BATTLEGAOUI"ID

~ U R O P ~
THE HINOENBURG UNE
One of the stranges! defence systems the
world has ever seen. Because of this it saw
some of the fiercest fighting during World War
One. The author, Peter Oldham, follows the
whole length of the line from Arras 10 SI
Quentin and describes the various actions
against the background of conerele and steel
still 10 be found toclay.
ISBN 0-85052-568-3 208 pages E9.95
VlMY RIOGE
Scars of the Great War dominate Vimy Ridge
giving some indication of the intensive fight-
iog, first by the French in 1915 and then by
the British in 1916. The Canadians finally
look the heights in 1917. Underground tun-
nels riddle the hillside and huge overlapping
craters fram mining explosions beg explana-
tion - this book by Nigel Cave satisfies the
casual inquirer and the serious historian.
ISBN 0-85052-399-0 208 pages E9.95
RIQUEVAL
The bridge over the SI Quentin Canal at
Riqueval is one of the most readily recognized
images of Ihe Great War. The bridge and its
surrounding countryside witnessed many
ferocious engagements in the period between
the retreat to the Hindenburg Une in 1917 and
the final assault against the canal's defences
in September 1918.
ISBN 0-85052-622-' E9.95
To lII'IIIIr any bIIok In lIIe lIIe III11epn1 series ..
OIZ2& 734ZZZ
Olht'r guidt's irr Iht' Ba/rlt'grourrd St'Tlt'S:
Ypru Santluary Wood and "ooge b)' Nigel Cal"e
Ypm Passchendaele b.ll\"igel Ca'e
Ypres Hili 60 b)' Nigel Cave
Walking the Somme b) Palll Reed
Sommt Mrrt by Jack Horsfall & Nigel Cale
Somme - Beaumont Hame! by Nigel Cave
Somme Thitp,"al by Michael Stedman
Somme La Boissetle by MichaelStedman
Sommt . Fricourt Mametz by MichaelStedman
Somme b,. Graham Keech
Somme Gomm('("()urt by Nigel Cave
Somme Courcelelle by Paul Reed
Arl'llli' \'im}' Rldge b.' Nige! Cave
Hindenburg Line b) PeterOldham
Ba/llt'grourrd guidts irr prrparaliOlr:
Walking the Sallenl by Paul Reed
Ypm Pol)"gon Wood by Nigel Cave
Ypm l\lesslnes Rldge by PeterOldham
Somme DeMll e Wood by Nigel Cal'e
Somme Boom Ra,"ine byTll'vor Pigeon
Somme by Graham Maddocks
Somme High Wood by Terr)' Caner
Hindenburg Une Rique, .. 1 by Bill MitthinSOfl
Hindenburg Une Epehy b) Bill Mitthinson
lIindenburg Line - Cambral: Ri ghl Hook by Jack Horsrall & l\"igel eale
Botr War. The Relief or Ladysmith. Colenso, Spion Kop by Lewis Childs
Botr War The Siege or Ladysmhh by Le .... is Childs
Battleground Europe
GUILLEMONT
Michael Stedman
Series editor
Nigel Cave
x
LEOCOOPER
umdon
I
l
T
hiS book is dedicated 10 memory oflhe numberless soldiers who
fough! on balh sides of the tcrrible divide and whose graves lie
in profligatc waste al Gui ll emont, unmarked and unknown.
In particular I should like 10 fecal! the life of one such young
subaltern, 2nd Lieutenant John Hayes (Jack) Feamhead, who
was twenty ane years old when he succumbed 10 wounds on
13th August 1916. I should have liked 10 have met hirn in his
old age. Jack was an effervescent and delightful chameler
whose memory is sti ll recalled with great affection by his
family. He served in the Il7th Battalion, the King's (Liverpool)
Regiment
First published in 1998 by
LEQCOQPER
an imprimof
Pen & Sword Books Limiled
47 Church Strect. Bamsley. South Yorkshire 570 ZAS
Copyright 0 Michael Stedman ]998
ISBN 0 85052 591 8
A CIP cataloglle of this book is al'ai]able
from the Briti sh Library
Printe<! by Re<!I<'ood Books Umited
Trowbridge, Wihshire
For IIp-lodOle infomralion on OIlIu lil/es prodllced IInder Iht! uo Cooper imprinr,
pieast! ft'lt'pllont! or ,,,,iEt {o;
Pen & Sword Books LId. FREEPOST, 47 Church Street
Bamsley. South Yorkshire S70 2AS
Telephone 01226 73.\222
CONTENTS
Introduction by Series Editor 6
Author's Inlroduction 8
Acknowl edgements 9
Sensible equipmenl and advice for visitors 10
How 10 use Ihis book. 11
On the subjecis of Maps 13
Chapler 1 Dur designaled ar-ea tods)' .______ 17
Chapler 2 The events whieh brought the Oritish
Army 10 Trones Wood 27
Chapter 3 The Battle Cor canlrol of Trones Woo(L ..... *. 37
Chapter 4 The Dallies ror Guillemont village. Part L 59
Chapter 5 The Dall ies ror Guillemont village. Part 2 97
Chapter 6 Cemeteries and Memorials 119
Chapter 7 Tours and walks within Ihis area .. _ .. _._.... 135
Appendix: GemlUn Maps 154
Index 157
lack Feamhead's life e r o ~ the onset of war had bftn C8rerree and happy. wlthin the
Sli"Curit y of a dose and lo,ojng ramily. Thcre Wtrt' 1"'0 sislers and he was the youngesl of
rour brolhers. This pholograph sho,,-s Jack ,,-ith his pan'nts and youngcr slster.IHall l
Int roduction by Series Editor
This latest volume in the Battleground Europe seri es is centred around
the village of Guillemont. To go there now it is impossible to envisage the
ghastl y image that men like Fr Willy Doyle, Ernst Junger and the Master
of Belhaven tried to describe in words. Now it is an utterl y placid
agricultural communit y, where the loudest noise is the barking of fannyard
dogs and, in season, the sounds of shot guns echoing across the fields. It
is no exaggeration to say that most of the traffk for a good proportion of
the year consists of British vehides engaged in a pilgrimage to these
terrible killing fields. How can one replace Ihis scene wi th the sights.
smells and fearsome sounds of hundreds of guns, trench monars. machine
guns and the tonured wounded; of the decomposing bodies of seemingly
uncountable soldi ers, their stench and mangled limbs all in all a vista of
desolation and despair? The answer for most, if not all of uso is that it is
impossible, and beyond our imaginative capabilities, which is just as weil.
The book follows on from the comparative success that was gained in
this sector. the southemmost part of the 1 July battlefield. by British
troops, work.ing in immediate conjunction with their French allies. Various
features of the ground, such as Trones Wood and the village itself, were
vilal to the success of funher. and larger. operations dose by. such as the
Dawn Attack on 14 July and the push using tanks for the first time on 15
September. It is the story of a struggle without any fonn of glamour; a
large number of small (by the standards of the Great War) anacks. often
hastily contrived agai nst a detennined and resolute enemy defending
extraordinarily weil prepared positions. There were numerous examples of
great heroism, perhaps most famously amongst them being the actions of
Noel Chavasse, which were to win hirn the firs l of hi s Victoria Crosses.
BUI the evenls at and around Guillemont during the summer and
autumn of 1916 are characteristic of much that happened in what is now
collecti vely known as the Battle of the Somme 19 16. It became, for the
British, their first great gri nding down battle which was then followed by
an almost unending series of similar battles that culminated in the
Annistice of November 1918. It destroyed the na"ive enthusiasm that was
the hall mark of many of the New Anny divisions that set off with such
confidence on I July. and replaced il with a resigned and dogged
detennination that ultimately resulted in an enonnously expensive victory.
This great battle also cost the Gennan fighting machine much - it
destroyed what remained of the great field army that was mobil ised in
August 191 4. By the end of it all, brought 10 a halt by the onset ofwinter,
both annies had become fully conversant with the concept - and reality -
Opposite: The 16t h (Irish) Division's memori al is um'eil ed in Guillemonl
in the 20s.
of that doomladen word, allrilion. Falkenhayn had been the firstto preach
its military possibil ities when he put forward his scheme for Verdun
(though neglecting to tell his Army commander that this was what he had
in mind); Haig realised that this was what the war was coming to. lt has
become a word synonymous with the heanlessness of generals; yet it also
means the destruction of the enemy's will (and ability) to fight. In the
contex! of the time, it is difficult to see how the war was to be won by other
means. and given that the war was one that not only had 10 be foughl but
also had to be won, as very great issues were al stake. il is difficult to see
how else things could be done. cenainly at this stage of Ihe war.
What cannot be denied is that the detail was more often than not poorly
planned and poorly executed even allowing for the considerable practical
difficulties that faced all levels of command. This book. by its nature,
concerns itself with the detail involved in this relatively tiny part of the
Western Front - of monumental significance to the men who were here.
pan of ajigsaw 10 those who oversaw the operation. Thus this book - and
others in the series - do not try and explain the why, except possibly in the
broadesl sense. but the who and the where and the how. Since this is the
way that most of those who foughl and were wounded or died or were
shallered here saw things. it has both value and immediacy - but readers
should be prepared to read funher and deeper if they want to undersland
more fuHy the great tragedy that was the Great War.
Nigel Cave
Ely Place. London.
Author's introduction
The history of the Great War is very much the people's history, a
story with which we fecl affinity bccause the document ation and
familial stories are so rcadily accessible to us all. In this contcxt a
thought which has constantly engaged me whil st writing this small
volume is the enormous number or infantry and supporting units which
were drawn into the battles for Trones Wood and Guillemont. Of
course, that was equally tme of both sides whose men rought here. It
therefore proved impossible to name anything othcr than aproportion
of those myriad battalions who came and were swallowed. their men
tixed forever into the terrible black hole which Guillemont becamc.
Thc omission of any regiments from the narrative is therefore in no
way suggestive that its contribution had linie or no significanee. But
sadl y. to attempt thc inclusion of cvery uni I into the story would have
made this book, in the limited spaec available. linie more than a list or
participanls. Instead I have sought to make clear thc taelical and
topographieal faclors wh ich made Guil1emont such a tcrrible and
unforgcnable plaee in thc summer and autumn of 19 16, illustrating that
with what 1 hope are representative and illuminating eontemporary
aceounts.
Michael SIedman.
Leigh, Woreester.
Acknowledgements
Within the narrative record of events here at Bemafay and Trones
Woods and Guillemont I have made considerable use of many words.
orten penned in haste amidst terrible danger more than eighty years
ago. To all of the soldiers who wrote at that time and those who penned
their memoirs during the post war era I am grateful and can only stand
in awe. However. it would have been impossible to complete this guide
withoul the help of many of my contemporaries. In particular I should
like 10 Ihank Nigel Cave who made a number of very helpful
suggestions as 10 sources and who. as always, has undertaken a
thorough review of this work: Derek Butler and other staff of the
Commonwealth War Graves Commission at Maidenhead. John Baker
of The Map Shop in Upton-upon-Sevem who kindly supplied a
number of IGN maps: Geoff Thomas who has walked many miles of
the Somme banlefield in all SOriS of wealher with me and in whose
company the sun has always seemed to shine kindly. Sue Cox. Eisie
Davis. John Garwood. Pam Hall. Jennifer Hartley. Simon Jones and
the Trustees of the National Museums & Galleries on Merseyside -
King' s Regiment Collection for pennission 10 use the photograph of
Sergeant Jones. v.c.. UeUienant Colonel Tony Moore of the King' s
Regiment and Bame Thorpe who is the Memorials Officer for the
Western Front Associati on. Ralph Whitehead. The Mayor of
Guillemont. Monsieur Dazin. Paul Reed has been generous in
providing a number of interesting contemporary photographs which
appear within this guide. The staff at the Public Records Office in Kew
and the Imperial War Museum have provided me with much help.
assistance and considered judgement. Many other members of the
WeStern Front Association ha\"e also helped in greatl y enhancing my
knowledge of the Guillemont area. To all of these people I should like
to extend my sincere thanks whilst making clear that any errors wh ich
remain within the text are solely of my own making.
Opposite: Stretcher bearers from the 5th Di vision near Waterlot Farm, 3
to 6 September 1916.
9
Sensible equipment and advice for visitors
There is nothing like getting outside in the fresh air and walking. It s
good exercise. you can do it on your own. with 01 friend or as one of a
large group. During the last decade the growth of interesl in the history
of the Great War has led to many more organised tours which has
added 10 the pressure which some siles. such as Tyne COI at
Passchendaele or Thiepval here on {he Somme. experience. Bul
wherever you are on the Westem Front's miles of accessible battlefield
history one of the greatest pleasures. and Ihe most salulary and movi ng
of experiences. is 10 'walk the course' of an event in the extraordinary
history of the Great War. Often the interest lies in reconstructing in our
minds the encounters of the men who were there and shari ng Ihe
chance insights and discoveries with friends. I cannot forget the first
time I saw and walked many of these places, (he Salford Pals' attack
on Thiepval on Ist July 1916. the tragie advance of (he Tyneside
battalions of (he 34th Divi sion at La BoisseIle that same day. and
foll owing the story of the Manchester POlis here at Trones Wood with
my great friend Vincent Sleigh.
But whoever you are following. or whatever you are trying to
explain and understand. certain items are always likely to enhance
your pleasure. It is wonh noting that here the trees of Trones Wood
provide admirable shelter. The walks I have described should nevcr
lake more Ihan IwO hours. The urea south-east of Maricoun is
picturcsque and alt ractive. South of the Albert - Peronne road at Vaux.
Fargny and Curlu there are wonderful places 10 laze away an aflemoon
on the south facing slopes above the river Somme. In (he laIe summer
of 1916. for a lucky few who found the time and opportunity to get
down here to swill the chalk dust from their aching limbs. this was a
haveo of tranquillity. Sun cream and plemy of drinks are absolutely
esscmial. especially in hot summer weather. Stout shoes or walking
boots al any time ofthe year are vi tal . Wel liogton boots and thick sacks
in winter or soon afler rain are needed. along with appropriate outer
c1othing. lncidentally. you could attempt to complcte the walks in the
immediate vicinity of Guillemoot io one day. Therefore, for those of
you inlem on spending just such a full day here 'in the field' and who
want to record your visi t carefully some further items are advisable.
Take a sandwich. a camera. a peo and notebook 10 record where you
took your photographs and perhaps to note YOUf visit in the cemetery
registers. A pair ofbinocu1ars would be helpful, especially in 01 location
such as Maltz Horn Fann where the views are extensive. However, and
10
finally. adecent penknife with a corkscrew. a first aid kit and a small
rucksack capable of carrying everything comfortably should complete
your requirements.
Here at Guillemon1. as elsewhere on the Somme. a metal detector
iso lei us be frank. an embarrassment. Many people come here to the
fields 10 sweep for any remnants of elothing, perhaps the occasional
Manchester or Li verpool Pals' shoulder title. or whatever. But in my
opinion Ihey are beller left 10 rest and awail a chance discovery. To be
seen digging within sight of what should be places of peace and
reflection near to the Guillemont Road Cemetery is almost to desecrate
the memory of those whose names are recorded so starklyon those
bare white headSlOnes. The speclaele of lone Britons sweeping their
electronic plates across empty fields fills me with sadness. This should
be a place where a more rewarding and meaningful history reveals
jlself. withoul recourse 10 indignity.
No significant preparation is required to cope with medical
requirements. It is however very sensible 10 ensure Ihat you carry an
E 111 form which gives reciprocal rights 10 medieal and hospital
treatment in France. as weil as all other EC countries. The necessary
documents can be obtained free from any main post office. As in the
UK where you are in a working agricultural area and may be scratched
or cut by rUSly metals, ensure that your tetanus vaccination is up to
date. Comprehensive personal and vehiele insuranee is advisable. In
this context it is worth noting thaI thefe have been a number of thefts
frorn British tourists' vehieles in the area of the Somrne, even when
parked near 10 the cerneteries and features around Guillemon1. To help
arrange and plan your stay I have idenlified a lisl of campsites. hotels
and B&B accornmodation within easy distance of the village in
Chapter I. whieh deals with the designated area today. However. a
fuller guide 10 the rnany excellent hotels. restaurants. auberges and
ovemight accomrnodations available in the Picardie area can be
oblained frorn the Comite Regional du Tourisme de Pieardie. 3 Rue
Vineent Auriol - 80000 Arniens - Tel: 00 33 322 91 10 15.
How to use this book
This guide can be used in preparation for your visil, in frolll of the
fire al horne on a cold winter evening. In thaI case il is perhaps best
read from Slart 10 finish. 1 think you will have asound feel for
Guillemont atthe end of one or two eveni ngs' reading and might be
ready to book your cross channel ferry or tunnel for those days in
March and Apri l when the wealher begins 10 elear, the fields are
11
ploughed and crop growth has not yet hidden the detail and topography
of the ground. But the guide is also designed as a pocket reference. a
quick supplement to your knowledge when you are 'walki ng the
coursc', and need an explanation or clarification.
By far the best way to see thc Guillemont area is on foot or bicycle.
At the end of the text you can find a number of suggested routes
makillg use of the paths and tracks which are accessible to these mean5
of transpon. The Iwo chapters dealing wit h 1916's hi slori c events
wi thin the designated area are obvious1y in chronological order.
Although there was fighting here during 191 8 this guide is not
intended 10 cover that conflict in great detail since it will be the subject
of a funher volume in Ihis series.
I suggest that a tour by car or coach is the best way to get your
hearings and to give an overview of the whole area. Again I have
suggested a tour to highlight the main features of the area, along roads
which are easily accessible. The roads covered on this route are usuall y
quile satisfactory for coaches and involve no dangerous turns through
180"! This tour is 10 be found at the end of the book and is slrongl y
recommended 10 those of you not already conversant with the area. It
is wonh noting that some of the tracks and smaller roads to be found
on the IGN maps of the area are nOI suitable for couches. Cars without
four wheel drive will find difficulty in getti ng along some minor tracks.
for example those leading to and around Bois Favier. You would be
most unwise to allempt to drive around or through the confines of
Trones Wood in any vehicle. although the track leading along the east
of Trones Wood nonhwards to LonguevaJ is usually acccs5ible! Be
prepared to walk i5 the best advice that I can give. but do take care to
lock all vuluables. especially cameras and olher inviting items. out of
sight in the boot of your vchiclc.
A lane in front of Guillemont showing the ha\"oc ",rough! by the British
bombardment on the defences, 3 . 4 September 1916.
On Ibe subjecl of Maps
Unlike {WO of the previous villages abou! whi ch I have wrinen in
Ihis series. Thiepval and La BoisseIle, the village of Guillemont is
located finnly wit hin jusl onc IGN 1:25000 series map. ThaI map is
numbered 2408 es!. Bray-sur-Somme. However. yall would also find
2408 ouest. Alben. a useful addition since Ihis covers all ofthe western
approaches 10 thc Guillemont area from the direction of Alben. For
geneml access 10 the area of the Somrne sheet 4 in the I: 100,000 IGN
green series, Laon and Arras, is very useful. A compass is also an
essential companion. For those of yall interested in detail beyond the
northern pan ofthis guide Bapaume East and Bapaume West (2407 es!
ct ouest) would also prove 10 be sensible purchases. Taken logether
these four maps cover the entirety of the British sector of the 1916
Sattle of the Somme. Such maps. and many others covering the area of
the Western Front. can be obtained by post from The Map Shop in
UptonuponSevem (0 1684 593146) or from Waterstones' Booksellers
who maintain anot her excellent special ist map dcpartment in
Manchester.
I havc idcntified here the maps which appear withi n this guide. For
most navigat ional and walking purposes these wi ll be suffident for
your cnjoymem of this area. However, for a really intimate knowledge
of each location the I: 10,000 and 1:5.000 trench maps are
indispensable to the serious slUdent or expert. I: 10.000 maps
approximalc 10 ascale of six inches to the mHe. In order to gain
detailed understanding a trench map is thcrcfore indispensable.
Map I. Page 25. Thc Trones Wood - Guillemont balliefield area.
showi ng the prewar geography of the area. This is taken from the
1:40.000 shcets which uccompanied the Officiaf His/or)' volume
detailing the fighling leading 10 the first day of the Sattle of the
Somme.
Map 2. Page 28. The dispositions of XIII Corps' men in the vici nit y
of Maricourtl Montauban before and after thcir successful attack on I
July 1916, Taken from the Officiaf HislOry series of maps. 1916 Vol I.
Map 3. Page 29. The Objectives alJotted to the 7th, 18th and 30th
British Di visions along with the Frcnch 39th und 11 th Di visions for I
July. taken from thc Offiein' HislOl)' series of maps. 1916 Vol l .
Map 4. Page 31. The advance made by the French XX Corps (Sixth
Anny) between Bois Faviere and Curlu on the moming of I July 1916.
Offiein' His/ol)'. 1916 Vol I.
13
Map 5. Page 38-39. Taken from the I: 10,000 series trench map.
corrected to 216ft 91 6. this is a segment of 62.c.NWI showing the area
around the Briqueterie, Hardecourt and Maltz Horn Farm.
Map 6. Page 54. Maxwell's troop dispositions within Trones Wood.
14 July 1916.
Map 7. Page 64. Detail from the I: 10,000 trench map (corrected 10
2417/ 1916) showing the Trones Wood - Arrow Head Copse -
Guillemont area in detail.
Map 8. Page 66. Map issued 10 19th Manchester offkers showing
the fim stages of the operations launched against Gulllemont by the
soldiers of 30th Division al 3.40 am on 23 July.
Map 9. Page 81. Detail from sheet 62cNWI - I: ID.oootrench map.
corrected to 216/1916, showing Ihe Mahz Horn Fann - Angle Wood
area at Ihe extreme southern end of the British seclor of the Somme
battlefield.
Map 10. Page 85. The OH Map opposi te pp 190. Military
Operations France and Belgium 1916. Vol 2.
Map 11. Page 108. Showing the 12th King's at Guillemont's final
capture (3 September J 916).
Map 12. Page 115. Detail from the Wedge Wood, Falfernont Fann.
Oakhanger Wood and Angle Wood areas, north of Maurepas and south-
east of Guillemont, taken from two I: 10,000 trench maps.
Map 13. Page 123. The complex of trenches wh ich exiSled around
the Gui ll emont Road cemetery in the laie summer and autumn of 1916.
Map 14. Page 129. Detail laken from the I: 10,000 Irench map.
62cNWI. showing the location of Caplain Heumann' s grave.
Map 15. Page 136. A General Tour of the Guillernont area.
Map 16. Page 140. The Bemafay Wood walk area.
Map 17. Page 142. The Trones Wood walk area.
Map 18. Page 146. Maricourt. Hardecoun. Mahz Horn area toc.lay.
Map 19. Page 147. Detail from I: 10.000 trench map covering Ihe
Maricoun. Faviere Wood. Hardecourt. Mahz Horn Farm areas. 1916.
Map 20. Page 150. Delnil from the I: 10.000 trench map. dated
corrected to 15/8ft916. 57cSW3. showing the captured Gennan
positions at Delville Wood (Longueval). north Guillemont and Ginchy.
Vou shou1d note Ihat the trench maps, which are avaitable from the
Imperial War Museum Department of Printed Books (Tel: 0171 416
5348) or the canographer of Ihe Western Front Association (members
only). foll ow a specific sequence and should be referred to by the
numbers usually found in thei r top right hand corner. Unfortunately the
Trones Wood and Guillemont area is covered by two sheels belonging
14
to the I: 10.000 trench map seri es. Those are sheet 57c5W3. entitled
Longueval. which covers the villages of Longueval and Bazentin-le-
Petit. Ginchy. Guillemont and Montauban: and sheet 62cNWI. entitled
Maricourt. which covers Mahz Horn Fann, Marieourt. Hardecoun-
aux-Bois and the area towards the Ri ver 50mme. Variously dated
versions are available from both sourees. In the text I have sometimes
referred to locations whieh are noted on such treneh maps. but not on
present day maps. In such cases I have where neeessary given the
relevant trench map referenee to help you identify the exact position.
For example, 'Waterlot Fann' nonh-east of Trones Wood was located
on sheet 57cSW3. at referenee 5.18.e.9.1.
One feature which the young or first time visitor might wish for is
an easily aceessible reconstruction which gives an insight inlo the
conditions which prevailed around Guillemont at the height of the
eonflicl. One such souree of insight and empathy is to be found at
Newfoundland Park. two miles north-wesl of Thiepval on Ihe
Auchonvillers road out of Hamei, the D73. This is an area of preserved
battlefield, purchased by the government of Newfoundland after the
Great War. Further detailed insight can be obtained at the two quality
museums which are within reasonable distance. The first, the Musee
des Abris, aI Albert below the celebrated Basilica, is only twenty
minutes away by car. The second, the Historial, at Peronne, is weil
wort h the longer joumey, but you should remembcr to set aside a good
forty minutes travelling time, each way. Take the 0938 running south-
east from Albert to Peronne, a route which will cnable you to follow
the soulhem ann of the British front lines as they existed before the
openi ng or the battle of the Somme.
One extraordinary fact about the Somme and Anere battlefield is
that after the utter devastation of the Great War many of the tracks and
other human geographical features were reconstructed in the 1920s
with an uneanny similarity to their pre-war locations. Most detail
shown on trench maps of the Trones Wood - Guillemont area still
stand true today. Ini tially the processes of reeonstruction were almost
insunnountably difficult. In order 10 help, many of the villages were
adopted by some of Britain's towns and eities.
However, in the early 1920s. as more villagers returned 10 rebuild
their hornes and li ves with the reparations monies wrung from Weimar
Gennany. every efron was made 10 find the exact location of their pre-
war houses. Sometimes. when a viHager did not relurn that plot was
left vaeant, in many cases still so today! But. we should remembcr that
GuillemOl is a working village. a eommunity whose roolS are based
15
in centuries of toil on the land which is also our place of interest. This
is not open access land on the National Trust model. It is all too easy
to let our two interests clash. During the autumn months. in panicular.
be aware of the numerous shooting panies. The farmers will not
welcome lhe sight ofyour tramping the fjelds with linie regard to crops
and seeds. Please ask before you enter. Please keep to the paths and the
edges of each field.
As someone said recently. 'My history but his land!'
L.IIte Autumn 1916 and the onsel of raill turns Ihe shell-torn l.II ndscllpe
around Guillcmonl Int o a quagmire.
Chapter One
OUR DESIGNATED AREA TODAY
Most people visiting the Somme battlefield for the first time join the
straight road which runs between Albert and Bapaume, the 0929,
along wh ich it was planned to execut e the 'Big Push' , This raad neatly
bisects the Brit ish sector of the first Battle of the Somme, However, the
events whi ch unfolded throughout the moming of the Ist Jul y and on
the following days meant that far greater emphasis would subsequentl y
be placed by the British army upon the areas south of the Bapaume
raad rather than to it s north, At the very eastem end of the southem arm
of the British battlefront on Ist Jul y lay the vi l1ages of Maricoun and
Montauban, Here the New Army divisions within XIII Corps of
Rawl inson's Founh Army joined hands with the French soldiers of XX
Corps, A shon distance tO the north-east of Maricoun lies Favier Wood
(Bois Favier), wh ich was one of the immediate fi rst day objectives tor
the French anny, and the vil1age of Hardecoun-aux-Bois, '
From Hardecoun a raad leads north towards the village of
Hardccourt, photographed during Hs occupation by German troops,
bt!ron damage wrought b ~ the t' nch artillery bombardments de"astated
this place in JUlle 1916,
Guillemonl. Between Montauban and Guillemont lay two substanti al
areas of woodland. Bemafay and These two woods lay
between the British army's fi rst day objectives and the main German
second position whieh here ran from outside Longueval. past Waterlot
Farm and in fronl of Guillemon1. The first of these woods to be
captured by the British was Bemafay Wood. However, the subsequent
allempts to capture Trones Wood resulted in far more severe fighting.
The origi ns of thaI severit y [ay in the fact that the capt ure of Trones
Wood was seen as an essential precursor before the night attack
towards Bazenlin, due on the moming of 14th July. could be launched
wi th any degree of confidence in its outcome.
East of Trones Wood the 0 64 leads past the Guillemonl Road
Cemetery and into the vill age of Guillemont. North-west of
GuilJemont is the forbidding outline of Oelville Wood whi ch contai ns
the South African memorial. As you look along the 0 20 towards the
village of Longueval and Oelville Wood your li ne of sight passes
Waterlot Farm whieh is dealt with wit hin Ihis guide. East of the village
of Guillemont lies Combles whilst to the north-east Ginchy can be
seen, although outside the scope of this guide. only one kilometre
away. If you are in search of refreshment on a hOl day then Combles
has a number of shops and a bar where refreshment can be purchased.
However, the most frequenll y used place to pick up supplies. some
The church and Guillemont \illage today.
distance to the west. is the town of Alben, familiar to almost every
Brilish soldier who served during the first Battle of the Somme. Today
Albert describes itself as being only the "3eme Ville de la Somme", but
quite properly "la Cite d' Ancre". The Town Hall square in Alben often
hosts a market and there are three small supennarkets nearby wh ich
can all provide a sound array of food and refreshments.
However. away from the town of Alben. the area south of the Alben
- Bapaume road in the quadrant east and nonh-east of Alben in the
di rection of Hardecoun and past Pozieres is distinguished by an
enonnous crescent of substantial woodlands. Havi ng been devastated
by shellfire during the Great War these woodlands are, once again.
mat ure and dark. completely dominating the atmosphere and
IOpography of this areas. In almost every case these prominent woods
have been allowed to re-establish themselves on exactl y the same sites
as they occupied before war ravaged the area.
Leaving Alben the village of Guillemont can be reached in a
number of ways. Each route has a very different character.
The first and most southerly roul e is along the 0938 Alben to
Peronne road. Continue along the 0 938 until you reach Maricourt
which lies on Ihis guide's western boundary. Afler passing the sites of
the Devons and Gordons cemeteri es this road begins to ri se up as it
approaches Maricourt and fine views can be had along the southem
arm of the Briti sh battlefront on Ist Jul y. At Maricourt, where the
British and French armies abutted. turn left along the 0197 for three
kilometres until you reach the cross raads where Bemafay Wood faces
you 10 the front right side. Turn right here along the 064 and after
passing Bernafay Wood you wi ll pass Trones Wood on your left before
continuing into Guillemont.
A second route starts along the 0938 Alben to Peronne road but
then takes you through Fricoun and along the 064 past Mametz,
Dantzig Alley Cemetery and the village of Montauban berore arriving
at the cross raads j usl south-wesl of Bemafay Wood. This route takes
you through territory attacked by three divisions on the morning of Ist
July. the 7th Di vision at Fricoun and Mametz. the 18th Di vision
towards Pommiers Redoubt and the 30th Di vision towards
Montauban. which all achieved some considerable degree of success in
their attacks. When you arrive at the cross roads south-west of
Bemafay Wood go strai ght ahead along the 064. past Trones Wood.
towards Gui ll emont.
A third possibility lies along the 0929 Albert to Bapaume road.
Turn right into La BoisseIle and continue along the 020 through
19
Contalmaison. BazentinJe-Grand. Longueval und thence inlo
Guillemont. This route takes you through much of the tcnitory
captured duri ng the hOl summer wecks of July 1916. and especially
nOlewonhy here is the area east of Mametz Wood towards Trones
Wood where the extraordinary Dawn Attack took place on 14th Ju\y.
Alternatively, Guillemont can be reached very simply from the
Bapaume area. Take the 0929 in the direction of Albert. Soon after
leaving Bapaume take the road signed for ThiJIoy and Aers on your
left. Follow Ihis road. which soonjoins the 010. inta Flers and thence
alang the 0197 inlO Longueval and then GuiJlemonl. Ir you intend 10
study in the Guillemont-Ginchy-Combles area for any lenglh of time
then an altemativecentre 10 Albert is the 5mall lown of Rancoun. east
of Combles on the 020 past the AI motorway. where hotel
accommodation is available.
There are no hotels within the area covered by Ihis guide and the
first thing you might Iherefore need 10 arrange is accommodation and
tomorrow moming's breakfast. I have therefore identified below some
of the available hotels and a number of "English" B&B houses where
you can base yourself during a visil. However. for those of you with a
tent or caravan and a more adventurous disposition. the Bell evue
campsite in AUlhuilie is a fine and central poi nt on the Somme
battlefield which can be reached from Guillemonl via La Boisselle in
twenty minutes by car. If you wish tO avoid travelling back through
Albert, take the D20 Longueval. Contalmaison tO La Boissell e route
thence across the 0 929 and take the road to Aveluy which is adjacent
to La Boisselle's communal cemetery. From Avel uy follow the DI51
into Aut huille. The campsite is quiet and orten frequemed by people
who share an interest in thc Great War. The owner. Monsieur Desailly.
and his family are always welcoming. The Bellevue campsite has been
expanded 10 include a simple restaurant. reached thirty yards to the
right as you look towards the mai n campsile entrance. where the food
is both substantial and economical. Here you are within tWO minute's
walk of the Authui ll e Mili tary Cemetery and not far from the Auberge
de la Vallee d' Ancre on the banks of the Ri ver Ancre. For many years
this bar and restaurant has served decent food and drinks for as long as
you cared to stay! The Auberge has been taken into new ownership in
1995 by Oenis Bourgoyne who has already establ ished a fine
reputat ion for the quality of his food amongst the local communi ty.
