[G.R. No. 162318. October 25, 2004] 1LT. JULIUS R. NAVALES et.al., petitioners, vs. GEN.

NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), B.GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., as Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the AFP, and OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY, respondents. FACTS: Before the Court are two petitions essentially assailing the jurisdiction of the General CourtMartial to conduct the court-martial proceedings involving several junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) charged with violations of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended) in connection with their participation in the takeover of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003. In G.R. No. 162341, Roberto Rafael Pulido, a lawyer, filed with this Court a Petition for Habeas Corpus seeking the release of his clients, junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, who are allegedly being unlawfully detained by virtue of the Commitment Order[1] dated August 2, 2003 issued by General Narciso L. Abaya, Chief of Staff of the AFP, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War. Under the said commitment order, all the Major Service Commanders and the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) were directed to take custodial responsibility of all the military personnel involved in the 27 Jul y 2003 mutiny belonging to their respective commands. This included all the junior officers and enlisted men (hereinafter referred to as Capt. Reaso,[2] et al.) who are subject of the instant petition for habeas corpus. The commitment order, however, expressly stated that LtSG. Antonio F. Trillanes, LtSG. James A. Layug, Capt. Garry C. Alejano, Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, Capt. Gerardo O. Gambala, and Capt. Nicanor E. Faeldon would remain under the custody of the Chief of the ISAFP.[3] In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as 1Lt. Navales, et al.), seven of the detained junior officers and enlisted men, filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to enjoin the General Court-Martial from proceeding with the trial of the petitioners and their co-accused for alleged violations of the Articles of War. Named as respondents in the two petitions are General Narciso Abaya who, as Chief of Staff of the AFP, exercises command and control over all the members and agencies of the AFP, and Brigadier General Mariano Sarmiento, Jr., the Judge Advocate General of the AFP and officer in command of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), the agency of the AFP tasked to conduct the court-martial proceedings. Background[4] At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP the Philippine Armys Scout Rangers and the Philippine Navys Special Warfare Group (SWAG) quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood roof deck.

The soldiers, mostly in full battle gear and wearing red arm bands, were led by a small number of junior officers, widely known as the Magdalo Group. The leaders were later identified as including Navy LtSG. Antonio Trillanes IV, Army Capt. Gerardo Gambala, Army Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, Navy LtSG. James Layug, and Marine Capt. Gary Alejano. Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public statement through the ABSCBN News (ANC) network. They claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Among those grievances were: the graft and corruption in the military, the sale of arms and ammunition to the enemies of the State, the bombings in Davao City which were allegedly ordered by Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, Chief of the ISAFP, in order to obtain more military assistance from the United States government, and the micro-management in the AFP by then Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Angelo Reyes. They declared their withdrawal of support from the chain of command and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo administration. Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00 p.m. to give up their positions peacefully and return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the existence of a state of rebellion and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting down the rebellion. A few hours later, the soldiers again went on television reiterating their grievances. The deadline was extended twice, initially to 7:00 p.m., and later, indefinitely. In the meantime, a series of negotiations ensued between the soldiers and the Government team led by Ambassador Roy Cimatu. An agreement was forged between the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to return to barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m. The Filing of Charges Under the Information[5] dated August 1, 2003 filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the Oakwood Incident with violation of Article 134-A (coup detat) of the Revised Penal Code.[6] Among those charged were petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. (G.R. No. 162318) and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus Capt. Reaso, et al. (G.R. No. 162341). The case, entitled People v. Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, et al., was docketed as Criminal Case No. 032784 and raffled to Branch 61 presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. On September 12, 2003, several (243 in number) of the accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 filed with the RTC (Branch 61) an Omnibus Motion praying that the trial court: 1. [A]ssume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal in accordance with Republic Act No. 7055; and 2. Order the prosecution to present evidence to establish probable cause against 316 of the 321 accused and, should the prosecution fail to do so, dismiss the case as against the 316 other accused.[7]

While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the Resolution dated October 20, 2003 finding probable cause for coup detat[8] against only 31 of the original 321 accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence. Thus, upon the instance of the prosecution, the RTC (Branch 61), in its Order[9] dated November 14, 2003, admitted the Amended Information[10] dated October 30, 2003 charging only 31 of the original accused with the crime of coup detat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code.[11] Only the following were charged under the Amended Information: CPT. MILO D. MAESTRECAMPO, LTSG. ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY C. ALEJANO, LTSG. JAMES A. LAYUG, CPT. LAURENCE LUIS B. SOMERA, CPT. GERARDO O. GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, CPT. ALBERT T. BALOLOY, CPT. SEGUNDINO P. ORFIANO, JR., CPT. JOHN P. ANDRES, CPT. ALVIN H. EBREO, 1LT. FLORENTINO B. SOMERA, 1LT. CLEO B. DUNGGA-AS, 1LT. SONNY S. SARMIENTO, 1LT. AUDIE S. TOCLOY, 1LT. VON RIO TAYAB, 1LT. REX C. BOLO, 1LT. LAURENCE R. SAN JUAN, 1LT. WARREN LEE G. DAGUPON, 1LT. NATHANIEL N. RABONZA, 2LT. KRISTOFFER BRYAN M. YASAY, 1LT. JONNEL P. SANGGALANG, 1LT. BILLY S. PASCUA, 1LT. FRANCISCO ACEDILLO, LTSG. MANUEL G. CABOCHAN, LTSG. EUGENE LOUIE GONZALES, LTSG. ANDY G. TORRATO, LTJG. ARTURO S. PASCUA, JR., ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, PO3 JULIUS J. MESA, PO3 CESAR GONZALES, and several JOHN DOES and JANE DOES. Further, the said Order expressly stated that the case against the other 290 accused, including petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus, Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. In another Order dated November 18, 2003, the RTC (Branch 61) issued commitment orders against those 31 accused charged under the Amended Information and set their arraignment. Meanwhile, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who were earlier dropped as accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, were charged before the General Court-Martial with violations of the Articles of War (AW), particularly: AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), AW 63 (Disrespect to the President, the Secretary of Defense, etc.) and AW 64 (Disrespect Towards Superior Officer).[12] On the other hand, Capt. Maestrecampo and the 30 others who remained charged under the Amended Information were not included in the charge sheets for violations of the Articles of War. Thereafter, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, entitled People v. Ramon Cardenas, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel. On February 11, 2004, acting on the earlier Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the original accused under the Information dated August 1, 2003, the RTC (Branch 148) issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the Orders dated November 14 and 18, 2003 of Judge Romeo Barza, the Omnibus Motion to: 1) Assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the Military Courts in accordance with R.A. 7055; and 2) Implement the August 7, 2003 Order of the Court requiring the prosecution to produce evidence to establish probable cause are

hereby considered MOOT AND ACADEMIC and, lastly, all charges before the court-martial against the accused (those included in the Order of November 18, 2003) as well as those former accused (those included in the Order of November 14, 2003) are hereby declared not serviceconnected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup detat.[13] In the Notice of Hearing dated March 1, 2004, the General Court-Martial set on March 16, 2004 the arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles of War in connection with the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident. The present petitions were then filed with this Court. Acting on the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order in the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 162318, this Court, in the Resolution dated March 16, 2004, directed the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the petition.[14] The Petitioners Case In support of the petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus, the petitioners advance the following arguments: I. UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7055, THE RESPONDENTS AND THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL ARE WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION TO FURTHER CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS AND THEIR COLLEAGUES BECAUSE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS ALREADY DETERMINED THAT THE OFFENSES ARE NOT SERVICE-RELATED AND ARE PROPERLY WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVILIAN COURTS;[15] and II. THE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO FURTHER DETAIN THE JUNIOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN AS THE CHARGES FOR COUP DETAT BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE UPON MOTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.[16] Citing Section 1[17] of Republic Act No. 7055,[18] the petitioners theorize that since the RTC (Branch 148), in its Order dated February 11, 2004, already declared that the offenses for which all the accused were charged were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, the General Court-Martial no longer has jurisdiction over them. As such, respondents Gen. Abaya and the JAGO have no authority to constitute the General CourtMartial, to charge and prosecute the petitioners and their co-accused for violations of the Articles of War in connection with the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident. The petitioners posit that, as a corollary, there is no longer any basis for their continued detention under the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003 issued by Gen. Abaya considering that the charge against them for coup detat had already been dismissed. In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners pray that the respondents be enjoined from constituting the General Court-Martial and from further proceeding with the court-martial of the petitioners and their co-accused for violations of the Articles of War in connection with the Oakwood Incident of July 27, 2003. In G.R. No. 162341, the petitioner prays that the respondents be ordered to

