Ordeals to Have Due Share of Transboundary River Water

Miah Muhammad Adel, P. O. Box 4941, University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff Pine Bluff, AR 71601, USA, e-mail: [email protected] ABSTRACT The article studies about 90 meetings between India and Bangladesh, the resulting temporary water-sharing agreements on the Ganges water, and the Indian grand river networking plan and its potential downstream impact. The Indian Ganges branch, the Hugly, lost its navigability because of dam constructions on its tributaries. India then constructed the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges to divert the Bangladesh Ganges water to the Hugly to increase about 260-km-away Calcutta Ports navigability. The first agreement between the two governments was a 41-day test-run beyond which India unilaterally diverted water till the end of 1977 when a 5-year treaty was signed after raising the issue to the UN General Assembly that prompted Indian dailies heinous comments against Bangladesh. Later, two memoranda of understanding were signed by the two governments one in 1982 and the other in 1985. Unilateral water diversion continued 1988 through 1996 toward the end of which a 30-year treaty was signed. Unilateral water diversion from the downstream countrys share is a gross violation of human rights, and the procrastination in a permanent water sharing treaty along with a river networking plan underway is downstream ecosystem-destructive. For the ecosystems survivability, UN should mediate transboundary water conflicts. Keywords: Ganges bain, transboundary rivers, Farake Barrage, water diversion, river networking, Bangladesh, India, water treaty, link canal, tributary. INTRODUCTION India and Bangladesh have 58 transboundary rivers. The major ones are the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the Surma-Meghna, the Teesta, and the Atrai. These are shown in Fig. 1. About 50% of the transboundary rivers have one or more upstream water diversion constructions on them. These rivers are marked in yellow. Before entering Bangladesh, the Indian Ganges bifurcates into the Hugli that flows through West Bengal of India to fall into the Bay of Bengal, and the Ganges or the Padma that flows through Bangladesh to fall into the Bay of Bengal after meeting with the Brahmaputra and then with the Meghna. Following the setup of the Domodor Valley Corporation (DVC) in the 1950s, Indian government constructed a number of dams and reservoirs on the tributaries of the Hugli/Bhagirathi. These are the Ajoy, the Mayurakshi, the Panchet Reservoir, the Maithon Reservoir, the Tilaiya Reservoir, the Konar Reservoir, the Subarnarekha Multipurpose, and the Kangsabati, numbered 18 through 24 under major irrigation projects under West Bengal rivers in Fig. 1 in the left side near the bottom These rivers lost their capacity to flush the Hugli. India then constructed the Farakka Barrage 18 km upstream from the international border on the Ganges to divert the water flowing through

Bangladesh to maintain navigability of the Calcutta Port located downstream about 260 km away. Up until June 1995, seventy seven meetings were held between the two countries prime ministerial and the topmost level 4, ministerial level 17, Joint River Commission Advisory level 13, ministerial level 21, ministerial level of joint expert committees 2, secretarial level 10, secretarial level on tranboundary river water sharing 6, secretarial level of joint expert committees 2 and foreign ministers level 2. There were ten more meetings 5 expertise level and 5 secretarial level - held between India and Pakistan on the Farakka issue during the Pakistan period (1952-70). All together there were 87 meetings between the downstream and upstream parties. These meetings were held in Pakistans capitol Islamabad, Bangladeshs capitol Dhaka, Indias capitol New Delhi, two provincial capitol of India Calcutta and Bangalore, Nepals capitol Kathmandu, Bahamas capitol Nasaw, and in the United Nations Office in New York. Until the signing a 30-year water-sharing treaty on 12 December 1996, one 41-day testrun agreement in 1975, one 5-year water-sharing treaty in 1977, two memoranda of understanding in 1982 and 1988 were signed between the two countries. India took advantages of longer-term unilateral water diversion for about ten years by the Farakka Barrage in between shorter-term treaties. No permanent treaties have yet been signed between the two countries on sharing the Ganges or other transboundary rivers water. Instances of cooperative agreements on river flow sharing and river basin development exist among nations across the world. In 1954, six nations participated in the Mekong River Treaty based on fair distribution of water. Syria and Lebanon reached an agreement on sharing the water of the Orontes River. Mexico and the United States signed the treaty on sharing the Rio Grande and the Colorado River flows in 1944. France fulfilled Spains demands. In 1970, the settlement of the dispute over Vardar/Axois river between Macedonia (a republic of former Yugoslavia) and North Greece was done under the auspices and technical and financial assistance from the United Nations. It may be mentioned that the river basin area is 23,747 sq km of which 91% lies in Macedonia and 9% in Greek Macedonia (Goodman, 1997) In south Asia, on the western sector India and Pakistan signed the Indus River Treaty to share six tributaries of the Indus. On the eastern sector, sharing the water of thirty rivers including the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the Teesta, and the Meghna, depends on Indias mercy (Haque, 2003). What are achieved are occasional short-term water-sharing treaties with the succeeding one less favorable for the downstream country than the preceding one because of the absence of arbitration and a guaranteed minimum flow at the Farakka point. The article focuses on the fruitless marathon meetings toward a permanent water-sharing treaty and resulting shorter-term water-sharing treaties between two riparian nations India and Bangladesh. Also, it focuses on the Indian grand river networking plan the implementation of which will have ecocidal effects upon Bangladesh. It reflects the Indian hegemony of transboundary river control which is driven more by politics than by