There is anot her campsile at the viHage of Treux in the Ancre valley
south west of Albert. This alternative is pleasantly shaded from the
summer's heat but is 100 distant from the Guillemont area.
20
However, it can be bitterly cold camping in February! Therefore, for
those of you who are travelling in style or during these colder and
wetter months of the year, a roof over your heads may be welcome.
The list identified below may be of same help, but it should not be
inferred that the order is one of descending merit! To call for
reservations from the UK dial 00 33, fo11owed by the 9 digil number.
In a11 these hotels, with one exception in Picquigny. you will find at
least one person on the hotel' s staff who can speak English.
Hotels:
The Royal Picardie ***. Route d' Amiens, 80300 Alben. Tel 322 75 37
00.
The Hotel de la Basilique **, 3 - 5 Rue Gambeua, 80300 Alben. Tel
322750471.
The Relais Fleuri **, 56 Avenue Faidherbe, 80300 Albert. Tel 322 75
081 1.
The Grande Hotel de la Paix *,43 Rue Vielor Hugo, 80300 Albert, Tel
3227501 64.
Les Etangs du Levant *. Rue du 1 er Septembre, 80340 Sray sur
Somme, Tel 322 76 70 00.
Auberge de Piequigny **. 112 Rue du 60 R. J.. 80310 Piequigny, Tel
322512053.
Hotel Le Prieure. 17 Route National. 80860 Rancourt. Tel 322 85 04
43. This hotel is particularly weil sited for access to the Guillemont
area being located jusl six kilometres east through the small town of
Combles.
B&B accommodation:
Auchonvillers - Beaumonr Hamel. Comfortable and weil appointed
accommodation for up to eight people. Attraclive grounds and
interesting walks nearby. Evening meals and continental breakfast.
Twenty minutes from Guillemont driving past Newfoundland Park,
Thiepval and Pozieres. Mike alld Julie Rell slraw. Les Galets. Route de
Beaumont, Auchonvillers. Tel: 322 76 28 79.
AuchOllvillers. Five good rooms wi th en suite facil ities and an
interesting history, the centrepiece of which is the cellar still carved
with the names of many soldiers who passed through in 1916. Bed,
breakfast and evening meals by arrangement as weil as a Tea Room for
non residents. Agai n, access to Guillemont best undertaken by car.
Avril Williams. [0 Rue De[attre, 80560 Auchonvillers. Tel: 322 76 23
66.
21
COllrcelette. A distinctive farmhouse, self catering or mea[s
provided. Situated right al the hean of the Somme Baulefields. This
fine location provides the most straight forward access to Guillemont.
less than ten minutes in a car. POlll Reed and KierOIl Murphy.
Sommecoun. 39 Grande Rue. 80300 Courcelene. Tel: 322 74 01 35.
Martinpllich. A welcoming and comfonable house which can cater
for up 10 eight people. This newly renovated house is situated at the
hean of the 1916 Somme battlefield providing excellent and speedy
access 10 Guillemont. Evening meals by request and continental
breakfast. Co/bi and Lisa Gillard. 54 Grand Rue. Maninpuich, 62450
Bapaume. Tel. 321 50 1887,
The Guillemont Area
Once you are established it is time to see the sUITounding locality
and 1 suggest that, soon after you arrive. you would enjoy following the
general tour explained in Chapter seven. However, in this first chapter
I have attempted to give some definition to the boundaries of this
guidebook and give abrief commentary to illustrate the imponance of
the area's history.
The boundaries to this guidebook run north from Maricourt, along
the D197 unlil the cross-roads are reached, faeing Bemafay Wood. The
boundary then runs around the wesl and north of Bemafay Wood and
north of Trones Wood to include the site of Walerlol Farm, north east
Guillemont \'iIlage cenlre before the Great War. [Reed]
Reconstruction wlthin Guillemont begins, soon after the Great War,
,R"',
of Gui ll emont. From there the boundary runs across the north of
Gui llemont and thence southwards pastlhe east ofthe village along the
course of the D20E towards Maurepas,
For some distance to the south of Guillemont the terrain raHs gentl y
along aseries of knoll s or spurs, past Hardecourt valley and the Bois
Faviere and Bois d'en Haut in the di rection of lhe great Somme Ri ver.
The most noticeable of these knolls stands south-west of GuilJemont
above and to the north of the Bois Faviere and Hardecourt-aux-Bois.
At the nonhem end ofthis knoll in 1916 Maltz Horn Farm fonned an
imponant defensive position for the Germans. south-east of Trones
Guillemont \'i!lage cenlre, present da)'.
The baule arena of the summer of 1916. The Germans were pushed back
from the woods to the vill age of Guill cmont from where they were
dislodged in September. (eal'el
WoOO. But only when you arrive on the D938 Albert to Peranne raad
is iI possible to appreciate jusl what a significant course the River
Somme cuts across this area of France. South of the D938 the land falls
away sharply and you can look down on the Somme as il meanders
idly. a greal basin of water meadows. lakes. pools and canalised
waterways which make a considerable nalOral barrier. The Bois
Faviere objective was caplOred by the French on the moming of Ist
July 1916. along with the village of Curlu which lies adjacent to one
of the huge sweepi ll g meall ders which charactcrise the Somme's
sedate progress in Ihis area.
Five ki lometres nort h of the River Somme the chalk upland terrai n
around Bemafay Wood. Trones Wood, Longueval and Guillemom is on
first glance seemingly devoid of significam geographical fealOres.
Over such porous base rock the fields are without streams. During the
fighting for Guillcmont and Falfemont Farm the lack of water posed
ever present difficulties for the men and their transport and supply
units. Here lhere are no sudden and impressive slopes such as those
which provided such easily defensible positions to the Gem13n army
on Ist July 1916 at the villages of Thiepval or Ovillers. From
Guillemont a shallow valley. Caterpillar Valley. runs westwards.
through Trones Wood, north of Bemafay Wood, thence past Caterpi ll ar
Wood, south of Mametz Wood and then south-westwards towards
Fricourt where il occasionally produces a triekle of waler known as lhe
Willow Stream. In the Trones Wood-Guillemont area what higher
24
l\lap J. The Trones Wood - Guillemont bauJelield area, showing the pre
war geography of the area. This is laken from the 1:40,000 sheel.S wh ich
accompanied the Official Hislory ,"olume detailing the fighting leading 10
the first day or thc BuHle or the Somme.
25
ground is of discemible significance lies to the north, around
Longueval and Delville Wood, where the highest elevations are a little
over 150 metres above sea level. The advantage in height enjoyed by
the German army at Delville Wood ensured that the capture of Trones
Wood would be camed out amidst the most terrible ordeal of shell fire
since the wood and its approaches were observed from that higher
ground to the north. As the Official History put the situation so
succinctly:
'Facing Longlle\'al, in rhe Gem/GII 2nd Position, Trones \Vood
srretclles down rhe sOllrhem slope ofCarerpillar Valley asfaT as
rhefoot of its norrhem slope; east ofthe wood rhe \'alley exrends
as a shallow rrol/gh ro GI/illemom, I\'hich was also in rhe 2nd
Position. TllIls rhe wood was commanded ar dose range borh
from fhe norrh and lhe easr, and lhere was tiftle chance of
holding ir IVhi/sr rhe enemy sm in Longlleval and GI/Wemom.
Capwred il mlghr be, m a price, bllf ollly by permission of rhe
Germans co1l1d Ir be held.'l
Second Lieutenant Jack f eamhead,
tnth King's (lh'erpool), 55th
(Territorial) Di vision, from whose
diary abrief extracl appears opposite.
He had enJi sted, in September 1914, as
a private.
Running north-west from Guillemont,
past Longueval and Pozieres. the higher
ground persists all the way to Thiepval
in a great spine of elevated ground
which overlooked the Briti sh positions
at the outset of the Battle of the
Somme, At Thiepval that elevated ridge
falls away steepl y into valley of the
River Ancre and it was this height
wh ich the Briti sh army sought so
desperately to aUain during the long
and bitter mont hs of the Somme
campaign.
l. I shnll subsequently LI$ually refer 10
HnrdecoLlrt-nux-Bois simply as Hnrdecourt
IhroughoLit this guide.
2. Bois des Trones on your tGN maps ofthe
area, nnd also on prc-war Freneh maps of the
3. Military Oper(JIions. Fror/ce and Belgium.
/916. Vo12. pp37.
26
Chapter Two
THE EVENTS WHICH BROUGHT THE BRITISH
ARMY TO TRONES WOOD'
Men had assembled for months berore the 1916 Somme battles
commenced. Many had, at the time they were sucked inta its seemingly
inexhaustibly grim appetite, linIe idea ofwhat terribleness they would
face. Thousands ofBrilish soldiers thought the event would presage the
end ofwar. Same, Iike Jack Fearnhead, were weil aware their departure
from horne, and all they held dear, was a step into the unknown. As he
left Southampton in the laIe evening of 26 May 1916, Ihis young
subaltern with the 117th King's, 55th (Territorial) Division, recorded
that:
'At IOp.m. fhe anchors were drawlIlIp, and sream pur Oll. and
sllortl)' we left behind fhe last solid view ojSollthamplOn. a vista
of (rees 0/1 each flank, broken Oll ,he right by the towers and
chimneys ofOsborne, and dead astern by the chinmeys alld roofs
and occasional masts of Southamptoll, oll si/houetled fiercely
against olle of the most perfect sllnsets mall ever saw. Tlle sea
astern a marvellOlls electric bille, no waves, a Jew vel)' small
wavelelS not sllfficient to break the bille in tlle smallest degree.
The sky above i1 an artist spalette of colour. brilliantjlamillg red
immediately above tlre horizon, shading offgell1ly tllrollgll all the
c%llrs kllown. and some for which lI'e have 110 words. throllgh
yellows, greens, blues. to a deep IInknown pllrpfe overhead. I1
was trofy wOllderfuf, and Ille wllole effect inspired olle wilh an
intense desire for something indefinite. somerhing intangible,
perhaps for furtller kllowledge of the Creator of so 1I'0ndeljili a
scene - ofGod.'I.
It was perhaps the last moment of beauty that these men would ever
witness.
On the morning of I July 1916 the British army, in conjunction wi lh
the French, launched a massive assault along a fronlage running
continuously from their positions facing Serre all the way south to
those facing Montauban. South of Montauban the British and French
armies joined al the village of Maricourt and Ihe impact which the
Frcnch anillery made during their part of those initial bombardment
was immensely helpful to the British. East and to the sout h of
Maricourt the Freneh attack was due to continue past the River
Somme.
27
Map 2. The disposil.ions of XIII Corps' men in Ihe vicinity of Maricourt I
!\Iontauban before aod after I.heir successful aUack on 1st July 1916.
Taken (rom the Offieial History series of maps, 1916 Vol I.
28
.1
The British unit whose attack was developed from thc Maricourt
sector was the 30th Division, Their objective was the capture of
Montauban. To effect Ihis advance the 30th Di vision employed the
Liverpool Pals to make the initial advance across the German front line
positions fac ing Maricourt whilst the Manchester Pals would secure
Montauhan village itself in the final stages of the attack. Montauhan
was one of many strongly fortified Intermediate Positions in this area
between thc Germans' front lines and their main Second Position. On
the right of the British 30th Division stood the French army's 39th
Division whose first day objective was the capture of Bois Favier. The
30th Division incJuded among its ranks four of the Manchester Pals
battalions and four ofthe Liverpool Pals
1

Billon FII.tnl.. / .. 'Q" .
: ~ Q ~ Q]
\CI,"" .. :Q!
,. Maricourl
\. /'--
":/0.- / __ .
1\ / j., l
" I( //i)
Map 3. The Objecth'es allotted 10 Ihe 71h, 18th and 3{)th British Divisions
along with the Frt'nch 39th and 11th Dh'isions for the Ist Jul y, taken from
t he Official His/ory series of maps, 1916 Voll.
29
The anacks made by the 30th Division, and that by the 18th and 7th
Divisions 10 their left, were, by contrast with much that occurred
elsewhere Ihis day, hugely successful. All along the southern arm ofthe
British army's fronlage, from Fricourt 10 Montauban, a very substantial
advance was made whieh reflects enormously weil upan the resi lience
and determination of the soldiers in this part of the battlefront.
Elsewhere, with the possible exception of the Uistermen at Schwaben
Redoubt north ofThiepval, thc story was one of unremitting disaster.
The advance from Fricourt - Mametz aleng to Montauban was the ooly
one of substancc whieh was consolidated and held by the end of that
day. JUSI north of Montauban thc Manchester Pals had captured
Montauban Alley whilst the Liverpool Pals held the Briqueterie, south-
east of Montauban and south of Bemafay Wood.
As a consequence this southem sector of the British frontage,
adjacent to those advances made by the French, would now become the
focus of the British anny's attempts to wring some advantage out of
their tragedy on 1 July.
Perhaps one of the most inexplicabJe issues which has since been
debated at great length is why Rawlinson failed to capitali se on the
success at Montauban on I July. Here the Manchester Pals had repell ed
Gennan counter attacks in the area around Triangle Poi nt between 3
and 4 am on the moming of 2nd July and the village was secure. It
seemed that most ofthe Gennan infantry reserves had been commi tted
and that his artillery was in astate of disarray. One problem was that
by the moming of 2 July the Maricourt area south of Montauban was
very congested with troop movements, both British and French. The
French Sixlh Army had issued orders at 8.30 am on the moming of I
July pointing out thaI the attack of their XX Corps on the Gennan
second positions inci uding Hardecoun would dcpend upon the Brit ish
attacking Bernafay and Trones Woods. At 10.30 am on the 2nd a
further French Sixth Army order simply instrucled their men on these
locations to stand fast.
During the moming of 2 July the 30th Division's field howitzers
shelled Bemafay Wood with thennite shells in an att empt to set the
woodland on fi re. Later in the day the wood was scoured by patro!s
who captured a number of prisoners. This was the day that Haig had
arrived early at Fourth Army HQ urging thaI the success al Montauban
should be exploited and that attacks should be made along the whole
southern arm of the battlefield, laki ng the li nes of Gerrnan trenches
faci ng weslwards, 10 the north of Fricourt, in the rear. However those
attacks were not fot1hcomi ng as Rawlinson concentrated his efforts
30
Map 4. The advance made by the French XX Corps (Sidh Army) between
Bois Faviere and Curlu on the morning of Ist July 1916. Off/dal HistoT)',
1916 Voll.
31
r" i'
'.' "
~ ',..
. : : ~ ...
,'.'-,
B 0
B
British and French lines abulted.
Ihroughout the day on frontal auacks being made in the Thiepval -
Ovillers - La Boisselle areas. ey 3 Ju[y the divisions within XIII Corps
were still occupied with consolidalion yet patrols in Bernafay Wood
wcre still able 10 report that it was undcfended. 1I was only al 3.15 pm
that Congreve, XIII Corps' cOInmanding officer, ordered the 30th
Division 10 occupy the wood. ThaI attack was undertaken at 9.00 pm
by soldiers of27 Brigade' operating under contral ofthe 30th Division
Bemafay Wood today, photographl'd from its southern asp1.
Tr 0 n 9 S-
and was achieved with the loss of only six casualties! In terms of the
subsequent history of attempts to capture woodlands on {he Somme
battlefield this was an eXlraordinary lapse on the part of the Gennans.
At Ihis stage it was also dear that Trones Wood was held more
strongly. However Rawlinson was sti ll stT"ingely reluctant to give
emphasis to his troops success in the south, believing that the capture
of Bemafay Wood had created an awkward re-entrant at the junction of
the Sritish and French armies. Nevertheless, it was decided at the
Corps commanders conference, held that afternoon of 3 July, that
every preparation should be made for an anack on the German second
position in the Longueval to Bazentin-le-Petit area.
It was therefore self-evident that Trones Wood would have to be
caplured be fore such an al1ack could take place.
4th - 8th July in thc Bcrnafa)' - Trones Wood area
On 4 July it was abundantly dear that the German defences north
of La BoisseIle were still secure. By contrast, in the area between the
Albert - Sapaume road in the north and the Amiens - Vermand road
south ofthe River Somme the German position was relatively weak. In
view of what had been happening at Verdun the German army had been
surprised by the effectiveness of the French whose advance south of
33
The view towards Trones Wood from the south-east corner of Uernafay
Wood.
the river had see the capture or many German troops and anillery
units. Here the French Sixth Army had al ready ad\'anced some lhree
miles lowards Biaches and Barleux. However. lhis day. 4 July. the
weather began 10 play havoc wilh the British auempts 10 press rorward
10wards the German second positions. Showers lurned to a
The view towards Maltz Horn Fann and the Hardef:ourt area from the
sunken lant' south of Bernafay \\'ood.
MAILTZHO'" FARM
SUNKEN UNE
thunderstorm in thc afternoon and thc British trenches and supply
roules became a quagmire. During these thrce difTicult days, belween
4th to the 6th inclusive. holh the British and French gave emphasis 10
preparing for their attack. duc on 7th, against the Hardecourt - Tranes
Wood - Mametz Wood and Contalmaison positions. Allhough south of
thc Somme things had gone weIl. te lhe nonh ofthe Somme thc French
were clamped in thc same difficulties which beset the British. Thc
fulcrum around which Ihis issue swung al the junclion of thc Briti sh
and French armies was the problem of capturi ng thc Tranes woodland
area.
As we have seen. the combined French - British Hardecourt -
Tranes Wood attack was duc on thc 7th. However, on 6 July German
counter attaeks at Bois Faviere, whieh sueeeeded in re-eapturing the
northern edge ofthat wood, ensured that the attaek on !-Iardeeoun and
Trones Wood was postponed until the 8th. Overnight, 7/8t h Jul y, the
weather was wet and the underfoot eonditions eontinued to hamper the
British and Frcneh troops prcparing to make Ihis attaek. The British
would employ the 30th Division, eommanded by Major-General Shea,
a unit whieh had already been in the area for months and whose men
had performed so brilliantly on the morning of I July to effeet thc
eapture of Montauban.
The plan 10 capture Trones Wood
The Allied attaek would be in two stages. The first stage, timed for
8.00 am, would be undertaken jointly, in part by the Freneh who were
due to eapture Maltz !-10m Treneh, in front of Maltz !-10m knoll
betwcen !-Iardeeourt and the junetion between thc two armies, whilst
the British eaptured the eontinuation of the Maltz Horn Treneh north
towards Trones Wood and the sOUihern half of the wood itself. Later,
at a time to be agreed upon by thc loeal eommanders, the Freneh would
attack Hardecourt and thc Maltz Horn knoll to its nonh whilst the
British would attack Maltz Horn Farm's rubble and capture the
remainder ofTrones Wood.
Thc British faced a severe problem in that the distanee from the
Briqueterie to the German held Maltz Horn Treneh was across 1,10010
1.500 yards of open and fire-swept land. Further south the Freneh
faccd a much narrower prospect Congreve therefore deeided to
capture Ihc southern part ofTrones as a preliminary operation. Trones
Wood was effectively divided by the course of two light railway lines
whieh passed through the woodland. Thc more significant \ine was the
Albert 10 Peronne light railway which passed between Montauban and
35
the Briqueterie, thence through Bernafay Wood, where thefe was a
station in its corner, and Tranes Wood be rare passing
Guillemont on the north side of that viJIage. The other lioc, effeclively
a branch ofthe main line. approached from the confi nes of Caterpillar
Valley jusl north of Bemafay and joined thc Albert - Peronne line juS!
cast of Tranes Wood. Congreve's plan had the advantage that thc
approach 10 Tranes Wood from the sout hern end of Bernafay Wood
was nol observed from Longueval. Once the southern end of T rones
was secured the arilish attack towards Maltz Horn Trench and Farm
could be made in a south-easterl y direetion across thc shallow head of
Maltz Horn vall ey, whi ch was hidden from thc German Second
Position.
I. Whether by accident or design the military cartographers who mapped this area for
the British Army in the )"ears both before and dl,lring the Great War ollen changed the
spelling of locations. Trones Wood is a corruption of Bois des Trones
2. Extract from lack Feamhead's Diary. May 26th. 1916.
3. The 30th Division consisted of:
21 Brigade.
18th Kings (Liverpool Pals).
2nd Green Howards
2nd Wiltshire.
19th Manchester (Pals)
89 Brigade.
17th Kings (Liverpool Pals)
19th Kings (Liverpool Pals)
20th Kings (Li"erpool Pals).
2nd Bedfordshire.
90 Brigade.
2nd Royal Scots Fsiliers.
16th Manchester (pals).
17th Manchester (Pals).
18th Mancht'Stcr (Puls).
Divisional Pioneers: II th Sol,llh Lancashire.
4.27 Brigade were pan ofthe 9th (Soottish) Division. The two battalions which eaptured
Bemafay Wood al so liule eosl were the 6th KOSBs and the 12th Royal Seots.
36
Chapter Three
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF TRONES WOOD
Thc events of 8th Jul y
AI 8 am on the morning of 8th July the British anempt 10 capture
T rones Wood began. It was 10 prove a long and arduous proccss. For
same hours prior 10 the infanlry assaul! the Corps' heavy artillcry and
the field guns of halh the 18th and 30th Divisions had fired with
relatively little impact on the Gennan positions. On the right thc
French artillery barrage was rar more effcctive. reducing the II1/ 123rd
Reserve Regiment 10 juS! two officers and 150 olhers. Thc initial
British attack on Tranes Wood was undertaken by the 2nd Green
Howards of 21 Brigade. Thc men moved forward through Bemafay
Wood struggling with thc dense undergrowth and smashed trees which
only served 10 worsen the trauma ofanillcry shells which were al ready
falling around them. Leaving the confines of the wood the Green
Howards began to cross the open ground towards Trones Wood,
breasting the slight rise which initially
shielded them from view.
As soon as the men came into view
of the Germans in Trones Wood, the
Green Howards ' men were caught in a
curtain of fire from machine guns and
two fie ld guns firing over open sights
from the edge of the woodland. There
were heavy easualties and the Green
Howards were withdrawn, the 2nd
Wiltshire being ordered 10 renew the
attack at 10.30 am. In view ofwhat had
happened, Brigadier General Sackville-
West arranged a postponement until
1.00 pm. Already the plan of a
combined Anglo-French operations in
the T rones - Hardecourt area was
breaking down and a melange of local
initiatives and Corps orders began to
emerge as the norm whin this area.
On the right of the British the
French assault had gone ahead as
37
Major General Shea, the 30th Dhision's
commanding officer.
Map 3. Taken from Iwo I: 10.000 series trellch maps, corret:led 10 1/611916
and 315/1916 which co\'er Ihe Briquetf'rie, Hardecourt and Maltz Horn
--
;' -"-.
. ' "-
-''''-Her' -
!
Farm. To the north Longue,"al. Wood, Trones Wood and the
Guillemont approaches.
planned al 10.05 am, capturing their sector of Maltz Horn Trench up to
a position opposite the site of Mahz Horn Fann. Because ofthe failure
of 21 Brigade 's men to get into Trones Wood the Frenchmen 's le flank
was completely exposed to machinc gun fire from thai wood. As a
consequence, at 12.20 pm, Congreve ordered that Shea's 30th
Division, in order to cover Ihe French left, auack towards Mahz Horn
Farm and Trones Wood from the direction of the Briqueterie, as the
OfTicial History pUl it, ' even ifhe had to employ his whole division.'!
Fortunately this proccss had already got off 10 a good stan on the
initiative of the 2nd Wihshires, one company of which had worked
Iheir way up 10 Ihe head of Maltz Horn Valleyl along Ihe sunken lane
leading soulh-east from the Briqueterie. These men had then taken a
part of Mahz Horn Trench allotted to the Brilish pan ofthe attack, and
Ihey had been later reinforced by a company of the 19th Manchesters
(41h Pals) who linked up with Ihe French on their right. Mahz Horn
Farm was now Iittle more than a barely perceptible heap of rubble
between the IWO lines facing each olher across the knolI , Ihe Gennans
having wilhdrawn 10 the eastern slopes of the knolI. However, Ihere
was still a gap between the two companies of Ihe Wiltshires and
Manchesters adjacent to the French facing Maltz Horn Farm and the
soulhern end ofTrones Wood.
Throughoul the rest ofthe afternoan of81h July a number of further
British battalions were drawn inlO the attempts to capture Trones
Woad. The first rnen to get into the wood reached that objective as a
resull of an attack at about 1.00 pm by the rernaining thtee companies
of the 2nd Wihshires from Bernafay Woad. Although, like Ihe 2nd
Green Ho\Vards before thern, the Wiltshires suffered heavy casuallies,
small groups of men reached the south-eastern edge of Trones Woad
where Ihey entrenchcd themselves and bcgan to construct a funher
trench 10 their right, fac ing nonh, 10 prolect their flank. Two further
companies of the 181h King 's and one of the 19th Manchesters
managed 10 get up 10 help \Vith this prQCess of consolidation and by
nighlfall the 18th Manchesters of90 Brigade had arrived 10 prepare for
an attempt, due the fotJowing moming. 10 renew the attack on Trones
Wood.
The ewnts of 91h Jul y
By now it was clear that what had been described as prelirninary
operations, designed to ensure the success of the general attack on the
German second position due soon
1
, were taking on a severity and
momentum oftheir own. Thc Official History cornmcn\s that:
40
'11 so happelled that in these preliminary operntions several
days of hard allli costl)' fightillg did /lot achiel'e complete
success: )'et. iftl/e three localities [Contalmaison, Mametz Wood
and Trones Woodj had bee/l i/lcluded i/l the general allack
lIgainstthe Gel'mlln 2nd Position. fhe)' might. ifstoutl)' defended.
"al'e disorganised Ihe assault and desll'oyed its impetus before
the main objeclil'es lI'ere approached. Cenain it is Ihar some
penalty had 10 be paid for tlle failllre 10 take advantage of the
oppommities which "ad offered themsell'es on this front
immelliately after tlle first day of the offensive:
J
The eosl of Ihal tardiness would be horn, in large pan, by the
Manchester and Liverpool Pals units ofthe 30th Division.
The first evenls ofthis day were marked, al 3.00 am, by a suceessful
advanee by the men of2nd Royal Seots of90 Brigade who again made
use or the sunken tane leading southeastwards from the Briqueterie.
By Ihis route the 2nd Royal Seots gained the centre of Maltz Horn
Treneh, rushing the ruins or the farm and then bombing their way
northwards up Maltz Horn Trench in the direction ofTrones Wood. By
7.00 am the Royal Seots had reached the Guillemont road whieh ran
towards thaI vilJage from the southeastern corner of the wood.
Looking towards Guill emont rrom the southeastem corner or Trones
Wood.
The second, and seemingly decisive event. was the attack made by
the 17th Manchesters on Trones Wood. This atlack was timed at 3.00
am from Bemafay Wood. The men were greatly hampered by gas
shells and the misting of their eye pieces in the damp drizz1e laden
atmosphere. Consequently their advance across the ground between
the two woods only took place some three hours after il shou1d have
occurred! Nevert heless, the men passed successfully through Trones
Wood, reaching its eastern border at approximately 8.00 am. There the
17th Manchesters joined wirh the 2nd Royal Scots and then pushed
patrols into the northern end of the wood.
Trones Wood was now. early on the morning of9th July. in British
hands.
The situat ion was soon 10 change. Within hours. soon after mid-day,
the Germans had organised a systemat ic shelling ofTrones Wood and
its western approaches. The 17th Manchesters sufTcrcd panicularly
severely on the eastern limits ofthe wood and in view ofwhat seemed
an imminent counter attack the men werc ordercd at 3.00 pm to
withdraw. They began to fall back towards Bernafay Wood.
Unfortunately one detachment, which the order fai led to reach, was left
within the wood's confi nes. At 3.30 pm the Germans began to develop
a general counter attack from the Maltz Horn Farm area all the way to
the northern limits ofTrones Wood. In view ofthe 17th Manchesters'
retirement the 18th Manchesters were also forced to pull back, in their
case towards the Briqueterie, leaving one company in the south-eastern
corner ofTrones Wood. Bearing in mi nd what was happening to their
north the 2nd Royal Scots then withdrew from Mahz Horn Trench
joining with the company of the 18th Manchesters just inside the
south-eastern corner ofTrones, leaving a block just clear ofthe wood.
Although thc Royal Scots and 18th Manchesters drove ofTthe Germans
facing them the Germans succeeded in penetrating the bulk of the
northern end of the wood nonh of the Guillemont road. As the
Germans pressed through the wood the isolated detachmenl of 17th
Manchesters was ovetwhelmed after stout resistance.
Thus, by 4.00 pm on 9 July the greater part of Trones Wood was
back in German hands. The German's artillery, arrayed in a great
sweep from Maurepas, east of Hardecourt, to Bazentin-Ie-Grand,
completely dominated the area and it seemed likely that any
subsequent British counter attacks designed 10 recapture Trones would
be costly.
Initially that counter attack was the responsibility of the 16th
Manchesters, the Ist Manchester Pals. Their attack was launched from
42
A German observation post in Trones Wood.
the sunken lane. which ran from the Briqueterie lowards HardecourI, at
6.40 pm. Their objective was 10 re-secure the southern portion of the
waod and cover the left of the Royal Seals who should have been in
possession of Mailz Horn Trench. Thc 16th Manchestcr's attack
succeeded in advancing 10 SUpp0rl the Royal Seals wel! but was unable
10 seeUTe the southern part of the waod. As a consequence thc 16th
Manchesters dug in abau! 60 yards south ofTrones where they spent
an uncomfortable and exposed night
Thc cvents of 10th July
DUTing the early hours of the nigh! of 9/ 1 Olh the 16th Manchesters
sent patrols out inta Tranes Wood 10 attempt a clarification of the
si tuation there. Progress in the pitch black amongst the devastation was
tortuously slow. I1 was decided 10 make an advance soon after fi rsl
light at which li me a preliminary bombardment was fired on the wood.
AI 4.00 am the 16th Manchesters. 10 whom a company ofthe 4th South
African Regiment had been attached', began 10 advance in seclions
northwards through thc \\'ood. Thc advance proved almost impossible
to co-ordinate and many men became disorientated. However. some
43
detennined groups passed along the whole length of the wood and
rerurned 10 repon it clear of German soldiers. Those reports wcre
mistaken since some Germans had not evacuated the wood when the
preliminary bombardment had struck. Soon, on the western side ofthe
wood, fighti ng broke out within the confines of Longueval Alley, a
trench which ted from the northern end of Trones across the upper
reaches of Calerpillar Valley into the north-eastern lip of Bernafay
Wood. The foeus of this fight ing moved to Central Treneh at the
northern tip ofthe wood. Whilst this struggle continued a targe number
of Germans advanced from the Waterlot Farm area, capturing several
ofthe 16th Manchesters' sections and re-occupying the western side of
the wood.
By 8.00 am on the morning of 10th July only the south-eastern part
ofTrones Wood remained in Brit ish hands again. Corpses littered the
smoking woodland's wreckage and the smell of putrefaction hung
heavily in the air. The men unfortunate enough to be within Trones
Wood were plagued with flies and the awful sights and stench of
corruption. Concern was mounting that failure 10 caprure Trones Wood
might compromise the chanees of sueeess of the imminent attaek on
the German main Second Position east of Longueval. However, the
remainder of the day was quiet and the 30th Division took the
opportunity to relieve 90 Brigade by 89 Brigade under the cover of
darkness.
Thc c\'ents of 11th - 12th Jul y
On the morning of 11th July the decision was made by the British
that Trones Wood should be flallened by an overwhelmingly heavy
artillery barrage. Aceordi ngly the south eastern portion of the wood
was evacuated and the 2nd Royal Seots replaced by the 20th Kings in
Maltz Horn Trench. The plan was that, as soon as the bombardment
ended the 20th King's would bomb their way northwards into the
south-eastern corner of Trones Wood. The 2nd Bedfordshires were
arrayed in the sunken lane south-east ofthe Briqueterie and they would
advancc into the southern part ofthe wood tinking with the King's who
woul d join on the Bedfords' right flank. At 2.40 am XIII Corps' heavy
guns, as weil as allihe available divisional guns in the area, opened an
intensive bombardment ofTrones Wood.