explain why the detained junior officers and enlisted men subject of the petition for habeas corpus should not be released without delay. The Respondents Arguments The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to dismiss the petitions. The respondents contend that the Order dated February 11, 2004 promulgated by the RTC (Branch 148), insofar as it resolved the Omnibus Motion and declared that the charges against all the accused, including those excluded in the Amended Information, were not serviceconnected, is null and void. They aver that at the time that the said motion was resolved, petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. (as movants therein) were no longer parties in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 as the charge against them was already dismissed by the RTC (Branch 61) in the Order dated November 14, 2003. Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al.no longer had any personality to pursue the Omnibus Motion since one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the petitioners were not real parties in interest at the time that their Omnibus Motion was resolved by the RTC (Branch 148). The respondents further claim denial of due process as they were not given an opportunity to oppose or comment on the Omnibus Motion. Worse, they were not even given a copy of the Order dated February 11, 2004. As such, the same cannot be enforced against the respondents, especially because they were not parties to Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The respondents, likewise, point out a seeming ambiguity in the February 11, 2004 Order as it declared, on one hand, that the charges filed before the court-martial were not service-connected, but on the other hand, it ruled that the Omnibus Motion was moot and academic. According to the respondents, these two pronouncements cannot stand side by side. If the Omnibus Motion was already moot and academic, because the accused who filed the same were no longer being charged with coup detat under the Amended Information, then the trial court did not have any authority to further resolve and grant the same Omnibus Motion. The respondents maintain that since 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. were not being charged with coup detat under the Amended Information, the trial court could not make a finding that the charges filed against them before the General Court-Martial were in furtherance of coup detat. For this reason, the declaration contained in the dispositive portion of the February 11, 2004 Order - that charges filed against the accused before the court-martial were not service-connected - cannot be given effect. Similarly invoking Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055, the respondents vigorously assert that the charges against 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. filed with the General CourtMartial,i.e., violations of the Articles of War 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97, are, in fact, among those declared to be service-connected under the second paragraph of this provision. This means that the civil court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the said offenses, the same being properly cognizable by the General Court-Martial. Thus, the RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it declared in its February 11, 2004 Order that the charges against

those accused before the General Court-Martial were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime ofcoup detat. Said pronouncement is allegedly null and void. The respondents denounce the petitioners for their forum shopping. Apparently, a similar petition (petition for habeas corpus, prohibition with injunction and prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order) had been filed by the petitioners co-accused with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82695. The case was resolved against the petitioners therein. The respondents pray that the petitions be dismissed for lack of merit. Issue The sole issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus. The Courts Ruling We rule in the negative. We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the courtmartial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, cannot be given effect. For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, such declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity. The trial courts declaration was made when the Omnibus Motion had already been rendered moot and academic with respect to1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.Reaso, et al. by reason of the dismissal of the charge of coup detat against them The Order dated February 11, 2004 was issued purportedly to resolve the Omnibus Motion, which prayed for the trial court to, inter alia, acquire jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military courts in accordance with Rep. Act No. 7055. The said Omnibus Motion was filed on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the original accused under the Information dated August 1, 2003. However, this information was subsequently superseded by the Amended Information dated October 20, 2003 under which only 31 were charged with the crime of coup detat. In the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61), the Amended Information was admitted and the case against the 290 accused, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. The said Order became final and executory since no motion for reconsideration thereof had been filed by any of the parties. Thus, when the RTC (Branch 148) eventually resolved the Omnibus Motion on February 11, 2004, the said motion had already been rendered moot by the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61) admitting the Amended Information under which only 31 of the accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290. It had become moot with respect to those whose charge against them was dismissed, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.

Reaso, et al., because they were no longer parties to the case. This was conceded by the RTC (Branch 148) itself as it stated in the body of its February 11, 2004 Order that: Now, after going over the records of the case, the Court is of the view that the movants first concern in their omnibus motion, i.e., assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before military courts in accordance with R.A. 7055, has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the Order dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case against TSg. Leonel M. Alnas, TSg. Ramon B. Norico, SSg. Eduardo G. Cedeno, et al. and finding probable cause in the Order dated November 18, 2003 against accused Cpt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, LtSg. Antonio F. Trillanes IV, et al., issued by Judge Barza. In view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza, there being no motion filed by the prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of the accused.[19] Accordingly, in the dispositive portion of the said Order, the RTC (Branch 148) held that the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. And yet, in the same dispositive portion, the RTC (Branch 148) still proceeded to declare in the last clause thereof that all the charges before the court-martial against the accused (those included in the Order of November 18, 2003) as well as those former accused (those included in the Order of November 14, 2003) are hereby declared not service-connected, on its perception that the crimes defined in and penalized by the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup detat; hence, absorbed by the latter crime. As earlier explained, insofar as those whose case against them was dismissed, there was nothing else left to resolve after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. Indeed, as they were no longer parties to the case, no further relief could be granted to them. 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. could be properly considered as strangers to the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. And in the same manner that strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court,[20] any rulings made by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 032784 are no longer binding on 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. The RTC (Branch 148) itself recognized this as it made the statement, quoted earlier, that in view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza there being no motion filed by the prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of the accused.[21] Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who are no longer charged with coup detat, cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC (Branch 148) that the charges filed before the General Court-Martial against them were not service-connected. The same is a superfluity and cannot be given effect for having been made by the RTC (Branch 148) without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Such declaration was made by the RTC (Branch 148) in violation of Section 1, Republic Act No. 7055 Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 reads in full: Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes

or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is serviceconnected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts. As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances. The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies what are considered serviceconnected crimes or offenses under Commonwealth Act No. 408 (CA 408), as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit: Articles 54 to 70: Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment. Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment. Art. 56. False Muster. Art. 57. False Returns. Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion. Art. 59. Desertion. Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert. Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter. Art. 62. Absence Without Leave. Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National Defense. Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer. Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer. Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer. Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition. Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition. Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders. Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Articles 72 to 92 Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners. Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received. Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority. Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities. Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy. Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender. Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign. Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard. Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service. Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy. Art. 83. Spies. Art. 84. Military Property. Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or Wrongful Disposition. Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers. Art. 86. Drunk on Duty. Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel. Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions. Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court. Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions. Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed. Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures. Art. 92. Dueling. Articles 95 to 97: Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government. Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Art. 97 General Article. Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. The following deliberations in the Senate on Senate Bill No. 1468, which, upon consolidation with House Bill No. 31130, subsequently became Rep. Act No. 7055, are instructive: Senator Shahani. I would like to propose an addition to Section 1, but this will have to be on page 2. This will be in line 5, which should be another paragraph, but still within Section 1. This is to propose a definition of what service-connected means, because this appears on line 8. My proposal is the following: SERVICE-CONNECTED OFFENSES SHALL MEAN THOSE COMMITTED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL PURSUANT TO THE LAWFUL ORDER OF THEIR SUPERIOR OFFICER OR WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A VALID MILITARY EXERCISE OR MISSION. I believe this amendment seeks to avoid any confusion as to what service-connected offense means. Please note that service-connected offense, under this bill, remains within the jurisdiction of military tribunals. So, I think that is an important distinction, Mr. President. Senator Taada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to propose to the Sponsor of this amendment to consider, perhaps, defining what this service-related offenses would be under the Articles of War. And so, I would submit for her consideration the following amendment to her amendment which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS SECTION, SERVICECONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO 70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408 AS AMENDED. This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these service-related or connected offenses or crimes would be. The President. What will happen to the definition of service-connected offense already put forward by Senator Shahani? Senator Taada. I believe that would be incorporated in the specification of the Article I have mentioned in the Articles of War. SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION

The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out between the two of you? I will suspend the session for a minute, if there is no objection. [There was none.] It was 5:02 p.m. RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed. The President. The session is resumed. Senator Taada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has graciously accepted my amendment to her amendment, subject to refinement and style. The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is approved.[22] In the same session, Senator Wigberto E. Taada, the principal sponsor of SB No. 1468, emphasized: Senator Taada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of offenses committed by persons subject to military law ... will be tried by the civil courts, except, those which are service-related or connected. And we specified which would be considered service-related or connected under the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No. 408.[23] It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered service-connected crimes or offenses. In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial. Indeed, jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case.[24] Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law.[25] It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2) acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of the courts.[26] Once vested by law on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by any body other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law. The power to change the jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may do. Congress has the sole power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the courts.[27] In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as service-connected offenses or crimes under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses. There was no factual and legal basis for the RTC (Branch 148) to rule that violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup detat and, as such, absorbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup detat against the petitioners and recommended the dismissal of the case against them. The trial court approved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against the petitioners. There is, as yet, no evidence on record that the petitioners committed the violations of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup detat. In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges were not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, the RTC (Branch 148) acted

without or in excess of jurisdiction. Such declaration is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.[28] At this point, a review of its legislative history would put in better perspective the raison detre of Rep. Act No. 7055. As early as 1938, jurisdiction over offenses punishable under CA 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, committed by persons subject to military law was vested on the military courts. Thereafter, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree (PD) Nos. 1822,[29] 1850[30] and 1852.[31] These presidential decrees transferred from the civil courts to the military courts jurisdiction over all offenses committed by members of the AFP, the former Philippine Constabulary, the former Integrated National Police, including firemen, jail guards and all persons subject to military law. In 1991, after a series of failed coup detats, Rep. Act No. 7055 was enacted. In his sponsorship speech, Senator Taada explained the intendment of the law, thus: Senator Taada. The long and horrible nightmare of the past continues to haunt us to this present day. Its vestiges remain instituted in our legal and judicial system. Draconian decrees which served to prolong the past dictatorial regime subsist to rule our new-found lives. Two of these decrees, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, remain intact as laws, in spite of the fact that four years have passed since we regained our democratic freedom. The late Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee enunciated in the case of Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 that the greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of human memory. PD No. 1822 and PD No. 1850 made all offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary, the Integrated National Police, including firemen and jail guards, and all persons subject to military law exclusively triable by military courts though, clearly, jurisdiction over common crimes rightly belongs to civil courts. Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. Likewise, Article VIII, Section 1 declares that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In the case of Anima vs. The Minister of National Defense, (146 Supreme Court Reports Annotated, page 406), the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Gutierrez declared: The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes at a time when all civil courts were fully operational and freely functioning constitutes one of the saddest chapters in the history of the Philippine Judiciary. The downgrading of judicial prestige caused by the glorification of military tribunals ... the many judicial problems spawned by extended authoritarian rule which effectively eroded judicial independence and self-respect will require plenty of time and determined efforts to cure. The immediate return to civil courts of all cases which properly belong to them is only a beginning. ... Thus, as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over military men for criminal offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. ...[32] Clearly, in enacting Rep. Act No. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to the civilian courts the jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of War. Conclusion

The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) and habeas corpus (G.R. No. 162341) prayed for by the petitioners must perforce fail. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.[33] Further, the writ of habeas corpusshould not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body.[34] The term court necessarily includes the General CourtMartial. These rules apply to Capt. Reaso, et al., as they are under detention pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003 issued by respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70[35] of the Articles of War. On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.[36] As earlier discussed, the General Court-Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. under Rep. Act No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-24241 February 26, 1968 HATIB ABBAIN petitioner-appellant, vs. TONGHAM CHUA, ET AL., respondents-appellees. Asaali S. Isnani for petitioner-appellant. Mussolini Izquierdo for respondents-appellees. SANCHEZ, J.: The jurisdictional issue thrust upon this Court was shaped out of background facts to be narrated. March 12, 1958. Respondent-appellee Tongham Chua commenced suit 1 for "forcible entry and illegal, detainer" against petitioner-appellant Hatib Abbain with the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao, Sulu. Pertinent are Tongham Chua's averments therein that he is "the owner of a piece of land together with the improvements thereon mostly coconut trees" located in Maraning, Bongao, Sulu, which contains an area of four hectares more or less; that this land was donated to him by his father, Subing Chua, on January 16, 1952 and from that date up to the present time he has "assumed ownership" thereof, taken "possession of the land and paid the corresponding taxes due the government every year"; that "on January 16, 1952 and before this day [March 12, 1958], my tenant has been the herein defendant, and we have been always dividing the fruits or copra harvested therefrom on fifty-fifty basis. That I shall have 50% of the sale and the herein defendants gets 50% also"; that during the month of December, 1957, the defendant [herein petitioner] "by means of force, strategy and stealth unlawfully entered and still occupies the land in question after I have repeatedly demanded of him to vacate the premises due to his non-compliance of our agreement of [his] giving my share of the several harvests he made." February 27, 1959. Respondent Justice of the Peace Mariano Managula rendered judgment directing Hatib Abbain to vacate the premises and place Tongham Chua in possession of the plantation, with costs. This judgment was predicated upon the findings, after trial, that sometime before World War II, petitioner Hatib Abbain, because of financial hardship, sold for P225.00 to Subing Chua the coconut plantation, subject matter of the suit; that after the sale, Hatib Abbain became the tenant of Subing Chua, the harvests of the land divided on a 50-50 basis; that subsequently, on January 16, 1962, Subing Chua donated the plantation to his son, Tongham Chua, and Hatib Abbain, the same tenant of the father continued to be the tenant on the land; that the tenancy relationship was at the beginning harmonious and cordial, but that during the month of December, 1957, the tenant, Hatib Abbain, "got ambitious, and wanted to assume ownership of the plantation; that the said tenant desisted to give the share of his landlord of the harvests, hence, the plaintiff [respondent Tongham Chua] filed the present case on March 12, 1958." June 30, 1959. Hatib Abbain filed the present petition in the Court of First Instance of Sulu against respondent Tongham Chua and Judge Mariano Managula. The verified petition, with an affidavit of merits, sought "relief from judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao and/or annulment of its decision in Civil Case No. 21 with preliminary injunction." 2 Petitioner there averred that: (1) the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao did not have jurisdiction over said Civil Case 21 which is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations; and (2) because of "fraud, mistake or excusable negligence," he was deprived of a hearing in said Civil Case 21, and prevented from taking an appeal from the decision therein rendered. Respondent Tongham Chua traversed the averments of the petition.

October 30, 1964. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Sulu issued the order now the subject of appeal. The court struck down petitioner's prayer for relief upon the finding that there was no fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which deprived defendant (petitioner) of a hearing because he was present at the trial and given opportunity to prepare his defense; and that neither was there evidence that defendant was prevented from taking an appeal therefrom. The court, moreover, noted that the petition for relief was filed more than four months after the oral promulgation of the decision on February 25, 1959. On the jurisdictional issue, the court ruled that "petitioner has not presented any proof or showing of landlord and tenant relationship between the parties" to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, and that upon the allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. 21, the case is "clearly one of ejectment." The petition was thus dismissed without costs. The present is a direct appeal to this Court. The three errors assigned in appellant's brief raise but one issue: Jurisdiction. 1. Appellant plants his case upon the provisions of Section 21 of Republic Act 1199 (approved August 30, 1954), known as the "Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines", which reads: Sec. 21. Ejectment; violation; jurisdiction. All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the land-holder or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of land-holder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes. The statutory precept just quoted is supplemented by Section 7, Republic Act 1267, creating the first Court of Agrarian Relations, effective June 14, 1955, as amended by Republic Act 1409 which took effect on September 9, 1955. Said Section 7 provides: Sec. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land: . . . .3 As heretofore adverted to, Tongham Chua's complaint was filed on March 12, 1958 long after Republic Acts 1199, 1267 and 1409 were incorporated in our statute books. Well to remember then is that Tongham Chua's complaint positively avers that Hatib Abbain is his tenant on a 50-50 sharing basis of the harvest; and that he seeks ejectment of Hatib Abbain "due to his non-compliance of our agreement of [his] giving my share of the several harvests he made." The Justice of the Peace Court itself found, after hearing, that Hatib Abbain continued to be the tenant of Tongham Chua after the latter became, on January 16, 1952, owner of the plantation which he acquired from his father by virtue of a donation; and that Hatib Abbain refused to give "the share of his landlord of the harvest." If both the complaint and the inferior court's judgment have any meaning at all, it is that the Justice of the Peace Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Right at the outset, the complaint should have been rejected. Failing in this, the case should have been dismissed during the course of the trial, when it became all the more evident that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The judge had no power to determine the case. Because, Tongham Chua's suit comes within the coverage of the statutory provision (Section 31, R.A. 1199) heretofore mentioned that "[a]ll cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the land-holder," shall be under the "original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take

cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes" and the broad sweep of Section 7, Republic Act 1267, which lodged with the Court of Agrarian Relations "original and exclusive jurisdiction . . . to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land." Jurisprudence has since stabilized the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations over cases of this nature. 4 Such exclusive authority is not divested by a mere averment on the part of the tenant that he asserts ownership over the land, "since the law does not exclude from the jurisdiction" of the Court of Agrarian Relations, "cases in which a tenant claims ownership over the land given to him for cultivation by the landlord." 5 The judgment and proceedings of the Justice of the Peace Court are null and void. 2. We take note of the observation of the Court of First Instance that the petition for relief from judgment must have to be ruled out because it was filed beyond the 60-day period after appellant learned of the judgment. But this is beside the point. The judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court is not merely a voidable judgment. It is void on its face. It may be attacked directly or collaterally. Here, the attack is direct. Petitionerappellant sought to annul the judgment. Even after the time for appeal or review had elapsed, appellant could bring, as he brought, such an action. More, he also sought to enjoin enforcement of that judgment. 6 In varying language, this Court has expressed its reprobation for judgments rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Such a judgment is held to be "a dead limb on the judicial tree, which should be lopped off or wholly disregarded as the circumstances require." 7 In the language of Mr. Justice Street: 8 "Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." And in Gomez vs. Concepcion, 9 this Court quoted with approval the following from Freeman on Judgments: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without redress." Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack "in any way and at any time, even when no appeal has been taken." 10 Upon the view we take of this case, the appealed order of October 30, 1964 is hereby reversed and set aside; and the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao, Sulu, in, Civil Case 21, entitled "Tongham Chua, Plaintiff vs. Hatib Abbain, Defendant," is hereby annulled. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-45418 October 30, 1980 TEOFISTA P. TINITIGAN, EFREN TINITIGAN, ELSA TINITIGAN and SEVERINO TINITIGAN, JR., petitioners, vs. SEVERINO TINITIGAN, SR. and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-45574. October 30, 1980.* PENTEL MERCHANDISING CO., INC. and TEOFISTA PAYURAN TINITIGAN, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE PEDRO C. NAVARRO, CHIU CHIN SIONG and SEVERINO TINITIGAN SR., respondents. MAKASIAR, J.: Two petitions are herein filed to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 1, 1976 in CA-G.R. No. 05387- SP docketed as L-45418 and L-45574 respectively, affirming the order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Branch II in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975. On March 25, 1975, petitioners Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc. (Pentel for short) and Teofista Payumo Tinitigan (Payuran for short) entered into a contract of lease of a residential house whereby for a term of four years Payumo shall lease to Pentel the premises at 205 Loring St., Pasay City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15923, at a rental of P1,500.00 per month with option to buy the same within the term of the lease for P350,000.00 [pp. 13-16, rec]. On April 22, 1975, Payumo and her three children, Efren, Elsa, and Severino Jr., all surnamed Tinitigan, leased to United Electronics Corporation a factory building together with the portion of land on which it is erected covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 160998 situated in Banwag, Paraaque, Rizal (pp. 17-20, rec., L-45418). In both transactions, the consent of Severino Tinitigan Sr. (Tinitigan for short), husband of Payumo and private responded herein, was not secured. Consequently, on May 22, 1975, Severino Tinitigan Sr., as conjugal partner and shareholder of Molave Development Corporation which is a family corporation filed a complaint captioned "Annulment of Ownership and Contract of witness Pre-Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, 7th Judicial District (pp. 23-27, rec.). This case docketed Civil Case No. 21277 and which was assigned to Branch II presided by the Honorable Judge Pedro C. Navarro principally sought to annul the contract of lease executed by Payumo in favor of United Electronics Corporation The property involved in this contract is entirely different from that leased to Pentel with option to buy. The complaint, however, was later amended with leave of court granted by order of August 20, 1975, to include in the prayer the following: ... 2. to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from encumbering or disposing properties in the name of the Molave Development Corporation or those in the name of Severino Tinitigan Sr. and Teofista Payuran; ... In the same order, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II enjoined petitioner from doing any "act to dispose, mortgage or otherwise encumber the properties described in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint" and set the case for hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 5, 1975. Paragraphs 7 and 8 pertain to the factory building and the land on which it is erected covered by TCT No. 160998 (p. 151, rec.).

At the hearing of the preliminary injunction the issue of the contract of lease of lot covered by TCT 160998 which was the main object of the complaint was settled amicably. Severino Tinitigan Sr., however, on September 17, 1975, filed a motion seeking judicial approval of sale of a two-storey residential house and a lot which are conjugal properties located at 205 Loring St., Pasay City, covered by TCT No. 15923 (pp. 28-34, rec.). The house is tenanted by Quintin Lim Eng Seng (Quintin Lim for short) who is President and General Manager of Pentel. Tinitigan contends that the proposed sale of the property for P300,000.00 to Quintin who was given priority right to purchase, was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal obligations that were overdue in the amount of P256,137.79 and to forestall the foreclosure of mortgaged conjugal property. Earlier, the same property had been leased by Payumo to Pentel with an option to buy for P350,000.00. On September 29, 1975, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II issued an order granting Tinitigan "authority to sell the house and lot at No. 205 Loring St., Pasay City covered by TCT No. 15923 in favor of Quintin Lim, if he is a Filipino citizen, for P300,000.00" (pp. 35-37, rec.,). An urgent motion for reconsideration was filed by Payumo and children alleging among others that the sale would result in substantial and tremendous losses because the property sought to be sold is a suitable condominium and/or hotel site and would, therefore, command a higher price (pp. 56-57, rec.). On October 9, 1975, merely two days after the motion for reconsideration of the September 29, 1975 order was filed in the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, the wife Payumo filed against her husband Tinitigan a complaint for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership, docketed as Civil Case No. 4459-P before Branch XXVIII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City presided by the Honorable Judge Enrique A. Agana (pp. 17-21, rec.). On October 29, 1975, the Pasay Court after noting that "the parties had agreed to the continuation of the administration of said conjugal properties by plaintiff (wife) Teofista P. Tinitigan," appointed her administrative of the conjugal properties subject to the following conditions: 1) that all and any disposition and/or encumbrance of the real estate belonging to the conjugal partnership shall be subject to the approval of the court; 2) that all rentals accruing from the properties in Angeles Civil shall be collected by the defendant Severino Tinitigan for his subsistence and support; and 3) that the disposition of the property located at Loring St., Pasay City, shall be subject to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal" [P. 22, rec.]. In Civil Case No. 21277 however, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, presided by respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the September 29, 1975 order for lack of merit. Further, the court stated that "the defendants (petitioners) have not even shown that there are offers from other sources willing to buy the property for more than P300.000.00 (p. 92, rec.) On November 22, 1975, a notice of appeal was filed by petitioners Payumo and children appealing the order of November 3, 1975, it being allegedly final in nature in so far as the disposition of the Pasay property is concerned and there being no further issue left between the parties (pp. 72-73, rec.). By a deed of absolute sale dated January 16, 1976 (pp. 38-44, rec.). the husband Tinitigan apparently sold for P315,000.00 the Pasay property not to Quintin Lim as contained in the order of the court in Civil Case No. 21277, but to herein private respondent Chiu Chin Siong (Chiu for

short) who obtained a title thereto. Pursuantly, TCT No. 20031 was issued cancelling TCT No. 15923. On February 23, 1976, a motion for the approval of the sale to Chiu was filed by respondent Tinitigan in the CFI of Rizal, Branch 11 (pp. 203-205, rec.). On March 3, 1976, the said court issued an order approving the sale executed by Severino Tinitigan Sr. in favor of Chiu covering the parcel of land at 206 Loring St., San Rafael District, Pasay City, for and in consideration of the sum of Three Hundred Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P315,000.00) [pp. 206-207, rec.). In a decision dated April 8, 1976, the same court denied the appeal filed by petitioners Payumo and children on the ground that the order appealed from is merely interlocutory and cannot, therefore, be the subject of appeal. Furthermore, it stated that "the sale in favor of Chiu Chin Siong is a right pertaining to the plaintiff under Article 171 of the Civil Code and the exercise cise of said right is justifiable to relieve the rest of the conjugal properties from mortgage obligations which are in danger of foreclosure" (p. 90, rec.). On May 17, 1976, Payumo and children filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondents Tinitigan and the Honorable Pedro C. Navarro in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 05387 assuming the orders of respondent Judge and praying that a restraining order be issued immediately enjoining respondent Severino Tinitigan Sr. from selling or disposing of the disputed property and if already sold to declare the sale null and void. Petitioners likewise prayed that the order of the lower court dismissing the appeal based on the grounds aforestated be declared a nullity and that the appeal be given due course (pp. 45-49, rec.). On June 1, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision upholding the orders of respondent Judge, particularly, the orders of September 29, 1975 approving the sale of the conjugal property in Pasay City, to quote: The ground for opposition to the sale is a claim that the property is a 'choice lot' within 'the tourist belt and its potentials for a hotel or condominium site is very promising' (Ibid. p. 4). It does sound good but too abstruse to meet the immediate need for the liquidation of a big conjugal liability and to avoid foreclosure and loss of the properties mortgaged. Besides the sale to liquidate the conjugal liability finds support from the provisions of Articles 161 and 171 of the Civil Code. We also see from the record before us that petitioner Teofista P. Tinitigan has filed a complaint for legal separation and dissolution of the conjugal partnership in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVIII in Pasay City, under Civil Case No. 4459-P. Private respondent agreed to the appointment of petitioner Teofista P. Tinitigan as administrative on certain conditions, which was approved by the Court (Ibid., p. 30). One of these is that the disposition of the property in question shall be subject to the decision of the CFI of Rizal, Brapeh II in Pasig (Ibid., p. 30). As stated above, respondent Judge, presiding over Branch II of the CFI of Rizal appellant proved the sale of the conjugal property in question to liquidate certiorari conjugal obligations (Ibid., pp- 17-19). ... But the petitioners would, nevertheless compel us to allow their appeal from the order dated September 29, 1975 approving the sale of the conjugal property in Pasay City in order to liquidate certiorari conjugal obligations (Ibid., p. 17) on the ground that the order dated November 3, 1975 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order dated September 29, 1975 is already final (Ibid., p. 4, par. 14). But the respondent Judge hold the questioned order as merely interlocutory (Ibid., p. 57). We sustain the respondent Judge. ... The fact that what was resolved by the respondent Court was a mere motion for judicial authority to sell conjugal