the importance of saving ecosystems in this era of globalization. The article urges the UN to mediate all transboundary water conflict issues existing among different nations.

Figure 1. The transboundary rivers of India and Bangladesh

METHODOLOGY Review of Marathon Meetings during Pakistan Period (1952-70) In October 1951, Indian dailies published the news that India will build the Fatrakka Barrage to divert water to the Hugly River. Pakistan protested to Indias decision on 29 October 1951. On 8 March 1952, a period of 4 months later, India informed Pakistan that she would be informed of the plan before its materialization. In the meantime, India took the project of diverting water from the Gandok (Fig. 2), a tributary of the Ganges, to Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The withdrawal of water from the Gandok affects the flow of the Ganges. On 8 May 1952, Pakistan informed India of the losses East Pakistan would face if water was diverted. More than a year later on 22 May 1953, India informed Pakistan that Farakka and Gandak projects were under investigation. Indian side had always been slow to respond to get her job done. On 14 September 1954, Pakistan informed India of her (Pakistans) Ganga-Kabodak Irrigation project in downstream East Pakistan. Correspondences were exchanged between the two nations for long nine years. The two nations started sharing information of their respective projects in 1960. However, India shared only on the Farakka project. She refused to share what other projects she was doing upstream of Farakka. On 28 June 1960, Pakistan and India met for the first time at the expert level in Delhi, India. The second meeting was held on 1 October 1960 in Dhaka. Pakistans President wrote to Indian Prime Minister on 27 March 1961. Indian Premier wrote back on 29 April agreeing to share information. But it was never done. On 28 April 1961, the two parties met in Calcutta for the third time which followed by Indian Governments formation of Farakka Barrage Control Board and Technical Advisory Committee. On 27 December 1961, the two parties met in Dhaka for the fourth time. Long six years later in 1967, Indian counterpart refused Pakistans proposal to meet at the expert level led by Pakistans High Commissioner to India. After long seven years, their 5th meeting was held on 13 May 1968 in New Delhi. Indian Government was buying time to complete the construction of the Farakka Barrage. In the Secretarial level, the two parties met on 9 December 1968 for ten days in New Delhi, on 21 May 1969 for five days in Islamabad, on 15 July 1969 for twelve days in New Delhi, on 24 February 1970 for eight days in Islamabad, and finally on 16 July 1970 for six days in New Delhi. There was little success in the last meeting. The key issue of water sharing remained unsolved. In the meantime, India finished the construction of the Farakka Barrage. What remained to be done was the construction of the feeder canal (Sattar, 1996, 1998). In 20 years 1951 through 1971 nothing was done except the exchange of information and refuting of Indian reasons. It may be mentioned that had India had any good will to solve the problem, she could have done that in that two decades. On the western sector, India signed the Indus treaty under the auspices of the World Bank, but she left the

