INTRODUCTiON

Chapter 53: MATTER

THE GREAT IDEAS
who assert. its existence postulate it as.
stratum .orsupport for the sensible qualities
they perceive.
The question, therefare, is whether such a
substratumis a necessary oran
Berkeley does not deny the existence
of beings which cannot be. directly sensed. He
affirms the existence of the human spirit or
mind, of minds other than his own,and the
spiritual being of God. These must be inferred
to exist in order. to. explain the phenomena of
our sensible. experience. and the experience of
our own activities in thinking,
ing. If, in addition, theexistence of rnatter or:a
material substance were necessary to explain
the phenomena,. Berkeley would not. obj eet to
affinning its existence ;by if it
could in no way be directly perceived.
His argument therefore involves, first, a
denial of Locke's distinction between primary
and secondary qualities. Supposing it tobe
eral1yagreed that colors, sounds, odors have no
actual existence except in the perceiviIig mind,
he denies that perceptible figure, size, orma-
tion can exist othe:rwise. "It having been shown
that none even of these can
,vise than in a Spirit or Mind. which perceives
them, it follows that we have no longer any
reason to suppose the being of Matter."
Matter is not needed as a substratum
port for the qualities we perceive. This is the
second main point in Berkeley's argument.
"Though we give the materialists their external
they by theifown confession are never
the nearer knowing howour ideas are produced;
since they own themselves unable to compre-
hend in what Inanner body can act upon spirit,
or ho\v it is possible it should imprint any idea
in the mind. Hence it is evident that the pro-
duction of ideas or sensations in our minds can
be no reason why we should suppose Matter or
63
t4AltTERwe came out of the church,"says
...B.oswell in his Life.ofJohnson, "we stood
IKing for some time together of Bishop Berke"
,. ingenious sophistry to prove the,. non"
of matter, and that everythingin the
universe is merely ideaL I observed that though
are satisfied his doctrine is not true, itis im..
possible it. I shall never
crity With which Johnson answered, stnkIIlg
hisfoot with mighty force against a.large stone,
tin he rebounded from.it, 'I refute it thus.' ";
But Berkeley's argument anticipated Dr.
Johnson's style ofrefutation. "I donot argue,"
hctsa}0s, "against the existence ofany one thing
.we can apprehend either by sense or reflex"
ion.. That .. the' things I see with my eyes: and
touh with my hands do exist,. really.. exist, .1
maKe' not the least The. only thing
se existence I deny is that which philosophers
call Matter or corporeal substance. And in do..
ing. this there is no damage done to the rest of
mankind, who, I dare say, ,vill never miss it."
The rest of mankind .does necdto be .in-
structed, however, that when they use the
BJiord "matter," they speak of nothing. They
may from careless habit suppose they are
fing to the most obvious something there is in
tile world---..the solid, massy, concrete stuff of
BJihich .tangible, visible, movable, and moving
.tllings,aremade. Of them, Berkeley would ask
llowtney know such stuff exists. It is not itself

Wrt, perceive a variety of
sllapes, temperatures, textures, sizes, or exten"
-but these, Berkeley argues, have their
gin beingperceived. Even if certain of these
qualities, sometinlCS called "primary,"
sucb as figure, size, or weight, are supposed. to
ang to bodies when they are not actually
!Ieing sensed, they are not matter, but only its
properties. Matter itself is not sensible. Those
O.VEBLEN and LENNEs.lntroduction to [nfinitesi
Analysis
KLEIN Famous ofElementary GeolnetlY
--. Elementary, Mathematics from an Advance
Standpoint
POINCARE. Science and 1-lypothesis, PART II
--. The Value ofScience, PARTI, CH I; PART II
--. Science and Method, BK I, CH 2-"3;BK II, CH
CASSIRER. Substance and Function, PART I, CH 2-
SUP VI
E. V. HUNTINGTON. The Continuum, and Other Ty
of Serial Order
--. The Fundamental Propositions ofAlgebra
J. \v. YOUNG. Lectures on Fundamental Conceptso
Algebra and Geometry
JOURDAIN. The Nature of Mathematics
O. VEBLEN and YOUNG. Projective Geometry
B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CHI
--. Philosophical Essays, CH 3
--. Mysticism and Logic, CH 4-5
--. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, CH I
N.R. CAMPBELL. What Is Science?, cH6-7
MARITAIN. An Introduction to Philosophy, PART n(
--. Theonas, Conversations of a Sage, VI
N lCOD. Foundations of Geometry and Induction
VVHITEHEAD. A Treatise on Universal Algebra
--. An Introduction to .Mathematics
--.'. Science and the Modern Wor/d, CH 2
G. N. LEWIS. The Anatomy of Science, ESSAY 1-
HILBERT and ACKE.RMAN. Grundziige der theore
schen Logik
BUCHANAN. Poetry and Mathematics
M. R. COHEN. Reason and Nature, BK II, CH I
A. E. TAYLOR. Philosophical Studies, CH III
GILSON. The Unity ofPhilosophicaI Experience, CH
DEWEY. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, CH 20
CARNAP. Foundations of Logic and Mathematics
BELL. The Development of Mathematics
G. H. HARDY. A Course of Pure Mathematics
--. A Mathematician's Apology
KASNER and NEWMAN. Mathematics and the lma
ination
COURANT and ROBBINS. What Is Mathematics?
WEYL. The Philosophy of Mathematics and Natu1j
Science
62
SACCHERI. Euclides Vindicatus (Vindication o.fEuch'd)
VOLTAIRE. "Geometry," in A Philosophical
tionary
EULER. Elements ofAlgebra
CARNOT. Rijlexions sur lametaphysique du calcul
jinitesimaJ
GAUSS. Untersuchungen fiber hohere Arithmetik
SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL II,
SUP, CH 13
DE MORGAN. On the Study and Difficultz'es ofMathe-
1natics
COMTE. The Philosophy of Mathematics
--. The Positive Philosophy, BK I
LOBACHEVSKI. Geometrical Researches on the Theory
of Parallels
WHEWELL. The Philosophy ofthe Inductive Sciences,
VOL I, BK II, CH 11-12, 14
G. PEACOCK. A Treatise on Algebra
B. PEIRCE. An Elementary Treatiseon Curves,
tions, and Forces
W. R. HAMILTON. Lectures on Quaternions
RIEMANN. ijber die Hypothesen welche der Geometrie
zu Grunde liegen (The Hypotheses of Geometry)
BOOLE. A Treatise on Dijferential Equations
--. A Treatise on the Calculus ofFinite DiJferences
DEDEKIND. Essays on the Theory of Numbers
CLIFFORD. Preliminary Sketch of Biquaternions
--. On the Canonical Form and Dissection of a
Riemann's Surface
J EVONS. On Geometrical Reasoning
LEWIS CARROLL. Euclid and His' Modern Rivals,
GIBBS. Collected Works '
C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL III, par 553-5621,
609-6 45
FREGE. Grundgesetze der Arithmetik
BURNSIDE. Theory of Groups of Finite Order
CANTOR. Contributions to the Founding ofthe Theory
of Transfinite Numbers
HILBERT. The Foundations of Geometry
PEANO. Arithmetices Principia
--. Formulaire de mathematique
--. Arithmetica generaIe e algebra elementare
BONOLA. Non-Euclidean Geometry
E. W. HOBSON. The Theory of Functions of a Real
Variable and the Theory of Fourier's Series
THE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 53: MATTER 64
corporeal substances, since that is acknowl-
edged to remain equally inexplicable with or
without this supposition."
BERKELEY'S ARGUMENTS against matter, which
occupy the greater part of his Principles ofHu-
man Knowledge, may not have the same force
when they are applied against different theories
of matter. Berkeley seems to regard his attack
on materialism as the refutation of an error at
the root of skepticism, atheism, and irreligion.
He also thinks rnaterialism creates .difficul ties
for the sciences. But are all affirmations of mat-
ter to be lumped together as materialism in the
same sense? Are Aristotle, Plotinus, Descartes,
Spinoza, and Locke materialists in the same
sense as Lucretius, Hobbes, and perhaps Marx?
Does it make no difference whether bodies are
said to be the only real existences, or whether,
in addition to bodies, immaterial substances or
spiritual beings are also said to exist?
Does it make no difference how matter is
conceived-whether as a self-subsistent sub-
stance in its own right, capable ofexisting apart
from any qualities except extension and motion
which belong to its very essence, or merely as
one factor in the constitution of bodies, the
factor of potentiality which, as will be presently
explained, has no existence apart from the
forms which actualize it? Are skepticism, athe-
ism, and irreligion to be associated with all
affirmations of matter, in view of the fact that
theologians like Augustine and Aquinas seem to
think that a sound view of matter supports the
truths of religion against the errors of the
materialists?
There seem to be, in short, three distinct
positions to \vhich Berkeley's blanket denial of
matter stands opposed. The diametrically op-
posite view seems to be the blanket denial of
anything except bodies, or of anything which
cannot be reduced to a property or function of
nlatter. The atomism of Lucretius, discussed
in the chapter on ELEMENT, may be taken as
representative of this view, though Engels
\vould insist that materialism can be dialectical
rather than atomistic or mechanical.
