Hans Loewald The Psychoanalyst As Mystic

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Some key takeaways are that Hans Loewald was a psychoanalyst influenced by Heidegger who gave Freud's terms new meanings and saw the unconscious not as chaotic but as a form of mentation. He addressed the distinction between the unconscious and consciousness by arguing they are a 'knowing together' rather than in opposition.

Hans Loewald was born in Germany in 1906. His father died before he was born and he was raised listening to his mother play Beethoven. He studied philosophy under Heidegger but rejected him after he allied with the Nazis. Loewald came to the US in the 1940s and saw Freud as a 'living presence' through his writings.

While appearing traditional, Loewald gave Freud's terms like the id, ego and consciousness radically new meanings. For example, he saw the id not as irrational but as a form of mentation and the origin of the ego and conscious life. This challenged the traditional Freudian view of their opposition.

Jones, J.W. (2001). Hans Loewald: The Psychoanalyst as Mystic. Psychoanal. Rev., 88:793-809.

(2001). Psychoanalytic Review, 88:793-809

Hans Loewald: The Psychoanalyst as Mystic


James W. Jones, PsyD, Ph.D.
In the recent discussion of psychoanalysis and religion, the work of Hans Loewald has played an increasing role (Finn, 1992; Jones, 1991; Leavy, 1988; Rothenberg, 1997). While agreeing that Loewald's theories have uch to contri!ute to the psychoanalytic understanding of religion, this article will argue that, at a deeper level, Loewald's psychoanalytic theori"ing has profound structural affinities with a funda entally ystical vision of life and that Loewald's ystical other etapsychology represents a (conscious or unconscious) translation of a attitude toward life into traditional psychoanalytic language. Hans Loewald was !orn in #er any in $%&'. His father died while his was carrying hi , so he never knew his father. His other, a gifted usician, usic.

consoled herself !y playing (eethoven on the piano with Hans in the cri! ne)t to her. *hus he grew up in a world surrounded !y the sound of the classical with .artin Heidegger and then irrevoca!ly repudiated hi He studied philosophy+his ,first love- he called it+at the university. He worked when Heidegger allied hi self with the /a"i party. 0till, the influence of Heidegger was enor ous. Heidegger had developed his own philosophy of language that focused on the evocative power of words+their sound and the lineage of associations that follow the +rather than only on the denotative function of language as 1nglo21 erican philosophy had done. Heidegger spoke of language as ,the house of !eing(3uoted in Robinson, 1963). 1pproached correctly, language disclosed a transcendental real

of Dasein, the ground of hu an

I wish to thank 4a es 5ittes, 1nne H. 0 ith, and 6li"a!eth Loewald for their encourage ent of this pro7ect.

e)istence1. We

ight translate Heidegger's dictu

and say that for Loewald,

language is the house of the unconscious, for again and again he recapitulates the structure of Heidegger's argu ents with the unconscious put in the place of Dasein. Loewald ca e to the 8nited 0tates in the $%9&s. He did not know :reud, !ut he asserted that through his writings :reud was to hi perhaps ,a living presence,through his uch as Loewald's father !eca e a living presence to hi

other's words a!out hi

(Mitchell, 1998). Loewald saw hi self as an

interpreter of :reud and not an innovator. He did not seek to coin a new psychoanalytic ter inology, as did Winnicott or ;ohut, for e)a ple. <ather, he used :reud's ter s !ut gave the reading of Loewald ight ake hi radically new eanings. *hus a superficial appear to !e a very traditional :reudian, !ut a ay!in, 1993). /owhere is that clearer than ysticis . ost !asic distinctions in the

careful reading discloses a radical reinterpreter (e)a ples of this interpretative issue can !e found in Fogel, 1991; in his psychoanalytic approach to religion and :or e)a ple, Loewald addresses one of the ety ologically ,consciousness

