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WJP Rule of Law Index

2014
by the World Justice Project
WJP Rule of Law Index

2014
by the World Justice Project
The WJP Rule of Law Index 2014 report was prepared by the World Justice Projects research team. The Indexs conceptual
framework and methodology were developed by Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero, and Alejandro Ponce. Data collection
and analysis for the 2014 report was performed by Juan Carlos Botero, Matthew Harman, Joel Martinez, Alejandro Ponce,
Christine S. Pratt, Kelly Roberts, and Joshua Steele, with the assistance of Priya Agarwal-Harding, Sophie Barral, Ayzada
Bengel, Chantal V. Bright Kyei, Brian Gitau, Sharanbir S. Grewal, Laurie Kontopidis, Sarah Chamness Long, Stephen Lurie,
Madison Marks, Matthew Mead, Kedar Patel, Karina Pena, William Sinnott, Jessica Villegas, Jennifer Wilmore, and Fanny Zhao.
eJ :nic Jeine: o: ni :eo: . onJ Seee. nJ coJn:, :one Jeine: . Ln cC:e,.
THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT
Board of Directors: Sheikha Abdulla Al-Misnad, Emil Constantinescu, Ashraf Ghani, William C. Hubbard, Suet-Fern Lee,
onJi |nn,. \iim . NeJ|om. Fen C:cie No:nee. me R. Si|en.
Ofhcers: William C. Hubbard, Chairman of the Board; William H. Neukom, Founder and CEO; Deborah Enix-Ross, Vice President;
Suzanne E. Gilbert, Vice President; James R. Silkenat, Director and Vice President; Lawrence B. Bailey, Treasurer; Gerold W. Libby,
General Counsel and Secretary.
Executive Director: Juan Carlos Botero.
Chief Pesearch Ofhcer: Alejandro Ponce.
The WJP Rule of Law Index

report was made possible by generous support from: American Bar Association (ABA); ABA Section
of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice; ABA Section of Antitrust Law; ABA Business Law Section; ABA Criminal
Justice Section; ABA Section of Dispute Resolution; ABA Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources; ABA Health Law
Section; ABA Section of Individual Rights & Responsibilities; ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law; ABA Section of
International Law; ABA Judicial Division; ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law; ABA Section of Litigation; ABA Section
of Real Property, Trust and Estate Law; ABA Section of State and Local Government Law; ABA Section of Taxation; Allen &
Overy Foundation; Allen & Overy LLP; Apple, Inc.; The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; The Boeing Company; Boies, Schiller
& Flexner, LLP; Carnegie Corporation of New York; Chase Family Philanthropic Fund; City of The Hague; Cochingyan &
Pe: . nce, L:in|e: FiJJe c Ren P, F. l. JJ Pon Je NemoJ: c Comn,, Fmine: P:e|,e:in CnJ:cn,
The Edward John and Patricia Rosenwald Foundation; Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation; Ford Foundation; Fulbright &
Jaworski LLP; Garrigues LLP; GE Foundation; General Electric Company; Gmez-Acebo & Pombo; Google, Inc.; Gordon and
Betty Moore Foundation; Haynes and Boone, LLP; Hewlett-Packard Company; Holland & Knight LLP; Hunton & Williams LLP;
Intel Corporation; Irish Aid; Johnson & Johnson; Judson Family Fund at The Seattle Foundation; K&L Gates LLP; LexisNexis;
Major, Lindsey & Africa; Mason, Hayes+Curran; McKinsey & Company, Inc.; Merck & Co., Inc.; Microsoft Corporation;
National Endowment for Democracy; Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP; Oak Foundation; PepsiCo; Pinnacle Gardens
Foundation; Roca Junyent; Society of the Cincinnati; Sullivan & Cromwell LLP; SyCip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan; Texas
Instruments, Inc.; Troutman Sanders LLP; Turner Freeman Lawyers; United States Chamber of Commerce & Related Entities;
U.S. Department of State; Ura Menndez; Viacom International, Inc.; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe;
White & Case LLP; The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation; William H. Neukom & Neukom Family Foundation; Winston &
Strawn LLP; and individual and in-kind supporters listed in the last section of this report.
ISBN (print version): 978-0-9882846-5-4 ISBN (online version): 978-0-9882846-6-1
Copyright 2014 by The World Justice Project. The WJP Rule of Law Index and The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index
are trademarks of The World Justice Project. All rights reserved. Requests to reproduce this document should be sent
to Alejandro Ponce, The World Justice Project, 1025 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Suite 1200, Washington, D.C. 20005 U.S.A .
E-mail: [email protected]
Preface
The WJP Rule of Law Index
Overall Scores and Rankings
World Maps of the Rule of Law by Factor
Rule of Law Trends
Regional Highlights
CoJn:, P:one
Methodology
Data Tables
JRC Statistical Audit
Contributing Experts
Acknowledgments
About The World Justice Project
1
Contents
3
13
17
35
39
63
165
175
187
201
213
217
1 Preface |
The World Justice Project (WJP) is an independent, multi-
disciplinary organization working to advance the rule of law
around the world. The rule of law provides the foundation
for communities of opportunity and equity - communities
that offer sustainable economic development, accountable
government, and respect for fundamental rights.
Where the rule of law is weak, medicines fail to reach health
facilities, criminal violence goes unchecked, laws are applied
unequally across societies, and foreign investments are
held back. Effective rule of law helps
reduce corruption, improve public
health, enhance education, alleviate
poverty, and protect people from
injustices and dangers large and small.
Strengthening the rule of law is a major goal of governments,
donors, businesses, and civil society organizations around
the world. To be effective, however, rule of law development
requires clarity about the fundamental features of the rule
of law, as well as an adequate basis for its evaluation and
measurement. In response to this need, the World Justice
Project has developed the WJP Rule of Law Index

, a
quantitative measurement tool that offers a comprehensive
picture of the rule of law in practice. The Index portrays the
rule of law in a nation by means of 47 indicators organized
around nine themes: constraints on government powers;
absence of corruption; open government; fundamental rights;
order and security; regulatory enforcement; civil justice;
criminal justice; and informal justice.
The WJP Rule of Law Index
2014 is the fourth report
in an annual series. It builds
on years of development,
intensive consultation, and
vetting with academics, practitioners, and community leaders
from over 100 countries and 17 professional disciplines.
The Index is the worlds most comprehensive data set of its
kind and the only to rely solely on primary data, measuring a
nations adherence to the rule of law from the perspective of
how ordinary people experience it. This years country scores
and rankings include the latest data collected and processed
by WJP, based on more than 100,000 household and expert
surveys in 99 countries and jurisdictions. This years report
o incJJe. o: ne n: ime. n n,i o cnne ove:
time.
The Index is intended for a broad audience of policy makers,
civil society, practitioners, academics, and others. The rule
of law is not the rule of lawyers and judges; all elements of
society are stakeholders. It is our hope that, over time, this
diagnostic tool will help identify strengths and weaknesses in
each country under review and encourage policy choices that
strengthen the rule of law.
Preface
The rule of law is the foundation for communities of opportunity and equityit is the predicate for the
eradication of poverty, violence, corruption, pandemics, and other threats to civil society.
-WILLIAM H. NEUKOM, FOUNDER AND CEO, THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT
>100,000
HOUSEHOLDS & EXPERTS
SURVEYED
99
COUNTRIES &
JURISDICTIONS
The WJP Rule of Law Index
4 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Tne :Je o . i noo:ioJ, JincJ o Jenne nJ meJ:e.
A simple way of approaching it is in terms of some of the
outcomes that the rule of law brings to societies such as
accountability, respect for fundamental rights, or access to
Jice ecn o .nicn :eec one ec o ne comex
concept of the rule of law. The WJP Rule of Law Index is an
attempt to outline these outcomes in a simple and coherent
framework that is broadly accepted, and to approximate
by means of performance indicators the extent to which
countries attain these outcomes. These indicators are
designed to provide a comprehensive and multi-dimensional
picture of the extent to which each country adheres to the
rule of law in practice, and to benchmark its performance
against that of other countries measured.
In attempting to capture a broad view of the rule of law in
a nation, the World Justice Projects Rule of Law Index


looks at 47 outcomes (or sub-factors) organized around nine
dimensions (or factors): constraints on government powers;
absence of corruption; open government; fundamental
rights; order and security; regulatory enforcement; civil
justice; criminal justice; and informal justice. These policy
outcomes, which emanate from the WJPs four universal
:incie. :e:een ecinc o o: enJ :eJ n :e
Ji:ec, inJenceJ |, ne Je:ee o Jne:ence o ne :Je
o . in ocie,. Jcn .nene: ove:nmen onci :e
held accountable under the law, or whether state institutions
protect fundamental rights and allow for delivery of justice to
ordinary people.
The Index has been designed to include several features that
set it apart from other indices, and which make it valuable for
a large number of countries:
O Rule of law in practice: The Index measures adherence
to the rule of law by looking at policy outcomes (such as
whether people have access to the courts or whether
crime is effectively controlled), in contrast to efforts
that focus on the laws on the books, or the institutional
means by which a society may seek to achieve these
policy outcomes.
O Comprehensive/Multi-dimensional: While other
indices cover particular aspects of the rule of law, such
The WJP Rule of Law Index
BOX 1: FOUR UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE RULE OF LAW
The WJP uses o working deniIion of Ihe rule of low bosed
on four universal principles, derived from internationally
accepted standards. The rule of law is a system where the
following four universal principles are upheld:
1. Tne ove:nmen nJ i onci nJ en .e
individuals and private entities are accountable under
the law.
2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are
applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights,
including the security of persons and property.
3. The process by which the laws are enacted,
administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and
encien.
4. Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical,
and independent representatives and neutrals who
:e o Jncien nJm|e:. nve Je,Je :eoJ:ce.
nJ :eec ne m|eJ o ne commJniie ne,
serve.
5 The WJP Rule of Law Index |
as absence of corruption or human rights, they do not
yield a full picture of rule of law compliance. The WJP
Rule of Law Index is the only global instrument that
looks at the rule of law comprehensively.
O Perspective of the ordinary people: The WJP Rule of
Law Index puts people at its core by looking at a nations
adherence to the rule of law from the perspective of
ordinary individuals who are directly affected by the
degree of adherence to the rule of law in their societies.
The WJP Index examines practical, everyday situations,
such as whether people can access public services
.inoJ neeJin o |:i|e ove:nmen once:. o:
whether a dispute among neighbors can be resolved
peacefully and cost-effectively by an independent
adjudicator.
O New data anchored in actual experiences: The Index
is the only comprehensive set of indicators on the rule
of law that are based almost solely on primary data. The
Indexs scores are built from the assessments of local
residents (1,000 respondents per country) and local
e exe:. .nicn enJ:e n ne nnJin :eec ne
conditions experienced by the population, including
marginalized sectors of society.
O Culturally competent: The Index has been designed
to be applied in countries with vastly differing social,
cultural, economic, and political systems. No society has
ever attained - let alone sustained - a perfect realization
of the rule of law. Every nation faces the perpetual
challenge of building and renewing the structures,
institutions, and norms that can support and sustain a
rule of law culture.
These features make the Index a powerful tool that can help
identify strengths and weaknesses in each country, and help
to inform policy debates both within and across countries that
advance the rule of law.
THE COMPONENTS OF THE RULE OF LAW
The WJP Rule of Law Index captures adherence to the rule
o . ( JenneJ |, ne \P Jnive: :incie. ee Fox
1) through a comprehensive and multi-dimensional set of
oJcome inJico:. ecn o .nicn :eec :icJ: ec
of this complex concept. The theoretical framework linking
these outcome indicators (or sub-factors) draws on two
main ideas pertaining to the relationship between the state
and the governed, namely that 1) the law imposes limits on
the exercise of power by the state and its agents, as well as
individuals and private entities (Factors 1, 2, 3, and 4), and
2) that the state limits the actions of members of society
nJ Jn i |ic JJie o.:J i oJion. o n ne
public interest is served, people are protected from violence,
and members of society have access to mechanisms to
settle disputes and redress grievances (Factors 5, 6, 7, and
8). Although broad in scope, this framework assumes very
little about the functions of the state, and when it does so, it
incorporates functions that are recognized by practically all
societies, such as the provision of justice or the guarantee of
order and security.
The resulting set of indicators also sums up an effort to
strike a balance between what scholars call a thin, or
minimalist, conception of the rule of law that focuses on
formal, procedural rules, and a thick conception that
includes substantive characteristics, such as self-government
and various fundamental rights and freedoms. Striking this
balance between thin and thick conceptions of the rule
of law allows the WJP Index to be applicable to various
different types of social and political systems, including
those which lack many of the features that characterize
Jemoc:ic nion. .nie i incJJin Jncien J|nive
characteristics that renders the rule of law as more than
merely a system of rules. Indeed, a system of positive law
that fails to respect core human rights guaranteed under
international law is at best rule by law, and does not deserve
to be called a rule of law system.
THE 2014 WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX
The 2014 WJP Rule of Law Index comprises nine aggregate
inJico: (o: co:) J:ne: Ji:eeJ ino 47 ecinc
indicators (or sub-factors). These indicators are presented in
Table 1 and described in detail in the section below.
Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers
Factor 1 measures the extent to which those who govern are
bound by law. It comprises the means, both constitutional
and institutional, by which the powers of the government and
i onci nJ en :e imieJ nJ :e neJ ccoJn|e
under the law. It also includes non-governmental checks on
the governments power, such as a free and independent
press.
Governmental checks take many forms; they do not operate
solely in systems marked by a formal separation of powers,
no: :e ne, nece:i, coJineJ in .. \n i eeni.
however, is that authority is distributed, whether by formal
rules or by convention, in a manner that ensures that no single
organ of government has the practical ability to exercise
unchecked power.
1
This factor addresses the effectiveness
1 The Index does not address the further question of whether the laws are enacted by
democratically elected representatives.
6 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Business environment: Imagine an investor seeking to commit resources abroad. She would probably think
.ice |eo:e invein in coJn:, .ne:e co::Jion i :mn. :oe:, :in :e iJenneJ. nJ con:c
:e JincJ o eno:ce. Uneven eno:cemen o :eJion. co::Jion. inecJ:e :oe:, :in. nJ ineecive
means to settle disputes undermine legitimate business and drives away both domestic and foreign investment.
Public works: ConiJe: ne |:iJe. :oJ. o: :Jn., .e :ve:e Ji, o: ne once nJ |JiJin in
which we live, work, and play. What if building codes governing their design and safety were not enforced, or
i ove:nmen onci nJ con:co: emo,eJ o.,Ji, me:i in o:Je: o oc|e ne J:J. \e|
regulatory enforcement and corruption decreases the reliability and security of physical infrastructures, and
wastes scarce resources, which are essential to a thriving economy.
Public health and the environment: Consider the implications of pollution, wildlife poaching, and deforestation
for health, the economy, and the environment. What if a company was pouring harmful chemicals into a
river at a highly populated area, and the environmental inspector turned a blind eye in exchange for a bribe?
While countries around the world have laws to protect the publics health and the environment, these laws
are not always enforced. Adherence to the rule of law is essential to effectively enforce public health and
environmental regulations and to hold the government, businesses, civil society organizations, and communities
accountable for protecting the environment without unduly constraining economic opportunities.
Public Participation: What if residents of a neighborhood were not informed of an upcoming construction
project commissioned by the government that will cause disruptions to their community? Or what if they did
not have an opportunity to present their objections to the relevant government authorities prior to the start of
the construction project? Being able to voice opinions about government decisions that directly impact the lives
of ordinary people is a key aspect of the rule of law. Public participation ensures that all stakeholders have the
chance to have their voice be heard and provide valuable input in the decision-making process.
Civil Justice: Imagine an individual having a dispute with another party. What if the system to settle such
dispute and obtain a remedy was largely inaccessible, unreliable, and corrupt? Without a well-functioning civil
justice system a core element of the rule of law individuals faced with a dispute have few options other than
ivin J on n, em o ove i o: :eo:in o vioence o: inimiJion o ee ne conic.
The rule of law affects all of us in our everyday lives. It is not only important to lawyers and judges; it matters to businessmen,
builders, consumers, doctors, and journalists. Every sector of society is a stakeholder in the rule of law.
Although we may not be aware of it, the rule of law is a profoundly important part of our lives. It is the foundation for a system
of rules to keep us safe, resolve disputes, and enable us to prosper. Lets consider a few examples:
BOX 2: THE RULE OF LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE
7 The WJP Rule of Law Index |
of the institutional checks on government power by the
legislature (1.1), the judiciary (1.2), and independent auditing
and review agencies (1.3)
2
, as well as the effectiveness of non-
governmental oversight by the media and civil society (1.5),
which serve an important role in monitoring government
cion nJ noJin onci ccoJn|e. Tne exen o .nicn
transitions of power occur in accordance with the law is also
examined (1.6).
3
In addition to these checks, this factor also
meJ:e ne exen o .nicn ove:nmen onci :e neJ
ccoJn|e o: onci miconJJc (1.4).
Factor 2: Absence of Corruption
This factor measures the absence of corruption in a number
of government agencies. The factor considers three forms of
co::Jion. |:i|e:,. im:oe: inJence |, J|ic o: :ive
interests, and misappropriation of public funds or other
resources. These three forms of corruption are examined
.in :eec o ove:nmen once: in ne execJive |:ncn
(2.1), the judiciary (2.2), the military and police (2.3), and the
legislature (2.4), and encompass a wide range of possible
situations in which corruption - from petty bribery to major
kinds of fraud - can occur.
Factor 3: Open Government
Factor 3 (previously Factor 5 in past editions of the WJP
Rule of Law Index series) measures the open nature of a
government, which is essential for effective public oversight.
Secinc,. ni co: meJ:e ne exen o .nicn ne
society has clear, publicized, accessible, and stable laws (3.1
and 3.2); whether administrative proceedings are open to
J|ic :iciion (.), nJ .nene: onci ino:mion.
including drafts of laws and regulations, is available to the
J|ic (.4). Tne n: .o J|co: :ee o ne c:i,.
publicity, accessibility, and stability that are required for the
public to know what the law is and what conduct is permitted
and prohibited. The other two sub-factors encompass the
opportunity for the people to participate in the processes
by which the laws are made and administered. Among the
indicia of participation are: whether people have the ability
to petition the government; whether proceedings are held
with timely notice and are open to the public; and whether
onci ino:mion. incJJin J: o eiion nJ :eco:J
of legislative and administrative proceedings, are available to
the public.
2 Tni incJJe .iJe :ne o iniJion. :om nnnci com:oe: nJ JJiin
agencies to the diverse array of entities that monitor human rights compliance (e.g. Human
Rights Defender, Ombudsman, Peoples Advocate, Defensor del Pueblo, Ouvidoria,
Human Rights Commissioner, iguskantsler, Mdiateur de la Rpublique, Citizens
Advocate, Avocatul Poporului). In some countries these functions are performed by judges
o: one: e onci, in one:. ne, :e c::ieJ oJ |, inJeenJen encie.
3 This sub-factor does not address the issue of whether transitions of political power take
place through democratic elections. Rather, it examines whether the rules for the orderly
transfer of power are actually observed. This sub-factor looks at the prevalence of electoral
fraud and intimidation (for those countries in which elections are held), the frequency of coups
dtats, and the extent to which transition processes are open to public scrutiny.
Factor 4: Fundamental Rights
Factor 4 measures protection of fundamental human rights.
It recognizes that a system of positive law that fails to respect
core human rights established under international law is at
best rule by law, and does not deserve to be called a rule of
law system. Since there are many other indices that address
human rights, and as it would be impossible for the Index
to assess adherence to the full range of rights, this factor
ocJe on :eive, moJe menJ o :in n :e n:m,
established under the Universal Declaration and are most
closely related to rule of law concerns. Accordingly, Factor
4 encompasses adherence to the following fundamental
rights: effective enforcement of laws that ensure equal
protection(4.1)
4
; the right to life and security of the person
(4.2)
5
; due process of law and the rights of the accused
(4.3)
6
; freedom of opinion and expression (4.4); freedom of
belief and religion (4.5); the right of privacy (4.6); freedom of
assembly and association (4.7); and fundamental labor rights,
including the right to collective bargaining, the prohibition of
forced and child labor, and the elimination of discrimination
(4.8).
7

Factor 5: Order and Security
Factor 5 (previously Factor 3 in past editions of the WJP Rule
of Law Index series) measures how well the society assures the
ecJ:i, o e:on nJ :oe:,. SecJ:i, i one o ne Jennin
aspects of any rule of law society and a fundamental function of
the state. It is also a precondition for the realization of the rights
and freedoms that the rule of law seeks to advance. This factor
includes three dimensions to cover the various threats to order
and security: crime (particularly conventional crime
8
); political
vioence (incJJin e::o:im. :meJ conic. nJ oiic
unrest); and violence as a socially acceptable means to redress
personal grievances (vigilante justice).
4 The laws can be fair only if they do not make arbitrary or irrational distinctions based
on economic o: oci J ne e: JenneJ o incJJe :ce. coo:. ennic o: oci o:iin.
ce. nioni,. iene. :eiion. nJe. oiic oinion o: niion. enJe:. m:i
status, sexual orientation or gender identity, age, and disability. It must be acknowledged
that for some societies, including some traditional societies, certain of these categories may
be problematic. In addition, there may be differences both within and among such societies
o .nene: iven Jiincion i :|i::, o: i::ion. Leie nee JincJie. i .
determined that only an inclusive list would accord full respect to the principles of equality
and non-discrimination embodied in the Universal Declaration and emerging norms of
international law.
5 Sub-factor 4.2 concerns police brutality and other abuses - including arbitrary detention,
torture and extrajudicial execution - perpetrated by agents of the state against criminal
suspects, political dissidents, members of the media, and ordinary people.
6 This includes the presumption of innocence and the opportunity to submit and challenge
evidence before public proceedings; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and
abusive treatment; and access to legal counsel and translators.
7 Sub-factor 4.8 includes the four fundamental principles recognized by the ILO Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998: (1) the freedom of association and the
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (2) the elimination of all forms of
forced or compulsory labor; (3) the effective abolition of child labor; and (4) the elimination of
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
8 In this category, we include measures of criminal victimization, such as homicide,
kidnapping, burglary, armed robbery, extortion, and fraud.
8 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Factor 1:
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 Government powers are effectively limited by the legislature
1.2 Government powers are effectively limited by the judiciary
1.3 Government powers are effectively limited by independent
auditing and review
1.4 Cove:nmen onci :e ncioneJ o: miconJJc
1.5 Government powers are subject to non-governmental checks
1.6 Transition of power is subject to the law
Factor 2:
Absence of Corruption
2.1 Cove:nmen onci in ne execJive |:ncn Jo no Je J|ic
once o: :ive in
2.2 Cove:nmen onci in ne JJici |:ncn Jo no Je J|ic
once o: :ive in
2.3 Cove:nmen onci in ne oice nJ ne mii:, Jo no Je
J|ic once o: :ive in
2.4 Cove:nmen onci in ne eiive |:ncn Jo no Je J|ic
once o: :ive in
Factor 3:
Open Government
3.1 The laws are publicized and accessible
3.2 The laws are stable
3.3 Right to petition the government and public participation
3.4 nci ino:mion i vi|e on :e,Je
Factor 4:
Fundamental Rights
4.1 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination
4.2 The right to life and security of the person is effectively
guaranteed
4.3 Due process of law and rights of the accused
4.4 Freedom of opinion and expression is effectively guaranteed
4.5 Freedom of belief and religion is effectively guaranteed
4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively
guaranteed
4.7 Freedom of assembly and association is effectively guaranteed
4.8 Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed
Factor 5:
Order and Security
5.1 Crime is effectively controlled
5.2 Civi conic i eecive, imieJ
5.3 People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances
Factor 6:
Regulatory Enforcement
6.1 Government regulations are effectively enforced
6.2 Government regulations are applied and enforced without
im:oe: inJence
6.3 Administrative proceedings are conducted without
unreasonable delay
6.4 Due process is respected in administrative proceedings
6.5 The government does not expropriate without adequate
compensation
Factor 7:
Civil Justice
7.1 People can access and afford civil justice
7.2 Civil justice is free of discrimination
7.3 Civil justice is free of corruption
7.4 Civi Jice i :ee o im:oe: ove:nmen inJence
7.5 Civil justice is not subject to unreasonable delay
7.6 Civil justice is effectively enforced
7.7 ADR is accessible, impartial, and effective
Factor 8:
Criminal Justice
8.1 Criminal investigation system is effective
8.2 Criminal adjudication system is timely and effective
8.3 Correctional system is effective in reducing criminal behavior
8.4 Criminal system is impartial
8.5 Criminal system is free of corruption
8.6 C:imin ,em i :ee o im:oe: ove:nmen inJence
8.7 Due process of law and rights of the accused
Factor 9:
Informal Justice
9.1 Informal justice is timely and effective
9.2 lno:m Jice i im:i nJ :ee o im:oe: inJence
9.3 Informal justice respects and protects fundamental rights
TABLE 1: THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX
The four universal principles which comprise the WJPs notion of the rule of law are further developed in the
nine factors of the WJP Rule of Law Index.
9 The WJP Rule of Law Index |
Factor 6: Regulatory Enforcement
Factor 6 measures the extent to which regulations are fairly
and effectively implemented and enforced. Regulations,
both legal and administrative, structure behaviors within
and outside of the government. Strong rule of law adherence
requires that these regulations and administrative provisions
are enforced effectively (6.1), and are applied and enforced
.inoJ im:oe: inJence |, J|ic onci o: :ive
interests (6.2). Additionally, strong rule of law requires that
administrative proceedings are conducted timely, without
unreasonable delays (6.3); that due process is respected
in administrative proceedings (6.4); and that there is
no expropriation of private property without adequate
compensation (6.5).
This factor does not assess which activities a government
chooses to regulate, nor does it consider how much
regulation of a particular activity is appropriate. Rather, it
examines how regulations are implemented and enforced.
To facilitate comparisons, this factor considers areas that all
countries regulate to one degree or another, such as public
health, workplace safety, environmental protection, and
commercial activity.
Factor 7: Civil Justice
Factor 7 measures whether ordinary people can resolve their
grievances peacefully and effectively through the civil justice
system. The delivery of effective civil justice requires that the
system be accessible and affordable (7.1), and the system be
free of discrimination (7.2), as well as be free of corruption
(7.). nJ .inoJ im:oe: inJence |, J|ic onci
(7.4). Tne Jeive:, o eecive civi Jice oneceie
that court proceedings are conducted in a timely manner
that is not subject to unreasonable delays (7.5), and that
JJmen:e eno:ceJeecive, (7.). Fin,. :econi.in
the value of Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms
(ADRs), this factor also measures the accessibility,
im:ii,. nJ encienc, o meJiion nJ :|i:ion
systems that enable parties to resolve civil disputes (7.7).
Factor 8: Criminal Justice
Factor 8 evaluates the criminal justice system. An effective
criminal justice system is a key aspect of the rule of law,
as it constitutes the conventional mechanism to redress
grievances and bring action against individuals for offenses
against society. Effective criminal justice systems are
capable of investigating and adjudicating criminal offenses
successfully and in a timely manner (8.1 and 8.2) through a
system that is impartial and non-discriminatory (8.4), and is
:ee o co::Jion nJ im:oe: ove:nmen inJence (o.
and 8.6), all while ensuring that the rights of both victims
and the accused are effectively protected (8.7).
9
The delivery
of effective criminal justice also necessitates correctional
systems that effectively reduce criminal behavior (8.3).
Accordingly, an assessment of the delivery of criminal justice
should take into consideration the entire system, including
ne oice. .,e:. :oecJo:. JJe. nJ :ion once:.
Factor 9: Informal Justice
Finally, Factor 9 concerns the role played in many countries
by customary and informal systems of justice - including
traditional, tribal, and religious courts, and community-based
systems - in resolving disputes. These systems often play
a large role in cultures in which formal legal institutions
fail to provide effective remedies for large segments of
the population, or when formal institutions are perceived
as remote, corrupt, or ineffective. This factor covers three
concepts: whether these dispute resolution systems are
timely and effective (9.1); whether they are impartial and free
o im:oe: inJence (.2), nJ ne exen o .nicn nee
systems respect and protect fundamental rights (9.3).
10
MEASURING THE RULE OF LAW
The analytical framework discussed above provides the
roadmap for developing the indicators that measure
adherence to the rule of law. These indicators presented in
the form of scores and rankings are constructed from over
nve nJnJ:eJ v:i|e J:.n :om .o nove J oJ:ce
collected by the World Justice Project in each country: (1)
a general population poll (GPP) conducted by leading local
polling companies using a representative sample of 1,000
:eonJen in ne n:ee :e ciie, nJ (2) ,JineJ
respondents questionnaires (QRQ) consisting of closed-
ended questions completed by in-country practitioners and
academics with expertise in civil and commercial law, criminal
justice, labor law, and public health. Taken together, these two
J oJ:ce :oviJe JoJe n:nnJ ino:mion :om
large number of people on their experiences and perceptions
concerning their dealing with the government, the police, and
the courts, as well as the openness and accountability of the
state, the extent of corruption, and the magnitude of common
crimes to which the general public is exposed.
11
These data
9 Sub-factor 8.7 includes the presumption of innocence and the opportunity to submit
and challenge evidence before public proceedings; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention,
torture and abusive treatment; and access to legal counsel and translators.
1 Sinincn eo: n |een JevoeJ JJ:in ne oJ: ,e: o coecin J on
informal justice in a dozen countries. Nonetheless, the complexities of these systems and the
JincJie o meJ:in nei: i:ne nJ eecivene in mnne: n i |on ,emic nJ
comparable across countries, make assessments extraordinarily challenging. Although the WJP
has collected data on this dimension, it is not included in the aggregated scores and rankings.
11 On top of the variables drawn from the QRQ and the GPP, some variables from third-party
sources have been incorporated into this version of the Index to account for certain conduct, such as
terrorist bombings and battle-related deaths, which may not be captured through general population
polls or expert opinion. These variables include, among others, the number of events and deaths
resulting from high-casualty terrorist bombings (from the Center for Systemic Peace), the number
of battle-related deaths, and the number of casualties resulting from one-sided violence (from the
U Conic L P:o:m). Tnee inJico: :e :oxie o: civi conic (J|co: .2).
10 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
The production of the WJP Rule of Law Index may be summarized in eleven steps:
Further information about the methods employed
to produce the Index scores and rankings can be
found in the Methodology section of this report.
The WJP developed the conceptual
framework summarized in the Indexs
9 factors and 47 sub-factors, in
consultation with academics,
practitioners, and community leaders
from around the world.
1
The Index team developed a set
of hve questionnaires based on
the Indexs conceptual
framework, to be administered to
experts and the general public.
Questionnaires were translated
into several languages and
JeJ o :eec common,
used terms and expressions.
2
Tne em iJenineJ. on ve:e. mo:e nn 300
potentiaI IocaI experts per country to respond
to the experts questionnaires, and engaged the
services of leading local polling companies to
implement the household surveys.
3
Polling companies conducted pre-test
piIot surveys of the general public in
consultation with the Index team, and
JncneJ ne nn J:ve,.
4
The team sent the questionnaires to
IocaI experts and engaged in continual
interaction with them.
5
The Index team collected and
mapped the data onto the
47 sub-factors.
6
The data were subject to a series of tests to identify
possible biases and errors. For example, the Index
team cross-checked all sub-factors against more
than 0 third-party sources, including quantitative
data and qualitative assessments drawn from local
and international organizations.
8
Tne lnJex em con:JceJ ne nn co:e Jin
hve-step process:
a. CoJineJ ne ,Jeionni:e iem nJme:ic
values.
b. Produced raw country scores by aggregating
the responses from several individuals
(experts or generaI pubIic).
c. Normalized the raw scores.
d. Aggregated the normalized scores into
sub-factors and factors using simple averages.
e. P:oJJceJ ne nn :n|in Jin ne
normalized scores.
7
A sensitivity analysis was conducted by the
Econometrics and AppIied 5tatistics
Unit of the European Commission's Joint
Pesearch Centre, in collaboration with
the Index team, to assess the statistical
reliability of the results.
9
To illustrate whether the rule of law in a
coJn:, inincn, cnneJ ove: ne coJ:e
of the past year, a measure of change over time
was produced based on the annual difference
in the country-level factor scores, the standard
errors of these scores (estimated from a set of
100 bootstrap sampIes), and the results of the
corresponding t-tests.
10
The data were organized into country reports,
tabIes, and hgures to facilitate their presentation
and interpretation.
11
BOX 3:THE WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX METHODOLOGY IN A NUTSHELL
11 The WJP Rule of Law Index |
are processed, normalized on a 0-1 scale, and aggregated
from the variable level all the way up to the factor level for
each country, and then to an overall score and ranking using
the data map and weights reported in Botero and Ponce
(2012).
The WJP has produced the Rule of Law Index for the last four
years. During this time, country coverage has increased, and
the surveys and indicators that comprise it have evolved to
|ee: :eec ne :Je o . nJce o coJn:ie :oJnJ
the world. The 2014 surveys and indicators are closely
aligned with those used in the previous edition. This years
report, however, introduces a measure to illustrate whether
the rule of law in a country, as measured through the factors
of the WJP Rule of Law Index, changed over the course
o ne ,e:. Tni meJ:e i :eeneJin ne o:m o
arrows, and represents a summary of rigorous statistical
testing based on the use of bootstrapping procedures (see
Data section). The 2014 WJP Rule of Law Index report also
includes two new countries (Afghanistan and Myanmar),
achieving a record of 99 countries and jurisdictions that
account for more than 90 percent of the worlds population.
The country scores and rankings presented in this report are
based on data collected and analyzed during the third quarter
of 2013, with the exception of general population data for the
countries indexed in 2011 and 2012, which were gathered
during the spring of 2011, and the spring of 2012. A detailed
description of the process by which data is collected and
the rule of law is measured is provided in the Methodology
section of this report, and in Botero and Ponce (2012).
USING THE WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX
The WJP Rule of Law Index has been designed to offer a
reliable and independent data source for policy makers,
businesses, non-governmental organizations, and other
constituencies to assess a nations adherence to the rule of
law as perceived and experienced by the average person;
identify a nations strengths and weaknesses in comparison
to similarly situated countries; and track changes over time.
The Index has been designed to include several features that
set it apart from other indices and make it valuable for a large
number of countries, thus providing a powerful resource that
can inform policy debates both within and across countries.
o.eve:. ne lnJex nnJin mJ |e ine::eeJ in in o
certain inherent limitations.
1. The WJP Rule of Law Index does not identify priorities
for reform, and is not intended to establish causation
or to ascertain the complex relationship among
different rule of law dimensions in various countries.
2. The Indexs rankings and scores are the product of a
rigorous data collection and aggregation methodology.
Nonetheless, as with all measures, they are subject to
measurement error.
12
3. Given the uncertainty associated with picking a
particular sample of respondents, standard errors have
been calculated using bootstrapping methods to test
whether the annual changes in the factor scores are
iic, inincn.
4. Indices and indicators are subject to potential abuse
and misinterpretation. Once released to the public,
they can take on a life of their own and be used for
purposes unanticipated by their creators. If data is
taken out of context, it can lead to unintended or
erroneous policy decisions.
5. Rule of law concepts measured by the Index may
have different meanings across countries. Users are
encoJ:eJ o conJ ne ecinc Jenniion o ne
variables employed in the construction of the Index,
which are discussed in greater detail in Botero and
Ponce (2012).
6. The Index is generally intended to be used in
combination with other instruments, both quantitative
and qualitative. Just as in the areas of health or
economics, no single index conveys a full picture of a
countrys situation. Policymaking in the area of rule
of law requires careful consideration of all relevant
dimensions - which may vary from country to country
- and a combination of sources, instruments, and
methods.
7. Pursuant to the sensitivity analysis of the Index data
conducted in collaboration with the Econometrics and
Applied Statistics Unit of the European Commissions
oin Ree:cn Cen:e. connJence ine:v nve |een
ccJeJ o: nJ:e incJJeJ in ne \P RJe o
. lnJex 214. Tnee connJence ine:v nJ one:
relevant considerations regarding measurement error
are reported in Saisana and Saltelli (2014) and Botero
and Ponce (2012).
12 Users of the Index for policy debate who wish to have a thorough understanding of
its methodology are encouraged to review the following papers: (a) Botero, J and Ponce, A.
(2012) Measuring the Rule of Law, and (b) Saisana, M and Saltelli, A. (2014) Statistical Audit
of the WJP Rule of Law Index, available online at: www.worldjusticeproject.org.
Overall Scores and Rankings
14 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
OVERALL SCORES AND RANKINGS
This map shows the overall rule of law scores for the countries covered
by the WJP Rule of Law Index. The overall rule of law score for each
country is calculated by taking the simple average of the eight individual
factors, listed in the table on page 8. The countries covered by the Index
range from light purple (the best performers) to dark purple (the worst
performers.)
THE GLOBAL
RULE OF LAW
Rank Country Score
1 Denmark 0.88 14 Republic of Korea 0.77 27 United Arab Emirates 0.65 40 South Africa 0.55
2 Norway 0.88 15 Estonia 0.76 28 Slovenia 0.65 41 Tunisia 0.55
3 Sweden 0.85 16 Hong Kong SAR, China 0.76 29 Italy 0.63 42 Brazil 0.54
4 Finland 0.84 17 Belgium 0.76 30 Hungary 0.61 43 Senegal 0.54
5 Netherlands 0.83 18 France 0.74 31 Georgia 0.60 44 Bulgaria 0.53
6 New Zealand 0.83 19 United States 0.71 32 Greece 0.59 45 Jamaica 0.53
7 Austria 0.82 20 Uruguay 0.69 33 Romania 0.59 46 Indonesia 0.52
8 Australia 0.80 21 Chile 0.68 34 Macedonia, FYR 0.58 47 Thailand 0.52
9 Germany 0.80 22 Poland 0.67 35 Malaysia 0.58 48 Sri Lanka 0.52
10 Singapore 0.79 23 Czech Republic 0.67 36 Croatia 0.57 49 Lebanon 0.51
11 Canada 0.78 24 Spain 0.67 37 Ghana 0.57 50 Belarus 0.51
12 Japan 0.78 25 Botswana 0.67 38 Jordan 0.57 51 Mongolia 0.51
13 United Kingdom 0.78 26 Portugal 0.66 39 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.55 52 Morocco 0.51
15 Overall Scores and Rankings |
53 Burkina Faso 0.51 66 India 0.48 79 Mexico 0.45 92 Bangladesh 0.39
54 Serbia 0.51 67 Dominican Republic 0.47 80 Russia 0.45 93 Nigeria 0.39
55 Malawi 0.51 68 Ukraine 0.47 81 Madagascar 0.45 94 Bolivia 0.39
56 Panama 0.50 69 Tanzania 0.47 82 Iran 0.44 95 Cameroon 0.39
57 Nepal 0.50 70 Zambia 0.47 83 Guatemala 0.44 96 Pakistan 0.36
58 Argentina 0.50 71 Kazakhstan 0.47 84 Sierra Leone 0.44 97 Zimbabwe 0.34
59 Turkey 0.50 72 Cote d'Ivoire 0.46 85 Nicaragua 0.43 98 Afghanistan 0.34
60 Philippines 0.50 73 Uzbekistan 0.45 86 Kenya 0.43 99 Venezuela 0.31
61 Colombia 0.49 74 Egypt 0.45 87 Liberia 0.42
62 Peru 0.49 75 Moldova 0.45 88 Ethiopia 0.42
63 Albania 0.49 76 China 0.45 89 Myanmar 0.41
64 El Salvador 0.48 77 Ecuador 0.45 90 Uganda 0.41
65 Vietnam 0.48 78 Kyrgyzstan 0.45 91 Cambodia 0.40
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
Low Score
16 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
OVERALL
GLOBAL RANK
COUNTRY/TERRITORY
CONSTRAI NTS ON
GOVERNMENT POWERS
ABSENCE OF
CORRUPTI ON
OPEN
GOVERNMENT
FUNDAMENTAL
RI GHTS
ORDER &
SECURI TY
REGULATORY
ENFORCEMENT
CI VI L
J USTI CE
CRI MI NAL
J USTI CE
1 Denmark 1 1 5 2 3 2 4 3
2 Norway 2 2 1 3 19 1 1 4
3 Sweden 3 4 4 1 6 3 5 6
4 Fi nl and 5 6 11 4 8 11 8 1
5 Net herl ands 7 7 7 6 22 4 2 9
6 New Zeal and 4 3 2 7 11 5 9 12
7 Aust ri a 6 10 6 5 10 6 7 5
8 Aust ral i a 8 8 12 10 14 7 12 11
9 Germany 9 12 14 8 13 16 3 16
10 Si ngapore 21 5 21 26 2 8 6 2
11 Canada 13 14 3 16 15 9 13 15
12 Japan 15 11 8 20 1 12 11 18
13 Uni ted Ki ngdom 10 15 9 15 23 10 14 14
14 Republ i c of Korea 16 16 13 23 7 17 10 8
15 Est oni a 12 18 15 12 24 13 15 13
16 Hong Kong SAR, Chi na 24 9 10 29 4 15 16 10
17 Bel gi um 11 13 18 9 16 19 19 20
18 France 14 20 16 18 30 14 18 21
19 Uni t ed St at es 20 21 17 27 18 22 27 22
20 Uruguay 18 19 20 19 64 18 17 42
21 Chi l e 17 22 19 21 61 21 26 28
22 Pol and 22 27 27 24 25 26 22 17
23 Czech Republ i c 23 31 33 11 28 24 20 19
24 Spai n 28 25 28 14 34 25 24 25
25 Bot swana 25 23 22 54 26 20 28 23
26 Port ugal 19 26 25 17 58 27 23 26
27 Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es 42 17 52 73 9 23 33 7
28 Sl oveni a 30 32 23 13 37 28 29 27
29 I t al y 26 30 39 22 50 29 36 24
30 Hungary 36 29 35 30 21 30 55 34
31 Georgi a 55 24 43 51 17 31 32 36
32 Greece 29 34 34 28 49 37 25 43
33 Romani a 43 41 47 25 31 45 34 29
34 Macedoni a, FYR 61 37 24 38 47 44 41 37
35 Mal aysi a 49 28 42 85 12 48 37 33
36 Croat i a 40 36 38 37 39 53 46 31
37 Ghana 27 58 37 33 57 43 35 49
38 Jordan 64 33 65 77 20 35 21 30
39 Bosni a & Herzegovi na 51 55 44 32 45 49 56 32
40 Sout h Af ri ca 37 46 26 41 86 40 44 47
41 Tuni si a 41 43 49 64 41 47 43 45
42 Brazi l 32 45 36 35 71 39 50 69
43 Senegal 33 48 70 39 69 33 39 54
44 Bul gari a 58 64 51 36 36 57 45 56
45 Jamai ca 34 50 59 44 74 32 64 53
46 I ndonesi a 31 80 29 65 42 46 67 71
47 Thai l and 63 40 50 52 48 62 89 35
48 Sri Lanka 54 39 41 56 59 69 80 38
49 Lebanon 44 70 62 43 43 66 70 55
50 Bel arus 95 38 79 83 33 42 30 50
51 Mongol i a 53 71 93 45 38 70 48 39
52 Morocco 46 62 46 84 44 36 51 81
53 Burki na Faso 76 54 71 50 65 34 42 64
54 Serbi a 65 67 48 40 51 65 71 58
55 Mal awi 60 65 80 58 68 77 31 40
56 Panama 75 57 31 46 62 55 69 65
57 Nepal 45 73 61 48 55 56 75 52
58 Argent i na 71 47 56 31 83 73 40 70
59 Turkey 72 35 69 78 67 38 47 62
60 Phi l i ppi nes 39 44 55 67 56 60 82 73
61 Col ombi a 47 61 40 61 89 50 54 79
62 Peru 38 79 63 34 78 61 83 67
63 Al bani a 68 83 60 49 53 64 53 75
64 El Sal vador 66 53 84 42 70 52 62 90
65 Vi et nam 86 59 77 71 32 86 73 41
66 I ndi a 35 72 30 63 95 81 90 48
67 Domi ni can Republ i c 67 77 45 47 87 76 60 66
68 Ukrai ne 84 94 53 55 27 84 49 83
69 Tanzani a 52 74 72 70 90 74 61 44
70 Zambi a 57 68 66 86 63 72 65 77
71 Kazakhst an 93 60 87 74 35 63 66 61
72 Cot e d' I voi re 77 69 88 72 85 58 57 60
73 Uzbeki st an 97 81 78 95 5 59 58 59
74 Egypt 74 52 64 90 66 75 84 57
75 Mol dova 79 88 58 68 40 79 76 82
76 Chi na 92 49 74 96 29 78 79 51
77 Ecuador 85 51 75 62 91 54 77 86
78 Kyrgyzst an 70 96 73 66 52 68 74 85
79 Mexi co 48 78 32 60 96 51 88 97
80 Russi a 89 66 67 79 75 67 68 76
81 Madagascar 83 84 68 76 46 82 78 80
82 I ran 90 42 90 99 77 41 38 63
83 Guat emal a 59 76 57 57 92 85 93 93
84 Si erra Leone 50 82 98 59 88 87 63 88
85 Ni caragua 96 75 54 69 72 71 91 78
86 Kenya 62 93 83 80 79 80 72 84
87 Li beri a 56 85 86 53 93 96 87 87
88 Et hi opi a 91 56 94 94 73 89 85 46
89 Myanmar 82 63 96 97 60 92 86 89
90 Uganda 81 89 92 93 84 90 59 72
91 Cambodi a 94 86 82 82 54 94 97 95
92 Bangl adesh 80 95 85 87 76 91 92 94
93 Ni geri a 69 97 76 88 98 83 52 91
94 Bol i vi a 88 87 81 75 82 88 96 98
95 Cameroon 87 98 91 81 80 93 95 92
96 Paki st an 73 91 95 92 99 95 94 68
97 Zi mbabwe 98 92 99 98 81 98 81 74
98 Af ghani st an 78 99 89 91 97 97 99 96
99 Venezuel a 99 90 97 89 94 99 98 99
GLOBAL RANKINGS
World Maps of the Rule of Law by Factor
18 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
/ i ne:. ne :Je o . Jenne nJ imi ne
power of those who govern. Modern societies have
developed systems of checks and balances, including
constitutional, institutional and non-governmental, to
limit the reach of excessive government power and hold
ne ove:nmen nJ i onci nJ en ccoJn|e.
These checks and balances take many forms in various
countries around the world: they do not operate solely
in systems marked by a formal separation of powers, nor
:e ne, nece:i, coJineJ in .. \n i eeni
is that the authority is distributed in a manner that
ensures no single organ of government has the ability to
exercise unchecked power, and that its agents are held
accountable under the law for their actions. Unchecked
government power may lead to abuse of authority,
preferential treatment towards special groups, wasted
resources, and ineffectiveness in achieving the most
basic purposes of government.
Factor 1 of the WJP Rule of Law Index assesses the
effectiveness of the institutional checks on government
power by looking at the performance of legislative
and judicial oversight, and independent auditing
and review agencies, as well as the effectiveness of
non-governmental oversight by the media and civil
society, which serve an important role in monitoring
ove:nmen cion nJ noJin onci ccoJn|e. l
also examines the extent to which transitions of power
occur in accordance with the law, as well as the extent
o .nicn ove:nmen onci :e neJ ccoJn|e o:
onci miconJJc.
Factor 1:
Constraints on Government Powers
Rank Country Score
1 Denmark 0.94 14 France 0.79 27 Ghana 0.68 40 Croatia 0.58
2 Norway 0.90 15 Japan 0.76 28 Spain 0.68 41 Tunisia 0.58
3 Sweden 0.90 16 Republic of Korea 0.76 29 Greece 0.66 42 United Arab Emirates 0.58
4 New Zealand 0.88 17 Chile 0.76 30 Slovenia 0.65 43 Romania 0.58
5 Finland 0.88 18 Uruguay 0.75 31 Indonesia 0.64 44 Lebanon 0.57
6 Austria 0.86 19 Portugal 0.74 32 Brazil 0.63 45 Nepal 0.56
7 Netherlands 0.86 20 United States 0.74 33 Senegal 0.63 46 Morocco 0.56
8 Australia 0.86 21 Singapore 0.73 34 Jamaica 0.62 47 Colombia 0.55
9 Germany 0.83 22 Poland 0.73 35 India 0.61 48 Mexico 0.55
10 United Kingdom 0.81 23 Czech Republic 0.72 36 Hungary 0.61 49 Malaysia 0.55
11 Belgium 0.81 24 Hong Kong SAR, China 0.72 37 South Africa 0.61 50 Sierra Leone 0.55
12 Estonia 0.80 25 Botswana 0.69 38 Peru 0.60 51 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.54
13 Canada 0.80 26 Italy 0.69 39 Philippines 0.59 52 Tanzania 0.54
19 World Maps of the Rule of Law by Factor |
53 Mongolia 0.53 66 El Salvador 0.49 79 Moldova 0.43 92 China 0.35
54 Sri Lanka 0.53 67 Dominican Republic 0.48 80 Bangladesh 0.41 93 Kazakhstan 0.35
55 Georgia 0.53 68 Albania 0.47 81 Uganda 0.41 94 Cambodia 0.34
56 Liberia 0.53 69 Nigeria 0.47 82 Myanmar 0.41 95 Belarus 0.34
57 Zambia 0.53 70 Kyrgyzstan 0.47 83 Madagascar 0.41 96 Nicaragua 0.31
58 Bulgaria 0.53 71 Argentina 0.47 84 Ukraine 0.41 97 Uzbekistan 0.29
59 Guatemala 0.52 72 Turkey 0.46 85 Ecuador 0.40 98 Zimbabwe 0.25
60 Malawi 0.52 73 Pakistan 0.46 86 Vietnam 0.40 99 Venezuela 0.17
61 Macedonia, FYR 0.52 74 Egypt 0.45 87 Cameroon 0.39
62 Kenya 0.51 75 Panama 0.45 88 Bolivia 0.38
63 Thailand 0.50 76 Burkina Faso 0.45 89 Russia 0.36
64 Jordan 0.50 77 Cote d'Ivoire 0.44 90 Iran 0.36
65 Serbia 0.49 78 Afghanistan 0.43 91 Ethiopia 0.35
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
0.2-0.29
0.1-0.19
Low Score
East Asia
c Pcinc
Latin America
& Caribbean
Middle East &
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
South Asia
Western Europe
& North America
Impunity around the world
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Eastern Europe
& Central Asia