property to liquidate certiorari conjugal obligations (Ibid., p. 8) indicates that the order granting the motion (Ibid., p. 17) is interlocutory. The rationale underlying the rule that an interlocutory order is not appealable is basically the avoidance of multiplicity of appeals in a single case which could considerably delay the final disposition of the case (People vs. Rodriguez 24 SCRA 163, 167) [pp. 93-97, rec.). Thereafter, on July 19, 1976, private respondent Chiu filed before the City Court, Branch III, at Pasay City, presided by judge Pablo M. Malvar, a compliant for unlawful detainer seeking an order to compel defendant therein, Quintin C. Lim to vacate the premises in question (pp. 331335, rec.). On July 26, 1976, Quintin C. Lim filed his answer with motion to dismiss denying that he 'was the lessee of the properly and moving to dismiss the detainer action for lack of jurisdiction, the issue of ownership not being capable of decision without resolving the issue of ownership pending in other courts (pp. 346-352, rec.). On January 5, 1977, a petition for review docketed as L-45418 was filed with this Court by Payumo and her three children praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari directed to the Court of Appeals, and commanding it to send to this Court for review and determination the records and proceedings of Civil Case No. 21277 assigned to the CFI of Rizal in Pasig, Branch II, presided by respondent Judge Navarro. The main allegations of the petition are: lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court since it did not have judicial authority to authorize the sale of the conjugal property in Civil Case No. 21277 considering that the complaint in the said case referred to other properties to the exclusion of the one authorized to be sold; and abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal since the order authorizing the sale of the Loring property was not merely interlocutory but one that was final and appealable. On February 15, 1976, another petition was filed with this Court, this time by Pentel and Payuran, against respondents Court of Appeals. Honorable Pedro C. Navarro, Chiu Chin Siong and Severino Tinitigan Sr. The petition, docketed as L-45574, seeks to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 05387-SP dated June 1, 1976 and order of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975 on the ground that the said decision and order are void. Petitioners assigr. the following errors as grounds for the allowance of writ, to wit: (1) The questioned order authorizing Severino Tinitigan Sr., to sell the property in question is void because (a) Tinitigan Sr. had no authority to sell the premises, they being under the administration of Payuran; (b) Respondent Judge had not acquired jurisdiction over the premises and could not grant Tinitigan authority to sell them; (c) The sale of the property was expressly authorized in favor of Quintin Lim, not respondent Chiu; (d) Pentel, whose President and General Manager is Quintin Lim, had the option to buy the premises; and (2) The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in denying Payuran's petition to enjoin or set aside the sale of the property here involved. On February 23, 1977, this Court, after deliberating on the petition filed in case G.R. No. L45574 resolved without giving due course thereto to require the respondents to comment and to take up L-45574 with L-45418 since both involve the same Court of Appeals decision (p. 107, rec.).

During the pendency of these petitions, the Pasay Court in the legal separation case (Civil Case No. 4459-P), issued an order dated August 29, 1977 dissolving the conjugal partnership between Tinitigan and Payumo and approving the partition of their properties pursuant to an agreement (pp. 319-325, rec.). The Loring property was adjudicated in favor of the wife Payuran. In consequence, defendant-respondent filed a motion to exclude TCT 15923 from the list of properties that should belong to Payumo (pp. 208-210, rec.). An amended motion was subsequently filed on October 25, 1977 praying that the order of August 29, 1977 be amended in such a way that the award of the Loring property be conditioned upon the final outcome of the cases pending before this Court (pp. 326-328, rec.). Pursuant to said motion, the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City issued an order dated November 22, 1977 in part stating that the "award of the Loring St., Pasay City property under TCT No. 15923 in favor of the plaintiff in the order of the court dated August 29, 1977 is understood to the subject to the outcome of the cases now pending before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-45418 and G.R. No. L-45574" (pp. 329-330, rec.). Notwithstanding these proceedings, the City Court of Pasay, Branch III in the unlawful detainer case, presided by Judge Malvar, issued a decision dated January 18, 1978 ordering the defendant Quintin Lim and all persons claiming under him to vacate the premises in question and to pay the corresponding rentals thereof to the plaintiff Chiu at the rate of P1,500.00 per month from January 16, 1976, until the defendant and all persons claiming under him actually vacate the said premises (pp. 367-371, rec.). For this reason, Payuran, on February 14, 1978, filed a motion for leave to apply for a writ of injunction to enjoin execution of the decision of Judge Malvar in the unlawful detainer case and to prohibit further proceedings therein (pp. 259-273, rec.). This Court, on February 22, 1978, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Malvar from conducting further proceedings and from executing the decision dated January 18, 1978 (pp. 372-374, rec.). The issues in both L-45418 and L-45574 related primarily to the question of validity of the challenged order dated September 29, 1975 issued by respondent Judge Navarro of the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, in Pasig and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals. WE pursue our discussion on the merits of the case as predicated on grounds raised in the assignment of errors. Petitioners argue that the order authorizing Tinitigan to sell the Loring property is void; firstly, because Tinitigan had no authority to sell the premises, they being under the administration of Payuran. This contention is without legal basis. Article 165 of the New Civil Code decrees that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership." This is the general rule. Although Article 168 of the same Code provides that "the wife may by express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property" and scattered provisions in the Code likewise speak of administration by the wife pursuant to a judicial decree, the said provisions are not applicable in the instant case. The judicial decree dated October 29, 1975 appointing Payumo as administrative of the conjugal partnership cannot be treated as an exception because it was issued only after the CFI of Rizal, Branch II had granted Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring property. Besides, the appointment of Payumo as administrative was not absolute as it was made subject to certain conditions agreed upon by the parties. Although the claim by Payumo that she was actually administering their conjugal properties even prior to this controversy may have some color of truth in it; legally, however, such fact is not enough to

make her administratix of the conjugal partnership for absent a public instrument or a judicial decree, administration still pertains to the husband as explicitly set forth in Article 165 (supra). As held in the case of Ysasi vs. Fernandez (23 SCRA 1079, 1083 [June 25, 1968]). The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This is a right clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration. The husband may even enforce right of possession against the wife who has taken over the administration without his consent. And the wife may be punished for contempt for her refusal to deliver to him the conjugal assets. She may be required to render full and complete accounting of such properties. Necessarily, the conclusion is that Tinitigan Sr. had not ceased being the administrator of their conjugal properties at the time the motion for judicial approval of sale was granted. Being administrator, however, does not give him outright authority to alienate or encumber conjugal assets. This kind of transactions requires the express or implied consent of the wife subject to certain exceptions. Thus, Article 166 of the New Civil Code provides Unless the wife has been declared a noncompos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her conscience the court may compel her to grant the same. This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code (Emphasis supplied). This was precisely the reason why respondent Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial approval of sale of the Loring property. The filing of the said motion was, in fact, directed by a legal provision since it became almost impossible for private respondent to obtain his wife's consent to the sale which transaction has not proven to be fraudulent. As the evidence warrants, the sale was necessary to answer for a big conjugal liability which might endanger the family's economic standing. Actually, this is one instance where the wife's consent is not required and impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary. According to Article 171 of the New Civil Code, "the husband may dispose of the conjugal partnership for the purposes specified in Articles 161 and 162." In general, these articles deal with the obligation of the conjugal partnership. Specifically, Article 161, paragraph 1 provides that "the conjugal partnerships shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the case where she may legally bind the partnership." It must be noted that Payumo did not dispute the existence of these conjugal liabilities. What she questioned, in reality, was the propriety of the sale of the disputed property, which, according to petitioners, has bright prospects of development and market value appreciation in the future. It was a 'choice lot' as termed by them. Nevertheless, the sale was the surest and the most practical means resorted to by respondent Tinitigan Sr. to save them from a serious financial setback. This consideration cannot be sidestepped by speculative allegations. Moreover, petitioners offer no acceptable and practical solution to remedy this contingency. Secondly, petitioners contend that the questioned order is void because respondent Judge had not acquired jurisdiction over the premises and could not grant Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell them. They would seem to capitalize on the fact that the complaint in Civil Case No. 21277 particularly mentioned only the lot covered by TCT No. 160998 leased to United Electronics Corporation. Petitioners failed to note, however, that in the amended complaint, respondents prayed among others "to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from encumbering or disposing

