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To what extent is it true to say there was a thaw in international relations

between 1953 and 1961?

The Cold War, a sustained state of political and military tension between East and West,
Communism and Capitalism, was arguably at the height of one of its various cycles from
1947 and 1953, with the Berlin blockade and the Korean War providing a backdrop to a
world perilously close to another global conflict. However, following the death of Stalin in
1953 unrest occurred in the Eastern Bloc, and there was a calming of international tensions,
the evidence of which can be seen in the signing of the Austrian State Treaty reuniting
Austria, and the Geneva Accords ending fighting in Indochina. However, this "thaw" was
only partial with an expensive arms race continuing during the period and many flares of
aggression from both sides.
The death of Stalin in March 1953 from a stroke suffered at his home, and the following
shake up of the Soviet system was met with a sigh of relief by many, including some in the
Soviet Union itself. The new leaders, Malenkov and Khrushchev, took over the country, and
immediately began to pioneer a new foreign policy. This suggests that Stalin himself had a
big role in the way in which the Cold War was being conducted, and so it is fair to say the
subsequent toning down of Soviet aggression could be traced back to this change at the top.
By now, the Soviets had the hydrogen bomb and the two sides were very finely balanced;
tensions had to be relaxed to avoid all-out war.
Khrushchev continued the move away from the aggressive nature of Stalins foreign policy
with his Secret speech at the 20
th
Party Congress in the Soviet Union. He spoke out against
some aspects of Stalins rule in a remarkable example of openness. He introduced the term
Peaceful Coexistence, speaking of relations with the U.S.A: There are only two ways
either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way.
This is a definite move from what Russia was trying to achieve before Khrushchev came into
power, and it is a deliberate move away from world war. This shows the scaling back of the
conflict by the Soviet Union, and so is indicative of the Thaw.
The U.S.S.R were not the only side scaling back their advances either, with Eisenhower
coming into office in America. Although originally expected to take a hard-line stance
against the Reds due to his military background, Eisenhowers New Look Policy, although
still quite aggressive, was much more nuclear driven as opposed to the all-out action of
Trumans strategy. This meant that neither side seemed to want to engage in any more
traditional warfare, instead making it a psychological battle of one-upmanship when it came
to military brunt. This shows a thaw as, compared to fighting proxy wars in the years up to
1953, they were just eyeing each other up from afar, arguably making it a much safer
battlefield in the immediate future.
On the subject of proxy wars, particularly the ceasefire in the Korean War and the ending of
the war in Indochina eased tensions. These sites, which in the years prior to 1953 had been
real hotspots of Cold War conflict, a clashing of Communism and Capitalism, were now at
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ease. In terms of sheer numbers, the conflict had certainly experienced a Thaw, with over
3.5 million people dying as a result of the Korean War alone, a figure that dwarves the
numbers post-Stalin. The situations were therefore far favourable in concrete international
relations, as they were no longer killing each other at free will in other wars.
In terms of diplomatic relations, there is a significantly more open feel to the relationship
between the two sides. The Austrian State Treaty in 1955 is a prime example of this, where
agreement was finally reached 10 years after the ending of WWII, with Austria being
allowed its own government provided it stayed neutral and did not join either NATO or the
Warsaw Pact. This was a significant step forward in East-West relations as it showed that
they could work together effectively even at this stage. The visit of Khrushchev to the
United States was also a landmark occasion in international relations, as it was the first for a
number of years. There were also a number of summits and conferences held in this years,
with the Geneva Summit in 1955 being the first top-level meeting between the leaders of
the superpowers since Potsdam in 1945. This led to the age of the Geneva Spirit of
cooperation, in which various meetings were held, including the Vienna Summit, the Geneva
Conference and the Paris Summit. Although not a great deal concrete was achieved at these
meetings, it is important to note the significance of the meetings in that they actually took
place. Although not the watershed in terms of actual negotiation, they show that the Cold
War had thawed to an extent as the leaders were willing to meet. And it wasnt a
complete waste of time, they did achieve some things, perhaps most notably the
abandonment of the Cominform in April 1956.