Farakka problem unsolved to punish East Pakistan the results of which have been published in a number of articles (Adel, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005). Review of Marathon Meetings during Bangladesh Period (1971 - ) Indian Premier came to visit Bangladesh on 17 March, 1972. Bangladesh raised a proposal for the formation of a joint river commission (JRC). During 26 29 April, 1972, the irrigation ministers of the two countries held discussion in Dhaka on the proposed river commission. The objective was to maintain regular correspondences for receiving maximum benefits from the transboundary rivers, to carry out jointly research projects on flood control, to implement flood control projects, and to carry out other responsibilities asked by the governments of the country. It was decided for the commission to meet annually four times. The joint River Commission met for the first time during 25-26 June 1972 in New Delhi. The Commission discussed the water problems of transboundary rivers leaving aside the Ganges water sharing issue. Ministers of the two countries met on 16-17 July 1973 to hold discussion on an acceptable settlement for the Ganges water sharing between the two countries. Later, on 15 February 1974, the foreign ministers of the two countries met in Dhaka to discuss the same issue. During 12-16 May 1974, premiers of the two countries met in Delhi and issued a joint communiqu stating that the Farakka Barrage will be operating by the end of 1974. The Ganges flow during the dry months is not enough to meet the demands of the two countries. To meet that demand, the Ganges flow has to be increased during the dry season. What the Indian Premier tried to mean was to set up a link canal between the Brahmaputra and the Ganges and to divert the Brahmaputra water upstream of the Ganges, a point that became clear in the follow-up 8th meeting of the JRC in 20 days in Dhaka. Indian side referred to its Prime Ministers proposal of the link canal to divert 2,830 cu m/s of water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges. The 337-km long (Fig. 2) canal would originate in Assam, India, enter northern Bangladesh at an elevation of 31 m, then rise to an elevation of 40 m at the mid-section before dropping down. To raise water at the higher elevation at the mid-section, India proposed to build a barrage at Jogighopa in Assam. A large portion of the canal would be embanked, which would obstruct the natural drainage of the land causing water logging during rainy season. The proposed canal would cross as many as fourteen rivers including the three major rivers of the Teesta, the Korotoa, and the Atrai. The design of the three major intersections or crossovers would present engineering challenge and would be very expensive. The proposed canal would use up to 121 sq km of land and displace over a million people. Further, the construction of the Jogighopa Barrage in Assam would transfer the physical control of another major river into Indias hands. Indias track record of the Farakka Barrage disqualifies her for this proposal. Besides, the lowest recorded flow of the Brahmaputra is only 3,117 cu m/s. If 2,800 cu m/s is diverted as proposed by India, the 13-km wide river would be left with 287 cu m/s. The consequences would be more disastrous than the Ganges Basin (Sufian, 1993).

Figure 2. Indian proposed link canal. It shows the tributaries of the Ganges including the Gandak (following B. M. Abbas ) Bangladesh side opposed it and proposed for the construction of reservoirs in India and Nepal. Bangladesh proposed an integrated basin development consisting of storage dams in the upper reaches of the Ganges. The monsoon season water could be conserved in these reservoirs for release during the dry season. In addition to generating a tremendous amount of hydropower, it is internationally recognized that the construction of major storage dams within the Ganges and the Brahmaputra basins offers advantages of flood control, as well as reduced sedimentation and increased dry season flows for enhanced agricultural production. The feasibility studies of three such projects viz., the Kosi High Dam, the Karnali Multipurpose, and the Punchesshwar proects had already been completed. The Karnali Project alone could produce 10,000 MW of hydropower, irrigate 32,000 sq km land in India and 2,023 sq km land in Nepal, and increase the dry season flow by 991 cu m/s. India did not like the proposal because she does not want tripartite agreement involving Nepal and Bangladesh, and insists on a bilateral agreement, and later follows unilateral decisions as the Farakka record shows (Sufian, 1993). In a ministerial level conference on 24-25 February 1975 in Delhi, Bangladesh proposed to reduce the flow in the Hugly during the dry season. Indian side said that Bangladesh did not have any urgency of water which was a strange statement from the Indian side. The two sides opposed each others proposals on the issues of the construction of link canal and reservoirs. The meeting ended in dissension between the parties.