properties in the name of the Molave Development Corporation or those in the name of Severino Tinitigan Sr, and Teofista Payuran." This, in effect, brings the Loring property by TCT No. 15923 within the jurisdiction of the court which issued the order. Certainly, a motion in relation thereto is but proper. Furthermore, it is worth repeating that the said motion to seek judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent amounts to compliance with legal requirement delineated in Article 166, supra. The issuance of the order dated September 29, 1975 was, henceforth, pursuant to a validly acquired jurisdiction, in keeping with a well-entrenched principle that "jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein - a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant. But it is necessary that jurisdiction be properly involved or called into activity by the firing of a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading. Nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. None of the parties to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall be removed. That power is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change" (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1970 ed., pp. 37-38). In addition, records further disclose that the action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership was filed almost right after the order of September 29, 1975 in Civil Case No. 21277 was issued. As can be gleaned from the facts, the filing of Civil Case No. 4459-P was apparently a tactical maneuver intended to frustrate the order of September 29, 1975 issued by respondent Judge Navarro granting Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring property. Aptly, however, the order of October 29, 1975 made the appointment of Payumo as administrative subject to the condition "that the disposition of the property located at Loring St., Pasay City shall be subeject to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch II, Pasig, Rizal." There can be no clearer indication of the validity of the questioned order, as far as jurisdiction is concerned, than the latter court's own recognition of the jurisdiction priorly acquired by the court issuing it. The well-settled rule that "jurisdiction once acquired continues until the case is finally terminated" is hereby observed (Republic vs. Central Surety and Ins. Co., 25 SCRA 641[1968]). "The jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of facts existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first innocence, will not operate to oust jurisdiction almdy attached" (Ramos vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565, 583 [1971]). Consequently, there is no merit in the assertion of petitioner that it is the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, Branch XXVIII which should have assumed jurisdiction over the disputed property upon the filing of the complaint for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership To permit this would result in the disregard of the order of September 29, 1975 issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Pasig, Branch II. Not even the court whose jurisdiction is being invoked sanctions this seeming attempt to contravene sound doctrines and long-standing principles. Thirdly, petitioners question the validity of the order appellant proving the sale of the Loring property on the ground that the sale was expressly authorized in favor of Quintin Lim and not respondent Chiu. Obviously, this is but a collateral issue. It is noteworthy that the motion was filed in order to secure judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent as Payumo would not

grant the same. The order, therefore, was not intended to vest Quintin Lim exclusive right to purchase the Loring property but rather it was intended to grant Tinitigan Sr. authorized to sell the same. To construe otherwise would defeat the purpose for which the motion was filed. The fact that Quintin Lim was favored as buyer is merely incidental, it having been made pursuant to the desire of respondent Tinitigan Sr. premised on the former's interest over the disputed property as tenant therein. Quintin Lim, however, did not manifest his ability and willingness to buy the property. He had practically every opportunity prior to the sale in favor of Chiu to exercise his pre-emptive right but he failed to exercise the same for one reason or another. The urgency of the need to settle pressing conjugal obligations prompted respondent Tinitigan Sr. to look for other buyers who could immediately pay for the property Chiu, to whom the property was subsequently offered, immediately paid the full amount of P315,000.00 upon the court's approval of the sale in his favor on March 3, 1976. This March 3, 1976 order is a reaffirmation of the order of September 29, 1975. Fourthly, petitioners assail the validity of the order on purely circumstantial ground that Pentel whose President and General Manager is Quintin Lim, had the option to buy the premises. While this may be so, petitioners seem to have neglected that the contract of lease between Payumo and Pentel with option to buy has been entered into in violation of Civil Code provisions. A close scrutiny of the facts would reveal that Payumo has contravened the law by encumbering the disputed property as well as other conjugal properties without her husband's consent. Article 172 of the new Civil Code provides that "the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law." Granting arguendo that she is the administrative still her act of leasing the lots covered by TCT No. 15923 and TCT No. 160998 is unjustified, being violative of Article 388 of the new Civil Code which states that "the wife who is appellant pointed as an administrative of the husband's property cannot alienate or encumber the husband's property or that of the conjugal partnership without judicial authority." Consequently, Payuran's unauthorized transaction cannot be invoked as a source of right or valid defense. True, the contract may bind persons parties to the same but it cannot bind another not a party thereto, merely because he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof (Manila Port Service vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 1214, 1217). So goes the "res inter alios acta nobis nocet, nec prodest," which means that a transaction between two parties ought not to operate to the prejudice of a third person. Finally, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in denying Payuran's petition to enjoin or set aside the sale of the Loring property. This argument, however, is unsubstantiated. The facts as when as the evidence presented by both parties leave no other recourse for the respondent Court of Appeals except to apply the pertinent legal provisions respecting the matter. Whether the order authorizing the sale of the Loring property is interlocutory or not, becomes of no moment in view of the conclusion aforesaid. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE PETITIONS IN THESE TWO CASES ARE HEREBY DENIED AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED JUNE 1, 1976 AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1975 ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN BOTH CASES. SO ORDERED.

FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 154684 Present: Panganiban, J., Chairman, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio Morales,* and Garcia, JJ. Promulgated:

- versus -

RICARDO T. SYCIP, Respondent. September 8, 2005 x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- x DECISION PANGANIBAN, Acting CJ: I n general, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal. This defense may be determined from the factual allegations of the complaint, regardless of the answer or even before the answer is filed. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 2, 2001 Decision[2] and August 14, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55127. The CA disposed as follows: It is not disputed that [petitioner] filed an illegal detainer case against [respondent] docketed as Civil Case No. 1310 before the Municipal Trial Court [MTC] of Bacoor, Cavite, which was accordingly dismissed by the MTC (See answer, p. 28, record). The filing of the instant case is another blatant attempt by [petitioner] to circumvent the law. For it is well-settled that where a complaint arises from the failure of a buyer [of real property] on installment basis to pay based on a right to stop monthly amortizations under Presidential Decree No. 957, as in the case at bench, the determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) (Francel Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 127 [1996]). WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[4] The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts

The CA narrated the facts as follows: x x x [I]n November, 1989, [petitioner] and [respondent] entered into a contract to sell a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-281788. Upon execution of the contract to sell, [respondent] made a down payment of P119,700.00, which was considered as monthly rentals at the rate of P2,686.00 per month. On March 16, 1990, the townhouse subject of the contract to sell was transferred in the name of [respondent] as evidenced by TCT No. T-281788. Despite the transfer of the title in the name of [respondent], the latter refused to pay the balance of P250,000.00. By applying the down payment of P119,700.00 to defendants monthly rental starting from December 1989, said amount has been reduced to nothing. Despite several demands made by [petitioner] to [respondent], including the demand dated December 12, 1991 made by [petitioners] counsel, the [respondent] refused to reconvey the subject property to [petitioner]. The [petitioner] suffered actual damages in the form of repairs amounting to not less than P100,000.00 as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses. x x x. The [respondent] filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but the court below denied the motion stating that the ground relied upon by [respondent did not appear to be] indubitable. Denying the material allegations of the complaint, the [respondent] again invoked the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Further, there is a pending case between the same parties and involving the same townhouse before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for unsound real estate business practices. Likewise, the [respondent] justified his refusal to pay the amortizations alleging that the [petitioner] sold and delivered to him a defective townhouse unit under Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. [957]. After trial, the court below dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.[5] Ruling of the Court of Appeals Agreeing with the trial court, the CA held that the case involved not just reconveyance and damages, but also a determination of the rights and obligations of the parties to a sale of real estate under PD 957; hence, the case fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. The appellate court observed that respondent and other buyers of the townhouses had notified petitioner of their intention to stop paying amortizations because of defective structures and materials used in the construction; they had in fact filed other cases, also before the HLURB, against petitioner for unsound real estate business practice. Noting that petitioners illegal detainer case against respondent had been dismissed by the MTC, the appellate court concluded that the filing of the instant case was another blatant attempt to circumvent the law.