This graph shows the percentage of
respondents replying that a high-ranking
ove:nmen once: exoeJ o |e |in
ove:nmen mone, o: e:on |enen
would be prosecuted and punished.
Respondents form Western Europe
& North America have the highest
expectation of punishment at 51% , while
respondents from Latin America & the
Caribbean have the lowest expectetations
of punishment at 28%.
20 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Tne |ence o co::Jion convenion, JenneJ
as the use of public power for private gain is one of
the hallmarks of a society governed by the rule of law,
as corruption is a manifestation of the extent to which
ove:nmen onci |Je nei: o.e: o: nei: o.n
interest. Corruption can take many forms including
bribery, nepotism, extortion, fraud, embezzlement,
and involvement of organized crime and may involve
a variety of public servants. Corruption is costly for
citizens: it siphons off scarce resources, introduces
inenciencie nJ ine,Jiie in J|ic e:vice Jeive:,.
lowers regulatory compliance, weakens accountability,
curtails the publics opportunities for participation,
undermines the governments credibility, and leads
to injustice. Addressing corruption is a complicated
political endeavor requiring creative thinking and
a coordinated effort by numerous stakeholders,
including government, businesses, academia, and the
civil society at large.
The WJP Rule of Law Index considers three forms
o co::Jion. |:i|e:,. im:oe: inJence |, J|ic
or private interests, and misappropriation of public
funds or other resources (embezzlement). These
three forms of corruption are examined with respect
o ove:nmen once: in ne execJive |:ncn. ne
judiciary, the military and police, and the legislature,
and encompass a range of possible situations in which
corruption - from petty bribery to major kinds of fraud
- can occur, from the provision of public services, to
the procurement processes, to the enforcement of
regulations.
Factor 2:
Absence of Corruption
Rank Country Score
1 Denmark 0.96 14 Canada 0.81 27 Poland 0.66 40 Thailand 0.51
2 Norway 0.94 15 United Kingdom 0.80 28 Malaysia 0.64 41 Romania 0.50
3 New Zealand 0.91 16 Republic of Korea 0.79 29 Hungary 0.64 42 Iran 0.50
4 Sweden 0.91 17 United Arab Emirates 0.79 30 Italy 0.60 43 Tunisia 0.50
5 Singapore 0.90 18 Estonia 0.78 31 Czech Republic 0.60 44 Philippines 0.50
6 Finland 0.90 19 Uruguay 0.78 32 Slovenia 0.60 45 Brazil 0.50
7 Netherlands 0.88 20 France 0.78 33 Jordan 0.57 46 South Africa 0.49
8 Australia 0.86 21 United States 0.75 34 Greece 0.56 47 Argentina 0.49
9 Hong Kong SAR, China 0.85 22 Chile 0.73 35 Turkey 0.55 48 Senegal 0.48
10 Austria 0.84 23 Botswana 0.73 36 Croatia 0.54 49 China 0.48
11 Japan 0.84 24 Georgia 0.71 37 Macedonia, FYR 0.53 50 Jamaica 0.48
12 Germany 0.83 25 Spain 0.69 38 Belarus 0.53 51 Ecuador 0.47
13 Belgium 0.81 26 Portugal 0.69 39 Sri Lanka 0.53 52 Egypt 0.46
21 World Maps of the Rule of Law by Factor |
53 El Salvador 0.46 66 Russia 0.42 79 Peru 0.36 92 Zimbabwe 0.28
54 Burkina Faso 0.45 67 Serbia 0.41 80 Indonesia 0.36 93 Kenya 0.28
55 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.45 68 Zambia 0.41 81 Uzbekistan 0.35 94 Ukraine 0.28
56 Ethiopia 0.45 69 Cote d'Ivoire 0.41 82 Sierra Leone 0.35 95 Bangladesh 0.27
57 Panama 0.44 70 Lebanon 0.40 83 Albania 0.34 96 Kyrgyzstan 0.27
58 Ghana 0.44 71 Mongolia 0.39 84 Madagascar 0.34 97 Nigeria 0.26
59 Vietnam 0.44 72 India 0.39 85 Liberia 0.34 98 Cameroon 0.26
60 Kazakhstan 0.43 73 Nepal 0.38 86 Cambodia 0.33 99 Afghanistan 0.24
61 Colombia 0.43 74 Tanzania 0.38 87 Bolivia 0.32
62 Morocco 0.43 75 Nicaragua 0.38 88 Moldova 0.32
63 Myanmar 0.43 76 Guatemala 0.37 89 Uganda 0.30
64 Bulgaria 0.43 77 Dominican Republic 0.37 90 Venezuela 0.30
65 Malawi 0.43 78 Mexico 0.37 91 Pakistan 0.29
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
0.2-0.29
Low Score
0 10 1 20 30 40 50 50 60
% of respondents who had to pay a bribe when stopped by the police. % of respondents who had to pay a bribe while requesting a government perm
East Asia
c Pcinc
Eastern Europe
& Central Asia
Latin America &
Caribbean
Middle East &
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
South Asia
Western Europe
& North America
10 20 30 40 50 60
East Asia
c Pcinc
Eastern Europe
& Central Asia
Latin America &
Caribbean
Middle East &
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
South Asia
Western Europe
& North America
Bribery
22 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
An open government conventionally understood
as a government that is transparent, accessible,
participatory, collaborative, and responsive is
fundamental to establishing the rule of law. An
open government fosters citizens participation in
decision making, shares information, and empowers
people with tools to hold the government
accountable. Openness ultimately enhances the
governments legitimacy among the population.
Factor 3 of the WJP Rule of Law Index assesses the
extent to which the society has clear, publicized,
accessible, and stable laws; whether administrative
proceedings are open to public participation; and
.nene: onci ino:mion. incJJin J: o .
and regulations, is available to the public. Clear,
stable, and publicized laws allow the public to know
what the law is and what conduct is permitted and
prohibited. Public participation provides citizens
with a voice in decision-making processes that may
impact their lives. Finally, access to information
provides citizens with knowledge to address public
issues, scrutinize the government, and demand
accountability.
During the past few years, governments around
the world have taken new steps to become more
transparent, responsive, and participatory. The
Open Government Partnership, which 62 countries
have joined since 2011, is representative of this
global trend.
Factor 3:
Open Government
Rank Country Score
1 Norway 0.85 14 Germany 0.73 27 Poland 0.56 40 Colombia 0.49
2 New Zealand 0.83 15 Estonia 0.71 28 Spain 0.55 41 Sri Lanka 0.48
3 Canada 0.82 16 France 0.70 29 Indonesia 0.54 42 Malaysia 0.48
4 Sweden 0.82 17 United States 0.70 30 India 0.53 43 Georgia 0.48
5 Denmark 0.79 18 Belgium 0.67 31 Panama 0.52 44 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.48
6 Austria 0.78 19 Chile 0.65 32 Mexico 0.52 45 Dominican Republic 0.48
7 Netherlands 0.78 20 Uruguay 0.65 33 Czech Republic 0.52 46 Morocco 0.48
8 Japan 0.77 21 Singapore 0.64 34 Greece 0.50 47 Romania 0.47
9 United Kingdom 0.77 22 Botswana 0.61 35 Hungary 0.50 48 Serbia 0.47
10 Hong Kong SAR, China 0.77 23 Slovenia 0.60 36 Brazil 0.50 49 Tunisia 0.47
11 Finland 0.76 24 Macedonia, FYR 0.60 37 Ghana 0.50 50 Thailand 0.47
12 Australia 0.75 25 Portugal 0.59 38 Croatia 0.49 51 Bulgaria 0.46
13 Republic of Korea 0.74 26 South Africa 0.58 39 Italy 0.49 52 United Arab Emirates 0.46
23 World Maps of the Rule of Law by Factor |
53 Ukraine 0.46 66 Zambia 0.43 79 Belarus 0.39 92 Uganda 0.33
54 Nicaragua 0.45 67 Russia 0.43 80 Malawi 0.39 93 Mongolia 0.33
55 Philippines 0.45 68 Madagascar 0.42 81 Bolivia 0.38 94 Ethiopia 0.32
56 Argentina 0.45 69 Turkey 0.42 82 Cambodia 0.38 95 Pakistan 0.32
57 Guatemala 0.45 70 Senegal 0.42 83 Kenya 0.38 96 Myanmar 0.31
58 Moldova 0.44 71 Burkina Faso 0.41 84 El Salvador 0.37 97 Venezuela 0.30
59 Jamaica 0.44 72 Tanzania 0.41 85 Bangladesh 0.36 98 Sierra Leone 0.29
60 Albania 0.44 73 Kyrgyzstan 0.41 86 Liberia 0.36 99 Zimbabwe 0.24
61 Nepal 0.44 74 China 0.41 87 Kazakhstan 0.35
62 Lebanon 0.44 75 Ecuador 0.40 88 Cote d'Ivoire 0.34
63 Peru 0.44 76 Nigeria 0.40 89 Afghanistan 0.34
64 Egypt 0.44 77 Vietnam 0.39 90 Iran 0.34
65 Jordan 0.43 78 Uzbekistan 0.39 91 Cameroon 0.33
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
0.2-0.29
Low Score
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
East Asia
c Pcinc
Eastern Europe
& Central Asia
Latin America &
Caribbean
Middle East &
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
South Asia
Western Europe &
North America
% of respondents replying that their government performs well or fairly well at:
Perception of government openness
providing information about government expenditures providing effective ways to complain about government services responding to people's concerns about community matters
0 10 20 30 40 50
East Asia
c Pcinc
Eastern Europe
& Central Asia
Latin America
& Caribbean
Middle East &
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
South Asia
Western Europe &
North America
South Asia
Middle East &
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
East Asia
c Pcinc
Latin America
& Caribbean
Western Europe &
North America
Eastern Europe
& Central Asia
24 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Its Preamble explicitly recognizes the centrality of
fundamental rights to the rule of law, stating that
it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the
rule of law
The WJP Rule of Law Index addresses protection
of fundamental rights in Factor 4, measuring how
effectively countries uphold and protect a menu of
:in nJ :eeJom n :e n:m, e|ineJ JnJe:
international law. These include the right to equal
treatment and the absence of discrimination; the right
to life and security of the person; due process of law
and rights of the accused; freedom of opinion and
expression; freedom of belief and religion; the absence
of arbitrary interference with privacy; freedom of
assembly and association; and the protection of
fundamental labor rights.
Tne nJ:e on ne ooie e iJ:e ne .iJe
variations from region to region in the extent to which
fundamental rights are effectively protected.
Factor 4:
Fundamental Rights
Rank Country Score
1 Sweden 0.91 14 Spain 0.78 27 United States 0.71 40 Serbia 0.62
2 Denmark 0.90 15 United Kingdom 0.78 28 Greece 0.69 41 South Africa 0.62
3 Norway 0.90 16 Canada 0.77 29 Hong Kong SAR, China 0.68 42 El Salvador 0.62
4 Finland 0.89 17 Portugal 0.76 30 Hungary 0.68 43 Lebanon 0.62
5 Austria 0.87 18 France 0.76 31 Argentina 0.67 44 Jamaica 0.61
6 Netherlands 0.85 19 Uruguay 0.76 32 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.67 45 Mongolia 0.61
7 New Zealand 0.84 20 Japan 0.75 33 Ghana 0.66 46 Panama 0.60
8 Germany 0.84 21 Chile 0.74 34 Peru 0.66 47 Dominican Republic 0.60
9 Belgium 0.83 22 Italy 0.73 35 Brazil 0.66 48 Nepal 0.59
10 Australia 0.82 23 Republic of Korea 0.73 36 Bulgaria 0.65 49 Albania 0.58
11 Czech Republic 0.80 24 Poland 0.72 37 Croatia 0.64 50 Burkina Faso 0.58
12 Estonia 0.80 25 Romania 0.71 38 Macedonia, FYR 0.63 51 Georgia 0.58
13 Slovenia 0.79 26 Singapore 0.71 39 Senegal 0.63 52 Thailand 0.58
25 World Maps of the Rule of Law by Factor |
53 Liberia 0.57 66 Kyrgyzstan 0.52 79 Russia 0.46 92 Pakistan 0.38
54 Botswana 0.57 67 Philippines 0.52 80 Kenya 0.46 93 Uganda 0.37
55 Ukraine 0.56 68 Moldova 0.51 81 Cameroon 0.46 94 Ethiopia 0.36
56 Sri Lanka 0.56 69 Nicaragua 0.51 82 Cambodia 0.46 95 Uzbekistan 0.36
57 Guatemala 0.56 70 Tanzania 0.51 83 Belarus 0.46 96 China 0.31
58 Malawi 0.55 71 Vietnam 0.50 84 Morocco 0.45 97 Myanmar 0.30
59 Sierra Leone 0.55 72 Cote d'Ivoire 0.50 85 Malaysia 0.45 98 Zimbabwe 0.29
60 Mexico 0.55 73 United Arab Emirates 0.49 86 Zambia 0.43 99 Iran 0.23
61 Colombia 0.55 74 Kazakhstan 0.48 87 Bangladesh 0.43
62 Ecuador 0.54 75 Bolivia 0.48 88 Nigeria 0.42
63 India 0.54 76 Madagascar 0.48 89 Venezuela 0.42
64 Tunisia 0.54 77 Jordan 0.47 90 Egypt 0.39
65 Indonesia 0.54 78 Turkey 0.47 91 Afghanistan 0.39
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
0.2-0.29
Low Score
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.2
East
Asia &
Pcinc
Eastern
Europe &
Central Asia
Latin
America &
Caribbean
Middle East
& North
Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
South Asia
Western
Europe &
North America
4.1 Equal treatment /
no discrimination
4.2 Right to life
and security
4.3 Due process of law
4.4 Freedom of
expression
4.6 Right to privacy
4.8 Labor Rights
Fundamental Rights around the World
Regional averages for each underlying sub-factor of Factor 4
4.5 Freedom of religion
4.7 Freedom of
association
26 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Jmn ecJ:i, i one o ne Jennin ec o n,
rule of law society and a fundamental function of
the state. Not only does violence impose wounds on
society, it also prevents the achievement of other
aims, such as exercising fundamental human rights,
and ensuring access to opportunities and justice. It
leads to instability and undermines the trust in state
institutions. In extreme situations, violence might
become the norm if legal rules are not enforced.
Factor 5 of the WJP Rule of Law Index measures
the absence of three forms of violence: crime
particularly conventional crimes such as homicide,
kidnapping, burglary, armed robbery, extortion, and
fraud political violence, including terrorism, armed
conic. nJ oiic Jn:e, nJ vioence men o
redress personal grievances, which results from the
o o connJence in ne oice nJ ne c:imin Jice
system. Whatever the cause of violence may be, its
effect on people can be devastating. That is why the
rule of law necessitates that the state be effective at
preventing crime and violence of every kind.
Factor 5:
Order & Security
Rank Country Score
1 Japan 0.92 14 Australia 0.86 27 Ukraine 0.82 40 Moldova 0.77
2 Singapore 0.91 15 Canada 0.86 28 Czech Republic 0.82 41 Tunisia 0.77
3 Denmark 0.90 16 Belgium 0.85 29 China 0.81 42 Indonesia 0.77
4 Hong Kong SAR, China 0.90 17 Georgia 0.85 30 France 0.81 43 Lebanon 0.76
5 Uzbekistan 0.90 18 United States 0.85 31 Romania 0.81 44 Morocco 0.76
6 Sweden 0.89 19 Norway 0.85 32 Vietnam 0.80 45 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.76
7 Republic of Korea 0.89 20 Jordan 0.85 33 Belarus 0.79 46 Madagascar 0.76
8 Finland 0.89 21 Hungary 0.84 34 Spain 0.79 47 Macedonia, FYR 0.75
9 United Arab Emirates 0.89 22 Netherlands 0.84 35 Kazakhstan 0.79 48 Thailand 0.75
10 Austria 0.88 23 United Kingdom 0.84 36 Bulgaria 0.79 49 Greece 0.74
11 New Zealand 0.87 24 Estonia 0.84 37 Slovenia 0.78 50 Italy 0.74
12 Malaysia 0.87 25 Poland 0.83 38 Mongolia 0.78 51 Serbia 0.74
13 Germany 0.87 26 Botswana 0.82 39 Croatia 0.77 52 Kyrgyzstan 0.74
27 World Maps of the Rule of Law by Factor |
53 Albania 0.74 66 Egypt 0.67 79 Kenya 0.63 92 Guatemala 0.54
54 Cambodia 0.73 67 Turkey 0.67 80 Cameroon 0.63 93 Liberia 0.54
55 Nepal 0.73 68 Malawi 0.67 81 Zimbabwe 0.62 94 Venezuela 0.53
56 Philippines 0.73 69 Senegal 0.67 82 Bolivia 0.61 95 India 0.51
57 Ghana 0.72 70 El Salvador 0.66 83 Argentina 0.61 96 Mexico 0.47
58 Portugal 0.72 71 Brazil 0.66 84 Uganda 0.61 97 Afghanistan 0.42
59 Sri Lanka 0.72 72 Nicaragua 0.66 85 Cote d'Ivoire 0.60 98 Nigeria 0.36
60 Myanmar 0.72 73 Ethiopia 0.66 86 South Africa 0.60 99 Pakistan 0.30
61 Chile 0.71 74 Jamaica 0.65 87 Dominican Republic 0.59
62 Panama 0.71 75 Russia 0.64 88 Sierra Leone 0.59
63 Zambia 0.70 76 Bangladesh 0.64 89 Colombia 0.58
64 Uruguay 0.69 77 Iran 0.63 90 Tanzania 0.57
65 Burkina Faso 0.69 78 Peru 0.63 91 Ecuador 0.57
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
Low Score
East Asia
c Pcinc
Latin America
& Caribbean
Middle East &
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
South Asia
Western Europe
& North America
% of respondents replying that they feel very safe or safe walking in their neighborhood at night
Perception of safety around the world
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Eastern Europe
& Central Asia
28 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Modern societies use enforcement of government regulations
to ensure that the public interest is not subordinated to
the private interests of regulated entities. Around the
world, regulations vary widely due to differences in policies,
institutional environments, and political choices. Whatever
those choices may be, regulations are futile if they are not
properly enforced by authorities. Ensuring compliance with
regulations is thus a key feature of the rule of law. Effective
regulatory enforcement depends, in turn, on accountability,
independence, and transparency to ensure that regulatory
institutions act within the limits authorized by law
The WJP Rule of Law Index addresses regulatory
enforcement in Factor 6. This factor assesses the
effectiveness of regulatory enforcement in practice; the
:eence o: |ence o im:oe: inJence |, J|ic
onci o: :ive ine:e, ne imeine o Jmini:ive
proceedings; and the level of adherence to due process of law
in Jmini:ive :oceJJ:e. Rne: nn n,.in ecinc
statutes, the WJP Index uses simple scenarios to explore the
outcomes associated with activities that are regulated in all
jurisdictions, such as environmental standards, public health,
workplace safety regulations, and permits and licenses. This
factor also addresses whether the government respects the
property rights of people and corporations; refrains from
the illegal seizure of private property without adequate
compensation; and provides adequate compensation when
property is legally expropriated.
As countries engage in regulatory reforms, special efforts
should be made to improve the mechanisms used to
guarantee that such laws are implemented and enforced in an
encien. eecive. nJ ccoJn|e mnne:.
Factor 6:
Regulatory Enforcement
Rank Country Score
1 Norway 0.87 14 France 0.75 27 Portugal 0.59 40 South Africa 0.53
2 Denmark 0.84 15 Hong Kong SAR, China 0.74 28 Slovenia 0.59 41 Iran 0.53
3 Sweden 0.83 16 Germany 0.74 29 Italy 0.59 42 Belarus 0.53
4 Netherlands 0.82 17 Republic of Korea 0.74 30 Hungary 0.57 43 Ghana 0.53
5 New Zealand 0.81 18 Uruguay 0.73 31 Georgia 0.57 44 Macedonia, FYR 0.53
6 Austria 0.81 19 Belgium 0.71 32 Jamaica 0.56 45 Romania 0.52
7 Australia 0.80 20 Botswana 0.68 33 Senegal 0.55 46 Indonesia 0.52
8 Singapore 0.79 21 Chile 0.68 34 Burkina Faso 0.55 47 Tunisia 0.52
9 Canada 0.79 22 United States 0.67 35 Jordan 0.54 48 Malaysia 0.51
10 United Kingdom 0.78 23 United Arab Emirates 0.66 36 Morocco 0.54 49 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.51
11 Finland 0.78 24 Czech Republic 0.63 37 Greece 0.54 50 Colombia 0.50
12 Japan 0.78 25 Spain 0.63 38 Turkey 0.54 51 Mexico 0.50
13 Estonia 0.75 26 Poland 0.59 39 Brazil 0.53 52 El Salvador 0.49
29 World Maps of the Rule of Law by Factor |
53 Croatia 0.49 66 Lebanon 0.44 79 Moldova 0.41 92 Myanmar 0.37
54 Ecuador 0.48 67 Russia 0.44 80 Kenya 0.41 93 Cameroon 0.36
55 Panama 0.48 68 Kyrgyzstan 0.44 81 India 0.40 94 Cambodia 0.36
56 Nepal 0.47 69 Sri Lanka 0.44 82 Madagascar 0.40 95 Pakistan 0.35
57 Bulgaria 0.47 70 Mongolia 0.43 83 Nigeria 0.40 96 Liberia 0.33
58 Cote d'Ivoire 0.47 71 Nicaragua 0.43 84 Ukraine 0.40 97 Afghanistan 0.33
59 Uzbekistan 0.47 72 Zambia 0.43 85 Guatemala 0.39 98 Zimbabwe 0.32
60 Philippines 0.46 73 Argentina 0.43 86 Vietnam 0.39 99 Venezuela 0.28
61 Peru 0.46 74 Tanzania 0.43 87 Sierra Leone 0.39
62 Thailand 0.46 75 Egypt 0.42 88 Bolivia 0.38
63 Kazakhstan 0.46 76 Dominican Republic 0.42 89 Ethiopia 0.38
64 Albania 0.45 77 Malawi 0.41 90 Uganda 0.37
65 Serbia 0.45 78 China 0.41 91 Bangladesh 0.37
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
0.2-0.29
Low Score
Over the course of the past year:
7 countries have improved
4 countries have deteriorated
88 countries remained the same
30 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
In a rule of law society, ordinary people should be able
to resolve their grievances and obtain remedies through
formal institutions of justice in a peaceful and effective
manner, rather than resorting to violence or self-help. Well-
functioning civil justice systems enable people to protect
their rights against infringement by others, including
powerful parties and the state. As an essential component
of a society where the rule of law thrives, effective civil
justice systems preserve peace and contribute to cultures
of personal accountability.
As understood by the World Justice Project, the delivery of
effective civil justice requires that the system be accessible
and affordable, as well as be free of discrimination,
co::Jion. nJ im:oe: inJence |, J|ic onci. Tne
delivery of effective civil justice also necessitates that court
proceedings be conducted in a timely manner that is not
subject to unreasonable delays, and that judgments are
enforced effectively. Finally, if alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms (ADRs) are available to divert disputes away
from the courts and the legal processes, these mechanisms
mJ |e ccei|e. im:i. nJ encien.
All around the world, peoples ability to use legal channels
to resolve their disputes is often impeded by obstacles
Jcn nnnci |::ie:. comexi, o :oceJJ:e.
co::Jion o coJ: e:onne. inJence o o.e:J :ie
in judicial decision making, or simply lack of knowledge,
disempowerment, and exclusion. These problems, which are
not restricted to developing countries, call for more work to
ensure that all people have the opportunity to resolve their
:ievnce eecive,. im:i,. nJ encien, n:oJn
the civil justice system.
Factor 7:
Civil Justice
Rank Country Score
1 Norway 0.86 14 United Kingdom 0.72 27 United States 0.61 40 Argentina 0.54
2 Netherlands 0.84 15 Estonia 0.72 28 Botswana 0.61 41 Macedonia, FYR 0.54
3 Germany 0.82 16 Hong Kong SAR, China 0.72 29 Slovenia 0.61 42 Burkina Faso 0.54
4 Denmark 0.82 17 Uruguay 0.70 30 Belarus 0.60 43 Tunisia 0.54
5 Sweden 0.78 18 France 0.69 31 Malawi 0.60 44 South Africa 0.53
6 Singapore 0.77 19 Belgium 0.69 32 Georgia 0.59 45 Bulgaria 0.53
7 Austria 0.75 20 Czech Republic 0.65 33 United Arab Emirates 0.59 46 Croatia 0.52
8 Finland 0.75 21 Jordan 0.62 34 Romania 0.59 47 Turkey 0.52
9 New Zealand 0.74 22 Poland 0.62 35 Ghana 0.59 48 Mongolia 0.52
10 Republic of Korea 0.74 23 Portugal 0.62 36 Italy 0.58 49 Ukraine 0.52
11 Japan 0.73 24 Spain 0.62 37 Malaysia 0.57 50 Brazil 0.51
12 Australia 0.73 25 Greece 0.61 38 Iran 0.56 51 Morocco 0.50
13 Canada 0.72 26 Chile 0.61 39 Senegal 0.55 52 Nigeria 0.50
31 World Maps of the Rule of Law by Factor |
53 Albania 0.50 66 Kazakhstan 0.47 79 China 0.41 92 Bangladesh 0.36
54 Colombia 0.49 67 Indonesia 0.47 80 Sri Lanka 0.41 93 Guatemala 0.36
55 Hungary 0.49 68 Russia 0.46 81 Zimbabwe 0.40 94 Pakistan 0.36
56 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.48 69 Panama 0.45 82 Philippines 0.40 95 Cameroon 0.34
57 Cote d'Ivoire 0.48 70 Lebanon 0.45 83 Peru 0.39 96 Bolivia 0.34
58 Uzbekistan 0.48 71 Serbia 0.45 84 Egypt 0.39 97 Cambodia 0.34
59 Uganda 0.48 72 Kenya 0.44 85 Ethiopia 0.39 98 Venezuela 0.33
60 Dominican Republic 0.48 73 Vietnam 0.42 86 Myanmar 0.39 99 Afghanistan 0.27
61 Tanzania 0.48 74 Kyrgyzstan 0.42 87 Liberia 0.39
62 El Salvador 0.47 75 Nepal 0.42 88 Mexico 0.39
63 Sierra Leone 0.47 76 Moldova 0.41 89 Thailand 0.39
64 Jamaica 0.47 77 Ecuador 0.41 90 India 0.39
65 Zambia 0.47 78 Madagascar 0.41 91 Nicaragua 0.37
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
0.2-0.29
Low Score
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.2
East
Asia &
Pcinc
Eastern
Europe &
Central Asia
Latin
America &
Caribbean
Middle East
& North
Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
South Asia
Western
Europe &
North America
7.5 No unreasonable
delay
7.1 Accessibility
and affordability
7.2 No discrimination
7.3 No corruption
7.4 No improper
ov. inJence
7.6 Effective
enforcement
7.7 Impartial and
effective ADR
Civil Justice around the World
Regional averages for each underlying sub-factor of Factor 7
32 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
An effective criminal justice system is a key aspect of the
rule of law, as it constitutes the conventional mechanism
to redress serious grievances and bring action against
individuals for offenses against society. Effective criminal
justice systems are capable of investigating, prosecuting,
adjudicating, and punishing criminal offenses successfully,
reliably, and in a timely manner through a system that
is impartial and non-discriminatory, as well as free of
co::Jion nJ im:oe: ove:nmen inJence. .nie
ensuring that the rights of both the victims and the
accused are effectively protected. The WJP Rule of Law
Index assesses comparatively how systems around the
.o:J Jn nee o.
While societies may have different cultural preferences
about the emphasis they assign to various goals of
the criminal justice system retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and restoration of community harmony
there is general consensus that a well-functioning criminal
justice system is an essential component of a society
governed by the rule of law. An ineffective and corrupt
criminal system provides little deterrence to criminal
|envio:. JnJe:mine J|ic connJence. nJ cn eJ o
citizens taking justice on their own hands or authorities
adopting harsh measures that violate human rights without
enhancing public safety or punishing perpetrators.
Responding to the challenges of criminal justice systems
requires, among other things, comprehensive policies
that embrace all the pertinent actors including police,
:oecJo:. .,e:. JJe. nJ :ion once: in o:Je:
to build systems that are capable of deterring crime and
handling criminal offenses while respecting human rights.
Factor 8:
Criminal Justice
Rank Country Score
1 Finland 0.85 14 United Kingdom 0.72 27 Slovenia 0.58 40 Malawi 0.48
2 Singapore 0.85 15 Canada 0.72 28 Chile 0.57 41 Vietnam 0.47
3 Denmark 0.84 16 Germany 0.71 29 Romania 0.56 42 Uruguay 0.47
4 Norway 0.83 17 Poland 0.69 30 Jordan 0.56 43 Greece 0.46
5 Austria 0.81 18 Japan 0.69 31 Croatia 0.55 44 Tanzania 0.46
6 Sweden 0.78 19 Czech Republic 0.67 32 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.54 45 Tunisia 0.45
7 United Arab Emirates 0.78 20 Belgium 0.67 33 Malaysia 0.53 46 Ethiopia 0.45
8 Republic of Korea 0.76 21 France 0.65 34 Hungary 0.53 47 South Africa 0.45
9 Netherlands 0.75 22 United States 0.65 35 Thailand 0.51 48 India 0.44
10 Hong Kong SAR, China 0.73 23 Botswana 0.63 36 Georgia 0.51 49 Ghana 0.44
11 Australia 0.73 24 Italy 0.63 37 Macedonia, FYR 0.50 50 Belarus 0.43
12 New Zealand 0.72 25 Spain 0.61 38 Sri Lanka 0.49 51 China 0.43
13 Estonia 0.72 26 Portugal 0.59 39 Mongolia 0.48 52 Nepal 0.43
33 World Maps of the Rule of Law by Factor |
53 Jamaica 0.42 66 Dominican Republic 0.37 79 Colombia 0.35 92 Cameroon 0.31
54 Senegal 0.42 67 Peru 0.37 80 Madagascar 0.35 93 Guatemala 0.30
55 Lebanon 0.42 68 Pakistan 0.37 81 Morocco 0.35 94 Bangladesh 0.29
56 Bulgaria 0.41 69 Brazil 0.37 82 Moldova 0.33 95 Cambodia 0.29
57 Egypt 0.41 70 Argentina 0.37 83 Ukraine 0.33 96 Afghanistan 0.28
58 Serbia 0.41 71 Indonesia 0.37 84 Kenya 0.33 97 Mexico 0.25
59 Uzbekistan 0.41 72 Uganda 0.37 85 Kyrgyzstan 0.33 98 Bolivia 0.23
60 Cote d'Ivoire 0.40 73 Philippines 0.36 86 Ecuador 0.33 99 Venezuela 0.16
61 Kazakhstan 0.40 74 Zimbabwe 0.36 87 Liberia 0.33
62 Turkey 0.39 75 Albania 0.36 88 Sierra Leone 0.32
63 Iran 0.38 76 Russia 0.36 89 Myanmar 0.32
64 Burkina Faso 0.38 77 Zambia 0.36 90 El Salvador 0.31
65 Panama 0.38 78 Nicaragua 0.35 91 Nigeria 0.31
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
0.2-0.29
0.1-0.19
Low Score
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12%
Panama
Nicaragua
Chile
Argentina
Uruguay
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Peru
Jamaica
Mexico
Brazil
El Salvador
Bolivia
Ecuador
Venezuela
Colombia
Conviction rates in Latin America
% of perpetrators of burglaries who are captured, prosecuted, and punished.
Rule of Law Trends
36 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
RULE OF LAW TRENDS
The WJP Rule of Law Index 2014 introduces a new feature to the report: an analysis of whether a countrys primary rule of law
inJico: exe:ienceJ inincn cnne ove: ne ,e:. / |e o UP inJice iic, inincn im:ovemen.
.nie |e o L\N :e:een inincn Jecine. / JeieJ exnion o nee meJ:e cn |e oJnJ in ne
Methodology section.
O Criminal justice declining worldwide: The indicator that deteriorated the most was criminal justice: 20 countries showed
inincn Jecine in nei: co:e ove: ne ,e: .nie none o ne coJn:ie in ne lnJex Jemon:eJ inincn
improvement.
O Order and security improving: The indicator that improved the most was order and security: 25 countries showed a
inincn im:ovemen in nei: co:e .nie 7 exe:ienceJ Jecine in i.
O Split global trends: Out of the eight factors that are reported on in the Index, four improved on average and four
deteriorated. The factors that improved were absence of corruption, open government, order and security, and
regulatory enforcement. Those that deteriorated were constraints on government powers, fundamental rights, civil
justice, and criminal justice.
37 Rule of Law Trends |
RULE OF LAW TRENDS
COUNTRY/TERRITORY
CONTRAI NTS ON
GOVERNMENT POWERS
ABSENCE OF
CORRUPTI ON
OPEN
GOVERNMENT
FUNDAMENTAL
RI GHTS
ORDER &
SECURI TY
REGULATORY
ENFORCEMENT
CI VI L
JUSTI CE
CRI MI NAL
JUSTI CE
Af ghani st an - - - - - - - -
Al bani a - - - DOWN - - - -
Ar gent i na - - - UP - - - -
Aust ral i a DOWN - - - - DOWN - -
Aust r i a - - - - - - - -
Bangl adesh - - - - - - UP -
Bel ar us - - UP - - - DOWN DOWN
Bel gi um - UP - - UP - - -
Bol i vi a - UP - - DOWN - - -
Bosni a & Her zegovi na - - - - - - - -
Bot swana DOWN - - - - - - -
Brazi l - - - - - - - DOWN
Bul gar i a - - - - UP - - -
Bur ki na Faso - - - - DOWN - - DOWN
Cambodi a - - - UP - - - DOWN
Camer oon UP - UP UP - UP - -
Canada - - - - - - - -
Chi l e - - - - - - DOWN -
Chi na - - - - - - - DOWN
Col ombi a - - - - UP - DOWN -
Cot e d' I voi r e - - - - - - - -
Cr oat i a DOWN - - - - - - -
Czech Republ i c - - - - - - - -
Denmar k - - - - - - - -
Domi ni can Republ i c DOWN - - DOWN - - - DOWN
Ecuador - - - - - - - DOWN
Egypt DOWN - - - - - - -
El Sal vador - - - - UP - - -
Est oni a - - - - - - - -
Et hi opi a - - - - UP - - -
Fi nl and - - DOWN - - - - -
France - - - - DOWN - - -
Geor gi a - DOWN - - - - - DOWN
Ger many - - - - - - - -
Ghana DOWN - - DOWN UP - - -
Gr eece - - - - - - - -
Guat emal a - UP - DOWN DOWN - - DOWN
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na - - - - - - - -
Hungar y - DOWN - - - - - -
I ndi a - UP - - - - - -
I ndonesi a - UP - - UP - - -
I ran - - - - DOWN - DOWN DOWN
I t al y - - - - - - - -
Jamai ca - - UP - UP - - -
Japan DOWN - - - UP DOWN - -
Jor dan DOWN - - - UP - - -
Kazakhst an - UP - - UP - - -
Kenya UP - - - - - - -
Kyr gyzst an - - - - - - - -
Lebanon - - - - UP UP - DOWN
Li ber i a - - - UP - - UP -
Macedoni a, FYR - - - - - - - -
Madagascar - DOWN - DOWN - - DOWN DOWN
Mal awi - - - UP - - - -
Mal aysi a - DOWN - - - - - -
Mexi co - - - - - - - -
Mol dova - - - - - - - DOWN
Mongol i a - - - - UP - - -
Mor occo - UP - - UP UP - -
Myanmar - - - - - - - -
Nepal UP - UP - UP UP - DOWN
Net her l ands - - - - - - - -
New Zeal and - - - - - - - DOWN
Ni caragua - - - - - - - -
Ni ger i a - - - - DOWN - - -
Nor way - - - - - UP - -
Paki st an - - - - - - - -
Panama - UP DOWN - - - - -
Per u DOWN - - DOWN - - - DOWN
Phi l i ppi nes - UP - - UP - - -
Pol and DOWN DOWN - DOWN UP - - -
Por t ugal - - - - - - - -
Republ i c of Kor ea UP UP - - UP UP - -
Romani a - - - - DOWN - - -
Russi a UP UP - - UP - - -
Senegal UP - - - - - - DOWN
Ser bi a - - - - - - - -
Si er ra Leone - - - DOWN - UP DOWN -
Si ngapor e - - - - - - - -
Sl oveni a - - - - - - - -
Sout h Af r i ca - - - - - - - -
Spai n DOWN DOWN - DOWN - DOWN - DOWN
Sr i Lanka - - - - UP - - DOWN
Sweden - - - - - - - -
Tanzani a - - - - - - - -
Thai l and DOWN UP - - UP DOWN - -
Tuni si a - - - - - - - -
Tur key - - - - UP - - -
Uganda - DOWN - DOWN UP - - -
Ukrai ne - - - - UP - - -
Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es - UP - - - - - -
Uni t ed Ki ngdom - - - - - - - -
Uni t ed St at es DOWN - - - UP - - -
Ur uguay - - - - - - DOWN -
Uzbeki st an - UP - - - - - -
Venezuel a DOWN - - - - - DOWN DOWN
Vi et nam - - UP - - - - -
Zambi a - - - - - - - -
Zi mbabwe - - - - - - - -
Regional Highlights
40 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Criminal Justice 39/99
Civil Justice 48/99
Regulatory Enforcement 47/99
Order and Security 27/99
Fundamental Rights 52/99
Absence of Corruption 38/99
Open Government 44/99
EosI Asio & Pocic
Global Rankings
6 New Zealand
8 Australia
10 Singapore
12 Japan
14 Republic of Korea
16 Hong Kong SAR, China
35 Malaysia
46 Indonesia
47 Thailand
51 Mongolia
60 Philippines
65 Vietnam
76 China
89 Myanmar
91 Cambodia
Strengths: T|en .noe. ne F /i nJ Pcinc (F/P) :eion oJe:o:m
other regions of the world, with the exception of Western Europe and North America,
in most categories. A high level of safety from crime and other forms of violence is
the most notable regional strength. In other aspects, however, the region shows
inincn ine:n v:iion. Tne .en, J:iJicion in ne :eion /J:i. Ne.
Zealand, Singapore, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Hong Kong SAR, China - rank
among the top twenty globally. These countries display low levels of corruption, open
ove:nmen. eecive :eJo:, eno:cemen. nJ encien JJici ,em. o. nJ
middle income countries in the region do not show the same strengths.
Rule of law challenges: The most salient regional challenge is its relatively weak
protection of fundamental rights, particularly the freedoms of expression, religion, and
ociion. /vi|ii, o onci ino:mion. nJ ne ccei|ii, nJ o:J|ii, o
civil justice, are also areas in need of attention in the region as a whole.
Best and worst performers: The best overall rule of law performers in the region
are New Zealand and Australia, ranking 6th and 8th globally. The worst is Cambodia,
ranking 91st among the 99 countries included in the Index.
Trends to watch: Tne:e .e:e inincn im:ovemen in o:Je: nJ ecJ:i,
throughout the region during the past year. Most of the rich countries in the region
. m |J inincn Jee:io:ion in eoe e:ceion o ne eecivene o
constraints to government power. The Republic of Korea improved the most in the past
year, in comparison to the rest of the region. Most other countries, including China, saw
relatively little change in the same period.
Average Rule of Law Factor Rankings:
F /i c Pcinc
Constraints on Government Powers 45/99
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
Low Score
Average factor ranking for countries within the region. 1/99 being the best, 99/99 the worst.
41 |
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Average Rule of Law Factor Rankings:
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Constraints on Government Powers 75/99
Absence of Corruption 63/99
Order and Security 42/99
Fundamental Rights 62/99
Regulatory Enforcement 58/99
Civil Justice 55/99
Criminal Justice 61/99
Open Government 60/99
Global Rankings
31 Georgia
34 Macedonia, FYR
39 Bosnia & Herzegovina
50 Belarus
54 Serbia
59 Turkey
63 Albania
68 Ukraine
71 Kazakhstan
73 Uzbekistan
75 Moldova
78 Kyrgyzstan
80 Russia
Strengths: Regional strengths include low rates of crime and other forms of violence,
.e :eive, encien nJ eecive civi Jice Jeive:, nJ :eJo:,
enforcement.
Rule of law challenges: While there are variations amongst countries in the Eastern
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region covered by the Index, when the region is taken
as a whole, several rule of law challenges become noticeable. These challenges include
poor government accountability, lack of judicial independence, weak protection of
:eeJom o eecn nJ ne :in o :ivc,. nJ inincn eve o co::Jion nJ
JnJJe inJence o :ive ine:e in |:ncne o ove:nmen.
Best and worst performers: The best overall rule of law performers in the region are
Georgia and Macedonia, ranking 31st and 34th globally. The worst is Russia, ranking
80th among the 99 countries included in the Index.
Trends to watch: During the past year there were improvements in order and security
and deteriorations in criminal justice in several countries in the region. Russia was the
country that improved the most during the past year, with relative advances in the areas
of government accountability, control of corruption, and order and security.
Average factor ranking for countries within the region. 1/99 being the best, 99/99 the worst.
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
Low Score
42 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Latin America & the Caribbean
Global Rankings
20 Uruguay
21 Chile
42 Brazil
45 Jamaica
56 Panama
58 Argentina
61 Colombia
62 Peru
64 El Salvador
67 Dominican Republic
77 Ecuador
79 Mexico
83 Guatemala
85 Nicaragua
94 Bolivia
99 Venezuela
Average Rule of Law Factor Rankings:
Latin America & the Caribbean
Constraints on Government Powers 59/99
Absence of Corruption 60/99
Order and Security 79/99
Fundamental Rights 50/99
Regulatory Enforcement 58/99
Civil Justice 67/99
Criminal Justice 74/99
Open Government 53/99
Strengths: Protection of fundamental rights and government openness are stronger in
the Latin America and Caribbean region than in all other regions of the world, except
Western Europe and North America.
Rule of law challenges: Latin American countries struggle the most with violence,
ineffective justice, and corruption. Crime rates are the highest in the world, and the use
of violence to resolve personal grievances is widespread in most countries in the region.
The criminal justice systems are on average the least effective in the world. Judicial
delays and ineffective enforcement of civil justice are widespread. Corruption and
impunity remain major regional challenges, particularly among the legislature.
Best and worst performers: The best overall rule of law performers in the region are
Uruguay and Chile, ranking 20th and 21st globally. The worst is Venezuela, ranking last
among the 99 countries included in the Index.
Trends to watch: C:imin Jice eecivene exe:ienceJ inincn Jecine in
most regions around the world, and this trend was most pronounced in Latin America.
The largest countries, Brazil and Mexico, saw no rule of law improvement in 2013.
Average factor ranking for countries within the region. 1/99 being the best, 99/99 the worst.
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
Low Score
43 |
Middle East & North Africa
Global Rankings
27 United Arab Emirates
38 Jordan
41 Tunisia
49 Lebanon
52 Morocco
74 Egypt
82 Iran
Strengths: The Middle East and North Africa region as a whole ranks in the top half
of the world in most categories, including order and security, control of corruption,
effective regulatory enforcement, and effective civil and criminal justice.
Rule of law challenges: The most serious rule of law challenges facing the region are its
Jencien :oecion o JnJmen :in. imieJ ccei|ii, o onci ino:mion.
and relatively weak constraints on government powers.
Best and worst performers: The best overall rule of law performer in the region is the
United Arab Emirates, ranking 27th globally. The worst are Egypt and Iran, ranking 74th
and 82nd among the 99 countries included in the Index.
Trends to watch: Morocco showed the most improvement in the region during the past
,e:. .nie l:n Jee:io:eJ ne mo. F, . inincn Jee:io:ion in ne :e o
constraints on government powers.
Civil Justice 49/99
Criminal Justice 48/99
Average Rule of Law Factor Rankings:
Middle East & North Africa
Constraints on Government Powers 57/99
Absence of Corruption 46/99
Order and Security 43/99
Fundamental Rights 76/99
Regulatory Enforcement 46/99
Open Government 61/99
Average factor ranking for countries within the region. 1/99 being the best, 99/99 the worst.
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
Low Score
44 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
South Asia
Average Rule of Law Factor Rankings:
South Asia
Constraints on Government Powers 61/99
Absence of Corruption 78/99
Order and Security 80/99
Fundamental Rights 73/99
Regulatory Enforcement 82/99
Civil Justice 88/99
Criminal Justice 66/99
Open Government 67/99
Global Rankings
48 Sri Lanka
57 Nepal
66 India
92 Bangladesh
96 Pakistan
98 Afghanistan
Strengths: Countries in South Asia generally perform better than countries in other
regions in protecting the freedoms of speech and assembly and the right to petition, as
well as in guaranteeing judicial independence and other non-governmental checks on
the government.
Rule of law challenges: South Asia, as a region, is the weakest performer overall in
most dimensions of the rule of law. Corruption is generally present in these countries
in all branches of government, as well as in the police and the military. Regulatory
enforcement is poor, and civil courts are slow and ineffective. While crime rates are not
nin in one: :eion o ne .o:J. civi conic nJ ne Je o vioence o :eJ:e
personal grievances are major threats to stability and progress.
Best and worst performers: The best overall rule of law performer in the region is
Sri Lanka, ranking 48th globally. The worst is Afghanistan, ranking 98th among the 99
countries included in the Index.
Trends to watch: Nepal showed the most improvement during the past year, while
other countries in the region, including India, saw very little change during the same
period.
Average factor ranking for countries within the region. 1/99 being the best, 99/99 the worst.
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
Low Score
45 Regional Highlights |
Sub-Saharan Africa
Global Rankings
25 Botswana
37 Ghana
40 South Africa
43 Senegal
53 Burkina Faso
55 Malawi
69 Tanzania
70 Zambia
72 Cote d'Ivoire
81 Madagascar
84 Sierra Leone
86 Kenya
87 Liberia
88 Ethiopia
90 Uganda
93 Nigeria
95 Cameroon
97 Zimbabwe
Average Rule of Law Factor Rankings:
Sub-Saharan Africa
Constraints on Government Powers 62/99
Absence of Corruption 71/99
Order and Security 74/99
Fundamental Rights 68/99
Regulatory Enforcement 69/99
Civil Justice 60/99
Criminal Justice 65/99
Open Government 73/99
Strengths: The Sub-Saharan African regions best performances are in the areas of
constraints on the government power and delivery of civil justice. In these two areas the
regions average rank is similar to most other regions in the world.
Rule of law challenges: Sub-Saharan Africa faces multiple rule of law challenges.
Crime and vigilante justice are widespread, corruption is prevalent in all branches of
government and in the police and the military, and the legal system is not accessible to
ne o:Jin:, cii.en. Lencien :oecion o ne :in o ie nJ ecJ:i, o ne e:on.
and due process of law, are also areas of concern in this region.
Best and worst performers: The best overall rule of law performers in the region are
Botswana and Ghana, ranking 25th and 37th globally. The worst is Zimbabwe, ranking
97th among the 99 countries included in the Index.
Trends to watch: Overall, the region did not experience a noticeable increase or decline
during the past year in the level of adherence to the rule of law. Individually, Cameroon
improved the most, while Madagascar saw the biggest deterioration. There was no
inincn im:ovemen in :eJJcin ne eve o co::Jion n:oJnoJ ne eni:e
region.
Average factor ranking for countries within the region. 1/99 being the best, 99/99 the worst.
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
Low Score
46 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Western Europe & North America
Global Rankings
1 Denmark
2 Norway
3 Sweden
4 Finland
5 Netherlands
7 Austria
9 Germany
11 Canada
13 United Kingdom
15 Estonia
17 Belgium
18 France
19 United States
22 Poland
23 Czech Republic
24 Spain
26 Portugal
28 Slovenia
29 Italy
30 Hungary
32 Greece
33 Romania
36 Croatia
44 Bulgaria
Strengths: Countries in Western Europe and North America tend to outperform most
other countries in all dimensions. These countries are characterized by relatively low
levels of corruption and crime, open and accountable governments, and effective and
independent judicial systems.
Rule of law challenges: Generalized delays in the delivery of civil justice constitute the
greatest weakness in the region. While protection of fundamental rights in this region is
the highest in the world, police discrimination against foreigners and ethnic minorities
is an issue of concern in most countries. Equal access to justice for marginalized
populations is also problematic.
Best and worst performers: Five countries in the region - Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
FinnJ. nJ ne Nene:nJ :e ne o nve ove: :Je o . e:o:me: in ne
world. The worst performer in the region is Bulgaria, ranking 44th among the 99
countries included in the Index.
Trends to watch: While the level of adherence to the rule of law remained relatively
stable throughout the region, Spain saw the largest individual decline. Peoples
perception of corruption in the legislature appears to be growing in several countries.
Tne UnieJ Se . inincn Jecine JJ:in ne ,e: in eoe :J in ne
system of checks and balances and the protection of the right to privacy.
Average Rule of Law Factor Rankings:
Western Europe & North America
19/99 Constraints on Government Powers
22/99 Absence of Corruption
26/99 Order and Security
16/99 Fundamental Rights
21/99 Regulatory Enforcement
21/99 Civil Justice
20/99 Criminal Justice
21/99 Open Government
High Score
0.9-1
0.8-0.89
0.7-0.79
0.6-0.69
0.5-0.59
0.4-0.49
0.3-0.39
Low Score
Average factor ranking for countries within the region. 1/99 being the best, 99/99 the worst.
47 Regional Highlights |
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC
Australia ranks in the 8th position overall, and ranks within
the top 15 places globally in all dimensions measured by the
lnJex. Tne civi coJ: :e encien nJ inJeenJen. noJn
access to affordable legal counsel remains limited, particularly
for disadvantaged groups. Constraints on government
powers and regulatory enforcement are effective (ranking
8th overall and 7th overall, respectively), despite a slight
deterioration in performance since last year. Corruption
is minimal (ranking 8th overall and 3rd in the region). The
country ranks 10th in the world in protecting fundamental
rights, but lags behind other high income countries in
guaranteeing equal treatment and non-discrimination,
especially for immigrants and low-income people.
Cambodia places 91st globally and ranks lower than most
other countries in the region in all dimensions. Cambodia is
relatively safe from crime, ranking 3rd out of 16 low-income
countries in guaranteeing order and security. While the
countrys score in protection of fundamental rights improved
during the past year, the overall legal and institutional
environment remains weak. Constraints on government
powers and regulatory enforcement are poor (ranking 94th
in both categories), and the justice system is ineffective.
P:oe:, :in :e .e|. nJ co::Jion :emin inincn
problem (ranked 86th overall and last in the region).
China is ranked in the 76th position globally. It scores
well on public safety, ranking 29th overall and 4th among
its income peers, marking a slight improvement from last
year. The delivery of criminal justice is relatively effective,
but compromised by political interference. Civil justice is
relatively speedy and accessible, but vulnerable to corruption
nJ im:oe: ove:nmen inJence. Con:in on
government powers are ineffective (ranking 92nd globally).
Protection of fundamental rights is weak, ranking 96th
globally, notably due to substantial limitations on freedom of
speech and freedom of assembly.
The jurisdiction of Hong Kong SAR, China ranks 16th
overall, and places in the top 10 globally in four dimensions,
ranking 4th in providing order and security; ranking 9th in
controlling corruption; ranking 10th in open government as
well as effective criminal justice. Administrative agencies and
coJ: :e encien nJ :ee o co::Jion. Tne J:iJicion
lags behind most income peers in guaranteeing fundamental
rights (ranking 29th overall), due to restrictions on freedom
of speech and freedom of assembly.
Indonesia ranks 46th globally and it is in the top half of the
rankings among lower-middle income countries in most
dimensions. The country performs well in open government
(ranking 1st among income peers and ranking 29th overall),
and constraints on government powers (ranks 2nd among
income peers and ranking 31st overall). Indonesians enjoy
higher degrees of participation in the administration of the
. nn inJiviJJ in one: F /i nJ Pcinc :eion
countries. On the other hand, the country faces challenges in
the functioning of government agencies and courts. Despite
improvements in comparison to last year, corruption remains
a major problem (ranking 80th globally and next to last in
the region). The courts are perceived to be independent of
government control, but are affected by powerful private
interests. While crime rates are low, the use of violence
to redress personal grievances is a source of concern.
Restrictions on the freedom of religion and harsh conditions
co::ecion ciiie :e o inincn :o|em.
Japan ranks 12th globally, and is among the highest
e:o:me: in ne F /i nJ Pcinc :eion in mo
dimensions. The country ranks 1st in the world in delivering
order and security to its people, moving up several positions
from last years score, and ranks 8th overall in the area of
open government. The system of checks and balances on the
governments powers is well developed (ranking 15th overall
and 3rd in the region), corruption is minimal (ranking 11th
overall), and regulatory enforcement is effective (ranking
12n ove:). \nie coJ: :e encien nJ inJeenJen o
ove:nmen inJence nJ co::Jion. ne, :e e:ceiveJ
relatively inaccessible to the people.
Malaysia ranks 35th globally and ranks in the top third
among upper-middle income countries in most dimensions
in the Index. Malaysia scores well on public safety, ranking
1st among its income peers. Despite a slight decline when
compared to last years scores, corruption remains low, with
Malaysia ranking 3rd among income peers and 28th globally.
CoJ: :e encien (:n|in n mon income ee:).
although relatively inaccessible and not fully independent of
ove:nmen inJence. /ccei|ii, o onci ino:mion
is limited. Violations of fundamental rights (ranking 85th
overall and 13th in the region), most notably the freedoms of
expression, religion and association, are areas of concern.
Mongolia ranks 51st globally and performs well among its
lower-middle income peers, placing in the top half of the
rankings among lower-middle income countries in most
dimensions. The country scores relatively well on delivering
civil and criminal justice, ranking 4th and 3rd respectively
among lower-middle income countries, as well as on
protection of fundamental rights (ranking 4th among income
peers). Mongolias performance in the dimension of order and
security improved from last years scores, ranking 5th within
its income group. The press and civil society organizations
48 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
generally operate without government interference. The
countrys weakest performance is in the area of open
government, ranking 93rd overall and next to last among
i income ee:. Tni Jencienc, i exineJ |, eve:e
limitations on citizens right to petition the government, and
on nei: :in o cce o onci ino:mion. ne: :e o
concern are corruption (ranking 71st globally and third to last
in the region), particularly in the legislature, and unchecked
inJence o o.e:J :ive ine:e on |:ncne o
government.
Myanmar ene: ne :n|in o: ne n: ime on ce.
The country is safe from crime and places 3rd among 16
low-income countries in control of corruption (placing 63rd
overall). The country, however, faces a number of challenges
in its ongoing efforts to strengthen the rule of law. Myanmar
ranks 82nd overall and 12th among 16 low-income countries
in the area of accountability and constraints on the executive
branch, mainly due to political interference within the
eiJ:e nJ ne JJici:,. Jenciencie in ne Jncionin
of auditing mechanisms, and lack of non-governmental
checks. The countrys administrative agencies are somewhat
ineecive in eno:cin :eJion. |ei mo:e encien,
than their counterparts in other low-income countries
(ranking 92nd overall), and the justice system, although
relatively accessible, is perceived to be affected by corruption
and political interference. Restrictions on fundamental rights
and freedoms are sources of concern (ranking 97th overall).
New Zealand ranks 6th globally and it stands out as the best
performer in the region, placing in the top ten globally in six
of the eight dimensions measured by the Index. Government
encie nJ coJ: :e encien. :n:en. nJ :ee o
corruption. Constraints on government powers are effective,
and fundamental rights are strongly protected. While the
judicial system is independent and effective, there are relative
weaknesses in the areas of accessibility of civil justice for
marginalized populations. The countrys ranking for criminal
justice deteriorated slightly during the past year, with
effectiveness of criminal investigations and equal treatment
of criminal suspects standing out in particular as areas in need
of attention.
The Philippines ranks 60th globally and it stands out among
lower-middle income countries for having reasonably
effective checks on government power (ranking 5th among
its income group), including a vibrant civil society and a
free media. The Philippines ranks 3rd among lower-middle
income coJn:ie in con:o o co::Jion. no.in inincn
im:ovemen JJ:in ne ,e:. Civi conic nJ oiic
violence remain problematic, in spite of recent improvements.
The country also has challenges with respect to protection
of fundamental rights (ranking 67th overall), particularly in
regard to violations against the right to life and security of
the person, police abuses, due process violations, and harsh
conditions at correctional facilities. The civil court system
scores poorly (ranking 82nd globally and 12th in the region)
JJe o Jencien eno:cemen mecnnim nJ ne enn,
duration of cases.
The Republic of Korea ranks 14th globally, and was among
the most improving countries in the world during the past
year, with advances in the areas of constraints on government
powers, control of corruption, order and security, and
effective regulatory enforcement. The country presents a
strong and fairly even picture across most of the dimensions
measured by the Index. It performs well in the area of order
and security (ranking 7th in the world and 4th in the region),
and the courts are independent and effective (both civil and
criminal justice rank in the top ten in the world and the top
3 in the region). The countrys lowest score is in the area of
protection of fundamental rights, where it lags behind most of
its high-income peers.
Singapore ranks 10th overall. The country is free from crime
and violence, and its criminal justice system is among the
most effective in the world (ranking 2nd in both categories).
The public administration of the country is highly effective,
ranking 8th overall and 3rd in the region on regulatory
enforcement. Singapore performs well in the dimension of
open government as well as in constraints on government
powers, placing 21st in the world in both dimensions.
Corruption is minimal (ranking 5th in the world and 2nd
in the region). The countrys lowest score is in the area of
fundamental rights (ranking 26th overall and 24th in its
income :oJ). .nicn i :eecion o J|ni imiion
on freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.
Thailand is ranked 47th overall, earning high marks on the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system (ranking 35th
globally and 7th among its income peers). The countrys
performance in order and security has improved, and its
score in this area has moved up several positions since last
,e:. Leie :eive, o. c:ime :e. civi conic nJ
political violence remain substantial problems. Corruption,
particularly within the legislature, also remains a source of
conce:n. Jeie inincn im:ovemen JJ:in ne
year. The countrys lowest score is in the dimension of civil
justice (ranking 89th overall and second to last in the region),
:, |ecJe o JincJie in eno:cin coJ: Jeciion.
Vietnam comes in at 65th globally. The country performs
well in the area of order and security (ranking 32nd globally
and 4th among its income peers), due to low crime rates.
Compared with other lower-middle income countries,
49 Regional Highlights |
criminal justice is relatively effective (ranking 4th among
income peers), and corruption relatively low (ranking 8th
among the same group). Major rule of law challenges include
ineffective constraints on government powers and poor
regulatory enforcement (ranking 86th overall and third
to last in the region in both categories). Other areas faced
.in inincn imiion incJJe JJici inJeenJence.
:eeJom o eecn nJ ociion. nJ vi|ii, o onci
information.
EASTERN EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA
Albania is ranked 63rd this year, outperforming its regional
peers in most dimensions of the rule of law. Its system of
checks and balances ranks 68th overall and 5th among
its regional peers. The performance of administrative
agencies and civil courts is similar to that of other countries
in ne :eion. noJn inincn :oom o: im:ovemen
remains, particularly with regards to corruption. Turning to
fundamental rights, the country is ranked 49th globally and
4th in the region, despite suffering a drop in positions since
last year. The criminal justice system ranks 75th overall,
mainly because of corruption, police abuses, and harsh
conditions at correctional facilities.
Belarus ranks 50th overall and 4th in the region. The country
outperforms most of its income-level and regional peers in
several rule of law dimensions, including order and security
(ranking 33rd globally), regulatory enforcement (ranking
42nd), and civil and criminal justice (ranking 30th and
50th, respectively). On the other hand, the country shows
Jenciencie in ove:nmen ccoJn|ii, (:n|in n).
weak protection of fundamental rights (ranking 83rd), and
a lack of governmental openness (ranking 79th), although
the assessment in this area is slightly better than it was a
year ago. Major problems include lack of independence of
the judiciary and the legislature; restrictions on freedom of
opinion and expression, freedom of association, and the right
to privacy; and limitations on citizens right to petition the
ove:nmen nJ o cce onci ino:mion.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, at 39th position, places third
within the region. The country shows a fairly stable and
even performance across the different dimensions of the
Index. The country leads the region in the area of checks
on executive power (ranking 51st overall), protection of
fundamental rights (ranking 32nd overall), and delivering
effective criminal justice (ranking 32nd overall), and places
3rd regionally in the area of open government. The countrys
weakest performance is in the dimension of civil justice
(ranking 16th among upper-middle income countries
and 56th overall), mainly due to delays and ineffective
eno:cemen mecnnim. ne: :e o conce:n :e onci
corruption, particularly among the executive and legislative
|:ncne, c| o eecive ncion o: onci miconJJc,
and weaknesses in the criminal investigation and adjudication
systems.
Georgia is the best performer within Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, and ranks 31st overall. The country leads
the region in two dimensions absence of corruption and
:eJo:, eno:cemen nJ i econJ in ne :eion in nve
other dimensions. The countrys best performance is in the
area of security, where it places 17th overall. In contrast to
these positive elements, the country ranks 55th in providing
effective checks on the governments power, mainly due to
political interference within the legislature and the judiciary,
nJ 1 in :oecin JnJmen :in. cnie, |ecJe o
perceived violations of the right to privacy.
Kazakhstan is ranked 71st overall. The country is relatively
safe from crime and violence (ranking 35th overall and 5th
among its regional peers), and the civil courts, although
inccei|e o mo eoe nJ J|ec o JnJJe inJence.
:e :eive, encien. Tne coJn:,. no.eve:. coninJe
to receive low marks in the area of accountability and
constraints on the executive branch (ranking 93rd) due to
political interference in the legislature, the judiciary, and
the electoral process. Although some progress is visible,
corruption is another area in need of attention, as is open
government, on which Kazakhstan ranks third to last among
upper-middle income countries.
Kyrgyzstan is ranked 78th overall. In spite of recent advances
toward a functioning system of checks and balances, the
country still faces important challenges in establishing
effective limits on government power (ranking 70th overall
and 8th among low-income countries), and in reducing
corruption (ranking 96th globally and last in the region).
Administrative agencies are lax in enforcing regulations
(ranking 68th overall), although they perform slightly better
than those in other low-income countries. The performance
of courts in civil cases is relatively poor (ranking 8th among
low-income countries). The country is relatively safe from
crime, but its criminal justice system ranks last in the region
and 85th overall, mainly due to corruption among judges and
. eno:cemen onci. oiic ine:e:ence in JJici
processes, and violations of due process and rights of the
accused.
At 34th, Macedonia, FYR places second in the Eastern
Europe and Central Asia region, with a performance nearly
unchanged since last year. The country earns high marks
for open government (ranking 24th overall and third among
upper-middle income countries), and regulatory enforcement
(ranking 44th overall and 4th in the region). Although
50 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
to privacy are areas in need of attention. The judicial system
i no encien one: in ne :eion nJ i eceJ |,
corruption and political interference. Regulatory enforcement
is ineffective even by regional standards (ranking 65th overall
and 9th regionally). Lack of effective sanctions is a source of
concern.
At 59th, Turkey places in the middle of Eastern European
and Central Asian nations in most dimensions. The country
performs relatively well in regulatory enforcement (ranking
38th) and absence of corruption (ranking 35th and second
in the region), and its civil justice system ranks 47th. Turkey
receives lower marks in the dimensions of government
accountability (ranking 72nd overall and 21st among upper-
middle income countries) and fundamental rights (ranking
78th globally), mainly because of political interference within
the legislature and the judiciary, and restrictions on freedom
of expression and privacy.
Ukraine is ranked at 68th position, standing out among
lower-middle income countries for its low crime rates and
relatively strong civil society. Administrative agencies are
e:ceiveJ o |e encien noe in one: coJn:ie in
the region, albeit more corrupt and ineffective in enforcing
regulations. However, the country faces major challenges
that include political instability and unrest, weak government
accountability (ranking 84th), and widespread corruption
(:n|in 4n). CoJ: :e :eive, encien. |J eceJ |,
JnJJe inJence. co::Jion. nJ oiic ine:e:ence.
Uzbekistan comes in at 73rd overall, showing a relatively
steady performance. The country scores very well in the
:e o ecJ:i, (:n|in n ove: nJ n: in ne :eion)
and its administrative agencies and courts perform slightly
better than their counterparts of other lower-middle income
countries. Notwithstanding these strengths, the country still
ce inincn cnene in con:inin ne concen:ion
of power in the executive branch (ranking third to last
globally), addressing corruption, and protecting fundamental
rights and civil liberties (ranking 95th overall and last among
its income peers), including freedoms of speech, press, and
association, right to life and security of the person, and
privacy. Protection of property rights is relatively weak.
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
At 58th overall, Argentina shows a fairly stable performance
since last year. The country is ranked in the 71st place in
:oviJin eecive cnec| on ne execJive o.e:. :eecin
political interference within the legislature and the judiciary
and a perceived culture of impunity among government
onci. /Jmini:ive encie e:o:m in, .o:e nn
their counterparts of other upper-middle income countries,
corruption is low in comparison with its peers (ranking 37th
overall and 6th among its income-level peers) and transitions
of power occur in accordance with law, the system of checks
and balances is relatively weak (ranking 61st overall and
15th among upper-middle income countries). Civil justice
is accessible, but slow. Limitations on the freedom of the
:e nJ JnJJe inJence on ne c:imin Jice ,em :e
sources of concern.
Moldova is ranked 75th overall and places in the bottom half
of lower-middle income countries on most dimensions of
the rule of law, with a performance akin to that of last year.
The country outperforms most of its regional and income-
level peers in delivering order and security (ranking 40th
overall and 6th among lower-middle income countries),
nJ in :oviJin cce o onci ino:mion. Ye. i i
faces challenges in most of the other areas covered by the
Index. Government accountability is weak due to corruption
(ranking 88th globally and third to last in the region),
ineffective checks on the government power, and impunity for
miconJJc |, ove:nmen onci. nJ :eJo:, encie
:e e:ceiveJ ineecive nJ inencien (:n|in econJ
to last in the region). Of related and continuing concern is the
delivery of civil and criminal justice, which is hampered by
government interference, corruption, and violations of due
process.
Russia is ranked 80th overall. The country earns relatively
nin m:| on |o: :in. vi|ii, o onci ino:mion.
and absence of crime, particularly as compared with other
upper-middle income countries. Since last year, Russias
scores improved in three of the main indicators of the
Index: constraints on government power (now ranking 89th
globally), absence of corruption (ranking 66th), and order
and security (ranking 75th), although serious problems
remain. The judicial system, although accessible and relatively
encien. i e:ceiveJ o |e eceJ |, co::Jion nJ
oiic ine:e:ence. \nie civi conic nJ e::o:im
Jec:eeJ JJ:in ne ,e:. ne, :emin inincn
threats. Protection of fundamental rights, including property
rights, freedom of opinion, freedom of association, due
process and privacy are also areas of concern.
Serbia, at 54th, shows a stable performance since last
year but one that varies considerably across the different
dimensions. Its system of checks and balances ranks 65th
ove: nJ 4n mon i :eion ee:. :eecin
lawful transfer of power but also the presence of political
interference within the legislature and the judiciary. Turning
to fundamental rights, the country receives relatively high
marks (ranking 40th overall and 3rd in the region), although
discrimination against minorities and violations of the right
51 Regional Highlights |
and corruption, although still present, is not as high as in
other countries of the region (ranking 47th overall and 4th
in the region). Civil courts are accessible and rank among
the best in Latin America. Argentinas lowest score is in the
area of security, placing 83rd overall, due to high crime rates.
Lenciencie in oice inveiion nJ vioion o ne JJe
process are also areas that require attention.
Bolivia comes in at 94th overall and occupies the bottom half
of the rankings among lower-middle income countries in most
of dimensions, presenting a relatively steady performance.
Checks on the executive branch remain weak (ranking 88th),
and the performance of regulatory agencies continues to
lag behind that of its regional and income peers. The judicial
,em i inencien nJ eceJ |, co::Jion nJ oiic
interference. Of particular concern is the deterioration of the
countrys security situation (ranking 82nd), although overall
the score in this area is better than that of other countries
of the region. Bolivias best performance is in the area of
fundamental rights, where it ranks 75th globally, although
discrimination and violations of due process are still sources
of concern.
At 42nd, Brazil follows Chile and Uruguay as the third-best
performer in the region. The country has a good system of
checks on the executive power (ranking 32nd overall), and
an open government (ranking 36th overall), and obtains
relatively high marks on respect for fundamental rights
(ranking 35th overall and 6th among upper-middle income
countries). Regulatory agencies are perceived as relatively
inJeenJen. |J inencien. Tne civi Jice ,em i
relatively accessible, although court procedures are prone to
Je, nJ Jeciion :e omeime JincJ o eno:ce. n
less positive note, the country still faces several challenges,
especially in the areas of security, on which it places 71st
overall due to high crime rates. In addition, Brazil continues
to score poorly in criminal justice, dropping some positions
o :ecn n ce ni ,e:. o.in o Jenciencie in ne
criminal investigation and adjudication systems, violations
of due process, and poor conditions at correctional facilities.
/ e:ceiveJ cJJ:e o imJni, mon ove:nmen onci
remains also a source of concern.
Chile is ranked 21st overall and places second in the Latin
American region, with a performance nearly identical to last
years. The government is accountable and generally free
of corruption, and administrative agencies and courts are
i:, encien nJ :n:en. Tne c:imin Jice ,em
is effective and generally adheres to due process, although
Jenciencie in oice inveiion Jo exi. /:J|,. ne
countrys most important challenge is in the area of security,
on which it ranks 61st overall. Other areas in need of
attention include discrimination against low income groups
and ethnic minorities, harsh conditions in correctional
facilities, and criminal recidivism.
Colombia comes in at 61st overall. The country outperforms
most Latin American countries in the dimensions of
regulatory enforcement (ranking 5th in the region), and open
government (ranking 6th in the region and 40th globally).
The countrys judicial system is independent and one of
the most accessible and affordable in the region; however,
i i iceJ |, Je, nJ c| o eecivene in ne
investigation and prosecution of crimes. On a less positive
note and notwithstanding some recent progress in resolving
i onnJin civi conic. ne coJn:, i ce e:ioJ
challenges in the area of security (ranking 89th), particularly
in regard to high levels of crime, which is partly attributable
to the presence of powerful criminal organizations. Police
abuses, violations of human rights, and poor conditions at
correctional facilities are also areas that require attention.
The Dominican Republic is ranked 67th overall, losing
ground in three of the eight factors of the Index: constraints
on government power, fundamental rights, and criminal
justice. The country performs relatively well in open
government (ranking 45th overall and 7th in Latin America),
nJ n :eive, encien civi coJ: ,em. o.eve:.
it ranks 67th on checks on the executive authority, in part
because of political interference within the legislature and
ne JJici:,. nJ Jenciencie in ne Jncionin o JJiin
mechanisms. Corruption is still a problem (ranking 77th
globally and 26th among upper-middle income countries),
as is the relatively weak performance of regulatory agencies
(ranking 76th overall and 13th in the region). The criminal
justice system, although good by regional standards, has
dropped some positions over the past year to reach 66th
overall. Crime and vigilante justice, and lack of accountability
o: miconJJc o ove:nmen once:. :e one: :e in
need of attention.
Ecuador is ranked 77th this year, showing a stable
performance since last year. As compared to other countries
in the region, the country scores relatively well in the areas of
regulatory enforcement (ranking 54th overall and 8th in the
region), absence of corruption (ranking 51st globally and sixth
in the region), and protection of labor rights. Yet the country
continues to lag behind most of its Latin American and
income peers in the rest of the categories. It is ranked 85th in
government accountability, mainly because of concentration
of executive power and political interference among the
branches of government, and occupies the 75th place in
oen ove:nmen. Tne coJn:, civi coJ: :e inencien
nJ vJne:|e o co::Jion nJ ove:nmen inJence
52 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
32nd globally and fourth within the region), supported
in large part by a long constitutional tradition with an
independent judiciary, and strong protections for free speech
and freedom of religion. Administrative agencies perform on
par with those in other upper-middle income countries, which
contrasts with the poor marks earned by the civil justice
system (ranking 88th globally and third to last among upper-
miJJe income coJn:ie). .ne:e Je, nJ inenciencie
are common. Corruption remains a serious problem in all
branches of government (ranking 78th globally). Turning
to security, Mexicos police forces continue to struggle in
guaranteeing the safety of its citizens against crime and
violence (ranking 96th globally). Moreover, the criminal
justice system has not fully implemented the newly enacted
reforms, and continues to score poorly (ranking 97th overall),
mainly because of weaknesses in the criminal investigation
and adjudication systems, prevalent discrimination against
vulnerable groups, corruption among judges and law
eno:cemen onci. nJ vioion o JJe :oce o . nJ
the rights of the accused. Failure to prosecute government
onci .no commi vioion nJ c o co::Jion :e o
cause for concern.
Nicaragua comes in at 85th overall and places in the bottom
half of lower-middle income countries on most of the
dimensions of the Index, with a parallel performance to that
of last year. The country continues to score relatively well
on measures of openness and civic participation (ranking
54th overall and 8th among its income peers), but it still trail
its income and regional peers at 96th place in government
accountability, due to the erosion of checks on the executive
branch and political interference within the legislature and
the judiciary. The performance of administrative agencies is
on par with other countries in the region, but civil courts are
e encien nJ e:ceiveJ mo:e co::J nn i :eion
counterparts. Although not as large a problem as in other
countries of the region, crime is an area in need of attention.
Panama comes in at 56th this year, earning high marks on
open government (ranking 31st overall and third in the
region), and protection of fundamental rights (46th overall
and 8th in the region). The country lags slightly behind its
peers in constraining executive authority and addressing
corruption, although overall the marks on this dimension are
better than they were a year ago. Administrative agencies
and courts perform on par with those in other Latin American
nations, but worse than those in other upper-middle income
coJn:ie. C:ime :emin inincn :o|em. noJn i i
not as high as in most of the region.
Peru comes in at 62nd globally and ranks in the middle of
Latin American countries in most dimensions of the rule
(ranking 77th globally and 24th among upper-middle income
countries), and the criminal justice system continues to
score poorly, falling several positions to take the 86th overall
position (third to last among upper-middle income countries).
Protection of property rights is weaker than in other
countries of the region.
At 64th, El Salvador falls in the middle of the global rankings
in most categories. The country ranks relatively well in
protecting fundamental rights and freedoms (ranking
42nd globally and sixth in the region), and in the areas
of regulatory enforcement and access to civil justice,
particularly when compared with countries at similar stages
of economic development. The country has also seen a
marked improvement to its security situation (ranking 70th
ove: nJ oJ:n in ne :eion). noJn inincn :oom o:
improvement remains. The country, however, faces challenges
in the area of criminal justice where it ranks 90th in the
.o:J cnie, |ecJe o co::Jion mon JJe nJ .
eno:cemen onci. ineecive oice inveiion. nJ
harsh conditions at correctional facilities. Limited access to
onci ino:mion i none: :e n neeJ enion.
Guatemala ranks 83rd and places in the bottom half of
Latin American countries in most dimensions of the rule of
law. As compared to its income peers, the country scores
relatively well on government accountability, freedom of
religion, freedom of assembly, and effective protection of the
right to petition the government, and perceived corruption,
although still present, has dropped over the last year (ranking
76th globally and 11th in the region). The country, however,
continues to suffer from a deteriorating security situation
(ranking 92nd overall), and a weak criminal justice system
(ranking 93rd overall) affected by corruption and lack of
effectiveness in the investigation and prosecution of crimes.
Jamaica is ranked in the 45th overall position, showing
progress in a number of areas. The country performs
strongly in guaranteeing basic civil liberties and obtains high
marks in establishing effective checks on the governments
power (ranking 34th globally and fourth in the region).
Administrative agencies perform better than those of its
regional and income peers, and the judicial system, although
slow, is independent and relatively free of corruption. Despite
slight improvements, the countrys main weaknesses continue
to lie in the area of security, on which the country places 74th
overall, due to the high levels of crime and a high incidence of
mob and vigilante justice.
At 79th, Mexico shows a relatively stable picture. The
country stands out among Latin American countries for
effective checks on government power (ranking 48th overall
and seventh in the region), and an open government (ranking
53 Regional Highlights |
of law. Despite a slight decline since last year, the country
scores relatively well with regard to checks on executive
o.e: (:n|in on o|, nJ nn in ne :eion) .e
as in protection of fundamental rights (ranking 34th globally
and fourth in the region), including freedom of thought and
religion and freedom of opinion and expression. However, the
country ranks 79th on corruption (and second to last among
upper-middle income countries) and 61st on regulatory
enforcement. The civil justice system is perceived as slow,
expensive, and inaccessible, particularly for disadvantaged
groups. The criminal justice system moved down to the 67th
oiion JJe cnie, o n inc:eeJ e:ceion o co::Jion.
Jenciencie in ne c:imin inveiion nJ JJJicion
systems, and discriminatory treatment of the poor and ethnic
minorities.
Uruguay is the highest-ranked country in Latin America,
at 20th overall, showing a stable performance since last
year. The country scores relatively well on government
accountability (ranking 18th globally) and absence of
co::Jion (:n|in 1n ove: nJ n: in ne :eion).
Administrative agencies are effective in enforcing regulations
and civil courts are independent, accessible, and free of
im:oe: inJence. U:JJ, o.e co:e i in ne :e o
security, on which it ranks 64th overall. The country also faces
challenges in strengthening the functioning of its criminal
justice system (ranking 42nd globally and second to last
among high income countries).
At 99th, Venezuela is the weakest performer among all
indexed countries, showing downward trends in performance
across many areas since last year. The country is ranked
last in government accountability, owing to an increased
concentration of executive power and a debilitated system
of checks and balances. Corruption is commonplace (ranking
90th overall and last in the region); administrative agencies
Je: :om inenciencie nJ c| o :n:enc,, nJ ne
justice system, although relatively accessible, loses positions
on the back of increased political interference. Crime and
violence are also areas of concern, as are the violations of
fundamental rights, in particular, freedom of opinion and
expression, and the right to privacy. Venezuelas strongest
scores are in the areas of religious freedom, accessibility of
the civil courts, and protection of labor rights.
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
Egypt :n| 74n ove: nJ no. inincn Jee:io:ion
during the past year in civil order and the effectiveness
of constraints on government powers. Courts and
administrative agencies are generally slow and ineffective.
Protection of fundamental rights is weak (ranking 90th),
mainly due to violations to the rights to life and security of
the person, due process of law and rights of the accused,
and freedom of religion. While crime rates are relatively low,
the use of violence to redress personal grievances remains
a source of concern. On the other hand, Egypt outperforms
its income peers in the areas of control of corruption
(ranking 5th among lower-middle income countries) and
effective criminal justice (ranking 8th), as well as in providing
mechanisms for citizen participation, respecting judicial
independence, and protecting property rights.
Iran ranks 82nd overall but scores in the middle ranks in
several areas, including control of corruption (ranking 42nd),
regulatory enforcement (ranking 41st) and delivery of civil
justice (ranking 38th). Irans performance is among the worst
in the world in protecting fundamental rights (ranking last),
as well as in ensuring effective constraints on government
powers and open government (ranking 90th in both areas).
Tne JJici:, i :eive, encien nJ :ee o co::Jion. |J
subject to political interference, and the delivery of both civil
and criminal justice weakened during the past year. Order and
security also deteriorated in the same period; crime rates, civil
unrest and the use of violence to redress personal grievances,
are higher than in other countries in the region.
Jordan ranks 38th overall and it is in the top half of the
rankings among upper-middle income countries in most
dimensions, with relatively high marks in the areas of security
(ranking 20th globally and 2nd among income peers), civil
Jice (:n|in 21 ove: nJ n mon income ee:).
criminal justice (30th overall and 4th among income peers),
absence of corruption (33rd overall and 4th among income
peers), and effective regulatory enforcement (35th overall
and fourth among income peers). Property rights are also well
protected. Protection of fundamental rights is weak (ranking
77th overall and 22nd among income peers), particularly
with regard to the right to life and security of the person and
the freedoms of speech, religion, privacy and assembly. The
country also lags behind its peers in the areas of constraints
on government powers (ranking 64th), which deteriorated
during the past year, and open government (ranking 65th).
Lebanon ranks 49th overall. The countrys best performances
are in the areas of protection of fundamental rights (ranked
4:J o|, nJ n: in ne :eion). nJ con:in
on government powers (ranking 44th overall and 3rd
regionally), mostly due to a vibrant civil society and a free
media (non-governmental checks) and relatively effective
legislative oversight. The country ranks poorly on measures
of corruption (70th) and government agencies struggle with
inenciencie (:n|in n). Jeie :ecen im:ovemen.
The country is relatively safe from crime, but political violence
is a major problem. The civil court system ranks poorly
54 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
(70th and second to last in the region), mainly because of
corruption, delays, and discrimination against marginalized
groups. Due process violations and harsh conditions in
correctional facilities are also a source of concern.
Morocco ranks 52nd overall and it has seen improvements as
a result of ongoing reforms in the areas of open government
(:n|in 4n o|, nJ n: in ne :eion). o:Je: nJ
security (ranking 44th overall and 8th among income peers),
and regulatory enforcement (ranking 36th globally and
3rd among income peers). Morocco also outperforms most
lower-middle income countries in the area of constraints on
government powers (ranking 46th overall and 6th among
income peers). Despite the progress achieved, substantial
challenges remain in the dimensions of protection of
fundamental rights (ranking 84th and 19th among income
peers), and control of corruption (ranking 62nd). The civil
justice system ranks 51st overall and the criminal justice
system 81st, mainly due to due process violations, harsh
conditions at correctional facilities, and political interference.
Tunisia ranks 41st overall and near the top among the
countries in the region in several dimensions, including
con:in on ove:nmen o.e: (:n|in 41 nJ n:
in the region), and open government (49th and second
in the region). While protection of fundamental rights is
stronger than in other countries in the region (ranking 64th
globally and second regionally), violations to the rights to
life and security, due process and privacy remain a source of
concern. The countrys performance in all other areas falls
in the middle of both global and regional rankings, including
corruption (43rd), order and security (41st), regulatory
enforcement (47th), civil justice (43rd) and criminal justice
(45th).
The United Arab Emirates ranks 27th overall and it leads
the region in several dimensions of the rule of law. Public
institutions in the country are relatively well developed and
free of corruption (ranking 17th globally), and government
once: :e neJ ccoJn|e o: miconJJc. Tne coJn:, i
safe from crime and violence (ranking 9th in the world) and
ne coJ: ,em i encien nJ :eive, inJeenJen |,
regional standards. Nonetheless, due process violations, lack
of access to civil courts, and discrimination of marginalized
groups remain areas in need of attention. On the other
hand, the country ranks last among high income peers in
three areas: constraints on government powers (ranking
42nd globally), open government (52nd) and protection of
JnJmen :in (7:J). ln :icJ:. ccei|ii, o onci
information and protection of labor rights and the freedoms
of assembly, religion and opinion and expression, are lower
than in other high income countries.
SOUTH ASIA
Afghanistan ene: ne lnJex o: ne n: ime ni ,e:
at 98th position overall, placing below its regional and
income peers in most dimensions. Despite ongoing efforts
to strengthen the rule of law in the country, Afghanistan
continues to face challenges in increasing the accountability
o J|ic onci nJ im:ovin ne Jncionin o i J|ic
institutions. The country occupies the 78th position on
checks on government power, with relatively high marks on
limits by the legislature and non-governmental checks, and
low marks on judicial independence and effective auditing and
review. Corruption is prevalent in all branches of government
(ranking last overall), and the countrys administrative
agencies fail to perform at the same levels as their
counterparts of other low-income countries. With regard
to fundamental rights, the country performs relatively well
on freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, but receive
weak marks on equal treatment, freedom of religion, and
labor rights. The countrys security situation remains fragile
(:n|in 7n ove:) JJe o :meJ conic. c:ime nJ ne
use of violence for redress. Although not as prone to delays,
the judicial system presents a number of challenges including
co::Jion nJ JnJJe inJence. inencien eno:cemen.
discrimination against women and religious minorities, and
violations of due process
At 92nd, Bangladesh no. Jenciencie in mo :e
of the rule of law. Corruption is prevalent (ranking 95th),
particularly among the police and the military. Constraints on
government powers are weak (ranking 80th overall and last in
ne :eion). :eecin Jenciencie in ncion o: miconJJc
o ove:nmen onci. /Jmini:ive encie nJ coJ:
:e inencien nJ eceJ |, co::Jion nJ oiic
interference. Human rights violations and police abuses are
o inincn :o|em. FnJen |e e:o:mnce
is in the area of order and security, where it ranks 76th
globally and 3rd in the region, mostly due to its relatively
low crime rates, although the use of violence to redress
personal grievances remains an area of concern. Protection of
property rights is stronger than in other lower-middle income
countries.
India ranks 66th overall. The country has a robust system
o cnec| nJ |nce (:n|eJ n .o:J.iJe nJ n: in
the region), an independent judiciary, strong protections for
freedom of speech, and an open government (ranking 30th
globally and second among lower-middle income countries).
Administrative agencies are slow and ineffective (ranking
81st), and the civil court system ranks poorly (ranking
n). min, |ecJe o Jenciencie in ne :e o coJ:
congestion, enforcement, and delays in processing cases.
Co::Jion :emin inincn :o|em (:n|in 72nJ).
55 Regional Highlights |
despite some improvements during the past year. Order
nJ ecJ:i, incJJin c:ime. civi conic. nJ oiic
vioence i ne mo inincn :Je o . .e|ne (:n|eJ
95th). Police discrimination and abuses are also a source of
concern.
Nepal ranks 57th globally and it outperforms its regional
peers and most other low income countries in several
dimensions of the rule of law. The countrys best performance
is in the area of protection of fundamental rights (ranking
4on ove: nJ n: mon :eion nJ income ee:). l
has also shown improvements in the areas of constraints of
ove:nmen o.e: (:n|in 4n ove: nJ n: mon
income ee:). oen ove:nmen (:n|in 1 nJ n:
among income peers), order and security (ranking 55th), and
regulatory enforcement (ranking 56th). Rule of law areas of
particular concern in Nepal include corruption, especially
among the judiciary and the legislature, instability of the
legal framework, the use of violence to redress personal
grievances, limitations in the accessibility and affordability
of civil justice, due process violations, and poor conditions at
correctional facilities.
Pakistan, ranking 96th overall, shows weaknesses in most
dimensions when compared to its regional and income
peers. The countrys strongest performance is in the
area of constraints on government powers (ranking 73rd
globally and 14th among income peers), due to a relatively
independent judiciary and comparatively effective oversight
by the legislature and non-governmental checks. However,
corruption is common in all branches of government
(ranking 91st), administrative agencies are ineffective in
eno:cin :eJion (:n|in n). nJ imJni, o: onci
miconJJc o ove:nmen onci i :even. \nie
serious human rights violations are common, including
violations to the right to life and security of the person, the
county affords greater protection to the freedoms of speech
and assembly than most of its income and regional peers.
Tne mo inincn :Je o . cnene cin P|in
is in the area of order and security (ranking last in the
.o:J). JJe o civi conic. e::o:im. c:ime nJ ne Je o
violence to resolve personal grievances. Despite the relative
independence of the courts, the judicial system is slow and
ineffective, and it is affected by corruption, due process of law
violations, and the poor condition of correctional facilities.
Sri Lanka ranks 48th globally and outperforms its regional
peers in most dimensions of the rule of law. The country
also outpaces most lower-middle income countries in
several areas, ranking second in delivering effective criminal
justice, despite a recent deterioration in this area. Control of
corruption is relatively effective (ranking 39th globally and
n: in ne :eion). n ne one: nnJ. vioence nJ nJmn
rights violations related to the legacy of a protracted civil
conic :emin :o|emic. Jeie :ecen im:ovemen.
Other areas of concern are delays and barriers to access
civil justice, ineffective criminal investigations, due process
vioion. nJ c| o ccei|ii, o onci ino:mion.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Botswana is the highest-ranked country in the Sub-Saharan
African region, and comes in at 25th overall, even ahead of
some of the high-income level countries. Despite a slight
drop in positions since last year, the country continues to
enjoy an effective system of checks and balances, including a
fairly independent judiciary and a free press (ranking 25th).
Corruption remains minimal and all branches of government
operate effectively. Fundamental rights are generally
respected (ranking sixth in the region), although limitations
on the right to privacy, and discrimination against immigrants
and ethnic minorities are still areas of concern. Finally,
although the civil and criminal justice systems compare
favorably to other countries in the region (ranking 28th and
23rd, respectively), delays and political interference in judicial
processes remain areas that require attention.
Burkina Faso is ranked 53rd this year, outperforming most
of its regional and income peers in all but one dimension of
the rule of law. As compared to other countries in the region,
the country scores fairly well in the areas of regulatory
eno:cemen nJ civi Jice. :n|in ni:J nJ nn in ne
region, respectively. The country also performs relatively
well in freedom of speech, assembly, and religion. However,
the country is ranked 76th in government accountability
due to the lack of effective checks on the executive branch,
and political interference among the different branches of
government. Although not as pervasive as in other parts of
Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is commonplace, and crime
nJ viine Jice :emin inincn cnene. Tne
performance of the criminal justice system registered a slight
deterioration since last year (ranking 64th), and remains an
area in need of attention, particularly concerning violations
of due process, political interference in judicial decisions, and
harsh conditions in correctional facilities.
Cameroon is ranked 95th overall, lagging behind its
regional and income peers in most categories. Despite slight
improvements in several areas since last year, the country
still faces many challenges in terms of accountability and the
functioning of public institutions. Checks and balances are
poor (ranking 87th overall and third to last within the region);
protection of fundamental rights is relatively weak (ranking
81st overall and 13th among its regional peers); corruption
is common (ranking second to last in the world); and the
56 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
civi Jice ,em i o. nJ J|ec o oiic inJence.
Cameroon, however, has a relatively low incidence of crime,
although police abuses, a high incidence of mob and vigilante
justice, and harsh conditions in correctional facilities are
areas in need of attention.
Cote dIvoire is ranked 72nd overall and 9th in the Sub-
Saharan Africa region, with a performance similar to that of
last year. The country occupies the 77th position on checks on
government power due to limitations on the independence of
the judiciary and the legislature, and governmental pressure
on ne meJi nJ civi ocie, o:ni.ion. Conic
related violence and violations of fundamental rights are
serious concerns, including torture, disappearances, and
restrictions on freedom of speech and privacy. The criminal
justice system ranks 60th, due in part to weaknesses in the
criminal investigation system, violations of due process, and
poor conditions of correctional facilities. The countrys best
performance is in the area of civil justice (ranking 57th overall
and 9th among lower-middle income countries), and effective
regulatory enforcement (ranking 6th in the region and 7th
among lower-middle income countries).
Ethiopia ranks 88th this year and occupies the bottom half of
the rankings among low-income countries in most dimensions.
Despite important gains in the area of security (ranking 73rd
ove:). ne coJn:, i ce inincn cnene c:o
most of the areas covered by the Index. Accountability is weak
by regional standards, ranking 91st globally and second to
last in the region, and the performance of regulatory agencies
and courts lags behind that of its regional peers. The country
also has a poor record in protecting fundamental rights,
ranking 94th globally and second to last in the region. Of
greatest concern are restrictions limiting freedom of speech
and assembly, as well as illegal detentions, and due process
violations. The criminal justice system, although not without
problems, performs slightly better than those of other
countries in the region.
At 37th position overall, Ghana is the second-ranked
country in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and the strongest
performer among lower-middle income countries. Despite a
slight decline since last year, the country continues to enjoy
an effective protection of fundamental rights (ranking 33rd
ove: nJ n: in ne :eion). Jncionin ,em o cnec|
and balances (ranking 27th overall and second in the region),
and an open government (ranking 37th and third in the
:eion). n e oiive noe. Jmini:ive encienc, nJ
corruption remain important challenges, although the country
outperforms most of its regional peers in both dimensions.
The civil justice system is relatively independent, but slow and
inaccessible to most people. Finally, although improving since
last year, the safety situation (ranking 57th), particularly in
regard to security from crime and vigilante justice, is an area
that still requires attention.
Kenya ranks 86th overall and occupies the bottom half of the
regional rankings across all the major dimensions captured by
the Index. In spite of improvements in the perceived ability of
the legislature and the judiciary to act as effective checks on
the executive branch (ranking 62nd overall, up 13 places), and
relatively good marks in the areas of freedom of religion and
freedom of assembly and association, the country presents
a number of challenges. Corruption remains widespread
(ranking 93rd globally and third to last in the region);
regulatory enforcement is ineffective by regional standards;
and the civil justice system, although on par with the regional
average, needs improvements across many areas. Crime and
vigilante justice are also areas of concern.
Liberia is ranked 87th overall and 13th in the Sub-Saharan
Africa region. The country ranks relatively well in the
areas of government accountability (ranking 56th overall)
and protection of fundamental rights (ranking 53rd),
outperforming most of its regional and income peers on
the back of improvements in protecting basic civil liberties
and advances toward a functioning system of checks and
balances. Yet, corruption is commonplace and the quality of
administrative agencies and the judiciary continues to be
nme:eJ |, inenciencie nJ c| o :eoJ:ce. Tne coJn:,
o ce inincn cnene in ne :e o o:Je: nJ
security (ranking 93rd).
Madagascar comes in at 81st place. The country sustains
one of the regions sharpest drops, registering a fall in four
of the eight dimensions of the Index, including government
accountability and fundamental rights. The country continues
to receive relatively weak assessments on checks on
government power (ranking 83rd and 15th within the region),
corruption (ranking 84th overall and 12th in the region), and
regulatory enforcement (ranking 82nd). There are limitations
on freedom of speech and privacy, as well as on the ability to
eiion ne ove:nmen nJ o cce onci ino:mion.
Police abuses and political interference in the justice system
are also areas of concern. The countrys strongest scores are
in the area of order and security (ranking second in the region
nJ n: mon o.income coJn:ie).
Malawi ranks 55th overall and 6th in the region. The country
achieves its highest scores in the dimension of civil justice
(:n|in econJ in ne :eion). nJ n moveJ J inincn,
in the rankings in the area of fundamental rights, thanks to
improvements in protecting freedoms of speech, religion,
privacy, and assembly. The country scores relatively well
on checks on government power (6th in its income group
57 Regional Highlights |
and 9th in the region), and the judiciary is free of political
interference. Its weakest performance is in the area of open
government (ranking 80th overall and 10th in the region),
:icJ:, in :e:J o ne vi|ii, o onci ino:mion.
Enforcement of government regulations, violations of due
process, and poor conditions of correctional facilities are also
areas of concern.
Nigeria ranks 93rd overall and near the bottom half of lower-
middle income countries in most dimensions. The country
ranks 69th for checks on the executive branch and 76th
for open government, putting it slightly behind the average
rankings of Sub-Saharan African countries. Yet, in most of the
other dimensions, the country remains one of the poorest
performers of the region. Corruption is widespread (ranking
third to last in the world), the criminal justice system has
Jenciencie (:n|in 1 ove: nJ econJ o in ne
region), fundamental rights are poorly protected (ranking
88th overall), and a deteriorating security situation continues
o :ie inincn conce:n (:n|in econJ o ove:).
Nigerias best performance is in the area of civil justice, where
it ranks 52nd globally and 7th among its income peers.
Senegal is ranked in the 43rd position, and is in the top
half of the rankings among lower-middle income countries
in most dimensions, attributable to ongoing reforms. The
country continues its steady progress and scores fairly well
on checks on government power (ranking 33rd overall and
third among its income group). Administrative proceedings
:e mo:e encien nn ee.ne:e in ne :eion. nJ ne civi
justice system is relatively independent, although a bit slow
and inaccessible to most people. Although not as extensive as
in other countries in the region, corruption is still a problem,
as is open government, on which the country ranks 70th. The
country places 39th globally and second in the region for
protecting fundamental rights, although police abuses and
harsh treatment of prisoners are a source of concern.
Sierra Leone is ranked 84th overall and 11th in the Sub-
Saharan Africa region. The country ranks second among
o.income coJn:ie nJ nn in ne :eion .in :eec
to checks on government power. The judiciary and the
legislature are relatively independent, and the press and
civil society organizations are mostly free from government
interference. The country, however, faces many challenges.
Major problems include high crime rates, widespread
co::Jion. ineecive :eJo:, eno:cemen. c| o onci
ino:mion. nJ eve:e Jenciencie in ne c:imin Jice
system.
South Africa, at 40th place, leads the BRICS countries and
shows a rather stable performance since last year. The country
has relatively effective checks on government power (ranking
37th), and an open government (ranking 26th). The countrys
civil justice system is independent, but slow, and the criminal
Jice ,em. noJn :n|eJ 47n ove:. i i iceJ |,
Jenciencie in ne inveiion o c:ime. nJ oo: conJiion
of correctional facilities. Arguably, the countrys most
important challenge is in the area of security (ranking 86th)
JJe cnie, o ne :evence o c:ime nJ viine Jice.
Tanzania, at 69th, ranks in the upper half of low-income
countries in most dimensions of the rule of law, with a
performance similar to that of last year. The country features
a reasonable system of checks and balances (ranking
52nd overall and third among low-income countries), and
administrative agencies, although not without problems,
:e in, mo:e encien nn noe in one: coJn:ie in
ne :eion. Tne JJici:,. no.eve:. i inencien nJ eceJ
by corruption, and crime and vigilante justice continue to
be major problems (ranking 90th overall). Lack of access to
onci ino:mion i none: :e o conce:n.
At 90th, Uganda ranks below the majority of countries in
the region, with weakening performances across several
dimensions of the rule of law. Government accountability
remains relatively weak by regional standards (ranking 14th
regionally and 81st globally), and administrative agencies are
e:ceiveJ o |e inencien nJ co::J (:n|in on ove:
and 14th within the region). Protection of fundamental is
weak and is deteriorating since last year (ranking 93rd),
and crime and political violence, while improving slightly,
:emin inincn cnene. CoJ:. noJn :eive,
independent, are under-resourced, slow, and inaccessible to
most people.
Zambia comes in at 70th position overall and 8th in the
region, showing a relatively steady performance on the
eight dimensions assessed by the Index last year. The
country scores relatively well in the areas of government
accountability, absence of corruption, and open government,
and the performance of the countrys administrative
agencies is on par with the regional average. Yet protection
of fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and
assembly, remains relatively weak, ranking 86th overall. Other
rule of law concerns include political interference within the
legislature and the judiciary, police abuses, poor protection
of property rights, vigilante justice, and poor conditions of
correctional facilities.
With a performance essentially unchanged from the
previous edition, Zimbabwe comes in at 97th this year, the
lowest-ranked country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Checks on
government power are weak (ranking 98th), and the country
fails to protect fundamental rights (ranked 98th globally and
last amongst both its regional and income peers), including
58 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
freedom of speech, assembly, and association. Corruption
is pervasive and voting irregularities are common. Open
government and protection of property from expropriation
are weak. Zimbabwes best performance is in the area of
criminal justice (ranking 11th in the region and 7th among
low-income countries), although severe violations of due
process of law and the rights of the accused prevail.
WESTERN EUROPE & NORTH AMERICA
At 7th, Austria places among the top 10 globally in all dimensions
of the rule of law, with a stable performance since last year.
The government is accountable and free of corruption, and
fundamental rights are strongly protected. Although the
countrys government is very open (ranking 6th globally),
eoe in /J:i ce mo:e JincJie in ccein onci
documentation than do individuals in most other developed
nations. The countrys courts are accessible and free of improper
inJence, no.eve:. Jic:iminion in JiJvneJ :oJ
|, JJici e:onne nJ . eno:cemen once: i e:ceiveJ o
be a problem.
Belgium is ranked in the 17th position overall, and places in
the top 20 worldwide in all the eight dimensions measured by
the Index. The country continues to score well in government
accountability (ranking 11th overall), as well as in protection
of fundamental rights (ranking 9th overall), although police
discrimination against foreigners is still perceived to be a
inincn :o|em. Tne JJici ,em i inJeenJen nJ :ee
of corruption, although it is not as accessible to disadvantaged
groups. Judicial delays in civil cases, as well as a limited
effectiveness of the criminal investigation system in capturing
offenders, are areas that need attention.
Bulgaria is ranked in the 44th position. The country outperforms
most upper-middle income countries in protecting the security
of its citizens from crime and in respecting the freedoms of
speech, religion, and assembly, although it still scores lower than
its EU counterparts. The right to petition the government and
cii.en :iciion :e o inincn :enn. o.eve:.
the country faces challenges in the dimensions of government
accountability, corruption, and regulatory enforcement, where
it ranks 58th, 64th, and 57th, respectively. The criminal justice
system performs on par with those in other upper-middle
income countries (ranking 56th globally and 15th among its
income ee:). noJn Jenciencie in oice inveiion nJ
corruption are weaknesses that remain to be addressed.
Canada occupies the 11th position overall, and places in the
top 15 in seven of the eight categories of the Index, displaying
little change since last years edition. The government is
accountable (13th globally) and open (3rd globally); corruption
is minimal (ranking 14th overall); and the country generally
observes fundamental rights (ranking 16th overall), although
discrimination against immigrants and the poor is still a source
of concern. The country is relatively safe from crime, civil courts
are accessible and independent, and the criminal justice system is
effective in bringing offenders to justice. However, delays in court
processes, and unequal access and treatment of disadvantaged
groups at courts and police services, are areas in need of
attention.
Croatia places in the middle of the rankings in most categories,
with a fairly even performance across all dimensions captured
by the Index. The country is ranked in the 40th position in checks
on the governments power and in the 38th position in open
government. Although good by global standards good, Croatias
institutions lag behind those of other high-income countries.
l J|ic Jmini:ive |oJie. o: exme. :e no encien
as others in the region, and the judicial system, while generally
ccei|e. i o. nJ J|ec o im:oe: inJence. Tne coJn:,
is relatively safe from crime, but there is an increasing use of
violence to express discontent. Corruption is an area of concern
(ranking 36th globally and last among high-income countries).
Czech Republic is ranked in the 23rd position overall and
occupies the 15th place in the region, showing a similar
performance to that of last year. The country obtains high marks
in providing effective checks on the executives power (ranking
23rd overall), and in protecting fundamental rights (ranking
11th overall and 9th in the region). The countrys administrative
agencies are relatively effective in enforcing regulations, albeit
e encien, nn noe in one: FU coJn:ie. CoJ: :e
independent, but slow. Other areas in need of attention include
co::Jion mon ove:nmen onci (:n|in 1). c| o
eecive ncion o: onci miconJJc. nJ imiion on
cii.en :in o eiion ne ove:nmen nJ o cce onci
information.
Denmark attains the 1st position overall as a result of its
continuous strong performance across all dimensions. The
country is the world leader in two dimensions government
accountability and absence of corruption and places in the
top 5 in all other dimensions. Denmarks public institutions
:e :n:en. encien. nJ :ee o co::Jion. Tne coJn:,
is relatively safe from crime, and the criminal justice system
is effective in bringing offenders to justice; however, police
discrimination against foreigners and ethnic minorities are
perceived to be a problem. Court delays are also an area where
improvement is needed.
Estonia ranks 15th overall and ranks globally among the top 20
in all but one dimension, thanks to its well-functioning and open
institutions. Administrative agencies and courts are accountable,
59 Regional Highlights |
effective, and free of corruption, and fundamental rights are
strongly protected. On the other hand, the crime rates in Estonia
are slightly higher than in most of its high income peers. Judicial
delays are another area in need of attention.
Finland is ranked 4th overall, and places in the top 10 globally
in six dimensions, and places in the top 15 globally in the other
two dimensions of the Index. The country has well-functioning,
accountable, and transparent institutions, and the court system
i inJeenJen nJ :ee o im:oe: inJence. Neve:nee.
the country registered a slight decline in the area of open
government (ranking 11th overall), driven by the perceived
deterioration in the peoples ability to petition the government
nJ cce onci ino:mion. Tne c:imin Jice ,em :n|
1st overall, but police discrimination against foreigners and ethnic
minorities is perceived to be a problem.
France comes in at 18th overall, with high marks in the areas of
accountability (ranking 14th overall), open government (ranking
16th overall), and effective regulatory enforcement (ranking 14th
overall). The country also scores well on absence of corruption
(ranking 20th globally), and protection of fundamental rights
(ranking 18th globally), although police discrimination against
ethnic and religious minorities as well as perceived violations of
the right of privacy are both areas that need to be addressed.
The country has an independent, accessible, and affordable civil
justice system (ranking 18th overall). However, judicial delays are
a weakness in both the civil and criminal justice systems, where
cases can take a long time to resolve.
At 9th, Germany places in the top 15 worldwide in six
dimensions, and in the top 20 worldwide in the other two
dimensions, with a rather stable performance since last year.
Government accountability is strong (ranking 9th overall), and
corruption is minimal (ranking 12th overall). Administrative
agencies are transparent and effective in enforcing regulations
(ranking 16th). The countrys civil justice system ranks 3rd
overall, and is characterized by the affordability of attorneys,
ccei|ii, nJ encienc, o coJ:. nJ c| o JnJJe inJence.
Poice Jic:iminion in o:eine:. .e JincJie
in bringing criminal offenders to justice, are areas that need
attention.
Greece is ranked in the 32nd position globally, underperforming
most of its regional and income peers in all dimensions, and
displaying a broadly similar performance to that of last year. The
country has a fair system of checks and balances (ranking 29th
ove:). |J i Jmini:ive encie :e inencien. x in
eno:cin :eJion. nJ eceJ |, im:oe: inJence. Tne
countrys civil justice system is independent, but slow (ranking
25th overall), and the criminal justice system scores below levels
found in other advanced economies (ranking 43rd overall and
mon ninincome coJn:ie). min, |ecJe o JincJie
in identifying and prosecuting offenders, corruption, and poor
conditions at correctional facilities. While the country is relatively
safe from crime, riots in the streets still occur. Overall, Greece
earns high marks in protecting basic rights and liberties, but
discrimination against disadvantaged groups is perceived to be a
problem.
Hungary places in the top-third worldwide in most dimensions
of the rule of law, but lags behind its regional and income group
peers. The country ranks third to last among high income
countries for effective checks on government powers, due in
part to political interference among the different branches of
government. Despite a slight drop of positions since last year,
corruption remains relatively low (ranking 29th overall), and
administrative agencies are relatively effective in enforcing
regulations (ranking 30th overall). The country is relatively
safe from crime. The civil justice system, however, ranks 55th
overall and last among high-income countries, mainly because
o enn, Je, in ne :eoJion o ce. JincJie eno:cin
court decisions, discrimination against marginalized groups, and
oiic ine:e:ence in JJici Jeciion. Lenciencie in oice
inveiion nJ JincJie in |:inin c:imin oenJe: o
justice are other areas in need of attention.
Italy is ranked in the 29th position overall. The country
scores 26th globally in checks on the governments power,
and receives high marks for observing fundamental rights
(ranking 22nd overall). Administrative agencies are effective in
eno:cin :eJion. noJn ne, :e e encien nn nei:
counterparts in other countries throughout the region (placing
19th in the region, and ranking 29th overall). The countrys civil
justice system is independent, but slow. The countrys lowest
positions are in the areas of security (ranking 50th overall),
and open government (ranking 39th overall), attributable to an
increasing use of violence to express discontent, and to perceived
JincJie in eiionin ne ove:nmen nJ ccein onci
information, respectively. Corruption and discrimination against
disadvantaged groups are other areas in need of attention.
The Netherlands comes in at 5th overall. Checks on executive
power are strong (ranking 7th overall), corruption is minimal
(ranking 7th overall), the government is open and transparent
(:n|in 7n ove:). nJ Jmini:ive encie :e encien nJ
effective in enforcing regulations. The countrys civil courts are
ccei|e nJ :ee o im:oe: inJence. cin 2nJ .o:J.iJe.
Fundamental rights are also well protected (ranking 6th overall),
although labor market discrimination and police discrimination
against disadvantaged groups are perceived to be issues needing
attention. Although the country is relatively safe from crime,
burglaries and thefts are somewhat common.
Norway comes in at 2nd overall, and is the world leader in the
areas of open government, regulatory enforcement, and civil
60 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
justice. The government is accountable (ranking 2nd overall), and
the justice system operates independently and without improper
inJence. Tne c:imin Jice ,em i eecive nJ Jne:e o
due process. While the country is safe from crime, burglary and
theft are ongoing issues.
Despite a slight drop of scores in three of the eight dimensions
measured by the Index, Poland, at 22nd place, continues to earn
high marks across all areas. The country places 22th globally in
checks on the governments power, and its public institutions rank
27th overall in absence of corruption, and 26th in effectiveness
of regulatory enforcement. In general, the country has a good
record in protecting fundamental rights. The civil justice,
noJn ccei|e nJ :ee o JnJJe inJence. i eceJ
|, enn, Je, in ne :eoJion o ce nJ JincJie in
enforcing court decisions (ranking 22nd overall). Polands lowest
score is in the dimension of open government (ranking 27th
overall), mainly because of limitations on citizens right to petition
ne ove:nmen nJ o cce onci ino:mion. Le, in
administrative proceedings are another area in need of attention.
Portugal places 26th overall and 17th in the region. While
lagging behind many of its regional peers in most dimensions,
Portugal still maintains a stable performance since last year.
The country ranks 19th overall in checks on the governments
power, and 26th overall on absence of corruption. Administrative
agencies are relatively effective in enforcing regulations, albeit
e encien, nn noe in ne mo:i, o one: coJn:ie in ne
region. The civil courts are independent, but slower than their
counterparts in the European Union. Portugals lowest score is
in the area of order and security (ranking 58th overall), mainly
because people are increasingly resorting to violence to express
discontent. Its highest position is on respect for fundamental
rights (ranking 17th overall).
Romania is ranked in the 33rd position overall, trailing its EU
peers but outperforming most upper-middle income countries.
The country performs relatively well in the dimensions of
security (ranking 31st overall), respect for fundamental rights
(ranking 25th globally and 2nd among upper-middle income
countries), and criminal justice (ranking 3rd among its income
peers and 29th overall). However, the country does less well
on Jmini:ive nJ JJici encienc,. \nie Jmini:ive
agencies perform on par with those in other upper-middle
income countries, they rank worse than those of other countries
of the region. Corruption is still an area in need of attention,
(ranking 41st globally and second to last in the region),
:icJ:, in ne eiJ:e. :e ne JincJie in eiionin
ne ove:nmen nJ ccein onci ino:mion.
Slovenia places in the top-third worldwide in most dimensions
of the rule of law. The country has a good system of checks and
balances (ranking 30th overall), and obtain relatively high marks
in protecting basic civil liberties. The countrys administrative
agencies and courts perform well by global standards, but below
its regional and income counterparts. Among the challenges
faced by the country are delays and inadequate enforcement of
administrative and judicial decisions, impunity for misconduct by
ove:nmen onci. nJ oice co::Jion.
Ranked 24th, Spain J:o eve: oiion in nve o ne ein
dimensions measured by the Index this year, but nonetheless
maintains relatively good marks across all areas. The government
remains generally accountable, despite some decline over the
past year in the areas of judicial independence and legislative
corruption. Fundamental rights and basic civil liberties remain
strongly protected (ranking 14th overall), and administrative
encie. noJn in, inencien. :e eecive in eno:cin
regulations (ranking 25th overall). By contrast, Spain lags behind
its regional and income-group peers in providing mechanisms
for public participation including the right to petition public
authorities. Judicial delays, ineffective enforcement of civil
justice, police discrimination, and corruption in the civil and
criminal justice systems are also areas in need of attention.
Sweden is ranked in the 3rd position worldwide and places in
the top 5 in six dimensions and in the top 10 in the other two,
with a performance similar to that of last year. Government
accountability is strong (ranking 3rd overall), corruption is
minimal (ranking 4th overall), and fundamental rights are
strongly protected (ranking 1st overall). In addition, the countrys
administrative agencies and courts are rated among the most
effective and transparent in the world. Notwithstanding
these strengths, some concerns remain with regard to police
discrimination against foreigners and ethnic minorities, perceived
Je, in coJ: :ocee. nJ JincJie in |:inin c:imin
offenders to justice.
The United Kingdom is ranked 13th overall, with a stable
performance since last year. The country scores high on
government accountability (ranking 10th overall) and corruption
is minimal (ranking 15th overall). Administrative agencies are
encien nJ eecive in eno:cin :eJion. FJnJmen
rights are well protected (ranking 15th overall and 13th in the
region) and the country is relatively safe from crime. The court
,em i inJeenJen nJ :ee o JnJJe inJence. |J i i
not as accessible and affordable as others in the region. Undue
infringement of privacy is an area of concern.
The United States ranks 19th overall, with a relatively uniform
performance across all dimensions of the rule of law. The country
maintains a well-functioning system of checks and balances
(ranking 20th), in spite of a slight relative decline during the
past year. The United States scores well in the areas of Open
Government (ranking 17th) and Order and Security (ranking
1on). .in inincn im:ovemen :om ne :evioJ
61 Regional Highlights |
measurement. Protection of fundamental rights is strong,
particularly with regard to the rights of association, opinion and
expression, and freedom of religion. The country underperforms
income and regional peers in the protection of the right to
privacy, due process of law and fundamental labor rights. The
JJici ,em i inJeenJen nJ :ee o JnJJe inJence. |J
it lags behind its peers in providing equal treatment to ethnic
minorities and other disadvantaged groups. Civil legal assistance
is frequently expensive or unavailable, and the gap between
rich and poor individuals in terms of both actual use of and
icion .in ne coJ: ,em i inincn.
CounIry Proles
64 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CounIry Proles
Tni ecion :een :one o: ne coJn:ie nJ J:iJicion incJJeJ in ne \P RJe o . lnJex 214 :eo:.
65 CoJn:, P:one |
BraziI Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Upper middIe income
So Poulo, Rio de Joneiro, Belo HorizonIe
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.54 42/ 3/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.3 32/ 3/1 3/2
Absence of Corruption
0.5 45/ 3/1 12/2
Open Government
0.5 3/ 5/1 7/2
FundamentaI Pights
0. 35/ 5/1 /2
Order and 5ecurity
0. 71/ 5/1 18/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.53 3/ 4/1 /2
CiviI Justice
0.51 50/ 4/1 14/2
CriminaI Justice
0.37 / 7/1 23/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Brozil LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.72
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.2
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.4
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.4
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.74
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.1
4.3 Due process of low 0.37
4.4 Freedomof expression 0.74
4.5 Freedomof religion 0.81
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.53
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.7
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
Fcn coJn:, :one :een ne eJ:eJ coJn:, co:e
for each of the WJP Rule of Law Indexs factors and sub-
factors, and draws comparisons between the scores of the
featured country and the scores of other indexed countries
that share regional and income level similarities. The scores
Section 1 displays the countrys disaggregated scores for
each of the sub-factors that compose the WJP Rule of Law
Index. Each of the 47 sub-factors is represented by a gray
line drawn from the center to the periphery of the circle.
The center of the circle corresponds to the worst possible
score for each sub-factor (0.00), and the outer edge of the
circle marks the best possible score for each sub-factor
(1.00).
The featured countrys scores are shown in purple. The
average score of the countrys region is shown in orange.
The average score of the countrys income group is shown
in green.
Section 2 displays the countrys overall rule of law
score, along with its overall global and regional
ranks. The overall rule of law score is calculated by
taking the simple average of the eight individual
factors, listed in the table in Section 3.
Section 3 displays the featured
countrys individual factor scores,
along with the global, regional,
and income group rankings. The
distribution of scores for the global
rank, regional rank, and income rank
is spread amongst three tiers high,
medium, and low.
It also features upward and
downward arrows to illustrate
whether the rule of law in a
country changed in the past year.
Further information about the
statistical procedures to construct
these arrows can be found in the
Methodology section of this report.
Section 4 presents the individual sub-factor scores underlying each of the factors listed in Section 3. The
featured countrys score is represented by the purple bar and labeled at the end of the bar. The average
score of the countrys region is represented by the orange line. The average score of the countrys income
group is represented by the green line. Each sub-factor score is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 is the
highest score and 0 is the lowest score.
How Io Reod Ihe CounIry Proles
2 1
4
3
:ne |e.een nJ 1. .ne:e 1 inine ne nine co:e
(nin :Je o . Jne:ence) nJ inine ne o.e co:e
(o. :Je o . Jne:ence). Tne coJn:, :one coni o
four (4) sections, outlined below.
66 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Afghanistan
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5outh Asia [ Income group: Low income
Kobul, HeroI, Kondohor
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.34 8/ /
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.43 78/ 5/ 10/1
Absence of Corruption
0.24 / / 1/1
Open Government
0.34 8/ 5/ 11/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.3 1/ 5/ 12/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.42 7/ 5/ 1/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.33 7/ / 15/1
CiviI Justice
0.27 / / 1/1
CriminaI Justice
0.28 / / 1/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
AfghonisIon SouIh Asio Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.1
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.38
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.24
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.3
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.44
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.32
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.11
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.37
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.17
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.57
3.2 SIoble lows 0.25
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.48
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.0
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.28
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.31
4.3 Due process of low 0.31
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.1
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.3
4. RighI Io privocy 0.34
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.5
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.22
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.2
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.31
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.34
.2 No improper influence 0.31
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.23
.4 RespecI for due process 0.34
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.44
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.28
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.08
7.3 No corrupIion 0.12
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.31
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.48
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.2
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.38
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.44
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.37
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.14
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.18
8.5 No corrupIion 0.25
8. No improper gov. influence 0.23
8.7 Due process of low 0.31
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
67 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
AIbania
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Tirono, Durres, Shkodro
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.4 3/ 7/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.47 8/ 5/13 12/24
Absence of Corruption
0.34 83/ 10/13 17/24
Open Government
0.44 0/ 7/13 12/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.58 4/ 4/13 5/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.74 53/ 11/13 /24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.45 4/ 8/13 10/24
CiviI Justice
0.5 53/ /13 8/24
CriminaI Justice
0.3 75/ /13 14/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Albonio EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.58
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.4
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.38
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.33
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.55
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.51
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.45
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.25
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.37
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.2
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.52
3.2 SIoble lows 0.47
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.35
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.43
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.7
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.5
4.3 Due process of low 0.44
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.5
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.77
4. RighI Io privocy 0.4
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.52
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.85
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.3
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.51
.2 No improper influence 0.4
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.38
.4 RespecI for due process 0.4
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.55
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.58
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.5
7.3 No corrupIion 0.37
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.42
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.43
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.51
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.5
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.47
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.42
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.34
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.34
8.5 No corrupIion 0.32
8. No improper gov. influence 0.17
8.7 Due process of low 0.44
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
68 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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Argentina
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Buenos Aires, Cordobo, Rosorio
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.5 58/ /1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.47 71/ 11/1 20/2
Absence of Corruption
0.4 47/ 4/1 14/2
Open Government
0.45 5/ /1 17/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.7 31/ 3/1 3/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.1 83/ 10/1 23/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.43 73/ 12/1 2/2
CiviI Justice
0.54 40/ 3/1 8/2
CriminaI Justice
0.37 70/ 8/1 24/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
ArgenIino LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.41
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.35
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.44
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.3
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.3
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.7
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.5
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.1
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.31
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.5
3.2 SIoble lows 0.4
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.45
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.37
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.82
4.3 Due process of low 0.47
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.4
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.7
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.7
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.53
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.2
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.41
.2 No improper influence 0.57
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
.4 RespecI for due process 0.3
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.43
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.75
7.3 No corrupIion 0.5
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.37
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.33
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.53
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.3
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.18
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.32
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.27
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.44
8.5 No corrupIion 0.4
8. No improper gov. influence 0.43
8.7 Due process of low 0.47
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
69 CoJn:, P:one |
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AustraIia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: High income
Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbone
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.8 8/ 2/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.8 8/ 2/15 8/30
Absence of Corruption
0.8 8/ 3/15 8/30
Open Government
0.75 12/ 4/15 12/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.82 10/ 2/15 10/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.8 14/ 7/15 12/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.8 7/ 2/15 7/30
CiviI Justice
0.73 12/ 5/15 12/30
CriminaI Justice
0.73 11/ 4/15 11/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
AusIrolio EosI Asio & Pocific High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.8
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.85
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.83
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.81
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.8
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.84
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.2
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.74
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.7
3.2 SIoble lows 0.7
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.82
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.8
4.3 Due process of low 0.7
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.87
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.83
4. RighI Io privocy 0.
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.7
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.78
.2 No improper influence 0.2
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.77
.4 RespecI for due process 0.78
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.78
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.48
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.54
7.3 No corrupIion 0.3
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.2
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.7
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.83
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.71
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.4
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.53
8.5 No corrupIion 0.8
8. No improper gov. influence 0.
8.7 Due process of low 0.7
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
70 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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Austria
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Vienno, Groz, Linz
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.82 7/ /24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.8 / 5/24 /30
Absence of Corruption
0.84 10/ /24 10/30
Open Government
0.78 / 5/24 /30
FundamentaI Pights
0.87 5/ 5/24 5/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.88 10/ 4/24 /30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.81 / 5/24 /30
CiviI Justice
0.75 7/ /24 7/30
CriminaI Justice
0.81 5/ 4/24 5/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
AusIrio WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.81
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.77
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.78
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.2
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.82
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.88
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.1
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.74
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.82
3.2 SIoble lows 0.8
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.83
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.58
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.74
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.2
4.3 Due process of low 0.8
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.2
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.84
4. RighI Io privocy 0.4
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.2
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.81
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.3
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.7
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.78
.2 No improper influence 0.8
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.72
.4 RespecI for due process 0.78
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.8
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.2
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.8
7.3 No corrupIion 0.8
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.81
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.71
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.88
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.71
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.84
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.85
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.7
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.8
8.5 No corrupIion 0.85
8. No improper gov. influence 0.84
8.7 Due process of low 0.83
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
71 CoJn:, P:one |
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BangIadesh
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5outh Asia [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Dhoko, ChiIIogong, Khulno
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.3 2/ 4/
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.41 80/ / 18/24
Absence of Corruption
0.27 5/ 5/ 22/24
Open Government
0.3 85/ 4/ 20/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.43 87/ 4/ 20/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.4 7/ 3/ 17/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.37 1/ 4/ 22/24
CiviI Justice
0.3 2/ 4/ 20/24
CriminaI Justice
0.2 4/ 5/ 23/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Bonglodesh SouIh Asio Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.55
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.45
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.41
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.27
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.4
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.41
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.35
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.2
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.1
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.27
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.48
3.2 SIoble lows 0.2
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.41
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.27
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.55
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.22
4.3 Due process of low 0.3
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.41
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.5
4. RighI Io privocy 0.2
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.55
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.57
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.73
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.1
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.37
.2 No improper influence 0.25
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.37
.4 RespecI for due process 0.4
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.47
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.3
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.35
7.3 No corrupIion 0.3
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.37
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.3
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.41
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.24
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.33
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.25
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.3
8.5 No corrupIion 0.2
8. No improper gov. influence 0.27
8.7 Due process of low 0.3
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
72 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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BeIarus
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Minsk, Gomel, Mogilev
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.51 50/ 4/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.34 5/ 12/13 28/2
Absence of Corruption
0.53 38/ 4/13 7/2
Open Government
0.3 7/ 12/13 2/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.4 83/ 12/13 25/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 33/ 4/13 /2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.53 42/ 3/13 /2
CiviI Justice
0. 30/ 1/13 4/2
CriminaI Justice
0.43 50/ 4/13 11/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Belorus EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.27
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.28
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.3
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.5
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.27
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.34
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.51
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.5
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.4
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.4
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.51
3.2 SIoble lows 0.43
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.33
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.28
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.71
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.44
4.3 Due process of low 0.43
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.27
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.3
4. RighI Io privocy 0.24
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.3
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.54
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.87
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.51
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.5
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.
.4 RespecI for due process 0.45
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.41
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.52
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.77
7.3 No corrupIion 0.5
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.2
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.74
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.4
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.35
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.57
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.32
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.1
8.5 No corrupIion 0.5
8. No improper gov. influence 0.24
8.7 Due process of low 0.43
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
73 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
BeIgium
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
AnIwerp, GhenI, Chorleroi
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.7 17/ 11/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.81 11/ /24 11/30
Absence of Corruption
0.81 13/ 8/24 13/30
Open Government
0.7 18/ 13/24 18/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.83 / 8/24 /30
Order and 5ecurity
0.85 1/ 7/24 14/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.71 1/ 12/24 1/30
CiviI Justice
0. 1/ 12/24 1/30
CriminaI Justice
0.7 20/ 13/24 20/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Belgium WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.84
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.75
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.78
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.7
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.82
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.88
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.82
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.8
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.2
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.5
3.2 SIoble lows 0.7
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.5
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.5
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.7
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.5
4.3 Due process of low 0.77
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.82
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.82
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.82
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.85
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.71
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.77
.2 No improper influence 0.8
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
.4 RespecI for due process 0.5
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.77
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.58
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.78
7.3 No corrupIion 0.82
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.75
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.8
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.75
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.52
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.2
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.47
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.1
8.5 No corrupIion 0.85
8. No improper gov. influence 0.87
8.7 Due process of low 0.77
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
74 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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BoIivia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Lo Poz, SonIo Cruz, Cochobombo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.3 4/ 15/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.38 88/ 14/1 22/24
Absence of Corruption
0.32 87/ 15/1 18/24
Open Government
0.38 81/ 14/1 18/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.48 75/ 15/1 17/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.1 82/ /1 1/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.38 88/ 15/1 21/24
CiviI Justice
0.34 / 15/1 24/24
CriminaI Justice
0.23 8/ 15/1 24/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Bolivio LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.33
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.24
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.41
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.3
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.45
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.43
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.23
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.3
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.33
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.42
3.2 SIoble lows 0.32
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.45
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.33
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.47
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.45
4.3 Due process of low 0.35
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.45
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.4
4. RighI Io privocy 0.45
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.53
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.52
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.17
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.34
.2 No improper influence 0.45
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
.4 RespecI for due process 0.34
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.38
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.45
7.3 No corrupIion 0.27
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.18
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.28
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.3
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.52
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.25
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.13
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.24
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.25
8.5 No corrupIion 0.25
8. No improper gov. influence 0.14
8.7 Due process of low 0.35
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
75 CoJn:, P:one |
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Soro|evo, Bon|o Luko, Tuzlo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.55 3/ 3/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.54 51/ 1/13 13/2
Absence of Corruption
0.45 55/ 5/13 18/2
Open Government
0.48 44/ 3/13 10/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.7 32/ 1/13 4/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 45/ 7/13 11/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.51 4/ 5/13 14/2
CiviI Justice
0.48 5/ 7/13 1/2
CriminaI Justice
0.54 32/ 1/13 5/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Bosnio ond
Herzegovino
EosIern Europe & CenIrol
Asio
Upper middle
income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.2
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.51
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.4
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.42
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.57
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.3
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.52
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.2
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.27
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.55
3.2 SIoble lows 0.5
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.42
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.44
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.8
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.77
4.3 Due process of low 0.4
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.58
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.
4. RighI Io privocy 0.7
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.7
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.4
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.84
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.44
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.5
.2 No improper influence 0.44
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
.4 RespecI for due process 0.5
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.5
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.54
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.4
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.34
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.22
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.4
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.44
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.57
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.3
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.3
8.5 No corrupIion 0.57
8. No improper gov. influence 0.5
8.7 Due process of low 0.4
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
76 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Botswana
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Goborone, FroncisIown, Molepolole
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.7 25/ 1/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0. 25/ 1/18 2/2
Absence of Corruption
0.73 23/ 1/18 2/2
Open Government
0.1 22/ 1/18 2/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.57 54/ /18 1/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.82 2/ 1/18 3/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.8 20/ 1/18 1/2
CiviI Justice
0.1 28/ 1/18 3/2
CriminaI Justice
0.3 23/ 1/18 1/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
BoIswono Sub-Sohoron Africo Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.72
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.74
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.4
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.7
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.77
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.73
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.75
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.8
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.75
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.
3.2 SIoble lows 0.
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.8
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.4
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.51
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.53
4.3 Due process of low 0.58
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.7
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.
4. RighI Io privocy 0.2
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.72
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.55
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.7
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.7
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.74
.2 No improper influence 0.7
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.51
.4 RespecI for due process 0.58
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.78
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.53
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.47
7.3 No corrupIion 0.7
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.58
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.4
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.4
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.2
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.2
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.53
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.7
8.5 No corrupIion 0.83
8. No improper gov. influence 0.
8.7 Due process of low 0.58
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
77 CoJn:, P:one |
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BraziI
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Upper middIe income
So Poulo, Rio de Joneiro, Belo HorizonIe
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.54 42/ 3/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.3 32/ 3/1 3/2
Absence of Corruption
0.5 45/ 3/1 12/2
Open Government
0.5 3/ 5/1 7/2
FundamentaI Pights
0. 35/ 5/1 /2
Order and 5ecurity
0. 71/ 5/1 18/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.53 3/ 4/1 /2
CiviI Justice
0.51 50/ 4/1 14/2
CriminaI Justice
0.37 / 7/1 23/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Brozil LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.72
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.2
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.4
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.4
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.74
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.83
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.4
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.22
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.4
3.2 SIoble lows 0.48
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.45
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.5
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.1
4.3 Due process of low 0.37
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.74
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.81
4. RighI Io privocy 0.
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.7
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.58
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.41
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.5
.2 No improper influence 0.7
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.2
.4 RespecI for due process 0.53
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.57
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.53
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.7
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.25
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.52
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.22
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.32
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.15
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.28
8.5 No corrupIion 0.57
8. No improper gov. influence 0.7
8.7 Due process of low 0.37
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
78 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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BuIgaria
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Sofio, Plovdiv, Vorno
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.53 44/ 24/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.53 58/ 24/24 14/2
Absence of Corruption
0.43 4/ 24/24 22/2
Open Government
0.4 51/ 24/24 1/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.5 3/ 23/24 7/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 3/ 1/24 8/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.47 57/ 24/24 1/2
CiviI Justice
0.53 45/ 22/24 12/2
CriminaI Justice
0.41 5/ 24/24 15/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Bulgorio WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.5
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.41
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.4
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.34
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.2
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.3
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.5
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.3
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.4
3.2 SIoble lows 0.44
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.48
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.47
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.7
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.75
4.3 Due process of low 0.47
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.7
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.54
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.74
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.57
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.5
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.57
.2 No improper influence 0.44
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.43
.4 RespecI for due process 0.42
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.4
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.48
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.47
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.8
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.32
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.44
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.34
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.43
8.5 No corrupIion 0.38
8. No improper gov. influence 0.52
8.7 Due process of low 0.47
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
79 CoJn:, P:one |
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Burkina Faso
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
Ouogodougou, Bobo-Dioulosso, Dedougou
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.51 53/ 5/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.45 7/ 12/18 /1
Absence of Corruption
0.45 54/ 4/18 1/1
Open Government
0.41 71/ 7/18 4/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.58 50/ 4/18 2/1
Order and 5ecurity
0. 5/ 5/18 7/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.55 34/ 3/18 1/1
CiviI Justice
0.54 42/ 5/18 2/1
CriminaI Justice
0.38 4/ /18 5/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Burkino Foso Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.4
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.41
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.38
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.4
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.51
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.5
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.43
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.54
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.52
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.33
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.32
3.2 SIoble lows 0.4
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.44
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.44
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.72
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.51
4.3 Due process of low 0.37
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.52
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.7
4. RighI Io privocy 0.43
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.72
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.77
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.2
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.5
.2 No improper influence 0.58
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
.4 RespecI for due process 0.54
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.4
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.35
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.57
7.3 No corrupIion 0.55
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.54
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.58
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.48
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.43
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.51
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.23
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.45
8.5 No corrupIion 0.43
8. No improper gov. influence 0.23
8.7 Due process of low 0.37
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
80 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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Cambodia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: Low income
Phnom Penh, BoIIombong, Kompong Chom
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.4 1/ 15/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.34 4/ 15/15 15/1
Absence of Corruption
0.33 8/ 15/15 11/1
Open Government
0.38 82/ 13/15 8/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.4 82/ 12/15 10/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.73 54/ 13/15 3/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.3 4/ 15/15 13/1
CiviI Justice
0.34 7/ 15/15 15/1
CriminaI Justice
0.2 5/ 15/15 15/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Combodio EosI Asio & Pocific Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.43
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.2
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.23
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.38
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.4
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.37
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.38
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.22
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.1
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.51
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.4
3.2 SIoble lows 0.43
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.21
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.55
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.4
4.3 Due process of low 0.38
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.4
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.52
4. RighI Io privocy 0.3
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.47
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.51
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.85
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.35
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.38
.2 No improper influence 0.37
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.47
.4 RespecI for due process 0.25
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.31
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.33
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.32
7.3 No corrupIion 0.24
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.17
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.41
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.3
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.23
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.41
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.27
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.42
8.5 No corrupIion 0.21
8. No improper gov. influence 0.1
8.7 Due process of low 0.38
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
81 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Cameroon
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Douolo, Yoounde, Bomendo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.3 5/ 17/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.3 87/ 1/18 21/24
Absence of Corruption
0.2 8/ 18/18 24/24
Open Government
0.33 1/ 14/18 22/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.4 81/ 13/18 18/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.3 80/ 10/18 18/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.3 3/ 1/18 23/24
CiviI Justice
0.34 5/ 18/18 23/24
CriminaI Justice
0.31 2/ 18/18 21/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Comeroon Sub-Sohoron Africo Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.33
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.3
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.47
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.43
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.4
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.34
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.2
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.31
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.24
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.2
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.42
3.2 SIoble lows 0.33
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.31
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.27
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.42
4.3 Due process of low 0.31
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.4
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.1
4. RighI Io privocy 0.38
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.4
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.1
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.28
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.4
.2 No improper influence 0.3
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.15
.4 RespecI for due process 0.3
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.51
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.3
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.52
7.3 No corrupIion 0.31
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.27
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.33
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.11
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.48
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.33
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.3
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.1
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.28
8. No improper gov. influence 0.24
8.7 Due process of low 0.31
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
82 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Canada
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
ToronIo, MonIreol, Voncouver
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.78 11/ 8/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.8 13/ 11/24 13/30
Absence of Corruption
0.81 14/ /24 14/30
Open Government
0.82 3/ 2/24 3/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.77 1/ 14/24 1/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.8 15/ /24 13/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.7 / /24 /30
CiviI Justice
0.72 13/ 8/24 13/30
CriminaI Justice
0.72 15/ /24 15/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Conodo WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.77
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.7
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.8
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.75
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.8
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.88
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.77
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.8
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.8
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.78
3.2 SIoble lows 0.8
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.81
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.84
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.2
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.85
4.3 Due process of low 0.74
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.8
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.84
4. RighI Io privocy 0.78
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.85
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.88
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.73
.2 No improper influence 0.83
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.
.4 RespecI for due process 0.85
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.82
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.54
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.5
7.3 No corrupIion 0.8
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.88
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.55
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.8
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.8
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.73
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.81
8. No improper gov. influence 0.8
8.7 Due process of low 0.74
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
83 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
ChiIe
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Upper middIe income
SonIiogo, Volporoso, Concepcion
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.8 21/ 2/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.7 17/ 1/1 1/2
Absence of Corruption
0.73 22/ 2/1 1/2
Open Government
0.5 1/ 1/1 1/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.74 21/ 2/1 1/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.71 1/ 1/1 15/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.8 21/ 2/1 2/2
CiviI Justice
0.1 2/ 2/1 2/2
CriminaI Justice
0.57 28/ 1/1 2/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Chile LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.77
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.5
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.7
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.5
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.7
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.1
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.7
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.75
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.8
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.55
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.52
3.2 SIoble lows 0.84
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.48
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.7
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.83
4.3 Due process of low 0.1
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.77
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.83
4. RighI Io privocy 0.84
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.1
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.81
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.32
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.1
.2 No improper influence 0.7
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.7
.4 RespecI for due process 0.53
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.7
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.5
7.3 No corrupIion 0.8
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.75
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.44
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.51
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.42
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.2
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.32
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.55
8.5 No corrupIion 0.73
8. No improper gov. influence 0.75
8.7 Due process of low 0.1
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
84 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
China
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Shonghoi, Bei|ing, Guongzhou
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.45 7/ 13/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.35 2/ 14/15 2/2
Absence of Corruption
0.48 4/ 10/15 15/2
Open Government
0.41 74/ 11/15 24/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.31 / 14/15 28/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.81 2/ 8/15 4/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.41 78/ 12/15 28/2
CiviI Justice
0.41 7/ 11/15 25/2
CriminaI Justice
0.43 51/ 11/15 12/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Chino EosI Asio & Pocific Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.58
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.4
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.37
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.45
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.08
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.23
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.34
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.2
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.4
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.
3.2 SIoble lows 0.48
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.24
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.23
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.53
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.3
4.3 Due process of low 0.4
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.08
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.2
4. RighI Io privocy 0.3
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.17
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.32
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.78
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.5
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.4
.2 No improper influence 0.54
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.51
.4 RespecI for due process 0.2
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.2
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.4
7.3 No corrupIion 0.33
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.17
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.7
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.33
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.3
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.4
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.45
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.5
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.44
8.5 No corrupIion 0.53
8. No improper gov. influence 0.1
8.7 Due process of low 0.4
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
85 CoJn:, P:one |
Complete country prole available at: http://data.worldjusticeproject.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Colombia
A smaller sub-factor bar represents a lower score (0.00 being lowest possible), and a larger bar represents a higher score (1.00 being highest possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean | Income group: Upper middle income
Bogota, Medellin, Barranquilla
Overall Score Global Rank Regional Rank
0.49 61/99 7/16
Factor
Trend
Factor
Score
Global
Rank
Regional
Rank
Income
Rank
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.55 47/99 6/16 10/29
Absence of Corruption
0.43 61/99 9/16 21/29
Open Government
0.49 40/99 6/16 8/29
Fundamental Rights
0.55 61/99 12/16 18/29
Order and Security
0.58 89/99 12/16 26/29
Regulatory Enforcement
0.5 50/99 5/16 15/29
Civil Justice
0.49 54/99 5/16 15/29
Criminal Justice
0.35 79/99 10/16 26/29
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Colombia Latin America & the Caribbean Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 Limits by legislature 0.59
1.2 Limits by judiciary 0.52
1.3 Independent auditing 0.48
1.4 Sanctions for ofcial
misconduct
0.46
1.5 Non-governmental checks 0.59
1.6 Lawful transition of power 0.68
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corruption in the
executive branch
0.5
2.2 No corruption in the
judiciary
0.49
2.3 No corruption in the
police/military
0.56
2.4 No corruption in the
legislature
0.18
Open Government
3.1 Accessible laws 0.42
3.2 Stable laws 0.45
3.3 Right to petition /
participation
0.52
3.4 Right to information 0.57
Fundamental Rights
4.1 Equal treatment / no
discrimination
0.54
4.2 Right to life and security 0.54
4.3 Due process of law 0.43
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.59
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.67
4.6 Right to privacy 0.55
4.7 Freedom of association 0.63
4.8 Labor rights 0.41
Order and Security
5.1 Absence of crime 0.51
5.2 Absence of civil conict 0.94
5.3 Absence of violent redress 0.31
Regulatory Enforcement
6.1 Effective regulatory
enforcement
0.44
6.2 No improper inuence 0.6
6.3 No unreasonable delay 0.33
6.4 Respect for due process 0.45
6.5 No expropriation w/out
adequate compensation
0.68
Civil Justice
7.1 Accessibility and
affordability
0.53
7.2 No discrimination 0.59
7.3 No corruption 0.53
7.4 No improper gov. inuence 0.55
7.5 No unreasonable delay 0.23
7.6 Effective enforcement 0.37
7.7 Impartial and effective ADRs 0.66
Criminal Justice
8.1 Effective investigations 0.2
8.2 Timely and effective
adjudication
0.35
8.3 Effective correctional system 0.13
8.4 No discrimination 0.4
8.5 No corruption 0.45
8.6 No improper gov. inuence 0.5
8.7 Due process of law 0.43
Constraints on
Government
Powers
Absence of
Corruption
Open
Government
Fundamental
Rights
Order and
Security
Regulatory
Enforcement
Civil
Justice
Criminal
Justice
86 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Cote d'Ivoire
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Abid|on, Bouoke, Son Pedro
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.4 72/ /18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.44 77/ 13/18 1/24
Absence of Corruption
0.41 / /18 10/24
Open Government
0.34 88/ 13/18 21/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.5 72/ 10/18 1/24
Order and 5ecurity
0. 85/ 13/18 20/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.47 58/ /18 7/24
CiviI Justice
0.48 57/ 8/18 /24
CriminaI Justice
0.4 0/ 8/18 10/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
CoIe d'Ivoire Sub-Sohoron Africo Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.44
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.37
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.44
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.45
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.44
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.41
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.3
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.52
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.34
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.24
3.2 SIoble lows 0.3
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.42
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.32
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.2
4.3 Due process of low 0.33
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.4
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.32
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.48
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.5
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.75
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.41
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.38
.2 No improper influence 0.48
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.43
.4 RespecI for due process 0.41
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.2
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.3
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.55
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.37
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.57
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.48
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.2
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.2
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.54
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.28
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.51
8.5 No corrupIion 0.42
8. No improper gov. influence 0.45
8.7 Due process of low 0.33
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
87 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Croatia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Zogreb, SpliI, Ri|eko
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.57 3/ 23/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.58 40/ 22/24 2/30
Absence of Corruption
0.54 3/ 22/24 30/30
Open Government
0.4 38/ 21/24 28/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.4 37/ 24/24 2/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.77 3/ 21/24 2/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.4 53/ 23/24 30/30
CiviI Justice
0.52 4/ 23/24 2/30
CriminaI Justice
0.55 31/ 21/24 27/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
CrooIio WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.5
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.45
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.5
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.5
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.1
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.77
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.52
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.5
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.7
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.42
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.51
3.2 SIoble lows 0.54
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.38
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.55
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.8
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.5
4.3 Due process of low 0.5
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.2
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.72
4. RighI Io privocy 0.4
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.75
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.74
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.4
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.38
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.58
.2 No improper influence 0.53
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.28
.4 RespecI for due process 0.4
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.55
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.54
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.52
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.17
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.42
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.75
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.75
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.51
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.3
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.47
8.5 No corrupIion 0.57
8. No improper gov. influence 0.58
8.7 Due process of low 0.5
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
88 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Czech PepubIic
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Progue, Brno, OsIrovo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.7 23/ 15/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.72 23/ 1/24 22/30
Absence of Corruption
0. 31/ 1/24 27/30
Open Government
0.52 33/ 18/24 25/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.8 11/ /24 11/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.82 28/ 15/24 22/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.3 24/ 14/24 22/30
CiviI Justice
0.5 20/ 13/24 20/30
CriminaI Justice
0.7 1/ 12/24 1/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Czech Republic WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.78
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.5
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.7
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.5
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.7
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.84
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.58
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.71
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.8
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.32
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.53
3.2 SIoble lows 0.55
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.52
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.77
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.2
4.3 Due process of low 0.78
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.7
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.87
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.82
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.8
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.83
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.1
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.8
.2 No improper influence 0.77
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.48
.4 RespecI for due process 0.54
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.78
7.3 No corrupIion 0.8
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.7
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.34
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.7
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.72
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.4
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.1
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.5
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.7
8.5 No corrupIion 0.8
8. No improper gov. influence 0.82
8.7 Due process of low 0.78
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
89 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Denmark
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Copenhogen, Aorhus, Odense
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.88 1/ 1/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.4 1/ 1/24 1/30
Absence of Corruption
0. 1/ 1/24 1/30
Open Government
0.7 5/ 4/24 5/30
FundamentaI Pights
0. 2/ 2/24 2/30
Order and 5ecurity
0. 3/ 1/24 3/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.84 2/ 2/24 2/30
CiviI Justice
0.82 4/ 4/24 4/30
CriminaI Justice
0.84 3/ 2/24 3/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Denmork WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.2
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.5
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.4
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.5
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.8
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.5
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.7
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.8
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.72
3.2 SIoble lows 0.87
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.7
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.82
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.83
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.
4.3 Due process of low 0.3
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.5
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.85
4. RighI Io privocy 0.
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.4
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.85
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.82
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.87
.2 No improper influence 0.2
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.81
.4 RespecI for due process 0.8
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.83
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.72
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.1
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.4
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.7
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.71
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.8
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.82
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.74
8.5 No corrupIion 0.
8. No improper gov. influence 0.2
8.7 Due process of low 0.3
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
90 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Dominican PepubIic
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Upper middIe income
SonIo Domingo, DisIriIo Nocionol, SonIiogo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.47 7/ 10/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.48 7/ 10/1 1/2
Absence of Corruption
0.37 77/ 12/1 2/2
Open Government
0.48 45/ 7/1 11/2
FundamentaI Pights
0. 47/ /1 14/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.5 87/ 11/1 25/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.42 7/ 13/1 27/2
CiviI Justice
0.48 0/ /1 17/2
CriminaI Justice
0.37 / 5/1 21/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Dominicon
Republic
LoIin Americo & Ihe
Coribbeon
Upper middle
income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.52
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.3
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.31
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.35
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.7
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.7
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.42
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.4
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.14
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.53
3.2 SIoble lows 0.58
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.37
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.42
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.4
4.3 Due process of low 0.4
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.8
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.75
4. RighI Io privocy 0.51
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.72
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.53
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.1
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.18
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.37
.2 No improper influence 0.53
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.31
.4 RespecI for due process 0.3
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.51
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.7
7.3 No corrupIion 0.45
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.38
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.45
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.3
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.55
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.38
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.42
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.1
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.38
8.5 No corrupIion 0.41
8. No improper gov. influence 0.42
8.7 Due process of low 0.4
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
91 CoJn:, P:one |
Complete country prole available at: http://data.worldjusticeproject.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Ecuador
A smaller sub-factor bar represents a lower score (0.00 being lowest possible), and a larger bar represents a higher score (1.00 being highest possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean | Income group: Upper middle income
Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca
Overall Score Global Rank Regional Rank
0.45 77/99 11/16
Factor
Trend
Factor
Score
Global
Rank
Regional
Rank
Income
Rank
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.4 85/99 13/16 23/29
Absence of Corruption
0.47 51/99 6/16 17/29
Open Government
0.4 75/99 13/16 25/29
Fundamental Rights
0.54 62/99 13/16 19/29
Order and Security
0.57 91/99 13/16 27/29
Regulatory Enforcement
0.48 54/99 8/16 17/29
Civil Justice
0.41 77/99 10/16 24/29
Criminal Justice
0.33 86/99 11/16 27/29
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Ecuador Latin America & the Caribbean Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 Limits by legislature 0.36
1.2 Limits by judiciary 0.27
1.3 Independent auditing 0.37
1.4 Sanctions for ofcial
misconduct
0.37
1.5 Non-governmental checks 0.51
1.6 Lawful transition of power 0.5
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corruption in the
executive branch
0.55
2.2 No corruption in the
judiciary
0.35
2.3 No corruption in the
police/military
0.58
2.4 No corruption in the
legislature
0.38
Open Government
3.1 Accessible laws 0.48
3.2 Stable laws 0.31
3.3 Right to petition /
participation
0.47
3.4 Right to information 0.36
Fundamental Rights
4.1 Equal treatment / no
discrimination
0.56
4.2 Right to life and security 0.56
4.3 Due process of law 0.42
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.52
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.73
4.6 Right to privacy 0.42
4.7 Freedom of association 0.59
4.8 Labor rights 0.54
Order and Security
5.1 Absence of crime 0.46
5.2 Absence of civil conict 1
5.3 Absence of violent redress 0.26
Regulatory Enforcement
6.1 Effective regulatory
enforcement
0.5
6.2 No improper inuence 0.57
6.3 No unreasonable delay 0.42
6.4 Respect for due process 0.43
6.5 No expropriation w/out
adequate compensation
0.49
Civil Justice
7.1 Accessibility and
affordability
0.48
7.2 No discrimination 0.48
7.3 No corruption 0.37
7.4 No improper gov. inuence 0.26
7.5 No unreasonable delay 0.27
7.6 Effective enforcement 0.33
7.7 Impartial and effective ADRs 0.67
Criminal Justice
8.1 Effective investigations 0.28
8.2 Timely and effective
adjudication
0.37
8.3 Effective correctional system 0.16
8.4 No discrimination 0.31
8.5 No corruption 0.47
8.6 No improper gov. inuence 0.3
8.7 Due process of law 0.42
Constraints on
Government
Powers
Absence of
Corruption
Open
Government
Fundamental
Rights
Order and
Security
Regulatory
Enforcement
Civil
Justice
Criminal
Justice
92 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Egypt
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: MiddIe East & North Africa [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Coiro, Alexondrio, Gizo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.45 74/ /7
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.45 74/ /7 15/24
Absence of Corruption
0.4 52/ 5/7 5/24
Open Government
0.44 4/ 5/7 13/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.3 0/ /7 22/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 / /7 13/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.42 75/ 7/7 14/24
CiviI Justice
0.3 84/ 7/7 17/24
CriminaI Justice
0.41 57/ 5/7 8/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
EgypI Middle EosI & NorIh Africo Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.51
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.44
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.44
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.5
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.43
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.3
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.48
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.5
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.48
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.3
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.52
3.2 SIoble lows 0.43
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.51
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.28
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.54
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.33
4.3 Due process of low 0.28
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.43
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.23
4. RighI Io privocy 0.32
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.4
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.84
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.2
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.2
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.47
.2 No improper influence 0.4
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.2
.4 RespecI for due process 0.42
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.5
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.45
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.3
7.3 No corrupIion 0.5
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.48
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.35
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.13
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.3
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.41
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.43
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.28
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.41
8.5 No corrupIion 0.53
8. No improper gov. influence 0.54
8.7 Due process of low 0.28
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
93 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
EI 5aIvador
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Son Solvodor, Son Miguel, SonIo Ano
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.48 4/ /1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.4 / /1 11/24
Absence of Corruption
0.4 53/ 7/1 /24
Open Government
0.37 84/ 15/1 1/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.2 42/ /1 3/24
