Exequiel T. A Alejandro For Petitioners. Acuña, Lirazan & Associates For Private Respondents
Exequiel T. A Alejandro For Petitioners. Acuña, Lirazan & Associates For Private Respondents
Exequiel T. A Alejandro For Petitioners. Acuña, Lirazan & Associates For Private Respondents
GAMBOA, LYDIA R. GAMBOA, HONORIO DE 1A RAMA, EDUARDO DE LA RAMA, and the HEIRS OF MERCEDES DE LA RAMA-BORROMEO, petitioners, vs. HON. OSCAR R. VICTORIANO as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch II, BENJAMIN LOPUE, SR., BENJAMIN LOPUE, JR., LEONITO LOPUE, and LUISA U. DACLESrespondents. Exequiel T. A Alejandro for petitioners. Acua, Lirazan & Associates for private respondents.
CONCEPCION JR., J,: Petition for certiorari to review the order of the respondent judge, dated January 2, 1975, denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 10257 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, entitled, "Benjamin Lopue Sr., et al., plaintiffs, versus Ricardo Gamboa, et al., defendants," as well as the order dated April 4, 1975, denying the motion for the reconsideration of Said order. In the aforementioned Civil Case No. 10257 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, the herein petitioners, Ricardo L. Gamboa, Lydia R. Gamboa, Honorio de la Rama, Eduardo de la Rama, and the late Mercedes de la Rama-Borromeo, now represented by her heirs, as well as Ramon de la Rama, Paz de la Rama-Battistuzzi, and Enzo Battistuzzi, were sued by the herein private respondents, Benjamin Lopue, Sr., Benjamin Lopue, Jr., Leonito Lopue, and Luisa U. Dacles to nullify the issuance of 823 shares of stock of the Inocentes de la Rama, Inc. in favor of the said defendants. The gist of the complaint, filed on April 4, 1972, is that the plaintiffs, with the exception of Anastacio Dacles who was joined as a formal party, are the owners of 1,328 shares of stock of the Inocentes de la Rama, Inc., a domestic corporation, with an authorized capital stock of 3,000 shares, with a par value of P100.00 per share, 2,177 of which were subscribed and issued, thus leaving 823 shares unissued; that upon the plaintiffs' acquisition of the shares of stock held by Rafael Ledesma and Jose Sicangco, Jr., then President and Vice-President of the corporation, respectively, the defendants Mercedes R. Borromeo, Honorio de la Rama, and Ricardo Gamboa, remaining members of the board of directors of the corporation, in order to forestall the takeover by the plaintiffs of the afore-named corporation, surreptitiously met and elected Ricardo L. Gamboa and Honorio de la Rama as president and vice-president of the corporation, respectively, and thereafter passed a resolution authorizing the sale of the 823 unissued shares of the corporation to the defendants, Ricardo L. Gamboa, Lydia R. Gamboa, Honorio de la Rama, Ramon de la Rama, Paz R. Battistuzzi Eduardo de la Rama, and Mercedes R. Borromeo, at par value, after which the defendants Honorio de la Rama, Lydia de la Rama-Gamboa, and Enzo Battistuzzi were elected to the board of directors of the corporation; that the sale of the unissued 823 shares of stock of the corporation was in violation of the plaintiffs' and pre-emptive rights and made without the approval of the board of directors representing 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock, and is in disregard of the strictest relation of trust existing between the defendants, as stockholders thereof; and that the defendants Lydia de la Rama-Gamboa, Honorio de la Rama, and Enzo Battistuzzi were not legally elected to the board of directors of the said corporation and has unlawfully usurped or intruded into said office to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. Wherefore, they prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the defendants from committing, or continuing the performance of an act tending to prejudice, diminish or otherwise injure the plaintiffs' rights in the corporate properties and funds of the corporation, and from disposing, transferring, selling, or otherwise impairing the value of the 823 shares of stock illegally issued by the defendants; that a receiver be appointed to preserve and administer the property and funds of the corporation; that defendants Lydia de la Rama-Gamboa, Honorio de la Rama, and Enzo Battistuzzi be declared as usurpers or intruders into the office of director in the corporation and, consequently, ousting them therefrom and declare Luisa U. Dacles as a legally elected director of the corporation; that the sale of 823 shares of stock of the corporation
be declared null and void; and that the defendants be ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit . 1 Acting upon the complaint, the respondent judge, after proper hearing, directed the clerk of court "to issue the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendants and/or their representatives, agents, or persons acting in their behalf from the commission or continuance of any act tending in any way to prejudice, diminish or otherwise injure plaintiffs' rights in the corporate properties and funds of the corporation Inocentes de la Rama, Inc.' and from disposing, transferring, selling or otherwise impairing the value of the certificates of stock allegedly issued illegally in their names on February 11, 1972, or at any date thereafter, and ordering them to deposit with the Clerk of Court the corresponding certificates of stock for the 823 shares issued to said defendants on February 11, 1972, upon plaintiffs' posting a bond in the sum of P50,000.00, to answer for any damages and costs that may be sustained by the defendants by reason of the issuance of the writ, copy of the bond to be furnished to the defendants. " 2 Pursuant thereto, the defendants deposited with the clerk of court the corporation's certificates of stock Nos. 80 to 86, inclusive, representing the disputed 823 shares of stock of the corporation. 