U!

lv1v1LUJL
UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITNE ! ~~ ~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD t\f((C4014

Event: Interview of General Peter Pace
Date: January 16, 2004
Prepared by: Bonnie D. Jenkins
Reviewed by: Mike Hurley
Classification: Unclassified
Team: 3 (Counterterrorism Policy)
Location 2100 K Street
Participants: Non commission members: General Peter Pace, Captain Hal
Dronberger.
Commission members: Bonnie Jenkins, Mike Hurley, Steve Dunne

General Peter Pace is currently the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS).
He assumed that position on October 1, 2001. Prior to his current position,
General Pace served as the Combatant Commander for the United States
Southern Command, from September 8 until September 30, 2001. From
November 2, 1997 to September 8, 2000, he served as Commander, U.S. Marine
Corps Forces at Atlantic/Europe/South. General Pace also servedas the Director
of Operations (J3) in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from August 5, 1996 to 23
November 1997.

The Office of the Vice Chair. JCS (VCJCS)

The office of the VCJCS was originally established to focus on issues of

acquisition and procurement of resources. However, when Pace assumed his
current office in October 1, 2001, the attacks of September 11,2001 had already
occurred and his time was focused on providing military advice to the Chairman
on the global war on terrorism (GWOT) and on Iraq. On average, General Pace
spends approximately 80 percent of his time on operational issues and 20
percent on acquisition and procurement issues.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Generals Meyers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and General Pace have
regular interaction with the Service Chiefs and the Combatant Commanders. One
of the tasks of both Generals Pace and Myers is to be advisors to the Service
Chiefs on issues related to the organization of their services in meeting today's
security threats.

An additional task is to review the organization of the Combatant Commands

(CC) to ensure they are prepared to meet the national security threats to the U.S.
After 9-11, the question raised was whether there should be a change in the
Unified Command Plan. The Chiefs discussed the way in which the military is
postured and what recommendations should be made to for improvements. The
issue of most concern at the time was whether there should be a command in the
United States for homeland security. This discussion led to the establishment of

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE

 UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE

NORTHCOM.l Another change was new responsibilities given to USSOCOM,

which now has the responsibility of a supported command for the GWOT. Both of
these changes were the result of the Chiefs and combatant commands discussing
relevant issues in a deliberative process.

The Development of Military Plans

In the formulation of military plans, the JCS is the link between the Chiefs of the
services and the Combatant Commanders. Statutorily, each Service Chief
provides military advice to the Chairman. In the process of developing military
plans and operations, the CC's will come to Washington and brief on the way in
which they would execute the plan and operation. During the meetings in
Washington, the CC and JCS representatives provide collective advice to the
combatant commander. If the plan is viable, the CC would return to his command
and continue developing the plan until it is ready to be presented to the
President.

Khobar Towers
Pace was the J3 when Khobar Towers was attacked. At that time, the general
belief was that Iran was responsible. It was years later when Pace learned who
planned the attack. In the aftermath of the attack, there was a change within the
Pentagon. For the first time within JCS an entity was established that was
dedicated to the protection of U.S troops.

The Development of a Military Plan

After 9-11, the Chairman tasked all the combatant commands to develop their
own CT plans for their AOR. These plans were given to J3 for review and revision.

To illustrate the military planning process, he used the example of the

Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM) who has within his area of
responsibility the Philippines. In the Pacific Command, there is regular CT
planning. The commander planned what he believed the military should do
regarding terrorism in the Philippines. A number of options were developed. One
option was the U.S. military taking the lead without assistance from another
country and without permission from the Philippines. This would not be the best
option, but it was one considered. Another option was to train the Philippine
army to engage in CT operations in their own country. The CC could rely on U.S.
intelligence and assist the Philippine army in the protection of their country and
ultimately in the larger CT effort.

