JP Kenny Design
JP Kenny Design
JP Kenny Design
Technical Details Q4.1: Onshore Pipeline Design Review Q4.2: Offshore Design Basis and Addendum No 1 to Offshore Design Basis Q4.3: Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview Q4.4: Appraisal of Alternative Configurations for the LVI Safety Shutdown System Q4.5: Aspects of Process Engineering Design of the Corrib Production System Q4.6: Reliability of Overpressure Protection Systems for Offshore and Onshore Pipelines Q4.7: Materials and Corrosion Management Premises Q4.8: Assessment of Locally Corroded Pipe Wall Area Q4.9: Assessment of Wet Gas Operation, Internal Corrosion and Erosion Q4.10: Denting and Puncturing Evaluation
052377.01
CTR 349
No OF SHEETS
18 DOCUMENT No
OFFICE CODE PROJECT No AREA DIS TYPE NUMBER
05
2377
01
043
03 02 01 REV
Issued for Planning Application Issued for Comment Issued for IDC DESCRIPTION
JG JG JG BY
JG JG JG PM CLIENT
ATTACHMENT Q4.1A Onshore Pipeline Stone Road Settlement Analysis For Pipelines And Services
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Isolation Joint
20
From LVI
Ground Level VN 0601
Tie-in Point
3.6
Stone Road The method of construction of the stone road is presented in Chapter 5. The top layer of peat turf is stripped and stored. The lower section is excavated and removed from the site. The road is constructed by backfilling with stone to form the stable base within which the onshore gas pipeline and services can be installed with the top of the gas pipeline buried to a minimum depth of 1.2m. The ground surface above the stone road is reinstated using the stored turfs. As the stone backfill is carefully compacted, no movement of the stone road within the peat is expected. The potential for movement of the stone road has been evaluated and presented in Appendix M. The analysis established that there was no horizontal movement of the stone road in the peat. Small changes in vertical movement may occur and these have been quantified. To ensure that any such vertical movement would not result in loss of containment from the gas pipeline and that the displacements would not affect the services, an analysis was performed taking into consideration the worst case vertical displacements that could be considered along the route of the stone road. The analysis established that the effects on the services were within the design parameters and thus no consequential effects result from the worst case vertical displacement. For the gas pipeline the calculations established that the resultant pipeline stresses were 408 MPa and within the allowable limits stated by the respective pipeline code. The highest values were identified as occurring during hydrostatic testing of the onshore pipeline. (Refer Attachment Q4.1A for additional details) To verify the integrity of the gas pipeline, with respect to ground movement within the stone road, a movement monitoring programme will be adopted. This will involve short term (during construction) and long term (post construction) high accuracy surveys carried out regularly along the pipeline route to identify any indications of movement of the stone road. GPS plates will be installed where appropriate to assist this monitoring. As part of the movement monitoring programme, piezometers will be installed adjacent
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For design conditions at the Landfall Valve Installation refer to Appendix Q4.3. 4.4 Fatigue Normal Diurnal Pressure Range: Number of Cycles Between Diurnal Pressure Range: Number of Cycles Between Design Pressure Range: 90 to 85 barg 11000 30
Pressure cycles in the pipeline will be recorded via the DCS at the Gas Terminal. This data will be evaluated on an annual basis and the pressure cycles will be counted. The actual pressure cycles will be compared with the allowable pressure cycles to assess potential fatigue. 4.5 Gas Production The Corrib field gas will be produced as water saturated gas with small quantities of free water. Early years of production, including start-up, will require use of the wellhead choke valves. Cooling of the gas subsea reduces the temperature to below the hydrate formation point at normal operating pressure. Methanol is used during start-up and in normal operation to prevent hydrate formation. For information on well product composition, produced water and production profile refer to Appendix Q4.2. No operational blowdown of the gas pipeline is planned. If required under upset conditions, a pipeline depressurisation procedure at the Gas Terminal will be undertaken in such a manner so as not to induce hydrate formation. 4.6 Design Pressure TAG recommended, following issue of the Advantica Independent Safety Review, that the pressure in the onshore pipeline should be limited to no greater than 144 barg. This
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Design Location and Design Factor From the TAG recommendations following issue of the Advantica Independent Safety Review, the classification of design location should be suburban which would be consistent with the design of pipelines passing through more densely populated suburban areas. In I.S. 328 this is defined as a population density exceeding 2.5 persons per hectare but not classified as central areas of highly populated towns and cities. This is more stringent than the rural classification where the population does not exceed 2.5 persons per hectare. Subsequently the design factor for the onshore pipeline will be 0.3 (as defined in pipeline code I.S. 328). This is further detailed in Appendix Q6.2.
4.10 Corrosion Allowance From a detailed analysis of the potential for corrosion over the expected field life of the project, an allowance of 1.0 mm was determined for the Onshore Pipeline. Refer to Appendices Q4.7 and Q4.9.
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Wall thickness manufacturing tolerance: +/- 1mm Corrosion allowance: 1mm Nominal Wall thickness (onshore section): 27.1mm (inclusive of 1mm corrosion allowance) Nominal outside diameter: 20
4.13 Field Welding The lengths of 20 dia onshore line pipe will be welded in the field by qualified welders. Welding will be in accordance with the requirements of I.S.328:2003 and in particular I.S. EN 12732. 4.14 External Coating 4.14.1 Linepipe The factory applied external anti-corrosion coating protection for the onshore line pipe is a three layer polypropylene systems (3LPP). This system comprises a high performance fusion bonded epoxy (FBE) followed by a copolymer adhesive and an outer layer of polypropylene which provides the toughest, most durable pipe coating solution available. 4.14.2 Field joints Where the line pipe sections are welded together in the field, the section of jointed pipe at the weld is protected by an anti-corrosion coating termed field joint coatings. For the onshore pipeline they take the form of a sleeve or wrap. This shrinks in the circumferential direction under the influence of heat forming an adherent field joint coating. The shrink sleeve consists of a polyolefin based backing with an adhesive layer (mastic or hot melt) on one side. The shrink sleeve will be applied with a primer.
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The Advantica Independent Safety Review recommended that a factory built insulation joint should be considered at the landfall to separate the offshore and onshore CP systems. Alternatively the detailed CP system design should be revised to take account of the possible effects of the offshore section. An independent review of the inclusion of an isolating joint at the LVI concluded that an isolation joint should not be installed at the interface with the offshore and onshore pipelines. The review noted that the structural integrity of the pipeline system could be compromised. In addition, it would provide a point susceptible to internal corrosion damage. Furthermore burial of the isolation joint at the LVI was not considered best practice. The review confirmed that validation of the effectiveness of the cathodic protection onshore can be achieved through use of polarisation coupons installed at frequent points along the pipeline route. Current drain of the onshore impressed current CP system from the offshore pipeline was considered unlikely but could be mitigated by appropriate design of the onshore CP system. TAG evaluated and accepted this independent review. Electrical isolation will be provided for any above ground, earthed or bare connections at the LVI or any other metallic connections to the gas pipeline. Electrical isolation will be provided upstream of the Terminal by means of a monolithic isolation joint. Cathodic Protection Test Posts will be located along the route of the onshore gas pipeline and at the LVI. These enable the CP voltage potentials to be measured and interpreted to establish the effectiveness of the CP system. Within the Tunnel the test cables will be brought to the Tunnel entrances and connected to the test posts. 4.16 Bends The minimum bend radius for factory made hot bends shall be 5D. The minimum bend radius for cold field bends shall be 40D. 4.17 Pigging The onshore pipeline shall be designed to permit intelligent pigging. Pipeline internal diameters shall meet the requirements for the operation of all forms of pigs. There is no normal operational requirement to run pigs.