Order and 5ecurity
0. 70/ 4/1 15/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.4 52/ 7/1 /24
CiviI Justice
0.47 2/ 7/1 11/24
CriminaI Justice
0.31 0/ 12/1 1/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
El Solvodor LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.1
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.42
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.34
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.3
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.2
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.5
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.5
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.2
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.41
3.2 SIoble lows 0.42
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.41
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.25
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.7
4.3 Due process of low 0.4
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.3
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.75
4. RighI Io privocy 0.1
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.3
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.57
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.42
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.43
.2 No improper influence 0.55
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.54
.4 RespecI for due process 0.47
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.45
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.5
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.34
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.43
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.4
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.4
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.15
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.34
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.03
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.28
8.5 No corrupIion 0.44
8. No improper gov. influence 0.47
8.7 Due process of low 0.4
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
94 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Estonia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Tollinn, TorIu, Norvo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.7 15/ 10/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.8 12/ 10/24 12/30
Absence of Corruption
0.78 18/ 11/24 18/30
Open Government
0.71 15/ 10/24 15/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.8 12/ 10/24 12/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.84 24/ 13/24 20/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.75 13/ /24 13/30
CiviI Justice
0.72 15/ 10/24 15/30
CriminaI Justice
0.72 13/ 7/24 13/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
EsIonio WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.7
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.81
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.7
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.81
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.7
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.88
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.7
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.58
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.
3.2 SIoble lows 0.77
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.73
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.85
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.3
4.3 Due process of low 0.77
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.7
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.81
4. RighI Io privocy 0.77
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.85
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.7
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.83
.2 No improper influence 0.8
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.7
.4 RespecI for due process 0.2
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.74
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.57
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.87
7.3 No corrupIion 0.8
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.83
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.54
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.5
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.57
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.1
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.8
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.8
8.5 No corrupIion 0.83
8. No improper gov. influence 0.1
8.7 Due process of low 0.77
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
95 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Ethiopia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
Addis Abobo, Dire Dowo, Mek'ele
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.42 88/ 14/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.35 1/ 17/18 14/1
Absence of Corruption
0.45 5/ 5/18 2/1
Open Government
0.32 4/ 1/18 13/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.3 4/ 17/18 14/1
Order and 5ecurity
0. 73/ 8/18 /1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.38 8/ 14/18 10/1
CiviI Justice
0.3 85/ 1/18 12/1
CriminaI Justice
0.45 4/ 4/18 3/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
EIhiopio Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.3
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.35
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.38
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.47
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.2
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.28
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.43
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.35
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.48
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.54
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.54
3.2 SIoble lows 0.18
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.35
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.22
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.51
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.3
4.3 Due process of low 0.3
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.2
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.1
4. RighI Io privocy 0.21
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.31
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.31
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.5
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.4
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.38
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.41
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.28
.4 RespecI for due process 0.18
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.4
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.32
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.3
7.3 No corrupIion 0.37
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.2
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.37
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.58
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.55
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.47
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.42
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.51
8.5 No corrupIion 0.47
8. No improper gov. influence 0.33
8.7 Due process of low 0.3
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
96 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Complete country prole available at: http://data.worldjusticeproject.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Finland
A smaller sub-factor bar represents a lower score (0.00 being lowest possible), and a larger bar represents a higher score (1.00 being highest possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America | Income group: High income
Helsinki, Tampere, Turku
Overall Score Global Rank Regional Rank
0.84 4/99 4/24
Factor
Trend
Factor
Score
Global
Rank
Regional
Rank
Income
Rank
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.88 5/99 4/24 5/30
Absence of Corruption
0.9 6/99 4/24 6/30
Open Government
0.76 11/99 8/24 11/30
Fundamental Rights
0.89 4/99 4/24 4/30
Order and Security
0.89 8/99 3/24 7/30
Regulatory Enforcement
0.78 11/99 8/24 11/30
Civil Justice
0.75 8/99 7/24 8/30
Criminal Justice
0.85 1/99 1/24 1/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Finland Western Europe & North America High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 Limits by legislature 0.85
1.2 Limits by judiciary 0.83
1.3 Independent auditing 0.85
1.4 Sanctions for ofcial
misconduct
0.88
1.5 Non-governmental checks 0.9
1.6 Lawful transition of power 0.95
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corruption in the
executive branch
0.91
2.2 No corruption in the
judiciary
0.9
2.3 No corruption in the
police/military
0.96
2.4 No corruption in the
legislature
0.81
Open Government
3.1 Accessible laws 0.74
3.2 Stable laws 0.83
3.3 Right to petition /
participation
0.69
3.4 Right to information 0.79
Fundamental Rights
4.1 Equal treatment / no
discrimination
0.87
4.2 Right to life and security 1
4.3 Due process of law 0.9
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.9
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.77
4.6 Right to privacy 1
4.7 Freedom of association 0.9
4.8 Labor rights 0.81
Order and Security
5.1 Absence of crime 0.84
5.2 Absence of civil conict 1
5.3 Absence of violent redress 0.82
Regulatory Enforcement
6.1 Effective regulatory
enforcement
0.78
6.2 No improper inuence 0.87
6.3 No unreasonable delay 0.7
6.4 Respect for due process 0.81
6.5 No expropriation w/out
adequate compensation
0.73
Civil Justice
7.1 Accessibility and
affordability
0.6
7.2 No discrimination 0.93
7.3 No corruption 0.87
7.4 No improper gov. inuence 0.84
7.5 No unreasonable delay 0.62
7.6 Effective enforcement 0.77
7.7 Impartial and effective ADRs 0.62
Criminal Justice
8.1 Effective investigations 0.74
8.2 Timely and effective
adjudication
0.82
8.3 Effective correctional system 0.8
8.4 No discrimination 0.8
8.5 No corruption 0.92
8.6 No improper gov. inuence 0.98
8.7 Due process of law 0.9
Constraints on
Government
Powers
Absence of
Corruption
Open
Government
Fundamental
Rights
Order and
Security
Regulatory
Enforcement
Civil
Justice
Criminal
Justice
97 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
France
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Poris, Lyon, Morseille
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.74 18/ 12/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.7 14/ 12/24 14/30
Absence of Corruption
0.78 20/ 12/24 20/30
Open Government
0.7 1/ 11/24 1/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.7 18/ 1/24 18/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.81 30/ 1/24 23/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.75 14/ 10/24 14/30
CiviI Justice
0. 18/ 11/24 18/30
CriminaI Justice
0.5 21/ 14/24 21/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Fronce WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.8
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.74
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.7
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.82
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.78
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.83
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.87
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.3
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.2
3.2 SIoble lows 0.8
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.74
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.78
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.78
4.3 Due process of low 0.71
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.82
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.84
4. RighI Io privocy 0.7
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.7
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.5
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.73
.2 No improper influence 0.84
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.
.4 RespecI for due process 0.71
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.8
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.71
7.3 No corrupIion 0.77
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.74
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.72
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.57
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.5
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.45
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.8
8.5 No corrupIion 0.82
8. No improper gov. influence 0.7
8.7 Due process of low 0.71
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
98 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Georgia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Tbilisi, KuIoisi, BoIumi
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0. 31/ 1/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.53 55/ 2/13 /24
Absence of Corruption
0.71 24/ 1/13 1/24
Open Government
0.48 43/ 2/13 5/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.58 51/ 5/13 /24
Order and 5ecurity
0.85 17/ 2/13 2/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.57 31/ 1/13 1/24
CiviI Justice
0.5 32/ 2/13 1/24
CriminaI Justice
0.51 3/ 2/13 1/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Georgio EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.5
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.42
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.5
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.58
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.4
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.55
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.7
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.5
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.8
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.71
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.51
3.2 SIoble lows 0.44
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.51
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.7
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.58
4.3 Due process of low 0.55
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.4
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.
4. RighI Io privocy 0.35
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.57
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.2
.2 No improper influence 0.84
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
.4 RespecI for due process 0.34
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.53
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.4
7.3 No corrupIion 0.58
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.42
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.57
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.48
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.57
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.35
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.58
8.5 No corrupIion 0.72
8. No improper gov. influence 0.32
8.7 Due process of low 0.55
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
99 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Germany
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Berlin, Homburg, Munich
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.8 / 7/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.83 / 7/24 /30
Absence of Corruption
0.83 12/ 7/24 12/30
Open Government
0.73 14/ /24 14/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.84 8/ 7/24 8/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.87 13/ 5/24 11/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.74 1/ 11/24 1/30
CiviI Justice
0.82 3/ 3/24 3/30
CriminaI Justice
0.71 1/ 10/24 1/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Germony WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.83
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.84
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.7
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.78
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.5
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.8
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.3
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.1
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.7
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.8
3.2 SIoble lows 0.8
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.72
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.71
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.78
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.8
4.3 Due process of low 0.78
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.85
4. RighI Io privocy 0.7
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.1
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.82
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.7
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.74
.2 No improper influence 0.83
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
.4 RespecI for due process 0.82
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.8
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.3
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.88
7.3 No corrupIion 0.8
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.8
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.77
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.2
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.8
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.2
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.1
8.5 No corrupIion 0.85
8. No improper gov. influence 0.82
8.7 Due process of low 0.78
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
100 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Ghana
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Accro, Kumosi, Sekondi-Tokorodi
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.57 37/ 2/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.8 27/ 2/18 1/24
Absence of Corruption
0.44 58/ /18 7/24
Open Government
0.5 37/ 3/18 3/24
FundamentaI Pights
0. 33/ 1/18 1/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.72 57/ 3/18 11/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.53 43/ 5/18 4/24
CiviI Justice
0.5 35/ 3/18 2/24
CriminaI Justice
0.44 4/ /18 /24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Ghono Sub-Sohoron Africo Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.7
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.5
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.51
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.55
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.8
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.8
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.48
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.5
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.41
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.32
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.42
3.2 SIoble lows 0.58
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.57
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.42
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.
4.3 Due process of low 0.41
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.81
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.75
4. RighI Io privocy 0.
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.81
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.78
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.3
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.53
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.42
.4 RespecI for due process 0.47
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.48
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.8
7.3 No corrupIion 0.5
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.51
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.4
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.4
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.32
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.35
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.43
8. No improper gov. influence 0.75
8.7 Due process of low 0.41
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
101 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Greece
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
AIhens, Solonico, PoIros
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.5 32/ 21/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0. 2/ 1/24 2/30
Absence of Corruption
0.5 34/ 21/24 2/30
Open Government
0.5 34/ 1/24 2/30
FundamentaI Pights
0. 28/ 21/24 2/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.74 4/ 22/24 27/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.54 37/ 21/24 2/30
CiviI Justice
0.1 25/ 17/24 24/30
CriminaI Justice
0.4 43/ 23/24 30/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Greece WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.3
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.5
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.58
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.52
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.75
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.53
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.77
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.31
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.3
3.2 SIoble lows 0.4
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.41
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.73
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.4
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.74
4.3 Due process of low 0.52
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.7
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.73
4. RighI Io privocy 0.74
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.82
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.4
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.53
.2 No improper influence 0.4
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
.4 RespecI for due process 0.52
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.7
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.2
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.84
7.3 No corrupIion 0.
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.5
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.48
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.81
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.32
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.45
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.23
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.33
8.5 No corrupIion 0.3
8. No improper gov. influence 0.72
8.7 Due process of low 0.52
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
102 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
GuatemaIa
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Lower middIe income
GuoIemolo CiIy, QueIzolIenongo, EscuinIlo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.44 83/ 13/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.52 5/ 8/1 10/24
Absence of Corruption
0.37 7/ 11/1 14/24
Open Government
0.45 57/ 10/1 10/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.5 57/ 10/1 /24
Order and 5ecurity
0.54 2/ 14/1 21/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.3 85/ 14/1 1/24
CiviI Justice
0.3 3/ 14/1 21/24
CriminaI Justice
0.3 3/ 13/1 22/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
GuoIemolo LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.5
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.44
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.37
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.35
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.4
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.73
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.43
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.3
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.48
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.2
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.42
3.2 SIoble lows 0.52
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.4
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.44
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.58
4.3 Due process of low 0.45
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.4
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.7
4. RighI Io privocy 0.3
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.37
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.43
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.21
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.34
.2 No improper influence 0.51
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.31
.4 RespecI for due process 0.33
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.4
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.31
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.4
7.3 No corrupIion 0.45
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.4
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.22
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.1
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.55
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.1
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.21
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.11
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.32
8.5 No corrupIion 0.41
8. No improper gov. influence 0.44
8.7 Due process of low 0.45
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
103 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Hong Kong 5AP, China
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: High income
Hong Kong
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.7 1/ /15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.72 24/ /15 23/30
Absence of Corruption
0.85 / 4/15 /30
Open Government
0.77 10/ 3/15 10/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.8 2/ /15 27/30
Order and 5ecurity
0. 4/ 3/15 4/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.74 15/ 5/15 15/30
CiviI Justice
0.72 1/ /15 1/30
CriminaI Justice
0.73 10/ 3/15 10/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Hong Kong SAR, Chino EosI Asio & Pocific High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.87
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.81
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.81
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.5
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.2
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.8
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.87
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.1
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.81
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.85
3.2 SIoble lows 0.
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.5
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.75
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.77
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.81
4.3 Due process of low 0.77
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.5
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.71
4. RighI Io privocy 0.71
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.55
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.3
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.78
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.7
.2 No improper influence 0.8
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.78
.4 RespecI for due process 0.73
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.7
7.3 No corrupIion 0.84
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.74
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.74
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.2
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.71
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.77
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.7
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.84
8. No improper gov. influence 0.73
8.7 Due process of low 0.77
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
104 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Hungary
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
BudopesI, Debrecen, Miskolc
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.1 30/ 20/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.1 3/ 21/24 28/30
Absence of Corruption
0.4 2/ 17/24 25/30
Open Government
0.5 35/ 20/24 27/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.8 30/ 22/24 28/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.84 21/ 10/24 17/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.57 30/ 20/24 28/30
CiviI Justice
0.4 55/ 24/24 30/30
CriminaI Justice
0.53 34/ 22/24 28/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Hungory WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.52
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.1
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.4
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.58
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.72
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.83
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.1
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.78
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.48
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.3
3.2 SIoble lows 0.4
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.48
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.4
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.58
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.83
4.3 Due process of low 0.4
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.73
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.2
4. RighI Io privocy 0.73
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.75
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.7
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.88
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.72
.2 No improper influence 0.75
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.35
.4 RespecI for due process 0.53
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.51
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.4
7.3 No corrupIion 0.82
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.45
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.22
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.45
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.54
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.4
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.43
8.5 No corrupIion 0.7
8. No improper gov. influence 0.2
8.7 Due process of low 0.4
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
105 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
India
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5outh Asia [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Mumboi, Delhi, Bongolore
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.48 / 3/
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.1 35/ 1/ 4/24
Absence of Corruption
0.3 72/ 2/ 12/24
Open Government
0.53 30/ 1/ 2/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.54 3/ 3/ 10/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.51 5/ 4/ 22/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.4 81/ 3/ 1/24
CiviI Justice
0.3 0/ 3/ 18/24
CriminaI Justice
0.44 48/ 2/ 5/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Indio SouIh Asio Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.7
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.52
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.3
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.8
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.74
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.3
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.48
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.21
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.5
3.2 SIoble lows 0.5
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.58
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.45
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.34
4.3 Due process of low 0.38
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.8
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.72
4. RighI Io privocy 0.5
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.7
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.47
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.71
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.51
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.33
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.34
.2 No improper influence 0.38
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.24
.4 RespecI for due process 0.47
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.58
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.2
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.48
7.3 No corrupIion 0.48
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.25
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.21
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.4
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.43
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.3
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.4
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.52
8. No improper gov. influence 0.3
8.7 Due process of low 0.38
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
106 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Indonesia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: Lower middIe income
JokorIo, Suroboyo, Bondung
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.52 4/ 8/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.4 31/ 7/15 2/24
Absence of Corruption
0.3 80/ 14/15 15/24
Open Government
0.54 2/ 7/15 1/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.54 5/ /15 11/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.77 42/ 11/15 7/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.52 4/ 7/15 5/24
CiviI Justice
0.47 7/ /15 12/24
CriminaI Justice
0.37 71/ 12/15 12/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Indonesio EosI Asio & Pocific Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.7
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.5
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.51
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.57
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.74
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.8
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.34
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.37
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.22
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.
3.2 SIoble lows 0.53
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.3
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.38
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.51
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.4
4.3 Due process of low 0.35
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.74
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.45
4. RighI Io privocy 0.48
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.71
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.5
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.35
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.47
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.51
.4 RespecI for due process 0.5
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.1
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.51
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.51
7.3 No corrupIion 0.3
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.58
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.2
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.45
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.31
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.4
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.2
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.35
8.5 No corrupIion 0.38
8. No improper gov. influence 0.52
8.7 Due process of low 0.35
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
107 CoJn:, P:one |
Complete country prole available at: http://data.worldjusticeproject.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Iran
A smaller sub-factor bar represents a lower score (0.00 being lowest possible), and a larger bar represents a higher score (1.00 being highest possible).
Region: Middle East & North Africa | Income group: Upper middle income
Teheran, Mashhad, Isfaha
Overall Score Global Rank Regional Rank
0.44 82/99 7/7
Factor
Trend
Factor
Score
Global
Rank
Regional
Rank
Income
Rank
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.36 90/99 7/7 25/29
Absence of Corruption
0.5 42/99 3/7 10/29
Open Government
0.34 90/99 7/7 28/29
Fundamental Rights
0.23 99/99 7/7 29/29
Order and Security
0.63 77/99 7/7 21/29
Regulatory Enforcement
0.53 41/99 4/7 8/29
Civil Justice
0.56 38/99 3/7 7/29
Criminal Justice
0.38 63/99 6/7 19/29
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Iran Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 Limits by legislature 0.48
1.2 Limits by judiciary 0.47
1.3 Independent auditing 0.24
1.4 Sanctions for ofcial
misconduct
0.32
1.5 Non-governmental checks 0.23
1.6 Lawful transition of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corruption in the
executive branch
0.48
2.2 No corruption in the
judiciary
0.51
2.3 No corruption in the
police/military
0.6
2.4 No corruption in the
legislature
0.42
Open Government
3.1 Accessible laws 0.42
3.2 Stable laws 0.44
3.3 Right to petition /
participation
0.28
3.4 Right to information 0.22
Fundamental Rights
4.1 Equal treatment / no
discrimination
0.46
4.2 Right to life and security 0.14
4.3 Due process of law 0.34
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.23
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.13
4.6 Right to privacy 0.08
4.7 Freedom of association 0.21
4.8 Labor rights 0.28
Order and Security
5.1 Absence of crime 0.54
5.2 Absence of civil conict 0.92
5.3 Absence of violent redress 0.44
Regulatory Enforcement
6.1 Effective regulatory
enforcement
0.57
6.2 No improper inuence 0.55
6.3 No unreasonable delay 0.51
6.4 Respect for due process 0.49
6.5 No expropriation w/out
adequate compensation
0.55
Civil Justice
7.1 Accessibility and
affordability
0.5
7.2 No discrimination 0.52
7.3 No corruption 0.54
7.4 No improper gov. inuence 0.4
7.5 No unreasonable delay 0.63
7.6 Effective enforcement 0.65
7.7 Impartial and effective ADRs 0.7
Criminal Justice
8.1 Effective investigations 0.39
8.2 Timely and effective
adjudication
0.45
8.3 Effective correctional system 0.42
8.4 No discrimination 0.32
8.5 No corruption 0.53
8.6 No improper gov. inuence 0.22
8.7 Due process of law 0.34
Constraints on
Government
Powers
Absence of
Corruption
Open
Government
Fundamental
Rights
Order and
Security
Regulatory
Enforcement
Civil
Justice
Criminal
Justice
108 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
ItaIy
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Rome, Milon, Noples
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.3 2/ 1/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0. 2/ 17/24 24/30
Absence of Corruption
0. 30/ 18/24 2/30
Open Government
0.4 3/ 22/24 2/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.73 22/ 17/24 21/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.74 50/ 23/24 28/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.5 2/ 1/24 27/30
CiviI Justice
0.58 3/ 21/24 28/30
CriminaI Justice
0.3 24/ 1/24 23/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
IIoly WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.72
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.7
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.5
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.58
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.72
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.78
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.58
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.7
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.82
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.24
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.4
3.2 SIoble lows 0.53
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.42
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.5
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.1
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.2
4.3 Due process of low 0.
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.73
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.74
4. RighI Io privocy 0.81
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.58
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.42
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.7
.2 No improper influence 0.73
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.34
.4 RespecI for due process 0.5
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.54
7.3 No corrupIion 0.72
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.35
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.48
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.4
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.55
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.4
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.5
8.5 No corrupIion 0.75
8. No improper gov. influence 0.87
8.7 Due process of low 0.
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
109 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Jamaica
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Upper middIe income
KingsIon, PorImore, Sponish Town
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.53 45/ 4/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.2 34/ 4/1 4/2
Absence of Corruption
0.48 50/ 5/1 1/2
Open Government
0.44 5/ 11/1 18/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.1 44/ 7/1 12/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.5 74/ 7/1 1/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.5 32/ 3/1 3/2
CiviI Justice
0.47 4/ 8/1 18/2
CriminaI Justice
0.42 53/ 3/1 13/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Jomoico LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.7
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.54
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.43
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.8
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.72
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.51
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.1
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.2
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.4
3.2 SIoble lows 0.53
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.41
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.43
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.47
4.3 Due process of low 0.3
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.83
4. RighI Io privocy 0.5
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.75
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.51
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.78
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.17
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.57
.2 No improper influence 0.75
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
.4 RespecI for due process 0.54
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.57
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.43
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.44
7.3 No corrupIion 0.7
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.4
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.34
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.27
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.4
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.21
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.37
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.1
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.44
8.5 No corrupIion 0.5
8. No improper gov. influence 0.7
8.7 Due process of low 0.3
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
110 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Japan
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: High income
Tokyo, Yokohomo, Osoko
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.78 12/ 4/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.7 15/ 3/15 15/30
Absence of Corruption
0.84 11/ 5/15 11/30
Open Government
0.77 8/ 2/15 8/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.75 20/ 3/15 20/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.2 1/ 1/15 1/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.78 12/ 4/15 12/30
CiviI Justice
0.73 11/ 4/15 11/30
CriminaI Justice
0. 18/ /15 18/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Jopon EosI Asio & Pocific High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.81
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.81
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.7
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.8
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.7
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.81
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.82
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.1
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.81
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.81
3.2 SIoble lows 0.78
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.7
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.81
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.78
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.81
4.3 Due process of low 0.7
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.7
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.7
4. RighI Io privocy 0.77
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.77
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.71
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.1
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.84
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.73
.2 No improper influence 0.88
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.
.4 RespecI for due process 0.77
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.81
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.48
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.81
7.3 No corrupIion 0.
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.73
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.7
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.4
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.2
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.8
8. No improper gov. influence 0.7
8.7 Due process of low 0.7
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
111 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Jordan
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: MiddIe East & North Africa [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Ammon, Irbid, Zorqo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.57 38/ 2/7
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.5 4/ 5/7 17/2
Absence of Corruption
0.57 33/ 2/7 4/2
Open Government
0.43 5/ /7 21/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.47 77/ 4/7 22/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.85 20/ 2/7 2/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.54 35/ 2/7 4/2
CiviI Justice
0.2 21/ 1/7 1/2
CriminaI Justice
0.5 30/ 2/7 4/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Jordon Middle EosI & NorIh Africo Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.38
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.48
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.5
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.4
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.3
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.5
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.31
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.55
3.2 SIoble lows 0.45
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.3
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.34
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.4
4.3 Due process of low 0.5
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.47
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.4
4. RighI Io privocy 0.33
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.4
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.42
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.2
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.3
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.4
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.37
.4 RespecI for due process 0.
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.7
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.78
7.3 No corrupIion 0.7
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.3
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.43
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.2
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.2
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.4
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.5
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.53
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.5
8.5 No corrupIion 0.2
8. No improper gov. influence 0.
8.7 Due process of low 0.5
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
112 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Kazakhstan
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Upper middIe income
AlmoIy, AsIono, ShymkenI
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.47 71/ /13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.35 3/ 11/13 27/2
Absence of Corruption
0.43 0/ /13 20/2
Open Government
0.35 87/ 13/13 27/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.48 74/ /13 21/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 35/ 5/13 7/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.4 3/ 7/13 22/2
CiviI Justice
0.47 / /13 1/2
CriminaI Justice
0.4 1/ 7/13 17/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
KozokhsIon EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.31
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.2
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.37
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.45
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.34
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.3
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.44
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.4
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.3
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.52
3.2 SIoble lows 0.37
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.25
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.27
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.58
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.
4.3 Due process of low 0.45
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.35
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.58
4. RighI Io privocy 0.4
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.42
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.48
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.83
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.55
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.
.2 No improper influence 0.47
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.47
.4 RespecI for due process 0.28
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.47
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.3
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.38
7.3 No corrupIion 0.42
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.27
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.71
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.58
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.53
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.38
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.5
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.43
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.24
8.5 No corrupIion 0.45
8. No improper gov. influence 0.2
8.7 Due process of low 0.45
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
113 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Kenya
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
Noirobi, Momboso, Nokuru
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.43 8/ 12/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.51 2/ 10/18 7/1
Absence of Corruption
0.28 3/ 1/18 14/1
Open Government
0.38 83/ 11/18 /1
FundamentaI Pights
0.4 80/ 12/18 /1
Order and 5ecurity
0.3 7/ /18 10/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.41 80/ 10/18 7/1
CiviI Justice
0.44 72/ 13/18 7/1
CriminaI Justice
0.33 84/ 14/18 10/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Kenyo Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.5
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.52
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.41
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.42
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.58
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.48
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.3
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.3
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.23
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.13
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.38
3.2 SIoble lows 0.37
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.35
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.48
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.28
4.3 Due process of low 0.33
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.5
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.2
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.38
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.72
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.17
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.51
.2 No improper influence 0.44
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.24
.4 RespecI for due process 0.33
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.52
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.37
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.41
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.4
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.42
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.4
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.54
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.3
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.31
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.25
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.31
8.5 No corrupIion 0.28
8. No improper gov. influence 0.4
8.7 Due process of low 0.33
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
114 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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Kyrgyzstan
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Low income
Bishkek, Osh, Jololobod
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.45 78/ 12/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.47 70/ /13 8/1
Absence of Corruption
0.27 / 13/13 15/1
Open Government
0.41 73/ 10/13 /1
FundamentaI Pights
0.52 / 7/13 /1
Order and 5ecurity
0.74 52/ 10/13 2/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.44 8/ 11/13 3/1
CiviI Justice
0.42 74/ 12/13 8/1
CriminaI Justice
0.33 85/ 13/13 11/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
KyrgyzsIon EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.4
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.38
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.28
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.3
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.1
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.51
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.3
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.22
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.35
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.15
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.48
3.2 SIoble lows 0.45
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.34
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.38
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.48
4.3 Due process of low 0.33
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.1
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.2
4. RighI Io privocy 0.3
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.54
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.81
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.41
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.48
.2 No improper influence 0.34
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.52
.4 RespecI for due process 0.4
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.3
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.4
7.3 No corrupIion 0.28
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.32
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.53
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.3
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.5
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.4
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.51
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.31
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.28
8.5 No corrupIion 0.28
8. No improper gov. influence 0.22
8.7 Due process of low 0.33
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
115 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Lebanon
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: MiddIe East & North Africa [ Income group: Upper middIe income
BeiruI, Tripoli, Sidon
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.51 4/ 4/7
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.57 44/ 3/7 /2
Absence of Corruption
0.4 70/ 7/7 25/2
Open Government
0.44 2/ 4/7 1/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.2 43/ 1/7 11/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 43/ 4/7 10/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.44 / /7 24/2
CiviI Justice
0.45 70/ /7 22/2
CriminaI Justice
0.42 55/ 4/7 14/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Lebonon Middle EosI & NorIh Africo Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.72
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.4
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.4
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.47
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.7
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.54
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.3
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.5
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.24
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.44
3.2 SIoble lows 0.55
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.37
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.4
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.51
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.8
4.3 Due process of low 0.44
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.77
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.55
4. RighI Io privocy 0.71
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.82
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.44
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.87
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.42
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.4
.2 No improper influence 0.38
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.43
.4 RespecI for due process 0.45
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.4
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.51
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.48
7.3 No corrupIion 0.45
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.3
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.31
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.48
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.52
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.2
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.45
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.14
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.52
8.5 No corrupIion 0.54
8. No improper gov. influence 0.52
8.7 Due process of low 0.44
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
116 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Liberia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
Monrovio, KokoIo, Gborngo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.42 87/ 13/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.53 5/ 7/18 4/1
Absence of Corruption
0.34 85/ 13/18 10/1
Open Government
0.3 8/ 12/18 10/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.57 53/ 5/18 3/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.54 3/ 17/18 15/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.33 / 17/18 14/1
CiviI Justice
0.3 87/ 17/18 14/1
CriminaI Justice
0.33 87/ 15/18 12/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Liberio Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.8
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.4
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.23
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.35
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.74
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.7
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.34
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.44
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.34
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.24
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.3
3.2 SIoble lows 0.22
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.33
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.48
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.51
4.3 Due process of low 0.34
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.75
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.7
4. RighI Io privocy 0.54
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.73
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.41
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.5
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.83
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.24
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.37
.2 No improper influence 0.31
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.1
.4 RespecI for due process 0.35
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.4
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.3
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.25
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.47
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.35
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.42
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.37
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.35
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.2
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.27
8.5 No corrupIion 0.38
8. No improper gov. influence 0.3
8.7 Due process of low 0.34
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
117 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Macedonia, FYP
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Skop|e, BiIolo, Kumonovo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.58 34/ 2/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.52 1/ 3/13 15/2
Absence of Corruption
0.53 37/ 3/13 /2
Open Government
0. 24/ 1/13 3/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.3 38/ 2/13 8/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.75 47/ 8/13 12/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.53 44/ 4/13 10/2
CiviI Justice
0.54 41/ 3/13 /2
CriminaI Justice
0.5 37/ 3/13 8/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Mocedonio,
FYR
EosIern Europe & CenIrol
Asio
Upper middle
income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.51
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.3
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.52
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.4
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.52
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.7
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.5
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.43
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.71
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.44
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.74
3.2 SIoble lows 0.5
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.52
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.4
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.7
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.7
4.3 Due process of low 0.55
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.52
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.7
4. RighI Io privocy 0.57
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.71
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.52
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.84
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.42
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.47
.2 No improper influence 0.53
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.55
.4 RespecI for due process 0.5
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.5
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.58
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.7
7.3 No corrupIion 0.44
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.45
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.43
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.5
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.2
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.58
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.43
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.4
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.5
8.5 No corrupIion 0.54
8. No improper gov. influence 0.27
8.7 Due process of low 0.55
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
118 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Madagascar
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
AnIononorivo, AnIsirobe, Toomosino
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.45 81/ 10/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.41 83/ 15/18 13/1
Absence of Corruption
0.34 84/ 12/18 /1
Open Government
0.42 8/ 5/18 3/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.48 7/ 11/18 8/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 4/ 2/18 1/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.4 82/ 11/18 8/1
CiviI Justice
0.41 78/ 14/18 10/1
CriminaI Justice
0.35 80/ 13/18 /1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Modogoscor Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.44
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.35
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.43
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.4
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.42
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.41
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.3
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.3
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.37
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.23
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.47
3.2 SIoble lows 0.
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.31
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.2
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.7
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.23
4.3 Due process of low 0.38
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.43
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.
4. RighI Io privocy 0.2
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.53
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.2
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.7
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.57
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.42
.2 No improper influence 0.41
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.2
.4 RespecI for due process 0.3
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.51
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.3
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.1
7.3 No corrupIion 0.31
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.35
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.32
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.33
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.5
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.35
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.51
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.32
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.2
8. No improper gov. influence 0.21
8.7 Due process of low 0.38
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
119 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
MaIawi
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
Lilongwe, BlonIyre, Mzuzu
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.51 55/ /18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.52 0/ /18 /1
Absence of Corruption
0.43 5/ 7/18 4/1
Open Government
0.3 80/ 10/18 7/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.55 58/ 7/18 4/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 8/ /18 8/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.41 77/ /18 /1
CiviI Justice
0. 31/ 2/18 1/1
CriminaI Justice
0.48 40/ 2/18 1/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Molowi Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.58
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.5
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.42
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.44
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.58
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.52
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.38
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.57
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.43
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.32
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.38
3.2 SIoble lows 0.38
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.5
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.2
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.58
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.55
4.3 Due process of low 0.33
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.5
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.75
4. RighI Io privocy 0.5
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.4
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.2
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.3
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.3
.2 No improper influence 0.4
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.33
.4 RespecI for due process 0.4
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.58
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.53
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.2
7.3 No corrupIion 0.54
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.71
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.47
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.5
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.73
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.53
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.57
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.17
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.53
8.5 No corrupIion 0.44
8. No improper gov. influence 0.81
8.7 Due process of low 0.33
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
120 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
MaIaysia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Kuolo Lumpur, Ipoh, Johor Bohru
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.58 35/ 7/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.55 4/ /15 12/2
Absence of Corruption
0.4 28/ 7/15 3/2
Open Government
0.48 42/ 8/15 /2
FundamentaI Pights
0.45 85/ 13/15 2/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.87 12/ /15 1/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.51 48/ 8/15 13/2
CiviI Justice
0.57 37/ 7/15 /2
CriminaI Justice
0.53 33/ 7/15 /2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Moloysio EosI Asio & Pocific Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.7
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.58
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.52
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.5
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.37
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.57
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.5
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.4
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.5
3.2 SIoble lows 0.
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.21
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.7
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.42
4.3 Due process of low 0.5
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.38
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.23
4. RighI Io privocy 0.45
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.34
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.55
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.85
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.75
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.4
.2 No improper influence 0.1
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.52
.4 RespecI for due process 0.57
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.37
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.3
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.1
7.3 No corrupIion 0.73
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.42
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.51
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.8
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.53
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.3
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.44
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.51
8.5 No corrupIion 0.
8. No improper gov. influence 0.42
8.7 Due process of low 0.5
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
121 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Mexico
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Mexico CiIy, Guodolo|oro, MonIerrey
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.45 7/ 12/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.55 48/ 7/1 11/2
Absence of Corruption
0.37 78/ 13/1 27/2
Open Government
0.52 32/ 4/1 /2
FundamentaI Pights
0.55 0/ 11/1 17/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.47 / 1/1 2/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.5 51/ /1 1/2
CiviI Justice
0.3 88/ 12/1 27/2
CriminaI Justice
0.25 7/ 14/1 28/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Mexico LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.7
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.5
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.47
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.32
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.5
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.8
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.47
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.3
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.31
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.33
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.4
3.2 SIoble lows 0.1
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.45
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.53
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.43
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.4
4.3 Due process of low 0.3
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.5
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.55
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.73
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.2
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.42
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.75
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.24
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.45
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.45
.4 RespecI for due process 0.52
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.57
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.3
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.3
7.3 No corrupIion 0.3
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.48
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.3
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.45
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.15
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.24
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.1
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.1
8.5 No corrupIion 0.2
8. No improper gov. influence 0.3
8.7 Due process of low 0.3
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
122 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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MoIdova
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Chisinou, BolIi, Cohul
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.45 75/ 11/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.43 7/ 8/13 17/24
Absence of Corruption
0.32 88/ 11/13 1/24
Open Government
0.44 58/ /13 11/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.51 8/ 8/13 13/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.77 40/ /13 /24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.41 7/ 12/13 15/24
CiviI Justice
0.41 7/ 13/13 14/24
CriminaI Justice
0.33 82/ 11/13 17/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Moldovo EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.51
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.32
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.37
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.3
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.51
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.55
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.3
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.24
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.41
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.23
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.54
3.2 SIoble lows 0.37
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.3
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.51
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.2
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.53
4.3 Due process of low 0.35
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.51
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.
4. RighI Io privocy 0.43
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.41
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.84
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.48
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.54
.2 No improper influence 0.45
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.45
.4 RespecI for due process 0.23
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.3
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.47
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.57
7.3 No corrupIion 0.28
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.35
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.37
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.45
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.4
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.47
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.2
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.34
8.5 No corrupIion 0.3
8. No improper gov. influence 0.2
8.7 Due process of low 0.35
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
123 CoJn:, P:one |
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MongoIia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: Lower middIe income
UloonbooIor, ErdeneI, Dorkhon
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.51 51/ 10/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.53 53/ 10/15 7/24
Absence of Corruption
0.3 71/ 13/15 11/24
Open Government
0.33 3/ 14/15 23/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.1 45/ 7/15 4/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.78 38/ 10/15 5/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.43 70/ 11/15 12/24
CiviI Justice
0.52 48/ 8/15 4/24
CriminaI Justice
0.48 3/ /15 3/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Mongolio EosI Asio & Pocific Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.1
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.44
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.4
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.45
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.3
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.3
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.47
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.55
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.15
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.3
3.2 SIoble lows 0.35
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.2
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.3
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.2
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.7
4.3 Due process of low 0.43
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.4
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.5
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.73
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.7
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.5
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.4
.2 No improper influence 0.38
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.44
.4 RespecI for due process 0.43
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.42
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.2
7.3 No corrupIion 0.5
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.45
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.8
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.41
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.51
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.3
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.55
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.5
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.58
8.5 No corrupIion 0.45
8. No improper gov. influence 0.52
8.7 Due process of low 0.43
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
124 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Morocco
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: MiddIe East & North Africa [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Cosoblonco, RoboI, Morrokesh
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.51 52/ 5/7
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.5 4/ 4/7 /24
Absence of Corruption
0.43 2/ /7 /24
Open Government
0.48 4/ 1/7 /24
FundamentaI Pights
0.45 84/ 5/7 1/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 44/ 5/7 8/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.54 3/ 3/7 3/24
CiviI Justice
0.5 51/ 5/7 /24
CriminaI Justice
0.35 81/ 7/7 1/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Morocco Middle EosI & NorIh Africo Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.1
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.55
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.37
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.54
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.55
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.71
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.37
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.4
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.38
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.54
3.2 SIoble lows 0.4
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.53
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.43
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.1
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.32
4.3 Due process of low 0.3
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.55
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.48
4. RighI Io privocy 0.1
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.58
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.58
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.83
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.2
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.54
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.55
.2 No improper influence 0.58
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.41
.4 RespecI for due process 0.48
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.42
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.47
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.4
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.58
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.4
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.52
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.5
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.47
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.18
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.2
8.5 No corrupIion 0.5
8. No improper gov. influence 0.21
8.7 Due process of low 0.3
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
125 CoJn:, P:one |
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Myanmar
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: Low income
Mondoloy, Noypyidow, Yongon
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.41 8/ 14/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.41 82/ 12/15 12/1
Absence of Corruption
0.43 3/ 12/15 3/1
Open Government
0.31 / 15/15 14/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.3 7/ 15/15 15/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.72 0/ 15/15 5/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.37 2/ 14/15 12/1
CiviI Justice
0.3 8/ 13/15 13/1
CriminaI Justice
0.32 8/ 14/15 14/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Myonmor EosI Asio & Pocific Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.58
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.38
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.3
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.53
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.3
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.3
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.53
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.17
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.54
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.48
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.48
3.2 SIoble lows 0.24
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.24
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.27
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.41
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.22
4.3 Due process of low 0.27
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.3
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.37
4. RighI Io privocy 0.15
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.33
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.31
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.57
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.27
.2 No improper influence 0.4
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.41
.4 RespecI for due process 0.3
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.34
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.38
7.3 No corrupIion 0.24
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.24
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.48
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.4
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.55
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.33
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.37
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.24
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.27
8.5 No corrupIion 0.43
8. No improper gov. influence 0.33
8.7 Due process of low 0.27
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
126 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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NepaI
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5outh Asia [ Income group: Low income
KoIhmondu, Morong, Rupondehi
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.5 57/ 2/
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.5 45/ 2/ 1/1
Absence of Corruption
0.38 73/ 3/ /1
Open Government
0.44 1/ 3/ 1/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.5 48/ 1/ 1/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.73 55/ 1/ 4/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.47 5/ 1/ 2/1
CiviI Justice
0.42 75/ 1/ /1
CriminaI Justice
0.43 52/ 3/ 4/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Nepol SouIh Asio Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.1
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.57
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.4
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.42
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.8
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.52
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.35
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.44
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.21
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.4
3.2 SIoble lows 0.3
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.44
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.54
4.3 Due process of low 0.4
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.74
4. RighI Io privocy 0.52
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.72
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.53
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.87
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.31
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.45
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
.4 RespecI for due process 0.48
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.48
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.31
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.4
7.3 No corrupIion 0.3
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.48
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.37
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.4
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.3
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.44
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.3
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.54
8.5 No corrupIion 0.44
8. No improper gov. influence 0.57
8.7 Due process of low 0.4
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
127 CoJn:, P:one |
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NetherIands
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
AmsIerdom, RoIIerdom, The Hogue
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.83 5/ 5/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.8 7/ /24 7/30
Absence of Corruption
0.88 7/ 5/24 7/30
Open Government
0.78 7/ /24 7/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.85 / /24 /30
Order and 5ecurity
0.84 22/ 11/24 18/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.82 4/ 4/24 4/30
CiviI Justice
0.84 2/ 2/24 2/30
CriminaI Justice
0.75 / /24 /30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
NeIherlonds WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.85
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.85
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.83
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.84
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.8
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.1
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.8
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.4
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.84
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.7
3.2 SIoble lows 0.8
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.7
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.78
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.7
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.3
4.3 Due process of low 0.83
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.8
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.8
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.75
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.4
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.78
.2 No improper influence 0.8
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.83
.4 RespecI for due process 0.77
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.88
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.2
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.85
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.5
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.8
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.5
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.4
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.72
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.7
8.5 No corrupIion 0.88
8. No improper gov. influence 0.1
8.7 Due process of low 0.83
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
128 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
New ZeaIand
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: High income
Aucklond, WellingIon, ChrisIchurch
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.83 / 1/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.88 4/ 1/15 4/30
Absence of Corruption
0.1 3/ 1/15 3/30
Open Government
0.83 2/ 1/15 2/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.84 7/ 1/15 7/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.87 11/ 5/15 10/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.81 5/ 1/15 5/30
CiviI Justice
0.74 / 2/15 /30
CriminaI Justice
0.72 12/ 5/15 12/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
New Zeolond EosI Asio & Pocific High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.8
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.81
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.85
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.1
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.3
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.8
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.5
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.2
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.84
3.2 SIoble lows 0.85
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.77
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.8
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.8
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.2
4.3 Due process of low 0.82
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.2
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.81
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.84
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.75
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.88
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.74
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.82
.2 No improper influence 0.
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.74
.4 RespecI for due process 0.82
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.77
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.75
7.3 No corrupIion 0.
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.78
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.75
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.7
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.55
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.1
8.5 No corrupIion 0.4
8. No improper gov. influence 0.83
8.7 Due process of low 0.82
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
129 CoJn:, P:one |
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Nicaragua
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Monoguo, Len, EsIeli
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.43 85/ 14/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.31 / 15/1 23/24
Absence of Corruption
0.38 75/ 10/1 13/24
Open Government
0.45 54/ 8/1 8/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.51 / 14/1 14/24
Order and 5ecurity
0. 72/ /1 1/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.43 71/ 11/1 13/24
CiviI Justice
0.37 1/ 13/1 1/24
CriminaI Justice
0.35 78/ /1 15/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Nicoroguo LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.3
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.25
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.24
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.23
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.48
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.31
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.28
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.48
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.2
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.57
3.2 SIoble lows 0.47
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.53
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.23
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.58
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.44
4.3 Due process of low 0.3
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.48
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.73
4. RighI Io privocy 0.4
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.53
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.58
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.71
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.28
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.48
.2 No improper influence 0.55
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.37
.4 RespecI for due process 0.31
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.45
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.45
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.47
7.3 No corrupIion 0.32
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.18
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.34
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.31
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.55
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.47
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.48
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.1
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.38
8. No improper gov. influence 0.17
8.7 Due process of low 0.3
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
130 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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Nigeria
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Logos, Oyo, Kono
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.3 3/ 1/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.47 / 11/18 13/24
Absence of Corruption
0.2 7/ 17/18 23/24
Open Government
0.4 7/ /18 15/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.42 88/ 15/18 21/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.3 8/ 18/18 23/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.4 83/ 12/18 17/24
CiviI Justice
0.5 52/ 7/18 7/24
CriminaI Justice
0.31 1/ 17/18 20/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Nigerio Sub-Sohoron Africo Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.3
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.4
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.28
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.3
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.55
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.28
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.22
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.0
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.41
3.2 SIoble lows 0.4
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.45
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.2
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.53
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.24
4.3 Due process of low 0.22
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.5
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.4
4. RighI Io privocy 0.34
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.2
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.4
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.34
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.31
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.42
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.38
.2 No improper influence 0.37
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.2
.4 RespecI for due process 0.44
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.53
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.47
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.48
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.37
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.45
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.5
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.34
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.34
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.2
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.3
8.5 No corrupIion 0.27
8. No improper gov. influence 0.41
8.7 Due process of low 0.22
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
131 CoJn:, P:one |
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Norway
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.88 2/ 2/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0. 2/ 2/24 2/30
Absence of Corruption
0.4 2/ 2/24 2/30
Open Government
0.85 1/ 1/24 1/30
FundamentaI Pights
0. 3/ 3/24 3/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.85 1/ /24 1/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.87 1/ 1/24 1/30
CiviI Justice
0.8 1/ 1/24 1/30
CriminaI Justice
0.83 4/ 3/24 4/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Norwoy WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.2
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.1
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.74
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.4
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.4
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.5
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.2
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.5
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.4
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.75
3.2 SIoble lows 0.
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.75
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.8
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.87
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.4
4.3 Due process of low 0.1
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.4
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.83
4. RighI Io privocy 0.2
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.3
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.87
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.1
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.2
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.73
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.85
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.83
.4 RespecI for due process 0.84
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.8
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.7
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.1
7.3 No corrupIion 0.88
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.84
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.81
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.85
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.72
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.85
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.84
8.5 No corrupIion 0.3
8. No improper gov. influence 0.7
8.7 Due process of low 0.1
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
132 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Pakistan
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5outh Asia [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Korochi, Lohore, Foisolobod
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.3 / 5/
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.4 73/ 4/ 14/24
Absence of Corruption
0.2 1/ 4/ 20/24
Open Government
0.32 5/ / 24/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.38 2/ / 23/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.3 / / 24/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.35 5/ 5/ 24/24
CiviI Justice
0.3 4/ 5/ 22/24
CriminaI Justice
0.37 8/ 4/ 11/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
PokisIon SouIh Asio Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.53
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.53
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.28
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.28
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.5
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.5
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.35
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.41
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.25
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.1
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.31
3.2 SIoble lows 0.3
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.37
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.3
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.3
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.21
4.3 Due process of low 0.27
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.43
4. RighI Io privocy 0.25
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.3
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.24
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.53
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.0
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.27
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.27
.2 No improper influence 0.34
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
.4 RespecI for due process 0.4
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.44
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.28
7.3 No corrupIion 0.41
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.47
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.31
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.1
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.47
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.3
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.4
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.27
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.3
8.5 No corrupIion 0.35
8. No improper gov. influence 0.54
8.7 Due process of low 0.27
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
133 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Panama
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Ponomo CiIy, Coln, Dovid Chiriqu
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.5 5/ 5/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.45 75/ 12/1 22/2
Absence of Corruption
0.44 57/ 8/1 1/2
Open Government
0.52 31/ 3/1 5/2
FundamentaI Pights
0. 4/ 8/1 13/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.71 2/ 2/1 1/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.48 55/ /1 18/2
CiviI Justice
0.45 / /1 21/2
CriminaI Justice
0.38 5/ 4/1 20/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Ponomo LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.34
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.32
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.38
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.27
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.58
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.82
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.51
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.42
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.2
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.22
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.52
3.2 SIoble lows 0.
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.43
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.4
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.
4.3 Due process of low 0.38
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.58
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.71
4. RighI Io privocy 0.
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.4
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.71
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.42
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.5
.2 No improper influence 0.2
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.38
.4 RespecI for due process 0.38
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.51
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.52
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.58
7.3 No corrupIion 0.44
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.38
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.32
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.34
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.58
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.2
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.31
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.1
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.8
8.5 No corrupIion 0.48
8. No improper gov. influence 0.43
8.7 Due process of low 0.38
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
134 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Peru
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Limo, Tru|illo, Arequipo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.4 2/ 8/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0. 38/ 5/1 /2
Absence of Corruption
0.3 7/ 14/1 28/2
Open Government
0.44 3/ 12/1 20/2
FundamentaI Pights
0. 34/ 4/1 5/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.3 78/ 8/1 22/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.4 1/ 10/1 20/2
CiviI Justice
0.3 83/ 11/1 2/2
CriminaI Justice
0.37 7/ /1 22/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Peru LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.3
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.45
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.2
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.42
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.78
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.51
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.35
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.38
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.1
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.32
3.2 SIoble lows 0.47
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.44
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.53
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.55
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.77
4.3 Due process of low 0.53
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.7
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.78
4. RighI Io privocy 0.72
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.73
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.4
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.54
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.35
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.4
.2 No improper influence 0.51
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.35
.4 RespecI for due process 0.4
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.58
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.45
7.3 No corrupIion 0.35
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.47
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.28
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.28
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.52
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.2
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.21
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.25
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.48
8.5 No corrupIion 0.32
8. No improper gov. influence 0.54
8.7 Due process of low 0.53
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
135 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
PhiIippines
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Monilo, Dovoo, Cebu
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.5 0/ 11/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.5 3/ 8/15 5/24
Absence of Corruption
0.5 44/ /15 3/24
Open Government
0.45 55/ 10/15 /24
FundamentaI Pights
0.52 7/ 10/15 12/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.73 5/ 14/15 10/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.4 0/ /15 /24
CiviI Justice
0.4 82/ 12/15 1/24
CriminaI Justice
0.3 73/ 13/15 13/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Philippines EosI Asio & Pocific Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.72
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.5
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.47
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.54
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.52
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.41
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.58
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.47
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.5
3.2 SIoble lows 0.44
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.44
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.35
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.32
4.3 Due process of low 0.38
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.4
4. RighI Io privocy 0.3
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.4
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.72
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.88
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.58
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.4
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
.4 RespecI for due process 0.44
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.47
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.48
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.42
7.3 No corrupIion 0.48
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.42
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.25
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.2
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.45
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.4
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.32
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.18
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.28
8.5 No corrupIion 0.5
8. No improper gov. influence 0.42
8.7 Due process of low 0.38
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
136 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Complete country prole available at: http://data.worldjusticeproject.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Poland
A smaller sub-factor bar represents a lower score (0.00 being lowest possible), and a larger bar represents a higher score (1.00 being highest possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America | Income group: High income
Warsaw, Lodz, Cracow
Overall Score Global Rank Regional Rank
0.67 22/99 14/24
Factor
Trend
Factor
Score
Global
Rank
Regional
Rank
Income
Rank
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.73 22/99 15/24 21/30
Absence of Corruption
0.66 27/99 16/24 24/30
Open Government
0.56 27/99 16/24 23/30
Fundamental Rights
0.72 24/99 18/24 23/30
Order and Security
0.83 25/99 14/24 21/30
Regulatory Enforcement
0.59 26/99 16/24 24/30
Civil Justice
0.62 22/99 14/24 21/30
Criminal Justice
0.69 17/99 11/24 17/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Poland Western Europe & North America High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 Limits by legislature 0.79
1.2 Limits by judiciary 0.74
1.3 Independent auditing 0.69
1.4 Sanctions for ofcial
misconduct
0.59
1.5 Non-governmental checks 0.68
1.6 Lawful transition of power 0.89
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corruption in the
executive branch
0.63
2.2 No corruption in the
judiciary
0.78
2.3 No corruption in the
police/military
0.81
2.4 No corruption in the
legislature
0.41
Open Government
3.1 Accessible laws 0.55
3.2 Stable laws 0.53
3.3 Right to petition /
participation
0.53
3.4 Right to information 0.62
Fundamental Rights
4.1 Equal treatment / no
discrimination
0.71
4.2 Right to life and security 0.84
4.3 Due process of law 0.64
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.68
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.66
4.6 Right to privacy 0.75
4.7 Freedom of association 0.76
4.8 Labor rights 0.68
Order and Security
5.1 Absence of crime 0.92
5.2 Absence of civil conict 1
5.3 Absence of violent redress 0.56
Regulatory Enforcement
6.1 Effective regulatory
enforcement
0.6
6.2 No improper inuence 0.62
6.3 No unreasonable delay 0.45
6.4 Respect for due process 0.64
6.5 No expropriation w/out
adequate compensation
0.67
Civil Justice
7.1 Accessibility and
affordability
0.51
7.2 No discrimination 0.77
7.3 No corruption 0.79
7.4 No improper gov. inuence 0.73
7.5 No unreasonable delay 0.41
7.6 Effective enforcement 0.47
7.7 Impartial and effective ADRs 0.66
Criminal Justice
8.1 Effective investigations 0.69
8.2 Timely and effective
adjudication
0.62
8.3 Effective correctional system 0.56
8.4 No discrimination 0.76
8.5 No corruption 0.72
8.6 No improper gov. inuence 0.87
8.7 Due process of law 0.64
Constraints on
Government
Powers
Absence of
Corruption
Open
Government
Fundamental
Rights
Order and
Security
Regulatory
Enforcement
Civil
Justice
Criminal
Justice
137 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
PortugaI
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Lisbon, PorIo, Brogo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0. 2/ 17/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.74 1/ 13/24 18/30
Absence of Corruption
0. 2/ 15/24 23/30
Open Government
0.5 25/ 15/24 22/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.7 17/ 15/24 17/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.72 58/ 24/24 2/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.5 27/ 17/24 25/30
CiviI Justice
0.2 23/ 15/24 22/30
CriminaI Justice
0.5 2/ 18/24 25/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
PorIugol WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.75
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.7
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.1
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.7
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.7
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.73
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.84
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.5
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.53
3.2 SIoble lows 0.52
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.1
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.71
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.83
4.3 Due process of low 0.5
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.7
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.71
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.87
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.7
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.82
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.35
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.7
.2 No improper influence 0.73
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.42
.4 RespecI for due process 0.53
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.1
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.87
7.3 No corrupIion 0.71
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.71
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.42
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.3
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.8
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.51
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.44
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.5
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.72
8. No improper gov. influence 0.82
8.7 Due process of low 0.5
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
138 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
PepubIic of Korea
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: High income
Seoul, Buson, Incheon
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.77 14/ 5/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.7 1/ 4/15 1/30
Absence of Corruption
0.7 1/ /15 1/30
Open Government
0.74 13/ 5/15 13/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.73 23/ 4/15 22/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.8 7/ 4/15 /30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.74 17/ /15 17/30
CiviI Justice
0.74 10/ 3/15 10/30
CriminaI Justice
0.7 8/ 2/15 8/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Republic of Koreo EosI Asio & Pocific High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.77
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.78
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.72
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.7
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.75
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.8
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.78
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.8
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.1
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.8
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.85
3.2 SIoble lows 0.75
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.5
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.71
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.7
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.8
4.3 Due process of low 0.77
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.75
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.3
4. RighI Io privocy 0.7
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.73
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.78
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.
.2 No improper influence 0.78
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.84
.4 RespecI for due process 0.72
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.8
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.52
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.8
7.3 No corrupIion 0.83
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.7
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.7
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.84
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.3
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.2
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.82
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.75
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.8
8.5 No corrupIion 0.88
8. No improper gov. influence 0.82
8.7 Due process of low 0.77
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
139 CoJn:, P:one |
Complete country prole available at: http://data.worldjusticeproject.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Romania
A smaller sub-factor bar represents a lower score (0.00 being lowest possible), and a larger bar represents a higher score (1.00 being highest possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America | Income group: Upper middle income
Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca, Timisoara
Overall Score Global Rank Regional Rank
0.59 33/99 22/24
Factor
Trend
Factor
Score
Global
Rank
Regional
Rank
Income
Rank
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.58 43/99 23/24 8/29
Absence of Corruption
0.5 41/99 23/24 9/29
Open Government
0.47 47/99 23/24 12/29
Fundamental Rights
0.71 25/99 19/24 2/29
Order and Security
0.81 31/99 17/24 5/29
Regulatory Enforcement
0.52 45/99 22/24 11/29
Civil Justice
0.59 34/99 20/24 5/29
Criminal Justice
0.56 29/99 20/24 3/29
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Romania Western Europe & North America Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 Limits by legislature 0.62
1.2 Limits by judiciary 0.56
1.3 Independent auditing 0.45
1.4 Sanctions for ofcial
misconduct
0.48
1.5 Non-governmental checks 0.67
1.6 Lawful transition of power 0.69
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corruption in the
executive branch
0.49
2.2 No corruption in the
judiciary
0.59
2.3 No corruption in the
police/military
0.66
2.4 No corruption in the
legislature
0.29
Open Government
3.1 Accessible laws 0.48
3.2 Stable laws 0.5
3.3 Right to petition /
participation
0.43
3.4 Right to information 0.49
Fundamental Rights
4.1 Equal treatment / no
discrimination
0.73
4.2 Right to life and security 0.85
4.3 Due process of law 0.62
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.68
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.78
4.6 Right to privacy 0.66
4.7 Freedom of association 0.78
4.8 Labor rights 0.59
Order and Security
5.1 Absence of crime 0.86
5.2 Absence of civil conict 1
5.3 Absence of violent redress 0.56
Regulatory Enforcement
6.1 Effective regulatory
enforcement
0.53
6.2 No improper inuence 0.5
6.3 No unreasonable delay 0.5
6.4 Respect for due process 0.47
6.5 No expropriation w/out
adequate compensation
0.6
Civil Justice
7.1 Accessibility and
affordability
0.57
7.2 No discrimination 0.74
7.3 No corruption 0.62
7.4 No improper gov. inuence 0.54
7.5 No unreasonable delay 0.44
7.6 Effective enforcement 0.52
7.7 Impartial and effective ADRs 0.68
Criminal Justice
8.1 Effective investigations 0.6
8.2 Timely and effective
adjudication
0.54
8.3 Effective correctional system 0.39
8.4 No discrimination 0.63
8.5 No corruption 0.57
8.6 No improper gov. inuence 0.58
8.7 Due process of law 0.62
Constraints on
Government
Powers
Absence of
Corruption
Open
Government
Fundamental
Rights
Order and
Security
Regulatory
Enforcement
Civil
Justice
Criminal
Justice
140 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Pussia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Moscow, SoinI PeIersburg, Novosibirsk
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.45 80/ 13/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.3 8/ 10/13 24/2
Absence of Corruption
0.42 / 7/13 23/2
Open Government
0.43 7/ 8/13 22/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.4 7/ 11/13 24/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.4 75/ 13/13 20/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.44 7/ 10/13 25/2
CiviI Justice
0.4 8/ 10/13 20/2
CriminaI Justice
0.3 7/ 10/13 25/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Russio EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.4
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.3
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.35
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.35
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.38
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.37
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.44
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.41
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.5
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.35
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.52
3.2 SIoble lows 0.52
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.28
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.4
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.45
4.3 Due process of low 0.37
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.3
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.54
4. RighI Io privocy 0.38
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.44
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.55
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.81
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.8
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.44
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.55
.2 No improper influence 0.47
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
.4 RespecI for due process 0.37
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.37
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.52
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.3
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.54
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.35
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.53
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.3
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.44
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.34
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.44
8.5 No corrupIion 0.4
8. No improper gov. influence 0.22
8.7 Due process of low 0.37
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
141 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
5enegaI
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Dokor, Thies, SoinI-Louis
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.54 43/ 4/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.3 33/ 3/18 3/24
Absence of Corruption
0.48 48/ 3/18 4/24
Open Government
0.42 70/ /18 14/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.3 3/ 2/18 2/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 / 7/18 14/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.55 33/ 2/18 2/24
CiviI Justice
0.55 3/ 4/18 3/24
CriminaI Justice
0.42 54/ 7/18 7/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Senegol Sub-Sohoron Africo Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.51
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.3
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.57
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.8
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.7
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.43
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.55
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.45
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.3
3.2 SIoble lows 0.4
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.48
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.33
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.1
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.5
4.3 Due process of low 0.43
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.83
4. RighI Io privocy 0.58
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.51
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.2
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.52
.2 No improper influence 0.52
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.47
.4 RespecI for due process 0.58
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.8
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.47
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.41
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.5
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.2
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.48
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.45
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.22
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.52
8. No improper gov. influence 0.4
8.7 Due process of low 0.43
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
142 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
5erbia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Belgrode, Novi Sod,Nis
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.51 54/ 5/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.4 5/ 4/13 18/2
Absence of Corruption
0.41 7/ 8/13 24/2
Open Government
0.47 48/ 4/13 13/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.2 40/ 3/13 /2
Order and 5ecurity
0.74 51/ /13 14/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.45 5/ /13 23/2
CiviI Justice
0.45 71/ 11/13 23/2
CriminaI Justice
0.41 58/ 5/13 1/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Serbio EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.5
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.33
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.3
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.34
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.74
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.41
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.53
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.32
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.51
3.2 SIoble lows 0.51
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.42
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.4
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.3
4.3 Due process of low 0.57
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.1
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.75
4. RighI Io privocy 0.4
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.75
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.87
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.35
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.3
.2 No improper influence 0.4
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.45
.4 RespecI for due process 0.3
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.5
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.48
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.74
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.37
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.37
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.31
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.4
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.51
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.37
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.31
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.41
8.5 No corrupIion 0.41
8. No improper gov. influence 0.2
8.7 Due process of low 0.57
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
143 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
5ierra Leone
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
FreeIown, Kenemo, Mokeni
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.44 84/ 11/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.55 50/ 5/18 2/1
Absence of Corruption
0.35 82/ 11/18 8/1
Open Government
0.2 8/ 17/18 15/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.55 5/ 8/18 5/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.5 88/ 15/18 13/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.3 87/ 13/18 /1
CiviI Justice
0.47 3/ 11/18 5/1
CriminaI Justice
0.32 88/ 1/18 13/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Sierro Leone Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.1
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.42
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.48
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.51
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.4
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.3
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.32
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.32
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.3
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.3
3.2 SIoble lows 0.1
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.42
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.23
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.54
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.54
4.3 Due process of low 0.3
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.5
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.7
4. RighI Io privocy 0.43
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.2
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.44
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.34
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.43
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.45
.2 No improper influence 0.4
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.24
.4 RespecI for due process 0.3
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.48
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.51
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.4
7.3 No corrupIion 0.3
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.42
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.44
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.4
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.5
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.34
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.1
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.27
8.5 No corrupIion 0.3
8. No improper gov. influence 0.3
8.7 Due process of low 0.3
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
144 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
5ingapore
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: High income
Singopore
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.7 10/ 3/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.73 21/ 5/15 20/30
Absence of Corruption
0. 5/ 2/15 5/30
Open Government
0.4 21/ /15 20/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.71 2/ 5/15 24/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.1 2/ 2/15 2/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.7 8/ 3/15 8/30
CiviI Justice
0.77 / 1/15 /30
CriminaI Justice
0.85 2/ 1/15 2/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Singopore EosI Asio & Pocific High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.7
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.81
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.8
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.51
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.83
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.8
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.84
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.88
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.75
3.2 SIoble lows 0.81
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.57
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.44
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.8
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.8
4.3 Due process of low 0.81
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.51
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.7
4. RighI Io privocy 0.7
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.47
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.8
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.1
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.82
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.85
.2 No improper influence 0.4
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.71
.4 RespecI for due process 0.81
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.5
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.5
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.3
7.3 No corrupIion 0.82
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.7
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.8
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.85
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.8
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.88
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.3
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.82
8.5 No corrupIion 0.8
8. No improper gov. influence 0.7
8.7 Due process of low 0.81
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
145 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
5Iovenia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
L|ubl|ono, Moribor, Cel|e
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.5 28/ 18/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.5 30/ 20/24 27/30
Absence of Corruption
0. 32/ 20/24 28/30
Open Government
0. 23/ 14/24 21/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.7 13/ 11/24 13/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.78 37/ 20/24 25/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.5 28/ 18/24 2/30
CiviI Justice
0.1 2/ 1/24 2/30
CriminaI Justice
0.58 27/ 1/24 2/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Slovenio WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.54
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.52
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.8
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.55
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.3
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.53
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.
3.2 SIoble lows 0.5
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.5
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.3
4.3 Due process of low 0.77
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.7
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.81
4. RighI Io privocy 0.82
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.81
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.8
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.88
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.45
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.5
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.1
.4 RespecI for due process 0.5
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.8
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.1
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.74
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.7
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.38
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.54
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.43
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.52
8.5 No corrupIion 0.58
8. No improper gov. influence 0.3
8.7 Due process of low 0.77
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
146 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
5outh Africa
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Johonnesburg, Cope Town, Durbon
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.55 40/ 3/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.1 37/ 4/18 5/2
Absence of Corruption
0.4 4/ 2/18 13/2
Open Government
0.58 2/ 2/18 4/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.2 41/ 3/18 10/2
Order and 5ecurity
0. 8/ 14/18 24/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.53 40/ 4/18 7/2
CiviI Justice
0.53 44/ /18 11/2
CriminaI Justice
0.45 47/ 5/18 10/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
SouIh Africo Sub-Sohoron Africo Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.5
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.47
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.72
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.71
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.47
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.1
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.54
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.3
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.1
3.2 SIoble lows 0.
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.1
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.51
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.52
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.
4.3 Due process of low 0.45
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.72
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.7
4. RighI Io privocy 0.5
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.77
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.48
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.33
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.53
.2 No improper influence 0.58
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.33
.4 RespecI for due process 0.55
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.8
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.43
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.47
7.3 No corrupIion 0.1
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.57
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.48
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.53
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.5
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.34
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.4
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.25
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.54
8. No improper gov. influence 0.1
8.7 Due process of low 0.45
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
147 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
5pain
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
Modrid, Borcelono, Volencio
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.7 24/ 1/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.8 28/ 18/24 25/30
Absence of Corruption
0. 25/ 14/24 22/30
Open Government
0.55 28/ 17/24 24/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.78 14/ 12/24 14/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 34/ 18/24 24/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.3 25/ 15/24 23/30
CiviI Justice
0.2 24/ 1/24 23/30
CriminaI Justice
0.1 25/ 17/24 24/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Spoin WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.7
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.5
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.58
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.74
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.8
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.73
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.88
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.47
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.55
3.2 SIoble lows 0.5
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.53
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.5
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.73
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.85
4.3 Due process of low 0.78
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.74
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.78
4. RighI Io privocy 0.87
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.81
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.7
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.87
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.51
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.8
.2 No improper influence 0.77
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
.4 RespecI for due process 0.58
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.1
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.8
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.78
7.3 No corrupIion 0.71
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.4
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.38
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.41
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.71
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.48
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.53
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.3
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.55
8.5 No corrupIion 0.72
8. No improper gov. influence 0.2
8.7 Due process of low 0.78
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
148 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
5ri Lanka
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5outh Asia [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Colombo, Negombo, Kondy
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.52 48/ 1/
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.53 54/ 3/ 8/24
Absence of Corruption
0.53 3/ 1/ 2/24
Open Government
0.48 41/ 2/ 4/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.5 5/ 2/ 8/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.72 5/ 2/ 12/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.44 / 2/ 11/24
CiviI Justice
0.41 80/ 2/ 15/24
CriminaI Justice
0.4 38/ 1/ 2/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Sri Lonko SouIh Asio Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.52
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.53
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.55
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.47
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.2
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.51
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.5
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.5
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.8
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.37
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.54
3.2 SIoble lows 0.57
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.51
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.31
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.2
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.3
4.3 Due process of low 0.45
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.2
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.74
4. RighI Io privocy 0.38
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.87
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.38
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.55
.2 No improper influence 0.5
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.34
.4 RespecI for due process 0.3
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.4
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.31
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.3
7.3 No corrupIion 0.5
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.44
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.2
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.35
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.47
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.25
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.4
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.3
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.71
8.5 No corrupIion 0.8
8. No improper gov. influence 0.55
8.7 Due process of low 0.45
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
149 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
5weden
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
SIockholm, GoIhenburg, Molmo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.85 3/ 3/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0. 3/ 3/24 3/30
Absence of Corruption
0.1 4/ 3/24 4/30
Open Government
0.82 4/ 3/24 4/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.1 1/ 1/24 1/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.8 / 2/24 5/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.83 3/ 3/24 3/30
CiviI Justice
0.78 5/ 5/24 5/30
CriminaI Justice
0.78 / 5/24 /30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Sweden WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.81
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.84
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.2
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.8
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.88
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.5
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.85
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.73
3.2 SIoble lows 0.88
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.77
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.8
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.77
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.
4.3 Due process of low 0.1
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.2
4. RighI Io privocy 0.
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.81
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.77
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.83
.2 No improper influence 0.1
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.8
.4 RespecI for due process 0.74
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.83
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.8
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.7
7.3 No corrupIion 0.2
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.8
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.1
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.72
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.7
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.
8.5 No corrupIion 0.1
8. No improper gov. influence 0.2
8.7 Due process of low 0.1
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
150 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Tanzania
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
Dor es Soloom, Mwonzo, Shinyongo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.47 / 7/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.54 52/ /18 3/1
Absence of Corruption
0.38 74/ 10/18 7/1
Open Government
0.41 72/ 8/18 5/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.51 70/ /18 7/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.57 0/ 1/18 14/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.43 74/ 8/18 5/1
CiviI Justice
0.48 1/ 10/18 4/1
CriminaI Justice
0.4 44/ 3/18 2/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Tonzonio Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.5
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.51
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.43
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.48
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.58
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.57
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.38
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.38
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.37
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.41
3.2 SIoble lows 0.3
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.58
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.3
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.42
4.3 Due process of low 0.37
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.5
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.1
4. RighI Io privocy 0.47
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.4
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.5
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.22
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.4
.2 No improper influence 0.34
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.33
.4 RespecI for due process 0.53
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.5
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.2
7.3 No corrupIion 0.3
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.48
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.41
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.5
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.57
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.5
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.4
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.33
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.38
8.5 No corrupIion 0.42
8. No improper gov. influence 0.
8.7 Due process of low 0.37
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
151 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
ThaiIand
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Bongkok, NonIhoburi, Pok KreI
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.52 47/ /15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.5 3/ 11/15 1/2
Absence of Corruption
0.51 40/ 8/15 8/2
Open Government
0.47 50/ /15 15/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.58 52/ 8/15 15/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.75 48/ 12/15 13/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.4 2/ 10/15 21/2
CiviI Justice
0.3 8/ 14/15 28/2
CriminaI Justice
0.51 35/ 8/15 7/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Thoilond EosI Asio & Pocific Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.2
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.53
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.3
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.44
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.48
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.4
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.1
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.5
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.38
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.58
3.2 SIoble lows 0.4
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.54
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.35
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.55
4.3 Due process of low 0.42
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.
4. RighI Io privocy 0.57
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.4
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.55
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.81
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.57
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.43
.2 No improper influence 0.54
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.38
.4 RespecI for due process 0.51
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.44
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.47
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.38
7.3 No corrupIion 0.2
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.35
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.47
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.13
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.2
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.4
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.1
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.54
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.3
8.5 No corrupIion 0.5
8. No improper gov. influence 0.52
8.7 Due process of low 0.42
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
152 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Tunisia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: MiddIe East & North Africa [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Tunis, Sfox, Sousse
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.55 41/ 3/7
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.58 41/ 1/7 7/2
Absence of Corruption
0.5 43/ 4/7 11/2
Open Government
0.47 4/ 2/7 14/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.54 4/ 2/7 20/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.77 41/ 3/7 /2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.52 47/ 5/7 12/2
CiviI Justice
0.54 43/ 4/7 10/2
CriminaI Justice
0.45 45/ 3/7 /2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Tunisio Middle EosI & NorIh Africo Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.55
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.54
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.48
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.2
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.3
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.52
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.52
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.5
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.47
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.51
3.2 SIoble lows 0.1
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.41
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.3
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.3
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.51
4.3 Due process of low 0.41
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.2
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.53
4. RighI Io privocy 0.44
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.2
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.54
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.84
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.47
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.58
.2 No improper influence 0.53
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.33
.4 RespecI for due process 0.48
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.48
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.71
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.52
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.44
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.5
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.44
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.52
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.33
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.44
8.5 No corrupIion 0.52
8. No improper gov. influence 0.4
8.7 Due process of low 0.41
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
153 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Turkey
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Upper middIe income
IsIonbul, Ankoro, Izmir
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.5 5/ /13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.4 72/ 7/13 21/2
Absence of Corruption
0.55 35/ 2/13 5/2
Open Government
0.42 / /13 23/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.47 78/ 10/13 23/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 7/ 12/13 17/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.54 38/ 2/13 5/2
CiviI Justice
0.52 47/ 4/13 13/2
CriminaI Justice
0.3 2/ 8/13 18/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Turkey EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.47
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.44
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.42
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.47
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.4
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.5
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.54
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.2
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.5
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.3
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.4
3.2 SIoble lows 0.55
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.35
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.34
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.58
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.5
4.3 Due process of low 0.5
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.4
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.51
4. RighI Io privocy 0.3
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.44
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.45
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.8
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.73
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.43
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.57
.2 No improper influence 0.55
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.52
.4 RespecI for due process 0.43
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.1
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.54
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.43
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.41
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.4
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.7
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.41
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.27
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.37
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.3
8.5 No corrupIion 0.
8. No improper gov. influence 0.25
8.7 Due process of low 0.5
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
154 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Uganda
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
Kompolo, Mbole, Mbororo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.41 0/ 15/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.41 81/ 14/18 11/1
Absence of Corruption
0.3 8/ 14/18 12/1
Open Government
0.33 2/ 15/18 12/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.37 3/ 1/18 13/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.1 84/ 12/18 12/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.37 0/ 15/18 11/1
CiviI Justice
0.48 5/ /18 3/1
CriminaI Justice
0.37 72/ 10/18 /1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Ugondo Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.43
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.38
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.43
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.48
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.35
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.42
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.27
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.42
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.25
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.25
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.25
3.2 SIoble lows 0.31
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.42
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.34
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.45
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.22
4.3 Due process of low 0.31
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.35
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.3
4. RighI Io privocy 0.17
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.45
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.4
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.71
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.2
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.1
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.33
.2 No improper influence 0.22
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.25
.4 RespecI for due process 0.54
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.52
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.53
7.3 No corrupIion 0.37
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.4
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.37
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.5
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.3
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.32
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.33
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.43
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.42
8.5 No corrupIion 0.28
8. No improper gov. influence 0.4
8.7 Due process of low 0.31
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
155 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Ukraine
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Kiev, Khorkiv, Odeso
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.47 8/ 8/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.41 84/ /13 1/24
Absence of Corruption
0.28 4/ 12/13 21/24
Open Government
0.4 53/ 5/13 7/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.5 55/ /13 7/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.82 27/ 3/13 3/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.4 84/ 13/13 18/24
CiviI Justice
0.52 4/ 5/13 5/24
CriminaI Justice
0.33 83/ 12/13 18/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Ukroine EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.5
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.25
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.2
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.32
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.51
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.25
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.41
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.34
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.11
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.51
3.2 SIoble lows 0.53
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.3
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.44
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.2
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.5
4.3 Due process of low 0.38
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.52
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.3
4. RighI Io privocy 0.52
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.5
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.55
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.41
.2 No improper influence 0.34
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.44
.4 RespecI for due process 0.45
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.3
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.51
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.74
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.28
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.2
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.43
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.4
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.37
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.43
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.28
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.4
8.5 No corrupIion 0.2
8. No improper gov. influence 0.15
8.7 Due process of low 0.38
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
156 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
United Arab Emirates
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: MiddIe East & North Africa [ Income group: High income
Duboi, Shor|oh, Abu-Dhobi
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.5 27/ 1/7
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.58 42/ 2/7 30/30
Absence of Corruption
0.7 17/ 1/7 17/30
Open Government
0.4 52/ 3/7 30/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.4 73/ 3/7 30/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.8 / 1/7 8/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0. 23/ 1/7 21/30
CiviI Justice
0.5 33/ 2/7 27/30
CriminaI Justice
0.78 7/ 1/7 7/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
UniIed Arob EmiroIes Middle EosI & NorIh Africo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.52
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.3
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.75
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.74
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.33
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.5
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.83
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.7
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.78
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.77
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.1
3.2 SIoble lows 0.
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.41
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.17
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.58
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.8
4.3 Due process of low 0.
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.33
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.35
4. RighI Io privocy 0.3
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.24
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.45
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.78
.2 No improper influence 0.88
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.58
.4 RespecI for due process 0.51
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.54
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.42
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.3
7.3 No corrupIion 0.77
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.5
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.71
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.4
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.84
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.8
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.8
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.75
8.5 No corrupIion 0.78
8. No improper gov. influence 0.77
8.7 Due process of low 0.
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
157 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
United Kingdom
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
London, Birminghom, Glosgow
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.78 13/ /24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.81 10/ 8/24 10/30
Absence of Corruption
0.8 15/ 10/24 15/30
Open Government
0.77 / 7/24 /30
FundamentaI Pights
0.78 15/ 13/24 15/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.84 23/ 12/24 1/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.78 10/ 7/24 10/30
CiviI Justice
0.72 14/ /24 14/30
CriminaI Justice
0.72 14/ 8/24 14/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
UniIed Kingdom WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.83
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.7
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.7
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.78
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.82
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.83
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.85
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.8
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.73
3.2 SIoble lows 0.74
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.77
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.83
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.71
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.87
4.3 Due process of low 0.77
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.82
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.71
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.84
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.88
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.5
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.7
.2 No improper influence 0.8
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
.4 RespecI for due process 0.85
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.77
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.54
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.74
7.3 No corrupIion 0.87
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.8
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.5
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.77
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.2
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.7
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.1
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.5
8.5 No corrupIion 0.81
8. No improper gov. influence 0.88
8.7 Due process of low 0.77
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
158 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
United 5tates
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Western Europe & North America [ Income group: High income
New York, Los Angeles, Chicogo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.71 1/ 13/24
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.74 20/ 14/24 1/30
Absence of Corruption
0.75 21/ 13/24 21/30
Open Government
0.7 17/ 12/24 17/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.71 27/ 20/24 25/30
Order and 5ecurity
0.85 18/ 8/24 15/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.7 22/ 13/24 20/30
CiviI Justice
0.1 27/ 18/24 25/30
CriminaI Justice
0.5 22/ 15/24 22/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
UniIed SIoIes WesIern Europe & NorIh Americo High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.81
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.73
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.8
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.8
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.78
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.7
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.75
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.81
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.87
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.58
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.
3.2 SIoble lows 0.75
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.71
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.8
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.75
4.3 Due process of low 0.2
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.7
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.8
4. RighI Io privocy 0.
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.83
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.1
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.87
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.8
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.
.2 No improper influence 0.84
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.52
.4 RespecI for due process 0.8
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.4
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.51
7.3 No corrupIion 0.82
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.8
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.53
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.71
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.5
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.7
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.4
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.47
8.5 No corrupIion 0.8
8. No improper gov. influence 0.8
8.7 Due process of low 0.2
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
159 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Uruguay
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: High income
MonIevideo, SolIo, Poysondu
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0. 20/ 1/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.75 18/ 2/1 17/30
Absence of Corruption
0.78 1/ 1/1 1/30
Open Government
0.5 20/ 2/1 1/30
FundamentaI Pights
0.7 1/ 1/1 1/30
Order and 5ecurity
0. 4/ 3/1 30/30
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.73 18/ 1/1 18/30
CiviI Justice
0.7 17/ 1/1 17/30
CriminaI Justice
0.47 42/ 2/1 2/30
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Uruguoy LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon High income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.73
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.4
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.8
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.4
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.82
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.78
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.8
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.73
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.1
3.2 SIoble lows 0.71
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.3
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.83
4.3 Due process of low 0.54
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.8
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.3
4. RighI Io privocy 0.75
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.8
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.8
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.72
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.3
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.78
.2 No improper influence 0.83
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.54
.4 RespecI for due process 0.5
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.8
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.7
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.78
7.3 No corrupIion 0.7
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.74
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.58
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.7
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.4
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.24
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.32
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.3
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.55
8.5 No corrupIion 0.72
8. No improper gov. influence 0.5
8.7 Due process of low 0.54
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
160 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Uzbekistan
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Eastern Europe & CentraI Asia [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Fergono, Somorkond, ToshkenI
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.45 73/ 10/13
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.2 7/ 13/13 24/24
Absence of Corruption
0.35 81/ /13 1/24
Open Government
0.3 78/ 11/13 17/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.3 5/ 13/13 24/24
Order and 5ecurity
0. 5/ 1/13 1/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.47 5/ /13 8/24
CiviI Justice
0.48 58/ 8/13 10/24
CriminaI Justice
0.41 5/ /13 /24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
UzbekisIon EosIern Europe & CenIrol Asio Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.07
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.23
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.43
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.42
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.14
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.42
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.2
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.37
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.34
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.43
3.2 SIoble lows 0.55
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.28
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.31
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.3
4.3 Due process of low 0.33
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.15
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.55
4. RighI Io privocy 0.2
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.25
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.42
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.1
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.77
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.8
.2 No improper influence 0.4
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.51
.4 RespecI for due process 0.42
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.23
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.45
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.5
7.3 No corrupIion 0.4
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.2
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.47
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.53
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.54
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.55
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.48
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.38
8.5 No corrupIion 0.32
8. No improper gov. influence 0.28
8.7 Due process of low 0.33
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
161 CoJn:, P:one |
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
VenezueIa
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: Latin America & the Caribbean [ Income group: Upper middIe income
Corocos, Morocoibo, BorquisimeIo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.31 / 1/1
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.17 / 1/1 2/2
Absence of Corruption
0.3 0/ 1/1 2/2
Open Government
0.3 7/ 1/1 2/2
FundamentaI Pights
0.42 8/ 1/1 27/2
Order and 5ecurity
0.53 4/ 15/1 28/2
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.28 / 1/1 2/2
CiviI Justice
0.33 8/ 1/1 2/2
CriminaI Justice
0.1 / 1/1 2/2
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Venezuelo LoIin Americo & Ihe Coribbeon Upper middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.23
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.1
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.04
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.1
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.28
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.2
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.3
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.24
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.3
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.21
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.4
3.2 SIoble lows 0.23
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.34
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.18
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.5
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.25
4.3 Due process of low 0.24
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.28
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.74
4. RighI Io privocy 0.27
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.45
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.58
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.35
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.23
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.45
.2 No improper influence 0.43
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.17
.4 RespecI for due process 0.15
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.22
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.47
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.5
7.3 No corrupIion 0.31
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.07
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.1
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.11
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.48
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.2
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.11
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.08
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.1
8.5 No corrupIion 0.28
8. No improper gov. influence 0
8.7 Due process of low 0.24
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
162 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
CompleIe counIry profile ovoiloble oI: hIIp://doIo.world|usIicepro|ecI.org RULE OF LAW INDEX
Vietnam
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: East Asia & Pacific [ Income group: Lower middIe income
Ho Chi Minh CiIy, Ho Noi, Hoi Phong
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.48 5/ 12/15
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.4 8/ 13/15 20/24
Absence of Corruption
0.44 5/ 11/15 8/24
Open Government
0.3 77/ 12/15 1/24
FundamentaI Pights
0.5 71/ 11/15 15/24
Order and 5ecurity
0.8 32/ /15 4/24
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.3 8/ 13/15 20/24
CiviI Justice
0.42 73/ 10/15 13/24
CriminaI Justice
0.47 41/ 10/15 4/24
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
VieInom EosI Asio & Pocific Lower middle income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.3
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.2
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.43
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.55
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.35
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.48
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.44
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.2
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.4
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.57
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.5
3.2 SIoble lows 0.45
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.17
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.2
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.
4.3 Due process of low 0.48
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.35
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.3
4. RighI Io privocy 0.72
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.3
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.52
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.2
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 0.3
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.55
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.54
.2 No improper influence 0.28
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.38
.4 RespecI for due process 0.41
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.33
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.38
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.
7.3 No corrupIion 0.34
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.2
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.5
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.34
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.55
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.37
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.54
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.54
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.
8.5 No corrupIion 0.53
8. No improper gov. influence 0.2
8.7 Due process of low 0.48
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
163 CoJn:, P:one |
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Zambia
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
Lusoko, KiIwe, Ndolo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.47 70/ 8/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.53 57/ 8/18 5/1
Absence of Corruption
0.41 8/ 8/18 5/1
Open Government
0.43 / 4/18 2/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.43 8/ 14/18 11/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.7 3/ 4/18 /1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.43 72/ 7/18 4/1
CiviI Justice
0.47 5/ 12/18 /1
CriminaI Justice
0.3 77/ 12/18 8/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Zombio Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.51
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.38
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.2
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.2
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.43
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.2
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.38
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.4
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.3
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.3
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.4
3.2 SIoble lows 0.37
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.4
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.4
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.4
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.37
4.3 Due process of low 0.33
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.43
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.54
4. RighI Io privocy 0.48
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.42
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.41
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.71
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.37
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.47
.2 No improper influence 0.41
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.3
.4 RespecI for due process 0.57
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.34
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.41
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.53
7.3 No corrupIion 0.45
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.44
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.4
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.5
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.41
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.4
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.15
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.41
8.5 No corrupIion 0.38
8. No improper gov. influence 0.4
8.7 Due process of low 0.33
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
164 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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Zimbabwe
A smoller sub-focIor bor represenIs o lower score (0.00 being lowesI possible), ond o lorger bor represenIs o higher score (1.00 being highesI possible).
Region: 5ub-5aharan Africa [ Income group: Low income
Horore, Bulowoyo, ChiIungwizo
Overoll Score Globol Ronk Regionol Ronk
0.34 7/ 18/18
FocIor
Trend
FocIor
Score
Globol
Ronk
Regionol
Ronk
Income
Ronk
Constraints on Government
Powers
0.25 8/ 18/18 1/1
Absence of Corruption
0.28 2/ 15/18 13/1
Open Government
0.24 / 18/18 1/1
FundamentaI Pights
0.2 8/ 18/18 1/1
Order and 5ecurity
0.2 81/ 11/18 11/1
PeguIatory Enforcement
0.32 8/ 18/18 1/1
CiviI Justice
0.4 81/ 15/18 11/1
CriminaI Justice
0.3 74/ 11/18 7/1
0
0.5
1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8 5.1 5.2
5.3
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
Zimbobwe Sub-Sohoron Africo Low income Trending up Trending down Low Medium High
Constraints on Government Powers
1.1 LimiIs by legisloIure 0.34
1.2 LimiIs by |udiciory 0.2
1.3 IndependenI oudiIing 0.27
1.4 SoncIions for officiol
misconducI
0.35
1.5 Non-governmenIol checks 0.1
1. Lowful IronsiIion of power 0.15
Absence of Corruption
2.1 No corrupIion in Ihe
execuIive bronch
0.28
2.2 No corrupIion in Ihe
|udiciory
0.42
2.3 No corrupIion in Ihe
police/miliIory
0.25
2.4 No corrupIion in Ihe
legisloIure
0.17
Open Government
3.1 Accessible lows 0.2
3.2 SIoble lows 0.28
3.3 RighI Io peIiIion /
porIicipoIion
0.2
3.4 RighI Io informoIion 0.2
FundamentaI Pights
4.1 Equol IreoImenI / no
discriminoIion
0.34
4.2 RighI Io life ond securiIy 0.2
4.3 Due process of low 0.25
4.4 Freedom of expression 0.1
4.5 Freedom of religion 0.
4. RighI Io privocy 0.14
4.7 Freedom of ossocioIion 0.1
4.8 Lobor righIs 0.37
Order and 5ecurity
5.1 Absence of crime 0.4
5.2 Absence of civil conflicI 1
5.3 Absence of violenI redress 0.35
PeguIatory Enforcement
.1 EffecIive reguloIory
enforcemenI
0.38
.2 No improper influence 0.31
.3 No unreosonoble deloy 0.32
.4 RespecI for due process 0.3
.5 No exproprioIion w/ouI
odequoIe compensoIion
0.18
CiviI Justice
7.1 AccessibiliIy ond
offordobiliIy
0.42
7.2 No discriminoIion 0.43
7.3 No corrupIion 0.43
7.4 No improper gov. influence 0.21
7.5 No unreosonoble deloy 0.4
7. EffecIive enforcemenI 0.5
7.7 ImporIiol ond effecIive ADRs 0.34
CriminaI Justice
8.1 EffecIive invesIigoIions 0.52
8.2 Timely ond effecIive
od|udicoIion
0.52
8.3 EffecIive correcIionol sysIem 0.32
8.4 No discriminoIion 0.42
8.5 No corrupIion 0.32
8. No improper gov. influence 0.2
8.7 Due process of low 0.25
ConsIroinIs on
GovernmenI
Powers
Absence of
CorrupIion
Open
GovernmenI
FundomenIol
RighIs
Order ond
SecuriIy
ReguloIory
EnforcemenI
Civil
JusIice
Criminol
JusIice
Methodology
Tne \P RJe o . lnJex i ne n: em o
systematically and comprehensively quantify the rule of law
around the world, and remains unique in its operationalization
of rule of law dimensions into concrete questions. The WJP
Rule of Law Index 2014 report presents information on
nine composite indicators (or factors) further disaggregated
ino 47 ecinc inJico: (o: J|co:) (ee T|e 1). ln
attempting to present an image that accurately portrays the
rule of law as experienced by ordinary people, each score
of the Index is calculated using a large number of questions
drawn from two original data sources collected by the World
Justice Project in each country: a General Population Poll
(CPP) nJ e:ie o JineJ ReonJen Jeionni:e
(QRQs).
Tnee .o J oJ:ce coec JoJe n:nnJ
information that is not available at the global level, and
constitute the worlds most comprehensive data set of
its kind. They capture the experiences and perceptions of
ordinary citizens and in-country professionals concerning
the performance of the state and its agents and the actual
operation of the legal framework in their country. The
country scores and rankings presented in this report are
|Ji :om mo:e nn nve nJnJ:eJ v:i|e J:.n :om ne
assessments of more than 100,000 citizens and legal experts
in 99 countries and jurisdictions, making it the most accurate
portrayal of the factors that contribute to shaping up the rule
of law in a nation.
Methodology
167 Methodology |
Factor 1:
Constraints on Government Powers
Factor 2:
Absence of Corruption
1.1 Government powers are effectively limited by the legislature
Measures whether the legislative body as a whole, as well
as its individual members, and the political parties, enjoy
in practice the capacity to exercise effective checks and
oversight of the government.
1.2 Government powers are effectively limited by the judiciary
Measures whether the judiciary as a whole, and the
members of the high courts, enjoy in practice the capacity to
exercise effective checks and oversight of the government.
This includes the necessary judicial independence to halt
unconstitutional government actions or violations.
1.3 Government powers are effectively limited by
independent auditing and review
Measures whether independent comptrollers or auditors, as
well as national human rights institutions and ombudsman
agencies, enjoy in practice the capacity to exercise effective
checks and oversight of the government.
1.4 GovernmenI ofciols ore soncIioned for misconducI
eJ:e .nene: ove:nmen onci v:ioJ eve in
the executive branch, legislature, judiciary, and the police are
inveieJ. :oecJeJ. nJ JnineJ o: onci miconJJc
and other violations.
1.5 Government powers are subject to non-governmental checks
Measures whether people, civil society organizations,
and political parties are free to express opinions about
government policies or actions, either individually or in
peaceful association with others; and whether the freedom
of the media is respected in practice, including exercising
oversight of the government without fear of retaliation.
1.6 Transition of power is subject to the law
eJ:e .nene: ove:nmen onci v:ioJ eve
are elected or appointed in accordance with the rules and
procedures set forth in the constitution. In democratic
societies, it also measures the integrity of the electoral
process, including voter freedom and public scrutiny of
election results.
2.1 GovernmenI ofciols in Ihe execuIive bronch do noI use
public ofce for privoIe goin
Measures the prevalence of bribery, informal payments,
and other inducements in the delivery of public services and
the enforcement of regulations. It also measures whether
government procurement and public works contracts are
awarded through an open and competitive bidding process,
nJ .nene: ove:nmen onci v:ioJ eve o ne
executive branch refrain from embezzling public funds.
2.2 GovernmenI ofciols in Ihe |udiciol bronch do noI use
public ofce for privoIe goin
eJ:e .nene: JJe nJ JJici onci :e:in :om
soliciting and accepting bribes to perform duties or expedite
processes; and whether the judiciary and judicial rulings are
:ee o im:oe: inJence :om ne ove:nmen. :ive
interests, and criminal organizations.
2.3 GovernmenI ofciols in Ihe police ond Ihe miliIory do noI
use public ofce for privoIe goin
eJ:e .nene: oice once: nJ c:imin inveio:
refrain from soliciting and accepting bribes to perform
basic police services or to investigate crimes; and whether
ove:nmen onci in ne oice nJ ne mii:, :e :ee
:om im:oe: inJence |, :ive ine:e o: c:imin
organizations.
2.4 GovernmenI ofciols in Ihe legisloIive bronch do noI use
public ofce for privoIe goin
Measures whether members of the legislature refrain
from soliciting or accepting bribes or other inducements in
exchange for political favors or favorable votes on legislation.
The World Justice Projects Rule of Law Index