The 2nd Ministerial level meeting was held on 16-18 April 1975 in Dhaka. The Indian side slapped on the conference table and demanded 1,132 m3/s flow for the Hugly, violating the etiquettes of the conference. However, she could reduce the flow by only 141.5 m3/s. If Bangladesh would suffer from this diversion, Indian side would agree to reduce the flow at the Hugly. Prior to this meeting, India informed Bangladesh of her decision to start the operation of the feeder canal on an experimental basis so that both sides can observe the reactions on the Hugly and Bangladesh. The parties signed an understanding that later came out as a press release according to which India could divert water to the Hugly for periods of ten days from 21 April to 31 May 1975 according to table 1below. The same table mentions water shares according to the treaties signed signed in 1977 and 1996 for making comparison (Daily Dinkal, 1996; Daily Janakantha, 1996; Rahman, 1997; Sattar, 1998; Haque, 2003; . The table below shows the Indias share of water has been consistently increasing since the commissioning of Farakka Dam. In other words, less water is left for Bangladesh as natural flow. Table. 1 Withdrawal Period April 21-30 May 01-10 May 11- 20 May 21- 30 Ad hoc Agreement 4/21/75 5/51/85 (m3/s) 311 340 424.5 452.8 5-Year Treaty 1977-82 November 1977-82 (m3/s) 566 608.5 679.2 757 30-Year Treaty 1977-82 January 1997-2027 (m3/s) 735.6 990.5 1,092 1,132

To the surprise of Bangladesh, India continued water diversion beyond the forty-one days until 1977 without any respect for the downstream country. JRC held its 13th meeting in Dhaka on 19 June 1975. JRC held discussion on increasing the Ganges flow in its 9th through 13th meeting. Both the parties failed to reach a unanimous decision. Bangladesh did not approve the link canal proposal. Bangladesh had a new government in August 1975. Bangladesh government sent two letters to the Indian counterpart one after 18 December 1975 and the other on 3 February 1976 strongly protesting against Indias unilateral water diversion. Indian government replied on 11 February 1976 indicating her consent to discuss the water diversion at the time of the weakest flow of the Ganges only during the dry season. Bangladesh did not agree to discuss unless India stopped unilateral withdrawal of water. India sent an expert delegation to observe the widespread effects of water diversion at the invitation of Bangladesh. The delegation stayed during in Bangladesh during 27 April through 2 May 1976. Similarly, a Bangladesh delegation visited the Hugly and Farakka

during 6 May through 11 May 1976. But the exchange of the observant delegation did not produce any result. India unilaterally diverted water the entire season. Bangladesh decided to raise the water diversion issue at the UN General Assembly. In the meantime, Bangladesh joined a meeting in New Delhi during 7 through 10 September 1976 at the invitation of India. The meeting ended without any progress. Bangladesh raised the Farakka issue in the 31st UN General Assembly on 23 September 1976. It was the 121st of the 122 issues discussed in the assembly. Bangladesh proposed a discussion of the issue at the Special Political Committee which was approved by the General Assembly on 24 September 1976. Before the discussion took place, a number of non-aligned nations took some steps to reach an understanding between Bangladesh and India. Special political committee approved the statement of the understanding. In the perspective of the understanding, a ministerial level talk was held on 6 December 1976 in Dhaka and it continued up to 9 December. The second level of talk was held on 14 through 16 December in Dhaka, but without any success Another Ministerial level talk was held on 21 22 June 1977 in New Delhi without any result in favor of Bangladesh. (Sattar, 1998) In the meantime, UN organized a water conference on 18 March 1977 in Mardel, Argentina for 8 days. The conference ended with a resolution to preserve the interest of downstream countries which was somewhat favorable for Bangladesh. A new political party came in power in India 1 March 1977. The new Indian Defense Minister came to Dhaka on 15 April 1977 to hold talks for three days with Bangladesh. The talks resulted in an understanding later followed by three meetings 7-11 May 1977 in New Delhi, 29 31 July and 2 6 August 1977 in Dhaka, and 20-30 September 1977 in New Delhi. The Ganges treaty was signed on 5 November 1977. According to the treaty, during the weakest flow time in the last ten days of April, out of the 1,557 m3/s flow at Farakka, Bangladesh would receive 976 m3/s and India 574 m3/s. If for any reasons, the flow at the Farakka point fell below 1,557 m3/s, Bangladesh would receive 80% of her share i. e., 781 of 1,557 m3/s. Table1 mentioned earlier lists, at ten days intervals during 1 January through 31 May, the flows at the Farakka point, the Indias withdrawals, and the Bangladesh share. Bangladesh was subjected to heinous comments by the dailies published from Calcutta - the Anandbazar on August 28, 29, 1978; the Satyakatha on August 8, 1980; the Zugantar on January 12, 1981, etc. etc. after signing the treaty. Those editorials expressed Indian attitude to the Ganges water sharing issue. Such sensational comments were not befitting for a large nation toward its small neighbor for her due share. Later, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two countries on October 7, 1982. The guaranty clause on 80% of the minimum flow through Bangladesh was dropped from the treaty. The second memorandum of understanding was similar to the one of 1982 and was signed by the two countries in 1985. It ended on May 31, 1988. No treaty was operational during 1988-96. India unilaterally withdrew the Ganges water