Three quarters of an hour after the bombardment began the 20th
King's began Iheir attempt to bomb northwards along Maltz Horn
Trench. Initially all went weil , many German soldiers were killed and
two machine guns captured. Unfortunately the 20th King's did not
44
Tangled undergrowth, shattered lree stumps and branches of Trones
Wood made it difficult for ImopS of both sides in the fierce fighting fOT its
possession.
reach their objective, stopping a linie short of the strong-point' on the
eastern side of Tranes where the Guillemont road lay. Thc 2nd
Bedfords' advance was also inconclusivc. They advanced against
heavy machine-gun fi re which drove their two right hand companies
100 rar 10 the right. Thc two Icft companies did make the western side
ofTrones berween Trones Alley and thc Albert - Peronne light rai1way
line. These mcn tried 10 work northwards and eaSlwards but fauod the
Germans resolute in defence behind an impenclrable tangle of unerl y
shattered timbcr, undergrowth, tom Iree rOOlS and entangled barbed
wire. MeanwhiJe the two right companies ofthe 2nd Bedfords worked
their way from the upper reaches of Maltz Horn valley imo the south
eastern side of Tranes Wood, but were unabl e to progress past the
German held strong-point on the Guillemont road.
Throughout the rest of the morning fighting continued whin the
wood and to the south in [he confines of Maltz Horn Trench. By
midday the Germans, who had been reinforced, cleared the northern
end of Trones, forcing one company of the Bedfords back into
Bernafay Wood. Fortunately the British were able to fend off further
German counter allacks planned for later that evening. Information
45
A carrying party of ritish troops mo\e rorward with supplies
ammunitiOIl and grellades, from Bemafay Wood. during July 1916.
47
about this planned allack was found on a German officer capturcd by
the French in the afternoon and, as a conscquence, a constant defensive
artillery barrage was maintained bctwcen Guillemont and Trones
Wood as weil as east of Gui ll emont with the intention of breaking up
the assembly of German units in those vicinities.
That e"ening the 17th King's attacked the southern end ofthe wood
from the confines of the sunken lane, south-east of the Briqueterie.
These Liverpool Pals successfully took control of the southern end of
the wood from Gennan soldiers of the 182nd Regiment, re-wiring and
re-digging their trenches along the south-eastern side of the wood.
The following morning, 12 July, the process ofconsolidation went
ahead with the utmost urgency. With the help of the divisional
engineers a new trench was begun to link the 17th King's with the
Bedfordshire's positions. The process was made almost impossible by
the depth of shattered timber, tom undergrowth and wire.
Nevertheless, this new trench took shape, running intennittently south-
westwards across the wood from the Gui ll emont Road junction in the
east, dividing the small British controlled southern end of the wood
from the north which was still in Gennan hands. Whilst Ihis digging
was in process German counter attacks against Mahz Horn Trench and
Trones Wood were launched at 8.30 pm but were effectively driven off
by the prompt use of anillery. Ouring the hours of darkness ovemight
on 12/ 13th the trench was funhcr improved but al best the situation
was described by incoming troops as 'only a shaJlow trench with a low
parapel held in patches.'
This panorama shows both Bemafay (left ) and Trones Woods. German
shells are bursting in the vicinity of Bemafay, 10 the centreleft of the
pbotograph. Allhis time Gennan troops were occupylng Trones Wood.
It was at this stage that the 30th Division \'.'as finally withdrawn
from the Trones Wood area. The Division had been engaged in the
Maricourt - Montauban sector all year. They had effected the
successful capture of Montauban and the Briqueterie on I July and had
fought desperately for control of Trones Wood. In the five days
fighting between 8 and 12 July the division had lost over 2,300
casualties amongst all ranks. They were replaced by Major General
Ivor Maxse's 181h Division, which fought on the 30th Division's lef! on
I July and had suffered 3,300 casualties that day.
13th and 14th July - desperate measures to capture Trones Wood
It was now agreed between Rawlinson and Haig that the attack on
the Geman main Second Position bet\veen Longueval and Bazentin-
le-Petit would take place on 14th July at first light, 3.20 am. The plan
for this atlack was necessarily complex, the troops' assembly would
have to take place at night. Men drawn from four divisions would
participate and it was imperat ive that the minimum of disruption which
might corrupt the chances ofthis bold initiative's success should occur.
It was thus essential that Trones Wood be captured as soon as was
humanly possible.
It was now the turn of SS Brigade, 18th Division, to take their place
in the ebb and flow of events al Trones Wood and Maltz Horn Trench.
6
Two further baltalions, the 12th Middlesex and the 6th Northamptons,
were anached to 55 Brigade as support units. They would be vital in
thc foJlowing three days fighting. Having laken ovcr these positions,
be fore dawn on thc 13th, 55 Brigade was ordered to make a new
attempt on thc northcrn end of thc wood at 7.00 pm, after a two hour
bombardment by the 30th Divisions artiltery. The barrage was
concentrated upon Central Trench and the area facing Longueval Alley.
At 7.00 pm the 7th Buffs began theiradvance along Maltz Horn Trench
but again, as with the 20th King's before them, failed tO reach the
strong-point on the eastern side of wood astride the Guillemont road.
Meanwhile the 7th Royal West Kent anacked from the new trench
running across the wood. In the chaos oftumbled timber and the onset
of darkness the attack quickly lost any sense ofunified direction. From
their nonh, German survivors in Central Trench opened fire at very
short range. Same 150 ofthe West Kents found their way to the eastern
side ofthe \\'ood just south of the strong-point, and imagined that they
had succeeded in reaching the northern apex of the wood and that the
wood was therefore in British hands! Throughout the night isolated
groups of the West Kents found themselves fighting for contro! of
small palches of woodland out of contact with their comrades or the
Brigade HQ. On the north-west ofTrones Wood an attack made from
Longueval Alley by the 7th Queens was repu!sed by a combination of
rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, the last being eo-ordinated from
the higher ground which the Germans still enjoyed along the
Longueval to Bazcntin-le-Pctit ridge. One small group of bombers
from the 7th Queens commanded by Lieutenant a.C.Haggard did
however manage to get into the northern tip ofthe wood, having fought
their way up Longueval Alley, and here they stayed throughout the
night.
lt was not unti! after midnight that XIII Corps' commander,
Lieutenant General Congreve. was told by Maxse, 18th Division's
commanding officer, that 55 Brigade's allack on the nonhern end of
Trones Wood had fai led. The general attack on the German Second
Position was now due in three hours, less than 300 yards away from
Trones Wood. The men involved in that attack were already engaged in
their extraordinary and silen! assembly by night. As yet Ihey had not
been seen.
At 12.45 am, amidst the drizzle and dank mist of morning, 54
Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Shoubridge, was told by
Congreve that his brigade would have to capwre Trones Wood. The
success oflhe 9th Di vision's attack on Longueval was dependant upon
that fact. Meanwhile, the Gennan gunners ' continued to shell the wood
heavily, not caring apparcntly if Ihey killcd their own men as weil as
ou"
There was no time for rcconnaissancc. Shoubridge dccided that
onlya simple plan would stand any chance of success. His men would
sweep through from south to north, establishing a defensive flank on
50
The terrain due south ofTrones Wood across which the 6th Northamptons
ad\anced on the morning or 14th July. Pholographed (rom close 10 Maltz
Horn Farm Crucifix.
thc right, thc eastcm perimeter or the wood, as they progressed. Thc
12th Middlescx would lead thc way, the 6th Northamptonshires WQuld
follow up aud establish the defensive flank. However, in thc chaos or
troop movcments, around the sunken Jane south-easl or thc
Briquctcric, thc Middlesex batlalion were glow 10 gel up and
Lieulenant Colonel F.A.Maxwell oflhe Middlesex, in IDeal charge of
the operation. dec ided 10 pul the Northamptons in thc lead and use his
own Middlesex men 10 make the flank guard as and when they could
be assembled. In support of Ihis operation the 7th Bedfords and the
11 th Royal Fusiliers were moved up from Trigger Valley to positions in
Dublin Treneh and Maricourt vi1lage.
Advancing from the sunken lane at about 3.00 am the
Northamptons covered the 1000 yards of open ground south ofT rones
Wood under a terrifying barrage of 5.9' shells, the survivors gaining
the southern perimeter at 4.30 am. This was just minutes be fore the
Dawn Attack on the German main Second Position was begun, less
than three hundred yards to the west ofTrones Wood. By 6.00 am the
Northampton's men werc in control ofmueh ofCentral Trench. Greatly
thinned in numbers the Northamptons nevertheless continued to
advance northwards but became increasingly disorientated amidst the
debris and ruination whieh surrounded them. Eventually the men
halted at the small copse' which projects from the eastern side ofthe
wood - believing this to be the northern apex ofTrones. The men then
51
lined the easlem edge of the woad from the railway track down 10 the
strong-point on the Guillemont road.
There now followed one ofthe most original and memorable events
of the Great War. It s instigator was Lieutenant Colonel Frank A.
Maxwell who had moved into the woad at 8.00 am with the bulk ofhis
banalion, the 12th Midd1esex. '
These scene within what linie was lefl ofthe wood was
one of horrendous imagery. Great shards of splintered
timber stood as grotesque reminders ofwhat had once
been a proud woodland. Sodies were everywhere,
many crushed by the weight of falling timber and
tom by the effects of the thousands of shells which
had been pumped by both sides into the confines of
Trones Wood. The stench of decay was awful.
Gennan snipers lay in wail, many taking advantage
of remnants of leafy canopy to disguise their aerial
presence. Initially Maxwell established hirnself near
the shallow trench at the south west corner of the wood,
keepi ng two companies of the Middlescx lhere at his
disposal. In front of him soldiers were crawling around
trying to identify friend or foe, firing blindly. It was a
hellish cauldron. Now, al 8.00 am, Maxwell wen! boldly
forward to reconnoitre the situation himsclf. He found
F.A.Maxwell, V.c.,
C.S.I., D.5.0., after his
promotion to the rank
of Brigadier.
scatlered groups of the 7th Royal West Kent's men
around the south eastern corner. They had been there all night! Nearby
were other groups of Middlesex and Northamptons who were
exhausted and disorientated.
Nevertheless, by dinl of extraordinary powers of organisation and
leadership Maxwell inspired these men to the final capturc ofTrones
Wood.
Onc company ofthe Middlesex were detailed 10 attack and capture
the strong-point on the Guillemont road. This they would do in
conjunction with the 7th Suffs who were in Maltz Horn Trench. This
manoeuvrc was successful and completed by 9.00 am. Within the wood
Maxwell sent an officer from the groups he had found in the south
eastern corner across thc wood on a compass beari ng unt il he reached
the western peri meter. Behind him a great crocodile of Maxwell's men
were strung out across the wood. As the officer reached thc perimeter
the order was given to face right and the advance began, shouldcr to
shoulder. The wood was so devastated that any nonnal signs of
direction were utterl y missing. The men moved ahead, guided at evcry
52
step by compass. To maintain the men's nerve in the face of constant
sniping Maxwell ordered them to fire from the hip into the
undergrowth and branches ahead of them. At the point where the
Albert - Peronne light railway entered on the western side ofthe wood
a machine-gun post was encountered and Maxwell , wirh perhaps 70 of
his men, surrounded and capwred the post, ki lli ng alt its occupants.
For a while no Germans were seen but more serious opposition was
met at the second of the two light railway lines. In a letter, written to
his wife, Maxwell gives an insight into this extraordinary story:
'I had meallf only ro organise and start the line. and Ihen get
back to my loarhsome ditch, back near the edge ofthe lI'ood, so
as 10 be in comm/llzicarion by runners wirh the brigade and
world outside. Bur ... I immediately found rhat wil/zout my being
there the Ihing would collapse in a few minutes. Sounds vain,
perhaps. bllf there is 1I0llzing of \'anity abour il. really. So off I
went with the line, leading ir, pulling it Oll. keeping irs direction,
keeping itfrom its hopeless (and humanly natural) desire LO gel
illto a singlefile behind me, instead of a long line either side.
'500111 made tlzem advance withfixed bayoners. and ordered
them. by wo)' of encouraging themselves, to fire ahead of Ihem
illto the tangle allthe way. This was a good move. and gave Ihem
con./idence ... The Germans couldn 'I face a 10llg line oJJering 1/0
scattered groups 10 be killed. and they began to bolt. first back,
then, as the I\'ood became narrow, they bolted our 10 fhe sides,
and wirh rifle and auromalic guns lI'e slew tlzem.
'Righlup to the very top Ihis Iren( on, and I could hal'e had a
milch bigger bag. except that I did not wallt to show my people
out ofrhe wood, or too much ollt,for fear oflelling Ihe German
artillery know /zow we Izad progressed, and so enable them fo
piaster the 1I'0od parri passu wilh our advance ... "J
During the fi nal sweep towards the apex ofthe wood Sergeant
WilJiam Ewart Boulter of the 6th Northants showed enormous
courage in putting a machine gun out of act ion. In so doing he
became the first man ofhis regiment to \Vin the Victoria Cross.
The official account of his action [London Ga=eue. 26th
October 1916] reads:
'Durillg the capture ofTrones Wood one company (lnd a
portion of another company was held up by a machine-gun
II'lticJl was causing heavy casualries. Sergeam Boulter.
realising the situation, with complere disregard of his per-
sonal safety and in spite of beillg severely 1I"01lllded in fhe
Willi am Ewart
BoulterVC
53
!/
, ~ : . ..
/::
KEY
B = Buffs
M = Middlesex
N = Northants
R = Royal West Kents
"
"
/
54
shouldel: adl'aneed alone across fhe open in Jrom 0/ ,he gun
wider heavy fire ami bombed fhe team from ,hei,. position,
Ihereby sOI'iug ,he !il'es o/lIIall), ofhis comrades all" materially
O};sistillg tlle adval/ce whieh el'emually c!eared Trolles Ubod:
A fiel' the fighting at Trones Wood Sergeant Boulter was hospilalised in
!he UK unlil March 1917, after which he was promoted 2nd Lieutenant
on 27 June 1917. Berote the war William Boulter had worked in the
haberdashery department of the Co-Operative Stores at Kcncring.
Afterwards it was said of hirn that it was always difficull 10 persuade
hirn 10 describe hi s exploil. As a rule, ar! he would say was that he had
with hirn that morning a revolver that kepl going off; and so he killed
Germans!
By 9.30 am, more than six hours after the attack on the German
Second Position had begun, the genuine northem apex ofTroncs Wood
was gained.
Finally the British had taken the advantage here at Trones Wood. To
the east of the wood Germans had fled from the confines of its
northern end whcre they had become trapped by Maxwell's advance.
As they ran desperately towards Waterlot Farm and Guillemont and the
protection of their Second Positions there these men were gunned
down in great numbers by the soldiers of the Middlesex and
Northampton battalions, which werc now in complete control of the
eastem perimeter ofthe wood, and by the rines ofthe 7th Buffs which
now controlled the strong-point on the Guillemont road.
The capture ofTrones Wood secured the right flank ofthe advance
of the 9th Division's men towards Longueval. The phrase 'better late
than never' might be employed to describe the events here at Trones,
but I prefer to think that 'cometh the hour - cometh the man' might be
more appropriate to describe Maxwell's remarkable achievements
here. Perhaps, under different circumstances he might have become the
second soldier to win one of two Victoria Crosses here facing
Guillemont.
Post Scdpt. The Dawn Attack on 14th July
The capture ofTrones Wood on the morning of 14th July cannot be
said to have ensured that all which occurred during that day's Dawn
Attack went weil. Trones Wood was the scene of preliminary
operations which initially wem badly wrang. The cause was, as we
have seen, the delays which mounted during the first week of the
Somme offensive. It is, however, all too easy to say that these deJays
resulted in Trones Wood being Jeft isoJatcd when its capture couJd have
55
The scene adj acent 10 the southem end of Bemafay Wood looking east in
the direction ofTrones Wood. Supplies liUer both sides ofthe route in this
photograph taken in the mid summer of 1916.
Below: The same stretch of road today.
been efTected without great loss. The reali ty is thai Trones Wood could
cenai nly have becn captured on Ihe 3rd or 4th July but, j ust as
cenai nly, the cost of holding il againsl superior ani ll ery would have
becn enormous. What is true is that the final desperate attempts to
capture Trones Wood on the 13th and 14th July did divert Gennan
attention from what was happening to thc west and north-west of the
wood. As thc four di visions assembled beneath thc Longueval ridge
that night the sounds of the struggle within Trones Wood's confines
masked any noise which those thousands oftense soldiers made. In this
contcxt thc preliminary operation to capture Trones Wood became a
successful diversion and one which. at the very last moment, was
certainly bencficial to the Dawn Attack's chances of success.
In effecting the wood's capturc on 14th July the 18th (Eastern)
Di vision proved itself to be a highly competcnt and formidable
flghting force. Maxse's reputation as an effective organiser was greatly
enhanced. His New Army division's fighting reputation was then
ensured. That it would be used on a number of further occasions when
lesser divisions were rejccted as unsuitable was inevitable.
The Dawn Attack on the Longueval to BazentinJcPctit ridge was a
A break for officers of the Manchesters after fighling in the area leading
to Guillemont.
triumph. The most significant factor in the morning's success was the
forward and silen! deployment of the assault tmops in No Man's Land
in readiness for the attack. North ofBcrnafay Wood and east ofTrones
Wood it was the soldiers of the 9th (Sconish) Division who were able
to benefit from the capture ofTrones, moving the British front forward
from thc northern perimeter of Bcrnafay imo Longueval village.
Adjacent to the site ofLongueval Road cemeterylO the 8th Blaek Wateh
had been chosen as the right Oank unit at the eastern end of this
massive asscmbly of men. The fac! that this assembly and assault was
carried out under the most arduous and dangerous eircumstanees,
almost exclusively by other New Army troops, meant that its
innovative mcthodology would forever be uscd as a point in argument
to suggest that, had similar taclics been possible, on the morning of I
July the great disaster whieh befell thc British could have been
avoided.
ll
However, Ihe purpose of Ihis book is not to address that
question - but now 10 eonsider the course ofthe fighling for the village
of Guillemont, in the German main Second Position, to the east of
T rones Wood.
I. On your IGN maps Mallz Horn Valtey is denoted 3S the 'Fond des Maras. The vallcy's
trench map refrrence 15 sheet 62cNW I. ASb and A6a. The very upper limit of Mallz
Horn Valley is found Oll sheet S7cSW3. S30C and it is this map whieh also covers the
Trones \\'000 - Longucval - Guillcmonl area. Maltz Horn Valley WliS sometiroes
referred 10 in contemporary Briti sh accounts as 'Dealh VaJley.
2. thai allack eventually took plaee. "ery sueeesfully from the Briti sh perspectiw. on the
morning of 14th July.
3. Military Opern/ions. Frnnce und Belgium. 19/6. Vo12. pp 43.
4. From 9th Division. The 9th (Sconi sh) Di,' ision consisted of 26 and 27 Brigade as weil
os the South African Brigade. Amongst thc South Africans the 4th Regiment was known
as the 'Seottish.
S. Located at 57eSW3. S.30.3.5.4.
6. A full and detailed aceount ofthese events can be found in: 18th DiI'ision in the G'l'UI
]Iar, G.H.F.NichoJs. BlaekY:ood & Sons. 1922.
7. Located at 57cSW3. S.24.c.4.0.
8. Maxwell had won the VC whilst serving in South Africa. He tater serve<! as
Kitchener's ADe. ouring September 1916 he was instrumental in the 18th oivision's
suecesful attempl5 to complete the capture ofThiep\'a1. Undoubte<!ly 3 fine and brave
omcer. Maxwell was kil1ed at Third Ypres whilst commanding 27 Brigade.
9. 181h Division in /he G'l'ut IIar. pp 64/65.
10. Next to the eemetery a smal1 shrine is the subject oflocallegend whieh suggests that
Julius Caesar addressed one of his legions here during the Roman subjection of Gaul.
11. On I July a night time assembly was not an oplion fOT the British sinee the French
wante<! a 7.30 am attatk. and had original1y "''llnted il e\"en laler in the day.
58
Chapter Four
THE BATTLES FOR GUILLEMONT VILLAGE
Part I. July and August 1916
Before the war Guillemont village had a relatively unprepossessing
place in the li fe of the Somme region. Its main thoroughfare, the Rue
d'En-Bas, was the backdrop for a typical collcction of Somme farm
building and dwellings. Numerous agricultural implements, ploughs,
harrows and seed drills littered the street. The centre ofthe vi ll age was
a rather gaudy church whose architcclurc sccmcd rooted in
inappropriate style for such an agrarian and tranquil backwater.
Guillemont's topography and location would not lead you to
suppose that 11 could provide a thorn in the side of British progress weil
into the third monlh of the Somme baules. Guillemont stood at the
shallow head ofCaterpillar Valley which wound its way from Frlcourl,
past Mametz Wood and then the northem end of Bemafay Wood into
Trones Wood. By this stage in the valley's course il is of little
The Rue d' En.Bas, Guillemonl 'S main street, in prewar days. [Reed)
signifieanee but the upper
reaehcs ofthe valley, noted as
the Vall ee du Bois des Trones
on your IGN map, are quite
diseernible to the lefl of the
Guillemont road as you look
from the east of Trones Wood
towards Gui ll emont vi llage.
On the immediate lefl of ehe
roadside stands the im-
pressive portal of thc Guillc-
mont Road Ccmctery whieh
is a fine loeat ion from whieh
to view this area of the
Somme battlefield. There is
linie differenee in elevation
between Guillemont and
Trones Wood. The south-
eastern tip ofthe wood stands
at 142 metres above sea level
- Guillemont's elevation
exeeeding that by one metre!
The more dominant loea-
Guillemont church, photographed during the tions, in terms of elevation in
German occupation in the winter or 1915-16. this vicinity, are Ginehy at
By the late July or 1916 the structure had 154 met res and Del ville
vanished into pul\'erised brick dust and Wood at 156 metres. Sut
rubble. [Reed) Guillemont's interest lies in
the fact that it is loeated towards the south-eastern end of the great
Thiepval - Pozieres ridge whose lesser spurs run down through the
Ginchy - Guillemont area as they lose height towards Hardeeourt ami,
eventually, the River Somme.
Onee Trones Wood had been secured on 14 Jul y there now elapsed
aperi od of some days before conditions favourable to the ehanees of a
suecessful assault on Guillemont were ereated. Although only a short
distanee from Trones Wood any attempt to capture it at the start ofthe
third weck of fight ing woul d only have served to make even more
prominent a Briti sh salient in the Waterlot Farm - Longueval area. Any
attempt to capture Gui llemont would also have sufTercd from enfi lade
fire directed from Delvi ll e Wood 10 the north-west and it was therefore
deemed essential that at least those parts of Longueval and Delville
60
Wood which overlooked Guillcmont be in British hands before thc
attack on Guillemont was undertaken. During this time the focus of the
British efforts on the Somrne batt lefront were therefore di rected
agai nst Longueval and Delvi ll e Wood toget her with High Wood and
thc Pozieres defences.
One of the first and most pressing tasks to secure the left flank of
any anack upon Guillcmont lay at Waterlot Farm. In pre war years this
dominant structure had been a sugar refinery. Now, in the centre ofthe
most enonnous conflagration the world had yet wimessed, the fall en
brickwork of its many buildings, its extensive cellars and earthworks
had been developed by the Gennans as a feature of their main Sccond
Position, a linie way south-east of Longucval on the road towards
Guillemont. At dawn on 15 July an attack was made down this road by
a company ofthc 5th Cameron Highlanders, later supplcmented by two
companies ofthe 4th South African Regiment. After fierce fighting the
Gcnnans were driven out but it proved quite impossible to maintain a
hold on the refinery in view of the terrible and intense shelling which
was then poured into its confines by thc Gennans. Not unti l 17 July
was Waterlot Fann finally consolidated into British control.
The main road into GuiJIemont. Thc shatlercd trees are those nanking the
rout e from Watetlot Farm to Guillcmont , c1early shown on the
conl emporary Ircnch maps. This pholograph was laken in September,
soon arter Guillemont 's caplure.
Private Clifford Hicks, 17th Lancashire
Fusiliers, a soldier from the 35th
(Bantam) Division. His brigade, 104,
consisted of men raised in south
Lancashi re and l\'1anchester. Clifford
Hicks survi\'ed the war. For the rest of
his life (he died agcd 74 in 1970) he
could nc\"Cr spcak of thc horrors hc
..... itncssed at Trones Wood or
Guill emont. [Harlley]
A mere stone's throw to the nort h-
west, throughout this period the South
Africans were engaged in the most
desperate fighting for Delville Wood.
That fighting replieated many of the
eireumstanees whieh had made the
eapture ofTrones Wood such a misery.
Nevertheless, on 17th July an
important eonferenee was held at
Dury. where Rawli nson and General
Foch met to diseuss the immediate
future of combined operations in the
Somme area. It was agreed that
Guillemont and Ginehy be anaeked by
the British on the 19th. and that the
following day the whole German front
between Falfemont Farm
'
and the
Somme be subjeeted to a eombined
Franco-Bri tish attack. Guillernont, it
was ant icipated would therefore
became the scene of a prel iminary
anaek, undertaken by the British, 10
secure a more general and combined
advanee planned to the south. In the
event Ihis plan carne to nought in the
grip ofbad weather and the exhaustion
whi ch had seI in amidSI those divisions
which had been committed throughout
the first three weeks of the attacks on
the Somme. One extraordinary ex-
ample of such endurance was the 18th
Division whieh was still loeated in
positions around Trones \Vood, Maltz Horn Farm trench and the
Briqueterie having first been engaged almost three weeks before,
duri ng thei r assault towards Pommiers Redoubt and Caterpillar \Vood.
On the night of 18 July the 18th Division were relieved from their
locations around Trones Wood and Maltz Horn Trench by the 35th
Division - the Bantams.
At this time both Haig and Rawli nson were worried that any
successful Gennan counter attack from the Longueval positions woul d
plaee in jeopardy the many British batteries whieh were now
62
British stretcher bearers bring in the wounded amongst many German
prisoners of war. This scene was photographed on 19th July in 8ernafay
Wood d ose to the dressing stations located there. Note the waler eart
being manha ndl ed by the German prisoners. Sumdenl fresh waler
suppli es were an on goi ng problem for the 8ritish.
concentraled within Caterpillar Valley. On 19 July Rawlinson, in
consultation wh General Fayolle and General Foch, therefore agreed
that the British and French would attack, simultaneously on 23 July, a11
Gennan ma in Second Positions from Waterlot Farm 10 the River
Somme.
20 July saw the Bantams in action to covcr thc advance of the
French who were expected 10 make a major effort this day, astride both
banks of Ihe Somme. In fact there was no discernible French
movement on the Bantam's right, but the Bantams ncvertheless stuck
10 their task, whieh was thc capturc ofGennan trenches belween Mahz
Horn Farm and Arrow Head Copse. Arrow Head Copse lay a linie east
ofTrones Wood. soulh oflhe Guillemont rond (at 57cSW3. S.30. b.3.3).
The purpose behind this anack by Ihe Bantams was 10 create a more
advantagcous position from which thc general aUack upon Gui11emont
and the German Second Position could be launched. The Bantam's
anack resulted in no progress and 450 casualties from concentrated
machinc-gun, rine and shcll fi re. However. further soulh the French
did achieve some progress. reaching the western slopes of the
Maurepas ravine beyond Hardecourt as weil as the station on the
Hardecourt - Maurcpas road and further south-eastwards towards the
River Somme.
63
See German
map page 154
!\'lap 7 Detail rrom the 1:10,000 trench map (corrected to 24n/l916)
showing the Trones Wood - Arrow Head Copse - Guill emont area in
detai l.
64
Thereforc, at Ihis stage, 20th July, thc British front ]jnc facing
Guillemont was still located on the eastern perimeter ofTrones Wood
down 10 Maltz Horn Farm, although beyond the northern tip of thc
wood 's wreckage the front Hne swung north-eastwards towards
Waterlot Farm. On the 21st thc 17th Lancashire Fusiliers replaced
another bantam unit, the 18th Lancashire Fusiliers, in these front [ines.
A measure of thc severity with whieh the Germans were sheJling these
positions can be gauged from the casualties which the 17/LFs suffercd
during the period 21-24 July during which they simpl y garrisoncd thc
front lioes without making any attacks; five ofTiccrs wounded, 32 other
ranks killed, 147 wounded and 2 missing
l
, Thc parts ofDelville Wood
under British control, and Waterlot Farm, therefore existed as a
pronounced and insecure saHcnt in the British lines. Rawlinson's hope
was that progress past Ginchy, Guillcmont and Falfemont Farm would
straighten the British lines, removing the insecurity of the Delville
Wood - Waterlot Farm salient and securing thc safcty of those many
batteries exposed in Caterpillar Valley.
French participation in the plan to capture Guillemont and
Falfemont Fann on 23 July was extensivc. Thcir artillery was to be
deployed to destroy the Falfemont Farm defences before its occupation
by British troops. XIII Corps would assault the whole line between
Waterlot and Falfemont farms, the German majn Second Position, jn
dose co-operation wilh the attack of the French XX Corps on ils left
and the British XV Corps on its left. The reality proved very different
in the complexity of arranging what Rawlinson, Congreve (XIII
Corps) and Horne (XV Corps) hoped would be a general attack timed
to coincide with the Gough's Reserve Anny's attack on Pozieres as
weil! On 22 July the French announced that they could not be ready for
their pan in this enonnous enterprise until 24 July at the earliest. As a
consequence the plans of XIII Corps were scaled down and il was
decided that, on the ri ght, the 30th Di vision would capture Guillemont
whi lst on the left a further attempt was to be madc to complete the
capture of Delville Wood by the 3rd Division. It is worth noting here
thai the 3rd Di vision's objectives stretched from Longueval and
Del ville Wood allthe way south-easl 10 Guillemont Station and it was
therefore unfortunate that, at such a cruciallocation, the impetus ofthe
attack should be complicated by the conjunction ofthese two divisions.
As a preliminary 10 the assault on Guillemont, now due at 3.40 am
on Sunday 23 July, attempts were made on the 22nd to secure more
advantageous positions for those attacks to be made the following day
by the 3rd and 30th Division's men. At 1.30 am the 35th Di vision made
65
)
' '
"
I ' ~ J '
. .,f{r>I:
another unsucccssful atlemp' 10 carry thc German trcnches between
Maltz Horn Farm and Arrow Head Copse. whilst halfan hauT later men
of thc 3rd Division also attempted thc capture of Guillemont railway
station (locatcd at S,24,d,8.9) by attack from Waterlot Farm. Thc 3rd
Division"s men werc forced back undcr a hail ofmachi ne-gun fiTe.
23rd July's attacks againsl Guillemont village
On thc morning ofthe 23rd attacks on Guillemont were undertaken
by units of the 30th Division from thc di rection of Waterlot Farm and
also from thc northern segment of Trones Wood above thc rai lway
linc's point ofexit on its castern perimeter.
Thc reason why these attacks werc devcloped from thc direction of
Waterlot Farm and thc northern end of Trones Wood was simply 10
avoid the wide expanse of open and exposed glacis due west of
GuillemOnl (in the vicinily of what is now the Guillemont Road
Cemetery). The 19th Manchesters (4th Pals) were the key unit and their
attack was supported on their left by the 2nd Green Howards. The 19th
Manchesters ' atlack was preceded by a massive art illery bombardmenl.
Apart from devastaling the village, and its trenches being manned by
the l04th Reserve Regiment's men, the heavy guns also placed
standing barrages on the eastern side of the vi ll age, the southern end
of Leuze Wood, the southern face ofGinchy vil lage, Wedge Wood and
Falfemont Farm - all places which might provide the cover for German
rei nforcements to assemble within and advance from. A further
protection was to be derived from a barrage on the fl ank south of
Arrow Head Copse. The barrage on the village ilsclf was due to lift
through the village in four stages, coming to rest on the eastern and
soulhern limits forty f ive minutes after zero.
The 19th Manchesters attacked from the eastern perimeter of
Trones Wood with three companies in line. Only when the men reached
the German wire did they realise that it was uncut. After forcing the
wire the Manchesters thcn entered the village and were immediately
engulfed in very fierce fighting. Some parties of the Manchesters got
as far as the eastern limits
l
where they initially surrounded the batt le
headquartcrs ofthe 1II/ 104th Reserve RegimenI. However, those men
who penetrated furthest eventually found themselves cut off and those
who could do so were eventually forced 10 withdraw. No
reinforccments were able 10 cross the area of No Man's Land west of
Guilternont and the attack fai led as the 19th Manchesters were
gradually exhausted. On the left of the Manchesters the allack of the
2nd Green Howards. made from Longueval All ey, was a shambles, the
67
men being confused by their own smoke barrage which was blown
across their path by a northerly wind! Some groups of the Green
Howards crossed the advance of the Manchesters and found
themselves against uncut wire southwest ofGuillemont before falling
back to Trones Wood. Others from the Green Howards'
attack did manage to capture a trench just south of
the railway line but were themselves ejected
and forced to fall back towards Waterlot
Farm where the 2nd Green Howards' men
then managed to disorganise the attacks
being made by the 3rd Di vision. lt was a
sorry tale.