Between the two extremes, there appear to
be two middle positions which are alike insofar
as both affirm the immaterial as well as the
material. Although they are alike in asserting
the existence of spiritual substances, they ma
of course, define the nature of these immateri
things differently, and differently interpr
their relation to the realm of matter. But,
theories of matter, their principal differen
consists in the way in which they conceive t
being of bodies, material substances, or t
bodily mode of substance.
In the conceptions of Descartes and Lock
for example, it is matter which gives actuali
to sensible bodies. We have "no other idea
notion of matter," Locke writes, "but sam
thing wherein those many sensible qualitie
which affect our sense, do subsist." The enti
substance of sensible bodies consists of matte
All their properties derive from the essence
nature of matter. But in the conceptions
Aristotle and Plotinus, bodies would not exist
all if they were composed only of matter,
matter is no more than a capacity for being, n
something which by itself actually is. Sensib
bodies derive their being and all their attribut
from the forms which matter assumes wheni
potentialities are actualized. Matter totallyd
void of form is not the nothing Berkeley calls i
but it is so near to nothing that Plotinus says
is "more plausibly called a non-being ... a ba
aspiration towards substantial existence."
These theories of matter or corporeal bei
seem to be as contrary to one another as t
gether they are contrary to Berkeley's doctrin
Yet each of the two middle positions lea
toward one of the opposite extremes.
The conception of matter seems to be ve
much the same in the complete materialism
Lucretius and Hobbes and in the view of D
cartes, Spinoza, and Locke. In the former, on
bodies exist. In the latter, bodies do not co
prise the whole of existence, but matter is t
whole substance of bodies. The separation
body and mind, or matter and spirit, into di
tinct substances, or modes of substance, leav
matter the same kind of stuff that it is in
world which admits of no other reality. Ato
ism, furthermore, may be common to bot
theories, at least to the extent that it is hel
that the complex bodies we perceive are co
posed of minute and insensible particles. U
like Lucretius, Locke may not insist upon t
absolute indivisibility of the particles, or upo
the eternity of the uncreated atoms of matte
he, like Hobbes and Newton, carries the
sion of the familiar. bodies of sense-expe-
ce down toparts which cannot be perceived
d yet have, in a way, a more ultimate reality
an its of rnatter than the complex bodies they
(ponstituteo
f-Jad we senses acute enough to discern the
ute particles of bodies, and the real can"
titution on which their sensible qualities de-
s d," Locke writes, "I doubt not but that
quite different ideas in us; and
tnat .which is no\v the yellow color of gold,
would then disappear, and instead of it we
sno
uld
see an admirable texture of parts, of a
size and figure."
the other extreme, Berkeley's complete
Cienial of matter has less in common" wi th the
'ViewofAristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, and Aqui-
nas than the theory of Descartes, Spinoza, and
llliocke has with the materialism of Lucretius
and .. Hobbes. They would appear. to be close
enough, for one seems to hold that matter is
almost non-being and the other that rnatter is
simply nothing at all. .But where Berkeley de-
nies any role to matter, Aristotle and those who
take his view affirm matter to be an indispen-
saDIe factor in the constitution of physical
tnings. They do not question the reality of bod-
iesor their existence apa.rt from mind. On both
of these points they are as opposed to Berke-
ley as they would be if they were complete
materialists. Nevertheless they lean toward
:Berkeley rather than toward the other extreme
in one respect. Where Berkeley denies the
existence ofmatter, they deny its substantiality.
'Where Berkeley says matter has no being, they
saY' it has the lowest grade of being-on the
'Very verge of not being!
IN SPITE OF ALL the differences noted, the idea
matter has a certain constant meaning
throughout the tradition of the great books.
It is generally associated with the idea of
quantity, and especially the basic magnitudes,
such as time, space, and mass. Sometimes it is
saicl that the essence of matter itself is exten-
sioft; sometimes that bodies-not matter itself
-have the property of tridimensionality. But
in either case that which is or has matter in it
necessarily occupies space.
The manner of that occupationis also gener-
6S
ally agreed upon. Two bodies or t\VO distinct
quantities of matter cannot occupy the same
place at the same time. A body may not be im-
penetrable in the sense of being indivisible, but
so long as it remains the whole that it is, it offers
resistance to other bodies tending to move into
the place it occupies.
There is another connection between rnatter
and quantity. To those who ask what makes two
otherwise identical things two in number........ or
what is involved in the merely numerical dif-
ference of things alike in every other respect-
the usual answer is in terms of matter. Matter is
traditionally spoken of as "the principle of in-
dividuation." Aquinas, for example, holds that
angels, unlike physical substances, cannot differ
from one another as do numerically distinct in-
dividuals. Because they are immaterial, they
can differ only as do species or kinds. "Such
things as agree in species," he wri tes, "but differ
in number, agree in form, but are distinguished
rnaterially. If, therefore, the angels be not com-
posed of matter and form, it follows that it is
impossible for two angels.to be of one species;
just as it would be impossible for there to be
several \vhitenesses apart, or several humanities,
since whitenesses are not several, except in so
far as they are in several substances."
The way in which matter is related to in-
dividual differences can be exemplified in works
ofart. T\vo calls, stamped out of the.same kind
of rnatter by the impression of the same die,
may differ in no other discernible respect than
that they are ttllO of the same kind. Their
twoness seems to be somehow related to the fact
that each consists ofa distinct quantity of mat..
ter. But it may be asked how two units of mat-
ter have the distinction of being t\VO while they
differ in no other respect. One answer to this
difficult question is that their distinction con-
sists in their occupying different places. In the
Platonic theory of the origin of many particu-
lars all participating in the same form, diversity
of place seems to play the role which matter
plays for Aristotle and Aquinas.
Plato's doctrine of the receptacle, which is
discussed in the chapter on FORM, is sometimes
interpreted by conceiving the receptacle as
space, and sometimes by conceiving it as mat-
ter. The receptacle, it is said in the Timaeus, is
that which, "while receiving aU things, never
TfffiE @REAT IDEAS 67
the atoms, as in Lucretius, and Newton; Of, asin
Spinoza,it may he established"by the.,uncrieated
and eternal nature ofGod. "By body,,','; Spinoza
wri tes, ,"I understand a mode which expressesin
a certain and,determinate manner the essenceof
God in,:$O far asHe is considered as the thing
exte,nded."
In the modern,development of the science of
mechanics the law of the cOilservationQfmat-
terseems to be andther>cxpression,of the. same
insight. "We may lay it down as an
able. axiom," Lavoisier writes, "that til; all the
operations oartal1dnature, po;thing
an equal quantity of matter
and afterthe experimerr,t." What appears
the destruction. gfabody is merely.thetratls-
fornlation of its matter into another physical
condition, without lossofmass unless.the.t;eis an
equivalent gain totaLquantity
otmaJter and energy remains cons.tant:throllgh-
out all physical; changes.
But though change or motion seems to be in-
herent in the material \V()rld, of
bodies, as well as the frnmutabili ty .of rnatter,
seems to be differently conceived according to
different The. difference
between, the physics of Aristqtle and thephys-
of Descartes can be expressed in. tt;rmsof
contrary definitions of motion, or '. divergent
notions of causality, but of these differ-
ences is fully intelligibleflpart from the vari..
ance of these theories from one another orr the
nature of matter.
When matter isan actual substance, whose es."
sence is extension and whose chief
local motion, the principles of physics are me"
chanical. The laws of mechanics, with
space, and mass as their fundamental variables,
seem to have a universality adequate for de-
scribing all natural phenomena. All. changes in
material things are either the local motions of
bodies or the result of the local motions oftheir
parts. Motions are determined in their magni..
tude and direction by the impressed forcew4ich
one body exerts upon another and the resistance
of. that other..Motion is itself completely ac"
tuaI, as Inatter is; and the only type of cause to
which physics need appeal is, the efficient cause,.
that is, the push or pull of one body upgll
another.
Physicists who share this conception ofmat..
GRAFTER 53: MATTER
ita
tion
which belongs; to., everything
".As matter is, said to cause the
'numerical Qf.bodies, so is- it
ake sensations' alldjmages .
s of the mind"7"""'" that is, of
ti1'lgonly particular not genet..
orcl(isses.. Hence such theories' face the
f the relation of se.p.sations
'universal intentions of the mind," its
or abstract" ideas.
ORE 'tRADITIONAL Jl1e<;ining q matter re-
tobementioneq./fhe ofphysics
hanics are concerlled with changeqrmo-
'heyarenot.concernecl, with ffil.1tabjii ty
ral, but with the ofmutability
ifested .M(lterial
are never conceiveei ,as unmov9-1\)le or
able..
qll:estion whether 111atter itself is
as. different meaningsfor differenttheories
tter.On the. theory (discussed in the
er on CHANGE) that matter and form are
her principles pf change in changing
stances, it is. neither matter nor form but the
ancecompositeof matter G,lnd.form \-vhich
ges. Those who think that the motions of
hysical world are without .beginning and
II1G, attribute a similar eternity to matter and
ceive it as. imperishahie.. rrhe .theologians
wno think that God can annihilate .wha.tever
reates,do not hold that matterisindestruct-
but they nevertheless attribute. everlast-
ing endurance to rnatter in God's plan. Aquinas,
tot" example, in his treatise on the end of the
world, describes the final conflagration which
will purge the material universe but leave its
matter in existence under the forms of the ele-
ments and the heavenly bodies. "The world
will be renewed," he writes, "in such away as
to throw off all corruption and remain forever
at rest. " I-Ience nothing can be "the subjeFt of
tn.atrenewal, unless it be a subject of incorrup-
tion," such as "the heavenly bodies, the ele-
ments, and man."