3 On October 31, 1972, the plaintiffs therein, now private respondents, entered into a compromise agreement with the defendants Ramon de la Rama, Paz de la Rama Battistuzzi and Enzo Battistuzzi , 4 whereby the contracting parties withdrew their respective claims against each other and the aforenamed defendants waived and transferred their rights and interests over the questioned 823 shares of stock in favor of the plaintiffs, as follows: 3. That the defendants Ramon L. de la Rama, Paz de la Rama Battistuzzi and Enzo Battistuzzi will waive, cede, transfer or other wise convey, as they hereby waive, cede, transfer and convey, free from all liens and encumbrances unto the plaintiffs, in such proportion as the plaintiffs may among themselves determine, all of the rights, interests, participations or title that the defendants Ramon L. de la Rama, Paz de la Rama Battistuzzi Enzo Battistuzzi now have or may have in the eight hundred twenty-three (823) shares in the capital stock of the corporation INOCENTES DELA RAMA, INC.' which were issued in the names of the defendants in the above-entitled case on or about February 11, 1972, or at any date thereafter and which shares are the subject-matter of the present suit. The compromise agreement was approved by the trial court on December 4, 1972, 5 As a result, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, on November 19, 1974, upon the grounds: (1) that the plaintiffs' cause of action had been waived or abandoned; and (2) that they were estopped from further prosecuting the case since they have, in effect, acknowledged the validity of the issuance of the disputed 823 shares of stock. The motion was denied on January 2, 1975. 6 The defendants also filed a motion to declare the defendants Ramon L. de la Rama, Paz de la Rama Battistuzzi and Enzo Battistuzzi in contempt of court, for having violated the writ of preliminary injunction when they entered into the aforesaid compromise agreement with the plaintiffs, but the respondent judge denied the said motion for lack of merit. 7 On February 10, 1975, the defendants filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the complaint' and subsequently, an Addendum thereto, claiming that the respondent court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the management of the corporation by the board of directors, and the enactment of a resolution by the defendants, as members of the board of directors of the corporation, allowing the sale of the 823 shares of stock to the defendants was purely a management concern which the courts could not interfere with. When the trial court denied said motion and its addendum, the defendants filed the instant petition for certiorari for the review of said orders. The petition is without merit. The questioned order denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint is merely interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The proper procedure to be followed in such a case is to continue with the trial of the case on the merits and, if the decision is adverse, to reiterate the issue on appeal. It would be a breach of orderly procedure to allow a party to come before this Court every time an order is issued with which he does not agree. Besides, the order denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint was not capriciously, arbitrarily, or whimsically issued, or that the respondent court lacked jurisdiction over the cause as to warrant the issuance of the writ prayed for. As found by the respondent judge, the petitioners have not waived their cause of action against the petitioners by entering into a compromise agreement
with the other defendants in view of the express provision of the compromise agreement that the same "shall not in any way constitute or be considered a waiver or abandonment of any claim or cause of action against the other defendants." There is also no estoppel because there is nothing in the agreement which could be construed as an affirmative admission by the plaintiff of the validity of the resolution of the defendants which is now sought to be judicially declared null and void. The foregoing circumstances and the fact that no consideration was mentioned in the agreement for the transfer of rights to the said shares of stock to the plaintiffs are sufficient to show that the agreement was merely an admission by the defendants Ramon de la Rama, Paz de la Rama Battistuzzi and Enzo Battistuzzi of the validity of the claim of the plaintiffs. The claim of the petitioners, in their Addendum to the motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss the complaint, questioning the trial court's jurisdiction on matters affecting the management of the corporation, is without merit. The well-known rule is that courts cannot undertake to control the discretion of the board of directors about administrative matters as to which they have legitimate power of, 10 action and contractsintra vires entered into by the board of directors are binding upon the corporation and courts will not interfere unless such contracts are so unconscionable and oppressive as to amount to a wanton destruction of the rights of the minority. 11 In the instant case, the plaintiffs aver that the defendants have concluded a transaction among themselves as will result to serious injury to the interests of the plaintiffs, so that the trial court has jurisdiction over the case. The petitioners further contend that the proper remedy of the plaintiffs would be to institute a derivative suit against the petitioners in the name of the corporation in order to secure a binding relief after exhausting all the possible remedies available within the corporation. An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he holds stock in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued or hold the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party in interest. 12 In the case at bar, however, the plaintiffs are alleging and vindicating their own individual interests or prejudice, and not that of the corporation. At any rate, it is yet too early in the proceedings since the issues have not been joined. Besides, misjoinder of parties is not a ground to dismiss an action. 13 WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. With costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION and PUERTO AZUL LAND, INC., respondents. DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