That part of the 3rd Di vision 's
assault. directed southeastwards
down the Longueval to Guillemont
road. known as Hi gh Holbom. on
Guillemont Station failed to make a
secure advance and the men \vere also
forced back into the Waterlot Farm
area.
This failure to capture Guillemont
on 23 July now meant that there was a
large question mark hanging over the
prospect of any joint Anglo French attack
north of the River Somme. Undaunted at
6.15 pm on the 23rd Rawlinson issued further
instructions for the conti nuance of
General Sir Henry Rawlinson operations. XIII Corps' orders
continued in exactly the same vein as
before: clear Longueval and Delville Wood in conjunction with the
next French attack north ofthe Somme and to assault the German main
Second Positions be!\\'een Falfemont Farm and Guillemont inclusive.
For the village ofGuillemont that meant another pause until the events
of 30 July.
The e"ents of 30th July in thc Guillemont area
Ovemight on the 29/30th July the 30th Division's soldiers were
again moved up to positions in the Trones Wood - Maltz Horn Trench
area. The plan envisaged that these men would attack through the 35th
m a : : ~ : ; ; ~ (Bantam) Di vision's men who were still garri soning the front Jines'.
Inll \56 Whilst the 30th Division was being brought fon",ard in darkness the
68
Pril'ate C.W.Cope, X Platoon, C CO)" 18th
Manchesters. Prh'ate Cope was killed near
Guill emont on 30 July. His bod}' was found,
somewhere between the northern end of
Trones Wood and the Station, b)' aburial
party belonging to the U4th Loyal North
Lancs. In a letter datcd 5 August 1916 one
of thc part y, Prh'ate J. Collier, wrote to
Prh'ate Cope's family:
'Dear Friend,
Please f!Xcuse me II'ring 10 )'0/1, as
I am Ille sellder f ~ e r y bad news, I a",
eXlremel)' sorry 10 illfor", )'011 of Ill e
death of Pri\'ute C. Cope. I do 1101
know /!im personalI), but me Ulld a
chum of mine were out bur)'ing ,he
dead and lI'e found him I)'ing in a sllell
hole, by tll e look of him he cOllld not
hal'e suffered /10 pai/l, so we paid the
best respetls H'e could a/ld bllried him!
like man)' similar burials that simple gra\'e
was nel'er located after Guillemont's final
caplure and Prh'ale Cope's name is now
inscribed, s long \\llh many others from his
regiment, on the Thiepval 1\'lemorial to the
Missing.
[AlexanderlDavis]
Gennan barrage on Trones Wood increased in intensity and a number
of the units were very badly affected by bolh gas and high explosive
shells. Zero hour was set for 4,45 am but as dawn broke it was apparcnt
that thick fog had reduced visibility 10 less than forty yards. However,
the attack was launched with 89 Brigadc's objeetive as Falfemont Fann
and the German lines north-west to Guillemont and 90 Brigade's
objeelives as Guillemont village, Guillemont Station, and the trenches
north-west of it towards Waterlot Farm, was to be earried by 5 Brigade
of the 2nd Division.
In the murk ofthe mist whieh lay thiek in every hollow Mahz Horn
Fann was eaptured and some men ofthe 20th King's then reaehed the
Hardeeourt - Guillemont road. In Guillemont soldiers ofthe 2nd Royal
Seots had advaneed along the Trones Wood to Guillemont road and
entered the village, taking many prisoners. The Royal Scots wcre then
joined by the 18th Manchesters who had moved forward from the
69
eastern side ofTrones wood towards the nonhern half of the village.
This attack was given ftes h impetus by the support ofboth the 16th and
17th Manchesters but again no secure lodgement
whin the northem portion of the village could be
achieved. The soldiers confined within the Guillemont
locality were now in great danger of being cut off.
Many German counter attacks in the area were being
developed and runners, attempting to eonvey reports
to brigade and battalion HQs in Trones Wood were
being shot down after the fog began to clear at 9.00
am. lt was in this eontext that CSM George Evans of
the 18th Manchesters won his VC for his gallantry in
delivering messages' .
Gradually the 19th King's began 10 suceumb to the
CSM George E\'ans, vc. pressure of German counter attaeks on the south of
Guillemont and were foreed to pull back. The British
artillery was faeed with the dilemma of what to do
about the 2nd Royal Seols in Guillemont itself. In the event the village
was not shelled and the Royal Seots foughl on, unsupported, until they
were all killed or captured.
Further north the attacks made by the 2nd Division were a failure
and the troops were eventually withdrawn to their assembly positions.
The only gains from the events was the capture of the trench leading
from Arrow Head Copse along the sunken part of Ihe Guillemonl to
Hardecourt road to Maltz Horn Farnl where the right flank ofthe 30th
Di vision was in touch with the Freneh. The losses ofthe units had been
depressingly heavy. In 89 Brigade those losses amounted to 1.314
casualties. 90 Brigade losl 1,463. The 2nd Royal Scots had been
virtually wiped oul, losing 17 officers and 633 other ranks, comparable
with the losses of almost any unit engaged on day one of the Somme
battles.
The outcome of 30 July's attacks had almost exact1y mirrored those
which preceded them on 23 July. Guillemont was simply a very
strongly defended location surrounded by an open glacis, utterly
devoid of cover bolh to the west ofthe village and over the Maltz Horn
knoll 10 the south-west of the village. The depth of dug-ouls and the
many interconnected tunnels meant that any limited British infantry
advance into the vi llage could then be isolated and dealt with as the
German defenders emerged 10 take these unils in the rear. The British
front line facing Guillemont was still the eastern perimeter of Trones
Wood. As day ended XIII Corps commander, Lieulenanl General
70
Congreve, relieved all the forward troops of the 35th and 30th
Divisions and replaced them with the newly arrived 55th Division's
men
6

Thc c\'ents of August 1916
More than four wecks into the campaign the German Second
Positions at Guillemont still held firm. Haig was adarnant that the fight
be continued, but thai the present stage of operations should be
regarded as a 'wearing out' battle in whieh subsequent operations
should only bc delivered using the greatest economy of men and
material so that, as the Official Hislory so suceinelly put it: 'the Allies
should have al their disposal the 'Last Reserves' when the crisis ofthe
fightiog was reached.'
Even so, the first inSlinet of Haig and Rawlinson was 10 help the
French Sixth Army get forward by securing the positions at
Guillemont, Ginchy and Falfemont Farm. Whilsl Ihe French did attack
on 7 August it proved impossible to make comparable arrangements
for Congreve's XIII Corps, especiall y the 55th Division, who were
hampered greatly by the strength of artillery which the Germans used
10 oppose every move opposite Guillemont. However, the 55th
Division's men used every opportunity during the f irst week of August
to dig preparatory trenches sufficiently forward to bring them to within
assaulting distance ofthe German positions around the Station and the
western limits ofthe village. Tbe 55th Division's attacks on Guil lemont
would start on 8 August in tandem with attacks made by the 2nd
Division between Waterlot Farm and the northem end of Guillemont
by the Station. During 7 August a number offeints were carried out by
the artillery simulating the final preparations for an assault by the
infantry. The purpose of these feints was to keep the German defenders
on edge and in doubt as to when and where the final attack would
occur.
There was rea11y no need for such subterfuge. The final barrage
would leave no one in doubt as 10 when, where or how the assault on
Guillemont would occur. The artillery plan was similar to a11 those
which had been employed during July's failed attacks. Throughout 7
August the arti ll ery feints continued, and on the 8th the heavy artillery
ofXl 1I Corps lifted from the German front lines fifteen minutes before
zero at 4.20 am, and began to pound the trenches cuning across the
centre of the vi ll age. The morning was characteristically misty with
very limited visibility. Twenty minutes later the heavy arti11ery would
lift towards the village's eastem limits. Thereafter the heavy guns
71
would place a standing barrage on positions east ofGuillemont around
Wedge Wood, on the slopes between Ginchy and Guillemont and
finally in front of Leuze Wood. The divisional field guns would
concentrate their fire on Guillemont village, lifting through the village
in five stages, ten minutes apan on each lift.
Amongst the infantry the most elaborate preparation were made to
keep every member of each unit fuUy informed as to his role. That
perhaps begs the question as to whether or not individual soldiers were
denied such information in earlier anacks. Whatever, there was a huge
depth of suppon made available to every unit, contact planes to spot
the advance, ground flares, miTrors, lamps and even a radio station in
a trench nonh-east of Faviere Wood. But just to keep within the norms
for the time pigeons were taken forward and the men were obliged to
wear reflective tin discs on their back as a further aid to observers.
As soon as the atlack got underway all the men disappeared from
view in a dense c10ud of dank mist, smoke and dust. The Gennan
barrage began to search No Man 's Land and for an hour and a half 00
news of the attack was heard at the 55th Division's HQ. In that time
some progress was made by the men of I/5th King's (165 Brigade)
across the spur east of Maltz Horn Fann to Ihe south of Guillemont.
Unfonunately this advance proved to have no substance in that it was
unsupported on either flank. It nevertheless represented the sole
British gain ofthe day. On the left ofthe I/5th King's the I/4th King's
Own ( 164 Brigade) was repulsed at the wi re on the south-west corner
ofthe village. Although these men bravely tried to dig in, almost wit hin
bombing range of the Gennan defenders, they were eventually forced
to retire 10 their assembly trenches. It was during Ihis action thaI 2nd
Li eutenanl Gabriel Coury of the 1I4th South Lancashires, the 55th
Division's Pioneer battalion, would win the Victoria Cross.
Gabriel George Coury was bom on 13 June, 1896, at Sefton Park,
Liverpool , son of Raphael and Marie Coury, of Li verpool. Hi s father
was a col1on merchant. He was educated at Slonyhurst College, where
he won many prizes for sports, before being apprenticed to one ofthe
many cotton firms in that area. He joined the Army in August 1914, as
a private in the 6th King's. Coury was given a commission in the 3rd
Bal1alion The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire
Regiment) in April, 1915; then served in the 4th South Lancs until
August 1916 from which he joined the RFC as an observer, returning
to England in May, 1917. He was promoted Lieutenant on 8 August
1916, and Captain during September 1918. He was awarded the
Victoria Cross [London Gazette, 26 OCI.1916] ; Gabriel George Coury,
72
Bringing up an 18 pounder during the attack.
73
Lieutenanl (then Second Lieutenant), 3rd Battalion, The Prince of
Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire Regiment).
2nd Ueulenant
Gabriel George
Coury. VC
'For IIIOSt conspicuolls brallery. Dilring an
adval/ce he was in commalld of {wo platoolls ordered
to dig a commUllication trenc!, fi'Om (he old firing
fine ro fhe position WOll. By his fine exampfe and
/Irrer comempt of dallger he keprllp the spirits ofhis
men, and complered his rask IIl1der intellse fire.
Later, after his baf/alioll Iwd slt/fered sel'ere
casl/alties and rhe commallding officer had been
wOl/llded. he wem Ouf il/ from of ,he adllallced
position in broad daylight. and in full view of the
el/emy found his commanding officer alld broughl
him back 10 fhe /lew adllanced Irel/ch Oller ground
swepl by machine-glil/ fire. He nor ollly carried 0111
his original task, and salled his commcmding officer, bul also
assisred in rallyillg Ihe arracking troops when they were shaken
and in leadil/g (hem fonvard:
The officer referred to whin the citalion was Major lL.Swainson,
commanding officer of the I/4th Kings Own, 164 Brigade, who had
been wounded during the earlier attacks.
The difficulty which all the assaults on Guillemont were labouring
under was the inabi li ty ofthe British artillery to locate and destroy the
many machine-gun nests scattered within the wreckagc of the village.
Whilst the Gennan machine gunners retained the will to continue, and
the Briti sh anillery failed to winkle out these astonishingly resilient
and brave men, the machine gun continued 10 dominate the Guillemont
battlefield. In reality the subterranean tunnels made the anillery's task
an impossible one. Typical of the circumstances this day was the fate
which befe]] the Ist King's. This banal ion was attacking to\vards The
Stat ion, Brompton Road and High Holbom and the position knovm as
Machine Gun House.' The King's soldiers had been Iying out in the
open be fore advanci ng at 4.20 am. In the dense cloud of dust and
smoke the men had gone too far south, missing the strong points
around the station and only entering High Holbom via the confincs of
Brompton Road, although almost immediately the Germans had then
re-occupied their front line from their still intact dug-outs and tunnels.
When the three attacking companies, B, C and 0 were later
supportcd by A Company Ihis last company was therefore met by
heavy machine gun fire and a shower of grenades as they tried 10
approach the German front lines. Nevertheless, by 5.20 flares signalIed
74
Ihat Guitlemont had been captured and Lieutenant Colonel Charles
Goffoflhe ISI King's sem back Ihe news, by pigcon, Ihat:
'First, \\e "ave taken from lilie ami station and I think High
Holborn. EI'eryrhing is rather mL.ed. Machine gllllS arefirillg at
IIsfrom Guillemont alldfrom ol/rleft. I am at pl'esem i" German
from lilie and am goingfonmrd ro deal' IIp rhe sit/lation.'
The words are so typical of the laconic style and immense bravery
whieh personified the Regular soldier's approach to his duty. They are
Goff's last testimony sinee he was soon to be killed along with his
seeondin-eommancl Major McErvel. and many of the banalion's
subalterns and roen.
South of the Ist King's the situation in Guillemont had been
ehanged by an inspirational anack made by the 1/8th King's. the
Liverpool [rish, 164 Brigade. who fought their way into Guillemont
past bOlh sides ofthe quarry. Problematieally the situation could not be
made secure and a company ofthe 1/4th Loyal North Lancs who were
sent up to hold the old German front line behind the 1/8th King's mell,
were bombed out of it by coumer attack from the south, thus isolating
the 1/8th King's withill the village. That counter attack also ensured the
Germans' suecess in eutting offthe Ist Banalion's mell, who were Ihus
Guillemonl village showing the lolal deslruclion by Brilish sheillire.
Enlrances 10 lunnels made by Ihe Germans. and which ran under Ihe
'"iIlage alld surrounding areas. conn ling wells and pro\'iding shelter. can
be di scerned.
also trapped. Worse, the German machine-guns were now sweeping the
original No-Man's-Land west of Guillemont making any
communication wilh, cr reinforcement of, the King's an impossibiliry.
The whole of the 2nd Di vision's attack, of whi ch the 1 SI King's were a
5mall part, being made balh frorn Trones Wood north of the light
railway line and from the north-west from WaterJot Farm, was
therefore foundering again in the area of Guillemont Station. Wilhin
Ihis maelstrom of dealh the King's regiment oew had balh a regular
and territorial unit wi thin the confines ofthe vi llage. The ether units of
the 2nd and 55th Divisions fonvard ofTrones Wood had a very tough
time during these exchanges. Crowded into assembly tfenches,
suffering an imense artillery bombardment, uncertain of the outcome
10 the east, these men took heavy casualties whilst frozen in astate of
suspended activity.
Although orders were issued by XIII Corps for these units to
advance to the support ofthe Ist and I/8th Kings it proved impossible
within the confines of such chaotically overcrowded trenches to
organise such movemems on the 8th. Eventually Congreve ordered the
two divisions to replicate their atlack the following moming, 9 August,
at 4.20 am, with the same objectives. Whilst this process of organising
further attacks went ahead the mixed units of the King's regiment
fough! on within Guillemont umil, 36 hours after their initial attack,
the remnants were killed or captured at the quarry and later fighting in
the vicinity of the Station' . 164 Brigade's diary records that the nature
of the problem was oow understood.
:4s soon as Ihey had got infO Ihe village it appears thaI Ihe
enemy came IIp OUf 0/ the ground belmv them and eU! fhem off
emirely by means of maehine guns. This is praetieally wllOl
happened 01/ the previous auack Olf Guillemom on 30th July. and
il is possible tllal Ihe village is an underground warren 0/
passoges in wllieh Ihe garrisoll is immune from shell fire, and
/rom whieh Ihey can emerge I\' ;th their maehine guns after the
attacking in/amT)' has passed over.
lnterestingly the date 8 August marks one of those few moments when
Haig's hold on his command might have wavered. On Ihis moming the
monarch travelled to France, lunching at GHQ in Montreuil before
driving 10 meel with Haig at Beauquesne, Haig's advanced HQ. The
King, who was weil disposed towards Haig and his style of leadership,
wanted to discuss Winston Churchill's9 critique of the Somme
Offensive which had given rise to disturbing questions amongst the
Cabinet's membership. The events at GuiJIemont during the previous
76
month were a perfce! example or why Churchilrs conccrns had
surfaced. Haig was fortunate that the King was so weil attuned 10 thc
Commanrler-in-Chief's thinking. In fact , as events in London unfolded
Ihis day, the c.I.G.S. Sir Wiltiam Robertson, sent a message 10 Haig
' assuring hirn that he might count on full support from horne:
However, back at Guillemont, on thc moming or 9 August, thc
replica attack was made, again at 4.20 am, by those men ofthe 2nd and
55th Divisions who had now been exposed 10 ordea! by shclJfirc for the
best part oftwo days in their trenches within and south-west ofTrones
Wood. Many or thc men wcre in adesperate state, unfed and short of
sleep, dazed by the conslan! detonations whieh seemed 10 accompany
their every movc. Thc whole area surrounding Trones Wood and
Guillemont was now infested with a haze of fat flies, bluebottles,
whose maggots gnawed at the wounds of any man Iying out in the open
for any lengthy period of time. Qne uni! whose aetions Ihis moming
deserve elose scrutiny is the I/l Oth King's, the Liverpool Scottish,
whose men tried desperately 10 elose with the German defenders on the
left ofthe 55th Division's advanee.
Ouring the night of 8/9 August the Liverpool Seollish had moved up
from their reserve positions, moving past the sout h of Trones Wood
towards Arrow Head Copse. The journey had been very difficult. No
guides had lumed up and when replaeemems finally did arrive Iheir
knowledge ofthe route proved sketchy. Eventually 166 Brigade's men
Wefe in place, astride the Trones Wood to Gui11emont road. On the
right, south of the road, were the I/ 10th King's with the 5th Loyal
North Lanes on their left to the north of the road. The Liverpool Scots
had been granted just minUies to prepare themselves for the attack and
the men's sense of direction and familiarity with Ihe terrain was nOI
firmly grounded. The bombardment which preeeded their advance was
weak and, as soon as the men rose 10 advanee, they were met by
scemingly unsupressed machine-gun fire. In these terrifying
circumSlances the attack was constantly rallied by Lieutenant Colonel
Davidson, his battalion making four charges in a11, each to no avail.
Amongst the Liverpool Scots the easualties wcre heavy. Fi\'e offieers
killed, five more missing, seven wounded, 69 men killed, 27 missing
and 167 wounded,
This action was the scene for those events surrounding the winning
ofthe Vicloria Cross by Noel Chavasse, thc IIlOth King's inspirational
medical officer. During the day he watched three of the banalion's
doomed charges. Thai evening Caplain Noel Chavasse look a group of
his streicher bearers out into No Man's Land in front ofGuillemont and
77
began the process of trying to ident ify the dead and succour the
wounded. Throughout Ihe night Chavasse's team worked on, inspired
by his cool and good nalured manner. As he searched the shattered
terrai n Chavasse brought his characteristic qualities of humanity and
dedieation to the grue50me lask in hand. Eventuall y dawn forced
abandonment and Chavasse returned, laler to find that he had been
wounded. His words on the subjeet wcre the epitome of his typically
reticent understatement. ' ... the merest particle of shell just frisked me.
I did nol even know about it till I undressed at night." o
The subsequent eitation. published in the London Gazette on 26th
Oetober 1916. spoke in fine terms of the dignified and detcrmined
valour which Noel Chavasse had shown whilst carrying out his duties.
During an alfack he (ended (he \\"ounded in fhe open all day.
under heavy jire. jrequem/y ;11 I'iel\" of fhe ellemy. Dur;lIg the
el/suing I/ighf he searchedfor 1I'0l/lu/ed on the grol/lld illfrolll of
the ellemy S lilles for fOllr hO/lrs. Nexf day he lOok olle strelcher-
bearer 10 file adrallced frenches. (md. IInder heal')' fire. carried
all urge'Jt case fo/" 500 yards imo safet)', beillg wOllllded in tlle
side by a she/l splinler during Ihe jOl/me}'. Tlle same niglll he
lOok up a party of !l"IIst)' \'ohmteers. reSC/led !hree 1I'0lmded men
from a she/l-hole tll"emy-jive yards from the enemys trenel/,
buried rhe bodies of um officers. and collected mall)' idenrity
discs. altlloughjired Oll by bombs a"d machine gUI/S. Allogether
he saved the lil'es of same /Wem)' badI)' wounded men. besides
rhe ordil/my cases whic" passed through his lumds. His courage
and self-sacrifice were beyolld pmise.'
One important post war publication, The Victoria Cross 1856-1920.
written by Si r O'Moore Creagh, devotes a greal deal of space to
biographieal details covering Chavasse's life. I have reproduced some
ofthat below in a ralher condensed manner:
Noel Godjrey Chavasse. M.B . Capraill, bOn! at Oxford. 9
Nov /884. SOli of the Righ! Reverend The Lord Bishop of
Li\'erpool alld of Edilh Jalle Chal"Osse, daughter of Callon
Maude, Recror ofCh;rk. He was rwill brother to Ihe Reverend C.
M. Cltal'Qsse. M.C.. TemporOlY Chop/ain ro Ihe FOIces. Noel
Cha\'asse was educated ar Magdalen College School (1896-
/900). U\'erpool College Schoo/ (1900-1904). and at Trillir)'
College Oxford (1904-1908). and was a well-known atMete.
Chav(lsse roll in atMetic cOllfeslsfor Oxford agaillst Cambridge,
both ill 1907 alld 1908. /11 Iheformer yea,. he rall a dead-heat ill
the 100yards witl! K.G. Macleod illllnder 11 secollds. alU/was
78
second ro his twill brother. C.M.Chal'asse, in
the quarter mi/e. Noelllrls 1I0t so sllccessjlll
ill 1908, /"IIp/ilring a Ihigh ml/sc/e in the
Illmdred yards. Howel'er. he also represemed
Oxjord at Lacrosse, botll ill 1904-5 amI
1905-6. Capr. Chollasse was a Medieal
Officer at rhe Royal Somhern Hospital.
Live/pool, beJore the lI'ar. He joined the
Royal Army Medieal Co/ps ill 1913. beillg
attached to the 10rh (Lil'erpool Scottish)
King S 011'11. and sen 'e(/ lI"ith them in rhe
Ellropean m,r in France. He \I'OS flImn/e(/
the Mililary Cross beJore beillg awarded fhe
Vicloria Cross JOl" gallallt!)' at Guillemol11.
Noel Cha!'asse was sl/bseqllemly all'onle(/ a
bar ro the Vieroria Cross [London Gazette,
14 Sept.1917J: The ciWlioll swres tlml: "His
Majesry Ihe King hos beeil graciollsly
pleased 10 applYJl'e oJ fhe award oJ Ihe
Vicroria Cross to Captain Noel GodJrey
Chavasse, V.C, M.C, laIe R.A.M.C. Noel Cha\'asse VC and Bar
attached Lil'erpoo! Regimellt. Though
severely IrOlll/ded early in the actioll II'hilst ean)'ing 0 1I"0ullded
soldier to the dressing star ion he reJl/sed to lem'e his post, and
Jor (WO days not only continued ro peiform his duties but ill
addiliOIl went 0111 repeatedly ulIder heav)' jil"e ro search JOl" and
allelld ro the 1I'0unded II'ho were I)"illg Ollt. During these
searches, a/rhough pmerieall)' lI'ilhollf Jood dllring this period.
worn withJotiglle andJaimwilh his wOlllld. he assisred ro eany
ill a number oJ badly I\"OI/Ilded mell ol'er hea"y alld diJJicult
ground. By his exrmordinary el/ergy and inspiring example he
was instrumental in rescl/ing many lI"oun(/e(/ 11"110 1\"OIIId have
othen,ise IfIIt/oubtedl)' sllccllmbed under the bad wearhel"
condiriolls. This del'oted and gal/am officer subsequemly died oJ
his \I"oullds.
At a memorial senke ill Lil'erpoo/ll'hich was COlldllcted by
Arclu/eacOIl Spoolle/: Canon LaI/ce/at gOl'e all address. AI/uding
to rhe late Coptoin Noel ehal'asse, v.c.. he said ir was 110 wonder
thar rhe Killgfelt that fhe II-ho/e AI"m)' \I"ould 1110 111"11 rhe dem" oJ
so bml' and distillgllished (l brotlter. Illal his Brigadier tlec/ared
him ro hal'e beeil the most gal/am on(/ lIIodest lIIall he had el'er
79
mel. Ihal Ihe Major-General commanding (he Dil'ision should
say that his devotion was magnificelll, 01" that the IIhole
barralion, sm01hered ill mild as 1hey lI'ere, alld ready 10 drop Jrom
exhaustion, paraded Jor his fimeral. Captain Chal'Qsse might
hal'e been a great surgeoll, 01' a I"eally great clergymal/ and
medical missiollm)'.'
It would be inappropriate for me to add furt her to such a tribute or
commentary,
The 2nd Oivision 's al1acks againstthe north ofthe village and the
station on this day, 9 August, were again a failure.
Further Plans for Guillemont
By 9 August Haig was expressing concern about the strain which
events at Waterlot Farm, Guillemont and elsewhere on the buttlefront
were placing on the staff of XII I Corps. The Corps commander's son,
the inspirational Billy Congrcve VC. OSO, MC, had been killed before
High Wood the previous month. Accordingly, on 10 August, Lieutenant
General Congreve rel inquished his command, being replaced by
lieutenant General the Earl of Cavan, Cavan brought with hirn the
staff of XIV Corps and frorn midnight on 16/ 17 August the old XIII
Corps was renarned the XIVth. However, be fore Congreve departed,
his immediate superior Rawlinson had agreed with General Fayolle of
the French Sixth Army that there "'ould be a combined attack on 11th,
the Freneh attacking Maurepas whi lst XIII Corps seeured the rising
ground on thc spur south of Guillemont. In the event this attack was
postponed until 12 August on the grounds of inclement weather.
Subsequently, Guillemont and Maurepas would then be attacked and
captured as soon as both armies were sure this could be achieved.
Meanwhile all units were ordered to work forward to their objectives
by: ' .. digging, by the seizurc of enemy posts, and by advancing their
lines towards the enemy whenever an opportunity occurred.' " This was
the most unimaginative siege warfare. One of Congreve's last
contributions to the events at Guillemont was to report to Rawlinson.
on the morning of 10 August, that XIII Corps would be ready to
capture the vi ll age on 17 August.
Ouring the late afternoon ofthe 12 August, amidst fine hot weather.
the 55th Division attempted another al1ack on the Maltz Horn knoll
south of Guillemont. Thc objcct ive was to seeure the higher ground on
the Gui ll emont to Hardecourt road (from east of Maltz Horn Farm at
62cNW1, 8.l.a.5,5 northwards to 57cSW3, T.25.cA.9 and thenee 10
S.30.b.6, I) in order to ensure that further frontal attacks on the viUage
wcre not cxposed 10 enfilade fire from thcir right. On the left flank of
80
the British lines facing these positions the trenches were being held by
the Il7th King's men who heard the divisional art illery begin its
bombardment at 3.30 pm. Almost immediately the German anillery
fire increased in intensity. Nevertheless, the attack was made
successfull y at 5.15 pm under the protect ion of an intense
bombardment. Unfonunately the expected French advance at
Maurepas and the ravine failed to materialise and the I/9th King's men
who made the advance were eventuall y forced to withdraw since their
right flank was utterly exposed. Late on [3th the King's soldiers in this
vicinity were rel ieved.
Earlier that same day, at [0.00 am, the young Sccond Lieutcnant
Jack Fearnhead was hit, possibly by two bullets, one of which
penetrated his lung. The trenches were so shallow from
the devastating shelling that it proved impossible for
him to be removed in daylight. The stretcher
bearers of the 5th South Lancs dressed Jack's
wounds whilst he was conscious, probably
believing it to be superficial and promised 10
return that night 10 evacuate him. The
likel ihood is that the 5th South Lancs men
were very hard pressed that day and Jack
Fearnhead slipped into unconsciousness
unnoticed. On the stretcher bearers' return
he was found 10 be dead. Like so many
other young men who were killed here at
Gui llemont his grave is unmarked. Jack's
company commander, Captain R.G.
Thompson, said in his letter of condolence
that;
'They buried him on the spot, alld
collected his idenlily disc alld personal
belollgings ... I Gm ajraid thai ir is Ilorlikely rhat
file burial party will have been able to mark the
gral'e. bllt it was at a spot a bare half
mile sourh ojGuillemom.'
2nd Lieul enant Jack Fearnhead,
February 16th 1916, [Hall)
Funher discussions about the nature of
combined Franco- British operat ions in the area nonh of the Somme
continued unabated. The Bri tish pan of the plan was again to allempt
the capture of the Hardecoun to Guillemont road before pressing
forward to the non hern apex of Angle Wood (localed at 62cNW [,
B.l.d.7,8).
82
On thc nigh! of 14/ 15 August thc 55th Division was relieved of dUIY
in the Guillemont seclor. Since its arrival thc division had 10SI Qver
4,100 casualties amongst all ranks. Thc best thaI thc Official Hislory
could find 10 say about its endeavours was that ;if i1 had failed 10
caplure GuiJlemont. [the 55th] had at least pushed forward thc British
right 10 wirhin elose assaulting distance.' In my opinion il is a sadness
that thc 55th Di vision 's men have 00 memorial here at Guillemont. Thc
aren is littered wilh thc unmarkcd graves of so many young men like
Jack Fearnhead that not 10 mark their passing in same meaningful
manner seems a tragedy in its own right. Thc 55th were replaced in thc
line by thc 3rd Division whose attacks thc followiog day were
anticipated as having a good chance of success.
On 16 August the anacks were timed to occur at 5.40 pm. The
weather was hot and clear, the bombardmcnt thorough and the infanrry
anacks delivered punctually. AlIlooked set for an auspicious advance.
On the right Ihe 2nd Suffolks cleared Cochrane Alley as far as the
Hardccourt to Guillemont road and then bombed forward along the
trench by the side ofthe road in the direction ofGuiliemont, capturing
part of the Irench but were unable to reach Ihat part overlooking the
sout h of the viUage. Unfortunately the isolated German position
known as Lonely Trench, just west of the Hardecourt 10 Guillemont
raad, was not taken by Ihe troops in support ofthe Suffolks who had to
be withdrawn al nightfall. Other attacks Ihis day directed against the
north of Guillemont by the 24th Division failed, as did the French
153rd Di vision's attacks in the Maurepas - Angle Wood area to the
right ofthe 3rd Di vision.
The slrain was intolerable and the following day Lord Cavan, who
hadjust succeeded to the corps command, was himself obliged to quit
because of iU health. Cavan was replaced by Moreland who had been
commanding X Corps. That evening the British front lines west of
Lonely Trench were cleared in order 10 facilitate a heavy howitzer
bombardment of the Lonely Trench area. Two hours after that had
ceased a surprise attack by the 10th Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 12th
West Yorkshires failed to get in. Six houTS later another allempt to
capture Lonely Trench, by men drawn from no less than four
battalions, was also unsuccessful.
There could be no clearer indication ofthe futi1ity ofallacking weil
prepared and determined defenders without recourse to a wider
frontage than these wasteful and ill considered altacks south of
Guillemont.
83
The attacks made on Guill emont bern'een 18th & end of August
The ineffectiveness of those piecemeal artacks made on 16 August
detennined that subsequem assaults on Guillemont should be more
focused in their approach 10 the vi ll age's capture. On the morning of
the 17th Rawlinson and Fayolle decided that the caplure of the village
should occupy two days, the first ofwhich would see a parallel French
assault on Angle Wood 10 the saulh of Guillemonl.
11 was believed that, with the French in possession of Angle Wood
and the British in contrel of the higher ground 10 the saulh of
Guillemont, il would be feasible 10 imagine that Guillemont woul d fall
on the 19 August.
On the 18th the wealher proved to be dull and damp. As day broke
the German positions at Guil lemont, southwards in the direction of
Angle Wood and further north towards Ginchy, had already sustained
almost twenty four hours of steady unremi ui ng homhardmenl.
Throughoul the moming thai art illery fire continued until zero hour.
fixed for 2.45 pm. As the final minutes ticked away the rate of f ire
never altered, in the hope that such a policy would prevent the Germans
anl ici pati ng the auack. Amongst Ihe gunners who were supporting the
infantry, hack at Mari court, Ralph Hamilton described the cacophony
of sound with awesome precision.