On other theories of matter the fact thatmo-,
tion is regarded as an intrinsic property of bod-
i(t$ seen1S to be similarly consistent with the
notion that matter itself is immutable or inde-
structible. This indestructibility may be con-
ceived in terms of the absolute indivisibility of
It is supposed that some of the qualities
we sense in bodies are actually in them V\T
t
we sense them or not-such properties as
figure, weight, motion. Other sensible qual
such as' colors, .odor9; temperatures, or so
are supposed to be effects produced by the"
tionsof material particles actingon sensi
apparatus of animals. This distinction betw
"vhat Lockecalls "primary and secondaryq
ties"-found also in Lucretius and Descart'
is more fully considered in .the chapters
QUALITY and SENSE, but here it calls attent
to the problemoEhowmatter, devoid of cent
sensible .qualities,. causes' these quali ties .' to a
For Lucretius the peculiar difficulty oE
problem seems to lie in the fact that these
tive animal is itself nothing but a material s
tern., All its powers and acts are.conceived
functions of matter in motion. Hb\\\ then, d
moving matter within. the organism gene
certain qualities which do not belong tomovi
matter outside the organism? For Locke
problem raises a difficulty of still another so
Secondary qualities, such. as; colors, soun
odors, exist only as sensations in the mind.
corporeal substances, or bodies, such qualit
he writes, "are nothing but the powers th
substances have to produce several ideas in
by our senses; which ideas are not in the thin
themselves, otherwise than as anything is in
cause." Though they result from the impact
moving particles on.. , the bodily sense-orga
they do not belong to the \vorld ofmatter at a
but to the realm of spirit. How, then, do t
motions of matter cause effects which ex'
only in the immaterialdomain of mind?
These questions indicate some, of the pr
lems of matter as an object, condition, or cau
of knowledge. 1'hey also show how the natu
of the problem varies with different eonce
tions of matter, both in itself and in its relati
to mind. There are still other problems whi
confront those theories of mind which separa
reason or intellect from the sensitive faculty
In .such theories the consideration of rna
ter's relation to mind goes beyond the questi
of the origin of sensations. It takes sensatio
and images as. somehow the functions of Iivi
matter-the acts of the various sense-orga
and the brain. But sensations and images, b
cause they are acts of corporeal organs, have th
66
departs. at all. romher .. own nature' and never,
in anyway, or at any time, assumes:a form like
that ofany enterimtoher."
This, accor4.iag to Plotinus, nleans that "its one
form. is an invinciBle ;formlessness. "
But plotinus, who combines Plato's doctrine
of the receptacle and the orms:with Aristotle's
theory of.potentiality and actuality, ,holds-'that
it ismatter,not space, which is "tho irece:l?:ta(11e
and ,nurse of aU says that
".recipient and nurse" is' .abetterdescription
of matter than the term "mother," for,that
term "is used by those who thinkofa mother as
matter to ,the offspring, asa conta.1neronly,
giving nothing to them." In his own vle"v,: mat-
teris more than space or mere receptivity. He is
willing to admit the "parallel with mother-
hooel" onlyto the extent that "matter is.sterile,
not Jemale .. to full effect, female .in receptivity
only, not in pregnancy."
TRADITIONALLY, the distinction between uni..
versal and particularisunderstoodas.a distinc-
tion between.. the ip.telligible. and '. the'. sensible.
This indicatesanother traditional meaning of
matteror the material..The realm. ofsensible
things is the realmofboclies.Butthe atoms
which are the elementary bodies are.also usually
called "insensible. particles of matter." This,
however, can be interpreted to mean, not that
a definite rnaterial' mass or bulk is in itself ab-
solutely intangible or imponderable, but. that,
because of the lilnitation in our senses, it is
perceptible to us. On this interpretation .it
would then seem possible to say that allbodily
existence is sensible existence.
But if we ask about the sensihilityof matter
itself, ,rather than of bodies la.rge or small,
questions arise \vhichare more difficult. to
solve. On one theory of matter,matterdevoid
of form is as insensible as it is unintelligible, yet
forms which are not material, that is,not in
matter, are also insensible but not unintelligi
j
ble. On the contrary, they are regarded as more
perfectly intelligible than embodied forms.
I-Io\v, then, does rnatter "vhich is itself insensi-
ble cause the forms \vhich it assumes to becolne
sensible \vhen they are. rnaterialized ?
The theory of matter which does not regard
it as a co-principle with form seems to be con-
fronted with a different problem of sensibility.
THE GREAT IDEAS
IN THE TRADITION of Aristotle's physics and
metaphysics, especially as developed by Aqui-
nas, rnatter and form become basic analytic
terms, often having a significance remote from
their original meaning in the analysis of change.
The conception of prime (or formless) matter
as the substratum of substantial change leads to
designation of the formed nlatter under!y-
109 accidental change as "second matter." This,
i? turn, is called "signate matter" when, con-
SIdered as the matter ofan individual substance
is viewed as having the limiting
hons of individuali ty.
"NIatter is t\vofold," Aquinas writes, "con1-
RISl'OTLE's DEFINITION of matter as "the pri-
mary substratum of each thing, from which it
comes to be without qualification, and which
persists in the result" not only signifies an ob-
ject \vhich the physicist must apprehend ana-
logically (i.e., by comparison with substantially
formed matter like wood and bronze), but also
indicates that matter, by definition, must be in
itself both unintelligible and non-existent.
What Aristotle calls "the primary substratum"
is later called by Plotinus "primal matter," by
Augustine "formless matter," and by Aquinas
"prime matter." Since they all agree that that
which is wi thout form lacks all determination
and actuality, they deny that it can have exist-
ence by itself or be an object of knowledge,
either by sense or reason.
Augustine and Aquinas go further. They
deny even to God's omnipotence the power of
creating matter without form. They speak of
matter not as created, but as concreated, that is,
united at the very instant of its creation with
the forms it must assume in order to exist. God
"made formless matter of absolutely nothing,
and the form of the world from this formless
matter," Augustine writes. Yet I-Ie "created
both simultaneously, so that form came upon
matter with no space of time intervening."
CHAPTER 53: MATTER 69
tlerlyingnature," Aristotle says that it "is an man, and signate or individual; common, such
'eet of scientific knowledge by analogy. For as flesh and bones; and individual, as this flesh
the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the and these bones." When the intellect forms
so is the matter and the formless before re- concepts of different kinds of physical sub-
'ing form to anything which has form,and stances, it abstracts "from the individual sensi-
so also is the underlying nature to substance, ble matter, but not from the common sensible
i.e., the actually existing." matter." In defining the nature of man, for
example, we abstract, Aquinas says, from "this
flesh and these bones,which do not belong to
the species as such, but to the individual"; hut
we do not abstract from the fact that man, con-
sisting of body and soul, is a thing of flesh and
bones.
To say that man consists of body and soul is
to indicate that common matter enters into the
definition ofman as a physical substance. But in
distinction from definitions of this type, which
are proper to physics, mathematical and meta-
physical definitions carry the abstraction from
matter still further. Tn mathematics, Aquinas
declares, the intellect abstracts "not only from
individual sensible matter, but also from com-
mon sensible matter." In conceiving numbers
and figures, the intellect does not, however, ab-
stract from matter entirely, but only from in-
dividual intelligible matter. The common intel-
ligible matter which is represented by "sub-
stance as subject to quantity" underlies all
mathematical notions. "But some things,"
Aquinas maintains, "can be abstracted even
from common intelligible Inatter, such as being,
unity, potency, act and the like, all of which can
exist without matter." Such abstraction char-
acterizes the concepts of metaphysics. Aquinas
thus differentiates the three speculative sci-
of physics, mathematics, and metaphys-
ICS In terms of three grades of abstraction, each
distinguished by the type of rnatter from which
the concepts of the science are abstracted.
vVith one exception physical matter is not
said to be of different kinds when it exists under
different forms. The one exception for both
Aristotle and Aquinas is the matter of terres-
trial and celestial bodies.
Basing his inference on the observations avail-
able to him, Aristotle holds that the heavenly
bodies are eternal-"not subject to increase or
diminution, but unaging and unalterable and
unmodified." Immutable in every other way,
they are, however, subject to local motion.
Since they are eternal, both their matter and
respects in which the substance is actually
terminate), and lacks certain forms which it
assume (the respects in which the substanc
both indeterminate and potential).
As the chapter on indicates, Aristo
frequently uses artistic production to affor
simple illustration of his theory of matter a
form as principles of change. When a man s
out to make a bed, he chooses material, such
wood, which can be shaped in a certain wa
The same wood could have been made into
chair or a table. With respect to these vario
possible determinations in structure, the w
is itself indeterminate and determinable.
Before the artist has worked on it prod
tively, the wood is in a state of both privati
and potentiality with regard to the form of
bed, a chair, or a table. The transformati
which the artist effects consists in his actuali
ing certain potentialities in the material
forms or determinations which the rnaterial
the moment lacks. When the bed is made, t
\vood or matter which is now actually in t
form of a bed may still have the potentiali
for being remade into a chair or table.