comprises
47 outcomes indicators (or sub-factors) organized around
nine dimensions (or factors). The following table presents
a summary of the concepts underlying each of these sub-
factors. A more detailed description of the variables used
to calculate the Index scores is available in Botero, J and
Ponce, A. (2012) Measuring the Rule of Law. WJP Working
Paper No. 2, available online at www.worldjusticeproject.org/
publications.
TABLE 4: THE INDICATORS OF THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECTS RULE OF LAW INDEX

168 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014


Factor 3:
Open Government
Factor 4:
Fundamental Rights
3.1 The laws are publicized and accessible
Measures whether basic laws and information on legal
rights are publicly available, presented in plain language,
nJ :e mJe ccei|e in nJe JeJ |, inincn
segments of the population. It also measures if administrative
regulations and high court decisions are accessible to the
public in a timely manner.
3.2 The laws are stable
Measures whether commercial, labor, public health, and
c:imin . nJ :eJion :e Jncien, |e o o.
the people and corporations subject to these regulations to
ascertain what conduct is permitted and prohibited.
3.3 Right to petition the government and public participation
Measures whether people can - in practice - get together with
others to share ideas, voice concerns, or to make complaints
|oJ J|ic onci o: J|ic e:vice o v:ioJ ove:nmen
once: nJ mem|e: o ne eiJ:e. l o meJ:e
whether local government agencies effectively consult the
commJni, nJ :oviJe Jncien ino:mion nJ Jvnce
notice about decisions that affect the community.
3.4 Ofciol informoIion is ovoiloble on requesI
Measures whether drafts of legislation and administrative
decisions at the national and local levels are available to the
public on a timely basis; whether legislative proceedings are
broadcast by radio or TV; and whether relevant records
Jcn |JJe nJ:e o ove:nmen encie. ove:nmen
contracts, transcripts of administrative proceedings,
JicoJ:e :eco:J o ove:nmen onci. om|JJmn
reports, and information relative to community projects - are
accessible to the public upon request.
4.1 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination
Measures whether individuals are free from discrimination
- based on socio-economic status, gender, ethnicity, religion,
national origin, or sexual orientation - in their interactions with
the police and public health services, or in court proceedings,
public employment, and criminal investigations.
4.2 The right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed
eJ:e .nene: ne oice inic n,ic n:m o: n,ic
injury upon criminal suspects during arrest and interrogation; and
whether political dissidents are subject to searches or placed in
detention centers without warrant, or are killed. It also measures
whether the police or criminal organizations threaten, imprison, or
punish members of the media.
4.3 Due process of law and rights of the accused
Measures whether the basic rights of criminal suspects are
respected, including the presumption of innocence and the
freedoms from arbitrary arrest and unreasonable pre-trial
detention. It also measures whether criminal suspects are able to
access and challenge evidence used against them; whether they
are subject to torture or abusive treatment; and whether they are
provided with adequate legal assistance. It also measures if the
basic rights of prisoners are respected once convicted.
4.4 Freedom of opinion & expression is effectively guaranteed
Measures whether people, civil society organizations, and political
parties are free to express opinions about government policies or
actions, either individually or in peaceful association with others; and
whether the freedom of the media is respected in practice, including
exercising oversight of the government without fear of retaliation.
4.5 Freedom of belief and religion is effectively guaranteed
Measures whether religious minorities can freely and publicly
observe their holy days and events, and whether non-adherents
to a religion are required to submit to religious laws.
4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is
effectively guaranteed
Measures whether the police detain people or search their homes
.inoJ .::n. nJ .nene: ove:nmen onci ine:ce
private telephone or electronic communications of regular
citizens or political opponents without judicial authorization.
4.7 Freedom of assembly and association is effectively guaranteed
Measures whether people can freely attend community
meetings, join political organizations, hold public non-violent
demonstrations, sign petitions, and express opinions against
government policies and actions without fearing retaliation.
4.8 Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed
Measures the effective enforcement of fundamental labor rights,
including freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining; elimination of discrimination with respect to
employment; and effective abolition of forced labor and child labor.
169 Methodology |
Factor 5:
Order & Security
Factor 6:
Regulatory Enforcement
5.1 Crime is effectively controlled
Measures the prevalence of common crimes, including
homicide, kidnapping, burglary and theft, armed robbery, and
extortion, as well as peoples general perceptions of safety in
their communities.
5.2 Civil conicI is effecIively limiIed
eJ:e .nene: eoe :e :oeceJ :om :meJ conic
nJ e::o:im. :eeceJ |, ne nJm|e: o |e :eeJ
deaths and casualties from one-sided violence and terrorist
|om|in (oJ:ce. U Conic L P:o:m nJ
Center for Systemic Peace).
5.3 People do not resort to violence to redress personal
grievances
Measures whether people resort to intimidation or violence
to resolve civil disputes amongst themselves, or to seek
redress from the government; and whether people are free
from mob violence.
6.1 Government regulations are effectively enforced
Measures whether labor, environmental, public health,
commercial, and consumer protection regulations are
effectively enforced.
6.2 Government regulations are applied and enforced
wiIhouI improper inuence
Measures whether the enforcement of regulations is subject
o |:i|e:, o: im:oe: inJence |, :ive ine:e, nJ
whether public services, such as the issuance of permits and
licenses and the administration of public health services, are
provided without bribery or other inducements.
6.3 Administrative proceedings are conducted without
unreasonable delay
Measures whether administrative proceedings at the national
and local levels are conducted without unreasonable delay.
6.4 Due process is respected in administrative proceedings
Measures whether the due process of law is respected in
administrative proceedings conducted by national and local
authorities in areas such as the environment, taxes, and labor.
6.5 The government does not expropriate without adequate
compensation
Measures whether the government respects the property
rights of people and corporations, refrains from the
illegal seizure of private property, and provides adequate
compensation when property is legally expropriated.
170 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Factor 7:
Civil Justice
Factor 8:
Criminal Justice
7.1 People can access and afford civil justice
Measures the accessibility and affordability of civil courts,
including whether people are aware of available remedies,
can access and afford legal advice and representation, and
can access the court system without incurring unreasonable
fees, encountering unreasonable procedural hurdles, or
experiencing physical or linguistic barriers.
7.2 Civil justice is free of discrimination
Measures whether the civil justice system discriminates
in practice against users based on socio-economic status,
gender, ethnicity, religion, national origin, or sexual
orientation.
7.3 Civil justice is free of corruption
Measures whether the civil justice system is free of bribery
nJ im:oe: inJence |, o.e:J :ive ine:e.
7.4 Civil |usIice is free of improper governmenI inuence
Measures whether the civil justice system is independent
:om oiic inJence. nJ .nene: ne ove:nmen JnJJ,
affects the outcome of cases.
7.5 Civil justice is not subject to unreasonable delay
Measures whether civil justice proceedings are conducted
and judgments are produced in a timely manner without
unreasonable delay.
7.6 Civil justice is effectively enforced
Measures the effectiveness and timeliness of the
enforcement of civil justice decisions and judgments in
practice.
7.7 Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are
accessible impartial, and effective
Measures whether alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
(/LR) :e o:J|e. encien. eno:ce|e. nJ :ee :om
corruption.
8.1 Criminal investigation system is effective
Measures whether perpetrators of crimes are caught
and indicted. It also measures whether the judicial police,
investigators, and prosecutors have adequate resources, are
free of corruption, and perform their duties competently.
8.2 Criminal adjudication system is timely and effective
Measures whether perpetrators of crimes are prosecuted and
punished. It also measures whether criminal judges and other
JJici once: :e comeen nJ :oJJce eeJ, Jeciion.
without abuse of pre-trial detention.
8.3 Correctional system is effective in reducing criminal behavior
Measures whether correctional institutions are secure,
respect prisoners rights, and aid in the prevention of
recidivism.
8.4 Criminal system is impartial
Measures whether the police and criminal judges are
impartial and do not discriminate against suspects based on
socio-economic status, gender, ethnicity, religion, national
origin, or sexual orientation.
8.5 Criminal system is free of corruption
Measures whether the police, prosecutors, and judges are
:ee :om ne inJence o |:i|e:, nJ im:oe: inJence
from criminal organizations.
8.6 Criminal system is free of improper government
inuence
Measures whether the criminal justice system is independent
:om oiic inJence. incJJin .nene: ne ove:nmen
unduly affects the outcome of cases.
8.7 Due process of law and rights of the accused
Measures whether the basic rights of criminal suspects are
respected, including the presumption of innocence and the
freedoms from arbitrary arrest and unreasonable pre-trial
detention. It also measures whether criminal suspects are
able to access and challenge evidence used against them,
whether they are subject to torture or abusive treatment, and
whether they are provided with adequate legal assistance. It
also measures if basic rights of prisoners are respected once
convicted.
171 Methodology |
DATA SOURCES
Every year the WJP collects data from representative
samples of the general public (the General Population Polls
o: CPP) nJ e :oeion (ne JineJ ReonJen
Questionnaires or QRQs) to compute the Index scores and
:n|in. Tne CPP J:ve, :oviJe n:nnJ ino:mion
on the experiences and the perceptions of ordinary people
regarding a range of pertinent rule of law information,
including their dealings with the government, the ease of
interacting with State bureaucracy, the extent of bribery and
corruption, the availability of dispute resolution systems,
and the prevalence of common crimes to which they are
exposed. The GPP questionnaire includes 87 perception-
based questions and 56 experience-based questions, along
with socio-demographic information on all respondents. The
questionnaire is translated into local languages, adapted
to common expressions, and administered by leading local
polling companies using a probability sample of 1,000
respondents in the three largest cities of each country.
1

