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Te Political Sociology of C. Wright Mills
Bipul Kumar Bhadra
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THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
OF
C. WRIGHT MILLS
"
THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
OF
C. WRIGHT MILLS
By
BIPUL KUMAR BHADRA
A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts
McMaster University
July 1978
MASTER OF ARTS (l978)
(Sociology)
TITLE: The Political Sociology of
C. Wright Mills
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario
AUTHOR: Bipul Kumar Bhadra, B.A. Hons. (Calcutta University)
M.A. (Calcutta University)
LL.B. (Calcutta University)
SUPERVISOR: Professor Dusky Lee Smith
NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 386 .
ii
ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that
C. Wright Mills' sociological contributions are of wide-
ranging scope and diversity. Despite many limitations of
the model of sociology which Mills offered, it may be con-
tended that he deserves a place in the history of modern
sociology/radical sociology for his many substantive contri-
butions. These contributions, centering around his Critique
of the Parsonian grand sociology, Sociological methodology,
Mass Society, Alienation, Political Sociology, New Leftism,
and Democracy and Liberalism, constitute the main themes for
analysis and assessment in the present dissertation. A
champion of sociological radicalism, Mills represents an
integrating link between classic sociology and modern sociology.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am indebted to many individuals, too numerous to mention,
who helped me in one way or another in writing the present
dissertation. I am grateful to Dr. Buddhadeva Bhattacharyya
of Calcutta University for first en60uraging me to work on
Mills' major ideas of political sociology. My thanks are
due to members of my thesis committee: Dr. Dusky Lee Smith,
Dr. Wallace Clement and Dr. Carl Cuneo, whose stimulating
guidance, insightful criticisms, constructive suggestions
and continued encouragement provided me with a thoroughly
enjoyable intellectual experience at McMaster, I am especially
grateful to Dr. Dusky Lee my who was very
kind to offer me the intellectual freedom I needed very badly
in the pursuit of my studies and work. I am very much in-
debted to him for his careful editing and criticisms of the
entire manuscript for both content and style. I express my
sincere appreciation to Rick G. Guscott, Anupam Sen and
Mohammad Shahidullah who were kind to read and react to
many draft chapters of the work. Finally, I am grateful to
my wife, Bula Bhadra. Without her unfailing criti-
cisms and encouragement this study would never have been
completed.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
j
~
I. Introduction 1
II. Parsons and Mills: A Comparison 39
III. Sociological Methodology 78
IV. Mass Society 123
~ ;.
V. Alienation 170
JVI. Political Sociology 221
VII. New Leftism 273
VIII. Democracy and Liberalism 305
IX. Conclusion 337
BIBLIOGRAPHY 353
v
A NOTE ON MILLS' WRITINGS
The abbreviations used in the bracketed references to Mills'
works in this dissertation are as follows:
SP---Sociology and Pragmatism
FMW--From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
NMP--The New Men of Power
WC---White Collar
CSS--Character and Social Structure
PE---The Power Elite
CWT--The Causes of World War Three
SI---The Sociological Imagination
IM---Images of Man
LY---Listen, Yankee
TM---The Marxists
P P P P 9 w e r ~ Politics & People
vi
ONE
Introduction
The Objective
The basic objective of this dissertation work is to
attempt an interpretive exposition of some chosen aspects
of Mills' political sociology. Nowadays Mills is generally
acknowledged as one of the central figures of modern socio-
logy, particularly as the father of radical sociology. Al-
though, generally speaking, I share this view, I consider
Mills mainly a political sociologist and, ascordingly, intend
to systematize and assess the leading aspects of his political
sociology.
It is my conviction that Mills has appreciably con-
tributed to the development of modern sociology. Specifical-
ly.said, Mills' sociology marks, in view of its political
implications, a significant break with the mainstream socio-
logy which dominated arena of sociological theory and
research until the beginnings of the decade of the 1960s. It
has contributed towards a restoration of the critical and v
oppositional stance which sociology lost in the 1950s. On
the one hand, Mills' political sociology constitutes a radi-
cal critique of the corporate capitalist social structure of
America and its institutional arrangements. On the other
hand, it represents a distinct variety of political sociology
including a model of man and society, a definition of socio-
1
2
logy, and a theoretical system of sociological concepts and
ideas. In other words, there are two manifest concerns be-
hind this theoretical endeavor of evaluating important poli-
tical sociological contributions of Mills. These contribu-
tions can briefly be summed up in the form of two hypotheses.
,n
(--
In the first place, Mills' political sociology is a
theoretically articulated critique of a capitalist social
structure and its institutions. It is often assumed, not
without reason, that sociology as a field of intellectual
inquiry and academic exercise is a way of expressing socio-
historical realities at a given point of time. Since it
evolves within a matrix of operating sociohistorical forces
it:reveals, among other things, changing relations of man
to man in society. As far as political sociology is concern-
ed, it reveals the nature of this changing relations In poli-
tical terms. Mills' political sociology, though rooted in
diverse American, European and the British intellectual tradi-
tions, is embedded within the sociohistorical contexts of
a society and, as such, it is an indicator of the dominant
operating sociohistorical forces and their associated insti-
tutional-structural trends. That is to say, Mills' political
sociology reflects some of the contradictions of corporate
capitalism, analyses some of the crises points in corporate
capitalist social structure, focuses on some of their conse-
quences on the life fates of individuals, and sheds some new
light on the ascendancy of the military-industrial state.
If, therefore, sociology is an indicator of sociohistorical
forces and institutional trends encompassing man's life and
3
his social relations, it may be hypothesized, then, that
Mills' political sociology highlights these aspects as basic
-
concerns of reason and freedom for the establishment of an
equilitarian society.
This leads, secondly, to the other facet of Mills'
political socielogy. The task of political sociology, as he
says, is to deal with "private troubles and public issues."
They provide the goals to which the concerns of political
sociologists, democratically oriented to the values of reason
and freedom, should be directed. If power elite, mass society
and alienation--the critical concepts of Mills' sociological
radicalism--are features of American society, they constitute
merely an aspect of his political sociology. The other one
is programmatic and reformist in nature and mission. It
envisages the establishment of a democratic society in terms
of a translation of the ideas and ideals of the classic liber-
al democratic tradition. In its turn, it sets out the task
of political sociology as themes of private troubles and public
issues. If, therefore, establishment of a democratic society
depends upon the restoration of reason and freedom In human
social affairs, it may be hypothesized, then, that the primary
task of political sociology is to deal with, among other things,
private troubles and public issues of men and women in society.
It is in this that political sociology becomes a function of
private troubles and public issues. This also distinguishes
Mills' pOlitical sociology either from Marxist sociology or
from the mainstream/functional political sociology.
4
Thus the present dissertation takes up and deals with
analytically and critically the leading aspects of Mills'
political sociology. The following are the leading aspects
which I have chosen for specific analysis here: a compari-
son of Mills with Parsons, sociological methodology, mass
society, alienation, political sociology, new Leftism, de-
mocracy and liberalism. As .already indicated, the central
theme of this theoretical work is Mills and his basic aspects
of political sociology. In spite of this theoretical point
of reference, an attempt has been made to discuss the issues
in the comparative perspective, taking note of the works of
other theorists who have advanced their ideas on the similar
items. In this regard my purpose has been to indicate how
far Mills' ideas are continuous with, or have departed from,
those of others in the area concerned. In brief, the present
dissertation work is predominantly a theoretical and evalua-
tive study of Mills' contributions to the field of political
sociology.
Contemporary Evaluations: A Review
As Andy Warhol facetiously remarked, "Every
one in America will be famous for fifteen
minutes." Mills had his hour, and it came
none too soon. Had he lived, the remaining
years of the sixties might have been painful.
Young Leftists, unable to tolerate any poli-
tical or intellectual leader for more than
a few months, would surely have abandoned
Mills. Yet this would not have troubled him
nearly as much as their growing tolerance of
;
reason and democracy. There was finally no
way for Mills to throw off what he poignantly
called "'this moral anguish is crushing me. '"
(Clecak, 1973: 71).
These concluding remarks bring an end to Clecak's portrayal
of C. Wright Mills as a lone rebel with radical paradoxes
5
and dilemmas of a new Left. To be fair, in this contemporary
epoch of political isms the obverse of "radicalism" is not
anything without paradoxes and dilemmas. Whether young
Leftists are intolerant of reason and democracy is one
question; and whether there really exists a way out of radi-
cal paradoxes yet another. The significant point is whether
one confronts, to use Mills' words, "the question of poli-
tical irresponsibility in our time or the cultural
and political of Rob05'YCPPP: 246)
In the hey-go-mad days of rabid in
politics and grand theory and abstracted empiricism in socio-
logy of the fifties Mills does, unlike most others, confront
the question of political in the
ed superstate of corporate capitalism. If "moral anguish"
crushed him it was not entirely, I think, due to radical
paradoxes and dilemmas in his Left radicalism; it was rather
the verbalized expression of powerlessness of a conscientious
man in a society defined only by situated contradictions of
corporate motives through metaphors of liberal vocabulary.
If Mills was not sure of the answers to the questions he
raised he was, however, able to demonstrate, living in the
academic dog days of mytholozing jargon, that there were
"important tendencies for irresponsible thought and action
,/
within American social science" (Kaufman, 1960: 116). Not
that irresponsible thought and action have now abated. The
V
mainstream sociology has become "corporate sociology." Its
basic concepts, problems, theories and orientations are now
determined "at least in broad outline, by the needs of the
6
corporate system of which it is a part" (Szymanski, 1970: 3).
In the mass production of this corporate corpus, the Uni-
versity has now become what Miller called "part of the factory
system of commercial America" (1962: 8). It has been asserted
that Mills was "a complex man" with "a bundle of contradic-
tions," "egomaniacal and brooding, hearty and homeless, driven
by a demon of discontent and ambition
lf
or simultaneously
"sociable and aloof, democratic and snobbish, generous and
close, humble and cocky, rationalistic and simplistic"
(Swados, 1963: 36-37). But at the same time he remains a
man, says Wakefield, "as great in generosity and kindness
as in talent and dedication" and that he was "out of step
with the time and society he lived in" (1962: 331). Indeed,
there were contradictions in Mills. He was on the Left but
not of the Left, a radical but a lone guerilla, and always
a political man but never with any political affiliation.
He blieves that liberalism has become a pOlitical rhetoric
and, hence, increasingly banal and meaningless to larger
masses. Yet he did not lose faith in the classic values
of liberalism': Rather he speaks of moral, political and
7
intellectual commitment to its basic values of reason, freedom
-
and truth. He likened Marx's conception of the working class
to a romantic illusion, "a labor metaphysic" without any
politico-historical substance. But he still conceives man,
more in Marx's terms, as the maker of his life fate. Mills
saw intellectuals having become transformed into powerless
technicians and salesmen in the "American Celebration." But
he thinks that they could be "programatic in a politically
realistic way." However, beneath all too apparent contradic-
tions and subterranean truths lies the significance of his
life as a political sociologist. He lived a full life, had
his hour and died a revolutionary (cf. Landau, 1965: 46)
though in terms of effort rather than of accomplishment in
his own decade. And as Howe, earlier a friend and later a
critic, puts it nicely: "Even his enemies paid him that
tribu t e" (1966: 246) .
My own work is an attempt to search an answer to
this question: Why do even his enemies pay him that tribute?
In my own effort to undertake this present study I have been
motivated by this question, and it is this which has prompted
my investigation into the manifold aspects of Mills' p o l t ~
cal sociology. Even when he remains much criticized, attack-
ed, despised, fabricated, misunderstood and accused of socio-
logical heresy and paranoid romanticism, what then accounts
for the resurgence of Millsian themes in contemporary socio-
Ii
logical literature? Stated otherwise, how can be become a
rich fount of unabated inspiration to the present generation
8
of radical sociologists? How could he become the founding

father of "radical soc (S cime cca, 1976, 1977), the
-=--- -
forerunner of a "new sociology" (Horowitz, 1965; Anderson,
1974), and also a mentor of a radicalized liberal political
sociology? How did he remain the most widely read socio-
logist of international repute over the decade and a half
following the Second World War (cf. Friedrichs, 1970: 68)?
In brief, why is he regarded as a "titan" (cf. Hartindale,
1975) of modern sociology?
Is it due to the fact that, as Horowitz notes, "the
main drift of C. Wright Hills' work is linked to the practi-
./'
cal importance of an ethically viable social science"? He
thinks that "this is so because such a sociology confronts
the facts with integrity by doing something about the facts"
(Horowitz, 1969a: 20). Is it because, as Domhoff concludes,
Hills' The Power Elite, as landmark of political sociology,
"stands as tall in the light of recent events as it did in
1956 when it crashed in on the Great American Celebration
with its detailed description and provocative indictment of
the structure of power in modern society" (Domhoff,.:_1969: 278)
In commenting on the sources of appeal and overall achieve-
ments of social criticism as contained in Hills' same classic,
Gillam concludes by saying that in a time of disquieting con-
sensus "it was altogether timely and prophetic, moreover, in
its attack on the prevailing orthodoxy." Although it lapses
into ambiguity and contradiction in its task of the new radi-
cal synthesis in the long run, he continues, tiThe Power Elite
9
at once announced and helped to inspire a revival of radical
theory that would, over the next decade and a half, consider-
ably influence the course of American social thought This
was no mean achievement" (Gillam, 1975: 479). Aptheker,
a much known Marxist theorist, contends that Mills' critique
"does represent very vigorous indictments of significant
aspects of monopoly capitalism's institutions, does offer
important contributions toward a really radical attack upon
the social system itself" (1960: 87). Then, are Mills'
contributions important in terms of "tactical programs"?
Thus he estimates: "He does stand firm against McCarthyism
and the New Conservatism; he does condemn militarism; and
he does call for an end to the Cold War and its replacement
by an era of active peaceful co-existence. For an American
today these are decisive ideological and political virtues.
They are epitomized in and fought for in the books
C. Wright Mills and this must determine their over-all
political evaluation" (Aptheker, 1960: 87-88). Sigler finds
out that Mills, as both a post-Marxian and a post-Weberian,
-
was a of democracy which he wanted to preserve and
refine; as a social theorist Mills was "the outstanding recent
--
exponent of radical-reformist social science" (Sigler, 1966:
46) . Should he then be recognized as the inspiring fount of
radical sociology; Translating Mills' message into tasks of
sociological commitment Szymanski defends: "The radical
sociologist must serve as a constant social critic. He must
10
incorporate into his life work an incessant critique of the
dominant institutional structure to the extent that it
frustrates man's human and material needs and crushes man's
potentiality.
to relate people's personal troubles and day-to-day concerns

to the dynamics of social structures, thus translating them
into political issues" (1970: 9-10). In view of their stages
of economic development together with related issues, both
.. the postindustrial and the industrialLzing nations are now
exhibiting symptoms of structural strains. Translated into
the individual's problems, the structural strains become what
Mills calls personal troubles. If this be so, sociology then
takes on a humanistic and liberating role. This means that,
as Rex points out, "the whole humane purpose of sociology
is to take these 'private troubles' seriously by tracing
them to their roots, even if this means being criticised for
not dealing with immediate problems of suffering" (1974: x).
Is it true, therefore, that Mills' contributions lie in giv-
ing a human content to sociology's themes? Or, finally, can
it be said that Mills' importance is because of his personal
thrusts of "a unified style of life, one that would bring
together thought and action, power and reflection, as few
in tellec tuals se emed to be capable of doing?" Th e scar
Mills left on the map of modern sociology, defeating his
premature death, continues to scintillate. He was an intellec-
tual maverick, a political radical neither deterred by os-
11
tracism and alienating hostility nor ever exalted by honor-
ific status bestowals of any sort. A tough-minded rebel
throughout his life, Mills never lost the muckracker's zeal
to expose and blast the ideological superstructure of con-
sensual sociology of neo-liberal myths and rationalizations.
Is this portrait a reason for which the posterity should
remember Mills? Howe remembers Mills as a Promethean person-
ality, "a man of great seriousness if only fragmentary
achievement, a natural rebel at a time when most intellectuals
were taking to cover, a kind and ambitious mind that had the
courage to undertake too much Compared to shilly-shally-
ing of his academic colleagues, this Mills seems a great
giant. For it is true that some of them can point to work
more neatly rounded and firmly structured than the achieve-
ment of Mills. What is the measure of their success against
the tragic power of his failure" (1966: 252) ? Despite
ambiguities, oversimplifications or contradictions, Mills'
contributions to sociology are well recognized. His legacy
definitely stands above and transcends discoverable inade-
quacies in his sociology. In brief, Mills as a political
sociologist gave, in the words of Spinard, "enough that was
valuable to make us all, if we want to think and act intelli-
gently and responsibly in the political world, somewhat
Millsean" (1966: 57).
In a profound sense, truth always remains elusive
indicating a perennial gap between search and success. From
12
this point of view, all the above-mentioned portrayals may
be considered in fact a multitude of intellectual endeavors
to approach Mills--the man and the sociologist--and to evalu-
ate his contributions. In bringing all these perspectives
together in review I do not intend to contest their valid-
ity, disprove them and then make my own revelations hither-
to unknown. Instead, I intend to pursue, in my work, the
issue even further, rather in a different way. Mills con-
tributed in several ways. For example, he constructed his
\ I
own radical sociology in course of his debates with grand
theory and abstracted empiricism. He fought against anti-
------------
ideologists and gave a Leftist orientation to sociological
studies. He deplored for the rise of the power elite, mass
society or alienation. But, above all, he also envisioned
a humanistic radical sociology, contributed to sociology of /
- ----------------------._--------_._--.--- -------
knowledge, and revised and/or stood for democracy and liber-

alism. These are leading aspects of Mills' sociology, and
the avowed objective of this present study is to systematize
and critically evaluate Mills 'contributions to these themes
of sociology, having considered him basically a political
sociologist par excellence.
2
I prefer to call Mills a political sociologist,
specifically in the political sociological tradition of Karl
Marx (1818-1883) and Max Weber (1964-1920) and definitely
without ignoring the influences of others on him. The In-
separability of the social and the political goes back to
the days of Aristotle, the grandmaster of modern politics.
13
This tradition of intrinsic inseparability continued to flow
more or less in a historical sequence only to be interrupted
seriously by Machiavelli (1469-1527) who opted for Politik
rather than Staatslehre and sharply distinguished between
Realpolitik and Ecclesiastical politics. Whereas both Bodin
(1530-1596) and Montesquieu (1689-1755) renewed the tra.di-
tion, it suffered a halt again in Hegel (1776-1831), al-
though his metaphysical idealism postulated eventual con-
summation of the civil society in the State. But it was Marx
and Weber who struck the keynote of modern political socio-
logy, restoring the lost linkage between the social values
and social science regardless of contrary purposes in their
respective minds. As Runciman suggests, speaking of the
inseparability of the social and the political: "For Marx,
social science and social values are mutually involved be-
cause all social thought is liable to be (in his sense of
the term) 'ideological'; for Weber, they are involved be-
cause the social sciences must be 'value-relevant' although
this does not prevent the conduct of an actual sociological
investigation being 'value-free!!' (1963: 53). In Mills this
classic tradition flows, occupying a unique place between
Marx's political tradition of sociology and Weber's socio-
logical tradition of politics. Whether it is a theoretical
position of precarious balance and stabilized uneasiness in
Mills or how he moves back and forth in between them itself
poses a different problem which still needs to be answered.
3
14
In the meanwhile what I call Mills' political sociology re-
presents a fruitful intersection between the social and the
political and thus makes strongly a valid plea to redirect
sociological imagination--its theory, research and practice--
to the accomplishment of politically defined goals. Put
otherwise, the relevance of Mills lies in his efforts to re-
vitalize sociology in political terms and also to unite poli-
tics and sociology into a common.area of intellectual explor-
. ation by social scientists. From another perspective, the
political significance of Mills' political sociology may be
understood in the background of predominant social science
exercises around the decade of the fifties in America. As
one commentator describes the situation: "Sociologists are
hot on the trail of new discoveries in American social
political scientists are busily assuring us that
the two-party system is an inevitable ingredient of American
politics; economists are celebrating America's new affluence;
socialism is treated as a dead dog, buried for all time
(thank God) in an enormous Princeton study" (Martinson, 1960:
14) . It was in this academic environment of pseudo-politics
that Mills spoke of the role of sociology in political terms.
However, for Mills, how_does"the political become the social? if
Let him speak for himself:
The shaping of the society we shall live In and
the manner in which we shall live in it are in-
creasingly political. And this society includes
the realms of intellect and of personal morals.
If we demand that these realms be geared to our
activities which make a public difference, then
personal morals and political interests
become closely related; any philosophy that
is not a personal escape involves taking a
political stand. If this is true, it
places great responsibility upon our poli-
tical thinking. Because of the expanded
reach of politics, it is our own personal
style of life and reflection we are think-
ing about when we think about politics
(PPP: 299).
15
In this statement, which he made as far back as 1944, Mills
comes very close to Weber who once made this remark: IlAll
ultimate questions without eception are touched by political
events, even if the latter appears to be superficial
ll
(quoted
in Mayer, 1956: 15). Mills was predominantly a sociologist
by training as well as by profession. When he coined the
term Il soc iological imagination
ll
he admits that he did not
intend lito suggest merely the academic discipline of 'socio-
logy'" (SI: 19 footnote). Nevertheless he, uses the term
inter alia, he was primarily a sociologist. IlEvery
cobbler thinks leather is the only thing, and for better or
worse, I am a sociologist
ll
(SI: 19 footnote). Despite his
self designation as a sociologist, it is neither unwarranted
nor unjustified to call him a political sociologist because
of the obvious political meaningfulness in which Mills con-
celves the substance of his sociology. Stated otherwise,
this is to suggest that Mills' sociology is predominantly
political sociology which seeks to study social structural
problems in teIDms of their political repercussions on the life
fates of individuals. Needless also to suggest, his is a
political sociology and as such it offers a political critique
of advanced capitalist society.
16
There is another reason which supports my decision
to treat Mills' sociology as political sociology. Whether
regarded as a political intellectual, intellectually a
political rebel, an ideologist, a politically-oriented
sociological social psychologist, a sociologist or even a
democrat, Mills was basically a political man, a homo
politicus. Beneath all concerns of his sociological imagina-
tion or social science, this remains the all-pervasive fact
of his life. Mannheim said in his Ideology and Utopia:
"Whatever your interests, they are your interests as a
political person, but the fact that you have this or that
set of interests implies also that you must do this or that
to realize them, and that you must knDw the s p e ~ i f i posi-
tion you occupy in the whole social process" (1936: 163).
Mills' life concerns are a fulfillment of this Mannheimian
dictum as Mills reverberated in later years of his life. Al-
though Weber started with different premises, this is also
Weber's position, and, like Weber's, Mills I political socio-
logy is a sociology of a political man. He is indeed a
political man by self affirmation, not by anybody's imputa-
tion. In commenting upon the criticisms made against his
The Power Elite, which was in effect "a blow at the smooth
certainties and agreeable formulas that now make up the con-
tent of liberalism," Mills makes no wriggling to point out:
Yes, I do feel that I stand, with most other
people, outside the major history-making forces
of my epoch, but at the same time I feel that I
am among those who take the consequences of
these forces. That
distinction between
is one major reason
is why I do not make a rigid
"life and history," and that
why I am a political man.
I
,.
F
,j No one is outside society; the question is
where you stand within it (Mills, 1957: 30)
17
As a political man, intellectually and morally tied to demo-
cratic values of truth, reason and freedom, Mills confronted
"the greatest human default being commited by the privileged
in our times" at the bakc of which lie what he calls private
troubles and public issues. Mills' political awareness as
a social being is reminiscent of Aristotle's prophetic utter-
ance in The Politics, the magnum opus of modern political
science: "The man who is isolated--who is unable to share
the benefits of political association, or has no need to
share because he is already self-sufficient--is no part of
the polis, and must therefore be either a beast or a God"
(Aristotle, 1968: 6). Throughout his life, Mills remained
politically conscious, and the leading agency of his political
socialization was, among others, the trouble-ridden years of the
Second World War (cf. Gillam, 1966). While the issues of both
national and international politics strongly influenced the
development of Mills' political attitudes (cf. Gerth, 1962a,
1962b), it was, most importantly, the outbreak of World War
II that threw him the challenge to think and act politically
and to profess radically.4 Mills was awakened to the new
realities of power and pOlitics of the modern industrial
society only in the forties although the fact remains un-
erringly evident that his subsequent years were marked by
ever increasing political awareness in sociological vocation.
At this point I would like to point out that any
18
specific discussion on Mills' power elite has been excluded,
somewhat deliberately, from the purview of the present work.
In this two reasons are responsible for my decision. First,
much work has already been done on this aspect of Mills'
5
political sociology. It is also my impression that absence
of any specific discussion on this aspect does not seriously
affect my treatment of his other contributions especially
because I have in taken due note of this concept through-
out the work as and when necessary. Second, I am of the
opinion that it is quite possible to approach Mills and
evaluate his other contributions without necessarily concen-
trating on the theme of power elite. In fact, those who
evaluate Mills' position or his political sociology in terms
of power or power elite tend to underemphasize his
other aspects of political sociology. This is, however, not
to suggest that discussion of power elite thesis is unnecess-
ary in or irrelevant to my assessment of Mills' contributions.
Neither is it to undermine or undervalue its importance in
the study of his political sociology. What is suggested here
is that, on the contrary, Mills
./
can be credited for having en-"
riched many other areas of sociology. In other words, Mills'
contributions do not exhaust what he said about the rise of
power elite in America. Even if it is assumed that he has
overemphasized power aspects in sociology, I take the posi-
tion that Mills, by his use of the concepts of power or power
elite, contributed to the relative politicization of socio-
logy. Also, he made appreciable use of power elite theory
19
as heuristic device in order to articulate his concerns for
the decline of democracy and democratic institutions In
America.
This aspect may be illustrated in some more detail.
Theorists like Horowitz, Gillam and Cuzzort, to cite three
among many others, think that Mills' sociology revolves around
the dimension of power, and this explains both political sig-
nificance and political orientations of his sociology.
Horowitz argues, "In short, the settlement of the sociological
question of how men interact, immediately and directly entails
research into questions of superordination and subordination,
elites and masses, rulers and ruled, in-groups and out-groups,
and members and non-members The study of power is the
beginning of the sociological wisdom--but the essence of that
wisdom resides in men. Hence the existence of power is a
less significant area of study than the human uses made of
power.
by it.
Men define power; they are not necessarily defined
This, at any rate, is the liberating task of the social
sciences" (1969a: 9, II).
The Intellectual as Rebel:
In his unpublished Master's thesis,
C. Wright Mills 1916-1946, Gillam
seems to have emphasized the "power" aspect in the political
orientatioris of Mills' sociology. As evident by t ~ title
of the thesis, Gillam purported to understand "the mind" of
Mills as a "paradoxical individual," and so he was led "back
to his formative years." In connection with Mills' criticism
of Dei'ley on grounds of the latter's failure to "confront the
20
the problem of power" in modern industrial societies, Gillam
points out that there are "two elements which would dominate
the course of Mills' own intellectual odyssey--his sometimes
agonizing efforts fully to know his every hidden value, and
a concomitant obsession with the problem of power in modern
society" (1966: 67).6 Elsewhere, in tracing the roots of
Mills' radicalism, he makes this observation: "Mills, how-
ever, while he sometimes feared power and always viewed it
. with suspicion, was ultimately concerned with using it for
his own purposes" (Gillam, 1966: 130). Cuzzort's evaluation
is this: "Mills was concerned with one aspect of society
which never loses its significance--the question of power.