during the dry season for those eight straight years causing ecocidal effects in Bangladsh (Adel, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005). In Bangladesh, a new political party came in power in March 1991. A two-day meeting was held in Dhaka on 23 April 1991. It was decided to prioritize the water sharing of the Ganges and another transboundary river the Tista. In a meeting in August 1991, Indian foreign secretary proposed for a permanent solution of water sharing problem from the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the Tista, and the Meghna. In the secretarial level meeting on 2 February 1992 in Dhaka, no understanding was reached on the sharing of the Ganges and the Tista water. However, both parties agreed to continue further discussion. On 2122 April 1992, a ministerial level meeting was held in New Delhi on the sharing of transboundary river water. Bangladesh proposed to solve the water diversion issue from the Ganges and the Tista. On 26-28 May 1992, the premiers of Bangladesh and India met in New Delhi and agreed to work for a long term settlement of the water sharing issue of transboundary rivers. Indian Premier said of taking steps to avoid the sufferings of Bangladesh by sharing of the Ganges water. But India took no such steps. The ministerial level meeting of 29-30 March 1993 ended in vain due to the obstinate nature of India. During the SARC meeting on 11 April 1993, the premiers of Bangladesh and India decided to meet soon to work on the issue of water sharing. Never later that meeting was held. Bangladesh Premier raised the Farakka issue at the 48th General Assembly on 1 October 1993. Again the Bangladeshi Premier met the India Premier on 2-4 May 1995 in the SARC meeting in New Delhi. The Bangladeshi Premier, as usual, received the assurance from the Indian counter part. On 24 June 1995, a Secretarial level meeting was held in Dhaka in which the sharing of water from transboundary rivers was given due importance. Also, a decision was made to monitor the flow at four points of the Ganges. Bangladesh Premier again raised the issue on 23 October 1995 at the 50th anniversary of the UN. A pen picture of the sufferings of the Bangladeshi people was portrayed. Government changed in Bangladesh in 1996. The new government tried for 6 months in 11 meetings at the levels of ministers, secretaries, and experts. The first meeting was held on 5-7 July 1996 in Dhaka at the secretarial level. Bangladesh water resources minister left for New Delhi on 29 October 1996 to meet with his counterpart. Later, he met other high level officials and the Indian Premier. Bangladeshi foreign minister held talks with the Indian counterpart for three days beginning on 9 November 1996. Both of them expressed hopes for fair sharing of the Ganges water before the onset of the dry season. Bangladeshi premier held a courtesy meeting with the Indian Premier on 17 November 1996 in Rome in the World Food meeting. The Prime Minister of West Bengal came to Dhaka on 27 November 1996 for a six-day visit. He gave indications of the solution to the water sharing problem. Bangladesh Premier went to India on 10 December 1996, and held talks with her counterpart on 11 December, again. At last, after 21 years of procrastination on the Indian side, a water treaty was signed between the two governments just for 30 years on 12 December 1996 in the Hyderabad House. The discharges in the Ganges up to the treaty time are shown in Fig. 3. Water shortage left its

impression in the irreparable losses in many known and unknown sectors of the downstream country (Adel, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008).