The wood, of course, remains actually wo
throughout these artificial changes, as it do
not when it suffers the natural change of co
bustion. This indicates that though the wo
may be called Inatter or material by the arti
it is not matter, but a substance, a thing co
posite of matter and form; for when the wood
reduced to ashes by fire, the matter which h
the form of wood assumes another form.
In the analysis of accidental change, whi
artistic production illustrates, it suffices
treat a composite substance, like wood or ir
or bronze, as the material principle. But in t
analysis of substantial change, when matter
self changes fronl being one kind of nlatter
being another in the coming to be or perishi
of composite substances, the material princi
must be pure matter-matter totally devoid
form. Where a whole substance can be
garded as the matter or substratumofacciden
change (in quality, quantity, or place) the su
stratum of substantial change, which Aristo
calls "generation and corruption," must
matter in a condition of absolute indeterminac
and pure patentiality.
Referring to this ultimate substratum as "t
REMOVE MATTER entirely from a thing and,
according to Aristotle, you renlove its capacity
for physical change. Remove form, and you re-
move its existence, for nothing can exist with-
aut being actual or detenninate in certain re-
spects. When a thing changes physically, it
loses certain determinate characteristics and
acquires others. The determinations it acquires
it had previously lacked, yet all the while it
must have had a capacity for acquiring them.
The thing is "capable both of being and of not
being," Aristotle says, "and this capacity," he
goes on to say, "is the matter in each." T'he
matter of an existing substance is thus con-
ceived as that which has certain forms (the
ter may not agree, as Descartes and Newton do
not, in their mechanical formulations. They
mayor may not be atomistsiThey may, like
Lucretius, think that local motion is an abso-
lutely intrinsic property of the eternal. parti-
cles; or, like Descartes and Newton, they may
think that God first imparted motion to matter
at the \vorld's creation. They may hold that all
subsequent motions issue therefrom in a con-
tinuous chain of cause and effect. But when
matter is the only factor in the constitution of
bodies, and one body differs from another only
in its quantitative determinations, the conse-
quence for physical theory seems to be one or
another sort of mechanical formulation.
When matter is nothing more than a body's
potentiality for change, and when neither what
the body is nor how it changes can be explained
by reference to its matter alone, physical theory
seelns to be constructed in other than mechani-
cal terms. Its concepts and principles resemble
those of biology. It finds natural tendencies or
desires, and ends or final causes, in the motion
of inert as well as animate bodies.
Central to Aristotle's physics are his theory
of the four causes, discussed in the chapter on
CAUSE, and his theory of the four types of
change, discussed in the chapter on CHANGE.
But even more fundamental is his definition of
motion as the actualization of that which is
potential in a respect in which it is potential.
With motion so defined, the principles of phys-
ics must include the correlative factors of po-
tentiality and actuality which Aristotle con-
ceives in terms of matter and form.
68
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
5. Matter in relation to good and evil
'6. Criticisms of materialism and its consequences
1'1
and REP 220d-21b;'Q 7,AI, ANS 31a-d; A 2,
ANS and REP 3 "Q 14, A 2, REP Id
Q IS, A3, REP 18, A 4,
REP 2-3 Q47, A I, ANS
Q 86, A 3 463b-d; PART I-II, Q 10, A I, REP 2
662d-663d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART Q
52, A I, ANS 15d-18a; PART III, Q 2, A I, ANS
and REP 2 710a-711e
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, 13K I, 2sb
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH X,
SECT IS 295a-e
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT II
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-76e esp
186b-d / Judgement, 56sb-d;
la. Matter and the analysis of change: prime
and secondary matter; privation and
form; participation and the receptacle
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 45se-4s8b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BKI, CH
BK II, CH I [I93a9-b2I] cn 3
[I94bI6-I9Sa2I] 271a-d; BK II, eH 7-BK III,
CH 3 275b-280e; BK IV, CH 2 [209bI-2l0aI3]
288b-289a; CH 4 [2II
b
S-2I2
a
2] 290e-291a;cH
9 [2I7a20_b26] 297a-e; BK V'I, CH 10 [i40b8-
24Ia26] / Heavens, BK I, CH 33600.-
362a; BK III, CH 2 [30Ib33-302a9] 393b; BK
CHAPTER 53:. MATTER
REFERENCES
'Fo find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, 'which are the volume arid page
numbers of the passages referred to. For e.xample, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, B.K [26S-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume In the set; the number 12dlndlcates that the
sage is in sectiond of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: \Vhen the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example., in53 JAMES : Psychology, 116a-119b, thepassag.e
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends In the lower half of page 119. When the text IS"
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and of
hand side of the page, the letters eand d to the upper and lower halves of the. nght-hand sloeo(
thepage. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164e, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a \vorK (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in braCKets, aregive
ll
in
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK 11 [26S-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to bOOK, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of bOOKS or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:4S-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is
tently rather than continuously in the worK or passage cited.
For additional infonnation concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult thePreface.
1. The conception of matter as a principle of
change and as one constituent of the
being of changing things: the receptacle
or substratum
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 4sse-4s8b
8ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 4-9 262a-268d;
BKIII, CH 7 286e/ Metaphysics,
BK I, CH 6 [987bI9]-CH 7 [988bS] 50sd-s06e;
CH 8 [988b22-989b24] s06d-s08a; BK" II, CH 3
[99SaI S-I7] 513d; BK" V, CH 2 [IOI3
a2
4-27]
s33b; CH 4 534d-s35e; BK VII, eH 3
ss2a; CH 7-17 ss5a-s66a,c esp CH 7-9 sssa-
5s8a, CH 17 565a-566a,e; BK VIII 566a-s70d;
BK XII, CH 10 [I07Sa2S-33] 606a / Soul, BK
III, CH S [43oaIO-I4] 662e
12 AURELIUS: Aleditations, BK VII, SECT 23 281h;
BK XII, SECT 30 310a-b
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, sb
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VIII, CH 10,
32a-b / Second Ennead, TR IV-V sOa-60c;
TR VII, CH 3 64b-c / Thrd Ennead, TR VI,
CH 7-19 110d-119a / Sixth Ennead, TR III,
CH 2-8 281e-285d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XlI, par 6 100b-e;
par 14 102b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3,
A 2, ANS and REP 3 lsc-16a; Q 4, A 1, ANS
75
74
difference between celestialandterrestt1al In
ter or motion, and as the chapter on 'ASTRa
OMYshowTs, by so doing he not only gives-I
petus to the Copernican system, but also pa
the way for Newton frame laws ofmoti
applicable to matter everywhere in theu
verse. Because their matter is the same, it
possible, Kepler insists, to explain the motion
the heavenly bodies by the same principl
which account for the motion of bodies 0
earth.
THE GREAT IDEAS
I. The. conception of matter a principle of change and as oneconstituent of the being
of changing things: the receptacle or substratum
la. Matter and the analysis of change: prime and secondary n1atter; privation and
form; participation and the receptacle
lb. Matter in relation to the kinds of change: substantial and accidental change;
terrestrial and celestial motion
Ic.Matter and the distinction between individual and univ'ersal: signate and com-
mon matter; sensible and intelligible matter
2. The conception of matter as extension, as a bodily substance, or as a modeof substance:
atoms and compound.bodies
2a. The properties of matter: hypotheses concerning its constitution
2b. The motions of matter or .bodies
2C. Matter -as the support of s.ensible" qualities
2d. The diremption of body and mind, or matter and spirit
3. The existence of matter
3a. Matter as the sole existent: materialism,atomism
3b. Matter as the most imperfect grade of being or reality
3C. Matter as a fiction of the mind
3d. The relation of God to matter: the creation of matter and its motions
4. Matter as an object or condition of knowledge
4a. The knowability of matter: by sense, by reason
4b. The role of matter in the concepts and definitions of the several sciences: the
grades of abstraction in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics
4c.,The material conditions of sensation, imagination, and memory
4d. The material conditions of thought: the relation of matter to the existence and
acts of the mind
70
their motion must be. different from that of
perishable terrestrial ,bodies. "All things that
change hayematter," Aristotle writes, "but
rnatter ofdifferent sorts; of eternal things those
which are not generable but are movable in
space have for generation,
:however, hut for motion from one place to
another." That motion from place to place is,
unlike terrestrial niotion, circular; it has the
appropriate characteristic .ofendlessness.
Kepler challenges .. this .theory. 'of a radical
THE GREAT. IDEAS
CHAPTER 53: MATTER
72
(1. The conception of matter as a principle of
change and as one constituent of the being
of changing things: the receptacle or sub-
stratum. 1a. Matter and the analysis of
change: prime andsecondary matter;priva-
tion andform; participation and the recep-
tacle.)