His work remains centered on power--the nature of power, the
distribution of power, the uses and abuses of power, the
power of organizations, the myths of power, the evolution of
power, the irrationality of power, and the means of observ-
ing and comprehending power in the vastness of modern
society" (1969: 134). Of these different perspectives,
Horowitz appears to have correctly indicated the role of
power in Mills' sociology. Gillam has overemphasized his
case and this exaggerates, I think, Mills' concern for power.
As far as Cuzzort is concerned, he undervalues the over-all
political contexts behind Mills' apparent reliance on the
concept of power or power elite as a heuristic device.
Generally speaking, there is little doubt that the power di-
mension is an indispensable, if not integral, component of
Mills' sociological system. But, to be sure, that is not all
21
that Mills' sociology stands for. What is postulated here and
to be elaborated throughout this work is that the dimension
of-power additionally adds political character to Mills'
leading sociological themes. ~ ~ ~ other words, the concept of
power has added political dimension to his sociology. "B u t
the truth", says Hiliband, "it was not so much by power that
v/
Hills was haunted as by powerlessness" (1965: 81). In view
of this, my position with regard to the role of power in
Hills' sociology is this: on the one hand, it not only en-
hances the political character of sociological themes but
also restores, to a great extent, the significance of power
in sociological analysis which was lost typically in the
decade of the fifties; on the other hand, Mills only employed
the concept of power as a heuristic device in order for high-
lighting the low ebb of America's democratic institutions.
That Hills' use of the concept of power adds poli-
tical dimension to his sociology may be illustrated from the
fact of its importance right in the discipline of political
science itself. From one point of view, all great political
thinkers have been aware not only of the coercive aspects of
power; "they have also taken cognizance of the possibility of
using power as an instrument by means of which other values
might be maximized, and the 'good life' brought into being"
(Lasswell and Kaplan, 1961: xiii). In their book, Power
and Society, Lasswell and Kaplan point out that "political
science, as an empirical discipline, is the study of the
shaping and sharing of power" (1961: xiv). Poulantzas, a
22
theorist in the Marxist tradition, recognizes that the prob-
lem of power is of "supreme importance for political theory"
(1973: 99). In this regard, by introducing his concept of
power or power elite into the arena of sociological debates,
Mills has made noteworthy contribution towards the develop-
ment of political sociology. From another point of view,
the concept of power implies also a social process and, as
such, its political aspect cannot be differentiated from its
social aspect. To be specific, a political process is also
a social process politically considered. Power is as much
social as it is political. "The power process is not a
distinct and separable part of the social process but only
the political aspect of an interactive whole" (Lasswell and
Kaplan, 1961: xvii). Viewed in this light, Mills' use ofl
the concept serves an important purpose in studying the
political and the social structures of American society. By
its use, he exhibited the structural consequences, in socio-
logical and social psychological t@rmg and in his diseu8siens
of mass society and alienation especially, of power elite as
an independent variable in all its major aspects. Looking
sociologically at power, the central concept of politics,
Mills suggests how the study of society and polity through
the instrumentality of this concept could be made theoretical-
ly possible and practically relevant. But this is not to say
that Mills' use of the concept is beyond controversial limits.
What is significant is that it means a fruitful beginning,
not at an interdisciplinary endeavor only, but in the study
23
of what I call political sociology. From this focal point,
political so_<:!.i,()logy is concerned with "who the power holders
-- - - ~ - - --.-------_._--- . ~ ~ . ~ ~ - - - - . - . - . . , - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
are, how they deal with social issues, why they follow a
particular course of action, what kinds of challenges exist
to their prerogatives, and how conflicts, if they exist, are
resolved. These are issues of great consequence to all our
lives. Political sociology, therefore, is not esoteric
field, of interest only to specialists, but should speak to
all concerned with the structuring of power in our society"
(Chasin and Chasin, 1974: 2). What is true, therefore, is
that Mills' sociology does recognize both the social and
the political aspects of the same social reality of every day
life. In a similar way, Mills accepts that politics is in-
timately connected with power phenomena. Setting forth
his position in unmistakably clear terms Mills' goes on to
say, "There are those, of course, who deny that politics has
to do with a struggle for power but they are of no direct
concern to politics as we know it or can imagine it" (PPP: 212).
This should be taken as more than a mere statement of a socio-
logist about his political concern for the role of power in
the study of social structure. From sociology's point of
view, Mills' treatment of power has had a profound impact on
the politicization of sociology and also the evolution of
political sociology itself. As for Mills, he realized the
political implications of "power" in sociological studies as
early as 1942. But it is interesting to note that "neither
Park Burgess; Introduction to the Science of Sociology, which
24
was the standard introductory text in the 1920's and 1930's,
nor Ogburn and Nimkoff's Sociology, which was probably the
widely read text during the 1940's and 1950's, even
1 is t the t e r m ' power' in the i r in d e xes. I' COl sen, 1 9 7 0: x).
The advent of Mills, coupled with a host of empirical research
studies of power structures in communities and organizations,
provided the much-needed impetus towards the development of
political sociology in the decade of the 1960s.
r
! Though power is the major avenue through which institution-
al structures of the political society may be studied, where
does power come from? In this Mills followed the sociological
tradition of Weber. If power is an important variable in
the study of political sociology, it is the state, the poli-
tical society, which becomes all the more important since the
nature, character, scope and consequences of power depends
on the diverse structural contexts and components of the
political organization called 'State'. Mills' realization
of the as the highest political or-
.---.....,-----
ganization monopolizing all sources of legitimate violence,
a conception that precisely reflects the impact of the Weber-
ian heritage on him, is contained in the article, "A Marx
for the Managers", written with Hans Gerth in 1942. In this
article he carried out a searching criticism of James Burn-
ham's The Managerial Revolution. In this book Burnham ad-
vances the thesis that a managerial society will supersede
through war and revolution both capitalism and socialism be-
25
cause of increasing indispensability of_the new managerial
class as experts and administrative executives.
In reviewing Burnham's thesis, Mills strongly contends that
"the chances at political power for those filling technically
indispensable roles is not a function of their technical
roles but of their class position and political affiliations,
whatever that may be" (PPP: 61). He, therefore, vehemently
refutes Burnham's assumption that "the technical indispens-
ability of certain functions in a social structure are taken
ipso facto as a prospective claim for political power" (PPP: 57).
Alternatively Mills suggested:
The question is: Where is the power? The
answer is: It is the structure of domination,
which is the state with its monopoly of phys-
ical force, and fused within it the industrial-
ists and their agrarian colleagues (PPP: 60).
Though Mills stated this In the immediate context of the Nazi
State, it is fascinating to note him saying that "the task
of understanding what is happening in the world today involves
a comprehension of such basic issues as the retention or a-
bolition of private property, the structure of classes,
possible political and social movements, and of war" (PPP: 68).
As a matter of fact, Mills' use of power to dissect the insti-
tutional structures of society is inextricably bound up with
his notion of politics the meaning of which consists "in
understanding authority," the legitimated power involving
voluntary obedience of the ruled to the ruler. In their turn,
both power and politics are facts of state. For Mills, it
was the state in the industrial epoch of advanced capitalism.
26
To raise such a question as "where is the power" meant a
real beginning in Mills' intellectual odyssey as a political
sociologist. On the one hand, it signifies his realization
of the essence of political process in power; on the other
hand, it enabled him to locate the habitat of power in the
state as the social structure of domination, just as Wber
did when he spoke of "Politics as a vocation" in a speech
at Munich University in 1918.
This brings us to the crucial question Mills raised
in connection with the role of power in modern industrial
society. He asked: "Whose power and for what ends" Cess:
195)? The general problem of politics, in general of his
political sociology, is then the explanation of varying
,
\./
distributions of power and obedience. But power is not, and
cannot be, an end but simply a means and an avenue to discern
historical changes overtaking self, society and polity in
/ the wake of industrialization, bureaucratization and central-
izing tendencies in modern times. As far as Mills is con-
cerned, he was aware of the limits of power in any fruitful
analysis of the structural problems of society. To quote
Mills:
In reflecting upon the basic transformations of
twentieth-century societies, we may first examine
those institutional orders in which the distribu-
tion of power is most v i s i b l ~ We do not intend
by this approach to imply that "power" is the
highest value, for men in general or for us; it
is simply expedient to approach modern social
structures from this point of view, for it is
from this vantage point that we may best hope to
understand the ground swell of our age Cess: 456)
7
27
In terms of this it seems clear, as I understand, that Mills'
evolution into a political sociologist does not coincide
with his discovery of "the power elite" In the institutional-
structural trends in American society. In fact those who
exaggerate his uses of power concept really underemphasize
other aspects of Mills' political sociology. As a matter of
fact, these other aspects, which constitute the substance of
the present work, are equally, if not more, important in any
attempt to evaluate his over-all contributions. Repeatedly
Mills points out that "the idea of power elite is of course
an interpretation. It rests upon and it enables us to make
sense of major institutional trends, the social similarities
and psychological affinities of the men at the top. But the
idea is also based upon what has been happening on the middle
and lower levels of power .... " (pPP: 30). Yet from
another point of view Mills ,- analysis of the power elite is
a part of his political and intellectual concerns for what
is spoiling American democracy.S Elsewhere he specifically
pointed out the fOllowing:
-)
An attack on this power elite is also a fight I
for the democratic means of history-making. )
A fight for such means is necessary to any /
serious fight for peace; it is part of t h t ~
fight (CWT: 121).
If,'therefore, as Horowitz says, the study of power is the
beginning of sociological wisdom, then, it may be argued,
it is not definitely and ultimately the goal; neither is it
an end to which efforts of sociology, political sociology or
any other social science as such need be directed. From this
28
vantage point, Mills does not falter to proclaim that his
basic point is always "the political role of social science
--what that role may be, how it is enacted, and how effective-
ly--this is relevant to the extent to which democracy pre-
vails" (SI: 189). To put him more succinctly:
it is precisely the job of liberal educ-
ation, and the political role of social science,
and its intellectual promise, to enable men to
transcend .... - fragmented and abstracted milieux:
to become aware of historical structures and of
their own place within them (SI: 189, footnote).
Coverage of the Work
As already indicated, in delineating the contours and
the content of this political sociology I have chosen selec-
tively some issues which I have deemed basically fundamental
to Mills' sociological system. My decision, involving un-
avoidably some amount of personal preference and understand-
ing, need not however be taken in absolute terms since, what-
v ~ ~ the criteria for choosing one set of issues rather than
another, Mills' ideas are so interrelated as to defy any
systematic scheme of classification. This is to suggest that
his sociological categories stand in complex relationship to
each other, and that all of them occur in one form or another
in the analysis of any specific aspect of his sociology. In
view of this the broad purpose of this work has been to present
his sociological system as a whole although this has been
done in terms of focussing on individual issues.
29
In chapters 2, 3 and 6 I discuss different aspects
of Mills' political sociology as such. In chapters 2 and
3 I discuss how his political sociology g t h e ~ s its form
and content in the context of its theoretical debates with
grand theory and abstracted empiricism, which claimed legi-
timate authority to have the final say over the defining
contours of all theory and research in sociology until the
advent of Mills in the decade of the fifties when he firmly
put forward an alternative conception, variously designated
as "radical sociology", "new sociology", or "humanistic
3''
" ,
sociology".9 While these two chapters serve to outline
:t'
Mills' contributions to various general aspects of socio-
logy including its theoretical emphasis and research orien-
tations, in chapter 6 I focus on the political aspects and
the political goals of his sociology. It is essentially a
problem centered sociology conceived in terms of a reaffirm-
ation of faith in political liberalism. Though conceived
immediately to highlight private troubles and public issues,
Mills' political sociology envisages reconstruction of a
democratic society through an appeal for restoration of
reason and freedom for all in the society. In chapters 1+
and 5, wherein I discuss Mills' assumptions about mass
society and alienation, contain descriptions of how individ-
uals fell into the grip of private troubles or public issues
due to continuing disappearance of reason and freedom from
the society. Mills' ideological orientations and political
30
inclinations, as manifest in the totality of his counter
conception of sociology, have constituted the general themes
of chapters 7 and 8. Mills was not only a sociological
ideologist, and as sociological ideologist he was, in his own ~
unique way, a champion of new Leftism. It is needless to
say that his protest against Bell's thesis of the end of
ideology has become the cornerstone of sociological radical-
ism of his later life. Whereas these aspects are the substance
of chapter 7, the specific concern in chapter 8 has been to
establish Mills as a liberal democrat. Since I suggest that
Mills' brand of pOlitical sociology is essentially a liberal
political sociology, I have found it necessary to catalogue
the elements of democratic liberalism for which Mills stood for
throughout his life. My own finding is that Mills' position is
~ e r y much comparable to that of Mill, the best theoretical
representative of liberal democracy. My conclusions, con-
tained in chapter 9, consist of two parts. The first part
presents a sUmmary or rindings as to my assessment of Mills'
contributions. The other part focuses on the shortcomings
of Mills' political sociology and suggests some measures by
which its theoretical and methodological deficiencies can be
remedied.
A Note on the Method and Limitations of the Work
In pursuing the present work I have relied on what
Mills "called "intellectual craftsmanship." Bbradly speaking,
this concept of intellectual craftsmanship underlies my own
research procedure, or "method
ll
as it may be called. Put
very briefly, it demands, among others, the following pre-
requisites.
lO
Avoid any rigid set of procedures. Above all,
seek to develop and to use the sociological
imagination. Avoid the fetishism of. method
and technique. Urge the rehabilitation of
the unpretentious intellectual craftsman, and
try to become such a craftsman yourself. Let
every man be his own methodologist; let every
man be his own theorist; let theory and method
become part of the practice of a craft
(51: 224).
31
In terms of these assumptions of intellectual craftsmanship,
which have influenced my own methodological consciousness, I
have tried to examine, analyse and systematize basic ideas
or categories of Mills' political sociology. Mills' concept
of intellectual craftsmanship is meaningful in the sense of
a method of analysis the purpose of which is to explain some-
thing or to increase
'/
\,
their understanding. ~ ~ h i l not all
sociologists are methodologists (cf. Becker, 1970: 3),
methods are undeniably essential in the pursuit of socio-
logical knowledge. As Mills said, "Statements of method
promise to guide us to better ways of studying something, often
in fact of studying almost anything" (51: 122).\ So far so
good. In my own work, I have taken the point of view that
method is a tool, a means of raising certain worthwhile issues
and of explaining them in order to reach certain conclusions
which might follow from the findings. The criteria for rais-
ing issues or the modes of answering and explaining them
32
differ from sociologist to sociologist. Nevertheless, this
study has chosen some issues, having assumed that they pre-
sent a theoretical system of interrelated ideas. The ques-
tion of any rigid adherence to any specific scientific method
has been avoided because of the fact that sociology is both
"a humanistic and scientific discipline" (Zetterberg, 1965:
20) . For me, method has to do, as Mills said, "with how
to ask and answer questions with some assurance that the
answers are more or less durable" (SI: 120). In my effort to
avoid any rigid adherence to method, I have tried to be
guided by what Mills calls the sociological imagination.
ll
Stated otherwise, the function of the sociological imagina-
tion; in addition it has been conceived as a guiding prin-
ciple that gives order to theory, methodology and research
process.
rules:
In my work I have adhered to the following ground
The sociological imagination demands varia-
bility in the research process. The processes
by which sociology is should not be made
too rigorous; an open mind is required. What
some regard as doctrinaire will be challenged
by others and, therefore, methodological and
theoretical principles must always be evaluated
in terms of the sociological imagination (Denzin,
1973: 6).
As far as the theoretical perspective of this work is con-
cern ed, I have looked to and have utilized of \
It has been used as a frame of _.
ence, as a kind of perspective or orientation in my examina-
tion and explanation of the issues concerned. Although
33
Manheim is generally associated with the development of the
sociology of knowledge area, it has a rich but widely diver-
sified origin.
12
But, it must be noted, the scientific
status of the sociology of knowledge is still a matter of
debate in spite of the fact that there are many sociologists
who are urging for its development and employment in the
sociological analysis.
13
Without entering into controversies
as to this, i.e., the scientific status of the sociology of
knowledge, let me state in broad terms in which I have used
this as the theoretical point of research orientation. My
own understanding isthat, put in the words of Jarvie, "we
do not acquire our knowledge, opinions and beliefs in a v/
vacuum, but in a social and political atmosphere; that what
we take to be true, and especially what we take to be ob-
viously true, is conditioned by these social and political
surroundings, and especially by our social and political
interests" (1972: 131). To this assumption it must also
be added that knowledge has its GFigin in the seeial and
material bases the exploration of which falls within the
tasks of the sociology of knowledge. Obviously this approach
conceives the society as a dynamic concept and steers its
way through conflicting viewpoints. As one contemporary
sociologist states: "For its vitality as an intellectual
exercise, the sociology of knowledge posits a society of
diverse and diverging viewpoints, intellectually rent into
ideological camps providing, on the one hand, justification
for the maintenance of the status quo and propounding, on
34
the other hand, dreams and schemes of future utopias"
(Shaskolsky, 1970. 6). While the truth orfalsity,correct-
ness or incorrectness, validity or invalidity of my findings
is left to the readers, this study has in general attempted
to pursue an objective and detached analysis. Regardless of
whether or not this stand has succeeded. I have tried to
follow what Hughes advised to all researchers: "I believe
those sociologists who will contribute most to the funda-
mental, comparative and theoretical understanding of human
society and of any of its problems are those deeply concern-
ed with it as to need a desparate, almost fanatical detach-
ment from which to see it in full perspective" (Hughes,
1971: 495).
Finally, few words need to be said with regard to
some limitations of this work. The most important of all
limitations that might be found inherent to this work is that
it remains far from being a complete study by itself. The
existing literature on Mills or concerning his life and works
is terrifyingly vast and is continuously growing.
tion, Mills himself was also a voluminous writer.
In addi-
For ob-
vious reasons, therefore, not all but only chosen few aspects
that are politically and sociologicallY relevant have been
selected for specific analysis in this study. Since disser-
tations for the Master's degree requirement are necessarily
of narrow scope my work, being conceived as an attempt to
present Mills' contributions as a theoretical system, appears
somewhat ambitious. I have no hesitation to admit this al-
35
though I have continuously struggled with the constraint of
time which deprived me of more concentration and further
critical analysis in my work. I urge the readers to consider
this work as a necessary preliminary study of i l l s ~ and not
a decisive one which I hope to undertake in the near future.
Another limitation of this work relates to the source of
data. In general, the data for this work have been mainly
collected from library sources. These data constitute the
published works of Mills, works published about him, and
other works that have been found to have a bearing on Mills
and his era or his contemporaries. But I have not been able,
primarily because of monetary and time constraints, to con-
sult and examine Mills' unpublished papers some of which
have been retained by Mrs. Yaroslava Mills, while others are
now lying with the University of Texas.
14
Since these papers
are "primarily academic in nature and weighted toward the
middle and later years of Mills' life" (Gillam, 1966: 152),
I presume that they might have a bearing on my information
of Mills' sources of or views on sociological concepts. The
readers are therefore forwarned of some inadequacies of this
work although, I suppose, these unpublished works of Mills
may not, unless otherwise shown, significantly change the
main theoretical thrusts or arguments of his political socio-
logy. The main reason for this assumption is that Mills'
own published writings are clearly indicative of what he has
to say, and that published works of others concerning his
sociology are also clear in their respective interpretations
36
or emphases. It is my feeling that I have covered, as much
as I can, the substantive information contained in the
available published sources. However, this should not be
construed as a justification of my lapses which this work
might suffer from.
37
Notes
1. A clear evidence of increasing sociological interest in
Mills' work can be illustrated by drawing attention,
besides existing voluminous literature, to the number
of theses already done on different aspects of his
sociology. See Gillam (1966), Cleere (1971), Warner
(1972), Bray (1973), Kraetzer (1975), Berkowitz (1976)
2. It must be noted that most of the contemporary review-
ers of Mills are in general agreement over this char-
acterization. See, for example, Spinard (1966), Dom-
hoff (1969), Bray (1973), etc.
3. My own impression is that Mills, in spite of his serious
plea for incorporation of what he calls "plain marxism"
into social science, is more Weberian than Marxian. In
all his essential ideas, e.g., power, power elite, poli-
tics, state, stratification, society, bureaucracy or
marxism, Mills is far more close(r'"\to Weber than to Marx.
To start wTth, see MlIls(FMW: 46-0::50; 1963); Sharp (1960),
Zeitlin (1971), Kozyr-Kowalski (1968), Mayer (1975),
Sigler (1966), Berkowitz (1976: 73-89).
4. However, this political evolution of Mills was not con-
tinuous but rather abrupt. See Scimecca (1977:12).
5. For example, see especially Domhoff and Ballard (1969),
Crockett (1970), Gillam (1971), and Berkowitz (1976).
6. Italics added. Gillam quotes William Miller in order to
point out that the theme of Mills' life was "the in-
tellect as a source and engine of power (H)e was a
self-conscious studerrt of power, and of men of power, new
or old; he worked on power as an intellectual category.
And he was devoted to his intellectual work; one should
never forget that. And yet he studied power with the
hope and anticipation of getting to use it as he under-
stood it " (See Gillam (1966: 68).
7. Italics added.
8. For a powerful but negative assessment of Mills' views
on lithe spoiling of American democracy," see Plamenatz
(1973: 34-51, 130-47).
9. Towards the end of the decade of the 1950s, Davis called
for an abandonment of "functional analysis" as a special
method or body of theory, and argued that structural-
functional analysis was in effect synonymous with
sociological analysis. IIIf the most frequent con-
ceptions of functionalism make it, in effect, in-
clusive of sociological analysis but exclusive of
reductionism and sheer description, then the scien-
tific problems of functional analysis are the same
as those of sociology in general" (Davis, 1959: 762)
See also Warshay (1975: 85) who designates the period
between 1950 and 1963 as "Theory-Method Era".
10. For an elaboration of other fundamentals of this con-
cept, see Mills' essay "On Intellectual Craftsmanship"
in his The Sociological Imagination.
38
11. For a discussion of the scope and usefulness of Mills'
concept of the sociological imagination, see chapter 3.
12. See, for example, Curtis and Petras (1970); also
Stark (1958).
13. For leading criticism of the sociology of knowledge,
see Popper (1957, 1959, 1962, 1972). For a brief criti-
cism of Popper and an argument for the relevance of the
sociology of knowledge as a fruitful orientation in
sociological research, see Sjoberg and Nett (1968: 39-69).
They argue that if the assumption that knowledge is
superior to ignorance is accepted, then the sociology of
knowledge perspective "can be employed as a tool to
further rationality as opposed to irrationality. View-
ed as a methodological tool, the sociology of knowledge
perspective not only prevents any lapse into an anti-
scientific, historicist position but permits one to
avoid, at least to a degree, becoming captive of one's
own time and place" (Sjoberg and Nett, 1968: 11-12).
14. This information is provided by Gillam (1966: 152).
CHAPTER TWO
Parsons and Mills: A Comparison
Introduction
Throughout the decade of the 1950s the mainstream
sociology, in its twill aspects of grand theory and abstract-
ed empiricism, dominated the sociological scenario practi-
cally without any rival to challenge its hegemonic control.
Both grand theory and abstracted empiricism constituted its
life essence. It claimed legitimate authority to have the
final say over the defining contours of all theory and re-
search in sociology until especially when Mills firmly put
forward an alternative conception, variously designated as
"new sociology", "radical sociology" or "humanistic socio-
logy."l Against this backdrop my purpose in the two follow-
ing chapters, 2 and 3, is to undertake an examination of
Mills' critique of the Parsonian sociology and an assessment
of his views on sociological methodology.
Why Parsons?
Of the numerous social scientists, both within and
outside of America, Mills launched one of the earliest and
probably the bitterest attack against Talcott Parsons, the
high-priest of what has been generally known in sociology
39
40
as "functionalism", "structural-functional approach" or
"grand theory" in Mills' derogatory labelling. To start
with, the basic question, which remains to be answered is
why Mills picked up Parsons, not, for example, Merton "whose
disservice to sociology has been more insidious than that
of Talcott Parsons because, free from the monu-
mental muddle-headedness, he was able to sterilize the
ject matter without falling into absurdity" (Andreski, 1973:
. 56-57). Another related question is whether Mills' almost
exclusive focus on The Social System (1951) has degenerated
into an one-sided critique of Parsons. On both counts
Mills' position, I think, seems justified in view of the
theoretical and practical ipfluence exerted by Parsons' con-
ceptual and methodological position upon innumerable ad-
herents of the structural functional approach.
Compared to The Structure of Social Action (1937),
the major work of Parsons' first phase in the intellectual
career when he formulated various elements of a much-publicized
voluntaristic theory of action, the publication of The Social
System in 1951 marks the beginning of the second phase, pro-
bably and significantly the last one, where Parsons shifted
his focus to the analysis of large scale social systems and
detailed elaboration and further sophistication of the cate-
gories of his action theory. Closely following its heels
were his Toward a General Theory of Action (1951) and Working
Papers in the Theory of Action (1953), both of which were
41
outputs of collaborative effort. An interesting point to
be noted here is that the publication of Working Papers was
welcomed by Lundberg (1956a), a rigorous follower of the
positivist tradition of Dodd, as a new positive methodological
development in sociology.2 However in all three very signi-
ficant publications one can easily discover Parsons' effort
to develop a general conceptual scheme in terms of a set of
concepts and categories that would enable, while codifying
. the empirical data, sociology to benefit from a theoretical
framework to be developed by other sociologists through care-
ful but systematic use of Parsons and his other associates'
endeavours to establish a sociological science. This is to
say practically that, despite Parsons' diversified and wide
ranging areas of interest, one can see without much effort
certain persistent themes and problems in all his writings,
including those not specifically mentioned. Mitchell, a
rather sympathetic commentator on Parsons, affirms this:
Perhaps the most persistent and generally noted
theme has been his lifetime dedication to theory
and to the task of elaborating a "logically
articulated conceptual scheme" which will
allow social scientists, generally, a means of
organizing their collective product and direct
them into fruitful areas of research. This has
been the explicit goal and strategy in each of
his books (Mitchell, 1967: 4).
If this be so and is accepted, there remains little doubt as
to Mills' propriety to choose specifically The Social System
as the focal point of his critique. For instance, in the
afore-mentioned book Parsons admittedly undertook an attempt
42
"to present a logically articulated conceptual schemel! (1964a:
536) . In later years Parsons consistently pursued the theme,
reiterating his position forcefully in 1959 when he said
this: "As the sciences of behavior mature as sciences, they
will not continue to be the province of a plurality of com-
peting 'schools' of theoretical interpretation, but they will
tend to converge on a logically integrated, but also highly
differentiated, conceptual scheme" (quoted in Mitchell,
1967: 5). Related to Parsons' concern for a unified conceptual
scheme, it is worthwhile to outline his methodological posi-
tion, especially his views on the role of values in a science,
which, I think, only paralleled abstracted empiricism in its
high esteem for the method of physical sciences. In 1935
he stated his position clearly:
Like most Americans growing up in the social
sciences since the War, my starting-point has
been what may be broadly called the "positivis-
tic" movement in those fields--the tendency to
imitate the physical sciences and to make phy-
sical science the of all things
.... The task of sociology, as of other social
sciences, I consider to be strictly scientific
--the attainment of systematic theoretical
understanding of empirical fact I stand
squarely on the platform of science (Parsons,
1935: 313-14,316).