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Prior to commissioning, the maximum pressure in the outfall line during pipeline hydrostatic testing will be 20 barg at the low point. 5.3 Codes and Standards The primary code applicable to the planning, design, construction and commissioning of the onshore section of the outfall pipeline shall be: I.S. EN 14161 2004 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries Pipeline Transportation Systems (ISO 13623:2000 Modified) The following standards shall also be deemed to apply: ISO. 4427-2007 Plastic piping systems Polyethylene (PE) pipes and fittings for water supply. 5.4 Outfall Design Taking into account pressure losses, velocity limits, installation requirements and flow cycles amongst other considerations the outside diameter selected for the outfall pipeline is 250mm. The design pressure for the Outfall Pipeline will be 16 barg. The offshore section of the outfall pipeline has been installed as a piggy-back with the offshore gas pipeline. It has been hydrostatically tested to 6 barg. The onshore section of the outfall pipeline will be hydrostatically tested to 20 barg. The 250 mm OD polyethylene (PE) pipe is selected with grade of PE80 SDR17 for the offshore section and PE100 SDR11 for the onshore section.
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Figure 6-1. A schematic of the Corrib onshore umbilicals 6.2 Umbilical Configuration The singe offshore umbilical combines all the services into a single multi-element cable.
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19mm ID Steel Tubes (proof test 315 barg) 12.7mm ID Steel Tubes (proof test 1007 barg)
19mm ID Steel Tube (proof test 1007 barg) 25.4mm ID Steel Tube (proof test 570 barg)
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PROJECT No.
Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS ATTACHMENT Q4.1A STONE ROAD SETTLEMENT ANALYSIS FOR PIPELINES AND SERVICES
DOCUMENT No
OFFICE CODE PROJECT No AREA DIS REF
052377.01
CTR 349
No Of Pages
16
TYPE NUMBER
05
2377
01
051
03 02 01 REV
Issued For Planning Application Issued for Comment Issued for IDC DESCRIPTION
JG JG GSW CHK
JG JG JG PM CLIENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 4 OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................................... 5 3.1 3.2 The Analysis Methodology ............................................................................................... 5 Investigated Pipelines/ Services...................................................................................... 6
RESULTS ....................................................................................................................................... 8 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Onshore Gas Pipeline ....................................................................................................... 8 Outfall Pipeline ................................................................................................................ 10 Umbilicals......................................................................................................................... 11 Fibre Optic Cable & Signal Cable in Duct ..................................................................... 13
6 7
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For additional conservatism, the design pressure has been used to represent the operating condition. This uses a higher pressure and contents density than the MAOP, and therefore provides higher calculated stresses. The onshore gas pipeline assessment for unsupported lengths was assessed by calculation, and verified using Caesar II pipe stressing software.
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The onshore gas pipeline and outfall pipeline have been assessed on Von Mises combined stress criteria. The remainder of the services were assessed on allowable curvature, axial strain, and axial load criteria provided by vendors. This is summarised in Table 3-1: Table 3-1
Service Onshore Gas Pipeline Outfall Pipeline Umbilicals Assessment Criteria Von Mises Strength (elastic) Von Mises Strength (elastic and elastic/plastic) Strength (vendor axial tension limit) Bend radius (vendor minimum radius limit) Strength (vendor axial tension limit) Bend radius (vendor minimum radius limit) Strain (assessment of available loose cable length in jointing chambers) Tool FEA FEA FEA
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Settlement Case 1, for the second section of peat is summarised in Figure 4-1: Figure 4-1
Settlement Case 1 Profile
0.800 0.600 0.400
S e ttle m e n t (m )
88500
89000
89500
90000
90500
91000
91500
92000
Chainage (m)
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Stress (MPa)
89000
89500
91000
91500
92000
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Stress (MPa)
89000
89500
91000
91500
92000
Table 5-1
Onshore Gas Pipeline Settlement Assessment Load Condition Description Pressure (barg) Allowable Stress (MPa) (*) Maximum FEA Calculated Stress (MPa) Stress Ratio as a percentage of Allowable Stress 1 Hydrostatic Test 504 485 407.6 84 2 Design 144 436.5 148.2 34
(*) Code I.S. 328, clause 6.4.1 gives the equation for equivalent stress (Von Mises) and 6.4.2 which gives the allowable limits (see Table 3, page 20). These are 1.0 x SMYS for Construction and Environmental load combinations as applied for the Hydrostatic Test case and 0.9 x SMYS for the Functional and Environmental load combinations as applied for the Design case.
For the design case, the onshore gas pipeline remains below 34% of the allowable stress. The location for maximum stress occurred around chainage 90.770. This is due to the relatively abrupt change in the settlement data at this location in the Settlement Case 1 values, as can be seen in Figure 4-1.
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The calculated equivalent stress was less than 40% of SMYS for all spans considered, including the highly unlikely 40m span. This indicates that during operation, loss of containment from the onshore gas pipeline will not occur as a result of being exposed to an unsupported span within the stone road. 5.2 Outfall Pipeline The outfall pipeline maximum stress was calculated as 98% of the Minimum Required Strength (MRS) based on the Design case combined with the Settlement Case 1 displacements. MRS is a term used to describe the strength of polyethylene materials, and is similar in concept to SMYS for steel.
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It is noted that the above Design case considers a temperature of 35C. This temperature is highly unlikely and is used as a conservative value for design purposes. Analysis of lower temperatures in the outfall pipeline will result in lower stresses. For example the stress ratio in the pipeline decreases from 98% to 71% if the analysis temperature is reduced to 0C. It is further noted that the 50 year MRS for PE100 is 10.0MPa, and this is the basis for the results above. The 30 year MRS has been estimated in consultation with Vendors as greater than 11.0MPa. Using 11.0MPa as the 30 year MRS results in lower stress ratios of 72% and 89% for the Hydrostatic Test and Design cases respectively. On the above basis, the pipeline satisfies the elastic stress-based assessment criteria. As discussed in relation to the onshore gas pipeline, there remains capacity for increased loading beyond the point where the pipeline reaches the SMYS (or in the case of polyethylene pipe, the MRS) as calculated by an elastic analysis. With increased loading, local yielding and strain concentration would occur. A strain based approach would show that a significantly higher load can be applied without loss of containment. 5.3 Umbilicals The umbilicals have limits for bend radius and axial load provided by the manufacturer (see table below). The calculated curvature and tension are included in Table 5-4 below.
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By comparison of the allowable and calculated values for curvature and tension, it can be seen that the umbilicals will remain well within acceptable limits.
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It is noted that there will be several FOC and Signal Cable splicing chambers along the route where spare cable will be coiled to allow for small amounts of axial displacement. Therefore even though axial load is assessed above, the cable will not be overstressed, as additional cable will be drawn into the ducts from the splicing chambers if required. The maximum allowable strain (based on e.g. 1.2km sections between splicing chambers, with 0.5m looped cable at each end in the splicing chambers) will be 2 x 0.5/1200 = 0.083%.
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PROJECT No.
052102.01
REF
23 DOCUMENT No
OFFICE CODE PROJECT No AREA DIS TYPE NUMBER
05
2102
01
100
04 03 02 01 REV
Re-approved for Design Approved for Design Issued for Approval Issued for Comment DESCRIPTION
CW SMR CW CW BY
WAB CW CS IK CHK
CW CW CW CW ENG
MG SMR MG MG PM
GD GD
CLIENT
Page
of
Project Engineer:
Review Finding
Project Response
Distribution : Project File, Lead Engineer, Project Engineer Manager, Project Manager
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FIELD DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................................................. 5 2.1 2.2 2.3 General ............................................................................................................................... 5 Locations............................................................................................................................ 5 Infield Configuration ......................................................................................................... 6
CODES AND STANDARDS........................................................................................................... 8 3.1 3.2 General ............................................................................................................................... 8 Primary Codes ................................................................................................................... 8
OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS.................................................................................................... 9 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 General ............................................................................................................................... 9 Reservoir Conditions ........................................................................................................ 9 Production Data................................................................................................................. 9 Product Details ................................................................................................................ 11 Produced Water ............................................................................................................... 12 Water Outfall Pipeline ..................................................................................................... 15 Umbilical Conduit ............................................................................................................ 15 Pigging.............................................................................................................................. 15
ENVIRONMENTAL DATA............................................................................................................ 16 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 General ............................................................................................................................. 16 Bathymetry ....................................................................................................................... 16 Waves & Currents............................................................................................................ 16 Seawater ........................................................................................................................... 17
SEABED ....................................................................................................................................... 18 6.1 6.2 6.3 General ............................................................................................................................. 18 Overview........................................................................................................................... 18 Pipeline Route.................................................................................................................. 18
DESIGN OF SEALINE.................................................................................................................. 21 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 General ............................................................................................................................. 21 Routing ............................................................................................................................. 21 Wall Thickness................................................................................................................. 21 Stability............................................................................................................................. 21 Mechanical Protection .................................................................................................... 21 Corrosion Protection & Monitoring ............................................................................... 21 Freespans......................................................................................................................... 22 Landfall ............................................................................................................................. 22 Water Outfall Pipeline ..................................................................................................... 22 Umbilical Sleeve .............................................................................................................. 22 PLEM................................................................................................................................. 22 Manifold Tie-in Spool ...................................................................................................... 22
REFERENCES.............................................................................................................................. 23
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The overall pipeline layout is illustrated in Figure 2-1. 2.2 Locations The location of the Corrib field, 60 to 65 km off the County Mayo coastline, is illustrated in Figure 2-1 and is summarised below. Its general location is classified as West of Ireland, occupying Blocks 18/20 and 18/25. Coordinates are presented in Table 2-1. Table 2-1 Geographical Latitude Field centre Landfall 54o 20' 20 N 54o 17' 01 N Longitude 11o 03' 27 W 9o 49' 09 W Easting 366 250 81 540 Key Coordinates Grid Northing 6 023 200 338 730 Projection UTM zone 29 Irish National Spheroid WGS84 Airy Modified
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2.3
Infield Configuration At the Main Drill Centre, a total of five wells will be clustered around the manifold, connected by flowline and umbilical jumpers. Infield flowlines and umbilicals will connect the two satellite wells identified in Table 2-2 to the central manifold. Further infield lines will link the spur well, 18/25-1, in a daisy-chain configuration via the 18/25-3 satellite.