IV, CH 5 403d-404d I Generation and Corrup-
tion 409a-441a,c esp BK I, CH 3 413c-416c I
Meteorology, BK IV, CH 12 [389b22-39oa7] 493d-
494a I Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 [987b30-988a8]
506a; BK II, CH 2 [994al-6] 512b; [994aI9-b8]
512c-d; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b24] 518a-c; BK
v, CH 4 [IOI4b27-IOISaIO] 535a-b; CH 6 [10168,
17-24] 536c-d; BK VI, CH 2 [1026b27-I027aIS]
549a-b; CH 3 [1027bIS-17] 549d; BK VII, CH
7-9 555a-558a; BK VIII, CH I [I042B24-b7]
566b-d; CH 4-6 568d-570d; BK IX, CH 7 574c-
575a; BK XI, CH 9 [106S
b
20-3S] 594a-b; BK XII,
CH 2-5 598c-601a; CH 10 [107Sa2S_b24] 606a-c
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation ofAnimals, BK I, CH 20
[729aIO]-CH 22 ]73ob33] 269b-271a
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VII, SECT 23
281b
16 KEPLER: Harmonies ofthe World, 1078a-b
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR III, CH 18-
TR V, CH 5 49c-60c I Third Ennead, TR VI,
CH 7-19 110d-119a I Sixth Ennead, TR III,
CH 2-8 281c-285d; TR v, CH 8 307d-308c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XII, par 3-6
99d-100c; par 8 101a-b; par 14-16 102b-103a;
par 24-26 104c-105b; par 28-"31 105c-107a;
par 38-4 I08d-110a; BK XIII, par 48 124a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A
2, ANS A 8, ANS 19d-20c; Q 4, A I,
ANS and REP 2 20d-21b; Q 5, A 3, REP 3
25a-d; Q 7, A 2, REP 3 31d-32c; Q 9, A I, ANS
38c-39c; Q 29, A 2, REP 3-5 163b-164b; Q 45,
A 2, REP 2 242d-244a; A 8 249b-250a; Q 46,
A I, REP 6 250a-252d; Q 47, A I, ANS 256a-
257b; Q 48, A 3, ANS 261b-262a; Q 66, A I
343d-345c; Q 77, A I, REP 2 399c-401b; Q
84, A 3, REP 2 443d-444d; Q 86, A3 463b-d;
Q 92, A 2, REP 2 489d-490c; A 3, REP I 490c-
49lb; A 4, ANS and REP I 491b-d; Q 103, A I,
REP 2 528b-529a; Q 104, A I, ANS and REP 1-2
534c-536c; Q 110 564c-568b; Q 117, A 3 598c-
599b; PART I-II, Q 22, A I, REP I 720d-
721c
20 AQUINAS: Surnma Theologica, PART I-II, Q 60,
A I 49d-50c; Q85, A 6 182d-184a; PART II-II,
Q 24, A II, ANS 498b-499c; PART III SUPPL,
Q92, A I, REP 12 1025c-1032b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, VII [121-
148] l16b-c; XIII [52-87] 126a-b
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK I, 25b
28 HARVEY: On Anirnal Generation, 407c-409b;
412a-415b; 494a-496d esp 494b, 495c-496a
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK III, CH X,
SECT 15 295a-c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT II 415a-b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 74b-76c; 100d-101b
lb. Matter in relation to the kinds of chan
substantial and accidental change; te
restrial and celestial motion
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK III, CH I [200
b
2
20I
a
I4] 278b-c;-CH 3 [202
b
22-29] 280c; BK I
CH 9 296b-297c es1J [2I7a20_b26] 297a-c; B
v, CH 1-2 304a-307b I Heavens, BK I, CH 2
359d-364a; CH 9-12 369a-375d; BK II, Cll
[287bIS-2I] 379b; BK IV, CH 3 [3IOb22-31IaI
402b-c; CH 4 [3 I2aJ-22] 403c-d I Generati
and Corruption 409a-441a,c esp BK I, cn
[320a2-6] 417a I lvfetaphysics, BK CH 7-
555a-558a esp CH 7 [I032aI5-22] 555a-b; B
VIII, CH I [I042a24-b7] 566b-d; CH 4 [1044b2]
CH 5 [I044
b2
9] 569a-c; BK IX, CH 7 [I049a19
bI] 574d-575a; CH 8 [I050b20-28] 576c-d
BK XI, CH II [r067bI]-CH 12 [lo68
b
2S] 596a
597d; BK XII, CH 2-5 598c-601a esp CH 2 [1069
24'-27] 599a I Soul, BK I, Clf 3 [406b26-407
13] 636b-637b
16 PTOLEMY: Alnlagest, BK I, Sa-6a; 8b; lOb-lIb,
BK XIII, 429a-b
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenl
Spheres, BK I, 517b-518a; 519b-520a
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 888b-890b; 894a;
929b-930b
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR I, CH 1-4 35a-
37b; TR IV, CH 6 51d-52a; TR v, CH 6 103b-
104a I Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 8-19 111e-
119a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 7, A
2, ANS and REP 3 3Id-32c; Q 45, A 2, REP 2
242d-244a; Q 46, A I, REP 1,3,5-6 250a-252d;
Q 48, A 3, ANS 261b-262a; Q 55, A 2, ANS
289d-290d; Q6b, 1\ I, ANS 343d-345c; A 2
345d-347b; Q 84, A3, REP I 443d-444d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q49,
A 4, ANS 5a-6a
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK VI, 110b-c
lc. Matter and the distinction between individ.-
ual and universal: signate and common
matter; sensible and intelligible matter
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 [987bI9-
98saI6] 505d-506b; BK III, CH 3 [998a20_bI3)
517a-b; CH 4 [999a24-IOOoa4] 518a-d; CH 6
[lo03aS-16] 521d-522a,c; BK VII, CH 10-II
558a-561a; CH 15 [lo39b27-3I] 563d; BK VIII,
CH 6 [r04sa33-36] 570a-b; BK x, CH I [IOS2
a
28--37] 578d; BK XII, CH 4-5 599d-601a; BK
XIII, CH 10 618c-619a,c I Soul, BK II, CH I
[412a6-81 642a
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK XII, SECT 30
310a-b
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 2-5
SOb-SId I Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 3 282a-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A
2, REP 3 15c-16a; A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 4, A I,
REP 3 20d-21b; Q 7, A I, ANS 31a-d; Q 14,
A II, ANS 84c-85c; Q 15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a;
Q 29, A I 162a-163b; A 2, REP 3 163b-164b;
A 3, REP 4 164c-165c; Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-
020
258c; Q 50, A 4, ANS 273b-274b; Q 56, A I,
REP 2 292a-d; Q 65, A 3, ANS 341c-342b; Q
75, A 4, ANS 381b-382a; A 5, ANS 382a-383b;
A 7, ANS 384d-385c; Q 76, A2388c-391a; Q 85,
A I, REP 2 451c-453c; Q 115, A I, ANS and REP
1-3 585d-587c; Q 119, A I,ANS 604c-607b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART. III, Q 2,
A 2, ANS 711d-712d; A3, REP 3 713a-714c
2 The conception of matter as extension, as a
bodily substance, or asa mode of sub-
stance: atoms and compound bodies
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-
173c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [146-448]
2d-6c; [483-634] 7a-8d
1'1 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 7, 52c;
CH 12 54c-55b; TR VII, ClI 3 64b-c I Third
Ennead, TR I, CH 2, 78d; TR VI, CH 7, lIla;
CH 12, 114b-c; CH I6-I9116e-119a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 271d-272a
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 131d-
132a
31 Rules, XIV. 28a-33b I "N!ed!"ta-
tions, II 77d-8ld esp 78c-d, 80b-d I ObJectzons
and Replies, l14d-115a,c; DEFVII 130c-d;
153c-154b; 231a-232a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 14, COROL 2-
PROP IS 360a-361d; PART II, DEF I 373a; PROP
2374a
34 NEWTON: OptiCS,BK lu,S3'7a-b; S4lb
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK en, CH
XIII, SECT 11-27 150d-154d passim; ClIXXIII
204a-214b passim; BK III, CH X, SECT IS
295a-c; BK IV, ClI X, SECT 9-19 351b-354c
passim
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9--17
4l4d-4l6b passim; SECT. 37 419d; SECT .50
422c; SECT 91-96 430d-431d
35 HUME: HU1rlan Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
123506a
42 Pure Reason, 15b-c; esp
lOOc-d I Judgement, 580c-d
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF,
3b-4a
45 FARADAY: Researches in. Electricity; 850b,d-
855a,c
53 JAMES : Psychology, 876a-b; 882a-884h
2a.The properties of matter: hypotheses con..
cerning its constitution
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK III, CH 4 [3()3
a
3:....
b8
]
394b-d I Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH
2 410d-413c; CH" 8 423b-425d I Metaphysics,
BK I, CH 4 [985b3-'19] 503c-d
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-
173c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK 1[146-920]
2d-12b; BK 11[333-990] 19b-27c
16 K.EPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 936a-937a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PARTIV,271d-272a
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BKII, 29c-30a
73
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY
178a-196d passim
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 8 140b;
APH 25 155a-d; APH 40 170c-173d; APH 48
179d-188b
31 DESCARTES:. Meditations, II, 78c-d; 80b-d I
Objections and Replies, DEF VII 130c-d; 154a;
231a-232a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 14, COROL 2-
PROP 15 360a-361d; PROP 25, COROL 365b;
PART II, DEF I 373a; PROP 2374a
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF 1 Sa; DEF III Sb;
BK II, PROP 40, SCHOL, 246a-b; BK III, RULE
III 270b-271a; PROP 6, COROL III-IV 281b;
PROP 7 281b-282b; GENERAL SCHOL,371b I
Optics, BK II, 479b-485b; BK III,S31a-543b
esp
34 HUYGENS: Light, CH III, 566b-569b; CH V,
60lb-603b
35 LOCKE: Human .Understanding, BK II, CHIV
129b-131a; CH VIII, SECT 7'-26 134b-138b
passim; CH XIII, SECT 21-27 1S2d-154d;cH
XXI, SECT 2-4 178c-179c; SECT 75 200b.. d;
CH XXIII, SECT 1-32 204a-212d passim; CH
XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d esp 239d; BK III, CHVI,
SECT 5, 269b-c; SECT 21 273c-d; CH X, SECT
IS 295a-c; BK IV, CH III,SEcr6 313c-
315b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9-18
4l4d4l6c passim; SECT 37 419d;' SECT 47
421t-422a; SECT 85 429c; SECT 91 430d-
43la
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 99a-100d esp 100c-d;
137a-140c; 152a-d
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART I,
9a-10c; 12d-13d; 16b-c
45 FOURIER: Theory ofHeat, 169b-170a
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 273a-276a;
386c-390d; 604c-632d esp 604c-607a,c, 626c-
632d; 819a-c; 850b,d:-85Sa,c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, .160c-d
51TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II,
695c
53 JAMES: Psychology,68a-b
2b. Tile motions of matter or bodies
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BKIV,CH 6-9 292c-
297c I Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 8
423b-425d \.
