te PCP-SL, therefore, could no longer move up the
Tambo River, and Poyeni became the frontier.
The ashninka martyrs of the Tambo river
At the end of 1989, a group of leaders in the Central Organization of the Tambo River Ashninka (Cen-
tral Ashninka del Ro Tambo, CART) decided to form an Ashninka Army to ght the PCP-SL. Plans
4 CVR. Interview with Ernestina. Puerto Ocopa, November 2002. Woman, approximately 30 years old.
5 Noshninka means friend, brother in Ashninka.
6 Man, age 36. Testimony recorded by CAAAP. Puerto Ocopa, 2000.
7 The name the Kunuja indigenous organization gave to the self-defense patrols in Pangoa.
14 1
did not move forward because the PCP-SL leader HP was also a CART member.
In 1990, at the Sixth CART Congress, the organization ocially declared its opposition to the PCP-
SL. A column of 60 Shining Path cadres, including colonists and Ashninkas led by HP, entered the
community of Mayapo, where the congress was being held. Most of the delegates managed to escape,
but the PCP-SL captured Pablo Santoma and the leaders of two other groupsscar Chimanca, of the
Nomatsiguenga and Ashninka Confederation of Pangoa, and Dante Martnez, of the Confederation of
Amazonian Nationalities of Peru. Te PCP-SL took the prisoners to the community of Anapati, where
they were executed. Pablo Santoma was calm, drinking masato and singing. My father-in-law, Andrs
Torres, said to him: Why dont you escape, no one is watching. Pablo responded that if he escaped they
would blame us and kill my father-in-law and the whole family. If I am going to die, I will die alone for
my people. Santoma, Chimanca and Martnez became Ashninka martyrs in the war against the PCP-
SL, and their names are recalled at every Ashninka congress.
Te murders led to the formation of the Ashninka Army under the leadership of the Poyeni community,
which became a refuge for Ashninkas seeking protection from the subversives.
Te Ashninka Self-Defense and Development Central Committee No. 25which was recognized by
the Armywas formed on September 23, 1990. Te rst president was Emilio Ros, who adopted the
name Kitniro (Scorpion). Over the next four years the committee played a key role in the organization
and leadership of communities in the lower Tambo River Valley.
Te Ashninkas attacked the PCP-SLs principal force several times in 1990, forcing the subversives
to retreat. Te Shining Path took the base committees with them. As a result, 14 of the 35 Ashninka
communities in the upper Tambo River Valley disappeared and nearly 10,000 Ashninkas either fol-
lowed the PCP-SL or ed from it.
The New State: The life of the masses in the deep jungle
Once in the high jungle, the PCP-SL regrouped the Ashninkas into camps that had been previously
established, located away from the rivers and on higher ground for increased security. Te communities
were divided into small groups known as platoons. Two or three platoons would form a peoples com-
mittee. Each family had a hut, and the huts formed a circular pattern. Te platoons had a common area
for food storage and a eld for meetings and exercise. A control tower was located about 15 minutes from
the camp. Te passwords for entering and leaving the camp were changed each week.
Te day would begin at 3 a.m. Te leaders would wake up the masses to bathe and pack their
things in baskets to be ready to escape if the miserable ones [from the Army] showed up. Te
women would prepare food. To avoid detection, they were forbidden to light res. Te food
was served at 5 a.m. Te commanders ate rst. When they [the commanders] take a spoonful,
they say, Long Live Gonzalo. Te others [the masses] [ate] after them.
8
Te commanders
ate the best food. Te masses ate what they could, watery soup, chalanca leaves, even snake,
thats what they ate. From 8 a.m. to 3 p.m., the masses worked in the elds, returning to
the camp at 5 p.m. Elderly and inrm people remained in the camp, making weapons. What
was produced or caughtcassava and shwas given to the commanders to be distributed.
Children between aged 8 to 10 attended a peoples school for one hour each day. Tey were taught
subjugation to and respect for President Gonzalo, self-criticism and subjugation to the party and many
songs. Te older children, or pioneers, had one hour of military training each day. Tey had rudimen-
tary weapons, generally bows and arrows. At best, they would have some old ries. Only the command-
8 CVR. BDI-P737. In-depth interview. Male resident of Quempiri.
14 2
Chapter 2
ers had revolvers and automatic weapons.
Tey ate and bathed at the end of the day. Te women were forced to braid their hair like the female
colonists from the highlands. Tey all had to wear clean clothes, rags, really, but they had to be clean.
During the rst months, the day ended with a family meeting. Sometimes they sang Andean songs in
Spanish, which the PCP-SL commanders taught them. As the committees situations worsened, family
meetings and visits were restricted. Even signs of unhappiness or lack of appetite were punished. If you
were quiet, they would say, What are you thinking about? Surely you must be thinking about escaping.
9
During the weekly meetings called by the local force, those present accused other members of the
platoon, including their own family, of making mistakes. Everyone knew how to do self-criticism.
We learned by force. We learned how to salute their president, subjugation only to President
Gonzalo. I would like to speak, comrades, beginning with a declaration of my total subjuga-
tion to the teacher and guide, the dear and respected President Gonzalo, who is the head of our
party and the revolution. If you didnt comply, talk about what you thought and felt, youd
have to oer self-criticism. I am a bum, Im lazy. What the hell, I sometimes think. Tat is
what I have to say. You could do that three times, but after that they would apply violence.
10
Dierent forms of resistance were developed in the camps. You had to suer alone in the jungle, where no
one could see you, to avoid punishment.
11
When they could, people would conceal food so they could eat
it later with their family.
12
Others hid their children so that they would not be taken away to wage war.
When they went out to do their chores, they would check on the children. Tis was extremely risky and
could lead to physical punishment or even death. When the PCP-SL applied violence to snitches, rule-
breakers or individualists,
13
the accused would be placed in the center of a circle and a member of the
principal force would be chosen to kill him or her with a rope or knife. While the masses did not witness
most of the assassinations, the commanders forced the platoon, especially the victims family, to celebrate the
death by drinking masato, laughing and shouting, Long live the Party and President Gonzalo!
Te number of people who died of malnutrition and disease was high. Tere was nothing to eat; there
was no longer any salt []. Sometimes children just ate dirt, and a lot of them died.
14
Te dead were
sometimes dumped in common graves. Tey would make a deep hole or sometimes a hole with a rock
on top; thats where they threw the bodies.
15
Te people ended up living like pigs, hiding in the jungle,
sleeping in mud and eating watery soup.
16
You were an animal. You no longer had a family. Sometimes
you had to kill your family, your child, because they were no longer your family. Tat is the will of the
people, which was a lieit was his [the PCP-SL commanders] will.
17

Te number of Ashninkas eeing from the zone increased between 1992 and 1993. Some left behind
children and relatives who were too weak to escape. Tey also had to overcome their fear of the Army
and the self-defense patrols, which had been instilled during the PCP-SLs indoctrination, to seek refuge
in population centers. Te Ashninkas who escaped took advantage of their knowledge of the forest to
survive. Mass escapes were less frequent.
9 Testimony recorded by CAAAP. Puerto Ocopa, 1994.
10 Woman, age 48. Testimony recorded by Leslie Villapolo (CAAAP). Puerto Ocopa, 1995.
11 CVR. Interview with Carlos. Otica, September 2002.
12 CVR. BDI-P. In-depth interview. Woman, resident of Quempiri.
13 The PCP-SL defned individualists as those who did not follow the order to centralize all the food that was produced in the felds, the
fsh that were caught, or the fruits and other products gathered in the jungle by the masses. People were also considered individualists if
they did not want to participate in group tasks assigned by the commanders.
14 CVR. BDI-P737. In-depth interview. Quempiri, September 2002. Man, approximately 40 years old.
15 CVR. Interview with Ernestina, approximately 32 years old. Puerto Ocopa, November 2002.
16 Woman, age 28. Testimony recorded by CAAAP. Puerto Ocopa, 2000.
17 Man, age 41. C.N. Testimony recorded by CAAAP. Puerto Ocopa, 2000.
14 3
Escape from the Wacap and Vista Alegre de Otica Peoples Committees
In February 1993, Mximo and Javier, the commanders of the Wacap and Vista Alegre peoples com-
mittees, decided to ee with their respective groups. According to Javier, Tere was a lot of fear. Because
everyone had to oer self-criticism, we didnt tell anyone. We only told them to make canoes and hide
them in the jungle. We told them not to tell their wives or children.
18
Te night they had chosen to ee, the local force commanded by Javiers brother, Jess, arrived. Te
PCP-SL leader discovered his brothers plan and wanted to accuse him. Faced with this danger, Javier
tied up a woman from Ayacucho who had arrived with the local force and another group grabbed Jess.
When Javier reached the river, he found his brother dead. I looked at him, but had to go onWe escaped
and I didnt think about it until later.
19

Community members recall the events dierently, maintaining that Javier killed his brother so that they
could escape. He is seen as the savior of the group. Jess arrived at the river and Javier had to kill him so
that we would not reveal our plan.
20
Te night before, they said, they dreamed of the color white, which
was a good sign. Approximately 187 people ed to Poyeni. We were lucky because it was a windy day
and that helped push the boats. [...] We arrived in Poyeni.
21
Another 147 adults and children did not ee.
Faced with mass escapes, the PCP-SL leaders began to separate family members so that if someone es-
caped they could take revenge on his or her relatives. Te number of executions multiplied. At the same
time, the Army and civil-defense patrols intensied their operations in the Tambo and Ene Valleys, slowly
rescuing Ashninka communities that had been kidnapped by the PCP-SL. Nearly 3,000 Ashninkas in
the Ene Valley were rescued in 1993 alone.
Population Centers
People who escaped or were recovered by the Army were taken to refugee communities or popula-
tion centers,
22
such as Puerto Ocopa, Poyeni and Betania, in the Tambo River Valley, and Cutivireni and
Valle Esmeralda, in the Ene River Valley. In many cases, people who were recovered were subjected to
intense questioning by the military.
Centers were overcrowded and isolated and lacked basic resources. In addition, constant harassment by
the PCP-SL made life in the centers extremely dicult. None of the residents could leave the centers
without protection. Fishing, hunting and farming were restricted and could only be carried out with the
self-defense patrols serving as guards. Overcrowding led to outbreaks of cholera, tuberculosis and malaria.
Many people, especially the elderly, died in the centers, while young families preferred to ee into the jun-
gle to try to survive. Tere were also tensions and conicts between families from dierent communities
as well as because of dierences in the communities degree of sympathy with or rejection of the PCP-SL.
Marginalization of Otica refugees in Poyeni
Te civil defense patrol members allowed refugees from Otica to enter Poyeni only because they had
contacts in the community. My childs godfather was there when we arrived. He recognized me and
defended me to the civil defense patrol members [...]. Tat is why they allowed us in.
23
If that had not
happened, the patrol members would have killed the male and female leaders, as they did with refugees
18 CVR. Interview with Javier. Road between Puerto Ocopa and Satipo. December 2002.
19 Ibid.
20 CVR. Interview with Carmen. Otica, September 2002.
21 CVR. Interview with Mximo. Otica, September 2002.
22 Some experts use the term population center because international legislation does not recognize the existence of internal refugees,
only displaced people.
23 Testimony from the political commanders at the Wacap Base Committee, Otica. November 2002.
14 4
Chapter 2
arriving from other communities [...]. We would later see the bodies oat by in the river.
24
A group of soldiers was sent from the Naval base in Atalaya to interrogate the people from Otica, settling
them into dierent sectors of the community. Te orphans were placed in dierent homes, and many
showed signs of physical abuse, including rape.
People from Otica were discriminated against when aid from private and public sources was distributed.
Residents of Poyeni treated them like terrorists and feared that refugees from Otica would organize and
attack them, believing that they still followed the PCP-SL. Tis fear lingered even after people from
Otica returned to their own lands.
Te internal armed conict produced a demographic upheaval. Women and children outnumbered men,
many of whom had died in conicts. Many of the elders died in the support bases or in the population
centers. Some of the agricultural tasks normally performed by men were taken over by women, adding
to the workload they had to perform at home and in the community. Te men also had much more work,
because they had to participate in self-defense patrols. Te availability of adult males for patrols was lim-
ited because of the large number of men who had been killed. Tere were about 500 patrollers in the Ene
Valley and another 1,000 in the Tambo Valley in 1993. Te number was relatively low for a population
of approximately 20,000 people. Entire communities participated in self-defense eorts.
In many cases, the civilian population paid a high price for military support. Most soldiers were from
the coast or the highlands and did not understand the customs of the jungle. A large number of abuses
were committed because of that lack of cultural understanding. Soldiers routinely took advantage of the
women or stole the belongings of families or communities. Te lines between military and civilian life
were blurred because of the presence of military detachments in some of the population centers. Te
civil defense patrol members had to fall into formation, raise and lower the ag and sing the national
anthem every day at 6 a.m. and 5 p.m. Tat militarization was reected in the language used by patrol
members, teachers and authorities as well as in the communities ways of resolving conicts.
The return
Te PCP-SL retreated toward the Ene River around 1995. As peace took hold in the Tambo River Valley,
residents in population centers began returning to their lands. In many cases people who returned were not
the same people who had ed. Many had died, others had escaped into the jungle, and some had decided to
remain in the communities that had received them, where they had met new partners and started families.
In some cases, entire communities moved without adequate resources for their relocation or survival. In
other cases, the relocation was gradual to ensure survival. Several communities also received assistance
from outside institutions to help with the return. Te most eective approach was a gradual return orga-
nized by the community itself.
Homes in the original communities had been destroyed by the PCP-SL or the passage of time, and the
forest had reclaimed many of elds. CART was re-activated and held its Seventh Congress in 1994. Te
self-defense patrols in Poyeni and Puerto Ocopa joined forces at the same time. Land and river trac
began to return to normal in 1995. Toward the end of the decade, some families were able to replant
cropssuch as coeefor sale and began to market products. Non-governmental organizations re-
turned to the zone, but so did the colonists, loggers and petroleum companies. Te processes re-ignited
old conicts and caused new problems between communities.
24 Information provided by a professional who worked in the community in the 1990s. Lima. November 2002.
14 5
THE MRTAS USE OF KIDNAPPING
From isolated acts to systematic practice
Te CVR has obtained evidence that allows it to conclude that between 1984 and 1996 the MRTA car-
ried out dozens of individual and collective kidnappings for extortion. Te number of kidnappings may
be much higher, however, because statistics were based on cases led with investigations undertaken by
security forces. In many cases, kidnappings were not reportedin the hope that the victim would be
released quickly or for fear that family members could be accused of collaborating with terrorism because
they paid the ransom demanded for the release of their relatives.
Kidnappings occurred in various cities in the departments of Lima, San Martn, Junn, Loreto, Areq-
uipa and Amazonas. Te principal site was the department of Lima, where 65 percent of kidnappings
occurred. Other important areas were the departments of San Martn and Junn, with 14 percent and 9
percent of abductions, respectively. Te departments of Amazonas, Arequipa and Loreto each registered
approximately 2 percent of kidnappings.
Te practice of kidnapping for extortion varied signicantly in scope during the period studied. Between 1984
and 1987, the number of kidnappings was small, but signicant. Te MRTA began by kidnapping Jos Onru-
bia Romero, a local businessman. No other cases were reported until 1987. Kidnappings fell o again in 1988.
Te number of kidnappings increased yearly between 1989 and 1992. Te increase was linked to the
implementation of a political-military plan approved by the MRTA in 1988. Te plan included various
operations to be carried out by a special squad of the MRTA Special Forces.
Te number of kidnapping dropped in 1993, thanks to a police operation in October that led to the arrest
of a large group of MRTA cadres who formed the kidnapping unit of the subversive organizations Special
Forces. Seriously weakened, the organization attempted to regroup and prepare for new kidnappings in
1995. Te number of abductions increased again that year. Te MRTA received another blow toward the
end of 1995 from ocers of the National Anti-Terrorism Bureau who raided a home in Limas La Molina
district, arresting a large number of MRTA members and seizing a major cache of weapons.
Finally, at the end of 1996, with most of its members and leaders in dierent jails around the country, the sub-
versive group carried out what would be its last mass kidnapping, aimed at forcing the release of these prisoners.
Kidnapping was a systematic practice between 1988 and 1995.
Kidnapping as part of a plan
Abductions between 1984 and 1987 were done for political and economic gain but do not seem to have
been part of a general plan.
Starting in 1988, however, kidnapping became part of the subversive groups policy. Te decision to use ab-
duction to obtain money was made at the second Central Committee meeting in 1988. Te MRTA needs
to strengthen its political and military preparation, because we foresee moving to a new stage in the class
struggle. We have, therefore, drafted a plan that consists of [...] obtaining a war chest to resolve the needs im-
posed by party tasks. We will begin by capturing one of the heads of the 12 Apostles
1
(MRTA 1990: 127).
Te subversives decided to launch their kidnapping plan by abducting Carlos Ferreyros (1988) and Hc-
tor Delgado Parker (1989), wealthy businessmen with ties to the government. Te MRTA began training
1 The 12 Apostles was the name given by the media to the countrys wealthiest businessmen, who had strong ties to the government.
14 6
Chapter 2
a special group to be in charge of abductions. According to one former MRTA militant:
Tere were times in 1988 when we were poor, no money for anything. What little money we
managed to get was earmarked for priority sectors. [...] We had attempted some bank robberies
and other assaults, but the results werent promising. Modernity also ruled that out, because
banks dont keep a lot of cash on hand. Te only way was through kidnapping. [Economic
necessity] led us to kidnapping. Tere was a process and all that. At rst we thought about
major, important kidnappings, at least a few people at a time. [...] If you could grab two people,
the heads of the most important economic groups in the country, youd be able to ll the pot.
A special group was formed for this, which took more than a year.
2
Over the next few years, the practice continued because of the need to obtain funds to maintain the or-
ganization and acquire weapons. One former MRTA militant stated:
Vctor Polay got caught and we didnt have a war chest.
3
What were we supposed to do after
his arrest? We had been okay, but then we were in trouble. We had the idea that to wage war,
you have to accumulate a war chest. We had robbed some banks and some of the combat-
ants had carried out common crimes and kidnapping. Tere were many kidnappings. Tats
a simple tactic thats also been used in other countries. Tat source of income enabled us to
buy weapons on the black market, which is easy to do. Tere were times when the situation
was tough, but others when the cadres, the combatants, had some material comforts despite
the dicult living conditions in the jungle or the mountains, where its very cold.
4
A specialized unit
One of the MRTAs units was the Revolutionary Military Force,
5
which included the Special Forces.
6
Tis
group was an elite unit formed by ocers and combatants in charge of rear-guard activities against the enemy.
7

Te Special Forces operated in rural and urban areas and had been trained to carry out commando-
style operations.
8

In the MRTA by-laws, Article 32 states that the organizations internal structure consists of various de-
partments, each with its own leader and structure, which report to the General Command.
9
A former
MRTA militant described it this way:
In the case of the commandos, the structure was like that of the English SAS. Special opera-
tions that are carried out autonomously and not linked to the army structure. It is [...] under
the political leadership. Tere were several units, including recovery teams, kidnapping teams,
intelligence operations teams and even a team for police actions, if necessary. Tere was a sub-
2 CVR. BDI-II-P461. In-depth interview, September 2002. MRTA commander, former UNCP student now serving a sentence in a maximum-
security prison.
3 Vctor Polay Campos, the head of MRTA, was arrested February 3, 1989, at the Tourist Hotel in Huancayo, Junn. He was sentenced to 20
years and imprisoned in Castro Castro.
4 CVR. BDI-II-P532. In-depth interview, September 2002. MRTA militant serving a sentence in a maximum-security prison.
5 According to Article 6 of the MRTA by-laws, which were approved at the second Central Committee meeting in August 1988, the Revolutionary
Military Force was a political-military structure whose objective was direct confrontation with and defeat of the armed forces (MRTA 1988: 59).
6 In describing the Revolutionary Military Force, the MRTA by-laws do not expressly mention the Special Forces. MRTA Military Forces
are made up of the Tupacamarista Peoples Army, the urban and rural commands, the Tupacamarista militias in the countryside and cities, and
the rural and urban self-defense groups (Article 5). Nevertheless, a document entitled, Military Guideline, which was also prepared at the
second Central Committee meeting, states that the Special Forces are a component of the Revolutionary Military Force (MRTA 1988: 57-59).
7 MRTA. MRTA by-laws , Article 21 (MRTA 1988: 59).
8 MRTA 1988: 17. Article 22 of the MRTA Statute defnes the commandos as the basic tactical combat unit within the revolutionary military force [...]
they are military units with a high level of professional training and combat-readiness. Their work is direct confict with the enemy. The commandos are
dedicated exclusively to the military task. They possess technical-military training that ensures mobility, speed and solid actions. (MRTA 1988: 52).
9 MRTA 1988: 60. According to Article 23 of the MRTA Statute: The General Command is the permanent political-military organism within
the M.F. [Military Force] of MRTA (MRTA 1988: 52).
14 7
urban branch, which was combination of the Urban Militia and the Command Structure.
10
Te General Command, meanwhile, was subject to the decisions of the principal political-military
structures, which were not permanent units, like the Central Committee.
11
Tat committee consisted
of the National Executive Committeealso known as the National Bureauand other appointed
members.
12
A former member of the MRTA Central Committee stated:
Large-scale operations, like the assassination of Army Gen. Enrique Lpez Albjar, the
kidnapping of Delgado Parker and attacks on towns and police stations, were decided by
the MRTA National Bureau, and each Regional Bureau was in charge of carrying out the
plans according to their capabilities. Te political objectives and campaigns were decided
and planned by the Central Committee.
13
Te Special Forces, under the direction of the General Command, were in charge of various activi-
ties, including planning and carrying out kidnappings in coordination with the MRTAs highest-level
political-military commands.
Te units special training enabled the MRTA to carry out detailed, imperceptible surveillance of its vic-
tims and reach a high degree of precision and speed in carrying out kidnappings.
10 CVR. BDI-II-P532. In-depth interview, September 2002. MRTA militant serving a sentence in a maximum-security prison.
11 Article 21 of the MRTA by-laws states: The maximum political and military bodies of the party to which the Military Forces are subordinate
are: The National Congress, National Convention and Central Committee (MRTA 1988: 60).
12 MRTA. MRTA by-laws, Article 30 (MRTA 1988: 53).
13 Statement to police by Alberto Glvez Olaechea on June 10, 1991, in the DIRCOTE ofce (Police Report 119-D1-DINCOTE, June 14, 1991).
14 8
Chapter 2
Civilian Governments in the First Decade of the Violence
C H A P T E R 3
Te civilian governments that held power in the rst decade of the violence responded inadequately to the
threat posed by the Shining Path and MRTA in the 1980s. Initial mistakes in assessing the problem were
followed by a lack of political will to design and apply a comprehensive strategy that would respond to the
complexities of the problem. Te tragic result was that the subversive organizations expanded and imposed
their violence on a considerable amount of national territory. Tis was complicated by the decision of various
administrations to cede control of the anti-subversive ght to the armed forces without civilian authorities
taking sucient steps to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the population. With the exception of
some notable cases, these administrations renounced the civil and democratic authority won through free
elections, allowing a broad section of the Peruvian population to be placed under military rule.
ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT FERNANDO BELAUNDE
TERRY AND THE POPULAR ACTION FRONT
Te CVR recorded 7,795 deaths and disappearances during the government of President Fernando Be-
launde Terry as a result of the violence unleashed by the PCP-SL. Tis number represents 35 percent of
the total number of victims from the entire period of violence, as reported to the CVR. Te CVR also
found that of the 7,795 victims reported between 1980 and 1985, the subversive organization was respon-
sible for 48 percent while 45 percent were attributed to state security forces.
By the end of the Belaunde administration, 32 provinces were under a state of emergency with fundamental
rights suspended. A nationwide state of emergency was declared on six occasions during his administration.
Te department of Ayacucho, where the PCP-SL began its armed struggle in May 1980, was under a
partial or complete state of emergency beginning in October 1981. On January 1, 1983, the armed forces
took charge of maintaining internal order in the department. Te highest number of deaths and disap-
pearances registered during the years of violence were recorded in this department in 1984. Ayacucho also
had the highest number of human rights abuses recorded by the CVR.
Te CVR has conrmed that massive human rights abuses occurred between 1983 and 1985, with the ru-
ral population of the central Andes suering the brunt of the violence. Tis was the result of the constant
increase in terrorist actions perpetrated by the PCP-SL as well as the response from the armed forces,
which, as has been noted, were given broad powers over the anti-subversive ght as of December 1982.
Context at the beginning of the internal armed confict
Fernando Belaunde, an architect and candidate of the Popular Action party (Accin Popular, AP), was
elected to the presidency for a second time on May 18, 1980. His party controlled a slight majority of seats
in the Senate (26) and an absolute majority of seats in the House of Representatives (98).
1
Tere are certain elements of the national context when the AP took over the government that must be
understood. It corresponded precisely with the moment when it was necessary to combat the Shining
Paths initial actions.
First, the country that Belaunde was elected to govern had grown quickly compared to 1968, when he
was overthrown in a military coup. Te military government that ran the country for 12 years instituted
a development model that was based on state intervention in the nancial, production, distribution, com-
mercial and service sectors of the economy, focusing specically on redistributing wealth and enforcing
policies of social participation in private and public companies. As a result of that model, in 1980 the
Peruvian state had vastly increased its control over the nations wealth as well as the bureaucracy needed
1 The 1979 Constitution created a 60-member Senate and a 180-member House of Representatives. The majority, won by the AP in both
houses, was increased by its alliance with the Popular Christian Party.
152
Chapter 3
to manage it.
2
Reforms were introduced during this period that transformed Peruvian society, giving sec-
tors that had long been excluded a voice in the public sphere.
Second, the parties that had once formed the political system were weakened by 1980. Tis weakness was
due to 12 years of rule by a military government that had limited the scope of political parties, as well as
political and civil rights, and used selective deportations to silence the opposition. Te parties were also
extremely slow in adapting to the social transformation in the country that preceded the return to democ-
racy, failing to adequately adapt their structures, ideologies and platforms to the new context.
Te ruling party shared this weakness. During the years of military rule, the partys political activity had
decreased substantially.
3
It is important to highlight, however, that the AP chose not to participate in the
1978 Constituent Assembly, preferring to focus on rebuilding its party organization. Tis deprived the
party of the chance to take part in debates over the new Constitution. Most of the parties that partici-
pated in the 1980 elections had elected delegates to the assembly.
Tird, the new government took oce while the relationship between a civilian government and the armed
forces was still unclear and did not meet democratic standards. Belaundes decision to keep commanders of
the three military branchesArmy, Navy and Air Forcein place during his rst year in oce reected
the militarys high level of autonomy in defense and national security issues, its control of the National
Defense System, which was inherited from the dictatorship, and its maintenance of the military budget. Be-
launde also chose to keep the three military ministriesWar, Navy and Aeronauticsthroughout his term.
A nal characteristic of the political transition was the climate of social unrest. In 1980, there were 739
strikes involving 481,000 workers; in 1981, there were 871 strikes involving 857,000 workers; and in
1982, there were 809 strikes involving 572,000 workers.
Rounding out the picture were a brief border conict with neighboring Ecuador in 1981, massive eco-
nomic losses from the El Nio phenomenon in 1983 and the international debt crisis, which severely
aected the countrys productive sector and nances, in the early 1980s.
Initial responses to subversion
Te CVR has found that armed subversive actions using terrorist methods, which were initiated by the
PCP-SL, provoked two responses from the AP administration. Te rst consisted of allowing the police
forcesthe Civil Guard, Republican Guard and the Investigative Police of Perucontrolled by the Inte-
rior Ministry to deal with the problem. Te second response was to leave the anti-subversive ght in the
hands of the armed forces, with little civilian control. In both cases, particularly the rst, the administra-
tion made serious mistakes in assessing the subversive threat.
4
First actions and assessments
Te Shining Paths rst actions were carried out in Ayacucho and Lima. Te best known is the subversives
attack in Chuschi, Ayacucho, on May 17, 1980, when they burned ballot boxes that were to be used in the
general elections the following day. For the PCP-SL, that action marked the start of the armed struggle.
On June 13, 1980, militants of the PCP-SLs Classist Workers and Laborers Movement (Movimiento de
Obreros y Trabajadores Clasistas, MOTC) exploded Molotov cocktails in the municipal oces in San
Martn de Porres, a Lima district. On June 15, another explosive device was set o at the tomb of General
2 The public sector workforce grew from 225,714 to 424,611 employees between 1969 and 1978. On the economic model of the military
dictatorship and the growth of the state, see Wise (2003: 119-158).
3 During the military government, Popular Action held only two party congresses to elect general secretaries.
4 The choice between the police and military options was part of a much broader debate within the AP government. One side, led by Senator
Javier Alva Orlandini, wanted to increase the partys infuence over the government by naming prefects, sub-prefects, governors and other low-
level bureaucrats as well as exercising the partys strength in Congress. The other side, represented by the Cabinet Chief and Finance Minister,
Manuel Ulloa Elas, pushed for ensuring macroeconomic stability by guaranteeing technocratic management of the economy and following the
guidelines of multilateral fnancial organizations.
153
Juan Velasco Alvarado, the rst military president. Tose attacks occurred while the armed forces, under
the leadership of General Francisco Morales Bermdez, were still running the country.
5
Te rst obstacle to eciently dealing with the subversion was a decient assessment of the problem and the
confusing label given to the group responsible for these acts of terrorism and sabotage. Te government had
two principal theories about subversion, neither of which included a direct examination of the PCP-SL.
6
International plot theory
Some members of the AP government saw the appearance of the PCP-SL as an expansion of international
communism. Tis interpretation, inuenced by the ongoing Cold War, considered communism to be
part of an extensive international network that was well nanced and organized and capable of imple-
menting revolutionary strategies around the globe. Foreign Relations Minister Javier Arias Stella stated
that while there was no proof, Tere was highly suspicious evidence of some kind of foreign intervention
in the acts of sabotage.
7
More than a year after the PCP-SL began its actions, President Belaunde said
that the attacks were part of a plan led, organized and nanced from abroad.
8
He would later state that
this is a ght between democracy and totalitarianism. Tey want to undermine and wipe out democracy,
and they have international backing to do it.
9
Tese comments were not supported with evidence, and according to information obtained by the CVR,
members of the administration admitted privately that they had no proof.
10
Theory of convergence between social mobilization and subversion
Another sector within the administration believed that there was a link between the wave of social pro-
tests, over which left-wing parties had powerful inuence, and the acts of violence. Te end of the 1970s
and the start of the 1980s witnessed the rapid spread of social protests that were not conned to unions,
but involved urban grassroots organizations, particularly in Limas shantytowns. Tis wave of protests
coincided with the political platforms of a signicant number of left-wing political organizations that
opted to participate in the democratic electoral process and promoted mobilization of the masses as a way
of achieving social democracy.
11
Some sectors within the government linkedwithout specifying the linksocial protests with terrorist
attacks. Interior Minister Jos Mara de la Jara stated that the new Head of State Security, PIP General
Edgar Luque, had been given the mission to see if a link exists between factory takeovers, violence, labor
troubles and terrorism.
12
Cabinet Chief Ulloa Elas stated that there was a coincidence between terror-
ist acts and labor conicts.
13
Senator Alva Orlandini maintained that there was a campaign against the
democratic system and that the acts of terrorism in the central highlands link agitation in the workplace
and the countryside.
14
Besides the politicians comments, the Commander of the Civil Guard, General
Jorge Balaguer, stated that left-wing groups were responsible for altering social peace with strikes, work
5 There is still debate over whether the Morales Bermdez government left behind fles on the incipient PCP-SL activity. The CVR believes
that the answer to that question does not have a decisive bearing on an understanding of the general process, given the minimal information
about the subversive organizations and its plans for the armed struggle that existed at the time.
6 In considering this hypothesis, it is important to keep in mind that during Belaundes frst term (1963-1968), he and his party had faced a
guerrilla insurgency in the Andes in 1965, which was eliminated by the armed forces in only a few months. In 1968, Belaunde was overthrown
and deported by the military coup that led to the 12-year military government discussed at the start of this chapter.
7 El Comercio, December 15, 1980. In Desco 1989: 371.
8 El Comercio, September 16, 1981. In Desco 1989: 377.
10 Another widespread claim, both in ofcial and media circles, is that Peruvian terrorists are receiving support from foreign countries. Cuba
is most prominently hinted at, but ofcials decline to be specifc in public, and in private admit that they have no convincing evidence. In fact,
Perus terrorists show few signs of being particularly well-equipped. Declassifed CIA document, No. 344, April 20, 1982.
11 In Desco 1981. See the overview of left-wing thinking in reference to the importance of social mobilizations.
13 La Repblica, August 22, 1982. In Desco 1989: 382.
14 Expreso, November 28, 1982. In Desco 1989: 387.
154
Chapter 3
stoppages and subversive acts.
15
A variation of this theory attributed the rst acts of sabotage and terrorism to followers of General Juan
Velasco Alvarado, who had created a system of social mobilization during his government (1968-1975) as
a complement to reforms that were put in place.
Two ways of seeing the confict
In addition to these divergent assessments of the cause, the AP government also had two basic ways of
dealing with subversion.
Te rst emphasized police intelligence work and was wary of involving the armed forces in the ght against
terrorism. Te other called for a rm hand in dealing with subversion, which meant involving the military.
Supporters of the dierent approaches were evenly divided in the administration in the last six months of 1980,
but the situation changed by the end of following year. In 1982, as PCP-SL activities increased, the government
position leaned progressively toward the military option. Te decision to involve the military was nally made
in late 1982, and the armed forces were put in charge of the anti-subversive eort in Ayacucho.
Te rst call for a heavy hand in dealing with the subversion came in October 1980. On October 20,
Senator Alva Orlandini proposed legislation that would elevate the crimes of sabotage and terrorism to
treason. Te initiative was supported by Cabinet Chief Ulloa Elas, but rejected by Congress. On De-
cember 17, Senator Alva Orlandiniwho had been Minister of Government and Police during the nal
months of the rst guerrilla uprising in 1965proposed declaring an emergency zone and calling up the
armed forces to ght terrorism. Tat bill also failed in Congress.
At the same time, a more moderate position was spearheaded by Interior Minister Jos Mara de la Jara.
On August 5, 1980, De la Jara rejected the idea that there was a guerrilla outbreak and said that the
PCP-SL was a group without strength. In November, despite the increase in armed actions, he said it
was an exaggeration to talk about a terrorist threat.
16
Finally, in June 1981, he stated that acts of terrorism
had dramatically decreased thanks to ecient police work.
17
Other party leaders, including the mayor of Lima Eduardo Orrego and Representative Francisco Be-
launde, backed the interior ministers position. Representative Belaunde stated in November 1980 that it
was an exaggeration to call childish actions terrorism.
18
On December 17, when Senator Alva Orlandini proposed declaring an emergency zone and dispatching
the armed forces, Minister De la Jara rejected the idea, stating that terrorism could be controlled with-
out having to suspend constitutional guarantees. According to the minister, the work being done by
the Civil Guard and Investigative Police
19
was sucient, and if necessary, the ministry could call up the
special police battalion known as the Sinchis.
Prior to this debate, in March 1981, the government passed Legislative Decree 046, which codied the
crime of terrorism and established the procedural norms for trying someone for this crime. Article 1 of
the decree dened a terrorist as one whom:
[Provokes or maintains] a state of anxiety, alarm or terror in the population or a sector of
it, committing acts that could endanger peoples life, health or property or that are aimed
at destroying or damaging pdyyublic or private buildings, roads, communication systems,
transportation, or the ow of energy [...] disrupting public tranquility or aecting interna-
16 El Peruano, November 25, 1980. In Desco 1989: 370.
17 El Comercio, June 21, 1981. In Desco 1989: 374.
18 El Diario, November 11, 1980. In Desco 1989: 368.
19 La Prensa, December 17, 1980. In Desco 1989: 371.
155
tional relations or state security [...].
Te interior minister began to change his position in August 1981, after an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Lima.
For the rst time, De la Jara admitted that a state of emergency could be declared if the situation worsened.
20
Te situation did get worse. According to documents reviewed by the CVR, 791 attacks were registered
between May 1980 and October 1981. Of these, 140or 18 percentwere staged in September 1981.
On October 11, a Shining Path column attacked the police station in Tambo, Ayacucho. After a Cabi-
net meeting the next day, President Belaunde declared a state of emergency in ve of Ayacuchos seven
provinces.
21
Te press reported at the time that De la Jara and Vice Minister Hctor Lpez Martnez
encouraged the president to make that decision. De la Jara would resign from oce at the end of October
because of an incident unrelated to the subversive threat. He stepped down on October 28 after the death
of a university student in Cusco, accepting political responsibility for the case.
22
Te CVR believes that the rst state of emergency marked a turning point in the way in which Belaundes
administration addressed the problem. Tere was a sustained increase in the levels of violence throughout
1982, with several of the PCP-SLs armed actions having major repercussions. Tis led the government to
put the military in charge of controlling the internal order of Ayacucho, one province in the department
of Huancavelica and one province in the department of Apurmac.
Major actions during this period included: the Shining Paths attack on the prison in Huamanga, Aya-
cucho, on March 2, 1982, which freed its jailed militants; destruction of the Allpachaca agricultural
experiment center at the San Cristbal de Huamanga National University on August 3; an attack on the
police station in Vilcashuamn on August 22; an attack on the Huanta police station on October 4; and
a complete blackout of Lima and Callao on August 19. Te blackout in the capital led to a 60-day state
of emergency in Metropolitan Lima and Callao. Te state of emergency was extended in Ayacucho and
Apurmac in November.
Finally, on December 29, 1982, President Belaunde signed Supreme Decree 068-92-IN, which declared
a state of emergency in the Ayacucho provinces of Huanta, La Mar, Cangallo, Vctor Fajardo and Hua-
manga as well as one province each in Huancavelica and Apurmac and put the armed forces in charge
of guaranteeing internal order. With that, the constitutional government opted for a military response
to the conict. Te decision was inevitable, but the CVR believes that it did not have to mean transfer-
ring political responsibility to the military or neglecting to institute any sort of safeguards to protect the
population. Neglecting to institute oversight mechanisms was an obvious mistake.
Militarization of the confict
Te period of greatest violence in the 20 years reviewed by the CVR began when the armed forces entered
Ayacucho. Te number of dead and disappeared in those years reached levels that would not be repeated
in the long years of violence.
Interior Ministry
One of the direct eects of the decision to call up the military was loss of control over the anti-subversion
eort within the Interior Ministry.
23
In the remaining years of Belaundes administration (1983-85), three
ministers, Fernando Rincn Bazo, Luis Percovich Roca and General scar Brush Noel, were in charge
of the ministry. Te rst concentrated his eorts on reorganizing the ministry, but resigned in April 1983
21 Huamanga, Huanta, Cangallo, La Mar and Vctor Fajardo.
22 Retired General Jos Gagliardi was named Interior Minister. He maintained many of De la Jaras policies, including defending the role of the
police in fghting subversion. In September 1982, Gagliardi proposed, with no Cabinet support, the possibility of a dialogue with the PCP-SL. He
left the ministry at the end of 1982.
23 Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that at the start of the armed forces intervention in the confict the police continued to carry out
the majority of armed actions in the emergency zone.
156
Chapter 3
after massacres by the PCP-SL in Lucanamarca and Huancasancos. Te second, Luis Percovich, was
in favor of the armed forces involvement in Ayacucho: I personally believe that the armed forces can
intervene more eectively to control these acts of violence.
24
He maintained that position during the 18
months he ran the ministry:
[T]he Interior Ministry does not participate in decisions concerning the anti-subversive strat-
egy in the zone [...]. I believe that this is the correct approach. Because there is a military-po-
litical commander, intervention by the Interior Ministry would only wrest authority from the
political-military commander and create confusion about the decisions that must be adopted.
25
Percovich remained on the sidelines of the anti-subversive eort, seeing police action as complementary
to military eorts, and concentrated on controlling social agitation. He was replaced at Interior by Gen-
eral scar Brush Noel, who had been running the Ministry of War.
In summary, the CVR found that after the military was put in charge of the anti-subversive eort, the
three remaining interior ministers were uninterested in developing their own anti-subversive policy and
did not establish proper civilian control or oversight over what was occurring in the emergency zone. As
a result, civilian authorities did not obtain information about the subversive organizations nature, strat-
egies and tactics. Te armed forces involvement in the theater of operations in Ayacucho should have
generated much greater interest from the elected civilian government in guaranteeing respect for human
rights in the region.
Political-military commands
Te armed forces were in control of the anti-subversive ght in the emergency zone in the central Andes
from January 1, 1983, until the end of Belaundes administration. Te militarys participation unfolded
within a legal framework that vaguely dened the powers of the military commands and provided inad-
equate mechanisms for protecting the human rights of people living under military rule.
While actions by the political-military commands hit hard at the PCP-SL, according to evidence reviewed
by the CVR, they did not stop terrorist attacks or eradicate the subversion. Furthermore, they instituted
widespread practices of human rights abuses against the civilian population in Ayacucho, Apurmac and
Huancavelica at certain times and in certain places.
Supreme Decree 068-82-IN, which established the 60-day state of emergency in various provinces of
24 La Crnica, April 25, 1983.
25 Caretas, May 9, 1984.
FIGURE 22
PERU 1980-2000: DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED TO THE CVR, BY YEAR
1990 1985 1980 2000 1995
2250
4500
0
157
Ayacucho, Apurmac and Huancavelica, did not specify the functions of the political-military command.
It stated that the armed forces would assume control of internal order in those provinces to re-establish
public order. While broad, the decree signed by President Belaunde did not mention actions the civil
government would undertake as a complement to military activities. Given the PCP-SLs criminal attacks
on civilian authorities and ocials assessment of the threat, the government chose to hand power to the
military without designing its own strategy for the defense and restoration of civilian authority.
Tere were three military commanders in the emergency zone during the rest of the administration.
Year one: General Roberto Noel
Te rst head of the political-military command in the emergency zone was Army General Roberto Cle-
mente Noel. He took charge of the zone on December 31, 1982, and 2,000 soldiers were given the task
of controlling the provinces declared under a state of emergency.
At the time, Noel still believed that the subversive phenomenon was a localized outbreak of guerrilla activity
that could be eradicated in two months.
26
When he took the post, Noel said that as of December 29, 1982,
there was a military tribunal in place to deal with excesses committed by police and military ocers.
27
Noels period was marked by an increase in PCP-SL activity, which was a foreseeable result of the gov-
ernments decision to involve the armed forces in the conict. Te period also witnessed the rst violent
rejection of the Shining Path by some groups of Ayacucho peasants, and the subversives vicious response
to these revolts. Emblematic examples were the events in Uchuraccay on January 26, 1983, where eight
journalists were killed, an event that unleashed a spiral of violence in the community that would lead
to the deaths of dozens of Uchuraccay residents over the next months, and the PCP-SLs massacres in
Lucanamarca and Huancasancos in April 1983.
In 1983 there were also serious cases of human rights violations by state agents, including extrajudicial
executions in the communities of Totos and Chuschi, murders at the Los Cabitos military base and the
massacre of peasants in the district of Soccos, 18 kilometers from the city of Huamanga.
In interviews with the CVR, Noel stated that he had President Belaundes backing throughout his time
as Head of the Command. He recounted the following dialogue:
Mr. President, excuse me, I want to ask a question, because you have changed the mission.
Am I or am I not going to ght? President Belaunde told me, General, you go into combat
with all your energy and all the support of the constitutional government. Tank you.
28

26 El Comercio, January 1, 1983. In an interview with the CVR, retired General Noel denied these afrmations: I never said optimistically that we
would be fnished [with subversion] in two or three months. What happened was that there were moments of calm (CVR. Interview. March 18, 2003).
27 El Comercio, January 17, 1983. In Desco 1989: 571.
28 CVR. Interview. August 28, 2002.
HEADS OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY
COMMANDS IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE
1/HE WAS AN ARMY COLONEL BEFORE BEING NAMED HEAD OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMAND
PERIOD
ARMY GENERAL ROBERTO CLEMENTE NOEL DECEMBER 31, 1982-DECEMBER 31, 1983
ARMY GENERAL ADRIN HUAMN DECEMBER 31, 1983-AUGUST 28, 1984
ARMY GENERAL WILFREDO MORI 1/ AUGUST 28, 1984-SEPTEMBER 18, 1985
TABLE 5
HEADS OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMANDS IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE
158
Chapter 3
Noel said that he periodically reported on his activities:
I normally came every two or three months and coordinated with the President of the Joint
Chiefs of Sta. I went to the Presidential Palace with the Minister of War and the Army
Commander. Te National Defense Council would meet there and the president would give
orders based on the information.
29
Testimonies from other close colleagues of President Belaunde during this period contradict Noels statements.
Politicians and the media denounced human rights violations during Noels tenure as political-military
commander of the emergency zone. Tose accusations were interpreted by the administration as part of
the oppositions strategy and not taken as a serious warning of the expanding climate of violence in the
country. On July 1, 1983, left-wing Representative Javier Diez Canseco led a constitutional accusation
with the Attorney Generals Oce, accusing Noel of assassination, kidnapping, illegal arrests and abuse
of authority. Te accusation was dismissed.
Year two: General Adrin Huamn
General Adrin Huamn took over the political-military command on December 31, 1983. Huamn ad-
opted a dierent strategy in the anti-subversive ght, prohibiting soldiers from drinking as a way of pre-
venting abuses and ordering that disappearances be investigated by the police. In a communiqu released
jointly with Ayacucho Superior Court prosecutor Jorge Zegarra, the political-military command called
on people who had been victims of abuses to le accusations so that corrective measures could be taken.
Te new strategy included requesting measures for improving the local peoples economic and social con-
ditions. Tis included, among other things, a demand for greater economic resources:
[I]n the emergency zone there is not only a power vacuum, but a lack of resources. Te Army
is replacing the Shining Path in terms of the distribution of food and other items, but the
budget does not allow for us to carry out this plan.
30
Te call for greater investment in Ayacucho was not heeded by the government. Huamns proposals were
slowly translated into a demand for the government to exercise greater control over local authorities. He
stated in August 1984:
Te solution is not military, because if it were military I would resolve it in minutes [...] if it
were only a matter of killing, Ayacucho would cease to exist in half an hour, the same thing
with Huancavelica [...] but we are talking about human lives, of forgotten people who have
been making demands for 160 years without a response, and we are now seeing the results
[...] the solution, in my opinion, is to correct the situation that exists, that jails are not lled
with innocent people, that the judges do not accept bribes [...]. Lima wants to be Peru [...].
We are dealing with the same people who allowed subversion to happen Arent they the
same people who allowed abuses, the same judges, the same ones who allowed all this to
happen? [...] Te armed forces are not in charge of the political situation, only the military
situation. Being in charge of the political situation means that when you come across an
injustice, you can change the authorities immediately.
31
Te new approach taken by Huamn basically meant giving the military commanders greater political au-
tonomy, but it did not signify any major change in the intensity of the violence. On the contrary, the highest
number of deaths and disappearances recorded between 1980 and 2000 took place in 1984. Tere was also
a notorious increase in the PCP-SLs terrorist activities. Table 6, while depicting aggregate data from the
29 CVR. Interview. March 18, 2003.
30 Desco. Resumen Semanal, March 19, 1984.
31 La Repblica, August 27, 1984.
159
entire country, demonstrates the increase in subversive activity in the emergency zone in the central Andes.
In response to spiraling violence, the president and Joint Chiefs of Sta issued an ocial communiqu on
July 7 stating that they had given instructions to eradicate narco-terrorism with the participation of the
armed forces. Te government discounted the possibility of declaring a state of siege, but did prolong the
nationwide state of emergency for an additional 30 days.
32
Te increase in actions and crimes by the Shining Path was answered by an increase in repressive tactics
by the security forces. Tis led to numerous human rights abuses: 20 percent of forced disappearances
committed during the 20-year internal conict occurred in 1984.
Successive accusations of human rights violations were reported in August 1984, including the assassination
of evangelicals in Callqui-Nisperocniyoc, the disappearance of journalist Jaime Ayala, the discovery of peasant
leader Jess Oropesas body (Puquio),
33
and the discovery of mass graves in Pucayacu. Human rights abuses on
the Los Cabitos military base continued during Huamns tenure as political-military commander.
Te CVR believes that these events, which are only a few of all that took place, should have led the gov-
ernment to undertake a serious overhaul of the anti-subversive strategy. Tis did not occur.
Huamn was relieved of his command on August 28, 1984, through a communiqu from the Joint
Chiefs of Sta:
Te Joint Chiefs of Sta of the Armed Forces make public that, for the good of the service
and according to current norms, on this date the Army has named Second Infantry Divi-
sion Colonel Wilfredo Mori Orzo as political-military commander of the emergency zone.
34
Te CVR found no evidence that the replacement of Huamn was motivated by accusations of human
rights violations committed while he was in charge. Te widespread practice of crimes and human rights
abuses that began in 1983 continued under General Mori Orzo.
Government responsibility
It is clear that Belaundes administration supported the actions of the political-military commanders
between 1983 and 1985, despite accusations of serious human rights abuses and information that the
32 El Peruano, July 8, 1984.
33 His murder occurred outside the emergency zone.
34 El Peruano, August 29, 1984.
SOURCE: DESCO (1989)
TOTAL
219
715
891
1,123
1,760
2,050
JAN
-
90
65
83
93
153
FEB
-
29
48
52
104
188
MAR
-
34
60
55
112
118
APR
-
45
71
60
105
261
MAY
2
75
91
41
145
131
JUN
27
65
90
192
120
139
JUL
40
23
106
173
288
203
AUG
30
71
48
70
124
132
SEP
26
140
64
75
141
155
OCT
41
56
54
87
185
160
NOV
25
40
90
166
185
129
DEC
28
47
104
69
155
281
YEAR
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
TABLE 6
PERU 1980-1985: NUMBER OF ATTACKS PERPETRATED
BY THE PCP-SL, BY YEAR AND MONTH
16 0
Chapter 3
government obviously had about these actions. Te decision to involve the armed forces in the anti-
subversive eort was made without taking necessary precautions to protect the rights of the population.
Civilian authorities gave military commanders broad powers and renounced their role in impeding and
punishing human rights abuses.
Undermining the rule of law
Article 231 of the 1979 Constitution, which was in place until 1993, allowed for a state of emergency to
be declared in case of disturbance of peace or internal order, catastrophe or grave circumstances that af-
fect the life of the nation. Such a measure was not to last longer than 60 days, and each extension would
require a new decree. Te same article stipulated that during a state of emergency constitutional rights
related to the inviolability of the home and freedom of assembly and freedom to travel in national terri-
tory were suspended. Tese rights included inviolability of home (Article 2, Section 7), freedom to choose
a place of residence (Article 2, Section 9), the right to peaceful assembly (Article 2, Section 10), and the
right not to be detained without the written consent of a judge or police ocers in the case in agrante
delicto (Article 2, Section 20(g)).
Te AP government declared a state of emergency on October 12, 1981, and as of January 1, 1983, it put
the armed forces in charge of internal order.
Tis temporary measure took on a permanent character rst in Ayacucho, then in other departments (in-
cluding the capital) and nally in the entire nation. On May 25, 1983, the cities of Lima and Callao were
placed under a state of emergency because of a strike by police ocers. Te measure was extended to the
entire country for the rst time on May 30, 1983. Te nationwide state of emergency would be declared
six more times during the remaining years of the Belaunde government.
Te anti-subversive ght developed under conditions in which the populations fundamental rights were
violated because there was no clear denition of the functions or attributes implied by military control
and there were permanent restrictions on constitutional rights.
Impunity
Te armed forces anti-subversive strategy in the conict area was extremely costly in terms of human life.
Some people considered this cost inevitable and publicly defended it. In September 1984, Minister of War
General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra stated:
[W]e cannot understand that in a war zonea zone that is practically extraterritorialwe
must maintain the rule of law. We have given the armed forces the task of eliminating the
Shining Path, but when they go to pull the trigger here comes the Attorney General want-
ing to know if we are going to kill this man, and then there is the lawyer, the journalist [...].
Tere is a tendency to criticize everything the military does in Ayacucho [...] there is the
impression that it is the security forces that should be eliminated [...] we talk about human
rights in a unilateral manner. Tere are no human rights in war.
35
Multiple human rights violations were made public through various accusations, which the AP govern-
ment saw as part of the political ght by the opposition. Tat position was expressed by media connected
with the administration. For example, political commentator Manuel DOrnellas stated that the discov-
ery of mass graves was a true political gift for the extreme left, adding that the war that we would like
to be clean, but which is obviously dirty, was ocially declared by the group led by Guzmn.
36
According to Javier Alva Orlandini,
37
President Belaunde was aware of the seriousness of events and
35 Caretas. No. 817, September 1984. In Desco 1989: 378.
36 Expreso, August 25, 1984.
37 CVR. Interview. August 16, 2002.
16 1
shared Minister Jos Mara de la Jaras doubts about declaring a state of emergency and ordering the
armed forces to intervene.
Nevertheless, the CVR found that after the political-military command was established in Ayacucho,
and in the face of the increasing number of crimes committed by the PCP-SL and state agents, President
Belaunde did not develop a policy that would guarantee the protection of human rights. On the contrary,
he chose to overlook accusations of human rights abuses.
In August 1983, Amnesty International sent a letter to President Belaunde maintaining that state security forc-
es had summarily executed hundreds of people in anti-subversive operations in the Andes. Belaunde discarded
the report, saying Te letters from Amnesty International go into the trashcan [...] I dont accept them.
38
Te AP governments indierence to these crimes was not limited to the executive branch, but also
extended to the legislature. Te CVR has found that Congress, in which the AP held the majority of
seats, never formed a commission to investigate forced disappearances, despite numerous accusations. In
general, Congress did not fulll its oversight role in the area of human rights. Coupled with the attitude
of the executive branch, this helped to create a climate of impunity that the CVR considers deplorable,
because it led to the loss of thousands of lives.
Te administration headed by Belaunde, however, did progress in strengthening democratic institutions.
Te AP government reinstated freedom of the presswhich had been limited during the long years of
military ruleheld municipal elections and maintained a clear separation of powers. Te preservation of
constitutional order in these areas was a valuable tool in resisting the Shining Path insurrection, which
was aimed at the destruction of the old state. Te administration ended with a transfer of power after
free and fair elections, as stipulated in the 1979 Constitution.
Constitutional order, however, was weakened in one essential area: respect for fundamental human rights.
President Belaunde was unsuccessful in stopping the advance of subversion and uninterested in prevent-
ing or punishing human rights violations perpetrated by the security forces, to which he had given broad
authority over the anti-subversive ght.
One of the nal decisions in the anti-subversive ght adopted during the Belaunde administration was
the passage of Law 24150, which established the powers of the political-military command:
[C]oordinate the participation of the public and private sectors located in the emergency
zone, coordinate and supervise the actions of the sectors, public agencies, departmental
corporations and other public sector institutions, request the appointment or transfer of po-
litical and administrative authorities in the areas in cases of negligence, abdication, vacancy
or other impediments to carrying out their functions [...].
Te CVR considers that these norms, and the broad powers granted to political-military commands, were the
outgoing governments stamp of approval for the military strategy that led to massive human rights violations.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PERUVIAN APRISTA PARTY
Te testimonies received by the CVR have allowed it to identify 8,173 deaths and disappearances
between 1985 and 1990. Of these, 58 percent were perpetrated by subversive organizations, while 30
percent can be attributed to state security forces. During the rst year of President Alan Garca Prezs
administration, the number of victims declined substantially compared to 1984, the worst year of the
conict. Nevertheless, the second violent peak in the number of victims came in 1989. In addition, vio-
lent actions were registered in more areas of the country and more public authorities were killed than at
any other time during the conict, principally at the hands of the PCP-SL. Te political-military com-
38 Desco. Resumen Semanal, August 19, 1983.
16 2
Chapter 3
mands expanded as violence spread throughout the country, implying more restrictions on democratic
institutions and judicial independence.
Te government and the main political authorities of the Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP) stopped attributing
responsibility for human rights violations to the military in 1986, after the massacre of Shining Path inmates
during riots in prisons in Lima and Callaomainly at El Frontn. Civilian authorities adopted an attitude
of tolerance for human rights abuses, which allowed for impunity for these crimes and human rights viola-
tions. Examples include the cases of El Frontn (1896), Parcco Alto and Pomatambo (1986), the Santa Rosa
military base in Apurmac (1987), Cayara (1988) and the extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances
that followed the confrontation between an Army patrol and a MRTA column in Molinos (Junn, 1989).
Te PAP faced growing opposition from politicians and the media after the failed attempt to nationalize
the countrys banks in July 1987. Among other things, this new opposition led to an increase in the num-
ber of accusations of human rights violations involving the government and the party. Meanwhile, the
Shining Path began a campaign of selective assassinations of party members, making the PAP the party
with the highest number of victims during the internal armed conict.
In response, the ruling party closed ranks and distanced itself from the rest of the countrys political
forces and from the possibility of forming alliances to guarantee greater political support. Tis was most
obvious in Congress, where PAP lawmakers supported measures to block investigations into serious hu-
man rights violations, such as the massacre in Cayara and the participation of paramilitary groups in the
anti-subversive ght. Tat support carried a high political cost.
PAPs opposition during the Popular Action administration
PAP and the start of the internal armed confict
Te beginning of the PCP-SLs peoples war coincided with a reorganization of the PAP and the partys role
as the principal opposition to the Popular Action government. During the political transition that began with
the 1978 Constituent Assembly, the PAP was the countrys main political force and a stabilizing factor in the
political process. After the death of party founder Vctor Ral Haya de la Torre in August 1979, the PAP faced
a number of internal struggles that would lead to its defeat in the April and November 1980 elections.
PAPs opposition to the APs anti-subversive policy was clear from the onset of the conict. Together with
other political parties, PAPs congressional bloc objected to the APs proposal to declare people accused
of acts of sabotage and terrorism to be traitors. Te party also opposed Legislative Decree 046, passed
in March 1981, which dened the crime of terrorism and established corresponding procedural norms.
It was also highly critical of the decision to impose the rst state of emergency in Ayacucho as terrorist
actions increased in the highlands and in Lima.
In addition to opposing the various legal norms proposed by Popular Action to confront the PCP-SL, the PAP
also denounced human rights violations committed by state security forces. When congressional opposition
called Cabinet members to Congress for hearings on the increase in violent actions, PAP Representative Javier
Valle Riestra, President of the Human Rights Commission, was in charge of preparing the questions.
PAP and the militarization of the confict
Te PAP administrations initial approach to terrorism must be viewed in light of its opposition to the an-
ti-subversive policies of the AP government that preceded it, which is explained above. Te APs policy led
to a militarization of the conict, as the Shining Path stepped up its activities and the Belaunde admin-
istration put the armed forces in charge of combating subversion through political-military commands.
Garca consolidated his power as leader of the PAP during the AP government. A member of Congress,
Garca was elected General Secretary of the PAP at the end of 1982, at the same time that the government
16 3
passed the decree putting the armed forces in charge of ghting subversion in Ayacucho. In August 1983,
Garca visited Huamanga to obtain rst-hand information about the situation in the region. He received
numerous testimonies of violations committed by the security forces. He denounced the problems and
demanded that the government rectify its policy in the zone: the government cannot confuse sanction
and punishment with generalized repression [...] in the name of the law, and it cannot treat all residents
of Ayacucho as suspects.
39

While Garca said the PCP-SL was involved in unjustiable terrorism, he nevertheless sought historic, so-
cial, psychological and regional reasons to explain it. He said it was a phenomenon that aected areas where
the political system and the parties have no presence, where the Shining Path presented itself as an alterna-
tive and where no one is telling these Peruvians that it is a blind alley, wrong and dangerous for the country.
He went on to say that the problem was largely ignored by Peruvian society and that the violence had been
separated from its causes and became charged with ideology and autonomous (Gonzlez, 1983b).
According to Garca, subversion had ideological components, leaders who were the central agents of
terrorism; it also has militants pressured by their social context or direct coercion. He said it was clear
that what is happening in Ayacucho is not a problem to be addressed on the battleeld, but through
intelligence work and development and that actions were needed that would remove the central leader-
ship using a well-trained intelligence service (Gonzlez, 1983b). Te violence is deep and long-term, he
added, suggesting that a strategy for long-term combat was needed along with a strategy for governance.
In reference to the violence, he said there is the need to create an adequate intelligence apparatus, prison
systems that allow inmates to be rehabilitated and, most importantly, a great historic national vision that
commits the entire country to non-violence (Gonzlez, 1983b).
Te PAP remained critical of human rights abuses committed by the armed forces during the nal years
of the Popular Action government, but without the energy that had characterized its initial reaction
when Noel was named the rst political-military commander. Some PAP spokespeople defended Noels
replacement, General Huamn, when he was dismissed as described above.
First years of the PAP government
Garca was inaugurated on July 28, 1985, in a favorable political climate. He not only received a solid
backing at the polls, but his party won a majority of the seats in both chambers of Congress. In his in-
augural address, he announced his intention to implement a socio-economic strategy to combat armed
subversion. Tere existed, according to high-ranking PAP leaders, a belief that a government that could
implement a social reform would disarm the insurgency.
40
About the governments military response to
the conict, the new president said that his administrations commitment was:
[To have no] more considerations than those required by our democratic creed and Chris-
tian faith. Te law will be applied with severity, even to those who violate human rights with
murder, extrajudicial executions, torture and abuse of authority, because to ght barbarity
it is not necessary to use barbarity.
41
One of the concrete measures announced by Garca was the release from prison of people accused of mi-
nor crimes. He said that this would be done by a commission of judicial experts who would evaluate the
cases of inmates serving time for terrorism and propose options that could include the release of prisoners
who had participated in actions that had resulted in deaths. He also announced that the police forces
would be reorganized within 90 days.
42

39 Desco. Resumen Semanal, August 26-September 1, 1983, No. 231, P. 2.
40 CVR. Interview with Armando Villanueva. October 30, 2002.
41 Desco. Resumen Semanal. July 26-August 1, 1985. Year VIII, No. 327
42 On August 6, the lower house of Congress approved a bill allowing the government to pass the Organic Law and the Foundation Law for
the Interior Ministry, the Organic Laws of each of the police forces and the Organic Law of the National Intelligence System. Desco. Resumen
Semanal, July 26-August 1, 1985. Year VIII, No. 327, p. 3.
16 4
Chapter 3
From the start, Garca ratied his governments priority of implementing development policies in the
countrys most depressed areas, especially the Andean trapezoid. According to the Vice Minister of In-
terior, this implied a kind of division of labor: We discussed how the military and some civilians would
be in charge of the anti-subversive ght, while the rest would work on reducing poverty, which would
mean that subversion would decline. Tats how we would attack it.
43
As noted above, a month and half before the change in government, Belaunde approved Legislative De-
cree 24150. Despite accusations of widespread human rights abuses, the outgoing president increased the
power of the political-military commands. Te legislative decree eectively institutionalized the states
of exception in which the armed forces control internal order and placed in the hands of the political-
military commands all activities related to internal order. Te law eectively limited the power of civilian
authorities in the emergency zones.
One of the problems faced by Garca was the history of tensions and mistrust between the PAP and the
armed forces.
44
Some of the problems had been overcome in the early 1960s, when Haya de la Torre
headed the Constituent Assembly convoked by the military government. Te mutual mistrust between
the PAP and the armed forces, which had begun decades earlier, appeared to take on new force as a
consequence of the internal armed conict. While the PAPs criticism of the role of the armed forces in
the emergency zone starting in 1983 was harsh, it paled in comparison to the position taken by left-wing
parties. Once in oce, however, the PAP had to establish a smooth relationship with the military that
could mesh with the historic task that the party planned to carry out and the lack of civilian control
over the anti-subversive ght, which the military had been running for the past two years. According to
former Vice Minister Agustn Mantilla:
[T]here were a series of stumbling blocks. Te armed forces had been the government in
years past and were coming out of a government that was weak and had ignored them po-
litically, but which had allowed them to do what appeared convenient without placing any
obstacles in the way. We encountered an uneasy situation. Psychologically, they were not
willing to be subjugated, silenced, managed or told what to do.
45
Te PAP was unable to establish its own guidelines for the anti-subversive ght as it did with its socio-
economic policies. It did not have proposals or militants trained in security issues who could organize
initiatives in that eld. A former PAP lawmaker from Ayacucho stated that, in the congressional blocs
rst meeting with Garca, he asked that they discuss the anti-subversive issue, specically how to involve
Ayacuchos peasants in the war against the PCP-SL. Te proposal was not discussed. In his opinion, the
party did not have a position; it did not have a thesis. When we came to the government, we were blind
with respect to the phenomenon of violence [...].
46
Former President Garca remembers that lawmaker Alberto Valencia and says he was right in his early
call to arm communities so that they could defend themselves against the Shining Path, but that in 1985
that idea was unacceptable to political leaders of various parties, not only the PAP. According to Garca,
besides a lack of special initiatives the party had serious limitations because everyone in the PAP ran
from the issue and it continued to be a military issue; thats true. If the military, police and DINCOTE
can solve it, then they should do it, because we dont know how [...].
47
Despite those strategic problems, the drop in the number of victims in the rst year of the government led
the PAP to believe that a change was occurring. Tat sense was strengthened by the MRTAs announce-
43 CVR. Interview with Agustn Mantilla. October 24, 2002.
44 These tensions originated with the brutal military repression of the PAP-led insurrection in July 1931 in the city of Trujillo on the northern
coast. When it was obvious that the military had put down the rebellion and retaken control of Trujillo, PAP militants executed several Army
ofcers whom they had taken prisoner. That, along with the massive fring squad deaths of PAP militants after the uprising, fed the deep
resentment between the party and the armed forces in the years to come.
45 CVR. Interview with Agustn Mantilla. October 24, 2002.
46 CVR. Interview with Alberto Valencia. September 11, 2002.
47 CVR. Interview with Alan Garca. May 7, 2003.
16 5
ment of a unilateral truce. While there was an overall decline in the number of attacks and sabotage, the
violence continued to expand beyond the Ayacucho countryside to new areas. In May 1985, only a few
weeks after the PAP victory, Luis Aguilar Cajahuamn, mayor of Pasco and a newly elected member of
the lower house of Congress, was murdered. His death marked the beginning of a Shining Path assassina-
tion campaign targeting PAP lawmakers, governors and local council members throughout the country
that would last several years. Te PCP-SL declared war on the Aprista government and responded to the
possibility of peace talks with murder.
48
Changes in the Interior Ministry and the Police Forces
As noted above, when the PCP-SL launched the peoples war, the government at the time ran into a num-
ber of diculties, including problems in the police forces. Not only were the police forces suering from
corruption related to drug tracking, but their three divisionsthe Civil Guard, Republican Guard and
the Investigative Police of Peruwere embroiled in internal conicts that basically paralyzed them.
In response, Garca announced a reorganization of the police forces. With the passage of a law restruc-
turing the police, Interior Minister Abel Salinas headed a commission that announced a number of
measures, including a purge of many high-ranking and beat ocers. Besides ocers who had question-
able records, a number of highly qualied ocers were also purged. Te following year, the government
undertook an eort to equip the forcesbuying vehicles, weapons, information systems and other items
that also improved the states ability to ght armed subversion.
Alternatives to addressing human rights abuses
Early on in the new government, in September 1985, came reports of mass graves from Army massacres
in Pucayacu, where seven people were killed, and Accomarca, where 69 people lost their lives. Te gov-
ernment immediately announced an investigation and demanded reports from the commanders of the
Second Military Region and the political-military commander of the emergency zone. With evidence
of the massacres in hand, the government demanded the resignation of the President of the Joint Chiefs
of Sta and red the regional commanders and the head of the political-military command. Te quick
response was a marked change from the previous administration.
Senator Valle Riestra, President of the Human Rights Commission, highlighted the obligation of those
responsible for the anti-subversive eort to be accountable for human rights abuses. Beyond investiga-
tions into events in Pucayacu and Accomarca, it was clear that defense of human rights was a priority
for the new government. Shortly after these events, the government created the Peace Commission to
introduce pacication as a component of the anti-subversive policy.
Te Peace Commission members included Judge Mario Surez Castaneyra; Bishop Augusto Beuzeville;
Fernando Cabieses, a physician; Diego Garca Sayn, a lawyer; Csar Rodrguez Rabanal, a psychoanalyst;
and Alberto Giesecke, a scientist. Besides advising the president on issues related to human rights and
pacication, the commissions task was unclear. Te commission worked without any real support from the
government or the political parties, and members resigned in December. As one commissioner stated, the
commission created expectations that were dicult to meet because the conditions it encountered were
exclusively geared toward dealing with certain eects or manifestations of violence, such as detention-disap-
pearance, innocent people in prison, proposals for legal norms for dealing with the problem of violence, etc.
Te president attempted to revive the eort in early 1986, reorganizing the Peace Commission with some
of the original members, but without the participation of the Catholic Church. In June, the Peace Com-
mission had a purely formal role during the uprising at the prisons. Shortly after the prison massacre,
the Peace Commission released a report on its actions and requested authority to investigate. Members
resigned on July 11, 1986, and the commission was never reactivated.
48 The Shining Paths Declaration of War. Caretas, May 13, 1985. P. 16.
16 6
Chapter 3
Impact of the prison massacre
By June 1986, there had been a decrease in the number of deaths in the zones that had been hardest hit.
In addition, the MRTA had called a truce, which was signicant even though the group was not as strong
as the PCP-SL; some members of the armed forces had been punished for human rights abuses, a reor-
ganization of the police forces was under way, and the state had initiated a program of social investment
in areas that had been most aected by the violence. Te economy was expanding and the government
enjoyed a high approval rating.
While those circumstances may have raised hopes for an end to the violence, there were also troubling
signs. Te Shining Path had been hit hard in the emergency zone, but it was gaining strength in other ar-
eas with its selective assassinations. As we have noted, the PCP-SL constantly harassed the government to,
as Abimael Guzmn stated, remove its progressive mask and force it to show its repressive underside.
Tat position translated into an agreement by the PCP-SL leadership to induce the PAP to genocide
with no thought for its own cadres and who would be killed as a result.
Following its plan, the PCP-SL launched a campaign to assassinate PAP members and attack party oces and
public institutions. It also stepped up its ambushes of the armed forces, trying to also force them to respond
with genocide. Te PCP-SL killed Rear Admiral Carlos Ponce Canessa, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Sta
and Head of the Navy, in May 1986. After the murder, the Navy Ministry demanded the reinstatement of
the death penalty, and the Navys Commander General attacked the pseudo-institutions that defend human
rights.
49
Shortly thereafter, the PCP-SL attempted to kill Alberto Kitasono, the PAPs organizational secretary,
who escaped unharmed. Tree Aprista militants and a passerby were killed, however.
Te PCP-SL also began to gain strength in the countrys jails, which it considered shining trenches of com-
bat, battleelds where it could continue to wage the peoples war and where the plan to induce the APRA
to genocide spread. Tere were also precedents of prison riots that had ended with multiple deaths, such as
one by inmates jailed on ordinary criminal charges in Limas El Sexto prison in 1984, and particularly one in
the so-called British cellblock in Limas Lurigancho prison. Te PCP-SL also took advantage of conditions
in the prisons, which were neglected by the state, to take control over what went on in various cellblocks.
Te situation in the prisons, which was already critical when Garca took oce, was aggravated in the wake
of the October 4, 1985, uprising in Luriganchos British cellblock. Te Republican Guard violently put
down the uprising by inmates accused of terrorism. More than 30 inmates were killed, but the government
did not investigate the events. Over the following months, PCP-SL inmates began demanding guarantees
from judicial authorities, and in June 1986 they led several civil rights protection suits, alleging that their
lives were in danger. Shortly before his interrogation before the Fifth Correctional Court, Shining Path
leader Antonio Daz Martnez announced that there was a new genocidal plan being prepared by the gov-
ernment to be applied to inmates in dierent jails around the country.
50
Te PCP-SLs tactic was to try to
force the Aprista government to induce genocide while publicly accusing it of planning do to so.
Te uprising by Shining Path inmates that led to the massacre in the prisons in Lima and Callao began on
June 18, 1986, with prisoners taking hostages at the Lurigancho, El Frontn and Santa Brbara prisons.
At the time, Peru was hosting a meeting of the Socialist International Organization. After an initial at-
tempt to control the situation, with mediation by the National Penitentiary Institute, judicial authorities
and members of the Peace Commission, the Cabinet decided that it was necessary to re-establish order
in the prisons as energetically as the law allowed, preservingwhen possiblethe lives of the hostages
and imposing authority by assigning the task to the Joint Chiefs of Sta of the Armed Forces.
51
Te Air Force quickly re-established order at the Santa Brbara prison. Tree inmates were killed in the
49 La Repblica, May 7, 1986; Hoy, May 7, 1986.
50 Desco. Resumen Semanal, June 13-20, 1986. Year IX, No. 371.
51 Report of the Ames Commission. P. 245.
16 7
operation. Te Army was in charge of restoring order at Lurigancho, taking over from the Republican
Guard. After securing the cellblock where the PCP-SL militants had rioted, authorities killed 124 in-
mates who had already surrendered. Te Navy was in charge of El Frontn. Te situation there was more
violent and lasted another day because inmates had three ries and many homemade weapons. Tree
Navy ocers were killed, as were 111 inmates, according to ocial statistics. President Garca partially
acknowledged that a massacre had taken place by visiting Lurigancho several days later. At the time, the
prison massacre was considered the most serious case involving the responsibility of the government.
Te Cabinets initial assessment of the events, during a meeting on June 18, 1986, was correct in seeing
the riot as a provocation by the PCP-SL,
52
but that judgment contradicted the decision to put the armed
forces in charge of regaining control of the prisons as quickly as possible. In most of the six ocial com-
muniqus issued during the riots and subsequent repression, the administration deliberately misinformed
the country about the decision to involve the military. Te Peace Commissions dissuasive role was a mere
formality, as members were unsure whether inmates had heard the only request, made over a loudspeaker,
that they reconsider their actions. Judicial and prison authorities were blocked from taking action before
the military operations began. Hundreds of inmates were killed.
While the government acknowledged that extrajudicial executions were committed at Lurigancho, the
CVR has found that executions were also carried out at the San Juan Bautista de El Frontn prison. Te
events at El Frontn, however, could never be investigated because of a cover-up that began on June 19,
with a supreme decree declaring the prisons a restricted military zone and preventing district attorneys
and judges from independently examining the events.
While the government could not have predicted the extremes of the military operation, it did possess in-
formation that should have allowed it to take precautions and even order that the rioting prisoners not be
killed. Instead, the government backed the actions of the security forces. During the Cabinet meeting on
July 19, the Joint Chiefs of Sta of the Armed Forces were congratulated for having quelled the prison riot.
From that moment on, the government adopted an ambiguous position regarding its responsibility for anti-
subversive policy and the armed forces actions. Military leaders, meanwhile, further distanced themselves
from the civilian government in making decisions about the implementation of the anti-subversive strategy.
Despite the seriousness of the events at the prisons, Garcas popularity increased among various sectors of
the population that demanded a heavy-handed approach to dealing with the PCP-SL. At the same time,
Garca attempted to appear as a defender of human rights, promising to sanction those responsible. He
made an impressive oer, saying: Either they go or I go.
Te Shining Path exploited the bloody episode, which t perfectly into its plan to force the government to
commit human rights abuses. Te subversive organization turned the victims into martyrs for the cause.
On the PCP-SL calendar, the anniversary of the massacre became known as the Day of Heroism.
Te executive branchs explanation of the events at the prisons was presented in September, when the
lower house of Congress held hearings to question the Cabinet. Congress named an investigatory com-
mission, but it did not operate during its rst year. Retired General Fernndez Maldonado, a United Left
senator, was chosen to preside over the commission, but he refused to accept the post. Te commission
began operating in 1987 under the leadership of Senator Rolando Ames, also of the United Left.
Te commissions report stated that the forces responsible for putting down the riots carried out extraju-
dicial executions in Lurigancho, while in El Frontn the Navy bombed the Blue Cellblock knowing that
there were inmates inside. Te report also stated that there were eorts to cover up crimes committed by
the security forces and called on Congress to take constitutional actions against the ministers involved
as well as against President Garca as soon as his term ended. Te report was signed by only a minority of
52 Minutes of the Cabinet meeting on June 18, 1986.
16 8
Chapter 3
the commission members, however, because PAP lawmakers refused to back it. Nevertheless, the report
did have wide support among all opposition parties and was widely publicized.
After the prison massacre, the PCP-SL continued its campaign of selective assassinations. In October
1986, a PCP-SL command attacked Vice Admiral Gernimo Caerata, former Commander General
of the Navy. Tis was followed by the murders of two Aprista leaders in Limas Huaycn and Horacio
Zevallos shantytowns. Te government and the PAP reacted to the events by naming Senator Armando
Villanueva as party secretary again, giving him the task of organizing an anti-terrorist plan.
Te government proposed several new laws, including one to create special courts to try terrorism cases and
another to change the list of crimes that soldiers might commit in the line of duty, eliminating excesses as
an excuse for human rights violations. Te second law was aimed at increasing the credibility of the govern-
ments eorts to stem abuses. On January 15, 1987, a series of bombings caused alarm in the capital. Several
PAP oces had been attacked a week earlier, when the Aprista candidate Jorge Del Castillo took oce as
mayor.
53
Tis wave of attacks on private and public installations ended in late January with the murder of
Csar Lpez Silva, a physician who served as the PAPs Secretary of Professional Issues.
Te security forces moved into public universities and carried out numerous raids in Limas shantytowns
in the following months. Te urgency of the situation led to reforms in the Interior Ministrys General
Intelligence Bureau. Te executive branch also proposed increasing sentences for crimes related to terror-
ism and the illicit use of the media to promote subversion with a law penalizing apology for terrorism.
54