The Securities and Exchange Commission is the government agency, under the direct general supervision of the Office of the President,[1] with the immense task of enforcing the Revised Securities Act, and all other duties assigned to it by pertinent laws. Among its inumerable functions, and one of the most important, is the supervision of all corporations, partnerships or
associations, who are grantees or primary franchise and/or a license or permit issued by the government to operate in the Philippines.[2] Just how far this regulatory authority extends, particularly, with regard to the Petitioner Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. is the issue in the case at bar. In this Petition for Review of Certiorari, petitioner assails the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals, dated June 27, 1996, which affirmed the decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission ordering the petitioner Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. to allow the private respondent Puerto Azul Land, Inc. to be listed in its stock market, thus paving the way for the public offering of PALIs shares. The facts of the case are undisputed, and are hereby restated in sum. The Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI), a domestic real estate corporation, had sought to offer its shares to the public in order to raise funds allegedly to develop its properties and pay its loans with several banking institutions. In January, 1995, PALI was issued a Permit to Sell its shares to the public by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To facilitate the trading of its shares among investors, PALI sought to course the trading of its shares through the Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. (PSE), for which purpose it filed with the said stock exchange an application to list its shares, with supporting documents attached. On February 8, 1996, the Listing Committee of the PSE, upon a perusal of PALIs application, recommended to the PSEs Board of Governors the approval of PALIs listing application. On February 14, 1996, before it could act upon PALIs application, the Board of Governors of PSE received a letter from the heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, claiming that the late President Marcos was the legal and beneficial owner of certain properties forming part of the Puerto Azul Beach Hotel and Resort Complex which PALI claims to be among its assets and that the Ternate Development Corporation, which is among the stockholders of PALI, likewise appears to have been held and continue to be held in trust by one Rebecco Panlilio for then President Marcos and now, effectively for his estate, and requested PALIs application to be deferred. PALI was requested to comment upon the said letter. PALIs answer stated that the properties forming part of Puerto Azul Beach Hotel and Resort Complex were not claimed by PALI as its assets. On the contrary, the resort is actually owned by Fantasia Filipina Resort, Inc. and the Puerto Azul Country Club, entities distinct from PALI. Furthermore, the Ternate Development Corporation owns only 1.20% of PALI. The Marcoses responded that their claim is not confined to the facilities forming part of the Puerto Azul Hotel and Resort Complex, thereby implying that they are also asserting legal and beneficial ownership of other properties titled under the name of PALI. On February 20, 1996, the PSE wrote Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) requesting for comments on the letter of the PALI and the Marcoses. On March 4, 1996, the PSE was informed that the Marcoses received a Temporary Restraining Order on the same date, enjoining the Marcoses from, among others, further
impeding, obstructing, delaying or interfering in any manner by or any means with the consideration, processing and approval by the PSE of the initial public offering of PALI. The TRO was issued by Judge Martin S. Villarama, Executive Judge of the RTC of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 65561, pending in Branch 69 thereof. In its regular meeting held on March 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the PSE reached its decision to reject PALIs application, citing the existence of serious claims, issues and circumstances surrounding PALIs ownership over its assets that adversely affect the suitability of listing PALIs shares in the stock exchange. On April 11, 1996, PALI wrote a letter to the SEC addressed to the then Acting Chairman, Perfecto R. Yasay, Jr., bringing to the SECs attention the action taken by the PSE in the application of PALI for the listing of its shares with the PSE, and requesting that the SEC, in the exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers over stock exchanges under Section 6(j) of P.D. No. 902-A, review the PSEs action on PALIs listing application and institute such measures as are just and proper and under the