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12.172d-
173c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [329-397]
5b-6a; [951-1113] 12d-14d; BK II [62-.332]
l5d-19b; BK III [177-251 32b-c
19 AQUINAS: Summ.a. Theologica, :BART I,'Q47,
A I, ANS 256a-257b; Q 115, A I,' ANsandREP
3,5 585d-587c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 50a-b; PART IV,
268d; 271d-272a
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
157b-171b; THIRD DAY-FOURTHDAy197a..
260a,c
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 53: 'MATTER
74
(2. The conception of matter. as exte,,!sion,' as a
bodily substance" or as a mode of substanfe:
atoms and compound:bodies. 2b. The mo..
tions of matter or bodies.)
30 BAcoN: Novum Organum, BK I, APH66
114d"'115e; BK II, APH 35-36 162a-168d; APH
40 170e-173d; APH 48 179d-188b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V 54b-60c /
Objections' and Replies, 114d-115a; DEF VII
130e-d; 231a-b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics,PART II, LEMMA 1-7 318e-
380b
34NEWTON:' Principles la-372a / Optics, BK III,
541b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BKII, ClI XXI,
SECT 2-4 178e-17ge; CH XXIII, SECT I7209a;
SECT'22209d; SECT 28-29 211b.. 212a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLaws,BKI, 1 b
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry., PART I,
41b-c
45 FOURIER: The01Y of Heat, 169a-b
51{TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE
r695e
53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a; 883a..884b passim
2,0. Matter as the support of sensible
8 ARISTOTLE: Sense and the Sensible, reH 4
[442a3o..:-b24] 680a-e; CH 6 [445P4-446a20]
683h-684c
12 LUCRETIUS : Nature of Things,. BK, II [398-477]
20a-21a; [730-885] 24b-26b; BK IV;[522-721]
i51a-53d ..
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead,TR IV, ClI 8-13
52e-5Sd/ ThirdEnnead,TR VI, CH6-I9109d-
119a / Fourth Ennead, 'TIt VII, 'ClI 8, 196a-b
I SixtffEnnead, TR I, 'CH 29 267c-268b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, ,PART Ie, .49b-d'; 57a-b;
PART III, '172b
30 BACON: NovumOrganum, BK"II,APH 40
170e-173d
31 DESOARTEs:Meditations, II, 78e-d; 80b.:.d /
Objections and Replies, DEF VII 130e..d;228c-
22gb; 229d-230e;;231a-b
35 LOCKE: .. !jun1an " SH
VIII, SECT 7-26 134h-1381:> passim; clI XXIIi:
204a.. 214b passim, espSECT 1;...,6:204a-2<:>Se,
SECT I5208e-d
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 7-21
,414b-417a; SECT\ 37 419cl;SECT 49: 422b;
SECT 73 427b-e; SECT 76-78 427d428b;
SECT 91 430d-431a,
3,,5 HUME: Human' Underftanding, SECT XII, DIV
122-123 505ci:..5Q6a esp DIV 123'506a
42 .KANT: Pure .Reason, ,15b-e; 100e-d
53
i
JAMES: Psychology, 185a;331a; S03a
2d. The. direwption of body and mind, or lll,;it-
, ter and spirit
1,7 PLOfFINUS: .. First Ennead, TR I . la-fib>
3-71d-4a /Sixth Ennead, TR IV,: cH,r297b-d;
CH 4-6 299a-300b
19 AQUINAS: Sunl1na Theologica,
A4393a-394e
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 48d-SOb
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 51d.;.S2a
Meditations, II 77cJ-81d passim; VI 96b-1
passim I Objections and Replies, DEF VI-
130e; DEF X l30d; PROP IV l33e; 153e-lS'
224d.. 225d; 231a"'232d; 248b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART ,I, PROP 14, COROL
360a; PROP 15, SCHOL 360b-361d; PART
PROP 1-7. 373d-375e; PROP 10-13 376e-37
PART III, PROP 2 396e-398b; PART V, PR
451a-452e
35 LOCKE: Hun1an Understanding, BK II,
XIII, SECT 16 151d-l52a; CH XXIII, SECT
205a-b; SECT 15;""32 208e-212d passim;
XXVII, SECT 27 227d-228a; BK IV, CH' n
SECT 28 322a-e; CH x, SECT 9-19 351b-35
passim
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 18-2
416h-417'a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 84a-93b esp 88a-90a; 95b
98a; 115a-119b esp 118b-119b; 139a-l40
221a-226a esp 221a-222b; 225b-226a
3. The existence of matter
3a. Matter as the sole existent:
atomism
7 PLATO: Sophist, 567a-568a
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics,BKII,
269b"e /. Heavens, BK III, CH 4 [303a3-bg
394b.;.d /Generation and Corruption, .BK I, C
2 410d-413e; CH.B 423b-425d /Metaphysic.
UK I, ClI 3 f983
b
7]-CH 4
CH 8 [988b23-989b20] 506d-507d; BK VII, C
13 [I039a2-II]\562d; BK XII, eH 10 [175825
I07685J'606a-d
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH {2l72
173e
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, 'BK I [146-634

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BKIX, SECT 39 29Sa
BK x, SECT 6 297a-"b
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV, eH r SOa-
eH 7, 52e I Third Ennead, TR I, CH 3 79b-
j
c
Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 2-4 192a-193e
Six'Nt lnnead, TR 1,CH 25-30 265b-268e '
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions" BK v,parI9-2
3'2e-33b; par 25 34b-e; BK: VII,par 1-2 43
44a; par 7 45a-d
19AQ'UINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I" Q 4
A I, 'ANS 256a-257b; Q 50, A 1, ANS 269
270a; Q75, A I, ANS378b..31ge
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART Ill, 172b; PART I
269b-272b
30 BACON: NovU1n Organu111, BK II, APH
140b
35 LOCKE: Hutnan Understanding,
SECT 8-17 351a..353c passim
53 JAMES:: Psychology, 9$b-98a;
[fn I] ; 882a-884b
4a
Matter as the. most imperfect grade of be-
ing or reahty
7 PLATO: Republic, 423e-424a
2AURELIUS: Medztatzons, BK IX, SECT 36
.294d-295a
'1 PLOTINUS: First Ennead,TR' VIII, CH 4-5
28e-2ge; CH 7-8 I Second Ennead,
TR IV CH 5 51b-d; CH 15-16 56e-57c; TR v,
cIl 5ge-60e /Third Ennead, TR VI, CH
11-14 113a-116a
18AUGUSTINE: Confessions, . UK. XII, ,par 3-8
99d-101b; par 15 102b-e
19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica,. PART I, Q 3, A
8;ANS and REP 3 19d-20e; Q 4, A I,ANS and
REP 2 20d-21b; Q5,AJ, REP 3 25a-d;Q 7, A2,
REP 3 31d-32e;' Q 14, A I I, REP 3 84e-85e;
Q 15, A 3, REP 3 93b-94a; Q 46, ,A I, REP I
250a-252d; Q 84, A 3, .. REP 2 443d-444d;
Q 103, A 1, REP 2 528b-529a; Q 115, AI, REP
4585d-587c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXIX
[13-36] 150b-e
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK .II, CH
XXI SECT 2118e; CH XXIII, SECT 28 211b-d
35 Underftanding; .. SECT XII, DIV
123506a
3&. Matter as a fiction of the mind
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1-96
413a-431d passim; SECT 133 43ge:440a
35 HUME: Ruman Understanding, SEC1;XII, DIV
I23S06a
tl2 KANT: Pure Reason, 85d-91d esp 88b-e
tl4 BOSWELL: Johnson, 134e-d
3d. The relation of God to matter: the creation
of matter and its motions
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1.....2
ApOCRYPHA: . Wisdom of Solomon,
OT, Book of WisdQm, 11:18
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 448b-449a; 450b-451b;
458a-b; 466a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics,. l?K XII, CH 6
[I07IbI9-32] 601e; CH 10 [I075bI6-24]606e
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [146-158]
2d-3a; BK V [146-194] 63a-e
18 AUGUSTINE: . Confessions, BK VII, pari. 45a-
d; BK XI, par 7 90d-91a; BK XII, par 3-9
99d-101e; par 15.... 16 102b-103a; par 24-
105e-107a; par
38-4 108d-110a; BKXIII, par. 45 123a; par
48 124a / City of God, BK XI, .cli
335e
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,PARTI,.Q 8, A4,
ANS and REP I 37c-38e; Q IS, A 3, R'EP 3-4
93b-94a; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d;Q .44, A 2
239b-240a; Q 45, A 2, REP 2242d-244a; A
8 249b-250a; Q 46"A I esp REP I,3,5-6250a-
252d; Q 47, A 'I,;\NS 256a-257b;. Q 65, A 3
341e-342b; Q 66343d-349d;Q 75, A 5, REP
1,4 382a-383b; Q A 3, REP' 2 443d-444d;
'i5
Q 91 484a-488e; Q 92, A 2,REP 2 489d-490e;
A 4 491b-d; Q 103, A I, REP 2 528b-529a;
Q l0S, AA 1-2 538d-540e; Q, IIO,A2, ANS
565d-566d; Q 117, A 3, ANS and REP 2 598e...