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Figure 2-1
Pipeline Route
2102-01-P-3-100 Rev04
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4.3
Production Data Design values for flowrates, pressures and temperatures are given in the following tables. The facilities shall be capable of the following: ramp down by 50% of daily flowrate in six (6) hours ramp-up from turn down at 50% to 100 % of daily flowrate in six (6) hours ramp-up from shut down to 100% of daily flowrate within 24 hours. turn down to 20% of daily flowrate or 25MMSCFD whichever is greater
Design pressures and temperatures are given in Table 4-2 and Table 4-3. During the design life of the field, both flowrates and pressures will decline, and details are given in Table 4-4. These profiles will be used for determination of corrosion allowance, but will not be considered with respect to base wall thickness. Pipeline design pressure matches wellhead shut-in pressure. Pipeline operating pressure will normally not exceed 150 bara. Table 4-2 Parameter Wellhead Shut-in Flowing Wellhead (max) Pipeline Design Pressure Pressures Pressure 345 bara 272 bara 345 bara
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Qtr
2
nd rd th
Terminal
110 110 110 110 110 110 110 94 110 89 66 64 61 57 51 46 39 33 28 22 14 12 10 9 7
1st 2
nd rd th st
1 2
nd rd
Note:
Manifold pressure is assumed to be available pressure (eg max FWHP), and not imposed as pipeline inlet condition.
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18/20-3
Bottomhole Sample 1439-M1-F
18/20-3
Wellhead Sample 0374-M1-F
18/20-4
Wellhead Sample 4262-M1-F
Mole % Hydrogen Hydrogen Sulphide Carbon Dioxide Nitrogen Methane Ethane Propane i-Butane n-Butane i-Pentane n-Pentane Hexanes Me-Cyclo-pentane Benzene Cyclo-hexane Heptanes Me-Cyclo-hexane Toluene Octanes Ethyl-benzene Meta/ Para-xylene Ortho-xylene Nonanes Tri-Me-benzene Decanes Undecanes Dodecane plus Total 100.0 0.000 0.000 0.321 2.738 93.734 2.947 0.144 0.049 0.021 0.020 0.002 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Wt % 0.000 0.00 0.832 4.518 88.568 5.219 0.374 0.168 0.071 0.086 0.008 0.062 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.029 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.015
Mole % 0.000 0.000 0.258 2.644 93.706 3.028 0.161 0.057 0.021 0.023 0.003 0.014
Wt % 0.00 0.000 0.664 4.338 88.032 5.334 0.415 0.195 0.073 0.098 0.011 0.073
Mole % 0.00 0.000 0.251 2.658 93.639 3.072 0.159 0.056 0.022 0.023 0.003 0.015
Wt % 0.00 0.000 0.646 4.359 87.951 5.408 0.410 0.190 0.073 0.097 0.011 0.075
Mole % 0.00 0.000 0.261 2.791 93.683 2.968 0.159 0.055 0.022 0.022 0.003 0.013
Wt % 0.00 0.000 0.676 4.601 88.446 5.253 0.412 0.188 0.075 0.092 0.014 0.066
0.011
0.064
0.031
0.180
0.009
0.053
0.015
0.102
0.022
0.150
0.005
0.032
0.008
0.063
0.011
0.084
0.003
0.019
100.0
100.0
4.5
Produced Water Water cut will vary during the design life, as detailed in Table 4-7.
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Table 4-8
Well 18/20-2z Cations (mg/l) Sodium Potassium Calcium Magnesium Barium Strontium Dissolved Iron Total Iron 47 1.4 160 8.4 2.0 0.9 120 445
Anions (mg/l) Chloride Sulphate Bicarbonate Carbonate Hydroxide Nitrate 250 3.0 125 Nil Nil 4610 340 195 Nil Nil
Hydrogen Sulphide
Not Detected
Not detected
Lead
Note:
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Condensing Water Properties Well 18/20-2z 4.56 1.093 0.996 715 Well 18/25-1 4.8 1.145 1.019 8420
Table 4-10
Well 27/5-1z Cations (mg/l) Sodium Potassium Calcium Magnesium Barium Strontium Dissolved Iron Total Iron 23050 3196 2059 737 <0.4 46.1 1 76.8
Heavy Metals (mg/l) Chromium Manganese <0.1 2.9 15.7 <0.01 <0.01 <0.1 <1 <0.1 <0.01 3 <0.05
Anions (mg/l) Chloride Sulphate Bicarbonate Carbonate Hydroxide Nitrate 41200 4093 127
Hydrogen Sulphide
Not Detected
Lead
Note:
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Property pH @ 200C Resistivity (ohm.m) @ 60 F Specific Gravity @ 600F Total Dissolved solids (mg/l)
Sand production from the Corrib wells is not expected. Fracture stimulation may be used on some wells, when the produced fluids will contain proppant. Proppant production could be as high as 320 kg/year per well. The possibility of adding annular screens as part of the well completion to prevent production of proppant is being investigated, but the implementation of such measures should not be assumed. 4.6 Water Outfall Pipeline A water outfall pipeline will run from the terminal to an offshore diffuser whose location is specified as outside the candidate Special Area of Conservation of Broadhaven Bay. This places it at the 64m depth contour approximately 12.4km from the landfall. The pipeline allows for disposal of run-off water from the terminal as well as water separated from the product. It will be designed for the operational parameters summarised in Table 4-12, which are taken from Reference 8. Table 4-12 Parameter Design Flowrate Inlet Pressure Diffuser Location Water Outfall Value 85 m3/hr TBD 64 m water depth
Onshore, the water outfall pipeline will be routed alongside the 20 pipeline, whilst offshore it will be piggybacked onto the sealine. The diffuser at the offshore end will be attached to the 20 pipeline. 4.7 Umbilical Conduit The main control umbilical will generally be routed alongside the pipeline. For the shore approach, it will be installed within a conduit piggybacked onto the sealine. This conduit will be sized to facilitate the subsequent pull-through. 4.8 Pigging The pipeline design must facilitate inspection by intelligent pigging and occasional swabbing pigs, but no routine operational pigging is planned.
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KP 0 0 50 Water Depth (m) 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Figure 5-1
Seabed Profile
Tidal heights, extreme still water levels and storm surge data will be taken from Tables 4.1 to 4.3 of Ref 11. 5.3 Waves & Currents Extreme wave data will be taken from Tables 2.1a to 2.1d of Reference 11, whilst summer data (applicable to the installation case) will be taken from Table 2.2 and 2.1d. Where wave exceedance data is used, this will be taken from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 of Ref 11. Extreme and summer seabed currents will be taken from Table 3.1 of Ref 11. All this data is directional, and the appropriate values will be used for different sections of the line. Where significant variation in value is seen along a section, consideration will be given to either interpolation or use of the more conservative value. A summary of primary parameters taken from Reference 11 is given in Table 5-1.