Later, in 1959, the year which witnessed the pUblication of
Mills' The Sociological Imagination, Parsons formally acknow-
ledges that his position is grounded particularly upon Weber1s
views on the methodology of the social sciences and the SOClO-
logy of religion. He accepted the Weberian distinction be-
tween value-relevance (Wertbeziehung) and value-freedom
43
(Wertfreiheit). In his article, "An Approach to the Sociology
of Knowledge," he admits, in regard to the Weberian postulate
of-value relevance, that empirical generalizations about
society, however validated, are never completely independent
of the value perspective of the social
1970: 291). As to the other postulate of value freedom he
interprets the Weber ian position in another article, "Evalua-
tion and Objectivity in Social Science" (1964), by saying
that "it is not advocacy that the social scientist abstain
from all value commitments The point is rather than in
his role as a scientist a particular subvalue system must
be paramount for the investigator, one in which conceptual
clarity, consistency and generality on the one hand, and
empirical accuracy and verifiability on the other, are the
valued outputs of the process of investigation" (Parsons,
1968: 86). While the question as to why and under what
circumstances Weber made the dichotomy between Wertbeziehung
and Wertfreiheit elsewhere,3 for the time
being it seems legitimate, as did Mills in regard to abstract-
ed empiricists, to ask how far the Parsonian sociology pre-
serves its conformity to the ethical injunction of Weber.
Parsons proposes to distinguish between science and ideOlogy
on the analytical level. As to Wertbeziehung, his own version
of sociology reflects what he himself calls "particular
ideology," the ideological orientation which influences the
selection of some problem in preference to others for greater
emphasis and which thus neglects or plays down others. This
44
preference in selectivity, as he argues, "shades off into
distortion" (Parsons, 1970: 294). Interesting though,
Parsons seems to have never addressed himself to the "particu-
lar ideological" character of his own brand of sociology.
Remindful of the Millsian tradition, Zeitlin makes this
query. To quote him:
Has he confronted himself and asked whether
and in what degree his "scientific" statements
are characterized by "selectivity" and even
"distortion"; whether, and in what measure,
he has been yielding concessions to outside
orientations and interests? For if he has not
asked himself these questions, he has failed
to abide by the norms of "science" as voca-
tion (Zeitlin, 1973: 60).
In respect of the other canon of Weber's dichotomy,
one can raise similar issues. Does his own scientific socio-
logy contain the professed "conceptual clarity, consistency
and generality" or "empirical accuracy and verifiability"
as he suggested those as defining marks of the sociologist
in the role of a scientist? If not, as is truly the case,
the cult of dualism between fact and value, or knowledge and
interest, in the Parsonian sociology has been transformed
into a sacred doctrine of scientific objectivism as the
integral core of structural functional approach. To put my
own criticism in the words of a contemporary sociologist who
bears much Millsian tradition: "Their objectivism is gained
at the cost of reifying scientific knowledge and, consequent-
ly, mystifying its politically intended character and histori-
cal relationship to the
- . - - - - -- -- - - - 0 - - - - -- - ...... - - - - ...... - r -- .... - --- ..- - .....
production" (Horton, 1971: 178). There remains little doubt
45
as to why Mills' selection of Parsons, whose methodological
position provided a strong support to the abstracted empiri-
cists' scientism, is very much justified. Apart from Par-
son's theoretical, conceptual and methodological position
that Mills criticized in his claim for an alternative sDcio-
logy, he had in fact another equally important reason. Par-
sons' theoretical sociology, despite its many limitations,
coincided with the theoretical enterprise of American socio-
logy itself. "Few matched his classificatory diligence,
but many purveyed his sense. 'Structural' (or 'normative')
functionalism, as it carne to be called, was In the 19508 and
the early 1960s virtually coextensive with theory among Ameri-
can sociologists" (Hawthorn, 1976: 214). To be sure, there
are variations in theoretical adaptations of structural func-
tional approach among Parsons' adherents within the camp of
establishment sociology. Despite this fact, the singularity
of Parsons' prominence lies in over-all acceptance of his
syst8miG framework by innumerable socielogiats, no matter
whether they are his associates, colleagues or students.
For example, the list of his adherents is quite long; among
them are Marion J. Levy, Kingsley Davis, Robert K. Merton,
Neil J. Smelser, Charles Drekmier, Bert F. Hoselitz, S. N.
Eisenstadt, Winston White, Robert Bellah, Cliffort Geertz,
Albert Cohen, David Aberle, Bernard Berber, Renee Fox,
William Mitchell, Gabriel E. Almond, David E. Apter, Karl
Deutsch, and many others within sociology, anthropology and
political science. It is clear that even if Parsons lacks
the theoretical profundity of Weber, the revolutionary
chirisma of Marx, the lucidity of Freud or the causticity
of Veblen, he became the focal point of many sociologists,
both his proponents and opponents. Indubitably Parsons is
46
one of the very few sociologists who have deeply affected
theoretical and methodological developments of modern socio-
logy. "If ever a social theory seemed to grow only from
purely technical considerations internal to social theory,
as if born of an immaculate conception, it is the work of
Talcott Parsons" (Gouldner, 1970: 169). All this, therefore,
indicates why Mills, as did Gouldner later, focussed on
Parsons, considering him the best representative of the
establishment sociology.
Functions of Terminology
Next, the most fundamental aspect of Parsons' socio-
logy is his literary style, as Mills rightly pointed out.
Parsons has been, ln his own words, an "incurable theoreist."
Naturally the logical style of Parsons has raised more
questions, pointing ultimately to the ideological intent e ~
neath sociologically stated issues. Fletcher, though general-
ly accepting the main themes of Mills' The Sociological
Imagination, observes that "terminology is the most evident,
but surely the most trivial ground on which Parsons can be
criticised" (1960: 170).
Martindale suggests that "Parsons
wrote as he did by choice, that he developed a style as he
adapted to his purpose as was that of Mills to other ob-
47
jectives" (1975: 73). These two explanations are too simple
and do not reveal subterranean truths underlying the Parson-
ian sociology. The question is one of lack of substantive
issues in Parsons' sociology and of whether conceptualizing
problems is by itself worthwhile without necessary reference
to any description and explanation of concrete social events
and human action. If the purpose of the definition of the
concepts is to focus argument upon fact, to transform argu-
ment over terms into disagreements about fact, and thus to
open arguments to further inquiry, as Mills pointed out,
then Parsons' sociology is far beyond this, despite its
charms of pretentious language and sophisticated dressing up
of the subject matter almost to a mysterious level.
4
Most
often it is either a theoretical forest and "a jungle of
fine distinctions and intertwining classifications" (Devereux,
1961: 2), or a kind of sociological sport in which "methodo-
logy exercises its perverse influence by disguising itself
as a theory" (Louch, 1966: 11). Piercing through the subtle-
ties and obscurities of Parsons' language, Mills revealed
in his unique way the vacuity and relative barrenness of grand
sociology (SI: 25-33). But Mills was by no means alone to
point out this. To cite an example of how an outrageous
vocabulary can clothe 'the essential barrenness of the theory',
let me quote Louch who focuses his argument on Parsons'
48
article entitled "General Theory in Sociology" and published
in R. K. Merton and others' Sociology Today .
.... when the structure of the larger system
is undergoing a relatively continuous process
of change in the direction of increasing
differentiation, the mechanisms involved in
this change will, under certain circumstances,
operate to dichotomize the population of units
receiving the primary "real" output of the
focal system of reference and to produce an
orderly alternation of relative predominance
of the two nearly equal parts (Parsons, 1960a:
22)
Louch translates, so to say, and then comments:
That is: given social change in a democratic
society parties in power will tend to swing
from liberal to conservative and back again.
I do not know why such simpler formulations
will not do in place of the bewildering com-
plexity, unless it is that the terminnlogical
display clouds the paucity of information
(Louch, 1966: 14).
In other words, theory lacks explanatory p o w r ~ makes
description unnecessarily complex and is applied to cases
which are far from enlightening. Illustrating Parsons'
"nebulous verbosity" and his slippage into "the realm of
pure fancy completely out of touch with reality," Andreski
goes on to say, referring to his recent publication, Societies:
Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (1966), that "des-
pite the author's good intentions, what he says is sadly
lacking in clarity. Indeed he can make the simplest truth
appear unfa thomably obs cure" (1973: 60). Lack of substantive
content is one of the basic shortcomings which reduce the
grand theoretical sociology into what Mills calls "an arid
49
game of concepts." Much of what remains is sociological
commonplace. "In fact, many of the ideas of grand theorists,
when translated, are more or less standard ones available
in many text books" (SI: 29).
Black points to the same direction when he opines
that "on the whole, it seems to me, the component concepts of
Parsons' scheme are laymen's concepts in the thin disguise
of a technical-sounding terminology" (1961: 279). The grandoise
vocabulary, built upon endless elaborations of finer distinc-
tions, innumerable empirical generalizations and other con-
ceptual and theoretical exercises, speaks of emptiness,
rather than organizing a systematic effort to describe and
explain intelligibly human conduct and social issues. In a
very profound sense, grand theoretical sociology is locked
within itself. As Mills points out:
The basic cause of grand theory is the initial
choice of a level of thinking so general that
its practitioners cannot logically get down to
observation. They never, as grand theorists,
get down from the higher generalities to prob-
lems in their historical and structural contexts.
This absence of a firm sense of genuine problems,
in turn, makes for the unreality so noticeable
in their pages (SI: 33).
Relative Insignificance of Grand Sociology: Issues of Politics
Legitimation, Order, Change and Conflict
While the role of terminology in Parsons' sociology
is not so simple as to be explained away as a matter of
personal style or endeavor at theoretical abstraction to
picture reality, its more serious limitation is due to his
persistent insensitivity and apathy to concrete social and
political issues.
5
For him sociological theory is "that
aspect of the theory of social systems which is concerned
with the phenomena of the institutionalization of patterns
50
of value-orientation in the social system, with the conditions
of that institutionalization, and of changes in the patterns,
'with conditions of conformity with and deviance from a set
of such patterns and with motivational processes in so far
as they are involved in all of these" (Parsons, 1964a: 552)
It is now quite well known that the Parsonian theoretical
system is a consensual sociology that has become self-defeat-
ing in its extraordinary emphasis over the sUbjective and
normative elements. His sociology raises debates and resolves
issues within the broad-based framework of order, coopera-
tion, consensus and agreement. Norms are adhered not be-
cause of sanctions but for reasons of 'moral obligation'
that manifests 'the existence of a common system of ultimate-
value attitudes'. Parsons' overemphasis on the problem of
order (1964a: 36-37) has led Mills, as also many others In-
cluding Lockwood and Gouldner, to observe: "The idea of the
normative order that is set forth, and the way it is handled
by grand theorists, leads us to assume that virtually all
power is legitimated" (SI: 42). Stated otherwise, grand
sociology provides legitimation to any social order in which
harmony of interests is the natural feature of the society
51
(SI: 42). Similar to his overemphasis on the normative order
is Parsons' assertion that the social equilibrium, the con-
tinuity and maintenance of social patterns, normative ex-
pectations or value systems, is not problematic. He assumes
that "the maintenance of the complementarity of role-expecta-
tions, once established, is not problematical, in other words
that the 'tendency' to maintain the interaction process is
the first law of social process" (Parsons, 1964a: 204).
The position that social continuity, normative eKpectations
or value systems do not require explanation is hardly tenable.
They do not suddenly appear from vacuum. But, as is contend-
ed here, the dominant normative system, requiring internal-
ization of values and norms for a stable order, may very well
serve the interests of the powerful and the privileged, such
as, for example, those of big corporate owners of America's
mass society. Alternatively said, which is predominant cannot
be decided "a priori" in accordance with certain principles
of sociology. Mills elaborates: "We might well imagine a
'pure type' of society, a perfectly disciplined social struc-
ture, in which the dominated men, for a variety of reasons,
cannot quit their prescribed roles, but nevertheless share
none of the dominator's values, and thus in no way believe
in the legitimacy of the order" (SI: 39). Parsons isolates
values from social classes, interests and the state, invit-
ing serious deficiencies which weaken the reliability of
Parsons' sociology.
To maintain and transmit a value system, human
beings are punched, bullied, sent to jail,
thrown into concentration camps, cajoled,
bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read
newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot,
and sometimes even taught sociology. To speak
of cultural inertia is to overlook the concrete
interests and privileges that are served by in-
doctrination, education, and the entire com-
plicated process of transmitting culture from
one generation to the next (Moore, Jr., 1968: 486)
It is then quite understandable why Mills' reaction
to Parsons' sociology is so much negative. Parsons' selec-
tive emphasis on the normative elements only matches his
52
underemphasis of the conflictual elements within the society.
Those elements making for instability and conflict tend to
be ignored "as a general determinant of the dynamics of social
systems" (Lockwood, 1956: 136). To be sure, Parsons of course
refers to conflictual elements within the normative social
system and does in detail deal with "sources of conflict,
aggression, deviance, and with processes at both the psycho-
logical and social-systems levels for the handling of conflict,
deviance, and general re-equilibriating tendencies" (Mitchell,
1967: 39). Going a step fupther, Merton contends that f u n ~
tionalism, far from being a conservative ideology, can very
well be radical and critical when addressed to the malfunc-
tioning of specific institutions that satisfy societal needs
of all. In other words, functionalism may involve tl no in-
trinsic ideological commitment" (Merton, 1957: 39). But as
a matter of fact in their respective functional sociologies
of Parsons, Merton and Davis, even when conflictual elements
53
are raised and problems of social change posed, the considera-
tion only proceeds along the Durkheimian "dysfunctional"
road. Deviance, tension or strains, though dysfunctional,
tend to become either institutionalized or resolved in such
a manner as to promote integration which is taken for granted
as the dominant equilibrating tendency inherent in the society.
This is what is called cybernetic functionalism wherein soci-
ety is conceived to be a self-regulating and equilibrating
system (cf. Jacobson, 1971).
For instance, in his article "Social Classes and
Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Sociological Theory"
(1949), Parsons thinks that "class conflict is endemic in
our modern industrial type of society" and that "class con-
flict certainly exists in the United States." But he does
not focus on the bases, structural and objective, of class
conflict and regards conflict as a failure of social control
and normative breakdown. It is basically a Durkheimian ap-
proaGh, anomie with GonfliGt. No wender fer him,
there is no "sharp and fundamental sociological distinction
between capitalist and all noncapitalist industrial type of
society," and capitalist and socialist industrialism can be
seen "as variants of a single fundamental type, not as dras-
tically distinct stages in a single process of dialectical
e vol uti on !I (p ar son s, 1966: 333). Such a view not only under-
writes most basic differences between socialism and capital-
ism but is also either too conservative or too Messianic.
54
Practically it ignores "the experiential reality of industri-
al society. It fails to touch upon an entire vast realm
of the industrial experience, horror. It fails to comprehend
either the collective horror or the personal horrors which
certain features of industrial society almost necessarily
involve" (Foss, 1963: 125-26).
Let me look at the same facet of Parsons' consensual
sociology, In his "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-
"Nazi Germany" (1942), Parsons refers to the development of
Germany under the aegis of "big business" and to many other
concepts such as "propertyless industrial class," "a high con-
centration of executive authority and control of industrial
property," the role of "feudal-militaristic" elements in the
structure of the German state, "economic distinction,1f "class
struggle," giving an idea that he was pursuing a Marxian
analysis. Far from it; he rather employs Durkheim's anomie
and Weber's rationalization as explanatory categories in
tracing the development of German National Socialism. In the
period of "rapid technological change, industrialization,
urbanization, migration of population, occupational mobility,
cultural, political and religious change" in Pre-Nazi Germany,
the immediate result was, says Parsons like a loyal Durkheim-
i n ~ "the widespread insecurityll involving lithe well known
consequences of anxiety, a good deal of free-floating aggres-
sion, a tendency to unstable emotionalism and susceptibility
to emotionalized propaganda appeals and mobilization of affect
55
around various kinds of symbols" (1966: 117). With this
Durkheimian approach to "the elements of malintegration,
tension and strain in the social structure" of Germany, Par-
sons finds out through what Weber called the process of ra-
tionalization how Germany's cultural tradition was affected
"in the form of seularization of religious values, emancipa-
tion from traditional patterns of morality .... and the
general tendency of rational criticism to undermine tradi-
tional and conservative system of symbols" (1966: 118). As
a result of both, the older conservative patterns were shaken
in such a way that they particularly "in defining the role of
the youth, of sex relationships, and of women could not serve
as an adequate basis of institutional integration" (1966:
122). From this vantage point the critically important as-
pect of the National Socialist movement for Parsons lies "in
the fact that it constitutes a mobilization of the extreme-
ly deep-seated romantic tendencies of German society in the
service violently aggressive political incorporat-
ing a 'fundamentalist' revolt against the whole tendency of
rationalization in the Western world, and at the same time
against its deepest institutionalized foundationsl! (1966:
123) .
Similar analysis can be found also in his article on
"Sociological Aspects of Fascist Movements
ll
(Parsons, 1966:
124-41). As is therefore evident in the Parsonian analysis,
anomic consequences of disorganizing processes of industrial-
ism and urbanism, and negative impact of rationalization were
56
obstacles to the development of liberal democratic patterns
and values within German capitalism. And, as Parsons makes
clear, it had nothing to do with what Neumann called "total-
itarian monopolistic capitalism." Stated otherwise, the
differences between Parsons and Mills as to their respective
political orientations carne to the fore when the latter re-
viewed in 1942, the year which saw the appearance of Parsons'
essays, Neumann's Behemoth, and regarded it "at once a de-
finitive analysis of the German Reich and a basic contribu-
tion to the social sciences" (pPP: 170). The deficiencies in
the Parsonian analysis are now clear. Parsons never gives
attention to the factual support rendered by bankers and in-
dustrialists who were largely responsible for the accession
of the Nazis to power. The.monopoly form of German capital-
ism required the stabilizing support of a total political
power, for the corporations could not flourish in capitalism
without guarantees and subsidies from the state, the struc-
ture of legitimate coercion.
Parsons also ignores the fact that the working class
was regimented and fragmented, that the trade unions were
smashed and, finally, that the social democratic and commun-
ist parties were suppressed. Power was concentrated in four
elite constituents, the Nazi party, the State bureaucracy, the
armed forces and particularly the monopoly capitalists. The
combination of these forces made the struggle against capi-
talism impossible. The espousal of these views made, among
others, Mills not only a radical but also aware of ominous
future awaiting individuals in capitalist democracy.
The analysis of Behemoth casts light upon
capitalism in democracies (1)f you read
his book thoroughly, you see the harsh out-
lines of possible futures close around you
(1)t sets our attitude toward given
elements in other countries, sights the acts
of our allegiance, places limits upon our
political aspirations: helps to locate the
enemy allover the world .... Behemoth is
everywhere united (pPP: 177-78).
57
This explains, as Mills concluded, lI"w-hy one Behemoth is worth,
to social science, twenty Social Systems!! (S1: 47).
The deliberate emphasis on a normative social order
in the grand theoretical sociology, as also in its different
structural functional variants, has resulted in a double ef-
fect; on the one hand, it not only minimizes the role of con-
flict or antagonisms within society but also, on the other,
makes any large scale structural change of the corporate
capitalist society impossible. Take for instance, Parsons'
views on social change and Bolshevism in The Social System.
He stresses the need for adaptive social structures in terms
of functional requirements of the social system, the re-
emergence of conformity needs as associated with the old
society, the mitigation of radicality of revolutionary pro-
cess (Parsons, 1964a: 527). All revolutionary meovements,
because of-their motivational ambivalence due to a fusion of
"utopian" and "realistic" elements, have to come to terms
with reality once they are all accomplished--in other words,
the process of reequilibration of the society, Pos sib iIi tie s
of large scale structural changes are therefore ruled out by
58
its own internal constraints such as supposed ideological
and utopian limits of revolutionary movements, inevitable
equilibrating tendencies toward adaptive structures and
restoration of old cultural values, personality need disposi-
tions, vested interests, complexity of social structures,
tendentious socialization toward conformity, strains of in-
dustrialization that shift emphasis from the universalistic-
ascriptive to the universalistic-achievement pattern, etc.
By employing what he calls universalistic-achievement pattern,
he not only discusses American society but also goes on to
say that industrialization would transform the USSR in the
direction of the USA, involving changes towards "political
democracy" (Parsons, 1964b: 397).
In other words, we might expect a new variant of
political democracy out of a marriage between industrializa-
tion and Soviet socialism. This is to say, as does Swinge-
hood, that "civilization has run to its close in American
pluralistic democracy and that only modifications and 'improve-
ments' can be expected in the pattern of social inequality
during the coming centuries. Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia
are merely episodes on the way to normal mode of a well-in-
tegrated and stable industrial capitalism" (1975: 211). The
truth of the matter is that in the Parsonian sociology the
emphasis has been carried to an utopistic level.
By no feat of the imagination, not even by the
residual category of "dysfunction," can the
integrated and equilibrated social system be
made to produce seriuus and patterned conflicts
in its structure The system theory of
society comes, by implication, dangerously
close to the conspiracy-theory of history
--which is not only the end of all socio-
logy but also rather silly (Dahrendorf,
1958: 120-21).
59
Parsons' one-sided selective emphasis on and p r f r ~
ence to normative elements, which as a matter of fact mini-
mize structural causes of conflict, are linked to his rela-
tive insensitivity to political issues and, so to say, con-
servativism of open complacency. (MillS rightly points out
---
that in terms of systems sociology "the idea of conflict
cannot effectively be formulated. Structural antagonisms,
large-scale revolts, revolutions--they cannot be imagined
.... Not only does the 'collective behavior' of terrorized
masses and excited mobs, crowds and movements-- with which
our era is so filled--find no place in the normatively
created social structures of grand theorists. But any
systematic ideas of how history itself occurs, of its mechan-
ics and processes, are unavailable to grand theory,and ac-
cordingly, Parsons believes, unavailable to social science"
(SI: 42-43).6 If the thrust of sociological analysis is on
normative order and socialization, regardless of the fact
that it legitimates in effect the exploitative social struc-
ture of corporate capitalism, it remains to imagine how the
understanding of American society in terms of universalistic-
achievement pattern can be realistic "'tlithout mentioning the
changes which its capitalistic institutions .... are under-
going" (Lockwood, 1956: 138) Mills poses the same questions
as Lockwood did earlier:
It is, for example, difficult to imagine a
more futile endeavor than analyzing American
society in terms of 'the value-pattern' of
'universalistic-achievement' with no mention
of the changing nature, meaning and forms of
success characteristic of modern capitalism,
or of the changing structure of capitalism
itself; or, analyzing United States strati-
fication in terms of 'the dominant value
system' without taking into account the known
statistics of life-chances based on levels of
p ~ o p r t y and income (SI: 43).
60
Not that Parsons is unaware of social change. He does
deal with them, their origins, their directions, scope and
'rates; however, not to highlight the problematic facets of
capitalism but eventually to return, by means of his peri-
pheral analysis, to "liberal democracy" within the doctrin-
aire sovereignty of corporate capitalism. Whatever the optim-
ism cherished by the sociologists of structural functionalism
about the 'new possibilities for accounting for change and
conflict, not to mention stability and order'--through the
developments in the theories of resources, generalized media
interchange, the logic of value adding processes, cybernetic
control or general action level analysis--, even the adherents
of Parsons admit of his failure. Loubser, a former student
claiming to stand in particularistic relationship to Parsons,
admits that "the critics have a point to the extent that
Parsons in spite of his astounding capacity for sustained
abstract thinking, has slipped into misplaced concreteness
himself, hence seemingly providing empirical conceptions of
concrete reality as always relatively integrated and stable"
(1976: 17). To be sure, it is not a mere slippage since
61
Parsons' theoretical sociology is manifestly on the side of
liberal optimism for a consensual social order, considering
conflicts only anomie dislocations of ephemeral duration.
This apparent political bias is at the bottom of his persis-
tent avoidance of stark realities of capitalist society, such
as the scale of corporate concentration, massive alienation,
potential class conflict, consequences of elite constella-
tion, media manipulation of mass consciousness, problems of
legitimation, decline of democracy, growth of weapons cul-
ture at home or underdevelopment and imperialism abroad, and
so on. A glaring example of his analysis of power. He has
less to say on the distribution of power, struggle for it
or costs of authority. Economic and political aspects of
power, which constitute the factual social order, remain
largely unattended and are delivered "for safekeeping to the
economist and p61i tical sc ien t ist" (Lockwood, 1956: 141). The
same criticism holds good for Parsons' recent writings (cf.
1968: 223-63, 297-354; 1965: 199-225). As one contemporary
sociologist points out:
The parallels which Parson is determined to
pursue between the polity and the economy
serve, in fact, to separate political and
economic processes from one another. That
economic and other "material" factors them-
selves play a key part in power deflation
is ignored because Parsons is above all con-
cerned to show how the polity and economy are
"analytically" similar, not how they inter-
twine, Parsons' many discussions of the re-
lationships between sociology and economics,
including his and Smelser's Economy and Society,
are all stated in terms of highly formal
categories, and rarely suggest any substantive
generalizations linking the two (Giddens, 1968:
266) .
62
Parsons, Mills and the Role of History
Another serious flaw in Parsons' grand theoretical
sociology is its conspicuous disinterestedness for historical
(--
concerns. ',Whereas in Mills
-;
S
"history is the shank of social
study", .in Parsons'
~
it is relegated to comparative insigni-
ficance. The historical dimension appears to impose barriers
-
to the development of a science of sociology. In the process
.. of sociology's emergence into 'the status of a mature science',
Parsons contended in 1945, historical sociologies of Tylor,
Morgan, Marx or Veblen scarcely have any significant place
since their "ill advised" attempts have tried "to attain,
at one stroke, a goal which can only be approached gradually
by building the necessary factual foundations and analytical
tools" (Parsons, 1966: 220). In 1950 he reiterated his
stand: "If the prospects of sociological theory are good,
so are, I am convinced, those of sociology as a science, but
only if the scientifically fundamental work is done" (Par-
son s, 1966: 368).
Incidentally, a striking parallel can be found in
Karl Popper's two books, The Open Society and Its Enemies
(1945) and The Poverty of Historicism (1957), wherein he
argues over the impossibility of historical prediction since
the progress of history is conditionally dependent upon the
progress of knowledge. If Parsons' deliberate attempt to
divorce sociology from historical concerns marks a healthy
63
protest against unfounded theorizing, fruitless abstraction
or mere historicism, it in turn invites immediate criticism
by its naive avowal of a.bstract conceptualization at em-
pirical levels in almost total seclusion of historical data.
Lynd, whose impact on Mills remains evident, argued in 1939
that the place of historical analysis in social science is
"basic and beyond question." To the extent "that it reveals
man confronted by typical human dilemmas and finding service-
able paths through them, we may cautiously canvass past pre-
cedents as possible dress rehearsals for coping with the
fumbling present; and, in so far as it represents irrepar-
ably spilled milk, we may learn from it how to avoid past
err 0 r s" ( Lyn d, 19 6 4: 12 9 - 30 ) . Historical knowledge is neither
luxury nor amusement of intellect at leisure time. History
adds to widen the range of intellectual grasp over reason
itself; to understand society is to history too 1
because aocial structures exist only as historical structures.