circumstances. On the same date, or on April 11, 1996, the SEC wrote to the PSE, attaching thereto the letter of PALI and directing the PSE to file its comments thereto within five days from its receipt and for its authorized representative to appear for an inquiry on the matter. On April 22, 1996, the PSE submitted a letter to the SEC containing its comments to the April 11, 1996 letter of PALI. On April 24, 1996, the SEC rendered its Order, reversing the PSEs decision. The dispositive portion of the said order reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, and invoking the Commissioners authority and jurisdiction under Section 3 of the Revised Securities Act, in conjunction with Section 3, 6(j) and 6(m) of the Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the decision of the Board of Governors of the Philippine Stock Exchange denying the listing of shares of Puerto Azul Land, Inc., is hereby set aside, and the PSE is hereby ordered to immediately cause the listing of the PALI shares in the Exchange, without prejudice to its authority to require PALI to disclose such other material information it deems necessary for the protection of the investing public. This Order shall take effect immediately. SO ORDERED. PSE filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order on April 29, 1996, which was, however denied by the Commission in its May 9, 1996 Order which states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission finds no compelling reason to consider its order dated April 24, 1996, and in the light of recent developments on the adverse claim against the PALI properties, PSE should require PALI to submit full disclosure of material facts and information to protect the investing public. In this regard, PALI is hereby ordered to amend its registration statements filed with the Commission to incorporate the full disclosure of these material facts and information.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, the PSE filed with the Court of Appeals on May 17, 1996 a Petition for Review (with application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order), assailing the above mentioned orders of the SEC, submitting the following as errors of the SEC:
I. SEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDERS WITHOUT POWER, JURISDICTION, OR AUTHORITY; SEC HAS NO POWER TO ORDER THE LISTING AND SALE OF SHARES OF PALI WHOSE ASSETS ARE SEQUESTERED AND TO REVIEW AND SUBSTITUTE DECISIONS OF PSE ON LISTING APPLICATIONS; II. SEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT PSE ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND ABUSIVE MANNER IN DISAPPROVING PALIS LISTING APPLICATION; III. THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF SEC ARE ILLEGAL AND VOID FOR ALLOWING FURTHER DISPOSITION OF PROPERTIES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS AND WHICH FORM PART OF NAVAL/MILITARY RESERVATION; AND IV. THE FULL DISCLOSURE OF THE SEC WAS NOT PROPERLY PROMULGATED AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND APPLICATION IN THIS CASE VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
On June 4, 1996, PALI filed its Comment to the Petition for Review and subsequently, a Comment and Motion to Dismiss. On June 10, 1996, PSE filed its Reply to Comment and Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. On June 27, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Resolution dismissing the PSEs Petition for Review. Hence, this Petition by the PSE. The appellate court had ruled that the SEC had both jurisdiction and authority to look into the decision of the petitioner PSE, pursuant to Section 3[3] of the Revised Securities Act in relation to Section 6(j) and 6(m)[4] of P.D. No. 902-A, and Section 38(b)[5] of the Revised Securities Act, and for the purpose of ensuring fair administration of the exchange. Both as a corporation and as a stock exchange, the petitioner is subject to public respondents jurisdiction, regulation and control. Accepting the argument that the public respondent has the authority merely to supervise or regulate, would amount to serious consequences, considering that the petitioner is a stock exchange whose business is impressed with public interest. Abuse is not remote if the public respondent is left without any system of control. If the securities act vested the public respondent with jurisdiction and control over all corporations; the power to authorize the establishment of stock exchanges; the right to supervise and regulate the same; and the power to alter and supplement rules of the exchange in the listing or delisting of securities, then the law certainly granted to the public respondent the plenary authority over the petitioner; and the power of review necessarily comes within its authority. All in all, the court held that PALI complied with all the requirements for public listing, affirming the SECs ruling to the effect that: x x x the Philippine Stock Exchange has acted in an arbitrary and abusive manner in disapproving the application of PALI for listing of its shares in the face of the following considerations: 1. PALI has clearly and admittedly complied with the Listing Rules and full disclosure requirements of the Exchange;