599b .
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II" Q85,
A 6 182d,.184a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADlsE,vn[I2I-
148] 116b-e; XIII [52-84J 126a-b; XXIX [IJ...45]
150b-e
22 CHAUCER: Knight'S Tale [2987-3016l209a-b
30 BACON: of Learning, ... .. d
31 DESCARTES : Di,fcourSe,PART v, 54d,.56b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP I5360a-361d;
PART II, DEF I 373a; PROP 2 374a; PROP 7,
SCHOL 375b-e
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BKIII [694-735] 150b-
151b esp [708-735] 150b-151b;BK V [468-55]
185b-186a; [577-599J 187b-188a; BK VII [59-
640] 218b-231a esp [70-108] 2l8b-219b,[I92-
386] 221b,.225b
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 541b-543a
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK. II, CH XXI,
SECT 2178e;CHXXIII, S.ECT 28 211b-d;BK
IV, CH X, SECT 9-19 351b-354e '
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 67-
79 426b-428b passim; SECT' 91""-94' 430d-
431c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
132, 509d [fn I]
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Histqry, INTRO, 156d-
157b
4. Matter as an object or condition of knowl-
edge
4a. The knowability of matter: by sense, by
reason
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228d-22ge / Republic,BK IX,
423e-424a / Timaeus, 456a-458a
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 7 [I9Ia8-II]
266d I Metaphysics, BK VII,CH IS [I039b20-
I040a8] 563c-564a; BK IX, CH
574d-575a I Soul, BKIII,CH 4 [429bro-43089]
661d-662e
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things,BK I [265-328]
4b-5a; BK II [80-I4I]l6a-d
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead" TR VIII, . CH 9 31e-
32a I Second Ennead, TR IV, ClI 10 53b-d;CH
I254e-55b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions,< .BK XII, par 3-6
99d-100e
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3,
A3, ANS 16a-d; Q 14, A II 84e-85e; Q IS, A 3,
REP 3-4 93b-94a; Q 50, A I" 269b-2.70a;
Q 57, A I 295a-d; Q 66, A I,REP I 343d,.345e;
QQ 84-86 440b-464d; Q 87, A I, ANS 465a..
466e
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL,
Q92, A I, ANS aAd. REP.I21025e-10321?
30 BACON:. Novum Organum, BK .I, APfI .. 66
114d-11Sc
TI-IE GREAT IDEAS
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other considerations of matter as a principle of change, see ART 2b;BEING 7b(S); CHANGE
2a; FORM Id( I)-Id(2); and for the theory of celestial and terrestrial nlatter as distinct in
kind, see ASTRONOMY 8a; BEING 7b(3); CHANGE 7C(4); WORLD 6a.
The conception of matter as potentiality in relation to formas actuality, and for the theory of
physical substances as composite of matter and form, see BEING 7b(2), 7c(3); FORM 2C( 1)-
2c(3); INFINITY 4c; 11AN 3a; MIND 2b; ONE AND MANY 3b(4); SOUL 3c.
Considerations relevant to the doctrine that matter is the source of nUlnerical diversity or the
principle of individuality in material things, see SAl\tIE AND OTHER Ia; UNIVERSAL AND
PARTICULAR 3.
6. Criticisms of materialism and its conse-
quences
7 PLATO: Sophist, 567a-568a
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 2-5 633a--641d
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH I
[640b5-64Ia33] 163a-164b
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-
173c; BK II, CH 3, 185a; CH 6188e-191a
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR I, CH 2, 78d;
CH 3 79b-e / Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 6-8,
194b-197b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 75,
A I, REP I 378b-37ge; Q 84, !A I, ANS 440d-
442a; A 6, ANS 447e-449b
28 HARVEY:On Animal Generation, 355b-d;
495e-496d
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 21
417a; SECT 35 41ge; SECT 50 422e; SECT 85-88
42ge-430b; SECT 92"':96 431a-d; SECT 102
432d-433a; SECT 133 439c-440a; SECT 141
441a-b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 126e-d I Judgement,
558b-559d; 579d-580a; 582b-e
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK III, 140b;
143a-e; BK X, 449b-e; BK XI, 469a-472b;
BK XIII, 570d; BK XIV, 589c-590c; 609b;
EPILOGUE II, 678a-b; 68ge-690a; 694d-696d
S3 JAMES: Psychology, 5a; 8b-9a;84a-119b;
291a-295b; 655b-656a; 745a-b; 823a-825a
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 882b-884c
to 6 CHAPTER 53: MATTER 77
REP 2289d-290d; Q 57, A I, REP 3295a-d; Q 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 3 260b;
75, A S 382a-383b; Q 76 385e-399b; Q 77, A BKIX, SECT 36 294d-295a
5 403d-404e; A 8 406b-407a; Q 79, A 3 416a- 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VIII 27b-34a esp
417a; QQ 84-88 440b-473a esp Q 84, A 6-Q 8S, ClI 3-S 28a-2ge, elI 7, 30d I Second Ennead,
A 3 447e-457a; Q 110, A 2, REP I 565d-566d; TR IV, ClI 16 57b-e / Fifth Ennead, TR IX, CH
Q 117, A 3 598e-599b; PART I-II, Q 22,A I 10, 250e / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 27-29
720d-721e 334d-336b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q85, 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK V, par 19-21,
A 6 182d-184a; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, AI, 32e-33b; BK VII, par 1-7 par 18-22
j\NS and REP 10 1025e-1032b 49a-50a; BK XIII, par 45 123a I City of God,
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; 52b-e; BK XI, CH 23 334l:-335e
54b-c; PART II, 162c-; PJ\.RT IV, 262b 19 AQUINAs:Sunlma Theologica, PART I, Q3, A2,
30 BACoN: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 51 111e ANS 15c-16a; Q4, A I, ANS and REP 2 20d-21b;
31 DESCARTES:_ Rules, XII, 18b-20d; XIV-XV PART I-II, Q 17, 8, REP I 692a-e
28a-33d I Discourse, PART IV, 53b; PART VI, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, 1[97-142]
61e I Objections and Replies, 215b-e; 229d- 107b-d; XIII [52- 87] 126a-b
230c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 330a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH
XXVII, SECT 27 227d-228a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-24a esp 23b;
45d-46a; 48d-49a; 63a; 63d-64a; 6ge-
72c; 81b-83b; 85d-91d; 95a-d; 115b-e; 117b.;
119a; 173b-174a; 187a-e / Fund. Prin. Meta-
physic oflvIorals, 281c-282d I Practical Reason,
349b-35Oc esp 350b-e / Judgement, 542b-543c;
570b-572e;604a-b
49 DAR\VIN: Descent oflvIan, 288e-d
50 MARX: Capital, 11b-e
53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 2b-3b; 8a-67a
esp 9a-12b, 15b-17b, 43a-44a, 46a-47a, 51b-
52a, 53a-54a, 66b-67a; 69b-73b; 82b; 84a-
93b esp 84a-85a, 88a-90b, 91a-93a; 116a-119b
esp 119b; 151a-153a; 291a-295b; 367a-373a
esp 368a-369a, 370b-371a; 455b-456a; 690a-b;
758a-759a; 827b-835a; 856b-858a
54 FREUD: Hysteria, 87a / Interpretation of
Dreams, 154d-155a; 367b-e; 382a-e; 384e-
385a / Unconscious, 431e-d I Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, 646b-64ge
5. Matter in relation to good and evil
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-226c; 231e-234e / Ti-
maeus, 452d-453b; 474b-d I Statesman, 587a-
589c
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [I9Ib35-192R24]
267d-268e I Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 [988a7-I6]
506a-b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 9 114e-116b
4b to
4c. The material conditions of sensation, i
agination, and memory
7 PLATO: Meno, 177b-e
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH I [403
a
S'"'""2
632a-b; BK II, CHJ2 [424a25-bI9] 656a-d;
III, CH 3 [429
a
4-7] 661b; CH 4 [429
a2
9--
661c-d I Sleep, CH I [454aI-I2] 696b-e
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II L398-4
20a-2la; [73-864] 24b-26a; BK IV [26-2
44b-47d; [324-336] 48e; [522--817] 51a-54d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q
A2, ANS 37ge-380e; A 3, ANS and REP 2 380
381b; Q 76, A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 78, A
ANS 410a-411d; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443
A 6, ANs441e.!449b; A 7, ANS 449b-450
A8, REP 2 450b-451b; Q86, A4, REP 2 463
464d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I,
PART III, 172b-d; PART IV,
262a-b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII 18b-25b passilu
Meditations, VI 96b-103d passim
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17-18 380
382b
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 518b-519b; 522a
35 LOCKE: 1/uman Understanding, BK II, CH
SECT 23 127b; CH VIII, SECT 4 133d; CH
SECT 5 142a-b; SECT 10 143e-d; ClI XXI
SECT 3 CH XXXIII, SECT 6 249a-b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knotvledge, SECT 18-