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0.42
0.45
0.50
5.4
Seawater Properties of seawater are given in Table 5-2 below Table 5-2 Parameter Density Viscosity Seawater Properties Value 1025 kg/m3 1.51x10-6 m2/s
Seawater temperatures for both extreme and installation cases will be taken from Table 5.1 of Ref 11. For the Corrib Field location, extremes are as given in Table 5-3 Table 5-3 Extreme Temperatures at Corrib Value 6 C 12.7 C
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2102-01-P-3-100 Rev04
The interface between onshore and offshore sections of the pipeline is located at the landward end of the landfall. This is represented by the extent of the onshore pull. At the interface, a welded connection will be made. 8.9 Water Outfall Pipeline Design of the water outfall pipeline will be addressed as part of the onshore system, as outlined in Ref 8. Installation of the offshore section of the water outfall pipeline will be addressed, since it will be performed by piggy-backing on the 20 sealine. Protection of the diffuser at the seaward end of the outfall will be provided by a suitable structure attached to the sealine. 8.10 Umbilical Sleeve Design of the umbilical is not part of the pipeline scope, but in the shore approach, a sleeve will be pre-installed to allow pull-in to shore of the beginning of the offshore umbilical. This sleeve will be piggybacked to the sealine. 8.11 PLEM The PLEM near the manifold end of the sealine houses an isolation valve. The structure will be designed to protect this valve from accidental loads in accordance with API RP2A (Ref 6). Pipeline expansion movement will be accommodated, and due account will be taken of proposed installation methods. Location of the PLEM will be finalised to accommodate diverless connection of the tie-in spool using the Matis system 8.12 Manifold Tie-in Spool Although forming part of the pipeline, design of the tie-in spool will be addressed under the Subsea Facilities. See section 1.2.
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2102-01-P-3-100 Rev04
PROJECT No.
052377
CTR 349
No OF SHEETS
4
TYPE NUMBER
05
2377
01
027
04 03 02 01 REV
Revised for Planning Application Revised for Planning Application For Planning Application For Review by SEPIL DESCRIPTION
JG JG CW CW BY
JG JG JG JG PM CLIENT
Reference Document: OFFSHORE DESIGN BASIS J P Kenny Document 05-2102-01-P-3-100 Rev 04 dated 10/5/02 issued as Allseas Document No.: 8820/D100-01
ADDENDUM No 1
General J P Kenny Document 05-2102-01-P-3-100 Rev 04 dated 10/5/02 (also issued as Allseas Document No: 8820/D100-01) presented the Design Basis for the Corrib Offshore Pipeline. Since that issue a number of statements or items of data have changed and the purpose of this Addendum No 1 is record and document these changes as at May 2010. The original document remains a valid basis for design of the offshore section of the Corrib export pipeline. None of the changes identified below materially affect the original design basis for the offshore pipeline. A copy of the original Offshore Design Basis is attached following this Addendum No 1 for reference purposes. Item
1
Section 1.1
Description Shell E&P Ireland Ltd has replaced Enterprise Energy Ireland Ltd as the owner of the Corrib Field. Length of onshore section is now 8.3km
1.2 2.1
Manifold tie-in is no longer part of the Allseas scope. Allseas subcontract with Stolt Offshore is closed. Distance from landfall to water outfall diffuser is more than 12km. This change has been incorporated in the design (see section 4.6) but the update in this section was omitted in error. Delete 7th bullet and replace with Corrib pipeline, from PLEM and tie-in spool to manifold, via Landfall Valve Installation (LVI) to Terminal
2.1
Landfall location has been revised. Refer drawing 05-2377-01-P-0-007 DG103 Gas Export Pipeline Overall Route Layout, latest revision. The system for Regulatory Approvals has been substantially changed. The prevailing system for Regulatory Approvals will be applied. A newer revision of DNV OS F-101 has since been issued (2007), but the offshore pipeline is designed and constructed, as stated, to the 2000 issue.
Page 2 of 3
Section 4.2
Description Delete sentence Pipeline operating pressure will normally not exceed 150 bara and replace with Offshore pipeline operating pressure will not exceed the stated maximum allowable operating pressure. Add to Table 4-2, Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure 150 barg The data set for Table 4-4 is now superseded as the inlet pressure to the Gas Terminal has been reduced resulting in a corresponding pressure reduction at the manifold. Last paragraph replaced with; One well has been hydraulically fractured. Based on production testing to date no significant proppant production is expected. The production system has been designed to tolerate proppant production up to 320kg/year per well. A sand detector has been installed on the production manifold and in the unlikely event that excessive proppant or sand is produced, the individual well will be closed in until it can be repaired. There are no plans to fracture any other wells.
9 10
4.3 4.3
11
4.5
12
4.6
The water outfall pipeline will only transport treated run-off water from the Terminal. Produced water from the Terminal will be transported via the Umbilical to the subsea facilities Delete first paragraph and replace with; This section defines the approaches to be taken to detailed design of the sealine. The extent of the sealine is taken as being from the connection with the tie-in spool at the upstream side of the PLEM to the tie-in weld with the Landfall Valve Installation. The piggy-backed umbilical conduit and outfall pipe are also included.
13
8.1
14
8.8
Delete second paragraph and replace with following two paragraphs; The interface between Offshore pipeline and the Onshore pipeline is at the Landfall Valve Installation system. The interface between the Onshore pipeline and the Landfall Valve Installation is at the downstream weld of the downstream barred-tee of the LVI. END OF ADDENDUM
Page 3 of 3
052377.01
CTR 349
No OF SHEETS
17
DIS TYPE NUMBER
05
2377
01
045
03 02 01 REV
Issued for Planning Application Issued for Comment Issued for IDC DESCRIPTION
JG JG JG BY
JG JG JG PM CLIENT
Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
CONTENTS 1 1.1 1.2 2 2.1 2.2 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4 4.1 4.2 5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20 5.21 5.22 6 6.1 6.2 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 3 Purpose.......................................................................................................................... 3 Background ................................................................................................................... 3 DESIGN STANDARDS..................................................................................................... 4 Applicable Codes and Standards............................................................................... 4 Applicable Design Standard ....................................................................................... 4 DESIGN AND OPERATING PARAMETERS.................................................................. 5 Flow Rate ....................................................................................................................... 5 Pressure......................................................................................................................... 5 Temperature .................................................................................................................. 5 Hydrostatic Test Pressures......................................................................................... 5 Design Life..................................................................................................................... 5 Location ......................................................................................................................... 5 Environmental Constraints ......................................................................................... 5 Production Flow Rates, Pressures and Composition ............................................. 5 Environmental Data...................................................................................................... 5 LVI DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGN CONCEPT................................................................ 7 Design Implications...................................................................................................... 7 Design Constraints....................................................................................................... 7 LVI DESIGN DETAILS.................................................................................................... 10 LVI Overview ............................................................................................................... 10 LVI Over-Pressurisation Protection System Functionality................................... 11 Restart Requirements ................................................................................................ 12 Primary Valve Selection............................................................................................. 12 Material Selection ....................................................................................................... 12 Erosion and Corrosion............................................................................................... 13 Cathodic Protection.................................................................................................... 13 Vibration....................................................................................................................... 13 Noise............................................................................................................................. 13 Emissions .................................................................................................................... 13 Instrument Cabin ........................................................................................................ 14 Fire Detection and Protection ................................................................................... 14 Control and Communications................................................................................... 14 Electrical Hazardous Areas ....................................................................................... 14 Security of Electrical Supply..................................................................................... 15 Lighting ........................................................................................................................ 15 Lightning and Earthing .............................................................................................. 15 Umbilical and Methanol Supply................................................................................ 15 Outfall Line .................................................................................................................. 15 Access for Maintenance ............................................................................................ 15 Drainage....................................................................................................................... 16 Site Security ................................................................................................................ 16 LVI OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE....................................................................... 17 Operation ..................................................................................................................... 17 Maintenance Strategy ................................................................................................ 17
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
1 1.1 INTRODUCTION Purpose The purpose of this document is to provide an evaluation of the design adopted for the LVI and to provide an overview of the facilities that will be installed at the site. The Corrib Onshore Pipeline Environmental Impact Statement presents an environmental assessment of the LVI regarding its alternative locations and its impact on the environment. Refer Chapters 3 and 4. 1.2 Background The original Corrib offshore and onshore proposed pipelines were designed to 345 barg to withstand the highest possible shut-in wellhead pressures. The onshore section of the pipeline traversed mainly an overland route to the Gas Terminal. The previous design comprised a manually operated 20 isolating valve with a bypass located at the landfall. Following the recommendations of the Corrib Technical Advisory Group (TAG), the Advantica report re-classified the onshore pipeline as a Class 2 (Suburban) pipeline (0.3 design factor) and reduced the design pressure of the onshore pipeline section from its original 345 barg down to a lower design pressure of 144 barg. Subsequent to the issue of the TAG/Advantica recommendations, maximum allowable operating pressures (MAOP) for the Corrib pipelines were defined. These are: Corrib Offshore pipeline and Landfall Valve Installation Corrib Onshore pipeline 150 barg 100 barg.