2. In applying its clear and reasonable standards on the suitability for listing of shares, PSE has failed to justify why it acted differently on the application of PALI, as compared to the IPOs of other companies similarly that were allowed listing in the Exchange; 3. It appears that the claims and issues on the title to PALIs properties were even less serious than the claims against the assets of the other companies in that, the assertions of the Marcoses that they are owners of the disputed properties were not substantiated enough to overcome the strength of a title to properties issued under the Torrens System as evidence of ownership thereof; 4. No action has been filed in any court of competent jurisdiction seeking to nullify PALIs ownership over the disputed properties, neither has the government instituted recovery proceedings against these properties. Yet the import of PSEs decision in denying PALIs application is that it would be PALI, not the Marcoses, that must go to court to prove the legality of its ownership on these properties before its shares can be listed. In addition, the argument that the PALI properties belong to the Military/Naval Reservation does not inspire belief. The point is, the PALI properties are now titled. A property losses its public character the moment it is covered by a title. As a matter of fact, the titles have long been settled by a final judgment; and the final decree having been registered, they can no longer be re-opened considering that the one year period has already passed. Lastly, the determination of what standard to apply in allowing PALIs application for listing, whether the discretion method or the system of public disclosure adhered to by the SEC, should be addressed to the Securities Commission, it being the government agency that exercises both supervisory and regulatory authority over all corporations. On August 15, 1996, the PSE, after it was granted an extension, filed an instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, taking exception to the rulings of the SEC and the Court of Appeals. Respondent PALI filed its Comment to the petition on October 17, 1996. On the same date, the PCGG filed a Motion for Leave to file a Petition for Intervention. This was followed up by the PCGGs Petition for Intervention on October 21, 1996. A supplemental Comment was filed by PALI on October 25, 1997. The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the SEC and the Court of Appeals, likewise filed its Comment on December 26, 1996. In answer to the PCGGs motion for leave to file petition for intervention, PALI filed its Comment thereto on January 17, 1997, whereas the PSE filed its own Comment on January 20, 1997. On February 25, 1996, the PSE filed its Consolidated Reply to the comments of respondent PALI (October 17, 1996) and the Solicitor General (December 26, 1996). On may 16, 1997, PALI filed its Rejoinder to the said consolidated reply of PSE. PSE submits that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the SEC had authority to order the PSE to list the shares of PALI in the stock exchange. Under presidential decree No. 902-A, the powers of the SEC over stock exchanges are more limited as compared to its authority over ordinary corporations. In connection with this, the powers of the SEC over stock
exchanges under the Revised Securities Act are specifically enumerated, and these do not include the power to reverse the decisions of the stock exchange. Authorities are in abundance even in the United States, from which the countrys security policies are patterned, to the effect of giving the Securities Commission less control over stock exchanges, which in turn are given more lee-way in making the decision whether or not to allow corporations to offer their stock to the public through the stock exchange. This is in accord with the business judgment rule whereby the SEC and the courts are barred from intruding into business judgments of corporations, when the same are made in good faith. The said rule precludes the reversal of the decision of the PSE to deny PALIs listing application, absent a showing a bad faith on the part of the PSE. Under the listing rule of the PSE, to which PALI had previously agreed to comply, the PSE retains the discretion to accept or reject applications for listing. Thus, even if an issuer has complied with the PSE listing rules and requirements, PSE retains the discretion to accept or reject the issuers listing application if the PSE determines that the listing shall not serve the interests of the investing public. Moreover, PSE argues that the SEC has no jurisdiction over sequestered corporations, nor with corporations whose properties are under sequestration. A reading of Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105205, 240 SCRA 376, would reveal that the properties of PALI, which were derived from the Ternate Development Corporation (TDC) and the Monte del Sol Development Corporation (MSDC), are under sequestration by the PCGG, and the subject of forfeiture proceedings in the Sandiganbayan. This ruling of the Court is the law of the case between the Republic and the TDC and MSDC. It categorically declares that the assets of these corporations were sequestered by the PCGG on March 10, 1986 and April 4, 1988. It is, likewise, intimidated that the Court of Appeals sanction that PALIs ownership over its properties can no longer be questioned, since certificates of title have been issued to PALI and more than one year has since lapsed, is erroneous and ignores well settled jurisprudence on land titles. That a certificate of title issued under the Torrens System is a conclusive evidence of ownership is not an absolute rule and admits certain exceptions. It is fundamental that forest lands or military reservations are non-alienable. Thus, when a title covers a forest reserve or a government reservation, such title is void. PSE, likewise, assails the SECs and the Court of Appeals reliance on the alleged policy of full disclosure to uphold the listing of the PALIs shares with the PSE, in the absence of a clear mandate for the effectivity of such policy. As it is, the case records reveal the truth that PALI did not comply with the listing rules and disclosure requirements. In fact, PALIs documents supporting its application contained misrepresentations and misleading statements, and concealed material information. The matter of sequestration of PALIs properties and the fact that the same form part of military/naval/forest reservations were not reflected in PALIs application. It is undeniable that the petitioner PSE is not an ordinary corporation, in that although it is clothed with the marking of a corporate entity, its functions as the primary channel through which the vessels of capital trade ply. The