------ ..,."
liThe main s truc tural tea tu-res of what soc iety can be like in
the next generation are already given by trends at work now.
Humanity's freedom to maneuver lies within the framework
created by its history" (Moore, Jr., 1958: 159). A system
sociology can of course establish certain uniformities and
recurrences regarding human behavior and action but there is
no guarantee that "the laws it establishes \vill hold good
beyond the historical period from which facts are drawn"
(Collingwood, 1969: 17-18).
/'
In sharp contrast to conceives socio-
64
logy and its significant problems within an awreness of
historical social structures.
7
For him, the task of the
sociological imagination, lying at the very bottom of any
sociological enterprise, is "to understand the larger his-
torical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and
the ex!ernal career of a variety of individuals" (S1: 5). To
Mills bo!h man and society appear in their historical signi- ~
ficance. On the one hand, says Mills, "we cannot adequate-
ly understand 'man' as an isolated biological creature, as a
bundle of reflexes or a set of instincts, as an 'intelligible
field' or a system in and of itself. Whatever else he may
be, man is a social and an historical actor who must be under- 1//
stood, if at all, in close and intricate interplay with social
and historical structures" (S1: 158). Elsewhere, "Man is a
unique animal species in that he is also an historical develop-
ment" (ess: 480). On the other hand, he also conveices that
lithe image of any society is an historically specific image"
(S1: 149). By the principle of historical specificity Mills
. ~ ---
7
J
means that lithe problems we face are set by conflicting
p ~
elements in a specifically capitalist social structure" (ess:
384) Having conceived of man as an historical actor he
espouses, in continuation of the classic tradition of socio-
logy, the view that "all sociology worthy of the name is
'historical sociology'" (S1: 146). Rightly he asserts that
no social science including sociOlogy can transcend history.
-------
Social sciences themselves have originated in the processes
-----------------
65
of transition of human societies from one historical stage to
another, from the rural communities in feudal era to urban
industrial societies in modern times. Many of the dominant
conceptions of modern sociology--Maine's status and contract,
Tonnies' community and society,)Weber's status, class and
rationalization, Spencer's military and industrial societies,
Pareto's circulation of elites, Cooley's primary and second-
ell/
Mt"GI'Y
A(SfL
ary groups, Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity etc. -,co/
y ~ leu
--are inextricablY bound up with different phases of historic- ~ f
al transition of society. These ideas still orient the prac-
titioners of sociology to multifarious ways of looking at
society and its realities. As a matter of fact the classic
tradition is imbued with, says Mills, "a master view of the
structure of society in all its realms, the mechanics of
history in all their ramifications, and the roles of individ-
uals in a great variety of their psychological nuances" (IM: 3)
Sociology, when conceived within its historical di-
-mensions, becomes a humanistic endeavor. The consciousness,
embedded in the knowledge of the past societies, of ironic
and tragic aspects of history has a sobering impact upon
anybody's enthusiasm for abstract theorizing. The dialogue be-
tween sociology and history is needed for a variety of
reasons. First, the intercourse is needed for a knowledge
of the historical varieties of human society. "We need the
variety provided by history in order even to ask sociological
questions properly, much less to answer them" (SI: 146-47)
Second, whereas "a-historical studies usually tend to be
66
static or very short-term studies of limited milieux
lt
(SI:
149), a historical knowledge of sociological concerns broaden
the range of consciousness and interest of the sociologist.
Third, knowledge of the historical dimensions of sociological
concerns enable the sociologist to undertake comparative
studies by means of which Itwe can become aware of the absence
of certain historical phases from a society, which is often
quite essential to understanding its contemporary shape
lt
.(SI: 157). Lastly, the knowledge of historical materials is
also required to discern long run trends of society, involved
in answering questions of Itfrom what" and Itto what
lt
. However
it must be noted, as Mills warns, that the sociologist re-
quires historical orientation in order to Itstudy history
rather than to retreat into itlt (SI: 153). One should study
history in order to get rid of it; otherwise historical ex-
planations, being indirectly relevant, may well degenerate
into conservative ideologies or, at best, sociological tri-
vialities. In brief, Mills' sociological perspective is what
follows in his own words:
The problems of our time--which now include the
problem of man's very nature--cannot be stated
adequately without consistent practice of the
view that history is the shank of social study,
and the recognition of the need to develop a
further psychology of man that is sociologically
grounded and historically relevant. Without use
of history and without an historical sense of
psychological matters, the social scientiest
cannot adequately state the kinds of problems
that ought now to be the orienting points of
his studies (SI: 143).
A parallel to Mills' perspective can be found
in Berger's invitation to a humanistic sociology:
While most sociologists, by temperament per-
haps or by professional specialization, will
be concerned mainly with contemporary events,
disregard of the historical dimension is an
offense not only against the classic Western
ideal of the civilized man but against socio-
logical reasoning itself-namely, that part of
it that deals with the central phenomenon of
predefinition. A humanistic understanding
of sociology leads to an almost symbiotic re-
lationship with history, if not to a self-
conception of sociology as being itself a
historical discipline (Berger, 1963: 168-69).
An Assessment: The Roots of Ideology In Parsons and his
Sociology
Having surveyed the main theoretical divergences of
their ideas, it remains to see how Parsons' sociology is a
67
sociology of legitimation of, and status quo for, the corporate
capitalist society of Stated otherwise, it remains
to point out in Mills' terms how the system sociology serves
the ideological needs of the corporate mass society. The
leading question is: "Is grand theory merely a confused
verbiage or is there, after all, also something there"
(SI: 27)7 His own answer is quite suggestive, providing the
basis of radical criticism of structural functional socio-
logies. Mills' anwer is:
Something is there, buried deep to be sure,
But still something is being said (SI: 27).
Although he modestly claims not to "judge the value
of Parsons' work as a whole," Mills nevertheless points,
among other things already indicated, to the legitimation
68
functions of the systemic categories of the Parsonian socio-
logy. The Parsonian variety seeks basically to convert all
institutional structures including their problems of change
and order into what Mills calls "moral sphere" or, more
specifically, "symbol sphere." Parsons' value orientations
and normative structures are mainly "master" symbols of
legitimation of a specific type of social order, namely, the
corporate liberal society of America. "Such symbols, however,
do not form some autonomous realm within a society; their
social relevance lies in their use to justify or to oppose
the arrangement of power and the positions within this arrange-
ment of the powerful. Their psychological relevance lies in
the fact that they become the basis for adherence to the
structure of power or for opposing it" (SI: 37). If this
is the truth, as Mills claims, Parsons' sociology has none-
theless important function of providing political and ideo-
logical support in order to legitimate stable forms of domina-
tion. To this extant his is a Benservative It
is, in Dahrendorf's phrase, "the conservatism of complacency".
Considered yet from another point of view,
The great challenge of sociology and of social
science is not the concern with social equili-
brium or stability commonly expressed with a
repressive conservatism by the entrenched. The
challenge is not to provide intellectual in-
struments and perspectives to entrepreneurs and
administrators in the hope that they will ap-
proximate the ideal of the philosopher-king
or even the philosopher-actionist (Lee, 1973: 6).
That is to say, as does Lee, "man is not a tool; society is
not a system." To dig up conservative roots of Parsons'
69
sociology is to find that these are deep lying. His con-
servative antecedents are linked to social disorganization
and consequent demoralization caused by the Great Depression,
and to the general crisis facing the middle class dominated
societies.
8
The economic crisis born of the Depression had the
shattering impact on the economy which failed, as a result,
to hold together American society of the middle classes. For
Parsons it was predictive of even greater social catastrophe.
In search of a way out of this disorganization and demorali-
zation he
economic
looked.to individual moral commitment than to
I\..
:>
sources that would involve consideration of economic
of the society or changes in the distribution of power
and income. Thus Parsons' voluntaristic sociology, the work
of the first phase of his career, postulated that commitment
to moral values would ensure stability and promote social in-
tegration despite wide spread deprivation for economic reasons.
This was indeed the beginning of hi Gonservative respense te
the structural problems of society. When the Depression
gradually receded, war came to an end, stability was restored,
and prosperity made its appearance slowly, American society
was no longer in need of an exclusive focus or emphasis upon
commitment to moral values as cementing forces of a harmon-
ious society. Having been assured of relative stability of
the society and "welfare state" developments, Parsons shifted
his emphasis, in the second phase, to a conception of society
70
as a social system. He now elaborates "the complex
variety of specific mechanisms that contribute directly
to the internal stability of a society, which goes well
beyond the mere affirmation of the importance of shared
values as a source of societal stability" (Gouldner, 1970:
143). In the postwar period he replaces the voluntaristic
individual commitment by a conception of "how the social
system as such maintains its own coherence, fits individu-
als into its mechanisms and institutions, arranges and
so c ializes them to prov ide what the sys tem requir-es II
(Gouldner, 1970: 143). This is indeed quite well in
accord with the welfare state's need to assure its exis-
tence through an emphasis upon "the over socialized con-
ception of man" (cf. Wrong, 1961). Needless to mention,
the so-called evolving welfare state is in fact a limited
conception within the social structure of corporate capi-
talism. Any sociology which is consistent with the basic
assumptions and fundamental requirements of welfare state
is necessarily a corporate sociology, assuring the system
equilibrium of the corporate social structure. This is
why Szymanski states, following Mills, that the main func-
tion of Parsons' sociology is to provide a conservative
definition of the society in order to legitimate its exist-
ing institutional structures of domination. "The function
of legitimation is the production of a sophisticated de-
finition of social reality that explains and justifies the
existing social order and its dominant interests--it ex-
plains how well a society functions, how well the ongoing
institutions are necessary, and how good the whole system
is" (Szymanski, 1970:3). In the words of another radical
theorist:
Even though the functionalists may well be right
that there are a set of "needs" that each
society has to meet to get it on, they cannot
"scientifically" demonstrate that American
corporate capitalism is the necessary or in-
evitable or most rational way of meeting those
"needs." As a matter of fact, the irrational-
ity, inequality, and inefficiency of American
capitalism in meeting the "functional requisite"
of its population is support for the "stupidity
of the body" corrective to establishment func-
tionalism (Sternberg, 1977: 115).
Tracing back again to its origins, Parsons' con-
servatism is also rooted in such factors as shook the con-
fidence of and created anxieties in the middle class men
71
of America. On the one hand, there was the impact of World
War II which undermined the confidence of the middle class
in any notion of uninterrupted and continuous progress;
prior to this, the Bolshevik Revolution heightened the
psychOlogical anxiety in the Euro-American middle classes;
the rise of fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany further
aggravated bourgeois search for social peace in a stable
political order; and, finally, the global economic crisis
of the 1930s created, among others, acute status anxieties
and economic insecurities for the middle class. Here too,
Parsons' response was conservative because he sought remedy
only in a stable political order whose economic foundations
remained nonetheless as weak as ever. The
___ _ ~ _ . 1
gL'UWLlI of welfare
state only strengthened his conservatism. On the other hand,
72
the rising popularity of the Marxist studies necessitated a
thinking of possible theoretical and/or practical alterna-
tives to the claim of Marxism as an adequate social theory
(cf. GouldneT, 1970: 188). Parsons' grand scheme, reflected
in the voluntaristic interpretation, served to expel, at
least for some time to corne, Marxism from the purview of
sociological analysis.
From another point of view, that of his intellectual
orientations, Parsons was more amenable to a number of con-
servative influences. Many of his sociological heroes are
either conservatives or old liberals, or both. Marshall was
a neo-classical economist and liberal; Pareto a conservative
Italian economist and sociologist with old liberal tradition;
a German nationalist and sociologist with old liberal
tradition; 'purkheim a French liberal, nationalist and ad-
mittedly conservative; Hobbes an English conservative poli-
tical thinker famous for absolutist theory of sovereignty
anQ a18G pGlitical order. In this context it is of
to note that "Parsons has never suggested that if he were
to rewrite The Structure of Social Action Marx's name would
be added, although he has expressly suggested that Freud
would be added" (Mitchell, 1967: 177).
What is, therefore, the dominant political orienta-
tion to which Parsons and his sociology remain firmly tied?
It is not at all difficult to find that beneath his con-
servatism, which only rivals that of Edmund Burke, there lies
his political and moral commitment to liberalism. It is "the
73
ideology of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, the ideology
of political liberty and a free society" (Hacker, 1961: 291)
In terms of what Parsons has omitted from the scope of his
work, it is highly illuminating to note that he speaks less
for the workers, the middle classes or the elites than for
the aristocracy of leadership. Masses are politically un-
dependable though he never explains why some are prodemocratic
than others. Since he is more interested in leaders not in
the masses of workers, no matter whether they are of white-
or blue-collar variety, he has much less to say of the masses,
of the structural transformations toward a mass society, of
cheap materialism or of the lowering of mass public tastes.
Whereas Mills' target was elites of politics, business and
-
military, Parsons' suggestion is for an elite aristocracy.
In his article, "Social Strains in America" (1955), he wrote:
Under American conditions, a politically leading
stratum must be made up of a combination of
business and nonbusiness elements. The role of
the economy in American society and of the
business element in it is such that political
leadership without prominent business participa=
tion is doomed to ineffectiveness and to the
perpetuation of dangerous internal conflict.
It is not possible to lead the American people
against the leaders of the business world. But
at the same time, so varied now are the nation-
al elements which make a legitimate claim to
be represented, the business element cannot
monopolize or dominate political leadership and
responsibility. Broadly, I think, a political
elite in the two main aspects of "politicians"
whose specialities consist in the management of
public opinion, and of "administrators" in both
civil and military services must be greatly
strengthened (Parsons, 1965: 247).
This being "the realistic need" of time, Parsons argues,
74
in his search for a way out of strains during McCarthyism,
for a close alliance between "a specially political elite"
and other "cultural elements", notably those in the Univers-
ities and Elsewhere, he seems to think that the
institutionalized values and norms of the society motivate
at least certain upper groups and intellectuals to promote
the interests of the social system as a whole (cf. Parsons,
1960b: 120). Given the theoretical thrusts and political
orientations of both Parsons and Mills, one can only guess
how there could be a reconciliation between the two (cf.
Fallding, 1961).
At least one third of Parsons' work are on political
issues which cover a wide range of areas and topics. But
"even when he embarks upon the study of an important poli-
tical question, as he has done increasingly in the last few
years, apparently in response to external pressures, his
natural inclination is simply to restate, where possible
according to his conceptual scheme, some conventional and
generally accepted judgements upon the subject" (Bottomore,
1975: 35). However, it must also be noted that structural
functional sociology also confronted forces and factors all
of which converged in the 1950s toward a paradigmatic con-
solidation for the legitimation of the status quo. The
smooth transition from a war time economy to the material
reconstruction of Europe, the retooling demanded by the
electronic age and reinforced by the demands of Korean war,
the resistance of the East Europeans to the militant Soviet
75
marxism, the collapse of McCarthyism, the open-ended pro-
perty, and the homilies of family, education, and Eisen-
hOVl-er --all thes e united "to underVlr i te an era of unparallel ed
conformity and commitment to the status quo (Friedrichs,
1970: 17). Put in political terms, consensual sociology,
Vlhich has its locale in Parsons' grand theoretical con-
struction, has become in effect "a metaphysical representa-
tion of the dominant ideological matrix. It rests on a
principle of 'general interests' that every member of society
is supposed to imbibe if he Vlishes to avoid the onus of be-
ing a deviant or an unconnected isolate" (HoroVlitz, 1968: 7).
This only impels anyone seriously concerned with the state
of sociology in corporate capitalism to think that thanks
are due to Mills for his prophetic words he said in 1959:
It must be evident that the particular view of
society which it is possible to dig out of
Parsons' texts is of rather direct ideological
use; traditionally, such views have of course
been associated Vlith conservative styles of
thinking. Grand theorists have not often de-
scended into the political arena; certainly
they have not often taken their problems to
lie within the political contexts of modern
society. But that of course does not exempt
their Vlork from ideologitial meaning .... The
ideOlogical meaning of grand theory tends
strongly to legitimate stable forms of domina-
tion. Yet only if there should arise a much
greater need for elaborate legitimations among
coriservative groups would grand theory have
a chance to become politically relevant (SI:
48-49, footnote).9 ')
To call Parsons an ideologist of conservatism or of
conservative liberalism is therefore not a stretch of
imagination. Although Mills seems to be entirely justified,
76
his criticism is not enough since it, adds Andreski, "does
not do justice to the insidiousness of a doctrine capable
of carrying its adherents far beyond ordinary and honest
conservatism, which entails a loyalty to some definite order,
accompanied by a deprecation of systems or theories opposed
to it." The structural functionalism is what he calls
"promiscuous crypto-conservatism." There is much to believe,
in continuity with Mills, in what Andreski says of this
ideological variant of sociological conservatism:
The ideology of structural-functionalism, in
contrast, bestows its blessing on every system
which exists, so long as it exists; which
means that it throws its weight on the side
of the powers that be, whoever, wherever and
whenever they might be (Andreski, 1973: 146).
Notes
1. Cf. Kingsley Davis (1969).
2. See also McKinney (1954).
3. See ch?pter 3, especially the section on "Values and
Objectivity".
77
4. It seems difficult for me to see how Parsons' literary
style, which is of course unique, could be separated
from the way in which he makes theoretical abstractions.
In any case, the effect often has been to mystify,
rather than to clarify, issues which Parsons raises
and deals with.
5. For this and various other criticisms, see Bottomore
(1975: 29-43).
6. It must, however, be noted that Mills "did not con-
sciously conceive of providing a category for conflict
in the conventional theory" (Allen, 1975: 48).
7. For further analysis of Mills' views on the role of
historical dimension in sociological studies, see
chapter 3 wherein I discuss, in a separate section,
his ideas of "Empiricism based on Social-Historical
Structures."
8. I am indebted to Gouldner (1970: 141-48) for his ex-
cellent analysis of Parsons' conservative roots. I
have more or less pUrsUed my own analysis along Gould-
ner's suggestions. See also Strasser (1976: 122-48)
for conservative sources of Parsons' sociology.
9. Italics added.
CHAPTER THREE
Sociological Methodology
Introduction
The model I have 'taken' is C. Wright Mills.
I have rejected arae-licking empiricism and
bland theory in favor of his 'new sociology'.
Mills did create a new method, theory and
subject area with each substantive work. I
do not think that new sociology is, in fact,
new. It seems to be a traditional sociology
surfacing in yet another generation with its
modernity coming as shock. Mills united his
sorrow, anger, knowledge and dignity in his
sociological imagination. He did his very
best .... I have a wish for fellow researchers;
make Mills your model (Fletcher, 1974: 197).
These inspiring words of Fletcher, a contemporary writer
on sociological methodology, only remind us of Mills' frantic
attempt at liberating sociology from the empriricists
i
narcissistic focus on scientistic methodology. In accomplish-
ing this, as he did in The Sociological Imagination, Mills
did not overstate his case; rather he was "putting a genuine
point of view. His statement is vigorous but not sweeping,
unreasonable or purelyemotionaf' (Robb, 1968: 79). And in
proposing a counter sociology within humanistic concerns and
an alternative sociological methodology Mills, succeeding the
generation of Karl Mannheim, Robert Lynd, Louis Wirth and
Pitrim Sorokin, invited in turn fiercest opposition from
those in the camp of establishment sociology. Among other
things, the heat produced in retaliation, and reprisal as a
result, of Mills' virulent but well timed and long overdue
78
79
attack against "abstracted empiricism" was responsible to a
larg-e extent, I think,. for the over-all neglect of his basic
contributions to the issues of sociology of knowledge, epis-
temology and methodology. For example, the publication of
The Sociological Imagination, in which Mills furnished a o r t h ~
right statement of his own "philosophical and meta sociological
position with respect to the goals and methods of the social
sciences, especially that of sociology" (Winthrop, 1960: 300),
was followed by a barrage of devastating criticism. Despite
the fact that "there is no question of rejecting the sort of
quantitative research Mills attacks", Selznick asserts that
his criticism, couched in "polemical language" evoking the
"thrill of revelation," has added intellectually "nothing
new" (1959: 128). Feuer contends that "the'vulgar empiricist',
whom Mills and the Marxists scorn, has contributed much to
the daily life-blood of science" (1959: 121). Most note-
worthy criticism was however made by Shils, who nevertheless
agr>eeswithMills' critique o-f ahistorical bias and bureau-
cratic tendencies in the current empirical research practices.
The questions which Shils directed at Mills are the following:
Does he deny that sampling, standardization of
interview questions, and the statistical pro-
cessing of the data gathered by interviews can
make our picture of at least certain sectors of
reality more reliable--even if it cannot depict
all of that reality which properly interests
us? Does he really believe that nothing that
has been learned or could be learned by system-
atic empirical research can ever enrich our
self-awareness and give us a more differentiated
picture of the society in which we live? And
does he really believe--as he says he does--that
the sins of systematic empirical research arise
simply and exclusively from the self-denying
ordinances decreed by a false conception of
science and by a desire to stay on the right
side of the powerful (Shils, 1961: 607).
80
Despite these_criticisms Mills never misses, I think,
the mark or fails to indicate wherein lies the deficiencies
of the dominant modes of empirical inquiry. Anyway, although
his interests in "the improvement of social science methodo-
logy" and his "concomitant faith in the ability of the social
sciences, through the experimental method, to approach reality"
.. (Gillam, 1966: 62-63) are clearly indicative even of his
early writings, it is not until recently, it should be noted,
that there has been a revival of interest in the methodological
issues raised by Mills.
l
Many years have passed by since Mills
expressed his doubts as to the absolutist claims of methodb-
logy based on the model and philosophy of natural sciences
(cf. PPP: 453-468). But, looking at the current trends of
empirical inquiry., the situation seems not to have changed
much, and the mainstream currents of the discipline are "still
the safe and shallow waters of academic empiricism" (Dreit-
zel, 1969: ix). The weltanschauung of socio-
logy is related to what Mills called "liberal practicality."
In its older forms it emphasized "pathological" in sociology.
For example, in 1943 Mills spoke out, in criticising the
"typical perspectives and key concepts" underlying the ideology
of several authors of social problems books, that lIin seeing
everything social as continuous process, changes In pace and
revolutionary dislocations are missed or are taken as signs
81
of the 'pathological'" (pPP: 537). In its current form,
"the new liberal practicality" has shifted its emphasis,
turning from "pathological" aspects of society towards
"fragmentary problems of scattered causation" as relevant
to serving the purposes of the political, corporate and
military orders of the society (SI: 92). As a whole, the
focus on "social problems", not of course in Mills' sense
but covering stray cat and dog topics like crime, delinquency,
families and broken homes, alcoholism, suicide, ghetto con-
ditions, race relations etc., continue to remain firmly linked
to liberal practicality in the academic Stern-
berg has shown that three leading sociological journals,
American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review,
and Social Problems, are "basically social problems journals"
(1977: 99). Interestingly, most American sociologists
scarcely think that social problems are "the result and re-
flection of the underlying problems of an increasingly voci-
ferous American capitalist system." As he further makes it
clear, "the general rule is that American sociologists, deep,
deep in the hip pocket (ASS) of the ruling class in the
United States, define 'social problems' as groups of people
or conditions likely to pose a present or future threat to
the current structure of vast social inequality in our country'l
(Sternberg, 1977: 109). Others find that what goes on within
sociology or the social sciences as scientific study tanta-
mounts to "sorcery.,,2 In view of such an image of the current
82
state of affairs in sociology and the social sciences, it is
quite worthwhile to sum up Mills' contributions in regard to
the important issues of sociological methodology, as he
conceived of them.
3
Sociology of Knowledge and Epistemology
It is to be contended here that Mills' reaction to
and critique of methodological positivism as contained in
abstracted empiricism is less important than what he had to
say on the substantive issues of the sociology of knowledge,
epistemology and methodology. Before Mills subjected the
epistemology based on the model of physical sciences to
searching criticism, in America it was prominently Lynd
(1964: 119-20), among others, who cautioned against the
rising trend of empiricism. But, despite his reminder and
admonition, American sociologists ln the 1940s and 1950s re-
mained enthralled by the method of physical sciences. The
culmination of this empiricist tendency transforming science,
in Mills' words, "less a creative ethos and a manner of
orientation than a set of science machines," produced sharply
an opposite reaction for him. In The Sociological Imagination
Mills directly raised the question of the cultural and human-
istic role of science. liThe felt need to reappraise physical
science reflects the need for a new common denominator. It
is the human meaning and the social role of science, its
military and commercial issue, its political significance
....a... 1-- _..J...
LlIC1L
are undergoing confused reappraisal" (SI: 16). The truth of
83
the matter is, however, that Mills' own intellectual career
as a sociologist began with his lasting interests in the
substantive problems of sociological methodology--the socio-
logy of knowledge, epistemology, and other methodological
issues.
Since Mills' own position on these matters is largely
connected with what emerged as Wissenssociologie in Germany
in the 1920s it is necessary, in brief, to outline its in-
tellectual postulates within the framework of which Mannheim,
Mills' orienting point, conceived the sociology of knowledge.
In his IdeOlogy and Utopia Mannheim undertakes to show that
the sociology of knowledge seeks to clarify how conditions of
existence affects the historical genesis of ideas; to show
how they constitute an essential part of the products of
thought and how they are reflected in the content and form
of thought. Since the approach to a problem, the levels of
problem formulation, the stage of abstraction or the concrete-
Il@g t;h@ p@[email protected] hepes te ,attain are all bound up with
social existence, the sociology of knowledge seeks to obtain
"systematic comprehension of the relationship between social
existence and thought" (Mannheim, 1936: 309). In this re-
lationship of epistemology to general social-intellectual
situations of any given period 'truth' necessarily appears
as social, and it undergoes a process of social conditioning
over time, meaning thereby absence of any absolute truth or
any static ideal of "eternal truth."
84
We see, therefore, not merely that the notion
of knowledge in general is dependent upon the
concretely prevailing form of knowledge and
the modes of knowing expressed therein and
accepted as ideal, but also that the concept"
of truth itself is dependent upon the already
existing types of knowledge (Mannheim, 1936: 292).
The precondition to further goals of the sociology of know-
ledge consists in the acquisition of a detached perspective
through which not only the outlines of the contrasting modes
are discovered but through its validity as well is established.
The procedure allowing this is "relational" in contrast to
avoidance of what is called "relativism" by Mannheim. Re-
lationalism lies "in the nature of certain assumptions that
they cannot be formulated absolutely, but only in terms of
the perspective of a given situation" (Mannheim, 1936: 283).
Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and epistemology
has raised many questions which still await solution. Of
them, the most serious, besides his ambiguities in the con-
cept of relationalism, is the charge of relativism which his
views invariably lead to.
4
In order to overcome epistemo-
logical consequences, which characterized his earlier work,
Mannheim was gradually led "to argue in terms of a pragmatic
theory of adjustment to the specific requirements of parti-
cular historical situations and, later, to stress the posi-
tion of the 'socially unattached intelligentsia
'
" (Phillips,
1974: 75). As will be seen, Mills I position reflects both
the advantages and disadvantages of the Mannheimian position.