Hence this Petition.[6] Issues In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: A. Whether or not the lower court can dismiss, after full blown trial, Civil Case No. BCV-94-2 of the RTC, Imus, Cavite, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. B. Whether or not the lower court can dismiss this case in spite of the indisputable fact that respondent never secured HLURB authority or clearance to stop payment of monthly rentals.[7] The Courts Ruling The Petition lacks merit.

First Issue: Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction

Before going into the jurisdictional question, we must at the outset point out that, contrary to petitioners assignment of errors, the trial courts Decision is not the proper subject of this Rule 45 Petition. Rather, it is the Decision of the CA that is up for review by this Court. This mistake in stating the issues could have been fatal to petitioners case, had it not correctly restated them in its arguments and discussion.[8] That said, we now proceed to the main issues. Petitioner argues that the CAs affirmation of the trial courts dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended. The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[9] in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a courts jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.[10] Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[11]

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.[12] Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. [13] That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez,[14] which we quote: A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of nonwaivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[15] Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.[16] The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.[17] Moreover,jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.[18] From the very beginning, the present respondent has been challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court and asserting that the HLURB is the entity that has proper jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, he had raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in his Motion to Dismiss. Even when the Motion was denied, he continuously invoked lack of jurisdiction in his Answer with affirmative defenses, his subsequent pleadings, and verbally during the trial. This consistent and continuing objection to the trial courts jurisdiction defeats petitioners contention that raising other grounds in a Motion to Dismiss is considered a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.[19]

We stress that Rule 9 of the Rules of Court requires that all defenses and objections -- except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, bar by prior judgment and/or prescription -- must be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer; otherwise, they are deemed waived. [20] As to the excepted grounds, the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists. In the present case, the trial court at first denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent, because the grounds he had relied upon did not appear to be indubitable. The ruling was made under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which then provided that the court, after hearing x x x may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable.[21] Moreover, the factual allegations of the Complaint[22] that petitioner filed below for reconveyance and damages sufficiently conformed to the jurisdictional requisites for the exercise of the MTCs authority. Thus, in accord with the procedures then prescribed, the court conducted trial to allow all arguments and evidence to surface. Significantly, petitioner has previously sued respondents brother and co-complainant before the HLURB over the same subdivision project. In Francel Realty v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Sycip,[23] petitioners Complaint for unlawful detainer was premised on the failure of respondents brother to pay monthly amortizations on the basis of his right to stop paying them under PD 957. In that case, the Court had ruled that the issue involved a determinative question x x x exclusively cognizable by the HLURB; that is, a determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. 957.[24] Because an earlier Complaint had been filed by Sycip before the HLURB against Francel Realty Corporation for unsound real estate business practices, the Court dismissed petitioners cause of action. The reason for the dismissal was that the Complaint should instead be filed as a counterclaim in [the] HLURB [case] in accordance with Rule 6, Section 6 of the Rules of Court x x x.[25] For the same reason, this Court has ruled that a suit to collect on a promissory note issued by a subdivision lot buyer involves the sales of lots in commercial subdivisions; and that jurisdiction over such case lies with the HLURB, not with the courts.[26] Further, the rules governing counterclaims[27] and the prohibition on the splitting of causes of action (grounded on the policy against a multiplicity of suits)[28] should effectively bar the Complaint for reconveyance and damages filed by petitioner. Its Complaint came at the heels of its unlawful detainer suit that had previously been dismissed by the MTC of Imus, Cavite, and of the litigation filed by respondent against Francel Realty before the HLURB. Petitioner avers that the present controversy is not cognizable by the HLURB, because it was filed by the developer rather than by the buyer, as provided under PD No. 1344.[29] Such pretension flies in the face of the ruling of the Court in Francel Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Sycip,[30] which we quote: x x x. In the case of Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte the developer filed a complaint to collect the balance of the price of a lot bought on

installment basis, but its complaint was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction. It appealed the order to this Court. In dismissing the appeal, we held: The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a complaint to collect amortization payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a subdivision lot under P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade and industry, and to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices. Although the case involving Antonio Sarte is still pending resolution before the HLURB Arbiter, and there is as yet no order from the HLURB authorizing suspension of payments on account of the failure of plaintiff developer to make good its warranties, there is no question to Our mind that the matter of collecting amortizations for the sale of the subdivision lot is necessarily tied up to the complaint against the plaintiff and it affects the rights and correlative duties of the buyer of a subdivision lot as regulated by NHA pursuant to P.D. 957 as amended. It must accordingly fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that the motion to dismiss was properly granted on the ground that the regular court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint.[31] Petitioners strategy, if allowed, would open a convenient gateway for a developer to subvert and preempt the rights of buyers by the mere expediency of filing an action against them before the regular courts, as in this case. Fortunately, the CA saw through the ruse. Contrary to petitioners contention, the HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear and decide a case merely on the basis that it has been initiated by the developer and not by the buyer. Petitioner cites Ayala Corporation v. Ray Burton Development Corporation[32] and Fajardo Jr. v. Freedom to Build, Inc.,[33] which do not further its cause either. These cases pertain to deed restrictions and restrictive covenants in the sale of subdivision units; hence, they do not fall under any of the cases over which the HLURB exercises exclusive jurisdiction. Naturally, there was every reason for the courts in the said cases to assume and exercise their jurisdiction.

Second Issue: Authority to Stop Payment of Monthly Rentals The next proposition relates to the absence of a clearance from the HLRUB authorizing respondent to stop payment of his amortizations. It is petitioners position that under Section 23 of Rule VI of the Rules implementing PD 957, clearance must first be secured from the Board before the buyer of a subdivision lot or a home can lawfully withhold monthly payments. This contention is also unmeritorious. First, Section 23 of PD 957 -- the law upon which the Implementing Rule cited was based -requires only due notice to the owner or developer for stopping further payments by reason of the latters failure to develop the subdivision according to the approved plans and within the time limit. Section 23 provides as follows: SECTION 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding [delinquency] interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (Italics supplied)

To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions of the enabling law.[34] An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void.[35] Thus, the Court in People v. Maceren[36] explained as follows: Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. x x x. The rule making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. x x x.

Plainly, therefore, Section 23 of Rule VI of the Implementing Rules cannot rise higher than Section 23 of PD 957, which is the source of its authority. For that matter, PD 957 would have expressly required the written approval of the HLURB before any stoppage of amortization

payments if it so intended, in the same manner that the decree specifically mandates written consent or approval by the NHA (now the HLURB) in Section 18.[37] Section 18 has been held by the Court to be a prohibitory law; hence, acts committed contrary to it are void,[38] pursuant to the intent of PD 957 to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers.[39] The Court stressed that such construal ensures the attainment of the purpose of the law: to protect lot buyers, so that they do not end up still homeless despite having fully paid for their home lots with their hard-earned cash.[40] Apropos, to require clearance from the HLURB before stopping payment would not be in keeping with the intent of the law to protect innocent buyers of lots or homes from scheming subdivision developers. To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to treat the right to stop payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the owner or developer or upon filing a complaint before the HLRUB against the erring developer. Such course of action would be without prejudice to the subsequent determination of its propriety and consequences, should the suspension of payment subsequently be found improper. Significantly also, the Court has upheld the reliance of a buyer on Section 23 of PD 957 when he ordered his bank to stop payment of the checks he had issued, so that he could suspend amortization payments until such time as the owner or developer would have fulfilled its obligations.[41] In Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority,[42] the exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments was considered a valid defense against the purported violations of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 by the petitioner in that case. Such right negated the third element the subsequent dishonor of the check without valid cause. With more reason, then, should the buyers right to suspend installment payments be considered a valid defense against the suit for reconveyance and damages. WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