Figure 3. The dwindling flow in the Ganges in Bangladesh has lost 60% of her virgin flow. During 1 March through 10 May, each country, in turn, will get 991 m3/s flow lasting for 10 days. India stole water in the darkness, as she did in the past (Begum, 1988), of the night and blamed the solar radiation for not being strong enough to melt the Himalayan ice (Burns, 1997) The two treaties of 1977 and 1996 have been compared in Figs. 4a and 4b. Whereas the average flow through the Bhagirathi is increasing for India, it is decreasing through the Bangladesh Ganges in the dry season. The treaty lacks a guaranty clause for the fair share of Bangladesh. If the discharge at the Farakka point drops below 1,500 m3/s, the treaty will not work and the two countries have to meet an unknown number of times to come to a settlement. It is mentionable that 87 meetings were held up until December 12, 1996. It is thought that no more treaty will be required when the current one ends because of unavailability of water at the Farakka point. Right after the creation of Pakistan, India blocked the Indus River water. Under the auspices of the World Bank the Indus basin water sharing treaty was done. If the United Nations would come forward to settle the water-sharing issues, Bangladeshi people would not have to face the sufferings. Less than two decades are left for the treaty to

expire. During this period, the Ganges in Bangladesh will shrink in depth and width. Many shoals will be formed. It will end up being a floodplain.

Figure 4a. Dry season 1996 water share for Bangladesh relative to the 1977 water sharing treaty (Courtesy of Hossain et al., 2003)

Figure 4b. Dry season 1996 water share for India relative to the water sharing treaty (Courtesy of Hossain et al., 2003)

OTHER UNSETTLED TRANSBOUNDARY WATER ISSUES There are more than 25 rivers that includes some major ones from which India unilaterally withdraws water. The Tista Barrage India built the Tista Barrage at Gazaldoba in the district of Jalpaiguri with which she diverts 42.5 m3/s of water from the Tista into the Mahananda (Fig. 1) in the dry season. No treaty has been signed on sharing the Tista flow. In 1983, a memorandum of understanding reached between the two countries in which Bangladesh was to get 36%, India 39%, and 25% for reserve. However, no settlement has yet reached. Bangladesh raised objections to diverting Tista flow to Mahananda from the beginning. The Mahananda Dams The Mahanda (Fig. 1) is the only tributary of the Ganges in Bangladesh. India constructed two dams upon the Mahananda River one at 3 km and the other at 32 km upstream (at Khodaimaree) of Tentulia. A 42-km long canal from the dam site links the Teesta and the Mahananda rivers. Water is diverted from the Mahananda during the dry season resulting a weakened downstream flow that affects the northern districts of Rangpur and Dinajpur in agriculture, industry, and the ecosystem. Besides, thousands of cubic meters of pebbles would reach Bangladesh through this river. Unemployed people would collect these pebbles to earn their living. These pebbles were used in the construction work (Sattar, 1996). Mini-Farakkas The other transboundary rivers that face dams and other water diversion constructions are the Ichamati-Kalindi, the Betna-Kodalia, the Bhairab-Kabodak, the Khukshi, the Atrai, the Korotoa, the Talma, the Ghoramara, the Deonai-Jamuneshwari, the Buri Tista, the Sangil, the Dharla, the Jinjiram, the Bhogai, the Piyan, the Kushiyara, the Sonai Bardal, the Juri, the Manu, the Dhalai, the Khowai, the Sonai, the Gomti, the Selonia, the Muhuri, and the Feni. The location of these rivers are shown in Fig. 1. Water diversion has affected agriculture, fisheries, and navigation in their basins (Sattar, 1996). PROJECTED DAMS AND RIVER NETWORKING The Tipaimukh Dam India is building a dam upon the Barak river in Assam, upstream of the Meghna to store 15.9x109 cubic meter of water. This Tipaimukh dam is located 200 km upstream of Amalshit, the point where the Barak River splits into the Surma and the Kushiyara in the states of Manipur/Mizoram in India. The dam will substantially reduce the dry season flow in the Kushiyara and the Surma rivers, the headstreams of the Meghna River (Fig. 2) in north-east Bangladesh. River Networking In the m eantime, India is planning grand tributaries of the Ganges above Farakka on river networking. In the plan, the m ain the right bank are the Upper Ganges, the