This is however to indicate that Mannheim himself was not
sure of any way out of relativism despite his gradual re-
85
liance on pragmatism and activism. He himself said: "Only
a mode of thought, only a philosophy which is able to give
a concrete answer to the question, 'What shall we do?' can
put forward the claim to have overcome relativism" (Mannheim,
1959: 128-29). Despite all criticism that can be legitimate-
ly raised to assail Mannheim's position, it goes .to his credit
for indicating that knowledge has a social basis; in add i-
tion he has shown that, as Kecskemetic has said, "genuine
knowledge of historical and social phenomena" (1959: 1) is
possible. It now remains to see how profoundly Mills was
influenced by Mannheim although the former tried to effect
a communion between the latter's sociology of knowledge and
epistemology with the pragmatism of Peirce and Dewey, and
with the symbolic interactionism of Mead.
Combining the views of both Mannheim and Mead, Mills
asserts that the sociology of knowledge is moving towards
"a theory of mind and knowledge which takes as its data not
an individual's performances or tests, but the entirety of
intellectual history" (PPP: 470).
Drawing upon the theories and findings of all
social science, sociology of knowledge is an
attempted explanation of the phenomena of in-
tellectual history. In its explanation of
these materials it appeals to the data of social
history. And in order to trace the mechanisms
connective of metitality and society, the socio-
logy of knowledge must be informed by a "psycho-
logy" that is socially, ethnologically, and
historically relevant (PPP: 471)
In his first full-length article concerning the sociology
of knoviledge, "Language, Logic and Culture", Mills confronts
"the relevant sociological materials, particularly as they
86
bear on the nature of mind and knowledge" (PPP: 423). Accord-
ingly, he presents "certain coordinates for a sociological
approach to reflection and knowledge, viewing conjointly
sociality and mind, language and social habit, the noetic
and the cultural" (PPP: 437). Broadly speaking, Mills sets
himself to the task of constructing a theory of mind that
conceives "social factors as intrinsic to mentality," of
developing a concept of mind that incorporates "social pro-
-'cesses as intrinsic to mental operations" and of developing
"a clear and dynamic conception of the relations imputed be-
tween a thinker and his social context." Without such a
thorough-going social theory of mind, the research in the
sociology of knowledge may become, says Mills, "a set of
mere historical enumerations and a calling of names" (pPP: 426).
As is therefore evident, although Mills takes up the Mann-
heimian concern for social determination of ideas and mental-
ity and directly s:t:resses his conception of "a psychology
which would be socially and historically relevant" (Mannheim,
1940: 15), he moves a step farther than Mannheim. He calls
for "a more adequate psycho'logical base than has been given
.... " (pPP: 425) to the sociology of knowledge and, accord-
ingly, proposes to deal with relevant "social psychological"
categories. It is here that Mills utilizes the Meadian social
psychological category of "the generalized other. For Mills,
The generalized other is the internalized audience
with which the thinker converses; a focalized and
abstracted organization of attitudes of those im-
plicated in the social field of behavior and ex-
perience. The structure and contents of selected
and subsequently selective social experiences
imported into mind constitute the generalized
other with which the thinker converses and
which is socially limited and limiting
Within the inner forum of reflection, the
generalized other functions as a socially
derived mechanism through which logical evalua-
tion operates (PPP: 426-27, 429).
However, unlike Mead who holds that "the attitude of the
generalized other is the attitude of the whole community"
(1965: 218), Mills argues that the concept may stand for
"selected societal segments" instead of incorporating "the
87
whole society" (PPP: 427 footnote). 5 He names these selected
societal segments as "significant others", "authoritative
others", and the "generalized other" (ess: 95). In any
event the generalized other is very much crucial:
One operates logically (applies standardized
critiques) upon propositions and arguments
(his own included) from the standpoint of a
generalized other. It is from this socially
constituted viewpoint that one approves or
disapproves of given arguments as logical or
illogical, valid or invalid. No individual
can be logical unless there be agreement among
the members of his universe of discourse as to
the validity of some general conception of good
reasoning (PPP: 427).
Thus understood, illogicality or immorality are both deriva-
tions from social norms. The social structure of mind, built
upon social and psychological factors, influences IIfixation,
not only of the evaluative but also of the intellectual,"
The generalized other is "the seat of a logical apparatus
ll
(PPP: 431).
Like Mannheim, Mills is inevitably led to confront
these following questions: How is the sociology of knowledge
88
related to epistemology and methodology? Does the sociology
of knowledge have epistemological and/or methodological con-
sequences? Finally, can epistemology and methodology be
bracketed together? In answering these questions, Mills
finds, on the one hand, "no fundamental disagreement between
Dewey's and Mannheim's conceptions of the generic character
and derivation of epistemological forms" (pPP: 456). On the
other, he strongly supports Mannheim-
1
- s claim that "new cri-
teria for social science may emerge from the inquiries of
the sociology of knowledge. It is en t ire 1 y po s s ib 1 e" ( P P P :
461). However, in attempting to work out a synthesis between
sociOlogy of knowledge and Peirce and Dewey's
scientific postulates of the verificatory model, Mills moves
a step beyond them. For example, Mannheim has failed to
avoid certain ambiguities and mislocations in his work be-
cause of his inability to understand that, in Mills' words,
"in its 'epistemological function' the sociology of knowledge
is specifically propaedeuctive to the construction of sound
methodology for the social sciences" (PPP: 464). In Dewey
experimental activity is the core element in his descriptive
account of the scientific method (inquiry inquiry). As
a result, in Dewey's model "there is ever present the drive
programmatically to derive from physical science and then
apply to other domains a paradigm of inquiry. Such an epis-
temological program carries with its fulfillment the applica-
tion of the experimental mode of action to society" 387).
In contrast to this, the position of Mills, who intends to
89
join "the live logician and social methodologist in the
critical building of sounder methods for social research"
(PPP: 465), is plainly opposite. Because, like a Mannheim-
ian disciple, he explicitly recognizes the need "to analyze
social researches in their cultural and intellectual con-
texts and attempt to articulate the inchoate rules implicit
within them" (PPP: 466).
Mills asserts the relevance of the sociology of
knowledge for epistemology by questioning the negative pro-
position, advanced mainly by Hans Speier, Talcott Parsons,
Robert MacIver, and R. K. Merton, that "sociological investi-
gations of inquiries have no consequences for norms of 'truth
and validity'" (PPP: 453). The matter is more complicated
than this simplistic assertion and the relevant questions,
which Mills raised, are as follows:
He who asserts the irrelevance of social con-
ditions to the truthfulness of propositions
ought to state the conditions upon which he
conceives truthfulness aci;uaJoly tGQ@peI1Q; h@
ought to specify exactly what it is in thinking
that sociological factors cannot explain and
upon which truth and validity do rest. Those
who take the negative position must state what
sort of things these criteria of truth and
validity are, how they are derived, and how
t ~ y function (PPP: 454).
Mills acknowledges that 'truth' and 'objectivity' are meaning-
ful in terms of some accepted model of verification. But
they have many 'criteria' and these, either the observational
and verificatory models of truth and validity or their cri-
teria, are not !1transcendental."
In terms of the Mannheimian
language, there are no eternal truths. They vary in different
90
social groups In different historical periods. In their
persistence and change these criteria are "legitimately open
to social-historical relativization." The acceptance or
rejection by a thinker of a particular verificatory model is
a kind of "juncture" when, says Mills in conformity to his
sociology of knowledge stance, "extralogical, possibly socio-
logical, factors may enter and be of consequence to the
validity of an elite's thinking" (PPP: 457). The reason is
that many thinkers do not select their verificatory model
"consciously" or "thoroughly", as did Peirce. In addition,
the social position of a thinker, though not directly rele-
vant to the truthfulness of propositions tested by the veri-
ficatory model, is of considerable importance. For example,
it is by no means certain that all thinkers have employed
what is currently called 'scientific' thought model. Mills
specifically draws attention to two factors. First, the
intellectual and scientific categories upon which the inquiry
rests are related to "social situations, cultural determinants."
What is taken as problematic and what concepts are available
and used may be interlinked in certain inquiries" (PPP: 459).
Mills' views are also reflected in his assessment of Marcel
Granet's La Pensee Chinoise. Adopting what he calls "the
sociologistic view of sociology is ~ i t h the 'parallelism' of
ideas and social structures, the 'origin' of conceptions from
societal forms and drifts" (PPP: 474). In Granet's treatment
the sociology of knowledge was used "methodologically as an
organon of historical reconstruction" (PPP: 476). Second,
91
empirical verification is not a "simple, and positivistic
mirror-like operation." Mills refers to "the social theory
of perception" according to which observational dimensions of
any verificatory model, that may be selected, are delimited
by "the selective language of its users." As he says, "A
specialized language constitutes a veritable a priori form of
perception and cognition, which are certainly relevant to the
results of inquiry Different technical elites possess
different perceptual capacities" (PPP: 459-60).
As a matter of fact, besides the concept of the gen-
eralized other, in Mills r formulations language is an addi-
tional social psychological mechanism which connects thinking
with societal patterns or reflection with sociality. The
importance which Mills attaches to the social psychological
role of language in its historical significance can be under-
stood clearly from his formulation of the concept of "socio-
tics." As Horowitz has stated, "BY designating his work as
'sociotics', Mills sought to encompass all sociological pheno-
mena involved in the function of language; the ways in which
language channelizes, limits; and elicits thought" (SP: 15).
Sociotics is at once a portion of theory of
language and a division of sociology of
language .... Within the sociology of know-
ledge, sociotics designates the attempt to
set forth linguistic mechanisms connective
of mentality and other cultural items
(PPP: 492).
Sociologically considered, language is the mechanism by
which persons "internalize roles and the attitudes of others"
92
Cess: 12 footnote). From an individual's point of view,
mind lS "the interplay of the organism with social situa-
tions mediated by symbols" CPPP: 433). Thus from the socio-
logy of knowledge point of view,
Our behavior and perception, our logic and
thought, corne within the control of a system
of language. Along with language, we acquire
a set of social norms and values. A vocabul-
ary is not a mere string of words; immanent
within it are societal textures--institution-
al and political coordinates. Back of a vo-
cabulary lie sets of collective action CPPP: 433).
If this be so the thinking process of the individual is cir-
cumscribed by the audience to which he addresses through a
common set of symbols characteristic of any language system.
Because, argues Mills like a Median, "in order to communi-
cate, to be understood, he must 'give' sysmbols such meanings
that they callout same responses In his audience as they do
in himself. The process of 'externalizing' his thought in
language is thus, by virtue of the commonness essential to
meaning, under the control of the audience" (PPP: 434-35).
The task of the sociology of knowledge consists in
giving, among other things, "promise of explaining an area
of lingual and social fact" CPPP: 450). Accordingly, Mills
develops "an analytic model" for the explanation of motives
based on "a sociological theory of language and a sociological
psychology." This rests, argues Mills with the influence of
Weber (1964a: 39) and Dewey (1970: 471) in the background,
upon refutations of both Wundt and Freud. Motives are not
express lons of !!pI'io:c' elemen ts:: in the individual as Wund t
sees them.
Rather they are "typical vocabularies having
93
ascertainable functions in delimited societal situations"
(pPP: 439). Again, the problem of motivation is not one of
"motive power" as Freud's biological metaphysic holds. On
the contrary, it is a problem of "steered conduct" (ess: 113).
With such a viewpoint Mills discovers motives in socially
situated actions. Although motives are "terms with which
interpretation of conduct by social actors proceeds" or
"accepted justifications for present, future, or past pro-
.grams or acts" (pPP: 440, 443), they or their vocabularies
are avenues of social control. They are not static but vary
in content and character in relation to different societal
situations and historical epochs. So it is possible to say
"what is reason for one man is rationalization for another"
(PPP: 448). This poses the problem of relativism. Mills
suggests a way out by singling out, for the sociology of
knowledge analysis, the accepted vocabulary of motives of
the dominant group to which the individual is linked. On
the one hand,
Determination of such groups, their location and
character, would enable delimitatioh and methodo-
logical control of assignment of motives for
specific acts (PPP: 448).
on the other, rather at a higher level,
What is needed is to take all (these)terminologies
of motives and locate them as vocabularies of
motive in historic epochs and specific situations
(PPP: 452)
Finally, it remains to consider Mills' views on "theory",
"method" and "verification" ln empirical practices of s o i o ~
logy. In relation to these categories, as developed in The
94
Sociological Imagination (1959), Mills follows generally the
classic tradition of sociology.
In Mills' sociological methodology of intellectual
craftsmanship, neither theory nor method constitutes "auto-
nomous" domain. Methods are "methods for some range of
problems." Theories are "theories for some range of pheno-
mena." Every working sociologist is "his own methodolFlgist
and his own theorist, which means only that he must be an
intellectual craftsman" (SI: 121). According to Mills, the
operating and practical postulates of a viable methodology,
based on the classic tradition, are the following:
'Method' has to do, first of all, with how to
ask and answer questions with some assurance
that the answers are more or less durable.
'Theory' has to do, above all, with paying
close attention to the words one is using,
especially their degree of generality and
their logical relations. The primary purpose
of both is clarity of conception and economy
of procedure, and most importantly just now,
the release rather than the restriction of the
sociological imagination (SI: 120).
There_.is no one grand model or one grand methodology of socio-
logical work. "Social science of any kind is advanced by
ideas; it is discipline only by fact." The relevance of
either theory or method consists in their efficacy to illumine
the concrete realities of social happenings; their uses are
justified in terms of actual work only. Successful crafts-
manship avoids "rigid set of procedure," "association and
dissociation of concepts," and "fetishism of method and
technique." The methodological sophistication and scientistic
95
concerns over purity of the "empirical," "data," "validity"
or "facts" may bring about mellower maturity of sociology
but, when it becomes an ethos of epistemological enthusiasm,
it may needlessly erode human passions or moral fibres of
the sociologist in understanding the human significance of
tormenting sociopolitical issues. Neither theory nor method
is, says Mills, "part of the actual \vork of the social studies.
In fact, both are often just opposite: they are statesmanlike
withdrawals from the problems of social science" (51: 122).
However sophisticated the postulates of theories and methods
are, the search for universal generalizations of cause-and-
effect- relationships always falls short of the desired per-
fection. The more rigorous the methodology becomes the more
it defeats the purpose of research, that of providing "factual
information, that is, empirical evidence in the form of quanti-
tative estimates and/or qualitative experience which can be
organized to relate values we hold, and to confirm or re-
pudiate our beliefs about the functioning of society, institu-
tions, and people" (Rein, 1976: 38).
raises the question of verification.
Finally, Mills also
"For what level of veri-
fication ought workers in social science be willing to settle"
(51: 71)? Mills' answer avoids both the rigidity of episte-
mology and the empiricists' techno-mindedness to process every
thing through "the fine mill of The Statistical Ritual." He
does not emphasize "how to verify" at the cost of "what to
verify." The Problem of verification is not set apart from
the craftsman's moral consciousness and social responsibility.
Verification consists of rationally convincing
others, as well as ourselves. But to do that
we must follow the accepted rules, above all the
rule that work be presented in such a way that
is open at every step to the checking up by
others. There is no One Way to do this; but it
does always require a developed carefulness and
attention to detail, a habit of being clear, a
skeptical perusal of alleged facts, and a tire-
less curiosity about their possible meanings,
their bearings on other facts and notions. It
requires orderliness and system. In a word, it
requires the firm and consistent practice of the
ethics of scholarship. If that is not present,
no technique, no method, will serve (SI: 126-27).
Having outlined Mills' sociology of knowledge and
96
epistemology, it now seems evident that his views, like Mann-
,>--,"/"
heim's suffer from what has been called "relativism." The
truth of the matter inherent in the of both Mann-
heim and Mills is that they were unable to provide satis-
factory remedy for relativism, and this seriously affects
the scientific validity of their formulations. A partial
explanation consists In their rejection of the Marxian V
scientific method.
6
In particular Mills' dominant orienta-
tions, sociological, political and philosophical, were after
/
all on the side of which he still regarded viable
as an adequate theory of society. The other part of the
story is that the sociology of knowledge remains, more pro-
bably, built upon certain relativistic propositions. What-
ever it is, Mills' sociological methodology has been validly
characterized by Gillam (1966: 4-8), Phillips (1974-: 71-72),
and Scimecca (1977: 59) as relativistic. For instance, even
the verificatory model of Peirce and Dewey cannot provide,
argues Mills, "absolute guarnaty" for the truthfulness of
the findings of the sociology of knowledge. However, he
suggests that it is "the most probable we have at present"
(pPP: 461). In addition he holds,
The assertions of the sociologist of knowledge
escape the "absolutist's dilemma" because they
can refer to a degree of truth and because they
may include the conditions under which they are
true .... Assertions can properly be stated as
probabilities, as more or less true. And only
in this way can we account for the fact that
scientific inquiry is self correcting (PPP: 461).
97
This raises the question of inner contradictions or relati-
vis tic Phillips rightly points out:
either the relativist's own assertions are
themselves relative, and, therefore, lacking
truth value; Or his argument is unconditionally
true, and, consequently, relativism is self
contradictory (1974: 72).
Language is relative because "semantical changes are surro-
gates and foci of cultural conflicts and group behavior"
(pPP: 432). Motives are relative because "the motivational
structures of individuals and the patterns of their purposes
are relative to societal frames" (PPP: 448). Logic is
relative because "criteria are themselves developing things"
(pPP: 461). And so on. Despite such relativistic social
analysis, there is no point, I think, to underrate the theor-
etical awareness Mills demonstrated in these matters. The
problem of relativism vs. absolutism has yet to be solved.
And until that is done, it should be clear that both Mannheim
and Mills recognized "as most sociologists do not, the social
nature of language; perception, concept-formation, verifica-
tory models, truth and knowledge" (Phillips, 1974: 79).
98
Values and Objectivity
The still indecisive controversy as to whether or
not values should play any significant part in the scienti-
fic enterprise arose with Weber who asserted in 1904 that
"it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide
binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate-
ly practical activity can be derived .... An empirical science
cannot tell anyone what he should do--but rather what he can
do--and under certain circumstances--what he wishes to do"
(1964b: 52-54). But, at the same time, it must be specifical-
ly noted, he did not intend withdrawal of value judgements
from "scientific discussion in general"; rather he enunciates
his position by saying that lithe capacity to distinguish be-
tween empirical knowledge and value-judgements, and the ful-
fillment of the scientific duty to see the factual truth as
well as practical duty to stand up for our own ideals con-
stitute the program to which we wish to adhere with ever
increasing firmness" (Weber, 1964b: 58). Despite the myth
of a value free science which American sociologists created
in the period following the Second World War in order to seek
legitimation for their rampant methodological empiricism and
also to shun social responsibility, it is thus clear that
Weber never understressed the value relevance of the subjective
value judgements in sociology. However, it is very difficult
to gainsay that he, by emphasizing a dichotomy between judge-
ments of fact and judgements of value, became the ideologicai
99
fountain source of the weltanschauung of the current neo-
positivism in the social sciences. But even then, he
dichotomized under certain constraining circumstances. He
formulated the doctrine of ethical neutrality, together with
its all-soul concern for jUdgements of fact, in order to main-
tain the cohesion and the autonomy of the University in
general and the nascent social sciences in particular, to
enhance the independence of sociology, to depoliticize the
University and place it above controversies of politics, to
restrain political passion, to provide 'a partial escape from
the parochial prescriptions of the sociologist's local or
native culture', and so on (cf. Gouldner, 1973: 3-26). When
the doctrine was imported into America in the early thirties
most sociologists forgot, in their quest to make sociology
scientific and search for predictive sociological generali-
zations and laws, the specific constraining circumstances of
its origin and also Weber's concern that "only a small portion
of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-condition-.
ed interest and it alone is significant to us (1964b: 76).
The intensity of the rising currents of social scientists'
enthusiasm is conceivable in terms of their general agreement
that "research should be conducted objectively; researchers
should proceed without value judgements or personal prefer-
eDces concerning the utilization of knowledge" (Hinkle and
Hinkle, 1968: 26). This position was most brilliantly re-
flected in Lundberg who, as faithful successor to the Comtean
. \
100
vision of a unified positivistic science, advocated "bring-
ing societary phenomena within the framework of natural
sciences" (1956b: 18).7 Needless to say, the myth of value
free sociology in its pseudo-objectivity was born at almost
total cost of Weber's other dictum, the value relevance of
social phenomena. It came to mean not only "an utter de-
tachment" incumbent on the social scientist but also involved
practically his "renunciation of the role of the citizen"
(Shils, 1965: 1434). Many sociological practitioners found
it expedient "to become peddlars not of knowledge but of
techniques" (Lee, 1951: 706). The doctrine of ethical
neutrality, involving a loss of critical stance for sociology,
is now an escape route for those "who live off sociology
rather than for it, and who think of sociology as a way of
getting ahead in the world by providing them with neutral
techniques that may be sold on the open market to any buyer"
(Gouldner, 1973: 12).
Of the sociologists in America it was Wirth and Lynd,
most prominently among others, who developed the unmasking
tradition of which Mills subsequently became the most notable
protagonist. Wirth, writing in the Preface to Mannheim's
Ideology and Utopia, has reminded that assertions in the social
sciences, no matter however objective they may be, have "rami-
fications extending beyond the limits of science itself" and
accordingly points out that truth itself, not being a simple
correspondence between thought and existence, is "tinged with
101
the investigator's interest in his subject matter, his
standpoint, his evaluations, in short the definition of his
object of attention" (1936: xy, xviii). Lynd has advised
sociologists to be more candid about their "motivations
ll
and
not to hide behind "the aloof 'spirit of science and scholar-
ship "' (1964: 178). However, it must be noted that it was
Mannheim who, by virtue of his sociology of knowledge, in-
fluenced Millsmore than others. His awareness of the problem
of values was quite noticeable as early as 1940:
Questions of value should not be taken uber-
haupt. Located as snarls in social inquiry,
questions of value become specific and genuine
.... Not only the content of values in social
inquiries should be detected, but how values
creep in, and how, if at all, they condition
the direction, completeness, and warrantability
of the results of research (PPP: 466-67).
While the values are themselves the subject matter of
valid sociological investigation, later in 1962 Mills cate-
gorically asserts that "no political philosopher can be de-v
tached; he can only pretend to be" (TM: 11-12). Political
and moral judgements are at the very heart of the social
scientist's intellectual orientation. Values arise from
various possibilities and are involved in all stages of
sociological studies. As Mills wrote: ("Val ues are involved
in the selection of the problems we study; values are also
involved in certain of the key conceptions we use In our
formulation of these problems, and values affect the course
of their solution"\(SI: 78). The fact that values are extra-
scientific or non-scientific and that they dre elusive of
102
logical formulation does not free the social scientist from
moral, political and intellectual implications underlying
his methodological commitment to objective detachment.
Science itself is, as Polyani says, "a system of beliefs to
which we are committed" (1964: 171). In the scientific
enterprise values do creep in and the fact remains that "we
cannot escape from making judgements and the jUdgements that
we make arise from the ethical preconceptions that we have
soaked into our very view of life" (Robinson, 1964: 19). To
avoid values and ostracize them from the analysis of social
phenomena practically means mindless refusal of onels respons-
ibility. This causes concern in view of the fact that in
this ideological epoch and so called social science affluence,
the problems of research as well as results of their findings
will have political implications. In other words, the question
of the scientific status of sociology is less important than
"the social and political uses" of this soft science (cf.
Horowitz, 1975: xiv). Thus,
Whether he wants it or not, or whether he is
aware of it or not, anyone who spends his life
studying society and publishing the results is
acting morally and usually politically as well.
The question is whether he faces this condition
and makes up his own mind, or whether he conceals
it from himself and from others and drifts moral-
ly (SI: 79).
The s ~ g a n of scientific objectivity and the neutralist posture
of the sociologist are in effect indication of a fear of "any
passionate commitment." The avid passion for the curious
mannerism of noncommitment, as evident in the small scale
;::;
F
103
empiricists, is a diplomatic maneuvre of putting their work
outside the political contexts of their society. It is need-
less to add that the task of social theory "does require a
continuous, critical, uncomplaisant, re-examination of pre-
mises and analyses,1I and is not limited to describing lithe
basic form and outline of soceity as it is" (Kolka, 1970: 133).
~ n the one hand, the scientific character of socio-
logy and the nature of its data re not the same as those of
natural sciences. As has already been pointed out, Mills was
particularly aware of the II cultural and intellectual" contexts
of social research and he emphasized the inappropriateness of
the laboratory and experimental technique to the investiga-
tion of social phenomena. The truth of the matter is that the
social sciences in general are not, keeping aside the para-
phernalia of scientific methodology with its associated tech-
nician's attitude,')sciences characterized by their own laws,
but a heterogeneous collection of inquiries strung together
on the common theme of human action" (Louch, 1966: 236-37)
(MillS' call for the acceptance of a legitimate role
'.
8
of values, on the other hand, can be justified yet from another
point of view. The positivistic viewpoint, taken by itself,
is inadequate because it is not yet complete. The conception
of objectivity, founded on the so called separation of facts
from values, is more complex and intriguing than is supposed
by the protagonists of positivist sociology. While, on the
one hand, scientific canons of verity, precision and semantic
neutrality are yet to be formulated to distinguish "is" from
I
t
F
104
"ought" of the situations, a science which proposes to es-
tablish factual truth by purely objective formal criteria
is, on the other, likely to be a failure. "Any process of
inquiry unguided by intellectual passions would inevitably
spread into a desert of trivialities" (Polyani, 1964: 135)
Again, while values are difficult to exclude from social
analysis, it is also difficult to ensure objectivity in view
of the fact that the researcher's orientations are invari-
ably bound up with the evaluative elements of his culture
and society. In a conception of sociology that centers
around human concerns and that involves what Berger calls
"an openness of mind and catholicity of vision" no amount of
methodological technicalities of verification or validation
can guarantee objectivity. The problem of objectivity be-
comes acute only when one blindly adheres to personal
preferences and partial views in face of clear, logical,
factual and irrefutable evidence to the contrary. Otherwise
the claim of the social scientist that "he knows how to
proceed impartially is an illusion" (Couch, 1960: 46).
However, by this it is not intended to argue that the ideal
is not worth pursuing; it is rather to suggest that values
may not be simple personal predilections but it may be such
conceptions as are built within the logical structure of the
argument. For this values themselves are worthy of discussion.
The researcher can attain objecJcivity "not by giving up his
will to action and holding his evaluations in abeyance but
in confronting and examining himself" (Mannheim, 1936: 47).
As for Mills,
So far as conceptions are concerned, the aim
ought to be to use as many 'value-neutral'
terms as possible and to become aware of and
to make explicit the value implications that
remain. So far as problems are concerned,
the aim ought to be, again, to be clear about
the values in terms of which they are selected,
and then to avoid as best as one can evaluative
bias in their solution, no matter where that
solution takes one and no matter what its moral
or political implications may be (51: 78).
105
Put in the words of Gouldner, who carries distinct Millsian
tradition in his sociology:
Objectivity thus means not being biased in
favor of one's own side or against our ad-
versaries, particularly in our cognitive work
It means, in short, facing bad news and
not exaggerating the good news (1976: 5).
It follows, therefore that the problem of objectivity can be
overcome, at least to a large extent, by confronting, and
not by denying, values and value judgements (cf. Werkmeister,
1959: 503; Myrdal, 1953: 242). Additionally, if the socio-
logist keeps problem consciousness upper-most in his mind, he
can proceed objectively in his analysis, giveR the aeknewledge-
ment of value premises and value implications of his work.