Debate over the creation of a Defense Ministry began at this time. Te idea was that the armed forces
would be represented in the Cabinet by a minister appointed by the president. Te proposal met resis-
tance in various political circles as well as in the armed forces, which publicly rejected the change, arguing
that it would reduce their inuence. Te law creating the Defense Ministry was passed in March 1987,
but it had no real impact on the anti-subversive ght. It seemed that the government no longer had the
energy or conviction for such a reform. Retired Army General Enrique Lpez Albjar became the rst
Defense Minister in October 1987.
PAP and the nationwide spread of the confict
Terrorist attacks began to multiply in the second quarter of 1987 as the economic situation deteriorated
quickly. Te economic program based on price controls, subsidies and stimulation of demand had reached
its limits. At the same time, President Garca made a surprise announcement in Congressdecreeing
the nationalization of the banking system. Te decision sparked erce opposition from the business sec-
tor, Popular Action and the Popular Christian Party, giving rise to the Liberty Movement (Movimiento
Libertad) led by Mario Vargas Llosa.
Te debate over nationalizing the banks was heating up when Rodrigo Franco, a young Aprista militant
and president of the state-run company in charge of distributing basic foodstus and other goods (Empre-
sa Nacional de Comercializacin de Insumos, ENCI), was murdered. Francos death hardened the position
of the government and the PAP and reinforced the partys idea that the war against subversion needed the
support of the entire population. A month later, the PAPs Assistant Secretary for National Aairs, Nel-
son Pozo, was also assassinated by the PCP-SL. Te government turned to the armed forces, seeking to
rebuild the links that had been lost with the creation of the Defense Ministry. Te armed forces, however,
had already decided to undertake their own redenition of the strategy for the internal armed conict.
New criticism of the governments use of the Interior Ministry began to surface. After Jos Barsallo was ap-
pointed Interior Minister, opponents charged that the ministry was at the service of the PAP. Paramilitary
actions targeting subversive organizations also began, including an attempt to bomb the oces of El Diario.
53 Desco. Resumen Semanal, January 16-22, 1987. Year X, No. 402. P. 1.
54 Desco. Resumen Semanal, February 27-March 5, 1987. Year X, No. 408. P. 1.
16 9
Personnel linked to the Interior Ministry were blamed for the failed bombing. In an interview with the
CVR, Barsallo revealed the climate of mistrust in the government and the tensions with the armed forces: I
knew where all the generals and commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force were. I knew perfectly well
where they were, because it was my job and I was not going to let them carry out a coup.
Te presidents actions during a party meeting further increased the climate of tension and distrust between
the government and the armed forces. In an attempt to encourage the partys youth, Garca highlighted
some characteristics of the Shining Path militants to justify the importance of commitment to the party.
At the opening session of the Seventh National Congress of Aprista Youth in May 1988, the president said:
And we must recognize how the Shining Path has its militants active, committed and willing
to sacrice. We must recognize something that they have and that we do not have as a party
[] wrong or not, criminal or not, the Shining Path militant has what we dont have: mystique
and a willingness to give of oneself []. Tese are people who deserve our respect and my per-
sonal admiration because they are, whether we like it or not, militants. Tey are called fanat-
ics. I believe that they have mystique, and part of our own self-criticism, my fellow delegates,
is to recognize that anyone who is willing to face death, to give up his life, has mystique.
55
Assault on Juanju
While the MRTA had announced in 1986 that it was ending its truce with the government and the
PAP, the appearance of MRTA guerrilla columns in San Martn at the end of November 1987 took police
by surprise. Te Special Operations Bureau had been established just three months earlier and was not
yet ready for action. Te press gave wide coverage to the situation in Juanju in the days following the
November 6, 1987, assault on the city. President Garca called on the media to assume an important
responsibility, because if we are going to give the terrorists the importance they are looking for we will
become their principal collaborators. He added: Te war will be severe and will last for a long time.
Interior Minister Jos Barsallo played down the attack, saying it was a show put on by the MRTA, and
repeating comments his predecessors had used earlier in the decade to dismiss the terrorist threat. A state
of emergency was declared in the department of San Martn on November 10 and the Army was sent in
to control the zone. Te legal left-wing parties had a strong presence in the department, and there was a
great deal of social unrest among the peasants.
Te Front to Defend the Interests of the People of San Martn called a department-wide strike on Novem-
ber 17 and 18 to protest the state of emergency. Te people of San Martn wanted to take advantage of the
situation created by the new front in the war, and the new regionalization process, to press for economic
and social change.
In mid-May 1988, the Army entered the community of Cayara after a PCP-SL ambush of a military pa-
trol. Te Cabinet released an ocial communiqu denying an alleged massacre of peasants. After peas-
ants who had witnessed the massacre came forward, a commission of Cabinet ministers, representatives
of the Attorney Generals Oce and members of Congress visited the zone. President Garca visited the
area himself, and ocials began to change their version of the massacre. One month later, a special com-
mission set up by the Senate and headed by Senator Carlos Enrique Melgar visited the area and began its
own investigation, in addition to the one already under way by the district attorney. Te district attorney
and Senate commissioners received conicting reports, and several witnesses either disappeared or were
killed. District Attorney Carlos Escobar presented his initial ndings, concluding that a massacre had
indeed taken place. Escobar was removed from the case shortly thereafter, replaced by another district
attorney who agreed with Senator Melgars opinion that no massacre had occurred in Cayara.
Nevertheless, a minority report from the Melgar Commission, which included much more supporting
evidence, found that unarmed peasants had denitely been killed in Cayara shortly after a Shining Path
55 Desco. Resumen Semanal, July 1-7, 1988. Year XI, No. 475. P. 1.
170
Chapter 3
ambush on a military convoy. Te report stated that the political-military commander in the zone, Army
General Jos Valdivia Dueas, was responsible. Te case was closed in 1990.
Meanwhile, Senator Armando Villanueva was named Cabinet Chief and announced that he would pre-
side over a new inter-ministerial commission that would take over leadership of and responsibility for
anti-subversive eorts. Te Anti-Subversive Coordinating Commission began operating on July 3, 1988,
and appeared to be a replacement for the National Defense Council, which had been dissolved after the
reform of the National Defense System and the creation of the Defense Ministry. Te commission, how-
ever, did not produce many concrete results, and the executive branch seemed to take a backseat to the
armed forces in the ght against subversion (Obando 1991:381).
In his State of the Nation address on July 28, 1988, President Garca made a call for national unity. He
denounced the unscrupulous use of information that jeopardized the security of judges and prosecutors
and proposed returning responsibility for the investigation of terrorism cases to the police and training
police ocers to avoid legal errors that could ultimately benet people detained on terrorism charges.
One such case had been the acquittal of well-known PCP-SL leader Osmn Morote. Garca also pro-
posed a new law that would sanction illicit association for terrorism and people who distribute iers,
falsify documents or advocate terrorism.
56
A second bill proposed by the president would control the
use of arms and explosives. Te two bills were included in Law 24953, passed in December 1988, which
established that the intellectual authors or instigators, co-authors or accomplices of terrorist acts would
receive the same sentence as the person who carried out the crime. Te law again dened as a terrorist
act the association with, inciting or advocating of terrorism. In June 1989, the government passed Law
25031, which modied Law 24700, putting the police in charge of pre-trial investigations and the Special
Corrections Courts in charge of trying terrorism cases.
Te special commissions created in Congress were originally seen as a logical consequence of the demands
that the PAP had made of the ruling party during much of the AP government between 1980 and 1985.
As the conict worsened, however, most Aprista lawmakers lost enthusiasm for the investigations and
closed ranks behind the administration and the party, undermining the original purpose of the commis-
sions. Tis created an odd situation in which Congress continued to create special commissions, implying
that the state did recognize that a problem existed, but the panels majority reports almost always favored
the government, often negating the commissions purpose and fostering impunity.
An example was the Special Senate Commission to investigate the causes of the violence and formulate
alternatives for bringing peace to the nation. Te commission was created in April 1988 amid increasing
subversive violence and a worsening economy. Te commission conrmed that while the government had
guidelines for an anti-insurgency policy, it had not developed an integral and integrated strategy. In
addition, the commission stated that the military operations were based on doctrinaire manuals that were
outdated and inadequate for combating subversion in Peru. Te commission presented to the Senate 18
recommendations for a comprehensive pacication strategyincluding citizen participation, a national
pacication accord, complementary policies for dierent sectors, linking the National Defense strategy
to development and social welfare policies, rejecting concepts foreign to the nations reality, creating a
human rights ombudsman and reinforcing the National Intelligence Service.
Te Senate approved the report but did not act on any of the commissions proposals. Senator Enrique
Bernales, who headed the commission, stated in a later report:
Te government understood that these recommendations would not force it to change its
conduct and undertake a complete review of the anti-subversion policy. Tis was a serious
mistake by both sides. Te Senate should have demanded compliance with the recommen-
dations it approved, and the government should have accepted that it was time to involve the
56 Desco. Resumen Semanal, July 22-August 4, 1988. Year XI, No. 478-479. P. 2.
171
population in a national commitment to pacication (Bernales 1990: 179).
PAP in the face of the crisis
Te government presented a package of gradual economic adjustment reforms in September 1988, ending the
plan for economic change instituted by the PAP. Te lack of resources for the anti-subversive eort was obvious
at a time when the conict was spreading to other parts of the country and security forces needed to expand.
It was impossible to maintain the socio-economic component of the anti-subversive policy under those condi-
tions. Te deepening economic crisis and spiraling ination eroded the governments popular support.
Te armed forces, meanwhile, were systematically studying their anti-subversive experience and develop-
ing a comprehensive anti-subversive policy that not only gave the military control over the ght against
terrorist violence, but granted it a role in the new political conguration of the country.
Te new strategy was designed without the direct participation of the administration or Congress. Meanwhile,
the police forces independently developed an intelligence strategy for ghting terrorism. Tis occurred while
the administration was seeking an alternative to the National Defense Council and while Congress was unable
to pass anti-subversive legislation based on the recommendations of its own Special Commission.
By mid-1989, eight departments were under a state of emergency: Lima, Apurmac (except for Andahuaylas
province), Huancavelica, San Martn, Junn, Pasco, Ayacucho, Hunuco and the Constitutional Province
of Callao. Te departments under a state of emergency represented 33 percent of the nations territory and
36 percent of its 1,770 districts, which meant that ocials in those areas ran a serious risk of being targeted
by the Shining Paths assassination campaign. An increasing number of local authorities left their posts
between 1987 and 1989. Abandonment of elected ocea situation not contemplated in the lawbecame
widespread in the departments aected by subversion or under a state of emergencyparticularly in Junn,
Lima, Ayacucho, Hunuco, Apurmac, Ancash, Huancavelica, Pasco, La Libertad, Puno and San Martn.
On March 27, 1989, the PCP-SL attacked the police station in Uchiza, in the department of Ucayali, kill-
ing 10 ocers. Te attack revealed the lack of coordination among state agencies, as requests for backup
went unanswered and the ocers were left alone to face a much larger enemy force.
In the meantime, peasant patrols in the Apurmac River Valley had defeated a group of Shining Path cad-
res. According to Aprista Representative Alberto Valencia (Ayacucho), the patrols represented 42 com-
munities in the Sachabamba Valley of Huamanga and 58 hamlets around the Apurmac River. Valencia
supported the patrols over the objections of the Army and his party. Te head of the Civilian Self-Defense
Patrols in the Apurmac River Valley, known as Commander Huayhuaco, made his rst public appear-
ance, stating that if the government gave me no more than 100 ries, 100 FALs, and allowed for over-
sight by a group of conscientious ocers, I would return peace to Ayacucho by November or December.
Te armed confrontation between a column of MRTA ghters and an Army convoy on April 28 outside
Molinos, Jauja is described in the preceding chapter. President Garca traveled to the zone almost imme-
diately and was seen inspecting the bodies of MRTA ghters and some local residents. Te images were
widely publicized in the media. Te fact that some of the MRTA ghters had been summarily executed
after surrendering or being wounded was ignored.
May was the most violent month of 1989. Aprista Representative Pablo Li Ormeo was assassinated on
May 6 and the Cabinet resigned. Senator Luis Alberto Snchez, one of the PAPs old-guard leaders, was
named Cabinet Chief and Agustn Mantilla was appointed to head the Interior Ministry. Te PCP-SL
called an armed strike for May 10 in the departments of Junn, Hunuco and Pasco. Te president
ew to Huancayo in an eort to calm the fear that had gripped the city, which was now under military
control. Another successful armed strike was called a few days later in Huancavelica. In the rst week
of June, the PCP-SL called armed strikes in the provinces surrounding Lima.
172
Chapter 3
On June 6, during the presentation of the new Cabinet before Congress, Defense Minister General Ve-
lzquez Giacarini explained the actions that the government would take to deal with subversion, describ-
ing the number of subversives in the country and where they operated. He announced plans to strengthen
the intelligence service, organize peasant self-defense patrols, stage an oensive against support groups
outside the country and create a special fund to nance the anti-subversive ght.
Rodrigo Franco Command
On July 28, 1988, only a few hours before the presidents annual Independence Day address, Manuel Febres
Flores, President of the Democratic Lawyers Association and attorney for PCP-SL leader Osmn Morote, was
murdered in Lima. A new group, the Rodrigo Franco Command (Comando Rodrigo Franco, CRF), took credit
for the killing. Te group was named for the Aprista leader who had been assassinated a year earlier by the
PCP-SL. Various sources began to link the CRF with the PAP, the Interior Ministry and the National Police.
After IU Representative Heriberto Arroyo and PAP Representative Pablo Li Ormeo were murdered,
Congress set up a commission to investigate the paramilitary group. Te commission attempted to high-
light the events and circumstances that would link the paramilitary group to the PAP, including the
governments decision to buy new weapons for the police, a radical militant youth wing and internal
problems in the party due to the murders of active party members.
On May 31, 1990, during the House of Representatives last legislative session under President Garcas
administration, the special commission investigating the CRF presented two reports. Te minority re-
(*) WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE DISTRICTS IN METROPOLITAN LIMA (42), THE TOTAL IS 128 DISTRICTS.
SOURCE: PAREJA, 1990, PP. 8-16
JUNIN
HUNUCO
LIMA(*)
AYACUCHO
APURIMAC
ANCASH
HUANCAVELICA
PASCO
LA LIBERTAD
PUNO
SAN MARTN
DEPARTMENT
PROVINCES
IN THE
DEPARTMENT
8
9
9
11
7
18
8
3
9
11
9
74
PROVINCES
WHERE
POSTS WERE
ABANDONED
6
9
5
8
4
9
4
3
2
3
7
60
DISTRICTS
IN AFFECTED
PROVINCES
108
74
88
81
45
96
57
29
21
36
57
692
DISTRICT
COUNCILS
AFFECTED
55
38
31
13
18
20
12
9
7
3
12
218
DISTRICTS
WHERE
POSTS WERE
ABANDONED
201
53
67
20
37
44
15
14
6
7
19
483
PROVINCIAL
POSTS
ABANDONED
5
8
15
10
12
1
-
-
15
-
9
75 TOTAL
TABLE 7
PERU 1989: MUNICIPAL POSTS ABANDONED, BY DEPARTMENT
173
port armed the existence of the paramilitary group and pointed to possible links to Interior Minister
Agustn Mantilla. Te majority report, signed by Commission President Representative Csar Limo,
stated that there was no evidence proving the existence of the CRF. Instead, he accused three IU lawmak-
ers of association with terrorism. Congress approved the majority report, but struck out the accusations
against the IU representatives. With this vote, one of the nal ones cast during the Garca presidency,
Congress again rejected accusations of crimes committed by state agents.
Te CVR believes that the large number of actions attributed to the Rodrigo Franco Command and the
variety of areas where the actions occurred make it dicult to believe that the crimes were committed by
a single organization. It is possible that the commands name was used by dierent perpetrators who were
not necessarily connected with one another.
Elections and the subversive threat
If 1984 was one of the years with the highest death tolls during the internal war, 1989 was the year with
the most assassinations of authorities and elected ocials. Of the politicians killed throughout the de-
cade, 68 percent of political ocials and 71 percent of municipal authorities were killed in 1989. Accord-
ing to preliminary data, 33 percent (53) of the provincial and district mayors killed between 1980 and
1995 were assassinated in 1989. Of these, 45 percent were members of the PAP.
Te CVR received reports of approximately 500 municipal and political authorities who were killed. Tis
does not include the community authorities and other traditional leaders who held leadership positions in
indigenous communities far removed from the national political scene. Te largest groups of victims were
district mayors and appointed lieutenant governors. For both groups, 1989 was the most violent year.
Te impact of threats, attempted murders and assassinations forced hundreds of district and provincial
authorities to abandon their jobs. Before the local elections in November 1989, 576 local authorities had
abandoned their posts. Of these, 431 (75 percent) were from the PAP and 80 (14 percent) were members
of the IU. Te provinces of Lima, Hunuco and Junn were hardest hit by these resignations.
In the local elections, there were no candidates in 15.37 percent of the countrys districts. Also in 1989,
17 justices of the peace were killed, representing 40 percent of all those killed between 1982 and 1995.
Te majority lived in rural zones, where the lack of protection was most pronounced, and they were often
assassinated with families and neighbors. Te scope of this campaign of selective assassinations did not
receive sucient attention from the countrys political class, particularly in Lima.
Te 1990 general elections were marked by the highest rate of absenteeism in 10 years of democracy. Ab-
senteeism exceeded 40 percent in the departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica, while it was close to 50
percent in the departments of Hunuco and Junn. Pledges by the Interior Ministry, police and military
to increase protection did not convince voters.
Final phase of the PAP government
In December 1989, amid a rapid decline in his popularity and a general pessimism about the future of the
anti-subversive eort, President Garca presented ries to peasant patrols in the community of Rinconada
Baja, Ayacucho. Te government had decided to provide logistical support to the peasant patrols, a deci-
sion that was controversial then and remains controversial today.
Meanwhile, following the lead of civil society organizations and local politicians, residents of the cities of
Huancayo and Huamanga held marches to protest the Shining Paths armed strikes. In November 1989,
shortly after the local elections, the PCP-SL called an armed strike in Lima. Te strike was countered by a
march by tens of thousands of people through the downtown area. Unlike other eorts, the march brought
together a wide spectrum of citizens and political organizations. Te demonstration was called by Henry
Pease, the IU presidential candidate, and supported by his rivals in other left-wing parties, the PAP and
174
Chapter 3
FREDEMO, as well as civil society groups, church organizations, etc. Te PCP-SL strike failed.
Te Special Intelligence Group (Grupo Especial de Inteligencia, GEIN) was created within the DIRCOTE
during the nal year of the Aprista government. Tis group would go on to arrest Abimael Guzmn Re-
inoso two years later. Police Lieutenant General Reyes Roca, then Superior Director of the Technical Po-
lice, was given the basic resources needed to organize the group. On June 1, 1990, the GEIN raided a safe
house near Army headquarters where Guzmn had been staying only a few days earlier. Te safe house
also housed the PCP-SLs Department of Organizational Support, which organized party congresses and
Central Committee meetings and coordinated communication between the central leadership and party
organizations. Ocers seized the PCP-SLs general archive in the raid. Te GEIN also struck at the Party
Support Group, which was in charge of distributing PCP-SL propaganda. Tat was important because
this group also coordinated the network of safe houses and had a list of contacts for the various PCP-SL
organizations. Te GEIN, which was reinforced by Interior Minister Mantilla, was eective, even though
it operated with a budget innitely smaller than those of other police units.
Police eorts under the Aprista government, however, were overshadowed by the jailbreak on July 9,
1990, by 47 MRTA inmatesincluding Polay, Glvez and Rincnthrough a tunnel built into the
Miguel Castro Castro prison. Te MRTA escape exposed the precariousness of the countrys maximum-
security prison and the limitations of the intelligence services, which had not detected a 300-meter tunnel
that had been dug over several months. In addition, the MRTA was able to regroup as a result of its lead-
ers escape, further aggravating the countrys security problems. In an interview with the CVR, however,
MRTA leader Vctor Polay denied that the escape had worsened the security problem.
Te escalation of the internal armed conict during the PAP government is best seen through statistics.
In 1985, 6.04 percent of the nations population and 7.25 percent of Peruvian territory were under a state
of emergency or under the control of a political-military commander, while in 1990, 45.18 percent of the
population and 29.62 percent of the territory were under a state of emergency (Lynch 1999).
Like President Fernando Belaundes administration, the Aprista government failed in the ght against
subversion. While the administration began with the intention of changing the Popular Action govern-
ments practices, which had been marked by abdication of civilian control and a blind eye to human
rights abuses, it did not maintain that position and fell back on methods that militarized the conict and
permitted impunity for crimes committed by the armed forces against the population. President Garca
and the PAP, in the CVRs judgment, are ethically and politically responsible for numerous human rights
violations and the suering inicted upon thousands of citizens during a process of violence that they did
not know how to handle eectively within the limits of the rule of law.
175
State Security Forces
C H A P T E R 4
As has been mentioned above, the constitutional governments of the 1980s failed to design a compre-
hensive anti-subversive strategy that would have enabled them to eectively combat the PCP-SL and the
MRTA while still respecting human rights. Te state security forcesthe police and armed forcesalso
made analytical and strategic mistakes that considerably delayed an eective response to the subversion.
Serious human rights violations were committed under the Popular Action and the Peruvian Aprista
Party (PAP) governments. Only in the late 1980s and early 1990s was an appropriate strategy nally
developed, involving cooperation with the civilian population and eorts to gather and use reliable infor-
mation, which led to the strategic defeat of the subversive groups.
POLICE FORCES
Ocers of the various police forces were the rst targets of the Shining Paths terrorist tactics. With the
goal of eliminating representatives of the state in rural parts of the Andes to create a new power, from
the beginning of the so-called armed struggle the PCP-SL targeted police stations in small communi-
ties in the interior of the country, which were generally poorly equipped and ill-prepared to face an orga-
nization that staged surprise attacks and almost never engaged in open combat.
Te state responded early to this aggression by changing the type of police presence in areas where the
PCP-SL operated. Police ocers who had been trained mainly for preventive and guard duties were re-
placed with anti-subversive patrols trained to destroy the enemy and strike fear in its collaborators, rather
than to protect local people and their rights. Pursuit, capture and interrogation were the new police tactics.
During this process, the police forcesthere were three branches of the police force until 1988, when
they were merged into the National Police of Peruwere placed under the command of the military in
places where political-military commands were established. Under these circumstances, police ocers
were generally limited to auxiliary functions and had to invent opportunities to carry out their specialized
tasks of investigation. Intelligence work improved in the late 1980s with the creation of various intelli-
gence units, which played a key role in dismantling the national PCP-SL leadership.
During the decades of the internal armed conict, the police committed numerous violations of peoples ba-
sic rights, while at the same time, they were hard hit by the subversive organizations, which they were poorly
equipped to face. During the years of violence, the police forces suered the greatest number of victims in
their history: 682 dead, 754 wounded and 101 disabled, according to a police report submitted to the CVR.
From confusion to a slow learning process
When the violence unleashed by the PCP-SL began, the police were divided into three branches: the Civil
Guard (Guardia Civil, GC), Republican Guard (Guardia Republicana, GR) and the Investigative Police
of Peru (Polica de Investigaciones del Per, PIP). It was this three-pronged organization, which lacked rm
government support and had few logistical and nancial resources, that was given the initial responsibil-
ity of confronting the subversive threat that had taken the countrys political system by surprise.
Te lack of a solid, consistent government position on the subversion, mentioned above, created a basic
diculty for the police forces. On the one hand, there was a lack of reliable information; on the other,
civilian authorities failed to understand the signicance of the PCP-SL and tended to consider subversion
a problem that could be solved relatively easily.
Te police forces also faced other diculties. Te political transitions legacy of social unrest made it dif-
cult to distinguish between the legal left and its protests, which fell within the existing legal framework,
and the new threat from the PCP-SL, which was illegal and diametrically opposed to the rule of law. In
addition, the police had other res to ght, mainly common crime, and another problem that was taking
on increased importance and demonstrating its ability to corruptdrug tracking.
Added to this was an institutional problem that has already been mentioned in various sections of this
178
Chapter 4
book: rivalries among the dierent police branches, which sometimes reached the extreme of public con-
frontations between top ocials or violence between lower-ranking ocers. Tis inghting, combined
with the increasing corruption that permeated the PIPs Intelligence Oce, a key link in the ght against
subversion, seriously undermined any timely, eective response to the new challenge.
Tis was the institution that the PCP-SL chose as its rst target. Te choice had a certain symbolic force,
because in rural areas the police, especially the Civil Guard, were the most visible face of the stateand
not always a friendly face. On the contrary, in many communities the police were part of the local power
structure, where they established authoritarian relationships and committed abuses against citizens.
Beginning in the early 1980s, the police suered from attacks unleashed by the Shining Path in cam-
paigns dubbed conqueror weapons and resources, beat the countryside with guerrilla actions and
strike to advance towards the construction of support bases. It must be remembered that in May 1981,
the PCP-SL leadership had approved the directive to pay for the triumph of the revolution with a blood
quota, paving the way for the madness that was demonstrated in the attacks on police stations.
In 1981, police stations in Quinua, Luricocha and Tambo were attacked. Te rst police ocer killed
in the conict, Sergeant Ramiro Flores Sulca, died in the attack on the station in Quinua on August
15. Seven weeks later, another erce attack, this time on the police station in Tambo, led to the rst
declaration of a state of emergency in Ayacucho. President Fernando Belaundes government sent 193
police ocers to the area to enforce it, including 40 members of the Special Forces known as the Sin-
chis. A high-level police command, formed by colonels from the three police branches, implemented
a plan known as the Vivanco Joint Operations Plan, in honor of a police ocer who was mortally
wounded in the attack in Tambo.
During this rst 60-day period of joint action, the police arrested important PCP-SL members in Hua-
manga, while suering no fatalities. In rural areas, however, the lack of personnel made more eective
control dicult. In addition, police interventions were accompanied by violations of the populations
basic rights. Te CVR heard testimony from one woman who was raped by a group of 7 hooded Sinchis
when she was 14 years old. Te woman said they burst into her home on October 28, 1981, forced her
into a car, raped her, and then took her aloft in a helicopter, tying a rope around her feet and dangling
her in the air to force her to confess to her alleged participation in the attack on the Tambo police station.
Meanwhile, the Investigative Police had arrested other people outside Ayacucho, and the situation was
becoming more dicult for the subversive organization. Te PCP-SL planned jailbreaks, the largest of
which occurred on March 2, 1982, in Huamanga. Te escape of 254 prisoners from the Huamanga
prison took the police by surprise, even though the Republican Guard had warned authorities about
the plan. Te deaths of two police ocersFlorencio Arons Guilln and Jos Rea Condeduring the
jailbreak was followed by reprisals by a group of Republican Guards, who killed three accused subversives
in a local hospital where they were recovering from wounds. Te government re-established the state of
emergency in the area the following day.
Te raid on the Huamanga prison to release prisoners demonstrated the Shining Paths ability to or-
ganize eective attacks on protected facilities. Te group continued to demonstrate its repower with
successive attacks on police stations, until the Director General of the Civil Guard ordered a retreat to
larger installations. Tis left the eld clear for the PCP-SL, and the situation in Huanta and Huamanga
grew more chaotic.
Encouraged by these moves, the PCP-SL intensied its oensive. On March 26, cadres attacked the
Ayzarca hacienda, near Parcco and Pomatambo; on March 31, they targeted the main police headquarters
in Vilcashuamn.
1
It was now clear that the police could not continue ghting the Shining Path without
improving the conditions they operated under.
1 Police jurisdictions have a main headquarters and network of minor police facilities that are run by the headquarters.
179
Ocers lacked equipment, weapons were obsolete and ammunition scarce. Tere was also a lack of
coordination with jurisdictional headquarters and community police stations. Lack of equipment and
coordination dragged down morale among the ocers.
Another problem was the relationship with the population. Tis was most notable in the case of the
Sinchis. Although these ocers were trained in anti-subversive tactics, their training was of little help
in dealing with the challenge posed by Shining Path cadres: without uniforms, they blended into the
local population. As a result, the Sinchis began to suspect everyone, and that, added onto the abuses
they committed, widened the gap between the police and the civilian population. A stereotype soon
emerged of the Sinchi as the perpetrator of abuse, torture and rapean image borne out by facts.
Torture and arbitrary detention were common practices of the Sinchis, as was rape, not only of adult
women, but also of adolescents. One of the rst cases to spark public outrage was the rape of Georgina
Gamboa, who was 17 when she was raped by 7 Sinchis in January 1981. In a CVR public hearing, Ms.
Gamboa recalled the events as follows:
Tey beat me. Tey beat me, then they started to abuse me, to rape me. Tey raped me
all night long. I screamed for help. Tey stued a handkerchief in my mouth, and when I
screamed and asked for help they hit me. I was devastated. Tey raped me that night. Tere
were seven of them. Seven soldiers. Seven Sinchis came in and raped me. One would go out
and another would come in; he would go out and another would come in. I was practically
dead. I didnt feel normal any more. Te next day, when daylight came, they threw me
onto a truck like a corpse or an animal carcass and took me to Cangallo. I was a prisoner in
Cangallo, too.
From the beginning, eorts were made to justify the human rights violations committed by the anti-sub-
versive forces. One excuse used was that they were in a tense state because of the hostile environment and
threat of being targeted at any minute by the Shining Path. Committing human rights violationsre-
ferred to as excesseswas also a way of taking revenge for the violence inicted on them by subversives.
Besides police eorts in the Andean area, a division of PIPs State Security Oce began carrying
out specialized anti-subversive investigations. Te Anti-Terrorism Division (Divisin Contra el Ter-
rorismo, DICOTE), which was briey called the Anti-Subversive Police Division (Divisin de Polica
Antisubversiva, DIPAS), was established in March 1981. It was conceived as an operational unitfor
investigationrather than an intelligence unit. In the months that followed, DICOTE, which worked
intensively under less-than-ideal conditions, was the only unit that achieved constant, consistent re-
sults in the ght against the PCP-SL.
Overall, however, the confusion of this early period resulted in a loss of valuable time that ultimately gave
the Shining Path an advantage. Te element of surprise combined with ocial vacillation and negligence
played into the subversives hands.
Police during the militarization of the confict
Te relationship between the police forces and the armed forces has traditionally been one of both emu-
lation and contempt. Military disdain for the police was accentuated in the early 1980s because of the
latters failed anti-subversive eorts and the lack of discipline they displayed in the emergency zones.
When President Belaunde Terry gave the armed forces control over the emergency zones by establishing
political-military commands, the military took on the task with the certainty that they would quickly
achieve the success that had eluded the police. Tus began the phase that the CVR calls militarization
of the conict, which would last from December 29, 1982, until June 19, 1986.
Te governments new policies formally subordinated the police to the military. Exercising this author-
ity, the rst head of the political-military command in Ayacucho met with top police ocials so that
they could emphasize their preventive functions. Under the new scheme, the police were to share reliable
18 0
Chapter 4
information with the military and participate in joint patrols with soldiers, always under the command
of an Army ocer.
Meanwhile, as the PCP-SLs activity expanded, soldiers began to capture more and more people whom
they assumed were subversives. Te detainees were taken to military bases, such as Los Cabitos in Hua-
manga, where they were interrogated with help from sta from the local PIP oce.
Nevertheless, in the early days of the political-military command, armed interventions fell mainly to the
police. As a result, the police felt the need to recruit more personnel and provide specic training to those
who would be sent into the theater of operations.
Te training mimicked the methods used at the Panama-based School of the Americas and other U.S.
bases: having trainees kill animals and rip out their entrails with their teeth, as well as lacerate their own
bodies and resist the pain without complaint, and recording the practices on lm and in photographs.
Tere were also ritual practices for group bonding. According to testimony received by the CVR, one
of the most chilling may have been the baptism of new arrivals who lacked combat experience. Te
baptism consisted of killing a terrorism suspect with a dull knife. Describing the situation faced by police
ocers who arrived in Ayacucho, one agent told the CVR that it was disastrous, because people were
arriving from Mazamari. Tey had us, the new recruits, inside there [in the military base] and they said,
Now youre going to get your baptism. Every time they came and brought a detainee, you knew.
Tis training kept pace with the increase in the various types of human rights violations committed by
the security forces: arbitrary killings, forced disappearance, torture and rape, of which women were the
main victims. Te crimes were covered up by the institutions involved. Te CVR is convinced that by
protecting thieves, rapists, torturers and murderers, the police commanders, as well as the governments
and the judiciary, facilitated the increase in the number of victims.
One of the police crimes that had the greatest repercussions was the massacre in Socos, a community in
the province of Huamanga. On November 13, 1983, police ocers burst into a house where an engage-
ment ceremony was taking place. After arguing with community members attending the ceremony, they
forced the people out of the house and took them to a place called Balcn Huaycco, where they were
murdered. In all, 32 people from Socos died. Ocials tried to cover up the crime, but a judicial investiga-
tion conrmed the events and established that a crime had been committed.
Along with these crimes, other forms of abuse also proliferated, including the theft of goods, food and
animals from the rural population, robberies motivated largely by the severe shortage of supplies for the
police themselves. Police ocers, meanwhile, suered from the eect of shortages, isolation and fear,
which began to translate into an increase in alcoholism and drug dependency (especially cocaine base
paste) among police in the emergency zone.
Work of DIRCOTE
While the military was moving into Ayacucho, DICOTE was pursuing its tasks in Lima without setting
aside institutional conicts. Te annual turnover of leadership, however, changed the situation for the
unit. A ministerial resolution issued on July 5, 1983, changed DICOTEs rank and name to the Anti-
Terrorism Bureau (Direccin Contra el Terrorismo, DIRCOTE). By the end of the year, the oce had a
sta of approximately 150 agents. Te units main tasks fell to 5 operational groups called Delta groups,
each of which had 10 to 15 members.
During that year, the units work bore its rst signicant fruits. Te detectives had gained greater knowl-
edge of how the Shining Path operated and acted, at least in Metropolitan Lima. DIRCOTE, therefore,
focused its activities on the PCP-SLs Metropolitan Committeethe ones who had the bombs, as one
agent told the CVRand dealt it some debilitating blows. It was partly because of this that within the
PCP-SL the group known as the Peoples Support Committee (Socorro Popular) began to take on greater
18 1
importance. Socorro Popular became a militarized organization and replaced the Metropolitan Commit-
tee as the PCP-SLs central organization in Lima.
Te PIP also made some progress in Lima. In December 1983, the PIP oce in Huaraz, under the direc-
tion of Colonel Hctor Jhon Caro, detained Antonio Daz Martnez, who had been a top PCP- SL leader
from the groups early days.
Tese arrests, however, did not have a signicant impact on the PCP-SL, because many of the subversive
leaders who were detained were quickly released because of deciencies in the judicial system.
Nevertheless, DIRCOTE paved the way for a dierent way of operating that was more coherent than
the indiscriminate persecution of alleged terrorists taking place in the central highlands. DIRCOTE
improved its logistics after the Belaunde administration ended. Between 1985 and 1986 the government
agreed to put DIRCOTE on equal footing with police services in the emergency zones.
During those years, the number of agents assigned to DIRCOTE increased, enabling the bureau to create
more operating groups to divide up the work. Beginning in 1984, DIRCOTE prepared a weekly report of
terrorist activities nationwide, gathering and analyzing information submitted by the departmental PIP
oces. In 1985, that task was turned over to the Delta group commanders, each of which was assigned
certain departments in the country.
Te new government enabled DIRCOTE to oer its personnel slight incentives and improve its organi-
zation. It was given greater freedom to work as long as it was accountable afterward. Greater autonomy
and better coordination, however, did not translate into clearer policy. Tere was support, but not a true
anti-subversive policy, and the new government also failed to rectify this shortcoming.
Support and search for counterbalances
Te new PAP governments greater interest in the police forces was due to, among other things, the need
to balance the excessive decision-making power that the armed forces had been given in the ght against
subversion. Te Garca administration sought to increase civilian control over the use of public force, and
with that goal in mind it established a particularly smooth relationship with the police.
Eorts to increase the inuence of the police ran into an increasingly serious diculty: deep-rooted cor-
ruption within the police forces, mainly associated with drug-tracking cartels. Corruption had reached
embarrassing proportions. On August 2, 1985, for example, it was revealed that the former PIP Director,
General Eduardo Ipinze, and other high-ranking ocers were protecting the drug-tracking ring run
by Reynaldo Rodrguez Lpez.
Reorganization of the police forces began on August 14, 1985, with the passage of Law 24294. One of
the most relevant provisions of the law was the dismissal or retirement of a large number of commissioned
ocers and lower-ranking personnel. Te criteria for this purge were not well designed, however, and
resulted in the removal not only of corrupt ocers and those implicated in crimes, but also of honest,
competent members of the forces.
Te Foundation Law of the Police Forces (Legislative Decree 371) regulated and extended the reorganiza-
tion. One important component of this legislation was classifying the police as a professional, not a mili-
tary, force (Article 5). Te law created a single directing oce, the General Bureau of the Police Forces,
while maintaining top-level oces of the Civil Guard, Republican Guard and the Investigative Police as
operational oces. Nevertheless, tensions among the police forces continued.
While the Garca administration saw equipping police combat units as a priority, it neglected the need
to strengthen the intelligence units. Te priority continued to be operational. Te greatest support came
from Agustn Mantilla, who rst served as Vice Minister and later as Minister of the Interior, who al-
lowed top-ranking police ocers greater access to decision-making spheres.
18 2
Chapter 4
Creation of DOES and the maturing of DIRCOTE
Te prison massacres that occurred on June 18 and 19, 1986, which have been discussed elsewhere in this
book, marked a turning point in the conict, with the violence taking on a national scope.
Te focus of the polices anti-subversive work began to change, largely as a result of the deterioration of
the situation: an increase in bomb attacks and assassinations by the PCP-SL, including the death of PAP
leaders, and an escalation of the MRTAs actions in Lima. Tat year, a state of emergency and curfew were
declared in Metropolitan Lima, and the armed forces were given control over its internal order.
Te government created and equipped the Ministry of the Interiors General Bureau of Intelligence (Di-
reccin General de Inteligencia del Ministerio del Interior, DIGIMIN), which was charged with producing
intelligence information for the top ministry ocials. Once that information had been analyzed, it was
disseminated to DIRCOTE and other operational units in the form of intelligence notes. Te type of
information generated, however, did not have tactical value for operational units like DIRCOTE, which
continued to take a back seat among government priorities. Instead of using police intelligence to combat
subversion, the government preferred to use militarized police forces. To that end, it created the Special
Operations Bureau (Direccin de Operaciones Especiales, DOES). In other words, it insisted on pursuing
a purely military solution.
Te rst DOES graduating classes consisted mainly of lower-ranking ocers who had recently graduated
from the National Police School (Escuela Nacional de Polica) and completed their mandatory military
service. As the conict worsened and the number of emergency zones increased, the number of police
killed and wounded rose. It became necessary to increase the number of agents as quickly as possible.
DOES members became the elite police force during this stage of the conict and were sent to reinforce
various police detachments in the emergency zones, which now included a large part of the country. Be-
sides serving as backup units, they carried out operations in various parts of Peru, including Puno, where
several ocers died. In 1990, the units name was changed to DIROES PNP. After the change in police
structures in 1991, the bureau was considered a national operational body and renamed the National
Bureau of Special Operations (Direccin Nacional de Operaciones Especiales, DINOES).
While DOES served as the focal point for anti-subversive operations and increased the combat capacity
of one sector of the police groups sent to the emergency zones, most of the police in those areas were not
from DOES and lacked adequate anti-subversive training. Te creation of DOES also failed to improve
the polices treatment of the civilian population in the emergency zones. Te police were still abusive and
authoritarian, and human rights violations continued.
Te next year, 1987, was marked by a serious setbackMRTAs assault on the city of Juanjuand the
serious tensions between the government and lower-ranking police ocers because of the police forces
serious economic problems. Te police ocers wage demands, along with their complaints about the
treatment they received from their commanders, were indicators of the unfavorable conditions under
which they were combating the subversion.
On December 6, 1988, a law was passed that modied certain articles of Perus Constitution and created
the National Police of Peru (Polica Nacional del Per, PNP). Tereafter, this institution would assume
the organization and functions of the police forcesthe Civil Guard, Investigative Police and Repub-
lican Guardwith all their rights and obligations. Te merger itself, however, which was met with as
much doubt and hesitation as the preceding reorganization, was put o until the next administration.
Amid this scenario of institutional upheaval and economic shortfalls, DIRCOTE agents sought resources
to unite and motivate their personnel. Te eorts quickly led to signicant achievements, including the
arrest of Alberto Glvez Olaechea, Rodrigo, a journalist working for Cambio and a member of the MRTA,
on August 17, 1987.
18 3
By 1988, DIRCOTE had nearly 1,000 members. With a sta that size, it was possible to take a broader
view of the subversion in the country. Te increase in the amount of information gathered soon exceeded
the groups ability to process and analyze it. DIRCOTE requested assistance from the United States to
train analysts. By that time, DIRCOTE had direct contact with U.S. diplomatic personnel, including
the sta of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, occasionally, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), basically to coordinate security measures for U.S. facilities and delegations visiting the country. At
the time, it was also receiving technical cooperation from the Israeli Embassy.
During those years, DIRCOTE detained top leaders of the subversive groups, especially the MRTA. In
February 1988, several months after Glvezs arrest, MRTA leaders Hugo Avellaneda and Peter Crdenas
Schulte were detained at Limas airport while they were trying to leave the country with Ecuadorian pass-
ports. One particularly important arrest was that of Osmn Morote Barrionuevo, the PCP-SLs second-in-
command. On February 3, 1989, MRTA founder Vctor Polay Campos, Rolando, was arrested by chance
at the Tourist Hotel in Huancayo. A few months later, on April 16, 1989, MRTA leader Miguel Rincn
Rincn was detained. Another important break for DIRCOTE during those years was the arrest of the sub-
versives responsible for the murder of the naval attach of the Peruvian Embassy in Bolivia, Juan Vega Llona.
In 1988, the head of DIRCOTE, Javier Palacios, attended a course on political warfare at the Fu Hsing
Kang School in Taipei, Taiwan. One of the most relevant parts of the course was its emphasis on ideology
as a battleground, which made all subversive movements essentially political. Viewed from this broader
standpoint, Perus strategy for combating subversion was very limited, as the DIRCOTE chief pointed
out in a presentation to the Center for Superior Military Studies (Centro de Altos Estudios Militares) in
1989, a recording of which was heard by the CVR.
Police constantly complained about the judicial system, which too often released Shining Path and
MRTA militants after their arrest, alleging a lack of evidence. In many cases, however, the releases were
the result of bribes or fear of reprisals from the subversive organizations.
Te judicial systems main problem in relation to police work was the presentation of evidence during the
pre-trial investigation. An already tense situation was aggravated by the approval in 1987 of Law 24700,
which gave the Public Ministry responsibility for conducting pre-trial investigations in terrorism cases.
Te relationship between police forces and prosecutors continued to deteriorate until that law was struck
down in 1989. Complicating the matter were the tense relations between the police and the military,
problems in the prisons and the lack of an appropriate response to the problem from the political class.
Terror spread, along with the sense that the government had lost control.
Tis cycle closed with a tragic event that also demonstrated the depth of the crisis: the PCP-SLs attack
on the police station in Uchiza. Te attack in this small city in the middle of a coca-growing area in San
Martn resulted in the destruction of the police station and the capture and murder of 10 police ocers,
including 3 who were executed by subversives after being subjected to a so-called peoples trial. Faced
with a much larger enemy force, ocers at the Uchiza station repeatedly called for backup, but their re-
quests went unheeded. Te Ministry of the Interior had timely information about what was happening,
but failed to provide assistance to the police station. After the attack, the armed forces began to take the
place of the police in the coca-growing zones, and a new battleground emerged.
GEINs progress and political and military control
Te Special Intelligence Group (Grupo Especial de Inteligencia, GEIN) was created within DIRCOTE
during the nal months of the PAP administration. Te group would achieve what had seemed impos-
sible: the arrest of Abimael Guzmn Reinoso.
Although the group was formally part of DIRCOTE, it began to work independently of the bureaus day-to-
day operations. In fact, the group was formed to resolve discrepancies that had arisen between the new head
of DINCOTE, Edgar Suclla Flores, and Benedicto Jimnez, the units capable analyst. In the months that
18 4
Chapter 4
followed, arrangements were made to obtain resources for the new group. Te U.S. government, through the
CIA, was one of its most important supporters. Te same would be true later with other DIRCOTE groups.
Te groups objective represented a quantum leap in the approach to combating the PCP-SL: a shift from
striking at the subversive groups military apparatus to dismantling its political apparatus. Te task of
counteracting the Shining Paths armed actions was left to other operational groups (Delta forces).
GEIN began its intelligence operations on March 5, 1990, using dataan address and a telephone num-
berthat had been on le for nearly ve years. On June 1, it scored its rst victory when agents searched
a house in Limas Monterrico neighborhood where Abimael Guzmn had been living until just a few
days earlier. Te house was the base of operations for the PCP-SLs Organizational Support Department
(Departamento de Apoyo Organizativo, DAO), the central apparatus in charge of organizing party events
and relaying orders from the central leadership to party committees and other groups. In the house,
agents also found a list of contact information for members of the central PCP-SL groups, including
pseudonyms, telephone numbers and addresses.
While the GEIN suered from logistical limitations, its strength lay in the knowledge agents had acquired in
the ght against subversion. Te information gathered was used to determine the identity, functions and where-
abouts of PCP-SL leaders. It was painstaking work that required a great deal of patience. Only months later,
in 1991, after arduous work, the GEIN was able to identify the members of the PCP-SL Central Committee.
While progress was being made on that front, a serious controversy was brewing over the apparently
increasing political nature of the police under the PAP government. As a result, and amid investigations
into the ties between the former interior minister and the Rodrigo Franco Command, one of the rst
measures adopted by the government of Alberto Fujimori was an extensive purge of the PNP. It is now
known that the decision had another motive: Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimoris adviser, was interested in
stopping the investigation into the drug-tracking organization run by Rodrguez Lpez, which would
have revealed Montesinos ties with drug trackers.
See Te Process of the Police Forces graphic, at 326.
Under the Fujimori administration, the armed forces were once more given a position of supremacy that
the preceding government had tried to counterbalance. Tis move, as would come to light much later,
paved the way for an extensive corruption network that reached to the highest levels of the statea net-
work that would also have a hand in the management of the police. Te post of interior minister went to
a series of Army generals, which naturally gave them control over the National Police of Peru. Military
ocers also took charge of the entire ministry structure, especially the top posts.
Despite initial diculties, GEINs work continued. Te information gathered by the group led to new
operations for tracking PCP-SL leaders. In December 1990, PNP General Hctor Jhon Caro was named
director of DIRCOTE. In that post, he provided greater support to operational groups and proposed to
Javier Palacios that a special group similar to GEIN be established to beef up the search for top leaders of
the subversive groups. Palacios would baptize that group the Special Brigade of Detectives (Brigada Especial
de Detectives, BREDET) in 1991, when he went to seek economic backing from the U.S. State Department.
Palacios was removed from his DINCOTE post that same year after refusing to carry out an order from
Montesinos, who wanted BREDET to issue warrants for the arrest of people on terrorism charges who, ex-
cept in one case, had no criminal record to justify such action. By January 1991, GEIN had 20 agents. While
Commander Marco Miyashiro led the group, Major Jimnez was in charge of the operations department.
In a raid shortly thereafter, GEIN seized important PCP-SL material, including a videotape that showed the
entire Central Committee. It also found detailed information about the PCP-SLs First National Congress.
After this signicant blow to the subversive organization, the intelligence services took greater interest
in GEINs work. In addition to initial cooperation from the Navy, the National Intelligence Service
18 5
(Servicio Nacional de Inteligencia, SIN) provided funding. In exchange for support however, Montesinos
asked DIRCOTE to allow a group of SIN analysts to examine documents that had been collected. Te
SIN analysts (who were military) would supposedly provide support for the intelligence work being done
by GEIN and BREDET. A few years later, several of the analysts placed in GEIN by Montesinos were
ngered as members of the death squad known as the Colina Group.
From mid-1991 on, tensions grew between the police and military ocers sharing the DIRCOTE facili-
ties. Tere was intense jealousy and erce competition among the intelligence services over information
that would lead to the arrest of subversive leaders, especially Guzmn Reinoso.
A year into the Fujimori administration, it was clear that the government lacked a clear state security
policy. Te decision to dismiss police ocers had not been accompanied by other, more comprehensive
proposals. Besides the ongoing rivalry among police forces that were theoretically united, there were new
cases of human rights violations, crimes and corruption.
For several years, the only signicant change the government made in the police force was to complete the
unication of the dierent branches by issuing a new organizational chart that, along with other innova-
tions, eliminated the top oces of the dierent branches, which had been considered operational oces of
the PNP. In their place, the government created a centralized structure with specialized operational units
for combating certain crimes, such as terrorism or drug tracking. Each police force had a strong identity,
however, and that institutional history and identity continued to carry heavy weight throughout the decade.
Amid these changes, DIRCOTE was raised to the status of an operations unit within the PNP and its
name was changed to the National Anti-Terrorism Bureau (Direccin Nacional Contra el Terrorismo,
DINCOTE). Tis enabled DINCOTE to obtain more resources and improve its performance consider-
ably. A new commander was appointed after the name change. In November 1991, the head of the unit,
Hctor Jhon Caro, was removed from his post unexpectedly, apparently for political reasons. In Decem-
ber, PIP General Antonio Ketn Vidal was named to head DINCOTE. After the restructuring, new oper-
ations were carried out that led to the arrest of what was left of the Peoples Support Committee, the head
of the Shining Paths propaganda tool, El Diario, as well as the second arrest of many MRTA leaders.
Of particular importance were the arrests of PCP-SL members linked to the Csar Vallejo Preparatory
Academy. Information obtained through these arrests would lead to the detention of Abimael Guzmn.
See DINCOTE Organizational Chart - 1992 graphic, at 327.
Under the new structure, GEIN and BREDET continued with the existing work plan, although with
new names: DIVICOTE-1 and DIVICOTE-2 (Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Divisions), respectively.
On September 12, DIVICOTE-1 began the nal phase of Operation Captain Carlos Verau Asmat,
which ended with the raid on a house in the Lima neighborhood of Surquillo, where Abimael Guzmn
Reinoso, Elena Iparraguirre Revoredo, Laura Zambrano Padilla and Mara Pantoja Snchezleaders of
the PCP-SL Central Committeewere arrested. With the operation successfully concluded, DINCOTE
Director Vidal personally escorted Guzmn and the other prisoners to the police units facilities.
Te CVR believes it is crucial to highlight that behind this resounding success lay a long process of police
work and learning. In DINCOTEs case in particular, it must be noted that since the bureaus establish-
ment as a division (DICOTE, in 1981), its agents had engaged in a gradual, cumulative learning process
rather than simply carrying out a previously designed plan. Te steps to be taken were dened once the
investigations were under way and depended on the progress being made.
Te arrests made by DINCOTEs various special intelligence groups were also the result of dedicated
work carried out exclusively by the police. Te DIRCOTE police agents performance (and later that of
DINCOTE) was the fruit of successive decisions by the heads of various operational and special groups
that were part of the unit throughout its long history.
18 6
Chapter 4
Based on its investigations, the CVR believes that these accomplishments ran counter to the path chosen
by the government of Alberto Fujimori. As will be seen in the next chapter, the government had decided
that its main base of power would be the armed forcesor, more precisely, the military top brassand
had opted for an anti-subversive policy based on a military solution. President Fujimori had given abso-
lute control of the conict to the Joint Chiefs of Sta, and the anti-subversion decrees issued at the time of
the 1992 coup transferred many police functions to the Army. Given this shift, Guzmns arrest surprised
top government ocials, who were unaware of the operation.
Arrests in September 1992not only of Guzmn, but also of many other PCP-SL leadersmarked
the subversive organizations strategic defeat. At the same time, however, they caused ill will among the
armed forces and their intelligence services, which could not forgive the police for inicting the decisive
blow without prior consultation and for having announced the news themselves. Te Fujimori adminis-
tration went to the extreme of dismantling DINCOTE, instead of providing it with the expected support
for work that was about to reach a decisive conclusion.
In the new authoritarian climate, the SIN, under the real but unocial direction of Vladimiro Montesi-
nos, became the governments preferred agency. Decrees related to national pacication reinforced the
SIN. Te service, which had been a small, bureaucratic body until 1990, became the governments politi-
cal apparatus and gradually assumed a variety of illegal functions.
In addition, the administration crafted an ocial version of pacication that was not based on fact. Te
revised version attributed the PCP-SLs defeat to the armed forces, particularly to the decisions supposedly
made by the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Sta, General Nicols Hermoza Ros, and to SIN-led
investigations and operations. Tis version of events was one of the banners that President Fujimori waved
during his re-election campaign in 1995.
Over the years, interest in DINCOTEand, consequently, funding for the group dropped o. In 1996,
however, a wave of attacks by the PCP-SL faction led by scar Ramrez Durand, Feliciano, would bring
back memories of GEINs eciency and underscore the error that had been made in disbanding the group.
Human rights violations
While acknowledging the merits of the work of the police forces during the 1990s, the CVR also believes
that it is necessary to examine the human rights violations committed under the protection oered by the
legal and institutional regime established by the coup of April 5, 1992. Te anti-terrorism decrees issued
by the government beginning in 1992 expanded the possibilities for discretionary action by the police,
while sidestepping rules or limits. One particularly deplorable manifestation of this was the way the re-
pentance law functioned. Laxly enforcedwithout precautions that should have been indispensable for
ensuring the credibility of information gathered in exchange for benetsthe repentance system turned
many people into victims of false, inexact or exaggerated accusations. A single accusation was enough for
the accused person to be arrested, indicted and often convicted.
According to testimonies received by the CVR, the police forces were responsible for 6.6 percent of deaths
and disappearances of Peruvians during the years of the violence. Tat puts them in third place behind
the PCP-SL (53.68 percent) and the armed forces (28.73 percent). In general, the ght against subversion
reinforced the repressive, authoritarian practices that already existed within the police as an institution.
In a closer analysis of the type, frequency, place and date of human rights violations perpetrated by the
police, it is vitally important to dierentiate between two types of patterns or behaviors.
First, there are certain violations of fundamental rights that are closely linked to traditional police activ-
ity in Peru: unlawful and indiscriminate detentionsi.e., the practice of detaining to investigate instead
of investigating and proving a crime before detainingand the mistreatment and torture of prisoners.
Torture by the police was a systematic, generalized, extensive practice. Unlike other, more focused types
of human rights violations, such as extrajudicial execution or forced disappearance, torture was practiced
18 7
by the police throughout almost the entire country. Te same was true of unlawful detention. Without
clear strategies or plans, the police frequently resorted to these methods amid generalized violence that
made them seem permissible, especially given the lack of ocial controls and sanctions.
Second, it must be noted that the pattern of violations by police personnel in the emergency zones
echoes that of the armed forces. Tis does not mean the police did not commit human rights viola-
tions independently; however, empirical evidence shows that the forced disappearances and arbitrary
executions attributed to the police were concentrated in the departments that were under a state of
emergency and the control of a political-military command, such as Ayacucho, Apurmac, Huan-
cavelica and Junn.
Finally, it is also important to note police responsibility in the crime of sexual violence against women,
especially rape. Te CVR found that these crimes occurred during police raids in communities in the
emergency zones, as well as in police stations and prisons. Tey were sometimes used as methods of
torture to obtain information or self-incrimination and were generally an ignominious way of exercising
power and abusing victims. Tis practice was aggravated by cover-ups and other guarantees of impunity
that police commanders and other state ocials granted to perpetrators.
ARMED FORCES
In 1980, there was no clear connection between national policy and military strategy. Te ideas about
security held by politicians and incipient civil society at the time adhered to rigid principles and were ab-
stract, disconnected and out of context. At the same time, the militarys doctrines and professional abili-
ties were not designed to help resolve the problem. Tis gap became evident with the return to democracy,
and the PCP-SL planned to take advantage of the opportunity to destroy the state.
Te peoples war declared by the PCP-SL, as well as the one launched shortly thereafter by the MRTA,
were attacks against peace, democratic self-determination and Peruvians fundamental rights. Although
it faced an internal enemy that had arisen among its own people, the democratic state had the right to
defend itself with armed force, because a legitimate government can justly defend itself against unjust
insurrections. With that in mind, the CVR has attempted to determine the extent to which human
rights violations committed by members of the armed forces against the population during the conict
responded to general policies and strategies of the armed forces.
5%
0%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1980
0.00
1982
3.89
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1981
1.21
7.24
8.77
9.33
8.7
5.31
5.8
24.14
SOURCE: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
FIGURE 23
PERU 1980-1989: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL
TERRITORY UNDER STATE OF EMERGENCY
18 8
Chapter 4
Unacknowledged internal armed confict and inappropriate strategy
Te rst two months of the PCP-SLs prolonged peoples war from the countryside to the city preceded
the transfer of power by the so-called Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, which was led
by General Francisco Morales Bermdez. It is clear that the military government did not recognize the
seriousness of the threat posed by the PCP-SL. In any case, it considered the transfer of power to a civil-
ian government more important and knew that the process would be more dicult if it occurred while
a military campaign was being launched against a domestic enemy. Besides, in the 1970s many political
groups talked about the possibility of armed struggle. It was not easy to determine if one of them, or
which one, had started taking concrete steps in that direction.
Te circumspection with which the matter was handled is understandable given the ideological convic-
tions of the time. Te only military activity that responded to the hypothetical threat of subversion was
the formation of an anti-subversive unit within each infantry division, and this was done according to the
textbooks and the experience of the 1960s. As part of the transition to a civilian government, the military
was careful to maintain an important margin of decision-making power over defense policy. It must also
be remembered that Morales Bermdez negotiated with Belaunde to ensure that the military command-
ers under his regimes remained the heads of the dierent branches of the armed forces. Responsibility
and authorityfor security remained in the same hands. Tus, the top military commanders at the start
of the Belaunde administration were simply carried over from the outgoing government. Te clearest
signs of this partial transfer of power were the detailed secret laws for the National Defense System issued
by the military government in June 1980, shortly before Belaunde took oce.
Te Peruvian Armed Forces returned the government to civilians with the idea that Perus Marxist left would
be kept in line by elections and that if subversive violence broke out it would be dealt with the way the problems
of Argentine Montoneros in Lima had been managed. Te PCP-SL, however, did not abide by that logic.
Proof of the ignorance of both the Belaunde government and the armed forces about the true nature of
the problem was the disparity between the foreign defense budget requested by the legislature and the
funds earmarked for ghting subversion. In the previous decade, under the military dictatorship, Peru
had spent excessively on weapons and military installations in an eort to increase its regional and global
geopolitical importance. Te hypothetical case of a war against Ecuador or Chileor in the worst case
against both at once in a war on two frontsguided ocial state policy. Te military ministers managed
to keep military spending equivalent to 26 percent of the national budget, falling back on the argument
of supplementary spending because of the conict with Ecuador. In comparison with these expenses,
which simply ratied the military governments strategic priorities, the amounts earmarked for the anti-
subversive campaign from 1983-1985, including local development and civic action projects, were min-
ute. While this disparity between spending and threat would soon be reconsidered, the massive increase
in military spending in 1985 was due to the acquisition of a squadron of Mirage ghter jets, which had
nothing to do with the internal conict and no clear relationship with external defense needs.
Another legacy of the military government was the National Defense System (Sistema de Defensa Nacio-
nal, SDN) and its laws. Te SDN essentially segmented the state, giving the military responsibility for
defense policy and requiring that it be justied only to the president. Tis was reected in the 1979 Con-
stitution, which gave the armed forces the constitutional mandate to guarantee security and national
defense. Instead of taking a step toward a more modern role for the armed forces, the 1979 Constitution
raised their guardian role to the rank of the supreme law of the state. Under this doctrine, only part of
the national power arises from the democratic vote and ows through directives issued by the government
and Cabinet ministers. Tis strengthening of the militarys constitutional rank blocked possibilities for
a comprehensive anti-subversive policy drawn up jointly by the executive branch, legislature and armed
forces, because the military continued to consider itself capable of dening defense policy alone, and so
neither the politicians in the ministries nor those in Congress took on the task. When the military began
to develop broader anti-subversive concepts with implications for overall state policy, it encountered a
18 9
serious lack of understanding in the government and in Congress.
By late 1980, the PCP-SLs many attacksmost of them brutal bombings, even thensparked debate
within the recently inaugurated democratic government. On December 23, Interior Minister Jos Mara de
la Jara opposed a plan to declare a state of emergency in the aected areas. During the preceding two years,
the military government had repeatedly used the suspension of constitutional guarantees as a way of dealing
with strikes by labor unions. De la Jara believed that terrorism could be controlled without suspending guar-
antees. He advocated using police forces, because the Civil Guard and, to a greater extent, the Investigative
Police had made some signicant arrests. Starting in early 1981, however, the government categorized the
PCP-SLs actions as terrorism and some voices were already proposing the use of the armed forces. Te presi-
dent himself stated that he believed that anyone who attempted to destroy the countrys riches and disturb
the peace with acts of terrorism and sabotage should be considered traitors to the country.
Te presidents decision to put ve provinces in Ayacucho under a state of emergency after the attack
on the Tambo police station included the suspension of guarantees, but stopped short of sending in the
armed forces. Te clearest voice speaking out against the involvement of the armed forces was that of the
Minister of War, General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra, who told the press that if the armed forces took control
of the internal order in Ayacucho they would have to start killing PCP-SL members and non-members,
because that is the only way that they could be certain of success. Tey kill 60 people and maybe there are
3 Shining Path members among them [...] and the police will certainly say that all 60 were members. [...]
I believe that would be the worst alternative, and for that reason I am opposed, as long as it is not strictly
necessary, to involving the armed forces in this ght (Gonzlez, 1983a: 50). Te drastic tone of his warn-
ing stemmed from very real circumstances. One segment of public opinion, outraged by the attacks, was
demanding the prompt use of armed force to eliminate the problem. Te armed forces, however, were
unprepared for anything but taking military control of the zone and stamping out all resistance by force,
just as in a conventional war, which would have resulted in the deaths of many innocent people.
Te PCP-SL, meanwhile, created the impression that the conict had indeed entered a military phase.
One example of this was the raid on the Huamanga prison. Some of the attackers scattered throughout
the city, engaging police in gun battles, while others overpowered the prison guards. Army soldiers did
not leave Los Cabitos military base because they had received no orders from Lima. Te jailbreak by the
Shining Path prisoners dealt a heavy blow to the police forces and to the governments policy in general.
As PCP-SL attacks became more violent, Belaunde and certain members of his administration became
seriously concerned about both the political implications of sending the armed forces into the emergency
zone, which appeared dicult to avoid, and by the progress made by the subversives. Te president re-
sisted approving a military campaign because, in his experience, there was a direct relationship between
military intervention against guerrillas of the 1960s and the military coup that had overthrown his rst
administration in 1968. Te result was a general confusion among the public, which was part of the na-
tional tragedy. Many people confused Cisneros dire warnings with threats, attributing his words to ill
will instead of considering the seriousness of what he was saying. By then, Belaunde had already made up
his mind. On December 27, he issued an ultimatum to the terrorists, demanding that they lay down their
arms. On December 31, about 2,000 members of the Army were sent into action in the emergency zone.
Te events of 1982 show how the PCP-SLs terrorist strategy took Belaundes government completely by
surprise and exposed tensions among sectors of the Peruvian government. Neither military control over
internal order in the emergency zone, provided for in the Constitution as an appropriate way to deal with
a serious upheaval, nor existing military capacity guaranteed success against the PCP-SL. Instead, they
fed into the Shining Paths plan for moving the war into a new stage.
Te decision to put the armed forces in charge of the internal order in the emergency zone was made with-
out clarity or a detailed examination of the diculties inherent in the task. Te militarys real mission was
far stranger and more dicult: to create conditions for the establishment of the rule of law where it had
19 0
Chapter 4
not previously existed. In other words, the armed forces were to make it possible to raise the awareness of
citizens that they had basic rights and belonged to a state that guaranteed those rights. To do this, they
had to eliminate the PCP-SL, the organization that was bent on destroying any signs of such awareness.
Responsibilities assigned to the armed forces by the president, who commanded them to assume control
of the internal order, were disproportionate to the militarys role. Creating conditions for imposing the
law and ensuring the operational character of the police and judiciary involves comprehensive action by
the state, not just the conquest of territory by the force of arms. Leaving this broader task exclusively to
the armed forces assumes that they must direct and organize comprehensive action, including economic,
educational, institutional and regulatory development.
Because putting the armed forces in charge of the internal order in Ayacucho was understood by Be-
launde in the narrow sense of militarily engaging enemies of the state, it was implicit that the state would
assume non-military tasks necessary to eectively re-establish rule of law. Tis limitation on military
functions meant a division of labor with civilians. Only a bold combination of military force and eorts
at social development and public services would have been able to reduce the violence and isolate the
PCP-SL before it could gain the strength to spread throughout the rest of the country. Tis did not occur
for two reasons: First, Belaundes new political team was not inclined to lead that sort of development
action; and second, the PCP-SLs strategy included the assassination of public ocials and, in general,
anyone involved in development, whether state-related or otherwise. Even before the actions began, there
was an attitude that the subversion should be confronted with a purely military strategy, without involv-
ing civilian authorities in the leadership of the political component of this battle.
Te result was a military anti-subversive campaign with an extremely complex objective and minimal
support from the rest of the state and society. Belaunde did not want to go to war. Only when it was abso-
lutely necessary did he give the order, and even then it was hedged. Te armed forces were also reluctant
to get involved. Only the Shining Path saw the militarys participation in Ayacucho as an important step
in its largely premeditated plan.
2
At the presidents request, the armed forces drew up and presented to the National Defense Council a plan
based on an evaluation of the PCP-SLs strategy and its military and political organization as a guerrilla force
similar to earlier movements. Te Shining Path was portrayed as part of the larger international communist
movement and, therefore, dependent on external support. Operations were planned and carried out accord-
ing to Manual NE-41-1, which had been used 17 years earlier in the 1965 anti-guerrilla campaign.
In the early years of the conict, the armed forces lacked adequate intelligence about the PCP-SLs orga-
nization and its way of operating. Neither the armed forces nor the government realized that the PCP-SL
did not depend on foreign support or guidance, that it did not establish camps or maintain columns,
and that it accumulated political and military power through a strategy that was unprecedented in Latin
America. Te Army deduced the nature of its mission from government directive 02 SDN/81. Te gov-
ernment lacked an overall, long-term strategic framework.
Te strategy adopted by the armed forces assumed that the population was divided into communities
that backed the subversives and those loyal to the Peruvian government. In fact, the PCP-SL divided up
each rural community, using its base of support in one segment to provoke a military response against the
entire community. Tat explains the high number of innocent victims. Te military response consisted of
taking control of communities and rural areas and attempting to destroy armed elements or enemy forces.
Te mission of the anti-subversive campaign was dened as the recovery of territorial control. Te mil-
itary operations began on December 30, 1982, when the government ordered the armed forces into
the ght against subversion. Under the command of General Clemente Noel Moral, national security
sub-zone Ewhich included ve provinces of Ayacucho and all of Huancavelicawas reorganized and
2 Some erroneous decisions were made in the early years because subversion was considered a purely police or military problem, rather
than a political war (Ministry of Defense, 2000).
19 1
expanded to include the province of Andahuaylas (Apurmac). After the rst eld inspections, and a
preliminary assessment of subversive activity, the decision was made to reinforce the militarys presence.
Te most notable measure was the dispatching of two Navy infantry companies to an area that extended
from Huanta to the Apurmac valley, in the jungle region of San Francisco.
Anti-subversive bases were established in all provincial capitals and at the points from which it was possible to
control the valleys, like the Luisiana hacienda in San Francisco. Te main tactic involved patrols dispatched
from these bases. It soon became clear that it was not a matter of developing greater repower at certain
points, because subversives did not engage the military in battle but rather limited themselves to entering
defenseless communities, attacking police stations and occasionally harassing military patrols. Te response
to these sudden, scattered appearances by subversives was a greater military presence and more patrols. In
places where the subversive presence was greatest, the state only existed if there was a military base nearby.
Te Navy infantry was forced to abandon its usual system of platoons and squadrons and formed combat
patrols, which also took turns serving at the base. Tis transformation came about as the result of combat
experience; small patrols did not become widespread until 1984. About 250 members of the Navy infantry,
equivalent to two companies, operated in the emergency zone. Tey were relieved every two months, and
they were trained and took rest periods at the Ancn Naval Base. Overall, the Peruvian Navys infantry at
the time had a force of 2,000, only one-eighth of whom were stationed in the emergency zone at any given
time during this period. Counting the Army and Navy, combat personnel stationed in the emergency zone
totaled about 2,000 troops, besides police. If the total size of the military during those years is estimated at a
minimum of 90,000 troops, it means only 3 percent participated in anti-subversive actions at any given time.
Te Army and Navy patrols left the military bases to make violent incursions into communities or to pursue
Shining Path columns. Te PCP-SL would burst into communities and then beat a nimble retreat, so that
the militarys eorts were useless or were directed against the local population. Te vacuum of authority cre-
ated by the PCP-SLs incursions was not solved by the militarys actions. Tere was a lack of intelligence work
and a broad margin for error. As a result, military patrols frequently engaged in indiscriminate violence.
It soon became clear that the goal of re-establishing internal order could not be achieved without nding
the enemy, which was hidden among the local people. In only a few exceptional cases were there direct
engagements with armed subversives or PCP-SL fortresses.
3
More often, weapons were turned against
defenseless communities, and interrogations to obtain intelligence were carried out in the same theater
as military operations. A common practice was to surround a village, force all the residents out of their
homes and use an intelligence blacklist to identify alleged terrorists.
4
Initial criteria included obser-
vations about the villagers behavior, such as who attended the raising of the ag in the plaza.
5
Often,
anyone who did not attend community assemblies called by the military patrol was considered suspect.
It was not unusual for a patrol to nd itself in a place where there had been no state presence for many
years. Te communities that had been visited by the PCP-SL reacted in dierent ways when a military
patrol arrived. In the best case, the community members welcomed the patrol and shared with it the
few provisions they had, describing the subversive incursion and sometimes ngering local Shining Path
sympathizers and agreeing to side with the armed forces. Te military troops also shared their food and,
especially, medicines. Tey sometimes also identied one or more people as subversives. During the rst
year of the conict, they usually detained the suspects. In the afternoon, when the patrol left, the village
was left defenseless. Retaliation from the PCP-SL followed. Communities that had been visited by the
armed forces received the harshest treatment. With help from local informants, the subversives publicly
abused, mutilated or executed anyone who had collaborated with the military patrol, holding a peoples
trial in front of the entire community.
3 CVR. Interview with retired General Roberto Noel Moral, March 10, 2003.
4 CVR. Interview with retired General Luis Prez Documet.
5 CVR. Interview with retired General Adrin Huamn Centeno.
19 2
Chapter 4
Tere were places where the armed forces succeeded in re-establishing local authorities and regaining
military control with the help of the local population, when people were able to overcome the division
and fear that protected local Shining Path militants. But the PCP-SL attacked again in many places until
it brutally accomplished a counter-reestablishment of its peoples committees. While the armed forces
pursued the dicult goal of gaining the support of the entire population for the Peruvian state and a re-
pudiation of terrorism, the PCP-SL focused on creating divisions, ensuring that there was a Shining Path
sector in every community that it was gradually able to gain political and military power amid the neu-
trality of the terried majority of the population. Tis explains the progress made by the PCP-SL in 1983.
Physical exhaustion and the psychological eects of the war explainbut do not excusethe errors and
excesses committed. Te people responsible for those errors and excesses were not only the combatants,
but also those who should have provided political, economic and institutional support to stabilize the
results of the military presence with non-military measures.
The political-military commands: Systematic,
generalized patterns of human rights violations
Because of the magnitude of the military counteroensive, the PCP-SL was aected as Cisneros had
predicted: members of the Shining Path had died, but to kill them, communities had been victimized on
a massive scale. Because of the loss of members and sympathizers, the number of attacks by the PCP-SL
decreased notably around 1985. Te armed forces and police, meanwhile, registered a smaller number of
losses than in later periods.
Te number of extrajudicial executions and various human rights violations committed in confronting
the PCP-SLs strategy reached catastrophic proportions considering the regions population. Te losses of
the armed forces in comparison with the enormous number of civilian casualties and alleged subversives
killed, which was in the thousands, as well as the lack of statistics on those wounded or captured or sub-
versive materials conscated reect an enormous imbalance in the countryside. Te diculty in obtain-
ing intelligence about the PCP-SL and controlling rural areas led not only to serious excesses but also to
clandestine detentions and torture centers on some military bases. One notorious case was that of the
stadium in Huanta, the main Navy infantry base in that province, which temporarily housed a clandes-
tine detention center where people were disappeared and tortured. Other interrogation centers included a
pig farm near the Los Cabitos Army base in Huamanga and the pink house in that city.
Human rights violations increased because the political-military command of the emergency zoneas part
of its strategy to isolate the zoneprohibited the Red Cross, humanitarian organizations and the press in
general from entering the area and reserv the right to authorize news reports or interviews. Te few reports
that ltered out were later taken by certain sectors of the public, both at home and abroad, as indicators of a
situation that was out of control, while Peruvian ocials discredited them. Just a few months after this news
blackout began eight journalists were killed by members of the community of Uchuraccay who mistook
them for subversives. Shortly thereafter, the case was ocially closed and the government opted for a rapid
victory, regardless of the cost, with no substantive changes in its political agenda or economic plans.
While members of the governing party denied that human rights violations were occurring or, in some
cases, simply minimized the complaints of such abuses, the opposition gave the matter greater political at-
tention. Tis lack of political unity in the country was the major obstacle to complementing internal defense
with economic, administrative and political eorts to increase the states presence in the emergency zone.
Opponents on the left saw the war against the PCP-SL as a Peruvian version of Argentinas dirty war. Al-
though the left in Congress distanced itself from the PCP-SL to a certain extent, in many political activities
the left took an ambiguous stance on the armed struggle, giving the impression that it had not completely
renounced taking up arms and that the violent nature that the social conict was taking on was perfectly
comprehensible. In any case, there was no active national political stance against the PCP-SL.
As a result, political positions on the issue became polarized. Top military commanderswho at the time
19 3
were also political guresinterpreted the lack of unied support for defense eorts as a weakness of the new
system. Both the governing party and the opposition confused the PCP-SL with just another Cold War phe-
nomenon, a national guerrilla force encouraged by international communism. Te confusion increased when
the Tpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tpac Amaru, MRTA) announced
its own armed struggle. Te fact that the MRTA had the characteristics of a regular guerrilla force, linked
to international communism and descended from the radical branches of the PAP that had given rise to the
ephemeral guerrillas of 1965, reinforced the belief that behind the PCP-SL, the MRTA and leftist legisla-
tors lay the same political player: international communism. In the early years of the conict, this collective
self-deceitwhich originated in the lefts own confusion about its rolekept people from recognizing the
marked dierences among the leftist groups, the MRTA and the PCP-SL. Tis not only frustrated the politi-
cal unity necessary for confronting the PCP-SL but also enabled broad sectors to underestimate the danger
and interpret the PCP-SL as the understandable outgrowth of discontent among poor peasant farmers.
Te marginal nature of the war in 1983-1985 was determined by the implicit and (clearly) unanimous politi-
cal decision to ensure that the military-led defense eort did not have repercussions in other areas of national
life. Tis occurred for two reasons: On the one hand, the government, while it had delegated functions to
the armed forces, wanted to ensure that this did not imply a return to military power; on the other, opposi-
tion groups wanted to make certain that the concept of anti-subversion did not include them. Te political
position of the government, which did not ocially acknowledge the existence of an internal conict that
had the nature of a subversive war rather than merely terrorist outbreaks, coincided with the armed forces
strategy of a communications blackout in the conict zone. Te result was an ocially non-existent war
being fought by people who sought to end it quickly and at any cost, leaving no trace of what had occurred.
In early 1984, General Manuel Clemente Noel Moral was replaced by General Adrin Huamn Centeno. A
native of the area and a Quechua speaker, General Huamn seemed willing to take personal responsibility
for the political and economic measures needed to win the populations support. Although he took steps in
that direction, the number of reports of extrajudicial executions and disappearances by the security forces
while he was in command is the highest of the entire period of conict. So is the number of crimes perpe-
trated that year by the PCP-SL. During that period, the rst mass graves were discovered in Huamanguilla
and Pucayacu. It is also clear that Huamns ambivalent support for peasant self-defense forces, encouraging
entire communities to rise up against the threat from the PCP-SL without providing them with appropriate
weapons or training, led to an increase in violence by the PCP-SL as well as by the self-defense organizations.
Convinced that he had to link development with military action, Huamn, as head of the Military-Political
Command of the Emergency Zone, interpreted his job as including management of the budget for public
spending of the Departmental Development Corporation of Ayacucho (Corporacin Departamental de De-
sarrollo de Ayacucho). He issued Directive 001-SAS/SZSN E on April 27, 1984, with the goal of quali-
tatively, quantitatively and strategically reorienting 1984 public spending for the Department of Ayacucho
toward agricultural production activities that benet the peasant population aected by acts of terrorism,
generating the greatest possible employment and self-suciency of food supplies in the emergency zone.
It is clear that his actions in the area of agricultural development had little expert guidance and were far
from being a model of sustainable development. It is also clear that he was much more concerned about
the psycho-social eect of these measures on the ght against the PCP-SL. In fact, many of these actions,
instead of being part of a real plan, seemed to recreate the paternalistic models that had existed in Ayacuchos
countryside long before the Agrarian Reform. Huamn also underestimated the PCP-SLs political ability
to make such social spending appear to be a victory for the peoples war. Because the villages in the emer-
gency zone had been visited by the PCP-SL since the time of the Agrarian Reform and had never seen any
public investment until General Huamns arrival, it was not dicult for the PCP-SL to make people believe
that there would never have been such spending if it had not been for the peoples war.
Te report about his experiences that Huamn submitted to his superiors before being removed from
his post contains revealing passages about his reformist and development-oriented ideological position,
which was undoubtedly shared by many top Army commanders; nevertheless, it was incompatible with
19 4
Chapter 4
the governments economic policy and the recommendations of the Reagan administration.
In 1984, the Navy infantry organized the rst self-defense committees. Tese peasant self-defense forces
(Apurmac Valley) and the policy of regrouping the population (strategic villages around Huanta) dur-
ing this phase, however, did not help reduce the indiscriminate nature of armed actions, although they
provided experience that would be useful later in the conict. Tese experimental strategies were outside
the bounds of ocial policy, which opposed mobilizing peasant farmers and giving political authority to
the military. Te governing partys national security strategy seemed to revolve around applying military
pressure in the countryside while the police arrested the leaders of the subversive forces.
Te government urged military and police commanders to eliminate the outbreaks of subversive activity
while avoiding signicant political consequences. Despite the creation of the Anti-Terrorism Division
(Divisin contra el Terrorismo), the investigative capacity of the police was placed at the service of intel-
ligence-gathering for the war. Tis veered away from the divisions purpose, which was to arrest people
legally on the basis of objective evidence. Instead of carrying out legally rigorous investigations to bring
criminal terrorists to trial in cases based on clear proof, the investigative police ocers trained in clandes-
tine surveillance, inltration of criminal organizations and recruiting of collaborators gradually came to
be seen as complementary to the militarys anti-subversion eorts.
Te militarys initiatives to organize community self-defense patrols were completely outside the bounds
of ocial strategy. Te government, the opposition, many top military commanders and most public
opinion opposed arming the population. Tis, along with the initiatives of General Huamn Centeno,
shows that from the early years of the conict, the armed forces adopted strategies that went beyond the
mandate given to them under the elected governments security and defense policy.
Eforts at civilian control and expansion of the internal armed confict
As seen in an earlier chapter, in the rst months of his administration President Alan Garca attempted
to ease the oppressive atmosphere of the internal war and address the economic recession with speeches
and radical measures. From the start, however, he had to assimilate very harsh conditions, even as he an-
nounced his programs for change.
On June 5, 1985, the outgoing Belaunde administration issued Law 24150, which regulated the functions
of the political-military command in any emergency zone, granting it the power to request the removal,
appointment or transfer of authorities. Te same lawwhich is still in eectmakes members of the
armed forces or police forces [exclusively subject] to the Military Code of Justice. Tis legacy of the
outgoing government, introduced under pressure from the armed forces and its political allies, was not
rejected by Alan Garca, who took advantage of his election to divert attention from the issue rather than
strike down the law, even though he had an absolute majority in Congress.
In August 1985, just after Alan Garca took oce, soldiers perpetrated massacres in Pucayacu, Ac-
comarca, Umaro and Bellavista. Tese actions coincided with erce attacks by the PCP-SL. In Sep-
tember, a congressional commission discovered the mass graves containing the bodies of people who
had been massacred. Alan Garca backed the investigation and immediately dismissed the military
commanders and even the president of the Joint Chiefs of Sta, blaming them for the killings. Tis
was the major investigation into human rights violations during the Garca administration that had the
presidents support and that produced results. Te scenario became more complicated in the following
months, when the Shining Path carried out a series of attacks on Navy personnel in Lima. On August
16, 1985, several dozen uniformed members of the Navy and civilians were attacked in the district of
Villa Mara del Triunfo while waiting for the bus that would take them to work. On March 14, 1986,
the PCP-SL murdered Lieutenant Commander Jorge Alzamora Bustamante, who had served on Task
Force 90 in Ayacucho. On May 4, 1986, PCP-SL militants murdered Rear Admiral Carlos Ponce Can-
essa, one of the Navys top commanders. After Ponces murder, the Minister of the Navy, Vice Admiral
19 5
Julio Pacheco Concha, warned that the subversives had deeply wounded the institution and the entire
country and had awakened the lion. Te selective murders did not end, however. On October 14,
the subversives claimed a new victim, Admiral Gernimo Caeratta Marazzi, who had recently served
as Commander General of the Navy.
Under pressure because of the ferocity of the PCP-SLs crimes and attacks, Alan Garca imposed a state of
emergency in Lima, suspending constitutional guarantees in the city that was the seat of his own govern-
ment. Added to this was a curfew in the capital, a measure that had a strong impact on the publics frame of
mind. Amid this notorious lack of clarity in its rst few months, the Garca administration began to imple-
ment an internal security policy. Te policy consisted of gaining civilian control over the armed forces and
police, while making eorts to mediate the conict and encourage agricultural development in the poorest
parts of the Andes. Civilian control was to be achieved in three ways: (1) by unifying the police forces into
the National Police of Peru and strengthening this new institution; (2) by merging the military ministries
into a Ministry of Defense; and (3) by ensuring the militarys loyalty to the government through a policy of
promotions as well as through communications between the president and the armed forces.
Awareness of the problems related to civilian-military relations arose, as we have seen, during the debate
within Belaundes administration over whether or not to use the armed forces in the ght against the
Shining Path. In Alan Garcas rst Cabinet, however, there was a clear attempt to increase civilian con-
trol over security and defense.
Alan Garca multiplied the areas of the country that were under the control of political-military com-
mands. Tis meant that the police in those areas remained as an auxiliary force under military author-
ity and that police work per se lost its meaning as constitutional guarantees were suspended. Te policy
announced by Garca and Abel Salinas included rigorous respect for human rights in the ght against
subversion. But when the prison uprising organized by the PCP-SL occurred, Alan Garca ordered that
armed force be used to regain control of the prisons as quickly as possible, regardless of the cost. Mean-
while, work was underway to create the Ministry of Defense, but Garca and his congressional majority
said nothing about the constitutional consequences of such a change. When creating the new ministry,
the president refused to acknowledge any reduction in his direct authority over the armed forces as head
of state, nor did he reduce the de facto power wielded by the Joint Chiefs of Sta. He did, however, al-
low himself to believe in the showor farceof winning over top commanders through his personal
relationships with them. Te result was a Ministry of Defense that was limited to coordinating relations
between the Joint Chiefs of Sta and the Cabinet. Although the National Defense System Law was
modied to give the Cabinet direct authority it was not enough to change the pattern of civilian-military
relations that had been established by the military government in 1979.
Te initial thrust of Garcas administration lasted eight months, coming to an abrupt end with the mas-
sacre in the prisons. When the law creating the Ministry of Defense was approved in 1987, the measure
had no real meaning. It was born of inertia, and the rst minister was a retired military ocer. During
the remaining four years of his administration, Garca backed the actions of the armed forces, even ac-
cepting a role that was unclear and subordinate as long as it appeared that he had taken the initiative.
Hyperination, the peak of the Shining Paths terrorism in 1988 and the countrys complete political
fragmentation as the result of his eorts to nationalize the banking system left Garca unable to lead.
Te Ministry of Defense was created on March 31, 1987, through Law 24654. Its operation and its re-
lationship with the branches of the military, however, were determined by legislative decrees issued by
the executive branch. In other words, the general idea of creating a Ministry of Defense was approved in
a law passed by Congress, but its specic content was established by the president. In fact, these decrees
gave the Ministry of Defense minimal functions, structure and competencies compared to those of the
commanding generals and the Joint Chiefs of Sta. In addition, instead of being a career politician, Alan
Garcas rst defense minister was General Enrique Lpez Albjar, who took the post on October 14,
1987. Te system of civilian-military relations that resulted was approximately as follows: the president
19 6
Chapter 4
received, for his approval, only those plans and operations supported by both the Joint Chiefs of Sta and
the minister of defense. Under this system, the minister could do little or nothing without the support of
the top military commanders. In fact and by law, the minister was little more than a mediator or facilita-
tor, rather than the director of military policy.
Te illusion of civilian control over military policy was rounded out by an element taken from an ad-
vanced democratic concept of civilian-military relations. Garcas decrees made the Cabinetrather than
the National Defense Council, which had been created by Morales Bermdez at the end of the military
regime and later kept by Belaunderesponsible for directing the National Defense System. Te president
of the Joint Chiefs of Sta was an automatic Cabinet member, with the same rights as the Defense Minis-
ter. Te new Defense Minister, however, was not prepared to direct or supervise the preparation of plans
or operations and limited himself to accepting or delaying those presented jointly by the armed forces.
With an internal war underway, this veto powerwhich was the only control mechanismplaced the
government in the position of throwing up roadblocks to anti-subversive actions.
Te Garca administration attempted to implement a security and defense policy aimed at increasing
civilian control over the armed forces without taking responsibility for a unied, consistent management
of the war. Civilian control was established indirectly, under a system of administrative controls, with no
sharing of operational responsibility with top military ocers. In other words, neither a civilian minister
nor the president himself headed the operational chain of command. Increased civilian administration
was supposed to lead to greater consistency in guiding the various eorts aimed at ensuring internal
security based on military, police, judicial, economic and political actions. Nevertheless, the objectives
of Alan Garcas security policy, which was based on civilian control, were unclear with regard to the
ght against terrorism. It appears that Garcas government, like the Belaunde administration before it,
assumed that it had to confront a dual internal security challenge: subversion on the one hand and the
possibility of a military coup on the other.
Te left-wing opposition in Congress criticized the apristas security policy with the goal of keeping
the ruling party from taking control of the police and armed forces, while at the same time distancing
itself from the Shining Path and trying to show Peruvians that it was a viable alternative for governing
the country. Te conservative opposition, meanwhile, focused on criticizing the governments economic
policy and organized opposition to the administrations eort to nationalize the banks. Te armed forces
soon took up the conservative oppositions demand that Peru resume paying its external debt and return
to the international nancial community, as it was impossible to nance the ght against subversion
without new external credit. Garcas government met that demand in September 1988, managing to
pull o a complicated nancial bailout that ensured more than US$1 billion for the Peruvian economy.
Te expansion of the Shining Paths action, and the change in civilian-military relations that favored the
armed forces after the prison uprising paved the way for the Joint Chiefs of Sta to issue Directive 01-PE-
DI-JUN 86 JUL 90 for the Internal Defense of the Territory: Anti-Subversion. Tis measure represented
signicant progress towards a more comprehensive strategy but also repeated certain errors that had ex-
isted since the start of the militarys anti-subversive actions. Te purpose of the anti-subversive operations
was to destroy and/or neutralize the Local Political-Administrative Organization of the subversives. It
would later become clear that this was the absolute strategic priority. In the directive, that goal was still
confused with the goal of destroying and/or neutralizing any violator of the law and constitutional order
who contributes to subversion. Tis still implied highly scattered eorts, considering that the same direc-
tive stated that all legal left-wing groups, unions (except those of the PAP) and even progressive sectors
of the church tend to support subversion as contradictions became more serious.
In the organization of national internal defense, the directive called for a division of labor between the
police and the armed forces that was very similar to the one that already existed. Police forces would be
in charge of house-to-house searches, document checks, interrogations, detentions and arrests, while
the armed forces would limit themselves to dissuading, pursuing and confronting armed subversives.
19 7
Another part of the directive, however, stated that a person detained by the armed forces must be turned
over to the police or the appropriate judicial authority after being interrogated by the military unit. Te
directive also acknowledged major pending tasks in the areas of intelligence and counterintelligence, and
although there was still little knowledge of the Shining Paths structure and actions, it emphasized the
need to obtain such knowledge, which was a major step forward.
As a sign of qualitative progress in the peoples war, PCP-SL columns staged bold and repeated attacks
on military patrols. In May, a military convoy was ambushed, resulting in erce retaliation by the Army
against the community of Cayara. News spread that the military had massacred more than 50 peasants. A
team including Justice Minister Camilo Carrillo, Defense Minister General Lpez Albjar, the Dean of
the Lima Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados de Lima) Ral Ferrero and Lima Auxiliary Bishop Augusto
Beuzeville traveled to the area and reported that they had found no signs of bombardment, re or com-
bat. But statements from local residents sent the case to the Attorney Generals Oce. Te head of the
political-military command in the zone, General Jos Valdivia Dueas, said there had been no innocent
victims in Cayara and that it was a terrorist ploy to undermine the militarys credibility.
Adding to the overall sense of insecurity in 1988 were the persistent rumors of a military coup, which
were promptly followed by denials by the Defense Minister Lpez Albjar. Te irregularity or collapse
of essential public services, such as urban drinking water, electricity, highway safety and police services
in general, along with uncertainly about the value of the national currency because of hyperination,
impoverishment of the middle class and rumors of large-scale corruption, helped create a sense of anxiety
that persisted until the end of Garcas term.
The comprehensive anti-subversive strategy
and the armed forces new incursion into politics
Te document that marked the beginning of a substantive change in strategy was the Army Manual on
Non-Conventional Anti-Subversive Warfare ME 41-7, which was published in Lima by the Ministry of
Defense in June 1989. It contained a very complete and accurate description of the PCP-SLs character-
istics. It explained the main ideas of the Guiding Tought, revealed the structure of the party and the
peoples guerrilla army, its form of action and its organization for attack, the PCP-SLs nal objectives,
the guiding ideas of the areas in charge of the militia and the masses, the types of peoples committees
and their functions, the support bases, guerrilla zones and related bodies.
Te change in the concept appears in the opening lines, which indicate that subversion was no longer
understood solely, or even principally, as military action. But the second part of the denition moderated
the scope of this understanding by limiting the goal to keeping subversives from seizing power or laying
the groundwork for such action. Te main ideas of the new strategy appeared in the section on Norms
for Anti-Subversion. Te rst norm stated that the support of the population was necessary for combat-
ing subversion. Tis was the fundamental problem of the war. Te PCP-SL was prepared to return to vil-
lages and turn the police and military interventions into opportunities for it to amass powermurdering
anyone who had collaborated directly with the security forces and setting up a new peoples committee
to control the population, which had been reduced and terrorized by the war.
Te way of winning the peoples cooperation was described in the norms that followed. Te second norm
stated that the populations support could be won through an active minority. Tis concept was based on
a theory of political power (Ministry of Defense 1989: 60).
Te similarity to the Shining Paths strategy is apparent almost immediately. Te neutral majority is what
the PCP-SL called the masses. Te minorities that are in conict are the local representatives of the Peru-
vian state and the interests of a free society, on the one hand, and the nucleus of support for the subversion,
on the other. Te question, then, was which of the minorities would prevail and which would disappear.
Tus military and police action against guerrilla units, and the subversives Political-Administrative Orga-
19 8
Chapter 4
nization, had to take precedence over actions involving the population. It would be impossible to mobilize
support without rst scoring a convincing victory that would destroy the subversives domination.
Winning the support of the population does not directly follow from re-establishing normal conditions
such as the rule of law or elections. Tese are nal steps that result from a long process of restoring order,
a process that occurs while a state of emergency is still in eect. Te rst thing necessary is to create in
the population a positive image of the forces of order (Ministry of Defense 1989: 69-70). Tis objective is
eshed out in a series of rules that are surprisingly similar to those imposed by Mao on his revolutionary
army. In Maos case, however, there was no recognition of basic rights, it was merely part of a psycho-social
strategy expressed in the form of a corporate ethic for members of the Peoples Army. In the new Peruvian
anti-subversive strategy, these rules had the same sense. Tus they were combined, without contradiction,
with the suspension of basic constitutional rights and the selective elimination of the subversive minority.
Te practical implications of the new strategy appeared in the manual when it described how to disrupt
the organization of armed subversive groups and how to intervene in a red zone. Te rst clarica-
tion was that the anti-subversive war is 80 percent intelligence and 20 percent operations (Ministry
of Defense 1989: 73). Its priorities, therefore, were to identify the partys members and organization,
its strengths and weaknesses, its support bases and local force; carry out counterintelligence op-
erations; optimize inltration; make trained interrogators available; establish a database; form
networks of collaborators and informants, etc. (Ministry of Defense 1989: 74). In describing the armed
action component, the document states: Fight with initiative, surprise, trickery, mobility and creativity,
using procedures similar to those of the subversives, and carry out aggressive and ecient psychologi-
cal operations to destroy or break the subversive forces morale and will to ght (Ministry of Defense
1989: 77). Te manual makes clear that armed actions are inseparable from the use of psycho-social and
counterintelligence operations.
Intervention in a red zone is the decisive action and the one that best reects the overall sense of this
strategic concept. Te rst step, which is actually only preparatory, is the destruction or expulsion of
armed subversives. Te second step is to install forces to control the territory and the population. Te
third step is the decisive one:
Step three: Destruction of the Local Political-Administrative Organization.
Tis is a directed police operation to eliminate the members of the Political-Administrative
Organization.
It is carried out based on the following two conditions:
(a) Tat sucient information has been received to guarantee the success of the elimination.
(b) Tat the planned elimination can be carried out completely.
In this operation, it must be kept in mind that the head and main members of the Local Polit-
ical-Administrative Organization are too committed to subversion to be expected to change.
Te nal phrase emphasizes that these people cannot be redeemed, thus explaining what is meant by the
two preceding conditions: the elimination must be complete and therefore the prior identication must be
accurate. Even if elimination of the Political-Administrative Organization is understood as deactivation,
it is clear that this anti-subversive action must accomplish its goal in the most eective, certain manner so
as to ensure that the elimination is carried out completely. One noteworthy detail in this main passage of
Army Manual 41-7, in which destruction of the Local Political-Administrative Organization is dened as
the nal step of intervention in a red zone, is that the denition of the operation states: this is a directed
police operation. It is understood to be a police operation rather than a combat operation.
Once the point of no returntotal destruction of the Political-Administrative Organizationis reached,
19 9
the processes of consolidation and pacication can begin, while combat shifts to other red zones. Impor-
tant local post-war elements include the establishment of self-defense committees, the election of municipal
authorities and the re-establishment or implementation of essential public services. Although this manual
did not completely erase the democratic, constitutional nature of the power being defended, it is mentioned
only in passing as part of the psycho-social war or as an existing condition that must be managed.
Te new strategy was the basis for the Joint Chiefs of Sta of the Armed Forces Directive 017 for Internal
Defense (DVA N 017 CCFUERZAS ARMADAS-PE-DI). Tis directive reected two major strategic
decisions that shaped military action throughout the rest of the war. First, the armed forces organization
for internal defense in national security zones and sub-zones was replaced by an organization built around
the anti-subversive fronts. Second, where drug tracking existed, the mission was to separate subversion
from drug tracking and ght the drug trackers who supported the subversives or received protection
from them. Directive 017 prioritized the zones where these measures would be implemented:
1. JUNN-PASCO, because of its great strategic importance it was dened as the Center
of Gravity of Anti-Subversive Operations nationwide
2. SAN MARTN - HUNUCO - UCAYALI
3. AYACUCHO - HUANCAVELICA - APURMAC
4. LIMA - ICA - CALLAO
5. Areas in the process of formation
With these priorities set, the fronts were established and the forces assigned. In January 1990, an unusual
appendix was added to Directive 017 (DVA N 017 CCFUERZAS ARMADAS-PE-DI). Tis appendix,
signed by the new president of the Joint Chiefs of Sta, modied a central point of the directive. Te ap-
pendix specied that (2) Te Anti-Subversive Fronts will be directly under the Joint Chiefs of Sta of the
Armed Forces for operational matters, maintaining their administrative dependence on their respective
military regions. Te measure was signed by Admiral Alfonso Panizo Zariquey. Tis measure, imper-
ceptible to the public at the time, increased the power of the Joint Chiefs of Sta by making its president
the chief of operations for the anti-subversive fronts.
Te intensity of the operations in Junn, Pasco and Hunuco in 1989-1991 was directly reected in the
number of murders and extrajudicial executions recounted in testimony gathered by the Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission of Peru.
Te other decisive strategic decision regarding the countrys military and political situation involved drug
tracking. Te ambiguity of the militarys task led to a certain level of coexistence between the armed
forces and drug trackers and paved the way for Vladimiro Montesinos inuence over the armed forces.
In 1989, the police base in Uchiza was destroyed. Tis disaster can only be explained in the broader
context of the political changes taking place at the time. Te zone was under a state of emergency, but
not under a political-military command; this was an exceptional case, and was probably due to the loca-
tion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administrations (DEA) anti-drug base in nearby Santa Luca. Te
U.S. agency is not allowed to operate in areas that are at war or under military control. Te PNP base
in Uchiza was disproportionately large, with more than 50 police ocers armed with weapons of war,
but was also ill-prepared to repel an attack because the ocers were very vulnerable to drug-related cor-
ruption. As a result, a month after the attack, on May 2, President Alan Garca named General Alberto
Arciniega political-military commander of the Huallaga.
Te door through which Vladimiro Montesinosa former Army captain who had been cashiered many
years earlier for misconductreturned to a military facility in 1989 was opened by intelligence operations
on the Huallaga front. In practical terms, reaching an understanding with coca-growing peasant farmers
20 0
Chapter 4
meant a certain acceptance of maceration pits, small-time drug runners, people who provided the acid and
kerosene needed to manufacture cocaine base paste, and some clandestine airstrips and light planes, because
the coca leaf has no value without the processing and marketing chain. Coca is not merely an agricultural
product, it is an agro-industrial product. To keep the peasant economy operating, therefore, it was necessary
to come to an understanding with the drug tracking cartels that did not support the Shining Path. Was
this indispensable at the time? On the eastern side of the Huallaga and in Ucayali, where the Navy was sta-
tioned, a tacit agreement with drug trackers was unnecessary because state forces there eectively fought
the PCP-SL while going after drug trackers at the same time. Intensive intelligence work was done in the
coca-growing area to identify possible allies and neutralize the Shining Paths logistical bases. At that point,
former Captain Vladimiro Montesinos, who lived in the area and had become a lawyer for drug trackers,
organized an extensive network of informants that constituted the beginning of his power base.
Te armed forces soon felt the advantages of this new strategy. Te enemy, which had seemed so over-
whelming before, began to crumble, taking refuge in the Mantaro Valley, where high-intensity anti-
subversive operations were carried out beginning in the rst half of 1990. Te new strategy gave rise to a
new phenomenon. Many of the people who were detained were freed after being held for days in cells on
military bases or in DINCOTEs facilities. Tose who had been detained once were followed and some-
times detained again, after which they disappeared or were found dead, their bodies dumped in various
parts of the valley. Because of the regularity with which this occurred, it was possible to determine from
the appearance of the bodies whether they had been executed by the security forces. Te majority of
anti-subversive operations were aimed at eliminating sympathizers, rather than active PCP-SL militants
In December 1990, the commander general of the 31st Infantry Division, who at the time was head of
the Mantaro Front, responded to a request from the Joint Chiefs of Sta by submitting a report about his
experience in the ght against subversion.
6
Tis experience was mainly in the areas of intelligence and
counterintelligence. Te most noteworthy points in the report were, rst, the need to provide more per-
sonnel and material resources for intelligence operations, and second, the need to avoid cruel treatment
or long periods of detention for interrogation.
In discussing interrogation and detainees, the report emphasized the importance of holding people for a
maximum of 24 hours before freeing them or turning them over to the police. It stated that when interro-
gation by military personnel determined that an alleged subversive was not implicated in terrorist activi-
ties, he or she should be freed. In addition, [t]he person captured and/or detained must not be mistreated
for any reason. In INTERROGATIONS, persuasion will be used instead of illicit coercion, threats or
any form of violence. Tese people must not be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment (Ministry of Defense 1989: 9).
Te fact that this report contained such clarications about what was permissible during interrogations
indicates that at the time it was written, such guidelines were not clear. Tis coincides with many of the
witnesses accounts of interrogations in which extreme violence was used, including such practices as
beating, near-drowning, hanging the person from hooks in the ceiling, electric shocks, burning, wound-
ing and mutilation, often followed by death because the person was already disgured or because he or
she had seen the captors or interrogators. Te person was killed and the corpse was disappeared or made
unrecognizable so that the victims family could not denounce the deed or so that the body would not
become proof that torture had been inicted.
Later events showed that self-critical reports, such as the one described above, had little inuence over the
course of the operations. Te mechanism that the new strategy had set in motion led to increasingly selec-
tive and sordid practices. Te circumstances that resulted in an intensication of clandestine operations
and the erosion of the security forces professional ethic were, rst, the meager state economic resources
at the end of the Garca administration and the beginning of the Fujimori government; second, the psy-
6 Ofcial Communiqu 289 C. o/07.00. Huancayo, December 21, 1990. Ref: RG N 050856- EMFA/PM-PH dated December 5, 1990.
20 1
chological eects and low morale resulting from the prolonged war; and third, the particular diculties
posed by the Huallaga and Ucayali fronts because of drug tracking.
Te scope of the anti-subversive operations broadened in 1990 and 1991. To the west, they expanded into
Limas low-income neighborhoodsmainly along the Central Highway, as in the cases of Huaycn and
Raucanaand the national universities, mainly La Cantuta and San Marcos. To the east, in Junn, com-
mandos from the Mantaro Front advanced to the Ene River, where they freed hundreds of Ashninka
people who had been recruited by the PCP-SL and were being held in a forced labor camp. To the north-
east, operations reached the red zones and coca-growing areas of Hunuco, San Martn and Ucayali.
On the Huallaga and Ucayali fronts, anti-subversive forces also faced the MRTA. Tis resulted in many deaths
and desertions among the subversives and represented their strategic defeat. Already decimated by the PCP-
SL, the MRTA was further crushed in confrontations with the armed forces. In January 1992, one of its lead-
ers, Sstero Garca, defected and began collaborating with the armed forces to deactivate the rest of the MRTA.
In 1989, an Army Anti-Subversive Battalion was operating in Padre Abad, on the eastern side of the Hual-
laga, while two Navy Light Combat Battalions (Batallones Ligeros de Combate, BALICOS) were in charge of
the rest of the Coronel Portillo province. Te Army took the initiative, the Navy shared in the tactics. Tere
were indiscriminate attacks against communities under PCP-SL control. Helicopters equipped with heavy
artillery opened re on communities along the river. In seconds, dozens of people hiding in vegetation along
the riverbanks were mowed down without either the gunners or the pilots ever seeing exactly who they were.
In the attack on the community of Bellavista, helicopters launched rockets at houses.
Te situation in Ucayali changed in 1990, when the Army left the Alexander von Humboldt Base to concen-
trate on the area of Tingo Mara, while the Navy took charge of the eastern side of the Huallaga. Te Navys
BALICOS launched a civic action campaign and established an organization of collaborators that enabled
them to form a series of self-defense committees in communities along the Federico Basadre Highway. Te
two positive indicators of this Navy campaign in Ucayali, beginning in 1990decreases in violence and
drug trackingwere not seen in Hunuco or San Martn until 1994. It is important to note that various
human rights violations were committed during the campaigns carried out under this comprehensive strat-
egy. Te new strategy was supposedly focused on gaining the populations support and on selective actions
made possible by intelligence work. Tis was undoubtedly the intent, but it is necessary to assess whether it
was actually implemented, and whether the strategic defeat of the MRTA and the PCP-SL was really due to
the existence of a plan. It seems, instead, that the campaigns on the northeastern front had secondary eects
that inuenced the political thinking of the top military commanders in the following years.
In early 1990 in Tingo Mara (Hunuco), Juan Ayala Almeida was detained by members of the Army af-
ter he was accused of being a PCP-SL militant. He was tortured and spent four days without food. When
he was near death, he was thrown from a helicopter over the jungle.
7
On January 6 in Angashyacu, Le-
oncio Prado, the PCP-SL called an armed strike, blocked roads and set up booby-trap bombs to detonate
when the Army arrived. Tey left one of the bombs buried in the doorway of the home of Anatolio, Rumo
and Shana Trujillo, where they also ran up a red ag. When the ag was removed, the bomb exploded,
injuring a soldier. Military personnel opened re as they entered the Trujillo home, killing Anatolio with
a shot to the head, as well as Rumo. Anatolios daughter was dragged by the hair, beaten and raped.
8
In
early 1991, soldiers from the Aucayacu military base detained and later killed 18 residents of the village of
Primavera, in Jos Crespo y Castillo. Mutilated bodies, including that of a girl who had also been raped,
were found in the Pucayacu River.
9
Tese events are mentioned here to give an idea of what the strategy of selective elimination meant in
practice. Only a few of the events that occurred in Hunuco in 1990 and 1991 are mentioned. If the
7 Event 1003908.
8 Event 1004165.
9 Event 1006272.
20 2
Chapter 4
events of 1989, before the new strategy and directive were disseminated, are examined, there is little
dierence from 1990 and 1991. Te events that occurred in the department of San Martn during those
same years demonstrated a number of inhuman practices that are as serious as in Hunuco. It is notable,
therefore, that the main decision of the war was to deploy anti-subversive battalions in certain zones
and organize intelligence activities and platoons to carry out selective elimination. Te new strategy was
undoubtedly a factor in the steady increase in the latter type of activity, however, eorts to protect the
population and increase trust in the armed forces were not equal in all places. For a long time in Hunuco
and San Martn, at least, terror was sown as much by the armed forces as by the subversives.
International infuences on the anti-subversive strategy
To combat subversion, in the 1980s the Peruvian government sought military aid from the United States
and other countries, such as Taiwan and Israel. Compared to U.S. spending in Central America during
the 1980s, the amount of economic aid provided to help Peru ght subversion was small. Assistance
during the 1980s was limited almost exclusively to instruction and training. Nevertheless, the ideas and
skills that the United States conveyed to Peruvian ocers during that time had a great inuence. Given
the results in Peru, there is good reason to doubt that those ideas about strategy, which were undoubtedly
useful in defeating the subversives, helped strengthen democracy.
Tere were reasons for the limited U.S. economic aid. Between 1980 and 1985, Peru was condent that it
could solve the problem on its own, without even a complete mobilization of its armed forces. Te United
States, meanwhile, had its eye on the dictatorships in the Southern Cone, especially the disastrous events
in Argentina. Te fact that Peruvian ocials had maintained good relations with the Soviet Union since
the 1970s worsened the situation. Later, from 1986 to 1988, Peru was isolated from the international
nancial community because of the governments policy on payment of its external debt. Tis blocked
economic aid for combating subversion. After the countrys reinsertion into the world nancial system in
the early 1990s, the idea of U.S. economic aid to Peru was raised again, particularly because the PCP-SL
and the MRTA were nancing themselves in the northeastern part of the country by providing protec-
tion to drug trackers. A new obstacle soon arose, however. Early in the Fujimori administration, the
U.S. Congress began paying attention to reports of systematic human rights violations. Only when the
conditions imposed by the U.S. legislature were met supercially did signicant economic aid material-
ize. With this support, Fujimori and his presidential-military coterie saw the opportunity to put their
sweeping plan into motion. Tey staged their institutional coup on April 5, 1992.
Te most signicant aspect of this setback for democracy was that it coincided with the new strategy of low-
intensity conict. Tis strategy was expected to bring a victory over terrorism without many human rights
violations and without representing a setback to the spread of democracy in the world. While the rst goal was
partially achieved, the cost was the creation of special operations groups that not only committed excesses, but
became the main tool of the National Intelligence Service even though they were part of the Peruvian Armed
Forces (Army Intelligence Service). Unlike the case of Central America, it was not the amount of economic
aid to help Peru combat subversion that was harmful to democracy, but a local interpretation of the political
implications of the new anti-subversive doctrine inspired by the U.S. concept of low-intensity conict.
A look at the international situation makes it possible to better understand these events. At the end of the
1970s, U.S. military activities and capacities related to low-intensity warfare had diminished as a result of
the policies of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981). With the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, it was clear
that wars that had been unleashed in far-ung places during the Cold War had had a negative political
impact, even when the United States had substantial military superiority. In South America, the victo-
ries over guerrillas in the 1970s had given way to military governments that, by the end of the decade,
were at a dead end. Under the Carter administration, the United States tended to increase the political
component of its support for democratic transitions in Latin America and decrease military aid. Tis im-
plied stepping back from developing anti-subversive strategies and training local repressive forces. When
the PCP-SL launched its subversive war against the Peruvian state in 1980, U.S. military preparation and
20 3
hemispheric cooperation in the ght against subversion were at an all-time low.
Tis began to change under the Reagan administration (1981-1989). Te term low-intensity conict
was adopted to refer to the combination of counterinsurgency, special operations and unconventional
warfare that would be used to achieve political objectives in countries aected by guerrilla warfare and
terrorism. According to this concept, low-intensity conict would demand the minimal involvement
of U.S. personnel and resources, unlike high-intensity conict, in which the full military might of the
United States would be unleashed to protect a country.
Te main agents of these wars would be special operations forces that would act in small commando
units. Levels of violence would be low in quantitative terms, but high levels of violence in concentrated
doses would be used during special selective operations. Recommendations included an emphasis on re-
spect for human rights to reinforce the thesis of selectivity. Training in human rights reinforced the idea
of applying violence selectively so as to have a decisive psychological impact. In this approach, training in
human rights was seen as an essential element of low-intensity warfare. Te result, paradoxically, would
be selective strikes with a strong psychological impact that closely resemble terror tactics. Te central task
of low-intensity warfare is to aect the enemy organization as selectively as possible and limit, insofar as
possible, the number of people aected by human rights violations. In low-intensity conicts, support for
counterinsurgency eorts from friendly governments alternates with support for the insurgency by enemy
governments. In both cases, low-intensity conict implies an active public human rights policy.
Besides this use of human rights, the resurgence of the special military capacity in the United States
marked a shift away from the socio-economic development that had been part of its anti-guerrilla strategy
in the 1960s. Tese comprehensive non-military programs were too expensive, slow and politically costly.
Ignoring the value of social reforms and strategic investment implemented during those years in many
Tird World countries, the Reagan administration eliminated national development plans from its
anti-subversive policy. Tis was a signicant part of the concept of low-intensity conict.
Tis international backdrop makes it easier to understand the situation that the Peruvian state faced in coun-
tering terrorist subversion in the early 1980s. When the terrorist violence broke out, the governments eco-
nomic policy was framed by the international political situation and, therefore, the development-based con-
cepts of the preceding decade. Te anti-subversive strategy remained the same, however, because the armed
forces had not changed. In 1984, when General Adrin Huamn Centeno, chief of operations in Ayacucho,
sent the Belaunde government an imperious demand for massive public investment and political and social
reform in the emergency zone, he was swimming against the tide. Te absence of international support for
large-scale development projects did not change in the following years, a factor that also doomed the develop-
ment projects and nationalization plans envisioned by Alan Garca when he took oce. Only afterward, in
1988, did the Peruvian armed forces systematically adopt the strategy recommended by the United States and
prepare to launch a special operations war aimed at respecting the human rights of the majority of the popula-
tion while isolating the subversives, even though there had been no public investment or social reforms.
It is necessary to describe with more precision the original combination of state policy and military
strategy that fell under the concept of a low-intensity conict. Te Reagan administration was convinced
that it could only support a government that would take up the challenge of social justice and provide
strong leadership to deal with the serious problems of legitimacy that tended to aect poor countries.
Such a government would have to adopt strict controls over the use of force, while politically confront-
ing subversives and mobilizing all sectors of the state against subversion. Te easiest reforms involved
restructuring public administration to make it more ecient and less expensive. Te government would
receive from the United States only the aid necessary for civic action, along with military preparation
for its special operations groups. Civic action, ultimately, is a type of psycho-social operation aimed at
producing a momentary sense of peace and progress amid the insecurity and defenselessness of internal
warfare. Te doctrine of low-intensity conict makes it clear that economic development is not the is-
sue; it denies that poverty is the main cause of subversion and that economic development would put an
20 4
Chapter 4
end to violent internal conict. For these reasons, during the 1980s the United States refused to provide
Peru with any type of assistance other than military aidinstruction and trainingneeded to adapt the
Andean nations anti-subversive strategy to the concept of low-intensity warfare. Tis U.S. policy nally
shaped Perus political process. Around 1988, as Peru was sinking under the weight of the economic and
social crisis provoked by Garcas policies, and subversion was at its peak, there was a sharp change of di-
rection and Perus anti-subversion eorts shifted towards an intense strategy involving special operations.
Te anti-subversive strategy within the concept of a low-intensity conict, however, was only part of the
recommendations that had been given a local twist. Te diculty in applying them was evident in the
internal conict in El Salvador during the same years. Te similarities between the strategy that stopped
the advance of the guerrillas in El Salvador and the one that defeated the PCP-SL in Peru are not coinci-
dental. Te United States had an interest in both conicts and was determined to inuence their outcome
through the strategic principles of a low-intensity conict.
An estimated 898 Peruvian ocers took courses at the School of the Americas between 1980 and 1996. If
the work of U.S. military instructors within Peru is added, anti-subversive instruction had an even larger
audience. Te basic content of the anti-subversion courses at the School of the Americas was made public
when the Pentagon declassied several manuals on September 20, 1996, as well as through CIA manuals
declassied in 1997. Tese manuals came to light as a result of pressure from the U.S. Congress and civil
society. Te contents were largely drawn from instruction material for Project X, the U.S. Army Intelli-
gence Schools Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program, which was designed to provide intelligence training
to U.S. allies around the world. Te anti-subversion manuals that were made public were designed at the
School of the Americas in Panama in 1987 by U.S. Army intelligence ocers. Te contents, concepts and
examples in the manuals were based largely on materials from the 1960s that had been partly reworked.
See Anti-subversive Oensives graphic, at 328.
Counterintelligence activities are surrounded by the moral and political problem of not distinguishing
between legal opponents of the government and subversives. Operations are carried out to begin distin-
guishing one from the other, so that at rst actions are aimed against all opponents, whether or not they
are support bases for subversion. What is clear in this strategy is the high risk that basic rights will be
violated. In Peru, the lack of democratic control over these operations allowed them to become the basis
for anti-democratic military and political power.
According to the manual, counterintelligence is not limited to identifying targets, it is also aimed directly
at changing peoples attitudes and controlling their activities. In this control over the population and re-
sources, other military personnel become a supporting force for activities designed and directed by coun-
terintelligence. It is understood that because the territory in which these activities occur is under a state
of emergency, the armed forces have responsibility for controlling and reorganizing civilian activities.
In this scenario, military intelligence becomes a source of political guidance for the government facing
the subversive threat. Implicit in the manuals is that such a war is not fought primarily with bullets, but
with comprehensive policies and mechanisms for controlling the populations activities and expectations.
With subversion as the pretext, the range and scope of military intelligence activities broaden, according
to these manuals, until they are almost unlimited. Tis implies serious risks for the future of democracy
in countries aected by low-intensity conicts. Te anti-subversive armed forces tend to become a paral-
lel alternative to the elected government. In the eyes of military intelligence, military missions include
measures that, in a democracy, could only be policies of the elected government. In Peru, this tendency
to usurp the governments functions was combined with the constitutional provision under which the
armed forces assume control of the internal order during a state of emergency. When this usurpation oc-
curs, democratic controls disappear and counterintelligence operations frequently trample the basic rights
of the people to whom they are applied.
Te U.S. recommendations focused on special operations. In Peru, the predominance of special op-
20 5
erations during the conict led to the development of a certain type of political-military power that
conspired against democracy and, nally, subjugated it. Te manual entitled Counterintelligence lists as
possible targets of counterintelligence operations local or national political groups, especially those whose
goals, beliefs or ideologies are contrary or opposed to the national government. Te concept is very broad,
as are the attributes of counterintelligence:
BLACK LISTS
CONTAIN THE IDENTITIES AND LOCATIONS OF PEOPLE WHOSE ARREST AND
DETENTION ARE OF PRIMORDIAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE ARMED FORCES.
EXAMPLES
Known or suspected enemy agents, persons involved in espionage, sabotage, politics, and
subversive persons.
Political Leaders known or suspected to be hostile toward the Armed Forces or the politi-
cal interests of the National Government.
Enemy Collaborators and Sympathizers, known or suspected, whose presence in the area
of operations represents a threat to National Security.
Enemy Collaborators or Sympathizers known or suspected to have participated in Intel-
ligence, Counterintelligence, Security, Police or Political Indoctrination activities among
troops or civilians.
Other persons identied by G2 as [targeted for] immediate detention. Tese may include
local political gures, Police Chiefs and leaders of municipal or departmental branches of
the enemy government (Counterintelligence: 237).
Tese are the groups or types of persons whom a black list should include. Tey are direct enemy col-
laborators who must be detained immediatelyin other words, they must be the targets of counterintel-
ligence operations. Te targets on gray lists include potential or occasional enemy collaborators, while
white lists contain the names of people who have proven their loyalty to anti-subversive eorts. It is a
general principle of intelligence and counterintelligence operations that the targets are not to be elimi-
nated, but exploited. Exploiting in this sense means obtaining information, which makes the white list
as important as the gray and black lists. Te basic principle of counterintelligence is to use the smallest
amount of force necessary to deactivate the threat to ones operational capacity without causing major
damage to the network of informants.
Te use of military intelligence to combat subversion introduces the criterion of limiting violence as an
alternative to the criterion of legality. In police actions and criminal prosecution, the legal criterion is the
rule of law; in military actions, the criteria are the rules of warfare established by international humani-
tarian law. Tat, however, is not why operational, strategic or tactical intelligence imposes strict control
over the use of force. Rather, control is aimed at giving the military force a decisive advantage over the
enemy by obtaining information about the enemys behavior. Tis utilitarian principle gives military ac-
tions an element of complexity and functional specialization that competes with the rule of law. While
the rule of law and international juridical order authorize the use of force according to legal norms, so
that everyone knows the rules of the game, counterintelligence actions dole out the violence according to
operating plans, so that only the forces themselves know the rules and the enemy does not.
With this dierence in mind, the concept of human rights mentioned in these manuals on anti-subversive
actionand in U.S. instruction of Latin American ocers in the 1980sis seriously distorted. It is a
paradigmatic case of disinformation.
20 6
Chapter 4
Te instructions for interrogation in the military manuals follow the teachings of the CIA manuals of the
1960s, especially the 1963 KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation. According to the Army manuals, the
basic rule is to subject the detainees to the strictest isolation, depriving them of any clear reference to what
is going on around them. If a person somehow becomes certain that his or her imprisonment will end soon,
that is enough to raise the persons psychological defenses and keep the interrogator from getting informa-
tion. Te detention facilities described in the manuals are clearly clandestine prisons. Te CIA manuals are
much more precise and explicit than the Army manuals. Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual
(1983) is an updated version of KUBARK. According to Human Resource Exploitation, detentions should be
done at dawn, because that is the time when people are most passive psychologically. Te person should be
gagged and blindfolded immediately, stripped naked, transported and kept incommunicado so he or she
loses all sense of time. Food and sleep schedules should be altered. Although both CIA manuals include
chapters on coercive techniques, they note that torture tends to be counterproductive for obtaining informa-
tion, and that the threat of pain is more eective than pain itself. Te use of force is not discarded, however,
as a way of breaking down the psychological defenses of the person being interrogated and convincing him
or her that the threats will be carried out. Interrogators should take turns and divide up roles in order to
prolong the pressure on the person being interrogated, subjecting the person to extreme physical exhaus-
tion and extreme heat and cold, depriving the detainee of sleep ([t]he bed should be minimal, a frame and
blanket, no mattress. Te idea is to keep the subject from relaxing and recovering from the shock E-3), and
resorting to hypnosis, drugs and placebos when they might be useful.
Ocers of the Peruvian police and armed forces carefully studied the Taiwanese concept of anti-subversive
warfare beginning in the early 1980s, traveling to Taiwan and living there for periods of up to a year. When
they returned, these ocers helped teach security personnel and prepare Perus anti-subversive strategy. Te
rst course in Psychological Operations based on the concept of political warfare was oered in Perus
War College as early as 1984. Tis doctrine merits close scrutiny for two reasons. First, it helped dene the
central elements of the anti-subversive strategy used to defeat the PCP-SL. Second, along with instruction at
the School of the Americas, it laid the ideological groundwork for the Fujimori regime.
It is clear that in the term political warfare, politics is considered an attribute of war. Te word political
has been reduced to an adjective modifying the noun war to dene a particular type of warfare. Under-
stood in this sense, politics is the exercising of the states right to existence, rather than the exercising of
citizens political rights. Unlike ordinary politics, in which there is open and fair competitionrather than
waramong ideologies or organizations, in this form of politics the state uses all means available to gain po-
litical dominance and subjugate or eliminate enemy activities. Tis is precisely what political warfare involves.
As a result, in this type of war the use of violence is limited for the same reasons that restrict the use of
violence in counterintelligence operations. It is not a matter of limiting destructive forces so as not to
violate peoples rights, whether these are citizens rights, or rights protected by international law regarding
warfare or human rights in general. Rather, the use of violence is limited because, in political warfare,
strategic advantage is won not on the battleeld, but in the delicate fabric of society. Military might
remain the centerpiece. Political warfare, which is also and more descriptively called total ideological
warfare, gains strategic advantages that make a simultaneous political and military victory possible.
All actions related to political warfare go beyond military maneuvers. Exceeding these boundaries does
not mean abandoning the mindset of war. In political warfare, there is the right to kill, as well as the right
to misinform, discredit, divide and debilitate the enemy. For strategic reasons, however, those involved do
not resort to open combat. Violence is limited so as to avoid military confrontation that could be disad-
vantageous if it occurred before sucient progress had been made in the political war. Te concept of per-
sonal rights, a central element of all rational concepts of justice, is absent from texts on political warfare.
Nevertheless, the analysis of Maoist strategy in these manuals had a decisive inuence on the development
of Perus anti-subversive strategy in the late 1980s. Perhaps the strategic idea that most clearly transferred
from the Chinese Communists peoples war to Taiwans political war,and likewise from the PCP-
20 7
SLs prolonged peoples war from the countryside to the city-Gonzalo thought to Peruvian anti-subversive
strategy in 1989is that of not trying to control territory, but of trying to gain the support of the popula-
tion. Te strategy itself indicates that a necessary rst step is making the public skeptical of the enemys
promises. Tis is followed by neutrality and, only at the end, by active participation in the political war.
Te decisive battle is fought on the eld of ideology. Te groundwork for ideological change is laid with
psychological operations. One of the central points of psychological warfare is the adequate distribution of
feelings of hostility. As in intelligence warfare, the key element is to aect only a limited group of leaders
of the enemy band, not a considerable number. Tis is not to be confused with gratuitous benevolence. It
is only a means of isolating the enemys leadership and stripping it of the support of the masses. Te radical
dierence between the strategic criterion of limited violence and the juridical criterion is clear in one of the
most aggressive operations: recruitment of collaborators with the promise that no one will look into their
past. A similar policy was applied under Fujimori with the repentance law, although this was limited by
aspects of the rule of law that the opposition and international pressure managed to maintain.
Finally, it should be noted that as part of psychological warfare, it is necessary to stress the fact that
the battle against communism is a battle between freedom and slavery, between democracy and totali-
tarianism. Terefore the establishment of a constitutional regime, the consolidation of the rule of law
and the safeguarding of human rights are the fundamental objectives of our anti-communist eorts of
national salvation. In other words, the full enjoyment of the rule of law and security is an ideal that will
someday be attained through national defense actions. In this view, as in political warfare, the order
of democratic values is inverted. Tose who help attain the goals of the states defense policy are the true
defenders of human rights, even if this defense policy requires suspending guarantees and eliminating
public oversight through undercover operations by military secret services with no democratic control.
The Military-Political Plan and the rise of Alberto Fujimori Fujimori
In 1989, while the armed forces were preparing and implementing the new anti-subversive strategy, a
group of military ocers and civilians was secretly preparing a plan to stage a coup and establish a guid-
ed democracy in July 1990, when a new administration would normally take oce. Te authoritarian,
neoliberal political tone of this extensive document, which the press called Plan Verde, was later adopt-
ed by the political-military power clique that Vladimiro Montesinos built around Fujimori. For lack of a
more precise name, we will refer to the document as the Political-Military Plan. Te idea of the Political-
Military Plan was to make a military declaration shortly before the change of government, overthrow
Alan Garca, detain him, try him for treason and pressure the new president to agree to govern jointly
with the armed forces. Te plan was not put into action, however, because Fujimoris election complicated
matters. Te Political-Military Plan assumed that extreme polarization between FREDEMO and PAP
would block a peaceful, democratic solution, paving the way for a military declaration that would come
from a new civilian regime propped up by the armed forces. Te new regime would immediately ensure
two necessary changes, economic reform and the defeat of terrorism. But Fujimoris political overtures
to PAP and the left early in his administration put such plans on hold. Tis waiting period was further
extended by negotiations with the United States over military and economic aid for combating subversion
and drug tracking. Troughout this process, Vladimiro Montesinos, although he had not been part of
the group that drew up the Political-Military Plan, took charge of keeping it alive despite the complica-
tions, updating it and adapting it to the interests of his presidential-military power clique. In short, he
took the conspiracy further than even the conspirators had imagined. Finally, the operation outlined in
the Political-Military Plan and its blueprint for governance, updated to coincide with the new scenario,
went into motion with Fujimoris coup on April 5, 1992.
An analysis of the Political-Military Plan indicates the way in which the armed forces were becoming politi-
cized. First, it is clear that, even then, the armation of the right of military ocers to seize power unconsti-
tutionallyusing the very arms that the nation conferred upon themwas an indecent, inadmissible doc-
trine that was purely conspiratorial and designed to unite the armed forces. Second, it is noteworthy that the
20 8
Chapter 4
emphasis placed on the elimination of the undesirable surplus population serves the same purpose, placing
the armed forces in an ideological position contrary to the culture of human rights that was by then already
the common heritage of the parties that were participating in the democratic elections. Tird, these forced
ideological positions stemmed from the desire to take credit for the two great accomplishments needed at
the time: a strategic victory over terrorism and the structural reform of the economy. Te top-ranking of-
cers who were conspiring to stage the coup were unwilling to allow democracy to solve the countrys major
problems (many of them would later be accused of human rights violations committed during the conict).
Two processes interfered with and transformed the coup plot being hatched within the armed forces: Fu-
jimoris electoral victory and the conditions that the United States placed on providing economic aid for
combating subversion and drug tracking. Te Political-Military Plan had certainly underestimated both
factors. Although they knew that they could not govern openly again as they had in the 1970s, the coup
plotters did not calculate that this meant being subject to the will of a popular leader who drew his power
from the very political dynamic that they sought to neutralize. Tere was also substantial confusion about
the United States, as the coup plotters had lost sight of what it meant to be part of the free world.
After the 1990 elections, the plotters were forced to readjust their analysis and, therefore, their operating
plans to the new scenario. A scant 7 weeks earlier, in their intelligence analysis of February 20, 1990, they
had concluded that plans for an orderly electoral process, transfer of government and the rst months of
the new administration are unrealistic and could lead to the unleashing of generalized social upheaval.
Under these conditions, only the forces of order guiding state policy can guarantee the unity of the ma-
jority of the population and the beginning of a process of nation building outside the democratic system
established in the Constitution. But in a new intelligence analysis dated April 9, the day after the elec-
tions, events were explained as follows: Tere is a natural tendency during periods of social, political and
economic instability for Citizens to take moderate, non-confrontational positions. Tey also stated that
the results reected the abnormal conditions aecting the Peruvian state.
Between the June 10 run-o election and July 28, when the new administration took oce, Fujimori spent
several weeks living in a suite in a military social club, where he had been taken on the pretext of providing
security for the president-elect. While there, Vladimiro Montesinos introduced him to the armed forces
secret plans. Te intended military declaration became unnecessary when Fujimori agreed to work toward
the plans goals. Moreover, if the idea was for the armed forces control over the elected government to be
secret, the new system put in place should also remain secret. Tis perfected and mediatized version of the
Political-Military Plan was put into play by Montesinos and Fujimori during their plotting in June. Te
National Intelligence Service would be the base and Vladimiro Montesinos the conductor.
It was not economic policy that started Fujimori down the road to the April 5, 1992 coup, but the desire
of the armed forcesencouraged by the administrationto eliminate all democratic control over secu-
rity and defense policy. Te rst test of strength came in October with Supreme Decree 017-90-JUS, by
which the executive branch granted amnesty to anyone indicted for excesses or human rights violations
committed during the ght against subversion. Predictably, the Senate struck down the decree on the
grounds that it was unconstitutional and illegal. From then on, Fujimori missed no opportunity to dis-
credit the legislature and judiciary, claiming they were corrupt and irresponsible. Meanwhile, the armed
forces and police continued to ght subversion using even harsher measures, and accusations of illegal
executions, massacres, torture and disappearances multiplied. With the militarys full support, Fujimori
announced a new anti-subversive strategy involving coordinated action by all sectors of the state. Tere
was political polarization between Fujimoris supporters, who favored an unlimited anti-subversive war,
and the opposition majority in Congress, which preferred stepping up anti-subversive eorts without
abdicating democratic control or the rule of law. Alan Garca was spared a constitutional accusation in
Congress for the massacres in the Lurigancho and El Frontn prisons because lawmakers loyal to Fuji-
mori cast their votes with the PAP legislators.
Following one priority of the Political-Military Plan, in early 1991 the Fujimori administration began
20 9
making arrangements to receive economic aid from the United States to combat drug tracking and sub-
version. Steps taken in this direction were revealed through declassied messages exchanged at the time
among the U.S. Embassy in Lima, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and the U.S. Congress.
In response to initial consultations, the U.S. government pointed out that international aid for such pur-
poses was regulated by the International Narcotics Control Act of 1990 (INCA). Tis norm is so explicit
regarding human rights violations that the Peruvian government was forced to invent an action plan for
improving respect for human rights in the ght against subversion. Fujimori took a series of steps, some
real and some mere invention, to meet the U.S. requirements. Tis process lasted throughout 1991, and
in 1992, after Peru received the rst pledges of disbursement, it was suddenly interrupted by the coup.
In May, in preparation for receiving economic aid, the Peruvian government signed an anti-drug agree-
ment with the United States. Te draft of that agreement had been revised in light of the results of the
international conference on Drug Tracking, One Year after Cartagena, which had been held in April.
Te Peruvian government signed the agreement without consulting Congress.
In the United States, there was an expectation tempered by doubts, and debate between Congress and
the Bush administration. While the latter believed that it was possible to make basic progress in respect
for human rights and signicant progress in combating drugs, Congress placed emphasis exclusively
on the issue of human rights, convinced that the situation was extremely serious. New reports from the
U.S. Embassy in Lima called attention to the Fujimori administrations ght against the PCP-SL and
the MRTA, and attributed part of the responsibility for corruption to the weakness of the judiciary and
public administration. Tese factors, which attenuated severe criticism of the Fujimori government in the
area of human rights, had little eect on the stance taken by the U.S. Congress. Added to the magnitude
of those violations was the fact that in Peru, investigation into human rights violations by relevant inter-
national agencies was systematically blocked.
Te U.S. administrations reaction to this frontal attack on its negotiations with Peru was an equally frontal
counterattack. Using presidential resolution 91-20 as a starting point, the U.S. secretary of state began to de-
termine independently whether Peru met the INCA criteria; this was reected in a letter to Congress dated
July 30, in which he listed, point by point, the INCA criteria already met by Peru and expressed his con-
dence in Fujimoris commitment to both ghting drug tracking and respecting human rights. A July 31
memorandum drafted by the military attachs at the U.S. Embassy stated that, in their judgment, the hu-
man rights violations committed in Peru were not the result of a policy of Perus top military commanders.
Te U.S. Congress responded by establishing a series of precise conditions for granting aid gradually, as
conditions were met. An initial payment would be made when personnel from the Red Cross and the At-
torney Generals Oce had free access to all detention facilities. Tat rst payment would be earmarked
for replacement parts urgently needed by the Air Force for anti-drug air patrols. Te second disbursement
would depend on Peru demonstrating ecient control over airports to prevent drugs from passing through
them, as well as on progress in complying with the accords of the Cartagena Summit. Te third installment
would be disbursed when (a) a national registry of detained persons was operating, (b) the armed forces and
police were able to jointly carry out anti-drug operations, and (c) progress was made in compliance with the
Cartagena accords. Te executive branch was required to accept these conditions in writing, and after each
disbursement it had to report to the U.S. Congress on progress in each area. A nal requirement was that
Peruvian military personnel be trained in the United States instead of U.S. instructors being sent to Peru.
Perus overtures included a visit by Fujimori to his U.S. counterpart, George Bush, in October to express
his willingness to comply with the requirements for U.S. aid. Te visit had no impact on the position of the
U.S. Congress. Te legislators were not mistaken. Tat same month, in a speech at a military ceremony,
Fujimori called human rights defenders useful fools and said there were terrorists inltrated in pseudo
humanitarian and human rights organizations. Te double standard continued. In an obvious eort to
calm international criticism, the Council for Peace was established with government support. Similarly,
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Chapter 4
a delegation from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights arrived in Lima that month at the
invitation of the Peruvian government to gather information about cases that had been denounced before it.
On January 17, 1992, the U.S. State Department reluctantly accepted the conditions imposed by the U.S.
Congress, as long as no eort was spared to reduce the ow of drugs from that country. Te conditions were
communicated to Peruvian ocials, with an emphasis on the registry of detained persons and an indication
that the aid would not include US $10.05 million for the training of three anti-subversive Army battalions.
Te economic aid and military assistance for the ght against drug tracking and subversion were inter-
rupted by the coup on April 5, 1992. In May of that year, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemispheric Aairs, Bernard Aronson, met with Fujimori and expressed support for the position taken by the
OAS. Fujimori was not impressed, because the amount of aid involved was not decisive to his plans. In March
1992, Fujimori had made an ocial visit to Japan, where he received aid commitments totaling $127 million.
Tus, the 1992 coup brutally conrmed the warnings of the U.S. Congress about Fujimoris unreliability.
From these events, it can be concluded that the more selective nature of the strategy adopted in 1989 was
not the only factor in the decrease in the number of human rights violations as of 1990. One powerful
factor was the list of prisoners that was updated daily and overseen by the International Red Cross and
Peruvian district attorneys. Tis list was established to comply with one of the conditions attached by the
U.S. Congress to economic aid for Peru. As a result, Shining Path leaders who were detained were not
disappeared, tortured or killed. Te intelligence interrogations no longer had fatal consequences.
Another inuential factor in this turn of events was the Fujimori administrations need to maintain cer-
tain democratic political appearances, which opened a door for those who insisted that the armed forces
actions should adhere to the basic criteria of ethics and justice. Tis need was created because Fujimori
sought, and gradually achieved, personal leadership over the armed forces instead of the decorative role
that had been outlined for the president in the Political-Military Plan.
Te source of Fujimoris political initiative was the ght against subversion, understood as a transformation
of society and state that transcended the democratic process. Te insistence on reducing ethical and legal
control over armed action to a secondary role responded not to the intrinsic need for such action, but to Fuji-
moris personal need to accumulate political capital. Te new regimes double dealing was reected in a Min-
istry of Defense directive (003-91-MD/SDN) on the pacication policy drawn up by the National Defense
Secretariat (Secretara de Defensa Nacional ). Te directive contained a broad political plan that included
military and non-military areas, despite the risks that such a plan implied for democracy and the rule of law.
Fujimori kept the rule of law and parliamentary policy alive in order to place himself above the militarys
authority. At the same time, however, he reduced them and weakened them to an extreme in the name
of ghting subversion, so as to accumulate power for himself alone rather than truly sharing it with the
other branches of government. While that power structure was contradictory, it was real and worked for
Fujimori at the time. His technique for ooding the legislature with anti-subversion initiatives with no
democratic controls was to produce a series of executive decrees and later, with extraordinary powers that
he obtained from Congress, pass legislative decrees that were illegal or inappropriate for a democracy.
What Congress did not foresee was that in the months that followed, Vladimiro Montesinos would or-
chestrate the preparation of 126 legislative decrees, including many, especially among the 35 that referred
to pacication, that would ignore the nations constitutional and democratic foundations and force Con-
gress to choose between allowing such a gutting of the political regime and confronting the president in
a debate in which it would be very dicult for the lawmakers to win popular support.
In July, journalist Cecilia Valenzuela presented on television a military document that referred to the
strategy of selective elimination. Te Joint Chiefs of Sta issued a statement denying any link with
document. At the time, there were also reports of murders by paramilitaries. It was later learned that the
murders were committed not by paramilitaries, but by active-duty ocers organized in special operations
squads. Te reports of human rights violations multiplied and were disseminated by international orga-
211
nizations, with no eect on the anti-subversive operations. Te majority of the population was unwilling
to risk its little remaining security to defend ethical and legal principles. Congress, however, did not yield
in the face of the challenge posed by the legislative decrees prepared by Fujimori and Montesinos. Te
legislature chose a collision course with the executive branch, even though that was exactly what the coup
plotters sought in order to justify the violation of the constitutional order.
Congress had 30 days to review the decrees. In the few days that remained before the end of the ordinary
legislative session on December 15, it struck down 6 decrees. Tese included Decrees 731 and 764, which
postponed the date that the criminal procedures code would take eect; and Decrees 736, 747 and 762,
which penalized money laundering, covering up drug tracking and revealing or disseminating informa-
tion obtained or processed by the National Defense System. Because the language was imprecise, Congress
argued that they could be misused to threaten democratic freedoms. It was the vote to strike down De-
cree 746, the National Intelligence System Law, however, that provoked the most outrage in the executive
branch, because it was a direct attack on its main tool for ghting subversion. In response, the president
refused to sign the measures striking down the decrees. On February 7, the congressional leadership signed
Law 25399, which contained the norms striking down the decrees. Fujimori had responded to the congres-
sional actions on the last day of the year, issuing a series of reservations regarding the General Budget Law
for 1992, preventing it from taking eect at a moment when Congress could not meet to resolve the impasse.
The role of the armed forces from the 1992 coup until
the end of the Fujimori administration (1992-2000)
Tis is not the place for a detailed description of the April 5, 1992, coup, but it should be noted that it was a
broad military operation of the same nature and scope as the operation outlined in the Political-Military Plan.
On Sunday, April 5, 1992, the coup operations focused on Lima, because political power in Peru is cen-
tralized (while military power is not). Te forces in Lima carried out the operations, therefore, while those
in the regions and on the fronts limited themselves to providing backup. Tat afternoon, all commanders
of operational units received telephone calls telling them that they should watch the televised presidential
message to be broadcast that night and later call their general commanders by telephone. Te regional
chiefs called that night to express their support for the coup. Te CVR has learned of only one honorable
exception, but we cannot discount the possibility that there might have been others.
Te civil disobedience led by many legislators and civil society leaders in the days after the coup had no
real objective, because they were facing a force that was determined to use arms and violate all basic liber-
ties to achieve its goals. Te protest, therefore, was brief and symbolic. But the most characteristic element
of the military operation and the regime born of it, which the armed forces supported institutionally for
eight years, was the insidious use of undercover and psycho-social operations to control the political pro-
cess. Te basic technique for such control is well explained in the Taiwanese schools doctrine of political
warfare. Te masses are controlled through a propaganda campaign of information and disinformation.
As will be seen be in greater detail in the next chapter, from the time of the coup until the Democratic
Constituent Congress (Congreso Constituyente Democrtico, CCD) was seated, Fujimori legislated profusely,
usurping the function of the legislative branch of government. Te CCD later took on the task of approv-
ing that legislation and adjusting it to the Constitution, resulting in the 1993 Constitution. Tus Fujimori
achieved all the legislative changes that he had proposed in 1991, which Congress had not ratied.
Besides repentance, the provision that most aected the ght against subversion was the one that rec-
ognized and organized peasant self-defense committees under military authority. According to the Joint
Chiefs of Sta, 4,628 self-defense committees with 232,668 members were formed between 1992 and
1994. More favorable to Fujimoris political dominance than to the anti-subversion eorts was the broad-
ening of the role of the heads of the political-military commands, who eectively became local governors,
with the power to appoint and re civilian authorities. Te political-military chief appointed a committee
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of dignitaries that recommended people for positions.
Te 1993 Constitution repeated, point by point, the chapter on security and defense in the 1979 Con-
stitution. Tis indicates that to successfully ght terrorist subversion it was not necessary to break with
the constitutional order or call a constituent assembly, because the 1979 constitutional norms for security
and defense were sucient. It also means that the content of those chapters of the 1979 Constitution
which, as we have seen, were proposed by the military while it was still in powerwas compatible with
the role played by the armed forces during the Fujimori regime and the laws regarding the agencies of the
National Defense System that led, among other things, to Montesinos SIN.
Te legislative changes that followed revealed the serious consequences of this lack of denition. Te modi-
cations with serious consequences included one which enabled the president to keep top military command-
ers in their posts indenitely, resulting in Hermoza Ros remaining as Head of the Joint Chiefs of Sta for 7
years, and one granting the SIN the power to carry out undercover operations with no oversight.
On November 13, 1992, just 9 days before the election of the CCD, a military coup attempt against
Fujimori was organized by retired Generals Jaime Salinas Sed, Jos Pastor Vives, Ernesto Obando and
other ocers. Fujimori left the presidential palace, but the coup plotters plans were revealed before they
could be carried out, and all the ocers involved were quickly detained.
Troughout Fujimoris 10 years in oce, Vladimiro Montesinos took charge of pressuring, blackmailing,
suing, bribing when possible and, especially, forcing out of the country any ocers who did not mold
themselves into the role that the regime established for the armed forces. One of the rst was General
Alberto Arciniega, who headed the Political-Military Command of the Huallaga front from mid-1989
until January 1990. Montesinos sent special operations personnel to his home when he and his family
were not there, vandalizing it and leaving insulting messages threatening him. When the threats were
repeated and he found no support within his branch of the military, Arciniega and his immediate family
emigrated to Argentina. Others, including many of those whose personal merits were most outstanding,
were given bureaucratic or diplomatic posts where their careers stalled, such as the post of military attach
in the Ukraine or Cuba. Te repression was also aimed at retired ocers, to keep them from using their
authority over younger ocers to encourage criticism of the regime.
Te sidelining or distancing of the best-prepared ocers, who also stood out for their independent judg-
ment and military leadership, was one of the types of damage inicted on the armed forces and, by exten-
sion, the on Peruvian state as a result of the militarys support for the April 5 coup.
One of the November 1991 legislative decrees that Congress did not ratify was Decree 746, which dealt
with the National Intelligence System (Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional, SINA). Tis norm granted broad
responsibilities to the National Intelligence Service and placed it under the presidents direct authority
with no ministerial, judicial or congressional oversight. Te SIN would set its own budget and makes
its own operating plans, keeping all that information classied as secret. Tis led to a series of actions
that were not only irregular, but also criminal, involving the top ocials of the regime. Tese have been
extensively described in the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions Final Report.
As drastic and immediate as the economic shock, but less perceptible, was the naming of military per-
sonnel to direct the National Police of Peru in 1990. Te subordination of the PNP to the heads of the
political-military commands in the emergency zones was rounded out when the agents most skilled in
gathering information from non-public sources were placed under military control. As a result, police
investigations were sidelined by intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
Tis created a paradoxical situation in 1991. While Fujimori was in intense negotiations with the United
States over military aid and the U.S. State Department was insisting to the U.S. Congress that military
aid to Peru was necessary to reduce the ow of drugs to the United States, Montesinos and Hermoza
Ros were monopolizing the states presence in the Upper Huallaga Valley, fostering the complete corrup-
213
tion of Perus top military commanders and the soldiers deployed there.
By January 1992 at the latest, payment of protection money to anti-subversive bases had resumed. Te
head of each anti-subversive base received $2,000 for every ight that took o from the airstrip controlled
by the base. Te local mayor, governor and coca growers organization also received payments, as did the
PCP-SL and the police base in Santa Luca. In other words, all the local players who had the capacity
to aect drug tracking received regular hush money. On the military base, the money was distributed
proportionately, with larger amounts going to ocers and smaller amounts to enlisted soldiers. Part was
also set aside for food, fuel and infrastructure improvements.
In short, in 1992 the armed forces and the SIN, the only state agents responsible for ghting drug traf-
cking, allowed the military bases themselves to provide services and facilitate the trackers business
instead of combating it, in exchange for modest amounts of money that made it possible to increase the
military presence in the zone. Tus the conditions were created for drug trackers to make a prot, invest
and expand. Army General Ros Araico was the chief of the Huallaga front at the time. When he was
tried on drug tracking charges along with most of the ocers who served there, he admitted that the
payments improved the food and other aspects of life on the base.
Drug money began to ow up the chain of command, and in greater quantities, when the Joint Chiefs
of Sta and the SIN, in cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)which
never stopped operating at the police air base in Santa Lucalaunched operations to combat drug traf-
cking. Ways of getting hold of drug money became more daring and dangerous in early 1993, when
Air Force interdiction ights, the destruction of airstrips ordered by Lima and intelligence obtained by
DEA agents, began to have an eect. Tere were cases in which narco-terrorists were assaulted and their
drugs stolen, deals struck with relatives of drug trackers who had been detained or whose drugs had
been seized, and even a case in which a PCP-SL leader known as Chatn, who was chief of logistics in the
Tocache area, was freed. According to testimony from a former DEA informant, scar Bentez Linares,
rms operating in Campanilla put him in charge of arranging a 20-ton drug shipment using Army he-
licopters. Trough Army ocers, Bentez arranged a meeting in Lima with Vladimiro Montesinos, who
authorized the helicopter ights to the processing center in Palmapampa, Ayacucho, and from there to
Colombia, in exchange for about USD $1 million. Te drug tracker Manuel Lpez Paredes also used
Army helicopters to transport drugs. Tis was proven in an undercover operation by anti-drug police
organized with cover from the DEA.
By late 1993, the anti-subversive military bases had sunk into inaction and lacked resources because of
the emphasis on operations planned and directed by Lima or by the DEA-supported police base in Santa
Luca. Special operations, whether to strike at drug trackers allied with the PCP-SL or to favor certain
drug-tracking rms, concentrated action and funds in the hands of the airborne commando groups that
carried out direct orders from the SIE, DINTE, Joint Chiefs of Sta and, ultimately, the SIN. Montesinos
had discouraged and disrupted intelligence work by using a parallel structure of special operations over
which he had direct control, which was unconnected with other events in the fronts theaters of operations.
Te change in military strategy is reected in the Army manual entitled Anti-SubversionDoctrine and
ProceduresApplication against Subversive Movements in Peru (ContrasubversinDoctrina y Proced-
imientosAplicacin contra los movimientos subversivos en el Per, ME 41-7-B), which was approved by
Nicols Hermoza Ros, and which we found in an edition of a command training manual dated January
1996. It is not dicult to see that this manual reects the strategy applied in Operation Aries and other
operations during the nal stage of the conict. Tere is practically no analysis of revolutionary ideology,
and the section on dismantling the Political-Administrative Organization consists of only 30 lines of
generalities. Te section on intelligence introduces the idea that certain operational methods are reserved
for the upper echelons of the intelligence system, implying that the upper echelons implement operations
of a type that the lower levels cannot carry out. Tere is an evident return to the principles of traditional
anti-subversive strategy and the language used by the School of the Americas.
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Chapter 4
Te manual emphasizes the psycho-social aspects of the ght against subversion, such as repentance, civic
action andas was common after 1991respect for human rights.
Operation Aries was the armed forces frontal oensive against the subversive pockets [groups of 9 to 12
PCP-SL peoples committees] known as Cuchara and Primavera in the province of Leoncio Prado,
Hunuco, between April and July 1994. Not surprisingly, the psycho-social tactics, particularly repen-
tance, that had been used earlier with some success were not eective in these places. Tousands of yers
warning people to abandon the area were dropped from helicopters, but with no result. Te local people
had been reduced to servitude by members of the PCP-SL, who kept them isolated, threatened them
and held them under ideological control. Anyone who tried to ee was shot by armed PCP-SL militants
stationed at piers and near the mouths of rivers, the only routes out of the areas.
To combat this, the Army prepared anti-subversive companies that operated in patrols. Testimony from
participants indicates that there were about 2,000 men, including support personnel. Of these, at least
two companies, some 300 men, were special operations commandos. Te goal was to destroy targets in
populated areas where the enemy was camouaged amid the civilian population, engaging in combat and
hand-to-hand ghting for territory. One of the diculties of this operation, and one that set it apart it
from all previous ones, was that there was no way to explore the terrain before going in. Tis represented
a huge advantage for the enemy, which made use of its knowledge of the terrain. Hermoza Ros personally
directed the preparation, and President Fujimori was also present.
Te rst phase, in April and May 1994, began with Air Force attacks. Commandos then surrounded
the zone and advanced, capturing the Shining Paths guard posts. Te PCP-SL members responded by
ambushing the small groups that harried the commandos hour after hour, ring from the dense jungle
and claiming victims without ever engaging in open combat. Finding no one to ght, but with casualties
mounting, the patrols that had gone in had to be replaced by new ones, which soon found themselves in
the same situation. By mid-May, the operation had been suspended and the forces withdrawn without
having achieved their goal, although they had tightened a noose around Cuchara and prepared a way into
Primavera. Some Shining Path militants had also been detained. During the weeks that followed, they
provided information about the location of key enemy positions.
Te second phase, from mid-June to mid-July, was characterized by an increase in the violence and the
military presence to make PCP-SL members feel they were facing a force they could not resist. Te infor-
mation provided by the detained repentant militants made it possible to deactivate the PCP-SLs orga-
nization in some of the villages at the entry to the area, but the main operation consisted of eliminating
all groups of residents who were suspected of helping to reorganize resistance. Te operation was the most
violent and bloody of the entire conict. Te military issued an ultimatum, dropping iers from helicop-
ters that told local residents to leave the area and turn themselves in to the armed forces as repentants.
Te result was a higher death toll than in any previous operation. Witnesses testied that bodies appeared
by the dozens along the riverbanks and that helicopters had to bring in fuel to burn them.
Te result was that Fujimori was able to announce that he had destroyed the PCP-SLs last bastions in the
Huallaga, and that the groundwork had been laid for the total pacication of the country. Tis increased
his popularity, which had been threatened by revelations about the Colina Group and the reorganization
of the opposition around the presidential candidacy of Javier Prez de Cullar. Montesinos gained control
over the coca-growing activities and established himself in the role that General Noriega had played in
Panama until four years earlier: exclusive pursuer and selective godfather of the drug trackers. In that
role, he was publicly recognized and praised by U.S. drug czar Barry McCarey over the next few years.
Hermoza Ros also obtained something, sharing in Montesinos economic bootyand a priority for a cut
of future bountiesand establishing a certain degree of military leadership that enabled him to tolerate
the frustration of supporting a tyranny that was not exactly a military government, but which committed
the armed forces to providing support day after day.
215
Te next chapter describes other ways in which President Fujimori used the armed forces for political gain.
Examples include the events surrounding the unfortunate conict between Peru and Ecuador, which erupt-
ed in January 1995, with armed confrontations continuing until March of that year. Te dicult conditions
under which the Peruvians fought contrasted with the well-prepared Ecuadorian campaign. It took the
Army nearly two weeks to mobilize to the point at which it could attack Ecuadorian positions. Te Peruvian
Air Force suered many casualties, partly because of its technological limitations in comparison to the new
anti-aircraft system it faced, but mainly because the order had been given not to enter Ecuadorian air space,
which forced Peruvian pilots to turn around within the combat zone every time they entered it. Ground
forces suered greatly because of the lack of food, water and medical attention.
Fujimori visited the theater of operations more for political gain than to support the war eort. He
singled out the Tiwinza post as a decisive military target and, in the middle of combat, made the surprise
announcement that Peruvian forces had routed the Ecuadorians there, and that because of that victory
he had decided to declare a unilateral cease-re as of noon Tuesday, February 14. In fact, Tiwinza had
not been under Peruvian military control. When the cease-re order came, Peruvian advance forces were
in disadvantageous positions and their supply lines had been cut. Diplomatic eorts in March, which
favored peace, and the presidential elections in April, diverted attention from what had really happened in
Tiwinza. For those who had risked their lives in the conict, Fujimoris lie turned into a rm conviction,
so solid that they would risk their lives again against anyone who believed the opposite. By linking the
militarys honor with a falsehood that was unacceptable to anyone aware of the true situation, Fujimori
continued to bend the armed forces to his will, encouraging in them and in his political supporters a
falsely patriotic hatred of the regimes democratic critics.
Months before the conict, in September 1994, journalists had caught General Howard Rodrguez, head
of the First Military Region, distributing Fujimoris printed electoral propaganda. He was accompanied by
many ocers and troops in a sort of civic military operation in support of Fujimoris electoral campaign.
Such military proselytism for the governing party had been seen in many areas before that particular case
came to light. It caused a scandal, but the military courts found only the lower-ranking ocers guilty.
Fujimori took advantage of the upsurge in popularity from his re-election and the peaceful outcome of
the Cenepa conict. In June 1995, Congress approved a general amnesty law that eliminated convictions
and indictments for crimes committed during the ght against terrorism. At the same time, it struck
down the convictions for the attempted military coup against Fujimori on November 13, 1992, and more
recent cases of serious oenses against the nation and the armed forces. Te amnesty threw justice out the
window. Besides being oensive, it created confusion. Te conict with Ecuador gave the presidential-
military clique headed by Fujimori, Montesinos and Hermoza Ros a chance to make new arms purchases
and, in the process, embezzle and divert public funds into illicit activities.
International political questioning of the Fujimori regime intensied as the government stepped up its
eorts to remain in power. At the same time, however, the United States repeatedly gave Peru high
marks in the ght against drugs and renewed aid for that purpose. Tere were no obstacles to continued
cooperation with the regime. In August 1999, the United States publicly praised Perus anti-drug policy,
mentioning the SIN in particular as one of its guiding forces.
Te successful Operation Chavn de Huntar on April 22, 1997, which freed the hostages who had been
held by the MRTA in the Japanese ambassadors residence since December 17, 1996, was the last military
operation that contributed to the governments prestige, as will later be seen, although in the years that
followed there was a bitter dispute between Fujimori and Hermoza Ros over who should get the credit,
resulting in a falling out that exacerbated the old problem of the militarys subjugation to Fujimori. At
a book presentation in October 1997 at the University of the Pacic, an event attended by Vladimiro
Montesinos, Hermoza Ros again claimed credit for having masterminded the operation. In December,
Fujimori let the press know that he was weighing whether the Hermoza Ros, President of the Joint Chiefs
of Sta, should remain in his post. Te armed forces response was an unprecedented meeting of the
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Chapter 4
heads of the six military regions, who left their bases simultaneously and met in Lima with the president
of the Joint Chiefs of Sta, Hermoza Ros, on the pretext that it was his birthday.
At the same time as that falling out, another process that was even more bitter and destructive was set in
motion. On May 23, 1997, the Joint Chiefs of Sta issued a communiqu against Baruch Ivcher, a natu-
ralized Peruvian citizen. After having faithfully supported the administration for years, the television sta-
tion in which Ivcher was a majority shareholder began broadcasting serious accusations against it (such as
Montesinos income, the Leonor La Rosa case, etc.). Ivcher also had ties to the armed forces due to a series
of contracts through a supply company he also owned. Although no one knew exactly what the generals
meant when they spoke of a biased campaign with evil intentions, Ivcher became the rst Peruvian to
merit a military communiqu about his personal behavior with no criminal charges or trial. To round out
the threat, on May 28 the Ministry of the Interior published the enabling regulations for the Nationality
Law, which outlines the requirements for foreign citizens to obtainor losePeruvian nationality. Under
Article 12, one justication for rescinding the nationality granted to foreign citizens is the commission of
acts that could aect National Security and the interests of the state. If Ivcher lost his nationality, he would
also lose control of the TV station, because foreigners are not permitted to own television stations in Peru.
Tere was an immediate outraged response from most daily newspapers, radio and television stations.
Instead of boosting the governments image, the Ivcher case revealed how dangerous its authoritarian and
anti-democratic mindset was and made businesspeople and even the conservative media feel insecure. By
stripping Ivcher rst of his right to freedom of expression and then of his citizenship, the regime showed
that it was capable of attacking the most basic principles of modern society.
In 1998, there were a series of accusations and investigations into the special operations using military person-
nel under the direct command of the SIN. Mesmer Carles Talledo, a former SIN informant, disclosed the Co-
lina Groups activities. Te head of that group, Army Major Santiago Martin Rivas, who had received amnesty,
was investigated by Congress, where his appearance was marked by his highly publicized escape through a
window to avoid the press. From Miami, where she is in hiding, former Army intelligence agent Luisa Zanatta
accused the SIN of pressuring and blackmailing electoral institutions, opposition candidates and the press.
Unlike Hermoza Ros, Montesinos responded to the storm with a bold plan to continue expanding the
powers of the president and the SIN. President Fujimori announced that the SIN and the armed forces
intelligence services would also lead the ght against crime. Te idea was to take advantage of the popula-
tions general sense of insecurity due to common crime to broaden the SINs power in police and criminal
operations, and apply to other crimes the same summary procedures that had been invented to combat
terrorism. Congress granted the executive branch special powers to issue legislation in this area, and the
president responded with a sweeping package of decree laws. Te Human Rights Ombudsman presented
a detailed report showing most of those norms to be unconstitutional and contrary to the development
of the democratic rule of law. Unfortunately, it had little eect. Te measuresanother of Montesinos
successescoincided with a demand from the National Police of Peru to simplify the tasks of arrest and
investigation. Te police had repeatedly requested that the organic law governing their work give them
the power to detain suspects for up to 48 hours for police investigation or to maintain public order. Be-
cause this could have been used to harass and blackmail the population, the legislature had never granted
the request. With the decree laws, however, the PNP got what it wanted.
On August 20, 1998, Nicols Hermoza Ros was relieved of his duties as commander general of the Army. Te
dismissal was surprisingly discreet and speedy, considering that he had wielded a large part of the states power
and been one of the pillars of the regime since the coup on April 5, 1992. He was replaced by Army General
Csar Saucedo. As a sign that Hermoza Ros had fallen into disgrace, on March 12, 1999, the Attorney Gen-
erals Oce ordered the 46th provisional district attorneys oce in Lima to investigate Hermoza Ros for the
crimes of rebellion, harm to the country, violation of freedom of expression and abuse of authority.
Te next day, on March 13, the Joint Chiefs of Sta held a special session also attended by top police ocials
217
and SIN representatives, including Vladimiro Montesinos. Te purpose of the meeting was to sign an agree-
ment backing the April 5, 1992, coup and the amnesty laws and rejecting any moves that would tarnish the
armed forces image or cast doubt on the victory over terrorism. Te agreement included a condemnation of
Baruch Ivchers activities. A few days later, on March 19, there was a meeting of the top active-duty ocers
of the armed forces and national police who were in the country, as well as SIN personnel, so that all could
sign the agreement and stamp it with the seal of their branches of the security forces.
Tis event was symptomatic of the regimes fatigue. Te need to make all the ocers sign an agreement
to condemn and punish anyone who refused to toe the line arose from the deep insecurity felt by Mon-
tesinos and the new commanders. Since Hermoza Ros, who had led the militarys support for the April
5 coup, had been dismissed, they apparently believed that support for the current regime lacked the cohe-
sion that had previously resulted from the coup.
Tese were the armed forces that presented Alberto Fujimori with the insignia of Supreme Commander
and hailed him as President of the Republic on June 7, 2000, ve days before the National Elections
Board ( Jurado Nacional de Elecciones) declared that he had won a third term. Te new commanders also
appeared on television in August of the regimes nal year, anking Vladimiro Montesinos as he and Fu-
jimori described the results of Operation Siberia. It was a last-ditch eort to inate Fujimoris popularity,
in an alliance with Montesinos and the top military commanders, by aunting a supposed extraordinary
ability to defeat the countrys enemies through special intelligence operations. Operation Siberia was
promptly unmasked as a farce by the countries implicated, especially Colombia, because it consisted only
of information that had been shared between Peru and Colombia, which Montesinos had appropriated
in bad faith, adding other information that was biased or blatantly false. Montesinos loss of control over
his own media, revealed by the outcome of Operation Siberia, turned into a catastrophe for his power
structure the night opponents aired a video showing Montesinos bribing Congressman Alberto Kouri to
switch loyalties and join Fujimoris congressional bloc.
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Chapter 4
EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN SOCOS (1983)
On November 13, 1983, in the district of Socos, 18 kilometers from the city of Huamanga, only 200
meters from the Civil Guard police station, Adilberto Quispe Janampa asked for Maximiliana Zamora
Quispes hand in marriage in a traditional ceremony known as yaycupacu.
At about 9 p.m., when the future bridegroom and some of guests were preparing to leave to meet his
future wife, a patrol of former Civil Guard members forcibly entered the house and told the people to
go home because they only had permission to have a social gathering until 8 p.m. Most of those present
had been drinking liquor and reacted by protesting the police intervention. Te police red into the air,
asked to see the identity documents of the people present, then ordered all of the guests out of the house.
When they had left the house, they were ordered to walk single le toward a place called Quebrada de
Balcn, half an hour from Socos. Te police stopped in Allpa Mayo, where they separated the young
women from the group and raped them.
Later, the peasants were taken to Balcn Huaycco where, at about 2:30 a.m., they were shot point
blank. Te police then piled the corpses together and detonated grenades so that the bodies would
be covered by rocks and earth shaken loose by the explosions. Te only survivor was Mara Crdenas
Palomino, who fell down an embankment and, therefore, was not shot. At dawn, when the patrol
went away, Mara Crdenas left her hiding place and returned to Socos, where she told her family and
neighbors what had happened.
Despite statements from plaintis and witnesses and eorts to cover up the deeds, the police were unable
to keep word of the case from reaching ocials. On November 15, the judge, the district attorney and
investigative police ocers arrived in Socos from the city of Ayacucho. Te ocials, along with relatives
of the victims, went to the Balcn Huaycco ravine, where they found the bodies of 29 people.
Based on the complaint led by relatives and the testimony gathered through the media and by the Public
Ministry, the provincial District Attorney of the Second Mixed Provincial District Attorneys Oce in
Huamanga, scar Edilberto Guerrero Morante, led a formal criminal complaint against 26 agents who
were members of the Socos police detachment at the timeunder the command of Lieutenant Alberto
Dvila Reteguifor the aggravated murder of 32 residents of Socos and for the attempted aggravated
murder of Mara Crdenas Palomino.
At the request of the Public Ministry, a police investigation was launched by the Investigative Police of
Ayacucho. Despite statements from witnesses that members of the Police Detachment of Socos were di-
rectly responsible for the crimes, the police report concluded that we cannot discount the possibility that
the authors of the crime of terrorism and multiple homicide with rearms were members of the PCP-SL.
On February 8, 1984, the judge for the First Criminal Court of Huamanga opened a case for man-
slaughter and attempted homicide. Once the instruction stage was complete and the nal reports were
issued by the judge and the Public Ministry, the Superior Court District Attorney of AyacuchoGual-
berto Altamirano Guevaradrew up the formal accusation, seeking 25 years in prison for the police
ocers involved.
When the oral trial was nished, the First Mixed Chamber of the Correctional Tribunal of Ayacucho
handed down its decision on July 15, 1986, sentencing eleven of the defendants (six of them Sinchis) for
the murder of the 32 residents of Socos and the attempted aggravated murder of Mara Crdenas. Te
defendants were also required to pay civil reparations of 120,000 intis to the victims legal heirs. Te rul-
ing acquitted fteen members of the police force who did not take part in the crime.
219
DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE AND EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS
AT THE LOS CABITOS MILITARY BASE (19831985)
Because of the increase in PCP-SL activity in the department of Ayacucho, on December 31, 1982, the
government decided to involve the armed forces in the ght against subversion. Army General Roberto
Clemente Noel Moral was named Political-Military Chief of the emergency zone, which included the
provinces of Huamanga, Huanta, La Mar, Cangallo and Vctor Fajardo. Between 1983 and 1985, the
political-military chiefs were Noel Moral, Army General Adrin Huamn Centeno and Army Colonel
Wilfredo Mori Orzo. Te center of operations for those ocers, as well as the battalion under their com-
mand, was Military Base 51, Los Cabitos, in Huamanga.
Complaints of human rights violations increased as soon as the Army took control of the area. Te CVR
has veried 138 cases of people who were abducted, tortured or murdered by security forces in the prov-
ince of Huamanga between 1983 and 1984. In all of these cases there was a pattern of police and military
behavior characterized by the following stages: arbitrary detention, taking the detainee to a military facil-
ity, torture, selective liberation, extrajudicial execution and disappearance.
In the case of arbitrary detentions, the agents did not identify themselves and later denied having detained
anyone. Tree methods were used for detention: searches, neighborhood sweeps and selective detention.
Te captors acted without judicial warrants or the participation of the Public Ministry or any authorization
that would have made these ordinary detentions. According to some ocers who served at the time, the
people who had been irregularly detained were held at Military Base 51, Los Cabitos, and occasionally at a
building known as the Pink House, which may have served as the intelligence units center of operations.
Torture generally occurred when detainees were interrogated, either in the Pink House or in the Los Cabi-
tos military base. Te detainees, who were blindfolded, were often forced to strip and, with their hands tied
behind their backs, were subjected to various types of torture to force them to provide information.
In some cases, detainees were selectively freed with no explanation. Some were dropped o in a street, while
others were turned over to the PIP. First they were threatened so that they would not report what had hap-
pened, and then they were told that they would be followed and put under surveillance. Generally, people
were freed when an investigation found that they had no relationship with the subversive groups.
In the case of disappearances the perpetrators denied the detention to relatives and the Public Ministry. In
certain cases the detainee was moved to a detention center or another place where he or she would not be found.
In the case of extrajudicial executions, it is important to note that many of the people who were detained
could not withstand the torture and died of exhaustion, while others were killed whenin the torturers
Te sentence was upheld on September 30, 1987, by the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme
Court, which also imposed an accessory sentence of total suspension during the time of the prison sen-
tences and for ve years thereafter. Te sentence of total suspension meant that the police ocers could
not return to active duty for ve years after their release from prison. A review of the records of some
of the police ocers sentenced, however, shows clearly that the penalty of suspension was not enforced.
While the CVR recognizes that judicial authorities sentenced those responsible for the deeds, despite
attempts to cover up the crime, it regrets that the payment of civil reparations to the victims families
was not made and that ve of those sentenced were reinstated by the police, even though they had
been ocially suspended.
220
Chapter 4
judgmentthey had demonstrated their guilt. Some bodies were buried in clandestine graves, while oth-
ers were abandoned along roads, in ravines or in other places relatively close to the city, such as Puracuti
and Inernillo. Because of this it can be assumed that a large majority of people who disappeared were
victims of extrajudicial execution.
Because of this pattern of behavior, we can state that the constant human rights violations represented
by arbitrary detention, detention in military facilities, torture, selective liberation, disappearance and
extrajudicial execution responded to a practice that was systematicbecause of the uniformity of the
proceduresand generalizedbecause of the large number of victims.
It is clear that only high-ranking military ocers could establish proceduresdesigning them, correct-
ing them or replacing themfor the security forces. Terefore, the human rights violations we have
described may have been part of an anti-subversive strategy created by, or at least tolerated by, the state
military apparatus. Te military commanders had to be aware of the large number of human rights viola-
tions and the complaints led about them.
Even taking into consideration the hypothesis that these practices or methods may not have been part
of a centralized plan, top commanders had the power to modify procedures that violated human rights.
Based on this information, and taking into account certain aspects, such as the characteristics of the
military organization itself (a hierarchical structure) and the responsibility of the Political-Military Com-
mand (based at Los Cabitos) in planning and implementing the military operations carried out in the
zone, it is clear that the top ocers had command and control over actions that violated human rights.
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF STUDENTS FROM THE NATIONAL
UNIVERSITY OF THE CENTER OF PERU (1990-1992)
Te National University of the Center of Peru was the scene of a erce battle between state security
forces and the two subversive groupsthe PCP-SL and MRTA. Te rst human rights violations
were committed by the subversive groups, particularly the PCP-SL, which had gained virtual
control of the university.
During the 1980srst through silent labor and later through deadly confrontationsthe PCP-SL held
administrative and academic control over the university, monitoring the election of student leaders and
university ocials and access to teaching posts and essentially liquidating the unions for workers and
teachers. In 1989, the PCP-SL carried out the rst executions, including some on the university campus.
Te MRTA had a lesser and briefer presence at the university, particularly in certain schools, such as
Education, Agronomy, Economics and Social Work, where some students were recruited for its urban
militias, which were armed columns on campus. Some of the bloodiest episodes of this era were due to
confrontations between the MRTA and the PCP-SL.
Due to the increase in subversive action at the university, members of the security forces, which had po-
litical control over the area through the political-military command, implemented a policy of detentions,
executions and forced disappearances, which began to intensify in 1990 and reached a height in 1992.
In June 1991, after a visit to the university by President Alberto Fujimori, the government decided to ex-
ercise even stricter control, increasing the number of military interventions. Tere are indications of the
Colina Groups participation in the execution and disappearance of students, professors and employees of
221
the National University of the Center of Peru.
Although the toppolitical-military commander of the zone may not personally have carried out the
extrajudicial executions and disappearances, he may have issued the policies or orders to carry out the
systematic military actions, which were passed down the military chain of command to those who actu-
ally implemented them. Te CVR was unable to do more in-depth investigation into the identity of those
directly responsible because the Ministry of Defense did not provide it with information on the Army
personnel who had served at the 9 de Diciembre military base, the CS Carhuamayo military base and the
Military Detachment of the National University of the Center of Peru between 1992 and 1993.
In October 1992, in response to constant complaints (mostly against military personnel) about disappear-
ances and extrajudicial executions of students, professors and employees of the university in the city of Huan-
cayo, the Attorney Generals Oce decided to investigate, appointing as investigator Imelda Tumialn Pinto,
provincial District Attorney of the Special District Attorneys Oce of the Human Rights Ombudsmans
Oce in the Judicial District of Junn. In April 1993, Attorney General Blanca Nlida Coln appointed En-
rique Miranda Palma as Special Prosecutor for a more in-depth investigation. Nevertheless, no criminal cases
are known to have resulted against members of the security forces who presumably committed these acts.
Despite the constant forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions, only in two cases did the First
Court of Instruction in Huancayo open criminal proceedings against members of the security forces.
Because it was impossible to get justice in the countrys courts, some relatives of those disappeared or
executed by military personnel turned to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
Years later, on October 3, 2001, at the 11th session of the Congressional Investigative Committee that had
been established for the case, Tumialn Pinto stated that the extrajudicial execution and disappearance of
students at the National University of the Center of Peru was a generalized practice.
Te CVRs investigation concluded that the PCP-SL murdered at least 43 people in its attempt to control
the university. In response, members of the security forces carried out a policy involving the arbitrary deten-
tion, torture, extrajudicial execution or disappearance of at least 74 people who have been fully identied.
Under domestic law, the conduct attributed to members of the Army implies the commission of crimes
of manslaughter, abduction and forced disappearance. For that reason, and within the framework of its
mandate, the CVR recommended to the Public Ministry, through the Attorney Generals Oce, that a
formal criminal complaint be led against those allegedly responsible for those crimes.
222
Chapter 4
Te Administrations of Alberto Fujimori
C H A P T E R 5
Alberto Fujimori Fujimori governed Peru from 1990 to 2000. Chosen in free elections, Fujimori became
the de facto head of state on April 5, 1992, when, with the support of the armed forces, he staged a coup
against the legislative and judicial branches of government and assumed powers not granted to him un-
der the 1979 Constitution. Although he was re-elected in 1995, during that time his government was
authoritarian and violated the rule of law. Tese traits were accentuated even further when he insisted
on running for a third term in 2000, contrary to the provisions of the 1993 Constitution that had been
his own administrations brainchild. Although he won those electionswhich were plagued by fraud,
irregularities and abusesFujimori was unable to complete a third term. His government collapsed after
scandals revealed that he had presided over a regime in which corruption reached levels rarely seen in the
countrys history.
Nevertheless, Fujimoris administration coincided with the years in which the subversive organizations
suered a strategic defeat. Te arrest of their top leaders and the destruction of their organization and
leadership structure were the most notable parts of that defeat. Te victory over subversion, which
translated into a collective sense of security and order after chaos, was one of the main reasons why the
government enjoyed high public acceptance despite the abuses and human rights violations mentioned
earlier. Te government and presidential adviser Vladimiro Montesinos engaged in propaganda tactics
in which they claimed for themselves, the National Intelligence Service and the armed forces credit for
the victory over the PCP-SL and the MRTA, using this as the basis for their legitimacy despite many
clear illegalities.
As has been explained in the two preceding chapters, however, the CVR found that the real story of the
defeat of the subversive organizations is dierent from the ocial truth that was constructed in the 1990s.
Although there were signicant successes, as the CVRs Final Report and this book point out, the actions
that were decisive in the strategic defeat of terrorism did not come from the government per se and some-
times ran counter to the governments mainly military strategy. Te CVR has also found that the Fujimori
administrations, in close collaboration with Vladimiro Montesinos and with tight control over the state ap-
paratus, were responsible for serious human rights violations. Te end of the decade and of Fujimoris second
administration demonstrated that by emphasizing strictly political objectives, and despite announcements
by the president and his cohorts of a harsh crackdown on terrorism, the administration had been careless in
anti-subversive eorts and the opportunity to decisively solve the problem had been lost.
The armed forces and new government
Te Garca administration left the country in a deep economic and social crisis, with annual ination
in 1989 running higher than 2,775 percent and with 65 provinces and one district under a state of
emergency. Te electoral campaign for Garcas successor was highly contentious and ended with two
candidates facing o in a runo election: Mario Vargas Llosa, candidate of the Democratic Front (Fr-
ente Democrtico, FREDEMO), and Alberto Fujimori of Change 90 (Cambio 90). Teir platforms were
sharply antagonistic, reecting the feelings of voters. While Vargas Llosa proposed a severe macroeco-
nomic adjustment as a prelude to establishing a liberal economic regime, Fujimori defended a gradual
adjustment and distanced himself from economic liberalism. On the issue of ghting subversiona true
national priority at the timeFujimori maintained that his strategy would focus mainly on attacking
hunger and misery, because in his opinion they were the breeding ground of subversion. Once in of-
ce, however, the new president put other policies into practice.
As has been indicated, during the last years of the Garca administration, the armed forces began rede-
ning their own focus for the ght against subversion. Tis redesign meant that the armed forces were
dening state policy based on the needs of war; the anti-subversive eort was a higher objective than
the democratic regime itself. Te new strategy emphasized psycho-social operations and, above all, intel-
ligence work and also included the perpetration of human rights violations that, while fewer in number,
would be more premeditated. All of this also demanded a readjustment of state institutions.
226
Chapter 5
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, in 1989 a group of military ocers and civilians planned a coup
aimed at establishing a directed democracy in 1990. Tis plan, which became known as Plan Verde,
involved establishing a secret military regime with real power or strategic dominance that would not be
susceptible to political wear and tear. As the power behind the elected president, such a military regime
would eectively govern the country.
Te plan included adjustment policies to stop hyperination and make the country credit-worthy again,
because the ght against subversion could not be sustained without new loans. It also included reforms to
create political and legal conditions favorable to military and intelligence operations.
Te rise of Fujimori and his electoral victory on a platform contrary to that of FREDEMO forced the
conspirators to suspend their plans. Tey thought that a military uprising under those circumstances
with an appreciable percentage of the electorate voting against a macroeconomic adjustmentwould
have appeared to be a coup against the people.
Soon, however, the coup plotters saw new opportunities in the circumstances surrounding the president-
elect: the lack of political denition, the lack of a political party and the absence of a real plan for govern-
ing the country. It was a vacuum that could be lled by the political-military plan.
With Vladimiro Montesinos help, the president-elect was asked to adopt that plan. Before he took of-
ce, the armed forces convinced Fujimori to take up residence at a military facility on the pretext that
his life was in danger. He quickly agreed to put the points of the plan into practice, beginning with the
macroeconomic shock that he had promised to avoid. Tus began the implementation of Plan Verde,
although its key points had been touched up somewhat through the interventionand self-interestof
Vladimiro Montesinos.
By the time the new government took oce, the violence had reached extremes. In 1989, as detailed in
earlier chapters, Abimael Guzmn had imposed on his organization the idea of a strategic equilibrium,
the most visible eect of which would be an intensication of the Shining Paths terrorist actions. Te
political-military plan was also a reaction to that situation.
Once Fujimori accepted certain central ideas of the plan, the groundwork was laid for increasing military
power without the controls mandated by the Constitution. First, Fujimori accepted the continuation of
the anti-subversive strategy that was directed by the armed forces and gave them broad room to maneuver,
which meant, among other things, impunity for military personnel responsible for human rights violations.
Under this model, the police followed two paths. In the emergency zones, they were subordinate to the
political-military commands. Yet, at the same time, they also began doing specialized intelligence work
through the Special Intelligence Group (Grupo Especial de Inteligencia, GEIN), a unit in DIRCOTE,
focusing on arresting the top leaders of subversive organizations.
First decisions
Te negotiation between military leaders and the president-elect over the adoption of the political-military plan
was marked by tensions and rumors of plots against the new government. As a result, the governments rst
decision was to replace the top commanders of the Navy and Air Force, but not the Army. With the threat of
a coup neutralized and the top commanders changed, the way was cleared for changing the security forces and
modifying power relationships. Tese changes occurred, but without a consensus among the armed forces and
police, because from the outset there was interference from Montesinos, who favored the new governments
relationship with the Army. Te police, meanwhile, were put under military control.
While these changes were being introduced, the government launched an economic adjustment shock
plan, which was announced by Finance Minister Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller in August. It was a severe
adjustment, which was implemented without setting up emergency social programs. Te countrys eco-
227
The Administrations of Alberto Fujimori
nomic stabilization, the shift toward a liberal model in the nancial and trade structure, and the recovery
of international credit took up a signicant part of the governments attention in 1990 and 1991.
While this was taking place, President Fujimori was getting rid of his initial collaboratorsprofessionals
with ties to the leftand forming a team more in tune with the steps he had taken. In the political arena,
this meant distancing himself from the image of a consensus-builder, with which he had won the election
and which he had even demonstrated in his rst few months in oce.
Unlike earlier governments, Alberto Fujimoris administration did not have a majority in Congress. His
party, Change 90, won only 32 seats (28 percent) in the lower house and 14 (18 percent) in the Senate.
Tis forced the government to establish pragmatic alliances on very specic issues: with FREDEMO on
issues related to the economic program and with the PAP on political issues. Beyond that, the govern-
ment had no intention of building a political party with which to govern. Tis raised the possibility of
ruling through a hidden regime supported by political gures operating in the shadows and in alliance
with sectors of the armed forces. Te clique that was formed held the real power, with Montesinos
playing a leading role, along with other government advisers, such as Santiago Fujimori (the presidents
brother), Augusto Antonioli and Absaln Vsquez.
In those early months, the government took a public stance in favor of respecting and protecting human
rights. To a great extent, this was a response to new requirements set by the United States government,
whose support was vital for Perus reentry into nancial circuits.
In fact, however, there was still a tendency to perpetuate the impunity that had existed under former
Presidents Belaunde and Garca. Tere were many cases, including the forced disappearance of several
dozen students at the National University of the Center of Peru, in Huancayo, in 1990 and 1991. Authori-
ties never investigated the cases and no one was ever held responsible.
Implementation of the anti-subversive strategy and impunity
In the early 1990s, the armed forces drew up the Anti-subversion Campaign Plan1990-1995. Accord-
ing to the plans timeline, the task between August 1, 1990, and July 31, 1992, would be the recovery of
critical areas. As the previous chapter explained, in 1990 the anti-subversive actions were expanded to
low-income neighborhoods east of Lima, such as Huaycn and Raucana, and national universities, main-
ly La Cantuta and San Marcos. Tey also expanded toward the eastern part of Junn, to the Ene River,
where hundreds of Ashninkas were freed from the PCP-SL, and northeastward to the coca-growing
zones of Hunuco, San Martn and Ucayali.
Te expansion included selective killings and other human rights violations that were denounced by vari-
ous civilian organizations. Te armed forceswith the governments encouragementtherefore sought
to eliminate the oversight of democratic institutions. A system of impunity, although incipient, was
already developing. On December 23, 1990, the government decreed that military and police actions in
the emergency zones would be handled by military courts. One indication of this trend was the Senates
approval of the promotions of Army Brigadier General Jorge Rabanal Portilla, who was linked to the
1986 prison massacre, and Brigadier General Jos Rolando Valdivia Dueas, who was connected with the
massacre in the Andean community of Cayara.
Toward the coup: Legislative decrees of November 1991
As part of the strategy to gain nancial support from the United States, the government announced its
commitment to respect human rights and seek a consensus among the political forces. In May 1991, it an-
nounced a proposal for pacication that stressed the importance of strict respect for constitutional norms
and human rights. Te massive and merciless violation of human rights by subversive groups does not jus-
tify the commission of abuses by state agents, stated the proposal presented to the countrys political parties.
With that proposal as a guarantee, in early June, Congress granted the executive branch the power to legislate
228
Chapter 5
on pacication, reorganization of the state, private investment and job creation for a period of 150 days.
After the third meeting of the countrys political forces at the end of June, it was announced that a com-
mission of four political party representatives would be formed to consolidate the main agreements on
pacication. In July, a National Political Accord was signed for the design of a comprehensive, demo-
cratic anti-subversive strategy. Tensions were already appearing between the government and the opposi-
tion in Congress, however, and these intensied when Change 90 lost the presidency of both houses of
the legislature. In July 1991, Fujimori stepped up his tactic of undermining the public image of Congress.
What followed was a shift from pragmatic cooperation to confrontation. And while the political forces
continued to hammer out a consensus on a strategy for pacication, the hidden core of the government
the clique of adviserswas preparing a rigid legal proposal for combating subversion.
From the time Fujimori took oce, Vladimiro Montesinos had sought to build his own power base in the
National Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional, SIN). Tis enabled him to extend his inu-
ence and power to the armed forces. Montesinos soon became the real head of the SIN, where he made
General Julio Salazar Monroe, a military ocer willing to accept his conditions, a gurehead. Montesinos,
who had become the presidents only adviser on military and intelligence aairs, made decisive changes in
the Army by April 5, 1991. He forced into retirement ocers who supported the institutional structure or
dispatched them to bureaucratic posts and replaced them with others whom he considered more malleable.
At the same time, he organized his own espionage network within the Army, which had a dissuasive eect
as he extended his inuence in the judiciary and the Public Ministry or the Attorney Generals Oce.
In June 1991, Montesinos took charge of preparing the legislative decrees on pacication that would be
issued in November. Tese responded to certain requirements of the armed forces anti-subversive strat-
egy, but especially to the interests of the real head of the SIN. Montesinos convinced Fujimori that an
ecient anti-subversive strategy required an intelligence apparatus that would reach into the most remote
places. Part of his proposal, which was not explicitly included in the political-military plan, was to raise
the SINs rank within the intelligence community so that it could centralize and control the activities
and budget of the military and police intelligence services. In December, amid open antagonism between
the executive and legislative branches, Montesinos struck the decisive blow by having Fujimori name
General Nicols Hermoza Roswho backed Montesinos plans, including for the coup the following
yearCommander General of the Army.
With only a few days left under the special legislative powers it had been granted, the government issued
120 decrees, 35 of which involved pacication, and made sweeping changes to security-related agencies.
Legislative Decree 743the National Defense System Lawcreated a new defense structure. Among the
most important changes, it called for commanding generals and the head of the Joint Chiefs of Sta to be
appointed directly by the president for the period of time he deemed appropriate. It also created the Op-
erational Command of the Internal Front (Comando Operativo del Frente Interno, COFI), which reported
to the president of the Joint Chiefs of Sta and consisted of leaders of the armed forces and police, with no
political oversight (Article 26). Legislative Decree 746the National Intelligence System Lawgranted
the SIN broad powers and required public and private agencies to provide it with any information it re-
quested, with criminal penalties for non-compliance. It also created intelligence bodies in ministries and
public agencies that would respond directly and exclusively to the SIN, and it made the intelligence budget
secret. Legislative Decree 749 broadened the prerogatives of the political-military commands in the emer-
gency zones. It established that those commands, as part of their power to undertake development work in
the areas under their jurisdiction, would have economic and nancial resources, goods and services as well
as personnel provided by the political ocials of public agencies and regional and local governments. It also
reiterated that the PNP was subordinate to the political-military commands, further detailing the scope of
229
the political-military commands and expanding their responsibilities in the ght against drug tracking.
1