:reudian voca!ulary+!etween the unconscious and consciousness+!y saying that eans !eing in a self+reflecting and self2reflected state. <eflection is a conscire, a knowing together- (1978, p. $=). <ather than the radical opposition of consciousness and the unconscious, we have a ,knowing together.- (ut such a ,knowing together- of the conscious and the unconscious de ands that the unconscious not si ply !e chaotic and irrational !ut rather that ,the id or the dyna ic unconscious. I have said is > a entation@ It is ,a scire, a for Dut of this older and ode of e)perience or of entation- (1978, p. $?). Here the id !eco es a way of knowing, a for of knowing or A indingB (1978, p. $C).

ore pri ary way of knowing develops the ego and the

conscious life, not in opposition to the unconscious !ut as the reali"ation of potentials and possi!ilities latent within the unconscious. Writes Loewald. If ego and (conscient life mean higher mental organization, in the sense of evolving, then id would be ego in statu nascendi. The coming into being of higher organization, of a more complex, richer mentality, seen as the realization of a potentiality, seems ordained, as it were, by the laws of evolution. (19 !, ". 19# We ature not !y con3uering the id !ut !y a ,continuous appropriation of the ,Wo 6s war, soll Ich unconscious levels of functioning- ($%CE, p. $%). *his leads to a striking reversal of :reud's !asic dictu werden,- which Loewald translates as ,where id was, there shall ego co e into !eing.- *hen he adds, ,*oo easily and too often ego is e3uated with rigid, un odulated and unyielding rationality. 0o today we are !ound to add@ where ego is, there shall id co e into !eing again to renew the life of ego and of reason($%CE, p. $'). 0o in typical Loewald fashion we !egin fro :reud's and end, !y an ety ological restate ent, with a ,pri ary processa classic state ent of eaning that is precisely

the opposite of :reud's. <ather than the ego do inating the id, for Loewald the ust re ain availa!le to us ,to renew the life of ego and of reason.- Loewald asserts, It would not do $ustice, however, to the complexity and richness of human life experience, if one only stressed the movement toward consciousness and over%loo&ed or neglected the fact that we are dealing rather with a circularity or interplay between different levels of mentation. 'ormulated in terms of appropriation, it loo&s as if there is a need for conscient appropriation

of unconscious experience as well as a need for re%appropriating conscient modes (and the corresponding mental contents into unconscious mental activity#%and bac& again toward consciousness. (hat counts is this live communication, a mutual shaping, a reciprocal conforming, of levels of mentation. The richer a person)s mental life is, the more he experiences on several levels of mentation, the more translation occurs bac& and forth between unconscious and conscious experience. To ma&e the unconscious conscious is onesided. It is the transference between them that ma&es a human life, that ma&es life human. (19 !, p. *1# 1s opposed to :reud's atte pt to keep id and ego, instinct and reason, in her etically sealed co part ents so that the purity of reason would not !e conta inated !y the irrationality of instinct, Loewald insists@ There is no one way street from id to ego. +ot only do irrational forces overta&e us again and again, in trying to lose them we would be lost. The id, the unconscious modes and contents of human experience, should remain available. If they are in danger of being unavailable-no matter what state of perfection our .intellect/ may have reached-or if there is a danger of no longer responding to them 0 1we must find2 a way bac& to them so they can be transformed, and away from a frozen ego. (19 !, p. 33# *his cycle of ental develop ent, arising out of the unconscious and returning to it again, reveals that the id, or what Loewald calls ,the dyna ic unconscious,- is not, as it was for :reud, pri arily chaotic and the source of neurosis. 1s ,a for of knowing, or A inding.B- ($%CE, p. $C) the unconscious has a rationality all its own. Loewald connects this need for a continual, reciprocal openness !etween the conscious and the unconscious, the knowing of the ego and the knowings of the id, to entions that 'reud was not a religious man and certainly not a mystic. 4ut one does not have to be a mystic to remain open to the mysteries of life and human individuality, to the enigmas that remain beyond all the elucidations of scientific explanation and interpretations. (19 !, p. 35# :or !oth :reud and Loewald, religious e)perience arises out of the id. *his eans that, for Loewald, religious e)perience carries the potential for a renewal of a civili"ation that has grown too rigidly rationalistic and is in need of ,a new level of consciousness, of conscire- ($%CE, p. '?). *he , inding- of the unconscious displays two characteristics, according to Loewald. *he first is a sense of unity. *his !egins, of course, fro !oundaries. Later, the capacity to dichoto ies that the infant2 caretaker !ond that Loewald sees as e)isting !efore the esta!lish ent of ego2 ake distinctions develops, !ut all the ake up rational life, such as !etween inner and outer a kind of ysticis ysticis and religion when he specifically in the conte)t of his discussion of the nature of the id, saying