"For objectivity in the work of social science requires the
continuous attempt to become explicitly aware of all that is
involved in the enterprise; it requires wide and critical
interchange of such attempts" (51: 130). Thus understood,
it remains to accept what Mills rightly puts forward:
There is no way in which any social scientist can
avoid assuming choices of value and implying them
in his work as a whole. Problems, like issues and
troubles, concern threats to expected values, and
cannot be clearly formulated without acknowledge-
ment of those values (51: 177).
106
Quantification and Sociology
Mills' emphasis on the historical dimensions of the
problems of structural significance might suggest his
hostility to quantifying trends in the current styles of
empirical researches.
9
However this is far from the actual
truth. He only reacted to what usually passes on in the
name of quantification, that is "the use of statistics to
illustrate general points and the use of general points to
illustrate statistics" (SI: 71). He was, quite rightly,
apprehensive of surreptitious white-washing by quantifica-
tion of the facts and issues of sociology. Rather than speak
against the uses of quantification Mills has persuasively
argued for proper utilization of statistics or mathematics
in the illumination of the problem situations of the emergent
mass society.
The specific methods--as distinct from the
philosophy--of empiricism are clearly suit-
able and convenient for work on many problems,
and I do not see how anyone could reasonably
object to such use of them. We can of course,
by suitable abstraction, be exact about any-
thing. Nothing is inherently immune to measure-
ment. If the problems upon which one is at
work are readily amenable to statistical proce-
dures, one should always try to use them (SI: 73)
His caution against the common tendency of the quantophrenic
empiricists to blind people and explore only such data as
are quantitatively manipulatable is therefore understandable.
It also must be noted that it is as wrong to assume that no
knowledge is possible without quantification as it is to
107
believe that amenability of the data to measurement necessar-
ily coincides with the significance of the problem chosen
for the study. Mills only calls for the use of quantifica-
tion in honest and sensible manner. What he argues against
is "the soul-destroying taboo against touching anything that
cannot be quantified and a surreptitious reverence for every
scribbling which loos like amthematics" (Andreski, 1973: 136).
No amount of high-level quantitative endeavor is able to ab-
stract without inVOlving the risk of distortion of facts or
reality. In addition, while dangers are obvious in the badly
collected data, quantitative data are 'scarecly available in
cases where the government and other private agencies do not
wish exposure of their lapses. Far more important limitation
arises in view of the fac t that "tilere is no ultimately s e If-
validating mathematics or other logic that could take from
man the necessity of choosing his axioms, selecting his
logical models and accepting responsibility for the particular
gr-a-mm-arhe chooses to ap-ply to the problem confronting him"
(Friedrichs, 1970: 151). Given the advantages of quantifi-
cation, Mills' position, I think, resembles that of Moore Jr.
who says this: "We do know in a general way that we do not
want our gains in logical rigor and ease of manipUlation to
be at the expense of too much historical content" (1958: 135).
Empiricism based on Social-Historical Structures
In conformity to his espousal of the need for the em-
108
Mills advoca tes "a much broader style of empiricism l' tfLan
is usually available within the methodological inhibitions of
abstracted empiricism.
lO
For him, legitimate sociological
analysis consists of comparative understanding of the social
structures in their historical significance. The classic
practitioners like Weber and Ostrgorski, Marx and Bryce,
Michels, 8immels or Mannheim have well illustrated the fruit-
fulness of the macroscopic orientation to sociological analy-
sis. In the words of Mills, "These men like to deal with
total social structures in a comparative way; their scope is
that of the world historian; they attempt to generalize types
of historical phenomena, and in a systematic way, to connect
the various institutional spheres of a society, and then re-
late them to prevailing types of men and women" (PPP: 554).
In terms of this broadbased empiricism, Mills urges the socio-
logists to undertake social analysis and pursue it in the
classic way which involves
.... an abstraction from what may be observed in
everyday milieux, but the direction of its ab-
straction is toward social and historical struc-
tures. It is on the level of historical reality
--which is merely to say that it is in terms of
specific social and historical structures that
the classic problems of social science have been
formulated, and in such terms solutions offered
(81: 124).
The productive sociological research lies between grand theory
and abstracted empiricism, as Mills said, or between "Big
Theory and Big Research", as Moore, Jr. (1958: 140) said.
Mills is however not hostile to small scale researches
109
centering around problems of milieux though he would advise
not to study "merely one small milieu after another."
I do not suppose that anyone has a right to
object to detailed studies of minor problems.
The narrowed focus they require might be part
of an admirable quest for precision and cer-
tainty; it might also be part of a division
of labor, of a specialization to which, again,
no one ought to object (81: 74).
Problem Consciousness as a 80ruce of Sociological Craftsmanship
The loss of problem consciousness had its origin in
a two-fold source: grand theory and abstracted empriricism,
both of which neglected historical dimensions in sociological
theory and research. As a result, working sociologists in-
dubltably came to underrate historical simensions that only
can provide ~ real sense of problems". In spite of many
limitations of his work, it is to the historian that "we may
turn in search for a different approach to the problems of
human society .... The fruitful historical research generally
begins with an awareness of some problem that is felt to be
significant" (Moore, Jr. 1958: 141). At the same time the
problem consciousness, an integral component of sociologists'
humanistic concern, "is not merely a means of avoiding ideo-
logical biases but is, above all, an indispensable condition
of progress in any discipline of human inquiry" (Dahrendorf,
1958: 124). As a matter of fact the loss of problem con-
sciousness was ultimately due to an abandonment of the classic
tradition of sociology. In urging the working sociologists
110
to keep "uppermost a full sense of the problem at hand" Mills
calls for the reinstatement of this tradition.
To practice such a policy is to take up
substantive problems on the historical level
of reality; to state these problems in terms
appropriate to them; and then, no matter how
high the flight of theory, no matter how pains-
taking the crawl among detail, in the end of
each completed act of study, to state the solu-
tion in the macroscopic terms of the problem.
The classic focus, in short, is on substantive
problems (81: 128).
But, inevitably, the question is: what is a significant or
substantive problem? As for Mills, the problems are not im-
mediately significant because of their practical, political,
or moral meanings. "What we should mean in the first instance
is that", says Mills, "they should have genuine relevance
to our conception of a social structure and to what is hap-
pening within them" (81: 73). And, then, the problems be-
come significant in terms of their political consequences
upon men in sociohistorical transformations of the society.
Thus his sociology l@com@s lolitieal sociology, and its
problems are significant, morally and intellectually, in
terms of threats to cherished values of truth, reason, and
freedom--in brief, political ideals of liberalism. These
values constitute "the necessary moral substance of all sig-
nificant problems of social inquiry, as well as of all public
issues and private troubles" (S1: 175). To elaborate the
political overtones of Mills' sociology:
The very enterprise of social science, as it
determines fact, takes on political meaning.
In a world of widely communicated nonsense,
any statement of fact is of political and
moral significance. All social scientists,
by the fact of their existence, are involved
in the struggle between enlightment and
obscurantism. In such a world as ours, to
practice social sciences is, first of all,
to practice the politics of truth CSI: 178)
The realization of this truth has its roots in the ideals
of political liberalism and pragmatism rather than in the
tenets of Marxism or dialectical materialism. Whatever it
is, in envisioning political tasks of the sociologists,
Mills does not intend "to save the world" although there is
111
nothing wrong in it if it means "the avoidance of war and the
re-arrangement of human affairs in accordance with the ideals
of human freedom and reason" CSI: 193))
Critique of Modern Empiricism: The Radical Viewpoint
Ever since its birth, mainstream sociological theory
and research has retained its one-sided unneutral function
of legitimating the irrationality and immutability of the
existing structure or institutional arrangements of the
society. Among other things, its main function has been ideo-
logical, and its practitioners are "so intensively interest-
bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to
see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domin-
ation" (Mannheim, 1936: 40). In its triumphant march the
mainstream sociology, both in its intellectual content and
ideological-political character, has continued to maintain
its historic alliance with capitalism. It is still, more
than ever, "a moralizing sociology of milieux" (SI: 88).
112
It lS not "a science: it is a way of doing ideology.

And
in a high-technology society, it is an ideological produc-
tion of great practical and ideological utility to any ruling
class" (Freiberg, 1973: 19-20). That the situation has
changed little since Mills' time is evident from the remark
made by Kon in 1974: "When studied from within, the crisis
of sociology, I believe, appears as a crisis of the illusions
of positivist science, empiricism and functionalism" (Kon,
1975: 58). It is therefore no wonder that Mills' critique,
in spite of its towers over most subsequent
criticisms made recently in the social sciences (cf. Shaw,
1975: x).
As early as 1944 Mills discovered the US intellectuals'
failure to reinstate "pragmatism's emphasis upon the power
of man's intelligence to control his destiny" (PPP: 292).
They suffered what he calls "a failure of nerve." In the
beginning of the mid-twentieth century Mills saw how the
emergence of rational bureaucracies affected "the conditions
of intellectual life." The intellectual, he writes,
.. .. hopes for opportunities of research, travel,
and foundation subsidies. Tacitly, by his
silence, or explicitly in his work, the academic
intellectual often sanctions illusions that up-
hold authority, rather than speak out against
them. In his teaching, he may censor himself
by carefully selecting safe problems in the name
of pure science, or by selling such prestige as
his scholarship may have for ends other than his
o wn (W C: 1 5 2 ) .
The development of rational bureaucracies accompanied what
M ills called "the manageI'ial dem iULg e . !! The bureaucratic-
113
managerial-technological society required a legitimating
ideology and a set of intellectuals who could be hired in
research cartels in order to turn out "elaborate studies
and accurately timed releases, buttressing the interest,
competing with other hatreds, turning pieties into theo-
logies, passions into ideologies" (WC: 153). As a result
they became technicians and joined "the expanding world of
those who live off ideas, as administrator, idea-man, and
good will technician" (WC: 156). To carry Mills' analysis
a little further, his concept of "technicians" is comparable
to Gramsci's concept of "functionaries". In the words of
Gramsci, whom Mills labels as a plain marxist, "the in-
tellectuals are the group's 'deputies' exercising
subaltern functions of social hegemony and political govern-
ment" (1971: 12). The great increase in the number of in-
tellectuals or technicians is itself an indication of their
need for ideological justification of the power wielder's
dCJmination in the regime of corporate capitalism. To quoTe
him again, "The democratic-bureaucratic system has given rise
to a mass of functions which are not all justified by the
social necessities of production, though they are justified
by the political necessities of the dominant fundamental
group" (Gramsci, 1971: 13). In this light there is little
difficulty to note, as Mills has done, that the empiricist-
technicians of modern sociology, though too alienated to
identify themselves with private and public issues
of their time, are in historical continuity with their pre-
114
decessors in providing legitimating ideology for the
capitalist social structure of domination, alienation and
manipulation. The producers of social scientific knowledge,
no better than other workers, are engaged in "producing
commodities for exchange" and they participate only in
developing "an exchangeable account of society" (Horton,
1971: 175). In fact the present relationship of the functions
of social scientific knowledge to the corporate-pluralist
interests of the dominant class is quite indicative of certain
patterns which, though more complex and intriguing than sup-
posed, are as follows:
First, a noticeable trend consists ln the emergence
of the government as the predominant buyer of social scien-
tific knowledge or, stated otherwise, of relevant information
suited to its political purposes. Private agencies corne next.
As a result of both the number of sociologists receiving
support from these is generally on the increase. Between
1966 and 1970 their number, who were receiving federal sUPP9rt,
has gone up from 3,640 to 7,658 (Horowitz and Katz, 1975: 10).
In this wider involvement with different policy making a-
gencies of the government, the sociologists are more prone
to accommodate government's priorities, and therefore its
political interests rather than assume autonomy and respons-
ib ili ty .
.... there is slender evidence that information
bought and paid for is made the basis of policy
in critical times. Indeed, there is just as
much evidence for the conclusion that information
is used when it suits policy-makers and discarded
\vhen it does not "fit" political plans
(Horowitz, 1968: 272).
As for researches within the Universities there is little
115
or no scope for developing or undertaking critical studies of
colonialism, imperialism or class struggle given the struc-
ture of Graduate programs geared to standardized methodology
d h h
11
an researc tec nlques. rhe chief obstacle is the feudal
structure of the University through which "a bankrupt
orthodoxy perpetuates its bankruptcy by forcing young scholars
to swear fealty to its certified ideological idols and techni-
ques" (cf. Horowitz, 1970: 8).
Second, it is the foundations and other corporate
bodies that are influencing the trends of sociological research.
Nearly one-half of all foundations grew up between 1950 and
1959 and nearly one-fourth between 1960 and 1969. The largest
12 of approximately 25,000 foundations In 1969 controlled
some $7.5 billion in assets or roughly 30 percent of the
resources of all the foundations put together. In 1970-71
foundation support for the social sciences rose to $77 million
or 38 percent of the total expenditure (Horowitz and Katz,
1975: 16-18). Whatever the philanthropic purposes they might
serve, the foundations have been increasingly caught in the
political crossfire since the 1960s. Attacks came from all
directions, from liberal to Marxist, but it was Mills who took
lead to focus on the ideological purposes which they served.
In 1944 he wrote: "Research ia social science is increasingly
dependent upon funds from foundations, and foundations are
nottibly averse to scholars who develop unpopular theses, that
116
is, those placed In the category of 'unconstructive'" (pPP:
297) . As a matter of fact, directions of foundation financed
research have caused concerns for many (cf. Lundberg, 1968;
Horowitz and Kalodney, 1969; Horowitz, 1969). Nielsen com-
ments that "the large foundations--their theoretical useful-
ness as creative forces and as change agents notwithstanding
--are in fact overwhelmingly passive, conservative, and
anchored to the status quo" (1972: 406).
The third characteristic trend relates to increasing
uses of sociology, as well as participation of more socio-
logists, in providing materials useful for military intelli-
gence, strategic planning and psychological warfare. Of
course, this trend is coincident with the rise of Cold War
and world wide US military involvement since the World War II.
Bowers reports that well over two hundred professional socio-
logists have contributed to this post-War use of sociology
and that "this upward trend in the military use of sociology
is here to stay" (1967: 267). Sometimes military spending for
behavioral and social research has yielded many important and
interesting results, causing thereby euphoria among the socio-
logists. For example, one of them remarks,
"
the resources
for the conduct of our foreign policy, and our social science
as a whole, would be poorer if military agencies had not
stepped in and provided funds and encouragement that were
not forthcoming from civilian departments" (Davison, 1967: 396).
What, however, causes concern is that the same money could
have come from another department. The truth is that socio-
117
logy is also becoming a component of the military establish-
ment of the corporate capitalist society (cf. Beals, 1969:
111-12). Take for instance, the ultimate purpose of Samuel
Stouffer's The American Soldier (1949). In spite of its
claim that the study was value free, it is not at all diffi-
cult to see that the military used "its findings as a kind
of handbook to promote higher m?rale, defuse dissension, and
generally increase the_efficiency of battle units in the
European campaign" (Sternber,1977: 107). A far more glaring
example in point is project Camelot, an Army-supported be-
havioral research project with a four year budget of $6
million. On the one hand, its purpose is clearly political
and practically conservative. Its purpose, however hidden
behind the technical vocabulary, was not only to
political conditions of Latin American countries but also to
obstruct any political changes therein. Clearly it was one
af "counter-insurgency" nature. On its
problems were also methodologically pertinent. By confusing
revolution and radical change with problems of social patho-
logy, the Camelot sociologists revealed only their conserva-
tive ideological biases characteristic of the functionalists'
concern to reduce every thing as issues of order, stability,
pattern maintenance, conflict management, and so on. As a
matter of fact the project, though cancelled in 1965, has
brought to the fore serious issues like value of the value-
neutrality ethic, ideological cohabitation between social
118
science and vested interests, and conservative roots of main-
stream sociology and sociologists. It is evident that "the
brutal fact of imperialism is incorporated into the intellec-
tual structure of the project. The unquestioned and highly
doubtful presuppositions of power politics in the Cold War
era are built into the very system of research which is sup-
posed to discover truth. One might ask whether such social
science is exploring or fabricating the truth" (Ober and
Corradi, 1966: 52). The project has demonstrated, more than
revealing the naked face of conservative-ideological politics
underlying the current trends of sociological empiricism,
that long run interests of the sociologists do not lie with
a sectarian politics but with "the broader concerns of man-
kind" (Sjoberg, 1967: 160).
Finally, in conformity to the increased demand for
policy related social sciences, the various government, in-
dustrial and corporate agencies are showing greater interest
in gathering raw quantitative data necessary to their policy
planning and policy formulation. In this survey research is
the most frequently used tool. That is to say, recent de-
velopments point toward a client-centered sociology (cf.
Lazarsfeld et al., 1967: x-xi). Besides such corporations
as General Motors, Ford Motor Company, General Electric etc.,
the government prefers, particularly in the studies of crimin-
ality, defense, foreign policy and urban studies, to appoint
sociologists who can transform qualitative materials into
quantitative terms. The policy makers r preference derives
119
from the fact that this enables them "to order and audit
political options and the implications of their choices", as
Horowitz and Katz say. The negative implication arising
from the purposive emphasis on the quantitative aspects is
that "social sciences move beyond their academic confines,
and become very much a part of the larger social and economic
system" (Horowitz and Katz, 1975: 46). The widespread uses
of survey research conform to the general pattern of the
domination of the quantitative trends in sociology. The
survey research provides necessary data by which establish-
ment sociologists, in the name of so-called meaningful in-
tegration of theory and research, build up, on the one hand,
a comfortable sociology and aid, on the the adminis-
trative-bureaucratic apparatus in the preservation of the
status quo. The rise of the trend is "almost entirely the
result of its general 'practical' uses in the manipulation
of together with its suitability to the fin-
ancial, ideological and career structures of the 'social
sciences'" (Shaw, 1975: 41).
This review of the major trends of current empirical
research styles in sociology attest only to Mills' premoni-
tion of how the politics of liberalism, both as ideology
and rhetoric, is providing "the terms of all issues and con-
fliets" (PPP: 218). Elsewhere he says that, even if the moral
content of liberalism is still abstractly stimulating,
its sociolog ical con ten t lS weak : its
political means of action are
unimaginative. It has no
theory of man in society, no theory of man
as the maker of history. It has no political
programme adequate to the moral ideals it
professes It is much more useful as a
defense of the status quo than as a
creed for deliberate historical change (TM: 30).
In this context Mills' political in its dual
aspect of criticism of the establishment trends and of an
120
attempt at the reconstruction of the radical is
singularly important in the history of sociological analysis.
To therefore, in the words of a recent critic of
mainstream sociology:
Given the persistence of the structural
constraints inherent in the exercise of
the procession, which are partly rooted in
the academic structure the chance
of another Mills arising in sociology is
about equal to the chance of a Fidel Castro
emerging in the State Department. Unless
this structure changes it is
safely predictable that the next generation
of prominent sociologists will be just as
bought as the present one is 1971: 51) .
/
121
Notes
1. To cite an seethe recent article of Phillips
where he contrasts Mills' position with that of
Mannheim and Merton. See also Kraetzer (1975).
2. For a contemporary but highly critical point of view
assailing "pompous bluff and paucity of ideas" in the
recent flood of see Andreski (1973).
3. It seems to be a rewarding task to trace how Mills'
Methodological contributions including his concept of
the sociological imagination have influenced the
temporary sociologist and their sociologies. Needless
to add, these sociologists vary widely between them.
Generally see Rapoport (1965: 94-107) Glaser and Strauss
(1967: 251-57), Willer Kariel (1968), Sjoberg
and Nett (1968), Becker (1970:13), Hughes (1971: 478-
95), Denzin (1973), Fletcher (1974; 1975).etc.
4. For a discussion of Mannheim's lapses into historicism
see Wagner (1952).
5. Mills' contention has been supported by Meltzer who
says of Mead: "He oversimplifies the concept by assum-
ing, apparently, a single, universal generalized other
for the members of each society--rather than a variety
of generalized others (even for the same individuals),
at different levels of generality" (1972: 20), as Mills
suggested earlier.
6. Mills' failurB to that Marxism an ade-
quate basis of "science" or "scientific method" has
resulted in serious consequences for his radical socio-
logy. See chapter 9, which contains my criticisms of
the drawbacks of radical sociology in general.
7. His arguments are more elaborate and articulate in
Can Science Save Us. See Lundberg (1961), and also
Bierstedt (1963) who carries the same tradition, more
or less.
8. For interesting discussion on the nature of social
science including sociology, see Winch (1965) and Ryan
(1970).
9 . Cf. Shils (1961). I have already quoted a
Shils' review article in this connection.
of this chapter .
section
See pp.
from
79-80
10. For Mills' views on the role of historical materials
in sociological analysis, discussed in a comparison
with Parsons' grand sociology, see chapter 2,
especially pp. 81-67.
11. Howev.er, I take note of the fact that nowadays many
American social scientists are undertaking serious
studies in these areas.
122
CHAPTER FOUR
Mass Society
Introduction
Before I again return to Mills' political sociology,
I propose to deal with, in the following two chapters, two
important theoretical issues: mass society and alienation.
In this regard, Mills' contributions may be summarized in
two ways: 1) he developed a sociological framework within
which a theory of mass society could be formulated; and in
doing so, he connected the alienating features of modern man
with the emergent society in America; and 2) his framework
provides an important perspective that helps one to assess
the structural changes of American society and its impact
upon the psychology of individuals. While accomplishing both
purposes, Mills' framework also creates a distinct tradition
within American sociological analysis in that it marks a
characteristic break with the aristocratic perspective of
European mass theorists.
The Trends towards Mass Society
In 1930, when he published his The Revolt of the
Masses, Gasset perceived the new trend and wrote: " .... America
is, in a fashion, the paradise of the masses" (1957: 116).
123
124
By the mid-twentieth century American society has moved,
says Mills, "a considerable distance along the road to the
mass society" (PPP:358). This movement is the noticeable
development of far-reaching structural transformations that
were taking place following the last World War. The gradual
evolution of American society into a mass society, in one
form or another, is linked with the changes, brought about
by developments of technologies of production and destruction,-
in the institutional orders of the society. Massive techno-
logical developments in the society were accompanied by rapid
industrialization, continuous urbanization, proliferation of
opportunities for men and women with the broadening of the
economic base, the expansion of decision-making spheres and
at the same time centralization of its apparatus and, finally,
bureaucratization of all spheres of life, social and individual.
The impact of these changes is most visible in the realm of
power which nowadays increasingly resides in the economic,
political and military orders of the society. Using the
concept of power as an 'expedient to approach modern social
structures' and keeping in mind the institutional dominance
of the economic, political and military orders, Mills ad-
vanced his thesis of the structural transformations and of
how it has trichotomized American society into three dis-
tinct layers, ranked in terms of their accessibility to
power. To quote Mills:
The top of modern American society is increas-
ingly unified, and often seems willfully coor-
dinated: at the top there has emerged an elite
, -
"
<{ r F }
-.;?"'.,
....
of power. The middle levels are a drifting
set of stalemated, balancing forces: the
middle does not link the bottom with the top.
The bottom of this society is politically
fragmented, and even as a passive fact, in-
creasingly powerless: at the bottom there is
emerging a mass society (PE: 324).
125
The concept of the mass society, as Mills develops, is linked
with the shift of power from the mass of people to those
"political, economic and military circles which as an intri-
cate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at
least national consequences. In so far national events are
decided, the power elite are those who decide them!! (PE: 18)
Conversely, in the mass society the people have become power-
less or have suffered powerlessness to the extent the power
elite has become powerful.-) Together with the middle level
of the society, characterized by the new bourgeoisie which
lS without any political direction, the men in the masses
are now open to control and manipulation by the power elite.
This approach to the problem of powerlessness of the masses
in a society presided over by elites in power sharply differ-
entiates Mills from Le Bon, Mill, Tocqueville, Burckhardt,
/
Gasset and others, who viewed with concern the Emergence of
the masses as a new balancing force in the society. These
theorists assume more or less that either the masses have
acceded to power or their likely accession to power is a
threat to society. The basic postulates behind this aristo-
cratic-elitist conception is a supposed incompetence of the
masses to decide their own destiny. In contrast, Mills'
126
viewpoint is just opposite. The dividing line is Mills'
explicit commitment to democracy. For Mills, the mass society
is indicative of a societal condition in which elite pre-
eminence replaces or erodes the power of the masses to rule
themselves by their own representatives. As he remarks, "In
our time, the influence of publics or of masses within poli-
tical life is in fact decreasing, and such influence as on
occasion they do have tends, to an unknown but increasing
degree, to be guided by the means of mass communication"
(pPP: 35).
Mills differentiates between what he calls "community
of publics" and "mass society." For these phrases in-
dicate only the extreme types. Neither of them is at any time
an exact reflection of social reality in America. "Social
reality is always some sort of mixture of the two" (PE: 302)
Therefore, these two concepts of "community of publics" or
"mass society" are mere theoretical constructs developed
in order to picture, in relative terms, the social situation
that could exist at a given period of time. In distinguish-
ing poblics from masses, Mills chooses to examine the role
of the communications media in influencing and as control
over man In the industrial-technological society. Apart
from many other effects which it entails, the media revolu-
has structurally transformed the community of publics
into a society of the masses along four dimensions.
public,
In a
!" -'
(1) Virtually as many people express opinion
as receive them. (2) Public communications
are so organized that there is a chance imme-
diately and effectively to answer back any
opinion expressed in public. Opinion formed
by such discussion (3) readily finds an out-
let in effective action, even against--if
necessary--the prevailing system of authority.
And (4) authoritative institutions do not
penetrate the public, which is thus more or
less autonomous in its operations (PE: 303-04).
At the opposite extreme, in a mass
(1) far fewer people express opiniqns than re-
ceive them; for the community of publics be-
comes an abstract collection of individuals
who receive impressions from the mass media.
(2) The communications that prevail are so or-
ganized that it is difficult or impossible for
the individual to answer back immediately or
with any effect. (3) The realization of opinion
in action is controlled by authorities who or-
ganize and control the channels of such action.
(4) The mass has no autonomy from institutions;
on the contrary, agents of authorized institu-
tions penetrate this mass, reducing any autonomy
it may have in the formation of opinion by dis-
cussion (FE: 304).
127
,,'
. ~
Mills' description of both concepts proceeds along 'ideal-
type' description. The dividing line, as already indicated,
is q.t py t.lle media. In addition, he draws heavily upon the
image of a classic public as theorized by the eighteenth
century political scientists. Somewhat ideally conceived,
the public of classic democratic tradition is the source of
legitimation and the center for exchange of rational opinion
between persons tied to each other by harmony of mutual in-
terests.
"And, in so far as the public is frustrated in
realizing its demands, its members may go beyond criticism
of specific policies; they question the very legitima-
tions of legal authority" (PE: 299). Such a concept of public
-
I
~
F
is, as the basis of democratic community, now.a 'fairy tale'
and does not even present 'an model of how the
American system of power works.' However, one should not
forget, as Mills reminds, that the idea of the mass socie!y
"involves more than mass communications. The idea implies
that multitudes of people participate in various activities,
but that they do so only formally and passively. Action and
opinion are one again, and both are rigorously controlled
by monopolized media" (PPP: 583). Mills never says that
America is completely a mass society though there are others
who called America a mass society.l America has never been
completely a community of publics either. Mills only dis-
covered the structural towards mass society. In 1954
he says that the situation was "half-mass a-nd half-public."
He also comments that America has travelled "a considerable
distance along the road to the mass society" (pPP: 358). The
latter position found poignant affirmation in his 'rh@ Power
Elite published in 1956. Therein he says more affirmatively
that "many aspects of the public life of our times are more
the features of a mass society than of a community of publics"
(PE: 304).