'Exactly 10 the secGnd hell broke loose, and thousands 0/ guns
went off at the same moment. Never have I heard anything like
it, or coufd have imagined such noises possibfe. 1I is quite
impossible 10 describe to people who have not experienced it. It
actually hurt, andfor a time Ifelt as ifmy head would burst. All
ta/king was impossible, and rhe telephones l\'ere use/ess. After a
time I retired to my telephone-pit. wllieh we have dug 20 feet
down into the solid chalk. and 30 feer infrom the entrance. There
maUers were almost worse, the noises were not so violent, but the
vibration was so great thar arftrst I thol/ght my heart was going
10 stop. from being so jo/ted. !f one could imagille fhe vibration
ofthe serew of a ship intensified a thousand times it miglu give
some idea of my sensations.'
As the whistles blew the field artillery brought thei! fi re hack inlO No
Man's Land, no more than one hundred yards in front ofthe attacking
soldiers. As the men approached towards Ihis curtain of f ire the field
art illery then began to !in forward in increments at the rate of f ifty
yards per minute. In front of Guillemont village these attacks were
undertaken by the men of the 24th Division, whilst on Iheir right, JUS!
to the soulh of Arrow Head Copse, the 3rd Division employed 9
84
Map 10. XIV CorpS attack, 18 August 1916
Brigade and then 76 Brigade in touch with the French.
In the centre of the anacks, in front of Gui11emom, the troops were
unable to advance their positions in the vicinity of Arrow Head and the
Trones Wood - Guillemont road. A linie to the nonh ofthat raad some
progress was made when the left hand companies of the 7th
Nonhamptonshires managed to gain a foothold in the German lincs
adjacent to The Quarry (57cSW3, T.19.c.l ,4). Thi s was an
extraordinary feat on the pan of these men who were later reinforccd
by a company ofthe 9th Royal Susscx. As darkness fell engineers werc
brought forward to help in the process of consolidation here on the
western outskins ofthe village.
However, hy far the most significam advance of the day was
achieved by thc men of 3rd Rifle Brigade
'l
on the nonhern, left, side
of the attack upon the village.
The Rifle Brigade's men north of The Quarry advanced with the
greatest speed to take a number of German pri soners from the
devastation at the Station. This banal ion managed to capture a section
of the Waterlot Farm raad 10 the north-west of the station where they
joined up with soldiers from the 8th Buffs who had advanced
successful1 y into the area ofZZ Trench, west ofGinchy.1l
On the right of the British attacks against Guillemont, in the Arrew
Head Copse area and further south towards the junction with the
French army, the 3rd Division employed 76 and 9 Brigade's mcn in
attacks lowards the Hardecourl road and the higher ground south of
Guillemont. A segment of the Hardecourt road to the east efCochrane
Alley was captured, as was the southem part of Lonely Trench. These
positions were terribly exposed and the Germans began to pour an
enormous weight of artillery fire into the area, counter anacking the
French who had taken ground in the Maurepas ravine. Some ofthe 1st
Gordon Highlandcrs in the Lonely Trench area were forced back 10
maintain their right flank in comacl wilh the Frenchmen. Neverthe1ess,
the following morning it became clear that the Germans had
themselves wi thdrawn to the Falfemont Farm - Wedge Wood lines. The
now empty Lonely Trench was thus immediately re-occupied and the
men began the consolidat ion of thc Guillemont - Hardecourt raad (in
the areas 57cSW3. T.25.c and 62cNWl. B.l.a). Throughoul that
evening and inte the night thc artillery rumbled on:
'Houl' after 1I0ur il wem Oll \l'illlolll a secollds pause.
Somelimes Iilel'e seemed 10 be a compal'Glive lull. alld rilell
immediately ir was off agaill 1I'0l'se r/zan evel: NoIV ar midlligllr
lI'e arefiring milch slowel; a sheJl evelJl minwe. bw liiere are so
86
many hundreds 0/ batteries engaged thai even that rate is olle
continuous rom: The /lien are \'ery tired, and fhe layers /learly
exhausled, although lI'e have changed {ll em os often as possible.
My glfllS IIm'e already fired nearly a thousand rounds eaeh and
are red-hot. Ife hove 10 keep slI'illing {hem 0111 wirh our preciolls
llle stock ofll'orer. EvelY 1I0W and (hen I have 10 srop one gun
{o aUow it to cool. meanwhile increasing thefire ofthe others.'''
During the nigh! of 19/20 August the 3rd Division 's frontage and part
of the frontage previously occupied by the right of the 24th Division
was taken over by the bantam soldiers of the 35th Division who once
again faund themselves facing the forbidding village of Guillemont.
Early that morning whilst the bantams were settling uncomfonably
imo their ravaged trenches Fourth Army commander, General
Rawlinson, was in conference with his corps commanders. Apart from
di sseminating information about the imminent arrival of the ' tanks',
and the possibility of using these withi n a major September initiative,
Rawli nson lOok the opportunity of making it known that he expected
the western side of Guillemont to be captured the following day, 21 st
August. The remainder of the village would be taken three days later
on the 24th, then moving forward across the spur towards Angle Wood
whil st the French would capture Angle Wood and Maurepas. The
British right flank unit was the 17th Lancashire Fusiliers; their
operation orders make interesting rcading, revealing that the battalion
took over from the French 127th Regiment d' lnfanterie in the Angle
Wood sector, thus extending the British fromage south of Guillemont.
This attack was part of the preparation required 10 ensure that the
tanks, when their time came, could be launched from the main ridge
running across the battlefield from Leuze and Bouleaux woods, past
Ginchy, Hi gh Wooel, Pozieres and onwards towards the east of
Thiepval.
On 21 August the 35th Division were due 10 make two attacks
opposite Guillemont. The first was at 5.00 am when they made an
attempt 10 capture German positions opposite Arrow Head Copse.
Whilsllhis proved unsuccessful , further north the meo ofthe 8th Buffs
and the 3rd Rifle Brigade again scored a success by taking that greater
part of ZZ Trench lendiog into the northern part of the village. Later
in the day the 35th Di vision's role in the attacks planned for 4.30 pm
was reduccd to the discharge of a smoke diversion whilst soldiers of
the 24th Division effected a frontal assault on the western face of
Guillemont. However, these attacks made 00 progress since aoy
positions captured proved impossible 10 hold onto.
87
Hauptmann Ernst Junger and Captain F.C. Hitchcock, MC
Atler the war both these \WO otficers wrote very different acoounts 01 their experi&nces here at Guillemont. Junger's
book. $tonn 01 Siee/. became a wicIety read dassic. HHchcock's book, Srand Tol. never anained such dlsbnction
but is, nevenheless, an interesting and detailed account 01 life with an in1anlfy battalion. Ihe 2nd Leinsters. 60th
men describe evocatively the trYlIlg circumstances of ba!tle. I llave placed !helr aeeounts olme terrible sheI1ing
which OCCUJTed around Ihe 23rd AlIQUst siele by siOe, editll'og theso 01 extraneous detail.
G.rm.an Iroopl, on ehlln::h paradl , In Iha vIIIag. 01
Combles beloftllhlltVlnls 01 Augllll1916 radueld 11
10. bloody and Ihattlrld Ih.mbill.
An der Somme
Junger's day slaried with his arrival at
Combles whieh was under the most intense and
indiscriminate artillery bombardment whieh
utterly devastated thc village, killing many ofthe
dvilian population who had stayed on theTe,
believing it 10 be a safe dislance behind thc ]ines.
Junger caugh! 5igb! ofa 'linIe girl dead in a pool
of blood on thc threshold of ae of thc
doolv,ays' . Everywhere thc sickly scent of death
abounded. Ernst Junger and his men were about 10
relieve troops in the centre of Guil1emont village.
They assembled withi n the square and .... "tre
feSlooned with ilems destined for the front line.
Then lI"e mQIed off in single file.
El"ery man had the strictest orders ta
fal/oll" closely on the man in front. Next
A Brlll.h Inlanlry battalton movlng acroll
blttllflald In plaloonl, advancln" In lUpport 01
operallonl lo tna sout" of GuiltemOfit In 1916.
Tayforbrary
On 23rd August. Captain Hitchcock who was
serving with the 2nd Leinsters, part of 73
Brigade, 24th Division. had also been ordered te
relieve a front line position that el"ening. He .... '3$
to replace the men facing the south-westel1l
fringes ofGuillemontto the fight ofthe Trones
Wood to Guillemont road, It\'el wilh Arrow Head
Copse. His route up 10 the from lines took hirn
along the lane leading north-eastwards from
Camoy lowards Monlauban. Arriving in what he
described as the Val1ey of Death' [Maltz Horn
I"alley]the 2nd Leinsters came under sustaiMl
and accurate shellfire.
23rd AuguSI ..... there lI"e Irere lI"ilh our
transport oll round us! Sergl. McCarlhy.
Tronsport Sergeant. gal"e Ihe order to trol,
Ernst Junger
we wert following, mostl)' allhe double, 0
while band loid down ol'er Ihe open
ground 10 gire Ihe dirtelion, II was shol
infO small bits. Often lI'e had 10 come (o 0
hall 01 fhe "vnl moment, when our gulde
losl his wo)'. Ta /je dowlI \t"Os forbiddell,
in eose lI'e 10Sllouch
In spile of Ih/s, Nos. land J platoons
suddeni)' I'onished, On again.! Jl e got 10
o sunken road, much shelled. II'hert Ihe
seetions stowed Ihemsekes. 'Lie down'
was Ihe order. A nauseous and oppresslve
seent worned us Ihol Ihis road had
elaimed man)' arietim, After a ron that
Ihreatened dealh al el'ery slep we
reaehed 0 seeond sunken road in whieh
battle heodquarters wert' eoneealed ...
On and on! Same of the men
col/apsed os Ihey ron, far lI'e were
compelled tO force Ihe losl ounce from
Iheir exhausted bodies. " aunded men
called 10 us on left and righl from Ihe
shell-holes, and were disregarded, On
and on, wirh our e;res flXed on Ihe mall in
front, olollg a Imee-deep Irtnchformed o[
linked-up shell.' holes of enormaus si:e.
where Ihe dead wert almosl louching,
Our feet fOU/ld fillle purchase againSI
fheir soft alld yielding bodies, EI'e1l Ihe
"vunded who feil by the woy shared Ihe
same fOle and \t1?re mx/deli belleolh Ihe
boots oflhose who slill hunied 011.
And ol1\'o)'s Ihis siekl)'smell, Erell m)'
orderl)" IWle Sehmidl, m)' compalIIon In
mony a dangerous pafrol, began 10 red.
Allasl 1\'e reached Ihe front lilie, It was
held by mell eowering elose in fhe shell-
holes, and Iheir dead roices trembled
wilhjoy when Ihe)' heard Ihat we were Ihe
rtlief A Bamnan sergeonl-major briej1)'
handed ol'er fhe seelor ond Ihe lere)'
Lighf pislOl.
My plaloon front formed Ihe right
wing oflhe position held b)' Ihe regimem,
II consiSled of a shalluw sunken road
which had been poullded b)' shells, Ir was
89
F.c. Hitchcock
and I rhen heard R,S.M. Smirh:S "oice:
'This way, C Company.' He gOl'e greal
assislollce thaI nighl, standing Olli/mder 0
heoL)' barrage dirn:{ing Ihe c()1Ilpllier os
Ihe)' eame up, The mell Ifere splelld/d. alld
dld nol budge - jusl slood up lI'ilh heods
bel1l. no rushillgoboullo lookforCUl'er: Tom
Monissey olld Reid wert superb. kneelillg
out under Ihe barrage ollellding 10
Mcfxmnell, "ho wos jllsl d)'ing. He left
Ihem theTf!. while Gen)' LislOn led Ihe
Compan)' up fhe shollow C. r Oll Ihe risillg
ground.
The c.o. met us lIeor Baltalion
Heodqllarters alld cOllduefed Ihe
Compan)' across Ihe open and behind Ihe
from line ro the sunkRn road junclion,
Here "'f' enlertd fhe lrenen alld proceeded
to take ol'er or fTlie ... e Ihe isolated semry
posts in our area, On aml'al, we leoml
/hol Poole and Barr)'. who had golle on in
adl'ance 10 reconnoitre Ihe lilie. hod been
wounded, Jli? acruall)' reliel'ed tliV unils,
bolh of whieh were Bantam Ballalions.!
The umpleenth ballalions o[ Ihe
Glollasler Regiment. and Shuwood
Foresten", Ollr men chalfed fhe fit/le Il esl
Counll)'men II'Ilh uproarious Irish
badinage, The BOl/aUon fOllnd itself
aslride Ihe SUllken rood wilh Gllillemolll
sante 150 yurds uwuy. Ife were in Ihe e.wel
line Ihat "'e hud held on Ine night 181h-
191hAugusl. A Company was on Ihe left in
fronl o[ Arroll' Heod Copse, IIe, C
Company, were on Ihe righl. BOlh
eOll/panles joined UI Ihe borrier on Ihe
sunken rood ,,'here the BO/laliOIl bombers
und a seclion o[ ,he Maehine-Gun Corps
were posled'. C CompallY ulso [ound u
delOched POSI uwuy on the right flank,
Loler: I wos 10 get "'eil ucq/loil1led wilh
Ihis isolured delOchmenf. BOlid D
Companies wert in support and rese,.,,'e
fTspeerirely, Bal/aUon Heodquuners "'US
behind A Contpany ond parallel ,,'ilh Ihe
sunken road, On dury oll nlghl, os LiSlon
Ernst Junger
a few hundred metres left of Guillemont
and a rother shorter distance right of
Bois-de-Trones. IIe lI'erepartedfrom the
troops on our right. the 76th Regiment of
Infantry. by 0 space about 500 metres
wide. This space was shelled so violent(r
that no troops could maintain themsehes
there.
The Bamrian sergeant-major had
mnished of a sudden and I stood alone.
the r ~ r e y light pistal in m)' hand, in the
midst of an IIncann)' sea of shell-holes
ol'er which lay a while mist whose
swalhes gare il an even more oppressive
and myslerious appearonce. A persislelll,
IInpleasanr smell came from behind. As I
had no idea hall' far off Ihe enemy were,
I warned my men fO be ready for the
warst. He all remained on guard - I
spenr the nighl lI'ilh my balman and nl'O
orderlies in a hole perhaps one yard
square and one yard deep.
When da)' dall'ned we were
aSfOnished 10 see. b)' degrees, whal a
sighl SllrTOunded IIS. The sunken road
now appeared as nothing bw aseries of
enormaus shell-holes fllled with pieces
of uniform, weapons. and dead bodies.
The grollnd all round, as far as Ihe ere
cOllld see. was plollghed by shells. YOII
eOllld search in l'Oin for one wrelched
b/ade of grass. This chllrned-lIp
baulefleld was ghasll)'. Among /he /i1Ing
lay Ihe dead. As lI'e dug ourselves in we
faund them in layers stacked one I/pan
the tap of anQ/her. One company after
ano/her had been shored inro Ihe dn/m-
fire and steadily annihilaled. The
corpses Il"ere cOI'ered lI'ith Ihe masses of
soi!wrned IIp by the shells, and Ihe nexl
company adl"Onced in Ihe plaee of lire
fallen.
The sunken road and the ground
behind was filII of German deud; Ihe
grollnd in front of English. Arms, legs,
and heads stllck out stark abol'e Ihe Iips
90
F.c. Hitchcock
feit rery ill, blllwould nOlleal'e Ihe /ine. I
lI'alked all nighl. visiting /he seil/ries. It
mined harn. and we got shelled sel'i'rely
eI'ery halfhour. J mted for some time on a
nmddy fire slep. lI'ith 8464 Corpl.
Broadbent. Primle 0 'Leary. Jim Marslands
scout of Hooge da)'s. 11'05 slOnding up on
the fire slep on sentfY-go beside me. lieft
thell! In that position. and in len minutes
rewrned to find a colossa/ shell-eroter in
/he pampet. or where it had been. Poor
Broadbell/ was dead. and badi)' smashed
up. and 0 'Lea'}', Ihe !reen sentl)' of len
minlltes previol/s/y. was le"ibly Cllt abow
Ihe hl!ad and bad)' - and was ml"ing.
Mo"issey und Reid took hirn away- nel'er
did I expect to see him again". IIe spent
the night deepening the treneh. and
blli/ding up the parapets. Whal cover
mited Ihe Ball/anIS of 4 feet 8 inches to 5
feet did not sllil the 2nd Leinsters,
uI'eraging 5 feet JO inches! 24th August ...
At 5 a.m. J met Ihe CO. II'ho had come IIp
to inspeci Ihe fine. He was par/ieu/arl)'
sympathelic abolII Ihe casuaJlies. lVe
laI/red the who/e Company front,
including the detached post. To gel to il we
had to CIII across the open. Howl!l"er. as it
wasfoggy. the Huns did not observe IIS. 11'1>
fa/md Jameson and his plaloon IInder
deplorable conditions. all arol/nd thern
were enemy dead. and (he Hllie ditch of a
trench filII of mild, lI'ith pieces of
eqllipment and halfburied corpses.
Jameson was cheel)'. bllr complained of
being shor{ of rations. This post on the
right of Ihe Company was at least 200
yards away from Ihe main line. 1t had no
C T. or lI'ire entanglemenrs. blll was
echeloned back facing Leu;:e IlQod. Loter
in rhe day I got in touch lI'ilh the unit on
Jameson s righl. ~ were silbjecl to heavy
shell-jire all 1I!0rning. c.s.M. Ke"igan
got badly 1I'0linded in Ihe arm: also Sergl.
Dignam und a few men.
From Baf/alion Headquarters lI'e
Ernst Junger
of Ihe cralers. In from of our miserable
defences Ihere were IOm.off limbs and
corpses ol'er man)' of which cloaks ond
ground.sheets had been thrown 10 hide
Ihefixed slOre of their dislOrted feotures,
III spill' of the heat no olle thought for 0
moment of cOI'ering them wilh soil. The
dUage of Guillemont wos dislillguished
from Ihe londscope oral/lId il onl)'
Mcause Ihe she/lholes Ihere Irere of 0
\lhiler colour b)' reoson of the houses
\lhich had been graund 10 powder.
Gl/illemOll1 rai/wo)' slaliolllo)' illfranl of
us. It was smashed to bils Iike 0 child's
p!aYlhing ...
JUSI before len at nighl Ihe left j1all/r.
of Ihe regimemal franl was hearif)'
shelfed, ond after /Wem)' mimltes we
came in for it toa. In abrief space we
were completeil' col'ered in dliSI alld
smoke. olld )'el mosl ofthe hils werejusl
in fraIlI or jllSI behind. Whife Ihis
h/lrricane was raglng I Irem olong ml'
plaloon frolll. The men were swnding,
rie in halid, os Ihough coned ill stolle,
Ilreir e)'es fixed 01/ Ihe grolllld infrolll of
l/rem. No\\' and Ihen b)' Ihe lighl of 0
rockel I sall' Ihe gleom of heimet after
heimeI, baronel after baroneI, al/d I was
!iffed wilh prille al commal/dillg lhis
hal/dful of men Ilral miglrl "e'}' Met)' be
poul/ded illlo Ihe eartlr bllf could nOI be
conquered. 1I is in such momellls Ihal lire
human spirillfiumphs ol'er lire mlglrliesl
demonslrations of material force. Tlre
fragile bad)" sleeted by the 11'11/, stands
up 10 Ihe most lerrific pllnislrmem:
After a shon period in such squalid and terrifying
circumstances Junger was relieved. Hours later he
was wounded by shrapnel whilst at Combles.
Junger \\'as evacuated 10 hospital whilst his unil.
the 73rd Hanovarian Fusiliers. were lateT
reintroduced 10 the horrors of GuHlemont. They
lIere Ihere on 3rd Seplember when the \lillage was
finally capt ured by the soldiers of the 20th
Division.
r.c. Hitchcock
IlIIderslood anO/her unit was loking ol'er
Ihis detaclred poSI. Shell:fire was heflish
oll afternoon. Bo.l barroges were pUl down
oll round, and Ihe eorth was going up /ike
I'olconoes, completef)' smolhering us, The
heal lI'OS imense, ond os we were oll
SII'foling prelf)' freel)', we 801 imo a !illhl'
SIOle. Crollching ;'1 Ihe lrench, hugging
Ihe fonrord side, one cOIM feel tI'el}'
millllle smol/ Slones olld Illmps of earth
ricachel off one 's heimeI. Now and Ihen
olle would be almost smotlrered bl' Ihe
pampeI beillg blq)l'n in, The dirt j1yillg
aballl and Ihe fumes from Ihe Iyddite
odded 10 our discom!iture, Dllring a
bombardmem Olle dtl'eloped 0 cra:e for
1lI'0 Ihings: water olld cigoreues. Fell'
could el'er eal IlIIder an intellse
bombardmem, especia/l)' on the Samme,
whell tI'el}' IIOW olld Ihel/ a she/l would
bIo\\' pieces of morta/ir)', or complele
badies, wlrkh hod been plllref)'ing in No
Man 'sLand slap imo olle S lrench. SIrelI
fire, 100, alwa)'s srirred up lire SII'orms of
blackfl{es, ofll'hich IhefT! IIW an absolute
plague on Ihe Samme battle:fields. The
bombardmem was Imellse, ar limes il
reminded me of Hooge exaclly one yeor
prel'iollsl)" I had beeil in command of the
Compan)' all da); alld os part of our fronl
line Oll Ihe righl of Ihe sllnken road was
compleIei)' oblileraled ond IlIIlenoble, I
golthe plaloons 10 side,slep 10 the j1anks.
Our whole fine lI'as one cloud of smoke,
tI'idenll)' the Huns anticipaled an attack
os Ihe)' senl all kinds of colol/red SOS l eI}'
lights up, I got Ol/r Lewis gllns imo
posilion ond gare the order 10 fl.l
bayonels. (In sl/ch a cose Ihis is always
good for the momfe.). Througholll Ihe
bombarc/mem Ihe men were splelldid. 1101
(J senI')' shirlr.ed his dut)':
Lalcr. on the 25th, having suffered nwnerous
casualties from the persistent shelling Ihe 2nd
Leinslers were relieved by soldiers of the 20th
Division,
Onee again the timetable for the capture of Guillemont had been
thrown into disarray.
The instructions which Fourth Anny had intended 10 issue relating
10 the 'final' capture ofGuillemont on 24 August therefore had 10 be
modified quickly. On (he right il was anticipated that the French would
advance the whole of their fromage north of the River Somme, and thai
the 35th Division would advance in step" - bOi not anack the German
secondary positions. Meanwhile the 20th (Light) Di vision. which as
we have noted had taken o\'er from the 24th Division in front of
Guillemont and southwest of Ginchy. were expecled 10 capturc the
nonhern part of Guillemont and the German tfenches on the south
west of Ginchy.
Events had overtaken the attacks planned for 24th August.
Throughout 23rd and 24th the Germans persistently bombarded the
British positions opposite Guillemont und Ginchy making any
preparation impossible to contemplate. The utter lack of any surface
water posed an enormous problem for the attaeking troops. One
banalion. due 10 attack alongside the French. knew that its men would
have to stay out in exposed positions all day prior 10 the assauh. Their
records state thaI:
Tlle \\"tl/er slIppi)" is a mafler of grem tllere is 110
wate,. ill the lilie alld all water Iws ro be carried from about
Brigade HQ ar Ilight. Men /lIlISt therefore be wamed that olle
borrle ofwater has ro last themfor the whole 14 hours. and /IIUst
accord;IIg6' be IIsed sparingl)':"
Nevertheless. during the dark early hours of August 24 the bantam
soldiers ofthe 17th Lancashire Fusiliers in thi s area were able to make
their assembly on the extreme right of the British frontage, across the
north-east face of Angle Wood from B.2.cA,3 to B.I.d.3,6. Weil be fore
dawn the men were concentrated in shell holes, in advance of their
front lines, where they stayed eoncealed throughout the day. At 5.45
pm the French I Corps attacked and succeeded in getting into the
German's main Second Positions south-east of Falfemont Farm, up to
B.2.d.4.8 and also making good their control of Maurepas. Thc 17ILFs
innovative assembly and coneealment taetics enabled the men to
advanee alongside the French with few casualties. reaching the 110
metre contour al the south-westem end of the Falfemont spur"'.
Falfemont Farm. with its strong defences amongst the surrounding
copse and whin its extensive cellars and outbuildings, was thus
finally within realistic assaulting distance.
The suceess on the right flank was good news for Rawli nson and his
93
Corps commanders who were coming under increasing pressure from
Haig, The Official History reports that:
'Conferring with his CO/ps eommunders on fhe mO/"lling of
25111 AUgUSf, GelIerai Rall'lil/son /"ead a GHQ letter, receil'ed Ihe
pre\'iolls e\.'ening, \\hich emphusised fhe eXfreme imporlance of
securilzg Ginclly, Guillemolll alld Falftmollf Farm wir/Will dela)'.
The Commander-in-Chief considered fhe rask weil wifhin the
pOIl'er of tlle troops and artillelY al'ailable, prol'iding that file
higher commanders, bearing in mind fhe s/(llldard of training
which existed alllong tlle tlVOPS and sllbordinate leaders, gal'e
fheil" personal attemioll fO fhe derails of preparafioll.' zi
As a consequence the attacks upon Ginchy were allotted to XV Corps
whilst XIV continued to pil itsclf against Guillemont. The 5th Division
was added 10 XIV Corps for the attacks 10 be made on 29 August.
However the tactical situation for the British was worsening as rain on
The objecth'e - Guillemont \'iIIage - a de\'asted \\3steland,
the afternoon of the 25th began 10 lum what were al ready badly
churned trenches into a nightmare ofmud and whieh made thc digging
of new communication trenches a torlUOUS process. Thc storage of
ammunition and thc preservation of food and dri nking water suffered
accordingly. Thc Gennan artillery was sll very active and the British
troops were now experiencing the very worst that summer weather and
the German army could throw at them. As thc wcather worsened Haig
prevailed on the French for a postponement, initiaHy 10 the 30th. When
the bombardment for these allacks began on thc morning of 29th poor
visibility made anillery observation impossible and another oe day's
postponement became inevitablc. Thai afternoon a vcry heavy
thunderstorm broke in [he Somme area, causing the French to delay
further - this time detennining 3 September as their preferred date -
although Haig and Rawlinson werc in no position to argue against
Foch's wishes since their own positions in front of Guillemont were in
astate of considerable devaslation.
3 I August was the first fine day for nearly a whole week. The scene
was therefore set for the final battle for Guillemont village.
I. Originally speI! as Faffemont on eontemporary French maps.
2. Amongst the wounded were the baltalion's oommanding offieer, UeutelUlnt Colonel
A.M.Mills. and his second in command Major Sir H.S.M. Havelock-Allan.
3. Guillemonl village was bisected in an eaSll\\1:st manner by its main street. identified
on British treneh maps as 'Mount Street". The eastern limits orlhe village were defined
by a road running nonh/south. The segment of that road nonh of Mount Stect was
Iherefore identified on trench maps as 'Nonh Street' and that 10 the oouth as 'Soulh
Street". Mount Street ran cast away from Guillemont past the village communal
~ m l r y en route tOI' .. ards Combles.
4. Many detachments of Bantams \\1:re attached 10 units wilhin 89 Brigade to serve as
carrying panies. moving forv .. ard with the 4th waves of assaulting infantry.
5. See Manches/er Pals for more detail of this and other attacks made here by the
Manchester Pals battalions.
6. A Territorial Division raise<! in west Lancashire.
7. High Holbom was the stretch ofthe Guillemont to Longuc\"al road to the nortb-\\1:st
of Guillemont. Brompton road was the track which ran across the nonhem side of the
viUage from S.24.d.8.5 to T.19.a.8.2. Machine Gun House \\"aS located at S.24.b.7.4.
8. The 1I8th Kings battalions casualty list gives 5 omcers and 10 OR killed. 8 omeers
and 47 ORs wounded. 502 Olt;; missing. The Ist King's rollcall on 2nd August eounted
just 120 survh'ors in total.
9. Churchill \\"aS not then a member oflhe Cabinet. His critique expresscd concern about
the profligate \\"aste of life in the pursuil of minimal strategie. and even taeliea!. gain.
This document had ben circulatcd to all Cabinet members during laIe July.
10. Cbavassc Double Vc. Ann Clayton. Loo Cooper, 1992. pp 161. This excellent
volume details the whole e:maordinary story of Nocl Chavassc's life.
11. The His/ary' of/he Kings Regime", (Lil"erpool). Wythall. pp 311.
12. The litle 3rd Battalion ofthe Rille Brigade is a 11Ither confusing one in tha1 Ihe Rille
Brigade was in fact a regimen1 of the British Anny. OuTing the 18th August attacks on
95
L.ooking norlh-easlwards in Ihe direclion of
Dch'ille Wood from thc l\Ialtz Horn Crucifix.
Gui1lemont the 3rd Rille Brigade were
the right hand battalion of 17 Brigade.
13. There is a very fine and now weil
maintained private memorial to one of
the 3rd Rille Brigades subalterns. 2nd
Lieutenant George Futvoye Marsden-
5medley. who was killcd in action
hereon 18 August 1916.
14. Ilor Diar)" of Ihe .\las/er of
Be/haren. LI.Colonel Ralph G.A.
Hamilton. 1924. lohn Murray.
RepubJished 1990. Whamcliffe (Pen
& 5 ..... ord Books. Bamsley).
15. Men of 105 Brigade. 35th
(Bantam) Division.
16. NB. This is not the Trones Woo<I tO
Guillemont road but a smaller farm
track. still walkable today. \\hich ran
from 57e5W3. 5.30.b.9.7 to the south-
II.'eSI. The pan of this sunken lane
where the two companies met was
locatcd at 5.30.b.6.0.
17. In a footnote to the original te:<t
Captain says tha!: 'Years
afterwards Iran across thi s man
whom 1 had believed to havc died of
soulh-wesl of GUillCntOIlI, on Ihe Hardcourl 10 wounds. walking across the square at
Trones Wood road. Fon 51. George. Madras:!
18. On the night of 22/23 August the
35th DiVIsion had taken (!Ver Angle \\'00<1 from the French, thus extending the right of
the British frontage.
19. 17tb Lancashire Fusiliers' War Diary. PRO W095 2484.
20. Later in the day the Germans launched a heal'Y bombardment against the 17fLF's
new positions and the battalion ended the day suffering almost 100 casualties.
21 . OjJieial His/Ory: Military Opera/ions in Fronee und Be/girlm. /916. Vol 2. pp 202.
The Rue d ' En-Bas. Guillemont's main s ireei, loday. Comparc wilh
piclure on page 49.
Chapter Five
THE BATTLES FOR GUILLEMONT VILLAGE
Part 2. September 1916 - Thc Baute orGuillemont
The weat her during the first days of September 1916 was greatly
improved. As the forward troops' trenches began to dry the men's
morale improved, aided by the commencement of the Bril ish
bombardment al 8.00 am on 2 September whieh in some way
compcnsated for the persistent German shctting of the Brit ish forward
positions; circumstances which had so drained the spirits of the British
The positions on the right or the British XIV Corps whieh were 10 be
atlaeked by the Freneh on the morning or 3rd September 1916. This
photograph was taken looking north-eastwards aeross the Combles ravine
(marked as Vallet! de JIobureplIs on your IGN map). On the right is the
97
AbO\'e: German howitzer gun crew and
below a trench mortar team operating
rrom a dugout.
98
soldicrs in the Longueval,
Delville Wood, Ginchy and
Guillemont vicinities, The
British advance was planned
to take place behind a roll ing
barrage, advancing at the
rate of 50 yards per minute,
The 5th Division, which was
to attack on the right of the
attack, issued orders that its
men should keep as close as
humanly possible to within
25 yards of that cunain of
fi re!
The objective of XIV
Corps' attack was identified
as a line across thc north-
eastern edge of Leuze Wood
a position which it was
hoped would dominatc and
secure any subsequent attack
upon the important vil lage
of Combles. The junction with the French would be whhin the steep
sided valley or ravine south of Falfemont Farm. The plan envisaged
that Falfemont Farm would be captured by the right of XIV Corps,
during a preliminary attack in advance of the main assault which
would begin at noon.
The pre1iminary attack on FaIfemont Farm was undertaken by the
2nd KOSBs at 8.50 am but this gallant attempt was an utter disasler.
The French, on the KOSB's fight, were unable to gel forward in the
face ofheavy machine-gun fire. To compound this problem the French
artillery had been redirected away from the ravine and the attack about
10 be undertaken by the KOSBs, in order to deal with a German allack
to the south. ThaI redi reclion was never transmitted to XIV Corps HQ
and the attack therefore proceeded withoul anil1ery protection.
Hundreds ofthe KOSBs were cut down.