e)perience, or ,a host of other distinctions (a ong the , !etween past and present, here and there, physical and psychical) gradually evolves fro unitary, glo!al e)perience. *his unitary e)perience ay !est !e called being-

($%CE, pp. =?2='). *he Heideggerian echoes in this last co tradition of the West with its vision of a

ent are clear. ystical

He also echoes Hegel, and !efore Hegel, the voice of Flotinus and the pri al unity that divides into duality and diversity, which then new and Loewald clearly stands in this tradition when he writes, the development of preconscious or conscient mentation is based upon a similar splitting

akes possi!le

ore co ple) levels of individuation, knowing, and reconciliation.

whereby a unitary, unconscious, mental process differentiates so that a mutual responding, an inner conscire may result0. 6plitting, duality, and multiplicity ma&e possible a conscire, a &nowing together. (19 !, p. 71# Loewald follows :reud in calling this pri ordial, unitary state narcissis , !ut again he gives the ter a eaning opposite to that of :reud. +arcissism-to sum up-in my discussion does not refer primarily to love of self in contrast to love of others, but to that primordial love-mentation which does not structure or divide reality into poles of inner and outer, sub$ect and ob$ect, self and other. (19 !, p. 73# *hus we for of ust ,acknowledge the undifferentiating unconscious as a genuine entation entation which underlies and unfolds into secondary process

(and re ains e)tant together with it, although concealed !y it)- ($%CE, p. '9). :or Loewald, then, undifferentiated and sy !iotic e)periences are ,genuine for s of entation- and not signs of infantilis or psychosis. o ents of aesthetic, *he second characteristic of the knowing evoked !y the pri ary process+ !esides a sense of unity+is a sense of ti elessness. In se)ual, or religious ecstasy, our ordinary, linear sense of ti e is ,overshadowed or pervaded !y the ti elessness of the unconscious or pri ary process- ($%CE, p. 'C). 0uch ,transte poral- e)periences point to a way of knowing that is ,structured or centered differently, that !eginning, and ending, te poral succession and si ultaneity, are not a part Gof such e)periencesH. *hey are transte poral in their inner fa!ric- ($%CE, p. 'E). Loewald goes on to say@ 6imilar forms of mentation are &nown to us from ethnopsychological research and studies in comparative and developmental psychology. They have, among other non%differentiating features, an atemporal, ahistorical character, as though what we call history and historicity, as distinguished from myth, begins or is connected with the differentiated, hierarchical structuring of complex forms of mentation. (19 !, p. * # Here again Loewald echoes a position articulated !y Heidegger@ that our sense of !eing te poral, historical !eings is derived fro and nonhistorical source. 1s opposed to our co as historical !eings (a sense pro!a!ly derived fro heritage), Heidegger (who was pro7ection of a a ore pri ary nonte poral on, Western sense of ourselves our 4ewish and Ihristian

ore attracted to the #reek than to the He!rew

side of our Western heritage) argued that the hu an sense of historicity was a ore funda ental and ti eless ground of e)istence (Dasein). Here again Loewald takes over and rearticulates a position of Heidegger's !y

su!stituting the psychoanalytic category of the dyna ic unconscious for the etaphysical category of Dasein, or ,!eing- (Leavy, 1989). Hu an e)istence starts fro fro this ti eless, undifferentiated state. Loewald is odel in which the infant is seen as oving critical of Winnicott's develop ental

pure su!7ectivity into a world of o!7ectivity. ,*he 7ourney does not start fro a state prior to the