How has this situation corne about? That is, how
has this transition to the mass society occurred apart from
the rise of the power elite at the top of the masses? What
are the other structural trends? What is their impact upon
the mass life of the individual?
All these queries are at
129
the heart of Mills' thesis of the mass society and aliena-
tion. On the one hand, there is the decline of the individ-
ualism and a rise of irrationality in life (cf. PE: 301-02).
What Mills argues is a part of the story of disillusionment
of the old liberals with the modern forces of sociopolitical
change. The idealization of the traditional community as the
source of organic, natural and desirable interpersonal re-
lationship and the celebration of the free individual at the
same time constituted the theme of liberal optimism which the
old liberal mass theorists thought to have broken down under
the impact of modern conditions of society. This kind of
sociological romanticism found its genesis in the well known
themes of Tonnies, Simmel, or Sombart.
2
Mills only subscribed
to this romanticism. On the other hand, Mills has found in
the mass society "a movement from widely scattered little
powers to concentrated powers and the attempt at monopoly con-
trol from powerful centers, which, being partially hidden, are
centers of manipulation as well as of authority" (PE: 304-05).
The fact that media control aids in manipulation is not to
ignore the role which communication technology plays in the
biological evolution of man and in the development of social
structure. Rather, "the development and maintenance of
large social structure depends on a communication technology
that permits communication through space and time in addition
to face-to-face oral communication" (Parker, 1973: 619).
Mills' apprehension is that mass society marks a transition
towards a life of manipulation, a life guided and directed
130
by centralized points of control, which must be eliminated.
In this sense men are not moving towards but are drifting
away from possibilities of any more freedom in the society.
He only points to the danger inherent in the society of media
sovereignty. To put it in the words of Fromm: "We are not
on the way to greater individualism, but are becoming an in-
creasingly manipulated mass civilization" (1968: 26). Need-
less to add, it is also Mills' message.
Other Factors
The Bureaucratic Character: In his Economy and Society (1922)
Weber wrote:
The United States still bears the character
of a polity which, at least in the technical
sense, is not fully bureaucratized. But the
greater the zones of friction with the outside
and the more urgent the needs of administrative
unity at home become, the more this character
is inevitably and gradually giving way formally
to the bureaucratic structure. Moreover, the
partly unbureaucratic form of the state structure
of the United States is materially balanced by
the more strictly bureaucratic structures of those
formations which, in truth, dominate politically,
namely, the parties under the leadership of pro-
fessionals or experts in organization and elec-
tion tactics (1968: 211).
Mills, the faithful carrier of the sociological heritage of
Weber, also found that "the United States has never and does
not now have a genuine civil service, in the fundamental sense
of a reliable civil service career, or of an independent
bureaucracy effectively above political party pressure"
(PE: 239).
As far back as 1942, Mills said, in virtual agree-
131
ment with this master theorist of bureaucracy, that "the
historical drift may be seen as a bureaucratization of in-
dustrial societies, irrespective of their constitutional
government" (PPP: 53). He also notes that "all modern states
are bureaucratic" and that "bureaucracies do not operate
without definite social settings" (PPP: 65).
With Weber as the dominant influence upon him there-
fore, it was not difficult for Mills to discover bureaucratic
tendencies of the modern industrial societies. In other
words, bureaucratization added mass character to the indus-
trial-technological societies of today. Although the develop-
ment of a money economy is not decisive for the existence of
a bureaucracy, it flourishes along with bureaucracy. It is
a "presupposition of bureaucracy" (Weber, 1968: 204). Mills
found its corroboration in his own society. "In three or
four generations the United States has passed from a loose
scatter of enterprisers to an increasingly bureaucratic coor-
dination of specialized occupational structures. Its economy
has become a bureaucratic cage" (we: 58). Bureaucratic
centralization has pervaded almost all aspects of mass m a n ~
life and all the sectors of his society. In the present era,
the mass society is characteristic of, to borrow a phrase of
Whyte's "a generation of bureaucrats." The corporation mani-
fests the generation's values. All are in a frantic race to
respond to standardized future which it portends. Whether
he is corporation-bound, a lawyer or a scientist, his occu-
pation is "subject to the same centralization, the same trend
132
to group work and to bureaucratization Whatever their
many differences, In one great respect they are all of a
piece: more than any generation in memory, theirs will be
a generation of bureaucrats" (Whyte, Jr., 1956: 64).
(1) The Managerial Demiurge: An important aspect of the
emergent mass society, as Mills refers to in one way or
another, is that it has increasingly become, following World
War II, a "managerial society." Managerial development is
a new phenomenon of the modern America's mass society. The
managerial demiurge, as Mills termed it, is largely a result
of bureaucratization. "As the means of administration are
enlarged and centralized, there are more managers in every
sphere of modern society, and the managerial type of man
becomes more important in the total social structure" (WC: 77).
Both types of managers--the business and industrial--set the
pace and tone of corporate life for the mass. Managers are
the high priests and they possess social mana. The managerial
bureaucrats have exiled the old captains of industry and
business into oblivion. They have thus become "the economic
elite of the new society; they are the men who have the most
of whatever there is to have; the men in charge of things and
of other men, who make the large-scale plans. They are the
high bosses, the big money, the great say-so" (WC: 100).
The managerial demiurge is conspicuous In terms of
three distinct tendencies that it seems to have. First, it
is manifest in the increasing trend of rationalization, the
core and the essence of bureaucratization. Stated simply,
133
rationalization decreases the chance of the individual, how-
ever placed in the stratification structure or in the occu-
pational hierarchy, to-get a view of the whole, of the
totality of any reality. The managers, the business men,
the corporation executives, the clerks, the salesmen, the
store-keepers or the foremen--all are now subject to the
sovereign rule of rationalization. The second consequence of
the rising tide of managerial ism is that, in its progress,
"the capitalist spirit itself has been bureaucratized and
the enterprise fetishized" (We: 107). Bureaucratization, in
the last place, gives way to manipulation, the secretive
exercise of power. The mass man's powerlessness has increased
to the extent to which manipulation has grown anonymous and
all embracing. The shift from the exercise of authority to
one of manipulation is the hallmark of the new society of
the masses, including the new bourgeoisie.
( 2 ) The Profession and Education: The increased bureaucra-
tization of the world of professions is another mark of this
society. The managerial dffimiurge works to build up "in-
genious bureaucracies of intellectual skills" (we: 115)
practically in all types of professions. The impact of
bureaucratization is such that "the rationality itself had
been expropriated from the individual and been located, as
a new form of brain power, in the ingenious bureaucracy it-
self" (We: 112). More and more professionals now respond
to and operate as part of the managerial demiurge.
Again, Mills refers not only to "mass-production
methods of instruction" (we: 129) but also to a kind of
"bureaucratic ethos" which underlies education in the mass
socie-ty. American educational system is based upon the
organizational and hierarchical pattern of the corporate
society. It functions only as a response to and in the
satisfaction of the needs of a technocratic culture. "It
134
is a product both of certain unique conditions of mass educ-
ation and higher education's servicing role vis-a-vis the
bureaucratically organized political and economic sectors"
(Vaughan, 1973: 232). The knowledge has thus become both
bureaucratized and a commodity. It is giving rise to what
Mills calls a "new academic practicality" (cf. we: 134).
Its practitioners readily assume "lithe political perspective
of their bureaucratic clients and chieftains" and serve only
"to increase the efficiency and reputation--and to that ex-
tent, the prevalence--of bureaucratic forms of domination in
modern society" (81: 101). Professors become "more directly
an appendage of the larger managerial demiurge" (We: 133)
as more and more foundation money is poured to encourage
large-scale bureaucratic research into small-scale issues.
The more the members of the academic community act as part
of the corporate establishment and pursue goals bureaucratical-
ly set out, the more they become apolitical, detached from
larger structural issues of long run consequence. The more
they professionalize this apolitical ideology of the mana-
gerial society, the more they endanger their ability to grasp
the other side of the political reality. Given such a situa-
135
tion, American social science presents a dismal picture.
"Research for bureaucratic ends serves to make authority more
effective and more efficient by providing information of use
to authoritative planners" (81: 117).3
It is worthwhile to note that before the mass society
began to make its appearance, it was considered a major
avenue to social equality and political freedom, but "not
the big avenue of economic advancement for the masses of
populace" (WC: 266). The purpose of education was the crea-
tion of 'good citizen' in a 'democratic republic. t In the
new industrial-mass society the meaning of education has
shifted "from status and political spheres to economic and
occupational areas" (WC: 266). It has increasingly become
"a mark of status, and has already become a necessary pre-
requisite for higher social ranking" (Rodnick, 1972: 50).
Because it is the decider of the individual's occupational
fate in a competitive mobile society, educational system is
oriented to providing "'the successful man' in a 'society
of specialists with secure jobs "' (WC: 266). Of many other
consequences that it has produced, education on a mass scale
has also been "one of the major social mechanisms of the rise
of the new middle-class occupations, for these occupations
require those skills that have been provided by the educa-
tional system" OIC: 266). For wage workers, mass education
probably prov ides the only channel along whl.cIL their offs pr ing
can improve their status, although in the long run they usually
end up at the bottom of the white collar job hierarchy. Whether
136
for wage workers or for salaried employees, it must not be
presumed that the prospect offered by mass education is of
limitless success. Often the supply exceeds the demand and
this results in alienating frustration for those who find
themselves outside the opportunities. As Mills says, "Among
those who are not allowed to use the educated skills they
have acquired, boredom increases, hope for success collapses
into disappointment, and the sacrifices that don't payoff
lead to disillusionment" (we: 272).
(3) The Decline of Voluntary Associations: Another important
consequences of the bureaucratization of the predominant
economic, political and military structures of the US society
has been the lowering of the effective use of all "smaller
voluntary associations operating between the state and the
economy on the one hand, and the family on the other" (pPP:
360). The decline of the primary, traditional or voluntary
relations and, therefore, also of primary groups iB historical-
ly associated with the theory of the mass society. Maine, the
celebrated English sociologist of law, traced the development
of progressive societies in terms of a passage from status
to contract. This movement involved a decline of social
groups and the family and an accompanying emergence of legal-
ly autonomous individual (cf. Maine, 1861). The German
sociologist, Tonnies, who introduced the much publicized
dichotomy between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in 1887,
traced the rise of more imDersonal_ mAchanical
.... oJ - --- --- ----
relations as features of the new society, Gesellschaft,
137
which grew out of the ruins of new commercialism and indus-
trial capitalism. In America Colley anticipated the rise of
the mass society because of the continuous eclipse of primary
groups from social life. Park, who also perceived the same
trend, distinguished masses from publics as far back as 1904.
4
It was, however, Blumer, a student of Park, who extended and
systematized the idea of limassll (cf. Blumer, 1955: 370).
Mills looked at the decline of voluntary associations
from the political context which is, in its turn, a conse-
quence of centralization and bureaucratization of the dominant
institutional structures of the society. He clearly points
out: "Voluntary associations, open to individuals and small
groups and connecting them with centers of power, no longer
are dominant features of the social structure of the United
States" (CWT: 33). It is this political perspective that
differentiates Mills from other mass theorists who associate
the decline mQre with the rise of industrialism and commercial-
ism. Voluntary associations are gradually transformed into
mass organizations and the m9re they become so, the more they
lose the grip over individuals. The result is three-fold:
first, the individual lS detached from his moorings in the
voluntary association in which he can either reach 'reason-
able opinions' or utilize its agency to undertake 'reasonable
activities;' second, he becomes vulnerable to mobilization.
5
With the media techniques they become open to manipUlation.
As the parties become larger, the individual's role disappears
140
sector of the economy in 1969. Moreover, that figure is a
substantial advance over a dozen years ago and lS actually
1.35 times higher than it was in 1955, when only half were
on the top 500 payrolls" (1970: 38).6 A typical but repre-
sentative example of the late 1970's corporations is General
Motors
.... with its 750,000 employees, its 1.3 million
shareholders in more than eighty countries, its
plants in twenty-four different countries and
its varied production which includes autos, re-
frigerators, electric stoves, locomotives, jet
engines, earth-moving equipment and missile
guidance systems. In 1969 General Motors had
a net profit (after taxes) of over $2 i l l i o n ~
which was greater than the general revenues of
forty-eight states, while its sales of $21
billion were greater than the Gross National
Product of all but nine foreign countries (Rod-
nick, 1972: 97-98).
The following two Tables provide a picture of corporate con-
centration in American economy.
Table A
Share of Assets Held by the Largest
US Manufacturing Corporations, 1950
to 1972 (percentages)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
100 largest 39.7 44.3 46.4 46.5 48.5
200 largest 47.7 53.1 56.3 56.7 60.4
Source: Clement (1977: 139).
1972
47.6
60.0
Number
Percent of
mfg. corps
Percent of
of all mfg.
all
Table B
US Manufacturing Corporations
with Assets over $1 billion,
1960 to 1973
1960 1970
28 102
27.6 48.8
profits
corps. 37.1 51.9
Source: Clement (1977: 140).
141
1973
124
52.9
52.6
( 2 ) The Thesis of the Managerial Revolution and Mills: An
important aspect, which needs to be mentioned, relates to the
so-called separation of ownership from the control of corpora-
tions. The question is: Who controls the corporations?
In the early thirties, Berle and Means suggested that control
had passed to the top managers who did not own the corpora-
tions. They assert that recent changes, brought about by
distribution of stock of the corporation among a wider segment
of people and by concomitant legal measures, have affected
radically the character of the corporations. It represents
a qualitative break with the older forms in so far as the
question of control is concerned. The separation of ownership
from control has thus necessitated a 'neutral technocracy'
that would supposedly promote the well being of all sections
of the people and balance their interests against each other.
To quote them:
"It is conceivable--indeed it seems almost
142
inevitable if the corporate system lS to survive--that the
'control' of the great corporations should develop into a
-
purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by
;
C
F
various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion
of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather
than private cupidity" (Berle and Means, 1933: 356). The
idea of neutral technocracy found its authentic articula-
tion in J. Burnham's The Managerial Revolution (1941). There-
in he asserts that the present capitalist institutions and
beliefs are undergoing a rapid transformation. The forces
that are at the back of contemporary societal events have
ruled out both socialism and capitalism as any adequate basis
of social reorganization. Rationalization process has meant
increasing indispensability of 'production experts' and 'ad-
ministrative executives.' Therefore, "within the new social
structure a different social group or class--the managers--
will be the dominant or ruling class" (Burnham, 1966: 74).
Stated very simply, present social trends are towards a
managerial society. Berle further developed the ideas in his
other works, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (1954)
and Power Without Property (1959).7
Mills' response to this thesis of managerial re-
volution, formulated in the larger contexts of political
power and social.stratification, was contained in the
"A Marx for the Managers," written with his teacher Hans Gerth
and published in 1942. Later, he elaborated his position
143
and never lost sight of it. Subsequently this article has
become a substantive basis of a radical critique of the cor-
porate-mass society. The postulates of the managerial revo-
lution, as theorized by Burnham, "unduly short-cut the road
from technical indispensability to a grab and hold of power.
The short-cut establishes too automatic an agreement between
the social-economic order and political movements" (PPP: 57-58)
The fundamental error consists in the recognition of techni-
cal indispensability of a class as superior claim to political
power. Burnham was incorrect in assuming that In Germany
the new middle class--the managers--had become new rulers.
The group of big industrialists and Junkers never lost their
power; German capitalism produced for the state rather than
for the open market; and so the political power was a monopoly
of the German state; the fact that the middle class enjoyed
more opportunities on a wider social scale did not mean that
it rose to power; "On the contrary, the Nazi war economy has
violated all material election promises to the middle class.
The middle class was politically important in the ascent of
the Nazi party to power, but it is a power which they do not
share" (PPP: 59). Burnham confounds 'the regulatory power
of the state with ownership.' The fact is that the state
control does not dislocate ownership but rather guarantees
security against such dislocation. Burnham's definition of
property as actual disposition perpetuates the notion of
private property. No American heiress loses ownership of
144
machines and offices which her late father's 'production
engineers and executives efficiently and faithfully run' for
her. In the sphere of politics, "managers do not significant-
ly differ from owners in their beliefs and loyalties" (PPP: 64).
At the same time, experts seldom make decisiohs and the top
knock off "the 'managers' before they get to be the deposi-
tory of decis ional power" (PPP: 67). In this he blasts the
myth of the managerial revolution and, so to say, of the idea
of soulful corporations. "Modern revolutions are not watched
by masses as they occur within the palace of elites. Revolu-
tions are less dependent upon the managerial personnel and
their myths than upon those who bring to focus and legitimate
the revolutionary activity of struggling classes" (pPP: 71).
Later, Mills argues in specific terms: "Hhile owner and
manager are no longer the same person, the manager has not
expropriated the owner, nor has the power of the propertied
e-nterprise Elver workers <3.ndmarket declined. Power has nut
been spilt from property; rather the power of property is
more concentrated than is its ownership" (HC: 101). What has
happened in fact is, as Mills calls it, "the managerial re-
organization" of the propertied class whose powers and pri-
vileges are integral components of the institution of private
ownership (cf. PE: 147). As one industrial sociologist says:
As C. Hright Mills has shown, the managers
under any regime whatsoever are never anything
but executive agents. They are never in a
position, publicly or institutionally, to as-
sert themselves against their masters. Con-
versely,. the masters become totally powerless
without the complex (and secretly all powerful)
managerial cadre (Ellul, 1965: 256).
145
The institution of private ownership is now "depersonalized,
intermediate and concealed" (we: 101). The owners do not
run the corporation or the enterprise. Owners are only
people "who legally claim a share of profits and expect that
those who operate the enterprise will act for their best in-
terests" (We: 100 footnore). Managers only have such 'operat-
ing control' over the enterprise as is necessary to run it.
The top man in the bureaucratized big business is, says Mills,
a powerful member of the propertied class.
He derives his right to act from the institution
of property; he does act in so far as he possibly
can in a manner he believes is to the interests
of the private-property system; he does feel in
unity, politically and status-wise as well as
economically, with his class and its source of
wealth (we: 102).
The divorce of control rrom ownership of property changes
"the personnel, the apparatus, and the property status of the
more immediate wielders" (we: 102) of power, but it does not
diminish, rather increases, the power of property. Therefore,
as Mills argues, "if the powerful officials of U.S. corpora-
tions do not act as old fashioned owners within the plants
and do not derive their power from personal ownership, their
power is nevertheless contingent upon their power of property"
(we: 102). The managers are the managers of private properties.
It is frequently asserted that stockholders are the
owners of corporations, involving a disposal of ownership
over wider sections of people. But this proposition has little
validity in point of stockholder's control over the corporations.
146
If it is true that there are individual stockholders, then
it lS also true that almost half of the stockholding are
owned by corporate entities (cf. Hacker, 1970: 41). Menshikov
reports that
In 1953, the richest families owned 77.5
percent of all stocks in individual possession,
76 per cent of the bonds of copanies and 100
per cent of the bonds of states and
ties .... While in 1929 one per cent of the
U.S. population owned 65.6 per cent of the in-
dividually owned corporate capital, in 1953
this share increased to 76 per cent (1973: 73-74).
This is the reason why Mills lS led to conclude that "the
managers are agents of big property owners and not of small
ones. Managers of corporations are the agents of those owners
who own the concentrated most; they derive such power as they
have from the organizations which are based upon property
as a going system" (We: 103).
The stark reality is that neither the salaries nor
business nor stock options have essentially altered the dis-
tributions of stock ownership in favor of the top executives
so that they will in a position to control the corporations
in the near future. Menshikov reports, on the basis of data
for over 100 of the biggest US corporations, that "in the last
ten years there has not been a single case of any of the hired
executives advancing to the ranks of their leading stockholders"
( 19 7 3: Ill). Although it is true, as Mills thinks, that man-
agers seldom personally own the property they manage, it should
not be assumed that managers are in general divorced from
ownership. "Quite to the contrary," hold Baran and Sweezy,
147
"managers are among the biggest owners; and because of the
strategic positions they occupy, they function as the pro-
tectors and spokesmen for all large-scale property. Far
from being a separate class, they constitute in reality the
leading echelon of the property-owning class" (1972a: 167).
Mills had no doubt that managers, especially those at the
top, 'definitely form a segment of the small, much-propertied
circle'. However, they do not constitute a separate class
since the "top level managers .... are socially and political-
ly in tune with other large property holders. Their image
of ascent involves moving further into the big propertied
circles
ll
(We: 104). In The Power Elite Mills reaffirmed the
idea that "the chief executives and the very rich are not
two distinct and clearly segregated groups. They are both
very much mixed up in the corporate world of property and
privilege (PE: 119). It must be pointed out, however,
thGlt th@ Gf the t-G.f> e*eeutives te tll.e ranks of
the very rich does not mean their ultimate absorption into
the owning class. Rather they remain in subordinate position.
Mills' failure has been made up by Menshikov who suggests
the fOllowing:
Whatever corporate 'privilege and prerogative'
top group enjoys, however broad its power
over the working masses and also the small and
middle businessmen, it is not the owner and it
is not the one which in the final count wields
power. Managers come and go, but the power of
the finance-capitalists, based on their wealth
and ramified control system, remains so far
(1973: 132).
148
In the light of foregoing analysis, it seems that the theory
of the managerial revolution--the myth of a ruling class of
managers--is in reality an apology for the institution of
private property and ownership. What Mills said in 1942 seems
to be valid even today: "If the present ruling owners fall,
so may their managers" (PPP: 71).
The Cultural Character
Whereas McLuhan notes the impact of media revolution
by saying that in the modern society "the medium is the message,"
Mills realizes its importance through its capacity to transform
the community of publics into a society of the masses. By ob-
serving that medium is the message, McLuhan merely says that
"the personal and social consequences of any medium--that is,
of any extension of ourselves--result from the new scale that
is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves
or by any new technology" (1965: 7). For Mills, the media
are a basic feature of America's industrial-technological
society and they have added the mass character to it. The
pervasiveness of the mass media in American society can hardly
be overemphasized. "Americans are media freaks. They read
60 m l l ~ n newspapers per day, have nearly 300 million radios
in cars and homes, and spend more than 360 million hours per
day in front of their television sets. Including film, book
and stereos, total media consumption per person averages some
50 hours per week, exceeding every other activity but sleeping"
,
r
149
(Glessing and White, 1973: v). In other words, the media
consumption in America has already reached a height quite
unknown to any earlier period. At the same time, as Mills
argues, lithe media, as now organized and operated, are even
more than a major cause of the transformation of America into
a mass society" (FE: 315). While Blumer in his analysis of
mass behavior perceived the tendency of the media to detach
the individual from his links with primary group and local
community, Mills was more pointed, along with other critics
of mass culture, in his attack on the negative consequences
that jeopardize modern man's life in the urban-industrial
society of the masses. Like Macdonald, Howe, Van den Haag,
to mention the prominent few, Mills sharply criticized the
role of the media in massifying American society.8 To illus-
trate his basic stand on the cultural role of the media in
America:
The contents of the mass media are now a sort
of 6f experience,
feeling, belief and aspiration. They extend
across the diversified material and social
environments, and, reaching lower into the age
hierarchy, are received long before the age of
consent, without explicit awareness. Contents
of the mass media seep into our images of self,
becoming that which is taken for granted, so
imperceptibly and so surely that to modify them
drastically, over a generation or two, would be
to change profoundly modern man's experience and
cllaracter (WC: 334).
For him, the individuals are passive consumers of
standardized media content in the media markets of the mass
society; they are at the receiving cnd; they are imprisoned
within a 'pseudo-environment' full of stereotypes and standardized
,
,
150
images of imitation. In reviewing the media effects, Klapper
notes that "persuasive mass communication functions far more
frequently as an agent of reinforcement than as an agent of
change" (1965: 15). In this light, Mills argues, not without
reason, that the prime function of the media is to foster "a
sort of psychological illiteracy" among the mass consumers
of this media-dominated society. This reminds us of McLuhan
who paid: "Mental breakdown of varying degrees is the very
common result of uprooting and inundation with new informa-
tion and endless new pattern of information" (1965: 16). Let
me indicate some of the functions of media in the mass society.
First, "the media not only giye us information; they
guide our very experiences. Our standards of credulity, our
standards of reality, tend to be set by these media rather
than by our own fragmentary exper ience" (PE: 311). Even when
the individual attempts to define the meaning of the message
of the media, he is seldom successful because of the stereo-
types already organized by the mass media in his structure of
attitudes and beliefs.
'; ,_ I ,( :-.,.
IV
Second, the individual's passivity
and his construction of the pseudo-world is furthered by the
consensual, homogeneous and standardized themes that the media
purvey. As the media are now organized, the individual cannot
play 'one medium off against another' because there is no
genuine competition For, "The more genuine
competition there is among the media, the more re&istance
the individual might be able to command" (PE: 313). But this
does not usually happen, given the economic nature of the
151
corporation-dominated capitalist society. The media operate
on the basis of corporate profitability encompassing the
broadest audience. "Profitability may depend on reaching a
national audience; if so, then sympathetic treatment of the
American Negro's struggle for equality--for instance--is un-
economical. This is not because the television networks are
anti-Negro. If they have been unable to find sponsorship
for popular Negro entertainers, it is because advertisers
are afraid of alienating too many white viewers" (Bensman
and Rosenberg, 1963: 361). Speaking of the TV in particular,
Lazarsfeld admits, though 'facetiously', that "the networks
continue their bad programs because this makes for larger
audiences and therefore more profit from advertising" (1971:
viii). Third, the mass media have become the chief source
of mass man's identity, aspirations and self-image. As
Mills puts it, "(I) the media tell the man in the mass who
he is--they give him identity; (2) they tell him whEl 1; he
wnats to be--they give him aspirations; ( 3) they tell him how
to get that way--they give him technique and (4 )
they tell
him how to feel that he lS that way even when he is not--
they give him escape" (PE: 314). In other words, the media
provide him with a sophisticated frame of self-reference,
which is, more often than not, a source of perverted way of
looking at the sociopolitical reality. In the last place,
the mass media, the TV being the most important of them,
noften encroach upon the small-scale discussion, and destroy
152
the chance for the reasonable and leisurely and human inter-
change of opinion" (PE: 314). The media have produced a new
human type, the mass-produced hermit captivated in a world
within the four walls of his room.
9
The mass media are the purveyors of a vUlgarized
universe; they do not focus on individual's soruces of private
tension and anxieties; they do not provide clues to wider
contexts of reality and connect them with his experiences.
"They do not connect the information they provide on public
issues with the troubles felt by the individual. They do not
increase rational insight into tensions, either those in the
individual or those of the society which are reflected in the
individual" (PE: 315). Rather they are a bunch of diver-
sionary techniques which corrode his chance to understand his
self and its meaning or the world he lives in.
The Metropolitan and Industrial Character
Lastly, as Mills points out in the tradition of
Simmel in particular, the rise of the metropolis lS an im-
portant master trend making for a mass society (cf. PPP: 364-
65) . For Simmel, the advent of metropolis, as the locale of
modern urban civilization of innumerable masses, is one of
the great transformations the origins of which are rooted in
'the large developmental tendencies of social life as such.'
It has simultaneously given rise to opposing trends which
engulf modern man.