The commander of PACOM met with Secretary Rumsfeld and Chairman Myers
and informed them that he would like to pursue the option of training the
Philippine army. The commander explained how he could train the Philippine
army in one year to eighteen months and provide them with other needs during

1 Pace is not aware of any discussion about the establishment of a NORTHCOM type of command within
the United States prior to 9-11.

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE 2

 ., ~
'.'

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE

•
.• :.""-!j"

that period (food, a place to live, etc). At the conclusion of the eighteen months,
the Philippine army would possess the skills necessary to conduct military
operations against CT targets

After these discussions with Rumsfeld and Myers, the commander refined the
plan. The next step was to bring in the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines,
followed by the Philippine government, and the military. Each step was a
deliberative process and only after everyone was pleased with the plan was it
taken to the next level.

As a result of this process, today there is an ongoing program to train and feed
the Philippine army to conduct operations against terrorists on the island. This
story is an example of how an idea that originates in the Pentagon is taken on by
a commander. However, it also illustrates what can happen under the initiative of
a commander. Regardless of how an idea originates, the process is the same.
There is a great deal of back and forth within the military and then back and forth
with civilians and other agencies including the Department of State, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the local u.s. Ambassadors and the relevant authorities
in the country involved.

How the Military is Adapting to its Combating Terrorism Mission

•
The process of the National Command Authority (NCA) deciding upon USG
military action is cumbersome. There is not enough time to come back to
Washington, D.C. to discuss military operations in response to timely
intelligence. Terrorists move around and do not stay in one place. Today in
Afghanistan and Iraq there are teams that have the capacity to collect
intelligence, and the assets to take action in local areas. These sub regional nodes
have ~een de,:,elop~ng an ~xpe~e in their ~gion and call Ulld~lISl ;:: kind
of actionable intelligence IS required to actl Irhese
forces can get to the target quickly and coli uct an operation wit out t e ackup
of a large military. !

What makes this process work is that the Principals have predetermined that in .
certain countries where there are terrorist problems, a small team can conduct
operations in a timely manner without having to request permission from the
NCA to act. In addition, these teams are not waiting for the terrorists to act first.
They act when they have intelligence ~b do so. They know the limits of their
authority and they can deal with problems as they occur. The more familiarity
that exists on how the terrorists operate, the more these teams know how to
address the terrorist threat. /

9/11 Classified Information

·e
...
UNCLASSIFIED/BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE 3
9/11 Classified Information
 UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE

• 9/11 Classified Information

9/11 Classified Informatio.n-~~:"",,",,!,_~

oday the relations between t e
CIAand SOFs are as good as they have ever been. This also extends to the
relations between George Tenet and General Me~.ersas well as at the CClevel.
__ ~,,-'"

9/11 Classified Information

How the Government is Adapting to Deal with CT

" -;.-

According to Pace, the USG is very good at preparing the President for making
decisions. However, when that decision is to be executed, the question then
becomes, what mechanism exists to tie together all the different USG CTefforts?

•
How is the USG to pull it all together? To date there is no mechanism to carry out
that task .

Before the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA),.allthe military services were separate.

While many individuals in the military resisted the implementation of the Act,
!".. . through the years the Act has resulted in a joint service in many respects. This
has been a positive outcome. What is needed now is a joint interagency task force
for the global war on terrorism that ties all the agencies' efforts together and sets
forth what agency is responsible for what particular area of the GWOT.This
would also establish which part of the government has authority for elements in
the field, or at least which agencies have coordinating authority to make things
happen in the field.

This need for coordination of the agencies is also required below the strategic
level. Combatant Commanders require the authority to bring together a joint
. j," interagency group in their region when it is necessary. There are currently
established Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) in some commands
(there is one "atCENTCOM).The JIACG is a way to empower the agencies at the
regional levels and allow them to take direct action. This is another mechanism
that shortens the time required to act on actionable intelligence.

Therefore, a better strategy for coordinating efforts to carry out Presidential

decisions is needed. There are two ways to accomplish that goal: and

•
. 1. A Goldwter- Nichols Act II at the strategic level for the interagency (he
noted that the Center for Strategic and International Studies is working on
this issue); :, ..