the su!7ective,- Loe!al" (1988) writes, ,it is a 7ourney fro

differentiation of su!7ectivity and o!7ectivity to a state when su!7ectivity and o!7ectivity co e into !eing- (p. CJ). Loewald descri!es the infant's world as a uni3ue state of consciousness that e)ists prior to either su!7ectivity or o!7ectivity. *hus it is ,indeter inate- and ,ineffa!le- (1988, p. CJ); it is !efore and !eyond language. (*his difference !etween Loewald and Winnicott is discussed in depth in Jones, 1991, and Mitchell, 1998.) *his, then, is Loewald's funda ental vision@ not the con3uest of the id !y the ego, !ut rather an ongoing, utual interpenetration !etween levels of the ind+ conscious and unconscious, ego and id+which are not inherently antagonistic, !ut rather are different ways of knowing. If, we ac&nowledge the undifferentiating unconscious as a genuine form of mentation which underlies and unfolds into secondary process mentation (and remains extant together with it, although concealed by it#, then we regain a more comprehensive perspective-no doubt with its limitations yet un&nown. 6uch a perspective beto&ens a new level of consciousness, of conscire, on which primary and secondary modes of mentation may be &nown together. (19 !, pp. 87%85# 1n echo of this !asic the e, here developed ore fully in his $%CE :reud lectures at Kale 8niversity, can !e found in Loewald's earlier writings. In an address he gave in $%9%, shortly after he ca e to the 8nited 0tates, he concluded !y saying, It would seem that the more alive people are (though not necessarily more stable#, the broader their range of ego%reality levels is. "erhaps the so%called fully developed, mature ego is not one that has become fixated at the presumably highest or latest stage of development, having left the others behind it, but is an ego that integrates its reality in such a way that the earlier and deeper levels of ego%reality integration remain alive as dynamic sources of higher organization. (19!9, p. 39# His is a very rich, co ple), and nonreductive understanding of the History of the Individual, $%CE) Loewald applies this ental life. ind directly ore

In the last of his $%CE lectures (pu!lished under the title Psychoanalysis and odel of the to religious e)perience. He !egins in typical fashion with an e)egesis of a te)t of :reud's, in this case the passage a!out the ,oceanic feeling- fro Its Discontents, focusing on :reud's clai ,side !y side- with this ,coe)istence- of levels of the Civilization and that this oceanic consciousness e)ists

ore developed for s of rationality. Loewald concentrates on ind and, as usual, co es to a conclusion

dia etrically opposed to :reud's own.

The range and richness of human life is directly proportional to the mutual responsiveness between these various mental phases and levels0. (hile 1ob$ective rationality is2 a later development, it limits and impoverishes 0 the perspective, understanding, and range of human action, feeling, and thought, unless it is brought bac& into coordination and communication with those modes of experience that remain their living source, and perhaps their ultimate destination. It is not a foregone conclusion that man)s ob$ectifying mentation is, or should be, an ultimate end rather than a component and intermediate phase0. (19 !, p. 81# Ionscious reason ,li its and i poverishes- e)istence unless it has access to the ore unitive and intuitive for s of knowing ost highly grounded in the dyna ic unconscious. *he pri ary process with its co ple entary for s of rationality should !e accessi!le even to the re aining open to it. In arguing thus, Loewald rushes in where :reud refused to go+into the preoedipal period. In an earlier paper, Loewald staked out this territory in contrast to :reud and referred !ack to :reud's Civilization@ In a significant passage in :ivilization and its ;iscontents 0 'reud confessed his unwillingness to plunge into the depths of primordial, buried psychological levels of primary narcissistic or related stages, and investigate them. <uch in contrast to the proud and rebellious motto of The Interpretation of ;reams-'lectere si ne=ueo superos, >rcheronts movebo%here he exclaims .?et him re$oice who breathes the rosy light of day./ (19!9, p. 9# 1s we have seen, Loewald dives deeply into the preoedipal narcissistic depths and returns with a pluralistic vision of any ways of knowing and !eing. He follows <o ain <olland in linking religious e)perience to the oceanic feeling and isstates :reud's position in the process. :reud, Loewald says, ,did not deny <olland's clai , which to <olland's clai fro e is valid, that such an ego feeling > ay !e the root of religious e)perience- ($%CE, p. 'E). (ut Fre#" (193$) said clearly that ,does not see co pelling>. *he derivation of religious needs a the infant's helplessness and longing for the father aroused !y it see s to developed intellect. 0anity consists not in renouncing the pri ary process !ut in