According to the decree, this would guarantee the elimination of terrorism and drug tracking.
Tese and other decrees created the legal framework for and ratied the anti-subversive strategy that
had been established in 1989 and marked the culmination of a long process of abdication of democratic
authority in favor of the military. Te purpose of the maneuver was to ensure that Congress did not have
time to analyze all of the decrees, which would automatically take eect in mid-December, when the
30-day review period expired.
Congress did not shrink from the challenge posed by the legislative decrees drafted by Fujimori and
Montesinos. Te Senate and House of Representatives organized multi-party commissions, and in the
few days remaining before the end of the ordinary legislative session on December 15, struck down six
decrees. Tese included 731 and 764, which postponed the date that the criminal code would take eect;
and 736, 747 and 762, which penalized money laundering, covering up drug tracking and the revela-
tion or dissemination of information obtained or processed by the National Defense System. Because of
the lack of precision in their terms, those decrees could lend themselves to being misused to undermine
civil liberties. Te rejection of Legislative Decree 746, the National Intelligence System Law, was what
most exasperated the executive branch, because this was the central tool for combating subversion and
would unilaterally increase the executive branchs power. Te problem was that the norm removed the
SIN from all oversight by democratic institutions.
In response, the president ocially objected to the legislatures decisions overturning the decrees and re-
fused to sign them into law. In addition, on the last day of the year, Fujimori made a number of objections
to the General Budget Law for 1992, which blocked it from becoming law because Congress could not
meet to resolve the problem. Given the crisis, Congress called an extraordinary legislative session between
January 20 and February 3, 1992, to examine the bills the president had vetoed. Even so, the time was
too short to review the remaining decreesthere were 120 in all, not just those associated with paci-
cationand modify or overturn them. Nevertheless, Congress managed to modify 743, the National
Defense System Law, which was very important to the government. In response, a few days after being
appointed to head the Joint Chief of Sta of the Armed Forces, Nicols de Bari Hermoza Ros publicly
expressed his support for the pacication strategy set out in the presidents legislative decrees. Fujimori
nally signed all of the decrees that had been modied by the legislature, except that one. Te decrees not
reviewed by Congress automatically took eect when the 30-day review period expired.
Te governments intention had thus been blocked. Te administration turned again to multi-party
consensus-building schemes, but they were merely an empty formality that it used to buy time until
its secret plans matured.
April 5 coup: Measures and implications
At 10:30 p.m. on April 5, 1992, the constitutional President of the Republic, Alberto Fujimori, an-
nounced that he was dissolving Congress and reorganizing the judiciary, the National Council of Mag-
istrates (Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura), the Constitutional Guarantees Tribunal (Tribunal de Ga-
rantas Constitucionales) and the Public Ministry. Minutes later, the heads of the Joint Chiefs of Sta and
the National Police issued a statement expressing their complete support for the coup. Te move led to
the resignation of Cabinet Chief Alfonso de los Heros. On April 6, a new Cabinet headed by scar de la
Puente Raygada was sworn in. Tat same day, De la Puente announced the regimes rst decree law, the
Foundational Law of the Emergency Government of National Reconstruction, which calledfor, among
other things, the drafting of a new Constitution.
1 Law 24150 of June 1985 gave the political-military command responsibility for assuming command of the armed forces and police forces
in its jurisdiction and/or those assigned to it (Article 5, Section a). Legislative Decree 749 stated that its responsibilities included having under
its command the members of the National Police of Peru who provide services in the zones of its respective jurisdiction, who will carry out the
instructions and orders issued by the Political-Military Command with regard to the fght against terrorism and drug trafcking.
230
Chapter 5
Tere were various reactions from the congressional opposition, including an attempt to impeach the
president on the grounds of moral incapacity. Despite these eorts and the initial condemnation of the
international community, however, the de facto regime settled in. It had strong public support, with 71
percent of the population approving the dissolving of Congress and 89 percent in agreement with the
restructuring of the judiciary. Meanwhile, 51 percent of the population believed that the regime that
began on April 5 was democratic, and only 21 percent believed that the president should be impeached.
A fundamental factor in the regimes stabilization was the assembly of OAS ministers, during which Fujimori
announced elections for a new Constituent Congress. Tose elections were called on June 1. Te resulting body
was called the Democratic Constituent Congress (Congreso Constituyente Democrtico, CCD), and its members
were elected on November 22. With no real opposition, the regime had nearly nine monthsfrom April 1992
to December 1992to govern according to its own rules, by decree and with no checks or balances.
Governing by decree
On April 5, 1992, the Fujimori administration began enacting a series of decree laws that substantially
modied anti-terrorism legislation, in some cases violating the suspended 1979 Constitution. Legislative
decrees on pacication that had been modied or struck down by Congress at the end of 1991 also went
into eect. In July, Decree Law 25365 reinstated, with some modications, the National Intelligence
System Law granting broad powers to the SIN. Decree laws were also signed that expanded police control
in prisons, expanded support for peasant self-defense committees, permitted military intervention in
universities and sweeps through urban areas and intensied civil actions.
Changes were also made to anti-terrorism legislationthe legal framework for detention and trialthat
ignored the basic guarantees of due process. Decree Law 25475 (May 6, 1992) established the death penalty
in certain cases of terrorism and expanded sanctions in other cases, while instituting the use of anonymous
or faceless judges. Decree Law 25499 (May 16, 1992) modied Legislative Decree 748, which established
the repentance law for subversives who had surrendered. Decree Law 25564 (June 20, 1992) lowered the
age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 15 for crimes of terrorism. Decree Law 25659 (August 13, 1992)
dened as treason certain crimes that had been considered terrorism. In a clearly unconstitutional move,
it also allowed military courts to judge civilians accused of terrorism. In addition, it reduced the trial time
frame, limiting the accused persons ability to mount a defense. Tis same group of decrees ratied top
military prerogatives and expanded the militarys power in emergency zones and in anti-subversive activity.
Decree Law 25626 required all agencies involved in combating subversion and drug tracking to adapt
their norms and procedures to the directives of the Operational Command of the Internal Front (Comando
Operativo del Frente Interno, COFI), which was run by the president of the Joint Chiefs of Sta. Decree Law
25708 established procedures for judging crimes of treason and permitted the use of summary procedures
under the Military Code of Justice in trials in the theater of operations. Finally, Decree Law 25728 made it
possible to convict defendants in absentia for crimes of terrorism.
Te CVR believes that while specic measures and a modication of the system were needed to respond
to the crisis, such a step could not come at the cost of basic civic guarantees, as occurred with the decree
laws. While certain types of human rights violations, such as executions and disappearances, decreased
considerably after 1993, a new stage marked by violations of due process began. By decreasing the number
of deaths and disappearances, keeping a record of detentions and allowing the Red Cross into detention
centers, Peru improved its compliance with requirements for negotiating for U.S. economic and military
aid. Tese steps, however, were aimed at protecting detainee lives rather than determining whether basic
norms of due process were being followed.
While the political process followed that course, the Shining Path ratcheted up its violence with brutal
assassinations in the capital. Te urban campaign, however, was actually the other side of the PCP-SLs
defeat in rural areas, which had been caused by the strategy that the armed forces had been implementing
since 1989, supported by the rural population that had organized in self-defense committees. At the same
231
time, police work by the GEIN and BREDET was producing important results, enabling the groups to
amass information and make signicant arrests. Since 1990, the police had been nding clues during
raids on safe houses that would lead to Abimael Guzmns arrest.
Despite all of this, there was great concern not only in Peru but also in the international community because
it appeared that the PCP-SL could get the best of the Peruvian government. In March 1992, in Washington,
Bernard Aronson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Aairs, stated that the lack of in-
ternational aid for the Peruvian government could enable the PCP-SL to seize power. Tat same year, the U.S.
Congress held public hearings on the position that the United States should take if the PCP-SL came to power.
Such external and internal alarm was based on large-scale acts of terrorism, including the car bombing on
Tarata Street in Miraores, which created the sense among Limas middle class that the PCP-SL might tri-
umph. Under those circumstances, a de facto government that promised a rm hand received public support.
Guzmns arrest
Tey [the military] will never forgive the fact that this was done by the police.
2
On September 12, 1992, the event that the press dubbed the arrest of the century occurred: the detention
of Abimael Guzmn Reinoso along with three top members of the Central Committee. It was the greatest
achievement of the police, especially the GEIN and DIRCOTE, which by then was known as DINCOTE.
Contrary to the governments claims at the time, Guzmns arrest and the earlier detention of other impor-
tant subversive leaders were the result of dedicated work exclusively by the police, based on their accumulat-
ed experience and information. Tis did not stop the government, which had never attempted to conceal its
emphasis on a military strategy, from presenting the accomplishment as the fruit of its alleged new strategy.
In fact, Guzmans arrest surprised top government ocials, who were not aware of the eort. Te op-
eration, code-named PNP Captain Carlos Verau Asmat, was not coordinated with the president, the
interior minister or the National Intelligence Service. Fujimori
3
returned to Lima on September 13 and
made no statement to the press until 11:30 p.m., when he broadcast a message to the nation and presented
the rst images of Guzmn. DINCOTE, however, had already publicized the polices success without
waiting for government authorization or support.
Te fact that Guzmn was arrested without political coordination sparked the governments rancor to-
ward the police units involved. Months later, various members of DINCOTE were transferred to other
units and tasks. In 1993, the government dismantled several of DINCOTEs special groups. In particu-
lar, it did away with the GEIN (DIVICOTE-1), which had 80 agents at the time of Guzmns arrest.
Te government, meanwhile, insisted on giving the SIN power in the ght against subversion. Tis had
been done before Guzmns arrest with a series of national pacication decrees. Decree Law 25635,
published on July 23, 1992, granted full powers to the SIN on the grounds that it was necessary to cen-
tralize intelligence in order to combat subversion. Tat decree formally created the National Intelligence
System (Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia, SINA) and made the SIN its directing body. Te law gave the
SIN broad powers and placed it directly under the president, with no ministerial, judicial or congressional
oversight. It also gave the SIN power to establish its own budget and operating plans and to keep them
classied. Te SINs new powers did not clearly exclude it from carrying out its own undercover security
operations against enemy secret agentsin other words, counterintelligence operationsalong with its
tasks of coordinating and monitoring the military intelligence services.
Te power of Montesinosand, therefore, the SINbecame rmly established after the failed military
coup against Fujimori led by retired General Salinas Sed on November 13, nine days before the CCD
2 CVR. Interview with a PNP ofcer and former GEIN member, February 26, 2003.
3 The magazine S reported that he was fshing near Colombia. Other media reported that he was in Iquitos carrying out planned social
assistance activities in native communities in the Amazon (Desco. Resumen Semanal, September 9-15, 1992, No. 686).
232
Chapter 5
elections. Te event gave Montesinos an ideal opportunity to demonstrate the SINs eectiveness to Fu-
jimori and to convince him of the need to expand the services power and resources. One practical con-
sequence of this was the decision to replace some of DINCOTEs best police agents to ensure that tasks,
information and power were centralized in the SIN. Another factor that enabled Montesinos to shore up
his leading role was the close relationship he established with representatives of the CIA. With its new
power, the SIN also took charge of developing and disseminating an ocial version
4
of pacication.
Human rights violations after the coup
With its comprehensive strategy, the government expanded anti-subversive operations to areas where
there had previously been restrictions. According to the military, prisons and public universities were
two of the main bastions of subversion. Tis was true in the case of prisons, which operated as subversive
schools. By the early 1990s, this was more than clear, and the problem, which had been going on for years,
required an immediate solution.
Legislative Decree 734, issued in November 1991, gave the military discretionary powers in prisons. On
April 7, 1992, Army troops and the National Police took charge of the countrys two largest prisons, Miguel
Castro Castro and San Pedro, and began implementing reforms to reorganize the prison population, es-
pecially inmates accused of terrorism. On April 8, the government announced that the National Peniten-
tiary Institute (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario, INPE) was being reorganized and put the Ministry of the
Interiorthrough the PNPin charge of internal and external security as well as management of the
countrys prisons and related establishments, thus limiting INPEs functions. A month after the coup, with
no Congress and with oversight institutions such as the Attorney Generals Oce and the judiciary under
government control, a police raid on the Castro Castro prison, which the government said was an eort
to restore authority in the penitentiary, eliminated some of the top Shining Path leaders imprisoned there.
On May 6, the police operation called Transfer One began in the cellblocks holding Shining Path
members in the Miguel Castro Castro prison in Canto Grande, with the goal of transferring more than
100 women to the Santa Mnica prison in Chorrillos. Because of resistance from the prisoners, the opera-
tion lasted four days and ended with a high death toll among inmates. In an ocial statement on May
12, the Ministry of the Interior announced that 35 prisoners accused of terrorism had died. Altogether,
however, there were 41 victims,
5
including Hugo Deodato Jurez Cruzatt, a member of the PCP-SLs
Politburo, and other members of the Central Committee, such as Yovanka Pardav Trujillo, Elvia Nila
Sanabria Pacheco and Tito Valle Travesao.
Te university law that had been in eect since the beginning of the Fujimori administration allowed
the National Police to go onto university campuses by court order and at the request of the rector, but
eliminated those requirements in cases of agrant crime or imminent danger of perpetration of such a
crime. Legislative Decree 726, issued in November 1991, authorized the armed forces and the National
Police to go into a local university with nothing more than authorization from the Ministry of Defense,
the Ministry of Interior or a political-military command. Tat was one of the decrees that Congress had
modied, but which Fujimori nevertheless enacted with its original language after the coup.
Te government issued a new decree law expanding the powers of the armed forces in the universities. It was in
this context that a military incursion occurred on July 18, 1992, in a student dormitory at Enrique Guzmn y
Valle University, better known as La Cantuta, ending with the abduction and disappearance of nine students
and a professor. Te operation was dierent from those that had been carried out earlier at the National Uni-
versity of the Center of Peru, where selective elimination as part of the armed forces comprehensive strategy
under the direction of the political-military command, had led to the disappearance of dozens of students.
4 Some police ofcers have said that General Nicols Hermoza Ros maintained that only when he took charge of the Joint Chiefs of Staf in
late 1991 did the transfer of the new strategy to the police begin.
5 CVR. Event 10151401.
233
In contrast, the operation at La Cantuta was carried out by a group of SIE agents (Servicio de Inteligencia del
Ejrcito, SIE) who were not assigned to the area and who were directed by the SIN. Tat was not the rst
time this occurred, nor would it be the last. A series of apparently unconnected human rights violations
executions and disappearanceshad occurred previously in metropolitan Lima and nearby areas. It soon
became known that these had been carried out by the same perpetrators, the squad known as the Colina
Group, which had committed a massacre in Barrios Altos, in downtown Lima before the coup. Other crimes
committed by this group included the murders of nine peasant farmers in the district of El Santa, Ancash,
in May 1992, and the disappearance of journalist Pedro Yauri in Huaura, in Lima, in June 1992.
Te CVR believes that because of the de facto regimes command and decision-making structure,
those crimes could not have been committed without the knowledge and approval of President Fuji-
mori and Vladimiro Montesinos.
Discontent with the regime in one sector of the armed forces, which became evident with the coup at-
tempt on November 13, 1992, soon found other public expressions. In early 1993, information began
to lter from the Army about what had happened at La Cantuta. On April 3, a group calling itself the
Sleeping Lion (the Len Dormido) sent opposition Congressman Henry Pease a document stating that
the 10 people who had disappeared had been abducted, murdered and secretly buried by a military death
squad operating with the approval and support of top Army commanders and the SIN. Based on Peases
charges, Congress appointed an investigative commission, even though the documents credibility was
questioned because it has no seal or signature.
Reactions were not long in coming, either from Change 90 lawmakers, who denied the report, or the
president of the Joint Chiefs of Sta, who sent tanks into the street in an act of intimidation. Finally in
May, the congressional majority approved a motion that prevented ocers implicated in alleged human
rights violations from appearing before congressional investigative commissions once a case had been
opened in military courts.
SINs special operations
Army General Rodolfo Robles publicly claimed that the SIN was using military personnel and giving or-
ders outside the ocial chain of command, so that operations no longer fell within anti-subversive eorts,
but responded to orders of the presidential-military clique. Tese undercover SIN operations were ap-
proved by the Joint Chiefs of Sta, which as the Operational Command of the Internal Front (Comando
Operativo del Frente Interno, COFI), was part of the chain of command and directly commanded opera-
tions on the anti-subversive fronts beginning in early 1990. With that backing, the SIN deployed its own
forces for special missions, using personnel from the Army Intelligence Service, and sent them to theaters
of operations, notifying only the military chief of the front or zone so that he would provide guarantees
for the operationin other words, basically telling him not to stick his nose in or ask questions and to
allow the group to operate. Tat is what happened in the case of the disappearance and murders of the
students and professor at La Cantuta.
6