Depending on the particular situation of each country,
three different polling methodologies are used: Face-to-
face, Telephone, or Online. The GPPs are carried out in
each country every other year. The polling data used in this
years report was collected during the spring of 2011 (for 16
countries), the spring of 2012 (for 34 countries), and the fall
of 2013 (for 49 countries). Detailed information regarding
the cities covered, the polling companies contracted to
administer the questionnaire, and the polling methodology
employed in each of the 99 countries is presented in Table 5.
Tne JineJ ReonJen Jeionni:e (R)
complement the polling data with assessments from in-
country professionals with expertise in civil and commercial
law, criminal justice, labor law, and public health. These
questionnaires gather timely input from practitioners
who frequently interact with state institutions, including
ino:mion on ne encc, o coJ:. ne :enn o
regulatory enforcement, and the reliability of accountability
mechanisms. The questionnaires contain close-ended
perception questions and several hypothetical scenarios
with highly detailed factual assumptions aimed at ensuring
comparability across countries. The QRQ surveys are
conducted annually, and the questionnaires are completed
|, :eonJen eeceJ :om Ji:eco:ie o . n:m.
universities and colleges, research organizations, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as through
referrals from the WJP global network of practitioners, and
vetted by WJP staff based on their expertise. The expert
1 In the case of online surveys, samples are not probability samples, as they are drawn from
convenience samples such as access panels. In those cases, however, quota controls are used
o enJ:e n ne :JcJ:e o ne me i |nceJ o ne coJn:, oJion nJ:e in
e:m oincome (o: ocioeconomic J). enJe:. nJ ci, |eJ on cenJ J.
surveys are administered in three languages. The QRQ
data for this report includes a total of 2,423 surveys, which
represents an average of 24 respondents per country. These
data were collected from July 2013 through December 2013.
DATA CLEANING AND SCORE COMPUTATION
Once collected, the data are carefully processed to arrive
coJn:,eve co:e. / n: e. ne :eonJeneve
data are edited to exclude partially-completed surveys,
suspicious data, and outliers (which are detected using the
Z-score method). Individual answers are then mapped onto
the 47 sub-factors of the Index (or onto the intermediate
ceo:ie n m|e J ecn J|co:). coJineJ o n
all values fall between 0 (least rule of law) and 1 (most rule
of law), and aggregated at the country level using the simple
(or un-weighted) average of all respondents. To allow for
aggregation, the resulting scores are normalized using
the Min-Max method. These normalized scores are then
successively aggregated from the variable level all the way
J o ne co: eve o :oJJce ne nn coJn:, co:e
and rankings. In most cases, the GPP and QRQ questions
are equally weighted in the calculation of the scores of the
intermediate categories (sub-factors and sub-sub-factors).
A full picture of how questions are mapped onto indicators
and how they are weighted is presented in Botero and Ponce
(2012).
DATA VALIDATION
/ nn e. J :e viJeJ nJ c:ocnec|eJ in
qualitative and quantitative third-party sources to provide an
additional layer of analysis and to identify possible mistakes
or inconsistencies within the data. The third-party data
sources used to cross-check the Index scores are described in
Botero and Ponce (2012).
METHODOLOGICAL CHANGES
TO THIS YEARS REPORT
Every year, the WJP reviews the methods of data collection
to ensure that the information produced is valid, useful,
and continues to capture the status of the rule of law in the
world. To maintain consistency with previous editions and to
ciie :c|in cnneove: ime. ne 214 ,Jeionni:e
and data maps are closely aligned with those administered in
the past, with only three minor changes. First, sub-factors 5.1
Crime is effectively controlled, 8.1 Criminal investigation
system is effective, and 8.2 Criminal adjudication system is
timely and effective include new data from two experienced-
based questions of the general population poll. Second, in the
construction of sub-factors 3.1 The laws are publicized and
stable, 8.6 Criminal system is free of improper government
inJence. nJ 7.4 Civi ,em i :ee o im:oe:
172 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
TABLE 5: CITY COVERAGE AND POLLING METHODOLOGY IN THE 99 INDEXED COUNTRIES & TERRITORIES
COUNTRY/ TERRI TORY CI TI ES COVERED POLLI NG COMPANY METHODOLOGY SAMPLE YEAR
Af ghani st an Kabul , Herat , Kandahar ACSOR Sur veys, a subsi di ar y of D3 Syst ems, I nc. Face- t o- f ace 1014 2013
Al bani a Ti rana, Dur r es, Shkodra Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Argent i na Buenos Ai r es, Cor doba, Rosar i o St at mar k Gr oup Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Aust ral i a Sydney, Mel bour ne, Br i sbane Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2013
Aust ri a Vi enna, Graz, Li nz Mar ket I nst i t ut Onl i ne 1000 2009
Bangl adesh Dhaka, Chi t t agong, Khul na Or g- Quest Resear ch Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Bel arus Mi nsk, Gomel , Mogi l ev Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Bel gi um Ant wer p, Ghent , Char l er oi Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2013
Bol i vi a La Paz, Sant a Cr uz, Cochabamba Pr i me Consul t i ng Face- t o- f ace 1201 2013
Bosni a & Herzegovi na Saraj evo, Banj a Luka, Tuzl a Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Bot swana Gabor one, Franci st own, Mol epol ol e SI S I nt er nat i onal Resear ch Face- t o- f ace 1045 2012
Brazi l So Paul o, Ri o de Janei r o, Bel o Hor i zont e Fi ne Resear ch Mi xed ( Face- t o- f ace & Tel ephone) 850 2011
Bul gari a Sof i a, Pl ovdi v, Var na Al pha Resear ch Face- t o- f ace 1027 2013
Burki na Faso Ouagadougou, Bobo- Di oul asso, Dedougou TNS- RMS Camer oun Lt d. Face- t o- f ace 1007 2012
Cambodi a Phnom Penh, Bat t ambang, Kampong Cham I ndochi na Resear ch Lt d Face- t o- f ace 1006 2011
Cameroon Doual a, Yaounde, Bamenda Li ai son Mar ket i ng Face- t o- f ace 997 2013
Canada Tor ont o, Mont r eal , Vancouver Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2012
Chi l e Sant i ago, Val para so, Concepci on Fi ne Resear ch Tel ephone 850 2011
Chi na Shanghai , Bei j i ng, Guangzhou I BI Par t ner s Face- t o- f ace 1002 2013
Col ombi a Bogot a, Medel l i n, Bar ranqui l l a St at mar k Gr oup Face- t o- f ace 1017 2013
Cot e d I voi re Abi dj an, Bouake, San Pedr o TNS- RMS Camer oun Lt d. Face- t o- f ace 1013 2012
Croat i a Zagr eb, Spl i t , Ri j eka Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Czech Republ i c Prague, Br no, Ost rava Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1001 2011
Denmark Copenhagen, Aar hus, Odense Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2012
Domi ni can Republ i c Santo Domi ngo, Di stri to Naci onal , Santi ago CI D- Gal l up Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Ecuador Qui t o, Guayaqui l , Cuenca Pr i me Consul t i ng Face- t o- f ace 1152 2012
Egypt Cai r o, Al exandr i a, Gi za WJP i n col l aborat i on wi t h l ocal par t ner Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
El Sal vador San Sal vador, San Mi guel , Sant a Ana CI D- Gal l up Face- t o- f ace 1009 2013
Est oni a Tal l i nn, Tar t u, Nar va Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2011
Et hi opi a Addi s Ababa, Di r e Dawa, Mek el e Resear ch Sol ut i ons Li mi t ed Face- t o- f ace 1019 2011
Fi nl and Hel si nki , Tamper e, Tur ku Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2012
France Par i s, Lyon, Mar sei l l e Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1001 2013
Georgi a Tbi l i si , Kut ai si , Bat umi ACT Mar ket i ng Resear ch & Consul t i ng Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Germany Ber l i n, Hambur g, Muni ch Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2013
Ghana Accra, Kumasi , Sekondi -Takoradi FACTS I nt er nat i onal Ghana Li mi t ed Face- t o- f ace 1005 2013
Greece At hens, Sal oni ca, Pat ras Cent r um S. A. Tel ephone 1000 2012
Guat emal a Guatemal a Ci ty, Quetzal tenango, Escui ntl a CI D- Gal l up Face- t o- f ace 1026 2013
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na Hong Kong I BI Par t ner s Face- t o- f ace 1006 2011
Hungary Budapest , Debr ecen, Mi skol c SI S I nt er nat i onal Resear ch Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
I ndi a Mumbai , Del hi , Bangal or e I psos Publ i c Af f ai r s Face- t o- f ace 1047 2013
I ndonesi a Jakar t a, Surabaya, Bandung MRI - Mar ket i ng Resear ch I ndonesi a Face- t o- f ace 1067 2013
I ran Teheran, Mashhad, I sf ahan WJP i n col l aborat i on wi t h l ocal par t ner Face- t o- f ace 1045 2013
I t al y Rome, Mi l an, Napl es Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2011
Jamai ca Ki ngst on, Por t mor e, Spani sh Town St at mar k Gr oup Face- t o- f ace 1000 2011
Japan Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka I BI Par t ner s Face- t o- f ace 1002 2013
Jordan Amman, I r bi d, Zar qa WJP i n col l aborat i on wi t h l ocal par t ner Face- t o- f ace 1004 2013
Kazakhst an Al mat y, Ast ana, Shymkent VCI OM Face- t o- f ace 1002 2013
Kenya Nai r obi , Mombasa, Nakur u TNS- RMS Face- t o- f ace 1003 2013
Kyrgyzst an Bi shkek, Osh, Jal al abad VCI OM Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Lebanon Bei r ut , Tr i pol i , Si don WJP i n col l aborat i on wi t h l ocal par t ner Face- t o- f ace 1001 2011
Li beri a Monr ovi a, Kakat a, Gbar nga FACTS I nt er nat i onal Ghana Li mi t ed Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Macedoni a, FYR Skopj e, Bi t ol a, Kumanovo Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Madagascar Ant ananar i vo, Ant si rabe, Toamasi na DCDM Resear ch Face- t o- f ace 1002 2012
Mal awi Li l ongwe, Bl ant yr e, Mzuzu SI S I nt er nat i onal Resear ch Face- t o- f ace 1001 2012
Mal aysi a Kual a Lumpur, I poh, Johor Bahr u I BI Par t ner s Face- t o- f ace 1006 2011
Mexi co Mexi co Ci t y, Guadal aj ara, Mont er r ey On Tar get Tel ephone 1000 2012
Mol dova Chi si nau, Bal t i , Cahul Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Mongol i a Ul aanbaat ar, Er denet , Dar khan Sant Maral Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Morocco Casabl anca, Rabat , Mar rakesh I psos Publ i c Af f ai r s Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Myanmar Mandal ay, Naypyi daw, Yangon I BI Par t ner s Face- t o- f ace 1004 2013
Nepal Kat hmandu, Morang, Rupandehi I psos Face- t o- f ace 1015 2012
Net herl ands Amst er dam, Rot t er dam, The Hague Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2013
New Zeal and Auckl and, Wel l i ngt on, Chr i st chur ch I BI Par t ner s Tel ephone 1006 2011
Ni caragua Managua, Len, Est el i St at mar k Gr oup Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Ni geri a Lagos, Oyo, Kano Mar ket i ng Suppor t Consul t ancy Face- t o- f ace 1048 2013
Norway Osl o, Ber gen, Tr ondhei m Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1005 2011
Paki st an Karachi , Lahor e, Fai sal abad Gal l up Paki st an ( member of Gal l up I nt er nat i onal ) Face- t o- f ace 1902 2013
Panama Panama Ci t y, Col n, Davi d Chi r i qu St at mar k Gr oup Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Peru Li ma, Tr uj i l l o, Ar equi pa Pr i me Consul t i ng Face- t o- f ace 1231 2013
Phi l i ppi nes Mani l a, Davao, Cebu I BI Par t ner s Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Pol and War saw, Lodz, Cracow Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Port ugal Li sbon, Por t o, Braga Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2012
Republ i c of Korea Seoul , Busan, I ncheon I BI Par t ner s Face- t o- f ace 1004 2013
Romani a Buchar est , Cl uj - Napoca, Ti mi soara Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Russi a Moscow, Sai nt Pet er sbur g, Novosi bi r sk VCI OM Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Senegal Dakar, Thi es, Sai nt - Loui s Li ai son Mar ket i ng Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Serbi a Bel grade, Novi Sad, Ni s Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Si erra Leone Fr eet own, Kenema, Makeni TNS- RMS Camer oun Lt d. Face- t o- f ace 1005 2012
Si ngapore Si ngapor e Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2012
Sl oveni a Lj ubl j ana, Mar i bor, Cel j e SI S I nt er nat i onal Resear ch Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Sout h Af ri ca Johannesbur g, Cape Town, Dur ban Quest Resear ch Ser vi ces Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Spai n Madr i d, Bar cel ona, Val enci a Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2013
Sri Lanka Col ombo, Negombo, Kandy I psos Face- t o- f ace 1020 2012
Sweden St ockhol m, Got henbur g, Mal mo Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2013
Tanzani a Dar es Sal aam, Mwanza, Shi nyanga Consumer Opt i ons Lt d. Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Thai l and Bangkok, Nont habur i , Pak Kr et I BI Par t ner s Face- t o- f ace 1008 2013
Tuni si a Tuni s, Sf ax, Sousse WJP i n col l aborat i on wi t h l ocal par t ner Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Turkey I st anbul , Ankara, I zmi r TNS Tur key Face- t o- f ace 1003 2013
Uganda Kampal a, Mbarara, Mbal e TNS- RMS Face- t o- f ace 1002 2013
Ukrai ne Ki ev, Khar ki v, Odesa Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Uni ted Arab Emi rates Dubai , Shar j ah, Abu- Dhabi WJP i n col l aborat i on wi t h l ocal par t ner Face- t o- f ace 1011 2011
Uni t ed Ki ngdom London, Bi r mi ngham, Gl asgow Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2013
Uni t ed St at es New Yor k, Los Angel es, Chi cago Sur vey Sampl i ng I nt er nat i onal Onl i ne 1000 2013
Uruguay Mont evi deo, Sal t o, Paysandu St at mar k Gr oup Tel ephone 1000 2012
Uzbeki st an Fer gana, Samar kand, Tashkent Mar ket Resear ch & Pol l s - EURASI A ( MRP- EURASI A) Face- t o- f ace 1000 2012
Venezuel a Caracas, Maracai bo, Bar qui si met o WJP i n col l aborat i on wi t h l ocal par t ner Face- t o- f ace 1000 2013
Vi et nam Ho Chi Mi nh Ci t y, Ha Noi , Hai Phong I ndochi na Resear ch Lt d Face- t o- f ace 1000 2011
Zambi a Lusaka, Ki t we, Ndol a SI S I nt er nat i onal Resear ch Face- t o- f ace 1004 2012
Zi mbabwe Harar e, Bul awayo, Chi t ungwi za SI S I nt er nat i onal Resear ch Face- t o- f ace 1005 2012
173 Methodology |
ove:nmen inJence. eve: ,Jeion .e:e :emoveJ (nve
,Jeion in ne n: ce. nJ one ,Jeion in ne econJ
and third cases). Finally, in the construction of sub-factor 5.2
Civi conic i eecive, imieJ. ne ceo:ic coJin o
the variables battle deaths, one-sided casualties, terrorism
deaths, and terrorism events was revised.
In addition, in order to improve the accuracy of the QRQ
results and reduce respondent burden, pro-active dependent
interviewing techniques were used to remind respondents
.no :icieJ in ,e: J:ve, o nei: :eone in ne
previous year.
TRACKING CHANGES OVER TIME
This years report introduces a measure to illustrate whether
the rule of law in a country, as measured through the factors
of the WJP Rule of Law Index, changed over the course of the
,e:. Tni meJ:e i :eeneJin ne o:m o ::o.
and represents a summary of rigorous statistical testing
based on the use of bootstrapping procedures (see below).
For each factor, this measure takes the value of zero (no
::o.) i ne:e . no iic, inincn cnne in ne
score since last year; a positive value (upward arrow) if there
. cnne eJin o iic, inincn im:ovemen
in the score; and a negative value (downward arrow) if there
. cnne eJin o iic, inincn Jee:io:ion
in the score. This measure complements the numerical scores
and rankings presented in this report, which benchmark each
countrys current performance on the factors and sub-factors
of the Index against that of other countries.
The measure of change over time is constructed in four steps:
1. First, to allow for comparisons across the 2012 and
2013 data, the country-level raw values of each
variable are mapped onto the 47 sub-factors (using
the 2012 data map) and then normalized on a scale of
0-1 using the Min-Max method, so the maximum and
minimum values of each variable over the two years
equal one and zero, respectively.
2. The normalized variables are aggregated to yield
country scores for each of the factors and sub-factors
of the Index for each year. Last years scores are then
subtracted from this years to obtain, for each country
and each factor, the annual difference in scores.
3. To test whether the annual changes are statistically
inincn. |oo:in :oceJJ:e i JeJ o
estimate standard errors. To calculate these errors,
100 samples of respondent-level observations
(of equal size to the original sample) are randomly
selected with replacement for each country from the
ooeJ e o:eonJen o: 212 nJ 21. Tnee
samples are used to produce a set of 100 country-level
scores for each factor and each country, which are
Jii.eJ o ccJe ne nn nJ:J e::o:. Tnee
errors which measure the uncertainty associated
with picking a particular sample of respondents are
then employed to conduct pair-wise t-tests for each
country and each factor.
4. Finally, to illustrate the annual change, a measure of
change over time is produced based on the value of
ne nnJ Jie:ence nJi iic inincnce (
ne e:ceneve).
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
The Index methodology displays both strengths and
limitations. Among its strengths is the inclusion of expert
nJ noJenoJ J:ve, o enJ:e n ne nnJin :eec
the conditions experienced by the population. Another
:enn in i :ocne ne meJ:emen o :Je o
law from various angles by triangulating information across
data sources and types of questions. This approach not only
enables accounting for different perspectives on the rule of
law, but it also helps to reduce possible bias that might be
introduced by any one particular data collection method.
Finally, it relies on statistical testing to determine the
inincnce o ne cnne in ne co: co:e ove: ne
year.
With the aforementioned methodological strengths come
a number of limitations. First, the data shed light on rule of
law dimensions that appear comparatively strong or weak,
|J :e no ecinc enoJn o e|in cJion. TnJ. i
will be necessary to use the Index in combination with other
analytical tools to provide a full picture of causes and possible
solutions. Second, the methodology has been applied only in
three major urban areas in each of the indexed countries. This
year, the WJP is piloting the application of the methodology
to rural areas. Third, given the rapid changes occurring in
ome coJn:ie. co:e o: ome coJn:iem, |e eniive
o ne ecinc oin in ime .nen ne J .e:e coeceJ.
To address this, next year the WJP will pilot test methods
o movin ve:e o ccoJn o: no:e:m JcJion.
Fourth, the QRQ data may be subject to problems of
measurement error due to the limited number of experts in
ome coJn:ie. :eJin ine :ecieeime. To JJ:e
this, the WJP works constantly to expand its network of in-
country academic and practitioner experts who contribute
their time and expertise to this endeavor. Finally, due to the
limited number of experts in some countries (which implies
higher standard errors) and the fact that the GPPs are carried
174 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
out in each country every other year (which implies that for
some countries, some variables do not change from one year
to another),
2
it is possible that the test described above fails
to detect small changes in a countrys situation over time.
OTHER METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A detailed presentation of the methodology, including a
Jec:iion o ne mo:e nn nve nJnJ:eJ v:i|e JeJ
to construct the Index scores, are available in Botero, J and
Ponce, A. (2012) Measuring the Rule of Law. WJP Working
Paper No. 2, available online at www.worldjusticeproject.org.
2 While the QRQ surveys are administered annually in every country, the GPP surveys
are administered annually in approximately half of the countries in the Index country sample
(meaning GPPs are conducted every other year in any given country).
Data Tables
176 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
COUNTRY/TERRITORY
CONSTRAI NTS ON
GOVERNMENT POWERS
ABSENCE OF
CORRUPTI ON
OPEN
GOVERNMENT
FUNDAMENTAL
RI GHTS
ORDER &
SECURI TY
REGULATORY
ENFORCEMENT
CI VI L
J USTI CE
CRI MI NAL
J USTI CE
H
I
G
H

I
N
C
O
M
E
Aust ral i a 8/ 30 8/ 30 12/ 30 10/ 30 12/ 30 7/ 30 12/ 30 11/ 30
Aust r i a 6/ 30 10/ 30 6/ 30 5/ 30 9/ 30 6/ 30 7/ 30 5/ 30
Bel gi um 11/ 30 13/ 30 18/ 30 9/ 30 14/ 30 19/ 30 19/ 30 20/ 30
Canada 13/ 30 14/ 30 3/ 30 16/ 30 13/ 30 9/ 30 13/ 30 15/ 30
Cr oat i a 29/ 30 30/ 30 28/ 30 29/ 30 26/ 30 30/ 30 29/ 30 27/ 30
Czech Republ i c 22/ 30 27/ 30 25/ 30 11/ 30 22/ 30 22/ 30 20/ 30 19/ 30
Denmar k 1/ 30 1/ 30 5/ 30 2/ 30 3/ 30 2/ 30 4/ 30 3/ 30
Est oni a 12/ 30 18/ 30 15/ 30 12/ 30 20/ 30 13/ 30 15/ 30 13/ 30
Fi nl and 5/ 30 6/ 30 11/ 30 4/ 30 7/ 30 11/ 30 8/ 30 1/ 30
France 14/ 30 20/ 30 16/ 30 18/ 30 23/ 30 14/ 30 18/ 30 21/ 30
Ger many 9/ 30 12/ 30 14/ 30 8/ 30 11/ 30 16/ 30 3/ 30 16/ 30
Gr eece 26/ 30 29/ 30 26/ 30 26/ 30 27/ 30 29/ 30 24/ 30 30/ 30
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na 23/ 30 9/ 30 10/ 30 27/ 30 4/ 30 15/ 30 16/ 30 10/ 30
Hungar y 28/ 30 25/ 30 27/ 30 28/ 30 17/ 30 28/ 30 30/ 30 28/ 30
I t al y 24/ 30 26/ 30 29/ 30 21/ 30 28/ 30 27/ 30 28/ 30 23/ 30
Japan 15/ 30 11/ 30 8/ 30 20/ 30 1/ 30 12/ 30 11/ 30 18/ 30
Net her l ands 7/ 30 7/ 30 7/ 30 6/ 30 18/ 30 4/ 30 2/ 30 9/ 30
New Zeal and 4/ 30 3/ 30 2/ 30 7/ 30 10/ 30 5/ 30 9/ 30 12/ 30
Nor way 2/ 30 2/ 30 1/ 30 3/ 30 16/ 30 1/ 30 1/ 30 4/ 30
Pol and 21/ 30 24/ 30 23/ 30 23/ 30 21/ 30 24/ 30 21/ 30 17/ 30
Por t ugal 18/ 30 23/ 30 22/ 30 17/ 30 29/ 30 25/ 30 22/ 30 25/ 30
Republ i c of Kor ea 16/ 30 16/ 30 13/ 30 22/ 30 6/ 30 17/ 30 10/ 30 8/ 30
Si ngapor e 20/ 30 5/ 30 20/ 30 24/ 30 2/ 30 8/ 30 6/ 30 2/ 30
Sl oveni a 27/ 30 28/ 30 21/ 30 13/ 30 25/ 30 26/ 30 26/ 30 26/ 30
Spai n 25/ 30 22/ 30 24/ 30 14/ 30 24/ 30 23/ 30 23/ 30 24/ 30
Sweden 3/ 30 4/ 30 4/ 30 1/ 30 5/ 30 3/ 30 5/ 30 6/ 30
Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es 30/ 30 17/ 30 30/ 30 30/ 30 8/ 30 21/ 30 27/ 30 7/ 30
Uni t ed Ki ngdom 10/ 30 15/ 30 9/ 30 15/ 30 19/ 30 10/ 30 14/ 30 14/ 30
Uni t ed St at es 19/ 30 21/ 30 17/ 30 25/ 30 15/ 30 20/ 30 25/ 30 22/ 30
Ur uguay 17/ 30 19/ 30 19/ 30 19/ 30 30/ 30 18/ 30 17/ 30 29/ 30
U
P
P
E
R

M
I
D
D
L
E

I
N
C
O
M
E
Ar gent i na 20/ 29 14/ 29 17/ 29 3/ 29 23/ 29 26/ 29 8/ 29 24/ 29
Bel ar us 28/ 29 7/ 29 26/ 29 25/ 29 6/ 29 9/ 29 4/ 29 11/ 29
Bosni a & Her zegovi na 13/ 29 18/ 29 10/ 29 4/ 29 11/ 29 14/ 29 16/ 29 5/ 29
Bot swana 2/ 29 2/ 29 2/ 29 16/ 29 3/ 29 1/ 29 3/ 29 1/ 29
Brazi l 3/ 29 12/ 29 7/ 29 6/ 29 18/ 29 6/ 29 14/ 29 23/ 29
Bul gar i a 14/ 29 22/ 29 16/ 29 7/ 29 8/ 29 19/ 29 12/ 29 15/ 29
Chi l e 1/ 29 1/ 29 1/ 29 1/ 29 15/ 29 2/ 29 2/ 29 2/ 29
Chi na 26/ 29 15/ 29 24/ 29 28/ 29 4/ 29 28/ 29 25/ 29 12/ 29
Col ombi a 10/ 29 21/ 29 8/ 29 18/ 29 26/ 29 15/ 29 15/ 29 26/ 29
Domi ni can Republ i c 19/ 29 26/ 29 11/ 29 14/ 29 25/ 29 27/ 29 17/ 29 21/ 29
Ecuador 23/ 29 17/ 29 25/ 29 19/ 29 27/ 29 17/ 29 24/ 29 27/ 29
I ran 25/ 29 10/ 29 28/ 29 29/ 29 21/ 29 8/ 29 7/ 29 19/ 29
Jamai ca 4/ 29 16/ 29 18/ 29 12/ 29 19/ 29 3/ 29 18/ 29 13/ 29
Jor dan 17/ 29 4/ 29 21/ 29 22/ 29 2/ 29 4/ 29 1/ 29 4/ 29
Kazakhst an 27/ 29 20/ 29 27/ 29 21/ 29 7/ 29 22/ 29 19/ 29 17/ 29
Lebanon 9/ 29 25/ 29 19/ 29 11/ 29 10/ 29 24/ 29 22/ 29 14/ 29
Macedoni a, FYR 15/ 29 6/ 29 3/ 29 8/ 29 12/ 29 10/ 29 9/ 29 8/ 29
Mal aysi a 12/ 29 3/ 29 9/ 29 26/ 29 1/ 29 13/ 29 6/ 29 6/ 29
Mexi co 11/ 29 27/ 29 6/ 29 17/ 29 29/ 29 16/ 29 27/ 29 28/ 29
Panama 22/ 29 19/ 29 5/ 29 13/ 29 16/ 29 18/ 29 21/ 29 20/ 29
Per u 6/ 29 28/ 29 20/ 29 5/ 29 22/ 29 20/ 29 26/ 29 22/ 29
Romani a 8/ 29 9/ 29 12/ 29 2/ 29 5/ 29 11/ 29 5/ 29 3/ 29
Russi a 24/ 29 23/ 29 22/ 29 24/ 29 20/ 29 25/ 29 20/ 29 25/ 29
Ser bi a 18/ 29 24/ 29 13/ 29 9/ 29 14/ 29 23/ 29 23/ 29 16/ 29
Sout h Af r i ca 5/ 29 13/ 29 4/ 29 10/ 29 24/ 29 7/ 29 11/ 29 10/ 29
Thai l and 16/ 29 8/ 29 15/ 29 15/ 29 13/ 29 21/ 29 28/ 29 7/ 29
Tuni si a 7/ 29 11/ 29 14/ 29 20/ 29 9/ 29 12/ 29 10/ 29 9/ 29
Tur key 21/ 29 5/ 29 23/ 29 23/ 29 17/ 29 5/ 29 13/ 29 18/ 29
Venezuel a 29/ 29 29/ 29 29/ 29 27/ 29 28/ 29 29/ 29 29/ 29 29/ 29
L
O
W
E
R

M
I
D
D
L
E

I
N
C
O
M
E
Al bani a 12/ 24 17/ 24 12/ 24 5/ 24 9/ 24 10/ 24 8/ 24 14/ 24
Bangl adesh 18/ 24 22/ 24 20/ 24 20/ 24 17/ 24 22/ 24 20/ 24 23/ 24
Bol i vi a 22/ 24 18/ 24 18/ 24 17/ 24 19/ 24 21/ 24 24/ 24 24/ 24
Camer oon 21/ 24 24/ 24 22/ 24 18/ 24 18/ 24 23/ 24 23/ 24 21/ 24
Cot e d' I voi r e 16/ 24 10/ 24 21/ 24 16/ 24 20/ 24 7/ 24 9/ 24 10/ 24
Egypt 15/ 24 5/ 24 13/ 24 22/ 24 13/ 24 14/ 24 17/ 24 8/ 24
El Sal vador 11/ 24 6/ 24 19/ 24 3/ 24 15/ 24 6/ 24 11/ 24 19/ 24
Geor gi a 9/ 24 1/ 24 5/ 24 6/ 24 2/ 24 1/ 24 1/ 24 1/ 24
Ghana 1/ 24 7/ 24 3/ 24 1/ 24 11/ 24 4/ 24 2/ 24 6/ 24
Guat emal a 10/ 24 14/ 24 10/ 24 9/ 24 21/ 24 19/ 24 21/ 24 22/ 24
I ndi a 4/ 24 12/ 24 2/ 24 10/ 24 22/ 24 16/ 24 18/ 24 5/ 24
I ndonesi a 2/ 24 15/ 24 1/ 24 11/ 24 7/ 24 5/ 24 12/ 24 12/ 24
Mol dova 17/ 24 19/ 24 11/ 24 13/ 24 6/ 24 15/ 24 14/ 24 17/ 24
Mongol i a 7/ 24 11/ 24 23/ 24 4/ 24 5/ 24 12/ 24 4/ 24 3/ 24
Mor occo 6/ 24 9/ 24 6/ 24 19/ 24 8/ 24 3/ 24 6/ 24 16/ 24
Ni caragua 23/ 24 13/ 24 8/ 24 14/ 24 16/ 24 13/ 24 19/ 24 15/ 24
Ni ger i a 13/ 24 23/ 24 15/ 24 21/ 24 23/ 24 17/ 24 7/ 24 20/ 24
Paki st an 14/ 24 20/ 24 24/ 24 23/ 24 24/ 24 24/ 24 22/ 24 11/ 24
Phi l i ppi nes 5/ 24 3/ 24 9/ 24 12/ 24 10/ 24 9/ 24 16/ 24 13/ 24
Senegal 3/ 24 4/ 24 14/ 24 2/ 24 14/ 24 2/ 24 3/ 24 7/ 24
Sr i Lanka 8/ 24 2/ 24 4/ 24 8/ 24 12/ 24 11/ 24 15/ 24 2/ 24
Ukrai ne 19/ 24 21/ 24 7/ 24 7/ 24 3/ 24 18/ 24 5/ 24 18/ 24
Uzbeki st an 24/ 24 16/ 24 17/ 24 24/ 24 1/ 24 8/ 24 10/ 24 9/ 24
Vi et nam 20/ 24 8/ 24 16/ 24 15/ 24 4/ 24 20/ 24 13/ 24 4/ 24
L
O
W

I
N
C
O
M
E
Af ghani st an 10/ 16 16/ 16 11/ 16 12/ 16 16/ 16 15/ 16 16/ 16 16/ 16
Bur ki na Faso 9/ 16 1/ 16 4/ 16 2/ 16 7/ 16 1/ 16 2/ 16 5/ 16
Cambodi a 15/ 16 11/ 16 8/ 16 10/ 16 3/ 16 13/ 16 15/ 16 15/ 16
Et hi opi a 14/ 16 2/ 16 13/ 16 14/ 16 9/ 16 10/ 16 12/ 16 3/ 16
Kenya 7/ 16 14/ 16 9/ 16 9/ 16 10/ 16 7/ 16 7/ 16 10/ 16
Kyr gyzst an 8/ 16 15/ 16 6/ 16 6/ 16 2/ 16 3/ 16 8/ 16 11/ 16
Li ber i a 4/ 16 10/ 16 10/ 16 3/ 16 15/ 16 14/ 16 14/ 16 12/ 16
Madagascar 13/ 16 9/ 16 3/ 16 8/ 16 1/ 16 8/ 16 10/ 16 9/ 16
Mal awi 6/ 16 4/ 16 7/ 16 4/ 16 8/ 16 6/ 16 1/ 16 1/ 16
Myanmar 12/ 16 3/ 16 14/ 16 15/ 16 5/ 16 12/ 16 13/ 16 14/ 16
Nepal 1/ 16 6/ 16 1/ 16 1/ 16 4/ 16 2/ 16 9/ 16 4/ 16
Si er ra Leone 2/ 16 8/ 16 15/ 16 5/ 16 13/ 16 9/ 16 5/ 16 13/ 16
Tanzani a 3/ 16 7/ 16 5/ 16 7/ 16 14/ 16 5/ 16 4/ 16 2/ 16
Uganda 11/ 16 12/ 16 12/ 16 13/ 16 12/ 16 11/ 16 3/ 16 6/ 16
Zambi a 5/ 16 5/ 16 2/ 16 11/ 16 6/ 16 4/ 16 6/ 16 8/ 16
Zi mbabwe 16/ 16 13/ 16 16/ 16 16/ 16 11/ 16 16/ 16 11/ 16 7/ 16
RANKINGS BY INCOME
177 Data Tables |
RANKINGS BY REGION
COUNTRY/TERRITORY
CONTRAI NTS ON
GOVERNMENT POWERS
ABSENCE OF
CORRUPTI ON
OPEN
GOVERNMENT
FUNDAMENTAL
RI GHTS
ORDER &
SECURI TY
REGULATORY
ENFORCEMENT
CI VI L
J USTI CE
CRI MI NAL
J USTI CE
W
E
S
T
E
R
N

E
U
R
O
P
E

&

N
O
R
T
H

A
M
E
R
I
C
A
Aust r i a 5/ 24 6/ 24 5/ 24 5/ 24 4/ 24 5/ 24 6/ 24 4/ 24
Bel gi um 9/ 24 8/ 24 13/ 24 8/ 24 7/ 24 12/ 24 12/ 24 13/ 24
Bul gar i a 24/ 24 24/ 24 24/ 24 23/ 24 19/ 24 24/ 24 22/ 24 24/ 24
Canada 11/ 24 9/ 24 2/ 24 14/ 24 6/ 24 6/ 24 8/ 24 9/ 24
Cr oat i a 22/ 24 22/ 24 21/ 24 24/ 24 21/ 24 23/ 24 23/ 24 21/ 24
Czech Republ i c 16/ 24 19/ 24 18/ 24 9/ 24 15/ 24 14/ 24 13/ 24 12/ 24
Denmar k 1/ 24 1/ 24 4/ 24 2/ 24 1/ 24 2/ 24 4/ 24 2/ 24
Est oni a 10/ 24 11/ 24 10/ 24 10/ 24 13/ 24 9/ 24 10/ 24 7/ 24
Fi nl and 4/ 24 4/ 24 8/ 24 4/ 24 3/ 24 8/ 24 7/ 24 1/ 24
France 12/ 24 12/ 24 11/ 24 16/ 24 16/ 24 10/ 24 11/ 24 14/ 24
Ger many 7/ 24 7/ 24 9/ 24 7/ 24 5/ 24 11/ 24 3/ 24 10/ 24
Gr eece 19/ 24 21/ 24 19/ 24 21/ 24 22/ 24 21/ 24 17/ 24 23/ 24
Hungar y 21/ 24 17/ 24 20/ 24 22/ 24 10/ 24 20/ 24 24/ 24 22/ 24
I t al y 17/ 24 18/ 24 22/ 24 17/ 24 23/ 24 19/ 24 21/ 24 16/ 24
Net her l ands 6/ 24 5/ 24 6/ 24 6/ 24 11/ 24 4/ 24 2/ 24 6/ 24
Nor way 2/ 24 2/ 24 1/ 24 3/ 24 9/ 24 1/ 24 1/ 24 3/ 24
Pol and 15/ 24 16/ 24 16/ 24 18/ 24 14/ 24 16/ 24 14/ 24 11/ 24
Por t ugal 13/ 24 15/ 24 15/ 24 15/ 24 24/ 24 17/ 24 15/ 24 18/ 24
Romani a 23/ 24 23/ 24 23/ 24 19/ 24 17/ 24 22/ 24 20/ 24 20/ 24
Sl oveni a 20/ 24 20/ 24 14/ 24 11/ 24 20/ 24 18/ 24 19/ 24 19/ 24
Spai n 18/ 24 14/ 24 17/ 24 12/ 24 18/ 24 15/ 24 16/ 24 17/ 24
Sweden 3/ 24 3/ 24 3/ 24 1/ 24 2/ 24 3/ 24 5/ 24 5/ 24
Uni t ed Ki ngdom 8/ 24 10/ 24 7/ 24 13/ 24 12/ 24 7/ 24 9/ 24 8/ 24
Uni t ed St at es 14/ 24 13/ 24 12/ 24 20/ 24 8/ 24 13/ 24 18/ 24 15/ 24
E
A
S
T

A
S
I
A

&

P
A
C
I
F
I
C
Aust ral i a 2/ 15 3/ 15 4/ 15 2/ 15 7/ 15 2/ 15 5/ 15 4/ 15
Cambodi a 15/ 15 15/ 15 13/ 15 12/ 15 13/ 15 15/ 15 15/ 15 15/ 15
Chi na 14/ 15 10/ 15 11/ 15 14/ 15 8/ 15 12/ 15 11/ 15 11/ 15
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na 6/ 15 4/ 15 3/ 15 6/ 15 3/ 15 5/ 15 6/ 15 3/ 15
I ndonesi a 7/ 15 14/ 15 7/ 15 9/ 15 11/ 15 7/ 15 9/ 15 12/ 15
Japan 3/ 15 5/ 15 2/ 15 3/ 15 1/ 15 4/ 15 4/ 15 6/ 15
Mal aysi a 9/ 15 7/ 15 8/ 15 13/ 15 6/ 15 8/ 15 7/ 15 7/ 15
Mongol i a 10/ 15 13/ 15 14/ 15 7/ 15 10/ 15 11/ 15 8/ 15 9/ 15
Myanmar 12/ 15 12/ 15 15/ 15 15/ 15 15/ 15 14/ 15 13/ 15 14/ 15
New Zeal and 1/ 15 1/ 15 1/ 15 1/ 15 5/ 15 1/ 15 2/ 15 5/ 15
Phi l i ppi nes 8/ 15 9/ 15 10/ 15 10/ 15 14/ 15 9/ 15 12/ 15 13/ 15
Republ i c of Kor ea 4/ 15 6/ 15 5/ 15 4/ 15 4/ 15 6/ 15 3/ 15 2/ 15
Si ngapor e 5/ 15 2/ 15 6/ 15 5/ 15 2/ 15 3/ 15 1/ 15 1/ 15
Thai l and 11/ 15 8/ 15 9/ 15 8/ 15 12/ 15 10/ 15 14/ 15 8/ 15
Vi et nam 13/ 15 11/ 15 12/ 15 11/ 15 9/ 15 13/ 15 10/ 15 10/ 15
E
A
S
T
E
R
N
E
U
R
O
P
E
&
C
E
N
T
R
A
L
A
S
I
A
Al bani a 5/ 13 10/ 13 7/ 13 4/ 13 11/ 13 8/ 13 6/ 13 9/ 13
Bel ar us 12/ 13 4/ 13 12/ 13 12/ 13 4/ 13 3/ 13 1/ 13 4/ 13
Bosni a & Her zegovi na 1/ 13 5/ 13 3/ 13 1/ 13 7/ 13 5/ 13 7/ 13 1/ 13
Geor gi a 2/ 13 1/ 13 2/ 13 5/ 13 2/ 13 1/ 13 2/ 13 2/ 13
Kazakhst an 11/ 13 6/ 13 13/ 13 9/ 13 5/ 13 7/ 13 9/ 13 7/ 13
Kyr gyzst an 6/ 13 13/ 13 10/ 13 7/ 13 10/ 13 11/ 13 12/ 13 13/ 13
Macedoni a, FYR 3/ 13 3/ 13 1/ 13 2/ 13 8/ 13 4/ 13 3/ 13 3/ 13
Mol dova 8/ 13 11/ 13 6/ 13 8/ 13 6/ 13 12/ 13 13/ 13 11/ 13
Russi a 10/ 13 7/ 13 8/ 13 11/ 13 13/ 13 10/ 13 10/ 13 10/ 13
Ser bi a 4/ 13 8/ 13 4/ 13 3/ 13 9/ 13 9/ 13 11/ 13 5/ 13
Tur key 7/ 13 2/ 13 9/ 13 10/ 13 12/ 13 2/ 13 4/ 13 8/ 13
Ukrai ne 9/ 13 12/ 13 5/ 13 6/ 13 3/ 13 13/ 13 5/ 13 12/ 13
Uzbeki st an 13/ 13 9/ 13 11/ 13 13/ 13 1/ 13 6/ 13 8/ 13 6/ 13
M
I
D
D
L
E

E
A
S
T

&

N
O
R
T
H

A
F
R
I
C
A
Egypt 6/ 7 5/ 7 5/ 7 6/ 7 6/ 7 7/ 7 7/ 7 5/ 7
I ran 7/ 7 3/ 7 7/ 7 7/ 7 7/ 7 4/ 7 3/ 7 6/ 7
Jor dan 5/ 7 2/ 7 6/ 7 4/ 7 2/ 7 2/ 7 1/ 7 2/ 7
Lebanon 3/ 7 7/ 7 4/ 7 1/ 7 4/ 7 6/ 7 6/ 7 4/ 7
Mor occo 4/ 7 6/ 7 1/ 7 5/ 7 5/ 7 3/ 7 5/ 7 7/ 7
Tuni si a 1/ 7 4/ 7 2/ 7 2/ 7 3/ 7 5/ 7 4/ 7 3/ 7
Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es 2/ 7 1/ 7 3/ 7 3/ 7 1/ 7 1/ 7 2/ 7 1/ 7
L
A
T
I
N

A
M
E
R
I
C
A

&

T
H
E

C
A
R
I
B
B
E
A
N
Ar gent i na 11/ 16 4/ 16 9/ 16 3/ 16 10/ 16 12/ 16 3/ 16 8/ 16
Bol i vi a 14/ 16 15/ 16 14/ 16 15/ 16 9/ 16 15/ 16 15/ 16 15/ 16
Brazi l 3/ 16 3/ 16 5/ 16 5/ 16 5/ 16 4/ 16 4/ 16 7/ 16
Chi l e 1/ 16 2/ 16 1/ 16 2/ 16 1/ 16 2/ 16 2/ 16 1/ 16
Col ombi a 6/ 16 9/ 16 6/ 16 12/ 16 12/ 16 5/ 16 5/ 16 10/ 16
Domi ni can Republ i c 10/ 16 12/ 16 7/ 16 9/ 16 11/ 16 13/ 16 6/ 16 5/ 16
Ecuador 13/ 16 6/ 16 13/ 16 13/ 16 13/ 16 8/ 16 10/ 16 11/ 16
El Sal vador 9/ 16 7/ 16 15/ 16 6/ 16 4/ 16 7/ 16 7/ 16 12/ 16
Guat emal a 8/ 16 11/ 16 10/ 16 10/ 16 14/ 16 14/ 16 14/ 16 13/ 16
Jamai ca 4/ 16 5/ 16 11/ 16 7/ 16 7/ 16 3/ 16 8/ 16 3/ 16
Mexi co 7/ 16 13/ 16 4/ 16 11/ 16 16/ 16 6/ 16 12/ 16 14/ 16
Ni caragua 15/ 16 10/ 16 8/ 16 14/ 16 6/ 16 11/ 16 13/ 16 9/ 16
Panama 12/ 16 8/ 16 3/ 16 8/ 16 2/ 16 9/ 16 9/ 16 4/ 16
Per u 5/ 16 14/ 16 12/ 16 4/ 16 8/ 16 10/ 16 11/ 16 6/ 16
Ur uguay 2/ 16 1/ 16 2/ 16 1/ 16 3/ 16 1/ 16 1/ 16 2/ 16
Venezuel a 16/ 16 16/ 16 16/ 16 16/ 16 15/ 16 16/ 16 16/ 16 16/ 16
S
U
B
-
S
A
H
A
R
A
N

A
F
R
I
C
A
Bot swana 1/ 18 1/ 18 1/ 18 6/ 18 1/ 18 1/ 18 1/ 18 1/ 18
Bur ki na Faso 12/ 18 4/ 18 7/ 18 4/ 18 5/ 18 3/ 18 5/ 18 9/ 18
Camer oon 16/ 18 18/ 18 14/ 18 13/ 18 10/ 18 16/ 18 18/ 18 18/ 18
Cot e d' I voi r e 13/ 18 9/ 18 13/ 18 10/ 18 13/ 18 6/ 18 8/ 18 8/ 18
Et hi opi a 17/ 18 5/ 18 16/ 18 17/ 18 8/ 18 14/ 18 16/ 18 4/ 18
Ghana 2/ 18 6/ 18 3/ 18 1/ 18 3/ 18 5/ 18 3/ 18 6/ 18
Kenya 10/ 18 16/ 18 11/ 18 12/ 18 9/ 18 10/ 18 13/ 18 14/ 18
Li ber i a 7/ 18 13/ 18 12/ 18 5/ 18 17/ 18 17/ 18 17/ 18 15/ 18
Madagascar 15/ 18 12/ 18 5/ 18 11/ 18 2/ 18 11/ 18 14/ 18 13/ 18
Mal awi 9/ 18 7/ 18 10/ 18 7/ 18 6/ 18 9/ 18 2/ 18 2/ 18
Ni ger i a 11/ 18 17/ 18 9/ 18 15/ 18 18/ 18 12/ 18 7/ 18 17/ 18
Senegal 3/ 18 3/ 18 6/ 18 2/ 18 7/ 18 2/ 18 4/ 18 7/ 18
Si er ra Leone 5/ 18 11/ 18 17/ 18 8/ 18 15/ 18 13/ 18 11/ 18 16/ 18
Sout h Af r i ca 4/ 18 2/ 18 2/ 18 3/ 18 14/ 18 4/ 18 6/ 18 5/ 18
Tanzani a 6/ 18 10/ 18 8/ 18 9/ 18 16/ 18 8/ 18 10/ 18 3/ 18
Uganda 14/ 18 14/ 18 15/ 18 16/ 18 12/ 18 15/ 18 9/ 18 10/ 18
Zambi a 8/ 18 8/ 18 4/ 18 14/ 18 4/ 18 7/ 18 12/ 18 12/ 18
Zi mbabwe 18/ 18 15/ 18 18/ 18 18/ 18 11/ 18 18/ 18 15/ 18 11/ 18
S
O
U
T
H