e incontroverti!le>. *he part played !y the oceanic feeling > is ousted fro

place in the foreground- (0.6. J$, p. 72). Loewald had even 3uoted this passage in his $%9%, lecture !ut see s to have forgotten it in $%CE in his drive to derive his position fro :reud's. Civilization and Its *he pri ary reality, then, parallels <olland's idea of the oceanic feeling. (Loewald repeatedly cites the preceding passage fro Discontents; !eside the passages cited, see also Loewald, 1988, pp. C'2C%.) Loewald envisions the oceanic consciousness as the source of positive and potentially corrective e)periences. <eligious e)perience, then, keeps us open to ways of knowing and !eing rooted in the pri ary process with its unitary and ti eless sensi!ility.

If we are willing to admit that instinctual life and religious life both beto&en forms of experience that underlie and go beyond conscious and personalized forms of mentationbeyond those forms of mental life, of ordering our world, on which we sta&e so much-then we may be at a point where psychoanalysis can begin to contribute in its own way to the understanding of religious experience, instead of ignoring or re$ecting its genuine validity or treating it as a mar& of human immaturity. (19 !, p. *# In these lectures on Psychoanalysis and the History of the Individual , Loewald descri!es how conscious rationality arises out fro !ut ust re ain in contact of unity and with the dyna ic unconscious. <eligious e)perience is here affir ed as a carrier of these pri al and necessary encounters with the real ti elessness. *en years later, Loewald wrote his !ook on su!li ation where he again returned to this the e that runs throughout his pu!lished writings fro !eginning to end. 1s in his first pu!lished 1 erican lecture, he cites :reud's discussion of <olland's oceanic consciousness and goes on to argue that religious e)periences are not si ply unstructured eruptions of the unconscious for ,the e)perience of unity Gwith the pri ary processH is restored, or at least evoked, in the for of sy !olic linkage- ($%EE, p. 9?). *his is possi!le !ecause the dyna ic unconscious is structured and religious sy !ols can carry or e)press this structure of ti elessness and unity. If the pri ary process was si ply chaotic, it could not !e sy !oli"ed. *hus the dyna ic unconscious gives rise to sy !ols and ritual actions that can e)press this structure in the conscious world. :or Loewald, encounters with the dyna ic unconscious are not unstructured eruptions of psychic chaos that disrupt for !etter (in the case of 4ulia ;risteva) or worse (in the case of :reud) the neat processes of linear reason. Like Loewald, ;risteva has a two2level theory of do ain of ind@ what she calls the ,se iotic- and the shared with 4ac3ues Lacan) is the ,sy !olic.- *he ,sy !olic order- (a ter

orality and culture. Faralleling :reud's view of civili"ation, the

,sy !olic order- is the social world that de ands the renunciation of desire as the price of !elonging. It is the patriarchal syste !uilt around the law of the father and his prohi!itions. other and her !ody. *he se iotic

(eneath the ,sy !olic order- lies the ,se iotic-@ a prelinguistic reality having its origin in the infant's relationship to the !reaks forth in e otional states, drea s, and religious e)perience to disrupt the tidy world of patriarchal rationality ( risteva, 1987). 0uch interruptions can represent psychosis and horrific distortions of life !ut they can also for creativity and art, as well as psycho2pathology. (y contrast, for Loewald, the dyna ic unconscious is not unstructured or necessarily disruptive, unless the for s of rational consciousness are too rigid, as they often are in odern, e)cessively rational, individuals. This primordial type of experience is not uni=ue to the mother%infant matrix. It, or its direct ake space ystical enlighten ent. :or :reud, of course, the

intrusion of the unconscious is also disruptive, !ut, for :reud, that can only lead to

