Macalincag Vs Chang
Macalincag Vs Chang
Macalincag Vs Chang
Ponente: Paras
Facts: Lorinda Carlos signed a formal administrative charge approved by Victor Macalincag accusing
Robert Chang of dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. They
are for: (a) disbursing the amount of P30,000 to Ms. Marisa Chan during the local elections, (b) disbursing
certain funds allegedly as financial assistance to bereaved families, (c) disbursing funds for merienda of
the employees, (d) incurring overdrafts, (e) transferring certain amounts from the treasurer’s safe to the
realty tax division’s safe, and (f) remitting to the Bureau of Treasury the national collection.
Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against Chang. Chang filed a petition for
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC against Macalinlag and Carlos. The judge
sustained the power of the Secretary of Finance to issue the Order of Preventive Suspension. Upon MR, the
court set aside its decision and ordered the petitioners to cease and desist from enforcing the order of
preventive suspension.
Issue: WON the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against
the acting municipal treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Chang contends that a government officer is not suspended until someone has assumed the post
and the officer subject of the suspension order has ceased performing his official function; that the
implementation of the questioned suspension order was overtaken by the issuance of EO 392 creating the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and that the power to discipline is vested solely on the person who has the
power to appoint.
It is very apparent from the records that Chang was administratively charged on October 6, 1989
for dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts Prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It was signed by
Carlos, Executive Director, Bureau of Local Government and approved by Macalincag, Undersecretary of
Finance, then acting Secretary. Simultaneous with the charge, Chang was preventively suspended which
caused him to file a complaint for Prohibition with preliminary injunction in the lower court.
The lower court pointed out that in order that a preventive suspension will be implemented, there
are two steps involved, viz: 1) service of a copy of said order on the respondent and 2) designation of his
replacement. The trial court ruled that until an acting municipal treasurer is appointed to replace the
respondent, the order of preventive suspension dated October 6, 1989 is incomplete and cannot be said to
have taken effect. This ruling of the trial court is untenable.
Preventive Suspension is governed by Sec. 41 of P.D. 807 or the Civil Service Law. It will be noted
that under the law, designation of the replacement is not a requirement to give effect to the preventive
suspension. On the contrary, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
provides in Section 156, Article 5, Chapter 3, Title II thereof for the automatic assumption of the assistant
municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal treasurer.
Accordingly, there appears to be no question that: the Order of Preventive Suspension of
respondent Chang became effective upon his receipt thereof, which is presumed when he filed a complaint
in the trial court preventing the implementation of such Order of Suspension. Otherwise stated, the
designation of the OFFICER-IN-CHARGE to replace Chang is immaterial to the effectivity of the latter's
suspension. A contrary view would render nugatory the very purpose of preventive suspension.
Among others, Chang argued that EO 392 gave rise to the creation of the Metropolitan Manila
Authority (MMA) and vested in the President of the Republic of the Philippines the power to appoint
municipal treasurers in Metro Manila. As the power to suspend and remove a municipal official is an
incident of the power to appoint, he maintained that it is the President who may suspend or remove him.
Earlier, prior to EO 392, the power to appoint the aforesaid public officials was vested in the Provincial
Treasurers and Assessors of the Municipalities concerned, under PD 477 and later transferred to the
Commissioner of Finance under PD 921, but under both decrees, the power of appointment was made
subject to Civil Service Laws and the approval of the Secretary of Finance. Verily, the intention of the
aforesaid legislations to follow the Civil Service Laws, Rules and Regulations is unmistakable.
Correspondingly, the power to discipline is specifically vested under Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 in
heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and chartered cities who have original
jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action. Stated differently, they are
the proper disciplining authority referred to in Sec. 41 of the same law.
The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably under the Department of Finance as
provided for in Sec. 3, P.D. No. 477. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to
issue the preventive suspension order. More specifically acting Secretary of Finance, Macalincag, acted
within his jurisdiction in issuing the order.
By and large, even assuming that the power to appoint, includes the power to discipline as argued
by Chang, acting Secretary Macalincag as Secretary of Finance is an alter ego of the President and
therefore, it is within his authority, as an alter ego, to preventively suspend Chang.