A
S
I
A
Af ghani st an 5/ 6 6/ 6 5/ 6 5/ 6 5/ 6 6/ 6 6/ 6 6/ 6
Bangl adesh 6/ 6 5/ 6 4/ 6 4/ 6 3/ 6 4/ 6 4/ 6 5/ 6
I ndi a 1/ 6 2/ 6 1/ 6 3/ 6 4/ 6 3/ 6 3/ 6 2/ 6
Nepal 2/ 6 3/ 6 3/ 6 1/ 6 1/ 6 1/ 6 1/ 6 3/ 6
Paki st an 4/ 6 4/ 6 6/ 6 6/ 6 6/ 6 5/ 6 5/ 6 4/ 6
Sr i Lanka 3/ 6 1/ 6 2/ 6 2/ 6 2/ 6 2/ 6 2/ 6 1/ 6
178 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
FACTOR 1: CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT POWERS
COUNTRY/TERRITORY
CONSTRAINTS ON
GOVERNMENT POWERS
1.1 LIMITS BY
LEGISLATURE
1.2 LIMITS BY
JUDICIARY
1.3 INDEPENDENT
AUDITING
1.4 SANCTIONS FOR
OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT
1.5 NON-
GOVERNMENTAL CHECKS
1.6 LAWFUL TRANSITION
OF POWER
Af ghani st an 0. 43 0. 61 0. 38 0. 24 0. 30 0. 60 0. 44
Al bani a 0. 47 0. 58 0. 49 0. 38 0. 33 0. 55 0. 51
Ar gent i na 0. 47 0. 41 0. 35 0. 44 0. 30 0. 63 0. 67
Aust ral i a 0. 86 0. 86 0. 85 0. 83 0. 81 0. 86 0. 94
Aust r i a 0. 86 0. 90 0. 81 0. 77 0. 78 0. 92 0. 99
Bangl adesh 0. 41 0. 55 0. 45 0. 41 0. 27 0. 40 0. 41
Bel ar us 0. 34 0. 27 0. 28 0. 39 0. 50 0. 27 0. 34
Bel gi um 0. 81 0. 84 0. 75 0. 78 0. 76 0. 82 0. 88
Bol i vi a 0. 38 0. 33 0. 24 0. 41 0. 36 0. 45 0. 46
Bosni a & Herzegovi na 0. 54 0. 62 0. 51 0. 49 0. 42 0. 57 0. 63
Bot swana 0. 69 0. 72 0. 74 0. 46 0. 69 0. 76 0. 77
Brazi l 0. 63 0. 72 0. 62 0. 49 0. 40 0. 74 0. 83
Bul gar i a 0. 53 0. 65 0. 41 0. 49 0. 34 0. 66 0. 62
Bur ki na Faso 0. 45 0. 40 0. 41 0. 38 0. 40 0. 51 0. 59
Cambodi a 0. 34 0. 43 0. 26 0. 23 0. 38 0. 40 0. 37
Camer oon 0. 39 0. 33 0. 30 0. 47 0. 43 0. 46 0. 34
Canada 0. 80 0. 77 0. 79 0. 80 0. 75 0. 80 0. 88
Chi l e 0. 76 0. 77 0. 65 0. 79 0. 65 0. 76 0. 91
Chi na 0. 35 0. 58 0. 40 0. 37 0. 45 0. 08 0. 23
Col ombi a 0. 55 0. 59 0. 52 0. 48 0. 46 0. 59 0. 68
Cot e d' I voi r e 0. 44 0. 44 0. 37 0. 44 0. 45 0. 44 0. 49
Cr oat i a 0. 58 0. 59 0. 45 0. 50 0. 56 0. 61 0. 77
Czech Republ i c 0. 72 0. 78 0. 65 0. 70 0. 59 0. 76 0. 84
Denmar k 0. 94 0. 90 0. 92 0. 95 0. 94 0. 95 0. 98
Domi ni can Republ i c 0. 48 0. 52 0. 36 0. 31 0. 35 0. 67 0. 67
Ecuador 0. 40 0. 36 0. 27 0. 37 0. 37 0. 51 0. 50
Egypt 0. 45 0. 51 0. 44 0. 44 0. 50 0. 43 0. 39
El Sal vador 0. 49 0. 61 0. 42 0. 34 0. 30 0. 62 0. 64
Est oni a 0. 80 0. 76 0. 81 0. 76 0. 81 0. 79 0. 88
Et hi opi a 0. 35 0. 39 0. 35 0. 38 0. 47 0. 26 0. 28
Fi nl and 0. 88 0. 85 0. 83 0. 85 0. 88 0. 90 0. 95
France 0. 79 0. 80 0. 69 0. 74 0. 76 0. 82 0. 94
Geor gi a 0. 53 0. 50 0. 42 0. 50 0. 58 0. 64 0. 55
Ger many 0. 83 0. 83 0. 84 0. 70 0. 78 0. 90 0. 95
Ghana 0. 68 0. 79 0. 65 0. 51 0. 55 0. 80 0. 80
Gr eece 0. 66 0. 63 0. 56 0. 58 0. 52 0. 75 0. 90
Guat emal a 0. 52 0. 59 0. 44 0. 37 0. 35 0. 64 0. 73
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na 0. 72 0. 87 0. 81 0. 69 0. 81 0. 50 0. 62
Hungar y 0. 61 0. 52 0. 61 0. 40 0. 58 0. 72 0. 83
I ndi a 0. 61 0. 69 0. 67 0. 52 0. 39 0. 68 0. 74
I ndonesi a 0. 64 0. 76 0. 59 0. 51 0. 57 0. 74 0. 68
I ran 0. 36 0. 48 0. 47 0. 24 0. 32 0. 23 0. 40
I t al y 0. 69 0. 72 0. 67 0. 65 0. 58 0. 72 0. 78
Jamai ca 0. 62 0. 67 0. 66 0. 54 0. 43 0. 68 0. 72
Japan 0. 76 0. 81 0. 81 0. 60 0. 76 0. 80 0. 79
Jor dan 0. 50 0. 38 0. 48 0. 69 0. 59 0. 46 0. 39
Kazakhst an 0. 35 0. 31 0. 26 0. 37 0. 45 0. 34 0. 36
Kenya 0. 51 0. 65 0. 52 0. 41 0. 42 0. 58 0. 48
Kyr gyzst an 0. 47 0. 64 0. 38 0. 28 0. 39 0. 61 0. 51
Lebanon 0. 57 0. 72 0. 46 0. 49 0. 47 0. 76 0. 54
Li ber i a 0. 53 0. 68 0. 49 0. 23 0. 35 0. 74 0. 70
Macedoni a, FYR 0. 52 0. 51 0. 39 0. 52 0. 46 0. 52 0. 70
Madagascar 0. 41 0. 44 0. 35 0. 43 0. 40 0. 42 0. 41
Mal awi 0. 52 0. 58 0. 56 0. 42 0. 44 0. 58 0. 52
Mal aysi a 0. 55 0. 70 0. 58 0. 52 0. 56 0. 37 0. 57
Mexi co 0. 55 0. 70 0. 50 0. 47 0. 32 0. 65 0. 68
Mol dova 0. 43 0. 51 0. 32 0. 37 0. 30 0. 51 0. 55
Mongol i a 0. 53 0. 61 0. 44 0. 46 0. 45 0. 63 0. 60
Mor occo 0. 56 0. 61 0. 55 0. 37 0. 54 0. 55 0. 71
Myanmar 0. 41 0. 58 0. 38 0. 30 0. 53 0. 30 0. 39
Nepal 0. 56 0. 61 0. 57 0. 49 0. 42 0. 68 0. 60
Net her l ands 0. 86 0. 85 0. 85 0. 83 0. 84 0. 89 0. 91
New Zeal and 0. 88 0. 89 0. 90 0. 81 0. 85 0. 91 0. 93
Ni caragua 0. 31 0. 36 0. 25 0. 24 0. 23 0. 48 0. 31
Ni ger i a 0. 47 0. 63 0. 49 0. 28 0. 39 0. 55 0. 49
Nor way 0. 90 0. 92 0. 91 0. 74 0. 94 0. 94 0. 96
Paki st an 0. 46 0. 53 0. 53 0. 28 0. 28 0. 65 0. 50
Panama 0. 45 0. 34 0. 32 0. 38 0. 27 0. 58 0. 82
Per u 0. 60 0. 63 0. 45 0. 62 0. 42 0. 69 0. 78
Phi l i ppi nes 0. 59 0. 72 0. 60 0. 56 0. 47 0. 66 0. 54
Pol and 0. 73 0. 79 0. 74 0. 69 0. 59 0. 68 0. 89
Por t ugal 0. 74 0. 75 0. 66 0. 70 0. 61 0. 79 0. 94
Republ i c of Kor ea 0. 76 0. 77 0. 78 0. 72 0. 70 0. 75 0. 86
Romani a 0. 58 0. 62 0. 56 0. 45 0. 48 0. 67 0. 69
Russi a 0. 36 0. 40 0. 30 0. 35 0. 35 0. 38 0. 37
Senegal 0. 63 0. 60 0. 51 0. 63 0. 57 0. 68 0. 76
Ser bi a 0. 49 0. 56 0. 33 0. 39 0. 34 0. 60 0. 74
Si er ra Leone 0. 55 0. 61 0. 42 0. 48 0. 51 0. 64 0. 64
Si ngapor e 0. 73 0. 67 0. 69 0. 81 0. 89 0. 51 0. 83
Sl oveni a 0. 65 0. 69 0. 54 0. 66 0. 52 0. 69 0. 80
Sout h Af r i ca 0. 61 0. 66 0. 60 0. 50 0. 47 0. 72 0. 71
Spai n 0. 68 0. 67 0. 59 0. 60 0. 58 0. 74 0. 89
Sr i Lanka 0. 53 0. 52 0. 53 0. 55 0. 47 0. 62 0. 51
Sweden 0. 90 0. 81 0. 84 0. 92 0. 86 0. 96 0. 99
Tanzani a 0. 54 0. 65 0. 51 0. 43 0. 48 0. 58 0. 57
Thai l and 0. 50 0. 62 0. 53 0. 36 0. 44 0. 60 0. 48
Tuni si a 0. 58 0. 66 0. 55 0. 54 0. 48 0. 62 0. 63
Tur key 0. 46 0. 47 0. 44 0. 42 0. 47 0. 40 0. 56
Uganda 0. 41 0. 43 0. 38 0. 43 0. 48 0. 35 0. 42
Ukrai ne 0. 41 0. 59 0. 25 0. 29 0. 32 0. 51 0. 49
Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es 0. 58 0. 52 0. 63 0. 75 0. 74 0. 33 0. 50
Uni t ed Ki ngdom 0. 81 0. 83 0. 79 0. 76 0. 78 0. 82 0. 90
Uni t ed St at es 0. 74 0. 81 0. 73 0. 68 0. 68 0. 78 0. 76
Ur uguay 0. 75 0. 73 0. 69 0. 64 0. 69 0. 80 0. 94
Uzbeki st an 0. 29 0. 07 0. 23 0. 43 0. 42 0. 14 0. 42
Venezuel a 0. 17 0. 23 0. 16 0. 04 0. 10 0. 28 0. 20
Vi et nam 0. 40 0. 30 0. 26 0. 43 0. 55 0. 35 0. 48
Zambi a 0. 53 0. 51 0. 38 0. 62 0. 62 0. 43 0. 62
Zi mbabwe 0. 25 0. 34 0. 26 0. 27 0. 35 0. 16 0. 15
179 Data Tables |
FACTOR 2: ABSENCE OF CORRUPTION
COUNTRY/TERRITORY ABSENCE OF CORRUPTI ON
2. 1 NO CORRUPTI ON I N THE
EXECUTI VE BRANCH
2. 2 NO CORRUPTI ON I N THE
JUDI CI ARY
2. 3 NO CORRUPTI ON I N THE
POLI CE/MI LI TARY
2. 4 NO CORRUPTI ON I N THE
LEGI SLATURE
Af ghani st an 0. 24 0. 32 0. 11 0. 37 0. 17
Al bani a 0. 34 0. 45 0. 25 0. 37 0. 29
Ar gent i na 0. 49 0. 49 0. 56 0. 61 0. 31
Aust ral i a 0. 86 0. 84 0. 94 0. 92 0. 74
Aust r i a 0. 84 0. 82 0. 88 0. 91 0. 74
Bangl adesh 0. 27 0. 35 0. 29 0. 19 0. 27
Bel ar us 0. 53 0. 51 0. 56 0. 64 0. 40
Bel gi um 0. 81 0. 82 0. 86 0. 92 0. 66
Bol i vi a 0. 32 0. 43 0. 23 0. 30 0. 33
Bosni a & Herzegovi na 0. 45 0. 40 0. 52 0. 62 0. 27
Bot swana 0. 73 0. 73 0. 75 0. 68 0. 75
Brazi l 0. 50 0. 49 0. 64 0. 64 0. 22
Bul gar i a 0. 43 0. 39 0. 46 0. 56 0. 30
Bur ki na Faso 0. 45 0. 43 0. 54 0. 52 0. 33
Cambodi a 0. 33 0. 38 0. 22 0. 19 0. 51
Camer oon 0. 26 0. 29 0. 31 0. 24 0. 20
Canada 0. 81 0. 77 0. 89 0. 86 0. 69
Chi l e 0. 73 0. 76 0. 75 0. 86 0. 55
Chi na 0. 48 0. 46 0. 34 0. 62 0. 49
Col ombi a 0. 43 0. 50 0. 49 0. 56 0. 18
Cot e d' I voi r e 0. 41 0. 41 0. 36 0. 52 0. 34
Cr oat i a 0. 54 0. 52 0. 56 0. 67 0. 42
Czech Republ i c 0. 60 0. 58 0. 71 0. 80 0. 32
Denmar k 0. 96 0. 94 0. 95 0. 97 0. 98
Domi ni can Republ i c 0. 37 0. 42 0. 46 0. 46 0. 14
Ecuador 0. 47 0. 55 0. 35 0. 58 0. 38
Egypt 0. 46 0. 48 0. 50 0. 48 0. 39
El Sal vador 0. 46 0. 50 0. 46 0. 59 0. 29
Est oni a 0. 78 0. 76 0. 90 0. 90 0. 58
Et hi opi a 0. 45 0. 43 0. 35 0. 48 0. 54
Fi nl and 0. 90 0. 91 0. 90 0. 96 0. 81
France 0. 78 0. 78 0. 83 0. 87 0. 63
Geor gi a 0. 71 0. 70 0. 59 0. 86 0. 71
Ger many 0. 83 0. 80 0. 93 0. 91 0. 67
Ghana 0. 44 0. 48 0. 56 0. 41 0. 32
Gr eece 0. 56 0. 53 0. 64 0. 77 0. 31
Guat emal a 0. 37 0. 43 0. 39 0. 48 0. 20
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na 0. 85 0. 80 0. 87 0. 91 0. 81
Hungar y 0. 64 0. 61 0. 69 0. 78 0. 48
I ndi a 0. 39 0. 39 0. 46 0. 48 0. 21
I ndonesi a 0. 36 0. 49 0. 34 0. 37 0. 22
I ran 0. 50 0. 48 0. 51 0. 60 0. 42
I t al y 0. 60 0. 58 0. 76 0. 82 0. 24
Jamai ca 0. 48 0. 51 0. 60 0. 61 0. 20
Japan 0. 84 0. 81 0. 82 0. 91 0. 81
Jor dan 0. 57 0. 59 0. 69 0. 69 0. 31
Kazakhst an 0. 43 0. 44 0. 40 0. 49 0. 39
Kenya 0. 28 0. 36 0. 39 0. 23 0. 13
Kyr gyzst an 0. 27 0. 36 0. 22 0. 35 0. 15
Lebanon 0. 40 0. 39 0. 46 0. 50 0. 24
Li ber i a 0. 34 0. 34 0. 44 0. 34 0. 24
Macedoni a, FYR 0. 53 0. 56 0. 43 0. 71 0. 44
Madagascar 0. 34 0. 39 0. 36 0. 37 0. 23
Mal awi 0. 43 0. 38 0. 57 0. 43 0. 32
Mal aysi a 0. 64 0. 59 0. 66 0. 69 0. 64
Mexi co 0. 37 0. 47 0. 36 0. 31 0. 33
Mol dova 0. 32 0. 39 0. 24 0. 41 0. 23
Mongol i a 0. 39 0. 39 0. 47 0. 55 0. 15
Mor occo 0. 43 0. 49 0. 37 0. 49 0. 38
Myanmar 0. 43 0. 53 0. 17 0. 54 0. 48
Nepal 0. 38 0. 52 0. 35 0. 44 0. 21
Net her l ands 0. 88 0. 86 0. 90 0. 94 0. 84
New Zeal and 0. 91 0. 89 0. 90 0. 95 0. 92
Ni caragua 0. 38 0. 49 0. 28 0. 48 0. 26
Ni ger i a 0. 26 0. 28 0. 46 0. 22 0. 09
Nor way 0. 94 0. 95 0. 92 0. 95 0. 94
Paki st an 0. 29 0. 35 0. 41 0. 25 0. 16
Panama 0. 44 0. 51 0. 42 0. 62 0. 22
Per u 0. 36 0. 51 0. 35 0. 38 0. 19
Phi l i ppi nes 0. 50 0. 52 0. 41 0. 58 0. 47
Pol and 0. 66 0. 63 0. 78 0. 81 0. 41
Por t ugal 0. 69 0. 67 0. 73 0. 84 0. 50
Republ i c of Kor ea 0. 79 0. 78 0. 80 0. 91 0. 68
Romani a 0. 50 0. 49 0. 59 0. 66 0. 29
Russi a 0. 42 0. 44 0. 41 0. 50 0. 35
Senegal 0. 48 0. 49 0. 43 0. 55 0. 45
Ser bi a 0. 41 0. 40 0. 41 0. 53 0. 32
Si er ra Leone 0. 35 0. 39 0. 32 0. 32 0. 36
Si ngapor e 0. 90 0. 89 0. 84 0. 88 0. 99
Sl oveni a 0. 60 0. 55 0. 69 0. 63 0. 53
Sout h Af r i ca 0. 49 0. 47 0. 61 0. 54 0. 36
Spai n 0. 69 0. 69 0. 73 0. 88 0. 47
Sr i Lanka 0. 53 0. 50 0. 56 0. 68 0. 37
Sweden 0. 91 0. 88 0. 96 0. 95 0. 85
Tanzani a 0. 38 0. 40 0. 38 0. 38 0. 37
Thai l and 0. 51 0. 49 0. 61 0. 56 0. 38
Tuni si a 0. 50 0. 52 0. 52 0. 50 0. 47
Tur key 0. 55 0. 54 0. 62 0. 65 0. 39
Uganda 0. 30 0. 27 0. 42 0. 25 0. 25
Ukrai ne 0. 28 0. 25 0. 41 0. 34 0. 11
Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es 0. 79 0. 83 0. 79 0. 78 0. 77
Uni t ed Ki ngdom 0. 80 0. 83 0. 85 0. 89 0. 66
Uni t ed St at es 0. 75 0. 75 0. 81 0. 87 0. 58
Ur uguay 0. 78 0. 82 0. 78 0. 80 0. 73
Uzbeki st an 0. 35 0. 29 0. 40 0. 37 0. 34
Venezuel a 0. 30 0. 36 0. 24 0. 39 0. 21
Vi et nam 0. 44 0. 44 0. 29 0. 46 0. 57
Zambi a 0. 41 0. 38 0. 49 0. 39 0. 39
Zi mbabwe 0. 28 0. 28 0. 42 0. 25 0. 17
180 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
FACTOR 3: OPEN GOVERNMENT
COUNTRY/TERRITORY OPEN GOVERNMENT 3. 1 ACCESSIBLE LAWS 3. 2 STABLE LAWS
3.3 RIGHT TO PETITION/
PARTICIPATION
3.4 RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Af ghani st an 0. 34 0. 57 0. 25 0. 48 0. 06
Al bani a 0. 44 0. 52 0. 47 0. 35 0. 43
Ar gent i na 0. 45 0. 50 0. 49 0. 45 0. 37
Aust ral i a 0. 75 0. 70 0. 79 0. 69 0. 82
Aust r i a 0. 78 0. 82 0. 89 0. 83 0. 58
Bangl adesh 0. 36 0. 48 0. 29 0. 41 0. 27
Bel ar us 0. 39 0. 51 0. 43 0. 33 0. 28
Bel gi um 0. 67 0. 65 0. 79 0. 65 0. 59
Bol i vi a 0. 38 0. 42 0. 32 0. 45 0. 33
Bosni a & Herzegovi na 0. 48 0. 55 0. 50 0. 42 0. 44
Bot swana 0. 61 0. 66 0. 60 0. 80 0. 40
Brazi l 0. 50 0. 46 0. 48 0. 45 0. 59
Bul gar i a 0. 46 0. 46 0. 44 0. 48 0. 47
Bur ki na Faso 0. 41 0. 32 0. 46 0. 44 0. 44
Cambodi a 0. 38 0. 46 0. 43 0. 40 0. 21
Camer oon 0. 33 0. 42 0. 33 0. 31 0. 27
Canada 0. 82 0. 78 0. 86 0. 81 0. 84
Chi l e 0. 65 0. 52 0. 84 0. 48 0. 76
Chi na 0. 41 0. 69 0. 48 0. 24 0. 23
Col ombi a 0. 49 0. 42 0. 45 0. 52 0. 57
Cot e d' I voi r e 0. 34 0. 24 0. 39 0. 42 0. 32
Cr oat i a 0. 49 0. 51 0. 54 0. 38 0. 55
Czech Republ i c 0. 52 0. 53 0. 55 0. 46 0. 52
Denmar k 0. 79 0. 72 0. 87 0. 76 0. 82
Domi ni can Republ i c 0. 48 0. 53 0. 58 0. 37 0. 42
Ecuador 0. 40 0. 48 0. 31 0. 47 0. 36
Egypt 0. 44 0. 52 0. 43 0. 51 0. 28
El Sal vador 0. 37 0. 41 0. 42 0. 41 0. 25
Est oni a 0. 71 0. 66 0. 77 0. 66 0. 73
Et hi opi a 0. 32 0. 54 0. 18 0. 35 0. 22
Fi nl and 0. 76 0. 74 0. 83 0. 69 0. 79
France 0. 70 0. 62 0. 68 0. 74 0. 78
Geor gi a 0. 48 0. 51 0. 44 0. 46 0. 51
Ger many 0. 73 0. 68 0. 80 0. 72 0. 71
Ghana 0. 50 0. 42 0. 58 0. 57 0. 42
Gr eece 0. 50 0. 39 0. 49 0. 41 0. 73
Guat emal a 0. 45 0. 42 0. 52 0. 46 0. 40
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na 0. 77 0. 85 0. 90 0. 56 0. 75
Hungar y 0. 50 0. 63 0. 49 0. 48 0. 40
I ndi a 0. 53 0. 59 0. 50 0. 58 0. 45
I ndonesi a 0. 54 0. 60 0. 53 0. 63 0. 38
I ran 0. 34 0. 42 0. 44 0. 28 0. 22
I t al y 0. 49 0. 46 0. 53 0. 42 0. 56
Jamai ca 0. 44 0. 40 0. 53 0. 41 0. 43
Japan 0. 77 0. 81 0. 78 0. 70 0. 81
Jor dan 0. 43 0. 55 0. 45 0. 39 0. 34
Kazakhst an 0. 35 0. 52 0. 37 0. 25 0. 27
Kenya 0. 38 0. 38 0. 37 0. 40 0. 35
Kyr gyzst an 0. 41 0. 48 0. 45 0. 34 0. 38
Lebanon 0. 44 0. 44 0. 55 0. 37 0. 40
Li ber i a 0. 36 0. 39 0. 22 0. 49 0. 33
Macedoni a, FYR 0. 60 0. 74 0. 65 0. 52 0. 49
Madagascar 0. 42 0. 47 0. 66 0. 31 0. 26
Mal awi 0. 39 0. 38 0. 38 0. 50 0. 29
Mal aysi a 0. 48 0. 65 0. 60 0. 46 0. 21
Mexi co 0. 52 0. 49 0. 61 0. 45 0. 53
Mol dova 0. 44 0. 54 0. 37 0. 36 0. 51
Mongol i a 0. 33 0. 39 0. 35 0. 26 0. 30
Mor occo 0. 48 0. 54 0. 40 0. 53 0. 43
Myanmar 0. 31 0. 48 0. 24 0. 24 0. 27
Nepal 0. 44 0. 49 0. 39 0. 46 0. 44
Net her l ands 0. 78 0. 70 0. 86 0. 76 0. 78
New Zeal and 0. 83 0. 84 0. 85 0. 77 0. 86
Ni caragua 0. 45 0. 57 0. 47 0. 53 0. 23
Ni ger i a 0. 40 0. 41 0. 46 0. 45 0. 29
Nor way 0. 85 0. 75 0. 90 0. 75 0. 98
Paki st an 0. 32 0. 31 0. 30 0. 37 0. 30
Panama 0. 52 0. 52 0. 66 0. 43 0. 49
Per u 0. 44 0. 32 0. 47 0. 44 0. 53
Phi l i ppi nes 0. 45 0. 59 0. 44 0. 44 0. 35
Pol and 0. 56 0. 55 0. 53 0. 53 0. 62
Por t ugal 0. 59 0. 53 0. 52 0. 61 0. 69
Republ i c of Kor ea 0. 74 0. 85 0. 75 0. 65 0. 71
Romani a 0. 47 0. 48 0. 50 0. 43 0. 49
Russi a 0. 43 0. 52 0. 52 0. 28 0. 40
Senegal 0. 42 0. 36 0. 49 0. 48 0. 33
Ser bi a 0. 47 0. 51 0. 51 0. 42 0. 46
Si er ra Leone 0. 29 0. 36 0. 16 0. 42 0. 23
Si ngapor e 0. 64 0. 75 0. 81 0. 57 0. 44
Sl oveni a 0. 60 0. 66 0. 56 0. 50 0. 69
Sout h Af r i ca 0. 58 0. 61 0. 60 0. 61 0. 51
Spai n 0. 55 0. 55 0. 56 0. 53 0. 56
Sr i Lanka 0. 48 0. 54 0. 57 0. 51 0. 31
Sweden 0. 82 0. 73 0. 88 0. 77 0. 89
Tanzani a 0. 41 0. 41 0. 30 0. 58 0. 36
Thai l and 0. 47 0. 58 0. 40 0. 54 0. 35
Tuni si a 0. 47 0. 51 0. 61 0. 41 0. 36
Tur key 0. 42 0. 46 0. 55 0. 35 0. 34
Uganda 0. 33 0. 25 0. 31 0. 42 0. 34
Ukrai ne 0. 46 0. 51 0. 53 0. 36 0. 44
Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es 0. 46 0. 61 0. 66 0. 41 0. 17
Uni t ed Ki ngdom 0. 77 0. 73 0. 74 0. 77 0. 83
Uni t ed St at es 0. 70 0. 66 0. 75 0. 71 0. 68
Ur uguay 0. 65 0. 61 0. 71 0. 64 0. 63
Uzbeki st an 0. 39 0. 43 0. 55 0. 28 0. 31
Venezuel a 0. 30 0. 46 0. 23 0. 34 0. 18
Vi et nam 0. 39 0. 56 0. 45 0. 40 0. 17
Zambi a 0. 43 0. 46 0. 37 0. 49 0. 40
Zi mbabwe 0. 24 0. 26 0. 28 0. 20 0. 20
181 Data Tables |
FACTOR 4: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
COUNTRY/TERRITORY
FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS
4.1 EQUAL TREATMENT/
NO DISCRIMINATION
4.2 RIGHT TO LIFE
AND SECURITY
4.3 DUE PROCESS
OF LAW
4.4 FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
4.5 FREEDOM OF
RELIGION
4.6 RIGHT TO
PRIVACY
4.7 FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION
4. 8 LABOR
RIGHTS
Af ghani st an 0. 39 0. 28 0. 31 0. 31 0. 61 0. 36 0. 34 0. 65 0. 22
Al bani a 0. 58 0. 67 0. 65 0. 44 0. 56 0. 77 0. 40 0. 66 0. 52
Argent i na 0. 67 0. 66 0. 82 0. 47 0. 64 0. 80 0. 70 0. 67 0. 56
Aust ral i a 0. 82 0. 65 0. 89 0. 76 0. 87 0. 83 0. 90 0. 89 0. 76
Aust ri a 0. 87 0. 74 0. 92 0. 86 0. 92 0. 84 0. 94 0. 92 0. 81
Bangl adesh 0. 43 0. 55 0. 22 0. 30 0. 41 0. 56 0. 26 0. 55 0. 57
Bel arus 0. 46 0. 71 0. 44 0. 43 0. 27 0. 63 0. 24 0. 39 0. 54
Bel gi um 0. 83 0. 79 0. 95 0. 77 0. 82 0. 80 0. 82 0. 86 0. 82
Bol i vi a 0. 48 0. 47 0. 45 0. 35 0. 45 0. 64 0. 45 0. 53 0. 52
Bosni a & Herzegovi na 0. 67 0. 68 0. 77 0. 64 0. 58 0. 69 0. 67 0. 67 0. 64
Botswana 0. 57 0. 51 0. 53 0. 58 0. 76 0. 60 0. 29 0. 72 0. 55
Brazi l 0. 66 0. 66 0. 61 0. 37 0. 74 0. 81 0. 66 0. 76 0. 65
Bul gari a 0. 65 0. 70 0. 75 0. 47 0. 67 0. 80 0. 54 0. 74 0. 57
Burki na Faso 0. 58 0. 72 0. 51 0. 37 0. 52 0. 79 0. 43 0. 72 0. 59
Cambodi a 0. 46 0. 55 0. 46 0. 38 0. 40 0. 52 0. 36 0. 47 0. 51
Cameroon 0. 46 0. 50 0. 42 0. 31 0. 46 0. 61 0. 38 0. 60 0. 40
Canada 0. 77 0. 62 0. 85 0. 74 0. 80 0. 84 0. 78 0. 85 0. 65
Chi l e 0. 74 0. 60 0. 83 0. 61 0. 77 0. 83 0. 84 0. 80 0. 61
Chi na 0. 31 0. 53 0. 39 0. 46 0. 08 0. 20 0. 36 0. 17 0. 32
Col ombi a 0. 55 0. 54 0. 54 0. 43 0. 59 0. 67 0. 55 0. 63 0. 41
Cote d' I voi re 0. 50 0. 66 0. 26 0. 33 0. 46 0. 86 0. 32 0. 60 0. 48
Croati a 0. 64 0. 68 0. 65 0. 59 0. 62 0. 72 0. 40 0. 75 0. 74
Czech Republ i c 0. 80 0. 77 0. 92 0. 78 0. 76 0. 80 0. 87 0. 82 0. 68
Denmark 0. 90 0. 83 0. 96 0. 93 0. 95 0. 85 0. 90 0. 94 0. 85
Domi ni can Republ i c 0. 60 0. 60 0. 49 0. 46 0. 68 0. 75 0. 51 0. 72 0. 53
Ecuador 0. 54 0. 56 0. 56 0. 42 0. 52 0. 73 0. 42 0. 59 0. 54
Egypt 0. 39 0. 54 0. 33 0. 28 0. 43 0. 23 0. 32 0. 60 0. 40
El Sal vador 0. 62 0. 60 0. 76 0. 46 0. 63 0. 75 0. 61 0. 63 0. 50
Estoni a 0. 80 0. 85 0. 93 0. 77 0. 79 0. 81 0. 77 0. 80 0. 65
Ethi opi a 0. 36 0. 51 0. 30 0. 39 0. 26 0. 61 0. 21 0. 31 0. 31
Fi nl and 0. 89 0. 87 1. 00 0. 90 0. 90 0. 77 1. 00 0. 90 0. 81
France 0. 76 0. 66 0. 78 0. 71 0. 82 0. 84 0. 70 0. 90 0. 70
Georgi a 0. 58 0. 76 0. 58 0. 55 0. 64 0. 60 0. 35 0. 66 0. 50
Germany 0. 84 0. 78 0. 89 0. 78 0. 90 0. 85 0. 79 0. 91 0. 82
Ghana 0. 66 0. 65 0. 69 0. 41 0. 81 0. 75 0. 66 0. 81 0. 50
Greece 0. 69 0. 64 0. 74 0. 52 0. 76 0. 73 0. 74 0. 80 0. 56
Guatemal a 0. 56 0. 44 0. 58 0. 45 0. 64 0. 67 0. 63 0. 68 0. 37
Hong Kong SAR, China 0. 68 0. 77 0. 81 0. 77 0. 50 0. 71 0. 71 0. 55 0. 65
Hungary 0. 68 0. 58 0. 83 0. 49 0. 73 0. 62 0. 73 0. 75 0. 70
I ndi a 0. 54 0. 56 0. 34 0. 38 0. 68 0. 72 0. 50 0. 67 0. 47
I ndonesi a 0. 54 0. 51 0. 49 0. 35 0. 74 0. 45 0. 48 0. 71 0. 56
I ran 0. 23 0. 46 0. 14 0. 34 0. 23 0. 13 0. 08 0. 21 0. 28
I tal y 0. 73 0. 61 0. 92 0. 66 0. 73 0. 74 0. 81 0. 80 0. 58
Jamai ca 0. 61 0. 66 0. 47 0. 39 0. 69 0. 83 0. 59 0. 75 0. 51
Japan 0. 75 0. 78 0. 81 0. 67 0. 79 0. 70 0. 77 0. 77 0. 71
Jordan 0. 47 0. 66 0. 46 0. 50 0. 47 0. 46 0. 33 0. 49 0. 42
Kazakhstan 0. 48 0. 58 0. 60 0. 45 0. 35 0. 58 0. 40 0. 42 0. 48
Kenya 0. 46 0. 48 0. 28 0. 33 0. 59 0. 68 0. 26 0. 69 0. 38
Kyrgyzstan 0. 52 0. 56 0. 48 0. 33 0. 61 0. 62 0. 36 0. 68 0. 54
Lebanon 0. 62 0. 51 0. 68 0. 44 0. 77 0. 55 0. 71 0. 82 0. 44
Li beri a 0. 57 0. 48 0. 51 0. 34 0. 75 0. 79 0. 54 0. 73 0. 41
Macedoni a, FYR 0. 63 0. 70 0. 70 0. 55 0. 52 0. 79 0. 57 0. 71 0. 52
Madagascar 0. 48 0. 67 0. 23 0. 38 0. 43 0. 69 0. 26 0. 53 0. 62
Mal awi 0. 55 0. 58 0. 55 0. 33 0. 59 0. 75 0. 56 0. 66 0. 40
Mal aysi a 0. 45 0. 70 0. 42 0. 50 0. 38 0. 23 0. 45 0. 34 0. 55
Mexi co 0. 55 0. 43 0. 40 0. 30 0. 65 0. 68 0. 55 0. 73 0. 62
Mol dova 0. 51 0. 62 0. 53 0. 35 0. 51 0. 60 0. 43 0. 66 0. 41
Mongol i a 0. 61 0. 62 0. 67 0. 43 0. 64 0. 68 0. 56 0. 73 0. 56
Morocco 0. 45 0. 61 0. 32 0. 30 0. 55 0. 48 0. 19 0. 58 0. 58
Myanmar 0. 30 0. 41 0. 22 0. 27 0. 30 0. 37 0. 15 0. 33 0. 31
Nepal 0. 59 0. 60 0. 54 0. 40 0. 69 0. 74 0. 52 0. 72 0. 53
Netherl ands 0. 85 0. 79 0. 93 0. 83 0. 89 0. 86 0. 86 0. 89 0. 75
New Zeal and 0. 84 0. 80 0. 92 0. 82 0. 92 0. 89 0. 81 0. 84 0. 75
Ni caragua 0. 51 0. 58 0. 44 0. 36 0. 48 0. 73 0. 40 0. 53 0. 58
Ni geri a 0. 42 0. 53 0. 24 0. 22 0. 56 0. 49 0. 34 0. 62 0. 40
Norway 0. 90 0. 87 0. 94 0. 91 0. 94 0. 83 0. 92 0. 93 0. 87
Paki stan 0. 38 0. 39 0. 21 0. 27 0. 66 0. 43 0. 25 0. 63 0. 24
Panama 0. 60 0. 66 0. 69 0. 38 0. 58 0. 71 0. 60 0. 64 0. 56
Peru 0. 66 0. 55 0. 77 0. 53 0. 70 0. 78 0. 72 0. 73 0. 49
Phi l i ppi nes 0. 52 0. 56 0. 32 0. 38 0. 66 0. 64 0. 39 0. 68 0. 49
Pol and 0. 72 0. 71 0. 84 0. 64 0. 68 0. 66 0. 75 0. 76 0. 68
Portugal 0. 76 0. 71 0. 83 0. 65 0. 79 0. 89 0. 71 0. 87 0. 67
Republ i c of Korea 0. 73 0. 70 0. 86 0. 77 0. 75 0. 63 0. 70 0. 73 0. 66
Romani a 0. 71 0. 73 0. 85 0. 62 0. 68 0. 78 0. 66 0. 78 0. 59
Russi a 0. 46 0. 59 0. 45 0. 37 0. 39 0. 54 0. 38 0. 44 0. 55
Senegal 0. 63 0. 61 0. 56 0. 43 0. 69 0. 83 0. 58 0. 80 0. 51
Serbi a 0. 62 0. 66 0. 63 0. 57 0. 61 0. 75 0. 40 0. 75 0. 59
Si erra Leone 0. 55 0. 54 0. 54 0. 36 0. 65 0. 79 0. 43 0. 62 0. 44
Si ngapore 0. 71 0. 80 0. 86 0. 81 0. 51 0. 79 0. 76 0. 47 0. 68
Sl oveni a 0. 79 0. 69 0. 93 0. 77 0. 70 0. 81 0. 82 0. 81 0. 80
South Af ri ca 0. 62 0. 52 0. 60 0. 45 0. 72 0. 76 0. 56 0. 77 0. 56
Spai n 0. 78 0. 73 0. 85 0. 78 0. 74 0. 78 0. 87 0. 81 0. 70
Sri Lanka 0. 56 0. 62 0. 39 0. 45 0. 62 0. 74 0. 38 0. 68 0. 59
Sweden 0. 91 0. 77 0. 99 0. 91 0. 96 0. 92 0. 99 0. 96 0. 81
Tanzani a 0. 51 0. 59 0. 42 0. 37 0. 59 0. 61 0. 47 0. 60 0. 40
Thai l and 0. 58 0. 59 0. 55 0. 42 0. 60 0. 69 0. 57 0. 64 0. 55
Tuni si a 0. 54 0. 63 0. 51 0. 41 0. 62 0. 53 0. 44 0. 62 0. 54
Turkey 0. 47 0. 58 0. 56 0. 50 0. 40 0. 51 0. 30 0. 44 0. 45
Uganda 0. 37 0. 45 0. 22 0. 31 0. 35 0. 63 0. 17 0. 45 0. 40
Ukrai ne 0. 56 0. 62 0. 56 0. 38 0. 52 0. 63 0. 52 0. 69 0. 59
Uni ted Arab Emi rat es 0. 49 0. 58 0. 68 0. 66 0. 33 0. 35 0. 63 0. 24 0. 45
Uni t ed Ki ngdom 0. 78 0. 71 0. 87 0. 77 0. 82 0. 86 0. 71 0. 84 0. 66
Uni t ed St at es 0. 71 0. 56 0. 75 0. 62 0. 79 0. 80 0. 69 0. 83 0. 61
Uruguay 0. 76 0. 69 0. 83 0. 54 0. 80 0. 93 0. 75 0. 89 0. 68
Uzbeki st an 0. 36 0. 65 0. 30 0. 33 0. 15 0. 55 0. 20 0. 25 0. 42
Venezuel a 0. 42 0. 59 0. 25 0. 24 0. 28 0. 74 0. 27 0. 45 0. 58
Vi et nam 0. 50 0. 62 0. 66 0. 48 0. 35 0. 39 0. 72 0. 30 0. 52
Zambi a 0. 43 0. 49 0. 37 0. 33 0. 43 0. 54 0. 48 0. 42 0. 41
Zi mbabwe 0. 29 0. 34 0. 26 0. 25 0. 16 0. 60 0. 14 0. 19 0. 37
182 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
FACTOR 5: ORDER & SECURITY
COUNTRY/TERRITORY ORDER & SECURI TY 5. 1 ABSENCE OF CRI ME 5. 2 ABSENCE OF CI VI L CONFLI CT 5. 3 ABSENCE OF VI OLENT REDRESS
Af ghani st an 0. 42 0. 68 0. 26 0. 31
Al bani a 0. 74 0. 85 1. 00 0. 36
Ar gent i na 0. 61 0. 53 1. 00 0. 29
Aust ral i a 0. 86 0. 89 1. 00 0. 69
Aust r i a 0. 88 0. 93 1. 00 0. 70
Bangl adesh 0. 64 0. 73 1. 00 0. 19
Bel ar us 0. 79 0. 87 1. 00 0. 51
Bel gi um 0. 85 0. 85 1. 00 0. 71
Bol i vi a 0. 61 0. 66 1. 00 0. 17
Bosni a & Herzegovi na 0. 76 0. 84 1. 00 0. 44
Bot swana 0. 82 0. 79 1. 00 0. 67
Brazi l 0. 66 0. 58 1. 00 0. 41
Bul gar i a 0. 79 0. 86 1. 00 0. 50
Bur ki na Faso 0. 69 0. 77 1. 00 0. 29
Cambodi a 0. 73 0. 85 1. 00 0. 35
Camer oon 0. 63 0. 61 1. 00 0. 28
Canada 0. 86 0. 88 1. 00 0. 69
Chi l e 0. 71 0. 81 1. 00 0. 32
Chi na 0. 81 0. 78 1. 00 0. 65
Col ombi a 0. 58 0. 51 0. 94 0. 31
Cot e d' I voi r e 0. 60 0. 65 0. 75 0. 41
Cr oat i a 0. 77 0. 94 1. 00 0. 38
Czech Republ i c 0. 82 0. 83 1. 00 0. 61
Denmar k 0. 90 0. 90 1. 00 0. 82
Domi ni can Republ i c 0. 59 0. 61 1. 00 0. 18
Ecuador 0. 57 0. 46 1. 00 0. 26
Egypt 0. 67 0. 84 0. 92 0. 26
El Sal vador 0. 66 0. 57 1. 00 0. 42
Est oni a 0. 84 0. 85 1. 00 0. 67
Et hi opi a 0. 66 0. 65 0. 94 0. 38
Fi nl and 0. 89 0. 84 1. 00 0. 82
France 0. 81 0. 86 1. 00 0. 56
Geor gi a 0. 85 0. 99 1. 00 0. 57
Ger many 0. 87 0. 90 1. 00 0. 70
Ghana 0. 72 0. 78 1. 00 0. 39
Gr eece 0. 74 0. 82 1. 00 0. 40
Guat emal a 0. 54 0. 43 1. 00 0. 21
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na 0. 90 0. 93 1. 00 0. 78
Hungar y 0. 84 0. 88 1. 00 0. 66
I ndi a 0. 51 0. 71 0. 51 0. 33
I ndonesi a 0. 77 0. 95 1. 00 0. 35
I ran 0. 63 0. 54 0. 92 0. 44
I t al y 0. 74 0. 80 1. 00 0. 42
Jamai ca 0. 65 0. 78 1. 00 0. 17
Japan 0. 92 0. 91 1. 00 0. 84
Jor dan 0. 85 0. 92 1. 00 0. 63
Kazakhst an 0. 79 0. 83 1. 00 0. 55
Kenya 0. 63 0. 72 1. 00 0. 17
Kyr gyzst an 0. 74 0. 81 1. 00 0. 41
Lebanon 0. 76 0. 87 1. 00 0. 42
Li ber i a 0. 54 0. 56 0. 83 0. 24
Macedoni a, FYR 0. 75 0. 84 1. 00 0. 42
Madagascar 0. 76 0. 70 1. 00 0. 57
Mal awi 0. 67 0. 62 1. 00 0. 39
Mal aysi a 0. 87 0. 85 1. 00 0. 75
Mexi co 0. 47 0. 42 0. 75 0. 24
Mol dova 0. 77 0. 84 1. 00 0. 48
Mongol i a 0. 78 0. 76 1. 00 0. 56
Mor occo 0. 76 0. 83 0. 92 0. 54
Myanmar 0. 72 0. 89 0. 69 0. 57
Nepal 0. 73 0. 87 1. 00 0. 31
Net her l ands 0. 84 0. 89 1. 00 0. 64
New Zeal and 0. 87 0. 88 1. 00 0. 74
Ni caragua 0. 66 0. 71 1. 00 0. 28
Ni ger i a 0. 36 0. 34 0. 31 0. 42
Nor way 0. 85 0. 91 0. 92 0. 73
Paki st an 0. 30 0. 53 0. 09 0. 27
Panama 0. 71 0. 71 1. 00 0. 42
Per u 0. 63 0. 54 1. 00 0. 35
Phi l i ppi nes 0. 73 0. 72 0. 88 0. 58
Pol and 0. 83 0. 92 1. 00 0. 56
Por t ugal 0. 72 0. 82 1. 00 0. 35
Republ i c of Kor ea 0. 89 0. 89 1. 00 0. 78
Romani a 0. 81 0. 86 1. 00 0. 56
Russi a 0. 64 0. 81 0. 68 0. 44
Senegal 0. 67 0. 80 1. 00 0. 20
Ser bi a 0. 74 0. 87 1. 00 0. 35
Si er ra Leone 0. 59 0. 34 1. 00 0. 43
Si ngapor e 0. 91 0. 91 1. 00 0. 82
Sl oveni a 0. 78 0. 88 1. 00 0. 45
Sout h Af r i ca 0. 60 0. 48 1. 00 0. 33
Spai n 0. 79 0. 87 1. 00 0. 51
Sr i Lanka 0. 72 0. 90 0. 87 0. 38
Sweden 0. 89 0. 90 1. 00 0. 77
Tanzani a 0. 57 0. 50 1. 00 0. 22
Thai l and 0. 75 0. 86 0. 81 0. 57
Tuni si a 0. 77 0. 84 1. 00 0. 47
Tur key 0. 67 0. 86 0. 73 0. 43
Uganda 0. 61 0. 71 0. 92 0. 19
Ukrai ne 0. 82 0. 90 1. 00 0. 55
Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es 0. 89 0. 96 1. 00 0. 69
Uni t ed Ki ngdom 0. 84 0. 88 1. 00 0. 65
Uni t ed St at es 0. 85 0. 87 1. 00 0. 68
Ur uguay 0. 69 0. 72 1. 00 0. 36
Uzbeki st an 0. 90 0. 91 1. 00 0. 77
Venezuel a 0. 53 0. 35 1. 00 0. 23
Vi et nam 0. 80 0. 92 0. 93 0. 55
Zambi a 0. 70 0. 71 1. 00 0. 37
Zi mbabwe 0. 62 0. 49 1. 00 0. 35
183 Data Tables |
FACTOR 6: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT
COUNTRY/TERRITORY
REGULATORY
ENFORCEMENT
6.1 EFFECTIVE REGULATORY
ENFORCEMENT
6. 2 NO IMPROPER
INFLUENCE
6.3 NO UNREASONABLE
DELAY
6. 4 RESPECT FOR DUE
PROCESS
6. 5 NO EXPROPRIATION W/OUT
ADEQUATE COMPENSATION
Af ghani st an 0. 33 0. 34 0. 31 0. 23 0. 34 0. 44
Al bani a 0. 45 0. 51 0. 40 0. 38 0. 40 0. 55
Ar gent i na 0. 43 0. 41 0. 57 0. 36 0. 39 0. 43
Aust ral i a 0. 80 0. 78 0. 92 0. 77 0. 78 0. 78
Aust r i a 0. 81 0. 78 0. 89 0. 72 0. 78 0. 86
Bangl adesh 0. 37 0. 37 0. 25 0. 37 0. 40 0. 47
Bel ar us 0. 53 0. 59 0. 59 0. 60 0. 45 0. 41
Bel gi um 0. 71 0. 77 0. 86 0. 50 0. 65 0. 77
Bol i vi a 0. 38 0. 34 0. 45 0. 39 0. 34 0. 38
Bosni a & Herzegovi na 0. 51 0. 50 0. 44 0. 46 0. 59 0. 56
Bot swana 0. 68 0. 74 0. 79 0. 51 0. 58 0. 78
Brazi l 0. 53 0. 59 0. 70 0. 29 0. 53 0. 57
Bul gar i a 0. 47 0. 57 0. 44 0. 43 0. 42 0. 49
Bur ki na Faso 0. 55 0. 50 0. 58 0. 49 0. 54 0. 64
Cambodi a 0. 36 0. 38 0. 37 0. 47 0. 25 0. 31
Camer oon 0. 36 0. 40 0. 36 0. 15 0. 39 0. 51
Canada 0. 79 0. 73 0. 83 0. 69 0. 85 0. 82
Chi l e 0. 68 0. 61 0. 79 0. 70 0. 53 0. 76
Chi na 0. 41 0. 46 0. 54 0. 51 0. 26 0. 29
Col ombi a 0. 50 0. 44 0. 60 0. 33 0. 45 0. 68
Cot e d' I voi r e 0. 47 0. 38 0. 48 0. 43 0. 41 0. 62
Cr oat i a 0. 49 0. 58 0. 53 0. 28 0. 49 0. 55
Czech Republ i c 0. 63 0. 68 0. 77 0. 48 0. 54 0. 66
Denmar k 0. 84 0. 87 0. 92 0. 81 0. 80 0. 83
Domi ni can Republ i c 0. 42 0. 37 0. 53 0. 31 0. 36 0. 51
Ecuador 0. 48 0. 50 0. 57 0. 42 0. 43 0. 49
Egypt 0. 42 0. 47 0. 46 0. 20 0. 42 0. 56
El Sal vador 0. 49 0. 43 0. 55 0. 54 0. 47 0. 45
Est oni a 0. 75 0. 83 0. 89 0. 67 0. 62 0. 74
Et hi opi a 0. 38 0. 41 0. 56 0. 28 0. 18 0. 46
Fi nl and 0. 78 0. 78 0. 87 0. 70 0. 81 0. 73
France 0. 75 0. 73 0. 84 0. 66 0. 71 0. 80
Geor gi a 0. 57 0. 62 0. 84 0. 50 0. 34 0. 53
Ger many 0. 74 0. 74 0. 83 0. 50 0. 82 0. 80
Ghana 0. 53 0. 53 0. 56 0. 42 0. 47 0. 66
Gr eece 0. 54 0. 53 0. 46 0. 50 0. 52 0. 67
Guat emal a 0. 39 0. 34 0. 51 0. 31 0. 33 0. 49
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na 0. 74 0. 67 0. 86 0. 78 0. 73 0. 66
Hungar y 0. 57 0. 72 0. 75 0. 35 0. 53 0. 51
I ndi a 0. 40 0. 34 0. 38 0. 24 0. 47 0. 58
I ndonesi a 0. 52 0. 47 0. 50 0. 51 0. 50 0. 61
I ran 0. 53 0. 57 0. 55 0. 51 0. 49 0. 55
I t al y 0. 59 0. 67 0. 73 0. 34 0. 59 0. 60
Jamai ca 0. 56 0. 57 0. 75 0. 39 0. 54 0. 57
Japan 0. 78 0. 73 0. 88 0. 69 0. 77 0. 81
Jor dan 0. 54 0. 49 0. 56 0. 37 0. 60 0. 67
Kazakhst an 0. 46 0. 60 0. 47 0. 47 0. 28 0. 47
Kenya 0. 41 0. 51 0. 44 0. 24 0. 33 0. 52
Kyr gyzst an 0. 44 0. 48 0. 34 0. 52 0. 49 0. 36
Lebanon 0. 44 0. 46 0. 38 0. 43 0. 45 0. 49
Li ber i a 0. 33 0. 37 0. 31 0. 16 0. 35 0. 49
Macedoni a, FYR 0. 53 0. 47 0. 53 0. 55 0. 50 0. 59
Madagascar 0. 40 0. 42 0. 41 0. 29 0. 36 0. 51
Mal awi 0. 41 0. 36 0. 40 0. 33 0. 40 0. 58
Mal aysi a 0. 51 0. 49 0. 61 0. 52 0. 57 0. 37
Mexi co 0. 50 0. 45 0. 50 0. 45 0. 52 0. 57
Mol dova 0. 41 0. 54 0. 45 0. 45 0. 23 0. 39
Mongol i a 0. 43 0. 49 0. 38 0. 44 0. 43 0. 42
Mor occo 0. 54 0. 55 0. 58 0. 41 0. 48 0. 66
Myanmar 0. 37 0. 27 0. 49 0. 41 0. 36 0. 34
Nepal 0. 47 0. 45 0. 50 0. 46 0. 48 0. 48
Net her l ands 0. 82 0. 78 0. 86 0. 83 0. 77 0. 88
New Zeal and 0. 81 0. 82 0. 90 0. 74 0. 82 0. 77
Ni caragua 0. 43 0. 48 0. 55 0. 37 0. 31 0. 45
Ni ger i a 0. 40 0. 38 0. 37 0. 29 0. 44 0. 53
Nor way 0. 87 0. 85 0. 95 0. 83 0. 84 0. 89
Paki st an 0. 35 0. 27 0. 34 0. 30 0. 40 0. 44
Panama 0. 48 0. 50 0. 62 0. 38 0. 38 0. 51
Per u 0. 46 0. 40 0. 51 0. 35 0. 46 0. 58
Phi l i ppi nes 0. 46 0. 46 0. 59 0. 36 0. 44 0. 47
Pol and 0. 59 0. 60 0. 62 0. 45 0. 64 0. 67
Por t ugal 0. 59 0. 67 0. 73 0. 42 0. 53 0. 61
Republ i c of Kor ea 0. 74 0. 66 0. 78 0. 84 0. 72 0. 68
Romani a 0. 52 0. 53 0. 50 0. 50 0. 47 0. 60
Russi a 0. 44 0. 55 0. 47 0. 46 0. 37 0. 37
Senegal 0. 55 0. 52 0. 52 0. 47 0. 58 0. 68
Ser bi a 0. 45 0. 39 0. 46 0. 45 0. 39 0. 56
Si er ra Leone 0. 39 0. 45 0. 40 0. 24 0. 36 0. 48
Si ngapor e 0. 79 0. 85 0. 94 0. 71 0. 81 0. 65
Sl oveni a 0. 59 0. 50 0. 59 0. 61 0. 56 0. 68
Sout h Af r i ca 0. 53 0. 53 0. 58 0. 33 0. 55 0. 68
Spai n 0. 63 0. 68 0. 77 0. 49 0. 58 0. 61
Sr i Lanka 0. 44 0. 55 0. 50 0. 34 0. 30 0. 49
Sweden 0. 83 0. 83 0. 91 0. 86 0. 74 0. 83
Tanzani a 0. 43 0. 40 0. 34 0. 33 0. 53 0. 56
Thai l and 0. 46 0. 43 0. 54 0. 38 0. 51 0. 44
Tuni si a 0. 52 0. 58 0. 53 0. 33 0. 48 0. 66
Tur key 0. 54 0. 57 0. 55 0. 52 0. 43 0. 61
Uganda 0. 37 0. 33 0. 22 0. 25 0. 54 0. 52
Ukrai ne 0. 40 0. 41 0. 34 0. 44 0. 45 0. 36
Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es 0. 66 0. 78 0. 88 0. 58 0. 51 0. 54
Uni t ed Ki ngdom 0. 78 0. 76 0. 89 0. 65 0. 85 0. 77
Uni t ed St at es 0. 67 0. 69 0. 84 0. 52 0. 68 0. 60
Ur uguay 0. 73 0. 78 0. 83 0. 54 0. 65 0. 86
Uzbeki st an 0. 47 0. 68 0. 49 0. 51 0. 42 0. 23
Venezuel a 0. 28 0. 45 0. 43 0. 17 0. 15 0. 22
Vi et nam 0. 39 0. 54 0. 28 0. 38 0. 41 0. 33
Zambi a 0. 43 0. 47 0. 41 0. 36 0. 57 0. 34
Zi mbabwe 0. 32 0. 38 0. 31 0. 32 0. 39 0. 18
184 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
FACTOR 7: CIVIL JUSTICE
COUNTRY/ TERRI TORY CIVIL JUSTICE
7.1 ACCESSIBILITY
AND AFFORDABILITY
7.2 NO
DISCRIMINATION
7. 3 NO
CORRUPTION
7.4 NO IMPROPER
GOV. INFLUENCE
7.5 NO UNREASONABLE
DELAY
7. 6 EFFECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT
7. 7 IMPARTIAL AND
EFFECTIVE ADR
Af ghani st an 0. 27 0. 28 0. 08 0. 12 0. 31 0. 48 0. 26 0. 38
Al bani a 0. 50 0. 58 0. 56 0. 37 0. 42 0. 43 0. 51 0. 59
Ar gent i na 0. 54 0. 59 0. 75 0. 59 0. 37 0. 33 0. 53 0. 63
Aust ral i a 0. 73 0. 48 0. 54 0. 93 0. 92 0. 60 0. 79 0. 83
Aust r i a 0. 75 0. 62 0. 68 0. 86 0. 81 0. 71 0. 88 0. 71
Bangl adesh 0. 36 0. 36 0. 35 0. 30 0. 37 0. 39 0. 36 0. 41
Bel ar us 0. 60 0. 52 0. 77 0. 59 0. 29 0. 74 0. 64 0. 67
Bel gi um 0. 69 0. 58 0. 78 0. 82 0. 75 0. 46 0. 68 0. 75
Bol i vi a 0. 34 0. 40 0. 45 0. 27 0. 18 0. 28 0. 30 0. 52
Bosni a & Herzegovi na 0. 48 0. 49 0. 69 0. 54 0. 49 0. 34 0. 22 0. 64
Bot swana 0. 61 0. 53 0. 47 0. 79 0. 60 0. 58 0. 64 0. 64
Brazi l 0. 51 0. 53 0. 69 0. 67 0. 60 0. 30 0. 25 0. 52
Bul gar i a 0. 53 0. 50 0. 69 0. 49 0. 48 0. 39 0. 47 0. 68
Bur ki na Faso 0. 54 0. 35 0. 57 0. 55 0. 54 0. 58 0. 48 0. 70
Cambodi a 0. 34 0. 33 0. 32 0. 24 0. 17 0. 41 0. 30 0. 60
Camer oon 0. 34 0. 39 0. 52 0. 31 0. 27 0. 33 0. 11 0. 48
Canada 0. 72 0. 54 0. 65 0. 86 0. 88 0. 55 0. 80 0. 80
Chi l e 0. 61 0. 59 0. 65 0. 68 0. 75 0. 44 0. 51 0. 66
Chi na 0. 41 0. 49 0. 49 0. 33 0. 17 0. 67 0. 33 0. 39
Col ombi a 0. 49 0. 53 0. 59 0. 53 0. 55 0. 23 0. 37 0. 66
Cot e d' I voi r e 0. 48 0. 39 0. 55 0. 40 0. 37 0. 57 0. 48 0. 62
Cr oat i a 0. 52 0. 60 0. 66 0. 54 0. 52 0. 17 0. 42 0. 75
Czech Republ i c 0. 65 0. 64 0. 78 0. 68 0. 70 0. 34 0. 67 0. 72
Denmar k 0. 82 0. 72 0. 91 0. 94 0. 94 0. 63 0. 79 0. 79
Domi ni can Republ i c 0. 48 0. 50 0. 67 0. 45 0. 38 0. 45 0. 36 0. 55
Ecuador 0. 41 0. 48 0. 48 0. 37 0. 26 0. 27 0. 33 0. 67
Egypt 0. 39 0. 45 0. 39 0. 56 0. 48 0. 35 0. 13 0. 39
El Sal vador 0. 47 0. 50 0. 66 0. 50 0. 34 0. 43 0. 40 0. 46
Est oni a 0. 72 0. 57 0. 87 0. 89 0. 83 0. 54 0. 65 0. 69
Et hi opi a 0. 39 0. 32 0. 39 0. 37 0. 26 0. 46 0. 37 0. 58
Fi nl and 0. 75 0. 60 0. 93 0. 87 0. 84 0. 62 0. 77 0. 62
France 0. 69 0. 60 0. 71 0. 77 0. 74 0. 60 0. 72 0. 69
Geor gi a 0. 59 0. 60 0. 64 0. 58 0. 42 0. 69 0. 57 0. 67
Ger many 0. 82 0. 63 0. 88 0. 89 0. 86 0. 77 0. 92 0. 80
Ghana 0. 59 0. 48 0. 68 0. 56 0. 69 0. 51 0. 49 0. 70
Gr eece 0. 61 0. 62 0. 84 0. 66 0. 59 0. 30 0. 48 0. 81
Guat emal a 0. 36 0. 31 0. 46 0. 45 0. 40 0. 22 0. 16 0. 55
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na 0. 72 0. 59 0. 79 0. 84 0. 74 0. 74 0. 62 0. 71
Hungar y 0. 49 0. 50 0. 46 0. 82 0. 45 0. 40 0. 22 0. 60
I ndi a 0. 39 0. 29 0. 48 0. 48 0. 60 0. 25 0. 21 0. 40
I ndonesi a 0. 47 0. 51 0. 51 0. 36 0. 58 0. 56 0. 29 0. 45
I ran 0. 56 0. 50 0. 52 0. 54 0. 40 0. 63 0. 65 0. 70
I t al y 0. 58 0. 60 0. 54 0. 72 0. 69 0. 35 0. 48 0. 66
Jamai ca 0. 47 0. 43 0. 44 0. 67 0. 64 0. 34 0. 27 0. 49
Japan 0. 73 0. 48 0. 81 0. 90 0. 73 0. 65 0. 76 0. 79
Jor dan 0. 62 0. 50 0. 78 0. 79 0. 63 0. 43 0. 62 0. 62
Kazakhst an 0. 47 0. 39 0. 38 0. 42 0. 27 0. 71 0. 58 0. 53
Kenya 0. 44 0. 37 0. 41 0. 40 0. 49 0. 42 0. 46 0. 54
Kyr gyzst an 0. 42 0. 46 0. 49 0. 28 0. 32 0. 53 0. 39 0. 50
Lebanon 0. 45 0. 51 0. 48 0. 45 0. 39 0. 31 0. 48 0. 52
Li ber i a 0. 39 0. 39 0. 25 0. 40 0. 47 0. 46 0. 35 0. 42
Macedoni a, FYR 0. 54 0. 58 0. 67 0. 44 0. 45 0. 43 0. 59 0. 62
Madagascar 0. 41 0. 30 0. 61 0. 31 0. 35 0. 32 0. 33 0. 65
Mal awi 0. 60 0. 53 0. 62 0. 54 0. 71 0. 47 0. 56 0. 73
Mal aysi a 0. 57 0. 39 0. 61 0. 73 0. 42 0. 64 0. 51 0. 68
Mexi co 0. 39 0. 36 0. 36 0. 39 0. 48 0. 40 0. 30 0. 45
Mol dova 0. 41 0. 47 0. 57 0. 28 0. 35 0. 39 0. 37 0. 45
Mongol i a 0. 52 0. 46 0. 62 0. 50 0. 45 0. 68 0. 41 0. 51
Mor occo 0. 50 0. 42 0. 60 0. 47 0. 46 0. 58 0. 46 0. 52
Myanmar 0. 39 0. 40 0. 38 0. 24 0. 24 0. 48 0. 46 0. 55
Nepal 0. 42 0. 31 0. 49 0. 39 0. 48 0. 46 0. 37 0. 46
Net her l ands 0. 84 0. 69 0. 92 0. 94 0. 85 0. 69 0. 95 0. 80
New Zeal and 0. 74 0. 59 0. 75 0. 96 0. 78 0. 75 0. 70 0. 70
Ni caragua 0. 37 0. 45 0. 47 0. 32 0. 18 0. 34 0. 31 0. 55
Ni ger i a 0. 50 0. 47 0. 66 0. 49 0. 48 0. 37 0. 45 0. 59
Nor way 0. 86 0. 76 0. 91 0. 88 0. 96 0. 84 0. 81 0. 85
Paki st an 0. 36 0. 40 0. 28 0. 41 0. 47 0. 31 0. 19 0. 47
Panama 0. 45 0. 52 0. 58 0. 44 0. 38 0. 32 0. 34 0. 58
Per u 0. 39 0. 40 0. 45 0. 35 0. 47 0. 28 0. 28 0. 52
Phi l i ppi nes 0. 40 0. 48 0. 42 0. 48 0. 42 0. 25 0. 26 0. 45
Pol and 0. 62 0. 51 0. 77 0. 79 0. 73 0. 41 0. 47 0. 66
Por t ugal 0. 62 0. 64 0. 87 0. 71 0. 71 0. 42 0. 30 0. 68
Republ i c of Kor ea 0. 74 0. 52 0. 68 0. 83 0. 67 0. 67 0. 84 0. 93
Romani a 0. 59 0. 57 0. 74 0. 62 0. 54 0. 44 0. 52 0. 68
Russi a 0. 46 0. 49 0. 52 0. 46 0. 30 0. 54 0. 35 0. 53
Senegal 0. 55 0. 50 0. 66 0. 47 0. 41 0. 63 0. 59 0. 62
Ser bi a 0. 45 0. 48 0. 74 0. 40 0. 37 0. 37 0. 31 0. 46
Si er ra Leone 0. 47 0. 51 0. 64 0. 30 0. 42 0. 50 0. 44 0. 49
Si ngapor e 0. 77 0. 56 0. 93 0. 82 0. 67 0. 89 0. 85 0. 67
Sl oveni a 0. 61 0. 61 0. 74 0. 64 0. 70 0. 39 0. 38 0. 79
Sout h Af r i ca 0. 53 0. 43 0. 47 0. 61 0. 57 0. 48 0. 53 0. 65
Spai n 0. 62 0. 68 0. 78 0. 71 0. 64 0. 38 0. 41 0. 71
Sr i Lanka 0. 41 0. 31 0. 39 0. 59 0. 44 0. 29 0. 35 0. 47
Sweden 0. 78 0. 68 0. 79 0. 92 0. 89 0. 63 0. 90 0. 67
Tanzani a 0. 48 0. 40 0. 62 0. 36 0. 48 0. 41 0. 50 0. 57
Thai l and 0. 39 0. 47 0. 38 0. 62 0. 35 0. 47 0. 13 0. 29
Tuni si a 0. 54 0. 48 0. 71 0. 49 0. 52 0. 56 0. 44 0. 56
Tur key 0. 52 0. 54 0. 60 0. 60 0. 43 0. 41 0. 40 0. 67
Uganda 0. 48 0. 46 0. 53 0. 37 0. 49 0. 37 0. 50 0. 63
Ukrai ne 0. 52 0. 51 0. 74 0. 40 0. 28 0. 62 0. 43 0. 64
Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es 0. 59 0. 42 0. 39 0. 77 0. 59 0. 71 0. 64 0. 60
Uni t ed Ki ngdom 0. 72 0. 54 0. 74 0. 87 0. 80 0. 69 0. 65 0. 77
Uni t ed St at es 0. 61 0. 46 0. 51 0. 82 0. 68 0. 56 0. 53 0. 71
Ur uguay 0. 70 0. 70 0. 78 0. 79 0. 74 0. 58 0. 67 0. 64
Uzbeki st an 0. 48 0. 45 0. 56 0. 40 0. 29 0. 69 0. 47 0. 53
Venezuel a 0. 33 0. 47 0. 65 0. 31 0. 07 0. 19 0. 11 0. 48
Vi et nam 0. 42 0. 38 0. 60 0. 34 0. 20 0. 56 0. 34 0. 55
Zambi a 0. 47 0. 41 0. 53 0. 45 0. 44 0. 46 0. 49 0. 50
Zi mbabwe 0. 40 0. 42 0. 43 0. 43 0. 21 0. 49 0. 50 0. 34
185 Data Tables |
FACTOR 8: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COUNTRY/TERRITORY
CRI MI NAL
JUSTI CE
8.1 EFFECTIVE
INVESTIGATIONS
8.2 TIMELY & EFFECTIVE
ADJUDICATION
8.3 EFFECTIVE
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM
8.4 NO
DISCRIMINATION
8. 5 NO
CORRUPTI ON
8.6 NO IMPROPER
GOV. INFLUENCE
8.7. DUE PROCESS
OF LAW
Af ghani st an 0. 28 0. 44 0. 37 0. 14 0. 18 0. 25 0. 23 0. 31
Al bani a 0. 36 0. 47 0. 42 0. 34 0. 34 0. 32 0. 17 0. 44
Ar gent i na 0. 37 0. 18 0. 32 0. 27 0. 44 0. 46 0. 43 0. 47
Aust ral i a 0. 73 0. 60 0. 71 0. 64 0. 53 0. 86 0. 99 0. 76
Aust r i a 0. 81 0. 84 0. 85 0. 79 0. 68 0. 85 0. 84 0. 83
Bangl adesh 0. 29 0. 24 0. 33 0. 25 0. 39 0. 26 0. 27 0. 30
Bel ar us 0. 43 0. 35 0. 57 0. 32 0. 61 0. 50 0. 24 0. 43
Bel gi um 0. 67 0. 52 0. 62 0. 47 0. 61 0. 85 0. 87 0. 77
Bol i vi a 0. 23 0. 25 0. 13 0. 24 0. 25 0. 25 0. 14 0. 35
Bosni a & Her zegovi na 0. 54 0. 44 0. 57 0. 36 0. 63 0. 57 0. 56 0. 64
Bot swana 0. 63 0. 62 0. 62 0. 53 0. 67 0. 83 0. 60 0. 58
Brazi l 0. 37 0. 22 0. 32 0. 15 0. 28 0. 57 0. 67 0. 37
Bul gar i a 0. 41 0. 32 0. 44 0. 34 0. 43 0. 38 0. 52 0. 47
Bur ki na Faso 0. 38 0. 43 0. 51 0. 23 0. 45 0. 43 0. 23 0. 37
Cambodi a 0. 29 0. 23 0. 41 0. 27 0. 42 0. 21 0. 10 0. 38
Camer oon 0. 31 0. 33 0. 36 0. 16 0. 46 0. 28 0. 24 0. 31
Canada 0. 72 0. 73 0. 69 0. 66 0. 49 0. 81 0. 89 0. 74
Chi l e 0. 57 0. 42 0. 62 0. 32 0. 55 0. 73 0. 75 0. 61
Chi na 0. 43 0. 46 0. 45 0. 50 0. 44 0. 53 0. 19 0. 46
Col ombi a 0. 35 0. 20 0. 35 0. 13 0. 40 0. 45 0. 50 0. 43
Cot e d' I voi r e 0. 40 0. 29 0. 54 0. 28 0. 51 0. 42 0. 45 0. 33
Cr oat i a 0. 55 0. 75 0. 51 0. 36 0. 47 0. 57 0. 58 0. 59
Czech Republ i c 0. 67 0. 49 0. 61 0. 56 0. 79 0. 68 0. 82 0. 78
Denmar k 0. 84 0. 71 0. 80 0. 82 0. 74 0. 96 0. 92 0. 93
Domi ni can Republ i c 0. 37 0. 38 0. 42 0. 16 0. 38 0. 41 0. 42 0. 46
Ecuador 0. 33 0. 28 0. 37 0. 16 0. 31 0. 47 0. 30 0. 42
Egypt 0. 41 0. 41 0. 43 0. 28 0. 41 0. 53 0. 54 0. 28
El Sal vador 0. 31 0. 15 0. 34 0. 03 0. 28 0. 44 0. 47 0. 46
Est oni a 0. 72 0. 57 0. 61 0. 68 0. 68 0. 83 0. 91 0. 77
Et hi opi a 0. 45 0. 55 0. 47 0. 42 0. 51 0. 47 0. 33 0. 39
Fi nl and 0. 85 0. 74 0. 82 0. 80 0. 80 0. 92 0. 98 0. 90
France 0. 65 0. 57 0. 65 0. 45 0. 68 0. 82 0. 70 0. 71
Geor gi a 0. 51 0. 48 0. 57 0. 35 0. 58 0. 72 0. 32 0. 55
Ger many 0. 71 0. 60 0. 62 0. 69 0. 61 0. 85 0. 82 0. 78
Ghana 0. 44 0. 40 0. 32 0. 35 0. 40 0. 43 0. 75 0. 41
Gr eece 0. 46 0. 32 0. 45 0. 23 0. 33 0. 63 0. 72 0. 52
Guat emal a 0. 30 0. 19 0. 21 0. 11 0. 32 0. 41 0. 44 0. 45
Hong Kong SAR, Chi na 0. 73 0. 69 0. 77 0. 70 0. 64 0. 84 0. 73 0. 77
Hungar y 0. 53 0. 45 0. 54 0. 46 0. 43 0. 76 0. 62 0. 49
I ndi a 0. 44 0. 43 0. 36 0. 40 0. 40 0. 52 0. 63 0. 38
I ndonesi a 0. 37 0. 31 0. 46 0. 20 0. 35 0. 38 0. 52 0. 35
I ran 0. 38 0. 39 0. 45 0. 42 0. 32 0. 53 0. 22 0. 34
I t al y 0. 63 0. 49 0. 55 0. 46 0. 65 0. 75 0. 87 0. 66
Jamai ca 0. 42 0. 21 0. 37 0. 19 0. 44 0. 56 0. 76 0. 39
Japan 0. 69 0. 64 0. 60 0. 62 0. 64 0. 86 0. 76 0. 67
Jor dan 0. 56 0. 46 0. 56 0. 53 0. 59 0. 62 0. 66 0. 50
Kazakhst an 0. 40 0. 38 0. 56 0. 43 0. 24 0. 45 0. 29 0. 45
Kenya 0. 33 0. 36 0. 31 0. 25 0. 31 0. 28 0. 49 0. 33
Kyr gyzst an 0. 33 0. 40 0. 51 0. 31 0. 28 0. 28 0. 22 0. 33
Lebanon 0. 42 0. 29 0. 45 0. 14 0. 52 0. 54 0. 52 0. 44
Li ber i a 0. 33 0. 37 0. 35 0. 20 0. 27 0. 38 0. 39 0. 34
Macedoni a, FYR 0. 50 0. 58 0. 43 0. 49 0. 65 0. 54 0. 27 0. 55
Madagascar 0. 35 0. 35 0. 51 0. 32 0. 40 0. 29 0. 21 0. 38
Mal awi 0. 48 0. 53 0. 57 0. 17 0. 53 0. 44 0. 81 0. 33
Mal aysi a 0. 53 0. 53 0. 63 0. 44 0. 51 0. 69 0. 42 0. 50
Mexi co 0. 25 0. 15 0. 24 0. 16 0. 19 0. 29 0. 39 0. 30
Mol dova 0. 33 0. 40 0. 47 0. 29 0. 34 0. 30 0. 20 0. 35
Mongol i a 0. 48 0. 36 0. 55 0. 50 0. 58 0. 45 0. 52 0. 43
Mor occo 0. 35 0. 50 0. 47 0. 18 0. 29 0. 50 0. 21 0. 30
Myanmar 0. 32 0. 33 0. 37 0. 24 0. 27 0. 43 0. 33 0. 27
Nepal 0. 43 0. 30 0. 44 0. 30 0. 54 0. 44 0. 57 0. 40
Net her l ands 0. 75 0. 56 0. 64 0. 72 0. 70 0. 88 0. 91 0. 83
New Zeal and 0. 72 0. 55 0. 66 0. 66 0. 61 0. 94 0. 83 0. 82
Ni caragua 0. 35 0. 47 0. 48 0. 16 0. 46 0. 38 0. 17 0. 36
Ni ger i a 0. 31 0. 34 0. 34 0. 20 0. 39 0. 27 0. 41 0. 22
Nor way 0. 83 0. 60 0. 72 0. 85 0. 84 0. 93 0. 97 0. 91
Paki st an 0. 37 0. 39 0. 40 0. 27 0. 36 0. 35 0. 54 0. 27
Panama 0. 38 0. 26 0. 31 0. 10 0. 68 0. 48 0. 43 0. 38
Per u 0. 37 0. 29 0. 21 0. 25 0. 48 0. 32 0. 54 0. 53
Phi l i ppi nes 0. 36 0. 40 0. 32 0. 18 0. 28 0. 56 0. 42 0. 38
Pol and 0. 69 0. 69 0. 62 0. 56 0. 76 0. 72 0. 87 0. 64
Por t ugal 0. 59 0. 51 0. 44 0. 50 0. 49 0. 72 0. 82 0. 65
Republ i c of Kor ea 0. 76 0. 62 0. 82 0. 75 0. 68 0. 88 0. 82 0. 77
Romani a 0. 56 0. 60 0. 54 0. 39 0. 63 0. 57 0. 58 0. 62
Russi a 0. 36 0. 30 0. 44 0. 34 0. 44 0. 40 0. 22 0. 37
Senegal 0. 42 0. 48 0. 45 0. 22 0. 40 0. 52 0. 40 0. 43
Ser bi a 0. 41 0. 51 0. 37 0. 31 0. 41 0. 41 0. 29 0. 57
Si er ra Leone 0. 32 0. 50 0. 34 0. 10 0. 27 0. 30 0. 39 0. 36
Si ngapor e 0. 85 0. 80 0. 88 0. 93 0. 82 0. 89 0. 79 0. 81
Sl oveni a 0. 58 0. 60 0. 54 0. 43 0. 52 0. 58 0. 63 0. 77
Sout h Af r i ca 0. 45 0. 34 0. 46 0. 25 0. 49 0. 54 0. 61 0. 45
Spai n 0. 61 0. 48 0. 53 0. 63 0. 55 0. 72 0. 62 0. 78
Sr i Lanka 0. 49 0. 25 0. 40 0. 39 0. 71 0. 68 0. 55 0. 45
Sweden 0. 78 0. 61 0. 72 0. 70 0. 69 0. 91 0. 92 0. 91
Tanzani a 0. 46 0. 50 0. 49 0. 33 0. 38 0. 42 0. 69 0. 37
Thai l and 0. 51 0. 46 0. 61 0. 54 0. 39 0. 65 0. 52 0. 42
Tuni si a 0. 45 0. 44 0. 52 0. 33 0. 44 0. 52 0. 49 0. 41
Tur key 0. 39 0. 41 0. 27 0. 37 0. 36 0. 60 0. 25 0. 50
Uganda 0. 37 0. 32 0. 33 0. 43 0. 42 0. 28 0. 46 0. 31
Ukrai ne 0. 33 0. 37 0. 43 0. 28 0. 46 0. 26 0. 15 0. 38
Uni t ed Arab Emi rat es 0. 78 0. 84 0. 80 0. 86 0. 75 0. 78 0. 77 0. 66
Uni t ed Ki ngdom 0. 72 0. 62 0. 76 0. 61 0. 59 0. 81 0. 88 0. 77
Uni t ed St at es 0. 65 0. 65 0. 70 0. 49 0. 47 0. 80 0. 80 0. 62
Ur uguay 0. 47 0. 24 0. 32 0. 30 0. 55 0. 72 0. 65 0. 54
Uzbeki st an 0. 41 0. 54 0. 55 0. 48 0. 38 0. 32 0. 28 0. 33
Venezuel a 0. 16 0. 20 0. 11 0. 08 0. 19 0. 28 0. 00 0. 24
Vi et nam 0. 47 0. 37 0. 54 0. 54 0. 60 0. 53 0. 26 0. 48
Zambi a 0. 36 0. 41 0. 40 0. 15 0. 41 0. 38 0. 40 0. 33
Zi mbabwe 0. 36 0. 52 0. 52 0. 32 0. 42 0. 32 0. 20 0. 25
JRC Statistical Audit of the
WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
188 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
SUMMARY
The JRC analysis suggests that the conceptualized multi-level
structure of the WJP Rule of Law Index 2014 is statistically
sound in terms of coherence and balance: the overall Index, as
well as the eight dimensions, are determined by all underlying
components. Furthermore, the analysis has offered statistical
Jincion o: ne Je o e,J .ein nJ :inmeic
averaging at the various levels of aggregation. Country ranks
are also fairly robust to methodological changes related to the
estimation of missing data, weighting or aggregation rule (less
than 3 positions shift with respect to the simulated median
in 96% of the cases). The added value of the Rule of Law Index
and its dimensions, lays in the ability to summarize different
ec o :Je o . in mo:e encien nJ :imonioJ
manner than would be possible with a collection of almost
500 survey questions taken separately. In fact, the Rule of
. lnJex. :eeneJ ni ,e: o: ne n: ime n ove:
aggregate, has a very high reliability of 0.97 without being
redundant and captures the single latent phenomenon
underlying the eight main dimensions of rule of law.
The WJP Rule of Law Index is intended for a broad audience of
policy-makers, civil society, practitioners and academics, and aims
at identifying strengths and weaknesses in each country under
review and at encouraging policy choices that advance the rule of
law. In this respect, the assessment of conceptual and statistical
coherence of the Index, and the estimation of the impact of
modeling choices on a countrys performance are fundamental.
They add to the transparency and reliability of the Index, and
|JiJ connJence in ne n::ive Jo:eJ |, ne meJ:e.
The Econometrics and Applied Statistics Unit at the European
Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy, was
invited for a fourth consecutive year by the World Justice
Project (WJP) to conduct a thorough statistical assessment
of the Index.
1
Fine-tuning suggestions made by the JRC to
past releases of the Index were already taken on board by the
WJP. The request for a new JRC audit was driven by some
re-structuring of the framework, the introduction of the ninth
Jimenion on lno:m Jice meJ:eJ o: ne n: ime
ni ,e: nJ ne nn :eion o ne ein Jimenion
into an overall index
2
. The WJP Rule of Law Index was
assessed along two main avenues: the statistical coherence of
the structure, and the impact of key modeling choices on the
Rule of Law Index scores and ranks.
The JRC analysis complements the country rankings for
the Rule of Law Index and the underlying dimensions with
connJence ine:v. in o:Je: o |ee: :ecie ne
robustness of these ranks to the computation methodology. In
JJiion. o: ne n: ime ni ,e:. ne RC n,i incJJe n
assessment of potential redundancy of information in the Rule
of Law framework, and a suggestion on how to monitor changes
in the rule of law both in a quantitative and qualitative manner.

1 The JRC analysis was based on the recommendations of the OECD (2008) Handbook on
Composite Indicators, and on more recent academic research from the JRC. The JRC auditing
studies of composite indicators are available at http://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
2 The ninth dimension on Informal Justice was presented as part of the conceptual
framework for the rule of law but had not been populated with data in past releases of the
report. We remind the reader that Informal Justice is not included in the calculation of the
overall Index but only used for within country comparisons.
JRC Statistical Audit of the
WJP Rule of Law Index

2014
MICHAELA SAISANA AND ANDREA SALTELLI
European Commission Joint Research Centre (Ispra, Italy)
189 The WJP Rule of Law Index |
CONCEPTUAL AND STATISTICAL COHERENCE
IN THE WJP RULE OF LAW FRAMEWORK
The World Justice Project (WJP), in the fourth release of
the 2014 Rule of Law Index, attempts to summarize complex
and versatile concepts across 99 countries around the globe
with differing social, cultural, economic, and political systems.
Modeling the cultural and subjective concepts underlying
rule of law at a national scale around the globe raises practical
challenges related to the combination of these concepts into
e o nJm|e: nJ nn, ino n ove: inJex. lnJeeJ.
extending what Saltelli and Funtowisz (2014) argue for
models in general, stringent criteria of transparency must
be adopted when composite indicators are used as a basis
for policy assessments. Failure to open up the black box of
composite indicator development is likely to lead only to
greater erosion of the credibility and legitimacy of these
measures as tools for improved policymaking.
The analysis of conceptual and statistical coherence of
an index can be undertaken along four main steps: (a) the
consideration of the underlying conceptual framework
with respect to the existing literature; (b) the preliminary
data quality checks including data coverage, missing values,
reporting errors, existence of outliers; (c) the assessment of
the statistical coherence through a set of correlation-based
analyses, followed by robustness tests about estimation of
missing data, weighting schemes and aggregation methods;
(J) nJ nn, ne ,Jiive con:onion .in ne exe:
bodies in order to get suggestions and reviews about the
decisions undertaken in the previous stages of analysis
(Sin. 211). Tne \P em :eJ, JnJe:oo| ne n:
and last steps that are mostly related to the conceptual
issues. The JRC audit herein focuses on the second and third
steps on the statistical soundness of the Rule of Law Index
framework.
DATA CHECKS
The WJP Rule of Law framework builds on nine dimensions,
or factors, that are further disaggregated into 47 sub-factors.
The scores of these sub-factors are built from almost 500
survey questions drawn from assessments of the general
public and local legal experts. Figure 1 illustrates the
structure of the 2014 WJP Rule of Law Index.
Country data delivered to the JRC were average scores
across experts or individuals along the survey questions
(henceforth variables) for 99 countries. These variables are
not affected by outliers or skewed distributions
3
, except for
14 variables spread across six dimensions in the WJP Rule
3 Groeneveld and Meeden (1984) set the criteria for absolute skewness above 1 and
kurtosis above 3.5. The skewness criterion was relaxed to above 2 to account for the small
sample (99 countries).
of Law Index.
4
Given the high number of variables combined
in building a dimension, the skewed distributions of those
variables do not bias the results.
A further data quality issue relates to data availability. The
2014 dataset is characterized by excellent data coverage
(98% in a matrix of 541 variables 99 countries). Data
availability per dimension and country is also very good or
excellent. The WJP, for reasons of transparency and simplicity,
calculated sub-factor scores using only available information
for each country. This choice, which is common in relevant
contexts, might discourage countries from reporting low data
values. We tested the implications of no imputation versus
the use of the expectation-maximization method for the
estimation of missing data and discuss this in the second part
of the assessment together with other modeling choices. We
anticipate here that some caution is needed in the Informal
Justice, whereby 24 countries miss values on three or more
survey questions (total of eight questions). For most of those
countries, the overall score on Informal Justice will turn out to
be sensitive to the missing data.
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS AND
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Principal component analysis (PCA) was used to assess
.nene: ne conceJ :me.o:| i conn:meJ |, iic
approaches and to identify eventual pitfalls. The analysis
conn:m ne :eence o ine iic Jimenion in
each dimension of the rule of law (one component with
eigenvalue greater than 1.0) that captures between 58% (D5:
Order and Security) up to 88% (D2: Absence of Corruption) of
the total variance in the underlying sub-factors (Table 1). A
mo:e JeieJ n,i o ne co::eion :JcJ:e conn:m
the expectation that the sub-factors are more correlated
to their own dimension than to any other dimension and all
correlations are strong and positive. The statistical reliability,
measured by the Cronbach-alpha (or c-alpha), is very high
at 0.90 (up to 0.95) for seven of the nine dimensions, which
is well above the 0.7 threshold for a reliable aggregate (see
Nunnally, 1978). Instead, reliabilities are low for Order and
Security (c-alpha = .62), and Informal Justice (c-alpha = .36).
Neve:nee. once excJJin ecinc J|co: :om eine:
dimension (#5.2: civil conict is ejjectively limiteJ from Order
and Security and #9.1: informal justice is timely and effective
from Informal Justice), the reliabilities of the two dimensions
enter within the recommended limits (0.70 or slightly above,
see Table 1).
Overall, the conceptual grouping of sub-factors into
dimensions is statistically supported by the data for seven
4 In the WJP Rule of Law Index sub-factors are equivalent to sub-dimensions.
190 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
dimensions of the rule of law, whilst a careful revision is
needed for Order and Security and Informal Justice.
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that the eight dimensions
(D1 to D8) share a single latent factor that captures 83%
of the total variance and their aggregate has a reliability of
0.97. Instead, the Informal Justice (D9) is almost orthogonal
(not related) either to any of the eight dimensions or to the
overall index. The revision suggested above for this dimension
(i.e. to exclude #9.1: informal justice is timely and effective),
.ni Jncien o :enJe: ne Jimenion :ei|e ve:e.
i Joe no Jnce o :enJe: i cone:en o ne one: ein
dimensions.
1. Constraints on Government Powers 6 sub-factors / 61 question items
2. Absence of Corruption 4 sub-factors / 70 question items
3. Open Government 4 sub-factors / 35 question items
4. Fundamental Rights 8 sub-factors / 111 question items
5. Order and Security 3 sub-factors / 19 question items
6. Regulatory Enforcement 5 sub-factors / 83 question items
7. Civil Justice 7 sub-factors / 55 question items
8. Criminal Justice 7 sub-factors / 99 question items
9. Informal Justice 3 sub-factors / 8 question items
W
J
P

R
u
l
e

o
f

L
a
w

I
n
d
e
x
FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE 2014 RULE OF LAW FRAMEWORK AND INDEX.
Source: Saisana and Saltelli, European Commission Joint Research Centre; WJP Rule of Law Index 2014.
Notes: Rearranged from the information provided on the WJP Rule of Law Index 2014 main report.
RULE OF LAW DIMENSIONS
VARIANCE
EXPLAINED
C-ALPHA
C-ALPHA WHEN EXCLUDI NG ONE COMPONENT
#. 1 #. 2 #. 3 #. 4 #. 5 #. 6 #. 7 #. 8
Rul e of Law I ndex 83 . 97 . 96 . 96 . 96 . 97 . 97 . 96 . 96 . 96
1: Const rai nt s on Government Powers 83 . 95 . 94 . 93 . 94 . 95 . 94 . 94
2: Absence of Corrupt i on 88 . 96 . 92 . 94 . 93 . 95
3: Open Government 78 . 89 . 89 . 84 . 87 . 87
4: Fundament al Ri ght s 73 . 95 . 94 . 93 . 93 . 93 . 94 . 93 . 94 . 94
5: Order and Securi t y 58 . 62 . 30 . 73 . 44
6: Regul at ory Enf orcement 79 . 93 . 91 . 90 . 92 . 91 . 92
7: Ci vi l Just i ce 66 . 91 . 90 . 89 . 87 . 88 . 91 . 88 . 89
8: Cri mi nal Just i ce 77 . 95 . 94 . 93 . 93 . 94 . 93 . 95 . 93
9: I nf ormal Just i ce 69 . 37 . 69 . 00 . 04
TABLE1: STATISTICAL COHERENCE IN THE 2014 RULE OF LAW INDEX
Source: Saisana and Saltelli, European Commission Joint Research Centre; WJP Rule of Law Index 2014.
Notes: (1) CoJmn V:ince exineJ no. ne moJn o o v:ince exineJ |, ne n: :inci comonen c:o ne ein Jimenion o ne lnJex. o: ne J|co: in ne ce
of the dimensions. (2) c-alpha or Cronbach-alpha is a measure of statistical reliability (values greater than 0.7 are recommended for good reliability). (3) Informal Justice is not included in the
calculation of the Rule of Law Index but only in the framework of rule of law.
191 The WJP Rule of Law Index |
Concluding, the results from this analysis could be used as
iic Jincion o: ne \P cnoice o :ee
further the eight dimensions into a single index by using an
arithmetic average, and not to include Informal Justice in
the index calculation, but to used it instead only for within
country comparisons.
WEIGHTS AND IMPORTANCE
Next, tests focused on identifying whether the Rule of Law
dimensions and the overall Index are statistically well-
balanced in the underlying components. In the present
context given that all dimensions are built as simple
arithmetic averages (i.e. equal weights for the relative
sub-factors), and the index as a simple average of the eight
dimensions, our analysis answers the question: are the sub-
factors or the dimensions really equally important? We
used an importance measure (henceforth S
i
), most known as
correlation ratio, which is the non-linear equivalent to the
cic Pe:on co::eion coencien (Sei et al., 2008).
The S
i
describes the expected reduction in the variance
of the eight dimension scores that would be obtained if a
iven J|co: coJJ |e nxeJ. / JicJeJ in P:Joo et
al., 2013, we can take this as a measure of importance
5
; thus
if sub-factors are supposed to be equally important their S
i

values should not differ too much. Results are reassuring:
all sub-factors are important in classifying countries within
each dimension, though some sub-factors are slightly more
important than others (Table 2). Although still acceptable,
the least coherent results are: under Fundamental Rights
dimension, the contribution of the sub-factor 4.1 (equal
treatment and absence of discrimination) and 4.5 (freedom of
belief and religion is effectively guaranteed) compared to the
remaining sub-factors on the basis of the lower importance.
Similarly, sub-factors 5.2 (civil conict is ejjectively limiteJ),
sub-factor 7.5 (civil justice is not subject to unreasonable
delays) and sub-factor 9.1 (informal justice is timely and
effective) have a lower contribution to the variance of the
respective dimension compared to the other underlying
sub-factors. Finally, all eight dimensions are roughly equally
important in determining the variation in the Index scores,
though Order and Security (L) i in, e inJeni. /
together the degree of coherence of the Index is remarkable,
i.e. all dimensions and the overall index appear to be balanced
and coherent.