Jamuna, the Tons, the Karam nasa, the S on, the Punpun, and the Bu rhi Gandak, and on the left bank are the Ramganga, the Gom ati, the Ghaghra, the Gandak, and the Kosi will be interlinked resulting in the drying up of the Ganges downstream in Bangladesh. The tributaries of the Ganges are shown in Figs . 2 and 5. The Ganges ba sin catchment areas are shown in Figs. 2 and 6. Under the river networking plan, India will divert 200 to 250 of BCM water from the Brahmaputra, the Teesta and the Meghna basins through about 1,500 km link canals to the Kaveri River of south India. Fig.8 illustrates the grand network of the plan (Courtesy of Hossain et al, 2003). The link canal will extend from Dhubri region of Assam to upstream of Gazal Doba on the Indian Tista of the Indian district of Jalpaiguri. Link canals will be dug from the Sankosh (a tributary of the Brahmaputra) and Manos rivers of Bhutan to add to the Brahmaputra-Tista canal. Later, a 473-km long link canal will connect with the Ganges upstream of the Farakka point. Because of mistrust and environmental problems, Bangladesh government earlier rejected the link canal proposal through Bangladesh (Fig. 2) to divert water from the Brahmaputra upstream of Farakka.

Figure 5. Important tributaries of the Ganges. Also, Fig. 2 helps to understand their physical locations (Courtesy of Hossain et al., 2003). In the second phase of the grand networking of rivers, a link canal will connect the Ganges with the Kaveri of south India through many more small canals linked with the main canal. This artificial control of the river will make the Ganges dry. Also, the rivers the Tista, the Torsa, the Raydhak, the Jaldhala, the Mahananda, etc. - that discharge water to the north-west Bangladesh will be controlled by India.

Figure 6. The Ganges basin catchment areas (Courtesty of Hossain et al., 2003). The networking plan will have 14 links of the Himalayan components and another 14 links of the peninsular components. The Himalayan components are the BrahmaputraGanga (MSTG), Kosi-Ghagra, Gandak-Ganga, Ghagra-Yamuna, Sarda-Yamuna, Yamuna-Rajasthan, Rajasthan-Sabarmati, Chunar-Sone Barrage, Sone Dam-Southern Tributaries of the Ganges, Ganga-Damodar-Subarnarekha, Subarnarekha-Mahanadi, Kosi-Mechi, Farakka-Sundarbans, and Brahmaputra-Ganga (JTF)(ALT). The peninsular components are Mahanadi-Godavari, Godavari (Inchampali Low Dam)-Krishna (Nagarjunasagar Tail Pond), Godavari (Inchampali)-Krishna (Nagarjunasagar), Godavari (Polavaram)-Krishna (Vajayawada), Krishna (Almatti)-Pennar, Krishna (Srisailam)Pennar, Krishna (Nagarjunasagar)-Pennar, Pennar-Chauvery, Chauvery-Vaigai-Gundar, Ken-Betwa, Prasbati-Kalisindh-Chambal, Par-Tapi-Narmada, Damanganga-Pinjal, BedtiVarda, Netravati-Hemavati, and Pamba-Achankovil-Vaippar. As a result of the networking, the northern districts of Bangladesh will be deprived of the perennial river flows and will become dry, the Bangladesh Ganges will not have water past the Farakka point, the lean season flow of the lower Meghna will reduce substantially and the salinity front will be extended to the north. Further, the regional

climate will change, and the arsenic contamination of groundwater will engulf the entire country.

Figure 7. The Brahmaputra basin catchments (Courtesy of Hossain et al, 2003)

Figure 8. The grand river linking project of India (Courtesy of Hossain et al, 2003)