At 12.00 noon the anacks of95 Brigade, 5th Division, 10 the south
of Guillemont began. The brigade's most important task was the
capture of the spur (at 57cSW3. T.25.c central) to the south of
Guillemont village on the Hardecourt road. This task was enlrusted to
the 12th Gloucestershires on the right and Ihe 1st Cornwall Light
Infantry on the left. The men carried the German front Hne and then
pressed on during the next stage, at 12.50 pm, to caplure the German
main Second Position between Wedge Wood (at 57cSW3. T.26.c.O,3)
and the southern extremities of Guillemont ilself. The greater
proportion of the casualties incurred during this second stage of the
Falfemont farm \'iewed across Ihe terrain where the 2nd KOSBs were
dedmated on the morning of 3 September 1916. (From 62cNWl. B.2.c.4,3
just in front of Angle WOOO.)
attack were suffered by the Gloucesters who were taken in enfilade
from the Falfemont Farm positions which were still. at this stage, in
Gennan hands.
At the same time that the Gloucesters were advancing towards the
nonh-east of Wedge Wood anOlher attack upon the Falfemont Farm
posit ion was undertaken by the 15th and 14th Royal Warwicks. The
anillery fire provided for this assault was laid down by British units,
but was st ill described as 'feeble'. Unfortunately there were stil l
German troops on the right flank of this attempt to get fonvard and
their enfi lade fire therefore prevented a successful British assault on
Falfemonl Farm. However, further to the left. the 14th Wanvicks did
gain a foothold in the trench just south of Wedge Wood.
Lalcr that afternoon, at 2.50 pm. the soldiers of 95 Brigade then
continued their advance eastwards and made good the Wedge Wood to
Ginchy road on the ri sing slope 10 the nonh of Wedge Wood. Ouring
this process a large number of German prisoners were laken. notably
men belonging to the 73rd Fusiliers and the I 64th Regimem. As soon
as the British troops could reach the top of that rise and look down
upon the devastation whieh was Guillemont village they saw an
extraordinary sight. The wreckage was now in the hands of the 20th
Oivision's men who had finally achieved what. up until this time. had
seemed an insurmount able task.
Ouri ng the subsequcm hours of the afternoon of 3 September 13
Brigade was replaced in the line by 15 Brigade whose attacks towards
Falfemont Farm and the Wedge Wood position had mixed fortune. On
the right, at Falfemont, the Ist Cheshires and 16th Wanvicks were
unable 10 get fonvard, again because of machine-gun fire from their
right flank. However, on the left the I SI Bedfordshires reached and
look Wedge Wood and made conlact wi th 95 Brigade who nQW
overlooked Gui ll emont to the north ofWedge Wood. To the men in that
small wood and those dug in along the Ginchy road it seemed that
German resi stance east of Guillemont had collapsed. However. an
advance towards Leuze Wood the brigade's final objective, was denied
on thc grounds that the 20th Division's capture ofGuillemonl had been
compromised by the failure ofXY Corps to capture Ginchy al the same
time. Any advance upon Leuze Wood would therefore have created a
very exposed and untenable salienl.
Thc Capture of Guillcmont by thc 20th Dh'ision
'
Although the village of Guillemont retains a greal deal of
associat ion with the 20th (Light) Oivision's success in capturing the
I()()
Aerial pholograph of the Wedge Wood - ""alfemont Farm area. S map 12 on page
115.
village on 3rd September. the division was in a parlous state on that
day. even before the final attacks commenced. Casualties beforehand
had already reduced the effective rifle force of 59 Brigade tO just 1650
whilst 60 Brigade was so affected by sickness and casualties that its
replacement by 47 Brigade, drawn from the 16th (Irish) Division, had
been a necessity. The objectives set for the 20th Division's attack was
the Wedge Wood to Ginchy road, east of Guillemont. In front of the
British fon."ard positions the village had been reduced to liule more
than a lunar landscape of interconnected shell-holes. Gennan trenches
had ceased to have any visible line, but beneath the rubble a number of
deep dug-outs had withstood the shelling. Still deeper. a number of
tunnels which connected the village's weUs had been constructed by
the troops who had been in occupation for the previous two years.
These tunnels were still viable and provided the opportunity for
soldiers to move safely, more than ten metres beneath the surface.
The British anillery preparation of the area was complex and
thorough. As with the area south of the village attacked by 5th
Division's men, the assault on Guillemont was to be made in three
stages, each progressing behind a creeping barrage, that running
through the village at a rate of just 25 yards every minute. A feint
bombardment, fired as if 10 presage a British attack, occurred at 8.15
am and the area between Guillemont and Ginchy also recei ved a
special bombardment at 8.33 am. The final attack was to be made at 12
noon after a final and heavy bombardment of the Gennan positions in
front of and within the village.
The southem pan of the village was the objective of 59 Brigade,
and whin that brigade the men of the 10th KRRC had presscd
fonvard as elose as possible to their own barrage even before zero hour
at 12.00. Although casualties were thus incurred from their own
anillery, the men's initiative enabled them to take the Germans by
Thomas Hughes VC
surprise. On the left of the 10th KRRC the 6th Connaught
Rangers had also caught the Germans unaware by using the
same tactic. The Irishmen were howeve r more than
impetuous and swept fonvard without putting an end to a1l
signs of resistance in the area around the quarry. thus
obliging one company of the 10th KRRC 10 mop up after
the lrishmen in that vicinity as the morning unfolded.
Moments later, at 12.00 precisely, the rest of the line
advanced from their trenches and within minutes the
Gennan's front positions up to the Hardecourt road and the
\vestem end of Mount Street' were overrun by 59 Brigade's
102
men. In the conlext of this action one notable distinction was won by
Private Thomas Hughes of thc 6th Connaught Rangers who hailed
from County Monaghan. Ireland. He was awardcd the Victoria Cross
[LaI/don Go=ette, 26 Oc\. 1916]:
'Thomos Hughes, No.3/5027, Pril'ate, Connouglll Rangers.
For most conspicI10IIS brave,)' ami determination. He was
wOllnded ill 011 al1ack, bllt returned at once to thefiring line after
havillg his \\Olmds dressed. Loter, seeing a IlOstile machine glll1.
he dashed out in front of his compan)', shot the gl/lIlIel; ond
sillgle-handed caprured the gun. Tltouglt agaill woullded Ite
brought back three or Jour prisollers:
His own account is as fo11ows:
'Ollthe 3rd ofSeptember lI'e wellt ol'er the top. After beillg hit
il/ fOIll" different ploces. I noticed 0 machille gl/n firillg il1 the
Germalllilles. So I /"Ilshed IIp. shot botl! the chaps ollthe gun ond
broug"t iI back. I remember 110 more IImil I fOlllld myselJ dowlI
in fhe dressing statioll. Ps. - I forgot /0 "'ellrioll I brought Jour
German prisallers lI'it" the glln."
Thc len flank of Ihe 20th Division's attack was delivered in a south-
easterly direction by the 7th Leinsters of 47 Brigade. These men's
attack had been delivered from Iheir assembly trenches dug adjacent to
the north side of the railway line, nonh-east ofGuiliemont station and
east of the road from Longueval and Waterlot Farm. The assault had
been panicularly successful and owed much 10 the courage of the
battalion's bombers. who were ted by Lieutenanl John Vincent
Present-day 1";1'", east wards from ;the quarry" on the Germa n main
Second Position trench. looking pasl ' MounI Slree!' which ran towa rds
the ccntTt' ofGuiJlemont.
Holland. Holl and was anolher lrishman, born in July. 1889, at Athy,
County Kildarc. He was educatcd at C[ongowes Wood College. and at
Liverpool University. Holland was somcthing of an adventurer and
travelled extensively in Brazil, Argent ine, Chile and Bolivia, where he
was engagcd in ranching. rai lway engineering and hunting. He
relUmed 10 England on the outbreak ofwar and enlisted in the 2nd Life
Guards on 2 September 1914. He was gazened Second Ueutenant in
the 3rd Battalion Leinster Regiment, in February 191.5. After arriving
in France, Holland was attached 10 the 2nd Banalion Royal Dublin
Fusiliers. He was wounded at the Sccond Battle of Ypres. After
recovery from his wmmd he went back 10 France and was thcn attached
10 the 71h Leinsters as Batfalion Bombing Officer. He then saw service
at Loos, Hull ueh and the Somme in 1916.
Holland was awarded the Vietoria Cross [London Gazette. 26
Oct.1916), the citation reading as folIows:
'John Vil/cellt Holland. Lielll .. 3rd Balln. Leinster Regt ..
allached 7th Battn. Date 0/ Act of BrQl'ery: 3 Sept. /916. For
most conspicuous brm'e/JI during a heavy engagement when, not
comen! \\'irh bomhing hostile dug-ollls lI'ithill fhe objectile. he
feadessly led his bombers through our Oll'n artillery barrage and
c1eared a greal part ofthe village infront. He slarled out with 26
J V Holland bombers alld fillished up Wilh ollly fi\e. after capruring some
VC 50 prisoners. By {his very gal/am action he ulldoubtedly broke
the spirit of/he enemy, and I/'IIS saved IIS mallY casualties whell
Ihe bartalion made a furrher advance. He was far fro", weil al
Ihe time. and later /'ad ro go 10 hospilal.' J
It was clear 10 the Royal Flying Corps' observers thaI the German
resistance in Guil1emont was being overwhelmed. By 12.50 pm the
advanee to the seeond objeetives began on sehedule, the leading
battalions of 59 Brigade now being reinforced by the 6th Oxford &
Bucks Light Infantry and the 7th Somerset Light Infantry. The soldiers
of ihe 6th Connaught Rangers were leapfroggcd by the 8th Royal
Munsters. These soldiers then advanced eastwards alollg Mount Street
and began to consolidate along the line of NOrlh Street and South
Street whieh derined the castern perimeter ofthe village. To the east it
was difficult to see evidence of likely German resistance and to many
of the soldicrs and officcrs on the spot it seemed that German
resistance had broken do,",m. This was one of the few oceasions when
signallers were ahle to operate without interference, allowing the
divisional commanders a rare opportunity to control events without
interminable delay.
104
View eastwards towards Leuze Wood rrom the si te of the 20th (Light)
Di vision's memorial.
At 2.50 the advance to the third objective, the Maurepas to Ginchy
road, was made - within an almost surreaJ calm. In the area of 47
Brigade the 6th Royal Irish actually moved forward to the sound of
Looking towards Ginchy rrom the Guillemont to Combl es road. This near
seclion or the road was consolidated by the soldiers or 47 Brigade,
allached to the 20th Dh'ision rrom the 16th (Irish) Division. b)' the
artemoon or 3 September. Further north the 7th Di vision's attack had
initiall )' succeeded in enl ering Ginchy, onl)' to be expelled during the
artemoon's fighting.
spoils or battle - German prisoners being marched off 10 capthity.
: The task before those a5signed 10 clear up - coll ect, idenlify. bury and
their battalion pipers. Brigade HQ wired 20th Division's HQ that theTe
seerned 10 be 'nolhing in front'. Very considerabte numbers of
prisoners were captured, Same of whorn seemed more Ihan glad that
their ordeal was over. Thc British captured more Ihan 700 hundred
wounded and unwounded men in thc confines of Guillemont Ihis day,
the German dead lying in profusion 311 around the vicinity. During thc
aftemoon the soldiers of 59 Brigade made cantae! with the men of95
Brigade, 5th Division, on therr right. Unfonunately il was on the left of
the 20th Division, at Ginchy, wherc problems were emerging.
Thai Ginchy silualion was creating much nervousness amongst the
stafT at 20th Division's HQ. The divisional commander, Major General
WDouglas Smith, forbade any general ad\'ance towards Leuze Wood
and sent forward the 12th King's to reinforce the men of 47 Brigade
ast ride the Ginchy to Guillemont road. As afternoon deepened two
German counter attacks from the Ginchy area were repelled by
machine-gun and rifle fire organised by these detachments of the 12th
King's on the somh-western fringes ofGinchy. Amongst these men was
Sergeant David Jones whose deeds were to bccome the stufT of legend
in his home city, Liverpool.
Newspaper reports ofthe action, soon made available in Liverpool,
paid great tribute to Sergeant Jones' coolness and determined quali ties.
Sergl. Jones was Ihe righll1/a1l illlhe right place allhe righl
moment: was holl' a fello\\' 1I01l-commissiOlled officer of Ihe
Lil'erpoo! Regl. summed Mlllup. 'lfe walked righl into hell by Ihe
back doOl: a"d sllJJered lerribly. All 0111' officers bowled 0111. The
/lIeIl were like sheep wi,hollf a shepherd. Thillgs lI'ere all ill a
107
l\'lap 11. Showing t ~ 12th King's at Guili emont. ITabn rrom The lIisloryollhr
Kin, ,, Rtgimrnl (J";,y:I"pOOf). ppJ20. E,'frard \\")1 hall . Pub. AMlold. London. 193(1.
muddle. Nobody seemed to knoll' what to do. Sergeant Jones
splUllgJonl'ard alld gave orders. The /li en quickly recm'ered their
temporQ/J' disma)\ alld IInder his directiOlls the)" resllmed the
rush 011 the ene",y s position. The maehine guns played hel/with
IIS. bllf the Sergeant led IlS straight to the goal. 1I i> car/"ied ,he
position lI'i,II a rllsh. ,hollgh lI'e lI"ere grelUly outlllllnbered. Tlle
enemy flet! in ponie. and we losl 110 time ill makillg ollrselves at
home ill Ihe posilion. Allllight long the enemy deiliged IIS lI'ilh
108
shell fire. and rwice rhey arracked wilh grear Jury, They
were delermined 10 ol'enl'helm IIS by sheer weighl oJ
nllmbers, bill under Ihe orders 0/ Serg" Jones we plll our
backs '-mo il und drO\'e off Ihe Hllns each lime, He had
IIeilher Jood nor waler. and {he circllmsrances were abo/Ir
as depressillg os tlley cOIl/d be, bul Jones mn'er despaired,
He was so cheerJII/ himself Ihat el'erybody Jell ashamed 10
be anYlhil/g else, So I,'e held Oll like grim dealh Jor (wO
da)'s, It e smashed the enem)' I/P t?\'ery time Ihey ,ried (0 D, Jones VC
o\'enl"helm IIS, I1 was I'el}' hord fighting indeed, but the
boys slllck il weil Imlil relieJ come, He had been gil'en IIp
Jor 10Sl, Nobody t?\'er expecled 10 see IIS again, Thot I\'e had
come Ihrollgh the ordeal safe ond lI'ilh hOl/ollr was dlle
emireil' 10 Sergeant Jones s hal/dling oJ the men, al/d
nobody will begrlldge him fhe hOl/ollr he !ras I\'on '
[Nahonal
M ~ l I m s
Gallcries 00
Mcrscysldc
Kmgs RcgLlncnl
Collcclion]
' He oughl 10 be an offi cer,' was the remark of a pri vate who served
under Sergeant Jones duri ng the two days' siege:
'He led /lS wirh grear skill, and complerely baffled rheJoe 01
el'el}' I/lrn, Norhing cO/lld disrnay hirn. AI rimes Ihere II"OS el/ol/gh
Resling, near to Waterlot Farm, after the flerce fighting for the ,'ilIage of
Guillemont.
eft: This \'i"id phol ograph or a dead Hrilish soldier was taken at
rui ll emonl in ellrly Sept ember 1916.
10 make one 5 hearl sink 10 the bOOls. but Sergeam Jones was os
chirpyas cou/d be. and ""s cheerilless was infecliolls. We al/fell
sI/re Ihat 1I0lhing cOIl/d go Ilnmg with I/S /Inder his leadership.
am/ll'e were right.'
Sergeant David Jones, NO. 14951. was born on 10 January 1891. He
was the son of working class parents and was educated in a loeal
coundl school in Everton. Before the war he was an employce of
Blakes Motor Company as an appremice fitter. FOT his bravery and
dcvOIlon 10 duty at Guillemont on the Ginchy road during the 3rd, 4th
and 5th September 1916 he was awarded the Vietoria Cross [Landon
Ga=ette. 26 Oct.19161. The citation reads:
DalidJones. No. /4951. Sergt .. 12th Baltll. Lil'erpoo/ Regt.
For most COllSpiclIOIiS bml'el}', demtion to dmy, and abilit)' dis-
p/ayed ill the halldling of his platooll. The platoon to whieh he
belonged was ordered to a fonl'ard position. and dur/ng tlle
adml/ce ccmte IInder heavy machine-gun jire. the office/' beillg
killed and the p/atoon sujJering heal')' losses. Sergt. Jones led
fonrard the remaillder.occupiedtheposition.alld hefd iI fo/' {II'O
days alld {WO lIiglllS lI'ithollf food 01' water. Imtil refiel'd. Oll the
seCOlld day he dl'ove back rhl'ee cOll1l1er-arracks. injlicring heavy
lasses. His coollless II'(IS most {J/'aiseworthy. Ir lI'as due elltirefy
10 his resoll/'ce and example 11/01 his men retailled conjidellce
and held (heil' post."
Onee Guillemont had been eaptured, and the lines between the 7th
Th!' shalfered t rees or Trones Wood rorm a background 10 Ihest' Imops in
rront or GlIillemonl,
Division in the north around Ginchy. through the 20th Division's
positions east of Guillemont lOwards the 5th Division's men west of
Falfemont Farm linked, the men began to senle for the night. It was tO
be a IOrrid experience. JUSI before nightfall a number of Gennan
planes overtlew the area and within minutes a very accurate
bombardment of the British positions was begun. Rain began to settle
in as darkness shrouded the area. At 11.00 pm Rawli nson ordered that
the allack should continue the following day, at 3. 10 pm, and that the
art illery should commence a preliminary bombardment at daybreak.
ThaI day, 4 September, dawned damp and cool. After the customary
artillery bombardment a number of important local corrections were
undertaken 10 ensure the securi ty ofthe British success at Guil lemont .
Valley Trcnch'. north of Falfelllont Farm, was captured by two
companics of the Ist East Surrcys. A similar detachment of men from
the Ist Devons passed through Valley Trench later that afternoon en
route for the near edge of Leuze Wood, which they reached at 7.30 pm,
500n afierwards bcginning a consoli dalion just inside its southwestern
fating perimeter.
Norlh-east of Gui ll cmont thc situati on was still shaky. Thc
whcreabouts of the 7th Division's forward troops in parts of Ginchy
was uncerta in, alt hough it was clear that Ihe Germans had considerable
troop strenglh in the area between Ginchy vi\lage and Ihe
'Quadri lateral' - a loop of trenches cast of the vi ll age ( Iocated at
57cSW3, T. 14.d.9,5.). Some patrols from the 7th Somerset LI managed
to get into the western corner of Leuze Wood, joining the Ist Devon's
men Ihere, subsequently establishing aseries ofposts from the western
corner of Leuze Wood nonh-westwards to the Guillemont - Combles
road. However, on Ihe left il proved impossible tO make any furt her
progress along the rai lway line. past Ihe south of Gi nchy towards the
Quadrilateral, because of accurate sniping from the confi nes of the
village. Thc day closed in miserably heavy rain.
Out in his post. south-west ofGinchy, Sergeant Jones and his group
of meo from the 12th King's were still exposed and hungry. They
would st ill be Ihere on the mOTrOw. His regiment, the King's Liverpool,
had been engaged here at Guillemont throughoul 311 anempts to
caplUre the village. The regiment's senior battalion, the Ist, along wh
its cOlnmanding officer, had been swallowed up and wiped out wilhin
the fighting. Numerous Territorial uni ls, ordinary Service banalions
and Ihe locally raised Liverpool Pals units had a11 been here. The
rcgiment's hislory rccords that:
'Al CI modes/ estimare fhe King s Rcgimcm (,Iollc in rhc scvcra{
112
allempts 10 caplllre /he \'ilIage had losses II'hich came near 3.000
officers and o/her ranks: '
The capture of Falfemont Farm
As we have seen, 4 September was a day ofmixed weather, windy,
squally showers and alternating periods of bright sunshine. It was
expected that, at 3.10 pm, the 5th Division would carry the attack past
the German Second Position from Point 48, through Falfemont Farm
and north-westwards to \Vedge Wood. A subscqucnt advance was to be
made at 6.30 pm on the Leuze Wood positions by the 5th Division's
men, an objeetive whieh the 20th Division would also be seeking to
reach from their positions east of Guillemont.
The attack on Falfemont Farm was made by Ihree battalions of 15
Bri gade, 5th Division. The Ist Norfolks were immediately
handieappcd by the inability ofthc French on their right to leave their
trenches. The right of the 1 st Norfolks was thereforc devastated by
machine-gun fire from the Combles ravinc (Oakhanger Wood) and the
This \"er}' fine pholograph sho"'s Hrilish support lroops wailing 10
ad\'anee from Iheir Irench near to Guillcmonl on 3rd September.
Falremont Farm toda),. Don' t be conrused by the Ferme de f afTcmont 's
location on ),our IGN maps, a Iittlc way south-west or Conlbles, Thc
original Falremont Farm was located within the confines or tbc Bois dc
FafTemont west or the present farm, On )'our trench map that location is
62cNWl , B.2.a.9,6. Falrcmont Farm was Ihus on the German main
Second Position, just south-east orGuill emont, and was surroundcd by an
enclosure or trees, today regrown as the Bois de FafTemont.
banali on's anacks fai led. However, on the left ofthe 1st Norfolks one
company ofthe Ist Cheshires managed to work their way round to the
north-western face of the farm enclosure under the prolection of the
spur's shelter. From the north-west the Ist Bedfordshires bombed their
way down the German trench, captur"ing many Germans who were
driven towards the ISI Cheshire's men. The 1st Bedfords captured 130
prisoners, mostly from the l 64th Regiment, as weil as a number of
machine-guns. By 4.00 pm the northern and western parts ofthe fann's
enc!osure had been captured. A further anempl to storm the farm al
5.30 pm was a failure and il was then decided that the 16th Royal
Warwicks would sap towards the farm overnight. Whi lst Ihis process
conti nued the Ist Norfol ks pushed into the remaining parts of lhe farm
not yet eaptured and then sent patrols to elear the area down towards
Point 48 to the south-east.
Thus the positions in contac! with the French were made secure and
the south-eastern aspeet ofGuillemonl could be said to be finnly held.
During the peri od 26 August to 7 September the 5th Division's easualty
lists revealed that 133 offieers and 4, 100 other ranks had been lost.
Within the 20th Division the situation was revealed as similarly coslly.
114
Map 12. Detail from the Wedge Wood, Falremont Farm, Oakhanger
Wood and Angle Wood areas, nort h of l\'laurepas and soulh-east of
Guillemont , taken from Iwo 1:10,000 trench maps which join 10 each
other in Ihis location. Shaded rectangle corresponds wilh the aerial
photograph on page 101.
115
Between 22 August and the 8 September that division's casualty toll
had mounted by 129 offieers and 2,830 other ranks.
A postscript to the battles at Guillemont
The aftermath of these banles at Guillemont was the revelation of a
most unspeakable eoncentration of deat h. The dead were trampled
underfoot, pulverised as further units moved eastwards towards the
sound offighting at Leuze Wood and Combles. The terrain was littered
with the remains ofsoldiers who once contested Guillemont. One man
who witnessed the scene, on 4 September, was a padre serving with the
16th Division, Father William Doyle. His aecount of that terrible
passage is a harrowing indictment of the terrible human suffering
whieh the vi llage beheld.
'Thefirst part of our journey lay through a narrow trencll. fhe
floor of which consisred of deep rllick mud, and rlle bodies of
dead men troddenullderfool. Ir was horrible beyond description.
bur there was no help for it, and on the halfrotten corpses %ur
own brave men we marched ;n silence, everyone busy wilh his
own thoughls ... Half an hour of Ihis brought IlS out Oll rhe open
infO rhe middle of the battlefield of some days previous. The
11'0ullded, al least I hope SO. had all been removed. but Ihe dead
lay Ihere Slif/ alld slark. wilh open storing e)'es. jllSI os fhey lIad
fallen. Good God. such a sight! I had fried to prepare myselffor
Ihis, bw all I had read 01' piclUred gave me tirrle idea of fhe
reatity."I
Sergeant David Jones of the 12th King's who had done such sterling
work in rallying and commanding his detachment of soldiers on the
north-east of Guillemont survived the ordeal. But David Jones' life
was, almost inevitably, soon to be cut short. He was killed on 7th
Oetober 191 6. Searehing desperately for informati on, Jones ' newly
married wife, Elizabeth Dor01hea Doyle, thcn inserted a number of
appeals within thc local Liverpool press asking for details of her
husband 's service career.
One offieer wrote to Mrs. Jones:
'I have seen your adverrisemenf abollt Sergeant Jones, Vc. , ill
the 'Echo '. and though I am not able 10 fhroll' much light on Ihe
sllbjecf. I feel sure )'ou willnof mind a line 0/ condolellce and
cOllgratulal;oll from olle who Iws knOl\'11 him since No\'embel;
1914, and Iws Iherefore been ahle to appreciare fh e magnijicem
qllaliries your IllIsband possessed. I1 was on aClive service Ihal
his merils came oul so stmngly. He was a wondeiful scout. and
116
did same magnificelll parrol work, which combined brain and
bmvery 10 a high degree. His fearlessness had a very grem
influence fOT good on fhe men 01 his platoon and cOn/pany.
Cap/ain Ballom)'ne more thon any other officer was able to
appreciate Ihis. being Jor so lang his Platoon COn/mander.
EI'el/wall)', after being a bombing officer Jor several months. I
retumed tQ cOn/mond my own Company, and 10 find Sergeant
JOlles ,he Sergeant 0/ my old platoon, No. 12. I am so proud to
rhink ilWQS 111)' old platoon thar was wirh hirn 01 fhe time. When
a Lewis Gun Sergeonl become necessory. I chose him. and a
better choice could /lOt have been made. I am so proud. if very
sod. And, Mrs. Jones, you,. greal SOTraw will, I am sure, be
tempered by )'our great pride. thougl! yOIl will alll'oys say it
\\'ould have beeil easier 10 bear if he had only known. I was in
the attack on 7 Oe!. , and. as Senior Officer, became a little
anxious as to what were the casualties. I remember asking my
orderi)' a60llt 8 p.m., Ilhink and hisfirsr words were: 'Sergeanr
Jones, he Ihal did so weil 01 Ginchy, has been killed: I feit very
eilt up, as I had known him so long. Alas, many analher brave
manfelllhal day. Among Ihem Sergr. Andy White, also in No. 10,
fell. Bill the bartalion, yes, the whole Division, did wonderfully
weil. I know )'ou will exeuse Ihis writing when you know my right
arm is all 60und up (not badly hurt), and I have to use my left
hand. Mr. Fred Auslin, 75. Bagot Street. Wavertree, Sign Writer,
knew your husband I believe, 60th being conneeted wirh coaeh-
building. He is a grea/ friend of mine. Accept my deepesr
sympathy for yourself in your irreparable loss of as brave and
uprighl 0 man as one could wish for.'
After the war, at his school in Heyworth Street, Sergeant Jones'
bravery and sacrifice was commemorated by a marble tablet. now a
part of the Museum of Liverpool Life. His was jusl one of the
thousands of individual tragedies thai went 10 make the extraordinary
story of Guillemont. But, writing soon after Ihe war in Gennany, one
Ol her young soldier who had passed through the same stonn as David
Jones wrote eloquently aboul how the baule for Guillemont had
changed his generation and all that he had thought was fine within
civilised Europe.
'For I eamlOl 100 often repeat, a hattle was no longer an
episode that speilt itself in blood and fire; ir was 0 condirion of
things that dug itselfin remorselessly week after week and even
mollth after month What II'as a man s life in this wilderness
117
II'hose vapOllr was laden lI'ith the steneh of thol/sands IIpon
tholIsands ofdecaying bodies? Dem/! lay ill ambushfor eaeh one
;11 e\'el)' shell-hole. merciless. and makillg olle mereiless ill turn,
Chivalry here lOok a final farewell. Ir Iwd 10 yield 10 fhe
heigh fened inrellsiry ofwar, jllst as all fine wul personal feeling
has 10 yield when maehinery gefs fhe IIpper halid. rhe Europe 01
lo-day appeared herefor thefirst time on Ihefield ofbattle."
It took a funher quaner ofa century before Junger's 'Europe ofloday'
could be banished from Ihe face of the 20th century.
L 20th (Light) Division:
59 Brigade
10th K.R.R.C.
11th K.R.R.C.
60 Brigade
6th O&B.L1,
6th K.S.L.1.
10th Rille Bgd 12th K.R.R.C.
11th Rifle Bgd 12th Rifle Bgd
Pioneers: 11th D.L.1.
61 Brigade
7th Somerset L.I.
7th D.C.L.I.
71h K.O. V.L1.
12th Kings
2. Mount Stn'et was the main sueet in Guillemont. nmning eaSliwcSI. that pan 10 thc easl
running past the village communa1 cemetery and thence to Combles.
3. Holland survived to become a Staff Instruclor at an OmCeT Cadet Baualion based in
North Wales
4.Valley Trench ran from 57cSWJ, 1.26.c.4.0 to T.26.a.8.5. This day. 4 September, also
marked the death of Corporal Ed"''lud Dwyer V.C. Ist East Surrey. ~ ) e r was said to
have been the youngest winner ofthe VC when he \\115 awarded it. althe age of only 18
)'ears, following se\'ere fighting al HiJI 60, Vpres. during April 1915. Edward Dwyeris
buried at Flat Iron Copse cemelery.
5. The HisIOIJ' O/Ihe King-i" Regime'" (Lherpool). \\'ythaJJ. ppJ21.
6.located at 62cNWI, B.2.d.4.8.
7. Fa/her IHl/ianl Dorle, S.J. A O'Rahilly. Pub: Longmans & Co. 1930.
8. Junger. Slarm ofSteel. pp 109,
After Ihe baUlej the ,'ktors of the baUle ror Guillemonl village are taken
out of the line ror a rest.
CEMETERIES AND MEMORIALS
ehapler four
The ce mete ries and memorials in this area
There are, in real ity. only two ccmeteries which properly fall wlthin
the scope of this guide, Bernafay Wood and Guillemont Road. in the
details of the \va lk from Longucval 10 Guillemont and return via
Ginchy I have also mentioned the importanee of Delville Wood as the
resting place of many men who were killed fighling at Guillemont
during the July to September period of 1916. However, the General
Tour and same ofthe suggestions made within this guide willlead you,
of necessity. slight ly outside this guide's limits and I have therefore
mentioned a small number of other cemeteries which you mighl like 10
take in whilst visit ing the area covered. These include Hem Farm and
Longueval Road.
Bernafay Wood Cemeter)'
The cemetery can be reached along the 0197 Maricourt to
Longueval road and lics opposite the north-western face of Bernafay
Wooel, overl ooking the upper reaches of Caterpillar Vallcy. A short
distance a[ong that valley to the wcst lies Quarry Cemelcry whi[st
Longueval Road cemetery can be seen on the opposile. northern. side
ofthe valley. Thc cernetery provides a fine vantage point, in particular
towards the site of thc Dawn Attack made towards the German main
Second Position on 14th July 1916.
Thc bare details within the register record that the wood was taken
on 3 aod 4 July 1916, by the 9t h (Scoltish) Division. On 25 March,
19 18, in the relreat 10 thc Ancrc, thc same Division was driven from thc
Wood but recaptured it for a time. On 27 August, 1918 il was finally
regained by the 18th Di vision. Thc cemetery was begun by a Dressing
Station in August 1916, aod used as a front-line cemetery until the
followiog April. Today Bemafay Wood cemelery contains the graves of
945 men.
Sy thc end of hoslilities Bernafay Wood cemetery originally
contained 284 graves, but it was thcn increased by Ihe concentration of
80 graves from Bernafay Wood North Cemetery and 558 from the
battlefields immediately cast of the wood facing Trones Wood.
Bernafay Wood North cemetery was located opposite the north edge of
the wood, a linie way cast of the Longueval - Maricourt road. It was
begun by an Advanced Dressing Station, and used from July to
OClober 1916. Apart from those 80 soldiers from the United Kingdom
this cemetery also had the grave of one German prisoner. The great
majority of the concentrated graves in Bernafay Wood eemetery. or
417 out of the whole number, are those of unidentified men. Special
Memorials are erected to 9 soldiers from the United Kingdom and 2
from Australia, known or believed to be buried here as unknown; and
other special memorials record the names of 12 soldiers from the
United Kingdom, buried in Bemafay Wood North Cemetery, whose
graves were destroyed by shell fire.
Guillemont Road CemeteT}'
Guillemont Road Cemetery. which during the war ycars was often
called Trones Wood cemetery, lies between Guillemont village and
Trones Wood, on the north side of the road 10 Montauban overlooking
the very shallow upper reaches ofCaterpillar Valley. Before and during
the war the area just south of the cemetery was the site of Arrow Head
Copse.