In accordance with the respective pipeline codes the daily operating pressure shall not exceed the stated MAOP in either the offshore on onshore pipelines. Thus the MAOP takes precedence over the requirement to remain within the design pressure of the respective pipelines. To comply with the relevant design codes, the overall system design required a high reliability over-pressurisation protection system to be installed at the landfall. This facility would limit the pressure in the onshore section to below 100 barg. In addition TAG required that there were facilities to initiate, from the Gas Terminal, remote isolation between the offshore and the onshore pipelines sections at the landfall.
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
2 2.1 DESIGN STANDARDS Applicable Codes and Standards The principal authorities associated with regulatory codes, standards and legislative compliance, applicable to the aspects of design; construction, installation and commissioning of the LVI are listed below in alphabetical order. 2.2 Det Norske Veritas (DNV) European Community Legislative Standards. Institute of Petroleum (IP) International Organization for Standardization (ISO) National Fire Protection Association Codes (NFPA) Republic of Ireland National Standards. Shell Design and Engineering Practice (DEP)
Applicable Design Standard A review of the Codes and Standards recommended by TAG following issue of the Independent Safety Review of the Onshore Section of the proposed Corrib Gas Pipeline by Advantica, and their application to the LVI and the onshore pipeline is presented in Appendix Q3.2. In summary, TAG has designated that the design of the onshore pipeline shall be in accordance with I.S. EN 14161; however I.S. 328 and BS PD 8010 shall apply where they exceed I.S. EN 14161. The application of these standards to the design of the onshore pipeline has been evaluated and a Design Code Review issued to TAG (Refer Appendix Q3.3). The Design Code Review sets out the application of the individual standards to the design of the onshore pipelines. TAG subsequently accepted the findings of the design code review. The DNV-OS-F101 code for submarine pipeline systems is applied to the design of the offshore pipeline (issue 2000) and the LVI (issue 2007). The break between the two codes, namely DNV-FS-101 and I.S.EN 14161 is at the weld between the downstream barred tee of the LVI and the onshore pipeline.
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
3 3.1 DESIGN AND OPERATING PARAMETERS Flow Rate Design Flow Rate Maximum Flow Rate 3.2 Pressure Design Pressure (upstream of code break) Design Pressure (downstream of code break) MAOP (upstream of code break) MAOP (downstream of code break) 3.3 Temperature Maximum Design Temperature Minimum Design Temperature 20 inch pipeline from installed offshore line to LVI 20 inch pipeline at LVI to ~1100 m downstream LVI 20 inch pipeline from ~1100 m downstream of the LVI to Gas Terminal 16 inch/ 4 inch shutdown/restart spools at LVI 3.4 Hydrostatic Test Pressures LVI linepipe, mainline valve and shutdown loop and valves From installed offshore linepipe to LVI 3.5 Design Life The LVI shall have a design life of 30 years. 3.6 Location The location of the LVI is presented in drawing number DG2101 Site Plan. 3.7 Environmental Constraints Presented in the Corrib Onshore Pipeline Environmental Impact Statement. 3.8 Production Flow Rates, Pressures and Composition Refer to Appendix Q2.1. 3.9 Environmental Data Environmental data for the pipeline route is listed below, for years 1991 to 2000. Data received from Met Eireann. Maximum air temperature Monthly mean maximum temperature range Minimum air temperature Monthly mean minimum temperature range 28C 8.9C to 18.2C -5.5C 3.9C to 12.2C 504 barg 504 barg 0C -20C -10C -26C 50C 345 barg 144 barg 150 barg 100 barg 350 MMSCFD of dry sales gas 350 MMSCFD of dry sales gas
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
Mean annual rainfall Maximum daily rainfall Maximum hourly rainfall Mean days 0.2mm rainfall Mean monthly wind speed range Max wind speed (gust) 1269mm 67.8mm 25.9mm 254 days/year 11.7 to 16.2 knots 93 knots
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
4 4.1 LVI DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGN CONCEPT Design Implications To meet the objectives outlined in Section 1.2, the pipeline design codes require that where there is a change in design pressure or maximum allowable operating pressure, that is from offshore to onshore, then the downstream pipeline must be protected by an over-pressurisation protection system. Thus additional facilities are required at the landfall and these would replace the previous single, manually operated, 20 dia beach valve. These additional facilities at the landfall would comprise part of an overall Corrib pipeline over-pressurisation protection system (Refer Appendix Q2.1). This requires a high integrity safety shutdown system to be installed at the landfall in a new facility termed the Landfall Valve Installation (LVI). Isolation between the offshore and onshore sections will be initiated should the pressure in the downstream pipeline exceed a pre-set trip value. 4.2 Design Constraints The constraints influencing the design of the LVI were as follows: 4.2.1 Selection of the safety shutdown system and the optimum pipe configuration. Offshore to onshore pipeline interface at LVI to be suitable for intelligent pigging. Maximise safety at the LVI. Mitigate visual impact at Glengad. Minimise the footprint of the LVI site. Site security and lighting.
Each of these constraints are discussed in further detail below. Pigging Continuity It is a requirement that the offshore and onshore pipelines be suitable for intelligent pigging which necessitates a continuous connection between the 20 dia offshore and onshore pipeline sections. Consideration was given for provision of temporary receiver and launcher at the LVI, however this was discounted due to extended footprint, visual impact and safety implications. 4.2.2 Selection of the Safety Shutdown System and Pipe Configuration The safety shutdown system comprises two inline shutdown valves located in the 16 bypass of the locked closed 20 mainline valve. The actuators for the shutdown valves are spring to close and hydraulic pressure to maintain open. The tripping of the safety shutdown valves will be achieved by measuring the downstream pipeline pressure via triple transmitters and through a 2 out of 3 voting logic, close the shutdown valves should the measured pressure exceed a prescribed trip value. Locating the safety shutdown system inline with the 20 dia offshore and onshore pipeline was considered (Refer Appendix Q4.4). However, following evaluation, this configuration was discounted as there were no 20 dia high integrity safety shutdown valve systems available for the given design pressure and having a proven field track record. In addition there was potential consequential reduction in reliability of closing the shutdown valves due to pigging operations. Finally there was no significant improvement in safety at Glengad.