RESULTS If the tributaries of the Hugly were not exploited, the Hugly would not lose its navigability. A 60% loss in the Ganges water discharge has been ecosystem-destructive in the Ganges basin Bangladesh. Indias decision to settle the Farakka issue temporarily depends on the political party in power in Bangladesh. Indias track record with the Farakka issue had not been trustworthy by her neighbor so that she could agree to the Indian link canal proposal. The regional development of basin in a tripartite endeavor is a good idea. However, Indias disinterest to work trilaterally with Nepal and Bangladesh goes against it. She is at an advantage to work bilaterally with Bangladesh for show as is reflected in the procrastination to settle life-saving issues like water sharing conflicts. Both countries wasted a huge number of hours and a huge amount of dollars in the fruitless meeting. Bangladeshs water shares in the successive treaties have been diminished. Having the grand river network plan in paper, it is expected to be materialized without notifying Bangladesh in due time as it appears from the construction of the Farakka Barrage and the practice of delayed response from the Indian side. The full implementation of the grand plan will severely affect the ecosystem in the basins of the Brahmaputra and the Meghna. It is the mercy of the upstream country that Bangladesh can get permanent solution to the water-sharing conflicts of all transboundary rivers. DISCUSSION The first job to kill a river is to obstruct the flow of its tributaries. That is how the Hugly River lost its navigability. Actually, the Hugly has more than a dozen of tributaries over almost the same length of course as the Bangladshs Ganges which has only one tributary the Mahananda harnessed upstream by India for water diversion. India could have remain satisfied with the tributaries of the Hugly. The huge amount of health wasted in marathon meetings could have been used for poor people of both the countries. The Ganges basin is spread over one-third of Bangladesh. The Ganges basin wetland ecology that was the breeding and raising grounds of 109 species of fish is gone totally leaving people deficient in animal protein and calcium for want of fish, their cheap source fish. Favoring people is more important than favoring a specific political party. Water is a weapon of ecosystem destruction. Let not this weapon be used to punish people. Integrated basin development through multilateral endeavor is the solution for riparian countries in this era of globalization. Neighboring countries should not lose each others trust, rather should gain it through actions. When Europe is forming EU, a subcontinental nation is subjected to crippling punishment by her neighbor. Subjecting Bangladesh to lesser and lesser quantity of water in successive temporary treaties assures Bangladesh of requiring no water-sharing treaties in near future. Ensuring adequate water availability for all nations globally is as important as maintaining good air quality. Unless the upstream country India nourishes an attitude to cripple the down stream neighbor Bangladesh economically, there cannot be any reason for India to divert Bangladeshs share of water on top of her regular share. In this regard, India should realize that Bangladesh is a huge market for India. Indian market is spread over in marketing agricultural products, industrial products, technology, education, culture,

medical treatments, tourism, etc. etc. Any slight Indian sacrifice that goes in favor of Bangladesh acts like an Indian investment in Bangladesh. In order to save our natural resources in the ecosystem the UN has to monitor the waterrelated activities of riparian nations. Transboundary water conflicts need UN solutions and not bilateral ones that risk smaller nations interests. Bangladesh spent huge amount of time and money to get her share of water. Under UN mediation, these resources could be saved and use for the poor people CONCLUSION In the step-by-step temporary treaties, India buys time and plans to make the Ganges extinct through Bangladesh. She will use all the water that flow through the Ganges. Diversion and/or division of water due for the downstream country by the upstream country is a gross violation of water rights. At the end of the current Ganges water sharing treaty with India, no water will reach the downstream due to increased upstream withdrawals. The Ganges will be reduced to a large flood plain. The river networking plan will reduce the Brahmaputra, the Tista, and the Meghna to the same condition as the Ganges. Urgent international laws are required to save the sweet water resources in South Asia. All transboundary water conflicts have to be resolved through direct UN mediation without delay to preserve the ecosystem ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks are due to M. A. Sattar for his helpful books on Bangladesh rivers, to Hossain and his associates for letting me use some of the illustrations, and to Mahmood Hossain in arranging the illustrations. REFERENCE Abbas, B. M., 1982. The Ganges Water Dispute, University Press Ltd., Dhaka, Bangladesh Adel, M. M. The Impact of Climate Extremes and Water Shortage upon Human Health, World Resource Review, 11:576-602. Adel, M. M., 2001. Effects on Water Resources from Upstream Water Diversion in the Ganges Basin, Journal of Environmental Quality, 30, 356-368 Adel, M. M. 2002. Man-made Climatic Changes in the Ganges Basin, International Journal of Climatology, 22:993-1016 Adel, M. M. 2003. Biosphere III: The Site of Unprecedented Ecocide in the Ganges Basin, in J. U. Ahmed (ed.) National Documentation on the Problems of Arsenic and Farakka, 59-70 Adel, M. M., 2005. The Background State Leading to Arsenic Contamination of Bengal Basin Groundwater, Journal of Water and Health, 03.4, 435-452 Begum, K. , 1988. Tension over the Farakka Barrage, The University of Press Ltd., Dhaka, Bangladesh.

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