Tne Pe:on co::eion :io o: n: o:Je: eniivi, meJ:e oe: :ecie Jenniion
of importance, that is the expected reduction in variance of the CI that would be obtained
i v:i|e coJJ |e nxeJ, i cn |e JeJ :e:Je o ne Je:ee o co::eion |e.een
variables; it is model-free, in that it can be applied also in non-linear aggregations; it is not
invasive, in that no changes are made to the index or to the correlation structure of the
indicators.
ASSESSING POTENTIAL REDUNDANCY OF
INFORMATION IN THE RULE OF LAW DIMENSIONS
A very high statistical reliability may be the result of
redundancy of information in an aggregate. This is not the
case in the Rule of Law Index. The high statistical reliability
(c-alpha = 0.97) of the simple average of the eight dimensions
is a sign of a sound composite indicator that brings additional
information on the rule of law issues in the countries
around the world. This is shown in Table 3, which presents,
for all pairwise comparisons between the Index and the
Jimenion. ne Se:mn :n| co::eion coencien
(above the diagonal) and the percentage of countries that
shift 10 positions or more (below the diagonal). In fact, of
the 99 countries included this year, for almost 30% (up to
53%) of the countries, the Index ranking and any of the eight
dimension rankings differ by 10 positions or more. This is
a desired outcome because it evidences the added value of
the Index ranking as a benchmarking tool, namely to help
highlighting aspects of rule of law that do not emerge directly
by looking into the eight dimensions separately.
IMPACT OF MODELING ASSUMPTIONS ON THE
WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX RESULTS
The WJP Rule of Law Index and the underlying dimensions
are the outcome of choices: the framework (driven by
theoretical models and expert opinion), the variables
included, the estimation or not of missing values, the
normalization of the variables, the weights assigned to the
variables and sub-factors, and the aggregation method,
among other elements. Some of these choices are based
on expert opinion, or common practice, driven by statistical
analysis or the need for ease of communication. The aim of
the uncertainty analysis is to assess to what extent and for
which countries in particular these choices might affect
coJn:, cincion. \e nve Je .in nee Jnce:inie
imJneoJ, in o:Je: o e nei: oin inJence nJ
fully acknowledge their implications (Saltelli and DHombres,
2010). Data are considered to be error-free since the WJP
team already undertook a double-check control of potential
outliers and eventual errors and typos were corrected during
this phase.
The robustness assessment of the WJP Rule of Law Index
was based on a combination of a Monte Carlo experiment
and a multi-modeling approach. This type of assessment
aims to respond to eventual criticism that the country
scores associated with aggregate measures are generally
not calculated under conditions of certainty, even if they are
frequently presented as such (Saisana et al., 2005, 2011). The
Monte Carlo simulation related to the weights and comprised
1,000 runs, each corresponding to a different set of weights
of the sub-factors underlying each dimension, randomly
192 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
#. 1 #. 2 #. 3 #. 4 #. 5 #. 6 #. 7 #. 8
I NDEX 0. 87 0. 93 0. 87 0. 8 . 63* 0. 95 0. 87 0. 88
[ . 84, . 91] [ . 92, . 95] [ . 86, . 9] [ . 76, . 86] [ . 54, . 67] [ . 94, . 96] [ . 87, . 92] [ . 87, . 9]
D1 0. 91 0. 78 0. 71 0. 82 0. 88
[ . 88, . 92] [ . 77, . 82] [ . 7, . 75] [ . 75, . 85] [ . 82, . 89]
D2 0. 95 0. 87 0. 95 0. 8
[ . 93, . 96] [ . 86, . 91] [ . 9, . 95] [ . 8, . 86]
D3 0. 7 0. 87 0. 76 0. 83
[ . 69, . 78] [ . 84, . 9] [ . 75, . 83] [ . 82, . 87]
D4 . 57* 0. 9 0. 74 0. 79 . 61* 0. 88 0. 81 0. 75
[ . 56, . 6] [ . 85, . 9] [ . 73, . 79] [ . 74, . 85] [ . 56, . 65] [ . 83, . 9] [ . 7, . 84] [ . 74, . 79]
D5 0. 66 . 38* 0. 66
[ . 66, . 76] [ . 38, . 44] [ . 63, . 72]
D6 0. 83 0. 88 0. 72 0. 81 0. 75
[ . 81, . 84] [ . 85, . 9] [ . 72, . 8] [ . 8, . 86] [ . 69, . 81]
D7 0. 59 0. 67 0. 82 0. 76 . 39* 0. 77 0. 67
[ . 59, . 62] [ . 63, . 73] [ . 79, . 84] [ . 73, . 83] [ . 39, . 5] [ . 77, . 83] [ . 66, . 72]
D8 0. 65 0. 8 0. 8 0. 7 0. 89 0. 76 0. 84
[ . 64, . 71] [ . 77, . 87] [ . 79, . 87] [ . 7, . 73] [ . 86, . 91] [ . 69, . 85] [ . 83, . 88]
D9 . 43* 0. 7 0. 66
[ . 42, . 6] [ . 7, . 79] [ . 66, . 81]
TABLE 2: IMPORTANCE MEASURES (VARIANCE-BASED) FOR THE SUB-FACTORS AND DIMENSIONS
IN THE 2014 WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX.
Source: Saisana and Saltelli, European Commission Joint Research Centre; WJP Rule of Law Index 2014.
Notes: (1) Numbers represent the kernel estimates of the Pearson correlation ratio, as in Paruolo et al., 2013. Min-max estimates for the Pearson correlation ratio derive from the choice
of the smoothing parameter and are shown in parenthesis. (2) Sub-factors that have much lower contribution to the variance of the relevant Dimension scores than the equal weighting
expectation are marked with an asterisk. (3) D1: Constraints on Government Powers, D2: Absence of Corruption, D3: Open Government, D4: Fundamental Rights, D5: Order and Security,
D6: Regulatory Enforcement, D7: Civil Justice, D8: Criminal Justice, D9: Informal Justice.
sampled from uniform continuous distributions centered in
the reference values. The choice of the range for the weights
variation was driven by two opposite needs: on the one hand,
the need to ensure a wide enough interval to have meaningful
robustness checks (about 25% of the reference value); on
the other hand, the need to respect the rationale of the WJP
that the sub-factors have roughly the same importance when
calculating a dimension. Given these considerations, limit
vJe o Jnce:in, ine:v nve |een JenneJ no.n in
Table 4.
The multi-modeling approach involved combinations of the
remaining two key assumptions on the no imputation of
missing data and the aggregation formula across the sub-
factors or the dimensions. The WJP calculated sub-factor
scores using only available information for each country
6
.
This choice (often termed as no imputation) was confronted
with the application of the expectation-maximization method
6 Note that here no imputation is equivalent to replacing missing values with the average
of the available data within each sub-factor.
for the estimation of the missing data
7
. Regarding the WJP
assumption on the aggregation function (arithmetic average),
and despite the fact that it received statistical support (see
principal component analysis results in the previous section),
decision-theory practitioners have challenged this type of
aggregation because of their fully compensatory nature,
in which a comparative advantage of a few variables can
compensate a comparative disadvantage of many variables
(Munda, 2008). This offsetting might not be always desirable
when dealing with fundamental aspects of rule of law. Hence,
we considered the geometric average instead, which is a
partially compensatory approach.
8
Consequently, we tested
7 The Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm (Little and Rubin, 2002) is an iterative
:oceJJ:e n nnJ ne mximJm i|einooJ eime o ne :mee: veco: |, :eein
two steps: (1) The expectation E-step: Given a set of parameter estimates, such as a mean
vector and covariance matrix for a multivariate normal distribution, the E-step calculates the
conditional expectation of the complete-data log likelihood given the observed data and the
parameter estimates. (2) The maximization M-step: Given a complete-data log likelihood, the
e nnJ ne :mee: eime o mximi.e ne comeeJ o i|einooJ :om ne
E-step. The two steps are iterated until the iterations converge.
8 In the geometric average, sub-factors are multiplied as opposed to summed in the
arithmetic average. Sub-factor weights appear as exponents in the multiplication. To avoid
that zero values introduce a bias in the geometric average, we re-scaled linearly the sub-
factors scores to a minimum of 0.01.
193 The WJP Rule of Law Index |
TABLE 3: ADDED-VALUE OF THE RULE OF LAW INDEX.
I NDEX D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9
I NDEX 0. 88 0. 92 0. 89 0. 86 0. 77 0. 94 0. 89 0. 91 0. 16
D1 42 0. 75 0. 85 0. 86 0. 52 0. 82 0. 75 0. 76 0. 18
D2 31 54 0. 79 0. 72 0. 72 0. 91 0. 84 0. 89 0. 18
D3 36 46 52 0. 83 0. 63 0. 84 0. 74 0. 75 0. 14
D4 38 48 54 52 0. 53 0. 78 0. 74 0. 72 0. 07
D5 53 64 56 58 67 0. 71 0. 71 0. 77 0. 05
D6 30 40 28 40 54 60 0. 89 0. 83 0. 17
D7 31 47 44 54 52 61 35 0. 83 0. 21
D8 35 54 40 56 58 54 38 44 0. 18
D9 78 75 77 73 77 82 72 76 75
Source: Saisana and Saltelli, European Commission Joint Research Centre; WJP Rule of Law Index 2014.
Notes: (1) NJm|e: |ove ne Jion :e Se:mn :n| co::eion coencien. .ni nJm|e: |eo. ne Jion :e ne e:cene o coJn:ie n ni 1 oiion |e.een ne
rankings. (3) D1: Constraints on Government Powers, D2: Absence of Corruption, D3: Open Government, D4: Fundamental Rights, D5: Order and Security, D6: Regulatory Enforcement, D7:
Civil Justice, D8: Criminal Justice, D9: Informal Justice.
four models based on the combination of no imputation
versus expectation-maximization and arithmetic versus
geometric average. Combined with the 1,000 simulations per
model to account for the uncertainty in the weights across
the sub-factors, we carried out altogether 4,000 simulations.
Selected results of the uncertainty analysis are provided
in Figure 2, which shows median ranks and 90% intervals
computed across the 4,000 Monte Carlo simulations for the
overall Index and for two dimensions: Absence of Corruption
(D2, one of the most robust dimensions) and Order and
Security (D5, one of the least robust dimensions). Countries
are ordered from the highest to the lowest levels of rule
of law according to their reference rank in the WJP (black
line), the dot being the simulated median rank. Error bars
represent, for each country, the 90% interval across all
simulations.
o:e ecinc,. i one |e ne imJeJ meJin :n|
being representative of these scenarios, then the fact that
the dimension ranks are close to the median ranks suggests
that the eight dimensions and the overall Index are suitable
summary measures of the rule of law aspects. Country ranks
in the overall Index and in all eight dimensions are very close
to the median rank: 90 percent of the countries shift with
respect to the simulated median less than 1 position in
REFERENCE ALTERNATI VE
I . UNCERTAI NTY RELATED TO MI SSI NG DATA
NO ESTI MATI ON OF
MI SSI NG DATA
EXPECTATI ON
MAXI MI ZATI ON ( EM)
I I . UNCERTAI NTY I N THE AGGREGATI ON FUNCTI ON
ARI THMETI C
AVERAGE
GEOMETRI C AVERAGE
REFERENCE VALUE
FOR THE WEI GHT
DI STRI BUTI ON FOR
UNCERTAI NTY ANALYSI S
I I I . UNCERTAI NTY I NTERVALS FOR THE EI GHT DI MENSI ON WEI GHTS 0. 125 U[ 0. 094, 0. 156]
I V. UNCERTAI NTY I NTERVALS FOR THE SUB-FACTOR WEI GHTS
1: CONSTRAI NTS ON GOVERNMENT POWERS ( 6 SUB-FACTORS) 0. 167 U[ 0. 125, 0. 208]
2: ABSENCE OF CORRUPTI ON ( 4 SUB-FACTORS) 0. 250 U[ 0. 188, 0. 313]
3: OPEN GOVERNMENT ( 4 SUB-FACTORS) 0. 250 U[ 0. 188, 0. 313]
4: FUNDAMENTAL RI GHTS ( 8 SUB-FACTORS) 0. 125 U[ 0. 094, 0. 156]
5: ORDER AND SECURI TY ( 3 SUB-FACTORS) 0. 333 U[ 0. 250, 0. 417]
6: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ( 5 SUB-FACTORS) 0. 200 U[ 0. 150, 0. 250]
7: CI VI L JUSTI CE ( 7 SUB-FACTORS) 0. 143 U[ 0. 107, 0. 179]
8: CRI MI NAL JUSTI CE ( 7 SUB-FACTORS) 0. 143 U[ 0. 107, 0. 179]
TABLE 4: UNCERTAINTY PARAMETERS (MISSING VALUES, WEIGHTS AND AGGREGATION FUNCTION)
Source: Saisana and Saltelli, European Commission Joint Research Centre; WJP Rule of Law Index 2014.
194 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
the Rule of Law Index, Constraints on Government Powers
(D1) and Fundamental Rights, (D4); less than 2 positions
in Absence of Corruption (D2), Open Government (D3),
Regulatory Enforcement (D6) and Criminal Justice (D8);
less than 3 positions in Civil Justice (D7); and less than
5 positions in Order and Security (D5). These moderate
shifts for the vast majority of the countries can be taken
n inJicion n coJn:, cincion on ne :Je
of law issues depend mostly on the variables used and
not on the methodological judgments made during the
aggregation.
Simulated intervals for most countries are narrow enough,
hence robust to changes in the estimation of missing data,
weights and aggregation formula less than 6 positions
in 75% of the cases across the eight dimensions and the
overall Index. These results suggest that for the vast
majority of the countries, the Rule of Law Index ranks allow
for meaningful inferences to be drawn.
Nevertheless, few countries have relatively wide
intervals (more than 15 positions): none on Constraints
on Government Powers (D1), Absence of Corruption
(D2), Fundamental Rights (D4), Civil Justice (D7); China,
Malaysia, and United Arab Emirates on Open Government
(D3); Cote dIvoire, Jamaica, Myanmar, Philippines,
Russia, Senegal, and Thailand on Order and Security (D5);
Uzbekistan on Regulatory Enforcement (D6); and Brazil
and Panama on Criminal Justice (D8). These relatively wide
intervals are due to compensation of low performance on
some sub-factors with a very good performance on other
J|co: in iven Jimenion (ee coJn:, :one
in the main part of the report). These cases have been
eJ ne:ein : o ne Jnce:in, n,i in o:Je:
to give more transparency in the entire process and to help
appreciate the WJP Rule of Law Index results with respect
to the choices made during the development phase. To
this end, Table 5 reports the Index and dimension ranks
together with the simulated intervals (90% of the 4000
scenarios capturing estimation of missing data, weights
and aggregation formula).
The fact that the dimension on Absence of Corruption
(D2) is one of the most robust dimensions in the WJP Rule
of Law Index with respect to modeling assumptions and
also very coherent as discussed in the previous section,
see Table 1 and Table 2 is all the more noteworthy
given its inclusion in the Corruption Perception Index
of Transparency International, as one of the thirteen
measures describing perception of corruption in the public
sector and among politicians.

Belarus
Mongolia
Turkey
Uzbekistan
Russia
1
11
21
31
41
51
61
71
81
91
101
R
u
l
e

o
f

L
a
w

I
n
d
e
x

Countries
Median rank
WJP Index rank
Colombia
1
11
21
31
41
51
61
71
81
91
101
A
b
s
e
n
c
e

o
f

C
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n

(
D
2
)
Countries
Median rank
WJP D2 rank
Indonesia
Nepal
Philippines
Myanmar
Egypt
Senegal
Jamaica
Kenya
Bolivia
Cote d'Ivoire
1
11
21
31
41
51
61
71
81
91
101
O
r
d
e
r

a
n
d

S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y

(
D
5
)
Countries
Median rank
WJP D5 rank
Source: Saisana and Saltelli, European Commission Joint Research Centre; WJP Rule of
Law Index 2014.
Notes: Countries are ordered from high to low levels of rule of law. Median ranks and
intervals are calculated over 4,000 simulated scenarios combining random weights
(25% above/below the equal weights assumption), imputed versus missing values, and
geometric versus arithmetic average at the dimension (or sub-factor) level. Countries with
e :ei|e :n| o: mo:e oiion ni :om ne imJeJ meJin :n| :e eJ.
FIGURE 2: UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS (WJP INDEX
AND SELECTED DIMENSION RANKS VS. MEDIAN
RANK, 90% INTERVALS).
195 The WJP Rule of Law Index |
COUNTRIES INDEX F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8
Afghanistan 98 [97,98] 78 [77,83] 99 [98,99] 89 [87,98] 91 [90,92] 97 [97,97] 97 [96,97] 99 [99,99] 96 [94,96]
Albania 63 [62,66] 68 [65,69] 83 [81,85] 60 [56,63] 49 [49,51] 53 [51,56] 64 [62,67] 53 [50,56] 75 [68,79]
Argentina 58 [50,60] 71 [68,74] 47 [45,48] 56 [51,56] 31 [31,33] 83 [81,85] 73 [68,74] 40 [40,45] 70 [66,75]
Australia 8 [8,8] 8 [7,8] 8 [8,8] 12 [11,13] 10 [10,10] 14 [14,15] 7 [6,7] 12 [11,17] 11 [10,14]
Austria 7 [5,7] 6 [6,8] 10 [10,11] 6 [5,11] 5 [5,5] 10 [9,12] 6 [5,7] 7 [7,9] 5 [5,5]
Bangladesh 92 [92,93] 80 [79,83] 95 [91,96] 85 [84,86] 87 [87,88] 76 [75,85] 91 [88,92] 92 [88,94] 94 [91,95]
Belarus 50 [49,61] 95 [92,95] 38 [37,39] 79 [76,80] 83 [80,85] 33 [32,35] 42 [35,47] 30 [23,36] 50 [48,53.5]
Belgium 17 [17,17] 11 [11,12] 13 [13,13] 18 [18,18] 9 [9,9] 16 [15,19] 19 [19,19] 19 [18,19] 20 [19,20]
Bolivia 94 [93,95] 88 [88,88] 87 [86,87] 81 [77,82] 75 [71,76] 82 [81,92] 88 [86,90] 96 [95,97] 98 [98,98]
Bosnia & Herzegovina 39 [39,40] 51 [49,52] 55 [53,60] 44 [41,46] 32 [30,33] 45 [44,46] 49 [46,49] 56 [55,67] 32 [31,34]
Botswana 25 [23,26] 25 [25,28] 23 [22,23] 22 [22,25] 54 [52,58] 26 [25,27] 20 [20,21] 28 [22,30] 23 [22,24]
Brazil 42 [41,43] 32 [32,33] 45 [42,52] 36 [34,39] 35 [33,36] 71 [67,72] 39 [35,48] 50 [48,59] 69 [64,84]
Bulgaria 44 [44,45] 58 [55,59] 64 [60,65] 51 [46,54] 36 [33,36] 36 [36,37] 57 [55,60] 45 [44,46] 56 [51,58]
Burkina Faso 53 [49,56] 76 [73,76] 54 [51,56] 71 [66,75] 50 [49,52] 65 [64,72] 34 [31,34] 42 [40,44] 64 [63,69]
Cambodia 91 [90,92] 94 [92,95] 86 [84,89] 82 [81,84] 82 [79,83] 54 [53,59] 94 [91,95] 97 [95,98] 95 [93,95]
Cameroon 95 [94,95] 87 [84,87] 98 [94,98] 91 [88,92] 81 [78,83] 80 [77,80] 93 [91,95] 95 [95,97] 92 [90,93]
Canada 11 [10,11] 13 [13,13] 14 [14,16] 3 [3,3] 16 [16,19] 15 [15,17] 9 [8,10] 13 [11,15] 15 [13,16]
Chile 21 [21,22] 17 [16,17] 22 [22,24] 19 [19,21] 21 [21,22] 61 [59,66.5] 21 [20,22] 26 [22,29] 28 [28,30]
China 76 [74,82] 92 [89,96] 49 [45,50] 74 [69,84] 96 [96,97] 29 [26,32] 78 [74,85] 77 [75,87] 51 [47,55]
Colombia 61 [58,61] 47 [45,49] 61 [58,70] 40 [36,44] 61 [57,62] 89 [82,89] 50 [49,53] 54 [52,62] 79 [74,87]
Cote d'Ivoire 72 [70,73] 77 [74,78] 69 [67,69] 88 [86,91] 72 [71,78] 85 [73,88] 58 [56,62] 57 [52,60] 60 [57,62]
Croatia 36 [34,36] 40 [40,43] 36 [33,36] 38 [35,40] 37 [35,38] 39 [37,49] 53 [52,57] 46 [44,58] 31 [30,32]
Czech Republic 23 [22,25] 23 [22,24] 31 [30,31] 33 [31.5,34] 11 [11,12] 28 [27,28] 24 [24,25] 20 [20,20] 19 [19,20]
Denmark 1 [1,2] 1 [1,1] 1 [1,1] 5 [5,6] 2 [2,3] 3 [3,4] 2 [2,2] 4 [3,4] 3 [2,3]
Dominican Republic 67 [65,68] 67 [66,71] 77 [75,85] 45 [42,49] 47 [47,48] 87 [85,93] 76 [75,79] 60 [54,61] 66 [63,69]
Ecuador 77 [72,76] 85 [84,86] 51 [49,54] 75 [71,77] 62 [58,65] 91 [86,91] 54 [52,55] 78 [76,84] 86 [82,88]
Egypt 74 [70,74] 74 [69,76] 52 [49,54] 64 [59,68] 90 [90,92] 66 [66,76] 75 [73,82] 84 [81,91] 57 [53,59]
El Salvador 64 [62,67] 66 [65,67] 53 [52,55] 84 [81,84] 42 [39,43] 70 [65,74] 52 [50,53] 62 [60,66] 90 [89,97]
Estonia 15 [15,16] 12 [11,12] 18 [17,20] 15 [15,16] 12 [11,13] 24 [20,24] 13 [13,16] 16 [12,16] 13 [11,15]
Ethiopia 88 [86,88] 91 [89,92] 56 [51,58] 94 [91,95] 94 [93,94] 73 [69,74] 89 [87,94] 85 [81,89] 46 [41,49]
Finland 4 [4,4] 5 [5,5] 6 [5,6] 11 [9,11] 4 [4,4] 8 [5,10] 11 [11,12] 8 [7,9] 1 [1,2]
France 18 [18,18] 14 [14,14] 20 [19,20] 16 [15,17] 18 [16,19] 30 [29,31] 14 [13,15] 18 [18,19] 21 [21,22]
Georgia 31 [30,32] 55 [51,57.5] 24 [23,24] 43 [40,47] 51 [49,53] 17 [13,24] 31 [30,37] 32 [25,34] 36 [35,37]
Germany 9 [9,9] 9 [9,9] 12 [11,12] 14 [14,14] 8 [8,8] 13 [12,13] 16 [14,18] 3 [3,4] 16 [15,16]
Ghana 37 [36,38] 27 [26,28] 58 [55,61] 37 [34,41] 33 [32,36] 57 [54,60] 43 [40,44] 35 [31,35] 49 [48,52]
Greece 32 [31,33] 29 [29,30] 34 [34,37] 34 [33,43] 28 [28,29] 49 [48,53] 37 [34,41] 25 [23,34] 43 [43,50]
Guatemala 83 [78,84] 59 [58,63] 76 [75,78] 57 [52,59] 57 [54,58] 92 [92,94] 85 [81,86] 93 [92,94] 93 [91,94]
Hong Kong SAR, China 16 [15,16] 24 [22,24] 9 [9,9] 10 [7,12] 29 [28,30] 4 [3,4] 15 [14,17] 15 [11,16] 10 [9,11]
Hungary 30 [30,31] 36 [34,39] 29 [28,29] 35 [34,40] 30 [29,31] 21 [19,21] 30 [30,34] 55 [51,65] 34 [32,34]
India 66 [62.5,68] 35 [35,37] 72 [71,75] 30 [29,31] 63 [61,65] 95 [84,95] 81 [78,87] 90 [84,91] 48 [44,49]
Indonesia 46 [46,49] 31 [31,31] 80 [78,82] 29 [29,32] 65 [61,65] 42 [39,53] 46 [43,48] 67 [62,69] 71 [66,73]
Iran 82 [78,87] 90 [89,94] 42 [41,43] 90 [87,92] 99 [99,99] 77 [71,80] 41 [35,42] 38 [36,38] 63 [61,68]
Italy 29 [29,29] 26 [25,27] 30 [30,36] 39 [36,41] 22 [22,23] 50 [49,53] 29 [28,29] 36 [35,38] 24 [23,24]
J amaica 45 [44,45] 34 [33,35] 50 [48,59] 59 [54,63] 44 [42,46] 74 [70,86] 32 [30,33] 64 [59,70] 53 [51,64]
J apan 12 [12,13] 15 [15,17] 11 [10,12] 8 [6,8] 20 [19,20] 1 [1,1] 12 [11,12] 11 [10,13] 18 [18,18]
J ordan 38 [37,39] 64 [60,67] 33 [32,34] 65 [62,67] 77 [74,77] 20 [17,21] 35 [35,42] 21 [21,24] 30 [28,30]
Kazakhstan 71 [70,72] 93 [90,94] 60 [57,63] 87 [86,89] 74 [72,76] 35 [32,35] 63 [59,66] 66 [59,70] 61 [57,62]
Kenya 86 [84,87] 62 [59,63] 93 [92,96] 83 [78,84] 80 [78,85] 79 [76,89] 80 [78,84] 72 [69,72] 84 [78,87]
Kyrgyzstan 78 [77,82] 70 [69,74] 96 [93,97] 73 [68,74] 66 [66,67] 52 [50,53] 68 [65,73] 74 [73,75] 85 [80,87]
Lebanon 49 [49,54] 44 [41,44] 70 [69,71] 62 [57,64] 43 [40,46] 43 [42,47] 66 [63,68] 70 [67,71] 55 [53,62]
Liberia 87 [86,88] 56 [51,64] 85 [81,86] 86 [85,89] 53 [52,57] 93 [90,94] 96 [96,98] 87 [78,89] 87 [81,87]
Macedonia, FYR 34 [34,35] 61 [57,62] 37 [35,39] 24 [23,25] 38 [37,38] 47 [46,49] 44 [38,44] 41 [40,43] 37 [36,38]
Madagascar 81 [78,81] 83 [79,84] 84 [83,86] 68 [64,75] 76 [74,82] 46 [38,48] 82 [79,84] 79 [76,84] 80 [72,81]
Malawi 55 [49,57] 60 [56,61] 65 [59,66] 80 [76,80] 58 [56,61] 68 [66,70] 77 [75,80] 31 [27,33] 40 [38,47]
Malaysia 35 [34,37] 49 [45,52] 28 [27,29] 42 [36,62] 85 [81,86] 12 [11,14] 48 [44,50] 37 [36,38] 33 [32,34]
Mexico 79 [74,82] 48 [46,55] 78 [72,78] 32 [30,33] 60 [58,65] 96 [96,96] 51 [49,51] 88 [78,88] 97 [96,97]
Moldova 75 [74,78] 79 [77,80] 88 [86,88] 58 [53,64] 68 [67,69] 40 [38,41] 79 [75,83] 76 [75,79] 82 [77,85]
Mongolia 51 [51,61] 53 [53,56] 71 [71,79] 93 [90,94] 45 [42,45] 38 [36,43] 70 [68,73] 48 [44,49] 39 [37,41]
Morocco 52 [49,59] 46 [45,49] 62 [57,64] 46 [42,50] 84 [82,86] 44 [38,46] 36 [35,40] 51 [48,54] 81 [77,84]
Myanmar 89 [89,92] 82 [79,84] 63 [58,72] 96 [94,97] 97 [96,98] 60 [45,64] 92 [88,93] 86 [81,90] 89 [85,90]
Nepal 57 [53,60] 45 [44,47] 73 [72,76] 61 [54,63] 48 [47,48] 55 [54,64] 56 [53,57] 75 [73,76] 52 [50,53]
Netherlands 5 [5,6] 7 [6,7] 7 [7,7] 7 [6,9] 6 [6,6] 22 [21,23] 4 [4,4] 2 [2,2] 9 [9,10]
New Zealand 6 [5,7] 4 [4,4] 3 [3,4] 2 [2,2] 7 [7,7] 11 [10,11] 5 [5,6] 9 [8,9] 12 [11,15]
Nicaragua 85 [82,86] 96 [95,96] 75 [72,77] 54 [52,66] 69 [67,70] 72 [69,75] 71 [69,74] 91 [89,93] 78 [73,84]
Nigeria 93 [90,94] 69 [68,71] 97 [95,99] 76 [73,77] 88 [87,89] 98 [98,98] 83 [78,84] 52 [48,53] 91 [89,92]
Norway 2 [1,2] 2 [2,3] 2 [2,2] 1 [1,1] 3 [2,3] 19 [14,21] 1 [1,1] 1 [1,1] 4 [4,4]
Pakistan 96 [96,96] 73 [71,76] 91 [90,92] 95 [91,95] 92 [91,94] 99 [99,99] 95 [92,95] 94 [92,94] 68 [64,72.5]
Panama 56 [50,58] 75 [73,81] 57 [56,66] 31 [29,33] 46 [44,46] 62 [55,62] 55 [54,57] 69 [67,71] 65 [63,84]
Peru 62 [62,64] 38 [37,40] 79 [79,83] 63 [55,68] 34 [33,36] 78 [74,80] 61 [59,63] 83 [80,89] 67 [63,74]
Philippines 60 [55,61] 39 [37,40] 44 [41,47] 55 [52,58] 67 [67,71] 56 [44,60] 60 [57,61] 82 [80,87] 73 [68,77]
Poland 22 [22,23] 22 [21,23] 27 [27,29] 27 [27,27] 24 [24,25] 25 [25,28] 26 [26,27] 22 [22,26] 17 [17,17]
Portugal 26 [25,26] 19 [19,21] 26 [26,26] 25 [23,26] 17 [16,18] 58 [56,61] 27 [26,28] 23 [21,34] 26 [26,27]
Republic of Korea 14 [14,14] 16 [15,16] 16 [16,17] 13 [12,13] 23 [21,23] 7 [6,8] 17 [14,18] 10 [9,12] 8 [8,8]
Romania 33 [32,33] 43 [40,43] 41 [40,47] 47 [42,50] 25 [24,26] 31 [30,31] 45 [41,46] 34 [31,35] 29 [28,30]
Russia 80 [74,77] 89 [89,92] 66 [61,65.5] 67 [63,71] 79 [76,81] 75 [63,80] 67 [64,69] 68 [65,69] 76 [67,78]
Senegal 43 [42,43] 33 [32,34] 48 [44,49] 70 [67,73] 39 [39,41] 69 [67,83] 33 [30,34] 39 [38,39] 54 [52,57]
Serbia 54 [51,57] 65 [64,67] 67 [65,68] 48 [43,49] 40 [39,43] 51 [48,58] 65 [62,67] 71 [69,72] 58 [53,60]
Sierra Leone 84 [80.5,85] 50 [46,50] 82 [76,83] 98 [97,98] 59 [59,63] 88 [79,90] 87 [85,89] 63 [59,66] 88 [86,92]
Singapore 10 [10,13] 21 [18,23] 5 [4,6] 21 [19,21] 26 [24,27] 2 [2,2] 8 [8,10] 6 [5,6] 2 [1,3]
Slovenia 28 [27,28] 30 [29,30] 32 [30,32] 23 [22,24] 13 [12,13] 37 [37,43] 28 [26,29] 29 [26,33] 27 [26,27]
South Africa 40 [38,40] 37 [35,37] 46 [43,47] 26 [25,26] 41 [40,43] 86 [79,87] 40 [37,46] 44 [40,46] 47 [45,48]
Spain 24 [24,25] 28 [26,28] 25 [25,25] 28 [28,28] 14 [14,15] 34 [33,35] 25 [24,25] 24 [22,28] 25 [25,25]
Sri Lanka 48 [46,48] 54 [50,57] 39 [38,39] 41 [37,48] 56 [54,59] 59 [54,61] 69 [67,74] 80 [75,82] 38 [38,40]
Sweden 3 [3,3] 3 [2,3] 4 [3,5] 4 [4,4] 1 [1,1] 6 [6,8] 3 [3,3] 5 [5,6] 6 [6,7]
Tanzania 69 [64,68] 52 [51,55] 74 [69,76] 72 [67,76] 70 [69,71] 90 [89,93] 74 [67,75] 61 [55,63] 44 [41,46]
Thailand 47 [46,48] 63 [61,64] 40 [40,43] 50 [46,53] 52 [49,53] 48 [39,55] 62 [58,63] 89 [83,93] 35 [35,37]
Tunisia 41 [41,42] 41 [40,42] 43 [40,45] 49 [44,50] 64 [59,65] 41 [40,43] 47 [44,50] 43 [40,44] 45 [41,47]
Turkey 59 [49,58] 72 [67,74] 35 [32,35] 69 [65,70] 78 [76,80] 67 [60,73] 38 [35,40] 47 [46,48] 62 [59,63]
Uganda 90 [89,90] 81 [77,83] 89 [88,91] 92 [88,94] 93 [91,94] 84 [82,88] 90 [88,94] 59 [54,62] 72 [64,76]
Ukraine 68 [70,75] 84 [81,87] 94 [92,97] 53 [49,55] 55 [53,56] 27 [26,29] 84 [77,85] 49 [46,52] 83 [81,88]
United Arab Emirates 27 [27,28] 42 [39,48] 17 [15,18] 52 [44,74] 73 [72,80] 9 [6,9] 23 [22,23] 33 [29,36] 7 [6,7]
United Kingdom 13 [11,13] 10 [10,10] 15 [14,15] 9 [7,11] 15 [14,15] 23 [21,23] 10 [9,10] 14 [12,15] 14 [11,14]
United States 19 [19,19] 20 [18,21] 21 [21,21] 17 [16,17] 27 [25,27] 18 [17,20] 22 [21,23] 27 [23,30] 22 [21,23]
Uruguay 20 [20,20] 18 [18,19] 19 [18,20] 20 [19,21] 19 [16,20] 64 [63,65] 18 [16,18] 17 [16,17] 42 [40,47]
Uzbekistan 73 [78,84] 97 [97,98] 81 [76,83] 78 [75,81] 95 [95,95] 5 [5,6] 59 [55,70] 58 [53,63] 59 [52,60]
Venezuela 99 [99,99] 99 [99,99] 90 [88,91] 97 [96,97] 89 [87,89] 94 [93,95] 99 [99,99] 98 [97,98] 99 [99,99]
Vietnam 65 [65,69] 86 [84,87] 59 [54,64] 77 [75,84] 71 [67,73] 32 [31,35] 86 [83,89] 73 [73,78] 41 [39,43]
Zambia 70 [68,69] 57 [51,59] 68 [63,69] 66 [61,69] 86 [82,87] 63 [61,64] 72 [68,75] 65 [56,66] 77 [72,79]
Zimbabwe 97 [97,98] 98 [97,98] 92 [92,94] 99 [99,99] 98 [97,98] 81 [77,84] 98 [97,98] 81 [77,86] 74 [66,77]
Source: Saisana and Saltelli, European Commission Joint Research Centre; WJP Rule of Law Index 2014.
Notes: Countries are presented in alphabetical order. 90% intervals are calculated over 4,000 simulated scenarios combining random weights (25% above/below the equal weights
assumption), imputed versus missing values, and geometric versus arithmetic average at the dimension (or sub-factor) level.
TABLE 5: COUNTRY RANKS AND 90% INTERVALS FOR THE RULE OF LAW INDEX AND THE EIGHT DIMENSIONS.
196 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Though country rankings are not calculated by the WJP for
the Informal Justice, a similar robustness analysis reveals that
twenty two countries in this dimension have relatively wide
intervals (more than 15 positions)
9
. These wide intervals are
in most cases due to the amount of missing data (4 or more
out of the 8 question items). This outcome further supports
the WJP choice to use the Informal Justice dimension scores
as an indication for within country comparisons and not
across countries.
As a general remark, the robustness of an index should not be
interpreted as an indication of the indexs quality. It is instead
a consequence of the indexs dimensionality. In other words,
:o|Jne i o ome exen ne i iJe o :eJJnJnc,.
very high correlation between variables will lead to an index
ranking that is practically not affected by the methodological
choices, so the index will be both robust and redundant.
Similarly, a low correlation among variables would imply that
the methodological choices are very important in determining
country rankings, and thus the index is unlikely to be robust to
these choices. The results herein have revealed that the 2014
Rule of Law Index is robust without being redundant.
RULE OF LAW INDEX AND THE VARIABILITY OF
ITS DIMENSIONS
Finally, we study the relationship between the Rule of Law
Index scores of a given country and the variability of its eight
underlying dimensions, namely what the relationship is, if
any, between the Index score and a balanced performance in
constraints on government powers, absence of corruption,
open government, fundamental rights, order and security,
regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice.
While the Index values provide a quantitative indication of
trends in rule of law, changes in the dimensions variability
convey information on the quality of the changes: an increase
in rule of law may be achieved by improving the performance
in ecinc Jimenion. .ni Jec:ee in ne coencien o
variation may be achieved by reducing gaps in performance
between dimensions.
As can be seen from the scissors pattern in Figure 3,
generally countries with higher levels of rule of law exhibit
less variability since they tend to achieve high values in most
of the underlying dimensions. The opposite generally holds
true for countries with lower levels of rule of law. The average
variability in the top tertile group is 0.11, in the middle
tertile group is 0.21, and in the low tertile group is 0.27. This
:eec ne c n coJn:ie .in o.e: eve o :Je o
law generally display larger discrepancies in performance
9 These are: Albania, Australia, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong
SAR of China, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Jamaica, Macedonia-FYR, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Uruguay.
between dimensions, and that focusing only in particular
dimensions while allowing performance gaps between
dimension yields only marginal results in their overall rule of
law score. However, it is worth noting that there is a certain
variance in the results: although Tanzania and Pakistan belong
to the low tertile group in the rule of law, their variability is
just above the average variability of the top tertile group. The
same applies to a number of countries in the middle tertile
group (South Africa, Colombia, and Macedonia-FYR). Instead,
although the United Arab Emirates belongs to the top tertile
group, its variability is above the average of the middle tertile
group.
Tne Pe:on co::eion coencien |e.een ne RJe o .
lnJex nJ ne coencien o v:iion i .o. .n :eec
a high degree of negative association between the Index and
the variability of its eight dimensions.
CONCLUSIONS
The WJP team invited the JRC for the fourth consecutive
year to delve into the statistical properties of the revised Rule
of Law Index, so as to ensure the transparency and reliability
of the results and to enable academics and policymakers
to derive more accurate and meaningful conclusions. In
fact, stringent criteria of transparency must be adopted
when composite indicators are used as a basis for policy
assessments. Failure to open up the black box of composite
indicator development is likely to lead only to greater erosion
of the credibility and legitimacy of these measures as tools for
improved policymaking.
The JRC analysis suggests that the conceptualized multi-level
structure of the 2014 WJP Rule of Law Index calculated
through almost 500 survey questions and eight dimensions
for 99 countries is statistically sound, coherent, and
balanced. Indeed, within each dimension a single latent factor
i iJenineJ nJ J|co: :e :oJn, e,J, imo:n
in determining the variation of the respective dimension
co:e. Tni oJcome cn |e JeJ iic Jincion
for the equal weights and arithmetic averaging at the various
levels of aggregation of the Rule of Law Index which
should not be taken for granted when arithmetic averaging
is concerned. The Absence of Corruption dimension is
especially coherent and robust, which is noteworthy given its
inclusion in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency
International.
Country ranks across the eight dimensions and in the overall
Index are also fairly robust to methodological changes
related to the estimation of missing data, weighting or
aggregation rule (less than 3 positions shift in 96% of the
cases). Consequently, benchmarking inferences can be drawn
197 The WJP Rule of Law Index |
for most countries in the Rule of Law Index and the eight
underlying dimensions, whilst some caution may be needed
for a few countries. Note that perfect robustness would
have been undesirable as this would have implied that the
Index and the dimensions are perfectly correlated and hence
redundant, which is not the case. In fact, one way in which
the 2014 Rule of Law Index helps to highlight other aspects
of rule law is by pinpointing the differences in rankings that
emerge from a comparison between the Index and each of
the eight dimensions: for more than 30% (up to 53%) of the
countries, the Index ranking and any of the eight dimensions
rankings differ by 10 positions or more.
Tne min :ennemen JeeJ |, ne :een n,i
relate to the dimensions of Order and Security and Informal
Justice. The former needs a revision with respect to the sub-
co: on civi conic i eecive, imieJ. .ni lno:m
Justice appears to be measuring an aspect of the rule of law
that is totally different to what is being measured by the
other eight dimensions. The missing data for 20+ countries
within Informal Justice do not allow for a reliable estimation
of their performance level in this respect. Beyond conceptual
issues, these statistical considerations may justify the WJPs
choice not to include Informal Justice in the index calculation,
but to consider it instead indicatively for within country
comparisons only.
The added value of the 2014 WJP Rule of Law Index and
its underlying dimensions developed using international
quality standards and tested using state of the art statistical
analyses lays in the ability to summarize different aspects
o :Je o . in mo:e encien nJ :imonioJ mnne:
than what is possible with a collection of almost 500 survey
questions taken separately. In fact, the Rule of Law Index,
:eeneJ ni ,e: o: ne n: ime n ove: :ee.
has a very high reliability 0.97 and captures indeed the single
latent phenomenon underlying the eight main dimensions of
rule of law. In past reports, the WJP team had opted not to
calculate an overall index in order to shed more light onto the
dimensions of the rule of law. Hopefully, this years initiative
o ccomn, ne JeieJ coJn:, :one .in n ove:
rule of law score will reinforce the medias uptake of the Rule
of Law Index and the WJPs engagements with civil society.
United Arab Emirates
South Africa
Colombia
Tanzania
Pakistan
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Rule of Law Index (left Y-axis) Coefncient of Variation (right Y-axis)
Top tertile
Middle tertile Low tertile
Macedonia-FYR
FIGURE 3: RULE OF LAW INDEX VALUES AND THE VARIABILITY OF THEIR UNDERLYING DIMENSIONS.
Source: Saisana and Saltelli, European Commission Joint Research Centre; WJP Rule of Law Index 2014.
Notes: CoJn:ie :e o:Je:eJ :om nin o o. eve o :Je o .. Tne coencien o v:iion o: ecn coJn:, i ccJeJ ne :io o ne nJ:J Jeviion c:o ne ein Jimenion
of the rule of law to their average.
198 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
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Little, R. J. A., Rubin, D. B. 2002. Statistical Analysis with
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Munda, G. 2008. Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation for a
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OECD/EC JRC, 2008. Handbook on Constructing Composite
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Instructions for use. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 3(2):
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Saisana, M. 2011. Statistical tests on the Global Innovation
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Saltelli, A., Funtowicz S. 2014. When All Models Are Wrong,
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Saltelli, A., DHombres, B. 2010. Sensitivity Analysis Didnt
Help. A Practitioners Critique of the Stern Review. Global
Environmental Change 20: 298302.
Saltelli, A., Ratto, M., Andres, T., Campolongo, F., Cariboni, J.,
Gatelli, D., Saisana, M., Tarantola, S. 2008. Global Sensitivity
Analysis: The Primer. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons.
199 The WJP Rule of Law Index |
200 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Contributing Experts
202 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
The WJP Rule of Law Index