The cemetery register records only the briefest of summaries,
saying only that the village was an important point in the Gennan
defenees in July 1916, and that it was taken by the 2nd Royal Seots
Fusiliers on 30 July of that year, but that the ballalion was obliged 10
fall back; and it was again entered for a short time by the 55th (West
Lancashire) Division on 8 August. On 18 August it was reached by the
121
The magnilicent archileclure or Ihe enlrance 10 Guill emont Road
cemel ery.
2nd Division, and on 3 September, duri ng the Batt le of Guillemonl
proper, the village was captured and cleared by the 20th (light)
Division and part of the 16th (lrish) Di vision. It was losl in March,
191 8, but retaken on 29 August by the 181h (Easlem) and 38th (Welsh)
Divisions.
Interestingly the register also mentions that the '20th Division
erected a Memorial at the cross roads 450 metres east of the village;
whieh has now been replaced by a permanent monument near the same
spot'. That memorial has itself since been replaced by a further one,
making the curren! memorialthe third in succession! The register also
suggests that a permanent Memorial to the 16th Division has been
122
Map 13. The trenches whieh exlSled around the Guillemont Rond
cemetery In the late summer snd autumn of 1916. As Ihe British Army
tightened Its grip on Ihe ,-ilIage orGuillemont (he Geml3n defenders were
progressinly ringed with a compte:< network of trenches snd I ha"e gh'en
here a map whieh shows the location of those positions prior 10 the (lnal
capture 0' lhe ,iI!age. The cemelery Is located alongside 'Gulllemoni
Alle)" (adjau' nl 10 the Guillemont Rond) and south of ' lo\;CI8 All ey'.
123
Guillemonl Road c('m('lery during Ihe laie 1920s when Ihe concenlralion
of outl)'ing grlH'es inlo Ihis cemeler)' was complele. Piol 8 is thai jusl 10
the righl of Ihe enlrance porlal. [Garwoodl
124
erected between Guillemont and Ginchy. However, that is now located
within the village of Guillemont.
The cemetery was begun by fighling unils, mainly of the Guards
Division. and Field Ambulances after the Battle of Guillemont, and
was closed in March. 1917. It then contained 121 burials, besides a
number of regimental memorials. [I was greatly increased after the
Armislice by the conccntration of 2,139 graves, almost all of the July
- September 1916 period, from the battlefields immediately
surrounding the village. It now contains the graves of 2,259 soldiers
from the United Kingdom, one from Canada, one from AustraJia, one
from Soulh Africa and one from Newfoundland; and IWO Genuan
prisoners. Thiny-nine French graves have been removed !O Freneh
eemeteries. The Registers record partieulars of 740 War Dead. Thc
unnamed graves in the cemetery therefore number a very high
proportion, being 1.523 in total. A few other men are ident ified as
groups but not individually. Special memorials are erected to eight
soldiers from thc Unitcd Kingdom, known or bel ieved to be buricd
among the unnamed graves. Thc cemetcry is very extensive in size,
eovering an area of 8,344 square metres. I! is the third larges! on the
British seetor of the SOllllne baltlefield.
The only cemctery of any size from whieh British graves were
brouglu 10 Guillemont Road eemetcry was Hardceort Village Freneh
Military eemetery. The village of Hardeeourt was eaptured by Freneh
troops on 8 July, 1916, and again by the 58th (London) and 12th
(Eastern) Di visions on 28 August 191 8. Five Bri!ish Artillerymen
were buried by their unit in the Freneh Military Cemetery, in the
middle of the village, in September, 1916; and in 1918 thc 12th
Division buried in thc same cemetery 14 men ofthe 9th Royal Fusiliers
and two of the 7th Royal Sussex.
The original battlefield burials !ie just inside and to the !eft of the
eemetery ent ranee. In this section of the eemetery, amongst the first
two rows, theTe are a number of weil known and oft visited gravcs
including those of 2nd Licutenant William Stanhope Forbes - the son
of a Royal Aeademieian; Lieutenant Raymond Asquith - the Prime
Minister's son and Lieutenant Honourable Edward Wyndham Tennant
- thc son of Barron G!eneonner. Both the last two mentioned were
associates of Rupert Brooke and shared their families' nctwork of
relationships as part of London high soeiety's 'Souls'. Many of this
grouping's sons were killed during the Great War. But perhaps the city
whose anguish is most frequently represented amongst the multitudc of
headstones is Li verpool, whose King's Regiment was so closely
125
associated with the capture ofGuillemont and whose regimental badge
appears so very frequently arnong the headstones.
Hern Farm (La Ferme at Hern-Monacu) on the banks orthe Sornrne
The great sweeps and meanders of the River $omme providc a
dramatic backe 10th to a number of interesting British military
cemeteries. One of the best known is at $uzanne where many of the
early casualties belonging to the Li verpool and Manchester Pals ofthe
30th Di vision are buried. But at Hem-Monacll there is one small
cemetery which is completely offthe regular track ofBritish vi si tors 10
the Somme battlefield area. This is a pity because the ccrnctery is full
of interest and is weil siled for a summer lunchbreak! To reach this
cemetery follow the 0938 Peronne road east of Maricourt until the
junction with the Dl46leading 10 Monacu. The cernetery is close 10
the ri ver 10 the west of Hern-Monacu.
Hern Farm British Military Cemetery at Hem-Monacll.
126
Around the cemetery is a great deal of cvidcnce pointing 10 the
severity of the fighting here, both in July 1916 and during the two
campaigns in 191 8. The British lOok on this sector in January 1917 and
the adjacent farm became the localion for a Dressing Station. At thc
end ofthe war this was a liny cemetery but later more than 500 graves
were concentrated here.
Today there are therefore almost 600 graves, including those oftwo
mcn who werc thc rccipicms of thc Victoria Cross, bOlh
poslhumouslyl. Many men were killed during the Somh African
Brigade's attempts to defend the Leforest position, east of Maurepas,
during the German spring advancc through this area in 191 8. The most
frequently given date of dealh is 24th March. The Australian
representation here is also strong, although in their cases almoSI
invariabl y from the period August - September 1918.
Longueval Road Cemetery
This is also reached along Ihe course of the D 197 Maricourt to
Longueval TOad, north of Bernafay Wood. 11 lies roughly two thi rds of
the way aeross the No Man's Land of 13 July 1916. On that date the
British held the north of Bernafay Wood whilst the Gennan main
Second Position defences ringed the southern parts of Longueval. On
the night of 13/ 14 July the 9th (Scoltish) Di vision's men were
assembled in forward posilions in readiness for their successful assault
Longue\'al Road Cemelery looking towards Trones Wood on Ihe left and
Bemafay Wood 10 the right.
127
on those Second Positions. Whilst that assembly was taking place the
final stages in the Battle forTrones Wood were unfoldingjust yards 10
the cast. Thc right hand unit ofthe 9th Division, the 8th Black Watch,
were deployed here at the site of thc shrine adjacent 10 the present day
cemetery.
In fact the men buried hefe are mostly drawn from the casualties
incurred during the fighting cast of hefe in the Leuze Wood - Combles
area during September 1916. The explanation is that Ihis loeation
became the sile of a Dressing Station, known as Longueval Alley cr
Longueval Water Point. One hundred and seventy oue men were buried
hefe, a small number being from 1918. Duriog 1923-24 a further 49
were addcd, as a consequence of battlefield clearances in the
Longueval arca and eoncentration work, making a total of 220 graves.
Tbc eemetcry provides a very eentral loealion from which a number
of interesting views can be obtained towards Bernafay and Trones
Woods as we!! as Longucval, and Montauban.
Maurepas and ehe Frfnch National Cemeeer)'
Within Maurepas village, easily reaehed from the 20th Di vision's
memorial east of Guillemont, are two places of Interest. Sitcd at the
village green in the centre of Maurepas is the memorial to the soldiers
of the ISI Regi ment d' lnfanterie who died whilst capturing the village
in 1916, On the south eastcrn side ofthe vi11age is one ofthe many
large Freneh National Cemeteries in thi s area, this one containing the
graves ofmore than 3,600 Frenehmen killed during 1916. The largest
of these National eemeteries in the area, indeed on the Somme, is
located at Rancourt, east of Combles on the far side of the AI
mOlorway AulOroute du Nord. l1 is just a short drive south ofhere 10
thc sile ofthe interesting but linie visited British Military Cemetery al
Hem-Monacu.
The CWGC isolaeed gr a"e ae Falfemont Farm
This lonely and infrequently visi ted spot lies between the site ofthe
original Falfemonl Farm (Bois de Faffemont) and its post war
replaccmcnt whieh is now si tuated closer 10 Combles. Buried here are
the bodies of Caplain Riehard Heumann, Sergeant Major B.Mills and
Sergeant A.W.Torranee, a11 of the 1I2nd London banalion. When Ihe
three men were killed, on 10 September 1916 during an action elose to
Leuze Wood, the bodies were buried on the spot. This is righl on Ihe
boundary limits of Ihis guide but I have included a liule detail here
sinee many people will be walking rhis area in search ofunderstanding
128
l\1ap 14. A detail taken from the 1:10,000 trench map, 62cNWI, showing
the location of Captain Heumann's gra,'c .
The prescnt day Faffemont farm is located at 8.3.a central. See photo
page 114
relating to events concerned with the capture of the German main
Second Positions in the Guillemont area. After the war Captain
Heumann's family purchased Ihis plot of land from the farmer, having
rcquested that thc grave not bc removed to one of the ever growing
concentration cemeteries elsewhere on the Somme. A stone cover was
set above the grave and this, along with the border. is still maintained
by the CWGc.
Captain Heumann had been Mentioned in Despatches and was
described as a very popular and capable company commander. CSM
Mills was thc holder of thc Volunteer Long Service Medal. The three
ruen were killed whilst engaged in a company officer's conferencc
within a shell hole. Apan from the three men buried here three funher
casualties were incurred from the same shell burst - Ueutenant
Attenborough, Second Lieutenant UrseIl and Second Lieutenant
Childs who subsequently died ofhis wounds.
The most sensible way 10 get to Ihis location is through the village
of Combles. Leavc the village in a south-westerly direelion following
the signs for the Guards Cemetery but continue past that cemetery
unlil you rcach FafTemonl Farm. Ahhough you have the right ofaccess
10 whal is a rccognised War Grave ir would be a sensible idea to ask at
the farm. 'Je l'Olulrais I'isirer la tombe des soldats Ang/ais dans \'Olre
champs. 5 'jf VOIIS plait' should sufTice - although I lake no credit for
129
such indifferent French! This is also an ideal opportunity to walk a
small pan of thc German main Second Position in the vicinity of thc
original Falfemont Farm. The map here. a detail from 62cNW I.
squares 82 and 83, should he[p
20th (light) Dh ision's memorial, cast of Guillcmont
This wonderfully siled memorial recalls the central part played by
the di\'ision in the final capture of Guillemont in early September
1916. The original memorial commanded the ground east of
Guillemont until 1993 when its stonework's deterioration could no
longer be ignored. In that year the
venerable but fraclUred edifice was
demolishcd and rcplaced with a far less
vu[nerable stone upon which the original
bronze plaques were re-instal1ed. The
finance for the new memorial was raised
and arranged through Ihe Royal
Greenjackets. Thc memorial was re
dcdicated in 1995. Locating the site is very
simple and you will be rewarded with some
fine all round vicws from its vantage point.
The autumnal and early winter phascs of
the 8anlc of the Somme were a busy and
costly period for the 20th Dh-ision. Apart
from thc Sattle of GuiJlemont thc division
The 20th (Light ) Di ,'ision's memorial east of
Guillemont before subsidence and the erret'ts
of" eathering necessitated that it was pulled
dO\\ and rebuilt.IThorpe)
also then look part in the Bantes of Flers-Courcelette, Mor"al and the
Transloy Ridges. The division stayed on the Somme during the biuer
winter of 1916-17 until the German pull-back to the Hindenburg line
in March.
16th ( Iri sh) Di vision's memori al in
Guill emont
The memorial was originally located
on the Guillemont - Ginchy road north-
east ofGuillemont and commemorated the
division's extensive involvement in the
fighting in the Guillcmont - Ginchy area.
Here in Gui11emont this simple stone
recalls the facl that the caplUre of
Guillemont. on 3rd September 1916. was
greatly aided by the altachment of one of
the 16th Oivision's brigades to the 20th
Division. Thc memorial can be found
adjacent to the village church.
Thc 18t h (Eastern) Divi slon's memori al
on the south face of Trones Wood
This memorial Is easily located on the
sidc of the 064 road at the southem end of
Tranes Wood. The site overlooks the Maltz
Horn valley and farm area to the south. 11
was sited here in commemoration of the
sacrifice made by the 18th Oivision's
soldiers who finally captured Trones
Wood on the morning of 14th July 1916.
The prcvious week's fighting here costthe
Brilish Army in the region of 4.000
casualties, thc German Army a simi1ar
number. As with many locations on this
part ofthe Somme battlefield thc area was
the scene of fighting during 1918 as weil
Q>
... .
,r, !PISH fjl W,ION

as 1916. Coincidentally it was the 18th The 16th (Irish) Dh'ision's mClll oriul
Division again who look part in thaI re- near 10 Guill ClIl ont church.
capture in thc September of 1918 at the
start of thc last 100 days of the Greal War. Almost all of thc 18th
Oiv1sion's memorials on thc Western Front have the same
131
charactcrist ic shape. that of a siender poi nled obelisk. This onc carries
thc unusual phrase: 'The Grealcst Thing in the World' at 1tS base
leaving the startled onlooker 10 finish the sentence by his or her own
appropriale words.
Thc 18th ([astcrn) Dhision's lClIIorllll:
~ (a) Early postwar cross;
(b) Ncwly errecled memorial in the 19205:
(c) Present day.
Pipers 3t the memorial to 2nd Lieutenant Marsden-Smedley. ln Ihe
background the Irees or Trones Wood ean be seen c1early. (Thorpe]
The private memorial 10 Second Lieutenant Marsden-Smedley,
3rd Rie Brigade.
Second Ueutenant Marsden-Smedley served with the 3rd Rifle
Brigade. 17 Brigade. 24th Division. He was killed, aged 19, during an
attack against thc Station on 18 August 1916. Apart from being an
intelligent and assured young man. and belonging to his schoors
OfTicers' Training Corps. George Marsden-Smcdley was an
outstanding sportsmall. captaini ng Harrow school 's football and
cricket teams. Had he survived the war George Marsden-5medley
would have letl his horne in Lea Green. Matloek. to start dcgree studics
at Trinity College. Cambridge.
The si tc is best rcached from the Longucval road leaving
Guillemont to the north-wcst. Thc memorial is particularly poignant in
that. apart from the seeming youthfulness of its focus. the inseription
rccords that George Futvoye Marsden-Smcdley fell 'and lies near here
in an unknown grave. Lovely and pleasant in li fe - in death serene and
unafraid - most blessed in remembrance: There is another very fine
memorial to this young man's memory in the form ofa unique stained
glass window whin the ehureh of SUohn the Baptist at Dethiek,
Derbyshire.
133
I e 11Qnumt nl SolJa15 mu:!< le ;)1 Aufa !914
Individual French private memorials
Within the southern sector ofthis guide that area
att acked by the French during the 1916 Somme
offensive has given ri se to a number of individual
private memorials whieh you will come aeross. All
are within a short distance of each other. The first
of these reImes to Captain A.Cochi n whose
memorial is located half a kilometre along the road
leading northwards out of Hardecourt towards
Guillemont at a j uneti on where a left fork diverts
towards Trones Wood. The second of these
memorials lies adjacent to the Ol46E Hardecourt to
Maurepas road and is dedicated to the memory of
Gaston Chomel. The third memorial , that of
Y. Hallard, is within the village of Maurepas. As
already noted, Maurepas is the site of a substantial
Freneh National Cemetery to the south-east of that
village
'Le Monument aux SoJdats Francais morlS Je 28 Aout 1914' , This
substantial stone monument, which testilies to the of the tighting
during the fi rsl month of the war, was photographed soon after its
construction in the mid 1920s, The monument is Jocated opposite the
communal cemetery, east of Guillemont. [Reed]
I.Sccond Lieutenant G.E.Cates, 2nd Rifl e Bri gade and Private R.Mactier. 23rd Victoria
Baltali on. AJ .F.
134
Chapler Seven
Tours and Walks
This section of Ihe guide provides aseries of lours and walks. The
fi rst of these is a general tour, tao long 10 undertake excepl by cycle,
car or coach, designed 10 make you familiar with Ihe main geographie
features and siles of historie inlerest 10 be found within Ihe area.
Primarily this guide is concerned with Guillemonl and Ihe Iwo
woodlands on its western approach, Tranes and Bernafay Woods.
Because Ihe area cal/srad by this guide i$ extensive those of you with
cyeles might consider bringing Iham alang. The locations around
Guillemont certainty lend themselves weil 10 exploration on two wheels,
especially during Ihe summer months. As a general rule of thumb a
walk described as taking roughly three hours should be capable of
being completed on a mountain cycle in one quarter of that time,
depending entirely, of course, on how long you care to dweil at the
many places of interest. The detailed walks described here will allow
you to develop a more intimate understanding of the particular locations
described. Whilst stopping at places of interest I suggest that you
periodically cross reference with the relevant sections of historical
narrative and cemetery - memorial entries.
A general tour 01 the area to lamiliarise yoursell with the main
features around the area covered by this guide
This tour is suitable for cars and coaches. If you stop al all the
suggesled locations the circuit may weil take lour hours 10 complete. I
suggest that you make use 01 the relevant IGN maps. The Green series
1:100,000 Laon - Arras sheel will suffice, but more detail can be
gleaned by making use of the Blue series 1 :25,000 sheets, the one
covering the Guillemont area being 2408 est, covering all areas
described wilhin Ihis guide. However, the map below will help If you
have been unable 10 obtain the IGN sheets.
Coming Irom Albert you can reach a suitable startlng point for this
tour al the village 01 Fricourt. I suggest this since Fricourt was
attacked, on 1 July 1916, by Ihe 7th Division's men which included the
20th Manchesters. From Fricourt almost all the way along the southern
arm of the Brilish sector of the battlefield that day there were Ihousands
of men, representatives of Kitchener's New Armies, raised in the
industrial towns of Manchester and Liverpool. As you pedal or drive
eastwards along the D64 you will pass through Mametz and
Montauban, both villages where the association with the Manchester
Pals battalions is very strong, but nowhere is that association more
notable, or better recorded, than at Montauban where the initial attack
135
~ I P 15. A General Tour ofthe Guillcmont BreB.
south of the village was
undertaken by the Liverpool
Pals (King's Regiment) and
where the final capture of the
village was made by units drawn
form the Manchester Pals
(Manchester Regiment). Within
the village you will come across
the very fine Portland stone
memorial erected to the memory
of both the Liverpool and
Manchester Pals, raised there
during the early 199Os. The link
between the cities of Liverpool
and Manchester and their
Regular, Territorial and Pals
batta1ions with the area covered
by this guide continues into the
two woodlands east of
Montauban, Bernafay and
Trones, as weil as to the village
of Guillemont itself. More
recently the King's Regiment
The \"e rr fine memorial. dedicated to the memory
of the Li rerpool and I' lanchester Pals. whi ch is to
be found in :\10ntauban.
(wh ich raised the Liverpool Pals) and the Manchester Regiment have
amalgamated into a unified organisation and it can be said without
concern of contradiction that the King's regiment's part in the story of
Guillemont is unique.
From Montauban contlnue eastwards, still on the 064, in the
direction of Guillemont. You will soon come to a cross roads where,
faci ng you on the front left, is Bernafay Wood. Turn left and travel
north in the direction of longueval along the 0197. En route to
longueval you will pass along the western side of Bernafay Wood
which was, at the start of the Somme battles, roughly mid-way between
the German front line positions and their main Second Position. In this
area the distance between the front lines and the German main Second
Position was considerable and Bernafay Wood was therefore not within
the British infantry's objectives on 1 July. Nevertheless, Bernafay Wood
was organised for defence by the German army and a number of
significant trenches had been dug, both within the wood's confines and
between Bernafay and Trones Wood further east. As you approach the
northern end of Bernafay you will come across Bernafay Wood military
cemetery on your left. The cemetery slopes from left down 10 right as
you look at it and those slopes lead down into the shallow depression
of Caterpillar valley. Continue along the 0197 and you will pass
Longueval Road British Military cemetery on your right with its relatively
small number of graves. Four hundred metres past that cemetery turn
137
right, by-passing the southern end of Longueval. The village was a vital
feature on the German main Second Position. TM area to the west of
Longueval was that attacked by the British infantry during their
remarkable Dawn Attack on 14th July.
Travel for three hundred meters before turning right again, heading
in a soulherly direction lowards the northern tip of Trones Wood. On
your left is Waterlot Farm which was also an importantlocation on the
German main Second Positions. Continue southwards passing the
eastern perimeter of Trones Wood on your right. Fifty metres before Ihe
small stand of trees which juts out from Ihe eastern limits of Ihe wood
pause tor a short while. This is where Ihe two light railway lines which
passed through Trones Wood emerged on ils eastern perimeter. The
two lines then joined and ran across Ihe open ground al Ihe head of
Caterpillar valley lowards Guillemont Station whose site is sl ill plainly
visible just to Ihe north of Ihal village.
At the 064 turn left along the Guillemonl road, travell ing pasl
Guillemont Road Cemetery. This is a fascinating cemetery with a most
impressive enlrance. The cemetery slopes downwards, away to the
north, and into the last eastern vestiges of Calerpillar valley's long
course from Fricourt 10 Guillemont. As you enter Guillemont stay 10
the left and pass Ihe ehurch on your left, crossing straight over al the
cross roads and heading towards Longueval along the 020, This will
take you past the site of Ihe Station, adjacenl 10 Ihe grain silo, which
lies on the left of Ihe road some 300 hundred metres past Ihe Ginchy
turnoff. Travel past the sile of Waterlot Farm and Ihen turn rlght al the
communal cemetery in Longueval. This is a litlle outside the area
covered by this guide, but the route is worthwhile in thai it brings us
past the South African Memorial al Delville Wood and thenee inlo
Ginehy vitIage.
As you enter Ginchy turn left and then very soon right onlo the
D20E. The 020 runs due south. AI Ihe cross roads with Ihe 201h
(light) Oivision's memorial go straight over and follow that sunken
road and the signs for Maurepas. One kilometre after the cross roads
you will be able to see a stand of trees on your left whieh is Wedge
Wood. Just past Wedge Wood you can look up the slope of the
Falfemonl spur, to your left, towards Ihe original sile of Falfemont Farm.
The area in front of you south-eastwards in Ihe direcl ion of Maurepas
and south-westwards 10 Hardeeourt lay within the eonfines of the
French army's sphere of operations during Ihe Somme batlles of 1916.
Continue Into Maurepas where Ihere is a nolable and large French
National military eemetery on Ihe soulh-eastern side of Ihe village. The
village also provides the loealion for an individual and private memorial
to a Freneh soldier, V.Haliard.
From Maurepas take Ihe o0146E in Ihe direction of Hardecourt.
En route, on the left hand side of the road, you will see anolher private
memorial 10 Gasion ehome!. The vilJage of Hardecourt is roughly two
138
and a half kilometres south of GUiliemont, Iying half way between the
German front line positions (Iocated between Bois de Maricourt and
Bois Faviere) and Ihe German main Second Position in the Falfemont
Farm - Maurepas area. On 1 July 1916 Hardecourt lay outside the
objectives allotted to the French XX Corps north of the Somme,
although the wood 10 the west of Hardecourt, Bois Faviere, was due 10
be captured as was that to the south of the village, Bois d'en Haut. In
the evenl bolh woods were taken as the Frenchmen, on the right of the
Brilish 30th Division, swept forward 10 Curlu on the banks of the
Somme by the evening of 1 July.
In Hatdecourt take the Montauban road crossing the valley south
of Trones and Bernafay. (In some contemporary accounts this valley is
referred to as Death Valley. There were of course a number of other
locations so called. The Official History refers 10 this vaJley as Maltz
Horn Valley and I have used thai nomenclature throughout.) The latter
part of this road is a sunken lane and is that from which most of Ihe
early attacks upon Trones Wood were made. AI Ihe junction wlth the
0197, just south of Bernafay Wood, turn left in the dlrectlon of
Looking north tO\Hlrds ernafay Wood from the Chcmin des Anglais.
north of Maricourt, whieh was the jUllction betwcen thc British and the
frcnch armies on I July 1916.
139
Marlcourt. Almost immediately, on your fight, is the site of the
Briqueterie which was captured on 1 st July by No.4 Company of the
20th King's.
The road 10 Maricourt is close 10 the junction between the British
30th Division and tM French 39th Division on their right. Five hundred
metres south of the Briqueterie ran the important German reserve
position known as Dublin trench which was both the British and French
objective for 1 July's attacks here. The German front line was roughly
1,500 metres south of Ihe Briqueterie whilst the British - French front
li ne facing them was level with the northern tip of Bois de Maricourt
which is the large woodland afea on your left as you approach the
village of Maricourt. Interestingly there is a track which runs due east
from the road across the tip of the Bois de Maricourt which is called the
ehern;n des Anglais (the English path] .
From Maricourt return 10 Albert afong Ihe 0938.
Walk One. Bernafay Wood
This is a pleasant stroll around the wood taking in Ihe two
cemeteries to the west and north. It is quite possible to complete the
fOUf kilometres of this walk in an
f.. hour and a half. A suitable
i\ lap 16. The Ekmafay Wood walk.
startlng point Is the cross
roads near the southwestern
corner of the wood. Jus! to the
south of here was the site of the
Briqueterie which was captured
on the morning of 1 Jury 1916 by
the 20th King's. Adjacent to the
Briqueterie was Chimney Trench
which connected Nord Alley with
the sunken lane leading towards
Hardecourt. The sunken lane just
a few yards to your south was
thus the easternmost and most
forward position captured by the
British army during the first day's
fighting of the Somme offensive.
Patrols from this vicinity on both 2
and 3 July revealed Bernafay
Wood as empty. The wood was
eventually attaeked and captured
at 9.00 pm on 3 July with only six
casualties\ The two battalions
which undertook this capture at
so little cost were the 6th KO$Bs
and the 12th Royal Seots.
140
Leave the cross roads in a northerly direction keeping the
perimeter of Bernafay Wood on your right. Although the wood lay
between the front lines and the main German Second Position it had
been organised for defence. Eight hundred metres walking will bring
you to the British military cemelery west of Bernafay Wood. II is a very
attractive and intereslingly sited localion, overlooking Caterpillar valley,
marked as the Vallee de Longueval on your IGN maps, and being
constructed on the sile of a very important German Irench known as
Monlauban Alley. This trench ran from Pommiers Redoubt along the
high ground north of Monlauban, Ihen proceeding Ihrough Ihe northern
end of Bernafay Wood before heading northwards towards LonguevaJ,
where it was known as Longueval Alley. If you look to the west trom the
cemelery that is the part of Montauban Alley which was captured by the
Manchester Pals on the morning of 1 July 1916.
Continue along the 0197 in a northerly direction until you reach Ihe
small cemetery on your right, Longueval Road Cemetery.
Turn back to the right at the site of the cruclfl x and follow the
track running southwards to the eastern perimeter of Bernafay Wood.
As you approach the northern limit of the wood you will cross a smaU
depression which is where one of the light railways trom the west
passed Ihrough this area. Thai line then ran acress the fields on your
left in the direction of Trones Wood. Those fields were the scene of
reconnaissance patrols made, on the night of 3/4 July, by Ihe 6th
KOSBs and the 12th Royal Scots whose men discovered thai Trones
Wood was held by a number of machine-gun detachments. Whilst here
il is also worth noting the unsuccessful attacks made lowards Trones
Wood across these fields on 8 July, by 2nd Green Howards and 2nd
Wiltshires (see Chapter 3).
Continue to walk soulhwards down the eastern perimeter of
Bernafay Wood. Three hund red melres short of Ihe road you will find a
palh cut in the woods to your right. This was the site of Ihe other light
railway, this one coming from the direction of Albert past Mametz and
Carnoy before passing through Bernafay Wood and then running
across the open space before disappearing into Ihe confines of Trones
Wood and thence lowards Guillemont. These light railways were a vital
part of Ihe Somme's economy, both before the Great War and up unlil
the early 1960s when many were finally dismantied.
It is quite possible to walk back 10 the cross roads via this path
through the woods. Alternatively stay outside the perimeter and
continue to walk towards the road. Roughly half way between the sile
of the railway's exil trom the wood (1:10,000 trench map reference
57cSW3, S.29.c.5,9) and the road was a very important trench known
as Trones Alley which connected Ihe south east of Bernafay wilh the
southwestern corner of Trones Wood. Along with Maltz: Horn Trench
the existence of Trones Alley created an important intermediale
position Iying between Ihe German's Front Une and main Second
141
Positions. The Trones Alley trench continued within the confines of
Bernafay, exiting half way along its soulhern boundary and Ihence
joining up with Chimney Trench in Ihe vicinity of the Briqueterie.
Continue walking southwards until you reach the D64 where you
should turn rlght and relurn 10 the cross-roads where we started the
walk.
Walk Two. Trones Wood
This is one of the most interesting of the $omme's woodlands. II was
Ihe scene of fighting Ihroughoul Ihe second week of Ihe battle and from
Map 17. The Trones Wood walk.
r
I I
~
'-J
ils perimeter there are a
number of interesling and
significant views to be had. The
circumnavigalion of the wood is
approximately Ihree kilometres
and can be completed on fool
comfortably within the hour. It is
also possible 10 walk wilhin Ihe
confines of the wood along a
number of the foresl rides
which cut Ihrough in a north-
south and east-west axis. If you
intend to walk into the wood
Ihen set aside two hours.
I suggest that this walk is
besl commenced from Ihe
memorial at Ihe southern end of
the wood. The memorial to the
18th (Eastern) Di vision
stands adjacent to the 064.
Immediately behind and north
of the memorial are two rides
wh ich disappear inlo Ihe
woodland. Thai on Ihe righl is
Ihe central ride and would lake
you almosl all Ihe way to Ihe
northern lip of Ihe wood if you
care 10 follow it. That on Ihe left
leads up to a small railway
embankment in the western quadrant of Ihe worn:!. However, al this
slage I suggest thai you will see much more by staying outside the
wood, walking round its perimeter in a clockwise direclion. II is worth
nOling here thai immedialely soulh of Trones Wood the land begins to
fall away into Ihe upper reaches of Maltz Horn Valley, from which
direction many of the British attacks upon Trones were launched
because of Ihe relative ease by troops could approach the wood
142
withoul being observed'. Maltz Horn Trench ran soulhwards along Ihe
road towards Hardecourt, then leading away in a south-westerly
direclion towards Bois Faviere.
To begin our walk set off westwards, briefly, along Ihe 064 before
turning right along the wood's western boundary. This seclion of Ihe
walk is rather rough and yeu should slay outside the boundary of the
weod. On 81h August 1916 German machine gunners and artiUery units
firing fram this western side of Trones Wood caused terrible casualties
amongst the men of 2nd Green Howards and the 2nd Wiltshires. I have
quoted below at length from Ihe Otficial History's account of Ihis action.
'rhe Aflied attack, starling at 8 A.M, was 10 be in two stages.
First the French would capture the trench, Ma/tz Horn Trench",
covering the knoll norlh of Hardecourl, whilst the British secured
the continuation of this trench as far as Trones Wood and the
southern half of the wood itseff, "as far as the rai/way l i n e ~ So
much, it was hoped, would be accomplished by 9.45 AM; at an
hour to be agreed upon by the divisiona/ commanders
concerned, the French would attack Hardecourl vil/age and knoll
and the British Ma/tz Horn Farm of which there remained only a
few heaps of rubble. After some discussion Lieut.General
Congreve issued an order at 8 A.M., the hour at which rhe first
assault was to be delivered, for the completion of the capture of
Trones Wood in the second stage.
The re-entrant ar the junction of the two Armies presented a
problem of its own. To make the attack tru/y "jointive", as the
French desired, the British would have to advance trom La
Briqueterie to Ma/tz Horn Farm across 1, 100-1,500 yards ofopen
fire-swept ground: opposite rhe French, No Man's Land was only
800 yards wide. It was therefore decided to secure the southern
half of Trones Wood as a preliminary operation, since part of the
approach thereto from rhe southern part of Bernafay Wood was
not exposed to view from Longueval, although ir was
commanded by Ma/tz Horn Trench. The attack on Ma/tz Horn
farm and trench could then be made south-eastward across rhe
shal/ow head of the Ma/tz Horn val/ey which was entirely hidden
from the German 2nd Position.
In the early hours of rhe 8th the objectives were bombarded by
the XIII Corps heavy artil/ery and the batteries of rhe 30th
Division, the 18th Division artil/ery firing on rhe southern edge of
Longueval. The 2nd Green HowardS, of the 21st Brigade (8r.-
General Hon. C. J. Sackvil/e-West), which formed up for the
assault behind Bernafay Wood moved through the wood at 7. 15
AM, being much impeded by fallen trees and thick undergrowth
and subjected to considerable shel/ fire.