Special intelligence operations were part of regular military operations and could not be planned or car-
ried out without the knowledge of the operations chief or the head of the military region or anti-subver-
sive front where they occurred. Nevertheless, this is precisely what Montesinos did through the SIN. Te
military chiefs were persuaded to allow special operations to take place in their jurisdictions, with those
operations organized and directed by the SIN and the Joint Chiefs of Sta. Te objectives and person-
6 Major Martin Rivas appeared before General Luis Prez Documet and informed him that a special operation was going to be carried out
to detain subversive criminals at the university residence hall, and that he needed a certain lieutenant for the operation. When the general
asked why it had to be that lieutenant and not another, Rivas answered that the lieutenant had recently been stationed at the military base
that controlled the university and could identify the subversive criminals who were being sought. The chief of operations agreed, on the
understanding that it was a special operation under the direct responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staf and the SIN. He assigned the lieutenant
and arranged for the special group to have access to the university at night. Martn Rivass truck entered the campus, carrying the special group,
and left hours later without the chief of the military base examining what was in the truck or knowing where it was headed.
234
Chapter 5
nel for the special operationsunder direct control of the SIN or the Joint Chiefs of Stawere often
unclear or simply unknown to the local military chiefs. Tis parallel structure enabled Montesinos to use
intelligence agents and special operations military personnel for dirty jobs, such as settling scores with
drug trackers or specic retaliation, such as the murders in El Santa, Ancash, as well as threats, black-
mail, bribery and terrorist acts against dissident ocials or political opponents or for special psycho-social
operations aimed at changing public behavior, such as the massacre in Barrios Altos. Instead of limiting
itself to analyzing, authorizing and supervising operating plans and the results of the countrys various
intelligence services, the SIN planned and carried out operations on its own, taking advantage of the
operational capacity of the various branches as though their personnel were at its disposal. It had intel-
ligence agents, entire networks of informants and joint special operations squads under its direct control.
In other words, the same oceor, rather, the same personcarried out operations as well as providing
authorization and oversight. Besides having the SINA law in its favor, this capacity was facilitated by a
directive issued in January 1990 that gave the president of the Joint Chiefs of Sta the function of opera-
tions chief of the COFI. As a result, General Hermoza Ros had at his disposal all military personnel of all
branches at any time and for any reason. Martn Rivas and the other commandos of the Colina Group
did not acknowledge the military heads of the combat units as their superiors. Teir orders came directly
from Montesinos, with the approval of Hermoza Ros, as head of all military personnel, and President
Fujimori, who by law was the only person responsible for supervising the SIN.
After the Barrios Altos massacre, if not before, the governments presidential-military power clique en-
gaged in a series of activities that violated human rights in a premeditated, systematic way with the goal
of radicalizing its supporters and forcing them to defend positions that implied a complete lack of demo-
cratic control over the anti-subversive eorts. Even after the Colina Group itself was deactivated, special
intelligence operations continued because of the prerogatives and faculties that had been granted to the
SIN. Te goal of these operations was to terrorize the regimes opponents.
Impunity
The Cantuta Law
In June 1993, the congressional majority rejected a report from the investigative commission that found
the ocers in charge of the military base and General Hermoza Ros himself criminally responsible for
the La Cantuta case. Te majority approved a report that abstained from assigning criminal responsibility
on the grounds that military courts were investigating the case. Te case had broader repercussions the
next month, however, when a press report led to the discovery of four graves containing burned human
remains in Cieneguilla, on the outskirts of Lima. Te armed forces announced that they would launch
their own investigation. Tis led to a jurisdictional dispute that Congress resolved in the militarys favor
with Law 26291, known as the Cantuta Law. Te measure established that disputes over whether civilian
or military courts should have jurisdiction in cases other than drug tracking would be resolved in the
appropriate chamber of the Supreme Court by simple majority, hence reducing the number of required
votes. Tis was one of the rst laws drawn up by the SIN, and approved by Fujimoris majority in Con-
gress, that violated the recently approved 1993 Constitution. Te Supreme Court judges loyal to Fujimori
dispatched the La Cantuta case to a military court. Days later, the military court issued a verdict sen-
tencing some of the ocers implicated in the case. Among them were Santiago Martin Rivas and Carlos
Eliseo Pichilinge, both of whom were sentenced to 20 years in prison.
Operation Aries
During those years, the anti-subversive military bases in the Huallaga were languishing because of in-
action and a lack of resources. Special operations against drug trackers allied with the PCP-SL or in
favor of certain drug-tracking rms concentrated activities and resources in the hands of commando
groups that were own in for the job and that answered directly to the SIE, DINTE, Joint Chiefs of Sta
and, ultimately, the SIN. Tis stalled the anti-subversive eort again, as extensive coca-producing areas
235
controlled by the PCP-SL in Hunuco were left untouched and consolidated. Tis paved the way for a
new Army oensive that abandoned the anti-subversive strategy of 1989, which was based on the limited
use of force. Te new campaign involved massive repower, the destruction of subversive bases in coca-
growing communities and even bombardment from helicopters equipped with artillery.
Te armed forces launched the frontal assault known as Operation Aries against subversive pockets
clusters of 9 to 12 PCP-SL peoples committees, known as Cuchara and Primavera, in the province
of Leoncio Prado, Hunucobetween April and July 1994. In that area, the psycho-social tactics used
in earlier strategies, especially repentance, had not produced results. Local people were reduced to ser-
vitude by members of the PCP-SL, which kept them isolated, threatened and under ideological control.
Anyone who attempted to ee was shot by armed PCP-SL militants at piers or at the mouths of the rivers,
the only routes out of the areas. Te Army prepared anti-subversive companies for this operation with
help from Israeli experts. Te new strategy, especially in its second phase, led to the highest death toll
of the entire conict. Although the remote location made it dicult to document cases completely, hu-
man rights organizations began calling national and international attention to the situation in the region
in general and to Operation Aries in particular. Te rst reports of human rights violations resulting
from the operation were provided by local church groups or the local press. After a trip by members of
the National Human Rights Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos,
CNDDHH) and a group of journalists, a congressional investigative commission was formed. About 50
people testied before the commission, even though soldiers escorted the members throughout their visit
(Youngers 2003: 286-288). In two communities that the Army allowed the commission to enter, Moyuna
and Moyuna de Anda, bodies were found.
In the face of the evidence, instead of beginning an investigation, the government launched a campaign
against its critics, especially CNDDHH. Trough the media, ocials accused human rights groups of
blocking the nal oensive against subversion and of pressuring Congress to take action against it. As a
result, on April 28, 1994, the majority of CCD members approved a motion condemning the CNDDHH
for having released negative versionscomplaints from residents of Leoncio Pradoof the armed
forces actions in the last bastions of the Shining Path. Te congressional Human Rights Commission
eventually closed its investigation.
The amnesty law
Support for impunity reached its height with the approval of a broad amnesty law in June 1995. Te law
was passed just over a month after provincial criminal prosecutor Ana Cecilia Magallanes brought court
cases against the head of the SIN and four other military ocers for the murders of 15 people in the Bar-
rios Altos case. Because of the case, the president of the Joint Chiefs of Sta, titular SIN Chief General
Julio Salazar Monroe and adviser Vladimiro Montesinos were called to testify by Antonia Saquicuray, the
chief magistrate of the 11th Examining Court in Lima.
Te draft amnesty law was presented without warning by members of the congressional majority on
the night of June 13 and approved in the early morning hours of June 14 by a vote of 47-11. Te General
Amnesty Law (26479) beneted anyone sentenced for human rights violations during the ght against
terrorism. In an eort to appease opponents, it also included those involved in the coup attempt on No-
vember 13, 1992, and those who allegedly committed acts of disloyalty and oenses against the nation
and the armed forces during the recent conict with Ecuador. President Fujimori signed the law the
same day. Shortly afterward, Supreme Court President Moiss Pantoja announced that the judiciary
would honor the amnesty law. Judge Antonia Saquicuray, who was investigating the Barrios Altos case,
spoke out against the law. In response, the attorney general closed the case and warned that if Judge
Saquicuray tried to reopen it she would be guilty of prevarication. Congress approved a second law
that stated that the judiciary had no power to review the amnesty law. President Fujimori signed the
second law in July.
236
Chapter 5
Te CVR considers the amnesty lawwhich was defended and supported by congressional repre-
sentatives including Francisco Tudela, Julio Chu Meris, Martha Chvez, Gilberto Siura and Rafael
Reya disgrace.
Consequences of the legal framework that followed the coup
Anti-terrorism legislation and innocent people in prison
Te judicial systems ineciency or inability to help snu out terrorism in the 1980s was a major problem.
Te problems were left unchecked, thus aggravating the situation for several years. Among the most alarm-
ing indicators were the huge disparities between the number of people detained and the number tried, and
of these, between those tried and those sentenced. In addition, a large number of people who were sentenced
were released quickly because of prison benets. Specic measures were urgently needed given the emer-
gency situation created by the internal war. Believing that the end justied the means, however, the govern-
ment chose a utilitarian path that did not take into consideration either guarantees or oversight mechanisms.
Te legal provisions adopted after the coup led to the exacerbation of certain human rights violations.
Te large-scale problem of innocent people in prison was one such result. Much later, after the National
Human Rights Coordinating Committee launched a campaign, an Ad Hoc Commission was established
to review individual cases and make recommendations to the president for granting pardons in cases in
which the conviction had been based on fabricated or insucient evidence or coercion. Between August
1996 and December 1999, 1,087 innocent people who had been unjustly imprisoned were released.
Special prison regimen for cases of terrorism and treason
In 1999, about 2,700 people were being held in prisons after being indicted or sentenced for crimes of
terrorism or treason, a fairly small number compared to 1996, when the Ad Hoc Commission began
reviewing cases. Te imprisonment of so many people posed various problems for government prison
policy. Tey were solved by building new prisons or remodeling existing ones to house the inmates serv-
ing sentences on terrorism charges, who represented 15 percent of the countrys total prison population.
Tese inmates also had special prison regimens. In terms of the number of inmates, the crime of terrorism
ranked third after crimes against property and drug tracking.
Te new prisons were built using no criteria other than security and the most extreme isolation. All other
elements, such as education or work opportunities, were ignored. Te Yanamayo and Challapalca prisons,
for example, were designed so that inmates had no common areas or work areas. Considering that this
group of prisoners had been excluded from all prison benets, it made no sense to invest in anything other
than punishment. Gradually, existing prisons (Miguel Castro Castro and Chorrillos in Lima and Picsi in
Chiclayo) were remodeled and turned into enormous punishment cells. Te special norms issued after
1992 were applied in all areas, including absolute isolation of the inmate during the rst year and later
access to a patio for only 30 minutes a day. Unprecedented restrictions were placed on visits, and the few
visitors allowed in were often subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.
Anti-subversion without subversion
As was explained in the chapter on the PCP-SL, after Guzmns arrest and the rapid deactivation of the
subversive threat, Alberto Fujimoris administration chose to use the issue of terrorism as a tool. Anti-
subversive policy was just another in a set of tools that the government used to dissuade critics, gain
citizen support and, ultimately, prolong its stay in power.
In October 1993, for example, letters written by Abimael Guzmn asking Fujimori for talks to reach a
peace accord were used mainly as a propaganda tool for political gain.
It should be noted that on the eve of the referendum to approve the 1993 Constitution, the government
237
arranged to transfer Shining Path leaders from various prisons around the country for a meeting of 17
members of the PCP-SL Central Committee in the Naval Base in Callao. Te goal was for Guzmn to
persuade them to adopt the new political position that he was proposing.
7
Te meetings, which began on
October 8, were successful. On October 28, three days before the referendum, the government revealed a
letter signed by Osmn Morote, Martha Huatay, Rosa Anglica Salas and Mara Pantoja supporting the
initiative of Guzmn and Iparraguirre to seek conversations to reach a Peace Accord, whose application
would end the war that the country has lived through for more than thirteen years. We accept this peti-
tion as our own and reiterate it.
Vladimiro Montesinos was responsible for conducting the conversations and dealing with Guzmn, Ipar-
raguirre and the other Shining Path leaders as an academic interlocutor. Tese conversations were
dominated by circumstantial government interests and trailed o around 1995.
Te possibility of ending the problem of subversion was not addressed as seriously as the government
claimed. Strictly speaking, the pacication policy consisted of incarcerating the largest possible number
of subversives under extreme conditions in maximum-security prisons and isolating the remaining armed
groups. Te peace accord proposed by Guzmn and the Shining Path leadership paid political dividends
for Fujimori and lowered tensions in the prisons, but it did not wipe out the organization. Although the
PCP-SL did not sign a peace agreement with the government, it did achieve two important objectives:
rst, ensuring that Guzmn was not killed, which was the greatest concern, and second, reconstructing
the Party and disseminating its new political position and directives thanks to the meetings of the
top leaders organized by Montesinos. In eect, Guzmn salvaged an organizational structure that was
based in the prisons. Guzmn and Iparraguirre also indicated that as a result of negotiations during those
months, certain changes were made in prison conditions of PCP-SL inmates and they were given certain
leeway in the other prisons for holding meetings. Montesinos took newspapers and magazines when he
went to see the Shining Path leaders and allowed them to watch the news on television. He also allowed
them to work together a few hours each day on a history of the PCP-SL and gave them access to the
party archive that DINCOTE had conscated as well as books from Guzmns library.
Despite the apparent decrease in subversive actions, which was emphasized in ocial propaganda,
8
the
administration did not reduce the number of emergency zones. Instead, it maintained an anti-subversive
model without subversion. By mid-1995, approximately 68 provinces and three districts of the country
were still under a state of emergency. Te extension of the states of emergencywhich often became a
guarantee of tranquility for local residents fearful of new incursions by the Shining Pathmeant the
prolongation of military dominance over civilian authority through the political-military commands.
In several of the rural areas hardest hit by the internal war, for many years the military represented and
embodied the state because the civilian apparatus had retreated in the face of the violence. As subversive
actions subsided, military authority remained, although it was not as strict as it had been at the height of
the war. With the state of emergency in eect, military authorization was needed for public events and
meetings, and the military was informed of who was circulating in the area. When it was possible for
public ocials responsible for economic and social programs to begin operating again, military ocers
frequently served as intermediaries for their contact with the population.
Meanwhile, President Fujimori took advantage of the military deployment, whose pretext was the subver-
sive threat, for his re-election campaign in 1995. Another advantage was the armed conict with Ecuador,
which muted his opponents criticism and allowed the president to capitalize on his image as leader of the
military. Although doubts about the transparency of the elections persisted in light of new factssuch as
the disappearance of 37,000 electoral records in the city of Hanuco, an occurrence acknowledged by the
Special Elections Board in that departmentFujimori won with 67 percent of the vote.
7 Fujimori publicly displayed two letters from Guzmn proposing a peace accord, on October 1 and 8, a few days before the referendum.
8 In August 1994, for example, when Prez de Cuellar began his electoral campaign as candidate for the UPP, the President of the Joint Chiefs
of Staf of the Armed Forces, Nicols Hermoza Ros, stated that 95 percent of terrorism had been eliminated and that all that remained was the
arrest of a few leaders who had no support base.
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Chapter 5
Shortly after the start of his second term, the administration began preparing to remain in power after
2000. Besides a submissive congressional majority, the government wanted to ensure that it had strict
control over the judiciary. With that in mind, it created an Executive Commission. Years later, lmed evi-
dence would show the depths of corruption to which many magistrates had sunk. With this, the regime
not only guaranteed impunity for its membersavoiding judicial and political oversightbut also used
the judiciary as a political weapon for controlling anyone opposed to its interests.
One key step was the appointment of Blanca Nlida Coln, who deferred to Montesinos, as Attorney
General after the coup. In 1996, to keep her from leaving the post, and on the pretext of creating the Ju-
dicial Coordinating Council (Consejo de Coordinacin Judicial), an Executive Commission was created
in the Public Ministry
9
with Coln as president. Te commission was given more real power than the
attorney general, who became a mere gurehead.
It is important to note that the norms that allowed the judiciary and the Public Ministry to be subordi-
nated were approved by the congressional majority out of submission to, ignorance of and/or complicity
with the executive branch and the SIN.
With the reins of key state institutions rmly in hand, the administration displayed its desire to remain
in oce beyond the presidents second term. Te idea of a government that lasted more than a decade was
also part of the Political-Military Plan described above. Te scheme included the operation of the SIN
as a body that carried out espionage and threats and whose work focused not on subversionwhich by
now was barely visiblebut on any organization or person who appeared to oppose or represent political
competition to those in power.
Operation Chavn de Huntar
In August 1996, Fujimoris intention of remaining in power became clear. Legislators loyal to him ap-
proved a measure known as the Law of Authentic Interpretation. Te legislation stated that although the
1993 Constitution allowed only one re-election, that did not apply to Fujimori because he had only been
elected once under the new Constitution and was therefore eligible to run a third timewhich would be
only his rst re-election since the approval of the new Constitution.
It was in this context that a surprising event, detailed in previous chapters, occurred: the abduction of
more than 600 people who were held hostage by an MRTA command in the residence of the Japanese
ambassador. Te number was quickly reduced to 72 hostages, who would spend four months in captivity
before being freed by a military operation known as Chavn de Huntar.
Te operations success caused a notable upsurge in the governments popularity. More importantly, it side-
lined the serious and increasingly insistent accusations that were mounting against Vladimiro Montesinos.
For several reasons, however, the government could not maintain the political dividends that it reaped
with the operation. First, accusations continued.
10
Te government took advantage of the popularity that
it gained as a result of the operations success to shore up its image while it committed various violations.
One of the most serious occurred in May 1997, when the congressional majority red three judges from
the Constitutional Tribunal for having ruled that the Law of Authentic Interpretation was unconstitu-
tional. According to Congress, the formal charge was that they had exceeded their functions by issuing
a clarication of their decision.
The political use of terrorism
In the years that followed, the government continued to stage propaganda operations directed by the SIN,
carried out thanks to increasing control over the media, in which it exploited the issue of terrorism. Its
9 Law 26623 of June 15, 1996.
10 For example, in June Contrapunto (a TV news program) revealed 197 cases of phone tapping carried out by the intelligence services.
239
tactics included accusations of terrorism or use of the word terrorists by government ocials when referring
to activities carried out by the opposition or even some its own members. Beginning in 1998, with greater
control over the media, a frequent practice was to dissuade citizens from participating in protest marches by
circulating rumors that the marches were inltrated by the Shining Path. Te demonstrations were present-
ed on television, by stations closely allied with the administration, as terrorist acts, rather than what they
really were, demonstrations of political opposition to a regime that allowed no other outlets for expression.
During Alberto Fujimoris 2000 election campaign for a third term, there were ongoing irregularities,
such as the use of military personnel deployed on the pretext of combating subversion. Te state appara-
tusstill largely supported by the military in the emergency zoneshad clearly established itself as the
main voice for the administrations nationwide campaign. Tis time, however, several organizations of
election observers conrmed and documented serious irregularities in certain parts of the country.
One of the clearest examples of the governments manipulation of information about the ght against
subversion was the arrest of scar Ramrez Durand, Feliciano, who was a founder of the PCP-SL, a
member of its Central Committee and leader of the Red Path (Sendero Rojo) after Guzmn called
for the peace accord in 1993.
While Fujimori and his cohorts had repeatedly assured the country between 1993 and 1998 that terrorism
in Peru had been defeated, by mid-1999 information began to appear about actions carried out by Felicianos
followers in the eastern part of the central highlands. Te reports made the PCP-SL seem more dangerous
than it really was at the time. Te context in which these events occurred explains the importance of the
arrest of the weakened Feliciano. On the internal front, the use of Felicianos arrest as propaganda was only
too clear, in light of the approaching presidential elections. Apart from that, the arrest took place under
circumstances very dierent from those described in the governments version. Feliciano was detained on
an inter-provincial bus being driven by an o-duty police ocer named Juan Alfonso Salazar, who alerted a
group of police and military ocers about the strange presence of the vehicles only passengers.
Te nal months of the Fujimori administration followed the tone of the previous years. Te SIN focused
its attention and resources on persecuting, spying on and harassing opponents of the regime and manipu-
lating public opinion and, towards the same end, using the threat of terrorism as a dissuasive argument.
24 0
Chapter 5
PART TWO
Te Legacy of the Conict and the Way to Peace
Te Factors that Made the Violence Possible
C H A P T E R 6
It was the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions task to analyze the political, social and cultural con-
ditions, as well as the behaviors of society and state institutions, that contributed to the tragic situation of
violence experienced by Peru.
1
As a result of this analysis, the CVR found that the immediate, decisive
cause of the internal armed conict in Peru was the PCP-SLs decision to launch a peoples war against
the state, going against the will of millions of Peruvians who, in the late 1970s, were channeling their
dreams for the transformation of our society in other directions, mainly through the proliferation of com-
munity organizations, largely peaceful demonstrations and participation in elections, which remained
high after democracy was restored in 1980.
PCP-SLS DECISION TO BEGIN THE CONFLICT
Behind all violence that has a political purposespecically the conquest of state poweris a will that
organizes it and unleashes it. In Peru, this will was mainly embodied in the PCP-SL, which drew from
dierent political traditions.
One element was the Marxist-Leninist tradition, which grants ontological privilege to the proletariat as
the class that will establish a new, supposedly more just society (communism). Tat society can only be
attained through a long process of revolution, and to succeed the proletariat in dierent countries must
organize in parties of select, secret cadres who will be the enlightened vanguard, able to interpret the laws
of history. Needless to say, the PCP-SL considered itself the party of the Peruvian proletariat. Within
the Marxist-Leninist tradition, the PCP-SL subscribed to the Maoist way of thinking, in which peasants
were given the role of being the principal force in a revolution that would take the form of a prolonged
peoples war. Te proletariat, meanwhile, kept its role as the leadership class. According to Abimael
Guzmn, the Shining Path was the direct heir of Maoisms most radical expression, the so-called Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), and its call for an all-encompassing dictatorship over the
bourgeoisie. According to Guzmn, Chinas Cultural Revolution was the greatest milestone in human
history because it discovered how to change souls.
In the PCP-SL, Maoism was intertwined with a radical Peruvian tradition that was insurrectionist, en-
lightened and sectarian,
2
and which denied representative democracy and politics as a means for dialogue,
negotiation and consensus. It set direct democracy (assemblies) against representative democracy in its
quest for real democracy (economic equality). In the development of the Shining Paths plans, the radical
Peruvian tradition was always subordinated to Maoism. It only gained importance when, amid disputes
within the Peruvian left, the PCP-SL rose up to reclaim the legitimacy of Jos Carlos Maritegui, the
main socialist representative of the radical tradition, and proclaimed: Let us take up Mariteguis cause
again and reconstitute his party.
3
Once the PCP-SLs place within the universe of the Maoist left was
more or less dened, however, Mariteguis image gradually faded away until it disappeared altogether,
while Guzmn became President Gonzalo, the fourth sword of Marxism, the incarnation of the evolu-
tion of 15 billion years of matter in movement.
Along with the radical tradition, there was another aspect of Perus authoritarian tradition that was older,
more widespread and carried even greater weight: caudillismo, or the tradition of political bosses. Debate
in Marxist circles over the role of the personality in history was taken to unimagined extremes in what
Marxist tradition calls a personality cult, as was seen in the section on the PCP-SL.
Te Shining Paths extreme authoritarianism is also rooted in the social origins of its principal lead-
ers. Several were mestizo intellectuals from mid-sized provincial cities who shared the characteristics of
the social stratum known as misti, a Quechua word for the mestizospatrons or notableswho lived
in Andean urban centers and formed part of the traditional local power structure. While notable in
1 Supreme Decree, Article 2, Section a.
2 That sectarianism includes everything from the slogan of PAPs early decades, Only the APRA will save Peru, to the Marxist lefts most
recent thesis about the proletariat as the vanguard or the single party as a political regime.
3 See the document by the same name, dated 1975.
24 6
Chapter 6
traditional society, these intellectuals nevertheless felt that they were looked down on by the elites in the
capital. At the same time, overwhelmed by the emerging popular classes, they were losing respect after
having risen up through schools, trade unions, cities and/or markets.
A gure like that of Guzmn, and a plan like that of the PCP-SL, arose out of this environment. Al-
though it presented itself as radically new, in practice the Shining Path represented the restoration of a
strictly vertical order that was breaking down as a result of modernization. If in traditional landholding
society the hierarchy was based on a monopoly of economic and political power and a racist attitude that
saw the inferiority of the Indian as natural, in the PCP-SLs way of thinking the partys superiority over
the masses was justied by the monopoly of a scientic knowledge of which the PCP-SL considered
itself the exclusive representative. Tat knowledge made it possible to understand the laws of history and
therefore guide the entire country to a better future.
What remained constant between the old mistis and the new revolutionaries was an authoritarian rela-
tionship with the population, in which power was negotiated through the use of physical violence and left
its marks on peoples bodies. Te PCP-SL, therefore, was part of a long-standing tradition that included
physical punishment on estates or in police stations, as well as in the peasant communities themselves,
and even in schools that were still governed by the proverb, spare the rod and spoil the child.
At some point during the 1960s, these intellectuals discovered the potential of educational institutions
universities, pedagogical institutes, post-secondary institutesrst as a place for recruitment, and later
as a transmission belt between the party and the peasantry. Te states neglect of public education and
the persistence of a vertical transmission of knowledge, in which the teacher knows and the student learns
and obeys, created an environment ripe for the Shining Paths plans. Te intellectuals described above
established links with small groups of young people who were receptive to talk of a radical break with
the established order, but immersed in an authoritarian tradition. In that way, the PCP-SL was able to
implement its traditional, authoritarian pedagogical model and also reproduce the old vertical hierarchies
within the party itself, between the leaders and the militants, with the leader (Abimael Guzmn) as the
only one capable of interpreting the laws of history.
How did these small groups manage to forge such a strong will throughout the 1970s? First, parties of cadres
highly steeped in the ideology of the Leninist tradition tended to form very strong wills. Guzmn himself
recalled the case of the USSR: How many Bolsheviks were there when the October Revolution triumphed?
Eighty thousand in a country of 150 million inhabitants! (Guzmn, 1988). Tus the PCP-SL decided to
build a small but well-regimented organization that the members themselves dened as a war machine.
Te PCP-SL oered, above all, a discourse that claimed to be completely coherent, an all-encompassing
great story. Presented as a scientic ideology that was all-powerful because it is true (PCP-SL 1988a:
II), this provided an apparently consistent understanding not only of the country, but of the entire uni-
versea simple moral universe in black and white that gave meaning to the lives of those who shared it.
Te culmination of this great, all-encompassing story was a utopiacommunism:
Te society of great harmony the radical and denite new society toward which 15 bil-
lion years of matter in movement, from what we know of eternal matter, is necessarily and
inexorably headed. A single new society without substitute, without the exploited or the
exploiters, without the oppressed or the oppressors, without classes, without a state, without
parties, without democracy, without armies, without wars (PCP-SL 1986a: 20).
To attain this society without movement, literally the end of history, it was necessary to provoke a rup-
ture of apocalyptic proportions. Te beginning of the armed struggle marked the separation of the old
times from the new. For that reason, when Guzmn decided to cast his party into the armed struggle,
he changed the tone of his discourses and the party went through a period of internal battles that were
24 7
The Factors that Made the Violence Possible
understood as personal and collective purication and rebirth.
4
Tey would be the handwriting on the
wall in the middle of the banquet; the peoples war would be an extended Armageddon, from which only
the communists would come out alive.
Te PCP-SL also oered an organizational plan, the Communist Party, which was militarized to wage
the prolonged peoples war. To begin this with only a handful of communists, as Guzmn himself
admitted, required that the party be a complete institution that organized and controlled every aspect of
daily life, providing its active members with a total identity.
While it is necessary to highlight these elements in order to understand the concentration of political will
that the PCP-SL represented, it is also important to keep in mind the groups more prosaic aspects. Te
other face of caudillismo is political patronage, which the PCP-SL practiced profusely in the universities,
where it took pains to ensure that its members became directors of student welfare, in charge of managing
university housing and cafeterias. Te active party members, especially the youths, found in the PCP-SL
not only order, but the organization of their free time, a place for adventure and the possibility of social
advancement through the party at a time when it was dicult to achieve this through the market.
To that extent, the PCP-SL could be considered an exaggerated version of other leftist vanguard groups in
Peru and other parts of the world, which believed that the peoples war was the strategy by which social-
ism would triumph. Other traits, however, made the Shining Path a very special phenomenon. One of
these was its extreme caudillismo. Building the party around a god-like gure was very important for its
cohesion, but this became its Achilles heel when the bosses were captured in 1992.
At the same time, fanaticism became one of the key aspects of the Shining Paths mentality. It started with
the exacerbation of violence in Guzmns discourse before the armed struggle began. Te ferocity of his
harangues between 1978 and 1980 foreshadowed the type of violence that would strike the country be-
ginning in 1980, and the types of militants who would make up the PCP-SLthose willing to live their
lives on their ngertips and cross the river of blood, which would be necessary for the triumph of the
revolution. Tis willingness to face death increased with the letters of submission to President Gonzalo
that party militants signed when they joined the PCP- SL. Te glorication of the caudillo contrasted
with the loss of individual identity by party militants, who were encouraged to pay the quota of blood
and to induce genocide, proving that they were willing to die as the party members did in the prisons.
Political will is a decisive factor in explaining the beginning of any armed subversion, but that alone does
not explain why it endured. To understand the long decade of violence, it is necessary to note how that
political will took advantage of certain sets of circumstancesfed on old institutional weaknesses and
structural faults and took up certain demands and serious frustrations, expressed a certain mindset,
and was able to take root in particular social sectors and geographical places. Te historical causes that
fostered the explosion of the Shining Path, therefore, must be examined.
LONG-TERM OR HISTORICAL FACTORS IN THE CONFLICT
According to testimonies gathered by the CVR, the violence mainly aicted the poorest inhabitants of
the poorest parts of the country. As these testimonies indicate, however, poverty alone does not explain
the outbreak of the armed conict. Rather, it is one of the factors that helped spark it, and it served as the
backdrop against which the drama was played out.
Te countrys many gaps are important in understanding the conict. Te most visible and dramatic gap
is between the rich and the poor. Inequality, the abysmal dierence between those who have the most
and those who are merely surviving, is as important a factor as poverty, if not more important. It is not
just a matter of unequal distribution of wealth, however, but also of political and symbolic power, includ-
4 The symbolism of purifcation, rebirth and salvation abounds in Guzmns discourses before the armed struggle. See The New Flag, On
Three Chapters in Our History and We are the Initiators.
24 8
Chapter 6
ing having a voice: who has the right to speak, who is heard and who is ignored. Tis is important,
because the PCP-SL oered its followers a discourse that created the illusion of embracing all of reality, as
well as the possibility of making oneself heard and of silencing others. Wealth and power are distributed
unequally throughout our territory, resulting in other gaps:
Between Lima and the provinces. Centralization increased in the decades preceding the conict, exacerbat-
ing the distance between the capital and the rest of the country just when they seemed most interconnected.
Among the coast, highlands and jungle. Economic, demographic and symbolic gravitation toward Lima
and the coast, to the detriment of the Andes, became accentuated as the 20th century progressed, until
it resulted in the crisis of traditional Andean society. At the same time, the Amazon became the fron-
tier where the states modernization projects came crashing down almost as soon as they were designed.
Among Creoles, mestizos, cholos and Indians. Troughout the 20th century, the old social class dier-
ences were breaking down and their boundaries were becoming blurred and more porous. Tey did
not disappear, however. Instead, they were recreated and ethnic-cultural and racial discrimination
continued to weigh on the country.
Te mixture of these inequalities and forms of discrimination produced a growing perception of mis-
treatment among the poor, who were seen as cholos or Indians from the provinces, the highlands and
rural areas. Tat perception became more painful beginning in the middle of the last century, as the
processes of modernization in the country accelerated, often only to be cut o midstream. Te most
signicant of these were:
Large-scale migration
Widespread school enrollment
Expansion of the media
Expansion of the market
Organizational processes
Increased number and expansion of social networks in the countryside and city
Tese processes gnawed away at the structural underpinnings and arguments of traditional domination,
which saw discrimination based on class, region, ethnic-cultural background and race as normal. Te
structural foundations crumbled because of: (i) demographic changes, such as increased life expectancy
and urban growth; and (ii) economic changes, especially the expansion of the market and the terminal
crisis of the hacienda system, which had produced a society of lords and servants, especially in the poorest
areas of the Andes, making it dicult for a sense of citizenship to develop.
Te supporting arguments, which made a society with little social mobility and a fairly rigid hierarchical
order seem normal and bearable, broke down with migration to the cities, massive school enrollment and
the expansion of communication channels, especially highways and the radio.
Te breakdown of the traditional order and the acceleration of modernization deepened certain gaps and
made others visible. Among the former, the most explosive was the gap between Lima and the rest of
the country, which led to the emergence of important regional movements beginning in the 1960s. Te
gaps that grew more visible included the generational and gender gaps. Widespread access to schools and
24 9
universities deepened dierences between generations, especially in rural areas.
5
It is important to recall
that young people played the leading role in the massive waves of migration and were, to a great extent,
also the leaders of the various processes of social organization in rural and urban areas. Somewhat later,
women also began to gain access to education, and began to participate and become leading players in
the new social organizations, bursting onto the public stage in general.
All of this indicates a process of modernization that was unequal, consisting of scattered, intermittent eorts
that were often truncated, either because of a lack of a long-term vision shared by the political, business and
intellectual elites who led the country, or because of political stagnation and/or the inadequacy of national
plans. If these plans had been successful, they could have at least achieved a sustained economic develop-
ment that would have signicantly expanded the domestic market and provided for greater integration of
the country at dierent levels: economic, social, symbolic. Because this did not occur, however, there were:
Social sectors receptive to proposals for a radical break with the established order. Tese were especially,
but not exclusively, young people from the provinces, mestizos, with a higher than average education.
Some sectors scattered throughout the country felt that they were in a no-mans land between two
worlds: the traditional Andean world of their parents, which they, at least in part, no longer shared;
and the urban-Creole world, which rejected them because they were mestizos or cholos from the prov-
inces. A minority of these people was attracted to a model whose absolute consistency freed them from
a present that oered little satisfaction and too much uncertainty.
Geographical areas where this radical break could occur. Especially areas located in a sort of limbo be-
tween a modernity that existed within political discourse and expectations, more than anything, and
the backwardness and poverty that had been removed from the traditional order that had made them
somewhat bearable for so long. Tese were the areas hardest hit by the conict.
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
Tis society was accompanied by a state that had little legitimacy. Until the 1970s, law, juridical order
and the republican state itself were questioned by revolutionary paradigms that considered representative
democracy a form devoid of content, which placed little value on individual rights and liberties that
were considered bourgeois. Instead of formal democracy, they proposed real democracy, which could only
be attained in a popular or socialist democratic state built through a revolution that, for most of the leftist
parties of the time, could only triumph through violence.
Te rule of law was also questioned by the right through a long tradition of military takeovers. In the ve
decades preceding the outbreak of the internal armed conict, the country had only 14 years of demo-
cratic government. Tis fragility reected ways of thinking about and engaging in politics in which a
vertical, exclusive order imposed through violence, when necessary, was considered natural.
Te absence of conservative and liberal parties that were loyal to the democratic system and had plans for
the country contributed to this feeble sense of citizenship and led the military to take an active role in
political life, reinforcing its role as a guardian institution.
Te Cold War redoubled this questioning, placing the continents old militaristic traditions in a new context
and framing them within a new doctrine of national security that was energetically promoted in the region
by the United States. In the wake of the Cuban Revolution (1959), a wave of armed subversive movements
shook Latin America. Te response was a series of military coups and repressive regimes. Legitimate hopes for
transformation and democratization fell by the wayside. In the 1970s, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Colombia
5 It should be noted that in Ayacucho, the main social movements in the decades preceding the outbreak of the armed confict arose not out
of disputes over land, but from educational demands. The frst Peoples Defense Front (Frente de Defensa del Pueblo) arose in Ayacucho over the
defense of the University of Huamangas budget, and during its early years, it was strongly infuenced by people who would later form the PCP-
SL. Later, in 1969, there were massive protests in Huamanga and Huanta after a supreme decree issued by the military government threatened
to limit free secondary education.
250
Chapter 6
were the only countries in Latin America with governments that met the minimum standards for a democracy.
Modernity brought an embryonic sense of citizenship. In Peru, the awareness of having and exercising
rights developed unequally. Universal surage was not guaranteed until the 1979 Constitution. Munici-
pal elections were actually only held in 1963 and 1966, under the rst government of Fernando Belaunde.
If this process had not been interrupted by the 1968 coup, it would have made it possible to broaden the
practice of citizenship, confer responsibilities and resources and establish a greater presence of the state at
the local level. Because of this lack of democratic practice, in certain parts of the country the establish-
ment of the Shining Paths new powerwhich was imposed from above and which created subjects
(or even servants) instead of citizensdid not seem intolerable, particularly if that new power initially
imposed a certain order and its own style of justice.
If the development of a sense of citizenship was weak, the tradition of an impartial, universal system of
justice was almost non-existent. Both in public hearings and in the testimonies gathered by the CVR,
there are countless stories in which the protagonists traveled from distant rural communities to the de-
partmental or national capital in search of justice, only to have justice turn its back on them. Worse still,
when it did act, the judicial system tended to be discriminatory and its personnel abusive.
Te great structural changes that transformed the country, therefore, were followed by a weak, intermit-
tent process of modernization, democratization and reform of the state that, in the two decades that
preceded the outbreak of the armed internal conict, led to two dierent models:
Te liberal democratic model, which began in 1956 and evolved more clearly during the rst admin-
istration of President Fernando Belaunde (1963-1968)
Te reformist authoritarian model under the government of General Juan Velasco (1968-1975)
CIRCUMSTANTIAL FACTORS
Te outbreak of the internal armed conict came at a time when the state was overwhelmed by the demo-
cratic transition that began in 1977, which included areas beyond those directly related to the change of
the political regime. Te weak anks at the time included:
Te economic situation. By 1980, the size of the state apparatus (bureaucracy, public enterprises and the
states percentage of GDP) had grown, but the state as an institution had even greater diculty meet-
ing its basic obligations to its citizens.
Power vacuums in extensive rural areas, especially in the Andes. As part of the process of dismantling the
agrarian reform, Morales Bermdezs government deactivated the National Support System for Social
Mobilization (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilizacin Social, SINAMOS), the state apparatus that
in some ways had lled the vacuum left by local traditional powers in the countryside. Te coopera-
tivesSAIS, CAPcreated by the collectivist agrarian reform were left as tiny, demoralized islands
(often weakened from within by inept or corrupt administration) under attack from within and from
the margins by those who should have been their beneciaries. Te Green Sea (Verde Mar) opera-
tions, which began in 1977 with the support of the United States, aggravated the situation in signi-
cant parts of the high jungle, pushing large groups of settlers who had arrived during the preceding
decades to take part in the illicit economy, growing coca because of a lack of economic alternatives.
Weakness of political parties. Because of the suspension of national and municipal elections, the parties
had lost their strength. Some of their main leaders were in exile, and the political groups were discred-
ited by ocial propaganda that attacked political parties and representative democracy. Te absence of
party organizations, or their retreat from large areas of rural Peru, meant that the representation that
arose from the elections in the 1980s was tenuous and increasingly revolved around individuals rather
251
than organizations or platforms. Tis tendency was encouraged by the preferential vote.
Despite these diculties, the transition sparked by grassroots movements during those years continued.
Te Constitution approved in 1979 was politically inclusive and tended to make things more democratic.
It legalized leftist Marxist parties and granted universal surage to illiterate people over the age of 18.
Tus, on May 18, 1980, after 17 years, the country went to the polls to elect a civilian government. Te
previous day, the PCP-SL began its armed actions.
DURATION OF THE CONFLICT
Te Shining Path was an unexpected enemy. Fernando Belaundes second administration could have an-
ticipated an armed uprising similar to those taking place at the time in Central America or the Southern
Conesomething similar to the MRTAbut not the PCP-SL.
Te government and the armed forces distrusted left-wing leaders such as Hugo Blanco, who received
the second-highest number of votes for the Constituent Assembly of 1978 (after Haya de la Torre), as
well as Marxist parties such as PCP-Unity (PCP-Unidad), the UDP or UNIR, which would soon form
the United Left, and which had a strong inuence in organizations such as the General Confederation
of Workers of Peru (Confederacin General de Trabajadores del Per, CGTP), the Peasant Confederation
of Peru (Confederacin Campesina del Per, CCP) and the teachers union (SUTEP), all of which were
gaining strength in those years. It is important to remember that these parties continued to defend the
legitimacy of using weapons to take power.
Te PCP-SL had remained on the margins of nearly all grassroots mobilizations in the late 1970s.
6
Tis
helps explain why Guzmn had been arrested and quickly released shortly before launching his peoples
war. His insignicance on the political scene and in the labor movement was an advantage for his mili-
tary plan. Te members of the Shining Path got lost among other groups that shared its violent rhetoric,
but were undertaking political and labor-related actions.
In addition, even though it announced a peasant war, the Shining Path did not begin its actions in
a region where peasant organizations were on the rise, such as Cusco or Cajamarca. On the contrary,
in those areas it encountered serious resistance. Te conict began in Ayacucho, an area that had few
organizations and peasant movements in the years preceding 1980, and where the state, whose presence
in rural areas was tenuous, had especially let down its guard. Tus the small police stations in northern
Ayacucho were forced to beat a hasty retreat, while the Belaunde government appeared reluctant to call
on the armed forces, as explained above.
Besides the general surprise, another factor that contributed to the PCP-SLs survival was its radically
autarkic nature. During the early years, the government tried to nd links between the subversives and
some socialist country. Te PCP-SL itself took pains to discredit this hypothesis, launching violent ac-
tions to protest the new leadership in China
7
and the embassies of socialist countries.
Nevertheless, all these factors would have been insucient if the PCP-SL had not won the acceptance
or neutrality of signicant sectors of society, especially of the peasants. How did it reach them, and
what kind of peasants were they?
During the 1970s, most of the parties that would later form the IU tended to draw their best young cadres
from the universities and send them into the countryside, involving them at various levels in a circuit
designed to expand the party. Tis was primarily done by setting up peasant unions. Te eectiveness
of these groups was measured by their ability to control and mobilize people.
8
Te PCP-SL established a
6 Except for the strike by SUTEP in 1978 and by secondary school students in 1979, the PCP-SL had opposed these mobilizations, including
the national strikes in 1977 and 1978, because it believed they were being guided by PCP-Unitys revisionism.
7 The famous dogs hanging from posts that appeared in some Lima streets in 1980 with signs that said: Deng Xiaoping, son of a bitch.
8 In the 1980s, the yardstick for efectiveness shifted rapidly from the strengthening and mobilization of unions to electoral success.
252
Chapter 6
dierent circuit. It recruited cadres in certain universities, but kept them within the educational system,
sending them as teachers to rural schools. Tese teachers, in turn, recruited secondary school students
through whom the PCP-SL established beachheads in many communities. Te epicenters for party expan-
sion were the so-called generating organizations,
9
which fed cadres into the party through the peoples
schools. Te criterion for eectiveness was the growth of the party itself and, especially, the growth of
the peoples guerrilla army, since everything was at the service of the peoples war. Trough these link-
ages, the PCP-SL wove a net of party membership and support in the northern provinces of Ayacucho.
Tis enabled the PCP-SL to conquer bases on the margins, not only in urban Peru, but in the dynamic,
organized sectors of rural Peru. Its plan of top-down equality, expeditious justice, destruction of produc-
tive infrastructure and the distribution of livestock and harvests found acceptance in communities that
had serious internal or external conicts, where authorities had little legitimacy, and where there was
discontent because of inequitable access to scarce resources. In addition, the PCP-SL appeared early on as
an option for a new state, a vehicle for establishing order and administering a draconian, vertical style
of justice that put an end to antisocial behavior by resorting to physical punishment and executions.
Te PCP-SLs expansion to other parts of the country showed that the intellectuals and educated youths who
constituted sensitive links were not only a regional phenomenon, but extended throughout a chain of cit-
ies, including Lima. Tis also showed that poverty, a lack of rural organization and the exercising of power
associated with the use of physical violence were not exclusively characteristic of Ayacucho. Te phenome-
non brought to light other highly conictive rural areas, such as those where the agrarian reform had formed
the SAIS, or the coca-growing valleys, where entire populations had been pushed into the illicit economy
and where the police and judiciary were identied, more than anywhere else, with abuse and corruption.
To explain the duration and expansion of the subversive phenomenon, it is necessary to keep in mind
two additional factors. First, the PCP-SL and to a far lesser extent the MRTA became magnets that at-
tracted small, discontented groups that broke away from leftist parties that had changed their discourse
at the end of the 1970s from armed struggle to participation in elections, often in a less than consistent
manner.
10
Second, in certain places there was a regional identication with the subversive groupsthe
MRTA in San Martn, the PCP-SL in northern Ayacuchothat included not only the countryside, but
also the urban periphery. In the case of the MRTA, this identication was determined to a certain extent
by the unions over which the group had inuence: the Selva Maestra Agrarian Federation (Federacin
Agraria Selva Maestra, FASMA) or the Front to Defend the Interests of the People of San Martn (Frente
de Defensa de los Intereses del Pueblo de San Martn). In the case of the PCP-SL, the identication was
based on the party and violence. Tis was not an obstacle, however, and it might even have contributed to
the development of a very strong identity on the periphery of the PCP-SL, which fed into its generating
organizations. A sense of us was established with very rigid, exclusive boundaries based on ethnic and
regional similarities that combined skin color, language and customs with a sense of having been harmed
by inequality and discrimination. Te PCP-SL provided a structure of feelings for poor students who
suered from discrimination and who found themselves between two worlds, as well as for small neigh-
borhood groups in Lima and peasant sectors that were fed up with the poverty, abuse and exclusion.
None of these factors would have been enough to explain the duration of the conict if the political elites
had been up to the challenge. Te PCP-SL fed on the errors committed by the state and the political parties,
as well as the understandable confusion that existed at rst. Tose errors constituted a process of abdication
of democratic authority that progressed, with ups and downs, until it culminated in the coup of April 1992.
An indispensable element in the Shining Paths plans for survival and expansion was the need to create an
enemy in its own image and likeness, rst in the mind of its own militants, and later in the country as a whole.
Te CVRs investigations show that every time the state came close to resembling the Leviathan that Guzmn
9 On the defnition of generating organizations, see the chapter on the PCP-SL.
10 The PCP-SL demanded that the group disband and that its members be absorbed on an individual basis. At the other extreme, the MRTA
was the product of the successive mergers of various leftist groups that opted for violence.
253
described in his nightmares, it handed the subversives a victory. Te widespread repression in Ayacucho (1983-
1984), prison massacre (1986) paramilitary groups (1987) and death squads (1989) were all, in some way, tri-
umphs for Guzmn because they enabled him to validate his thesis in the eyes of his party members, and even
appear to be the lesser evil for certain sectors of society that were aected by the states response.
It was not, therefore, simply a matter of the errors, excesses or limitations of the various parties to the
conict. Te abdication, which was merely a symptom, revealed the deep geological fault lines on which
the democratic regime had been rebuilt in 1980, leaving signicant sectors of the population and national
territory on the sidelines of political representation. Te PCP-SL gained a presence in the unrepresented
margins of our society and advanced from there into other areas, taking advantage of the states errors,
the economic crisis and, later, the rampant social breakdown at the end of the 1980s.
Te mere existence of areas that lacked political representation was a sign of deep cracks in the congura-
tion of the nation, which included, but also transcended, the responsibility of government administra-
tions, political parties and the armed forces. Te relatively long duration of the internal armed conict
was also related to the fragility of a sense of national community, which should have been grounded in
having and exercising civil rights. Te fragility of this sense of national identity and citizenship was felt
beyond the rural periphery, embracing, to a greater or lesser extent, the entire country.
Viewed from the center of political, economic and symbolic power, the sectors labeled here as unrep-
resented were insignicant as they contributed little to the GDP. In rural areas, because of their scant
demographic weight, they were not decisive in elections; in urban areas, because of their extreme poverty,
they were easy prey for political patronage. Public opinion, therefore, could uctuate between indier-
ence and the demand for a rapid solution to the conict without caring much about the social cost. After
all, the victims were mainly otherspoor, rural, Indians. Tey were far away, not only geographi-
cally, but especially emotionally. Te distance included Limas cones, where the conict was marked by
sweeps conducted by the security forces and the stigmatizing of those who were dierentmigrants in
that case. Centralization and racism thus played their part in prolonging the conict.
Finally, the extreme economic crisis of the last years of Garcas administration also contributed to the
advance of the subversive groups. If the international communitys relative tolerance for the states human
rights violations was added to the mix, a picture emerged in 1990 that appeared to favor the subversive
groups, especially the PCP-SL.
CRUELTY IN THE CONFLICT
We have indicated the limits of the plans for building and modernizing the nation that were implemented
in those decades, but it is also necessary to highlight the serious social and political conicts that arose
and were resolved by peaceful means. Between 1958 and 1964, the most signicant peasant movement of
the time in Latin America arose in Peru. Hundreds of thousands of peasants and farm workers organized
and demonstrated throughout the country, taking over hundreds of thousands of hectares of land that
were in the hands of large landowners. In all those years, however, only 166 people died (Guzmn 1981),
fewer than in the rst 10 days of August 1991.
In the 1970s, a second wave of land takeovers shook the country as the agrarian reform was being imple-
mented. Te mobilization was not as widespread as in the previous decade, but the peasant organization
reached its height after the reorganization of the CCP and the creation of the National Agrarian Con-
federation (Confederacin Nacional Agraria, CNA) in 1974. Again, the cost in human lives was extremely
low compared to the number of deaths in the following decade.
Meanwhile, beginning in 1976, the cities experienced an unprecedented social upheaval that translated
into demonstrations and strikes by workers, teachers and regional groups, which in turn led to the nation-
al strikes of July 1977 and May 1978. Te former had an indirect inuence on the return to democracy,
254
Chapter 6
because days later the military regime called a Constituent Assembly for 1978. Once again, the number
of fatalities in the demonstrations during those years was minimal.
Critics may object to this discussion of social organizations, because the PCP-SL and the MRTA were po-
litical organizations. Nevertheless, even political upheavals in previous decades resulted in low levels of vio-
lence. In 1955, widespread political demonstrations in Arequipa led to the resignation of the feared Minister
of Government and Police, Esparza Zaartu, which marked the beginning of the end of the dictatorship
headed by Manuel A. Odra. Tose demonstrations produced two deaths. After that, the country suered
no additional widespread political persecution.
11
In 1956, after more than two decades in the catacombs,
the PAP was allowed to operate legally, and new parties, such as Popular Action (Accin Popular), the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Progressive Social Party (Partido Social Progresista) became more rmly established.
No blood was shed in the military coups of 1962, 1968 and 1975. In comparison to other Latin American
countries, the wave of guerrilla action inspired by the Cuban Revolution was muted in Peru. In comparison
to its counterparts in the Southern Cone, the military regime (1968-1980) was not particularly repressive,
despite its authoritarian style and the radical and controversial nature of its reforms.
From this standpoint, the Constitution approved in 1979 seemed to put a symbolic and legal end to the
great political exclusion that had blocked the construction of a national state. Te Constitution excluded no
political parties and nally enshrined full recognition for universal surage, granting all men and women
over the age of 18 the right to vote, even if they were illiterate. At the time, the latter category basically con-
sisted of Peruvian men and women who spoke only Quechua, Aymara or Amazonian indigenous languages.
After the deep demographic, economic, political and socio-cultural transformations of the previous de-
cades and the political earthquake of the military governments reforms, the country seemed to be on the
way to the consolidation of a modern, democratic national state. It is not surprising, then, that the start of
the armed conict was unexpected. Nor is it surprising that its extent and brutality continue to amaze us.
What was missing in the decades before the outbreak of violence was the will to kill, much less massively
or systematically, on the part of the state, peasants, other sectors of society or the main political parties.
Te PCP-SL leaders had to focus their energy on instilling this will in their party militants, and then
convincing the state and society that death was, so to speak, a way of life.
In the philosophical, political and even psychological foundations of subversive action, especially that
of the PCP-SL, there is a denite blind spot: the PCP-SL sees classes, not individuals. Tis leads to an
absolute lack of respect for the person and the right to life, including that of its own party members. In
order to maintain the partys cohesion, the leaders instilled in its members a taste for death that became
a symbol of identity and gave the Shining Path a terrorist and genocidal potential. Te terrorist potential
was unleashed with actions ranging from executions marked by cruelty, and a prohibition against bury-
ing the victims, to car bombs in the cities. Te genocidal potential, explicit when Guzmn announced
that the triumph of the revolution will cost a million lives or when he called on his followers to induce
genocide, was unleashed especially in indigenous areas, because the PCP-SL perpetuated old concepts of
superiority over indigenous peoples.
Meanwhile, beating the countryside and building the new power required a high cost in human lives,
because despite the power vacuums, the Peruvian countryside still had a far larger population of actors,
institutions and organizations and was more interconnected than that of China in the 1930s, which was
the PCP-SLs inspiration. For that reason, after the rst stage of acceptance, the PCP-SL increasingly had to
resort to imposing itself through terror. Its murders were exemplary punishments. Many of the testimonies
provided to the CVR reected not only pain, but also indignation at having seen family members die like
animals, often exacerbated by the prohibition against burying them. After the armed forces moved in to
combat subversion, the Shining Paths tactic of counter-reestablishments further increased the civilian
death toll. From Lima, Guzmn proposed establishing peoples committees near the places where military
11 The exception was the imprisonment of leftist leaders in the Sepa penal colony in the central jungle in 1962.
255
bases were being set up
12
to spark a reaction from the state. Tis policy also contributed to the high death toll.
Te other decisive factor in the cruelty of the internal armed conict was the states response. Te fact that
the PCP-SLs deadly provocation encountered a response shows that in the previous decades, which were
marked by the low intensity of deaths from social conicts and political confrontations, the country had
actually traveled a long and dicult path that the PCP-SL managed to block, at least temporarily. Begin-
ning in 1983, the deep cracks mentioned above began to show: not only the lack of a national community of
citizens, but the racism-tinged contempt for peasants that permeated state institutions, including the armed
forces. In the early years of their intervention, the armed forces sometimes behaved like an occupying army.
13
But the violence unleashed by the PCP-SL, whose militants blended into the general population, also
sowed fear. Te disdained others, who were often incomprehensible, began to be seen as dangerous,
with no distinction drawn between those who were members of the PCP-SL and those who were not. An
entire mythology began to (re)form around them that turned them into beings able to resist torture and
who were impassive in the face of death. Te old racist concepts of the stubborn, cruel and treacherous
Indian reappeared in force. Fear fanned the cruelty of the anti-subversive forces.
Added to this was the inuence of the national security doctrine exported to the region by the United
States, combined with the shallow roots of the human rights doctrines that had recently become legal
instruments, as human rights violations began to be sanctioned under international treaties that were be-
ing incorporated into national legislation.
If the previous phase was one of moderation on the part of all involved, the PCP-SLs sudden appearance
on the scene opened a Pandoras box that turned everything upside down. In the poorest rural areas, the
PCP-SL became involved inand often ended up escalating and militarizingold social conicts with-
in and between communities. In areas aected by drug tracking, the PCP-SL aggravated a situation
that was already violent in a society that was already on the periphery, a dynamic in which the forces of
order also became involved with the cruelty. Everywhere, the PCP-SL exacerbated physical punishment,
taking to extremes a tradition that ranged from abuse by landholders or police to punishment meted out
in peasant communities or low-income urban neighborhoods.
Rebellions against the PCP-SL were also brutal. Te violence latent in any community, especially poor
ones, welled up in a mixture that also included conicts between families, generations and land. Self-
defense committees often went beyond their specic mandate, turning into small, aggressive armies that
violently swept areas considered enemy territory or areas of support for the PCP-SL.
DEFEAT OF THE SUBVERSIVE GROUPS
When a very violent, motivated group takes up arms but the conditions for victory do not exist, one possibility
is that it will become a chronic insurgency. Tis may be the case, for example, in Colombia. Te same thing
has not occurred in Peru, despite the persistence of small armed groups in certain parts of the Amazon.
14
Why?
First, subversion began in a democratic context that, despite its limitations, reduced the opportunity for vio-
lence to take root. Even at the worst moments, the party system and elections acted as a shock absorber, pro-
viding an alternative way of channeling conicts and building representation. Te existence of a legal left fur-
ther reduced the subversive groups possibilities for recruiting members. Tis especially aected the MRTA.
While there were no elections in 1989 and 1990 in a small percentage of provinces, it is more important to
note the continuity of elected authorities in districts and provinces that were threatened by subversion. In
many cases, these authorities paid with their lives. While the subversives advance was one of the reasons
12 On the counter-reestablishments, see the chapter on the PCP-SL.
13 Rather, it was the peasants who somehow seem to have had a greater awareness of national community; when they tell their stories, they refer to
those who were killing them as foreigners, gringos or pishtacos. They could not conceive that their countrymen could kill them like animals.
14 This refers to the so-called remnants of the PCP-SL in the Ene and Apurmac valleys.
256
Chapter 6
for the breakdown of democracy, the April 1992 coup came when the PCP-SL was strategically defeated.
Te existence of an independent press, even in areas directly aected by the violence, was another factor that
helped stem the brutality of anti-subversive actions and create a climate of opposition to the subversive groups.
Tere were also oversight bodies that questioned the crimes and human rights violations committed by
both the state and the subversive groups: human rights organizations and signicant sectors of the Catho-
lic Church and evangelical churches. Tey challenged the legitimacy that the subversive groups were try-
ing to gain nationally and internationally by presenting themselves abroad as a romantic guerrilla force,
and the anti-subversive strategies as a dirty war.
With few exceptions, the subversives also failed to win over grassroots and neighborhood groups, and organi-
zations of workers, peasants and teachers. Instead, the PCP-SL became a social anti-movement (Wieviorka
1991) that demobilized, destroyed and/or preyed on the organizations that fell near its sphere of inuence.
Te sector whose rejection most contributed to the defeat of the subversive groups was the rural peasantry.
Tis sector was to have been the main force of the revolution, faithful allies, the second voice, the chorus
that would accompany the party and its leaders, who were focused on striking the resounding note that
would transform the world. In many places, however, the PCP-SL ended up causing the chorus to revolt.
Tis happened because after the destruction of the old orderthe elimination of authorities and de-
struction of the productive infrastructurethe PCP-SL could only oer them:
A subsistence-based economic plan that was archaic even for the poorest peasants.
Te establishment of an egalitarian utopia that quickly showed its authoritarian side, especially in the
application of a justice that resorted easily to the death penalty and a totalitarian organization that
regulated every facet of daily life, going beyond necessary order to an excess of vertical organization,
and which reached extremes when the party forbade people to even be sad.
Te murders committed by the PCP-SL not only ran up against the will to live that exists in any human
community, they were also counterproductive in poor economies where communities did not have the
luxury of dispensing with the lives of their members, most of whom were young men with families and
small children. For that reason, according to testimony gathered by the CVR in dierent parts of the coun-
try, those aected asked the party to punish, but not to kill. If the Shining Path was going to kill fathers,
women said, it would be better to kill the entire family, because whos going to support the children?
Te totalitarian approach implied intolerance toward the local culturenot only of the celebration of fes-
tivals or the election of authorities, but also of such basic elements as burying the dead or the use of forms
of address that denoted family relationships. Tese were replaced by the term comrade (compaero).
Above all, however, with peasants increasingly involved in a market economy, the PCP-SLs approach
conicted with the dynamics of rural society. To the PCP-SLs surprise, the prolonged war came up
against the peasant familys reproductive mindset, which organized activities around the cycle of family
life and planned for the childrens growth and education. In that context, when the PCP-SL gathered
speed to reach a strategic equilibrium, it broke the fragile balance that it still maintained in many rural
areas. Te Shining Path began to require more food supplies for the party and more young recruits. Tis
increased ill will among peasants, which, combined with the armed forces change in strategy, led to
widespread establishment of the self-defense committees that handed the PCP-SL its rst strategic defeat
in the place where the group least expected it.
In addition, as the conict progressed, the PCP-SLs strategy revealed its erroneous assessment of the role
of local authorities. For the Shining Path, these people were outside the communities, part of an old
state that was not a part of the peasantry. To the peasants, however, community authorities, justices of
the peace, mayors and often people with university degrees were viewed as resources for a necessary inter-
connection with a state that really did exist.
257
Based on their own experiences and historical peculiarities, the armed forces learned to better judge the
enemy. From the start, there were ocers who sought to gain the peoples trust. Tey were the heralds of
a change in strategy that, as has been mentioned, gave greater weight to intelligence work, made repres-
sion more selective, and sought to win over the rural population and establish alliances with self-defense
groups, or pressured rural residents to organize self-defense committees where there was resistance. In
many rural areas, the armed forces were the ones who ended up operating like a sh in the water.
Te absence of large rural landholders also helped keep paramilitary groups from forming in rural areas
like those that existed in Guatemala and El Salvador, or still exist in Colombia.
15
Te international climate also became more adverse for the subversive groups. Te end of the Cold War
directly aected the MRTA, especially because it contributed to peace negotiations and peace accords in
various Latin American countries, incorporating into political life guerrilla movements that had been the
MRTAs inspiration and sometimes its training ground. For the PCP-SL, Chinas post-Mao turn toward
capitalism made the followers of the Cultural Revolution an eccentricity. Te PCP-SL was linked to a Revo-
lutionary Internationalist Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Internacionalista, MRI) which was made
up of 18 small groups with little inuence in their respective countries. In Tird World solidarity groups, the
PCP-SL was increasingly isolated and even repudiated. By the end of the 1980s, its ambassadors of terror
found no one to whom they could present their credentials. While the PCP-SL was always radically autarkic,
this isolation was still signicant for a party that considered itself the beacon of the worldwide revolution.
Te most important factor in the PCP-SLs defeat was the groups inability to learn. Absorbed by strength-
ening the party and the peoples guerrilla army, the PCP-SL ended up constructing a very powerful exo-
skeleton to avoid the consequences of centrifugal force and hold its small body together. Tis, however,
blinded it to reality. While the state and the armed forces corrected the most indiscriminate and coun-
terproductive aspects of their strategy, in dierent parts of the country and at dierent times throughout
the 1980s we see a repetition of the PCP-SLs cycle of conquering bases, counter-reestablishment and
rejection by the population. Te dierence between the armed forces that learned and a subversive group
that repeated its errors explains why the overall death toll, especially the deaths of Quechua speakers and
rural residents, attributed to state agents decreased notably, while the PCP-SLs aggression against those in
whose name it was supposedly acting continued or even increased. Abimael Guzmns decision to reach
a strategic equilibrium showed itself to be a sort of ight forward. In practical terms, it meant:
A spillover of terror into the cities, through armed strikes and car bombs
Te massacre of rural populations, especially the Ashninka
Te overexposure of the PCP-SLs apparatus and the fall of its national leadership in 1992
Finally, the CVR would like to highlight another factor, beyond general public rejection of the subversive
groups: the stubborn willingness of Peruvians in general to keep going, especially those who lived and
survived in the areas hardest hit by the violence, where authorities, schools, churches, workers and daily
life in general continued. All Peruvians should pay homage to this willingness to wake up each morning,
take a deep breath and go on with life in the midst of such terror.
15 To a certain extent, the drug-trafcking areas were an exception.
258
Chapter 6
Te Consequences of the Conict
C H A P T E R 7
Te two decades of violence summarized in this text have caused great, lasting harm to tens of thousands
of people and their communities. Te actions of subversive organizations and state security forces caused
serious physical harm to many Peruvians while weakening and even destroying signicant resources and
forms of organization that were necessary for communal life.
Te CVR has found three main types of individual and collective consequences in the aftermath of the
violence. Tere was psychological harm that aected peoples identity and family and communal life.
Tere were socio-political consequences, reected in the weakening of communities, and on a national
scale, the breakdown of the democratic order that nally gave way to the return of authoritarianism in
Peru. Finally, there were economic consequences, reected in the great loss of infrastructure and op-
portunities throughout the country, as well as in the destruction of productive capacity and resources,
especially in rural communities in areas where the internal armed conict was most intense.
PSYCHO-SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
Tis report has described the behavior of the various armed groups that left tens of thousands of people
killed or physically injured. Te eects of the violence do not end there, however. Rather, they persist in
the survivors and witnesses of these events in the form of deep suering. In its investigation, the CVR
heard many accounts of traumatic experiences aggravated by decades of forced silence that kept victims
from dealing appropriately with the pain they had lived through.
Te psychological harmto individuals and societycaused by the violence has many manifestations.
Te most widespread and obvious is the dense climate of fear and distrust created by the abusive and
criminal behavior of the armed groups toward a defenseless population. Tat fear remains an obstacle to
recovery in the aected communities. Tere was also a severe process of family breakdown and abdication
of the familys role in providing education and protection. Tis loss has been especially pernicious for
those who were children when the violence struck their families and communities. Tey were not the only
ones aected, however; those who were adults at the time still carry the psychological scars of the violence
committed against them and their close relatives, whom they saw die under terrible circumstances. Tey
were powerless to prevent these deaths or to honor the dead according to their religious beliefs.
Besides fear and the breakdown of the family, another crucial element is the harm to personal identity as a
result of the abuse and humiliation of which thousands of Peruvians were victims. We are not the same,
some of these people told the CVR when describing their lives after the tragedies they had suered. Tat
laconic, resounding phrase speaks eloquently of the potential of violence to destroy the most intimate
aspects of human existence, such as the sense of self and the ability to live a life of self-determination with
the possibility for self-fulllment.
Fear and distrust
For the PCP-SL, as well as the state security forces, instilling fear in the population was a deliberate tactic.
Tat tactic was successful, as its repercussions can still be seen today among the direct and indirect victims
of the violence.
Te PCP-SLs most powerful weapon of fear was its use of public assassinations to teach a lesson. People
remember it with terror:
Tey had cut his throat here. Everything inside, theyd cut it with a knife. Tey had tied
his hands behind him with a cord, theyd tied his feet with a cord, and they killed him like
that. Tey covered him with his poncho and they left him, and all the blood ran out. If you
saw that, wouldnt you die? I used to tremble with fear.
1
1 CVR. BDI-SM-P295. Testimony 2002799, Ayacucho, November 18, 2002. Female witness in Tiquihua, May 1983.
Chapter 7
26 2
Te armed forces, meanwhile, used threats and forced disappearances:
Te persecution and repression by the Army was terrible at that time. It was enough for a
person to have seen a subversive go by, or if some repentant terrorist supposedly went to their
house, to have given them a plate of food or a glass of water. If a peasant had provided that, it
was enough of a motive for the security forces to go after him and torture him. Many people
were disappeared, so out of fear, instead of risking torture or disappearance, people preferred
to go voluntarily to make a statement.
2
Te fear instilled in this manner created a deep sense of vulnerability. In the areas aected by the violence,
anyone could be a victim, or at least that is what the behavior of the armed parties made people believe.
Tat fear, prolonged over time, turned into anxiety and a sense of an indenite but imminent risk that
disrupted daily life.
Te persistence of fear, even when the worst phase of the violence was over, is common among people who
lost family members or who were victims of torture or unjust detention. Te latter still fear that a possible re-
surgence of the violence will make them the rst targets of arrest or other intervention by state security forces.
Te fear that the violence will return is also common among certain groups, especially the Ashninka
communities in the Ene River Valley. Cruelly subjugated by the PCP-SL from the end of the 1980s until
the beginning of the 1990s, members of Ashninka communities still feel abandoned by the state and
fear the return of the subversives: I dont think its really peaceful; the enemies are nearby. As I told you,
we hear about people turning up dead in nearby districts, although that hasnt happened here yet. Tats
why I say it isnt really peaceful. It was at rst, but its going to come back.
3
While generalized fear is an eect of the violence, it also causes other harms. One of the most visible is
distrust among neighbors and even among family members, a feeling that often stems from prior experi-
ence of having being accusedjustiably or arbitrarilyby people who were considered close and loyal.
Tis distrust is also an obstacle to the possibility of rebuilding and reconstituting community life. At a
more general level, distrust also aects the relationship between the population and state institutions that
seldom appeared eager to protect the citizens who were aected.
Loss of family protection
Besides fear, the violence did serious harm to the personal identity of individuals who were suddenly de-
prived of the structures that provided safety and stability, such as the family and the community, as well
as cultural points of reference and local community organizations.
First was the breakdown of the family, which because of the loss of an adulta father or motherbecame
poorer and partially or totally unable to fulll its role of educating and protecting its minor children. It
must be noted that the rst blow suered by children and spouses was having witnessed the cruel murder of
their loved ones. Added to the pain of the loss was a feeling of powerlessness that sometimes became a sense
of guilt. It was especially devastating for minors to watch the death of a father, seeing the person who had
represented authority and protection being subjugated, abused and humiliated by subversives or soldiers.
For children, being suddenly orphaned constituted a profound moral harm. Small children were deprived
of the persons who had represented authority and order and who had provided protection and guidance.
Some witnesses told the CVR of the loss represented by the death of a father who, if alive, would have
provided not only food, clothing and school supplies, but also advice, guidance, aection, stimulation
and encouragement. Tus the emotional development of victims children was changed by the absence of
the role models necessary for them to develop and arm their identity.
2 CVR. BDI-I-P281. In-depth interview. Aucayacu, Hunuco, May 2001. Male, authority in 1993-1994, on the Repentance Law.
3 CVR. BDI-I. In-depth studies. Interview with an Ashninka leader.
The Consequences of the Confict
26 3
In most cases, older brothers or sisters had to take on the parental role: working the elds, tending the
animals, caring for younger siblings or working to support them. Tat responsibility, often premature, led
to overadapted children or adolescents who were forced to grow up too quickly.
Besides orphans, there was the drama of widowhood. Being a widow meant losing rights and status in
the community. With the pain still fresh, widows had to ght alone for their familys survival and their
childrens future. Tey were forced to take on new tasks for which they were not, or felt they were not,
prepared, even as they sometimes faced rejection in their communities.
I suer. I cant do it alone. How could I? Im a single mother and I have nothing. I cant do
what a man does, and I cry day and night. I suer. I suer from everything. I cant nd a
laborer. [...] I have to do the work myself, turning into a man, turning into a woman. Tats
what I do, and somehow I get through life. People hate me. Tey talk about me. Tat hurts.
I suer from all those things, and Im not doing well. [...] Our neighbors hate me. Tey say
all kinds of things. [...] Tey think I am after their husbands. Tey hate me.
4
A childs death was painful and upsetting for both parents and siblings. For parents, it meant the end of
hope and the beginning of a new fear, that of an unprotected old age. For siblings, it meant the loss of a
companion and protector who would remain idealized in their memory and their fantasies of what that
person would have been like if he or she had not died.
Te violence caused many families to scatter as they ed hurriedly to survive. Adaptation was always dif-
cult in the places where they settled, as ill treatment and instability were aggravated by their longing for
the world they had lost.
For adolescents, the physical distance from their homes became an emotional distance from their parents.
Just when family unity was most necessary for protecting their children, mothers had to dedicate most of
their eorts to supporting their families. Te accounts gathered by the CVR are lled with laments about
not having been able to give or receive parental protection. Children who lost one parent anxiously de-
manded the presence of the one who had survived, who was, precisely for that reason, unable to dedicate
full time to being with his or her children.
For families that were not scattered, life became dicult because of the irritability and depression that
aected some of their members. Adults often responded to traumatic events with silence. Questions from
their young children were disturbing reminders of the unfortunate events that they had had to face.
Loss of communal points of reference
For the emotional welfare of residents, the breakdown of community life in rural areas that were aected
by the violence was as damaging as the breakdown of the family.
Te harassment and massacring of entire communities, as well as the acts of violence committed by the
communities themselves, weakened communal bonds, made community organization fragile, altered the
conditions under which people lived together and undermined communal values and practices. In some
cases, the communities chose to be watchful; in others, perhaps the majority, the only available option
was displacement. In either case, daily life was disrupted and the community lost its strength as a struc-
ture that brought order to individual and family life.
Opportunities for shared experience, such as assemblies, began to be seen as dangerous because aggressors
used those occasions to attack. As a result, many community members stopped participating in commu-
nal activities and sought ways of surviving on their own.
Tat time, because we were afraid, we had to go into the hills and sleep there. We slept
4 CVR. BDI-SM-P11. Testimony 203238.
Chapter 7
26 4
where we shouldnt have slept, and my children cried like the rain. [...] If there had been au-
thorities but with all that fear, where were they? Tey also left out of fear. [...] Tere were
many of us that day. [...] Tose who were there, I dont know where they went. To Lima,
to Ica. Tey scattered, like when mother quail take ight and scatter. We scattered like
quail, here and there. We suered so much.
5
Te violence also changed streets and other public places, which were no longer community gathering
places, but became the sites of dreadful discoveries. Abandoned corpses or mutilated bodies could appear
at any time, accentuating fear of reprisals if anyone sought justice. So many people turned up dead in
the morning in the plaza. My neighbors and I said, No, if you try to take it to court [...] they might kill
you out of vengeance. So I dropped it, out of fear.
6
Many community members mentioned how upset and desolate they felt on seeing their crops burned,
their homes destroyed or their animals stolen or slaughtered without their consent:
Tey burned my entire house, they ate all my animals and they did me enormous harm. I
had 140 boards. [...] I was bringing wood to build my house. I raised coee, bananas and
cacao. Ive been a member of the cooperative [...] for years, and I had a drying oor for cacao
and coee and harvested a lot of corn. [...] I used to get loans from the bank. [] Ive worked
for years; Ive been a farmer for a long time. [...] Id worked with the bank since 1955. [...]
Te Army burned everything I had. Now I dont have a leaf or a roof tile. [] Im an old
man now and I have no way to build my house.
7
Other things, in this case symbolic, aected by the climate of fear were community rituals and festivals,
occasions that aggressors often chose for attacks. Te fear of suering new attacks, which were sometimes
tinged with sacrilege, led people in some parts of the country to give up those customs. In other cases,
the PCP-SL prohibited them.
Over the years, there has been a cultural loss in certain areas that were ravaged by armed groups. In some
places, according to testimony provided to the CVR, young people no longer want to participate in fes-
tivals and have lost interest in their communities traditions.
It is striking to note that aggression against communities was intense from both the subversive organiza-
tions and state security forces. Finding themselves in the crossre with no possibility of turning to any
of the armed parties for protection aggravated peoples daily anxiety. Te PCP-SL came and accused
people of being snitches. Tey murdered people in cold blood. Ten they left and the self-defense patrol
or the soldiers came and the same thing happened.
8
To save their own lives, people were regularly forced to help the PCP-SL and the security forces by providing
them with food or shelter. Tis forced collaboration was often punished with death by the opposing party.
None of the people in that area lived in peace again, because just as the soldiers had
been killed, they started killing local residents, saying, Why didnt you tell us the
subversives were coming? Later, they would go to dierent places and demand things.
Tey practically forced people, and people had no choice but to give them what they
asked for. A little while later, the subversives would come and do the same thing. Tey
would kill people because theyd helped the security forces, and it became a vicious
cycle. Tey went in, they killed, and people suered unspeakable things even though
they werent guilty.
9
5 CVR. Testimony 201066. Ayacucho.
7 CVR BDI-SM-P101. Testimony 430194.
9 CVR Testimony 100490.
26 5
When the worst years of violence in the rural Andes ended, eorts to re-establish community life encoun-
tered a major obstacle: the rancor that remained among neighbors who, for various reasons, had faced o
as victims and perpetrators during those years. Feelings of sadness and resentment color the lives of those
who lost family members or property and those who were accomplices to or perpetrators of those violations.
Some have re-entered community life without paying for what they did, and some over the years have risen
to positions of authority from which they deny their past actions and avoid taking responsibility.
Besides conicts among members of communities, in many cases an entire community has suered from
being stigmatized. Te clearest and most common case is that of the department of Ayacucho, a name
that in the 1980s and 1990s was automatically associated with terrorism and violence. Many people from
Ayacucho have suered because of this abusive association, which made life even more dicult for dis-
placed people in their new homes.
Te same thing occurred in many places that gained national notoriety because of news reports of some
episode of violence. One especially signicant case was that of the community of Uchuraccay, which became
known solely for the deaths of eight journalists there in 1983, with no mention of the dozens of community
members who died in the following years and no recognition of the local peoples eorts at reconstruction.
Personal scars of sufering
Te breakdown of the family and deterioration of communal life severely aected the social environment
in which people sought self-fulllment. Tis damage, however, merely complemented other deeper, more
intimate types of harm that resulted from the personal experience of suering and the way it permeated
the identities of the victims and those close to them. Te perpetrators unprecedented cruelty, whether
they were members of subversive organizations or agents of state security forces, reached the extreme of
forbidding survivors to honor their dead and attempting to strip the victims of their human condition.
Tat brutality has given the violations a perverse persistence: murders, rapes, beatings and insults are still
present in the memory and the identity of thousands of Peruvian citizens.
Changes in ways of grieving
Te lack of pity and basic respect for the dead was one of the characteristics of the conduct of the perpe-
trators that left the deepest mark on the aected population. Besides the loss of a father, mother, child
or sibling, the survivor underwent changes in the forms of grievingthe rituals and customs by which
people process their losses and prepare to get on with their lives. Grief is a very intense emotional process
that implies a certain temporary lack of balance and through which people respond to pain with their
mental and emotional resources. If these resources are overwhelmed, the person remains trapped by the
loss, unable to respond appropriately: he or she remains a prisoner of pain.
Many of the people who lost family members during the internal armed conict are still grieving. Tis is
not a pathological grief, but a result of the particular circumstances under which the loss occurred. It
is, therefore, a special grief.
One factor in these changes in the ways of grieving is the uncertainty about whether the person is dead.
In the 1980s and 1990s in Peru, the detention and subsequent disappearance of people was a strategy
frequently used by agents of the state. In every case in which the detainees whereabouts is still unknown,
the persons relatives have no access to evidence about his or her current condition. Grieving, therefore,
becomes charged with uncertainty, combining the need to know whether the loved one is dead or alive,
with an unending search and the anguished hope for news of the persons whereabouts.
[Weeping] I would like to ask you, please, to tell us the truth. If hes dead or alive. I want to
know because my children are also suering. Sometimes when they see a heavy-set person
Chapter 7
26 6
go past, they say, I think thats my dad coming. Tey look at someone and say that.
10
Te uncertainty opens the door for imagining, fantasizing and denying reality. Te survivor still imagines
that the victim may somehow have escaped death. Te CVR has found many versions of this process.
Although 15 or 20 years have passed and all indications are that the person was executed, family members
still harbor a glimmer of hope: maybe he was able to escape..., perhaps he lost his mind and is wan-
dering in some distant town..., someone said they saw someone who looked like my dad in a prison.
Te ocial discourse, which denied reality and opposed the truth, turned the disappeared person into a
ghost. Tus a signicant part of the lives of the victims family members remains in suspense.
Not knowing, however, is not the only obstacle to bidding an appropriate farewell to a lost relative. Another is
knowing too much, having witnessed the brutality of the death inicted on a father, mother, child or sibling.
Many people took on the painful task of searching for their loved ones remains, sometimes for several
days or weeks. Te bodies were often found in a state of decay, hacked to pieces or burned. Sometimes
they had to be rescued from animals that threatened to devour them. Dumped in streets, on riverbanks
or outside towns, the corpses revealed the ferocity and abuse suered. Tey killed him there where the
landslide was and a dog was eating him. It had already eaten part of his face.
11
15 or 20 years later, witnesses described to the CVR the details of scenes that they will never be able to
erase from their memories. He was tied up. When I found him tied up like that, I nearly went crazy.
Tats always before my eyes, and at night its all I can see.
12
Sometimes the unrecognizable bodies were
identied by clothing or other belongings found with them:
When I found my husband, I had to take him and bury him. He was already being eaten by
dogs. He had no blood, not even a tongue. [...] No tongue, no nose, no eyes. His hair and
clothes were rotting, his esh was all white. Tere was no skin. His hair was o to one side,
all rotten, and I had to gather it up to bury it.
13
Tose who recovered their loved ones bodies from a place where corpses were dumped often found their
pain exacerbated by a sharp sense of humiliation: their fathers had been treated like animals. Tey killed
my father there. Tey cut his head with a knife as if he were a sheep. Tey cut him up in pieces and burned
him. My fathers body was nothing but ash.
14
Te condition in which bodies were foundtortured, hacked to pieces, nakedraises painful images of
the indignities and abuses the victims suered.
Sometimes the rst thing that comes to your mind is your parentswhat happened to
them, how they died, who did it. Its very traumatic. Too much. I remember years later
reading the autopsy report, the criminal way they killed him. Sometimes I say: If theyd
killed him, if theyd killed him with one well-aimed blow and he hadnt suered. But
unfortunately, they killed him as if they were tilling the soil, because they hit him over the
head, they brutally cut his jugular, and when a person bleeds to death, I think they suer a
lot. My father lived for several hours because they didnt kill him outright.
15
In many cases, the brutalities suered in life were prolonged after death, increasing the suering of
survivors, whom the perpetrators forbade, under threat of drastic punishment, to honor their murdered
relatives with a funeral.
10 CVR. Testimony 435036. Woman, wife of a disappeared man who was detained by soldiers in Aucayacu, in the department of Hunuco, on April 8, 1990.
26 7
It must be remembered that burial ceremonies are crucial to the grieving process. Tey allow for a timely
expression of pain and help people to accept their loss. Tey are also a time when survivors feel the solidar-
ity of other community members. All societies have meaningful funeral ceremonies that must be carried
out according to certain procedures and time frames. People scrupulously follow tradition in honoring
the dead, thus ensuring that the deceased rests in peace, which is also a source of relief to the survivors.
In many places during the years of violence, burying the dead was prohibited as part of the terror strategy.
Te lifeless bodies had to be left in plain view. Tat posthumous dishonor was a lessonof submission
and silencefor the community. Tis is how informers die. Everyone who died along the road died
with a sign. Tey said no one should pick them up. And they all remained along the road, dead.
16