2014 was made possible by the generous pro-bono contributions of academics and practitioners
who contributed their time and expertise. The names of those experts wishing to be acknowledged individually are listed in the
following pages.
Tni :eo: . o mJe oi|e |, ne .o:| o ne oin comnie .no conJJceJ neJ.o:|. nJ ne noJnJ o
individuals who have responded to the general population poll (GPP) around the world.
Contributing Experts
203 Contributing Experts |
Afghanistan
Niamatullah Barakzai
Legal Oracles
Jrgen Baumann
Afghan Independent Bar Association
Valerie Docher
Medical Refresher Courses for Afghans
Selay Ghaffar
HAWCA
Mr. Ghazawi
Coordination of Afghan Relief
Baryalai Hakimi
Kabul University
Sanzar Kakar
Afghanistan Holding Group
Mohammad Khalid
Massoudi Legal Consultancy
Hashmat Khalil Nadirpor
Legal Education Support Program
Brouillet Pascal
Agence Franaise de Dveloppement
Ghislain Poissonnier
French Embassy
A.R. Rahimghiyasa
|.. C||.e | /. .m. .|m|v..
Saif ur Rehman
Legal Oracles
Mohammad Naeem Salimee
Coordination of Afghan Relief
Khalid Sekander
Sayed Mohammad Saeeq Shajjan
Shajjan & Associates
R. Michael Smith
Bowie & Jensen, LLC
Amiri Wahidullah
Nangarhar University
Adrienne Woltersdorf
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Sakena Yacoobi
Afghan Institute of Learning
Idrees Zaman
CPAU
Zmarak Zhouand
Afghanistan Lawyers International
Anonymous Contributors
Albania
Irma Cami
|e|ev|. |.. C||.e
Dorant Ekmekiu
Hoxha, Memi & Hoxha
Shirli Gorenca
Kalo & Associates
Drini Hakorja
Eris Hoxha
Hoxha, Memi & Hoxha
Gjika & Associates
Jonida Braja Melani
Wolf Theiss
Anteo Papa
Optima Legal & Financial
Genci Trpo
Anonymous Contributors
Argentina
Valeria Amelong
Sanatorio de Nios Rosario
Hugo Barrionuevo
Universidad Isalud
Federico A. Borzi Cirilli
Defensas Penales
Diego Carbone
Presa, Caffarello & Carbone Abogados
Hernan Jorge Danzi
Estudio Penal Danzi
Carlos Mara Ferrer Deheza
Estudio Ferrer Deheza
Maximo Julio Fonrouge
Colegio de Abogados
Alberto Justo Giles
Colegio e Abogados
Adrin Goldin
ISLSSL
Alvaro Herrero
Laboratorio de Polticas Pblicas
Atilio Killmeate
Hickethier & Killmeate
Martin G. Langsam
Universidad Isalud
Elina Manzanera
Silva Ortiz, Alfonso, Pavic & Louge Abogados
Carlos Marin
Gabriel Alejandro Martoglio
Estudio Juridico Integral
Sergio Muro
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Nicolas Francisco Niewolski Cesca
Estudio Ferrer Deheza
Rosa Mara Oller Lpez
Estudio Jurdico Oller Lpez & Asoc
Pablo Pejlatowicz
Asociacin por los Derechos Civiles
Mara Morena del Rio
Allende & Brea
Maria Julieta Sanchez Moreno
SECHI
Claudio Jess Santagati
Defensora General de Lomas de Zamora
Diego Silva Ortiz
Silva Ortiz, Alfonso, Pavic & Louge Abogados
Enrique Mariano Stile
Marval OFarrell & Mairal
Adrin R. Tellas
Mara Paola Trigiani
Alfaro Abogados
Anonymous Contributors
Australia
Nicholas Boymal
Hewlett-Packard
Kate Burns
Rule of Law Institute of Australia
Peter Cashman
University of Sydney
Sean Cooney
Melbourne Law School
Nicholas Cowdery
University of Sydney
Breen Creighton
RMIT University
Andrew Frazer
University of Wollongong
Fiona McDonald
Queensland University of Technology
Fiona McLeay
Justice Connect
Esther Stern
Flinders University of South Australia
Anonymous Contributors
Austria
Clemens Egermann
Barnert Egermann Illigasch Attorneys at Law
Thomas Frad
KWR Karasek Wietrzyk Rechtsanwlte GmbH
Ivo Greiter
e||e |ee ||e S |.|e
Gerhard Jarosch
International Association of Prosecutors
Lukas Kaelin
University of Vienna
Manfred Ketzer
Hausmaninger Kletter Rechtsanwlte GmbH
Rupert Manhart
Austrian Bar
Wolfgang Mazal
University of Vienna
Isabelle Pellech
Marcella Prunbauer-Glaser
Prunbauer & Romig
Martin Reinisch
BKP Brauneis Klauser Prndl Rechtsanwlte
Martin Risak
University of Vienna
Jernej Sekolec
Anton Spenling
Supreme Court
Karl Stoeger
University of Graz
Stefan Zleptnig
University of Vienna
Anonymous Contributors
Bangladesh
Tasmiah Nuhiya Ahmed
FM Associates
ASM Alamgir
WHO
Abdul Awal
NRDS
Kazi Faizul Bari
K. A. Bari & CO.
Fatima J. Chowdhury
FM Associates
M. R. I. Chowdhury
M. R. I. Chowdhury & Associates
Mirza Farzana Iqbal Chowdhury
Daffodil International University
Nasirud Doulah
Doulah & Doulah
Debra Efroymson
HealthBridge
Bilqis Amin Hoque
Uttara University
Mohammed Mutahar Hossain
Hossain & Khan Associates
Rokib Bin Hossain
The Legal Circle
Shusmita Khan
Eminence
Sarjean Rahman Lian
FM Associates
Mahbub Parvez
Daffodil International University
Sheikh Abdur Rahim
Daffodil International University
Al Amin Rahman
FM Associates
Anita Ghazi Rahman
The Legal Circle
Syed Mizanur Rahman
Daffodil International University
K.A.R. Sayeed
United Hospital Limited
Tanim Hussain Shawon
Supreme Court of Bangladesh
Anonymous Contributors
Belarus
Dmitry Arkhipenko
Revera Consulting Group
Siarhei Artsemyeu
Belarusian State University
Dmitry Bokhan
Verkhovodko & Partners LLC
Kseniya Dashutina
Foundation for Legal Technologies Development
Nina Knyazeva
Verkhovodko & Partners LLC
Anastasia Korchagina
Alexander Korsak
Arzinger & Partners
Sergei Makarchuk
CHSH Cerha Hempel Spiegelfeld Hlawati FLLC
Valentina Ogarkova
Stepanovski, Papakul & Partners
Stepanovski, Papakul & Partners
Vadzim Samaryn
Belarusian State University
Dmitry Semashko
Stepanovski, Papakul & Partners
Paulina Smykouskaya
Thomson Reuters
Sviatlana Valuyeva
Olga Zdobnova
Vlasova Mikhel & Partners
Anonymous Contributors
Belgium
Jean-Louis Berwart
AVODROITS
:. FoJnoJx
CHU Lige
Damien Gerard
Universit Catholique de Louvain
Patrick Goffaux
Universit Libre de Bruxelles
Pieter de Koster
Allen & Overy LLP
Patrick Papart
University of Liege
Emmanuel Plasschaert
Crowell & Moring
Andre Puttemans
Universit Libre de Bruxelles
Jean-Franois Van Drooghenbroeck
Universit Catholique de Louvain
Pieter Vandekerckhove
Patrick Wautelet
Universit de Lige
Kris Wauters
Universit Catholique de Louvain
Christian Willems
Loyens & Loeff
Olivier de Witte
Hpital Erasme ULB
Anonymous Contributors
Bolivia
Arletta Aez Valdez
Rosario Baptista Canedo
Comisin Andina de Juristas
Adrin Barrenechea
BM&O Abogados
Cesar Burgoa Rodriguez
Bufete Burgoa
Cristian Bustos
Ferrere Abogados
Carlos Gerke Siles
Estudio Jurdico Gerke, Soc. Civ.
Herrera & Abogados Soc. Civ.
Ricardo Indacochea
Indacochea & Asociados
Ivan Lima Magne
Lima & Asociados S.C.
Luis A. Mercado
Centro Medico Boliviano Belga
Javier Mir Pea
MIR & Asociados
Ariel Morales
CRF Rojas Abogados
Ariel Morales Vasquez
CRF Rojas Abogados
Haydee Padilla
OPS/OMS
Carlos Pinto
Ferrere Abogados
Sergio Reynolds Ruiz
Bufete Reynolds Legal Advice
Cayo Salinas
Cayo Salinas & Asociados
Sandra Salinas
CRF Rojas Abogados
Rene Soria-Saucedo
Boston University
Efran Freddy Surez Chvez
Victor Vargas Montao
Herrera & Abogados Soc. Civ.
Gretzel G. V. Baldiviezo
Bufete De Abogados Vidaurre
Hans Voss Ferrero
Indacochea & Asociados
Anonymous Contributors
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Adis Arapovic
Centres for Civic Inititives
Lana Bubalo
L|ve||v | |em.| f|,eJ|. ||.
Zoran Dakic
Health center Bijeljina
/Jnn LJ:|ovic
University of Zenica
enmeJ Cnic
International University of Sarajevo
Erkan Ilgn
International Burch University
n o:c
University of Travnik
Esad Oruc
International Burch University
Leni Pic
L|ve||v | |em.| f|,eJ|. ||.
RJmi Pvic
/iJ Po|ic
JU Kantonalna Bolnica Zenica
Aleksandar Sajic
Sajic Banja Luka
Danijela Saller- Osenk
i:n S:|inovic
Osman Sinanovic
University Clinical Center Tuzla
Milorad Sladojevic
Opcinski sud Bugojno BiH
N. Smailagic
University of Poitiers
S|i| Soic
University of Sarajevo
Mehmed Spaho
|.. C||.e S.
Fo:i Sonovic
f| S|,.v|. |.. C||.e
e:iJ SJce|
Univerzitet u Sarajevi, BiH
Milos Trifkovic
ANUBiH
Ezmana Turkovic
|.|. |.. C||.e
Anonymous Contributors
Botswana
Patrick Akhiwu
Pakmed Group
Jeffrey Samuel Bookbinder
Bookbinder Business Law
Tatenda Dumba
Armstrongs Attorneys
Rekha A. Kumar
University of Botswana
Lethogonolo Makgane
Senamela Sekga Attorneys
Motsomi Ndala Marobela
University of Botswana
Dorothy Matiza
Rahim Khan & Company
John McAllister
University of Botswana
Tsholofelo TJ Mvungama
Collins Newman & Company
Buhlebenkosi Ncube
Y S Moncho Attorneys
Kwadwo Osei-Ofei
Osei-Ofei Swabi & Co
Tshiamo Rantao
Rantao & Kewagamang Attorneys
Joanne Robinson
Rahim Khan & Company
Moemedi Junior Tafa
Armstrongs Attorneys
Anonymous Contributors
Brazil
Fernando Mussa Abujamra Aith
Universidade de So Paulo
Abel Simo Amaro
Veirano Advogados
Iliana Graber de Aquino
Graber Advogados Associados
Daniel Arbix
Google
Srgio Cruz Arenhart
Ministrio Pblico Federal
Carlos Ayres
Trench, Rossi e Watanabe Advogados
Vitor Blotta
University of So Paulo
Maria Celina Bodin de Moraes
UERJ & PUC-Rio
Thiago Bottino
Fundacao Getulio Vargas Law School
Julio Cesar Bueno
Pinheiro Neto Advogados
Daniel Bushatsky
Advocacia Bushatsky
Nancy Cardia
University of So Paulo
Maria Isabel Carvalho Sica Longhi
Google
Carolina G. F. Korbage de Castro
Montgomery & Associados
Fabio Peixinho Gomes Correa
Lilla, Huck, Otranto, Camargo Advogados
Gabriel Costa
Shell Brasil Petrleo Ltda.
Elival da Silva Ramos
Universidade de So Paulo
Andre de Melo Ribeiro
DCA
Ricardo de Paula Alves
Dias Carneiro Advogados
Mario de Barros Duarte Garcia
Duarte Garcia, Caselli Guimares e Terra
Felipe Dutra Asensi
FGV Direito Rio
Alexandre Esper
Microsoft
Heloisa Estellita
Direito GV
Melina Girardi Fachin
Fachin Advogados Associados
204 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Joaquim Falco
FGV Rio de Janeiro Law School
Mauricio Faragone
Faragone Advogados
Luciano Feldens
PUCRS
Joel Ferreira Vaz Filho
Garca & Keener Advogados
Isadora Fingermann
Instituto de Defesa do Direito de Defesa
Alexandre Fragoso Silvestre
Miguel Neto Advogados
Rodrigo Giordano de Castro
Peixoto e Cury Advogados
Paulo Fernando Giugliodori Grippa
Hewlett-Packard
Luiz Guilherme Primos
Primos e Primos Advocacia
Rosa R. Lima
. ||m.. |.C.|.. F|m
Sergio N. Mannheimer
Andrade & Fichtner Advogados
Fabio Martins Di Jorge
Peixoto e Cury Advogados
Edson Mazieiro
Murray Advogados
Maria Valeria Junho Penna
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
Maria Fernanda Tourinho Peres
University of So Paulo
Luiz Paulo Pieruccetti Marques
Vieira, Rezende, Barbosa e Guerreiro Advogados
Joo Otvio Pinheiro Olivrio
Campos Mello Advogados
Jos Ricardo dos Santos Luz Jr.
Duarte Garcia, Caselli Guimares e Terra
Eduardo Soto Pires
Veirano Advogados
Mauricio Vedovato
Lilla, Huck, Otranto, Camargo Advogados
Rafael Villac Vicente de Carvalho
Peixoto e Cury Advogados
Anonymous Contributors
Bulgaria
Ivo Baev
Ivo Baev & Partners
Jean F. Crombois
American University in Bulgaria
Todor Dotchev
Institute for Political and Legal Studies
Svetlana Ganeva
Arsov Natchev Ganeva
Lidia Georgieva
Medical University
Nikolai Milenov Hristov
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Stanislav Hristov
S|.vv S |||v |.. C||.e
Gergana Ilieva
Kolcheva, Smilenov, Koev & Partners
Dimitar Ivanov
Dimitrov Ivanov & Partners
Vladimir Ivanov
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Veselka Petrova
Tsvetkova, Bebov & Partners
Atanas Politov
PILnet
Lachezar Raichev
Penkov, Markov & Partners
Iana Roueva
|e|ev|. |.. C||.e
Elina Plamenova Ruseva
Tsvetkova, Bebov & Partners
Denitsa Sacheva
IHHII
Petko Salchev
National Center of Public Health and Analyses
Christian Schrobsdorff
Laureate Group
Atanas Slavov
S|. L|ve||v
Anonymous Contributors
Burkina Faso
Bobson Coulibaly
Julien Lalogo
Ali Neya
Cabinet dAvocats Ali Neya
Bouba Yaguibou
Yaguibou & Yanogo
Anonymous Contributors
Cambodia
Sopheap Chak
Cambodian Center for Human Rights
Duch Piseth
The Cambodian Center for Human Rights
Run Saray
Legal Aid of Cambodia
Fil B. Tabayoyong
BMAP
Anonymous Contributors
Cameroon
Stanley Abane
The Abeng Law Firm
Roland Abeng
The Abeng Law Firm
Jean Michel Mbock Biumla
M&N Law Firm
Charles-Olivier Boum-Bissai
Boum-Bissai and Partners Law Firm
Laurent Dongmo
Jing & Partners
Nelson Achuachua Enyih
Marie-Jos Essi
Universit de Yaound I
Hyacinthe Fansi
SCP Ngassam Njik & Associs
Tarh Besong Frambo
The Global Citizens Initiative
Nicaise Ibohn
The Abeng Law Firm
Nelly Kahndi
Kahndi and Partners Law Firm
Merlin Arsene Kouogang
Menyeng Manga Patrick
The Abeng Law Firm
Nkongme Dorcas Mirette
John Morfaw
Strategic Development Initiatives
Philip Forsang Ndikum
|J|om |.. C||.e
Samuel Nkoo-Amvene
Centre Hospitalier et Universitaire - Yaound
Ngassam Njik Virgile
SCP Ngassam Njik & Associs
Nana Philip Njotang
Central Hospital Yaounde
Zakariaou Njoumemi
Universit de Yaound I
Claude J. J. Siewe
Siewe & Partners
Innocent Takougang
Foundation for Health Research &Development
Barthlemy Tchepnang
CAJAD
Djokouale Guy Alain Tougoua
Tougoua & Associes
Alain Bruno Woumbou Nzetchie
Cabinet dAvocats Josette Kadji
Anonymous Contributors
Canada
Frdric Bachand
McGill University
John M. Buhlman
WeirFoulds LLP
Daniel M. Campbell
Cox & Palmer
Patrick Essiminy
Strikeman Elliott LLP
Jabeur Fathally
University of Ottawa
Fabien Glinas
McGill University
H. Patrick Glenn
McGill University
William H. Goodridge
Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador
Elise Groulx Diggs
International Criminal Bar
C.G. Harrison
Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP
Jula Hughes
University of New Brunswick
Brian A. Langille
University of Toronto
Glen Luther
University of Saskatchewan
Constance MacIntosh
Dalhousie University
Finn Makela
Universit de Sherbrooke
Connie Reeve
Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP
Gaynor J. Roger
Shibley Righton LLP
Colin L. Soskolne
University of Alberta
Hilary Young
University of New Brunswick
Anonymous Contributors
Chile
Andrea Abascal
Jara del Favero Abogados
Alberto Alcalde
Pugaortiz Abogados
Federico Allendes
Fundacin Pro Acceso
Luis Alberto Aninat Urrejola
Aninat Schwencke & Ca
Martn Besio Hernndez
Rivadeneira Colombara Zegers
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cvio Fon C.
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Gonzalo Cisternas Sobarzo
Espiona & Zepeda Abogados
Gonzalo Cordero Arce
Morales & Besa
Mara Isabel Cornejo Plaza
Universidad de Chile
Hernn Corral
Universidad de los Andes
Juan Pablo Cox Leixelard
Universidad Adolfo Ibez
Michele Daroch Sagredo
Abdala & Cia Abogados
Gabriel Del Ro
Aninat Schwencke & Ca
Gonzalo Eyzaguirre
Eyzaguirre & Cia
Oscar Gajardo Uribe
Eyzaguirre y Cia. Abogados
Sergio Gamonal C.
Universidad Adolfo Ibez
Luis Eugenio Garca-Huidobro Herrera
Philippi, Yrarrzaval, Pulido &Brnner
Davor Harasic Yaksic
Universidad de Chile
Luis Felipe Hubner
UH&C Abogados
nJe imene. Pnnno:n
Jara del Favero Abogados
Jos Luis Lara A.
Philippi, Yrarrzaval, Pulido & Brnner
Fernando Lolas Stepke
Universidad de Chile
Carlos Maturana Toledo
Universidad de Concepcin
Omar Morales
Montt y Ca. Abogados
Mara Norma Oliva Lagos
C|.|. Je |e|e. |.r.|
Carlos Ossandon Salas
Eluchans y Compaia
Germn Ovalle M.
Universidad de Chile
Orlando Palominos
Morales & Besa
Luis Parada
Bahamondez, Alvarez & Zegers
Carmen Maria Poblete
Jorge Sandrock
Universidad Adolfo Ibez
Marcelo Sanfeli Gerstner
Carey y Cia
Marcelo Soto Ulloa
Socio UH&C Ltda. Abogados
Juan Enrique Vargas
Universidad Diego Portales
Jorge Wahl
Larran y Asociados
Anonymous Contributors
China
Joanna Chen
Hewlett-Packard
Wei Gao
Little Bird Hotline for Migrant Workers
Matthew Murphy
MMLC Group
Jia Ping
Health Governance Initiative
Wei Wei
Little Bird Hotline for Migrant Workers
Liu Xin
China University of Political Science and Law
Anonymous Contributors
Colombia
Enrique Alvarez
Lloreda Camacho Co
Felipe Aristizabal
Nieto & Chalela Abogados
GuillermoHernandoBayonaCombariza
Joe Bonilla Glvez
Muoz Tamayo & Asociados
Eduardo Cardenas
Marcela Castro-Ruiz
Universidad de los Andes
Jorge Diaz Cardenas
Diaz Cardenas Avogados
Lucas Fajardo Gutirrez
Brigard & Urrutia Abogados
Laura Garca
Universidad del Rosario
Juan Fernando Gaviria
Prietocarrizosa
Jorge Lara Urbaneja
Arciniegas, Lara, Briceo & Plana
Santiago Martnez Mndez
Godoy Crdoba Abogados
Manuel Mejia Florez
Hewlett-Packard
Juan Mendoza
Prietocarrizosa
Alvaro Mendoza Ramrez
Universidad de la Sabana
Carlos Mario Molina Arrubla
Molina Diaz & Cia
Ana Mara Muoz Segura
Universidad de los Andes
Maria Fernanda Navas Herrera
||||.|. L|ve|J.J 1.ve|..
Jorge Julin Osorio Gmez
Medicina CES
Fernando Pabn Santander
Pabn Abogados
Martha Peuela
Universidad del Norte
Carolina Posada Isaacs
Posse Herrera Ruiz
Ricardo Posada Maya
Universidad de los Andes
Luis Fernando Ramrez Contreras
Rama Judicial
Juan David Riveros Barragn
Sampedro & Riveros Consultores
Angela Maria Ruiz Sternberg
Universidad del Rosario
Juan Oberto Sotomayor Acosta
Universidad EAFIT
Carlos Arturo Toro Lopez
Francisco Urrutia
Posse Herrera Ruiz
Diego Felipe Valdivieso Rueda
VS & M Abogados
Anonymous Contributors
Cote dIvoire
Raphael Abauleth
Service de Gyncologie Obsttrique CHU
Alexandre Bairo
KSK Socit dAvocats
Vanie Bi Ta
Cabinet dAvocats Le Belier
Aresne Dable
SCPA Dogu-Abb Yao & Associs
Lynda Dadi-Sangaret
Dadie Sangaret et Associs
Me. Guiro
Dogbemin G. Kone
SCPA Nambeya-Dogbemin & Associs
Angaman Georges Kouadio
KSK Socit dAvocats
Silue Nanga
Adama Yeo
ONG PDHRE-CI
Seydou Zerbo
SCPA Dogu-Abb Yao & Associs
Anonymous Contributors
Croatia
Fmi: Fni:evic
DTB
Marko Borsky
Divjak, Topic & Bahtijarevic Law Firm
Alan Bosnar
Vinja Drenki Lasan
Law Firm Drenki Lasan
Fo.iJ: FeJmn
Odvjetnicko Drutvo Matic & Feldman
Ivo Grga
Croatian Bar Association
L:|o J:iic
ee.| .J Co|v |||.| |. 1. fe.ev|.
Ivan Kos
|e|ev|. |.. C||.e
Luka Kovacic
University of Zagreb
Boris Kozjak
|.. C||.e \|v|||... C.||.
Anita Krizmanic
|.. C||.e |..e|. S |.|e
Marina Kuzman
Institute of Public Health Dr. Andrija Stampar
Zvonimir Lauc
Faculty of Law Osijek
:|o ov:ic
Natasa Novakovic
Croatian Employers Association
Petar Novoselec
Faculte de Droit Zagreb
Boris Savoric
Savoric & Partners
Duro Sessa
Supreme Court of Republic of Croatia
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/||ev S|. S mev|. |oJ.
Ana Stavljenic-Rukavina
DIU LIBERTAS International University
Milan Vonina
|.. ||.e \|. S or||. S |v|. S |.||.
Zoran Vujasin
Vujasin & Partners
Jelena Zjacic
|..e|. S |.|e |.. C||.e
Anonymous Contributors
Czech Republic
Marek Antos
Charles University
Denisa Bellinger
Hewlett-Packard
Ondej Chlada
Randl Partners
Tomas Cihula
Kinstellar
Hana Gawlasov
Kinstellar
Pavel Holec
Holec, Zuska & Partners
tpn Holub
Holubov Advokti S.R.O.
Jan Hurdk Jr.
District Court Teb
Jan Hurdk Sr.
Masaryk University
Marie Janov
Glatzova & Co.
Radek Matous
Balcar Polansky Eversheds
Robert Neruda
Havel, Holasek & Partners
Lukas Prudil
Matej Smolar
Felix a Spol Attorneys at Law
Martin Strnad
Havel, Holasek & Partners
Pavel Urban
National Institute of Public Health
Anonymous Contributors
Denmark
Per Andersen
University of Aarhus
205 Contributing Experts |
Morten Broberg
University of Copenhagen
Hans Henrik Edlund
Aarhus University
Jesper Grarup
Copenhagen HIV Programme, Rigshospitalet
Poul Hvilsted
Horten Law Firm
Jakob S. Johnsen
HjulmandKaptain
Thomas Neumann
Aarhus University
Jesper Noergaard
|.| |..|m Ce.e
Lars Lindencrone Petersen
Bech-Bruun Law Firm
Morten Hulvej Rod
University of Southern Denmark
Jens Rye-Andersen
/Jv.||m.e| ve/Jee
Anette Storgaard
University of Aarhus
Chalida Svastisalee
Metropolitan University College
Kim Trenskow
|m. eome| |..|m
Jrn Vestergaard
University of Copenhagen
Anonymous Contributors
Dominican Republic
Laura Bobea
Medina & Rizek Abogados
Esperanza Cabral
OMG
Dalia Castillo Sanchez
Universidad Autnoma de Santo Domingo
Ismael Comprs
Ortiz & Comprs
Jos Cruz Campillo
Jimnez Cruz Pea
Arlina Espaillat M.
Espaillat Matos
Mary Fernndez Rodrguez
Headrick Rizik Alvarez & Fernndez
Edwin Grandel Capelln
Instituto Dominicano de Aviacin Civil
Mara Elena Gratereaux
Gratereaux Delva & Asoc.
Carmen Luisa Martnez Coss
EMC Abogados
Fabiola Medina
Medina & Rizek Abogados
Virgilio A. Mndez Amaro
Mndez & Asociados, Abogados y Consultores
Enmanuel Monts
MS Consultores
Jose Manuel Paez Gomez
Bufete de Abogados, Paez-Mueses-Castillo
Gina Pichardo Rodrguez
Cabral & Daz, Asesores Legales
Arturo J. Ramirez
Aaron, Suero & Pedersini
Olivo Rodrguez Huertas
ADDA
Fernando Roedn Hernndez
Ortiz & Hernndez Abogados Asociados
Georges Santoni Recio
Russin & Vecchi LLP
Pedro Troncoso
Troncoso y Cceres
Anonymous Contributors
Ecuador
Vanesa Aguirre Guzmn
Universidad Andina Simn Bolvar Ecuador
Lenin T. Arroyo Baltn
Universidead Laica Eloy Alfaro de Manab
Andrea Izquierdo T.
Semprtegui Ontaneda Abogados Law Firm
Ximena Moreno Echeverra
Solines & Asociados
Santiago Solines
Solines & Asociados
Carlos Solines Coronel
Claudia Storini
Universidad Andina Simn Bolivar
Anonymous Contributors
Egypt
Mohamed Abdelaal
Alexandria University
Omar Ahmed Abdel Raheem
Egyptian Womens Union
Rania Alaa Eldin ElSebaie
Cairo University
Hamid Eltgani Ali
American University in Cairo
Haytham Ali
Hafez
Mohamed Dawaba
Mansoura Urology Center
Khaled El Shalakany
S.|..v |.. C||.e
Habiba Hassan-Wassef
National Research Center
Somaya Hosny
Suez Canal University
Ibrahim Kharboush
Alexandria University
Nagwa Sadek El Mahdy
Administrative Prosecution Authority
onmeJ nn mnoJJ
Egyptian Ministry of Justice
Soheir Mansy
Theodor Bilharz Research Institute
Sharif Shihata
S.|..v |.. C||.e
Bassem S. Wadie
Urology & Nephrology Center
Anonymous Contributors
El Salvador
Eduardo ngel
Arias & Muoz
Rebeca Atanacio de Basagoitia
Escalon & Atanacio
David Claros
Garca & Bodn
Po:n:io Li. FJene
DLM Abogados, Notarios, Consultores
Lourdes Dueas
Hospital Nacional de Nios Benjamin Bloom
Ana Yesenia Granillo de Tobar
Escuela Superior de Economa y Negocios
Yudy A. Jimenez Rivera
Gold Service S.A. de C.V.
Diego Martn Menjvar
Consortium Centro Amrica Abogados
Dlmer Edmundo Rodrguez Cruz
Escuela Superior de Economa y Negocios
Juan Jos Rodrguez Flores
Universidad Catlica de El Salvador
Rommell Sandoval
SBA Legal Firm & Consulting
Eduardo Surez
Universidad de El Salvador
Benjamin Valdez Iraheta
Benjamin Valdez & Asociados
Jos Freddy Zometa Segovia
Romero Pineda & Asociados
Anonymous Contributors
Estonia
Maksim Greinoman
Advokaadibroo Greinoman & Co
Pirkko-Liis Harkmaa
LAWIN Attorneys At Law
Triinu Hiob
LAWIN Attorneys at Law
Kari Ksper
Estonian Human Rights Centre
Tanel Kerikme
Tallinn University of Technology
Merle Muda
University of Tartu
Priit Pahapill
Attorneys at Law Borenius
Senny Pello
Advokaadibroo Concordia
Anneli Soo
University of Tartu
Gaabriel Tavits
University of Tartu
Andres Vutt
University of Tartu
Margit Vutt
Supreme Court of the Republic of Estonia
Anonymous Contributors
Ethiopia
Rahel Alemayehu
Tamrat Assefa
.m.| /e|. ||r. |.. C||.e
Abebe Assefa Terefe
Bahir Dar University
Addisu Dubale
Allied Law Firm
Endalkachew Geremew
University of Gondar
Afework Kassu
University of Gondar
Aberra Degefa Nagawo
Addis Ababa University
Mehari Redae
Addis Ababa University
Guadie Sharew
Bahir Dar University
Mahelet Shewangzaw
Wondwossen Wakene
University of Gondar
Belaynew Wasie
Bahir Dar University
Tesfay k.Woldu
University of Gondar
Tameru Wondm Agegnehu
.meo \Jm /eeo |.. C||.e
Hiruy Wubie
University of Gondar
Wondimu S. Yirga
Haramaya University
Abrham Yohannes Hailu
/r.m |.. C||.e
Anonymous Contributors
Finland
Mika Gissler
Nordic School of Public Health
Mika Launiala
University of Eastern Finland
Mika J. Lehtimaki
Attorneys-at-Law TRUST
Sanna Leisti
Rule of Law Finland
Patrick Lindgren
Advocare
Ari Miettinen
Fimlab Laboratories Ltd.
Jukka Peltonen
Peltonen LMR Attorneys Ltd
Iikka Sainio
Attorneys-at-Law Juridia Btzow Ltd
Kristiina Santanen
Hewlett-Packard
Jussi Tapani
University of Turku
Matti Tolvanen
University of Eastern Finland
Marja Vaarama
National Institute for Health and Welfare
Pekka Viljanen
University of Turku
Anonymous Contributors
France
Alvarez-de Selding Yanick
Thomas Ber
Hewlett-Packard
Olivier de Boutiny
BBG Associs
Mr. Cantier
SCP Cantier
Catherine Cathiard
Jeantet et Associs
Gauthier Chassang
INSERM
Vronique Chauveau
CBBC Avocats
Marie-Christine Cimadevilla
Cimadevilla Avocats
Professeur Delga
ESSEC
Philippe Derouin
Skadden
Sbastien Ducamp
Winston & Strawn
Nataline Fleury
Ashurst
Elisabeth Grabli
Cabinet dAvocats Elisabeth Grabli
Virginie Halley des Fontaines
Universit Pierre et Marie Curie
M. Vuillemin
Universit de Lorraine
Anonymous Contributors
Georgia
David Atabegashvili
Basisbank
Revaz Beridze
Eristavi Law Group
Ketevan Chkhatarashvili
Curatio International Foundation
Giorgi Chkheideze
East-West Management Institute, JILEP
Vera Doborjginidze
Lexpert Group, LLC
Imeda Dvalidze
Zurab Garuchava
Eristavi Law Group
Lasha Gogiberidze
BGI Legal
Grigol GagniDze
Barristers & Lawyers Intl Observatory
Ted Jonas
DLA Piper
Amiran Kapanadze
Economic Policy Experts Center
Nata Kazakhashvili
Iv.Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University
Ketevan Krialashvili
Economic Policy Experts Center
Zurab Mukhuradze
Legal and Business Consulting
Eliso Rukhadze
Georgian Bar Association
Akaki Zoidze
Consulting Group Curatio
Anonymous Contributors
Germany
Cornelius Antor
BridgehouseLaw
Alexander Baron von Engelhardt
Legal Guide to Germany
Susanne Besendahl
Lise-Meitner
Oliver Bolthausen
BridgehouseLaw
Thomas Feltes
Ruhr University
Ingo Friedrich
Friedrich & Partner
Wolfgang Grttner
Wolfgang Hau
University of Passau
Thomas Heimbrger
HWPG Heimbrger & Partner
Volker Henckel
Rainer M. Hofmann
Kanzlei im Hofhaus
Jessica Jacobi
Kliemt & Vollstdt
Thomas Jrgens
Jrgens Rechtsanwlte
Birte Kannegiesser
|| S ||oe
Burkhard Klver
Ahlers & Vogel Rechtsanwlte
Kathrein Knetsch
Advovox Rechtsanwalts GmbH
Torsten Koller
Hewlett-Packard
Anna Lindenberg
Gunther Marko
Andreas M. Michaeli
Rechtsanwaltssoziett Born
Carsten Momsen
University of Hannover
Axel Nagler
Rechtsanwlte Nagler und Partner
Solveigh Nivard
NIVARD Rechtsanwaltskanzlei
Alexander Putz
Putz und Partner Steuerberater &Rechtsanwlte
Werner Rausch
R,B&M
Henning Rosenau
University of Augsburg
Stefan Sasse
GHMANN Rechtsanwlte
Martin Straesser
S|.ee em f.|e|J
Oliver Thamerus
Othmar K. Traber
Ahlers & Vogel Rechtsanwlte
Ingo Klaus Wamser
Rechtsanwalt Wamser
Gernot A. Warmuth
Scheiber & Partner
Michael Zoebisch
Anonymous Contributors
Ghana
Augustine Adomah-Afari
University of Ghana
/.nne on /|in,n
A & A Law Consult
B.E.Appiah-Kumi
Tesano Chambers
Celia Asaana
|.. C||.e | /v|eSFe|||
Dinah Baah-Odoom
Ghana Health Service
P. E. Bondzi-Simpson
University of Cape Coast
Franklin Cudjoe
IMANI Center for Policy & Education
Reuben K. Esena
University of Ghana
Nii Hanson-Nortey
Ghana Health Service
Robert K. Poku Kyei
Olusola Ogundimu
Integrated Legal Consultants
Sam Poku
The Business Council of Africa
Araba Sefa-Dedeh
UGMS, Korle Bu
Anonymous Contributors
Greece
Alex Afouxenidis
National Centre for Social Research
Ada Alamanou
Klimaka NGO
Konstantinos Apostolopoulos
Apostolopoulos Patras Law Firm
Ioanna Chryssiis Argyraki
I.K.Rokas & Partners Law Firm
George A. Ballas
Ballas, Pelecanos & Associates L.P.C.
Nigel Bowen-Morris
Stephenson Harwood LLP
Panagiotis Gioulakos
Konstantinos Kanellakis
|. |.e||.| |.. C||.e
Ioannis Karkalis
Hellenic Supreme Court
Grace Ch. Katsoulis
Ballas, Pelecanos & Associates L.P.C.
Nikolaos Kondylis
|Jv|| S |.|e |.. C||.e
Anthony G. Mavrides
Ballas, Pelecanos & Associates
Kostoula Mazaraki
Nomos Law Firm
Christina Papadopoulou
IRCT
Fotini N. Skopouli
Harokopio University
Virgina Theodoropoulou
Panteion University
Anastasia Tsakatoura
| |e.| |.. C||.e
Fnmi TniJoJ
F||m|. ..||Jo S |.|e |.. C
Stefanos Tsimikalis
Tsimikalis Kalonarou Law Firm
George Vaos
Democtitus University of Thrace
Anonymous Contributors
Guatemala
Alexander Aizenstatd
Universidad Rafael Landivar
Mario Augusto Alcntara Velsquez
Carrillo y Asociados
Mario Ren Archila Cruz
Rodrguez, Archila, Castellanos, Solares &Aguilar
Elas Arriaza
Consortium- RACSA
Emanuel Callejas A.
206 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Alfonso Carrillo
Carrillo y Asociados
Alvaro Castellanos Howell
Consortium Centro Amrica Abogados
David Ernesto Chacn Estrada
Vilma Chavez de Pop
IBFAN Guatemala
Luis Pablo Cobar Benard
Integrum
Alvaro R. Cordn
Cordn, Ovalle y Asociados
Carlos Roberto Cordn Krumme
Cordn, Ovalle y Asociados
Jesse Omar Garca Muoz
Grupo Interamericana, S.A.
Liz Gordillo Anleu
Arias & Muoz
Mario Roberto Guadrn Rouanet
Palomo & Porras
Andres Hernandez L.
Carrillo y Asociados
Edson Lopez
Integrum
Gabriel Muadi
Mudi, Murga y Jimenez, Abogados y Notarios
Marcos Palma
Integrum
Juan Jos Porras Castillo
Palomo & Porras
Jose E. Quiones
QIL Abogados
Evelyn Rebuli
Quiones, Ibarguen, Lujan y Mata
Juan Sebastin Soto
A.D. Sosa & Soto
Fernando Zelada
F A Arias & Muoz Guatemala
Anonymous Contributors
Lorena Barrios Pinzn
Bonilla, Montano, Toriello & Barrios
Hong Kong SAR, China
Ruy Barretto
Danny Chan
Century Chambers
Anne SY Cheung
University of Hong Kong
Rick Glofcheski
University of Hong Kong
Lok Sang Ho
Lingnan University
Chris Hooley
Oldham, Li & Nie
A. K. C. Koo
University of Hong Kong
Yun Zhao
University of Hong Kong
Farzana Ann Aslam
University of Hong Kong
Ching Chua
Hewlett-Packard
Anthony Chung
Liza Jane Cruden
Des Voeux Chambers
Surya Deva
City University of Hong Kong
David C. Donald
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Charles C. L. Kwong
Open University of Hong Kong
Avnita Lakhani
City University of Hong Kong
Raymond Leung
Hong Kong Bar Association
James A. Rice
Lingnan University
James L.W. Wong
Century Chambers
Anonymous Contributors
Hungary
Gbor Baruch
f.o. |.. C||.e
Pl Jalsovszky
Jalsovszky Law Firm
Akos Sule
Sule Law Firm
Andrs Szecskay
Szecskay Attorneys at Law
Zsolt Zengdi
Zengdi Law Firm
Anonymous Contributors
India
Satish Aggarwala
Government of India
Bontha V. Babu
Indian Council of Medical Research
Lalit Bhasin
Bhasin & Company
Subhash Chandra Bhatnagar
Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad
Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti
KIIT University
Jhelum Chowdhury
Crystal Global Holdings Ltd.
E.N. Thambi Durai
Durai Group Cos.
I.C. Dwivedi
State Election Watch
Yashomati Ghosh
National Law School of India University
Sachidananda Kannarnuji
|e||.|e.v
Rajas Kasbekar
Little & Co., Advocates and Solicitors
Vipender Mann
||| S |.|e. |.. C||.e
Puneet Misra
AIIMS
Saurabh Misra
Saurabh Misra & Associates
Subhrarag Mukherjee
Hewlett-Packard
J. L. N. Murthy
Jonnalagadda LLP
Satish Murti
Murti and Murti International Law Practice
A. Nagarathna
National Law School of India University
Anil Kumar Paleri
Institute of Palliative Medicine, Kozhikode
Priyesh Poovanna
Hewlett-Packard
Nitin Potdar
J.SagarAssociates
Ashok Ramgir
Harsh Impex
Jegan Rupa Subramanian
Research Pharmaceutical Service inc.
Sankaran Ramakrishnan
Abhimanyu Shandilya
Hewlett-Packard
Ruchi Sinha
Tata Institute Of Social Sciences
S.R. Subramanian
RGSOIPL
Jayant Kumar Thakur
Hewlett-Packard
Y. S. Kusuma
All India Institute of Medical Sciences
Anonymous Contributors
Indonesia
Lia Alizia
Makarim & Taira S.
Hamud M. Balfas
Ali Budiardjo Nugroho Reksodiputro
Erline Herrmann
Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP
Immanuel A. Indrawan
Indrawan & Santoso
Alamo D. Laiman
Legisperitus Lawyers
Mahesa Rumondor
Adnan Kelana Haryanto & Hermanto
Mr. Sartono
|..|. |...S |.|e
Anonymous Contributors
Iran
Kamiar Alaei
Global Institute for Health and Human Rights
Rana Amini
Ardeshir Atai
Atai & Associates Law Firm
Parviz Azadfallah
Tarbiat Modares University
Ahmad Daryani
Mazandaran University of Medical Sciences
Dr. Hamedia
Mashhad University of Medical Science
Arash Izadi
Izadi Law Firm
Mohammad Hossein Nayyeri
Iran Human Rights Documentation Center
Anonymous Contributors
Italy
Antonella Antonucci
Universit di Bari
Francesco Maria Avato
University of Ferrara
Gianantonio Barelli
S|oJ| |e.|e C.|| |..e||| e /.|.||
Roberto Bin
University of Ferrara
Roberto Caranta
Univerity of Turin
Carlo Casonato
University of Trento
Mariano Cingolani
University of Macerata
Fulvio Cortese
University of Trento
Emanuele Cortesi
C.|| |..e||| S /.|.||
Astolfo Di Amato
Astolfo Di Amato e Associati
Alberto Fantini
Tonucci & Partners
Serena Forlati
University of Ferrara
Mitja Gialuz
University of Trieste
Francesco Gongolo
Direzione Centrale Salute
Alberto Lama
Ancarani Law Firm
Pierpaolo Martucci
Universit degli Studi di Trieste
Luigi Mori
BLR&M Studio Legale Associato
:co :onno
University of Milan
Fulvio Maria Palombino
University of Naples Federico II
Giovanni Pasqua
ISISC
Giuseppe Lorenzo Rosa
Giuseppe Lorenzo Rosa & Associated Counsels
Mario Rusciano
University of Naples Federico II
Emanuele Scafato
Anna Simonati
University of Trento
Francesca Valent
Direzione Centrale Salute
Anonymous Contributors
Jamaica
Althea Bailey
University of the West Indies
Orville W. Beckford
University of the West Indies
Audrey Brown
Anthony Clayton
University of the West Indies
Noel M. Cowell
University of the West Indies
Pauline E. Dawkins
University of the West Indies
Terrence Forrester
Solutions for Developing Countries
Marie Freckleton
University of the West Indies
Sonia D. Gatchair
University of the West Indies
Christopher P. Malcolm
University of the West Indies
Sylvia Mitchell
University of the West Indies
Sharon Neil Smith
Patterson Mair Hamilton
Lester O. Shields
Jamaica Psychology Society
Allan S. Wood
Ronald E. Young
University of the West Indies
Anonymous Contributors
Japan
Yasuhiro Fujii
Baker & McKenzie
Toshiaki Higashi
UOEH
Shigetoshi Hirano
Oh-Ebashi LPC & Partners
Osamu Inoue
Hewlett-Packard
Japan Federation of Bar Associations
Nobuo Koinuma
Tohoku Pharmaceutical University
Mark Nakamura
International Education, Information Center
Hiroshi Nishihara
Waseda University
Masanori Tanabe
S..| |.. C||.e
Anonymous Contributors
Jordan
Hazar S. Al Khasawneh
LEAD Advisory Group
Mohammed Adli AlNasser
Judiial Council
Mohammad Mamoun Khasawneh
Osamah Al Naimat
Philadelphia University
George H. Hazboun
American University of Madaba
Raad Kilani
LEAD Advisory Group
Rasha Laswi
Zalloum and Laswi Law Firm
Nisreen Mahasneh
ABA Jordan
Mahmoud A. N. Quteishat
Quteishat law Firm
Hayel Saad Srour
Zubi Law Firm
Azzam Zalloum
Zalloum and Laswi Law Firm
Anonymous Contributors
Kazakhstan
Michael Wilson & Partners, Ltd.
Madina Lavrenova
SIGNUM Law Firm
Roman Nurpeissov
Dechert LLP
Yerjanov Timur
Kazakh State University
Sergei Vataev
Dechert LLP
Arlan Yerzhanov
Grata Law Firm
Anonymous Contributors
Kenya
Peter Gachuhi
Kaplan and Stratton Advocates
Diana Nyakairu Gichengo
Kenya Human Rights Commission
Kamau Karori
Iseme Kamau & Maema Advocates
Nancy Kidula
James Mangerere
J. Mangerere & Co
Salima Mohammed
Kenya Red Cross Society
Laibuta Mugambi
ES-EA
Dennis Mungata
Gichimu Mungata & Company
Noelle Mutheu
NJM Mwangombe
University of Nairobi
Thomas Nyakambi Maosa
Maosa & Company Advocates
Angela Achieng Ochumba
New York University
John M.Vulule
KEMRI
Anonymous Contributors
Kyrgyzstan
Aizhan Albanova
Nurlan Alymbaev
Law Firm Alymbaev LLC
Aiaz Baetov
American University of Central Asia
Sardarbek Bagishbekov
Public Foundation Voice of Freedom
Gulnaz Baiturova
Valentin Chernyshev
Aikanysh Jeenbaeva
Bishkek Feminist Collective SQ
Gulnara Kalikova
Kalikova & Associates
Azamat Kerimbaev
ABA Rule of Law Initiative
Saltanat Moldoisaeva
For Rational and Safety Use of Medicines
Kanat Seidaliev
Grata Law Firm
Jyldyz Tagaeva
Kalikova & Associates
Aleksei Vandaev
Kalikova & Associates
Anonymous Contributors
Lebanon
Sara Ammar
Hewlett-Packard
Khatoun Haidar
Synergy-Takamol
Jihad Irani
University of Balamand
Houssam Itani
Hewlett-Packard
Joelle Khater
Badri and Salim El Meouchi Law Firm
Maryline Kalaydjian
Badri and Salim El Meouchi Law Firm
Samir Touma
Badri and Salim El Meouchi Law Firm
Ghada Khoury
Lebanese American University
Riad Madani
AL-Manar University of Tripoli
Elias Mattar
Abou Jaoude & Associates
Salah Mattar
Mattar Law Firm
Paul Otayek
Otayek Law
Rany Sader
SADER & Associates
Ramy Torbey
Aziz Torbey Law Firm
Tony G. Zreik
Anonymous Contributors
Liberia
Luke L. Bawo
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
F. Augustus Caesar
Caesar Architects Inc.
J. Sayma Syrenius Cephus
Innocence Project Africa
Abla Gadegbeku Williams
The Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia
Roosevelt L. Gould, II
Catholic Justice & Peace Commission
Alfred Hill
The Carter Center
David A. B. Jallah
The David A. B. Jallah Law Firm
Mohamedu F. Jones
Malcolm W.Joseph
Center for Media Studies and Peacebuilding
Lury T. Nkouessom
The Carter Center
T. Debey Sayndee
University of Liberia
James Nyepan Verdier, Jr
United Nations Development Programme
Peter Hne Wilson
United States African Development Foundation
Finlay C. Young
Anonymous Contributors
207 Contributing Experts |
Macedonia, FYR
Fe /:in
South East European University
Marija Blazevska
Pepeljugoski Law Firm
Dejvi Davidovski
Trpenoski Law Firm
Jadranka Denkova
Univerzity Goce Delcev Stip
Sinisha Dimitrovski
THEMIS SB Law Firm
Doncho Donev
Ss Cyril and Methodius University
Aleksandar Godjo
Godzo, Kiceec & Novakovski
Marija Gulija
Dr. Panovski AD
Aleksandar Ickovski
Maja Jakimovska
Cakmakova Advocates
Deljo Kadiev
Dori Kimova
||mv. |.. C||.e
Sami Mehmeti
South East European University
Neda Milevska Kostova
CRPRC Studiorum
Svetlana Neceva
|.. C||.e |ee|,o| S,e
Ilija Nedelkoski
Cakmakova Advocates
Goran Nikolovski
|||v| |.. C||.e
Ljupcho Nikolovski
Ljupka Noveska
Karanovic & Nikolic
Aleksandar T. Pulejkov
Maja Risteska
A.D. Insurance Policy
Ana Stojkovic Dimitrovska
THEMIS SB Law Firm
Leonid Trpenoski
Trpenoski Law Firm
Pamela Veljanoska
Pepeljugoski Law Firm
Svetlana Veljanovska
UKLO Bitola
Anonymous Contributors
Madagascar
Andrianjaka Adriamanalina
C||.e ||.|.| Je .m.|.ve
Rachel Favero
Jhpiego Corporation
e|nJ:in Rnoon
WYLD
Olivia Alberte Rajerison
Cabinet dAvocat Rajerison
Rija Rakotomalala
Cabinet dAvocats Rakotomalala
Jean Pierre Rakotovao
Faculte de Medecine Antananarivo
Rija Grard Ramarijaona
PRIMELEX
Jules Randrianomenjanahary
Yves Ratrimoarivony
Barreau de Madagascar
Mahery Ratsimandresy
Cabinet PRIME LEX
Bakoly Razaiarisolo Rakiotomalala
Anonymous Contributors
Malawi
Gracian Zibelu Banda
Banda, Banda & Company
Jacques Carstens
The Democratic Governance Programme
Dick Chagwamnjira
Chagwamnjira & Company
Justin G.K Dzonzi
Kainja & Dzonzi Attorneys
Tinyade Kachika
LawPlus
Patrick Dzilimbire Kalanda
Hannaford & Associates
Gabriel Kambale
GK Associates, Law Consultants
Dr. Kamoto
Ministry of Health
Martha Etta Kaukonde
Allan Hans Muhome
Malawi Law Society
Likhwa R. Mussa
KD Freeman and Associates
Adamson S. Muula
University of Malawi
James A.P. Mwaisemba
Sanctuary Dental Clinic
Mwiza Jo Nkhata
University of Malawi
Jack Nriva
Malawi Judiciary
Chizaso Eric Nyirongo
Malawi Law Commission
Anonymous Contributors
Malaysia
RooshidaMericanAbdul RahimMerican
Universiti Kebangsaan Mlaysia
Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed
International Islamic University Malaysia
S. B. Cheah
S.B. Cheah & Associates
Chew Phye Keat
Raja, Darryl & Loh
Sharon Jeyaraman
Hewlett-Packard
Sonia Ong
Hewlett-Packard
Rizal Rahman
The National University of Malaysia
Anonymous Contributors
Mexico
L. Alberto Balderas F.
Jaregui y Del Valle, S.C.
Jos Alberto Campos Vargas
Snchez DeVanny Eseverri, S.C.
Eugenio J. Crdenas
Stanford Law School
Teresa Carmona Arcos
Consultores Jurdicos
Daniel Carranca de la Mora
Instituto Mexicano para la Justicia
Omar Cullar Gamboa
Barrera, Siqueiros y Torres Landa, S.C.
Carlos de Buen Unna
Bufete de Buen
Marco Antonio Gonzlez Reynoso
Corredura 80 del Distrito Federal
Alonso Gonzlez-Villalobos
Julio Hernndez Barros
Bufete Hernndez Pliego, Abogados
Julio Hernndez Pliego
Bufete Hernndez Pliego, Abogados
Hugo Hernndez-Ojeda Alvrez
Barrera, Siqueiros y Torres Landa, S.C.
Elias Huerta Psihas
Asociacion Nacional de Doctores en Derecho
Juan Manuel Juarez Meza
NGA Abogados
Alfredo Kupfer-Domnguez
Snchez DeVanny Eseverri, S.C.
Sergio Lpez Moreno
UAM Xochimilco
Oliva Lpez Arellano
Universidad Autnoma Metropolitana
Esteban Maqueo Barnetche
Maqueo Abogados, S.C.
Luciano Mendoza Cruz
UNAM
Rodrigo Moreno
Moreno Rodrguez y Asoc., S.C.
Alejandra Moreno Altamirano
Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Mxico
Guillermo Piecarchic
PMC & Asociados
Jose Piecarchic Cohen
PMC & Asociados
Esteban Puentes-Rosas
Secretara de Salud
Carlos Riquelme
Carranc, Araujo, Acosta y Riquelme
Mario Alberto Rocha Garca
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Arturo Rocha Garca
FIMPE
Lorenzo Roel
Roel Asociados
Jos A. Sadurn
Instituto Tecnolgico Autnomo de Mxico
Jorge Luis Silva Mendez
Banco Mundial
Pietro Straulino R.
Snchez DeVanny Eseverri, S.C.
Juan Carlos Tornel
Hewlett-Packard
Juan Francisco Torres Landa R.
Barrera, Siqueiros y Torres Landa, S.C.
Anonymous Contributors
Moldova
Naatalia Bayram
La Strada
Adrian Belii
State Medical and Pharmaceutical University
Andrei Borsevski
Institute for Democracy
Tatiana Chirilenco
East Europe Foundation Moldova
Alexei Croitor
|.. C||.e | /|ee| C||
Alexandru Cuznetov
Marica Dumitrasco
Academy of Sciences of Moldova
Victor Durlesteanu
Durlesteanu & Partners
Ana Galus
Turcan Cazac Law Firm
Nadine Gogu
Independent Journalism Center
Eugeniu Graur
Certitudine
Iulia Furtuna
Turcan Cazac Law Firm
Oleg Postovanu
Independent Journalism Center
Alexandru Savva
Turcan Cazac Law Firm
Anonymous Contributors
Mongolia
David Buxbaum
Anderson & Anderson LLP
Bayar Budragchaa
ELC LLC
Byambaa Ganbat
City Health Service Unit
Erdenebalsuren Damdin
Supreme Court of Mongolia
Gankhuyag D.
GN & Co., Ltd.
Zoljargal Dashnyam
GTs Advocates LLP
Oyunchimeg Dovdoi
|or||. |.||.|.|||So|.|.r|e |eve|me|
Tsolmonchimeg Enkhbat
GTs Advocates LLP
B. Enkhbat
|.|e |.|e |.. |m
Darin A. Hoffman
MahoneyLiotta LLC
Indermohan S. Narula
The Global Fund
Baasanjav Navagchamba
Baasanjav Consulting LLC
Unentugs Shagdar
JP Law Group
Anastasia Zherbakhanova
Anderson & Anderson LLP
Anonymous Contributors
Morocco
Mohamed Akinou
Abdellah Bakkali
Mohamed Baske Manar
Universit Mohamed V Souissi Rabat
Abdelfattah Bennaouar
Abdelkader Boukasri
Mustapha Said Briou
Cabinet dAvocats Brioulaw
Richard D. Cantin
Juristructures LLP
Mimoun Charqi
Charqi Lex Consulting
Moulay El Amine El Hammoumi Idrissi
Hajji & Associs
Said Elbikri
Court of Cassation
Amin Hajji
Hajji & Associs
Zineb Idrissia Hamzi
Hamzi Law Firm
Azzedine Kettani
Kettani Law Firm
Mehdi Kettani
Kettani Law Firm
Ali Lachgar Essahili
Anis Mahfoud
Abouakil, Benjelloun & Mahfoud
/ni oJn|
|o.| |.. F|m
Saad Moummi
Kamal Nasrollah
Baker & McKenzie
Ilham Nassri
Institut National DHygiene
Nesrine Roudane
NERO Boutique Law Firm
Houcine Sefrioui
UINL
Anonymous Contributors
Myanmar
Nang Htawn Hla
Myanmar Nurse and Midwife Association
Joseph M. Lovell
BNG Legal Myanmar
Robert C. Millman
The Foundation, Terre des Hommes
Nwe Oo
Thu Ya Zaw
Yoma Bank Ltd.
Anonymous Contributors
Nepal
Sangha Ratna Bajracharya
NCHPE
Sudeep Gautam
CeLRRd
Shirshak Ghimire
Pradhan & Associates
Budhi Karki
Gourish K. Kharel
Kto Inc.
Bishnu Luitel
Rita Mainaly
Bijaya Prasad Mishra
Supreme Court Bar Association of Nepal
Rudra Prasad Pokhrel
R. P. Pokhrel & Associates
Shiva Rijal
Pioneer Law Associates
Yubaraj Sangroula
Kathmandu School of Law
Rup Narayan Shrestha
Avenue Law Firm
Suman Bahadur Singh
B.P.K.I.H.S
R.C. Subedi
Apex Law Chamber
Rabin Subedi
PILAL
Raj Kumar Thapa
Pokhara University
Sajjan Bar Singh Thapa
Dhruba Bar Singh Thapa & Associates
Nil Mani Upadhyay
Nepal Medical Council
Bimala Yadav
International Legal Foundation
Anonymous Contributors
Netherlands
Jeroen Bijnen
Hewlett-Packard
C.C. de Boer
Vakcentrale MHP
C.C.J. Muller
Vakcentrale MHP
Marjolein de Borst
Wladimiroff
M.J. de Heer
Vakbond De Unie
Gerben den Hertog
Galavazi Den Hertog
Else Frishman-Jansen
Brada LLP
Hans J. Hoegen Dijkhof
Hoegen Dijkhof Attorneys & Tax Counsellors
Joost Italianer
NautaDutilh
Jolanda Meeuwissen
Trimbos Institute
Eugenie Nunes
Boekel De Nere N.V.
H.J. Snijders
University of Leiden
Bernard Spoor
De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek
Arjen Tillema
NautaDutilh
Sjef van Erp
Maastricht University
Arnold Versteeg
Macro & Versteeg advocaten
Lukas A. Witsenburg
BWN Partners
Mikhail Wladimiroff
Anonymous Contributors
New Zealand
William Akel
Simpson Grierson Lawyers
Gordon Anderson
Victoria University of Wellington
Denise Arnold
Lyon ONeale Arnold
Sylvia Bell
Human Rights Commission
Mark Bennett
Victoria University of Wellington
Matthew Berkahn
Massey University
Marie Bismark
University of Melbourne
Michael Bott
Heretaunga Law
Petra Butler
Victoria University of Wellington
Bennet Castelino
C.||e| |.. ||J
Sonja M Cooper
Cooper Legal
Alberto Costi
Victoria University of Wellington
Frank Deliu
Justitia Chambers
Shelley Eden
Shieff Angland
Tony Ellis
Andrew Geddis
University of Otago
Kris Gledhill
University of Auckland
Paul Gooby
Cavell Leitch
Marie Grills
Wilkinson Adams Lawyers
Nigel Hampton
C. S. Henry
Danny Jacobson
Employment & Environment Law
Glenn Jones
Lane Neave
Brian Keene
Helen Kelly
New Zealand Council of Trade Unions
Dean Kilpatrick
Anthony Harper
Alan Knowsley
Rainey Collins Lawyers
Douglas Lyon
Lyon ONeale Arnold
Trudy Marshall
Employment & Environment Law
Paul Michalik
Kevin Riordan
Harbour Chambers
Campbell Roberts
The Salvation Army
Paul Roth
University of Otago
208 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Mary-Rose Russell
Law School, Auckland University of Technology
Libby Ryan
Hesketh Henry
Andrew J. Schulte
Cavell Leitch
Stephen Eliot Smith
University of Otago
Asha Stewart
Quigg Partners
WM Thomson
University of Otago
Jennifer Wademan
Thomas Dewar Sziranyi Letts
Peter Watts
University of Auckland
David V. Williams
University of Auckland
Joseph Williams
Ministry of Justice
Scott Wilson
Duncan Cotterill
Kim Workman
Robson Hanan Trust
Steven Zindel
Zindels
Anonymous Contributors
Nicaragua
Christian Alemn Sotomayor
Cala Attorneys & Counselors at Law
Rosa Margina Baca Castillo
Garca & Bodn
Blanca Buitrago Molina
Garca & Bodn
Yury Fernando Cerrato Espinoza
Alvarado y Asociados
Linda C. Hurtado Calero
Lexincorp S.A.
Vctor Mndez Dussn
Asociacin Nicaragense de Salud Pblica
John L. Minnella-Romano
Minnella Romano y Asociados
Soraya Montoya Herrera
Molina & Asociados
Mayra Navarrete Crovetto
Garca & Bodn
Luis Manuel Perezalonso Lanzas
Colegio de Abogados en Formacion
Roberto Sobalvarro Taboada
Consortium Taboada & Asociados
Carlos Eduardo Tllez Pramo
Garca & Bodn
Edgard Leonel Torres Mendieta
Arias & Muoz
Angelica Maria Toruo Garcia
UENIC
Diana P. Zelaya Salas
Anonymous Contributors
Nigeria
Abdulhamid Abdullahi Bagara
Community Health and Research Initiative
Joseph E.O. Abugu
Abugu & Co.
Bayo Adaralegbe
Babalakin & Co.
Onjefu Adoga
Brooke Chambers
Chioma Kanu Agomo
University of Lagos
Emmanuel Nwabueze Aguwa
University of Nigeria
Fabian Ajogwu
Kenna Partners
Olumide Aju
F.O. Akinrele & Co.
Adewale Akande
A.O.S. Practice
Olabisi Akodu
Olisa Agbakoba & Associates
Yusuf Ali San
Yusuf O. Ali & Co
Yomi Alliyu
Chief Yomi Alliyu & Co.
Michael C. Asuzu
University of Ibadan
Titilola Ayotunde-Rotifa
Valuespeak Solicitors
E.M. Azariah
Legal Aid Council
Ayodele Banjo
Yomi Dare
Yomi Dare and Company
Godwin Etim
AELEX
Olubunmi Fayokun
Aluko & Oyebode
Peter K. Fogam
University of Lagos
Aminu Magashi Garba
Community Health and Research Initiative
Vitalis Chukwunalu Ihedigbo
Punuka Attorneys & Solicitors
Bolanle Jibogun
Legal Aid Council of Nigeria
Uche Nwokocha
Aluko & Oyebode
Chinwe Odigboegwu
Banwo & Ighodalo
Gbenga Odusola
Gbenga Odusola & Co. L.P
Nelson Ogbuanya
Nocs Consults
Pontian N. Okoli
City Partners
Patrick Okonjo
Okonjo, Odiawa, & Ebie
Oladimeji Oladepo
University of Ibadan
Olasupo Olaibi
Supo Olaibi and Company
Ayotunde Ologe
Synergy Legal Practitioners
Terrumun Z. Swende
Benue State University
Festus Okechukwu Ukwueze
University of Nigeria, Nsukka
Chinedum Umeche
Banwo & Ighodalo
Anonymous Contributors
Norway
Jan Fridthjof Bernt
University of Bergen
Carl Christiansen
Rder DA
Terje Einarsen
University of Bergen
Vinjar Foenneboe
NAFKAM, University of Tromsoe
Erling Lind
/Jv.||m.e| \|e|m
Jon-Arne stvik
/Jv.||m.e| |.|m
Sigbjrn Sdal
University of Agder
Tina Sreide
University of Bergen
Karl Harald Svig
University of Bergen
Magne Strandberg
University of Bergen
Ulf Stridbeck
University of Oslo
Arild Vaktskjold
Hgskulen i Hedmark
Tor Vale
|.|. /Jv.||m. |/
Andreas Wahl
fo|| S C /Jv.||m. /S
Anonymous Contributors
Pakistan
Waheed Ahmad
Waheed Law Firm
Sarmad Ali
Legal Awareness Watch-LAW
Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam
Azam & Rai
Umer Farooq
Ayub Medical College
Qudsia Anjum Fasih
Ziauddin University
Muzaffar Islam
Lahore Waste Management Company
Asma Jahangir
AGHS Law Associates
Anees Jillani
Jillani & Hassan Advocates
Shams ul Haque Joiya
Right Law Company
Abdul Ghaffar Khan
Fazleghani Advocates
Kausar S. Khan
Aga Khan University
Faisal Mahmood Ghani
Mahmood Abdul Ghani & Co
Faiza Muzaffar
Legis Inn Attorneys & Corporate Consultants
Z:nnn ie:
Quaid e Azam Law College
Adnan Aslam Qureshi
Qureshi Law Associates
Tariq Rahim
Tariq Rahim Law Associates
Muhammad Nouman Shams
Qazi Law Associates
Mohammad Akram Sheikh
Akram Sheikh Law Associates
Syed Muhammad Farhad Tirmazi
Farhad and Associates
Mohammad Zakaria
Sir Syed College of Medical Sciences for Girls
Anonymous Contributors
Panama
Marcela Araz Quintero
Owens & Watsons
Juan Pablo Fabrega Polleri
Fbrega, Molino y Mulino
Gisela D. Juliao
Legal Invest Solutions
Mario A. Rognoni H.
Arosemena, Noriega & Contreras
Marcela Rojas de Perez
ComitePanamenoporlosDerechosHumanos1987
Ibis Sanchez-Serrano
The Core Model Corporation, S.A.
Raul Soto Beltran
Arosemena, Noriega & Contreras
Anonymous Contributors
Peru
Grover Jonny Aranguri Carranza
Seguro Social de Salud
Eduardo Benavides
Berninzon & Benavides Abogados
Raquel Cancino
Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia
Ismael Cornejo-Rosello Dianderas
Universidad San Agustn
Marino Costa Bauer
Estudio Melo Vega & Costa Abogados
Guillermo Donayre
Hospital Regional de Loreto
Jaime Durand
Garca Sayn Abogados
Arturo Grate Salar
FMHU-UNFV
Flix Santiago Garca Ahumada
Ministerio de Salud
Teodoro German Jimenez Borra
Estudio Muiz, Ramirez, Perez Taiman & Olaya
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Revista Actualidad Empresarial
Ralph Kuon
Peruvian American Medical Society
Rossana Maccera
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SOPEMFYC
Elfren Morales Villanueva
Hospital Nacional Hiplito Unanue
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INCN
Yesenia Nuez
INCN
Lleni Pach Miller
Sociedad Peruano Americana De Medicos
Ricardo Antonio Pauli Montenegro
Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Neurologicas
Mara del Pilar Pozo Garcia
Hospital Central de La Fuerza Area del Per
Nelson Ramirez Jimenez
Estudio Juridico Muiz
Sonia Rengifo Arstegui
Marcos Ricardo Revatta Salas
Universidad Nacional San Luis Gonzaga de Ica
Luis Robles Sotelo
Estudio Muiz, Ramirez, Perez-Taiman & Olaya
Miguel Rubio Aylln
Estudio Muiz, Ramirez, Perez-Taiman & Olaya
Emil Ruppert Yez
Estudio Rubio Legua Normand
Elena Timoteo Quispe
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos
Alberto Varillas
Garca Sayn Abogados
Efran Vassallo
Estudio Rodrigo, Elas & Medrano
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Estudio Olaechea
Dennis Vlchez Ramrez
Estudio Ghersi Abogados
Luis Villar
EsSalud
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Philippines
Ronahlee A. Asuncion
University of the Philippines Diliman
Ciriaco Calalang
Emerico O. De Guzman
/... |.. C||.e
Eduardo D. de los Angeles
RomuloMabantaBuenaventuraSayoc&DelosAngeles
Sherwin Dwight O. Ebalo
Follosco Morallos & Herce Law Firm
Karen S. Gomez Dumpit
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines
Nancy Joan Javier
Javier Law
Miguel B. Liceralde
Alga Law
Reynaldo G. Lopez
University of Santo Tomas
Jesusito G. Morallos
Follosco Morallos & Herce Law Firm
Carmelita Gopez Nuqui
Development Action for Women Network
Alfredo Z. Pio de Roda, III
Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco
Jeanie S. Pulido
|.. C||.e | 1e.|e S. |o||J
Ricardo J. Romulo
RomuloMabantaBuenaventuraSayoc&DelosAngeles
H. Harry L. Roque, Jr
University of the Philippines
Jonathan P. Sale
University of the Philippines
Reynald Trillana
PCCED
Louisa M. Viloria-Yap
The Law Firm of Garcia Inigo & Partners
Anonymous Contributors
Poland
Andrzej Brodziak
Institute of Occupational Medicine
lo:. C:.e|
Squire Sanders
/nie.| e.,n|
Kancelaria Adwokacka
Joanna Kobza
Medical University of Silesia
Agnieszka Lisiecka
Wardynski & Partners
Piotr Majer
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Michal Raczkowski
University of Warsaw
Krzysztof Rastawicki
RMS Rastawicki Sawicki sp.k.
Piotr Jakub Rastawicki
Polish Academy of Sciences
Piotr Sadownik
Gide
Tomasz Trojanowski
|eJ|..| L|ve||v | J.
Anonymous Contributors
Portugal
Antnio Pereira de Almeida
Pereira de Almeida e Associados
Jos Alves do Carmo
AVM Advogados
Luis Miguel Amaral
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||oe| /J.Je |.. C||.e
Fernando Antas da Cunha
Antas da Cunha, Ferreira & Associados
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Baio, Castro & Associados
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Ferreira da Conceio, Menezes & Associados
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Carolina Boullosa Gonzalez
Law ACE
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Superior Health School of Viseu
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Melo Alves Advogados
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Abreu & Marques
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Paulo de Almeida e Associados
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Republic of Korea
Jaewook Choi
Korea University
Haksoo Ko
Seoul National University
Chang Woo Lee
Donghwa Labor Consulting Firm
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Yonsei Law School
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Korea University
Scott Sung Kyu Lee
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Shin & Kim
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Catholic University of Korea
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Romania
Cristina Alexe
Popovici Nitu & Asociatii
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Alexandru Ioan Cuza University
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Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca
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Babes Bolyai University
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Chirita si Asociatii
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Universitatea Dunrea de jos Galai
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Cataniciu & Asociatii
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EY Law
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uca Zbrcea & Asociai
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Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca
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Babes Bolyai University
Raul Mihu
Voicu & Filipescu SCA
Vlad Neacsu
Popovici Nitu & Asociatii
George A. Nedelcu
|.. C||.e | ee |eJe|.o
Mihail Romeo Nicolescu
me ||.|e.o |.. C||.e
Daniel Nitu
Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca
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Cornescu Oana-Lucia
uca Zbrcea & Asociaii
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Alexandru Ioan Cuza University
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Rizoiu & Asociatii SCA
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Hewlett-Packard
Iulian Alexander Stoia
Bucharest Bar Association
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Bucharest University
/nJ:ei i:ce Zmn:ecJ
CHSH Gilescu, Valeanu, Nathanzon & Partners
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Russia
Sergey Avrusin
St. Petersburg State Pediatric Medical University
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Roche & Duffay
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St. Petersburg State Pediatric Medical University
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Chamber of Advocates
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CMS Russia
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Asnis & Partners
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Margulyan & Kovalev
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Dentons
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Capital Legal Services, LLC
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RANEPA
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Hewlett-Packard
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Institute of Private Law
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Google
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Lidings Law Firm
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Senegal
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Universit Cheikh Anta Diop
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CRES
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Universit Assane Seck Ziguinchor
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F.|| S C |.. C||.e
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Mouhamed Kebe
Geni & Kebe SCP dAvocats
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Etude Guedel NDiaye et Associes
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Ministere de la Sant et de lAction Sociale
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SCP Geni & Kebe
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Serbia
Vera Bajic
Dusan S. Dimitrijevic
|.. C||.e ||m|||,ev|.
Djordje Djurisic
|.. C||.e | |,J,e |,o||.
Lnie o:cnJic
Novi Sad Humanitarian Centre
Valentina Krkovic
|.. C||.e | \.|e||. |v|.
Vladimir Marinkov
ore|.|.|v |.. C||.e
Djordje Mijatov
|.. C||.e | |ov|.|..J|.
Dragan Psodorov
Joksovic, Stojanovic & Partners
Aleksandar Samuilovic
e |.. C||.e | S.mo||v|. | |.|e|
Simonida Sladojevic-Stanimirovic
Nebojsa Stankovic
S|.v|. S |.|e |.. C||.e
Petar Stojanovic
Joksovic, Stojanovic & Partners
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ore|.|.|v |.. C||.e
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Sierra Leone
Kortor Francis Kamara
Saddleback Re
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Tejan-Cole, Yillah & Bangura
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Timap for Justice
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Renner-Thoams & Co
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OSIWA
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Taylor & Associates
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Singapore
Simon Chesterman
National University of Singapore
Tan Cheng Han
National University of Singapore
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National University of Singapore
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National University of Singapore
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TSMP Law Corporation
Anonymous Contributors
Slovenia
Bojko Buar
University of Ljubljana
Andrej Bukovnik
|e|ev|. |.. C||.e
Ajda Celedin
Miro Senica and Attorneys, Ltd.
Tjaa Ivanc
University of Maribor
. n
Law Firm Ilic
Rajko Knez
Peter Kos
Suzana Kraljic
University of Maribor
Dorijan Mari
ITF Enhancing Human Security
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Repolusk Attorneys at Law
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Blood Transfusion Centre of Slovenia
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University of Ljubljana
Luka Ticar
University of Ljubljana
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South Africa
FT Abioye
University of South Africa
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University of South Africa
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University of South Africa
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University of South Africa
I.J. Bezuidenhout
University of the Free State
John Brand
Neil Cameron
Stellenbosch University
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University of KwaZulu-Natal
Desia Colgan
L|ve||v| |e\||..|e.J
Rosalind Davey
f.m. |||||. |..
Henri Fouche
University of South Africa
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Soul City Institute
D. A. Hellenberg
University of Cape Town
Paul Hoffman
Institute for Accountability
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Stellenbosch University
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Freedom Under Law
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Hewlett-Packard
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Mathewson Gess Inc
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University of South Africa
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University of South Africa
Budeli Mpfariseni
University of South Africa
Gusha Xolani Ngantweni
University of South Africa
Dejo Olowu
North-West University
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University of South Africa
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North-West University
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Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs Inc
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University of South Africa
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North-West University
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Hewlett-Packard
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University of the Free State
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University of South Africa
Clarence Itumeleng Tshoose
University of South Africa
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University of KwaZulu-Natal
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North-West University
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University of South Africa
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Spain
Mara Acale Snchez
Universidad de Cdiz
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Universidad Autnoma de Madrid
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Servicio Canario de la Salud
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Universidad de Castilla La Mancha
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Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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Universidad de Alicante
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Hewlett-Packard
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Direccin General de Salud Pblica y Consumo
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Luis Gaite
Hospital Universitario Marques de Valdecilla
Nicols Garca Rivas
Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha
Martn Godino Reyes
Asociacin Nacional de Abogados Laboralistas
Carlos Gmez de la Escalera
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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National Distance Education University
Maria del Carmen Gonzlez Carrasco
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Universidad de Alicante
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Universidad Autnoma de Madrid
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Gmez-Acebo & Pombo
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Universidad de Alcal
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Ura Menndez
Juan Oliva-Moreno
Universidad de Castilla La Mancha
Jos M Ordez Iriarte
Sociedad Espaola de Sanidad Ambiental
Rafael Ortiz
Garrigues Abogados
Jess Padilla Glvez
Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha
Vicente Pastor y Aldeguer
H.U. La Princesa- U.A.M.
Alfonso Pedrajas
Abdn Pedrajas & Molero
Antonio Pedrajas Quiles
Abdn Pedrajas & Molero
Jos Luis de Peray
Medicus Mundi Catalunya
Javier Ramirez Iglesias
Hewlett-Packard
Juan Roca Guillamn
Universidad de Murcia
Teresa Rodrguez Montas
Universidad de Alcal
Federico Rodrguez Morata
Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha
Luis Romero Santos
Luis Romero y Asociados
Cristina Sanz Sebastian
Hospital Universitario La Princesa
Jorge Sirvent Garca
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Magdalena Urea Martinez
Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha
Rosario de Vicente Martnez
Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha
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Sri Lanka
Chrishantha Abeysena
University of Colombo
H.N.D. Gamalath
Prathiba Mahanamahewa
Gamini Perera
R. Surenthirakumaran
Department of Community and Family Medicine
V.T. Thamilmaran
University of Colombo
Anusha Wickramasinghe
The Open University of Sri Lanka
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Sweden
Jack gren
Stockholm University
Bengt hgren
Nordic School of Public Health
Laura Carlson
Stockholm University
Gabriel Donner
Donner & Partners AB
Lindegrd EIderholm
/Jv.||m. ||Jre S S.
sa Esbjrnson Carlberg
Hewlett-Packard
Boel Flodgren
Lund University
Lars Fredn
University West
Fredrik Gustafsson
DLA Nordic
Sara Hedin Ekelund
Hewlett-Packard
Mikael Johanson
Raoul Wallenberg Institute
Lennart Kohler
Nordic School of Public Health
Gunilla Lindmark
Uppsala University
Bengt Lundell
Lund University
Olov Marsater
University of Uppsala
Gran Millqvist
Stockholm University
Karol Nowak
Lund University
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University of Lund
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Advokataktiebolaget Roslagen
Karl-Arne Olsson
Grde Wesslau Advokatbyr
Johan Sangborn
Swedish Bar Association
Kim Tabell
IKEA Group of Companies
Christer Thordson
Legal Edge Advisors
Henrik Wenander
Lund University
Malin Winbom
Hewlett-Packard
Sanna Wolk
Uppsala University
Mauro Zamboni
Stockholm University
Anonymous Contributors
Tanzania
Salim B. Abubakar
BLC Advocates
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Mkono & Co. Advocates
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Mrosso & Associates Advocate
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Mkono & Co. Advocates
Thomas Sipemba
IMMMA Advocates
Anayaty Tahir
Mkono & Co. Advocates
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Mkono & Co. Advocates
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Octavian & Company Advocats
Eliud Wandwalo
Mukikute
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Thailand
Anant Akanisthaphichat
Thai Law Firm
210 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Kwanjai Amnatsatsue
Mahidol University
Paul Connelly
International Legal Counsellors Thailand Ltd.
Frederic Favre
Vovan & Associes
Wonpen Kaewpan
Faculty of Public Health
Jeeranun Klaewkla
Mahidol University
Dej-Udom Krairit
Dej-Udom & Associates Ltd.
Ugrid Milintangkul
|.||.| |e.|| Cmm|| C||.e
Chanvit Tharathep
Ministry of Public Health
Chulapong Yukate
ZICO Law
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Tunisia
Wajdi Abdelhedi
SantaFe Associates International
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Elies Beltaifa
Juris International Lawyers Network
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Tunisia Legal
Mohamed Mehdi Ben Nasr
Cabinet dAvocats Ben Nasr
ToJn| Fen N:
Cabinet dAvocats Ben Nasr
Bessem Ben Salem
Ben Salem Law Firm
Maha Driss
Hewlett-Packard
Eya Essif
Alliance Culture & Nature
Hassine Fekih Ahmed
Zied Gallala
Gallala Law Firm
Amine Hamdi
Zaanouni Law Firm
Abdelwahab Hechiche
University of South Florida
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Cabinet dAvocats Maitre Imen Nasri
Hedia Kedadi
Cabinet dAvocats Kedadi
Imed Lamloum
Cabinet dAvocats Imed Lamloum
Brahim Latrech
|.. C||.e | f.|m |.|e.
Hechmi Louzir
Institut Pasteur de Tunis
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Mahbouli Law Firm
Ridha Mezghani
. |e..| |.. C||.e
Asma Nouira
Faculte de Droit et des Sciences Politiques
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Turkey
Ufuk Aydin
Anadolu University
Esenyel Barak Bal
Cailliau & Colakel Law Firm
Yesim Bezen
Bezen & Partners
Bahir Bozcali
Bozcali Law Firm
Berkhan elen
e|e |.. C||.e
Gke elen
e|e |.. C||.e
Onur Demirci
Co |em|.| /vo.||. foo
Burcay Erus
Bogazici University
Osman Hayran
Mahmut Kacan
|| |.. C||.e
Halil Ibrahim Kardiali
Hewlett-Packard
Onur Kilic
Kiyi Law Firm
Orhan Yavuz Mavioglu
/||| |.. C||.e
Umut Saglam
/vo| |.. C||.e
Cagatay Yilmaz
||m.. |.. C||.e
Fatih Selim Yurdakul
Anonymous Contributors
Uganda
Jane Frances Akiteng
Katende, Ssempebwa & Co. Advocates
Patrick A. Alunga
Barugahare & Co. Advocates
Enoch Barata
Birungyi, Barata & Associates
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Barugahare & Co. Advocates
Andrew Bwengye Ankunda
MMAKS Advocates
Birungyi Cephas
Birungyi, Barata & Associates
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Mothers Against Malnutrition and Hunger
Mpiima Jamir Ssenoga
Kiwanuka and Mpiima Advocates
Adrian Jjuuko
HRAPF
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Kawooya Junju & Co. Advocates
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Centre for Batwa Minorities Uganda
Damalie Naggita-Musoke
Makerere University
Salima Namusobya
Initiative for Social and Economic Rights
Rose Mildred Nassiwa
Nassiwa and Company Advocates
Laura Nyirinkindi
Uganda Association of Women Lawyers
Charles Odere
Lex Uganda Advocates & Solicitors
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GP Advocates ad Solicitors
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Ligomarc Advocates
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Shonubi, Musoke & Co. Advocates
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HRAPF
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Ukraine
Asters
Taras Bachynskyy
Legalaid
Alexander Bodnaruk
Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University
Zoryana Chernenko
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
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Lviv Centre for Intl Law and Human Rights
Tatyana Kaganovska
V.N.Karazyn Kharkiv National University
Nickolas V. Karchevskiy
Lugansk State University of Internal Affairs
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Astapov Lawyers
Illya Kostin
Legal Alliance Company
Sergiy Nezhurbida
Chernivtsi National University
Sergiy Oberkovych
Gvozdiy & Oberkovych Law Firm
Yaroslav Ognevyuk
Doubinsky & Osharova Patent and Law Agency
Iryna Shevchuk
Engarde Attorneys at Law
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Skliarenko and Partners
Alexandr Subbotin
Tarasov & Partners
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Attorneys Association Gestors
Anonymous Contributors
United Arab Emirates
Saleh Abdulla
Dubai Police
Jayshree Gupta
DLA Piper
Zeyad Jaffal
Al Ain University of Science and Technology
Noori Khater
UAEU
Tarek Nakkach
Hewlett-Packard
Kavitha S. Panicker
Panicker Partners
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Court of Cassation
Amer Saadeddin
Dubai Community Health Center
Anonymous Contributors
United Kingdom
Richard Ashcroft
Queen Mary University of London
James Bell
Slater & Gordon LLP
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University of Edinburgh
Janice Denoncourt
Nottingham Law School
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City University London
Mark Ellis
International Bar Association
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Lancaster University
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LSE
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Hewlett-Packard
Simon Honeyball
University of Exeter
Peter Hungerford-Welch
City University London
Jacqueline Laing
London Metropolitan University
Judy Laing
University of Bristol
Lawrence McNamara
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law
Peter McTigue
Nottingham Law School
JS Nguyen-Van-Tam
University of Nottingham
Tonia Novitz
University of Bristol
Katja Samuel
Reading University
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Edinburgh Napier University
Cassam Tengnah
Swansea University
Tony Ward
University of Hull
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Edinburgh Napier University
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United States
Jeffrey M. Aresty
Internet Bar Organization
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Bellows Law Group, P. C.
Paul Bender
Arizona State University
Earl V. Brown Jr.
The Solidarity Center
Sherman L. Cohn
Georgetown Law
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University of Pennsylvania
Patrick Del Duca
Zuber Lawler & Del Duca LLP
Sara Elizabeth Dill
|.. C||.e | S.. F||..re| ||||
Brian Downing
Google
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University of Notre Dame
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Georgetown Law
Ricks Frazier
EOHED
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Accountability Lab
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University of Miami
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The Center for HIV Law and Policy
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Center for Law and Social Policy
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Covington & Burling LLP
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Calhoun & Lawrence, LLP
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University of Arkansas
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Indiana University
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Henry, McCord, Bean, Miller, Gabriel & LaBar
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University of California, San Diego
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University of Hawaii
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Pobjecky & Pobjecky, LLP
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Public Justice Center
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University of Dayton
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Sherman & Howard LLC
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HIV Law Project
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University of Arizona
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Escandor El Ters
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Hughes & Hughes
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Bado, Kuster, Zerbino & Rachetti
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Hughes & Hughes
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Ferrere Abogados
Juan Andrs Fuentes
Arcia Storace Fuentes Medina Abogados
Diego Gamarra Antes
Posadas, Posadas & Vecino
Gabriel Gari
Queen Mary University of London
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Arcia Storace Fuentes Medina Abogados
Julio Iribarne Pl
Ferrere Abogados
Julio Lens
Camilo Martinez Blanco
Universidad de Montevideo
Ricardo Mezzera
Mezzera Abogados
Beatriz Murgua
Murguia- Aguirre- Abogados
Santiago Pereira Campos
Universidad de Montevideo
Martn Risso Ferrand
Universidad Catlica del Uruguay
Anonymous Contributors
Uzbekistan
Sherzod Abdulkasimov
Sherdav Himoya Law Firm
Shukhrat Khudayshukurov
||mv. |.. C||.e
Anonymous Contributors
Venezuela
Nelson E. Borjas E.
Torres, Plaz & Araujo
Dorelys Coraspe
Hewlett-Packard
Cruz Cordero B.
CEVECE
Sal Crespo Lossada
Borges & Lawton
Romn J. Duque Corredor
Academia de Ciencias Polticas y Sociales
Jesus Escudero
Torres, Plaz & Araujo
Catherina Gallardo
Carlos A. Godoy L.
Benson, Perez Matos Antakly & Watts
Andres Halvorssen
UNIMET
Carlos Henriquez Salazar
Hoet Pelaez Castillo & Duque Abogados
Luis Eduardo Lpez-Durn
Hoet Pelez Castillo & Duque Abogados
Jaime Martnez Estvez
Rodner, Martnez & Asociados
Mark A. Melilli S.
Mangieri Benavente & Asociados
Sonsiree Meza Leal
Luis G. Monteverde M.
Torres, Plaz & Araujo
Gregory Odreman
Odreman & Asociados
Diego Pardi Arconada
Arturo de Sola Lander
De Sola Pate & Brown
John Tucker B.
Hoet Pelez Castillo & Duque Abogados
Mariana Villasmil Blanchard
Borges & Lawton
Anonymous Contributors
Vietnam
Vo Duc Duy
Santa Lawyers Group
Vu Dzung
Cao Thi Huyen Thuong
|e |ove |.. C||.e
Nguyen Gia Huy Chuong
Phuoc & Partners
Ha Thuc Minh Trang
DFDL Vietnam Co. Ltd
Le Thi Thuy Huong
Russin & Vecchi LLP
Pham Van Phat
An Phat Pham Law Firm
Ngo Van Hiep
Hiep & Associates
Anonymous Contributors
Zambia
Natasha Banda
Corpus Legal Practitioners
Lizzy MN Chanda
Afya Mzuri
Sydney Chisenga
Corpus Legal Practitioners
Jacqueline C. Jhala
Corpus Legal Practitioners
Ernest K. Kakoma
Ministry of Health
Naomy Kanyemba Lintini
International Labour Organization
Tiziana Marietta
Sharpe & Howard, Legal Practitioners
Melvin L. M. Mbao
North-West University
Eustace Ngoma
C|re.oJ. S Cm.v
Mapange Nsapato
Chibesakunda & Company
Rodwyn Peterson
C|re.oJ. S Cm.v
Fares Florence Phiri
Action Africa Help Zambia
Anonymous Contributors
Zimbabwe
Clever Bere
Organising for Zimbabwe
Simplicio Bhebhe
Kantor & Immerman Legal Practitioners
Terence Hussein
Hussein Ranchhod & Co.
Mordecai Pilate Mahlangu
Gill Godlonton & Gerrans
Andrew Makoni
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights
Marshal N. Mapondera
Zimbabwe Institute of Legal Studies
Christopher Mhike
Atherstone & Cook
Gerald N. Mlotshwa
Titan Law Chambers
Tarisai Mutangi
Donsa-Nkomo & Mutangi Attorneys
211 Contributing Experts |
Casper Pound
Family A.I.D.S. Support Organisation
Otto Saki
Governance Resources Group
Obey Shava
Mbidzo Muchadehama & Makoni
Nyasha Pamella Timba
Kantor & Immerman Legal Practitioners
Anonymous Contributors
Acknowledgements
214 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
The World Justice Projects Honorary Chairs, Directors,
nce:. S. Finnci SJo:e:. nJ Sono:in
Organizations listed in the last section of this report.
The polling companies and research organizations listed in
the Methodology section of this report, and the contributing
experts listed in the previous section.
Academic advisors: Rolf Alter, OECD; Eduardo Barajas,
Universidad del Rosario; Maurits Barendrecht, Tilburg
University; Christina Biebesheimer, The World Bank; Tim
Besley, London School of Economics; Paul Brest, Stanford
University; Jose Caballero, IMD Business School; David
Caron, Kings College, London; Thomas Carothers, Carnegie
Endowment; Marcela Castro, Universidad de los Andes;
Eduardo Cifuentes, Universidad de los Andes; Sherman Cohn,
Georgetown University; Christine M. Cole, Harvard Kennedy
School; Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Stanford University;
Larry Diamond, Stanford University; Claudia J. Dumas,
Transparency International USA; Brad Epperly, University
of South Carolina; Julio Faundez, Warwick University;
Todd Foglesong, Harvard Kennedy School; Tom Ginsburg,
University of Chicago; James Goldston, Open Society Justice
Initiative (OSJI); Jorge Gonzalez, Universidad Javeriana;
Jon Gould, American University; Martin Gramatikov,
Tilburg University; Linn Hammergren; Tim Hanstad,
Landesa; Wassim Harb, Arab Center for the Development
of Rule of Law and Integrity; Susan Hirsch, George Mason
University; Ronald Janse, HiiL and Utrecht University; Erik
G. Jensen, Stanford University; Rachel Kleinfeld, Carnegie
Endowment; Jack Knight, Duke University; Harold H. Koh,
Yale University; Margaret Levi, University of Washington; Iris
Litt, Stanford University; Clare Lockhart, The Institute for
State Effectiveness; Zsuzsanna Lonti, OECD; Diego Lopez,
Universidad de los Andes; William T. Loris, Loyola University;
Beatriz Magaloni, Stanford University; Jenny S. Martinez,
Stanford University; Ghada Moussa, Cairo University; Sam
Muller, HiiL; Robert L. Nelson, American Bar Foundation
and Northwestern University; Harris Pastides, University of
South Carolina; Randal Peerenboom, La Trobe University and
Oxford University; Angela Pinzon, Universidad del Rosario;
Shannon Portillo, George Mason University; Michael H.
Posner, New York University; Roy L. Prosterman, University
of Washington; Anita Ramasastry, University of Washington;
Angela Ruiz, Universidad del Rosario; Audrey Sacks, The
World Bank; Lutforahman Saeed, Kabul University; Michaela
Saisana, EU-JRC; Andrea Saltelli, EU-JRC; Andrei Shleifer,
Harvard University; Jorge Luis Silva, The World Bank;
Gordon Smith, University of South Carolina; Christopher
Stone, Open Society Foundations; Rene Uruena, Universidad
de los Andes; Stefan Voigt, University of Hamburg; Barry
Weingast, Stanford University; Michael Woolcock, The World
Bank.
Roland Abeng; Lukman Abdul-Rahim; Priya Agarwal-
Harding; Lina Alameddine; Sarah Alexander; Rose Karikari
Anang; Evelyn Ankumah; Jassim Alshamsi; Ekaterina
Baksanova; Hamud M. Balfas; Sophie Barral; April Baskin;
Ivan Batishchev; Rachael Beitler; Laurel Bellows; Ayzada
Bengel; Dounia Bennani; Clever Bere; Rindala Beydoun;
Karan K. Bhatia; Eric C. Black; Cherie Blair; Rob Boone; Juan
Manuel Botero; Oussama Bouchebti; Ral Izurieta Mora
Bowen; Ariel Braunstein; Kathleen A. Bresnahan; Michael
F:o.n, SJnn F:o.n, \iim R. F:o.nneJ, LviJ
Bruscino; Josiah Byers; Carolina Cabrera; Ted Carroll; Javier
Castro De Len; Fahima Charaffeddine; David Cheyette;
Jose Cochingyan, III; Kate Coffey; Sonkita Conteh; Barbara
Cooperman; Hans Corell; Adriana Cosgriff; Alexander E.
Acknowledgements
215 Acknowledgments |
Davis; James P. DeHart; Brackett B. Denniston, III; Russell
C. Deyo; Surya Dhungel; Adama Dieng; Sandra Elena;
Roger El Khoury; Adele Ewan; Fatima Fettar; Eric Florenz;
Abderrahim Foukara; Kristina Fridman; Morly Frishman;
Viorel Furdui; Minoru Furuyama; William H. Gates, Sr.; Anna
Gardner; Dorothy Garcia; Sophie Gebreselassie; Dwight
Gee; Sujith George; Adam Gerstenmier; Jacqueline Gichinga;
Brian Gitau; Arturo Gomez; Nengak Daniel Gondyi; Lindsey
Graham; Deweh Gray; Michael S. Greco; Elise Groulx; Paula
F. Guevara; Arkady Gutnikov; Karen Hall; Kunio Hamada;
ei nn, Sn .mJen, /v:o e::e:o, Snei oi,
Michael Holston; R. William Ide, III; Murtaza Jaffer; Chelsea
Jaeztold; Hassan Bubacar Jallow; Sunil Kumar Joshi; Marie-
Therese Julita; Anne Kelley; Howard Kenison; Junaid Khalid;
Elsa Khwaja; Se Hwan Kim; Laurie Kontopidis; Simeon
Koroma; Steven H. Kraft; Larry D. Kramer; Jack Krumholtz;
Lianne Labossiere; Joanna Lim; Deborah Lindholm; Hongxia
Liu; Annie Livingston; Jeanne L. Long; Stephen Lurie; Ahna
B. Machan; Maha Mahmoud; Biawakant Mainali; Andrew
Makoni; Frank Mantero; Madison Marks; Roger Martella;
Vivek Maru; John Mason; Elisa Massimino; Hiroshi Matsuo;
Michael Maya; Matthew Mead; Sindi Medar-Gould; Nathan
Menon; Ellen Mignoni; Aisha Minhas; Claros Morean; Liliana
Moreno; Junichi Morioka; Carrie Moore; Katrina Moore;
Xavier Muller; Jenny Murphy; Rose Murray; Norhayati
Mustapha; Reinford Mwangonde; Doreen Ndishabandi; Ilija
Nedelkoski; Patricia van Nispen; Victoria Norelid; Justin
Nyekan; Sean OBrien; Peggy Ochanderena; Bolaji Olaniran;
Joy Olson; Mohamed Olwan; Gustavo Alanis Ortega; Bolaji
Owasanoye; Kedar Patel; Angeles Melano Paz; Karina Pena;
John Pollock; Cynthia Powell; Nathalie Rakotomalia; Javier
Ramirez; Eduardo Ramos-Gmez; Daniela Rampani; Richard
Randerson; Claudia Rast; Adrian F. Revilla; Ludmila Mendona
Lopes Ribeiro; Nigel H. Roberts; Liz Ross; Steve Ross; Patricia
Ruiz de Vergara; Irma Russell; Bruce Sewell; Humberto Prado
Sifontes; Uli Parmlian Sihombing; William Sinnott; Lumba
Siyanga; Brad Smith; Lourdes Stein; Thomas M. Susman;
Elizabeth Thomas-Hope; Laurence Tribe; Robert Varenik;
Jessica Villegas; Raymond Webster; Robin Weiss; Jennifer
Wilmore; Jason Wilks; Malin Winbom; Russom Woldezghi;
Stephen Zack; Jorge Zapp-Glauser; Fanny Zhao.
Altus Global Alliance; APCO Worldwide; Fleishman-
Hillard; The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences, Stanford University; The Center on Democracy,
Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University; The
Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL); The
Legal Department of Hewlett-Packard Limited; The Legal
Department of Microsoft Corporation; The Whitney and
Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies,
Yale University; Rule of Law Collaborative, University of
South Carolina; Vera Institute of Justice.
About the World Justice Project
218 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
The World Justice Project

(WJP) is an independent, multi-


disciplinary organization working to advance the rule of law
around the world. The rule of law provides the foundation
for communities of opportunity and equity - communities
that offer sustainable economic development, accountable
government, and respect for fundamental rights.
Our work engages citizens and leaders across the globe and
from all work disciplines to advance the rule of law. Through
our three complementary and mutually reinforcing programs
of Research and Scholarship, the WJP Rule of Law Index, and
Engagement, WJP seeks to stimulate government reforms,
develop practical programs at the community level, and
increase public awareness about the foundational importance
of the rule of law.
Founded by William H. Neukom in 2006 as a presidential
initiative of the American Bar Association (ABA), and with
the initial support of 21 other strategic partners, the World
Justice Project transitioned into an independent 501(c)(3)
non:on o:ni.ion in 2. l once :e oceJ in
Washington, DC, and Seattle, WA, USA.
GOALS AND PROGRAM AREAS
The mission of the World Justice Project is to lead a global,
multi-disciplinary effort to strengthen the rule of law for the
development of communities of opportunity and equity.
The rule of law helps people and communities thrive. Effective
rule of law helps reduce corruption, improve public health,
enhance education, lift people from poverty, and protect
them from injustices and dangers large and small. The World
Justice Project is one of the worlds foremost resources on
the importance of the rule of law.
Tne \P Jenniion o ne :Je o . i o:ni.eJ JnJe:
four universal principles and is derived from established
international standards and norms:
O Tne ove:nmen nJ i onci nJ en .e
individuals and private entities are accountable under
the law.
O The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are
applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights,
including the security of persons and property.
O The process by which the laws are enacted,
administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and
encien.
O Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and
independent representatives and neutrals who are of
Jncien nJm|e:. nve Je,Je :eoJ:ce. nJ :eec
the makeup of the communities they serve.
Tni Jenniion n |een eeJ nJ :enneJ n:oJn exenive
consultations with experts from around the world.
The work of the WJP is founded on two premises: the rule
of law is the foundation of communities of opportunity
and equity and multidisciplinary collaboration is the most
effective way to advance the rule of law. Based on this, the
WJP has three mutually reinforcing programs: Research and
Scholarship, the WJP Rule of Law Index, and Engagement
initiatives.
O Research and Scholarship: The WJPs Research &
Scholarship program conducts and supports rigorous
About The World Justice Project
219 About the World Justice Project |
research that examines the relationship between the
rule of law and various aspects of economic, political,
and social development. The program, co-chaired by
Robert L. Nelson (Northwestern University, American
Bar Foundation) and Tom Ginsburg (University of
Chicago), is currently pursuing an ambitious research
agenda, studying: the effectiveness of the rule of law
in various domains of social life, the interdependencies
among the institutional components of the rule of law,
and the causal mechanisms by which the rule of law
affects economic and political life. The Research and
Scholarship program is also in the process of building
the Rule of Law Research Consortium (RLRC), a
multidisciplinary community of leading researchers
in v:ie, o neJ incJJin .. economic.
political science, sociology, international relations, and
anthropology - that will harness diverse methods and
techniques to produce research on the rule of law, as
well as recommendations on how to best strengthen
it. The Consortium is intended to become a repository
of the best research on governance and the rule of law
for scholars and policymakers, and already features
academics from premier institutions in the United
States and abroad.
O WJP Rule of Law Index: The WJP Rule of Law Index


is a quantitative assessment tool designed to provide a
comprehensive picture of the extent to which countries
adhere to the rule of law in practice. It is the most
com:enenive inJex o i |inJ. :eecin ne cJ
conditions experienced by the population. To date, over
100,000 citizens and experts have been interviewed in
coJn:ie. lnJex nnJin nve |een :ee:enceJ |,
heads of state, chief justices, business leaders, public
onci. nJ ne :e. incJJin cie |, mo:e nn
media outlets in nearly 80 countries.
O Engagement: The WJPs Engagement initiatives convene
partners from all work disciplines to build a global network,
nnJ common :oJnJ. nJ c:ee :cic oJion n
advance the rule of law. Additionally, through the World
Justice Challenge, the WJP provides seed grants to
support these innovative efforts in communities around
the world. Engagement events include the World Justice
Forum, a global gathering at which prominent leaders
and change agents from more than 100 countries come
together to address critical rule of law issues. Additionally,
the WJP has held nine regional outreach meetings on
nve coninen. Tne \P o JnJe:|e inecoJn:,
sorties to help countries in periods of transition assess
rule of law opportunities and challenges, convening a local
taskforce to develop recommendations for the countrys
ongoing reform process.
Honorary Chairs
The World Justice Project has the support of outstanding
leaders representing a range of disciplines around the world.
The Honorary Chairs of the World Justice Project are:
Madeleine Albright, Giuliano Amato, Robert Badinter, James
A. Baker III, Cherie Blair, Stephen G. Breyer, Sharan Burrow,
David Byrne, Jimmy Carter, Maria Livanos Cattaui, Hans
Corell, Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Hernando de Soto, Adama
Dieng, William H. Gates, Sr., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Richard
J. Goldstone, Kunio Hamada, Lee H. Hamilton, Mohamed
Ibrahim, Hassan Bubacar Jallow, Tassaduq Hussain Jillani,
Anthony M. Kennedy, Beverley McLachlin, George J. Mitchell,
John Edwin Mroz, Indra Nooyi, Sandra Day OConnor, Ana
Palacio, Colin L. Powell, Roy L. Prosterman, Richard W. Riley,
Mary Robinson, Petar Stoyanov, Richard Trumka, Desmond
Tutu, Antonio Vitorino, Paul A. Volcker, Harold Woolf, Andrew
Young, Zhelyu Zhelev.
Board of Directors
Sheikha Abdulla Al-Misnad, Emil Constantinescu, Ashraf
Ghani, William C. Hubbard, Suet-Fern Lee, Mondli Makhanya,
\iim . NeJ|om. Fen C:cie No:nee. me R. Si|en.
Ofhcers and 5taff
William C. Hubbard, Chairman of the Board; William H.
Neukom, Founder and CEO; Deborah Enix-Ross, Vice
President; Suzanne E. Gilbert, Vice President; James R. Silkenat,
Director and Vice President; Lawrence B. Bailey, Treasurer;
Gerold W. Libby, General Counsel and Secretary.
Staff: Juan Carlos Botero, Executive Director; Rebecca
Billings, Nabiha Chowdhury, Ana Victoria Cruz, Beth Davis,
Radha Friedman, Margaret Halpin, Matthew Harman, Sarah
Chamness Long, Debby Manley, Joel Martinez, Bethany
McGann, Alejandro Ponce, Christine Pratt, Kelly Roberts,
Maria Rosales, Joshua Steele, and Nancy Ward.
Financial Supporters
Foundations: Allen & Overy Foundation; Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation; Carnegie Corporation of New York; Chase
Family Philanthropic Fund; The Edward John and Patricia
Rosenwald Foundation; Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation;
Ford Foundation; GE Foundation; Gordon and Betty Moore
Foundation; Judson Family Fund at The Seattle Foundation;
Oak Foundation; Pinnacle Gardens Foundation; The William
and Flora Hewlett Foundation; William H. Neukom & Neukom
Family Foundation.
220 | WJP Rule of Law Index 2014
Corporations: Apple Inc.; The Boeing Company; E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Company; General Electric Company; Google
Inc.; Hewlett-Packard Company; Intel Corporation; Johnson
& Johnson; LexisNexis; McKinsey & Company, Inc.; Merck &
Co., Inc.; Microsoft Corporation; PepsiCo; Texas Instruments,
Inc.; Viacom International, Inc.; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Law Firms: Allen & Overy LLP; Boies, Schiller & Flexner,
P, Cocnin,n c Pe: . nce, L:in|e: FiJJe
& Reath LLP; Fulbright & Jaworski LLP; Garrigues LLP;
Gmez-Acebo & Pombo; Haynes and Boone, LLP; Holland
& Knight LLP; Hunton & Williams LLP; K&L Gates LLP;
Mason, Hayes+Curran; Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
LLP; Roca Junyent; Sullivan & Cromwell LLP; SyCip Salazar
Hernandez & Gatmaitan; Troutman Sanders LLP; Turner
Freeman Lawyers; Ura Menndez; White & Case LLP;
Winston & Strawn LLP.
Governments: City of The Hague; Irish Aid; National
Endowment for Democracy; U.S. Department of State.
Professional Firms and Trade Associations: American
Bar Association (ABA); American Bar Association Section
of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice; American
Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law; American
Bar Association Section of Business Law; American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Section; American Bar
Association Section of Dispute Resolution; American Bar
Association Section of Environment, Energy & Resources;
American Bar Association Health Law Section; American Bar
Association Section of Individual Rights & Responsibilities;
American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property
Law; American Bar Association Section of International
Law; American Bar Association Judicial Division; American
Bar Association Section of Labor and Employment Law;
American Bar Association Section of Litigation; American
Bar Association Section of Real Property, Trust and Estate
Law; American Bar Association Section of State and Local
Government Law; American Bar Association Section of
Taxation; Major, Lindsey & Africa; United States Chamber of
Commerce & Related Entities; Welsh, Carson, Anderson &
Stowe.
Institutions: Eastminster Presbyterian Church; Society of the
Cincinnati.
Individual Donors: Mark David Agrast; Randy J. Aliment; H.
William Allen; William and Kay Allen; David and Helen
Andrews; Anonymous; Keith A. Ashmus; Robert Badinter;
Kirk Baert; Lawrence B. Bailey; Martha Barnett; Richard R.
Barnett, Sr.; April Baskin; David Billings; Juan Carlos
Botero; Pamela A. Bresnahan; Toby Bright; Jack Brooms;
Richard D. Catenacci; Valerie Colb; Lee and Joy Cooper;
Russell C. Deyo; Mark S. Ellis; Deborah Enix-Ross;
Matthew and Valerie Evans; R. Bradford Evans; William and
Janet Falsgraf; Jonathan Fine; Dwight Gee and Barbara
Wright; Suzanne E. Gilbert; Jamie S. Gorelick; Lynn T.
Gunnoe; Peter E. Halle and Carolyn Lamm; Margaret
Halpin; Harry Hardin; Joshua Harkins-Finn; Norman E.
Harned; Albert C. Harvey; Judith Hatcher; Thomas Z.
Hayward, Jr.; Benjamin H. Hill, III; Claire Suzanne Holland;
Kathleen Hopkins; Avery Horne; R. Thomas Howell, Jr.;
William C. and Kappy Hubbard; R. William Ide, III; Marina
Jacks; Patricia Jarman; George E. Kapke; Myron and Renee
Leskiw; Margaret Levi; Paul M. Liebenson; Iris Litt; Hongxia
Liu; Judy Perry Martinez; Roderick and Karla Mathews;
Lucile and Gerald McCarthy; Sandy McDade; M. Margaret
McKeown; James Michel; Leslie Miller; Liliana Moreno; Justin
Nelson; Robert Nelson; William H. Neukom; Jitesh Parikh;
Scott F. Partridge; J. Anthony Patterson, Jr.; Lucian T. Pera;
Maury and Lorraine Poscover; Llewelyn G. Pritchard; Michael
Reed; Joan and Wm. T Robinson III; Daniel Rockmore; Erik
A. Schilbred; Judy Schulze; James R. Silkenat; Rhonda Singer;
Thomas Smegal; Ann and Ted Swett; Joan Phillips Timbers;
Nancy Ward; H. Thomas Wells.
Strategic Partners
The World Justice Project is partners with organizations
that provide global leadership in a variety of disciplines.
The list of partnering organizations continues to expand,
increasing in its ability to represent disciplines and world
regions. The current strategic partners of the World Justice
Project are: American Bar Association; American Public
Health Association; American Society of Civil Engineers; Arab
Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity;
Avocats Sans Frontires; Canadian Bar Association; Club of
Madrid; Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law;
Human Rights First; Human Rights Watch; Inter-American
Bar Association; International Bar Association; International
Chamber of Commerce; International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis; International Organization of Employers;
lne:nion T:Je Union ConeJe:ion, lne:Pcinc F:
Association; Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human
Rights; Landesa; NAFSA: Association of International
Educators; Norwegian Bar Association; People to People
International; The World Council of Religious Leaders;
Transparency International USA; United States Chamber
of Commerce; Union Internationale des Avocats; World
Federation of Engineering Organisations; World Federation
of Public Health Associations.
For further details, visit: www.worldjusticeproject.org.
Laws of justice which Hammurabi, the wise king, established That the strong might not injure the weak,
in order to protect the widows and orphans..., in order to declare justice in the land, to settle all disputes, and
heal all injuries.
-CODEX HAMMURABI
I could adjudicate lawsuits as well as anyone. But I would prefer to make lawsuits unnecessary.
-ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS
The Law of Nations, however, is common to the entire human race, for all nations have established for
themselves certain regulations exacted by custom and human necessity.
-CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS
Treat the people equally in your court and give them equal attention, so that the noble shall not aspire to your
partiality, nor the humble despair of your justice.
-JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FROM UMAR BIN AL-KHATTAB, THE SECOND KHALIFA OF ISLAM
No freeman is to be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his free tenement or of his liberties or free customs, or
outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go against such a man or send against him save by lawful
judgement of his peers or by the law of the land. To no-one will we sell or deny or delay right or justice.
-MAGNA CARTA
Good civil laws are the greatest good that men can give and receive. They are the source of morals, the
palladium of property, and the guarantee of all public and private peace. If they are not the foundation of
government, they are its supports; they moderate power and help ensure respect for it, as though power were
justice itself. They affect every individual; they mingle with the primary activities of his life; they follow him
everywhere. They are often the sole moral code of a people, and they are always part of its freedom. Finally,
gooJ civil lows ore the consolotion oj every citizen jor the socrinces thot oliticol low JemonJs oj him jor the
city, protecting, when necessary, his person and his property as though he alone were the whole city.
-JEAN-TIENNE-MARIE PORTALIS. DISCOURS PRLIMINAIRE DU PREMIER PROJET DE CODE CIVIL
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
-UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ISBN: 978-0-9882846-5-4

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