derivatives, are encountered in various forms in adult experience. 4ut there they are ordinarily over%shadowed by more highly organized forms of experience and are often denied or bro&en off due to the development of anxiety. 6uch experiences are often felt as threats to individuality, to the ego)s cohesion and stability, but they may also lead to blissful exaltation. They seem to be involved in truly creative wor&. (19 !, p. * # (ecause the dyna ic unconscious has its own structure, encounters with it are, in Willia 4a es's words, ,noetic,- !ringing with the an authentic way of of knowing the self and the world distinct fro knowledge. *hrough sy !ols, ritual gestures and other for s of e)pression, religion evokes a connection with the pri ary process in a way that differentiation is not lost. We e)perience our relationship to the pri ary process in o ents of ti elessness and unity in such a way that we do not lose our capacity for secondary process ($%EE, chapter 9). <eligious sy !ols and e)periences are neither purely the product of the unconscious (like a drea ) or of o!7ective consciousness, !ut rather are influenced !y !oth levels of the ind. Loewald is advocating neither living entirely out of the pri ary y students used to say) life of continual erger, nor agic of process, a ,spaced out- (as the knowledge gained !y for al

reasoning. <eligious e)perience (for e)a ple) is, for Loewald, a genuine for

a life of fro"en rationality alone, !ut rather a life in which the ,early

thought, gesture, world, i age, e otion, fantasy- !eco e united with ordinary e)perience. *he life of religion in which sy !ols, rituals, altered states of consciousness e)ist within institutions, philosophical syste s, and conscire, on which pri ary and secondary of the !ook on su!li ation, carry our return, on a higher level of organization, to the early magic of thought, gesture, word, image, emotion, fantasy, as they become united again with what in ordinary nonmagical experience they only reflect, recollect, represent or symbolize0. a mourning of lost original oneness and a celebration of oneness regained. (19!!, p. !1# <efor ulating the pri ary process in positive ter s ena!les Loewald to speak for ,the general validity or i portance in hu an life of the different spheres and for s of e)perience- ($%CE, p. C$). *hus he can appreciate religious e)perience in ways that :reud+with his negative view of the pri ary process+never could. :or Loewald, religious e)perience is transfor ative in part !ecause it ena!les us to know ourselves and the world in a new way+a way characteri"ed !y a sense of unity and ti elessness in which our ordinary distinctions, differentiations, and sense of ti e disappear. *his way of knowing is i plicit in our nature !ut is seldo reali"ed in our ordinary e)perience, especially in odern culture, which Loewald sees as !eing too uch under the hege ony of linear reasoning. odes of entation oral teachings can e)e plify this delicate dialectic@ ,a new level of consciousness, of ay !e known together- ($%CE, p. '?). <eligious e)perience, then, can, in the concluding words

*his criti3ue of an overly o!7ectifying approach to hu an life (another

Heideggerian the e) runs throughout Loewald's writings. He notes that psychoanalysis grew fro the soil of scientific e piricis , !ut co ents that The mechanistic view of nature in scientific materialism carries ob$ectivism to an extreme whereby sub$ectivity0 is entirely eliminated from the world. "sychoanalytic theory still struggles with this heritage but is in the forefront of efforts to brea& the hegemony of the modern scientific natura naturata interpretation of reality. (19!!, p. 9# He also insists that we ust ,re ain open to the ysteries of life and hu an ent he goes individuality, to the enig as that re ain !eyond all the elucidations of scientific e)planation and interpretation- ($%CE, p. J?). 1nd in a striking co !eyond si ply pointing out the disciplinary li its of a direct affir ation of the religious for the assu ption, handed down to us fro evolutionary stage of echanistic science to hint at

of life@ ,I !elieve it is ti ely to 3uestion the nineteenth century, that the ore ature

scientific approach to the world and the self represents a higher and In Loewald, then, we have an essentially

an than the religious way of life- ($%E&, p. JJE). ystical vision e)pressed in which