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE 4

 ~9/11 Classified Information

UNCLASSIFIED B~T 'COIviMISsioN SENSITIVE

•
'c'

2. Continue to establish interagency cellsoutside Washington DC that can act

on intelligence received throu'~h the use o(~.~e different instruments.

A problem in establishing regional interagency mechanisms is that unlike the

military, other agencies cannot direct their personnel togo to certain regions of
the world. For example, the military can
order their peopl4 IFor the
other agencies, it is voluntary. However-some of the most unpopular p aces in
the world also are where many terrorists'find sanctuary. As a case in point, the
Embassy in Afghanistan is very under staffed, How can the USG establish a viable
JIACG in important parts of the world when the interagency group may not be
properly staffed? Agencies should develop ~~ncentiveprograms to encourage their
employees to work in some of these less popular areas. For example, promotions
in the Department of State should be based en individuals spending time in some
of these regions, which will provide the neceSs.a.,....
..ry incentive to staff that region.
Actionable Intelligence

Intelligence is a very important requirement in \the GWOT. However, the USG is

weak in its human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. There should be more
robust u.s. HUMINT capability that should be trained to work with the HUMINT
capabilities of other countries. As noted earlier, the U.S. must improve its speed

•
and ability to take advantage of intelligence that is\obtained.

The intelligence that is required for a military operation is what will allow the
commander to embark on a military action and achieve strategic impact. Prior to
9-11, the intelligence that was needed to conduct an operation was the location of
VBL and other A-Q leaders. It was necessary to know'who the key players in A-Q
were and what the key nodes were. There must be a g~d nj~e of the, network
and how to take out the nodes to collapse the network. _ n conduct a very
good raid operation, however, it is important that they know where to conduct
the raid. Once there is intelligence on the nodes, the question becomes how to
find UBL or Saddam 50 the military can drop a missile on their heads or conduct
a snatch operation. That type of intelligence was very difficult to obtain prior to
9-11.

It is difficult to obtain actionable intelligence without adequate HUMINT. The US

must be able to have access to difficult places, which we could not achieve prior to
9-11. In addition.the HUMINT need not be solely US HUMINT. The US can rely
on its allies to help gain access to difficult regions of the world.

Why Was the Military Deployment into Afghanistan Difficult Before 9-11?
In addition to the problem of obtaining actionable intelligence, there were other
concerns regarding sending troops into Afghanistan. While the U.S. had the
ability to go into Afghanistan, the U.s. made a policy decision not to do so if there

•
was no cooperation with President Musharraf, the President of Pakistan. It was
State Department's role to contact Musharaf and engage him on this issue. .
However, since he was a General in the Army, Generals Abizaid and Franks also

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE 5

 UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE

engaged. While the US wanted to work with Musharraf and obtain his permission
to transit Pakistan, the US could not lean so hard on him that doing so would
jeopardize his position. Having said that, if the U.S. knew where UBL was, the
U.S. military would have gone to take him out and would have dealt with the
Pakistan issue afterwards.

There are also many costs involved in sending troops to into harm's way. As a
case in point, the costs that arose for the military in Somalia were the result of
faulty policy decisions. The troops were sent to Somalia to relieve the famine in
the country. The US military accomplished that task and more. By February 1993,
the famine was overcome. The UN was supposed to take over the operation,
however, "the UN did not know it was on the team." In May 1993, the decision
was made to disarm thelocals, However, Somalia is a country of hunters who rely
on guns for their food and self protection. In addition, the fact that the SOFs were
to be engaged in Somalia was kept so quiet that when they ran into problems,
there was no one there to provide them with assistance. The lesson from this
experience is that there must be very clear policy before there is military action.