At 8 am the leading company, with the battalion bombers,
advanced from the eastern edge, covered by the fire of rhe 26th
143
Brigade (9th Division) trom the left flank. The way to Trones
Wood led aeross a slight erest, and when they had breasted this
rise the assailants ware shelled by two field guns, firing over open
sights, whilst maehine-gun fire trom the wood began to do great
execution among them. The advanee was eheeked, although
attempts were made to bomb along Trones Alley and so into the
wood; some men, in a gallant rush over the open, reached the
edge, but they were not seen again. The Green Howards were
now withdrawn, and the 2;Wiltshire was ordared to renew the
attack at 10.30 am; the brigadier, however, seeured a
postponement until 1 pm. '2
suggest thai you conllnue to walk northwards outside Tranes'
perimeter until you reach the second of the small projections on its
western side, roughly half way along thai side of the wood (1:10,000
Irench map reference 57cSW3, S.29.b.5,9). This was the location of the
southern-most light railway's entrance into the wood. II is quite possible
to walk acrass this ride until you emerge on the eastern side of the
wood, opposile Guillemont. However, for those of you with more
determination I suggest keeping oulside and walki ng 10 the
northernmosl point of the wood, facing Ihe village of Longueval. This
part of Ihe walk is conducled along a definable path and reveals just
why Ihe capture of Trones was such a nacassary adjunct 10 Ihe
success of the Dawn Attack on the Longueval - Bazentin main Second
Positions on the morning of 141h July. Without the capture of Tranes
Wood thai advance would have been dangerously enfiladed from the
east by direct fire from Tranes Wood. Looking from the northern tip of
!he wood you are just 500 metres from Waterlot Farm, the site of which
can be seen in a north-easlerly direction. Just 10 Ihe north of Walerial
Farm you can see the cemetery al Longueval, Ihe visitor centre and Ihe
entrance to the South African memorial within Delville Wood.
Now turn to walk i n a southerly direction down Ihe easlern side
of Trones Wood. On your left you can see Ihe site of the notorious
Guillemont Station, eight hundred melres to the east. Jus! inside Ihe
wood on your right here is the scene of the action which resulted in
Sergeant William Ewart Boulter being awarded Ihe Victoria Cross for
his valour on the morning of 14 July 1916. As you approach the small
stand of trees which juts out from the eastern side of Tranes Wood you
will come across the ride fram which Ihe southernmost light railway
emerged en route for Guillemont Station. It is quite possible to walk
westwards into the woodland tram this point (1:10,000 trench map
reference 57cSW3, S.24.c.3,1) along the course of that railway line.
Contemporary trench maps show Trones Wood as having a minimal
defence system organised by mid May 1916 consisting of a central
Irench running north-south, linking up with the Trones Alley Irench
running between Trones and Bernafay woods. In the south-eastern
144
corner of Trones there was a considerable strong-poi nt at the junction
between the Guillemont and Hardecourt roads. By July thaI pattern of
defence had not been strengthened within the wood.
II you choose to walk into Ihe wood follow the ride for roughly 200
melres unlil you come to the central ride runni ng north-south. Turn left
onto that ride and continue walking until you emerge from the southern
perimeter 01 Trones Wood adjacenl to the memorial f,om where we
started. This would be a suitable location 10 consider Ihe material
reterring 10 Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell in Chapter 3.
Alternati vely conlinue to walk down the eastern perimeter unlil you
reach the junction wilh the Guillemont and Hardecourt roads. From
Ihere you can look south along the upper reaches 01 Maltz Horn Trench
and east along the Guillemont road past the British military cemetery.
The quadrant between Ihose two directions is the scene 01 Noel
Chavasse's deeds which resulted in his being awarded the Victoria
Cross. His battalion, the Liverpool Scottish, left their mark on the trench
maps of this area by being responsible for digging and improving a
number of trenches such as Hooge Alley and Scottish Alley in that area
between Maltz Horn and Arrow Head Copse.
Walk Three. Maricourt Wood - Hardecourt - Maltz
Horn - Trones and return
This is a more prolonged walk lor those 01 you with an interest in
seeing the area which was on Ihe right flank 01 the British army's
attacks on 1 July 1916. I1 is approximately seven kilometres in length,
covers some open and rough lerrain and is not advisable in wet or
inclement condilions! I would set aside two and a half hours to
complete this walk.
A suitable starling point would be the Chemln des Anglals. This
was the French fronl line adjacent to the 30th Division's men facing
Montauban north of Maricourt. The German front li ne opposite this
location was known as Faviere Trench and a little way 10 the north, in
their reserve position, was an importanl German redoubt known as
Dublin Redoubt (the Lochner Werk). It was here al the Chemin des
Anglais that one notable moment signifyi ng the 'jointive' nature of the
attack was played out at 7.30 am on the morning of 1 July. Here the
commanding officer of the 17th King's, Lieutenant Colonel Fairfax, and
his opposite number Irom the 153rd Regiment d' lnfanlerie,
Commandant Le Petit, linked arms and led the attack northwardS,
together.
Continue walking eastwards down Ihe valley which runs between
the Bois Faviere and the smaller woodland area 10 the south, the Bois
Brule. The western perimeter of Bois Faviere was protected by a
strongly constructed trench but this was soon overrun by Ihe
Frenchmen of the 39th Division, these soldiers pushing on eastwards
145
Map 18. The Maricourt, Hardecourt, Maltz Horn area today.
146
Map 19. Detail from Ihe 1;10.000 lreneh map eo,ering the Maricourt,
Hardourt and Maltz Horn Farm area. 1916.
147
until they had captured the eastern side of Bois Faviere. As you walk
past the southern end of Bois Faviere you will see a valley re-enlrant
on your left. From the north eastern end of Ihat valley Ihe important
trench known as Maltz Horn Trench ran northwards past Maltz Horn
Farm towards the south-eastern tip of Trones Wood.
Walk on into Hardecourt, keeping to the street which runs north-
eastwards paS! the church on your right. This is the GuilJemont road
and half a kilometre north of the church you will come to a fork where
a private French memorial , wrought in iron of florid and elaborate
design, marks the death of Captain Augustin Cochin. Not far away is
Ihe simple stone marker commemoraling two men belonging to the
153rd Regiment d'lnfanterie, Mareel Boucher and Romeo Lapage, both
of whom died here in laie July 1916. Keep 10 Ihe left at thls fork and
follow Ihe rising ground up onlo Ihe high ground of Ihe Maltz Horn
plateau (the Hardecourt knolI). This location possesses one of the
finest panoramic vistas on the Somme battlefield, that to the soulh
across the French sector of the 1916 battlefield being especially
extensive. Here Ihe sile of Ihe original farm is marked by a magnificent
crucifix, Calvaire de Maltzkorn on your IGN maps. This reveals the
origin of the military map makers' error - the inscription
eommemorating Ihe passing of this farm into history recalling thaI Ihis
was lhe site of the farm, belonging to Maltzkorn Ouclercq, which was
destroyed in Ihe fighting here. Two hund red yards north of this location
the Maltz Horn Trench which came up Ihe valley on your left side (west)
joined the road, Ihen running northwards to Trones Wood. This is lhe
location where two companies of the 2nd Wiltshires and Ihe 19th
Manchesters got up onlo the French left flank during the initial attacks
made on Trones Wood on 8 July 1916.
Walk down towards Trones Wood. The length of road you have
just walked was that part of Maltz Horn Trench captured by the 2nd
Royal Scots of 90 Brigade on 9 July. At the junctlon with the
Gulllemont raad turn left along the southern perimeter of Trones
Wood. Jusl before you reach the 181h Oivision's memorial turn left Into
the flelds above Ihe Maltz Horn Valley. This is marked on your IGN
maps as a farm track but thaI soon peters out. 1I would be sensible 10
fix a compass bearing due sauth-west and follow that for almost ane
kllometre inlo Maltz Horn valley. This was Ihe valley within which many
of Ihe 30th and 18th Oivision's men were moved forward along prior to
the numerous attacks on Trones Wood during the period 7th - 141h July
1916. The first road which you slrike will be Ihe sunken lane running
south-east from Ihe Briqueterie towards Hardecourt.
Turn rlght along Ihe sunken secUon in Ihe direction of the
Briqueterie, bul then first left, some half a kllometre befare you reach
Ihe 0197, along Ihe farm track which runs sauth, parallelto Ihe 0197
Maricourt - Bernafay Wood road. You can see the course of this track
stretching away lowards the northern tip of the Bois de Maricourt and
148
the Chemin des Anglais from where we started. The important German
redoubt known as the Lochner Werk (Dublin Redoubt) was astride this
farm track level with the northern end of Bois Faviere. The western end
of that redoubt marked the furthesl advance made by the 17th King's
by 8.30 am on the moming of 1 July 1916. On their right Commandant
Le Petit's men were in control of the Lochner Werk and some way to
the north a detachment of the 20th King's had captured the Briqueterie,
but were isolated there.
One interesting postscript 10 this walk is one of the mosl impressive
and weil sited private memorials on the whole of the Somme battlefield,
located wilhin a kilometre of the easlern side of Maricourt on the 0938
Peronne road. The granite memorial is dedicated to the memory of
Lieutenant Robert Brodv, 224th Regiment d' lnfanterie. His memorial is
still maintained in good condilion, and lies within the ground over which
Ihe men of the French 11 th Division attacked on the moming of 1 st July
1916. To the south there are very fine views over the Somme and down
to Curlu and Hem-Monacu where there is a very infrequently visil ed
British cemetery.
Walk Four. Longueval to Guillemont, returning via
Ginchy
This is an opportunity 10 walk along the German trenches which formed
their main Second Position north of Guillemont. It will take perhaps an
hour and a half to complete, being just four kilometres in length, but full
of interest. The most interesting aspect of this walk is the way in which
it reveals Ihe care which was taken to provide a panoramic field of fire
for the machine-gunners whose positions were in or near to these main
Second Position trenches. I1 is also revealing of just how closely the
postwar reconstruction, fortunately for us, followed the prewar layout
in this area.
Start at the communal cemetery, looking down the 020 from
Longueval lowards Guillemont. Before the battles for Guillemont
altered the layout of the original trench system here, the German's main
Second Position lay on Ihe southwestern side of the road looking
lowards Trones Wood. As you walk along towards the site of Waterlot
Farm you can imagine Ihe beils of barbed wire on you right hand side.
Waterlot Farm was never a working 'farm' as such. Before the Great
War this was the localion of a suger beet refinery, and was rebu,'t for
the same purpose afterwards. By the 1990s it had long since ceased to
function and Ihe derelict buildings had become a seemingly ever
presenl eyesore in the area between Longueval and Guillemont.
Fortunately these crumbling and grim main buildings were demolished
in the mid 1990s.
Half way 10 Waterlot Farm the switch line running from Trones Wood
149
Map 20. Detail from the 1:10,000 trench map, daled corrected 10
1518119 16,571.'8\\'3, showing the captured German positions al Deh'ill e
Wood (Longuc\'al), north Guillcmont and Ginchy. Note Ihe swilch li ne
lreneh (whieh came (rom the north east of Bemafay) whieh runs (rom the
Dorthern end of Trones into thc main Sf'Cond Position northwesl of
Walerlot Farm. To the west of Trones Wood Ihis trench was known as
Longueval Alley a lld it was a conti nuation of l\Iontauban All e)' tnmch.
150
entered the trench by the road's side. At Ihe lar end 01 the site of
Walerlot Farm, on the right of the road, a track turns off t o the rlght
and you should foll ow this for a short distance belore turning left. This
track, marked as Le Chemin Neuf on your JGN maps and which was
idenlified on the British trench maps as ' Fleet Street' , will take you
southwards, for a short distance along the exact site of the German
main Seeond Position trenches. As you approach the site of the
Station, on your left by the silo, you will see the private memorial
dedicated 10 the memory of nineteen year old Second Ueulenant
George Futvoye Marsden-Smedley, 3rd Rifle Brigade, who was kiUed in
action here on 18th AuguS11916. The memorial is loealed 10 the Trones
Wood side 01 the track where the light railway line approached the
barbed wire entanglements in fronl of the German trenches here.
Before the war George Marsden-Smedley had been a student at
Harrow where he had captained the cricket and football teams, being
described by his teachers as an outstanding sportsman. The young
man had only joined the 3rd Riffe Brigade as a newly drafted subaltern
in July, only to be killed here al Guillemont during his first terrible taste
of action one month later. Tragically George's body was never identified
and he is commemorated at Thiepval , although four of his companion
subalterns who were killed with him were recovered and are buried at
Delville Wood cemelery. The inscriplion on the memorial is one
particularly reveal ing of the sense of tragic loss feit by his family. Also
noteworthy are the great efforts which have been made 10 maintain and
restore this memorial in very recen! years.
Before the final capture of Guillemont Ihe British had constructed a
series of assembly trenches in very forward positions which lay both to
the north-east of the station as weil as 10 ils south-west in the direction
01 Arrow Head Copse. It was from the Irenches north-east of the station
that lieutenant John Vincent Holland, 3rd Battalion, Leinster Regiment,
attached to the 7th Battalion, set forth with his team of bombers on 3
September to win his Victoria Cross within the confines of Guillemont.
Continue to walk past the site of 2nd lieutenant Marsden-
Smedleys memorial in a south-easterly direction, moving across the
shallow depression in front of Guittemont where a track on your left was
identified on the trench maps as the Bromp!on Road untit you come to
the site of The Quarry on your right. This loeation was part 01 the main
Second Position and was Ihe scene 01 hand to hand fighting on a
number of occasions during the early attempts to capture the village on
30 July, both the 8/9 and 18 August as weil as the village's final caplure
on 3 September! On that day this localion was Ihe scene of Thomas
Hughes' gatlantry which brought him the award of the Victoria Cross.
Jusl pas! t he Quarry turn Jett. This track will lead you into the
centre of the viUage along the slreet referred 10 on the relevant !rench
maps as Mount Stree!. A short delour from Mount Sireet is absolutely
essential. Turn right and walk down to the viltage church. Adjacent is
151
a simple memorial dedicated to the memory and sacrifice of Ihe 16th
(Irish) Oivision's sOldiers, here al Guillemont, during Ihe final hours of
its caplure. East of Ihe church al Ihe soulh-eastern end of Ihe viUage is
a small paslure where dug-outs can slill be seen. Interestingly their
entrances were buill 10 Ihe north, suggesling that the Germans rather
misjudged Ihe way in which Ihe battles here were likely 10 develop.
Relurn 10 Mount Street and follow its course through the village, pasl
Ihe communal cemelery on your right. The 20th (Light) Oivision's
memorial at the cross roads was an imposing structure. Ouring the post
Second World War years il had begun 10 show the ravages of time and
its structure was crumbling. However, re-slructuring work, carried out
during 1995, has restored this weil siled memorial to heallh and in a
form less likely 10 require expensive maintenance in Ihe fareseeable
future.
AI Ihe cross roads on Ihe Ginchy - Maurepas road by the 20th
Oivision's memorial turn left, northwards, along the D20E in Ihe
direction of Ginchy. This road, 100king soulhwards in the direction of
Wedge Wood and for a short distance northwards in the direction of
Ginchy, was Ihe furthest point reached during the attacks made on 3
September which finally made good Ihe capture of Guillemont village.
Three hundred metres north of the cross roads, as you walk towards
Ginchy, you will come 10 Ihe point where Ihe light railway crossed Ihe
road en-route towards Cambles. From here Ihe Brilish li ne of advance
an 3 September ran back 10 Ihe wesl Ihen swinging north-wesl around
Ihe weslern side of Ginchy. If yeu look 10 Ihe north-west, across the
sunken lane which leads from Guillemont to Ginchy, you will see Ihe
area wilhin which Sergeant Oavid Jones of the 12th King's cemmanded
One of two entrances to a Ge rman
dugout near to the cent re of
Guillemont \'iIlagc. This was later
used by the British during both 1916
and 1918,
his detachment of machine gunners so determinedly during those Ihree
days without food cr water during Ihe period 3-6 September, and which
led 10 Ihe award of his Victoria Cross.
You have now passed Ihe north-eastem limits of this guide.
However, your return 10 Longueval will take you into Ihe most
fascinating surroundings of Delvi ll e Wood. At Ihe cross roads within
Ginchy turn left and then rlght after a further ane hundred and fifty
maires 10 take Ihe road back 10 Longueva1. This will lead you past
Delville Wood Cemetery, Ihe South African memorial in Delvitle Wood
and Ihe visitor centre adjacent 10 thai memorial. In summer Ihe visitor
centre is perpetually busy. 1I boasts an excellent small bookshop, toilet
facililies and a eafe which would provide an admi rable place to rest
your feet awhile after this walk. These facilities mean that many people
are drawn here and you will often have the chance to speak with
visitors f,om all over the globe who find the interest and appeal of the
Somme irresistible. The Delville Wood cemetery is not a battlefield
cemetery but was created entirely by the process of concentrating
graves from outlying smaUer burial grounds. II is therefore worth noting
thai many bodies recovered trom Ihe Guillemont battlefield were
concentrated during the immediate post war years into this cemetery. I
have not identified aseparate section in this guide 10 deal with Delvilie
Wood, since the location is outside the limits of this text, but you should
note that Delvilie Wood cemetery is the third largest on the British part
of the Somme batlJefield, containing more than 5,500 graves, 65 per
cent of which are unknown>. Of those thai are identified almost every
man was kiUed in the period late July, August and September when the
fighting at Guillemont was at its heighl. Those of you who have come
to find the grave of an antecedenl are most likely 10 find Ihe graves of
men kilied al Guiliemont here in Delvilie Wood, or al Guiliemont Road
Cemetery, the bulk of which is also a concentration of graves made in
the immediate post war years.
1. See Chap!er 3 01 !his ~ for an outIine o1lhe attacks upon TrOlleS Wood malle duriog Ihe period
8th - 14th JuIy ;tJsive. Many o1lt1ose attacks centred around Ihe Manchester paJs"WlvoIYemertt and
lha1 is discussed at Iength wittWI my booII MllIIChester Psis, Leo COoper I Pen & Sword Bocks. 1994.
The LiverpooI Pals (Kng's AeguTlenl) invo/vemenl as part of the 3O!h DiYisioo is CO\IeIed in Graham
MaclOocks' book.1..NerpooI Pal$. l80 Cooper I Pen & Sword Books, 1991
2. 0friciaJ Hislory. MiJit8ry ()perariom i1 Fl1IIIOfIand 88fgiurn. 1916. VoI2. pp 3738
3. The secorld latgest ceme1&ry is C a e ~ a r VaBey. comaining a l"IarodfIA more graves that DeIviIIa
Wood. The latgest is Sene Aoad Number 2.
153
APPENDI X
German Maps
Somme Nord. 11 Teil. Die Brennpunkte Der Schlacht. Im Juli 1916. Oldenburg
1.0. Berlin 1927. Courtesy of Ralph Whitehead.
Guillemont -Maurep-a:
R.133
20.7.16.
154
Guill emont- Maurel1a 5
30.7.1916.
155

a.
__ __ __
Pk'ler
)RIO?


T . IivUMOrodt
SI.
JVCU
M. Mllhl
Ho. lug I/on.rpqdf
)R.Jti:P
IJ
Fr;' liilJeh.!
Alben, 19.
Angle WOOO. 81. 82. 83. 8-1. 87. 93. 101. 115.
ArTO\\' Head Copse. 39. 63. 64. 67. 70, 77. 8-1.
86. 151.
Asquith. Lieutenant Ra)'mond. 125.
Bed & Breakfast. 20-22.
Bemafay \\'000.18.32.33,38.40.42.48.
56.63.140,141.143.
Bois Brule. 150.
Bois d'cn Haut. 23. 146.
Bouller. William E\\'an. V.C" 53, 55.144.
Briquercrie. 28. 30. 38. 41.42, 141. 14l
Brompton Rood. 74. 123. 151.
Camping. 20.
Caterpil1ar Valley. 24. 59. 63. 120.
Caterpillar Wooo. 62.
Ca\an. Earl of. Lieutenant Gener:a\. 80. 83.
(ba,lISse. Captain Not\. v.c.. 77-80.
ehemin des Anglais. 139. 140. 145.
Churchill. Wimton. 76. 77.
CombJc5, 18. 20. 129.
Congre\"e. Lieutenant General. 32. 35. 36. 40.
5{),65, 71. 76. SO, 143
Congrevc, Bill y. v.c.. 0.5.0 .. M.C.. SO
Cape, Prh-ale c.w.. 69.
Coot)'. 2nd Licutenant. V.c., n 74.
Curlu. 10.24.
Dalidson. Licutenant Colonel. 77.
Da",n Anad: (14th My). 20, 51. 5558.
Delville \\'000. 18. 6S. 150.
Dolle. FatherWilliam. 116.
Dug-oolS in Guillemom. 152
Elevation & bigher ground, 25. 60.
EIans. CSM. George. v.c., 70
Fairfax. Lieutcnant Colonel. 145.
Falfemont (Fafferoont) farm. 62. 69, 81. 86.
93.99.100.101. 112. 1\3-116. 128. 129.
Fargny.IO.
Fa\"iere Wood. 17. 23. 32. 35. 39. 148.
Fayolle. General. 63. SO. 84.
Fcamhead. 2nd Lieutenant Jack. 27. 82
Foch. General. 62. 63.
F ~ s 1 n d Lieutenant W.S .. 125.
Ginchy. 18.
Goff. Licutcnant Colonel. 75.
Gough's Rcserye Ann)'. 65.
Guillemonl Chun:h. 18.60.
GuiUemont Station. 65. 68. 69. 71. 7t 92. 10l
Hagganl. liculcnanl B.C. 5{)
Hai S. 76. SO.
Hamihon. Ralph. Lieulcnant Colonel. 84.
HardecounauxBois. 17.23. 34. 35. 63. 145,
148
Heumann. Captain Richard. 128. 119.
Hicks. Pril"3.te Clifford. 61.
High Holbom. 68. 74. 123
Historial at Peronnc. 15.
Hitchoock. F.C. . Captain, 8891.
Holland. licutenant John Vincem. V.c.. 103
4.151.
Hotels. 20.
Horne. Lieutenam General. 65.
Hughes. Private Thomas. V.c.. 101, 103. 154.
Joncs. Sergeant Dal'id. V.c.. 107112. 116-
117.152.
Junger. ErnSt. Capcain. 8891. 1178.
Killgs lhtrpoo! Regimem. J 12. 125. 137.
1.euzc \\'000. 98. 100. 112. 113.
Ul'erpool Pals, 28. 29. 30. 41. 137.
M.l!;hineGun Hoo>e. 74.123.
Maltz Horn Farm (Malzzkorn). 10. 34. 39 . ..w.
65.67.68.70. SO. 81. 96.143.148.
Maltz Horn Vatky. 36. 39,..w. 45.14-1,141.
Maltzkorn Duc1ercq. 148.
Manchester Pals. 28. 29. 30. 41. 137.
Maps.l l
Map shops. 13.
Maricoun. 10. 17.51.
Marsden SmedJey, 2nd Lieutenant G.F .. 133.l5l.
Maurepas. 23. 83. 87. 93. 97.128,139.
Maxse. Major General. 49. SO. 57.
Maxwell.lieutenant Colone1. 5155
MeEr.el. Major, 75
Mill s. Sergeant Major B .. 128. 129.
Moreland. Lieutcnant General. 83.
Montauban. 18. 19.28.19.30.38. 137.
Moont Streel, 102. 103. I(}..\. 15l.
MusttdcsAbris.15
NC\\"foondland Park. 15.
NQnh Street. 10'-
Oakhangar\\'ood. 113,115. 129.
Petil. Commandam1.e. 145
Quarry. the. sec Trenches and Redoubts.
Railways, light agricultural. 35-6. 149
Rancoon.20. 128.
Ravine (at Maurepas . Comblcs. See also
Oathangar \\'ood). 63. 82. 86. 97.
Rawlinson. General Sir Henry. 30. 62. 63. 68.
84.87.9--1.
Reslllufllt.10.
158
Robc:nson. Sir William. c.J.G.S .. 77.
SachilleWes!. Hooourablc. Brigadier
Geoera1.37.IH
Shea. Major Geoer.d. 35
Shoubridge. Brigadier General. 50.
Smilh. W.D . Major Geoeral. 107.

S,,-ainsoo. Major. 74
Tennant. Honourable. Lieulenam E.W.. 125.
Torrnncc. SergeamA.W . 128. 129.
Trenehmaps.14.
Triangle Poin!. 28. 30.
Trones Wood (Bois des Trones). 18. 26. 33.
J..t. 35. 3758. 6-1. 65, 67. 68. 70.
142145.
Tunnels. 76. 102.
ValU.1O
Walcrlot Farm. 61. 6-1. 67. 71. 76.149.150
Wedge Wood. 86. 99. 100. 101. 102. 113. 115
WiIlO\< SIream. 25
Memorials:
16th (lrish) Di,ision. 7. 131. 152.
181h Di,ision. 1312. 142.
21h (Light) Division. 105. 130. 152.
Lherpool & Manchesler Pals 31
MonI3uban.137.
Le Monumenl Sold:lI.s Francais
mortS le 28Aout 1914 .. IJ..t.
Marcel Baucher & Romeo lapage. 148.
Bml>. Lieulenanl Robc:n. 149.
Gasion Chornet. lJ..t.
Captain Cochin. lJ..t. 151.
V.H:J.llard.I34.
200 rulenan\ Marodm Smcdky. 133. 151.
Ct mettrifs:
Btmafay Wood Cemelery. 12Q.I
Bcmafa) Wood Nonh Cernelery. 121.
[)cl"illc Wood. 153.
Falfemont Farm isol!lled gra'es.128-130.
Guards Cemelcry. Combles. 119.
Guillemonl Rood.. 18.41. 60.121126.138.
15)
Han.Ioun ,illage French MililaJ). 115.
Hern Farm (al Hem Monocu). 126-7.
Longuc'"lI1 Road Ccmelcry. 58. 120.
1278.137.
French CemeteT). 128.
QuarT) CcrnClery. 120.
British and Empirt mi litary uni t5:
Corps:
Xlii Corps. 17.32.44.65.68. 71. 76. SO.
147.
XIV Corps. SO. 85. 94. 97. 99.
XV Corps. 65. 9-4.
Di "isions:
2nd DiVision. 69. 70. 71. 76, 77. SO.
3rt! Di,ision. 65. 67. 68. 83. 84. 86. 87
5th Di,ision. 9. 94. 97. 99. 107. 112. 113.
114.
7th Di,ision. 19. 29. 30. 112
9th IScouish) Division. 50. 58.121. 128.
147.
161h (1rish) Di,ision. 102. 116. 122.
181h Division. 19. 29. 30. 37. 49. 50. 57.
62.1H
Wlh (Light) Di,ision. 93. ](XH 13. 114.
118.122.
241h Di'ision. 83. 84. 87. 93.
30th Di,ision. 19. 28. 29. 30. 35. 36. 37.
40.41. 44. 49. 65. 67. 68.140.
351h (Bamarn) Di'isioo. 62. 63. 630 68.
87.93.
55th (Tcnitorial). 27. 71. n. 76. 77. SO.
83.121
Brigades:
5 Brigade. 69.
9 Brigade. 85. 86.
13 Brigade. 100.
15 Brigade. 100. 113
21 Brigade. 37, 40.1 43
26 Brigade. 147.
47 Brigade. 102. 103. 105. 107.
54 Brigade. 50.
55 Brigade . ..\9. 50.
59 Brigade. 102. 107.
60 Brigade. 102.
76 Brigade. 85. 86.
89 Brigade. 4-1. 69. 70.
90 Brigade. 40. 41. 44. 69. 70.152.
95 Brigade. 99.100.107.
16-1 Brigade. n. 7..\. 75. 76.
165 Brigade. 72.
166 Brigade. 77.
UallaJions:
159
1,1 Bedfonh;hires. 100. 114.
2nd Bwford;:hires ..\..\ . ..\5 . ..\8.
7th Bedford,him;. 51.
8th Block Walth. 58. 128.
7th Buffs. SO. 52.
5th Cameron Highlanders. 61.
1;:1 Cheshires. 100. ! 14.
6th Conrtaughl Rangers. 102.
1,1 Com""lI1l Lighl Infanlry. 99.
ISI [)c'ons. 112
Ise Ease Sumys. 112
Ise Gordon Higllianders. 86.
12m (iloocrsten. 99. 100.
2nd Green Howaros. 37. 67. 68. 141.143.
Ist Kings. 74. 75, 76.
1/5ell King's. 72.
Inth Kings. 27. 82.
118th King's (Liverpool lrish). 75. 76.
119th Kings. 82.
IIIOth King's{Lh-eIJlOOI ScoUlslI), 77.
12th Kings. 107. 108. 112.
17th King's, 43.145.149.
18111 King's,4O.
19111 King's, 70.
20th Kings. 44. 50, 69.140.149.
1I.\1h KingsOwn. 72. 7.\
2nd KOSBs. 99.
6th KOSBs. 141. 142.
10th KRRC. 102.
17th Fusiliers. M. 87, 93
181h Lancashire Fusiliers, 65.
2nd Leinslers. 88.
7th Leinsters. 103.
11200 London. 128.
1/4111 Loyal North Unes .. 69. 75.
5th Loyal Nooll Lancs .. 77.
16t/1 Manclles1ers. 42. J3. 44. 70.
17111 MancheMers. 42. 70
18111 Manchesters. 40. J2. 69. 70.
191:11 Manchesters. 40. 67. 148.
12th Midellesex. 49. 51. 52.
Ise Norfolks. 113. 114.
6111 NorthamplO/lS. 49. 51. 52. 53.
7tll NonhamplOs. 86.
6th Oxfool & Bucks ght InfanU). 1O.t,
7tll Queens. SO.
3rd Rille Brigade. 86. 81.
11tll Royal Fusiliers. 51
6th Ro)'allrish. lOS.
8tll Royal MUllliters. l{)t,
2nd Ro)'al Scoo. 41. 42. 43. 44. 69. 70.
m.
12th Royal Scoo. IJI. 142.
9t1l Royal Sussex. 86.
14th Royal Warwicks. 100.
15th Royal WaI"A'icb. [00.
16th Royal Warwicks. 100. 114.
10th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 83.
7th Royal Wcst KenlS. SO. 52.
7th Lighl lnfanuy. 104. 112.
4th Soolh African. 43. 61.
1/4th Soutll Umcashires. 72.
3th South Lancs . 82.
2nd Suffolks. 83.
12th Wesl Yorbhires. 83,
2nd WiIhires. 37,40. 141.143. 144. 148
f n>ncll miUllIry unl lS:
Armies:
Sixth Army.)(). 11. 8{),
Corps:
xx Corps. 17.30.31.63.
Di"isiOlls;
11111 Dhision. 29.152.
39th Di,ision. 29.140.145.
153rd Di\'ision.83.
Banalions:
127m Regiment dlnfanterie. 87.
153rd Regimen! d lnfanlerie. 145,
224th Regimentd lnfanterie. 152.
Gtrman military units:
73rd Fusiliers.91. 100.
104m ReseT\'e ReseT\'e Regiment. 67.
IIVI23rd Resef'!'f Regiment. 37.
1&1m Regiment 100. 114.
18200 Regiment.
Tl'l'nchl's & Rtdoubl5:
160
BriQuctcric 28.
Ccnlflll Trencll. SO. 51. 123.
ChimneyTrench.28.141
ClXhranc Alley. 83. 123.
Dublin Rcdoubt (Lochner Werk). 28.
145, 149.
Dublin 28. SI. IJ1.
Flett Stret\. 123. 151
LDnely Trench. 83. 86.
LDnguc\'lIIAllcy. SO. 67. 123.
Malu Horn Treoch. 33. 39. 40. 41. 42.
44.45.48.49.52.143, 148.
Montauban Alle}'. 28.
Rc:doobi. 62.
Tranes Alley. 142. 144
Quarry. the. 86. 103. 15 J.
ValleyTrencll.1I2.
ZZ Trench. 86. 87
The 8attlflground Europe series cf guIdes
desIgned Ior both lhe battlefield visitor
end Ihe atmehair lraveller. There IS exten-
lNe guIdance on how 10 make lhe most cf
your battlefield vt$It. The hi$torical signifi-
cance cf each IIte IS described in detail
WIIh Ihe ald cf mapI and photographs.
For nine wees cf JuIy, August and earty
September Gulll.mont, on the German
main MCOOd position. withstood aJ ItIat
the British Army couId throw against its
Iortifications. SV the tinle Guillemont Iel 10
the 20th DMskln the notoriety of Ihis
village was assured. This guidfl also
encompasses Bemafay and Trones
Woods as weil as Waterlot . Maltz Horn
end FaHemonl Farms.