PSEs relevance to the continued operation and filtration of the securities transactions in the country gives it a distinct color of importance such that government intervention in its affairs becomes justified, if not necessary. Indeed, as the only operational stock exchange in the country today, the PSE enjoys a monopoly of securities transactions, and as such, it yields an immense influence upon the countrys economy. Due to this special nature of stock exchanges, the countrys lawmakers has seen it wise to give special treatment to the administration and regulation of stock exchanges.[6] These provisions, read together with the general grant of jurisdiction, and right of supervision and control over all corporations under Sec. 3 of P.D. 902A, give the SEC the special mandate to be vigilant in the supervision of the affairs of stock exchanges so that the interests of the investing public may be fully safeguarded. Section 3 of Presidential Decree 902-A, standing alone, is enough authority to uphold the SECs challenged control authority over the petitioner PSE even as it provides that the Commission shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all corporations, partnerships or associations, who are the grantees of primary franchises and/or a license or permit issued by the government to operate in the Philippines The SECs regulatory authority over private corporations encompasses a wide margin of areas, touching nearly all of a corporations concerns. This authority springs from the fact that a corporation owes its existence to the concession of its corporate franchise from the state. The SECs power to look into the subject ruling of the PSE, therefore, may be implied from or be considered as necessary or incidental to the carrying out of the SECs express power to insure fair dealing in securities traded upon a stock exchange or to ensure the fair administration of such exchange.[7] It is, likewise, observed that the principal function of the SEC is the supervision and control over corporations, partnerships and associations with the end in view that investment in these entities may be encouraged and protected, and their activities pursued for the promotion of economic development.[8] Thus, it was in the alleged exercise of this authority that the SEC reversed the decision of the PSE to deny the application for listing in the stock exchange of the private respondent PALI. The SECs action was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We affirm that the SEC is the entity with the primary say as to whether or not securities, including shares of stock of a corporation, may be traded or not in the stock exchange. This is in line with the SECs mission to ensure proper compliance with the laws, such as the Revised Securities Act and to regulate the sale and disposition of securities in the country.[9] As the appellate court explains: Paramount policy also supports the authority of the public respondent to review petitioners denial of the listing. Being a stock exchange, the petitioner performs a function that is vital to the national economy, as the business is affected with public interest. As a matter of fact, it has often been said that the economy moves on the basis of the rise and fall of stocks being traded. By its economic power, the petitioner
certainly can dictate which and how many users are allowed to sell securities thru the facilities of a stock exchange, if allowed to interpret its own rules liberally as it may please. Petitioner can either allow or deny the entry to the market of securities. To repeat, the monopoly, unless accompanied by control, becomes subject to abuse; hence, considering public interest, then it should be subject to government regulation. The role of the SEC in our national economy cannot be minimized. The legislature, through the Revised Securities Act, Presidential Decree No. 902A, and other pertinent laws, has entrusted to it the serious responsibility of enforcing all laws affecting corporations and other forms of associations not otherwise vested in some other government office.[10] This is not to say, however, that the PSEs management prerogatives are under the absolute control of the SEC. The PSE is, after all, a corporation authorized by its corporate franchise to engage in its proposed and duly approved business. One of the PSEs main concerns, as such, is still the generation of profit for its stockholders. Moreover, the PSE has all the rights pertaining to corporations, including the right to sue and be sued, to hold property in its own name, to enter (or not to enter) into contracts with third persons, and to perform all other legal acts within its allocated express or implied powers. A corporation is but an association of individuals, allowed to transact under an assumed corporate name, and with a distinct legal personality. In organizing itself as a collective body, it waives no constitutional immunities and perquisites appropriate to such body.[11] As to its corporate and management decisions, therefore, the state will generally not interfere with the same. Questions of policy and of management are left to the honest decision of the officers and directors of a corporation, and the courts are without authority to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the board of directors. The board is the business manager of the corporation, and so long as it acts in good faith, its orders are not reviewable by the courts.