So the overarching theme of this period would seem to be that both sides were perfectly
content with sitting back and waiting for the others to collapse, which is evident in
Khrushchevs Peaceful Coexistence policy and up to a point in Eisenhowers New Look.
However, all was not as good as it may seem in this period, with a great deal of the bad and
the ugly across the world occurring too.
There were a series of events in Eastern Europe between 1953 and 1956 that represent well
the instability of the world at the time. The Berlin Rising of June 1953 occurred after the
beginning of a massive programme of Soviet-style industrialisation to impose Socialism in
East Germany backfired. This also showed the failure of Berias wishes for a reunited,
demilitarised Germany, which is something that the West were not willing to accept.
Although showing that the U.S.S.R may not have been necessarily expansionist, neither side
of the coin were fully willing to accept that, and this caused a degree of tension. The West
stayed mostly out of it however, seemingly happy to sit back and watch what happened.
This attitude is also apparent in the other two conflicts of the time, the Polish and Hungarian
uprisings, where similar protests had been put down by the Russians without a finger being
lifted by the Western Allies. This caused tension within America itself, where there were
calls to help the struggling Capitalist forces trying to overthrow their Communist leaders; at
some point the West would have to act. These revolts showed that although the Soviets
were willing to show a degree of liberation, moving away from Stalins policies of terror and
repression, Khrushchev found that opening the door to reform could quickly degenerate
into challenges to Soviet domination. This meant that surprisingly little of the changes that
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may have been implied by the changes in leaders could actually be implemented across
Eastern Europe, rubbishing the idea of a Thaw for those countries.
The Warsaw Pact was set up in May 1955 as a military alliance across all Communist states
days after West Germany was admitted into NATO. This shows that rather than relaxing
their control across Europe, it in fact tightened the knot, playing down any Thaw. There
wasnt enough room for manoeuvre, and it created a great deal of tension still as they split
up the World into blocks. Sometimes this still led to certain crisis points, such as the Suez
Crisis, another classic Capitalism-Communism spat, and the failure of the Bay of Pigs
Invasion.
In Cuba, after the Cuban Revolution between 1949 and 1959, Fidel Castro had come into
power, and began to accept aid from Russia. The particularly close relationship of
Khrushchev with somebody whose country was so close to his own was of real indignation
towards Kennedy, and he created a plan to overthrow the Cuban leader. However, the
failed invasion strengthened the position of Castro's administration, who proceeded to
openly proclaim their intention to adopt socialism and strengthen ties with the Soviet
Union. This led eventually to the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The invasion
was a major embarrassment for U.S. foreign policy, and destroyed a lot of bridges that the
U.S had been gradually building with the Soviets over the course of the 1950s in The Spirit
of Geneva, and so is a real downturn in relations, one which will almost become fatal later
on in the war.
This strategy of displacing a Communist leader in favour of a supporter of the Western
regime was utilised various times across the World, such as in the Congo or in Iran, where
the Shah was installed by the CIA through a series of covert operations. This was a primary
goal of Eisenhowers New Look policy, and was further expanded upon under Kennedy.
This caused consternation between the two superpowers every time it happened, or at least
every time either side was suspected of such actions. There cannot have been too much of a
Thaw if either side were still trying to add to their spheres of influence and shows that
perhaps they were not sitting back and waiting as much as they would like the other side of
the conflict to believe.
The change in president between Eisenhower and Kennedy was a very important one in the
minds of Cold War historians, as Kennedys foreign policy, known as Flexible Response,
and general actions towards the U.S.S.R can be viewed as a lot more aggressive than
Eisenhower and Truman before him. For example, he increased spending on conventional
forces, and pioneered new Special Forces to counter the Communist threat, such as the
Green Berets in Vietnam. This can however be attributed in part to Khrushchevs attempt of
bullying the newbie into submission to favour Russia. Either way, it shows quite strongly
that by this point relations had slipped back into dark territory with the Bay of Pigs Invasion
and the shooting down of an American U2 spy plane towards the end of Eisenhowers
tenure.