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
The largest safety shutdown systems with proven track record were up to 16 dia and nonpiggable. From flow calculations it was determined that the maximum design flow rate that could be accommodated in a 16 diameter pipe without resulting in excessive gas flow velocities. Thus it was elected to install a 20 dia mainline isolation valve between the onshore and offshore pipeline sections (normally locked fully closed) and accommodate the two inline safety shutdown valves in a 16 dia bypass of the 20 dia mainline valve. 4.2.3 Maximise Safety at the LVI To maximise safety at the LVI, it was located as remotely as practicable from normally occupied buildings. All of the pipe work at the LVI below ground will have a minimum cover of 1.2 m. In addition all above ground small bore connections to the buried valves would be capped with a bolted flange. Security cages will be installed over all above ground actuators and instrumentation 4.2.4 Mitigate Visual Impact at Glengad The location of the LVI at Glengad is in an area of protected views. A number of alternative civil designs were evaluated which included: Conventional Above Ground Installation Installation on the Cliff Edge Underground and Enclosed Installation Installation in Excavated Lower Terrain Position
From the evaluation of the alternatives the installation in an excavated lower terrain position (Dished) was elected as the optimum arrangement which mitigated the visual impact of the LVI at Glengad. 4.2.5 Minimise the Footprint of the LVI Site. Based upon the dished arrangement for the LVI, the overall foot print of the LVI was minimised to reduce as far as possible the visual impact at Glengad while maintaining the design requirements for safe working at the installation. The factors that influenced the size of the footprint were: 4.2.6 Safety distances from the points of potential emissions from the pipe work and valves. The size required for a secure enclosure to house the electronic and electrical equipment. Access to the buried valves. Access to the connection between the onshore and offshore umbilicals. Space for the outfall pipeline manual and control valves. Vehicle access to the LVI compound area in the dished profile. Crane access for maintenance.
Site security and lighting In accordance with the pipeline design code, access to stations shall be controlled and fenced, with locked gates. Thus the LVI compound area housing the LVI valves and buried pipe work is enclosed in a security fence with a locked main gate and an
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
emergency gate. As there may be occasions to visit the LVI at night, low-level site lighting is required. All above-ground actuators and instrumentation are protected by security cages.
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
5 5.1 LVI DESIGN DETAILS LVI Overview The location of the LVI at Glengad is presented in Appendix A Drawing DG2101. An illustration of the LVI layout is presented in Chapter 4 Figures 4 and 5. The configuration of the LVI pipe work and valves is presented in Chapter 4 Figure 6 which is reproduced below as Figure 5-1.
Figure 5-1 LVI Configuration The primary function of the facilities at the LVI is to provide safety shutdown facilities, as part of the overall over-pressurisation protection system as described Appendix Q2.1. This will ensure that the pressure in the downstream onshore pipeline does not exceed the onshore pipeline maximum allowable operating pressure of 100 barg. The Mainline Isolation Valve (V1) is a full bore double expanding gate valve which is normally locked closed. This valve will only be opened for pipeline pigging (from subsea manifold to Terminal). The LVI will be permanently manned during opening of this valve
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
and the pigging operation will be executed under the Gas Terminal permit to work system. A full risk-assessment will be undertaken prior to a pigging operation. Normal flow is therefore via the 16 diameter Shutdown Spool which is connected to the mainline pipeline via barred tees. This spool comprises two Safety Shutdown Valves (V3 and V4) and upstream and downstream 16 Isolation Valves (V2 and V5). A 4 Restart Spool is installed around isolation valve V5. This spool includes a Restart Control Valve and a 4 Isolation Valve. This spool is used for re-pressurisation of the downstream onshore pipeline following a shutdown of the LVI. The barred tees and the interconnecting 20 pipe together with V1 will be fabricated with corrosion resistant materials. Also the complete shutdown spool, restart spool and valves will be fabricated with corrosion resistant materials. Both duplex and internally clad carbon steel materials will be used as the corrosion resistant materials. The actuators on the Safety Shutdown Valves (V3 and V4) will be hydraulically opened, spring closed, i.e. fail-closed. The remaining valves are all operated manually. The Safety Shutdown Valves will be axial flow type valves and the Isolation Valves (V1, V2, V5 and the restart spool) will be double expanding gate valves which provide an integral double block and bleed isolation. Three pressure transmitters located downstream of the downstream Isolation Valve V5, prior to the barred tee, will measure the pressure in the onshore pipeline and will be connected to the electronic Logic Solver Unit. The instrument piping connections to the buried pipe work will be heat traced to mitigate potential hydrate formation. To mitigate hydrate formation during restart following a shutdown, a methanol injection connection is located on the upstream of the Control Valve in the restart spool. The methanol will be obtained via permanent piping from the subsea umbilical line, which is routed through the LVI. The methanol injection connection is isolated during normal operation. A pressure indicator is located between the Safety Shutdown Valves to facilitate restart and is used when the valve seals are checked during maintenance. The temperature transmitter downstream of the three pressure transmitters is used to monitor the pipe temperature during restart. 5.2 LVI Over-Pressurisation Protection System Functionality The high integrity safety shutdown facilities at the LVI comprise the duplicated safety shutdown valves (V3 and V4), the triplicate pressure measurement instruments and the electronic control unit termed a Logic Solver. Under normal operation V3 and V4 are maintained open under hydraulic pressure and the pressure in the onshore pipeline is maintained below its MAOP of 100 barg. The independent readings from the three pressure transmitters are compared using a two outof-three (2oo3) voting system within the Logic Solver. Provided that the measured pressure is maintained below a preset trip pressure, valves V3 and V4 remain fully open. However should the measured pressure (2oo3) of the onshore pipeline exceed the preset trip pressure, then the logic solver will immediately release the hydraulic pressure from the actuators on both valve V3 and V4, and their respective spring actuators will promptly close the valves, thus isolating the pressure between the onshore and offshore pipelines. The system will be designed such valves V3 and V4 will fail to the closed position. The Logic Solver will also receive the remote close signal from the operator at the Gas Terminal and initiate closure of both V3 and V4 for the purposes of inventory control.
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
The status of the valves, the logic solver, pipeline pressures etc will be transmitted back to the Gas Terminal, via the fibre optic cable, to keep the Operator informed as to the operational status of the LVI. 5.3 Restart Requirements As discussed in Section 5.2 the high integrity shutdown system will close should the pressure in the onshore pipeline reach the defined trip value. However provisions at the LVI are required to restart the pipeline system following a shutdown. In this case the thermodynamics of restarting the gas flow, with the upstream pressure being higher than the downstream pressure, results in cooling of the downstream gas (known as the JouleThompson effect). To mitigate this effect the restart of the gas flow into the onshore pipeline must be regulated and this is achieved via the restart bypass around the Isolation Valve V5. The restart bypass will be equipped with a globe valve to regulate the flow and a downstream isolation valve to isolate the restart bypass during daily operation. During restart methanol needs to be injected into the onshore pipeline to mitigate formation of hydrates. This is achieved via a methanol supply line form the umbilical which is normally isolated by a 1 isolation valve. The supply of methanol is discussed in Section 5.18. 5.4 Primary Valve Selection As a result of the tendering process, the selected valve for the high integrity shutdown system is a 16 axial flow valve with a spring close and hydraulic open actuator with repressurisation through a manual hand pump. The fail safe condition is closed. The safety shutdown valves, the actuators, the electronic package and the pressure transmitters were supplied as a complete package with independent certification. In order for maintenance to be performed on the shutdown spool, positive isolation is required. Because of space restrictions, this has been achieved by the installation of, upstream (V2) and downstream (V5) of the shut down valves, double expanding gate valves (DEGV) which provides a Double Block and Bleed feature in a single valve. This could be achieved by closure of two inline valves with an intermediate bleed valve between the two inline valves (termed a double block and bleed - DBB). However, this arrangement requires additional space and it was decided to select a valve equipped with a double expanding gate valve (DEGV) mechanism. This mechanism provides the DBB feature in a single valve. IN addition the mainline 20 dia valve and the restart bypass isolation valve were all specified as DEGVs. 5.5 Material Selection The main section of the onshore and offshore pipeline is piggable through the 20 dia mainline valve. This valve is normally locked closed during daily operation of the Corrib pipeline system. Consequently the short section of 20 dia pipe between the upstream and downstream barred tees is not subject to continuous flow of gas and is not afforded protection via the internal corrosion inhibitors dosed into the gas subsea. Additional corrosion protection is therefore provided on this section of pipe in the form of clad carbon steel pipe. In addition the valve internals of the 20 dia DEGV are also clad carbon steel. The shutdown spool and the restart spool are non-piggable sections of pipe and thus the materials used are selected to provide additional corrosion resistance. This is achieved by using both duplex stainless steel and clad carbon steel pipe.