416b-417a; SECT 2S 417d-418a; SECT 10
432d-433a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DI
123506a
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART
14a
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 85d-87a / Desc
o.f Man, 568d-569a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-3a; 13a-19b esp 15
17b, 19a-b; 26b-42a; 49b-50a; 98b-lO
passim; 348a-'359a esp 348a, 358a-b; 36
373a esp 368b-369a, 370a-b; e
428b-430a; 453a; 455b-457a; 459a-479a pa
sim, esp 460a-464a, 469a; 497a-501b; 520
521a; 758a-759a
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Drea1ns, 351e-35
esp 352a-b / Beyond the Pleasure Prineip
646b-648a esp 646c-d, 647d-648a
4d. The material conditions of thought: t
relation of matter to the existence a
acts of the mind
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 4 [408bI8-3
638e-d; BK III, CH 4-5 661b-662d; CH
[43IaI4-bI9] 663d-664b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [94-17
31b-32b; BK IV [722-817] 53d-54d
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 8, 195
19 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART I, Q3, A
REP 2 14b-15b; Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32e; Q 1
A 2, REP 1--3 76d-77d; A II, REP I 84c-8
Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a--272a; Q 55, A 2, ANS
4b. The role of matter in the concepts and defi-
nitions of the several sciences: the grades
of abstraction in physics, mathematics,
and metaphysics
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 455e-458b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II, CH 2 270a-271a;
CH 7-9 275b-278a,e I Meteorology, BK IV,
CH 12 493d-494d I lv[etaphysics, BR II, CH 3
[99SaI 5-20] 513d; BK III, CH 3 [99
8a20
-
b
14
] 517a-b; BK VI, CH I [I02S
b
28-I026
a
6]
547d-548a; BK VII, CH 10-11 558a-561a; CH
IS [I039b20-I04oR8] 563c-564a; CH I7 565a-
566a,e; BK VIII, CH 2-3 566d-568d; CH 6
569d-570d; BK X, CH 8-9 585b-586e; BK XI,
CH 7 [I064aI 9-28] 592c; BK XII, CH 9 [
Io
74
b
37-I075a2] 605e; BK XIII, CH. 2 [I077bII]-
CH 3 [1078a3I] 609a-d I Soul, BK I, CH 1
[403aI5-bI9] 632b-d; BK III, CH 7 [43
IbI
J-
I
9]
664b
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH I
[64IaI4-3I] 163d-164a
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, 13K I, 5b
19 AQUINAS: Sum1na Theologica, PART I, Q I, A I,
REP 2 3b-4a; Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 18, A 4,
REP 3 107d-108c; Q 29, A2, REP .3163b-164b;
Q 50, A 2, REP I 270a-272a; Q 75, A 4 381b-
382a; Q 85, A I, REP 2 451e-453c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q
9,A2, REP .3 424b-425a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43d-44e /
Novurn Organum, BK I, APH 51111e; APH 66
114d-115e; BK II, APH 8 140b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-e; XIV 28a-33b /
Objections and Replies, .169c-170a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knotvledge, SECT 50
422e; SECT 118-131 436b-43ge
(4. Matter as an object or condition of knowledge.
4a. Theknowability of matter: by sense,
by reason.)
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, I-II 75a-81d passim;
VI 96b-l03d passim I Objections and Replies,
229d-230e
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 15, SCHOL 360b-
361d
3S LOCKE: fluman Understanding, BK II, CH VIII,
SECT 7-26 134b-138b passim; CH XXIII, SECT
5 205a-b; SECT 15-17 208e-209a; SECT 22-32
209d-212d; BK IV, CH III, SECT 6 313e-315b;
SECT 9-17 315e-317e passim; SECT 23-27
320a-322a passim; CH VI, .SECT 14 335d-
336b
3S BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 16-24
416a-417d; SECT 54 423b
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
123 50Ga
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 186b-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 52
25a-e
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 231a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 140b-145a;502a-503b pas-
sim
76
II
ADDITIONAL READINGS
THE GREAT. IDEAS
79
The Nature ofExistence, CH 34
STOUT. Mznd and Matter
BROAD. The Mind and Its Place in Nature CH 4
PESCOQS. :,Essai. crJfiquesur l'
G. N. LEWIS.' T.he }A.natomy of Science, ESSAY IV
B. RUSSELL. Prtnctples of Mathematics, CH S3
--. The ofPhilosophy, CH 2-4
--..
--. The Analyszs of Matter, CHI-
1
4
McDouC:
ALL
. Modern Materialism and Emergent
Evolutton
SANTAYANA. Scepticism and Animal Faith, CH 19-
20
--.The Realm of Matter, 10
LENZEN. The Nature of PART IV
CH IS' - ... .. ,
KONINCK. Le probleme de l'indeterminisme
CHAPTER 53: MATTER
XWELL. Matter and Motion
ZE. Metaphysics, BK II, CH S-6
LANCK. Das Prinzip der der Energie
. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, )rOL'Vl, par 23
8
-
28
6.
SON. The Grammar ofSctence; CRB
H. "On the Principle of the Conservation of
ergy, " in Popular Scientific Lectures
QN. _. ...
ANOV. In Deftnse- ofMaterialism
................ Essays in the History of Materialisn1
ERSON. and Reality, CH 4-S, 7-
8
N. Matertaltsm and Empiriocriticism
IRER. Substance and Function, sUP IV
t. Space-Time-Matter
TEHEAD. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
15
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, v (3), x (
XII (3), XIII-XV, XVI (I), XXVI (2), XXVII, X
(4), XXXI (8, 10, 13), xXXIV (S..!6), XXXV (3,
XXXVI
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus T
misticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART I, QQ 2
9, I I
DIGBY. The Nature of Bodies
MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de fa verite,BK
(n), CH 8 (2)
LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning Hun-Jan Una
standing, APPENDIX, CH I
VOLTAIRE. "Matter," in A Philosophical Diction
HOLBACH. The System of Nature
J. PRIESTLEY and PRICE. A Free Discussion of
Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Nee
sity
SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, v
III, SUP, CH 24
BUCHNER. Force and Matter
HELMHOLTZ. Popular Lectures onScientiJic Subje
VII
LANGE. The Flistory of Materialism
B. STEWART. The Conservation of Energy
Listed below are works not included in Great Books ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topicswitll. which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
1. Works by authors 'represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which foHows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
For: The conception of matter or extension as a substance, or as H mode of substance, see BEl
7b(4); FORM zd; MAN 3a; MINDZg; SOUL 3c.
Atomism as a theory of matter and as a materialistic philosophy of nature; see ELEMENT'S
Sh; MIND 2e; and fordiscussions bearing on materialism as a philo.sophyofnature, societ
and history, see ELEMENT S; HISTORY 4a(z); MAN 3c; WILL )C.
.l\1atter in relation to mind,orbody in relation to soul, see MAN 3a; MIND 2a-ze; SOUL
3e; and for the discussion: qf immaterial substances, spirits, ,or' beings which 'exist apa
from matter, seeANGEL 2, 3q;BEING7b(z); ETERNITY 4a; FORza, zd.;GQD4,C; MAN 3a(I
MIND za; SOUL 3a-3c.
The theological problems of matter, its creation and conservation, see GOD 7a ;WORLD 4
4e( I).
The physical properties matter or bodies and the laws of their motion,see ,ASTRONOl
8c(3); MECHANICS 4H, sa-sf(z);;pa-6e; QUANTITY sd-se; SPACE Ia-Id; and for the pro
lem of the infinity of matter or of an infinite body, see INFINITY 4a-4b.
Matter as an object of knowledge, see KNOWLEDGE sa(2).
!\1atter in relation to sensation and to sensible qualities, see ELEMENT se; MECHANICS '1
QUALITY I;. SENSE 3C(3). .
Matter in relation to thought,abstract ideas, or, definitions, see DEFINITION 6a; FORM 3
IDEA2g; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6C(I); MIND Ia(z); SENSE sa; UNIVERSAL A
PARTICULAR 4c.
I.
AQUINAS. On Being and Essence
-.-.-.-. On the Power of God, QA
-,.-. De NaturaMateriae et Dimensionibus Inter-
/JJ1inalis
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I,
7....-8, 11-12., 62-:-65 ; PART II, 22-23; PART III,2f8-
102; PART/IV, 1-2 7, 31-48
H0
13
BES.. Concerning Body, PART II, CH 8
BERKELEY. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and
Philonous
KANT. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
J. S. MILL. An Examination of Sir William Hamil-
ton's Philosophy, CH 12-13 .
ENGELS. Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outline of Clas-
sical Gern1an Philosophy
II.
EPICURUS. Letter to Herodotus
ERIGENA. De Divisione Naturae
JUDAH HA-LEVI. Kitab al Khazari
CREscAs.Or Adonai, PROPOSITIONS 10-12, 16, 19-
24