This plane, piloted by Gary Powers, was shot down by the Soviets in May 1960, flying over
their territory and taking pictures to be used by the CIA to get a better idea of where Russia
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had its missiles and how many there were. Although the U.S.A originally denied all
knowledge of the flight, after Powers had confessed, they were forced to acknowledge that
the flight had been planned. This event ruined the Paris Summit of 1960, when Khrushchev
walked out after President Eisenhower refused to apologise. This event was one of many
that increased suspicion between the two leaders of the superpowers, and made it
impossible for any more visits, such as Khrushchevs to the U.S, to take place.
Even when the Soviet leader visited America, however, it was viewed by many as a mistake
by the Americans. Khrushchev almost single-handedly created another Red Scare, making as
many jabs and boasts as possible while he was there, claiming that the U.S.A were way
behind in terms of missile superiority, and that the Russians were churning H-bombs out
like sausages. This, perhaps unorthodox, style of foreign policy caused a lot of worry and
tension between the two powers, and shows how Khrushchev may never have wanted a
Thaw at all, and was quite happy to sabotage relations again. He often threw hissy fits
when he didnt get his way, such as claiming the Americans were hiding missiles in
Disneyland when he was refused entry.
Another piece of evidence pointing away from improved relations and the chance of a
thaw was that for all the talk and bravado about Geneva Spirit, both powers continued
to stockpile arms at an alarming rate; at one point the Russians were spending 1/3 of their
budget on armaments. And although the Americans may have been leading in the arms race
despite Khrushchevs claims to the contrary, it was the other way around in the space race,
with the Soviets launched the first spacecraft, Sputnik, in 1957. It was very noticeable that
both sides were always trying to one-up the other, whether it was through armaments,
football or the Olympics. It clearly cannot have been a thaw if at all possible times they were
trying to best the other.
And finally, there was the constant turmoil that was taking place in Berlin. Although a hub
for the Cold War as it was the closest both sides came to each other, and was an outpost for
the Capitalists, much like Cuba for the Communists. There was the constant threat of
Russian aggression in this area, as soon as anyone put one step wrong, things could very
immediately change for the worse, as almost did on various occasions, such as the standoff
at Checkpoint Charlie. However, the Berlin crisis almost became a lot worse in 1961, when
the Soviets elected to put up a wall to stop the large number of refugees from the East
escaping across the border and destroying the East German economy. This became known
as the Berlin Wall, and is now the symbol of Cold War conflict across Europe. When it was
first built, it caused a great deal of consternation for the Western World. On one hand, the
President had told the world they had no interest in reuniting the German states once again,
and so they shouldnt do anything at all about it. However, many felt that it was the
Americans duty to protect the people forced to live under Communism. When the wall was
being built, conflict nearly erupted at various places, and it shows clearly how there cannot
have been a great deal of change within the world with regard to international relations:
They were still just at each others necks as ever, and this is apparent both in Berlin and in
Cuba, both real hotspots and crisis points throughout the Cold War where they make direct
contact with each other.
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So, overall, although there was certainly a Thaw in relations in the years after Stalins
death, with the armistice reached in the Korean War and the Spirit of Geneva that began
to creep into mid-50s relations, it took a turn for the worse in the late 50s and early 60s,
with the crisis points that almost erupted into another war: Berlin, Cuba and the shooting
down of the U2 spy plane for instance. However, it is not as easy as this to make judgements
and split the period into two, as there were moves towards a relaxing of relations even in
the late 50s, where steps had been taken by both sides to avoid falling into the inescapable
abyss of nuclear war, and kept true conflict from emerging. Therefore, although the
statement holds a lot of ground in terms of actual warfare, with the death toll almost non-
existent compared to the losses suffered in Indochina and Korea, it is important to note that
after a high point in the mid 50s, relations began to take a tumble once again in the
repeating cycle of the conflict, and by 1961 one could argue that international relations had
hit rock bottom, with the mutual suspicion between the powers and the dangers of nuclear
war erupting at their highest.