Sometimes survivors deed the threats and carried out hasty, desperate burials without indispensable rituals
such as washing the body, changing the clothes or holding a wake. Tese were uneasy, inadequate burials,
bad burialsincomplete processes that have left a legacy of sadness and uneasiness that still remains.
We didnt see their bodies, we couldnt bury them. To this day, whenever we remember
them, we cry. My mom remembers her children and it makes her sad. I should at least have
buried them so my heart would rest easy, my mother says, and then she bursts into tears.
17
Tis incomplete grieving had other consequences. Te survivors felt themselves forbidden to show out-
ward signs of grief, such as wearing mourning clothes, and that kept them from receiving signs of com-
munity compassion and solidarity. It was impossible to experience loss and sorrow collectively. Intimi-
dated, the community demanded rapid, discreet burials. Te survivors were left alone with their grief.
As explained above, in many cases changes in the grieving processes left survivors imprisoned by their
loss. Although a deceased family member is never forgotten, the person is given a special place in memory
that enables the survivors to get on with their lives. To do this, it is vital to have duly honored the loved
one who has died, secure in the knowledge that the person has been treated with respect.
In some cases, these processes are still pending. Te lives of the survivors are strongly marked by the
missing family members presence. Te scenes of violence that caused the death are more alive than ever
in relatives thoughts, memories and dreams.
Just like my younger sister, I still dream that theyre killing him. He says to me, Please help
me, help me. I dream of my father, and I suer a lot because of that.
18
One particularly disturbing element is the sense of guilt. Many family members feel partly responsible for
the events or reproach themselves for their powerlessness at having been unable to prevent a loved ones
death or disappearance.
If only my son hadnt come. ... Because we were living in Vinchos, my son was studying over
there. [...] He was studying there and my husband told him, You have to come help me
plow the eld on Saturdays and Sundays.
19
Giving the lost family member a place in memory so that survivors can get on with their lives is especially
dicult in the case of victims who were disappeared. Deprived of the certainty of death, relatives still hope
that the person will return. Whenever my dog barks, I think that my daughter is going to knock at the
door. Tats what I always think.
20
I feel sad because he is gone. I cry and think, Maybe hell come back,
maybe hell come back. Maybe one of these nights hell come back. I think that. But he never comes.
21
Chapter 7
26 8
Often added to the hope of a possible return is a search that has lasted several years. Very few found answers
in their searchesmost only encountered silence, lies and mistreatment. In some cases, the hope was nur-
tured by stories about disappeared people being held in some prison or on an island in the middle of a river.
Te most frequent demand of relatives of the disappeared is reliable information about their loved ones
fate or whereabouts. Only with that information can they get on with their lives.
I want them to give me an answer. Maybe hes alive, or maybe they really did kill him or dis-
appear him; I want to know the truth so I can be at peace, so I no longer hope for his return.
Tats what I want. [...] I want to tell my children, Your father has died. Hes no longer with
us. Tat way I can tell my children, so they wont keep thinking about him. Hell come
back, hell come back, hes alive, my children say. So thats what I want.
22
Along with this demand, naturally, comes the desire to hold funeral rites in honor of the loved one whose death
is conrmed. Wed be content to at least know that we had buried him and we would remember him.
23
Tats why weve come to the Truth Commission. Perhaps I can at least get my sons bones
back. I want to see him buried, and Ill forget about my son forever. If I see him buried,
Ill forget forever.
24
Te tragedy of the disappeared, and the demand for the truth about their fate, is tied to another terrible
legacy of the violence: the thousands of clandestine burial placesmass graves, in the terminology used
in past decadeswhere survivors believe they can nd their loved ones remains.
One of the CVRs tasks was to gather reliable information about these burial sites. Te CVR and the
Public Ministry jointly exhumed human remains from some such sites. Tese few cases provide an idea
of the extreme importance of these investigations to family members and their great value for justice and
as a humanitarian act.
Te ease with which this task was carried out at the rst exhumation site, Chuschi, ending with the iden-
tication and subsequent burial of the bodies that were found, raised the expectations of relatives, who
expected the rest to be exhumed. In one case, family members who had carried out the hasty burial hoped
to have the opportunity to perform the necessary rituals. At the second site, however, the work became
particularly dicult because the graves had been disturbed by animals and the elements.
Te most notable reaction from family members was their anxious expectation, charged with pain. What
would be found? What would their relatives body look like? Would they be able to recognize it? We
recognize people from our memories of their physical appearance. But when we nd remains, bone frag-
ments, body parts mixed with scraps of cloth decayed by time, how can they be recognized? Who is left
to be recognized among those remains?
Tose who were able to recognize a murdered family member and those who were sure that their relatives
had been found were relieved, but that was not the case for those who did not nd out or who could not
recognize or who resisted recognizing their loved ones. For some, opening a grave was an opportunity to
re-encounter the deceased relative. One grieving woman felt the eetingness of this encounter, saying:
You went away for such a long time, only to come back now and leave again so quickly.
Harm to the name and the body
Names are a sign of our identity; they identify us and single us out. Names enable us to recognize and be
recognized by others. Te violence of the conict and the conditions it imposed forced many people to
26 9
change or deny their names, or those of their relatives, in order to save themselves and their loved ones. By
doing so, they also concealed their family ties, places of origin, roles and lived experience, all of which are
important aspects of personal identity. For many people, it was dangerous to identify themselves, to make
themselves known, especially because of the risk of being associated with or confused with a suspect.
Some people were confused with others because of their names and were punished or unjustly detained.
As has been indicated, the name of a community, a town or a family could lead to stigmatization. In the
long run, concealing or denying ones name or other aspects of the self led people to question their own
identity and self-esteem, besides causing other people to fail to acknowledge or value them.
Tose who today suer the physical eects of violent acts bear on their bodies the visible signs of the
horror: faces disgured by gunshots, the shock waves of a bomb or sophisticated methods of torture;
limbs mutilated or paralyzed resulting in disability, among other things. Tese marks change peoples
concepts of their own bodies, leading them to doubt or lower their self-esteem, especially as the harm
usually aects their ability to live independently and work. When a body is damaged in this way, feel-
ings of vulnerability and loss aect the persons entire identity. Te people who oered their testimony
indignantly described how humiliated they felt when they were forced to strip or were violently stripped
of their clothes. Tey felt ashamed, defenseless, exposed to ridicule or sexual intrusion. Forced nudity is
the prelude to being stripped of ones defenses, of protection. Imagine someone hauling you out in the
middle of the night, naked. [...] And the police laughed to see us like that, to see us naked. Tey laughed.
It was humiliating.
25
I dont even know how to describe the feeling. All I can say is that they handed me
my clothes and I wanted to go somewhere to change, and they told me I couldnt move, that I had to do
it right there. I felt completely humiliated.
26
Sexual violence
Sexual violence, especially rape, is a trauma in itself, because it exceeds the victims capacity for re-
sponse. During the years of violence, rape was used as a means of subjugating or dominating people.
Women were the main victims of this type of abuse, but not the only ones. Male detainees were also
subjected to violence and rape. Rape leaves victims with painful scars on their self-image and dam-
ages their self-esteem. It aects peoples sexuality as well as their ability to relate to others and to the
world, which they then see as a threat. Many psychological phenomena come into play in the defense
of the emotional integrity of a person who is raped. Some aect the cohesion of the sense of self,
fragmenting the persons psychological unity. People frequently experience a sense of no longer feeling
the body or seeing it from a distance, becoming disconnected or thinking this isnt happening to
me or this is just a bad dream. After suering a rape, the capacity for emotional sharing is usually
changed, and there is great fear and distrust of new bonds. Te association between sexuality and tor-
ture that rape produces is dicult to overcome; the persons sex life and ability to enter into an intimate
relationship are seriously harmed.
Te CVR has gathered the testimony of countless victims of rape; we are convinced, however, that the
number of victims is far greater than we know. Because of the humiliation and shame that accompany
these wounds, because of the enormous defensive need to deny and refuse to acknowledge the deed, vic-
tims remain silent or refer to it as sexual violence, without admitting that they suered rape.
Over the years, fear, intense rage and deep humiliation turned into indignation, pain and a demand for
justice. For some victims, however, these events remain in the shadow of an experience that they simply
wish to forget. When they recounted events, victims showed the deep pain and shame they felt; many had
been unable to speak of it before, to share their humiliation or report the crime. In more than one case,
on recounting their experience, their body language revealed the trauma through trembling, sweating,
profuse tears and extreme tension.
25 CVR. BDI-P23. Testimony 100444.
26 CVR. BDI-SM-P20. Testimony 100188. Lima, 20-year-old woman detained by the police.
Chapter 7
270
Torture
Torture and physical and psychological abuses constitute another way of doing harm to a persons body
and identity. Te goal is to diminish the person by weakening the body as much as possible. Tis is the
most brutal face of the violence. All torture and physical abuse is also psychological, because it is always
a humiliating experience and an attack on the persons dignity. It is also a power relationship in which
the person committing the abuse exercises power over another in a destructive way. Te intentionality of
torture is associated with the loss of a sense of self.
Most torture victims were detained in prisons, military bases or police facilities, although in some cases
the abuse began at the time of detention, with public acts witnessed by the detainees children.
Tey didnt say, Good evening, sir. At that moment, they began to beat me in front of my
children and my wife, with no explanation. I even said, But why? I said, But why, please?
Tere was no district attorney there; only the police had come. Tey searched the house.
27
An analysis of the testimony of people who were tortured reveals the intense feelings of a lack of protec-
tion, vulnerability and humiliation they experienced when subjected to brutal mistreatment. Te results
indicate that the experience of torture is frequently accompanied by feelings of intense fear, hopelessness
and resignation, a sense of humiliation, guilt and a death wish, the loss of motor functions and alterations
in sensory perception, as well as what the victims refer to as trauma and general psychological prob-
lems. Also associated with torture are the strategies and methods for controlling thoughts and feelings
that the victims used to gather the strength to resist the beatings.
Ten he brought a basin full of water and stuck my head in it like this. He held me under-
water for a long time, so I couldnt even talk. Yes, Ill tell; yes, Ill tell, I said. OK! Sit
down and talk! he said. He wanted to write down what I was going to say. I told him I had
come alone. Tat went on for a long time, over and over [...] Have you thought about it?
He came in from time to time, saying that. Sometimes he hit me. [...] I got nervous when
he came in. I was afraid he was going to hit me. [...] He left me lying there, handcued [...]
until dawn. My arms hurt. I had slept because I was tired. I was thinking, What am I going
to do now, why are they doing this to me? I thought about everything. I even remembered
my mother. Everything goes through your mind.
28
Te PCP-SL also used physical and emotional abuse to punish and instill fear. Tey threatened to kill
me. Tey hit me and kicked me like an animal. Afterwards they told me never to speak out against the
party again.
29
Tey shot my friend. Tey doused him with gasoline and set him on re. Another person
turned up with no eyes, no tongue, no ngernails.
30
To the person who is tortured, the torturer appears to have unlimited power and abilities. He claims to
know more about the victim than the victim does and accepts no criticism. He demands only submission.
He has the victims life in his hands. Tis aront to the persons dignity makes the beating or physical
abuse even more destructive to personal identity. Te people describing their experiences spoke of having
been treated worse than animals. Te fact that they were human beings was completely ignored and
they were treated with the utmost contempt.
Tey made me listen to a radio that had a cassette, and I couldnt tell what it was about.
Tey beat me over the head, on the ears. Tey hit me on my vital parts, my back, my spine.
Tey beat me and said, Weve got to make this good-for-nothing completely useless. Tey
said, Hes a damned terrorist, We should kill him and make him disappear from the
28 CVR BDI-P124. Testimony 200175.
30 CVR. Testimony 10317, Lima, police ofcer.
271
face of the earth. I passed out twice from the beating and later you know, under those
circumstances, when theyre beating you, they insult you and say anything.
31
Stripped of humanity
Te perpetrators tried to strip their victims of their humanity. Many people said they were treated like
animals or worse than animals. In extreme cases of alienating humiliation, the people who are mis-
treated even say that they doubted their own humanity. All of this reveals the ways in which these acts of
violence destroyed the victims dignity.
Because I didnt know anything and I was innocent, I couldnt answer the questions they
asked me, so all I could do was scream and cry. I felt like I was dying, and I remember, as
though it were yesterday, that once I asked them outright to kill me, to stop torturing me.
Finally I passed out. Tey took me back to the same base. Te next day I was still alive, be-
cause I didnt really want to die. I had my two children who were very small, and I realized
that I had to keep living. I remember feeling a little hot water, I dont know if it was a water
heater or hot water that they had boiled. I remember that when I came to, they said, Tis
dog hasnt died, because they had wanted to bury me. [...] Dump him [...] with the pickup
truck, because this dog is already dead. Dump him [...].
32
Believe me, brother, from the time we entered the [...] prison, they treated us like garbage.
33
Fleeing in fear and taking refuge in hills and caves meant regressing to a state of extreme poverty and
rootlessness, because only people who have no community live in caves. Terefore this experience, al-
though only temporary, injured peoples dignity and made them feel like animals.
In those years, I had another child, another little boy, in 1991, and we escaped to the hills.
We lived in the hills like dogs. Day and night we kept running away because they said the
Sinchis had settled in the area [...] cutting and cutting they are going to kill us, ruin us, [so]
we escaped quickly, I grabbed my little girl and she let go of the little boy [...] my little boys
head broke, smashed like an egg. I grabbed my baby and we went over the hill to live. Tats
where we all lived. [...] Tey took everything I had in the house.
34
We didnt even sleep in our house at night. We lived like deer or foxes. We had to look for
caves. I took my blankets there every night. I lived like that for three or four years. So did my
mother and children. It was a completely chaotic, terrifying life. Even now I cant nd peace.
35
Peoples sense of dignity was also aected by the erce, arbitrary dominance that others had over their
lives. Te Shining Path made clear that it had absolute power to harm or eliminate anyone it chose to.
Members of the armed forces treated with contempt those whom it should have protected. Tere are
many accounts of the ways in which those who bore arms acted as the masters of other peoples lives.
For those most aected, the climate of terror had the face of death. A resident of one community said,
We were oppressed. We were alive, but dead. We were worthless. Te destructive message that a persons
life is worth nothing is the greatest aront to dignity and self-worth.
Pleas, desperation and submission
Another aront, of course, was having to beg to remain alive or to save the life of a loved one. Tere are
accounts from people whonding themselves at the mercy of their persecutors and unable to defend
Chapter 7
272
themselves and prevented from establishing any dialogue or appeal to reasonhad to resort to begging.
Tis was a desperate response, which they sometimes saw as the only way to escape a certain death or to
free themselves from detention, which they also knew would be fatal.
And when I begged them for my children, I got up from where they were aiming at me and I
went down on my knees there and I said to them, Please dont do this. You are also children
of God. I said to them, Someday, this could happen to your family, too. And one nally
took pity on me and said, Take your kids and get out of here.
36
Te testimonies reveal how, in their desperation, people oered animals and money in exchange for
lives. Tose people were robbing me. I said, Take anything. Ill give you my cows, my calves, but let
my husband live. I beg you. Heres the money I have. Ill give you all of it. Tey took everything; they
left me with nothing.
37
Te pleas, however, often fell on deaf ears. Tis contributed to the sense that the abusers had absolute
power, and they responded with new abuse and humiliation.
When I was escaping, they surrounded me and captured me, and I begged them not to kill
me. I have nothing; dont kill me. Tats what I told them. Tere was a tall one, a man,
who wanted them to kill me. You want to live? Ten dance in the dirt, he told me.
38
I begged the commander. I cried and begged him. I cried like the rain or like a river. So the
commander accused us of being thieves. Im going to accuse you and send you to prison.
What do you think of that, you old terrorist woman? Youre a terrorist too, because youre
her sister. Now Im going to send you to prison, he told me. When I cried, he didnt comfort
me. Get out of here. Go to the hills or the river and cry there. Tats what he told me. [...].
So he sent a soldier, saying, Take this woman anywhere. Trow her in the garbage or send
her home and let her cry there.
39
Life in prison
Besides revealing the dynamic that was established between representatives of the state and the subver-
sives, the violence in the prisons also shows how the state intimidated, forcibly extracted information
from and annihilated those who were allegedly subversives or terrorists.
Besides harming them, in many cases the cruel and intimidating regimen to which prisoners were sub-
jected had the opposite of the desired eect: many innocent people later joined the subversive groups,
having found in them refuge and protection in the face of the abuse and torture to which they were sub-
jected by prison guards. Te brutal violence that was unleashed in the prisons is clearly seen on prisoners
bodies, but the emotional experience, the impact it had on their sense of self, has gone unspoken of. Tat
silence, which is reected in testimony, is the result of two things: complex psychological processes to
repress pain and suering as an individual defense mechanism for restoring a precarious balance and a
policy based on the repression of emotions and individual needs and interests, placing the overall interest
of the people above all else.
Perpetuation of violence
As a result of the violence they suered, many of the people aected still harbor feelings of pain and rage,
exacerbated in some cases by the spectacle of impunity fostered by authorities.
273
Tose feelings of hatred and rage, as well as the desire for revenge, are not aimed only at those who in-
icted the harm. Feelings of powerlessness associated with aggressiveness, which sometimes slip out of
control, are also directed at people who are closer, including loved ones. Tey become part of daily life.
Perhaps to distance themselves from the enormous sense of powerlessness and rage left by the violence,
some people let loose their own destructive tendencies, turning them on those whom they perceive as
being the weakest. Te manifestations of aggression range from irritability and intolerance to violent
behavior, including a desire to hit others or punish their children severely, etc.
I dont know. Sometimes I feel afraid. I mean, I dont feel right. Sometimes I remember, and
maybe thats why I punish my children. Sometimes [weeping] its aected me a lot, I am
weak where these things are concerned. Tey have aected me a lot, and aected my children.
Q: And why do you hit your children?
A: I dont know. Maybe Ive become aggressive because of everything Ive seen. Maybe its
because Ive seen so much violence since I was just a little girl, about six years old.
40
In some cases, aggressiveness is manifested in fantasies and the desire to kill in an indeterminate way, as
we see in the testimony of two desperate youths:
Q: What about the eects? Who suered more harm in the case of your father, who died?
Who has suered most from all this?
A: I havent so much...
Q: How many brothers and sisters do you have?
A: Were seven, but of the seven I stayed alone in [HJUASAWASI], working with the self-
defense patrol until I was 22. I joined the Army when I was 22. I got out when I was 24. But
I went on patrols until I was 22, and I think its not that Im sick, but Ive been traumatized,
because I saw my father when they blew o his head. I scooped his brains up o the ground
and put them back in his head and wrapped it up in a rag. Whats in my mind, simply, is
killing. Nothing but killing. If I ght with someone, my goal isnt to hit them and go away.
No, the only thing is to kill, kill, kill.
41
Ive seen so much violence. I feel so violent at home sometimes. Anything that happens, I
hit them. Like I said, I lived in a violent neighborhood. Violent! And I feel violent! So much
so that I feel desperate. I get desperate; I dont know how to solve a little problem. I think I
need psychological help.
42
Te awful thing is, I used to say: After a few years, a year or two, youll forget everything.
But whats worse, not a day goes by that I dont remember. Everything that happened is
engraved on my mind. Sometimes I dont feel like doing anything. When I was in school,
my mind was like that. I was always complaining. I would say, Why dont I have a weapon
so I can do the same thing to them? When I saw the people who had threatened my father,
when I saw them in the street . [weeping]. I went home [] but I didnt tell anybody. I
just went home,- I cried. But my life wasnt peaceful. I know Ive been hard on all my broth-
ers and sisters, because I have an awful personality. I dont know. Te day I run into one of
the people who did that to my father, I may do the same thing to them.
43
Te violence has left its scars and an intense hatred that sometimes leads to aggressiveness toward children
40 CVR. BDI-SM-P149. Testimony 400093, resident of Uchiza 1980-1990.
Chapter 7
274
or partners, especially in situations in which the person feels powerless. Some people are aware of the
increased aggressiveness in themselves and in their relationships with others and say they are concerned
and frightened because they do not know how to handle it. Some ask for help.
Besides the family, there has been an increase in violent behavior in other areas of society. Instilling
fear and terror as ways of protesting, imposing ideas or forcing others into submission seems to have
become common behavior for many Peruvians. Violence, in varying degrees, has become a easy way
of dealing with conict and compensating for feelings of powerlessness at home, at school, in the
neighborhood and in the community. Te fact that during the political violence all of the parties
involved resorted to the same methods transmitted the idea that those methods could be used by
everyone. Because there was little condemnation, the violent terrorist style was reproduced in daily
life. Treats became common. Control, watchfulness, distrust and extreme suspicion permeated the
fabric of society.
SOCIOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
Destruction and weakening of community organization
Scattering and fragmentation: Displacement
Families, and even entire communities, left the places where they were living in search of less hostile
areas. Tis phenomenon was massive and widespread, especially in the countryside. Small communities
aected by the armed conict were deserted. In thousands of accounts gathered by the CVR, the phe-
nomenon appears clearly as a responseoften desperate and unplannedto threats, forced recruitment,
the murder of relatives, massacres or the destruction of communities. Its impact on community life is
reected in the words used in testimonies to describe the communities after the displacement: desolate,
empty, uninhabited, silent, no-mans land, solitary. Te intense, indiscriminate violence of the
various parties was a direct attack on each member of the community, which turned them into either
victims or witnesses of violations of the rights of individuals and communities. One witness said. When
we didnt listen to them, they threatened to kill us, and if we had stayed there, if we hadnt escaped to the
hills, they would have killed us. We left our houses and lived in the hills. We didnt take anything with
us, not even our animals. We went away to save our lives.
44
Te ight from home in search of protection and safety broke down the various community institutions
that had been built up over a long period of time. In some cases, families returned when the threat sub-
sided. In others, however, the ight was an uncertain road with no return.
Te eect of displacement was disintegration. Communal space became a place of silence, and the houses
and land nally belonged to no one. With the PCP-SL, everyone left. Huanta was practically desolate.
45