[12] Thus, notwithstanding the regulatory power of the SEC over the PSE, and the resultant authority to reverse the PSEs decision in matters of application for listing in the market, the SEC may exercise such power only if the PSEs judgment is attended by bad faith. In board of Liquidators vs. Kalaw,[13] it was held that bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It means a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest of ill will, partaking of the nature of fraud. In reaching its decision to deny the application for listing of PALI, the PSE considered important facts, which in the general scheme, brings to serious question the qualification of PALI to sell its shares to the public through the stock exchange. During the time for receiving objections to the application, the PSE heard from the representative of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family who claim the properties of the private respondent to be part of the Marcos estate. In time, the PCGG confirmed this claim. In fact, an order of sequestration has been issued covering the properties of PALI, and suit for reconveyance to the state has been filed in the Sandiganbayan Court. How the properties were effectively transferred, despite the
sequestration order, from the TDC and MSDC to Rebecco Panlilio, and to the private respondent PALI, in only a short span of time, are not yet explained to the Court, but it is clear that such circumstances give rise to serious doubt as to the integrity of PALI as a stock issuer. The petitioner was in the right when it refused application of PALI, for a contrary ruling was not to the best interest of the general public. The purpose of the Revised Securities Act, after all, is to give adequate and effective protection to the investing public against fraudulent representations, or false promises, and the imposition of worthless ventures.[14] It is to be observed that the U.S. Securities Act emphasized its avowed protection to acts detrimental to legitimate business, thus: The Securities Act, often referred to as the truth in securities Act, was designed not only to provide investors with adequate information upon which to base their decisions to buy and sell securities, but also to protect legitimate business seeking to obtain capital through honest presentation against competition form crooked promoters and to prevent fraud in the sale of securities. (Tenth Annual Report, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, p. 14). As has been pointed out, the effects of such an act are chiefly (1) prevention of excesses and fraudulent transactions, merely by requirement of that details be revealed; (2) placing the market during the early stages of the offering of a security a body of information, which operating indirectly through investment services and expert investors, will tend to produce a more accurate appraisal of a security. x x x. Thus, the Commission may refuse to permit a registration statement to become effective if it appears on its face to be incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect, and empower the Commission to issue a stop order suspending the effectiveness of any registration statement which is found to include any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. (Idem). Also, as the primary market for securities, the PSE has established its name and goodwill, and it has the right to protect such goodwill by maintaining a reasonable standard of propriety in the entities who choose to transact through its facilities. It was reasonable for PSE, therefore, to exercise its judgment in the manner it deems appropriate for its business identity, as long as no rights are trampled upon, and public welfare is safeguarded. In this connection, it is proper to observe that the concept of government absolutism in a thing of the past, and should remain so. The observation that the title of PALI over its properties is absolute and can no longer be assailed is of no moment. At this juncture, there is the claim that the properties were owned by the TDC and MSDC and were transferred in violation of sequestration orders, to Rebecco Panlilio and later on to PALI, besides the claim of the Marcoses that such properties belong to Marcos estate, and were held only in trust by Rebecco Panlilio. It is also alleged by the petitioner that these properties belong to naval and forest reserves, and therefore beyond private dominion. If any of these claims is established to be true, the certificates of title over the subject properties now held by PALI may be disregarded, as it is an established rule that a registration of a certificate of
title does not confer ownership over the properties described therein to the person named as owner. The inscription in the registry, to be effective, must be made in good faith. The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw. In any case, for the purpose of determining whether PSE acted correctly in refusing the application of PALI, the true ownership of the properties of PALI need not be determined as an absolute fact. What is material is that the uncertainty of the properties ownership and alienability exists, and this puts to question the qualification of PALIs public offering. In sum, the Court finds that the SEC had acted arbitrarily in arrogating unto itself the discretion of approving the application for listing in the PSE of the private respondent PALI, since this is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the PSE, a corporate entity, whose