psychoanalytic ter s. He has found a way to speak psychoanalytically of the ti eless, spaceless, unitary ground of e)istence, !eyond language, fro the individual e erges and to which he or she returns. *his ground of e)istence cannot !e spoken of or known a!out in a su!7ect+o!7ect way. (ut it can !e e)perienced in states that go !eyond the su!7ect+o!7ect dichoto y. "hilosophers and theologians have spo&en of the nunc slans, the abiding now, the instant that &nows no temporal articulation, where distinctions between now, earlier, and later have fallen away or have not arisen 0 uni=ue and matchless, complete in themselves and somehow containing all there is in experience. >s experience augments and grows in an individual)s life course, these instants, in time but not of time, contain more and more meaning which is poured into the nunc stans in such a way that temporal and other articulating differentiations are dissolved or become condensed into oneness. (hat was lived through earlier and later, and the mental categories of secondary process mentation-all fall away, collapsing into an instant, into that one experience which then stands for all experience, although only .for one instant./ (19 !, p. 85# In writing so powerfully of this ,eternal now,- it is hard to !elieve that Loewald was not writing fro his own e)perience. (Loewald ade a si ilar point, 3uoting $%C$; scholastic philosophy on the nunc stans and :reud on the oceanic feeling in an earlier paper fro see $%E&, pp. $9$2$9J.) <eligious e)perience for Loewald is valued not si ply as a supple ent to rational living or as a o entary aesthetic release fro the world of o!7ectivity 4a es, Loewald sees (as Winnicott so eti es see s to i ply). Like Willia

religious e)perience as ,noetic,- that is, it gives us authentic knowledge of reality. /ot si ply a feeling, it is rather a way of knowing. :or Loewald, religious

e)perience is a way of knowing ourselves and the world under the ru!ric of unity and ti elessness. /either a transitory peak e)perience (as descri!ed !y 4a es or .aslow) nor a continuing ti eless and unifying real perception. <eason itself etaphysical insight into what is ulti ately real, of the unconscious and the real of ordinary ore on the ysticis , rather, represents an ongoing reciprocal interaction !etween the ust !e transfor ed !y continual reconnections with the

dyna ic unconscious and the for s of knowing found there. (:or 1992.) Loewald's way of aking psychoanalysis

episte ological transfor ation of conte porary psychoanalysis, see 4ones, 1996, ore open to religion !y

reconceptuali"ing the unconscious has a long history in the psychology of religion. It goes !ack at least as far as %illia& Ja&es (1982), who writes in The Varieties of Religious Experience that ,we have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving e)periences co e, a positive content of religious e)perience which, it see s to true as far as it goes- (p. ?$?). *he a7or proponent of this !aptis of the unconscious, of course, was Iarl 4ung, with his doctrine of the collective unconscious and the universality of archetypes. :or 4ung, like 4a es, the unconscious is greater than the individual ego and we do not know its !oundaries. *he unconscious, according to this line of thought, ight very well !e infinite and could easily represent the infinite to which etapsychology into religion often points. Loewald does not go as far as 4ung in transfor ing etaphysics, !ut like 4ung he !oth roots religious e)perience in the unconscious and refra es the unconscious into so ething positive and ,higher- (in so e sense) so that what e erges fro *he first the unconscious is a new way of knowing@ self and world e)perienced as unified and ti eless. ove, rooting religion in the unconscious, goes !ack to :reud as well as 4a es. In the criti3ue of religion under2taken !y :reud and other classical analysts, religion is si ultaneously de!unked and also transfor ed into a kind of psychology, that is, ade into another window on the unconscious. :or e)a ple, and its refusal to accept the realities for :reud, in The uture of an Illusion, religious !eliefs provide the analyst with insight into the nature of infantile narcissis of death, nature, and social constraint. *his revisioning of religion into a tacit for of psychology is possi!le for :reud !ecause of the close connection !etween religion and the unconscious or id. *he difference as to religion !etween :reud on one hand and Loewald and 4ung on the other derives not fro (a a theoretical rooting of religion in the unconscious their radically different understandings of ove they all share), !ut rather fro e is literally and o!7ectively

the unconscious. :or :reud, the unconscious is a cauldron of antisocial drives and infantile wishes. :or 4ung, on the other hand, the unconscious is a source of