Te social order was upset to such an extent that traditionally safe placessuch as the home, a commu-
nity building, school or chapelbecame dangerous.
Te breakdown of the community began with the departure of adolescents and youths, who from the
start were prime targets for forced recruitment or detention. Te displacement of this sector of the popu-
lation was also related to the diculty that young people encountered in continuing their studies in
communities where schools were considered dangerous or stopped operating because the teachers were
the targets of threats and persecution: If they found us, they would beat us, both the military and the
subversives, and they took the young people away with them. Tats why young people didnt want to
study [here] anymore; they went to the city.
46
Tus the young people, mainly boys, abandoned the com-
munity, leaving the women and children to their fate.
275
Testimonies also show that other groups displaced in the early years included authorities and wealthier residents.
As a result, not only did the population shrink, but the community also disintegrated: it lost its young people,
its authorities and its teachers. Te resulting sense of disorganization and insecurity led to more displacement:
After that, the community was completely destroyed. Tere were no authorities, no men. Tose who had
remained also left eventually. Teyve been displaced to Lima and Huamanga. Just a few of us have stayed.
47
Te decision to leave in search of protection and safety implies countless losses, among which material
goods take on particular importance. Tese losses, which might be less signicant under other circum-
stances, must be understood within an economic and cultural context in which land is the main source
of survival and, along with the home, is the most important, if not the only, property that peasants own.
While people were sometimes able to sell property before being displacedwhich still constitutes a
lossin most cases that was impossible because of the desperate and secret nature of their ight from the
community. For these reasons, there are frequent references to homes, lands and animals, which in many
cases were lost forever, being taken by other community members or expropriated by one of the parties
to the conict. Tey went to Ica or Lima out of fear, leaving behind their elds and their animals.
48
Because of their abrupt departure, most people arrived at their destinations without resources and had to
start over from scratch. It is not dicult to understand, then, that the bulk of the displaced population
that went to the cities became the poorest of the poor. In addition, having lost their homes, lands and
animals discouraged those who might have wanted to return: I have nothing to go back to.
As soon as they reached a place of refuge, the displaced people had to start over again under especially dif-
cult conditions. Finding a place to sleep and something to satisfy their hunger were the rst problems to
be solved. Faced with the chaos of large cities, deprived of their usual food, far from their land and with-
out the company of those who were left behind, displaced people experienced intense feelings of nostalgia
and a desire to return: I came here to Huancayo, down in Chilca. Tats where Im living. My children
havent gotten used to it. Teyre suering there. Tey used to run away. Tey ran away to Huamal, but
I dont have family or anything. Teres one neighbor there who is good, although shes poor. Tey would
go there. [...] Tey didnt want to be here. [...] Tey couldnt get used to it.
49
Families who returned to their communities of origin had similar, although less intense, experiences. In
those cases, it was often the children and youth, accustomed to the pace of city life, who had the hardest
time adjusting to rural life.
Because of their lack of resources, displaced people, who were accustomed to working the land for a liv-
ing, were forced to obtain money to survive, and street vending was an accessible source of income.
I devoted myself to selling staple goods, which at the time was everything. Te cost of living was
high, and I only earned enough for food, because the things we got from the eld used to help.
I missed the things we used to produce. In the city you need money for everything, but in your
eld you can harvest. Youre better o with your eld, because in the city you have to buy every-
thing and its expensive. You have to buy everything there. I got a job, but it wasnt stable work.
It was only occasional. I was sorry Id gone to the city, and I came back after eight months.
50
Many of the people who settled on the periphery of the cities did not speak Spanish, which severely af-
fected their essential ability to communicate. You arrive in the city from the countryside and its deadly.
On top of everything else, we didnt know how to speak. In the highlands, everything was in Quechua.
We didnt know how to speak Spanish. We were lost. We didnt know who we could talk to. What we
went through was really sad.
51

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276
Te displaced people were also victims of ethnic discrimination, even by people who shared their roots.
It was the rst time Id gone to the city. It was big. I felt strange. I had friends and neigh-
bors who called me serrano (highlander), but it didnt give me a complex no matter how
much they treated me like that. My brother helped me a lot. Dont pay any attention to
themwere all equal. [] It was the same at school. Tey called me serrano, but I didnt
pay any attention and I studied. I beat them all. I was the best student in my school.
52
Even for children, the risk of being mistreated increased when the displaced person was from one of the
areas hardest hit by the violence.
Tey called us terrorist, even at school. Te teachers would say to me, Hey, little terror-
ist. Tere was a young teacher, she was afraid to talk about the Shining Path. Are you,
have you been a terrorist? she asked me one day. Oh yes, I told her. From then on, she was
afraid of me. She was scared. When I told her, like Im telling you today, how they killed, she
started to cry. After that, she became my friend,I was the only person from Ayacucho, and
Ayacucho was considered the land of the Shining Path. Tey thought anyone from there was
a terrorist, and my classmates kept their distance. Tey werent very friendly. Tey said, If
we do something to him, he might kill us... But I talked to them. I tried to make them un-
derstand that it wasnt like they thought, that I hadnt been a member of the Shining Path.
53

Disorder and generalized violence
Te armed incursions disrupted everyday life in communities and destroyed the norms that governed ex-
isting organizations internal dynamics. In addition, the presence of people from outside the community
upset the norms for coexistence: public spaces were forcibly taken over, expropriated without the commu-
nitys consent, and various actions took place outside the bounds of law and custom. All of these invasive
acts exacerbated the disorder of community life, which in many cases translated into social instability.
When they least expected it, communities found themselves caught up in violent acts perpetrated by
unknown people or, later, by people from their own areas, often with no comprehensible motive. Tese
events made people in the same community suspicious of one another and created a general climate of dis-
trust. Tis was added to the residents sense of powerlessness, turning what had been a relatively orderly
social structure into a chaotic environment with no direction.
Te destruction of communal space began with the takeover of villages and the temporary expropria-
tion of facilities that were considered communal. Tese were declared liberated zones, the places were
temporarily expropriated or military bases were established in the middle of towns. Under these circum-
stances, abuses by both subversive groups the security forces increased. Both parties sought the popula-
tions immediate submission and demanded various services, either in exchange for freedom based on
the establishment of a new social order or in exchange for the promise of national security. In either case,
what happened in practice was the forced appropriation of culturally dened spaces and, in the end, an
invasion of communal space and the destruction of the communitys relative tranquility.
Because one goal of the subversive groups was territorial expansion the liberated zones fullled multiple
functions: they were rehearsals for a new democracy, places occupied by the support bases, as well as
places for obtaining food and medicines. Tese zones, which were the product of decisions made by PCP-SL
members, therefore had a dual meaning: they eliminated any form of legitimately established authority, and
they provided a place to establish an organization that had totalitarian ideological goals. Te existence of these
places created so much confusion among local people that the legitimate authorities did not know who they
were relating, and their roles were ultimately shaped by the requirements of those who possessed weapons.
53 Ibid.
277
People who lived in the PCP-SLs liberated zones or near military bases lost a certain degree of freedom.
Tey were at the mercy of those who bore arms, and as time passed they became accustomed to living in
subjugation or under protection. Although it was temporary, this situation left deep scars of confusion
and discontent among local people and groups. At times, abuse by either a subversive group or the mili-
tary led people to try to rebel, although these attempts were not always successful, and the cost was the
loss of human lives. It must be noted, however, that in other cases people managed to organize themselves
and get rid of the subversive groups, recovering their customs and returning to a more normal life.
Te strategies of the armed groups ultimately confused people and reduced the notion of authority. Tey
came in and said, Im the authority. [...] Tere was confusion. No one knew for sure who they were, if
they were soldiers or the Shining Path camouaged as soldiers.
54
Tis confusion led to the stereotyping
of groups and people that stigmatized certain social groups, which were excluded, discriminated against
or eliminated because they were considered to be the enemy.
For local residents, there was no clear image of visitors, especially when visitors were armed. Soldiers
could look like terrorists and subversive groups could appear to be military patrols. Tis mimicry height-
ened the sense of fear and distrust and exacerbated relationships of subjugation or submission, despite
eorts at gradual democratization through such initiatives as the election of local authorities.
Te emergency zones were quickly plagued with assaults, systematic robbery and gangs, which aected
merchants and residents to a certain degree and for a long time. Violence had taken over the streets and
highways, becoming a modus operandi by which young people perpetuated the behavioral patterns that
had been stamped on their environment. Tis increase in youth violence has no parallel. Te cultural
mechanisms that had been shaped over many years broke down in many cases or were simply unable to
resist such an unexpected form of violence.
Many youth neither acknowledged nor respected authority: When theyre drunk, they ght, they insult each
other. Teyve lost all respect. [...] Tey dont respect their elders, either. When we tell them that we used to be
more respectful and that the things that are going on now didnt happen then they dont believe us.
55
Some started committing robberies. Tey werent afraid of anybody. Before, when there
were terrorists around, they made out all right taking other peoples things, so were going to
do the same. Tats what they say. Tats the way it is. Tey get involved in things like that
and dont want to work. I think their heads are full of the things theyve seen both the ter-
rorists and the military do, because they slaughtered their animals and took the meat. Te
others came in and did the same thing. Tey took our animals. Tats the way it was before,
and that negative behavior has been reinforced.
56
Exacerbation of internal conficts
Te armed conict exacerbated many long-standing local conicts, escalating them destructively and
leading to communal disintegration. Te armed groups used the conicts for their immediate strategic
purposesfueling internal hatreds and resentments, encouraging revenge and adding other elements
that made it dicult to restore local order.
To exercise power, the subversive groups tried to take advantage of peoples discontent and the contradic-
tions that arose in the community. Conicts over land or access to natural resources, family feuds and
personal enmities that sprang up from various sources enabled them to turn community members against
each other when necessary. Oon arriving in communities and villages, subversive groups established con-
tacts and named leaders, setting up a new order based on rigid discipline and accompanied by specic
54 CVR. BDI-I-P56. Interview with a resident, age 50, teacher, Accomarca (Ayacucho), June 2002.
55 CVR. BDI-I-P648. In-depth interview, Oronqoy, La Mar (Ayacucho), November-December 2002. Woman, age 70, who led the womens
revolt against one of the Carrillos.
56 CVR. BDI-II-P505. Interview with a young woman, a former community authority, in Huamanga (Ayacucho) in January 2003.
Chapter 7
278
moral gestures. From the start, therefore, they found a certain degree of acceptance among some com-
munity members, because their presence coincided with a desire for order and justice in the community.
Tis new order provided the opportunity to denounce authorities for the misuse of public funds or to
make accusations against important townspeople.
Te talk of a new order resonated with many people, especially when they witnessed specic gestures
of discipline and morality. Damn! Te people with money were sweeping the streets, everything was
orderly, no one slacked o. Tere were no longer any waqras, they were punished. Everything was clean
and orderly in those days,
57
one resident of Sancos said. Punishment of the powerful was a sign of justice
and of the establishment of a new egalitarian order, with the apparent elimination of gaps between rich
and poor. Not all community members agreed with the new way of doing things, however, which led to
even greater tensions among residents.
Te envy and resentments among residents created greater distrust and uncertainty, for example, espe-
cially when the PCP-SL, for no apparent reason, failed to punish some member of a family whom others
had thought would be punished. Some peoples prosperity also led to enmities, doubts and suspicions
within the community. Te conicts were not always explicit, and amid the fear and uncertainty some
people decided to leave their communities. People who were poorer and remained behind had no choice
but to follow the orders of those who were in command.
Te abrupt departure from communities forced people to abandon their goods and land, which were
then used by those who remained in the community who expected to become the owners of the land,
sometimes with the consent of local authorities. Sometime later many community members or landown-
ers returned to their places of origin only to nd that their property had been taken over by other people,
some of whom had even acquired title. Te new owners used threats and other maneuvers to keep the
property that they had acquired illicitly, sometimes even accusing the former owners of being terrorists.
Teyve returned to the community of Accomarca and are always causing problems over the land
they abandoned when their lives were in danger. [...] Now they want to get back the land that has
been taken over by residents of Accomarca. [...] Tose people are still behaving like Shining Path
leaders. Teyre terrorizing people, especially those they have some dispute with.
58
With the establishment of the new order, submission to the norms dictated by the subversive groups was
unquestionable. People who did not submit were warned, physically punished or executed after a summary
trial before the entire community. Te peoples trials that ended with executions were not the only murders
committed by the Peoples Committees, but they were the most important, because they were carried out
publicly. Tey had the greatest impact and are the ones that community members most remember.
59
Finding themselves under violent attack, the communities sought to defend themselves through various
means, organizing self-defense committees or adopting religious practices that in some places became
strategies for survival. Te indigenous and peasant self-defense committees were a way of protecting and
safeguarding the communities as well as signs of an alliance with the armed forces. Although there were
some initiatives among the communities to form self-defense committees on their own, most of the testi-
mony reects a certain pressure from the armed forces and police to form armed civilian groups capable
of supporting, or in some cases replacing, those forces in various conict zones.
Breakdown of the system of representation and hierarchical order
With traditional leaders gone from communities, because they had been murdered or forced to ee, there
was an interruption in the transmission of the knowledge needed to guide a group of human beings in
57 CVR. BDI-I-P335. Interview with former authority between March and May 2002 in Sancos, Huancasancos, Ayacucho.
58 CVR. BDI-I-P68. Field notes from informal interview with farmer, age 48, Accomarca (Ayacucho), June 2002.
59 Report, Huancasancos.
279
accordance with their customs, traditions and history. Te use of power was taken from its legitimate
possessors, and basic functions, such as the administration of justice, were usurped. One consequence
was that communities lost the people who had been their ethical guides.
Because of this vacuum, people were slow to learn new forms of political and social representation. Tis was
aggravated by the fact that young men had left their communities for the reasons mentioned above. It would
be some time before those who were children or adolescents at the time were old enough to hold leadership
positions in their communities. Tis brought another consequence: with no clear guidelines for organiza-
tion, residents had to invent new forms of leadership and adapt to the new situation created by the internal
armed conict. Te new leaders were caught between the destruction of the order under which their com-
munities had operated for years and new circumstances. Finally, besides destruction, interference by people
from outside the community caused a serious distortion of the norms and guidelines for organization.
Elimination of leaders and the power vacuum
According to the data gathered by the CVR, subversive actions were aimed especially at leaders who had the
closest ties to their communities, organizations and local governments. Te elimination of local and com-
munity authorities was one of the PCP-SLs main objectives, rst, to gain control of villages, and second, to
replace them with leaders loyal to the party. Authorities and leaders who did not ee were murdered.
Te gures gathered by the CVR provide a clear idea of what happened in the countryside: approximately
2,267 authorities and leaders were killed or disappeared. Tere was a concerted eort to remove heads of
communities and organizations. Disorganized, these communities and groups became easy targets for
invasion by the PCP-SL. Te imposition of new forms of organization that discredited democratically
elected authorities and imposed new ones was another form of violence against communities. Witnesses
testied that in some cases local residents felt obligated to accept posts out of fear, to hold them under the
command of either a subversive group or state security forces and to participate in actions against their
will. In other cases, they simply left the community to seek refuge elsewhere.
Te people voted. Because it was a dangerous time, no one wanted [to hold oce]. I didnt want
my husband to take an oce, but the military forced him to, because we didnt have any author-
ities. Tey beat people to make them accept. [...] And out of fear, beating him, they forced him
and appointed him. He didnt want to take oce, and he didnt last a monthbarely a week.
60
Te establishment of power by force took two dierent forms. One was aimed at the villages general
population. Tis occurred, for example, when Shining Path columns arrived in a community and re-
quired people to attend assemblies or take part in forced labor or imposed a new model of organization
that ignored or discredited forms that already existed in the community. It also occurred when military
patrols arrived in the community in search of suspectsoften accusing residents indiscriminatelyand
to reestablish or impose order.
Te imposition of an authority on a community not only disrupted and created imbalance in the existing or-
ganizational model, but also produced confusion and anarchy. Disruption and imbalance occurred because
the real representatives were physically or symbolically eliminated and replaced by others in a change that
did not reect the will of the people. Confusion and anarchy resulted because the disappearance of authori-
ties led to a lack of control in the community, accompanied by a decreased sense of safety and identity. In
those days, there were no authorities here. Te authorities were the leaders of the Party. [...]. Tey were the
ones who gave the orders, but there were no authorities who represented the government.
61
Opportunities for dialogue and decision-making, such as community meetings and assemblies, became dan-
gerous. On more than a few occasions, aggressors took advantage of the fact that people were holding a meeting
61 CVR. BDI-I-P284. Interview with authority from the community of Primavera (province of Leoncio Prado, Hunuco), May 2002.
Chapter 7
28 0
to capture, accuse and execute local authorities. Many testimonies tell of attacks in which the population had
no possibility of responding. Given the lack of protection, the individual or family survival instinct became
paramount. Everyone escaped with their own life, in groups or individually. Distrust had become deeply
rooted in the communities, where people considered their neighbors to be suspect or enemies.
Abuse of power and usurping of functions
Once the armed groups had taken over public spaces, they eliminated legitimate community representa-
tives in a clear act of abuse of power and usurping of functions. Tey declared that the partys word was not
to be questioned and that its commands were to be carried out without hesitation. In that way, subversive
groups simultaneously established executive, legislative and judicial roles. Anyone who disagreed or op-
posed them could be eliminated without a second thought.
In many communities or villages, authorities were nominally replaced by others who were under the
command of the armed groups or the Army. Tere were no authorities. Te terrorists were the ones who
governed, until the military came and appointed people such as the governor, assistant prefect, etc.
62

Out of fear of being killed, authorities and community leaders resigned or refused to participate in cer-
tain community activities. In that way, internal order and norms for social and political behavior were
systematically destroyed.
Leaders were subjugated and forced to perform a series of services that beneted the group giving the orders.
Depending on the place, leaders or authorities were required to make payments to subversives and some-
times to the military. Otherwise they had to force the population to do work or engage in other activities.
My husband was an authority. He was president. One day when he went to the eld, the
hikers recruited him. Tey took him prisoner for a day. You have to support me. Tey
forced him to support them. After that, he supported them. So when he was accused, we
didnt leave. We stayed in the hills with my children. We slept there, terried.
63
Te new authorities took justice into their own hands and used revenge to resolve old disputes with op-
ponents or local enemies. Te subversive groups executed people based on nothing more than the com-
munitys consent or, in some cases, simply their own authoritarian, ideological decision. Enemies were
pre-judged and sentenced, and their friends were accepted with some degree of suspicion. MRTA mem-
bers apparently did not engage in peoples justice, and while they sometimes took police ocers out into
a plaza to frighten them and win the peoples trust, the results were never to their benet. Te mere fact
that they frightened and humiliated community representatives led people to reject and fear them, and
the supposed meting out of justice did not necessarily guarantee public support for the subversive group.
With the peoples trials, many long-standing systems and procedures disappeared, giving way to a
political guillotine that not only eliminated the communitys representatives but also instilled fear and
terror in the population. It reached such a point that in those years, there were no longer any authorities.
Te PCP-SL had taken over every form of justice. Tey meted out justice in their style, as they thought
best. Tats why they killed without mercy.
64
Te violent arrival of the military also had an impact on communities legitimate power structures. Abuse
by members of the security forces took the form of arbitrary detention and torture of local residents. Te
aggression was an attack on the peoples cultural patterns, reducing them to a position of inferiority.
Te re-establishment of order was no dierent from the conquest of the liberated zones. In both cases,
instead of building an institution that would guarantee continuity, power was used to dismantle the rela-
tionships on which social organization was based. Tacit agreement to punish the relatives of members
of subversive groups probably led the military to carry out extrajudicial executions.
62 CVR. BDI-I-P321. Interview with a shepherdess, age 70, Sancos (Ayacucho), March 2002.
63 CVR. Testimony 202479. Ayacucho.
64 CVR. BDI-I-P415. Gender workshop with men in Huamanga (Ayacucho), October 23, 2002.
28 1
In 1989, they captured me in San Martn Plaza and took me to DINCOTE again, accusing me
of terrorism. I was there for 14 days. Te rst two days, they hung me by the feet to make me
confess to things Id never done. After 14 days, I was freed and suered from extremely violent
repression by the state. Given those circumstances, its possible that many of the people who are
in prison now arent guilty, but theres also a fair contingent that may be there for good reason.
65
Te violence weakened community and grassroots organizations, which were unprepared to resist or
respond collectively.
Breakdown of the system of citizen participation
One of the consequences of the abuse of power and the usurping of functions was the weakening of the
normative system of organization. When the PCP-SL recruited young people, it indoctrinated them with
the idea that power lay in weapons. Young people were sent to schools where instead of learning to defend
and respect order, they learned to violate ancestral patterns of authority. In other words, the subversive
groups put themselves above all laws, replacing them with violent action and doing away with procedures
based on traditional communal norms. Far from beneting the communities, the imposition of a new
order or of re-establishing order became a way of subjugating or eliminating people whom the new
power brokers thought were causing or might cause problems.
Authorities could barely do their jobs. Te norms governing organization had been hijacked by whichever
subversive group took control of the area and wielded power. Te phrase about a thousand eyes and ears un-
dermined public community life and turned society into a sort of prison with a lookout tower, where everyone
felt they were being watched, which disturbed their sense of freedom. Overnight, daily life turned into a closed
sphere that was under constant surveillance, where the only way to survive was to distrust everyone.
Because of the absence of authority due to elimination, ight or replacement, these places became a no-
mans land, where it was impossible even to maintain public institutions and record everyday events, such
as births, deaths and marriages. Te elimination of organizational leadership not only decapitated the com-
munity, it ultimately scattered local residents for a long time. It was a no-mans land. We had no authorities,
not even a mayor, from 1987 to 1990. Te local government oces closed. Tere was nothing. Te commu-
nity had no leaders. Tere was no type of organization and there were no authorities from 1987 to 1990.
66
Te beginning of the armed conict itself was an event that broke the continuity of political institutions
that were trying to gain strength through local, regional or national elections. Te election boycott was
an attack on civil and political rights that had been sidelined for years. Other attacks included the de-
struction of identity documents, ballots and voting records, the murder of candidates and threats against
people who attempted to exercise their primordial rights and responsibilities as citizens.
Tere could no longer be authorities. Tere could no longer be candidates for mayor. Not
anymore. Everyone was afraid to serve as a mayor, governor or judge, or to say they were
from such-and-such a party. When elections were held in those days, 20 or 30 people voted
and they were taking a risk. But people didnt want anything to do with elections or par-
ties or any kind of group, because panic and fear were everywhere. Te people who were in
charge of IER at the time and those who wanted to continue with their parties, I dont know
if they found some other way of doing so. I dont know.
67
Te traditional system of rotating leadership within communities was systematically destroyed by those
who usurped that function. Te new order imposed by a subversive organization was socialist and
people were forced to follow it, even if they did not understand it, out of fear of being branded a traitor.
65 CVR. BDI-I-P512. Thematic public hearing on Political Violence and the Educational Community. Lima, October 28, 2002. Testimony No. 2.
66 CVR. BDI-I-P403. In-depth interview with a local government ofcial and writer. Uchiza, Tocache (San Martn), August 25, 2002.
67 CVR. BDI-I-P256. Interview with a Colombian Dominican religious sister, Ayacucho (Ayacucho), May 2002.
Chapter 7
28 2
Meanwhile, the Armys presence in places where the repentance law was being promoted led not only to
confusion, but also to distrust among the population. Many people looked askance at the Armys actions
because of the bad experiences they had had during the conict.
When the repentance law came out, the Army didnt investigate who you were or where
you were from. Tey just came and grabbed you. Te entire town went to repent, and many
people died because of it. Te PCP-SL killed them. From then on, there were no authorities.
Weve only had authorities again in the past two or three years.
68
Daily life was also altered by the ght for hegemonic control over territory. Villagers had to ask permis-
sion of the de facto authorities in order to travel. Not only were freedom of movement and other aspects
of daily life suspended, it was impossible to continue with barter systems and markets, creating a life that
was limited, controlled and without escape. Anyone who traveled had to inform the military base. Tey
said our mission was to ght terrorists, and for that reason they needed the collaboration and compliance
of all members of the community. Te military base is at the service of everyone.
69
Te law and order that was hijacked by the violence of the armed conict has been dicult to reestab-
lish, even now. Te much-desired rotation of leadership was dicult to start up again. Te loss of leaders
because of murder, disappearance and forced displacement interrupted the transmission of learning that
was part of the process of the transfer of leadership and dissuaded, because of fear and distrust, those who
should have taken on leadership roles.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
Consequences of the armed confict for human and social capital
Te violence has had a very dramatic impact on human capital, with repercussions in various areas, in-
cluding the economic, which is addressed in this section. A rst element to be noted is the destruction
of human capital by such acts as murder and forced disappearance, as well as its deterioration because of
the poor physical and psychological condition in which the violence left people. Another element that
contributed to the notable decrease in human capital in the aected communities was the large-scale
displacement of the population. Finally, the armed conict also caused changes in labor conditions, in-
creasing unemployment and underemployment. All of these circumstances have had a serious impact on
the aected populations quality of life.
As has been seen in other sections, Ayacucho and Huancavelica were the areas most aected by the vio-
lence, which was accompanied by a serious deterioration of the economy. Te main reason was the de-
crease in the economically active population, which dropped from 154,000 to 131,000 in Ayacucho and
from 107,000 to 104,000 in Huancavelica between censuses. Tis was not the case in other zones that
were equally aected by the armed conictsuch as Apurmac, Junn, San Martn, Hunuco or Pasco
where the economically active population tended to increase (CUANTO 1980-1993; 1993 Census). Te
death or disappearance of part of the economically active population in communities aected by the vio-
lence had countless eects on the lives of families. Tese are briey summarized in the following sections.
Decrease in the productive capacity of families
Te violent actions of the subversive groups, and the security forces charged with ghting them, led to the
loss of many human lives and had other harmful eects, decreasing the productive capacity of families in
those areas and in entire regions. In the opinion of one witness, during the years of armed conict what
really destroyed us was the [loss of ] human resources, even for community labor at the time. We didnt
68 CVR. BDI-I-P302. Group interview with women, community of 7 de Octubre (province of Leoncio Prado, Hunuco), May 2002.
69 CVR. BDI-I-P43. Transcript of the minutes of the Community Assemblies of Accomarca (Ayacucho). Minutes from 1988.
28 3
have many people. So the labor force was small or nonexistent.
70
Te scope of the problem is even greater
if the value or meaning of this loss for families is taken into account.
In most cases, the loss of physical conditions and of the ability of certain family members to work resulted
in a reduction of the income that was crucial to the familys survival, as well as a decrease in the quality of
family life. In the rural economy of the areas aected by the armed conict, it is the father or mother who
provides the family with security, protection and stability, with each of the other members playing a specic,
complementary economic role. In this family structure, the man (adult or youth) is responsible for the main
agricultural activities, while the woman performs the activities related to household maintenance.
Under these circumstances, the absence of a male (adult or youth) meant the loss of the main source of
income and often the familys only means of support. Tis entailed a complete restructuring and reorga-
nization of the family. According to testimony gathered by the CVR, of a total of 22,507 victims (dead
or disappeared), 73 percent had performed a protable economic activity to support their families, and
most were considered heads of households. Tese gures indicate the heavy impact of the armed conict
on the family economy. Te absence of these people, who had been economically active, resulted in the
scattering and fragmentation of the family, which meant that, in the short run, the rest of the members
had to nd ways to survive under highly disadvantageous conditions.
Te denite absencebecause of death or disappearanceof fathers or young men of working age cre-
ated a gap in the chains of production, distribution and consumption. According to information gathered
by the CVR, the majority of victims (dead or disappeared) were males between the ages of 18 and 34,
with little education (illiterate, with a primary education or with some secondary education), married or
living with a partner. Most were Quechua-speaking peasants living in the department of Ayacucho.
Te most immediate consequence of this forced absence was that women were widowed and children
were orphaned. About this, one witness said:
Te violence we experienced had a series of consequences. Tere were many orphans, many
widows and many poor people who have been unable to study. In our community, in particular,
there are many women who were widowed. Te terrorists killed their husbands during those
years. Tere are many orphaned youths. Tat is the history of the community of Huaychao.
71

It has been impossible to determine the exact number of widows, widowers and orphaned children. Ac-
cording to Revollar (2000), the number of women widowed by the armed conict could be as high as
20,000, and the number of orphans (boys and girls) 40,000not counting children who have suered
from post-traumatic stress, whose number is estimated at more than 500,000.
For women, the consequences of the mans absence were not limited to reduced possibilities for produc-
tion; they were also reected in problems of security and social and emotional stability. Te section on
psycho-social consequences provides a detailed description of these eects on the lives of women who
were victims of the violence.
Because of the permanent absence of parents, minor children were abandoned. In some cases, close relatives
took them in temporarily, but in others they were cast adrift, depending exclusively on their ability to look out
for themselves. Te temporary absence of one parent because of imprisonment or forced displacement also had
negative consequences on the familys productive capacity, quality of life, and social and emotional stability.
Prison inmates unjustly accused of being terrorists were usually peasants from the emergency zones who
had been detained and imprisoned as the result of an arbitrary and unjust accusation. Tey were taken to
prisons far from their homes. For the family, the persons imprisonment in one of these facilities meant a
70 CVR. BDI-I-P343. In-depth interview, Lucanamarca, Huancasancos (Ayacucho), March 2002. Male council member, age 50, who was a
student at the time of the violence.
71 CVR. BDI-I-P416. Workshop with self-defense committee members, Huamanga (Ayacucho), October 23, 2002.
Chapter 7
28 4
forced absence that had an immediate, serious impact on the family members lives. Te victims of unjust
imprisonment were mainly male heads of households, although youths and women were also imprisoned.
In most peasant communities, a man cannot be replaced by another community member because most
lands are not communally owned. Each family supports itself with its crops and livestock. When a man
was gone, therefore, the familys elds were abandoned, and the livestock poorly tended or stolen. Left
alone, women had to spend much of their time seeking information about the whereabouts and condition
of their imprisoned or disappeared husbands. Tis not only severed the chain of production, it also led to
the disintegration of the family as an economic unit.
Te forced absence of a parent as a result of the armed conict triggered a long series of negative economic
consequences for family members, causing the deterioration of the quality of life and the physical and
psychological condition of the other family members.
Displacement of the labor force
Temporary or permanent absence because of the forced displacement of one of the main elements of the
production chain caused serious problems not only for families, but also for communities. Te displace-
ment of the rural work force to other areas, especially cities or urban peripheries, led to another debacle
in the rural communities and regions. Te number of people displaced from the areas aected by the
internal armed conict is estimated at more than 600,000 (Diez, 2003).
72
According to the 1997 Survey of Characteristics of the Returned Population by the National Institute of Sta-
tistics and Information (Instituto Nacional de Estadstica e Informtica, INEI), in 437 districts of the depart-
ments of Ayacucho, Apurmac, Huancavelica, Junn, Hunuco and Ancash, more than 50 percent of the
people interviewed had changed residence because of the armed conict and had returned to their places of
origin as a result of the pacication. Tere was widespread displacement of the work force, and many com-
munities became ghost towns. Te depopulation left communities without a labor force, greatly reducing
the possibilities for economic development for those who remained behind. Although the pace of economic
life was dierent at the national level, the absence of a labor force created dramatic local imbalances.
In places where the local labor force was displaced, local residents interpreted that absence as a sign of
the backwardness of village life, as the following testimony indicates. According to this account, the
poorest people were the ones left behind, because they had no alternative.
Te best-educated people had to leave. Tere was a ight of professionals and successful
merchants, who could leave because of their economic situation. Tose who were less for-
tunate had to stay behind, and there was a loss of professional and other job opportunities.
Te result was backwardness.
73

Displacement impoverished not only the community, but also the displaced people themselves. After the
armed conict subsided and the countrys economic situation stabilized, some displaced families began
to return to their home communities. Te returnees, however, probably represented only about half of the
displaced population.
74
Te socio-economic conditions that many of these people encountered in their
home villages, and the scant aid they received from the state, made it impossible for them to remain, and
they were displaced again, returning to the areas where they had originally taken refuge. Many of the
returnees who remained in their communities of origin were unemployed people of working age, accord-
ing to INEI (1997). A total of 62.1 percent of the returnees were of working age and actually employed,
while 37.9 percent were unemployed people of working age.
72 According to a document on displaced people in Peru prepared by Francis Deng, representative of the United Nations Secretariat Unit on
Internal Displacement (1996), the number of displaced people in the country is probably between 600,000 and 1 million.
73 CVR. BDI-I-P176. Testimony taken in Huertas, Huancayo (Junn), in May 2002. Authorities refer to the confrontation in Los Molinos.
74 The number of returnees is estimated at about 320,000, according to the state-run Repopulation Support Program (Programa de Apoyo al
Repoblamiento, PAR); the same PAR report notes that MENADES-CONDECOREP estimated the number of returnees at 200,000 (PAR 2001).
28 5
According to the same INEI survey, more than half of the returnees returned mainly to rural agriculture.
Tis can be seen in the following gures: 52.2 percent of the returnees worked (at the time the survey was
done) in agriculture or livestock, while the rest were involved in commerce (14.6 percent), construction
(13.4 percent), crafts (6.4 percent) and other activities (9.3 percent). Another survey in the areas hard-
est hit by the armed conict found that agriculture was the main activity of 90 percent of the families,
while 32 percent said they raised livestock and 15 percent of the families worked as day laborers on other
peoples lands (Matos 2002).
Considering that the impact of the armed conict on farming in the aected communities was great,
given that much of the agricultural land had been abandoned for long periods, it can be concluded that
people who were actually working the land were doing so under extremely disadvantageous conditions
and without much economic success. Te INEI survey (1997) found that more than 60 percent of dis-
placed people returned to their homes after a long absence (between 6 and 15 years), reecting this pro-
longed abandonment of the countryside.
Changes in labor conditions: Unemployment and underemployment
Te continuous attacks by the PCP-SL and the actions by the security forces decreased work opportuni-
ties for families and communities, not only because the means of production were destroyed, but also
because of the absence of the principal members of the production chain, which resulted in changes in
the relationships of production and in the production itself. Te decrease in the rural work force aected
familial, local and regional production systems to dierent degrees. In the opinion of those who testied,
there was a dual problem related to rural employment, because the situation aected not only employment
patterns, but also the very right to work, as reected in forms of unemployment and underemployment.
First, with the breakdown in social and productive support networks due to the absence, displacement
or unemployment of the male labor force, women and even children had to redouble their eorts to en-
sure their families day-to-day survival. Tis is reected in the testimony of many displaced community
members.
75
At the same time, for the people aected by the violence, the problem of unemployment and
the diculty in nding employment also had indirect eects: they could not plant because they lacked
seeds, and they could not tend their elds, or they were afraid of losing their crops, because they could
not see them through to the harvest.
For these reasons, employment decreased in the aected communities, and the problem persists today.
Te violence disrupted production dynamics in the communities and made it impossible to carry on with
economic life as usual: So we stopped working. We couldnt work anymore. People were afraid. You
couldnt even walk around.
76
It also aected commercial activities, as the following testimony indicates:
so we were walking [...] and we returned home because we were afraid. We didnt go out in the street any
more, and there was no business. We didnt have anything for our children to eat, because no one came
to the store. It was closed, and we stayed inside out of fear.
77
Te villagers fear isolated them and forced them to adopt lifestyles that were temporary and insecure.
Community development through collective labor came to a standstill. Te lack of trust had damaged re-
lationships, making it dicult to maintain friendships and cooperation among communities, neighbors
or even family members. Te lack of work forced displaced people to take up activities in the informal
sector or accept low-wage jobs that did not provide them with even a subsistence income. For these fami-
lies, informal employment created an insecurity and uncertainty that they had never experienced when
they had had their land and their animals.
75 See, for example, the following testimony: Our life changed a lot because I couldnt work. [...] My wife wore herself out to support me, and
I couldnt help with the work. CVR. BDI-I-P482. In-depth interview with a peasant victim of PCP-SL injured by a bomb. Ledoy, Bellavista (San
Martn), August 20, 2002.
76 CVR. BDI-I-P762. Interview with male settler, age 49, with ffth-grade education. Cushiviani (Junn), October 22, 2002.
77 CVR. BDI-I-P518. Public hearing in Lima. First session, June 21, 2002, case 2.
Chapter 7
28 6
Added to these problems was the job discrimination that aected women living in poverty. As one wom-
an put it, Because Im not a man, I cant work. [...] Because Im not a man, where could I go even to do
day labor? Nowhere.
78
For displaced people, the employment drama was even more acute. Tere was a gradual deterioration of
the relationship with family that had received them because of the economic burden of supporting dis-
placed relatives even temporarily: Te drama continued, because despite my age, I couldnt nd work in
Lima. Neither could my wife. Under those circumstances, even the family starts looking askance at you.
We usually got along well, but we could tell that they sometimes got tired of it.
79
Unemployment and poverty aggravated the uncertainty and desperation that many people felt. Even
those who managed to pull themselves up with a great deal of eort or family investment still felt the
eects: If this hadnt happened, my children would have nished their studies normally. [...] Now that
theyve nished however they could, now that theyre professionals, whats the use of being profession-
als if there are no jobs?
80
Te situation also created a sense of frustration because people were unable to
complete the educational-labor process, [a]nd even when they nish their studies, they end[ed] up on
the street without jobs.
81
Destruction of property, loss of agricultural capital and impoverishment
Te internal armed conict resulted in the destruction of public and private property, as well as in the
looting, theft and destruction of goods, with serious consequences for families and communities. Tis led
to even greater impoverishment. Tis section briey describes the material damage caused by the violence
and its eects on the economies of these communities.
78 CVR. BDI-I-P704. Public hearing in Abancay (Apurmac). Second session, August 27, 2002, case 8. Alleged violations: torture, sexual
violence and murder.
79 CVR. BDI-I-P438. Public hearing in Huamanga (Ayacucho). Third session, April 11, 2002, case 12. Relative of the victim; the witness is a teacher.
80 CVR. BDI-I-P450. Public hearing in Huamanga (Ayacucho), April 9, 2002, case 17. Testimony of a relative of a victim.
81 CVR. BDI-I-P704. Public hearing in Abancay (Apurmac). Second session, August 27, 2002, case 8. Relatives of a victim of torture, sexual
violence and murder.
OPPORTUNITY COST TOTAL DIRECT COST SECTOR
5,400,000,000 9,184,584,648 2,804,584,648 TOTAL US$
1,500,000,000 1,800,000,000 300,000,000 AGRICULTURE
900,000,000 1,976,535,217 1,076,535,217 ENERGY AND MINES
980,000,000 - - DEFENSE
500,000,000 542,649,431 42,649,431 TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
2,500,000,000 3,800,000,000 1,300,000,000 INDUSTRY AND TRADE
85,400,000 85,400,000 - OTHER
SOURCE: TAKEN FROM THE STUDY VIOLENCE AND PACIFICATION, SPECIAL SENATE COMMISSION,
DESCO AND THE ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS. LIMA, 1989.
TABLE 8
PERU 1980-1988: ESTIMATED ECONOMIC COST
OF THE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT (IN US$)
28 7
Destruction of social and communal infrastructure
It is impossible to determine the exact cost of the damage to state property during the internal armed
conict or the cost of the harm inicted on the civilian population. Nevertheless, there are some gures
that indicate the cost of the violence between 1980 and 2000. In 1988, a Special Senate Commission
responsible for a study of Violence and Pacication concluded that the economic cost of the damages
perpetrated by the subversive groups was approximately US $8,184,584,648, equivalent to 66 percent of
that years total external debt and 45 percent of GDP. Table 8 shows the economic cost of the violence by
sector as indicated in that study.
According to other studies (Desco), the destruction of high-tension power lines by subversives between
1980 and 1991 caused losses of US $2 billion.
82
Another study of Economics and Violence, prepared
by the organization Constitution and Society (Constitucin y Sociedad) in 1993, estimated the countrys
economic losses between 1980 and 1992 at US $21 billion (Puicn 2003: 12).
Te PCP-SLs violence was also directed against organizations involved in production. In the central high-
lands, acts of violence were launched between March 1988 and January 1989 against the Heronas Toledo
and Cahuida Public Interest Farming Cooperatives (Sociedades Agrcolas de Inters Social, SAIS) (Snchez
1989). Te former stopped operating after its buildings and property were destroyed in March 1988. Te
Cahuide SAIS, located in the upper Mantaro Valley, was considered the most important of the agricultural
businesses established in the region under the agrarian reform. According to Puicn, one of the reasons for
the PCP-SLs constant attacks on this cooperative was that the SAIS was able to bring peasant communi-
ties together in a market system. Tis led to the decision to destroy it (Puicn 2003: 19). It nally closed in
January 1989 after a series of attacks. Because of economic diculties, the company could not aord the
cost of security systems that would have enabled it to avoid destruction. Added to this was the lack of police
support and the slow response from police, factors that did not aect other SAISsuch as Tpac Amaru,
Pachactec and Ramn Castillawhich had resources for security and defense.
In the southern highlands, the PCP-SL attacks occurred especially in the department of Puno. Accord-
ing to a study by Rnique (1991), the main attacks were aimed at cooperatives. Shining Path incursions
increased from 15 in 1983 to 22 in 1984 and to 33 in 1985. In 1986, there were 83 attacks and 32 victims.
In 1987, the number of violent actions decreased after a PCP-SL column was destroyed at Cututuni.
During that year, however, there were 35 attacks. Te number increased to 77 in 1988 and 97 in 1989.
Te damage took its toll on communities. A study in Ayacucho
83
indicated that it would have cost the state more
than 1.3 million soles to rebuild the aected communities. Another study found that 28 percent of homes in
99 communities in 6 provinces of Ayacucho were destroyed, along with 35 percent of community buildings.
84
Although it is impossible to determine the number of houses or the amount of property destroyed as a result of
the violence, many of those who testied expressed a sense of emptiness and powerlessness in the face of these
events: In Incarajay, our houses were burned down. Te Shining Path members and the soldiers beat the men.
[...] Tose wretches left me in poverty. Tey burned down my house. Everyone in my community has suered
a lot.
85
A member of a peasant self-defense group testied that, Tey destroyed our community. Tey burned
down our houses and our school [...] and the PCP-SL came to take away the authorities and the children.
86
Estimates of the losses suered by families whose houses and crops were destroyed, either by the PCP-SL
or by members of the forces of order, are shown in Table 9. Tese families had to deal with the total or
82 According to ELECTRO-PERU, 335 towers were destroyed in 1989. That fgure includes towers owned by the subsidiary ELECTRO-NORTE,
which would increase the total by US $600 million, according to estimates from ELECTRO-PERU.
83 Evaluations by CEPRODEP in 10 communities in the districts of Vischongo and Tambo, in the provinces of Vilcashuamn and La Mar,
respectively, in the department of Ayacucho.
84 Diagnstico de desplazamiento en Ayacucho 1993-1997. Hroes sin nombre, a study of displacement done by CEPRODEP in 1997, based
on 167 family surveys with people from 99 communities, 33 districts and 6 provinces in the northern part of the department of Ayacucho.
85 CVR. BDI-I-P414. Gender workshop, Ayacucho (Huamanga), October 23, 2002. Female villager.
86 CVR. BDI-I-P411. Workshop with self-defense committee members, Satipo (Junn), November 4, 2002.
Chapter 7
28 8
partial loss of their assets, which seriously compromised their ability to support themselves.
Some studies mention the destruction of roads by the PCP-SL, which restricted the ow of trade among local
and regional markets (Del Pino 2001). For example, Huancasancos (Ayacucho) had been linked commercially
with coastal provinces such as Nazca, Ica and Lima. Te PCP-SL restricted commercial trac in these areas,
not only prohibiting people from traveling to the coast, but also keeping people from exchanging their products
with valley regions such as Cangallo, Huancapi, Hualla, Canaria, Sarhua and other provinces.
Abandonment of land and loss of capital
Te internal armed conict forced aected families and communities to leave their villages and abandon
their homes, farmlands, livestock and other property. According to the INEI survey (1997), 71.4 percent of
those polled had some sort of property in their home communities, including houses, land and/or livestock,
and only 28.6 had no property. In the same survey, 94.1 percent of returnees said they had agricultural land,
13.4 percent pasture land, 3.9 percent woodland and 20.2 percent livestock, as shown in Table 10.
Most of the people in the aected communities were small farmers. Te amount of land under cultivation
was drastically reduced, seriously aecting the income of peasant families.
87
A family that had about 1
hectare of land under cultivation before the violence was planting less than half a hectare afterwards (Del
Pino 2001). Some continued to sow their elds, but they spent as little time there as possible because of
the PCP-SLs presence in those areas.
According to the Tird National Agriculture Census of 1994, 30,655 hectares of cropland were no longer cul-
tivated because of terrorism. Besides terrorism, the census noted that the lack of a rural labor force and changes
in employment were also factors (see Table 11). Te areas most aected were Junn and Ayacucho. According to
87 These were families in six communities of returnees in the department of Ayacucho: Bellavista, Umaro and Pomatambo (province of
Vilcashuamn) and Laupay, Cunya and Uchuraccay in the north (province of Huanta).
COST IN SOLES PROPERTY
TOTAL (*)
HOUSING (KIT OF CORRUGATED METAL SHEETS)
SET OF KITCHEN UTENSILS
SET OF TOOLS (KIT)
THRESHING EQUIPMENT
PLOWING EQUIPMENT
SHEEP (2)
BLANKETS
17,922
1,300
1,220
92
44 SMALL ANIMALS (MODULE)
981
400
4,470
840
8,575 SEED POTATO (S/. 8,575 PER HECTARE * 3 HECTARES)
(*) EQUIVALENT TO US$5,120 (S/. 3.50 = US$1)
ESTIMATES BASED ON COSTS CALCULATED BY PAR
TABLE 9
PROPERTY LOSSES OF AN AVERAGE PEASANT FAMILY
(IN NUEVOS SOLES CALCULATED IN 2002)
28 9
the 1997 INEI survey, by the end of 1996 about 3,000 hectares had been abandoned in Junn and about 9,000
hectares in Ayacucho. Te number of agricultural units aected, however, was as high as 10,575.
With regard to the lack of labor gure in table 11, it is important to remember that the violence resulted
in a drastic reduction of the labor force in the communities aected by the death, disappearance, im-
prisonment and physical and psychological deterioration of their membersespecially those of working
ageas well as forced displacement. Logically, the reduction in the rural population due to these factors
resulted in a loss of capital for agriculture and the increased impoverishment of families.
Te production strategies of peasant families broke down because the PCP-SL not only hampered produc-
tion in the highlands (Coronel 1994), but also kept people from doing temporary work outside of the com-
munity to supplement their income and meet their families basic subsistence needs. For local residents,
the violence was another factor in their decisions related to economics and production. Families sought to
minimize their crop losses, planting smaller areas in order to reduce the risk of losing their investment if the
PCP-SL attacked again. Teir goal was not only to guarantee production, but also to ensure their survival.
Impact of theft and destruction of property and impoverishment
Both the subversive groups and members of the security forces perpetrated direct attacks on peoples
rights and property. Although they used dierent means, in both cases the theft and destruction of prop-
erty had a negative impact. When the violence arrived,
[M]en and women slept in other places, in the hills or places where there had been land-
slides, to escape and save their lives. [Te attackers] were burning their homes, taking their
livestock, blankets, pots, tools and anything else they found. Tey took everything, and if
you didnt want to help them, they would kill you or burn you alive in your house with your
kids out of revenge. You couldnt escape and youd be burned to a crisp. Children, mothers
they even destroyed the churches and schools.
88
88 CVR. BDI-I-P415. Gender workshop for men, Huamanga (Ayacucho), October 23, 2002.
PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS TYPE OF PROPERTY (*)
100% TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS
98.6% WITH PROPERTY
13.4% PASTURELAND
94.1% AGRICULTURAL LAND
20.2% LIVESTOCK
3.9% FOREST
0.1% CRAFT WORKSHOP
1.8% DRY-GOODS STORE
1.4% WITHOUT PROPERTY
(*) EACH CATEGORY OF HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY IS INDEPENDENT
SOURCE: INEI SURVEY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF RETURNEE POPULATION
TABLE 10
PERU 1997: PERCENTAGE OF RETURNEE HOUSEHOLDS,
BY PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND TYPE OF PROPERTY
Chapter 7
29 0
Tis account describes the theft, looting, destruction and pillaging that occurred in various places where
confrontations took place. Te number of cattle and sheepwhich are a form of savings for these fami-
liesdecreased notably, in some cases because they were stolen or killed by the PCP-SL or the military
and in others because people sold them at less than their market value in order to obtain money to emi-
grate. As a result, 34 percent of these families saw a sharp decrease in the livestock they owned, which led
to a loss of capital (Del Pino et al 2001).
REGION UNIT OF MEASURE TOTAL A/ TERRORISM
LACK OF
LABOR
FOUND
OTHER
WORK
THEFT
A/ INCLUDES OTHER VARIABLES THAT APPEAR IN THE SURVEY.
SOURCE: INEI THIRD NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CENSUS 1994.
HECTARES 1,107,356 1,148 12,001 561 171
AGRICULTURAL UNITS 63,062 117 2,184 91 72
SAN MARTN
AGRICULTURAL UNITS 1,745,773 10,575 84,312 4,853 3,015
HECTARES 35,381,808 30,655 104,498 5,368 1,615
NATIONAL
HECTARES 1,305,491 621 2,360 201 42
HUANCAVELICA
HECTARES 4,384,904 366 2,277 164 117
AGRICULTURAL UNITS 184,610 776 31,764 1,246 1,249
PUNO
HECTARES 1,343,787 2,695 34,088 401 355
HUNUCO
HECTARES 1,437,144 222 1,375 54 54
APURMAC
HECTARES 1,715,207 8,665 4,381 156 32
AGRICULTURAL UNITS 87,263 4,608 6,655 265 74
AYACUCHO
HECTARES 2,264,730 13,093 6,124 492 82
AGRICULTURAL UNITS 118,360 2,115 4,301 320 190
JUNN
HECTARES 997,807 795 5,720 1,482 70
PASCO
TABLE 11
PERU 1994: AGRICULTURAL AREA NOT PLANTED, BY MAIN CAUSE
29 1
In general, people suered the theft and destruction of their livestock and of all animals on which they
depended for survival:
Tey burned everything, the house. Tey took everything, whatever they wanted. My
mother had a pig. Tey killed the pig. What had come from the planting had gone to feed
the pig [...]. Tere was also a turkey. Tey ate the turkey, they took the hens. [...]. My brother
had gotten away, but they loaded the burro with meat from the animals theyd killed at the
house. Tey escaped with that. Tey escaped at night. I dont know where they slept, but in
the morning they were in Parcco, and the next day you could see everything theyd done.
Tere had been pigs. Teyd cut everything up [...].
89
Te subversive groups burst into communities and took over the property of the wealthier merchants as
well as small shops or private businesses run by community members, as one victim recounted at length:
Tey looted the shops. [...] Tey kicked in the door of the shop and opened it, and took sacks
of rice, sugar, everything. Where could you go to complain? [...] I was working in the shop.
Te shop was empty. I was discouraged. I didnt work anymore. [...] Only recently are the
shops opening again. Before, as I told you, they also went into all the houses and took corn,
fava beans, whatever was there. Tey ate that; they even ate cats. Tey prepared it there.
Tey brought meat from nearby. Tey slaughtered it. [...] For the Party, [they said], for the
Party! Tey needed provisions every day. [...] Tere were animals all around them. All their
food, all their meat was free. Tey took clothes from the merchants who came from Hua-
manga. Tey assaulted them and took all the clothes. For the Party! Do you want to stay
alive or not? Tey said, Were ghting for the poor! Te merchants who brought clothes, 8
or 12 sets of clothes, they attacked them. Tey [merchants] dont come any more.
90
Te looting and the burning of homes and community buildings was a common practice of the PCP-SL.
One witness said: Im from the native community of Aguayta. We have also suered from the violence.
Te PCP-SL came in 1989 and our village was destroyed, our houses were burned and the school was robbed
of everythingtools, pots. [...]
91
Te value of these goods to their owners was more than monetary. Seeing
their belongings go up in ames or nding nothing in their houses when they returned was a psychological
and emotional shock. Many people testied that they had to abandon their belongings to save their lives.
My neighbors stayed in the community of Kimbiri. Ive been living here in Anapate for three years. Tey
burned everything I had in my house. Tey burned my sewing machine, my typewriter, my radio. Tey left
me with no clothes. We escaped with the clothes on our backs. We ed into the forest.
92
Businesses and cooperatives also suered the eects of the violence. One witness described in detail what
happened to a community-run business:
Early the next day, we reached the cabin and found that they had slaughtered 200 animals.
Te corrals ran with blood. It looked like a river. We were shocked. Te women said, What
is this? Its the end of the world. How could they punish us this way? What have we done?
Tis wasnt a gift from the government; this was the fruit of our hard work and eort, be-
cause we live in poverty and want to have our own income, because the authorities ignore
us. Its just because we live in the Andes, in the hills. [...] Tey singled out the women and
men who had opposed the killing. Now youre going to take the place of the alpacas, they
said. And everybody else said, Why are they going to kill our brothers and sisters? Tey
should just kill us all. Since you want to kill our business, kill us all. Two or three men
came and readied their machine guns. Whoever survives this will stay alive. Today and
89 CVR. BDI-I-P59. Interview in San Juan de Lurigancho (Lima), June 2002. The interviewee is a seamstress, age 43, from Parqo.
90 CVR. BDI-I-P333. Interview in Sacsamarca, Huancasancos (Ayacucho), March 2002, with a villager, age 58, who witnessed the massacre in
Lucanamarca.
91 CVR. BDI-I-P410. Gender workshop for men, Satipo (Junn), November 4, 2002.
92 CVR. BDI-I-P412. Workshop with displaced people in Satipo (Junn), November 4, 2002.
Chapter 7
29 2
tomorrow, for just a few hours, youll stay alive. So we resisted somewhat, but unfortunately
we were unarmed. What could we do against people who were armed? Tey killed the 480
alpacas, including the young ones and pregnant females. After they slaughtered the animals,
they made us line up. Every man got two or three alpacas. Te guts were discarded and the
condors ate them. We didnt gather up the little ones. We left them there for the condors.
93