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
5.6 Erosion and Corrosion All buried and above ground pipe work and fittings will be painted to prevent external corrosion. Additional protection for the below ground section will be provided by the cathodic protection system as described in Section 5.7. The threat of corrosion for the LVI configuration will be the same as for the onshore pipeline. For the LVI valves and pipe work, Corrosion Resistant Alloys have been selected to mitigate any potential corrosion issues. As indicated by the erosion assessment (Appendix Q4.9), erosion is unlikely to occur with the expected flow rates because of lack of direct impingement of solids on any surfaces. All LVI valves have been specified for proppant service. 5.7 Cathodic Protection The LVI buried pipe work and valves will be integrated into the onshore pipeline impressed current cathodic protection (ICCP) system. Facilities are provided at the LVI to measure the ICCP system electrical potentials and enable the cathodic protection system to be optimised. No isolation joint will be installed at the interface between the offshore and onshore pipelines and the cathodic protection systems for the offshore and onshore pipelines will be designed to be balanced at the LVI. This design concept was proposed to and subsequently accepted by TAG. Appropriate electrical isolation and earthing will be provided between the below-ground and above ground facilities. 5.8 Vibration Based upon the design adopted for the LVI, any vibration that may occur during operation will be within the design limits of the pipe work and fittings. To verify the design with respect to vibration an independent study was commissioned by SEPIL and this concluded that: A vibration induced fatigue failure of the main flow lines of the LVI is considered unlikely due to: (i) (ii) (iii) 5.9 Noise As all the pipe work and main valves are located below ground the noise levels due to gas flow will be very low. Refer to Appendix H. An additional potential source of noise will be on infrequent occasions when use of the standby diesel generator is in use. This will only be required when electrical supply is not available from the ESB. The standby diesel generator is equipped with a silencer and acoustic insulation. The noise level is rated at 55 dBA at 10 metres (Refer Section 5.15). 5.10 Emissions There is no provision for permanent or temporary venting of gas at the LVI. flow induced turbulence flow induced pulsation pigging and slugging activities
The small bore connections on the flow lines are also not considered to be at risk of vibration induced fatigue failure
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
Each of the valves with a small bore connection to the body cavity, has connections which are routed above ground and fitted with a blank flange. All of the connections will be checked periodically for fugitive emission during maintenance visits. 5.11 Instrument Cabin There are a number of items of electronic and electrical equipment at the LVI that must be housed in a custom built cabin. As this Instrument Cabin is located in the compound it must be classified as a safe area to house the electrical/electronic equipment. Therefore the internal pressure within the Instrument Cabin is maintained positive with respect to the external air pressure. This is achieved by the HVAC system installed in the cabin. The Instrument cabin will house: 5.12 A Uninterruptible Power Supply with battery back-up. The shutdown logic electronic equipment. The controllers for the security systems. The DCS safety node (for communication with the Gas Terminal Control Systems). The HVAC system. The site lighting controls.
Fire Detection and Protection The above ground valve actuators for the safety shutdown valves will be fitted with passive fire protection. Portable fire extinguishers will be located in the Instrument Cabin. Internal smoke detectors will be provided in the Instrument Cabin Smoke and gas detection will be provided in the Instrument Cabin and an alarm provided to the Gas Terminal control room.
5.13
Control and Communications Various data from the LVI will be required for display to the operator in the Gas Terminal Control Room. This data is gathered at the LVI from the shutdown logic, the HVAC system and the smoke and gas detectors via a Distributed Control System (DCS) safety node installed at the LVI. Communication to the Gas Terminal will be via the Fibre Optic cable installed parallel to the onshore gas pipeline. Facilities to remotely close the safety shutdown valves from the Gas Terminal are achieved via the signal cable installed parallel to the onshore gas pipeline. The signal cable will connect directly to the electronic shutdown logic controller which operates the safety shutdown valves. Multiple cores are assigned within the signal cable for the LVI close command. Should the signal cable connection between the LVI and Gas Terminal be lost, then the shutdown logic will automatically close the safety shutdown valves at the LVI.
5.14
Electrical Hazardous Areas Field instrumentation located within electrical hazardous areas shall be rated accordingly for safe operation within the designated zone in general accordance with I.S. EN 60079 and Institute of Petroleum, Model Code of Safety Practice Part 15. Instrumentation shall be rated suitable for a Zone 1 Group II B T3 area.
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
The Zone 2 area will extend to the upper edge of the lowered area within which the LVI compound is installed. 5.15 Security of Electrical Supply Electrical Power will be required at the LVI for the electronic instrumentation and control systems together with the site lighting, CCTV and intruder detection systems. The supply of electricity to the LVI will be via the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) local overhead electrical supply system. As there are potential periods of outage from this supply, provisions are included in the LVI design to maintain essential loads from a battery system which will provide more than 4 hours electrical back-up. In the event of prolonged electrical supply outage, a standby diesel generator will be brought to the site from the Gas Terminal and this will provide a source of electrical power until the main ESB electrical supply is restored. 5.16 Lighting Security lighting will be installed at the LVI to illuminate the compound perimeter. Under normal conditions the LVI will not be illuminated at night. Lighting will also be installed to illuminate the Instrument Cabin and valve controls and be adequate for both operational and security purposes. The LVI site will be illuminated for required site attendance such as maintenance or for security purposes and on detection of unauthorised entry. The site lighting can be controlled from the Gas Terminal control room. 5.17 Lightning and Earthing The level of lightning strikes in the Glengad area is rated as low and thus no specific provisions are needed to manage lightning. There will be a site earth at the LVI to ensure all metal structures are correctly bonded to earth for personnel safety and to protect the electrical/electronic equipment. 5.18 Umbilical and Methanol Supply At the LVI the three onshore umbilical cables inter-connect into the single offshore umbilical cable via an Onshore Termination Unit (OTU). At this point methanol is piped from one of the umbilical cores through to the restart bypass pipe work. The methanol pressure is measured within the methanol off-take piping. Facilities are provided to control the methanol injection flow rate and valves are provided to isolate the methanol off-take. 5.19 Outfall Line The outfall line transporting treated surface water from the Gas Terminal though to disposal subsea in Broadhaven Bay will be routed through the LVI compound. At the LVI a backpressure control valve will ensure that the outfall pipe is maintained at a positive pressure to avoid slack line operation and water surges. 5.20 Access for Maintenance During maintenance various elements of the LVI facilities will require access. The safety shutdown valves will require removal and refurbishment after a prescribed period of time to ensure their high integrity to close when demanded. Thus these valves are flanged and are installed in a chamber, which is normally sand filled, to facilitate access for maintenance. In addition the buried pipe work upstream of these valves is arranged to facilitate removal and re-installation of the valves and includes an additional
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
buried flange. This arrangement also provides a method of access to the LVI bypass pipe work for internal visual inspection or external verification of the pipe work wall thickness. Controlled access will also be provided to the Onshore Termination Unit (OTU). 5.21 Drainage As the LVI compound is located at the bottom of the dished area specific provisions are included to manage surface water drainage and changes in the water table level. The drainage system is around the boundary of the compound area and drains to a designated surface water drain with an outfall through the cliff onto the beach area. The construction of the surface water outfall will be subject to further optimisation to reduce potential impacts where possible. Should the water level in the compound rise above a prescribed threshold then an alarm is alerted to the Operator in the Gas Terminal. 5.22 Site Security As the location of the LVI is some distance from the Gas Terminal, provisions are included at the LVI for site security. These comprise: Locked fenced compound CCTV (covers only the dished area of LVI) Intruder Detection Security cages over above ground valve actuators etc.
All authorised access to the LVI site will be controlled and in accordance with Gas Terminal work permit procedures.