greater wisdo

and healing, and for Loewald it is the source of a crucial a7or

ode of

knowing the world. 0o for 4ung and Loewald, religion, with its connection to the unconscious, represents a transfor ative knowledge. 0uch an approach has the advantage, as 4a es points out, of re aining in continuity with a recogni"ed ele ent in psychoanalytic theory+the unconscious+ while conceiving of it in rather untraditional ways. (ut 4a es and 4ung create a kind of psychological ontology in which the unconsciousness !eco es the universal ground fro 4a es's and 4ung's we cannot transfor addition, this of !elief that which individual selfhood e erges. We have here a odel is structurally like a theology in that it clai s there is theology in psychological dress. a power transcending the individual ego which !rings healing and wholeness, that ourselves !y reliance on ego rationality alone and, in ind). When 4ung and 4a es propose new o!7ects ore traditional religious ore odel offers new o!7ects of !elief (like the 4ung's collective ight co pete with the contents of ode of healing and a vehicle for authentic and

unconscious or 4a es's higher creeds, they create so ething

that is neither a religion nor a psychology as traditionally conceived, !ut is like a type of synthesis of !oth. It is a kind of psychotheology. Loewald (and Winnicott) do not go as far as 4a es and 4ung in this psychotheological direction. <ather, they stay i i poverished if it is lived wholly in the real for ,the fully hu an life.Loewald oves away fro ore narrowly focused on the ediacies of religious e)perience. (oth e phasi"e that hu an life is of ,o!7ectifying

entation.- Linear

rationality alone constricts life. 6pisodes that transcend o!7ectivity are necessary :reud's sole reliance on linear rationality and looks ystical literature. He provides psychoanalysis eaning)

positively on the potentially transfor ing i pact of ecstatic religious e)perience like that descri!ed !y traditional and religion with a way, of :reud's work, to affir ways of knowing. :reud clai ed that psychoanalysis had no philosophical assu ptions e)cept those shared with all the sciences+a clai that Dskar Ffister (Meng ' Fre#", resulted in ost of its 1963) challenged even in :reud's own ti e. :reud's clai history. Loewald de onstrates that a :reudian coe)ist with a one uch uch ore ore in continuity with the language (if not the

that the fully hu an life re3uires that discursive reason ore ecstatic, unitive, and ineffa!le

!e supple ented and co ple ented !y

psychoanalysis !eing linked to a positivistic philosophy of science for

etapsychology can, however,

etaphysical 3uasi2Hegelian or Heidegarian philosophy,

ore open to the spiritual di ension of hu an life. a unitary and ti eless source,

(eyond that, the deep structure of Loewald's thought parallels a classical ystical vision. Ionscious life e erges fro individuates itself, and then returns to union with its source at that higher and

ore co ple) level of relatedness we call love. 6arly in his 1 erican career, in $%?J, Loewald e)pressed precisely this vision in a talk given at a conference on ,Ihristianity and Fsychoanalysis- in Washington, 5I. *oward the end of his talk on ,Fsychoanalysis and .odern Liews on Hu an 6)istence and <eligious 6)perience,- Loe!al" (19(3) said, in words that are a fitting conclusion to this paper@ >s the unconscious becomes transformed into ego%freedom 0 the images and concepts of this relatedness 1to the dynamic unconscious2 also change into higher forms. The deepest inner &nowledge of such relatedness is the experience of relation to a universal being0. The mature individual, being able to reach bac& into his deep origins and roots of being, finds in himself the oneness from where he stems, and understands this in his freedom as his bond of love with @od. (p. 1*#

Note
$

*he #er an word 5asein is virtually i possi!le to translate. 1 co pound of sein, eaning ,there,- it is a central category in Heidegger's of 5asein, which stands for the do ain of the real of inert

eaning ,!eing- and da,

philosophy. His goal was to distinguish the real

hu an e)perience with its consciousness and intentionality, fro distinguished fro

physical o!7ects. (ut 5asein not only represents the do ain of hu an e)istence as stones and ta!les, it also points to a transcendental ground or source of these uni3uely hu an characteristics that is referred to as si ply ,!eing.-

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