Tis account and the following one show how the subversives destroyed the economy of the businesses,
such as the Illary SAIS, by forcibly distributing their property (livestock) among the peasants, who often
had conicts with the cooperatives workers.
Huacauta was burned down and people were killed there. I think I have it written
down. Seven people were killed, peasants and workers. Of course, at the time the com-
munity members and the peasants were in conict, but in the end they were poor peas-
ants. [...] Te Charquismo farm belonged to the Illary SAIS. It was completely burned
by the PCP-SL. Tey distributed the animals, but with no planning. Tere wasnt a
planned distribution of the livestock. People were told to take it. Some people took one
or two, some took 50, some took more, some didnt take anything. Te next day came
the repression, the Army, the police. Tey said that anyone who had livestock was a
terrorist. Youre a member of the Shining Path, a terrorist. But when they found people
who had nothing, they still didnt say anything clear, but those people had saved them-
selves. Teyd won a little something.
94
Te security forces actions were also marked by violence, abuse and discrimination. Although the Peru-
vian Army behaved well at rst, later there were abuses. Te Army [...] went into the elds quietly, took
the crops, took hens, but later you said something to them and they were afraid.
95
Soldiers from certain
military bases committed many abuses. Tey ate the animals, raped the women and made the people
submit to them. [...] [When they left] they took all our things. Tey took 50 sheep, tools, clothing, a tape
recorder, a typewriter.
96
In Accomarca, they started to loot goods and grain. Tey said, Its the pigs
birthday, and they asked for money and grain.
97
Villagers tended to give in to the soldiers out of fear of
what might happen to them if they did not: We cooperated. When they asked, we gave them potatoes
and corn. Tere were four neighborhoods, and each month we had to give them a calf. Each neighbor-
hood gave one each month.
98
As long as the military remained in certain communities, they did not miss
an opportunity to take the peasants goods. When the soldiers arrived, they took all the animals. Some-
times they took them away in a helicopter. Tey left us with nothing, even now. It has hurt us a lot.
99
People had no way to protect themselves from the abuses that came from both sides: What can you do if
four of them come with guns? Even if you tried to protect yourself, they would hit you with the rie butt.
Tey didnt even respect women. Tey didnt respect anybody.
100
Te security forces also appropriated the goods that people left behind when they ed the violence in
their communities:
Some people were abused and mistreated. Neither the people nor the animals were safe. Te
soldiers, the security forces, took advantage of the fact that many of us had ed, leaving our
belongings behind. We abandoned our homes and our animals. We abandoned our elds.
93 CVR. BDI-I-P708. Public hearing in Abancay (Apurmac). Second session, August 27, 2002, case 11. Woman and man, residents of the
community of Cotahuarcay.
94 CVR. BDI-I-P247. Focus group, Puno (Puno), May 14, 2002. Participants were new and former leaders of the Departmental Federation of
Peasants of Puno (Federacin Departamental de Campesinos de Puno).
95 CVR. BDI-I-P299. Interview with a female member of the 7 de Octubre community in the province of Leoncio Prado, Hunuco. May 2002.
96 CVR. BDI-I-P26. Accomarca (Ayacucho), August 2002, merchant, age 38, an alleged former PCP-SL member whose brother was killed by the Army.
97 CVR. BDI-I-P30. Focus group of men and women. Lloqllapampa ( Ayacucho), June 2002.
98 CVR. BDI-I-P33. Interview in Accomarca (Ayacucho), June 2002. The interviewee is a farmer, age 54, who was an authority in that community.
99 CVR. BDI-I-P48. Focus group of women in Accomarca (Ayacucho), June 2002. Five women participated.
100 CVR. BDI-I-P33. Interview in Accomarca (Ayacucho) in June 2002. Farmer, age 54, who was an authority in that community.
29 3
Te police and the Army took advantage of that. We couldnt le a complaint because we
didnt know who had done it.
101
Te destruction of property was aimed, among other things, at subjugating the villagers and leaving them
defenseless. People who did not ee were forced to serve the PCP-SL or the military, as the following
accounts describe: We had to take rewood to the camp. Tey forced us, because if we didnt do it we
would be punished. It was the same with the military.
102
Tey asked for our collaboration. Tey stole
and, besides that, they asked for collaboration. Each neighborhood collaborated by providing calves and
sheep for them to eat, for however many people were at the base. Tats the kind of collaboration they
wanted.
103
Captain Garca ate my burro to celebrate Mothers Day with the women in town. [...] It was
stolen the night before and they had a barbecue with it.
104
In general, stealing animals and food destroyed the peasants and villagers principal sources of wealth and
means of survival. Moreover, as the testimony shows, the loss and destruction of goods and property reached
very high levels. Many people lost everything when their homes and means of subsistence were burned.
So around two in the afternoon, more or less, we saw that they had burned everything.
Tere were 15 vendors there. Te Army burned everything. Despite my age, I still went to
complain. How could you burn down their houses, their businesses, if were not members
of the Shining Path? Youre the terrorists. Youve also killed people and dumped them. We
went through a lot. It was sad. I went to my house and found nothing. Bottles melted like
candles. Even the tin roof had melted. Te hens we had raised were burned up. Te guinea
pigs were burned up. I cried. It was a shame.
105
It is important to note that all of the situations mentioned here dramatically aected living conditions
in the countryside, impoverishing aected areas and communities even more than they had been before
the conict began.
Te political violence brought more poverty, because people didnt work in the elds any
more. Tey spent their time trying to keep the community safe, giving up their few free days
to work together so they could survive. Te subversion brought a lot of poverty. If it hadnt
been for that, the community would have progressed. Youve seen how it is. Te kids have
changed. Teyre resentful, they complain, theyre tired of life because of everything that
has happened. And they know the problems we had with such-and-such a person. Now we
call people uncle or cousin, but back then everybody was an enemy. Tats been ingrained in
the childrens minds. Its a terrible problem. Teres a total lack of trust. In the community,
we have almost no trust. No matter how close you are to someone, theres no trust. Tats
what it brought us in agriculture, in the economy and also in our way of being. We used to
be united, we used to trust each other. Now its every man for himself. Tose who look out
for themselves win and live; those who dont, dont. Everything broke down. And I worry
about it because I grew up with a dierent kind of life. I look at how I grew up and I look
at how my nephews and my little brother are growing up now, with resentment, with that
distrust, and I want to say something, but I cant because Im afraid, and were worried. It
wasnt like that before. If we had a problem, we went and talked about it. Tey didnt tell
us to go to hell. We looked for some way to solve it. But now people say, What do I care?
Tats your problem. Tings are complicated, arent they?
106
101 CVR. BDI-I-P701. Public hearing in Abancay (Apurmac). First session, August 27, 2002, case 6. Male community member recounts the
murder of villagers in Toraya, province of Aymaraes, Apurmac.
102 CVR. BDI-I-P39. Field notes from an informal interview with a female farmer, age 48. Accomarca (Ayacucho), June 2002.
103 CVR. BDI-I-P48. Focus group of women in Accomarca (Ayacucho), June 2002, held with fve women.
104 CVR. BDI-I-P53. Field notes from an informal interview with a 60-year-old farmer and alleged former member of PCP-SL in Accomarca
(Ayacucho), June 2002.
105 CVR. BDI-I-P298. Venenillo (province of Leoncio Prado, Hunuco), May 2002. The interviewee was a community authority.
106 CVR. BDI-I-P768. Interview with a leader of the community of Cushiviani (Junn), October 2002.
Chapter 7
29 4
Te magnitude of the economic consequences is greater for communities that have been destroyed and
the families that lost everything. But in one way or another, all the communities and families that lived
through, or still live amid, violence have been aected that way. It is not dicult, therefore, to nd evi-
dence of impoverishment in the thousands of accounts recorded by the CVR:
Te political violence made us poorer. In those days, we didnt even have seed to plant. Our
crops decreased. Nothing was the way it used to be. Only now are we recovering. In those
times of violence, the price of seeds rose and we didnt have enough money to buy them. We
couldnt produce the way we used to. Te prices we got for our products dropped, and we
didnt take our crops to market anymore.
107
Production has decreased. Te elds are abandoned. We dont work the way we used to.
Teres not the same strength. Whats more, now we all work in our own elds.
108
As indicated, the total or partial loss of their basic means of subsistence and the resulting impoverishment
forced many people to abandon their communities and move elsewhere in search of refuge and better
conditions for survival. Nevertheless, the new situation was also adverse, as they could not obtain an
adequate socio-economic status in their new places of refuge. Tose who returned to their communities,
however, now face serious economic diculties because of the terrible conditions in which their villages
were left by the violenceconditions that still have not improved.
Testimonies gathered by the CVR show that the current economic situation of families hardest hit by
the violence remains a concern. Tey have been unable to improve their situation signicantly because
many of the problems have not been resolved. For that reason, many of those who testied expressed to
the CVR their wish for the government to provide reparation for the damage done to them, with special
attention paid to widows and orphans:
Shes in Corilla, but shes from Sanaveni. She says, I have suered from the political vio-
lence. Te PCP-SL took us and killed my husband. Now the children left. I am a widow.
I have several small children and no one takes responsibility. Tey have no clothes to wear.
So I would like the Truth Commission to insist that the government pay reparations to all
these orphans who have been left behind. Not only them; there are many people who have
suered. Our Ashninka brothers and sisters have suered. Tey should also receive repa-
rations. I see how my children have been orphaned, too. Teyre malnourished. Tey have
nothing to eat. And I feel all alone, having seen how they killed my husband. Its not like
it used to be, when I lived with my husband. We had everything. We had food to eat. But
when we went with the PCP-SL, we didnt eat and we started to suer from anemia. How
many children died of anemia? Tats all I can say.
109
Deterioration of economic institutions
Te internal armed conict has also had an impact on local institutions for community development.
In this sense, the term institutions refers to implicit agreements among community members to pre-
serve a stable way of life, and reciprocity is one of the tools for sustaining and strengthening a group.
Others include their expectations and their way of teaching themselves to obtain what they need. From
this standpoint, the ways in which groups and communities organize themselves have been signicantly
transformed because of the eects of the violence.
Te actions of the armed groups aected the ways in which the communities organized production and
distribution as well as their sense of family and community development. Productionwhich was often
107 CVR. BDI-I-P416. Workshop with peasant self-defense committees in Huamanga (Ayacucho), October 23, 2002.
108 CVR. BDI-I-P421. Gender workshop with men, Pichari, La Convencin (Cusco), October 25, 2002.
109 CVR. BDI-I-P409. Gender workshop with women in Satipo (Junn), November 4, 2002.
29 5
ritualized in planting, harvesting and community festivalswas directly or indirectly aected. Tese
events had been opportunities for the exchange of agricultural goods or livestock, but this custom was
changed by the armed groups, which sought complete control and often prohibited such events or used
them for purposes other than those stipulated by ancestral practices. Tis created confusion and distrust
among the population, and these practices soon disappeared.
Tis section provides an overview of the way in which the armed violence changed the productive or-
ganization of families and communities, created major problems in the exchange of goods and aected
expectations for personal and local development. Te disorganization of the production system was ac-
companied by a lack of attention to improving production techniques, proper management of adminis-
tration and resolution of inter-community conicts.
Changes in collective forms of organizing labor
Local production organizations constantly resorted to the reciprocal provision of labor and resources to
support their members and achieve economic development. Tis system allowed for an exchange of labor
for production in the eld and ensured the survival of families and the community. Te sudden arrival
of armed groups changed this model of production, bringing chaos and imbalance to community life.
Peoples perceptions of one another also changed, and there was greater distrust in relationships, which
aected communal organization in various ways.
In families and communities that had no role in the armed conict, the people who had been the sole
supporters of their groups died, disappeared or suddenly ed. Te temporary or permanent absence of
these people seriously compromised the economic system. In the lives of families, villages and regions,
there was a disruption of unprecedented magnitude in local production systems.
Te turmoil that the armed conict created in familial and communal life was reected in the changes
that aected the way in which groups and individuals related to one another. Old models of personal and
collective cooperation and collaboration were weakened and altered in ways that aected community
members and institutions dierently and to varying degrees.
Peasant life is fundamentally communal and is strengthened by the bonds of family and community
relationships. Te permanent absence of a member aects this organization because the persons activities
were an important source of labor for supporting the family and the community. Economic organization
based on communal labor (minka) or reciprocal labor (ayni) was seriously aected because the armed
groups distorted these practices, using them in ways that were not part of communal customs. Both ayni
and minka are forms of exchange that imply long years of relationships based on knowing one another,
rooted in the assurance that the services provided will be repaid in kind sometime in the future. Trust,
therefore, forms the basis of continuity for social and economic relationships.
In many cases, however, relationships of trust were destroyed, giving rise to others based on individualism.
Tere used to be minkas here [...] work for the good of the community. Now people wont participate unless
you oer them liquor,
110
one person said with a combination of nostalgia and concern. Communal labor
is no longer an institution that brings individuals together for collective benet, strengthening the group.
Teyre coming back, one by one. As they see that the village is calm now, they say, I may
as well go back. Tey work in their elds, but relationships arent good. In those years, we
were united and we worked for the good of the village. Now people arent united. [...] Tings
have changed a lot. Te village is sad, and the park is all overgrown. People seem to have lost
their enthusiasm for working for the community. Tats how things are now. Why did they
have to kill the leaders of the community? Weve been abandoned, completely abandoned.
111
110 CVR. BDI-I-P3. Focus group, Vilcashuamn (Ayacucho), June 2002. Four male participants.
111 CVR. BDI-I-P412. Workshop for displaced people in Satipo (Junn), November 4, 2002. Displaced residents participated.
Chapter 7
29 6
In some cases, entire communities have become discouraged and lack the energy to start over with their
economic activities. Residents no longer want to participate in community labor, said one leader of the
peasant community of Accomarca.
112
Willingness to engage in civic action is practically disappearing. [...] Its going to disappear.
People are willing to work for one day, but no more. How will we eat? [...] Its a situation
thats hard to explain, and now, with government aid, its worse. Now nobody wants to
work. Even the mothers have become lazier. Tey want to receive food handouts. Tey ex-
pect that. Even the men are like that now.
113
Despite the constant, intense attacks communities were subjected to, however, reciprocity did not disap-
pear altogether; rather, it re-emerged at dicult moments. Even in the hardest times, the people who were
most aected by the armed conict could occasionally turn to cooperation or mutual aid for survival, to
rebuild property that had been destroyed or repair productive infrastructure.
Communities and families also suered as their members scattered. Tis fragmented the organizational
model and kept it from recovering quickly. As a result, each member found his or her own means of sur-
vival. Tis change in ancestral customsprompted by fear and distrustled to discouragement, neglect
and failure to fulll designated roles.
Te most serious problem, as Ive said, is that people are negligent. Tey dont come to com-
munal labor, they dont fulll their responsibilities, they dont come to meetings. [...] I think
they dont love their village. Each one works in his own eld and everybody minds their own
business. [...] Teres a lot of indierence. Ive talked with the captain at the base about going
from eld to eld and getting people together for communal labor [...] to clean up the village
and x up the health center. But the main work we need to do is cleaning up.
114
For many authorities and community leaders, communal organization was no longer a way of sustaining
and supporting community life. Because of this fragmentation, ancestral types of relationships faded.
In the opinion of one leader, a community such as Huancasancos is a peasant community organized
in four ayllus [clans] that perform minkas and ayni. Before, they planted collectively, but that custom is
disappearing, according to the people weve talked to. People have become very lazy. Te community uses
that land now as a meeting place.
115
Solidarity and cooperation were also undermined. Many of the people aected who lost family members
because of the violence, such as widows and orphans, no longer had material and social support. Tey
became destitute and often suered discrimination and were frequently stigmatized, as described in the
following testimony:
Community authorities look down on poor children, orphans and widows because they
have no money to pay laborers to help them work the land. People arent good any more.
Tey charge you for everything when they help you. Teyve gotten used to charging for
every job they do. Teres no ayni anymore. It still exists in some communities, but not in
others. For example, when widows want to work the land, no one helps them because they
dont have money to pay the laborers. Te authorities dont say anything, but they look
down on them because theyre poor. Orphaned children cant build their houses, cant repair
them. And no one says anything. Even though those widows lost their husbands in action
against the Shining Path, trying to protect everyone else, so nothing would happen to us.
116
112 CVR. BDI-I-P33. Interview with a farmer, age 54, who was an authority in the community of Accomarca (Ayacucho), June 2002.
113 CVR. BDI-I-P350. Interview in Sancos, Huancasancos (Ayacucho), March 2002. The interviewee is a resident, age 65, who works at the
community health center.
114 CVR. BDI-I-P298. Interview in Venenillo (province of Leoncio Prado, Hunuco), May 2002. The interviewee is a community authority.
115 CVR. BDI-I-P320. Field notes from an informal interview with a community authority in Sancos, Huancasancos (Ayacucho) in March 2002.
116 CVR. BDI-I-P416. Workshop on peasant self-defense committees held in Huamanga (Ayacucho), October 23, 2002. The participants are
members of the committees.
29 7
Suspension of trading networks and opportunities
Changes in the economic systems were accompanied by a decrease in production and, therefore, a reduc-
tion in what was available for bartering. Te presence of subversive groups or security forces in the com-
munities directly aected the system of distribution and exchange of products. Many families and com-
munities ended up without money or products, either because of theft and looting the armed groups or
security forces or because they were forced to abandon their elds without harvesting or selling the crops.
Te armed action also destroyed networks and other opportunities for communities and villages to trade
their products. In some cases, such trade was restricted or controlled, while in others it was prohibited,
altering the local commercial system. Markets and plazas were empty because peasants no longer had
products for market. Tese places also became dangerous, because opposing forces could identify resi-
dents there and later disappear them. Tis increased the sense of fear and distrust.
Constant robberies and assaults also decreased commercial movement in many places and led to the failure
of small businesses: I used to go up from Pomabamba and trade with a merchant from Huancavelica. Ten
I would buy cattle and take them to slaughter. I have a relative, D.Q., who is doing well at that kind of work.
But members of the PCP-SL stole my money and I went broke.
117
People who lost their goods and had no
way to continue their local economic activities were severely aected and had little chance of starting over.
While I was in Lima, they searched my house in San Jos: Id asked a neighbor to take care
of my dog. Tey killed him there. I found my house destroyed and the intelligence service
kept following us. Tey made life impossible. Tey left a note in the house telling me to turn
myself in or my house would be ashes. So we abandoned everything out of fear. As a result, my
children have been aected. Teyre ill, traumatized or paralyzed. One of them lost the ability
to speak. Im nervous, too. I have a bad heart, I get headaches. My children have heart prob-
lems and headaches, too. Teyve fallen behind in their studies. If it hadnt been for that, my
children would have nished their studies normally, they would have gotten jobs. But the way
things have ended up, now that theyre professionals, what good is that if there are no jobs, if no
one will hire them? I just ask that the Truth Commission support us. I ask for that support.
118
Te closing of small businesses was not only disadvantageous for the owners but also a problem for the
community, which lost access to the few goods that modernity had to oer. In many cases, the owners of
commercial establishments could not bear to see what they had earned through long years of eort and
sacrice vanish in an instant.
In 1987, there was another attack against my father. [...] Business got worse every day. My father
wasnt the same. He didnt have the business savvy that had made him a leader, even though
hed worked for and represented important companiesNational, Panasonic, Philips, Singer,
Honda, and others. Tey said, You know what, Jorge, keep working with us; were going to help
you. But he didnt have the same ability, the same drive. [...] Business got worse every day.
We were afraid, but not Jorge. No, Jorge wasnt afraid. [...] He wasnt afraid, and I thought that
was strange. He wanted to keep living here. Business got worse every day. [...] A few days before
the wedding, he arrived here in Ayacucho and found his store robbed. It was another attack on
my father, this time a robbery.... My father led a police report and the necessary investigation
was done. Tey never found out who did it. At the time, we were afraid. We didnt even want to
know who it was, because we were afraid they would kill us. But now we want to know. [] He
kept working, trying to get the store going again, but he couldnt. Te debt wore him out. Time
got the better of him, and little by little he fell apart. [...] My father broke down.
119
117 CVR. BDI-I-P371. Interview with a rancher, age 50, Lucanamarca (Ayacucho), March 2002.
118 CVR. BDI-I-P450. Public hearing in Huamanga (Ayacucho), April 9, 2002, case 17. Relatives of victims of disappeared people from the
province of Vctor Fajardo.
119 CVR. BDI-I-P443. Public hearing in Huamanga (Ayacucho), April 2002, case 15. Testimony of the victims relatives.
Chapter 7
29 8
Te people who lost their goods and shops had to nd new ways to make a living, which created great
instability and insecurity for their families. In many cases, they also found it impossible to plan and reor-
ganize their own lives and those of their families. One result was the limited possibilities of these families
to educate their children. Given the value of education for families in the zones aected by the armed
conict, the inability to oer it to their children brought the threat of cultural death.
Now there are more orphaned children who dont eat well. Te children who dress well are
those who have mothers and fathers. As mothers, we see that and suer greatly wondering how
those children will get an education. We cant help them either, because we are widows and we
dont have money. We wonder how well be able to aord to educate our children. So we get
even more discouraged. We cry because were sad that our children cant get an education.
120
Te destruction of their means of production left property owners and merchants disoriented and dis-
couraged. Under these unfavorable conditions, many community production organizations chose to give
up, declaring bankruptcy. Tese failures have continued, without much hope of recovery.
[Community members] dont want to have anything more to do with it. Its practically
bankrupted us. [...] Today no community has much support in livestock management. You
dont see the fruit of agricultural management or good administration. Tings were going
well before, but we dont see much possibility for recovery.
121
Paralysis of community development
Because of the eects of the armed conict on the countryside, which are described above, the CVR is
convinced that development in the communities was paralyzed and that this has persisted in various
ways. Te paralysis is seen not only in communities, but also among individuals, because impoverishment
and abandonment of the aected areas has had an obvious impact on their possibilities for development.
Tere was death, and that caused setbacks in community development. Why? Because the
Shining Path, especially, destroyed bridges, canals, churches, local government buildings
and other thingssavagely, so you could see that their motive was to destroy. For example,
they didnt want a road to reach a certain community. To me, thats a setback in community
development. Now the things they destroyed or damaged have to be repaired.
122
Many people who had contributed to local and regional development through agriculture or livestock
suddenly had to abandon the land and farms that they had built up over many years with great eort and
sacrice. Tey not only stopped harvesting their crops, they also abandoned elds and left them uncul-
tivated for several years. In short, the absence of investment in the communities not only impoverished
landowners, it also kept people from nding solutions to their production and marketing problems.
Tey came the next night, and everything went to hell until now. Te subversives came, and
the people who were investing left. Since the man who was investing had already recovered
the capital he had put into the road, he said he couldnt do any more, and everything was
left just as it was. In the end, we all had to work we had to do it ourselves.
123
For many of the people who testied, the abrupt end of production in the countryside or the city because
of the armed action meant a setback in their communal development as well as an end, in many cases, to
their dreams and aspirations. On top of this, the disappearance or absence of certain family members also
decreased the possibilities for adequate development. Tats why development is impossible in the village
120 CVR. BDI-I-P414. Gender workshop with women. Huamanga (Ayacucho), October 23, 2002.
121 CVR. BDI-I-P246. Focus group of female peasant leaders from the Departmental Association of Peasant Women of Puno (Asociacin
Departamental de Mujeres Campesinas de Puno), June 4, 2002.
122 CVR. BDI-I-P415. Gender workshop with men. Huamanga (Ayacucho), October 23, 2002.
123 CVR. BDI-I-P184. Interview with two brothers, one of whom is a member of a peasant self-defense group. Monobamba (Junn), June 6,
2002. They are villagers who forced the PCP-SL to leave.
29 9
of Pomatambo, because there are more widows than men,
124
one person said in a testimony to the CVR.
People aected by the violence also felt a sense of powerlessness and desperation because of the loss of
their property, which increased their sense of insecurity and lack of protection. Nobody thought about
getting ahead any morenot in their elds, where they used to work, not in their pastures. Everything
was practically abandoned. [...] Tey lived on the little they had in their houses, in their storerooms. Teir
livestock. Nothing more. Teres not much grain here, for example. When its clear at night, the frost
burns it.
125
For these and other reasons, the families aected by the actions of the armed groups believed
that family and community development in the countryside had been murdered. Te violence left
people defenseless and often unable to recover.
In Tarma, according to one of the people interviewed, the subversion killed rural development.
Tat was one of the rst eects I could see, because in those movements, no one builds things.
And those were promising rural areas. Tarma is full of people now because no one wants
to live in Palca or Tambo or Huasahuasi anymore; the guerrillas were strong there.
126
Te sense of community development was also changed by external factors that aected schools, which
were important for social mobility and growth. Te PCP-SLs actions not only corrupted the schools
function, it also made them dangerous places for the community. In the classrooms, villagers were lec-
tured about the doctrine of subversion or even killed. As a result, both students and teachers ed.
I didnt nish my studies because of the subversion, because of threats from members of
the community defense patrol and the military. [...] Young people fell behind out of fear.
We didnt want to study any more. If they found us, theyd take us away and kill us. Our
parents wouldnt even nd out. We were afraid to go to school. We were afraid to go to the
elds. Tey were like tigersif they found us, theyd eat us. Tat was a great setback to the
economy and to education.
127
In places where there had been violent confrontations, young people were forced to do work and take on
roles for which they were not prepared and which were not appropriate.
Tats how we passed the most dicult and most critical moment [] at the hands of those
murderers, of those damned terrorists who had all the children. More than 120 children
were orphaned, all of them minors. I was my fathers rst-born son and I have younger
brothers. Tere are 10 of us, and we were orphaned. Te same thing happened to many
other children, with 8 or 9. And since then, weve had no education. We havent been able
to study. From that moment on, we really didnt have anything to hang onto because my
younger brothers were just little. Tey didnt know how to work. [...] Since then, Ive had to
take care of my brothers the way many other older brothers have. So many brothers really
have been like fathers, supporting their younger brothers and sisters and helping them grow
up. I think that 90 percent or 95 percent of the orphans havent nished their studies. Tey
stopped at primary school. Well, some are in secondary, but they havent nished. Tats the
way it is even now.
128
Te transmission of ancestral knowledge was also transformed or mutilated, not only because elders no
longer had the freedom and opportunity to teach, but also because of the breakdown of collective social
patterns. Tis led many young people to stop participating in institutions that provided education or
training, so as to avoid becoming involved in the violence.
124 CVR. BDI-I-P431. Public hearing in Huamanga (Ayacucho). Second session, April 8, 2002, case 6. Victim of torture by the armed forces.
125 CVR. BDI-I-P350. Interview with a villager, age 65. Sancos, Huancasancos (Ayacucho), March 2002.
126 CVR. BDI-I -P182. Interview with villager and former mayor in La Merced (Junn), June 2002.
127 CVR. BDI-I-P776. Interview with female pre-school teacher, age 24, Cushiviani (Junn), October 17, 2002.
128 CVR. BDI-II-P48. Public hearing in Huancavelica (Huancavelica). Second session, May 25, 2002, case 8. Testimony of Rubn Chupayo
Ramos.
Chapter 7
30 0
Tere was a high dropout rate. Very high. Many people dropped out of the university. Oth-
ers stayed, but when I talk to them now, they tell me, Miss, we didnt learn anything during
those years, because people were concentrating more on surviving than on their studies.
Nothing much happened during those years, and there was constant terror. Tings would
happen and wed say, I wonder who it is: the PCP-SL, the MRTA or the Army. Everybody
was frightened, wondering who would show up. If they came with hoods and sacks, it was
the PCP-SL. If they came with black ski masks, it was the MRTA. And the Army, we al-
ready knew even before they arrived, the kids knew. Te Army! Te Army! Te Army!
And everyone who could leave did so.
129
In other places, schools disappeared because of the violence, leaving young people adrift and increasing
illiteracy rates. Te impossibility of oering their children an education became a serious obstacle for
families seeking ways to leave poverty.
I was just a kid of 14 or 15 at the time, but my goal was to become a professional. But with
the violence, my life changed. How I would have liked to have nished my studies, but I
wasnt able to. As I told you, grati appeared on the walls of our schools, and thats why
I wasnt able to nish. At the night school in Huanta where I studied, the military patrols
often went out into the streets and rounded up people. Tey could pick you up and beat the
shit out of you for no reason, and that was terrifying. Because of that, I stopped studying.
I dropped out in the fourth year of secondary school. I was almost nished, but there are
many families that were left like that. All my brothers and sisters, were backward because
we dropped out of school. I feel that as a great pain now. If it hadnt been for the violence,
one of my brothers, or maybe I, would have become a professional. We sacriced that. Were
in the elds every day as if we were nobody. Were not worth anything.
130
Te internal armed conict, therefore, paralyzed the development of the rural world and left a serious
impact on the productive structure, community organization, educational institutions and life plans of
the people in the aected communities. If we add these repercussions to the ones analyzed in the preced-
ing sections about human capital and the looting and destruction of the communities property, we can
conclude that the violence left economic desolation that aected an enormous number of people. Our
society and state owe these people a debt of reparation.
129 CVR. BDI-I-P444. Public hearing in Huamanga (Ayacucho). Third session, April 11, 2002, case 16. Testimony of the victims relatives.
130 CVR. BDI-I -P233. Focus groups, Huaycn, Ate (Lima), June 24, 2002. Male residents.
30 1
Te CVRs Proposals: Toward Reconciliation
C H A P T E R 8
Te CVR understands reconciliation as a process of re-establishing and refounding fundamental bonds
among Peruvians, bonds that were destroyed or eroded by the conict of the past decades. Reconcilia-
tion has three dimensions: (1) a political dimension, involving reconciliation among the state, society and
political parties; (2) a social dimension, involving the reconciliation of public institutions and civil society
entities with society as a whole, especially marginalized ethnic groups; and (3) an interpersonal dimen-
sion, involving members of communities or institutions that were in confrontation. Such reconstruction,
therefore, requires a social and political pact.
For reconciliation to be feasible, the country must address three vital issues: the nal resolution of the
conict, the critical discussion of the concepts of reconciliation held by dierent political and social sec-
tors, and the implementation of state policies that address the demands of civil society. Te latter implies
a profound reform of institutions, compliance with a plan for the reparation of damages for victims and
the application of criminal sanctions against those responsible for crimes and human rights violations.
Reconciliation in Peru must have certain basic characteristics that respond adequately, and therefore
justly, to the countrys particular situation. First, it must be multiethnic, pluricultural, multilingual and
multidenominational, justly taking into account Perus ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious diversity.
Second, it must lead to the states integration of the rural population. Tird, it must give a role to histori-
cal memory, understood as a collective reconstruction by people who acknowledge and recognize their
responsibility. Fourth, it must emphasize the value of women by recognizing their rights and their full
and equitable participation in civic life. And fth, it must be aimed at building citizenship, fostering a
democratic culture and educating in values.
Bringing this concept of reconciliation to fruition demands specic actions, rst by the state and second
by civil society. Tese actions or initiatives are set out in the following sections.
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Te proposal for institutional reforms is aimed at modifying the conditions that led to and exacerbated
the internal conict. Te CVRs analysis of the violence between 1980 and 2000 found that the immedi-
ate cause lay in the action of a minority of the subversive groups with a fundamentalist, totalitarian ideol-
ogy that used terror and violence to impose their views. Tis was possible for two sets of reasons. First,
the subversive groups exploited fragmentation and misunderstandings in Peruvian society and brought
together disenfranchised sectors that were excluded from the social and political democratization that ac-
companied the return to a democratic regime. In doing so, they took advantage of areas that were marked
by backwardness, stalled development and high levels of social conict, while also capitalizing on the
absence of state agencies and political and social organizations that could serve as representatives of the
people. Te CVRs investigations show that subversion was unable to take root in places where there was
a greater state presence and a more solid political and social fabric.
Within this context, we present a series of recommendations aimed at solidifying and expanding the
states presence, involving and respecting community and grassroots organizations, local identities and
cultural diversity and fostering citizen participation.
A second set of reasons for the violence is related to the states inadequate response. Te CVR, there-
fore, makes certain recommendations for reforming the armed forces, the National Police and the
intelligence services in an eort to establish political, democratic and civilian leadership of national
defense and the maintenance of internal order, based on respect for human rights and in coordination
with political authorities and community leaders.
Another area in which the limitations of the states response to the challenge of subversion are visible is in
the administration of justice. Te CVRs investigations show that the judicial system did not adequately
use the law to defend the rights of the victims of crimes and violations committed by subversive groups
30 4
Chapter 8
or state agents. For all these reasons, the CVR also makes recommendations to strengthen the judicial
system and reform the penitentiary system.
Finally, because the circumstances that gave rise to subversion also include elements related to public
education, as we have mentioned, the CVR also makes recommendations for reforms of basic and higher
education, especially in the countrys poorest and least developed regions.
In accordance with the CVRs mandate, its proposals for institutional reforms are related to the tragic
events experienced by the country in the past two decades and represent changes or modications to
guidelines, institutional structures or regulations that will have an impact on a particular sphere, ac-
tivity or sector of state action. Tey are expressed as changes in the organization of institutions or as
guidelines for public policy through constitutional reforms, legislation or other government norms or
policies, depending on their degree and depth.
Recommendations for strengthening the
presence of democratic authority
Develop policies and norms for collaboration among the National Police, local governments and citi-
zens, which is indispensable.
Strengthen the institutional structure of peasant self-defense patrols and committees, with appropriate
regulation. Study the medium-range possibility of creating a rural police force.
Strengthen the position of the Justice of the Peace and give it sucient authority to resolve everyday conicts.
Improve access to justice, increasing the number of public defenders and the number of judiciary oces
and allocating more resources for Community Legal Defense Oces (Consultorios Jurdicos Populares).
Establish a human rights defense system by creating specialized agencies in the police, judiciary and
Public Ministry, especially in areas where the violence had the greatest impact.
Te recommendations made so far refer to the tasks of maintaining internal order and ensuring access to
justice. Te states presence, however, must be clear in the rural areas that were hardest hit by the violence,
oering opportunities for development. To this end, we propose:
Establishing short-term goals related to state policies approved in the National Accord, giving priority
to their implementation in areas aected by the violence.
Establishing in these areas institutional policies that ensure that the needs of groups that do not have
a voice are included in local government plans and budgets.
Recommending to regional governments of predominantly rural departments the implementation of
plans for land zoning and titling, developed in consensus with local governments, so as to comprehen-
sively address the needs of residents of areas with low population densities.
Providing incentives to government personnel working in remote rural areas that were aected by the violence.
Recognizing and integrating the rights of indigenous peoples and their communities into the
countrys legal framework.
Creating a state agency or body to plan and implement policy related to indigenous and ethnic issues.
Besides these points, we present recommendations for strengthening political and community organiza-
tions so they can serve as intermediaries between the state and society throughout the country:
30 5
The CVRs Proposals: Toward Reconciliation
Develop a law for political parties and modify the system of representation.
Strengthen the Consensus Roundtable to Fight Against Poverty and for Development (Mesas de Con-
certacin de Lucha contra la Pobreza y por el Desarrollo).
Encourage the participation of young people in all areas of life (schools, neighborhoods, higher educa-
tion, the workplace), stimulating leadership formation.
Recommendations for consolidating democratic institutions
Te following recommendations seek to secure a balanced relationship between democratic authority
and the armed forces; they are followed by recommendations for improving the relationship between
the forces of order and society.
Dene the scope of the concept of national defense and the meaning of the corresponding policy, so
that everything that is considered part of defense, and that depends on military personnel and agen-
cies, falls under the Ministry of Defense.
Develop a national security policy that includes a national strategy for pacication that is aimed at
reconciliation and at consolidating the states presence throughout the country.
Train civilian experts in security and defense issues.
Regulate states of emergency and immediately repeal Law 24150, modied by Legislative Decree 749,
which gives the armed forces responsibility for controlling internal order. It must be clear that states
of emergency do not imply suspension of the Constitution or subordination of political authorities.
Ensure democratic civilian control over military intelligence services. Tis includes:
A law regulating intelligence activities, even those that are secret. Te President of the National Intel-
ligence Council (Consejo Nacional de Inteligencia) must have responsibility for approving operating
plans for obtaining intelligence from non-public sources and for counterintelligence as well as for be-
ing aware of and evaluating all operations carried out by bodies that obtain and process intelligence.
Regulating and strengthening the role of the National Intelligence Council as the highest-level body.
Strengthening the intelligence system of the National Police and the Ministry of the Interior.
Establishing a professional career track for intelligence agents to ensure a corps of qualied,
university-educated professionals.
Creating a national oce to oversee the professional integrity and ethics of public ocials, in-
cluding centralized management of access to classied documents.
Distinguish in the Constitution (and based on that also in lower-level regulations) the National De-
fense from the Internal Order and Citizen Security. Tis should lead to a policy under which the
armed forces do not participate in aairs related to internal order and citizen security, except under
serious circumstances expressly established by the Executive Branch within a state of emergency.
Constitutionally and legally dene the National Police as a non-militarized civilian institution. Modern-
ize the police career track in accordance with the denition of the National Police as a civilian institution.
Reinforce, with explicit mention in the Constitution, the function of the Ministry of the Interior as the
political and administrative authority responsible for organizing and directing policy in accordance
30 6
Chapter 8
with the law to guarantee public order, crime prevention and law enforcement.
Changes in military education and the military curriculum to instill in ocers strong democratic
values, respect for life and the physical integrity of the individual and loyalty to democratic authority.
A new code of ethics that gives a prominent place to the principles of democracy. Tis new code of
ethics must include the following:
Ocers will swear to defend not only the country, but also the principles on which the nation is
based, which are enshrined in the Constitution.
Soldiers and ocers will commit themselves to respecting human rights.
Soldiers and ocers will be taught that they cannot carry out unconstitutional or illegal orders.
Soldiers and ocers will be taught that the armed forces belong to the nation, not the government.
Soldiers and ocers will be taught that they are also citizens and that, as such, they have
rights and obligations.
Reporting a superior for having committed crimes will not constitute insubordination.
Create a Military Ombudsmans Oce responsible for handling complaints and drawing up recom-
mendations for relationships within the branches of the military.
Modernize continuing education and formation in ethics and human rights for the police as mem-
bers of a civilian agency.
Recommendations for the reform of the judicial system
Tese recommendations involve three areas: strengthening the judicial systems independence and auton-
omy, compliance with due process and respect for human rights and changes in the penitentiary system.
Strengthen the independence of the judicial system. Tis includes a system for the independent ap-
pointment, evaluation and sanctioning of magistrates and the re-establishment of civil service careers
in the judiciary and Public Ministry.
Establish a judiciary made up of permanently appointed magistrates, not temporary or substitute judges.
Constitutionally and legally incorporate the military court system into the judiciary under the
Supreme Court of Justice.
Create an autonomous body responsible for the Victim and Witness Protection Program.
Establish a temporary, specialized system to handle cases of human rights violations and crimes.
Tis system should include:
A chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Lima with national authority.
A Superior Court District Attorneys Oce as coordinator.
At least three specialized criminal courts, headed by magistrates who have sucient knowledge
of and experience in human rights and international humanitarian law.
30 7
At least eight specialized district attorneys oces, of which three should be in Lima and ve in the
provinces (two in Ayacucho and one each in Hunuco, Huancayo and Abancay).
Establish a comprehensive system for addressing the issue of people who disappeared during the in-
ternal armed conict between 1980 and 2000. We propose the creation of an autonomous National
Commission for people who disappeared during those years, which would coordinate and supervise a
National Plan for Forensic Anthropological Investigation, with the participation of the Public Minis-
try, the Ombudsmans Oce, the International Red Cross, churches and civil society organizations.
Incorporate into national legislation advances in international norms related to the administration
of justice and due process. Expressly establish in the Constitution the constitutional hierarchy of
treaties related to human rights.
Begin an ongoing program of training for judges, district attorneys and lawyers in human rights, hu-
manitarian law and democratic culture.
Establish in the Public Ministry an area specializing in the investigation of problems related to human rights.
Permanent oversight by judges during states of emergency.
In continuation, we present the following recommendations related to the reform of the penitentiary system:
Dene an institution specializing in penitentiary issues.
Modernize the Criminal Sentencing Code, adapting it to the reality of the penitentiary system.
Implement the enabling regulations of the Criminal Sentencing Code DS 023-2001-JUS.
A general norm, such as the Criminal Sentencing Code, requires the development of enabling regulations
that precisely establish its scope and content and provide the operators of the penitentiary system with
clear, precise guidelines for action. It must also ensure that people using the system (inmates, relatives,
human rights organizations, etc.) have a public tool that permits oversight of the actions of penitentiary
ocials in areas related to the defense of the rights of those deprived of liberty.
Establish the procedures and institutional framework necessary for studying and responding to re-
quests for pardons from people sentenced for terrorism who claim innocence.
Rearm in the Constitution that the purpose of the penitentiary system is the inmates re-education,
rehabilitation and reincorporation into society (this is noted in the 1979 and 1993 Constitutions).
End the indiscriminate transfer of inmates, enabling them to remain near their relatives; and in the
case of those sentenced for terrorism, facilitating their concentration in a few installations to ensure
better treatment and greater security.
Specic treatment for inmates convicted of terrorism and treason, dierentiating among situations
and behavior (PCP-SL and MRTA inmates, those who have renounced their ties, those who took ad-
vantage of the Repentance Law and those who claim to be innocent); encourage alternative measures
(restoration of prison benets and the possibility of commuted sentences).
Improve conditions for the prison population in terms of access to basic services (nutrition and health).
Recommendations for educational reform to foster democratic values
Emphasize education policies aimed at transforming the school into a place where the students human
dignity is respected and which contributes to the students holistic development.
30 8
Chapter 8
Establish a Study Plan that stimulates learning and guides knowledge toward well-being, holistic edu-
cation and reducing the propensity for violence.
Foster an education that respects ethnic and cultural dierences. Adapt all aspects of schooling to the
countrys ethno-linguistic, cultural and geographic diversity.
Reinforce opportunities for participation in and democratization of the school.
Discipline based on punishment and threats does not contribute to the development of a culture of
peace; rather, it creates violence. We propose prohibiting and sanctioning all forms of physical punish-
ment and humiliating or violent practices used as forms of discipline.
Te rural school, especially in the areas most aected by the violence, is a particularly critical area. A
special program should be implemented that includes:
Urgent assistance for the most vulnerable population, beginning with the youngest children in the
poorest areas. Particularly encourage pre-school education for children under the age of ve, taking
into account the countrys ethno-linguistic and cultural diversity and developing strategies for com-
prehensive assistance (health and nutrition), both in school and out of school, as appropriate.
Stimulate a literacy plan, giving priority to adolescent and adult women in rural areas.
Redene the content, methodology and coverage of education, taking into consideration skills for
entry into the labor market and emphasizing the rural population.
Restore the dignity and improve the quality of rural schools. Tis implies changing and adapting les-
son plans to: encourage learning that relates to the students real-life situation; restore the dignity of
rural schools, ensuring that they become places where students can study with decorum; adequately
and creatively motivate educators to work in rural schools, so that these schools attract better or the
best teachers; and encourage state education and health agencies to actively support rural schools.
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR REPARATIONS
Te Final Report includes a Comprehensive Plan for Reparations for victims of the violence. Its implementa-
tion will depend on the clear political will to carry it out and the cumulative eect of many contributions
and eorts. Te CVR believes that victims include all people or groups of people who, because of the internal
armed conict experienced by the country between May 1980 and November 2000, have suered from ac-
tions or omissions that violate norms of international human rights law. Beneciaries are all victims who will
receive some type of benet, symbolic and/or material, individual and/or collective, under the Comprehen-
sive Plan for Reparations. Besides the direct victims of the violations that have been documented, the con-
ict aected a wider universe: relatives of victims and groups of people who, because of the concentration of
massive violations in their communities, suered joint harm and the violation of their collective rights. Te
beneciaries may be individuals or groups. Te individual sphere includes harm done directly to the person
or his or her closest relatives; the collective sphere recognizes harm done to the common social fabric. Tese
spheres are not mutually exclusive. Beneciaries can be subject to both individual and collective reparation,
as long as the same benet is not duplicated. Te plan consists of six programs.
Symbolic reparations
Te CVR proposes certain symbolic actions in the form of a series of civic rituals aimed at re-establishing
the social pact and demonstrating the will of the state and society to ensure that violence and human
rights violations of the type that occurred between 1980 and 2000 are not repeated.
Te purpose of symbolic reparations is to help restore social bonds between the state and the people and
among people that were broken by the violence. Tis is done through public acknowledgement of the
30 9
damage inicted on them by the action of subversive groups and the action or omission of the state, in an
eort to foster national reconciliation and strengthen a sense of solidarity with victims among Peruvian
society as a whole.
Tis program consists of: public gestures, acts of recognition, memorials and actions that lead
toward reconciliation.
Reparations in health
Te purpose of this program is to help people aected by the internal armed conict to recover their men-
tal and physical health, re-establish social support networks and strengthen capacities for personal and
community development. All of this will help victims develop the self-determination necessary to rebuild
their individual and collective life plans, which were cut short by the armed conict.
Reparations in education
Te overall objective of the reparations program in the area of education is to facilitate and provide new
or better opportunities for access to education for people who, because of the internal armed conict, lost
the chance to receive an adequate education or nish their studies.
Te components of access to and restoration of the right to an education are: exemption from enrollment
and tuition fees for beneciaries, a comprehensive scholarship program and adult education.
Restoration of citizens rights
Te overall objective of the program is to enable people aected by the actions or omissions of the state
during the internal armed conict to regain full and eective civil and political rights, through the legal
restoration of those rights. Tis involves providing a sector of society with preferential access or priority
treatment, while ensuring that it is on equal footing with all other citizens.
Te program includes: normalizing the legal situation of the disappeared; normalizing the legal situation of
people for whom there are outstanding arrest warrants; expunging police, legal and criminal records; nor-
malizing the situation of people who lack identity papers; providing legal advice; and exemption from fees.
Program of economic reparations
Economic reparations are part of the states acknowledgement of damages inicted on, losses suered by
and moral harm done to victims of the internal armed conict. Tese reparations symbolize the eort
and public willingness to re-establish justice and provide reparations for harms suered by its citizens.
Granting economic reparations also contributes to a new social pact based on respect for and guaranteed
enforcement of human rights, the rule of law and the reduction of exclusion.
Te objective of the program of economic reparations is economic compensation for moral and material
harm caused to the victims and their relatives as a result of the internal armed conict, and to help vic-
tims and their families establish a new life and face the future with dignity and well-being.
Beneciaries of the program of economic reparations are:
Relatives of victims who were killed or disappeared
People who suered partial or total permanent disability as a result of rape, torture, wounds or injuries
classied by the CVR that occurred during the period of internal armed conict
Innocent people who have been imprisoned
310
Chapter 8
Victims of rape
Children conceived as a result of rape
Te individual beneciaries will also be considered for non-monetary economic reparations in
the form of services.
Components
Te program of economic reparations of the Comprehensive Plan for Reparations (PIR) consists of the
following components, explained in detail in the CVRs Final Report:
Economic reparation in the form of pensions and/or indemnity, consisting of ve measures: (1) for
relatives of those who were killed or disappeared; (2) for people who suered permanent partial or total
mental and/or physical disability; (3) for people who were unjustly imprisoned; (4) for victims of rape;
and (5) for children conceived as a result of rape.
Economic reparation in the form of services, consisting of complementary services granting preferen-
tial access to state housing and employment programs.
Program of collective reparations
Te objective is to contribute to the reconstruction and consolidation of collective institutions in
communities, neighborhoods and other population centers that lost all or part of their social and
physical infrastructure because of the violence, and to compensate for the erosion of capital suered
by entire populations, placing at their disposal the technical resources and capital necessary for
comprehensive reconstruction.
Beneciaries of the program of collective reparations include peasant communities, native communi-
ties, and other population centers aected by the armed conict as well as organized groups of displaced
people from aected communities who did not return to their homes and who will receive benets in the
places where they have settled.
Te components of the program are:
Consolidation of institutions
Restoration and reconstruction of productive infrastructure
Restoration and expansion of basic services
Employment and income generation
National coordinating and supervisory body
To make the reparations plan feasible, the CVR recommends the creation of a National Steering Com-
mittee to coordinate and oversee implementation of the PIR. Tis body must receive legal advice for
the qualication of victims, based on the same criteria used by the CVR, and for the qualication and
accreditation of beneciaries.
Te CVR recommends that guidance be provided to potential beneciaries of the PIR to ensure that they
have access to the benets to which they are entitled as well as the implementation of programs to provide
information and trainingin coordination with agencies of the Executive Branchthrough the network
of free legal clinics operated by the Ministry of Justice and with support from the Ombudsmans Oce.
Te PIR must ensure condentiality in granting benets to avoid any social stigma or dis-
311
crimination against beneciaries.
To nance the PIR, the CVR recommends creating a National Reparations Fund administered by the
National Steering Committee. Te fund would be drawn mainly from public resources, as that is the
only way to ensure medium-range nancial viability and demonstrate that implementing reparations is
primarily the states responsibility. Te CVR, therefore, recommends allocating funds for reparations
in the national budget. As a complement, the CVR believes that the Reparations Fund could be partly
nanced by extraordinary funds. It, therefore, recommends that some of the corruption-related money
that is repatriated be earmarked for the fund. Tese resources are currently available through the Special
Fund for Management of Illicitly Obtained Money (Fondo Especial de Administracin del Dinero Obtenido
Ilcitamente, FEDADOI).
Finally, the CVR calls on the international community to stand in solidarity with victims of the
violence by participating actively in complementary funding for the PIR. Te CVR believes that in-
ternational cooperation can contribute to the plans nancing in various ways, one of which could
be the creation of a mechanism for the conversion of external debt for projects directly related to the
reparations policy.
NATIONAL PLAN FOR FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION
Te complexity of the internal armed conict, especially with regard to the problem of forced disap-
pearances and extrajudicial executions, as well as the number of victims, demands tools for approaching
forensic anthropological investigation from various angles adapted to the socio-cultural situation.
One of the most important issues is the exhumation and identicationfor both humanitarian and
legal purposesof victims of serious violations of fundamental rights. Te humanitarian task is pri-
mordial and involves locating and identifying human remains and returning them to the victims rela-
tives. Tis helps families obtain the legal documents necessary to resolve inheritance problems created
by the disappearance of family members.
At the same time, it is vital that this humanitarian goal be accompanied by the objective of obtaining
justice. Appropriate judicial processes are needed that include the ndings as part of the accumulated
evidence in order to establish the events and circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the victims
(including time, place and perpetrators).
Public institutions have particular responsibility in this process, but the collaboration of humanitarian
organizations and the international community is also important.
Te CVR has created a National Registry of Burial Sites based on information obtained during its in-
vestigations. By the end of its mandate, the CVR had recorded 4,644 burial sites nationwide and had
veried 2,200 of them.
Te areas where the National Registry of Burial Sites has been implemented include the following jurisdictions:
Northeastern (San Martn, Hunuco, Ucayali)
Central (Cerro de Pasco, Junn, Huancavelica)
South-Central (Ayacucho, Apurmac, Huancavelica)
Southern Andean (Apurmac, Cusco, Puno, Madre de Dios)
Te information gathered has been processed in a database specially designed for this purpose, which in-
cludes general descriptions of each site, graphic and photographic information and a geographic database
that requires additional analysis in order to obtain specic results. A Pre-Mortem Database has also been
312
Chapter 8
developed, which includes information from 1,504 forms of a total of 1,884 forms collected by the CVR
during its mandate.
General guidelines
Coordination and supervision
Formation of a permanent multi-disciplinary, inter-institutional task force (Public Ministry, Ombudsmans
Oce and representatives of civil society) to coordinate and oversee the forensic anthropological investigations.
Participation of forensic experts
Te participation of forensic experts in the various phases of the forensic anthropological investigation is
of vital importance. Experts must be drawn from the forensic elds of medicine, anthropology, archeol-
ogy and dentistry as well as various elds of criminal science.
Stages of investigation
Te forensic anthropological investigation must be carried out in a series of successive stages that ensure
an optimal approach to and appropriate construction of the cases. Te stages to be followed in the foren-
sic anthropological investigation are:
Preliminary investigation and national registry and inspection of sites
Inspection and exhumation
Analysis and identication of victims
Development of regulatory, legal and technical aspects
Regulatory and legal aspects
Te legal norms for the implementation of the National Plan for Forensic Anthropological Inves-
tigation should include:
Creation of a National Commission on Disappeared Persons to handle cases of people who disap-
peared during the internal armed conict that occurred between 1980 and 2000.
Creation of an Oce of Disappeared Persons to handle cases of people who disappeared during the
internal armed conict. Te oce should consist of the following operational units: Specialized Unit
for Preliminary Investigation of Disappeared Persons; Unit for Evaluation, Analysis, Exhumation and
Recovery of Human Remains and Evidence; Post-Mortem Analysis Unit; Unit for Identication of
Victims; Legal Unit; and Data Processing and Technical Support Unit.
Te database should become a tool for continuing processes that began during the CVRs mandate. It
should include, insofar as possible, processes carried out by other institutions, ensuring their impartial
overall scientic management and making them a key issue of national interest.
Legal investigation
It is vital to reinforce the technical and legal aspects of the district attorneys oce as well as its infra-
structure and material and human resources. With regard to the latter, the Special District Attorneys
Oce must have a team that covers the various geographic jurisdictions where cases of human rights
violations are reported. Tese district attorneys must have a deep ethical and professional commitment
to the investigations they carry out and, therefore, broad knowledge of their scope and limitations.
313
Accreditation of investigators
Te investigator named for the cases must be skilled in the eld of forensic archeology and anthropology
(archeological exploration and excavation in the forensic area, mapping, geography and graphic records
as well as estimating age, sex, stature, laterality, pathologies and other distinguishing characteristics and
the observation of lesions and causes of death in skeletal remains). Te person must have training in in-
ternational human rights law and international humanitarian law.
Investigative report
Te investigative report provided to the specialized district attorney will include legal medical and fo-
rensic anthropological issues resulting from the joint work. It will includeas an appendixdental and
ballistics analyses, a description of the victims clothing and personal eects and documents associated
with the bodies to provide the necessary support for the investigative report.
Final disposition of the remains and legal status of the disappeared
A technical and legal mechanism must be established to allow for the temporary burial of human remains
when it has not been possible to identify them.
Protection of information
All documentary information and testimony generated by the National Registry of Burial Sites and witnesses ac-
counts, including the pre-mortem forms and post-mortem analysis and genetic information, must be protected.
Technical aspects
It will be necessary to consider:
Te adoption of protocols and forms for documenting and preparing reports
Te development and adaptation of logistical infrastructure
Te preparation of grant proposals to obtain funding
Implementation of the National Plan for
Forensic Anthropological Investigation
Evaluation phase
Evaluation of cases under investigation, cases in which human remains are at risk of disappearing or be-
ing seriously altered and cases that have the most solid justication based on preliminary investigation.
Tis phase of the investigation will make it possible to establish strategies for beginning subsequent pro-
cesses of exhumation and analysis.
Operational phase
As a result of the rst phase, there will be a signicant number of sites and cases available for investiga-
tion. During this phase, specic strategies for investigation can be adopted, implemented and incorpo-
rated into cases to be included in Regional Investigation Plans.
Number of investigations per year
Te number of investigations performed monthly or annually will depend on the complexity of cases as
well as logistical possibilities. It may be possible to do several small investigations in a short time, while
314
Chapter 8
other investigations may require more time and resources. It is important to clarify that two or more
investigations can be undertaken only when the necessary operational infrastructure is available, taking
into account the requirements of such cases. It is crucial that investigations not be left unnished, and
thatonce the plan is under wayat least one investigation a month be carried out.
MECHANISMS FOR FOLLOWING UP
ON THE CVRS RECOMMENDATIONS
Various types of recommendations have been made, and because of their diversity and complexity they
require an orderly, consistent process. Te CVR therefore recommends the following:
Tat a reasonable period be allowed for completing the CVRs technical and administrative work.
Te formation of an Inter-Institutional Task Force similar to the one that gave rise to the CVR, which
can draw up proposals for legislation in a short time.
Tat Congress gives consideration to the adoption of a law providing for the creation of a public entity
to centralize long-term decision-making.
The transition: Technical and administrative closure
Te CVRs work allowed it to gather abundant information that is now part of an extensive set of docu-
ments that will be transferred to the Ombudsmans Oce for safekeeping and management. Much of this
information must be copied or converted into an electronic format for storage, and some is condential and
must be delivered directly to the Ombudsmans Oce in an orderly manner. It is also important to prepare
administrative, accounting and nancial reports, with scrupulous accountability for the funds received
through various cooperation agreements signed as part of United Nations Development Program projects.
Other goods must be transferred in an orderly manner to the Oce of the Cabinet Chief in order to deter-
mine where and how they can legally be used. Te CVR recommends that the majority of those goods be
transferred to the Ombudsmans Oce because of its role in following up on the CVRs recommendations.
The Inter-Institutional Task Force
Te CVR was established on the basis of a proposal developed by a task force created through Supreme
Resolution 304-2000-JUS dated December 9, 2000. Te CVR suggests that the Executive Branch also
form an Inter-Institutional Task Force to organize its recommendations, help disseminate the Final Report
and transfer specic proposals to the appropriate public agencies. Tis Task Force could be created through
an administrative procedure and could be given a period of no more than ve months to fulll its tasks. It
could be established immediately, without jeopardizing the technical and administrative work described in
the preceding section. It could be composed of sectors of the Executive Branch that are included in some
of the recommendations (Ministries of Womens Issues and Social Development, Justice, Economy and Fi-
nance, Interior, Defense, etc.), the Ombudsmans Oce, representatives of churches (National Evangelical
Council and the Peruvian Conference of Bishops) and civil society, especially human rights organizations. It
should be headed by an independent gure appointed by the Executive Branch and should have a minimal
professional team under the responsibility of the Ombudsmans Oce.
At the end of its term, this Task Force could present the following results:
Plan for implementing the recommendations involving the Executive Branch, including each sectors
responsibilities, a timeline for implementation and an oversight mechanism.
Proposals for legislation that the Executive Branch could submit to Congress for its consideration; these would
be related to the various aspects recommended by the CVR in its Final Report that require legislative initiatives.
315
Proposals for administrative decisions that fall under the jurisdiction of the judiciary or other consti-
tutionally autonomous institutions.
National Plan for Dissemination of the Final Report, its conclusions and recommendations.
No member of the CVR may be part of this Task Force or any other mechanism for following up the
recommendations. Tis is a unanimous decision of the commissioners.
In January 2003, the CVR began studies to draft a bill to provide substantial stimulus for the imple-
mentation of its recommendations. Te bill was the subject of various consultations with agencies of the
Executive Branch, members of Congress and representatives of civil society and was even partially ad-
opted in two legislative initiatives that are currently before Congress (Bills 7045 and 6857). Te original
version follows:
Law Establishing Te National Council For Reconciliation
Title I
Purpose Of Tis Law
Single Chapter
Article 1: Purpose of this Law
1.1 Tis Law creates and regulates the National Council for Reconciliation as the public body responsible
for overseeing the implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion. It also delegates power to the Executive Branch to legislate in this area.
1.2 Te recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisin de la Verdad y Rec-
onciliacin, hereafter the CVR), created through D.S. 065-2001-PCM, are implemented in conformity
with the provisions of this Law, in accordance with criteria of progressiveness and equity.
1.3 Te conclusions and recommendations of the CVR, which are included as an appendix to this
Law, as well as the report on which they are based, constitute public documents for the purpose for
which they have been prepared.
Title II
On Te National Council For Reconciliation
Chapter I
Creation, objectives and composition
Article 2: Creation of the National Council for Reconciliation
1.1 Te National Council for Reconciliation (hereafter referred to as the Council) is created as a decen-
tralized public agency under the Oce of the President of the Cabinet, with due public legal identity
and with technical, administrative, economic and nancial autonomy for the purpose of centralizing
decision-making regarding the implementation of the CVRs recommendations.
2.2 Te Council has national authority and is headquartered in the city of Lima.
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RECONCILIATION
316
Chapter 2
Article 3: Objectives of the National Council for Reconciliation
Te objectives of the Council are as follows:
a. To implement and carry out the recommendations of the CVR through actions, regulations and poli-
cies that brings together proposals from public and private institutions.
b. To formulate and implement specic policies designed to strengthen the process of national reconciliation.
c. To coordinate and implement the comprehensive policy for reparations, subject to the provisions of
this Law and according to the nancial resources available.
d. To propose institutional reforms based on the CVRs recommendations, including the formulation of the
corresponding legislative initiatives, which will be submitted to the Council of Ministers for its consideration.
Article 4: Composition of the National Council for Reconciliation
Te Council consists of the following members:
a. One independent gure of acknowledged prestige and moral standing who will preside over the Coun-
cil, appointed by the President of the Republic.
b. Two representatives of the Executive Branch, in representation of the Councils Inter-Ministerial Sup-
port Committee. Tese representatives must have at least the rank of vice minister.
c. Te Ombudsman.
d. Te Executive Secretary of the National Human Rights Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora
Nacional de Derechos Humanos).
Chapter II
Advisory Committee of Victims of the Violence
Article 5: Advisory Committee of Victims of the Violence
Te Advisory Committee of Victims of the Violence is made up of seven representatives of victims of
crimes and/or human rights violations committed between May 1980 and November 2000. Te Advisory
Committee contributes to the fulllment of the Councils objectives, receives the information it requests
and responds to all requests for advice submitted to it.
Te members of the Advisory Committee are appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommen-
dation of organizations of the victims, taking into consideration criteria for ensuring equitable representation.
Article 6: Inter-Ministerial Support Committee for the National Council for Reconciliation
An Inter-Ministerial Committee of Support for the Council is created, to be headed by the President of
the Cabinet and made up of the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Justice, Economy and Finance, and Wom-
ens Issues and Social Development. Te Inter-Ministerial Committee chooses from among its members
two representatives to serve on the Council. Its purpose is to make the Councils decisions viable and to
coordinate the support of the Executive Branch.
Article 7: Functions and attributes of the National Council for Reconciliation
Te Council has the following functions and attributes:
a. To issue norms and administrative directives for implementing the CVRs recommendations.
b. To draft proposals for legislation for implementing the Councils programs, as well as other types of
317
norms that will receive priority consideration from the appropriate sector.
c. To approve the annual plan of activities and budget, as well as any other initiative prepared by
the Council for third parties.
d. To guide the Councils overall policy, including programs created for the implementation of
its recommendations.
e. To present semi-annual reports to the Permanent Commission of Congress on the progress of the
Councils activities, detailing obstacles encountered and indicating, where appropriate, which public
institutions have not contributed as necessary. Te Permanent Commission of Congress will call on
the head of the corresponding sector to explain any such failure to comply.
f. To publicly disseminate an annual report of the results and progress of its work.
g. To appoint, oversee and, if necessary, dismiss the Executive Director of the Council.
Article 8: Director of the National Council for Reconciliation
Te Director of the Council represents the body and guides its activities. Te Director manages the
budget and implements annual plans approved by the full Council. Te Director is a member of the
Council with voice but no vote.
Article 9: Programs of the National Council for Reconciliation
Te Council has the following programs:
a. Comprehensive Program of Reparations (Programa Integral de Reparaciones, PIR)
b. Historical Memory Program (Programa de Memoria Histrica, PMH)
c. Justice Program (Programa de Justicia, PJ)
d. Institutional Reform Program (Programa de Reformas Institucionales, PRI)
Article 10: Funding and property of the National Council for Reconciliation
Te Councils resources include:
a. Property that was acquired by the Truth Commission or allocated for its use by international coopera-
tion agencies or the Executive Branch. Te transfer of property will be included in the budget of the
Oce of the President of the Cabinet.
b. Resources allocated in the General Budget of the Republic, within the budget of the Oce of the
President of the Cabinet; for this purpose, the Council will be considered a Decentralized Public Body.
c. Resources transferred by public institutions under specic agreements or as extraordinary existing resources.
d. Resources obtained from international cooperation agencies.
e. Donations and transfers from private individuals or institutions.
Article11: Internal Regulations of the Council
Te Council approves its Internal Regulations and all other administrative norms required for its opera-
tion. Tese norms are published in the ocial gazette, El Peruano.
Final And Temporary Provisions
318
Chapter 2
First: Term of the Council
Te President of the Council and the representatives of the Executive Branch will be appointed within 30
days after this Law takes eect.
Te Council will begin operation immediately upon the appointment of its members. It will have a period
of three months for its internal organization. After that period, the Council will have four years to carry
out its objectives. Tis term cannot be extended.
Second: Delegation of legislative powers and complementary norms
Te Executive Branch is granted the power to legislate by Legislative Decree, within a period of 90 days
from the date this law takes eect, in the following areas:
a. Components of the Comprehensive Program for Reparations, including the amounts to be paid to
individuals and groups of victims that were qualied by the CVR, and those to be qualied by the
Council. Tis program will also include symbolic and legal reparations, as well as reparations related
to physical and mental health and education.
b. Implementation of the Historical Memory Program, including legislative modications to current
norms that make it possible to normalize the legal status of people who disappeared as a result of the
violence, and to ensure the implementation of the National Plan for Forensic Anthropological Inves-
tigation presented by the CVR.
c. Creation and implementation of a specialized judicial system that permits the investigation, prosecu-
tion and sanctioning of serious crimes and human rights violations as determined by the CVR.
Within 120 days, the Executive Branch will issue the remaining regulatory norms necessary for imple-
mentation of this law and the respective Legislative Decrees.
Tird: Repealing of other norms
Law No. 25237, Legislative Decree No. 652 and all legal or administrative provisions that are in opposi-
tion to this Law are hereby repealed.
1
Fourth: Eective date of this Law
Tis law will take eect on the day after its publication.
1 The repeal of the indicated laws will eliminate the Council for Peace (Consejo por la Paz). An analysis of the indicated norms reveals no
relevant functions that should be assumed by the National Council for Reconciliation.
319
Crimes and Human Rights violations
Human rights violations by victims sex
Forced
recruitment
Kidnapping Arrest Forced
Disappearanc
Injuries or
wounds
Sexual
assault
Torture
0
20
40
60
80
100
Women Men
16%
84%
73%
82%
87%
76%
80%
27%
18%
13%
24%
100%
20%
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1999 2000 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980
1999 2000 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980
Cases by group responsible for the violence
Deaths and Disappearances by year they occurred
PCP-SL
STATE AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY FORCES
11
4
111
37 37
335
923
598
755
1,171
1,668
560
1,116
878
810
604
176
120
71
56 45
29 17
392
597
1,094
405
100
77
36 37
18 17 12 5
221
123
188
356
348 331
392
Per 1980-2000
320
Total cases by year and place
Torture
Death and extrajudicial executions
52 43
473
1,590
2,889
1,017
664
846
1,012
1,710
1,609
1,370
1,360
770
300
198
121 88 75 57
29
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980
Forced disappearances
1
10
11
27
99
129
124
305
460
425
328
195
121
98
54
26 28 28
8
389
579
18
438
605
157
74
47
141
292
291
197
183
47
3
15
5 1
10
13
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
133
2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980
204
321
1980 1980 1981 1981 1983 1983 1984 1984 1985 1985
II II IV IV XI XI VII VII VIII VIII
1991 1991 1992 1992 1993 1993 1994 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996
VII VII VII VII
July
Discovery of common grave
with remains of La Cantuta
victims
July
Discovery of common grave
with remains of La Cantuta
victims
November 3
Massacre in Barrios
Altos (8)
November 3
Massacre in Barrios
Altos (8)
July 28
Fujimori inaugurated for second term
July 28
Fujimori inaugurated for second term
December
Assault on Japanese am
residence by MRTA (12
December
Assault on Japanese am
residence by MRTA (12
January
First counter-insurgency operations
by the armed forces; death of
journalists in Uchuraccay (3)
January
First counter-insurgency operations
by the armed forces; death of
journalists in Uchuraccay (3)
July 28
President Alan Garca P
inaugurated
August
Massacre in Accomarca
July 28
President Alan Garca P
inaugurated
August
Massacre in Accomarca
July
Four common graves
discovered in Pucayacu (4)
July
Four common graves
discovered in Pucayacu (4)
March
PCP-SL assault on Huamanga prison
September
Shining Paths Edith Lagos killed (2)
December
Army put in charge of fght
March
PCP-SL assault on Huamanga prison
September
Shining Paths Edith Lagos killed (2)
December
Army put in charge of fght
IX IX VV VII VII III III XII XII II VIII VIII
May 17
PCP-SL begins armed actions,
burning ballot boxes in
Chuschi.
July 28
Start of Fernando Belaundes
administration (1)
May 17
PCP-SL begins armed actions,
burning ballot boxes in
Chuschi.
July 28
Start of Fernando Belaundes
administration (1)
February
Murder of Mara Elena
Moyano (9)
April 5
Coup
July
Attack on Tarata Street (10)
September
Arrest of Abimael Guzmn and other
PCP-SL leaders (11)
February
Murder of Mara Elena
Moyano (9)
April 5
Coup
July
Attack on Tarata Street (10)
September
Arrest of Abimael Guzmn and other
PCP-SL leaders (11)
VV
1
8 9 10 11
2 3 4
Timeline of the internal armed confict (1980-2000) Timeline of the internal armed confict (1980-2000)
1980-1990 1980-1990
1991-2000 1991-2000
The Truth a
organized t
The Truth a
organized t
Start of the armed violence Start of the armed violence
Militarization of the confict Militarization of the confict
Decline of subversive activities, rise of authoritarianism and corruption Decline of subversive activities, rise of authoritarianism and corruption
322
1986 1986 1987 1987 1988 1988 1989 1989 1990 1990
1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999 2000 2000
XII XII IV IV VII VII XI XI IX IX
mbassadors
)
mbassadors
)
April
Rescue of hostages at Japanese
ambassadors residence (13)
April
Rescue of hostages at Japanese
ambassadors residence (13)
July
Arrest of Oscar Ramrez
Duran, Feliciano (14)
July
Arrest of Oscar Ramrez
Duran, Feliciano (14)
September
First corruption video, Kouri video,
revealed (15)
November
End of Fujimoris third government
September
First corruption video, Kouri video,
revealed (15)
November
End of Fujimoris third government
rez rez
June 18-19
Prison massacres (5)
June 18-19
Prison massacres (5)
July
MRTA militants escape from Castro Castro
prison (7)
President Alberto Fujimori inaugurated
July
MRTA militants escape from Castro Castro
prison (7)
President Alberto Fujimori inaugurated
VII VII VIII VIII VI VI XI XI VII VII VV
November
MRTA campaign in
northern jungle
November
MRTA campaign in
northern jungle
May
Massacre in Cayara (6)
July
PCP-SL newspaper publishes
interview with Abimael Guzmn
III III
March
Worsening of subversive attacks
and redefnition of principal
actors military strategies
March
Worsening of subversive attacks
and redefnition of principal
actors military strategies
VII VII
12 13 14 15
5 6 7
and Reconciliation Commission was given the mandate to investigate violent acts and human rights violations committed between May 1980 and November 2000. The CVR
this period, which spanned 20 years and six months, into fve stages that were marked by political decision or events of the confict that had a nationwide impact.
and Reconciliation Commission was given the mandate to investigate violent acts and human rights violations committed between May 1980 and November 2000. The CVR
this period, which spanned 20 years and six months, into fve stages that were marked by political decision or events of the confict that had a nationwide impact.
Spread of violence nationwide Spread of violence nationwide Extreme crisis: Subversive ofensive and counter-ofensive Extreme crisis: Subversive ofensive and counter-ofensive
323
PCP-Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) PCP-Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
HISTORY OF THE PCP-SL HISTORY OF THE PCP-SL
PCP
(Communist Party of Peru,
Socialist Party)
PCP
(Communist Party of Peru,
Socialist Party)
GPCR
(Great Proletariat
Cultural Revolution)
GPCR
(Great Proletariat
Cultural Revolution)
Red Flag
Communist Party
(Pro-China)
Red Flag
Communist Party
(Pro-China)
Communist Party
Unity
(Pro-Soviet)
Communist Party
Unity
(Pro-Soviet)
1928 - 1930 1928 - 1930
1964 - 1965 1964 - 1965
1967 1967
1970 1970
PCP
Red Homeland
PCP
Red Homeland
PCP
Red Flag
PCP
Red Flag
PCP-SL
(heirs of Mao and
the GPCR)
PCP-SL
(heirs of Mao and
the GPCR)
Hua Kou Teng
Den Xiao Peng
Hua Kou Teng
Den Xiao Peng
Death
of Mao
Death
of Mao
Internal struggle in Chinese Communist Party.
Red Guard/Red Book.
Mao personality cult.
All-encompassing dictatorship over the bourgeoisies
Internal struggle in Chinese Communist Party.
Red Guard/Red Book.
Mao personality cult.
All-encompassing dictatorship over the bourgeoisies
Northern Regional Committee Northern Regional Committee
Mid-North Zone Committee Mid-North Zone Committee
Metropolitan Regional Committee Metropolitan Regional Committee
Mid-South Zone Committee Mid-South Zone Committee
Principal Regional Committee Principal Regional Committee
Huallaga Regional Committee Huallaga Regional Committee
Iquitos Cell Iquitos Cell
Central Regional Committee Central Regional Committee
Southern Regional Committee Southern Regional Committee
ORGANIZATION OF REGIONAL COMMITTEES ORGANIZATION OF REGIONAL COMMITTEES
324
Revolutionary Movement Tpac Amaru (MRTA) Revolutionary Movement Tpac Amaru (MRTA)
The Marxist Leninist Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR ML) and the Left-wing Revolutionary Movement The Militant (MIR-EM) were the political
parties from which the MRTA originated.
The Marxist Leninist Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR ML) and the Left-wing Revolutionary Movement The Militant (MIR-EM) were the political
parties from which the MRTA originated.
June
VII Party unifcation: Marxist Leninist Socialist Revolutionary
Party (PSR ML) and Left-wing Revolutionary Movement The
Militant (MIR-EM)
July 28
Inauguration of President Fernando Belande Terry
June
VII Party unifcation: Marxist Leninist Socialist Revolutionary
Party (PSR ML) and Left-wing Revolutionary Movement The
Militant (MIR-EM)
July 28
Inauguration of President Fernando Belande Terry
February
Capture of Vctor Polay and Lucero Cumpa.
April 28
Military Campaign Los Molinos. MRTAs objective:
To seize the city of Tarma.
Armed confrontation between the MRTA and an Army squad.
Result: 55 members of the MRTA dead.
MRTA members were buried in a common grave in the Jauja
cemetery.
February
Capture of Vctor Polay and Lucero Cumpa.
April 28
Military Campaign Los Molinos. MRTAs objective:
To seize the city of Tarma.
Armed confrontation between the MRTA and an Army squad.
Result: 55 members of the MRTA dead.
MRTA members were buried in a common grave in the Jauja
cemetery.
March 1
Central Committee Agreement: to adopt the name Revolutionary
Movement Tpac Amaru (MRTA).
The new organizations name was not made public until January
1984.
March 1
Central Committee Agreement: to adopt the name Revolutionary
Movement Tpac Amaru (MRTA).
The new organizations name was not made public until January
1984.
August 7
Second MRTA press conference in Lima. End of the one-year long truce for the
government of Alan Garca Prez.
August 7
Second MRTA press conference in Lima. End of the one-year long truce for the
government of Alan Garca Prez.
January
Attack against a police station in Villa el Salvador.
The frst MRTA Central Committee meeting was held in Lima.
November 27
MRTA members were arrested in Cusco by police forces.
December 8
The kidnapping of reporter Vicky Pelez and her cameraman, Percy
Raborg, both from Channel 2, was the frst MRTA action that showed
their intention to use to use mass media as part of their strategy.
January
Attack against a police station in Villa el Salvador.
The frst MRTA Central Committee meeting was held in Lima.
November 27
MRTA members were arrested in Cusco by police forces.
December 8
The kidnapping of reporter Vicky Pelez and her cameraman, Percy
Raborg, both from Channel 2, was the frst MRTA action that showed
their intention to use to use mass media as part of their strategy.
April
First appearance of their online bulletin: Venceremos (We will prevail)
May
MRTA members successfully interfered with Channel 5s television transmission to broadcast their own
radio station signal: November 4
July
A car bomb exploded at the Ministry of the Interior (Ministry in charge of internal security and police
forces). President Alan Garca Prezs government began.
August 16
First MRTA press conference. Vctor Polay Campos, Secretary General of the MRTA was in charge. Truce
for Alan Garca.
November 11
A commando group lead by Nstor Cerpa took El Nacional headquarters, a newspaper of national
circulation.
April
First appearance of their online bulletin: Venceremos (We will prevail)
May
MRTA members successfully interfered with Channel 5s television transmission to broadcast their own
radio station signal: November 4
July
A car bomb exploded at the Ministry of the Interior (Ministry in charge of internal security and police
forces). President Alan Garca Prezs government began.
August 16
First MRTA press conference. Vctor Polay Campos, Secretary General of the MRTA was in charge. Truce
for Alan Garca.
November 11
A commando group lead by Nstor Cerpa took El Nacional headquarters, a newspaper of national
circulation.
July 28
Inauguration of President Alberto Fujimori Fujimori
July 28
Inauguration of President Alberto Fujimori Fujimori
Year 1995
Capture of Miguel Rincn Rincn, who was preparing to take
Congress
Capture of Lori Berenson, American citizen
July 28
Beginning of Alberto Fujimori Fujimoris second government
Year 1995
Capture of Miguel Rincn Rincn, who was preparing to take
Congress
Capture of Lori Berenson, American citizen
July 28
Beginning of Alberto Fujimori Fujimoris second government
December
The MRTA takes the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Peru.
December
The MRTA takes the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Peru.
325
Under the 1979 Constitution, the police forces were directly responsible for maintaining public order. The police institutions (Civil Guard, Investigative Police of Peru and Republican Guard) were considered part of the police
forces of the Ministry of the Interior (formerly the Ministry of Government and Police), in accordance with the provisions of their respective organic laws, passed in 1969 (Decree Laws 18069, 18070 and 18071. These also
established that their mission included functions assigned by the chief of the armed forces for internal defense in case of war.
The Process of the Police Forces
III
IX
X
VII
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
5
12
5
Dismissal of Civil Guard General Balaguer, director general of the Civil Guard.
He is replaced by Civil Guard General Humberto Catter Arredondo.
Increase in number of armed actions by the PCP-SL throughout the
country.
Inauguration of President Fernando Belaunde Terry.
Declaration of the start of the armed struggle by the PCP-SL.
Strike by police forces.
Capture of Alberto Glvez Olaechea (Comrade Rodrigo), a journalist
at Cambio and member of the MRTA.
Invasion of Juanju by an MRTA column.
The police detain MRTA members Hugo Avellaneda and Peter Crdenas Schulte.
June 13
DIRCOTE captures Osmn Morote, PCP-SL second-in-command.
Capture of Vctor Polay Campos (Comrade Rolando).
Capture of MRTA leader Miguel Rincn Rincn.
Creation of the Special Operations Bureau (Direccin de
Operaciones Especiales, DOES).
Creation of the Anti-TerrorismBureau (Direccin
contra el Terrorismo, DIRCOTE)
Attack by the Metropolitan Committee of PCP-SL on the ofces of
Popular Action in Lima.
DIRCOTE detains Laura Zambrano (Comrade
Meche)-
DIRCOTE detains various members of the
PCP-SL, including Sybila Arredonda (Luisa)
and Margie Claro Peralta (Nancy).
Reorganization of the police
forces under Law24294
State of emergency declared
under police command in fve provinces of Ayacucho (Huamanga,
Huanta, Cangallo, La Mar andVctor Fajardo).
Creation of the Anti-TerrorismDivision (Divisin contra el Terrorismo, DICOTE)
VII
20 VII
Creation of the Special Intelligence Group (Grupo Especial de Inteligencia) in
DIRCOTE.
15 VIII
28
17
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1979 Constitution: The Police Forces are directly responsible for maintaining
internal order and preserving public order. Creation of the Special Operational
Support Group (Grupo Especial de Apoyo Operativo, GEAO) in the PIP.
First capture of Abimael Guzmn.
First capture of Abimael Guzmn.
X 22
V
7 XII
III
XI
Law24949 signed, creating the
National Police of Peru
Creation of a special analysis group in DIRCOTE, under the cover of the Legal Advisory Ofce.
VII
Inauguration of President
Alan Garca Prez.
28
VII Inauguration of President Alberto Fujimori.
GEIN raids a house in Chacarilla del Estanque where the PCP-SL Central Department operated.
GEIN detains Abimael Guzmn, Elena Iparraguirre, Laura Zambrano and Mara
Pantoja, leaders of the PCP-SL Central Committee.
GEIN captures Martha Huatay.
Legislative Decree 744: Change in organizational structure (efective January 1992).
28
VIII 17
XI 6
13
3
16
II
VI
II
IV
31
5 Basic lawregulating the police forces approved.
Massacre of PCP-SL prisoners in the San Pedro prison (Lurigancho); 124 inmates
die.
1986
II
VI 18
I
12 IX
X
The Special Brigade of Detectives (Brigada Especial de Detectives, BREDET) captures
Peter Crdenas Schulte and Vctor Polay Campos, the top MRTA leader.
DINCOTE captures Edmundo Cox Beuzeville of the PCP-SL and Lucero Cumpa of the MRTA
326
DINCOTE Organizational Chart 1992
Director
Executive Director
Legal advisory ofce
Division chiefs
Inspectors ofce
Instruction
Center
Secretariat Duty Ofce
Administrative
Ofce
Technical-
Criminal
Content Control
Ofce
Instruction Unit Welfare Ofce
Assistant Director of
Anti-terrorism Intelligence
Metropolitan Anti-Terrorism
Regional Anti-Terrorism
Special Investigations Division
DIVICOTE I
DICOTEM II
DICOTEM III
DICOTEM IV
DIVICOTE II
DIVICOTE III
DIVICOTE IV
Counter-Intelligence
Division
DICOTEM I JECOTES (later DIVICOTES)
SECTOES
DECOTES
327
Anti-subversive Ofensives
First phase, 1983-1986
The armed forces lacked
adequate intelligence about
PCP-SLs organization and
methods of operation.
This campaign struck a heavy blow
to PCP-SLs organization and
operational capacity, but at the
cost of many serious human rights
violations.
Carried out in the
Historical-Ideological Zone.
UCAYALI
AYACUCHO
LIMA
ICA
HUNUCO
Lima
Economic resources from
the Expansion Zone had to
pass through the Corridor
Zone to reach the
Historical-Ideological Zone
and the Final Objective
Zone.
Third phase, 1990-1991
Centered on the Expansion and
Supply Zone.
The Upper Huallaga Valley in Hunuco and San Martn
and the Ucayali Valley in Ucayali department were the
area where PCP-SL accumulated greater military and
economic capacity.
On the Huallaga Front, the armed forces fought the
most difcult battles of the entire confict.
SAN MARTN
UCAYALI
JUNN
HUNUCO
Steady increase in the
number of military
personnel and local
residents involved in the
fghting.
Upper
Huallaga Valley
Ucayali
Valley
Second phase, 1989-1990
Centered on the Corridor Zone. If PCP-SL had
controlled this zone, it would have surrounded
Lima.
A comprehensive anti-subversive
strategy approved in August 1989 is
implemented and becomes the main
weapon for defeating PCP-SL.
This resulted in human rights violations that
were less extensive but more systematic than
those of the frst phase.
During the First Campaign,
troops were sent from the
capital to fght the
subversives.
Historical-Ideological
Zone
Expansion and
Supply Zone
Military Actions
Corridor Zone
Final Objective Zone
JUNN
PASCO
PASCO
JUNN
Advance of the armed forces
Ayacucho
Huancavelica
Abancay
AYACUCHO
APURMAC
APURMAC
HUANCAVELICA
LIMA
Moyobamba
Hunuco
Pucallpa
SAN MARTN
UCAYALI
Suvbersive
advance
328
General Conclusions
As a result of its investigation into the process of violence of political origin that was experienced in Peru
between the years 1980 and 2000, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisin de la Verdad y
Reconciliacin, CVR) has come to the following conclusions.
DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT
1. Te CVR has established that the internal armed conict experienced by Peru between 1980 and 2000
constituted the most intense, extensive and prolonged episode of violence in the entire history of the Republic.
It was also a conict that revealed deep and painful divisions and misunderstandings in Peruvian society.
2. Te CVR estimates that the most probable gure for victims who died in the violence is 69,280 indi-
viduals. Tis gure is greater than the number of human losses suered by Peru in all of the foreign and
civil wars that have occurred in its 182 years of independence.
3. Te CVR arms that the conict covered a larger share of national territory than any other conict,
caused enormous economic losses through the destruction of infrastructure and the deterioration of the
populations productive capacity and came to involve the society as a whole.
4. Te CVR has established that there was a signicant relationship between poverty and social exclu-
sion and the probability of becoming a victim of the violence. More than 40 percent of the deaths and
disappearances reported to the CVR are concentrated in the Andean department of Ayacucho. Tese
victims, taken together with those documented by the CVR in the departments of Junn, Hunuco,
Huancavelica, Apurmac and San Martn, add up to 85 percent of the victims registered by the CVR.
1
5. Te CVR has established that the peasant population was the principal victim of the violence. Of the
total victims reported, 79 percent lived in rural areas and 56 percent were engaged in farming or live-
stock activities. Tese gures contrast with those of the 1993 census, according to which 29 percent of
the population lived in rural areas and 28 percent of the economically active population worked in the
farming/livestock sector.
6. Te CVR has been able to discern that the process of violence, combined with socio-economic gaps, high-
lighted the seriousness of ethno-cultural inequalities that still prevail in the country. According to analysis
of the testimonies received, 75 percent of victims who died in the internal armed conict spoke Quechua or
other native languages as their mother tongue. Tis gure contrasts tellingly with the fact that, according
to the 1993 census, on a national level only 16 percent of the Peruvian population shares that characteristic.
7. Te CVR has shown that, in relative terms, the dead and disappeared had educational levels far below
1 It must be noted that the people who live in those departments today are so poor that together they account for only 9 percent of the income
of all Peruvian families. Moreover, Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Apurmac and Hunuco are four of the fve poorest departments in the country.
331
the national average. While the national census of 1993 indicates that only 40 percent of the national
population had failed to attain a secondary school education, the CVR has found that 68 percent of the
victims were below this level.
8. Te CVR concludes that the violence fell unequally on dierent geographical areas and on dierent
social strata within the country. If the ratio of victims reported to the CVR with respect to the popula-
tion of Ayacucho had been similar countrywide, the violence would have caused 1,200,000 deaths and
disappearances. Of that amount, 340,000 would have occurred in the city of Lima.
9. Te CVR has established that the tragedy suered by the populations of rural Peruthe Andean and
jungle regions, Quechua and Ashninka Peru, the peasant, poor and poorly educated Peruwas neither felt
nor taken on as its own by the rest of the country. Tis demonstrates, in the CVRs judgment, the veiled rac-
ism and scornful attitudes that persist in Peruvian society almost two centuries after its birth as a Republic.
10. Te CVR has found that the conict demonstrated the serious limitations of the State in its capac-
ity to guarantee public order and security as well as to guarantee the fundamental rights of its citizens
within a framework of democratic action.
11. Te CVR has also found the constitutional order and the rule of law to be precarious and that it
was breached in those moments of crisis.
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE CONFLICT
Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (Partido Comunista
del Per-Sendero Luminoso, PCP-SL)
12. Te CVR believes that the immediate and fundamental cause of the unleashing of the internal armed
conict was the PCP-SLs decision to start the armed struggle against the Peruvian Statein opposition
to the will of the overwhelming majority of Peruvian men and women and at a time in which democracy
was being restored through free elections.
13. In the CVRs view, based on the number of persons killed and disappeared, the PCP-SL was the
principal perpetrator of crimes and violations of human rights. It was responsible for 54 percent of victim
deaths reported to the CVR. Tis high degree of responsibility on the part of the PCP-SL is an excep-
tional case among subversive groups in Latin America and one of the most notable, unique features of the
process that the CVR has had to analyze.
14. Te CVR has proven that the PCP-SL deployed extreme violence and unusual crueltyinclud-
ing torture and brutalityas forms of punishment or of setting intimidating examples within the
population they sought to control.
15. Te CVR has found that the PCP-SL went against the great historical tendencies of the country. By
putting into practice an iron political will, it expressed itself as a militarist and totalitarian project with
terrorist characteristics that failed to gain the lasting support of important sectors of Peruvians.
16. Te CVR believes that the PCP-SL rested its project on an ideology that was fundamentalist in char-
acter, centered on a rigid preconception of the unfolding of history, conned to a vision of political action
that was solely strategic and, thus, at odds with all humanitarian values. Te PCP-SL disdained the value
of life and denied human rights.
17. Te CVR has established that the PCP-SL achieved its internal cohesion through so-called Gonzalo
Tought, which reected the cult of personality of Abimael Guzmn Reinoso, the founder and leader of the
organization, who was considered the incarnation of the highest intellectual order in the history of humanity.
332
18. Te CVR has determined that, in accordance with its ideology, the PCP-SL adopted a strategy that
consciouslyand constantlysought to provoke disproportionate responses by the state without taking
into consideration the profound suering this caused to the population for which it said it was ghting.
19. Te CVR believes that the PCP-SL carried fundamentalist ideology and totalitarian organization to their
extremes. In its subversive action there is a tragic blindness: it sees classes, not individuals. Tis led to its abso-
lute lack of respect for the human person and for the right to life, including toward the lives of its own militants.
Te PCP-SL encouraged a fanatical vein in its militants that became their identifying feature.
20. Te CVR has established the terrorist characteristics of the PCP-SL that were deployed from the be-
ginning through brutality carried out ajusticiamientos (killings to settle scores), the prohibition of burials
and other criminal acts, including the use of car bombs in cities.
21. Te CVR also nds a genocidal potential in proclamations of the PCP-SL that call for paying the blood
toll (1982), inducing genocide (1985), and that announce the triumph of the revolution will cost a million
deaths (1988). Tis is combined with conceptions of racism and superiority over indigenous peoples.
22. Te CVR has found that the PCP-SL took advantage of some institutions in the educational system
to form its principal beachhead. Trough these institutions it was able to expand its proselytizing and
draw in small groups of young people of both sexes in dierent parts of the country. While it may have
oered young people the vision of a utopia that provided them with a totalizing identity, it essentially
enclosed them in a fundamentalist and oppressive organization through the use of letters that declared
their submission to the control of Abimael Guzmn Reinoso.
23. Te CVR has established that the PCP-SLs proselytizing could have had a eeting acceptance be-
cause of the incapacity of the state and the countrys elites to respond to the educational demands of
youth frustrated in their eorts toward social mobility and aspirations for advancement.
24. Te CVR has found that the PCP-SL adopted Maoist theses and converted rural areas into the prin-
cipal settings for the conict. Nevertheless, it did not take into consideration the needs and economic
aspirations of the peasant population or of that populations own organizations or cultural specicities
and, instead, turned peasants into a mass that must submit to the will of the party. Individual dissidence
within the mass resulted in murder and selective assassinations, and collective dissidence led to massacres
and the razing of entire communities.
25. Te CVR has established that the presence of the PCP-SL in the Andes and the counter-subversive
response by the state revived and militarized old inter-community and intra-community conicts. Te
PCP-SL labeled as class enemies those sectors of rural society that were relatively more connected to
the market economy or to regional or national networks or institutions and ordered their destruction. Its
peasant war against the state became, in many cases, confrontations between peasants.
26. Te CVR has established that the extreme violence practiced by the PCP-SL in rural communities in
the Andes also extended into urban centers. Lima and other cities were complementary settings and suered
sabotage, selective killings, armed stoppages and terrorist acts, especially in the form of car bombs.
27. Te CVR notes that the ideological concept of the PCP-SL implied the destruction of the old state at
its foundations. Tis led them to assassinate local authoritiesmayors, governors, lieutenant governors
and justices of the peaceand national authoritiesgovernment ministers, parliamentarians and other
representatives of the powers of the State.
2
Out of all the reports received by the CVR on victim fatali-
ties caused by the PCP-SL, government authorities accounted for 12 percent. Additionally, the PCP-SL
engaged in the widespread assassination of social leaders (both men and women), community leaders,
traditional mayors and leaders of peasant, union, neighborhood, educators and womens organizations.
2 The CVR has received reports of 930 local authorities assassinated by the PCP-SL; nevertheless, the CVR estimates that the real fgure is
much higher.
333
28. Because of the generalized and systematic nature of these practices, the CVR points out that members
of the PCP-SL, and especially its national directors and its designated leadership, have direct responsibil-
ity for the commission of crimes against humanity in the form of armed attacks against the civilian popu-
lation, carried out on a grand scale or as part of a general strategy or specic plans. In the judgment of the
CVR, these actions likewise constitute grave violations of the Geneva Conventions, which all participants
in the hostilities were obliged to follow.
3
Te perdy with which the PCP-SL acted on the groundusing
the civilian population as a shield, avoiding the use of uniforms or other markers to identify themselves,
attacking traitors and, among other similar methods, using recourse to terrorist actionsconstituted a
calculated mechanism that sought to provoke brutal reactions from the security forces against the civil-
ian population, thus increasing to an extraordinary extent the suering of the communities in whose
territories the hostilities took place.
29/30. Te CVR nds that members of the leadership system of the PCP-SL hold the gravest responsibil-
ity for the conict that bled Peruvian society, based on the following elements:
For having initiated the violence in opposition to the wishes of the overwhelming
majority of the population;
For having formulated their ght against Peruvian democracy with a bloody strategy;
For the violent practices of occupation and control of rural territories and peasant communities,
with a high cost in lives and human suering;
For their genocidal policy that involved acts designed to provoke the State;
For their decision to proclaim the so-called strategic equilibrium that stressed the terror-
ist character of their actions.
31. Te CVR points out the profound irresponsibility and contempt of the PCP-SL toward its own
militants, who were induced to kill and die in the most cruel and bloody manner, while their top leader-
shipespecially Abimael Guzmn Reinosoremained in Lima, exempt from physical risks and priva-
tions throughout practically the entire conict. Tis incongruence was expressed patently when, after his
capture, Abimael Guzmn Reinoso almost immediately abandoned the thesis of strategic equilibrium
and requested a peace agreement from the government, together with an explicit recognition of and great
praise for the dictatorial government of Alberto Fujimori and Vladimiro Montesinos.
32. Te CVR expresses its sorrow for the thousands of youth who were seduced by a proposal that con-
rmed the profound problems of the country and proclaimed that, rebellion is justied. Many of those
youth, driven by the desire to transform that unjust reality, did not realize that the type of rebellion pur-
sued by the PCP-SL implicated the exercise of terror and the implantation of a totalitarian regime. Tus,
they were locked into a completely vertical and totalitarian organization that inculcated contempt for
life, punished dierences and demanded full submission. Many of them died uselessly and cruelly. Te
CVR calls on the country to set in motion institutional reforms necessary so that terrorist and totalitarian
projects never again nd any echo among the young.
33. Te Commission establishes thatunlike other countries in Latin America in the same period
from 1980 to 1992 the internal armed conict developed while a democratic regime was in power, with
free elections, freedom of the press and the most inclusive political system in our contemporary history.
Te PCP-SL and the MRTA unilaterally excluded themselves from the democratic system and through
their armed actions actually undermined the democratic political regime installed in 1980.
3 This refers to norms of international humanitarian law found in Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions.
334
Tpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(Movimiento Revolucionario Tpac Amaru, MRTA)
34. In 1984, the Tpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) initiated its own armed struggle
against the state. MRTA is responsible for 1.5 percent of the victim deaths that were reported to the
CVR. Unlike the Shining Pathyet like the other armed Latin American organizations with which it
maintained tiesthe MRTA claimed responsibility for its actions, its members used uniforms or other
identiers to dierentiate themselves from the civilian population, it abstained from attacking the un-
armed population and at some points showed signs of being open to peace negotiations. Nevertheless,
MRTA also engaged in criminal acts.
4
It resorted to assassinationsas in the case of General Enrique
Lpez Albjarthe taking of hostages and the systematic practice of kidnapping, all crimes that violated
not only personal liberty but also the international humanitarian law that the MRTA claimed to respect.
It is important to highlight that MRTA also assassinated dissidents within its own ranks.
35. During the 1980s, MRTAs discourse and actions contributed to the creation of a climate in which the
use of violence pretended to appear as a legitimate political recourse, ultimately fostering the actions and ex-
pansion of the Shining Path. And in the 1990sbeginning with their frustrated storming of Congress and
the occupation of the Japanese Ambassadors residence in December 1996the MRTA tended to legitimate
the authoritarian, militarized counter-subversive policy of Alberto Fujimoris government.
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE ENTITIES
36. Te CVR conrms that Fernando Belaunde Terry and Alan Garca Prez attained the presidency
in free and direct elections by the citizens. Alberto Fujimori also did so in 1990. However, beginning
with the coup detat of April 5, 1992, Fujimori became an authoritarian ruler who sought to remain in
power by consolidating a corrupt autocracy.
37. Te CVR points out that despite the armed subversion of the PCP-SL and the MRTA and despite being
notably decient in many aspects, Peruvian democracy respected the separation of powers and freedom of
expression. Tree presidential and parliamentary elections were held, four national municipal elections took
place, and regional elections were held in 1989. None of these elections were questioned.
38. Nevertheless, the CVR establishes that those who governed the state in that period lacked the necessary
understanding of, and adequate handle on, the armed conict as formulated by the PCP-SL and the MRTA.
Tere was an interest in implementing the 1979 Constitution, in developing the country and in making the
relationship between the rulers and the governed consistent with the rule of law. However, the governments
of both Fernando Belaunde and Alan Garca erred by failing to apply a comprehensive strategyinvolving
social, political, economic, military, psychosocial and intelligence as well as the mobilization of the popu-
laceto confront armed subversion and terrorism eectively within a democratic framework.
Conduct of police forces
39. Te CVR notes that the police forces had the duty to confront the subversive groups that harmed the
fundamental rights of citizens and recognizes the eorts and sacrices undertaken by their members dur-
ing the years of violence. Furthermore, the CVR pays the most profound homage to the more than 1,000
brave members of the armed forces who lost their lives or were disabled in the line of duty.
40. Te CVR considers that the counter-subversive training received by the security forces at that point
referenced the guerrilla movements as organized according to a Castroist model or, in the best case, as
armed groups similar to those who were active in other Latin American countries at that time. Tis was
the principal reason for the diculty in confronting a demented enemy that blended into the civilian
4 The very act of taking up arms against a legitimately elected regime is a criminal act.
335
population and that was dierent from other subversive groups.
41. Te CVR notes that the police had to respond to the aggression of the PCP-SL, and later the MRTA,
under precarious logistical conditions, without adequate training or sucient rotation of their agents.
When they were given the responsibility to conduct the counter-subversive ght in Ayacucho, they had
insucient support from the government.
42. Te CVR considers that the limitations of the police intelligence services hindered their ability to ade-
quately understand what was occurring. Tis, along with the lack of knowledge of the nature of the PCP-SL,
caused them to underestimate the magnitude of the developing phenomenon. Tus, instead of sending the
most prepared and ecient agents from each institution, the police organizations maintained the common
practice of sending inappropriate agents to distant regions as a form of punishment.
43. Te CVR has established that once the state of emergency was declared in Ayacucho in October 1981,
intervention by the counter-insurgency police detachment, known as the Sinchis,
5
led to an increase in
human rights violations, generated resentment and distanced the police from the population.
44. Te CVR notes that coordination problems in joining the eorts of the three police institutionsas
well as corruption at the level of high ocials and in strategic unitswere factors extraneous to the ac-
tual conict that impeded better police action during the years in which the subversion was still weak.
As a result, notwithstanding the relative achievements obtained in 1982 with the capture of subversives,
particularly in the cities, two events occurred that demonstrated that the subversion had exceeded the
abilities of the police forces: the attack on the Huamanga penitentiary by the Shining Path and the with-
drawal of police posts in the countryside in 1982.
45. Te CVR has conrmed that with the entry of the armed forces into Ayacucho and the later introduction
of the political-military commands (CPM) into areas with a declared state of emergency, the police were made
subordinate to the armed forcessubject to orders given by military commanders over and above their own
commands and the civilian authorities. In this context and as the military oensive advanced, agents from all
three police institutions acting in the emergency areas took part in grave human rights violations.
46. Te CVR concludes that the ght against subversion reinforced pre-existing authoritarian and repres-
sive practices among members of the police. Torture during interrogations and undue detentionswhich
had been frequent in addressing common delinquencyacquired a massive character during the counter-
subversive action. Additionally, the CVR has established that the most serious human rights violations by
military agents were: extrajudicial executions, forced disappearance of persons, torture, and cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment. Te CVR particularly condemns the extensive practice of sexual violence
against women. All of these acts dishonor the perpetrators who were directly involved and also those who
in their role as hierarchical superiors instigated, permitted or covered up such acts through mechanisms
of impunity.
47. Te CVR establishes that starting in the second half of the 1980s the unication of the police forces,
oversight from the Ministry of the Interior and fusion of the distinct operational units into the Direc-
tion of Special Operations (DOES) contributed to a better coordination of action in the struggle against
subversion. However, the sector did not address to nor suciently strengthen DIRCOTE (the Anti-
Terrorism Directorate), the unit that had acquired experience from its concentrated work in Lima.
48. Te CVR has found indications linking individual members of the police force to the misnamed Rodrigo
Franco Command Group. It has not been possible to determine whether that Command Group was a cen-
tralized organization or a denomination employed by various actors who were not necessarily interconnected.
49. Te CVR can conrm that the distance between the police and the population tended to increase
5 Counterinsurgency unit of the old Civil Guard.
336
as the internal armed conict evolved. Tis fact helped to cultivate a negative image of the police
as perpetrators of the violence take root or in the case of the coca regions an image of the police as
corrupt and linked to drug tracking.
50. Te CVR establishes that beginning in 1985 the police forces attained a more accurate understanding
of the organization and styles of action of the subversive groups, leading to the work of the DINCOTE
(previously DIRCOTE) intelligence operation, which achieved the awless captures of the principal sub-
versive leadersespecially Victor Polay Campos on June 9, 1992, and Abimael Guzmn Reinoso on
September 12 of the same year. Tese captures made a fundamental contribution to the strategic defeat
of subversion and terrorism.
51. Te CVR establishes that following the coup detat of April 5, 1992, the Peruvian National Police
(PNP) were subject to the plans of the National Intelligence Service and subordinated to the military.
Tere was a signicant reduction in the PNPs powers, distortion of its functions and at the top levels
involvement in the regimes web of corruption, overseen by Vladimiro Montesinos.
Conduct of the armed forces
52. Te CVR notes that the armed forces, by the decision of the constitutional government in an executive
decree issued on December 29, 1982, were duty bound to confront the subversive groups that challenged the
constitutional order of the Republic and threatened the fundamental rights of its citizens.
53. Te CVR recognizes the eorts and sacrices made by members of the armed forces during the years
of violence and oers the most sincere homage to the more than 1,000 brave agents of the military who
lost their lives or were disabled in the line of duty.
54. Te CVR has found that the armed forces applied a strategy that, during the initial period,
was one of indiscriminate repression against the population suspected of belonging to the PCP-SL.
Later, this strategy became more selective, although it continued to make it possible for numerous
human rights violations to be committed.
55. Te CVR arms that at some places and moments in the conict, the behavior of members of the
armed forces not only involved some individual excesses by ocers or soldiers but also entailed general-
ized and/or systematic practices of human rights violations that constituted crimes against humanity as
well as transgressions of the norms of international humanitarian law.
56. Te CVR concludes that in this framework the political-military commands (CPM) were designated
the highest state authority in the emergency zones and may bear the primary responsibility for these
crimes. Te judiciary must establish the exact degree of criminal responsibility of the CPM commanders,
whether for ordering, inciting, facilitating or engaging in cover-ups or for having neglected the funda-
mental duty to put a stop to the crimes.
57. Te CVR has established that the most serious human rights violations by military agents were: extraju-
dicial executions, the forced disappearance of persons, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Te
CVR particularly condemns the extensive practice of sexual violence against women. All these acts consti-
tute a dishonor for those who directly perpetrated them and for those who, in their position as hierarchical
superiors, instigated, permitted or covered them up through mechanisms of impunity.
58. Te CVR notes that at the time of their intervention in the ght against subversion, the armed
forces were prepared and equipped to engage in a conventional conict (an external conict). Dur-
ing the rst years of their intervention (1983-85), they lacked adequate intelligence on the organiza-
tion, military prole and strategy of the PCP-SL. By the decision of civilian authority, their objective
was to rapidly end the conict without taking into account the cost in human lives. Tey set out
to recover territorial control, assuming that the population was divided into communities loyal to
337
the Peruvian State and communities loyal to the subversives or red zones, without noting that the
latter were not homogeneous and generally contained sectors dominated by the PCP-SL through
coercion and even terror.
59. In the CVRs view, although the military intervention hit the organization and the operational capac-
ity of the PCP-SL hard,
6
it also left in its wake massive human rights violations and turned the two-year
period from 1983-84 into the most lethal of the conict, especially in Ayacucho. Worse still, the strategy
turned out to be counterproductive, because the indiscriminate repression of the rural areas postponed
the rupture between the PCP-SL and the poorer sectors of the peasantry and failed to stop the expansion
of armed action into other areas of the country.
60. Te CVR notes that in August of 1989, the armed forces approved the organization of a systematic
counter-subversive strategy. Te new strategy distinguished among friendly, neutral and enemy popu-
lations within the theaters of operations. Territorial control was no longer its main objective; rather, the
strategy sought the elimination of the Political-Administrative Organizations (OPA) or the Shining
Path popular committees to win over the population and to isolate the PCP-SLs military forces. Te
strategy produced decisive results, including encouraging the peasantrys reaction against the Shining
Path and the spread of self-defense committees, which changed the relationship between the armed
forces and the peasantry.
61. At this stage human rights violations were less numerous but more deliberate or planned than in the
previous stage. Moreover, death squads appeared whose actions made Peru the world leader in the forced
disappearance of persons in those years.
62. Te CVR notes that the new strategy was used by a group of ocers who then designed plans for
a possible military interruption of the political process. Part of those authoritarian plans would later be
taken up again in the coup of 1992. Tese anti-democratic projects exposed the armed forces to two great
institutional disorders: (a) the use of a model of counter-subversive policy and the image of a victorious
army to justify the coup detat in 1992; and (b) a truce with drug trackers by dening the PCP-SL as
the principal enemy that needed to be isolated from the coca-growing peasantry. In some cases, and espe-
cially following the promotion of Vladimiro Montesinos, this truce became an alliance.
63. Te CVR concludes that the capture of Abimael Guzmn and the dismantling of the PCP-SL and
MRTA failed to prevent the ethics, prestige and even the well-being and eciency
7
of the armed forces
from being seriously compromised by leaders who tied their fate to a dictatorial government. Tis process
of decomposition was characterized by the activities of the Colina Group, the persecution of dissenting
ocers as well as by the organization of a system of corruption, blackmail and political espionage internal
to the armed forces under the direction of Vladimiro Montesinos.
64. Te CVR has found that the armed forces were capable of learning lessons during the process
of violence, which allowed them to rene their strategy to the point that it became more ecient
and less prone to massive violations of human rights. Tis learning process is ostensibly reected in
the decrease in victims of actions by state agents precisely in the years of the most intense internal
armed conict (1989-93) and while the PCP-SL unleashed a torrent of violent terrorism against the
Quechua and Ashninka peoples and also against the urban populace. Tese lessonsalong with
the proliferation of the self-defense committees, police intelligence operations and the support of the
citizensexplains the defeat of the PCP-SL.
6 PCP-SL documents acknowledge about 1,700 deaths of party militants, the peoples guerrilla army and the so-called masses that
supported them between mid-1983 and mid-1985. Although it is uncertain, the CVR believes that some of the deaths of PCP-SL militants could
be among the 2,000 people who were disappeared at the hands of the PCP-SL. It is reasonable to believe that these were young people who
were forcibly recruited and who never returned, possibly because they were killed in confrontations.
7 The erosion of the armed forces efciency in its fundamental task of national defense was revealed in the Cenepa confict in 1995.
338
Conduct of the self-defense committees
65. Te CVR believes that from early on poorer sectors of the peasantrywho according to the calcula-
tions of the PCP-SL ought to have been their principal alliesrose up against a project in which they did
not share and which was being imposed on them by force. In some cases spontaneously and in others on
the initiative of the armed forces, the peasantry formed the rst self-defense committees (CAD), which
later multiplied, giving the PCP-SL its rst strategic defeat in the rural areas.
66. Te CVR recognizes the peasants right to self-defense in the exceptional context created by the Shin-
ing Paths aggression. It nds, however, that in a signicant number of cases, the formation of self-defense
committees occurred as a result of the pressure and intimidation of the armed forces and/or other CADs.
According to the ndings of the CVR, on some occasions the CADs went beyond self-defense duties and
were responsible for crimes that must be punished.
67. Te CVR recognizes, nonetheless, that the CADs were a very important factor in the outcome of
the internal armed conict and pays homage to those who fell in the defense of their communities and
country. Te CVR also emphasizes that, once the armed conict ended, the CADs did not become hired
assassins for drug trackers, nor did they lend their military experience to the service of other actors
implicated in illicit activities. Te large majority of the CAD members have rejoined their communities,
and the country continues to be in their debt. Legislative Decree 741enacted at the end of 1991and
its subsequent regulations only allow for compensation for actions that occurred after the enactment of
the law and has beneted a reduced number of family members.
THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE GOVERNMENTS
68. Te CVR distinguishes the years between 1980 and 1992a period of civilian, democratically elect-
ed regimesfrom the nal period of our mandate (19922000), following the coup-detat of April 5,
1992. Tis change of regime has had a direct eect on the responsibilities of the states highest authorities
with respect to violations of human rights because the centralization of power forges, in principle, a more
direct link between the President of the Republic and the groups who operate under the cover of power
to perpetrate those violations.
69. Te CVR considers that, given the development of events marked by the PCP-SLs growing violence, it
was inevitable that the state would respond with the use of its armed forces and would resort to declaring
states of emergency, which were allowed under the Constitution in eect at the time to confront situations
of serious risk. Te CVR deplores, nonetheless, the fact that when the governments did opt for such declara-
tions they failed to take steps to prevent violations of the populations fundamental rights.
70. Te CVR is aware that both the weakness and the improvisational nature of the dierent govern-
ments actions were the result of deep failings of the state:
i. Its insucient national coverage and institutional depth
ii. Its lack of preparation for confronting this type of conict
iii. Te mistrust generated by signicant sectors of its own citizens, and
iv. A growing inability to submit to the legal and constitutional framework that the country had
just adopted in the Constitution of 1979.
71. For this reason, the CVR pays homage to those leaders and militants of democratic political parties
who oered up their lives or suered mistreatment for honestly carrying out their public duties. We re-
fer to both the militants of governing parties as well as those with parliamentary, regional or municipal
339
responsibility. Special mention must be made of the local authorities in those areas most aected by the
violence, who maintained the presence of the Peruvian State, often at the cost of making the ultimate
sacrice. Tey should be an example to all in this new stage in the search for democracy.
72. Nevertheless, the CVR must conrm the very grave responsibility of the governments of those years,
including the parties represented in Parliament, local governments andbetween 1989 and 1991re-
gional governments. In the rst twelve years of the conict, the police and armed forces took charge of
combating the subversion through legal instruments approved by civilian governments within the frame-
work of anti-terrorist legislation passed by a democratically elected Congress.
73. Te CVR has gathered ample evidence concerning how grave, massive human rights violations were per-
petrated in combat against the subversive groups. Tis involves rst the governments, which were responsible
for the Executive Powers actions overall and had structural authority over the security forces. Furthermore,
the elected civilian governments incurred the most serious responsibility by failing to address reports of hu-
man rights violations or, as in many cases, by ensuring impunity for those responsible for the violations.
74. Te CVR nds that the rst institutional turning point in the abdication of democratic responsibility by
the government was the creation by legal order of the political-military commands. In practice, the commands
made civilian authority in areas declared to be in a state of emergency subordinate to its own by taking over
not only the military command but also the political leadership in the ght against subversion.
8
75. Te CVR establishes that Law 24150 placed soldiers and police in provinces declared to be in a state of
emergency under military jurisdiction, which favored the impunity of state agents responsible for human
rights violations. Similarly, the permanent nature of states of emergency in more and more provinces weak-
ened democracy and created a climate ripe for human rights violations as well as a general sense among the
population and the civilian authorities in those areas that power resided in the military.
76. Te CVR believes that the abdication of democratic authority culminated in the counter-subversive
legislation passed after the coup of April 1992. Under that law, commanders of the political-military
commands not only coordinated and supervised but also directed actions in non-military elds. Tis leg-
islation changed the National Defense System, the National Intelligence Service Law, and the law on the
military situation. Tis last law allowed general commanders of the armed forces to remain in their posts
even after reaching retirement age. Furthermore, the new legislation included procedures and sentences
that violated due process guarantees, the Constitution and international treaties to which Peru was a
signatory, such as: disproportionate minimum sentences, new legal concepts such as aggravated terrorism
and treason, and faceless courts and judges, among others. Tis new legal framework was one of the pil-
lars of the regime that emerged following the coup detat of April 1992.
Indiference and demand for harsh measures
77. Te CVR has found, sadly, that the civilian governments were not alone in bowing to the indiscriminate
use of force as a means of combating subversion. On the contrary, the proclivity of these governments for
a military solution without civilian controls resonated with a considerable sector of Peruvian society, prin-
cipally in the moderately educated urban sector that beneted from state services and resided far from the
epicenter of the conict. Tis sector, in the main, watched with indierence or demanded a quick solution
to the conict and stood prepared to face the social cost being paid by citizens of the rural, poorer regions.
The Popular Action government
78. Te CVR expresses its special recognition of all the victims belonging to the Popular Action party
(AP), many of whom were local authorities who remained in their positions despite the intensity of
the violence. Te CVR also emphasizes the special eort made by the government of Fernando Be-
8 The latter could have been left to civil authorities or to a minister or ad hoc presidential delegate.
34 0
launde Terry to preserve the democratic system, local and general elections and freedom of the press
in the context of a dicult transition to a democratic regime and in the middle of the worst internal
armed conict in the history of the Republic.
79. Te CVR recognizes that the Popular Action party had to confront subversion in a situation made
dicult by the complexity of an oversized state inherited from the military government, by the weakness
of a party system with no signicant democratic existence, by civil-military relations marked by distance
and distrust and by the existence of a large and radical left.
80. Te CVR recalls that in this context, President Belaunde proposed a number of policies for a broad
united front, which were accepted only by his ally, the Popular Christian Party. Te other parties opted
to maintain their own political proles. Tis disagreement made the creation of a united response to
the subversive threat enormously dicult.
81. Te CVR nds that the internal armed conict was considered for many months to be a marginal
problem that had taken the State and all of the countrys political forces by surprise.
9
Once the increase in
the number of armed subversive actions made the conict impossible to hide, the Popular Action govern-
ment and the opposition lost valuable time attributing blame for what was happening so as to suit their
own political agendas. It must be noted that the time lost in mistaken or interest-driven diagnoses was
a crucial period in which the PCP-SL settled into many areas of the Ayacucho countryside, without an
organized response by the government on behalf of the state.
82. Te CVR establishes that the government opted to confront the PCP-SL with police forces and with
exceptional measures that were extended without interruption. Te limitations of the police forcesdivided
into three institutions with no coordination among them, lacking basic equipment and without a coherent
anti-subversive policyquickly generated rejection by the population, rst toward the police and then to-
ward the government. Te government faced with increasingly violent activity by the PCP-S, opted to hand
over the direction of the counter-subversive ght to the armed forces at the end of 1982.
83. Te CVR believes that the decision taken by the Popular Action government initiated a process of
militarization that lasted for more than a decade and had grave consequences for the country. Te estab-
lishment of political-military commands, and the failure of political authorities to contribute to the ght
against subversion in nonmilitary arenas, produced a de facto subordination of local civilian authorities to
the anti-subversive strategies of the armed forces.
84. Te CVR has established that both the creation of the political-military commands and the interven-
tion of the armed forces were carried out without civilian authorities taking necessary preventive mea-
sures to protect the fundamental rights of the population. Tis resulted in numerous violations of human
rights being carried out in a systematic and/or generalized manner.
85. Te CVR concludes that the Popular Action party tolerated these human rights violations, ignor-
ing numerous reports from various government and civil society sources. Tis was the case in terms of
the massacres, such as those in Putis, Pucayacu, and Cabitos, to name some of the more notorious ones.
Similarly, during this period of terrible violence, the Parliament, controlled by the governing party, failed
to appoint any investigative commissions. Te sole commission during this time was appointed by the Ex-
ecutive to investigate the assassination of 8 journalists in the community of Uchuraccay, where the CVR
has established that, in the year following the massacre, 135 Quechua peasants also died, the majority at
the hands of the PCP-SL.
86. Te CVR nds that the Popular Action governments unjustied tolerance of these abuses of the funda-
mental rights of the citizenry was founded on the intention and expectation of eliminating subversion in the
9 The main political actors made contradictory accusations among themselves, simultaneously denouncing the Cuban government and the
CIA, the legal left, the government and even military ofcers of the Velasco regime or the far right as perpetrators of terrorist acts.
34 1
short term, with no consideration for the cost in human lives. Law 24150, passed in 1985, ratied this policy.
87. Te CVR nds that the Popular Action government bears political responsibility for its tolerance of
the human rights violations committed by the state, principally against the indigenous population, which
is the most unprotected and marginalized in the country. Te CVR nds this to be a regrettable demon-
stration of the habits of discrimination and racism existent in Peruvian society.
88. Te gures of the CVR reveal that, according to an analysis by year, the highest number of deaths
in the entire conict occurred between 1983 and 1984. Tese were caused by the PCP-SLs assassination
campaigns and the deadly ocial response, which, according to the CVRs calculations, left 19,468 fatali-
ties or 28 percent of the total estimated for the entire internal armed conict. Tese gures went almost
unnoticed by the rest of the country due to the serious ethnic divisions in our society.
The government of the Peruvian Aprista Party
89. Te CVR expresses its special recognition of all the victims who were members of the American
Popular Revolutionary Alliance Party (Alianza Progresiva Revolucionaria Americana, APRA), also known
as the Peruvian Aprista Party (Partido Aprista Peruano, PAP), many of whom were local authorities who
remained in oce despite the intensity of the violence. Te CVR also emphasizes the eort of the gov-
ernment of President Alan Garca Prez to preserve the democratic system, local and general elections,
and the freedom of the press in the context of a dicult situation and in the middle of the worst internal
armed conict in the history of the Republic.
90. Te CVR believes that when Dr. Alan Garca Prez took oce in July 1985, he initiated a series of
social policies to reorient the anti-subversive strategy then in place. Te explicit goal was to defeat subver-
sion through the development of policies directed at peasants and the poorest regions. Te new govern-
ment assumed responsibility for ongoing criticisms that had been directed against the conduct of the
armed forces since the previous government.
91. Tis policy of respect for human rights, and of reporting their violation, was demonstrated in the penal-
ties applied to military leaders responsible for the Accomarca massacre (August 1985). Te government thus
sought to exert civilian control over military actions. Additionally, it created a Peace Commission and car-
ried out initiatives for the unication of the police force and the creation of a Ministry of Defense.
92. Nevertheless, the CVR believes that what has been termed the prison massacre, which took place
on June 18-19, 1986, in the penitentiaries at Lurigancho and El Frontn marked a turning point in the
eorts of the PAP government to use civilian power to impose a new regime of respect for human rights
on the security forces. Te CVR has found that beginning with those events, the armed forces acted
with greater autonomy in their counter-subversive actions, without either the Executive or the Legislative
branches providing them with the legal framework to do so.
93. Te CVR nds grave political responsibility on the part of the PAP government in those cas-
es, without prejudice to other individual responsibilities that may be determined in other na-
tional or international judicial forums.
94. Te CVR believes the cover-up of the killings at Cayara in May 1988 to be paradigmatic of the new at-
titude of the governing party with respect to the actions of the armed forces in the ght against subversion.
Te Senate Investigating Commission, headed by PAP Parliamentarian Carlos Enrique Melgar, found that
the killings had not occurred, even though a minority on that commission and a prosecutor armed the op-
posite. Nonetheless, the Aprista majority approved the nding. Te CVRs investigations conrm the killings
in Cayara and nd the PAP politically responsible for collaborating in the cover-up of that massacre.
95. Te CVR has established that the PAP government initiated a reorganization of three existing police in-
stitutions in response to complaints about the crisis of corruption and ineciency. Tis led to the formation
34 2
of what later became the National Police. PAP had a particular interest in controlling the police through the
Interior Ministry. In the reorganization, new entities like the Direction of Special Operations (DOES) unit
trained in counter-subversion, were created and anti-terrorism intelligence work was strengthened.
96. Te CVR believes that the acute economic and political crisis that Peru experienced beginning in 1988
fostered the development of subversive groups and the maelstrom of violence. Te failure of the economic
program and the onset of hyperination led to a situation of grave instability in the country. With the
failed attempt to nationalize the banks, the government lost the support of the countrys business and
nancial sectors. Te marches and counterdemonstrations on economic policy deepened existing social
tensions, which were further aggravated by the collapse of basic services. Te PCP-SL took advantage of
these expressions of discontent to initiate its own protest marches, even in the capital itself.
97. Te CVR has gathered testimonies that suggest the existence of police personnel linked to death squad
activities and paramilitary commands used against presumed subversives. A series of events, such as the
appearance of the misnamed Rodrigo Franco Command Group, the confrontation in Molinos between
an Army patrol and a column of the MRTA, the PCP-SLs attack on the police station in Uchiza, the aban-
donment of municipal positions in 1989 and the escape of MRTA militants from the Castro Castro prison
in 1990, among others, fostered the image of anarchy and chaos in the country. Nevertheless, at the same
time, three national elections took place between November 1989 and June 1990. Discontent among the
armed forces was considerable, even leading to an attempted coup detat. Te CVR concludes that with the
emergence of the crisis, the government lost control of the counter-subversive policywith the exception
of some areas of police work that were very successful, like the Special Intelligence Group (GEIN), which
would eventually have the greatest success capturing subversive leaders.
Governments of Alberto Fujimori
98. Te CVR has established that the presidential elections of 1990which occurred in the midst of
a generalized crisis, the damaged reputations of political parties and the loss of condence in political
organizationsfacilitated the triumph of an independent, Alberto Fujimori, an engineer by training
who quickly revealed his contempt for democracy. He never built a political organization to support
him.
10
In order to address the large problems that he inheritedthe economic crisis and expanding sub-
versionhe placed a group of technocrats in charge of economic issues and adopted the armed forces
counter-subversive strategy as it appeared at the end of the 1980s. Additionally, he called upon military
intelligence operatives, the best known being Vladimiro Montesinos. With Montesinos participation,
the new regime began to strengthen the National Intelligence Service and assured for itself the loyalty of
the military leadership, converting them into pillars of its administration.
11