business judgments are respected in the absence of bad faith. The question as to what policy is, or should be relied upon in approving the registration and sale of securities in the SEC is not for the Court to determine, but is left to the sound discretion of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In mandating the SEC to administer the Revised Securities Act, and in performing its other functions under pertinent laws, the Revised Securities Act, under Section 3 thereof, gives the SEC the power to promulgate such rules and regulations as it may consider appropriate in the public interest for the enforcement of the said laws. The second paragraph of Section 4 of the said law, on the other hand, provides that no security, unless exempt by law, shall be issued, endorsed, sold, transferred or in any other manner conveyed to the public, unless registered in accordance with the rules and regulations that shall be promulgated in the public interest and for the protection of investors by the Commission. Presidential Decree No. 902-A, on the other hand, provides that the SEC, as regulatory agency, has supervision and control over all corporations and over the securities market as a whole, and as such, is given ample authority in determining appropriate policies. Pursuant to this regulatory authority, the SEC has manifested that it has adopted the policy of full material disclosure where all companies, listed or applying for listing, are required to divulge truthfully and accurately, all material information about themselves and the securities they sell, for the protection of the investing public, and under pain of administrative, criminal and civil sanctions. In connection with this, a fact is deemed material if it tends to induce or otherwise effect the sale or purchase of its securities.[15] While the employment of this policy is recognized and sanctioned by laws, nonetheless, the Revised Securities Act sets substantial and procedural standards which a proposed issuer of securities must satisfy.[16] Pertinently, Section 9 of the Revised Securities Act sets forth the possible Grounds for the Rejection of the registration of a security: - - The Commission may reject a registration statement and refuse to issue a permit to sell the securities included in such registration statement if it finds that - (1) The registration statement is on its face incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect or includes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material facts required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading; or
(2) (i)
(ii) has violated or has not complied with the provisions of this Act, or the rules promulgated pursuant thereto, or any order of the Commission; (iii) has failed to comply with any of the applicable requirements and conditions that the Commission may, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, impose before the security can be registered; (iv) had been engaged or is engaged or is about to engaged in fraudulent transactions; (v) is in any was dishonest of is not of good repute; or (vi) does not conduct its business in accordance with law or is engaged in a business that is illegal or contrary or government rules and regulations. (3) The enterprise or the business of the issuer is not shown to be sound or to be based on sound business principles; (4) An officer, member of the board of directors, or principal stockholder of the issuer is disqualified to such officer, director or principal stockholder; or (5) The issuer or registrant has not shown to the satisfaction of the Commission that the sale of its security would not work to the prejudice to the public interest or as a fraud upon the purchaser or investors. (Emphasis Ours) A reading of the foregoing grounds reveals the intention of the lawmakers to make the registration and issuance of securities dependent, to a certain extent, on the merits of the securities themselves, and of the issuer, to be determined by the Securities and Exchange Commission. This measure was meant to protect the interest of the investing public against fraudulent and worthless securities, and the SEC is mandated by law to safeguard these interests, following the policies and rules therefore provided. The absolute reliance on the full disclosure method in the registration of securities is, therefore, untenable. At it is, the Court finds that the private respondent PALI, on at least two points (nos. 1 and 5) has failed to support the propriety of the issue of its shares with unfailing clarity, thereby lending support to the conclusion that the PSE acted correctly in refusing the listing of PALI in its stock exchange. This does not discount the effectivity of whatever method the SEC, in the exercise of its vested authority, chooses in setting the standard for public offerings of corporations wishing to do so. However, the SEC must recognize and implement the mandate of the law, particularly the Revised Securities Act, the provisions of which cannot be amended or supplanted my mere administrative issuance. In resum, the Court finds that the PSE has acted with justified circumspection, discounting, therefore, any imputation of arbitrariness and whimsical animation on its part. Its action in refusing to allow the listing of
PALI in the stock exchange is justified by the law and by the circumstances attendant to this case. ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Securities and Exchage Commission dated July 27, 1996 and April 24, 1996, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new Judgment is hereby ENTERED, affirming the decision of the Philippine Stock Exchange to deny the application for listing of the private respondent Puerto Azul Land, Inc. SO ORDERED.