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Corrib Onshore Pipeline EIS Appendix Q4.3 Landfall Valve Installation Design Justification and Overview
6 6.1 LVI OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE Operation There are no specific operation actions to be undertaken at the LVI which will function as an unmanned location. Daily monitoring of the LVI will be undertaken from the Gas Terminal Control Room where operational and alarm data, obtained via the LVI DCS safety node and communication system, is displayed and alerted to the Operator. Visits to the LVI site will be conducted on at least a weekly frequency to monitor overall equipment condition and perform the associated task instructions. The Operator will also attend the LVI on an as needed basis in response to any alarms. In the event of outage of the electrical supply to the LVI the Operator will determine the need to mobilise the standby diesel generator from the Gas Terminal to the LVI. While the standby generator supply is at the LVI, the site will be manned. 6.2 Maintenance Strategy The LVI equipment is subject to the same Risk Reliability Management (RRM) analysis adopted for the Gas Terminal. Every item of equipment is identified and analysed using Shells RRM analysis tool. From the analysis, preventative maintenance routines are established together with the maintenance frequencies needed to mitigate potential failures. The maintenance plans are controlled by a computerised maintenance management system CMMS-SAP. The maintenance scheduler will ensure that work orders for the preventative maintenance routines (PMRs) are planned and executed in a timely manner by competent and trained technicians. Examples of Preventative Maintenance Routines are; Annual ESDV testing to prove that valve closes and does not pass (performance standard criteria and test results verified by independent assessor). Major overhaul by the original equipment manufacturer of the safety shutdown valves to replace seals (not greater than every 5 years). Pressure, Temperature, Level Transmitter calibration checks to ensure specified measurement accuracies are achieved. HVAC checks on dampers. Monthly handheld vibration measurements of all rotating equipment and the above ground process pipe work. Electrical checks for ATEX compliance on all equipment. Motor/Switchgear/UPS/Battery electrical inspections for contactors and ancillaries. Inspections of fencing, drainage and security systems.
Examples of Corrective Maintenance are; Replacement of failed electrical component (e.g. light fittings) Replacement of broken V belt in fan Rectification of a seized HVAC damper
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052377.01
Appendix Q4.4 Appraisal of Alternative Configurations for the LVI Safety Shutdown System
DOCUMENT No
OFFICE CODE PROJECT No AREA
CTR 349
No OF SHEETS
12
DIS TYPE NUMBER
05
2377
01
046
03 02 01 REV
Issued for Planning Application Issued for Comment Issued for IDC DESCRIPTION
JG JG JG BY
JG JG JG PM CLIENT
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Industry Track-Record High integrity safety shutdown valves are used in many applications throughout the oil and gas industry. They are to be found in subsea facilities, processing plants, topside facilities and at receipt and intermediate pumping/compressor stations for onshore transmission pipelines. In the majority of applications these valves are in process piping and thus are reduced bore ball, gate and axial flow valves with typical sizes ranging from 4 dia to 12 dia. Larger diameter safety shutdown valves, i.e. greater than 14 and pressure class 2500, are not as readily available in the market due to the fewer applications and resultant lower demand. A range of the larger diameter valves supplied to the industry are given in Table 3-1.
Pressure 830 bar Rating ASME 2500 301 bar 294/301 bar 345 bar
Project Kashaghan Venture-Annabel Development UK Pearl Development Qatar North Field Qatar North Field
Table 3-1 Typical larger valve diameters Mokveld BV manufacture axial flow valves up to a maximum 16 dia. These valves are not piggable but have many years of service in high integrity safety shutdown applications. From the information supplied from the above companies, all valves supplied in Table 3-1 are reduced bore i.e. non-piggable. No piggable safety shutdown valves have been identified. Petrolvalves advised that pigging would have an effect on the reliability of the safety shutdown valves as there would be a definite risk with the inclusion of pigs in the system. The conclusion from the above is that field proven, full bore 20 diameter safety shutdown valves at the required pressure rating are not available and if considered, they would be
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3x PT
PI
From Offshore
Shutdown Valve S1
Legend DEGV Double Expanding Gate Valve PT Pressure Transmitter PI Pressure Indicator TT Temperature Transmitter
To Terminal
Shutdown Valve S2
Methanol From umbilical
Figure 4-1 Straight pipe configuration The two safety shutdown valves (S1 and S2) are normally fully open. These valves will automatically close if the pressure readings from the three pressure measurements (3xPT) exceed the preset trip pressure on a two out of three (2oo3) basis. The Logic Solver then releases the hydraulic pressure in the actuators of the two safety shutdown valves and they close under the force of the compressed springs in the valve actuators. To isolate the section for maintenance an upstream and downstream double expanding gate valve (DEGV1 and 2) would be installed in the pipeline. To facilitate the restart a small 4 dia bypass equipped with the manual restart valve and the third isolation valve DEGV 3 would be installed around the downstream DEGV2. Methanol from the umbilical would be injected into the pipeline at restart (Methanol line from the umbilical). For this configuration all the valves will need to be full bore to allow pigging of the pipeline. It is expected that valves S1 and S2 would be top entry ball valves. 4.2 Corrosion/ Erosion The threat of corrosion for the straight pipe configuration will be the same as for the onshore pipeline. For the 20 valve sealing surfaces and the small bypass around DEGV2, Corrosion Resistant Alloys would be selected to mitigate any potential corrosion issues. As indicated by the erosion assessment (Appendix Q4.9), erosion is unlikely to occur with the expected flow rates and lack of direct impingement of solids on any surfaces. 4.3 Layout Arrangement The straight line configuration could be accommodated within the compound area of the proposed LVI. There may be some re-arrangement of the facilities however it is not expected to significantly change the visual impact of the LVI.
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From Offshore
20
3x PT 4
To Terminal
DEGV 2
Shutdown Valve S1
Shutdown Valve S2
Legend DEGV Double Expanding Gate Valve PT Pressure Transmitter PI Pressure Indicator TT Temperature Transmitter
The full bore mainline double expanding gate valve is positioned in the 20 dia pipeline and is normally locked closed. This valve will only be opened during a pigging operation when the facilities will be manned fulltime. This valve will be locked closed once the pig has passed the LVI and the valve leak tightness confirmed. The two safety shutdown valves (S1 and S2) are located in a shutdown bypass and are normally fully open. The valves will automatically close if the pressure readings from the three pressure measurements (3xPT) exceed the preset trip pressure on a 2oo3 basis. The Logic Solver then releases the hydraulic pressure in the actuators of the two safety shutdown valves and they close under the force of the compressed springs in the valve actuators. To isolate the shutdown valves for maintenance, an upstream and downstream double expanding gate valve (DEGV1 and 2) would be installed in the bypass. To facilitate the restart a small 4 dia bypass equipped with the manual restart valve and the third isolation valve DEGV 3 are installed around the downstream DEGV2. Methanol (MeOH) from the umbilical would be injected into the pipeline during restart. For this configuration DEGV 1, 2 and 3 will be reduced bore. The selected valve for the Shutdown valves S1 and S2 are Mokveld axial flow valves, 16 dia. 5.2 Corrosion/ Erosion Corrosion Resistant Alloys will be selected for the barred tees, the 20 dia pipeline, the 20 dia mainline valve together with the bypass pipe work and associated valves. This will mitigate any potential corrosion issues caused by the more geometric configuration. The changes in direction at the Tees and bends within the bypass configuration compared to the straight pipe increase the sensitivity to erosion by solids should they be produced.
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Figure 6 -1 Comparison of Individual Risk per Year The Figure presents individual risk (of fatality) transects for the base case "bypass" configuration and "straight pipe" alternative for the LVI at Glengad. The horizontal axis represents the distance from the LVI and the vertical axis represents the likelihood (risk) that a person will be fatally injured in a year as a result of release from the LVI. The smaller the number, the lower the risk. While the bypass arrangement has more items of equipment than the straight pipe arrangement, the straight pipe arrangement has more pipe and valves at the larger 20" dia. However in terms of individual risk, there is minimal difference between the two configurations for the LVI as the two risk transects are virtually identical. It is therefore concluded that adoption of a straight pipe configuration at the LVI would not result in increased safety at Glengad.
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Option Comparison Valve dia available Full bore valve required and available Change on Visual Impact Change in LVI footprint Complies with Shell standards Proven track record in field Reliability and rating certification available
Impact on safety at Glengad Corrosion Issues Erosion Issues Methanol Injection available Testing is achievable
Straight Line 20 Very limited source Required but not available None Minimal No No Will need specific qualification not guaranteed No difference in risk level Mitigated with CRA materials Not significant Yes Yes
With Bypass 16 16 readily available Not required None None Yes Yes High
No difference in risk level Mitigated with CRA materials Not significant Yes Yes
Key Significant problems Issue identified would require further investigation Acceptable no significant problem identified
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SHELL E&P IRELAND LIMITED