[G.R. No. 139561. June 10, 2003] SPOUSES FEDERICO ATUEL and SARAH ATUEL and SPOUSES GEORGE GALDIANO and ELIADA GALDIANO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES BERNABE VALDEZ and CONCHITA VALDEZ, respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] seeking to reverse the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 as well as the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals in its assailed decision affirmed the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board[3] (DARAB) which reversed the Decision[4] of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The MARO of Bukidnon ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Agusan del Sur, to segregate 2,000 square meters from the land of the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez. The MARO of Bukidnon also awarded the same segregated land to the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel and the Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano. The Facts The present controversy springs from a battle of possession over a portion of a property in Poblacion (formerly Sibagat Nuevo), Sibagat, Agusan del Sur. Atty. Manuel D. Cab (Cab) is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Poblacion, Sibagat, Agusan del Sur with an area of 125,804 square meters (Cab Property). The Cab Property is covered by OCT No. P-5638 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 1318. The Cab Property is traversed by the Butuan to Davao Road and adjacent to the municipal building of Sibagat. From the Cab Property, Cab donated the lot occupied by the municipal building.[5] In 1964, Cab appointed Federico Atuel (Atuel) as administrator of the Cab Property. Sometime in 1977, Bernabe Valdez (Valdez) arrived in Sibagat from Baogo Bontoc, Southern Leyte. Valdez is the nephew of Atuel, who recommended to Cab to lease a portion of the Cab Property to Valdez.[6] On 9 October 1978, Cab and Valdez entered into a Lease of Improved Agricultural Land under which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property forP300.00 per year for two years. In 1982, Cab allowed the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel (Spouses Atuel) and the Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano (Spouses Galdiano) to occupy a 2,000-square meter portion of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano constructed their respective houses on this 2,000-square meter lot (Subject Lot). On 27 September 1985, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, approved the town plan of the Municipality of Sibagat which classified the Cab Property as residential, subject to the approval of the Ministry of Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. On 25 June 1988, Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had already expired, and demanded that Valdez stop cultivating the 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property and vacate the same. On 2 October 1988, responding to Cabs letter, the MARO of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur informed Cab that Valdez was properly identified as a tenant, and thus deemed to be the owner of the land he cultivated. The MARO added that on 14 September 1988, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, Emancipation Patent No. A-159969 was issued to Valdez for a 2.3231-hectare portion (PD 27 Land) of the Cab Property. The PD 27 Land included the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot occupied by the houses of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.

On 11 May 1989, Cab filed with the DAR in Manila a petition for cancellation of Valdezs emancipation patent. Cab claimed that his property is not planted to rice and corn and that Valdez is a civil law lessee, not a tenant.[7] Consequently, the DAR ordered the Regional Director of Cagayan de Oro City to conduct an investigation regarding the petition.[8] On 17 September 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) approved the Town Plan and Zoning Ordinance of fifty-eight municipalities, including that of Sibagat. The HLURB classified the Cab Property as 90 percent residential, and the remaining portion as institutional and park or open space. On 27 September 1991, the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez (Spouses Valdez) filed a complaint[9] for Recovery of Possession with Damages with the DARAB in Malaybalay, Bukidnon against the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. In their complaint, the Spouses Valdez alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and through fraud entered and occupied a portion of the above-described property with an area of 2,000 sq. m. more or less. The Spouses Valdez claimed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano, despite repeated demands, refused to restore possession of the said portion of land to the Spouses Valdez. The Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore to the Spouses Valdez possession of the Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez also prayed for payment of litigation expenses, as well as unearned income from the Subject Lot and moral damages. In their answer, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano asserted that the Spouses Valdez had no cause of action against them because Cab is the owner of the Subject Lot while Atuel is the administrator of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano claimed that upon Cabs instruction and consent, they had been occupying the Cab Property since 1964, long before the Spouses Valdez leased a portion of the Cab Property in 1978. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano also pointed out that the Spouses Valdez never set foot on the Subject Lot nor cultivated the same, thus, there is no dispossession to speak of. Moreover, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano alleged that the emancipation patent issued to Valdez is null and void. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano maintained that the entire Cab Property, which is covered by the Free Patent issued to Cab, has already been classified as residential, hence, no longer covered by PD No. 27.[10] On 4 March 1993, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the case, issued a decision which disposed of as follows: WHEREFORE, premises above considered, the DAR Agusan del Sur is hereby ordered to segregate the TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less, from the land of the complainants, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1261 covered by Emancipation Patent No. A159969, and award the same to the respondents; and hereby ordered this case dismissed. SO ORDERED.[11] Dissatisfied with the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano appealed to the DARAB Central Office. The DARAB Central Office reversed the decision of the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (1) Enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing acts of intrusion and maintain the possessory rights of the complainants over the EP (Emancipation Patent) covered land; and (2) Ordering the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) or PARO (Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer) concerned to assist the parties in determining the amount to be reimbursed in

favor of the respondents for whatever improvements made on the 2,000 square meter portion to be paid by the complainants. SO ORDERED.[12] Aggrieved by the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a petition for review[13] with the Court of Appeals. On 20 May 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB Central Office and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. On 14 January 1998, while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the Spouses Valdez sold 5,000 square meters out of the PD 27 Land to the Municipality of Sibagat.[14] Hence, the instant petition. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals ruled that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipation patents. The Court of Appeals held that the DARABs decision should be respected because it enjoys the presumption of regularity. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the DARAB correctly relied on Pagtalunan v. Tamayo[15] where this Court held that upon issuance of an emancipation patent, a holder acquires a vested right of absolute ownership in the land. The Court of Appeals further held that the doctrine laid down in Teodoro v. Macaraeg[16] is applicable. In Teodoro, this Court ruled that a landowner has full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract covering his property. However, once a landowner enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to be devoted to agricultural production and said landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with the help of labor coming from his immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement. Otherwise, the Court added, it would be easy to subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the landed gentry.[17] The Issue After a review of the issues raised,[18] the question boils down to whether the Spouses Valdez are entitled to seek redress from the DARAB in recovering possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot from the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. The Courts Ruling We grant the petition based not on the arguments of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano but on an entirely different ground. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals because of the DARABs lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present controversy. The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession of the Subject Lot. Though the parties do not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction.[19] The Court has discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.[20] In their complaint for recovery of possession, the Spouses Valdez alleged, among others, that they are farmers and beneficiaries of an emancipation patent. The Spouses Valdez also alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and fraudulently occupied the 2,000square meter Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez claimed that despite repeated demands,[21] the

Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano refused to vacate and restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez.[22] The Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez. The Spouses Valdez did not allege the existence of tenancy relations, if any, between them and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, [23] this Court ruled: It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint. In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint, which are contained in the decision of the MARO,[24] indicate that the nature and subject matter of the instant case is for recovery of possession or accion publiciana. The issue to be resolved is who between the Spouses Valdez on one hand, and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano on the other, have a better right to possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot forming part of the PD 27 Land. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano likewise raise the issue of ownership by insisting that Cab is the real and lawful owner of the Subject Lot. In Cruz v. Torres,[25] this Court had occasion to discuss the nature of an action to recover possession or accion publiciana, thus: xxx This is an action for recovery of the right to posses and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of the title. Accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion is also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. In such case, the regional trial court has jurisdiction. xxx[26] For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relations between the parties.[27] This Court held in Morta,[28] that in order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: xxx 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. xxx[29] (Emphasis supplied) Emphasizing the DARABs jurisdiction, this Court held in Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,[30] that: xxx the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied) Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARP Law, an agrarian dispute is defined as follows: (d) xxx any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning

farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. In the instant case, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano are not and do not claim to be the owners of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot where their houses are constructed. They also do not claim ownership to any other portion of the PD 27 Land. They and the Spouses Valdez have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that will bring this controversy within Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657.[31] The instant case is similar to Chico v. CA,[32] where this Court ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over a case which did not involve any tenurial or agrarian relations between the parties. Since the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, it should not have taken cognizance of the Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession. Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.[33] Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property.[34] However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.[35] Moreover, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of registered emancipation patents. However, the Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession does not involve or seek the cancellation of any emancipation patent. It was the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano who attacked the validity of the emancipation patent as part of their affirmative defenses in their answer to the complaint. The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court (or agency in this case) cannot be made to depend on the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.[36] Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.[37] The active participation of the parties in the proceedings before the DARAB does not vest jurisdiction on the DARAB, as jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The courts or the parties cannot disregard the rule of non-waiver of jurisdiction. Likewise, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action.[38] The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent this Court from addressing the issue, as the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint. Issues of jurisdiction are not subject to the whims of the parties.[39] In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an order or decision rendered by a tribunal or agency without jurisdiction is a total nullity.[40] Accordingly, we rule that the decision of the DARAB in the instant case is null and void. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the DARAB is likewise invalid. This Court finds no compelling reason to rule on the other issues raised by the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 and the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 are REVERSED and

SET ASIDE. The MAROs Decision dated 4 March 1993, and the DARABs Decision dated 17 June 1998, are declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs. SO ORDERED.