99. Te CVR concludes that the coup detat of April 5, 1992, brought an end to the rule of law and dem-
onstrated the weakness of the political party system as a majority of public opinion supported the coup.
In the midst of the urban oensive of the PCP-SL, important sectors from all social strata indicated a
willingness to exchange democracy for security and to tolerate human rights violations as the necessary
cost of putting an end to the subversion.
100. Te CVR has established that beginning in 1992 the new counter-subversive strategy emphasized the
selective elimination of the political-administrative organization of subversive groups. A death squad linked
to Vladimiro Montesinos, called Colina, was responsible for assassinations, forced disappearances and cruel
and ferocious massacres. Te CVR has reasonable grounds to arm that President Alberto Fujimori, his
adviser Vladimiro Montesinos, and high level ocials of the National Intelligence Service are criminally re-
sponsible for the assassinations, forced disappearances and massacres perpetrated by the Colina death squad.
10 Change 90 (Cambio 90) was deactivated after the 1990 elections and never operated organically again. New Majority (Nueva Mayora) was
only a mechanism for participating in the 1995 elections. The Peru to 2000 Front (Frente Per al 2000), which was to support him in the 2000
elections, collected more than 1 million signatures to register with the National Elections Board.
11 One point of infexibility was preventing Nicols de Bari Hermoza Ros as Commander General from retiring in late 1991 until 1998.
34 3
101. Te CVR holds that in this same period the DINCOTEthanks to the experience it had accumu-
lated since late in the previous decade and the emphasis it placed on intelligence workdemonstrated
more constructive and eective capabilities that resulted in the capture of Victor Polay, the principal
leader of the MRTA, and the capture of Abimael Guzmn and members of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the PCP-SL on September 12, 1992. Te CVR concludes that the capture of the top lead-
ership of the PCP-SL and the MRTA were not used by the government to accelerate the defeat of subver-
sion; rather, they were used to obtain electoral returns.
102. Furthermore, the CVR notes the use made of the Chavn de Huntar operation, carried out to res-
cue the people taken hostage by the MRTA at the Japanese Ambassadors residence in December 1996.
Te CVR expresses its repudiation of that terrorist action, which kept dozens of people captive for more
than four months. Te CVR recognizes the right of the state to rescue the hostages held there, applauds
the heroism and eciency of the commandos who successfully carried out the rescue operation and pays
homage to the members of the Army who were casualties of that action as well as to Dr. Carlos Giusti,
a member of the Supreme Court who died during the operation. Nevertheless, the CVR condemns the
extrajudicial executions that apparently occurred; these were unjustied because they involved individu-
als who had surrendered. Te Commission shares the publics rejection of the images of Alberto Fujimori
walking among the dead bodies in the residence shortly after its recovery.
103. Te CVR arms that in the following years, several facts, some of which were true but the major-
ity of which were manipulated by the media, served to create and exaggeratedly re-create terrorism as a
latent threat to justify the authoritarianism of the regime and to discredit the opposition. Wiretaps on
the telephones of the political opposition, the harassment of independent journalism, the subjection and
nal perversion of the majority of the media, attacks and crimeseven against members of the National
Intelligence Service itselfas well as the distortion of legitimate operations such as Chavn de Huntar
all carry the stamp of Alberto Fujimoris authoritarian government.
104. In light of the foregoing, the CVR holds that in the last years of the Fujimori government, the inter-
nal armed conict was manipulated with the goal of keeping the regime in power. Tis plunged the coun-
try into a new economic crisis and into the abyss of corruption, moral decay, a weakening of the social
and institutional fabric and a profound lack of condence in the public sphere. All of these characteristics
constitute, at least in part, consequences of the authoritarian way in which the conict was resolved and
make up one of the most shameful moments in the history of the Republic.
Political parties of the left
105. Te CVR expresses its special recognition of all the victims who belonged to the parties that made
up the alliance of the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU), many of whom were local authorities who re-
mained in oce despite the intensity of the violence. Te CVR also emphasizes that the IU was a channel
of political representation for broad popular sectors and social movements that up to that time had not
been included on the national agenda. Tus, in many areas of the country left militants provided a brake
on the advance of the PCP-SL.
106. Te CVR has established that the alliance of the United Left was the second electoral force through-
out most of the 1980s; it had representation in Parliament, governed at the local level and between 1989
and 1992 participated in regional governments.
107. Te CVR has established that in the 1970s most of the organizations that later formed part of
the IU shared, with minor dierences, a discourse and a strategy that privileged taking power
through armed struggle. In the context of the extensive social mobilizations and the democrat-
ic opening at the end of the 1970s, some of these organizations changed direction to positively value
electoral politics and representative democracy.
108. Nevertheless, the CVR points out that insucient andin many casesdelayed ideological dif-
34 4
ferentiation placed the majority of the parties in the IU in an ambiguous position with respect to the
actions of the PCP-SL and even more so with respect to the MRTA. Tis ambiguity made it dicult for
both party leaders and the social organizations inuenced by the IU to confront the violent concepts of
the PCP-SL or the MRTA ideologically.
109. Te CVR establishes that the left denounced human rights violations committed by the state. Neverthe-
less, it did not give the same treatment to violations committed by subversive groups, especially the MRTA.
Tere were two groups on the left that maintained to the end the possibility of recourse to violence to take
power. Tis was what ultimately led to the division of the left into purported reformists and revolutionaries.
110. In the opinion of the CVR, although not a generalized position, sectors of the left understood their
participation in the parliament and in municipal governments as a platform for agitation and propaganda
in order to demonstrate the limitations of demi-bourgeois (demoburguesas) institutions.
111. Te CVR notes that, politically, the sectarianism and ineectiveness of the parties and independents
that made up the IUas well as the diculty of putting the interests of the country ahead of the groups
or personalities that were involvedimpeded the IU from transcending its character as an electoral alli-
ance and ended up dividing the IU in 1989. Te division was disconcerting to its followers and broke the
retaining wall that the IU represented among broad popular sectors, allowing for the advance of subver-
sive groups and subsequently Fujimorism.
112. Nevertheless, the CVR emphasizes the IUs positive role in the early denunciation of human
rights violations through its member parties, the social organizations that it was involved in, and its
representatives in Parliament, who had signicant roles in the most important congressional in-
vestigative commissions on issues related to the internal armed conict (the killing of prisoners,
paramilitary groups and the causes of the violence).
113. Furthermore, the CVR documents that many members of the IU, especially grassroots provincial
militants during electoral periods, were victims of the security forces, which did not distinguish between
IU members and subversives. Additionally, it is clear to the CVR that the IU was never a legal front for
the PCP-SL, neither organically nor ocially. As the decade progressed, the IU increasingly disavowed
the ideology and methods of the PCP-SL, which assassinated a signicant number of social leaders from
the ranks of the IU, some of whom were important leaders of national trade organizations.
The legislature
114. Te CVR has conrmed that the states problems confronting the internal armed conict also occurred
in the legislative branch of government. Te political forces represented there did not take, nor did they pro-
pose, comprehensive initiatives to address the subversive groups until the conict was quite advanced (1991).
115. Te CVR documents that throughout the 1980s, Congress functioned with majorities from the
respective governing party of each presidential term. Trough these majorities, the governments inhib-
ited or weakened the capacities for oversight and legislative initiative. Tus, the Parliament of 1980-1985
failed to perform its constitutional mandate of oversight by refusing to exercise control over what was
occurring in Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurmac as a result of the conict. During this periodin
which the largest number of Peruvians died or disappeared because of the warCongress did not under-
take any investigation of the mounting human rights violations that both the PCP-SL and the security
forces were committing with impunity.
116. Te CVR must note that in the face of the militarization of the conict, Congress failed to propose
any viable alternative or plan. Te principal law-making activity was in the hands of the Executive. And
when Congress nally took up that function again it did nothing but rearm its limited willingness to
commit to nding a harsh and ecient answer to the subversive phenomenon.
34 5
117. Te CVR notes the Congressional approval of Law 24150, which established the norms governing
states of emergency in which the armed forces assumed control of internal order in all or part of the af-
fected territory and legalized what was already occurring de facto, inhibiting civilian authority to the
benet of the military. Tus, this decision led to the weakening of civilian democratic power and reduced
counter-subversion policy to a sphere of military repression and control.
118. Nevertheless, the CVR notes that beginning in 1985, investigative commissions were appointed for
cases with signicant impact on public opinion. Although none of them were able to break the cycle of im-
punity, parliamentary debates and minority ndings generated important currents of opposition to human
rights violations within public opinion. Nevertheless, while Congress took on the investigation of important
cases of human rights violations perpetrated by the security forces, it made no similar eort to investigate
and demand sanctions for the terrible cases of violations perpetrated by the PCP-SL.
119. Te CVR notes that following the 1990 elections, the Executive lacked a majority in Congress for
the rst time. Taking advantage of the decline of the political parties and the legislatures loss of prestige,
Alberto Fujimoris government and the promoters of an authoritarian, militarized counter-subversive policy
overstated the institutions ineptitude and problems and had no qualms in dissolving it in 1992.
120. Te CVR nds that between 1990 and 1992, Congress acquired another dimension. Te lack of a
parliamentary majority for the governing party and the increase in subversion spurred greater consensus
and more active participation in the design of a counter-subversive policy within democratic frameworks.
Tis new attitude was evident in the debate on counter-subversive legislation in November 1991. With
respect to congressional oversight, the 1990-1992 Congress intervened in situations of human rights
violations in the internal armed conict. However, the April 1992 coup, which closed Parliament with
the consent of the majority of the public, demonstrated that this was a belated and insucient eort to
control the de facto powers and authoritarian currents in the country. At this point, the political parties
showed clear signs of exhaustion and crisis.
121. Te CVR believes that after the 1992 coup, Congress had no capacity for oversight due to both the con-
stitutional cutbacks on its powers and the absolute majority maintained by the governing party until 2000.
122. Te CVR has also been able to conrm that in many cases the post-coup ocial majority in Con-
gressdespite the brave attitude of opposition members in Congressnot only abdicated its constitu-
tional function of oversight but also endorsed and promoted cover-ups and impunity. An especially note-
worthy moment in the institutions participation in the process of arming impunity was the passage of
Law 26479, the General Amnesty Law (June 15, 1995). In eect, Parliament became an echo chamber
for the proposals of the palace and of the National Intelligence Service.
The judiciary
123. Te CVR notes that the abdication of democratic authority extended to the administration of jus-
tice. Te judicial system failed to adequately fulll its mission, whether in connection with legal penalties
for the actions of subversive groups, protecting the rights of detained persons or putting an end to the
impunity of state agents who committed grave human rights violations. First, the judiciary acquired the
image of an inecient sieve that freed guilty suspects and imprisoned innocent ones; second, its agents
failed to guarantee the rights of detainees, thus contributing to grave violations of the right to life and
physical integrity; and nally, they abstained from bringing members of the armed forces accused of
serious crimes to justice, systematically ruling in every case of contested jurisdiction in favor of military
jurisdiction, where impunity held sway.
124. Nevertheless, the CVR must specify that the judicial system suered from structural problems that
led to its ineciency. However, this circumstance was exacerbated by the negligent actions of some judicial
ocials who made the institutional context in which justice was administered even worse.
34 6
125. Te CVR documents that Perus judicial situation deteriorated after the coup detat in 1992, when
the following conditions were added to those already mentioned: clear interference in the capacity of
self-regulation through the massive termination of judges, provisional appointments and the creation of
management entities outside the structure of the judicial system. Tis was in addition to the ineective-
ness of the Constitutional Court.
126. Te CVR documents that the legislation applied by the judicial system was decient. Between 1980
and 1992, this situation was particularly aected by the broad and imprecise denition of the crime of
terrorism and the weakening of the Public Ministrys work in the preliminary investigation phase, mini-
mizing the prosecutors role as the guarantor of the process. Te situation worsened after the 1992 coup
because of the characteristics of the new anti-terrorism legislation, which included: the over-criminal-
ization of terrorism by making the concept exible and creating new crimes that were tried in dierent
forums and imposed dierent sentences for the same conduct; the lack of proportionality in sentencing;
the serious limitation on the ability of detainees to mount a defense; and the attribution of jurisdiction to
military tribunals to try crimes of treason.
127. Te CVR has established that, by abdicating its own jurisdiction and acting through the Su-
preme Court when the accused were members of the armed forces, the Judiciary ruled on every oc-
casion in favor of the military forumwhere the cases were generally dismissed, unnecessarily pro-
longed or resulted in lenient sentences.
128. Te CVR also has found that judicial ocials failed in their responsibility to protect citizens rights
by the generalized practice of declaring habeas corpus petitions inadmissible. Te tribunal for constitu-
tional guaranteesin existence until 1991systematically avoided making reasoned rulings. Tis situa-
tion contributed in no small measure to arbitrary detentions culminating in torture, arbitrary executions
and forced disappearances.
129. Te CVR believes that the dictatorship of Alberto Fujimori spuriously attempted to legalize impunity
for human rights violations by state agents by managing to have the Democratic Constitutional Congress
provide majority approval for two amnesty laws that violated constitutional provisions and international
agreements ratied by Perus sovereign power. With one honorable exception,
12
in which a law was not ap-
plied because it breached constitutional provisions and international agreements, judges renounced their
authority to serve as a decentralized line of defense against unconstitutional legislation.
130. Te CVR has established that strict and uncritical application of the 1992 anti-terrorist legislation
undermined the guarantee of impartiality and accuracy in the trials of detainees. Not only did hundreds of
innocent people have to endure long sentences, but due process violations cast a heavy shadow of doubt over
the trials that took place. Te discrediting of the Peruvian judicial system during the Fujimori regime proved
to be a boon for the true subversives when, years later, the state had to re-try them on the basis of insucient
evidence. Additionally, those sentenced for terrorism suered prison conditions that were degrading to hu-
man dignity and that in no way led to their rehabilitation. Te prison situation, little noticed by judges in
criminal sentencing, gave rise to riots and massacres in 1985, 1986 and 1992.
131. Te CVR notes that the Public Ministry (the prosecuting authority)notwithstanding some honor-
able exceptionsabdicated its duty to enforce the strict respect for human rights that must be observed
during detentions and was insensitive to the requests of victims relatives. On the contrary, it failed in
its duty to report crimes, its investigations were lethargic and forensic work was very decient, which all
contributed to the situation of chaos and impunity. Under the Fujimori dictatorship the Public Ministrys
deference to the orders of the Executive was total.
12 Proof that it was possible to reject this impunity can be seen in the brave stand taken by Antonia Saquicuray, who made public the Barrios
Altos case, maintaining that the amnesty law was unconstitutional.
34 7
ROLE OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
Trade organizations
132. Te CVR has established the violent aggression by subversive groups against various unions and busi-
nesses. In its report, the CVR records the assassination of union leaders, business leaders and employees.
133. Te CVR nds that while the PCP-SL exacerbated labor conicts and sought the destruction of
existing unions, the MRTA sought to use the unions for its subversive goals.
134. Te CVR also concludes that anti-democratic practices or conceptions in the unions and trade as-
sociations led to a mutual discrediting throughout the armed conict, giving rise to criticisms about the
representational character and legitimacy of the trade organizations.
135. Te CVR has established that the states role as arbiter of labor conicts was markedly inept as an
inecient bureaucracy prone to corruption, the absence of clear rules and complicated legislation, among
other factors, hampered negotiations, thus making the problems worse.
Educational system and teaching profession
136. Te CVR has found that the state neglected education for decades. Tere were modernization
projects in the 1960s, but these failed. Neither the university law nor the educational reform of 1972
succeeded in turning these tendencies around. Nor did they neutralize the predominance of traditional
authoritarian teaching methods. In those areas from which the state withdrew, new proposals emerged
that endorsed a radical changeone that could not be adopted by the social and political system but
was only achievable through confrontation and sustained by a dogmatic and simplied Marxism that
expanded widely throughout the universities in the 1970s. Tese new curricula were transmitted using
the old authoritarian pedagogical frameworks, which went unquestioned.
137. Te CVR has found that among many university instructors and students there was a common belief in a
fatalistic historical determinism through the path of confrontation. Tat vision opened spaces for the develop-
ment of authoritarian proposals from the extreme left. Te PCP-SL was simply the most extreme.
138. Te CVR has found that, in this context, the PCP-SL sought to instrumentalize educational institu-
tions: universities, secondary schools, advanced institutes and even pre-university academies. Widespread
dogmatism and the ambivalence of radical groups toward violence were factors that favored the PCP-SL.
Trough intimidation or cooptation, the PCP-SL was able to place instructors in schools where they
sought to proselytize. Taking advantage ofand feeding ona maximalist version of university auton-
omy, the PCP-SL gained access in some cases to university boards or at least found sanctuary in housing
and cafeteria facilities. Tere, a proselytism developed in which clientelism was mixed with an appeal to
the feelings of discrimination and insult experienced by the poor and provincial students, who were the
greatest users of those services. For those students, who had weak social networks in their places of study,
the proselytizing also oered an identity and a sense of belonging.
139. Te CVR nds grave responsibility of the State:
v. in the neglect of public education in the midst of a conict that used the educational system as
an important terrain for ideological and symbolic debate;
vi. in intimidating and/or stigmatizing entire communities of teachers and students in public uni-
versities, especially in the provinces;
13

13 Although rarely applied, in the 1990s the law of apology for terrorism legalized the intimidation of teachers.
34 8
vii. in the deterioration of the infrastructure for services at several public universities; and
viii. in having allowed grave human rights violations to be committed against students and professors
because of their status as such.
14

140. Te CVR repudiates the crimes committed against students, professors, and workers, whatever
their political aliation. Te Commission especially condemns the killing of more than 100 stu-
dents, professors and workers at the Universidad Nacional del Centro (UNCP) who were caught in
the confusion of the crossre, at the hands of various actors in the warincluding death squads.
Furthermore, the Commission condemns the massacre of eight students and one professor at the
Enrique Guzmn y Valle National Education University, La Cantuta, in July 1992, and the subse-
quent amnesty for the perpetrators, members of the Colina death squad, in 1995. Te Commission
notes that based on its investigations, in addition to those already cited, the Universities of San Cris-
tbal de Huamanga, Hermilio Valdizn de Hunuco, Callao, Huacho and San Marcos, among oth-
ers, were aected by the counter-subversive strategy of detentions-disappearances, the destruction of
infrastructure and during the authoritarian regime of the 1990s by the installation of military bases
on the university campuses.
Role of the churches
141. Te CVR, through the many testimonies gathered and the hearings and studies undertaken has con-
rmed that the Catholic and Evangelical churches contributed to the protection of the population from
crimes and human rights violations during the violence. Institutionally, the Catholic Church condemned
early on the violence of the groups taking up arms as well as the human rights violations committed by the
state. Tese positions took the shape of activities in the defense of human rights and in denunciations of the
violations very early in the process initiated through organizations such as the Episcopal Commission for
Social Action (Comisin Episcopal de Accin Social, CEAS) and others. Te CVR has concluded that many
lives were saved, and many other abuses were impeded, thanks to the support of these organizations as well
as of individual clerics and laypersons, regardless of theological or pastoral approaches. In departments such
as Puno, Cajamarca, Ancash, Ucayali or Amazonas, the role played by priests, lay people, and catechists
contributed to strengthening the social fabric and constructing a barrier that weakened the advance of the
PCP-SL and the explosion of what was termed the dirty war.
142. Nevertheless, the CVR has found that the defense of human rights was not steadfast in the
archbishopric of Ayacucho during most of the armed conict. Troughout much of the conict, that
archbishopric hindered the work of church organizations linked to the issue and denied the incidence
of human rights violations committed in its jurisdiction. Te Commission deplores the fact that some
ecclesiastical authorities from Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Abancay have not complied with their
pastoral commitments.
143. Te CVR has concluded that the Evangelical churches also played a valuable role in the protection of
human rights, principally through their national coordinating bodies. Te Commission also recognizes the
courage of pastors who contributed to this eort in the defense of life on the outskirts of large cities and in
remote rural areas. Te Commission also conrms that a signicant number of Evangelical peasants par-
ticipated in self-defense committees that confronted the subversion. Nevertheless, the Commission regrets
that some Evangelical communities have not shared in that defense of human rights.
144. Te CVR pays homage to the priests, the men and women of the religious communi-
ty, lay individuals, and the Catholic and Evangelical faithful who paid with their lives for doing
pastoral work during the internal armed conict.
14 According to testimony gathered by the CVR, of the total number of victims of state agents during the confict 3 percent were teachers and
2.4 percent were university students or students at post-secondary institutions.
34 9
Human rights organizations
145. Te CVR has concluded that throughout the conict, dozens of civil society associations kept the
capacity for indignation alive and created an eective movement in favor of human rights, which was
organized around the National Human Rights Coordinating Body (Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos
Humanos, CNDDHH) and which, despite constant eorts to demonize it, became an ethical point of
reference on the national stage and an eective resource in support of the victims goal of obtaining truth
and demanding justice. Te CVR is convinced that the country owes these human rights organizations
a debt of gratitude becauseby exercising the democratic right of critically monitoring the security
forcesthey contributed to controlling some of the most brutal aspects of the conict and obtaining
extensive international solidarity for the democratic struggle of the Peruvian people.
146. In keeping with the tradition of the international human rights movement, in the rst years of the
conict the Peruvian defenders of human rights directed their criticism fundamentally toward the State,
because the States actions are dened within a legal system that must be respected and, furthermore, the
State is the signatory of international agreements and must, above all, be accountable for the security of its
citizens. Nevertheless, in the mid-1980s, the organizations that made up the CNDDHH set themselves
apart from the subversive groups front organizations.
15
Later, they refused to provide legal defense for
militants or leaders of the subversive groups. Tey also actively and successfully advocated for the inter-
national human rights movement to include subversive groups within their criticism and monitoring,
whether those groups were Peruvian or from other parts of the world.
147. Te CVR also has conrmed that unlike other countries that experienced internal armed conict,
victims organizations were relatively weak. Tis is because in the majority of the cases the victims were
poor peasants, with little consciousness of their rights, for whom access to justice was dicult and who
had weak social networks with few urban contacts. Tis weakness worked to the advantage of impunity
for the perpetrators of human rights violations and crimes.
148. In that context, the CVR emphasizes and recognizes the persistence of the Peruvian National As-
sociation of Families of the Abducted, Detained and Disappeared (Asociacin Nacional de Familiares de
Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Per, ANFASEP); the vast majority of its members are poor,
Quechua-speaking women from Ayacucho. Even in the worst moments, with tenacity and bravery, these
women kept alive the ame of hope for the recovery of their loved ones and that justice would be applied
to those responsible for the disappearances.
Media
149. Te Truth and Reconciliation Commission establishes that the media played a very important role
throughout the internal armed conict. During those years, investigative journalism eorts were abun-
dant, courageous and in some caseslike in the massacre at La Cantuta (July 1992)indispensable to
uncovering who was responsible for horric crimes. Often, in these investigations journalists risked their
lives and, unfortunately, on several occasions, those lives were lost. Te CVR pays homage to the journal-
ists assassinated during the internal armed conict while carrying out their duties. Particular mention
is made of the Uchuraccay martyrs, the rst journalists killed in the line of duty and in especially tragic
circumstances. Additionally, the Commission gives special recognition to the contribution to the clari-
cation of facts and the reporting of crimes and human rights violations on the part of the journalists who,
when working in provinces declared to be in a state of emergency, carried out their duties selessly under
very adverse conditions.
150. With respect to news coverage and editorial policy, the CVR establishes that from the beginning
of the 1980s, the media condemned subversive violence, although with nuances reecting the political
15 Such as the so-called Democratic Lawyers (Abogados Democrticos).
350
inclinations of each outlet, which meant dierent evaluations of the situation or of the objectives of the
subversive organizations. Nevertheless, the media did not take the same position with respect to inves-
tigating and reporting human rights violations. Te CVR recognizes that there was valuable and risky
investigation and reporting work, but it also notes that there were media entities that held an ambiguous
position and in certain important cases even endorsed arbitrary violence by the State.
151. With respect to the way in which the media provided coverage, the CVR has found that in many
instances, the news media fell into a crude presentation that was inconsiderate to the victims and oered
little to inspire national reection and sensitivity to the issues. Part of this problem was the implicit rac-
ism of the media, which is underscored in the Final Report.
152. In many media outlets, the issue of subversive and counter-subversive violence was not treated in
a way that would entail a signicant contribution to the pacication of the country. Te CVR believes
that two factors led to this outcome: (i) the uncritical adoption of the logic of violence, which resulted in
imposing a treatment that was not very sensitive to the issues, and (ii) the primacy of a commercial logic,
which in the worst of cases led to yellow journalism and was complicated at the end of the 1990s by mas-
sive corruption and the buying of media.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT
153. Te CVR nds that the internal armed conict that it has investigated is the most serious in the his-
tory of the Republic and had profound eects on all levels of national life. Te breadth and intensity of
the conict accentuated serious national imbalances, destroyed the democratic order, worsened poverty,
deepened inequality, aggravated forms of discrimination and exclusion, weakened social and emotional
networks and fostered a culture of fear and distrust. Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize thatde-
spite the hard conditionsthere were individuals and communities that resisted and worked toward the
armation of a society dedicated to building peace and law.
154. Te CVR notes that the conict resulted in the massive destruction of the productive infrastructure
and the loss of social capital and economic opportunities. Te departments that suered most intensely
now occupy the lowest rankings in the poverty and human development indices. It is no coincidence that
four of the departments most aected by the conictHuancavelica, Ayacucho, Apurmac and Hu-
nucoare now among the ve poorest in the country.
155. It has been possible for the CVR to establish that violence destroyed local social life and threw its
organization into disarray, especially because of the assassination of traditional and state leaders and
authorities. Tis produced a profound weakening of civil society, the political parties and the structures
where the strengthening of the social fabric was most needed, in the sectors that were most marginalized
and in need of inclusion and the expansion of citizenship.
156. In the opinion of the CVR, massive displacement from violent zones constituted a painful process of
uprooting and impoverishment for hundreds of thousands of Peruvians. Tis led to compulsory urbaniza-
tion as well as a historic regression in the pattern of occupation of the Andean territory that will have a
long-term eect on chances for sustainable human development. Te displaced population experienced
the dislocation of social networks, forcing them to adapt to new circumstances with varying levels of
success and considerable suering, which posed an enormous challenge to the provision of services in the
cities. Additionally, people displaced by the conict were often stigmatized and suered discrimination in
schools, neighborhoods and the workplace. On returning, they sometimes had to deal with serious land
problems and the lack of sucient support to re-organize and support their families.
157. Te CVR has established that an entire generation of children and youth has had its educa-
tional development cut o or impoverished as a result of the conict; this generation deserves
preferential treatment by the state.
351
158. Te CVR is aware that the internal armed conict intensied fear and distrust to unbearable
levels, which in turn contributed to the fragmenting and atomizing of society. Under these conditions,
the extreme suering has caused resentment and colored social coexistence and interpersonal relation-
ships with jealousy and violence.
159. Te CVR has established that broad sectors of the population aected by the violence suer from
one form or another of eects on their mental health, which weakens their ability for self-development
and overcoming the wounds of the past.
160. In the opinion of the CVR, one consequence of the internal armed conict in the political arena
consists of the moral decay into which the country sank during the last years of the dictatorship of Alberto
Fujimori. In eect, the way in which the political forces and large sectors of public opinion faced those
yearswith indierence, tolerance for human rights violations and a willingness to exchange democracy
for security as the cost for ending the conictopened the door to autocracy and impunity.
161. Finally, the CVR notes that it must be recognized that the violence, with all its severity, was not
able to destroy the capacity of the population to respond. On numerous occasions, in the face of the
destruction of traditional social networks and the massive assassination of leaders, women took on new
responsibilities and raised the moral challenge to the country to acknowledge the loss of thousands of
their children in massacres and disappearances. Young leaders reconstructed many of the most-aected
communities and the CVR was able to conrm that many communities were able to resist the violence
through self-defense as well as with peaceful alternatives and micro-reconciliation processes.
162. Te CVR is convinced that the consequences of the internal armed conict weigh like a large mort-
gage on our future. Tey decisively aect our building of a national community of free and equal citizens
in a democratic and plural country moving along the road of development and equity. Te Commission
further believes that the rst step toward overcoming these consequences is that the country recognize,
in all its dimensions, the horror experienced between 1980 and 2000.
Need for reparations
163. With the submission of its report to the country, the CVR believes that if it had ever been pos-
sible to claim ignorance or incomprehension of the drama that occurred in the early years of the con-
ict it is no longer possible to do so. Once the state authorities and the citizens to whom our report is
directed learn of the shocking dimensions of what happened, it becomes indispensableif we wish to
live in a civilized manner in peace and democracyto make reparations, to the extent possible, for
the serious harms that have been caused.
164. Te CVR believes that its very existence and its mandate to propose reparations already constitute
the beginning of a process of compensation and restoration of the victims dignity.
165. For the CVR, reparation has profound ethical and political implications and is an important com-
ponent of the process of national reconciliation. Since the vast majority of victims were poor, indigenous,
peasants, traditionally discriminated against and excluded, they are the ones who should receive prefer-
ential treatment from the State.
166. For the CVR, reparation means reversing the climate of indierence with acts of solidarity that
contribute to overcoming discriminatory approaches and habits, which have not been free of racism. Ap-
plied evenhandedly, reparations must also generate civic trust, reestablishing the damaged relationship
between citizens and the state, so that democratic transition and governance are consolidated and new
scenarios of violence are prevented.
167. Te CVR presents the country with a Comprehensive Plan for Reparations in which individual and
collective, symbolic and material forms of compensation are combined. Te Program must be nanced
352
creatively by the state, but also by society and international donors. It places emphasis on: (i) symbolic
reparations, i.e., the recovery of memory and the return of dignity to the victims; (ii) attention to educa-
tion and mental health; and (iii) individual and collective economic reparations (programs for institu-
tional reconstruction, community development, basic services and income generation).
168. Te CVR believes that justice is an essential part of the reparation process. No path toward reconcilia-
tion will be passable if it is not accompanied by an eective exercise of justice in terms of reparations for the
damages incurred by the victims as well as the fair punishment of the perpetrators and, as a consequence,
an end to impunity. An ethically healthy and politically viable country cannot be built on the foundations
of impunity. Trough the cases that it submits to the Public Ministry, the identication of 24,000 victims
of the internal armed conict and, in general, through the ndings of its investigations, the CVR seeks to
expand substantially the arguments supporting the demand for justice made by victims and their organiza-
tions as well as by human rights organizations and citizens in general.
169. Furthermore, the CVR has prepared a National Registry of Burial Sites based on the information ob-
tained in its investigations. At the end of its mandate, the CVR has registered 4,644 burial sites at the na-
tional level, having carried out 3 exhumations and 2,200 preliminary investigations. Tese gures, which
are signicantly greater than previous estimates, conrm the importance of initiating and implementing
the National Plan for Forensic Anthropological Interventions proposed by the CVR. Additionally, the
CVR reinforces the fundamental importance of forensic anthropological work for achieving justice, iden-
tifying possible victims and helping the grieving process for disappeared compatriots.
Process of national reconciliation
170. Te CVR proposes that the great horizon of national reconciliation is full citizenship for all Peruvi-
ans. Given its mandate to foster national reconciliation and based on the investigations it has conducted,
the CVR interprets reconciliation as a new foundational pact between the Peruvian State and society and
among individual members of society.
171. Te CVR understands that reconciliation must occur at the personal and family level, in social orga-
nizations and in the recasting of the relationship between the state and society in its entirety. Tese three
levels should be oriented toward an overarching goal: building a country that is positively recognized as
multiethnic, pluricultural, and multilingual. Tat recognition is the basis for overcoming the discrimina-
tory practices underlying the multiple discords in the history of our Republic.
353
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358
Acknowledgements
During its mandate, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission beneted from the invaluable collabora-
tion of many people and public and private institutions. We would like to briey list these collaborators
and thank all those who accompanied and supported us.
Our gratitude goes rst to the victims of the violence, who came to our oces in far greater numbers than
expected to share their stories and the memory of their tragedies, all of which were moving and merit
urgent attention from the state and society. Listening to these accounts has enabled everyone who worked
with the CVRand should enable the entire nationto learn from our history and vividly perceive the
enormous gaps that still divide Peruvians. At the same time, the victims words have revealed the huge
potential and energy within those who, from the depths of their pain, have been able to keep hope alive
and ght for a better future for themselves, their families and those close to them.
Public support was essential. Even when the CVR addressed controversial and sometimes irritating is-
sues, the majority of the population supported and expressed condence in our work. Tis was revealed
in various opinion surveys carried out while the CVR was working, as well as through public and private
expressions of encouragement and support from various people.
Te creation of the CVR and the success of its work would have been much more dicult without the ac-
tive role played by various organizations. We would like to especially acknowledge the National Human
Rights Coordinating Committee and each of its member institutions. Tese groups helped to create the
conditions that made the process feasible, gained the commitment of political leaders to create the CVR,
submitted valuable information, accompanied victims during the process and made valuable suggestions
and proposals that were incorporated, insofar as possible, in this report. Te CVR worked in conjunction
with many institutions, with which it signed cooperation agreements and whose names appear on our
web site. We also thank the Pro Human Rights Association, the Institute of Peruvian Studies, the Center
of Anthropology and Practical Application, the Peruvian Conference of Catholic Bishops Social Action
Commission, the Center of Population Development and Outreach, the Center for Amazon Research
and Outreach, the Human Rights Commission, the Andean Commission of Jurists, the Peruvian Press
Council, the Consortium of Universities, Edhucasalud, the Bartolom de las Casas Institute, IDS, TV
Cultura, the National Roundtable on Displacement, the Roundtable on Mental Health, Terra Networks
S.A., Transparency, Redinfa and the Network for the Development of Social Sciences, and others. Te
CVR also received valuable cooperation from local NGOs through agreements and joint activities in our
regional and local headquarters. Other collaborators included the Pontical Catholic University of Peru,
the University of Lima, the National University of San Marcos, the National University of San Cristbal
de Huamanga, the University of Huancavelica, the National University of the Jungle, the University of
the Altiplano, the National University of the Center of Peru, as well as other schools.
We would also like to highlight the warm and ongoing support that we received from the International
Committee of the Red Cross, which not only responded to our dicult and repeated questions but was
always there when we needed logistical support and assistance for victims. We are deeply grateful to
359
Karl Mattl and Phillipe Gaillard, who as International Committee of the Red Cross delegation chiefs
were always enthusiastic in their support.
Collaboration from the media and many journalists was invaluable. Many of them joined us in traversing
various parts of the country so that the entire nation could understand the tragedy suered by our people,
thus arousing hearts that had been asleep. It is true that not all ofthe media were equally committed to
our mission, and there wereand still aresome that were not sympathetic toward the CVR and what
it represented. Nevertheless, we can say with pride that those that were indierent were in the minority.
We would like to thank the daily papers El Comercio, La Repblica and Correo; TV stations Frecuencia
Latina and Channel N; the weekly news magazine Caretas, and other media that, with noteworthy eort
and a strong sense of their own mission, provided Peruvians with a vivid image of their history. We are
also pleased to give special recognition to the many media in the country that, in their commitment to
serving their communities, were always willing to provide coverage of our activities.
As a state agency, the CVR received cooperation from various public institutions. We would rst like
to mention the support provided by the sector to which we belonged, the Oce of the President of the
Cabinet. Ministers Roberto Daino, Luis Solari and Beatriz Merino supported us under various cir-
cumstances. We would also like to acknowledge the administrative team of the Oce of the President
of the Cabinet, the board of directors of the Special Fund for Management of Illicitly Obtained Money
(FEDADOI), the Ministry of the Interior and the National Police of Peru, the Ministry of Defense and
its armed institutes, the Ministry of Womens Issues and Social Development (especially the Program of
Support for Repopulation), the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the National Penitentiary
Institute, the Judiciary, the Supreme Court of Military Justice and the Public Ministry (particularly the
Institute of Legal Medicine). We would especially like to acknowledge the National Institute of Radio
and Television, which made it possible to broadcast the public hearings and the CVRs main activities
over state-run radio and television stations.
We would like to give special recognition to the Ombudsmans Oce, which not only laid the ground-
work for a truth commission to function but also accompanied us on the dicult road that lay ahead of
us. Tanks to Ombudsman Walter Albn and his team it was possible to carry out our work. We apolo-
gize for having temporarily hijacked some of his valuable professional sta.
Last but not least, we express our gratitude for the generous contributions and support of friendly govern-
ments and international organizations that helped us to carry out our mission, not only with nancial
resources, but also with the friendship for which we were even more grateful during the dicult times
that we often faced. Tanks to the United States Agency for International Development; the European
Union; the Oce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; the Canadian International
Development Agency and the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Relations; and the governments of Belgium,
Holland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden (ASDI), Germany (GTZ and DED), and England (DFID and the
Foreign and Commonwealth Oce). We also owe thanks to the Open Society Institute, the Ford Founda-
tion and the Swedish Foundation for Human Rights. Similarly, we would like to thank the International
Center for Transitional Justice, the Peruvian-North American Cultural Institute, IDEA-Transparency and
the Telefnica Foundation for their invaluable support for various CVR activities. We would like to express
our special appreciation for and acknowledgement of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
for managing, eectively and with great patience, a complex project that we know demanded great eort
and dedication. We express our special thanks to Kim Bolduc and Martn Santiago for the support they
provided as resident representatives of the United Nations Development Program as well as Jos Manuel
Hermida, Assistant Resident Representative of UNDP, and Mario Solari, Program Ocer of UNDP.
We apologize for any omissions from this brief summary of our debt of gratitude. Te CVRs work was,
to a great extent, a vast collective eort, and it would be impossible to list here all the persons and institu-
tions from whose generosity we beneted. To them, we express our warmest thanks for their support and,
now, for their indulgence. And to all the readers of this report, we express our thanks for having allowed
36 0
us to serve the country and become messengers of a history and lessons that Peruvians must not ignore.
* * * * *
We cannot conclude these acknowledgements without especially remembering all of the people who
worked with the CVR. It is dicult to describe briey the intensity of the commitment of hundreds
of Peruvian men and women who gave their time and supported us directly. It is also dicult to be
sparing in the recognition of each and every one of our workers. Listing them in an order that does not
aect our appreciation for all, we express:
Our thanks to the interviewers, whether part of xed, mobile or short-term teams, who traversed much
of the country listening for hours to tragedies that they felt as their own and who expressed through their
presence and attitude great solidarity with those who suer.
Our thanks to the administrative sta, both in the Central Oce and in the administrative oces of
the regional headquarters. We have seen them work into the early morning hours to make life easier for
all of us. Tanks also to the secretaries for their tireless dedication and constant support for the arduous
task with which we were charged.
Our thanks to the editors of the accounts and the typists as well as the copy editors and supervisors,
who deluged the Information Systems area with basic data that might otherwise have been lost in a
sea of urgent matters.
Our thanks to the members of the regional and zonal oces, for facilitating the CVRs presence in their
respective geographical areas despite multiple limitations.
Our thanks to the communicators, journalists, photographers and other professionals who worked in
the Public Action Group. Te daily information, the information campaigns, and the way in which the
CVRs message was communicated to the public are mainly due to them.
Our thanks to researchers from various elds who participated with us in the in-depth studies, the
reconstruction of regional histories, the breakdown of the timeline of the violence and in the study of
political and social actors in the internal armed conict. Teir academic excellence was matched only
by their dedication to their work.
Our thanks to the members of the Legal Team for their in-depth exploration of patterns of behavior that
receive scant explanation in isolated reports and for having responded with eciency, responsibility and
commitment to the tasks delegated to them.
Our thanks to the members of the Special Investigations Unit for dedicating day and night to gathering
information that would serve as evidence, for listening with integrity to many stories and for applying the
law in the defense of human rights.
Our thanks to the Forensic-Anthropological Investigations Unit for working seriously and responsibly,
in conjunction with international experts, to uncover one of the darkest aspects of the matter that we
were charged with investigating.
Our thanks to the members of the Public Hearings area. Teir tireless dedication enabled the country to
hear the voices of those who had never been heard.
Our thanks to the Consequences area, the Comprehensive Program for Reparations, the Reconcilia-
tion area, the task force on Institutional Reforms and the Education area for developing specic short-,
medium- and long-range proposals based on an understanding of victims needs and for proposing a
new way of understanding the nation.
36 1
Our thanks to the Mental Health Team for its ongoing collaboration with both the victims and our work
teams. Without their strength and integrity it would have been impossible to carry out such an enormous task.
Our thanks to the sta of the Documentation Center for their painstaking, detailed work, which made
it possible to impose logic and order on the sea of documents analyzed.
Our thanks to those who were part of the Volunteer Program (PROVER). Teir enthusiastic, seless ef-
forts were evident in countless activities and were of great help to the many CVR working groups, both
in Lima and in our regional headquarters.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
December 2003, Lima, Peru
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Abbreviated Version of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

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