Views on Preparing the Final Report

During an earlier luncheon with the Secretary of Defense and some of the 9-11
Commissioners, Pace was asked to give his thoughts on what would be useful in
preparing the final report. During the interview, Pace noted several issues to
remember when preparing the final 9-11 report.
1. When analyzing facts, look at the environment that existed at the time (pre
9-11) and the perspective of the policy makers at the time. Evaluate the
actions taken and decisions made in that light. The question to ask is
whether the actions and decisions made sense at that time.
2. One should ask oneself the following: if the policy makers knew then what
we know now, what would they have done differently?
3. Finally, the report should include an analysis of what organizational
changes are required for the future.

Pace also noted the inherent dilemma in the USG taking positive steps towards
the eradication of terrorism on a global scale. The more successful the US is in its
CT efforts in the short run, the more comfortable the public will be and hence, the
less the public will realize the US is still at war. The public will also be less willing
to sacrifice the resources of the nation that must be sacrificed in the GWOT. The
public must realize that the GWOT will be with the U.S. for a long time.

Who in the US Government is in Charge of the Hunt for UBL?

Generally, each U.S. Department head should feel responsible for doing what he
or she can do to find Usarna bin Laden. They should all share that responsibility
and dedicate as much energy as possible to that effort. However, there is no
named individual in the USG who has that as his or her sole responsibility.

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE 6

 UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE

While the US has found Saddam Hussein, UBL still remains at large. While many
have argued there should have been boots on the ground pre 9-11, there must be
an understanding that it was simply too difficult to undertake that task at that
time. The US had no intelligence that would help the US locate UBL's
whereabouts in Afghanistan. HUMINT was needed. Today, even with 10,000
troops in Afghanistan, we have not yet found UBL. Locating UBL requires an
ability to determine where the targets are scurrying in the network. One very
good intelligence lead can be followed up with another lead, but that initial lead is
required.

A Terrorism Czar

After giving it serious thought, Pace stated that it might be useful to have one
person that is responsible to the President or to the Principals for the GWOT.
Tenet may be the person to take on that monumental task because the USG relies
on the capabilities of the CIA to locate UBL. At this point, there is no mechanism
for Tenet, for example, to go to Treasury and coordinate the activities of the two
agencies. Other than close collaboration among these individuals, there is no
national coordination of the elements of national power in CT efforts.

The GWOT: A New Kind of War

Pace noted that the GWOT is a difficult war for people to comprehend. In this
war, bombs are not dropping regularly on the U.S. or on U.s. interests overseas.
There are no clear indications of war that people can point to on a regular basis.
In addition, while the GWOT is a global war, the U.S. does not have freedom to go
anywhere in the world it must to hunt terrorists. It is not like WWII when there
was freedom to attack the enemy in the many parts of the world. Today there is
no global battlefield.

Draining the Swamp

While the military and the CIA can continue their missions to find and go after
terrorist targets, it is also important to drain the swamp. The U.S. must engage in
a battle of ideas through persuasion and education of young minds. This is a "war
of ideas" and the U.S. is only beginning to realize the magnitude of the task.
However, the formula for winning this type of war has remained elusive. It is
important that other governments, like Saudi Arabia, understand the need to
engage in the war of ideas. The Saudi government was awakened to this need
after the May 12 attack on its homeland and today it is taking action to address
this problem. The U.S. can work to help them with this task, but not simply
through dollars. However, this is not really a U.S. military function.

Recommendations

Pace concluded the interview with four recommendations for the Commission:

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE 7

 UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE

1. Intelligence, intelligence, intelligence. There must be an integration and

fusion of intelligence both in the United States and with other countries;
2. HUMINT must be improved;
3. The U.S. must increase its ability to understand and identify the terrorist
nodes. The U.S. must respond in a timely manner to intelligence so as to
make a difference in capturing and eliminating the terrorists;
4. The entire realm of technology must be improved to assist in tracking the
terrorists. However, the US should not become enamored with technology.
The analysis of information by individuals is still going to make the crucial
difference in the quality of intelligence that can be provided to the
warfighter.

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE 8