On the one hand, metropolis has given
153
the individual 'a heightened awareness and a predominance of
intelligence', 'punctuality', 'calculability', 'exactness',
a 'money economy', 'the highest dividion of labor' and a
system of mass production for the anonymous market. Yet, on
the other hand, Simmel discovers the progressive fragmenta-
tion of man in the metropolitan civilization in which he has
become encapsulated. Thus he could write, "The deepest
problems of modern life derive from the claim of the individual
to preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence
in the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical
heritage, of external culture, and of the techhiq}le of life"
(Simmel, 1964: 409). In 1938 Wirth, a prominent representa-
tive of the Chicago school of American sociology, added the
urban dimension to the sociological theory of mass society.
He reminds us, as Mills did later, that "the masses of men
In the city are subject to manipualtion by symbols and stereo-
types managed by individuals working from afar or operating
invisibly behind the scenes through their control of the in-
struments of communication" (Wirth, 1938: 23).
As mass theorist, Mills also discovers, reminding us
of Tonnies and Simmel in the earlier and Wirth in the latter
times, that "the growth of this metropolitaN society has
segregated men and women into narrowed routines and milieux,
and it has done so with the constant loss of community struc-
ture" (PPP: 365).
The metropolitan society has split the
individual from easily identifiable groups in which he had
his identity.
it is a society of strangers, only linked to
154
each other by a huge network of impersonal and formal media
of communications. Here persons know each other only -In a
"segmental manner." The members of a metropolitan society
of masses know one another only fractionally" (PPP: 365).
The metropolitan man is "a temporary focus of heterogeneous
circles of causal acquaintances, rather than a fixed center
of a few well-know groups (we: 252). Primary personal rela-
tions evaporate and causal contacts, at the impersonal level,
gain supremacy in the metropolitan life. It is a society in
which "the humanist reality of others does not, cannot, come
through" (PPP: 365).
The metropolis is also an industrial society. Ray-
mond Aron defines industrial society as a society in which
"
large scale industry is the characteristic form
of production" (1967: 73). Aron's definition has two key
features: first, it involves separation of the enterprise
from the family; and second, it al,so means a new form of
the diyision of labor which not only involves
"
the
division which has existed in every society between the various
sectors of the economy, peasants, merchants and craftsman, but
a technological division of labor within the firm which is
one of the characteristics of modern industrial society"
(Aron, 1967: 73). In both senses, American society is an
industrial society which, in course of large scale production,
turns into a society of the masses. For Mills, America is
becoming a mass society, among other reasons, by forces of
155
"structural industrialization." Whatever the criteria of an
industrial society, which are yet to be sorted out, America
is the top industrial society in terms of developments in
both science and technology, and mass production and mass
marketing. Industrial Revolution has led to mass production
of things and services through "special type of factory pro-
duction in which the principles of power, accuracy, economy,
system continuity, speed and repitition are realized" (Martin-
dale, 1960: 3-4). It has transferred the skill from the
artisan to the machines. In the assembly line production
man and machine are fused into one continuous operation.
The principle of maximum production by the minimum number of
men is the essence of mass production in the mass society.
Thus "the immense productivity of mass production technique
and the increased application of technological rationality
are first open secrets of modern occupational change: fewer
men turn out more things in less time" (we: 66). The idea of
mass production as an ongoing preoccupation involves mass con-
sumption, mass distribution and mass market in the society.
All are interconnected, which in the process becomes a 'net-
work of enterprises and occupations' with the middle classes
in the middle and the masses at the bottom of the mass society.
The underlying principles rest on the operations of a market
economy. To quote Mills:
Goods produced in the factory are transported
to urban centers of consumption; there they
pile up, and are unpiled into the market radius
of the city. Without mass production, commo-
dities cannot be accumulated to fill great stores.
Without big cities there are no markets large
enough and concentrated enough to support such
stores. Without a transportation net, the goods
cannot be picked up at scattered points and
placed in the middle of the urban mass. Each
ot these is a center of the modern web-work of
business and society (WC: 162-63).
As for the individual as worker in the industrial-metropoli-
156
tan society, Mills creates no vagueness to point out the follow-
ing:
in modern industrial society the mass of
men are, and must be, dependent workers. This
paramount fact of dependent, collective work
is firmly anchored in large-scale technology;
it finds a parallel and a further anchorage
in an extremely narrow distribution of property
(PPP: 180).
The rise of industrialism and urbanism has led to the dis-
integration of the family and no longer is it an economic
unit in the society of the masses. If its decline is one
aspect, its separation from the sphere of work is then another.
The process of the division of labor has acted as the major
catalyst towards this end (cf. WC:237-38). In addition,
Mills refers to religion as 'part of the false consciousness
of the world and of the self' among the cheerful robots of
the mass society (cf. CWT: 148). For them religion has be-
corne 'the religion of good cheer and glad tidings' or 'a
respectable distraction from the sourness of life.' The de-
cline of religion is a mark of the new society of the masses.
To quote him:
As a mass medium, religion has become a re-
ligiOUSly ineffective part of the show that
fills up c e r t i ~ time slots in the weekly
routines of the cheerful robots. As an in-
stitution that is part of a political so-
ciety, religion has become a well-adapted
rear g u a r ~ Rather than denounce evil,
rather than confront agony, the minister
goes his amiable way, bringing glad tidings
into each and every home (CWT: 152-53).
An Assessment
157
The main thrust of the foregoing analysis has been to
highlight the differential aspects of emergent mass social
order in American society in so far as they were evident in
Mills' writings. Put otherwise, his formulations provide,
from a theoretical point of view, "a diagnosis of certain
underlying tendencies in the modern world, as well as a set
of criteria for measuring the extent of these tendencies in
specific cases" (Kornhauser, 1968: 14).
This is of course not to overlook various other
assessments of the mass society theory. Bell, Shils, Rose,
Parsons, Bramson, Bauer Gl.nd RGl.uer, GGl.ng anE!. many e-thers have
squarely challenged the basic assumptions of the theory.
Shils hails the mass society as a new social order in which
the indivldual has for the first time experienced "a greater
sense of attachment to the society as a whole, and of affin-
ity with his fellows" and in which "large aggregations of
human beings living over an extensive territory have been
able to enter into relatively free and uncoerced association"
(1974: 229).
In the mass society man experiences, evidently
in contrast to Mills' assumptions, a new height of freedom
and individuality. To quote him:
The personal dispositions, those qualities of
rationality and impulsiveness, amiability and
surliness, kindliness and harshness, loving-
ness and hatefulness, are the constitution of
the individual. Felt by himself, acknowledged
by himself, coped with by himself, they are
formed into his individuality. The perception
and appreciation of individuality in others
moves in unison with its development in the
self (Shils, 1963: 40).
As conceivable, Mills' theory lS diametrically opposite to
one suggested by Shils. Both are 'ideal-type' descriptions
in respect of the major features of the mass society. It
is interesting to note in this connection that most of "the
158
critics of the critics" of mass society, such as Bell, Shils,
or Bauer and Bauer, have not referred to Mills except in-
directly. The criticisms they have made largely apply to
European theorists like Gasset, Marcel, Lederer or to those
who are European immigrants to America or Britain, such as
Arendt, Mannheim, Fromm and Marcuse. As a result, their
criticisms suffer from a two-fold drawback. On the one hand,
thses critics have much in mind the European postulates of
mass society or alienation. On the other hand, they criticize
most of which represent the aristocratic critique of the mass
society; to be sure, Fromm or Marcuse, along with Mills, do
not present such a view. On both counts their criticisms
have limited validity and scope in so far as Mills was con-
cerned. For all of them, Mills, Fromm or Marcuse, the primary
data in analysing the nature of post-Second World War Ameri-
can society are based on American, and surely not European,

I

159
experiences of life and society. Since the main purpose here
is to focus on Mills In particular, the essential points of
criticism against the mass society theory can be briefly
and selectively touched upon in as much as they apply direct-
ly or indirectly to Mills' theory.
First, Bell has said that the theory of mass society
is 11 at heart a defens e of an ar is tocra tic cul tural tradition --
a tradition that does carry with it an important but neglected
conception of liberty--and a doubt that the large mass of man-
kind can ever become truly educated or acquire an apprecia-
tion of culture. Thus, the theory often becomes a conserva-
tive defense of privilege" (196:7: 28). Applied this to Mills'
theory, Bell's criticism seems to have zero validity. In
his theory Mills does not talk of "mindless masses," as the
aristocratic representatives of the mass society theory do,
but of the "powerless masses" who have become targets of mani-
pulation from centralized points of control, no matter whether
specifically by the power elite or by any other persons in
the seat of power In the corporate capitalist society. If
his theory is any defense, it is the defense of democratic
tradition discovered in the loss of reason and freedom in the
contemporary American society.
Secondly, Shils says, though not directly referring
to Mills:
The critical interpretation of mass culture
rests on a distinct image of modern man, of
society, and of man in past ages. This image
has little factual basis. It is a
disappointed political prejudices,
pr'oduc t of
value as-
pirations for unrealizable ideal, resentment
against American society, and, at bottom,
romanticism dressed up in the language of
sociology, psychoanalysis and existentialism.
(1974: 255).
True, there are elements of romanticism in Mills' theory of
160
mass society. He resents for the decline of 'the Renaissance
man' or of the 'traditional' and 'primary' social relation-
ships. But, if Shils' critique could at all be applied to
Mills' theory, it is still hard to sustain in terms of the
basic spirit behind Mills' major assumptions. If Mills'
theory is a product of disappointment or resentment against
American society, Shils' own theory, as of Bell's too, is
simply an apology of the established regime. Far from being
a product of 'disappointed political prejudices, value as-
pira.tions for an unrealizable ideal or resentment against
American society', Mills' theory is directly an outcome of
political mindedness, of democratic aspirations and of an
assessment of America's ills for the construction of a so-
ciety founded on democratic values of reason and freedom. At
least, Shils' image of modern man in the new social order of
the mass society is as romantic as that of Mills' image of
alienated man. If Mills lS accused of pessimism, Shils then
portrays an equally opposite, more optimistic than real, image
of modern man. Bramson echoes Shils. Looking at the theory
of the mass society in the contexts of developments in the
media research in America, he suggests that the shift in the
analysis of the mass society is, among others, "symptomatic
of the disillusionment of many American sociOlogists with the
161
panaceas of socialism, which previously had provided a tacit
ideological justification for dealing with larger social
issues" (Bramson, 1967: 97). But, to be sure, Mills' dis-
illusionment with socialism matches equally with his disil-
lusionment with liberalism. What Mills detested in the mass
character of the industrial-urban or corporate-capitalist
society, not the industrial society or the processes of in-
dustrialization and urbanization thereof.
Thirdly, in a widely read and much quoted article,
"Amer ica, 'Mass So ciety' and Mas s Me dia ," Bauer and Bauer
made three specific criticisms against mass theorists. They
also, like others, did not mention Mills In their critique.
But these criticisms may very well be applied to Mills' theory.
First, they suspect that "the elements of elitism extend very
deeply into the thinking and feeling of the theorists of
mass society" (Bauer and Bauer, 1960: 59). Second, the
theorists are intellectuals in whom "social pessimism is
more often and more readily approved than is social optimism"
(Bauer and Bauer, 1960: 59). Third, mass theorists are op-
posed to the Protestant ethic and they fail to recognize "the
fact that in America Protestantism is a rural phenomenon"
(Bauer and Bauer, 1960: 62). Their image of American society
is an outdated model of describing the present realities; the
onset of automation has reversed the trend of progressive
alienation of the worker from his work; this has caused 'a
characteristic confusion between reality and values'; the
mass theorists are disturbed by 'the egalitarianism of modern
162
society'; their focus on alienation does not correspond 'un-
ambiguously to what is known in our society'; and, finally,
By and large, the theory of mass society is
a theory of social control from above even
though it is premised on the necessity for
making concessions to mass taste in order
that the masses be controlled most effective-
ly .... While the critics of mass society (or
at least some of them) exhibit a romantic
populist trend when talking about "folk so-
cieties," they are strongly anti-populist
with respect to modern society (something
of an anomaly in view of their generally
liberal political orientation) (Bauer and
Bauer, 1960: 64).
Parsons and White endorse the views of Bauer and Bauer. They
also agree on the point that the findings of the mass theor-
ists reflect not only "a serious paucity of adequate research
findings .... but also an even greater lack of theoretical
analysis" (Parsons and White, 1960c: 67). Bauer and Bauer
have drawn profusely, although at times to their advantage,
upon Ernest Van den Haag, Leo Lowenthal, T. W. Adorno, Ber-
napd RG8en1:lerg, T. . EliGt, Q. D. 1 e a v ~ 8 Dwight MaGdQ+lald,
Irving Howe, Clement Greenberg and a host of others. In
developing a generalized model of mass society, they have
underrrated the differences in moral, scientific or political
attitudes which exist in fact between different mass theor-
ists. Although the conclusions of most of the major theor-
ists point to the same direction and tend to be alike, there
is no denying the fact that considerable antinomies exist
between them.
As Coser has justifiably remarked, Bauer and
Bauer have thrown all the mass theorists, especially the
163
critics of mass culture, !lin one bag" (1960: 79). In the same
way it is difficult to sustain the argument that Mills' theory
is characterized by elitism as such. On the contrary, he
viewed with concern the growing political apathy and power-
lessness in face of manipulative in the mass
society. Mills found that the decline of primary publics
could only end up in the emergence of the mass society and
that, given the tendency, it is a serious set back for Ameri-
can democracy. An elitist is no supporter of democracy.
There is scarcely any indication in Mills' assumptions of
mass society that he preaches a control of the masses
the above.
These critics aver that mass societies destroy
the "public," i.e., those meaningful inter-
mediary groups which mediate between the primary
family unit and the nation-state. The claim that
by dissolving those proximate units which cushion
and envelop the individual and hence make poss-
ible a meaningful participation in public affairs,
mass society destroys ,the very possibility of a
democratic, pluralistic polity. This, in essence,
is the point of vi@w of, amoRg others, G. Wright
Mills, Seymour Lipset, Philip Selznick; that is,
of some of the major contemporary critics of mass
society. How do they fit into Bauers elitist
amalgam (Coser, 1960: 80)'?
By the same token, it may be counter-argued that the mass
theorists including Mills are no more intellectual than those
who criticise them. Again, it is also difficult to trace
out in Mills any lack of enthusiasm for the revival of Pro-
testant spirit as the core of work ethic. Rather, the whole
import of Mills' views on work alienation is pervaded by a
humanist concern to instill the spirit of the Protestant ethic
in the workers.
'"
164
The advent of automation, the second Industrial
Revolution as John Diebold has called it, now marks the
latest stage of the production technology. By substituting
machines in place of men as controllers of production opera-
tions, automation is now introducing most fundamental changes
in the nature of man and machine relations.
lO
But, to be
sure, there is no fool proof guarantee that automation will
always provide immunity against alienation from all types of
work. The introduction of automated techniques has not
always in fact produced similar immunity from alienation in
the office as it does more in the work places of factory. In
addition there are others who express concern, at this given
stage of technology's development, over the shape which auto-
mation will take on in the approaching future.
ll
Bauer and Bauer are on a very strong ground in respect
of the empirical evidence concerning the effects of exposure
to media of mass communications.
- - - -
In America early researches
In this field contributed much to the development of the
mass society theory. Naturally the theory becomes vulnerable
to severe scrutiny in so far as media research points to the
contrary. It bases are shaken to the extent that its theore-
tical postulates are based upon the "wrong" assumptions as
to the role of the media.
12
As far as the media impact on
the outcomes of the political campaigns is concerned, it
seems that mostly they are ineffective in causing substantial
changes in the attitudes of the ~ o p l in general.
Weiss re-
ports that "few people appear to be converted merely through
165
exposure to formal political communications. The available
evidence suggests that the preponderance of total media ef-
fects is contributed by the reinforcement of substantiation
of vote decisions brought about by other factors, such as
habitual patterns of voting or social and personal influences"
(1969: 176).
In whatever way one may look at the role of the media,
it is redundant to add that they have come to stay, rather
quite firmly, in human societies. Evidently, they have good
as well as bad, positive and negative, effects, and the con-
cern of the mass theorists is with the latter. There is no
evidence to show that the mass theorists are ignorant of the
positive impact of the mass media. It is, therefore futile
for anyone to single out the chosen set of data in order to
back up one's position and then criticize the adversaries, 0
often underestimating and even concealing the ill effects
of the media. The main question, as Weiss poses.it, is this;
"What role can the media play in developing public taste for
a culturally more varied range of programs and more serious
or demanding offerings!! (1969: 110)? In Mills' terms, the
media should also be a political forum disseminating clashes
of opinion and stimulating public interest in politics. The
fact that empirical evidence concerning media runs counter to
many of the basic postulates of the mass society theory has
got to be accepted with careful reservations. On the one hand,
it has not yet been possible to develop any satisfactory or
166
theoretically derived schema to categorize the effects of
the media. Despite unprecedented spurt in the media research,
it has not been successful to provide worthwhile scientific
generalizations since "there are a sizable number of differ-
ences between the different media and some of these may operate
to increase and others to decrease the effects studied. At
the same time, the studies have frequently been done under
somewhat artificial conditions so that they have likewise not
been too useful for practical application under naturalistic
conditions" (Hovland, 1972: 530). On the other hand, most
"critics" of the critics of mass society are more or less
silent on the specific question of the monopoly control by
corporate interests over different media. The irresistable
urge on the part of the media controllers to reinforce the
existent social trends and stabilize the Establishment de-
fined status quo and political attitudes has been a natural
corrolary of the capitalist transformation of the society.
The news media operate to continually underscore
the legitimacy of business and government, to
enhance their perpetuation in the name of order
and stability, and to romanticize their agents
with publicity and sometimes affectionate atten-
tion In American society where the news
media are controlled, almost monopolized by per-
sons of wealth, power and high political office,
most persons are imprisoned in a network of myths
and lies, in an environment where the media have
become a mass means for pacification (Ehrlich,
1974: 32-33,41).
Finally, contrary to the assumptions of Mills, Rose
has claimed that, among others, the institution of the family
and the voluntary associations have acquired special signifi-
167
cance in the mass society. Of the family, he says: "For
many adults In our society, the nuclear family provides the
only regular source of companionship, the only safeguard
against loneliness. It provides partial compensation for
the mass society" (Rose, 1967: 202). With regard to the
voluntary associations he thinks that they enable individuals
to counteract 'the feelings' generated by the mass society.
Like Shils or Bells and many others, Rose draws attention
to a vast increase in the number of voluntary associations,
clubs, societies and other organizations. Despite the rosy
picture Rose has provided, there are subtle truths behind the
pluralistic universe in the American social structure.
Despite its role as an emotional center, it may be said that
"in American society the institutional significance of the
family has been eroded especially fast. Its socializing
functions have been undermined not by political institutions
or the ideological jealousy of the authorities, but by the
growing belief that the experience of one generation is ir-
relevant for the next" (Hollander, 1973: 264). Keniston, in
a study of alienation of the American youth, remarks that
"the middle-class American family is extreme in its smallness,
its isolation from the mainstreams of public life and its
intense specialization" (1965: 273). Similarly, pluralism
has been a familial' model of society to many theorists be-
ginning with Madison and Tocqueville, apart from its modern
apologist",.
But the question remains the same: How far does
this model fit the facts of, and work in, the corporative
society of America? Hacker provides an answer:
.... when the General Electric, the American
Telephone and Telegraph, and Standard Oil of
New Jersey enter the pluralist arena, we have
elephants dancing among the chickens. For
corporate institutions are not voluntary as-
sociations of individuals but rather associa-
tions of assets, and no theory yet propounded
has declared that machines are entitled to
a voice in the democratic process (1970: 42-43).
The efficacy of voluntary associations suffers a serlOUS
168
erosion in a community that is molded mostly by the corporate-
normative institutions in the capitalist society. The alien-
ation of the individual from the community is anything but
natural likelihood since in the capitalist society "the
institutions determining the role structure, the power struc-
ture, and the physical structure of a community operate apart
from the needs of individuals" (Gintis, 1972: 282). It is
to these aspects, along with others, of alienation that I
now return in the next chapter.
Notes
1. See, for example, Wirth (1948) and Martindale (1960).
2 . Cf. Shils (1974: 257).
3. See also Whyte, Jr. (1956: 219). Mills' criticism on
the point and my own review of the current trends in
sociological research have already been discussed in
Chapter 3, especially at pp. 112-120.
4. This information is provided by Walter (1964: 399).
5. Arendt (1951) has illustrated this.
6. In the period, 1955-1970, "the proportion of workers
169
in manufacturing and mining in the United States employed
by the top five hundred rose from 44.5 per cent to 72
per cent" (Clement, 1977: 138).
7. For a modern version of managerialism emphasizing "wide
ranging scope of responsibility" of the "soulful corpora-
tions", see Kaysen (1957).
8. For a collection of critiques of mass media and mass
culture, see Rosenberg and White (1957).
9. See Anders (1957).
10. Shepard suggests that "the thesis that automation reverses
the historical trend toward increased alienation from work
among rae-tory workerB apperas to be supported " (1971: 117).
11. See, for example, Killingsworth (1970: 341-42).
12. For a recent review of the findings on the point, see
Gans (1974: 39-40).
CHAPTER FIVE
Alienation
Introduction
Both in the history of sociological thinking and in
the present day studies of human relations, the concept of
alienation, originating notably in the works of classic
sociologists such as Tonnies, Marx, Durkheim, Weber and
Simmel, has travelled a long way to become the master concept
of sociology. It has emerged lias the inclusive category
which points to our personal and social frustrations, .to our
sense of collapse and doom and to the critical nature of
the human situation at this juncture in (Murchland,
1971: 4). Whereas the classic masters were preoccupied in one
way or another with the alienating themes of the individual
in the urban-industrial society, the concept received
dramatic formulation and amazing authenticity in the hands
of the different mass theorists.
l
The massive literature
on the mass society became the breeding ground of phenomena
associated with the concept of alienation, although it may
very well be doubted how far the basic assumptions of the
mass society theory are central to the understanding of the
concept in its later manifestation In the contemporary
societies.
2
However, looking at its genesis from the histori-
cal perspective, the concept of mass turned out to be of
170
171
central importance to the phenomenon of alienation.
3
Mills
elaborated the theme and extended its differential dimensions
against the back-drop of mass societal developments that were
taking place amid forces of structural transformations in
American society.4 In the model he built for the study of
social structure and personality, alienation became its chief
social psychological issue. In other words, he started with
the assumption that "problems of the nature of human nature
are reaised most urgently when the life-routines of a society
are disturbed, when men are alienated from thelr social roles
in such a way as to open themselves up for new insight"
(ess: xiii). At bottom, the problem of alienation is a matter
of individual experience; outside, it is a question of re-
lationship between him and the historical social structure
he lives in. That is why Mills proposes that "the structural
and historical features of modern society must be connected
with the most intimate features of man's self" Cess: xix)--
theme of Mills' sociological social psychology. The pro-
blem of alienation, for him, is a problem of both personality
and social Mass society provided the framework
of modern social structure; and within this framework, the
psychological theme of modern man is alienation. Put in a
single sentence: /the structural shifts in social existence of
life have been accompanied by experiences of alienation for
man.
This was the basic point of Mills' stand when he review-
ed Chax'les 'Hirris! book, Paths of Life: Preface to a World

172
Religion. The basic issue of this book is one of 'estrange-
ment, of self alienation'. Alternatively he proposed that
the problem of estrangement arises from
an urbanized, pecuniary, and minutely divisioned
society and that the groud problem cannot be
solved by moral consideration of personal ways
of life .... That self-estrangement arises from
a social-historical condition has been demons-
trated by such men as Marx, Simmel and Fromm.
In order to transform the conditions of estrange-
ment C ... or to remake the self), we must be
dominantly Promethean CPPP: 161-62).
The developments that were taking place in the capitalist
orders of America's social structures, especially following
the Second World War, revealed, for Mills, the obstacles in
the way of the individual's capacity to live rationally with
freedom. Rationality and freedom are values, the heritage
of the Enlightenment, that are needed to establish a demo-
cratic or free society which lI en tails the social possibility
and the psychological capacity of man to make rational poli-
tical choices
ll
(Mills and Slater, 1945b: 315). The problem
of alienation is a problem embedded in the capitalist social
institutions, and Mills speaks for an acceptance of 'a social-
ist view of human nature' to counter the facts of changed
structural contexts of the society. Although early enthus-
iasm of Mills for this socialist image of man evaporates In
his later writings, he, nevertheless, points out in 1945
how this could enable men to solve the problem of alienation:
It will recognize the collective conditions of
work which exist under capitalism and which will
continue to exist in any modern industrial so-
ciety. It will see in immense detail how the
institutions of such collective work, pegged
upon bureaucratized private property, make for
the alienation of man from one of his key chances
173
to contact reality creatively. It will see
that the chances of individual men rationally
to work out their life plans are increasingly
expropriated by the spread and clutch of cor-
porative institutions (Mills and Slater, 1945b:
315) .
At the beginning of the mid-twentieth century Mills
discovers the social psychology of the little man in the emer-
gent mass society since the problems now confront him 'border
on the psychiatric'. "In so far as universals can be found
in life and character in America, they are due less to 3ny
common tutelage of the soil than to the levelling influences
of urban civilization, and above all, to the standardization
of the big technology and of the media of mass communication"
(we: xiv). In the new pattern there is no "moral sanctify-
ing of the means of success; one is merely prodded to become
an instrument of success, to acquire tactics and not virtues;
money success is assumed to be an obviously good thing for
which no sacrifice is too great" (We: 265). Though Mills
says this in his characterization of the new middle class
man, it also holds good for the wage workers who are not far
behind in their run for monetary success. Aware of the built-
in constraints of mobility in the corporate society, "the
comes to limit his aspirations, and to make them
more specific: to get more money for this job, to have the
union change this detail or that condition, to change shifts
next week" (we: 278). Mills continued to refer to the theme
of alienation in many of his other writings at various points
of time. 5
But the theme drew most of his attention in White
174
Collar (1951), The Power Elite (1956) and The Sociological
Imagination (1959). In The Power Elite he elaborates the
alienating experiences of the mass man in the following terms:
.... He is not truly aware of his own daily ex-
perience and of its actual standards: he drifts,
he fulfills habits, his behavior a result of a
planless mixture of the confused standards and
the uncriticized expectations that he has taken
OVer from others whom he no longer really knows
or trusts, if indeed he ever really did. He takes
things for granted, he makes the best of them, he
tries to look ahead .... but he does not serious-
ly ask, What do I want? How can I get it?
He loses independence, and more importantly, he
loses the desire to be independent: in fact, he
does not have the hold of the idea of being an
independent individual with his own mind and his
own worked-out way of life Such order and
movement as his life possesses is in conformity
with external routines; otherwise his day-to-day
experience is a vague chaos .... He does not
formulate his desires; they are insinuated into
him. And, in the mass, he loses the self-confi-
dence of the human being--if indeed he has ever
had it. For life in a society of masses implants
insecurity and further impoetence; it makes men
uneasy and vaguely anxious; it isolates the in-
dividual from the solid group; it destroys firm
group standards. Acting without goals, the man
in the mass just feels pointless (PE: 322-23).
In The Sociological Imagination, Mills comes finally to at-
tach central importance to alienation as did Karl Marx in his
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Contrary to
Becker's remark that "Mills himself was led to neglect the
idea of alienation" (1965: 122), it appears that Mills realiz-
ed, no less than Marx, the magnitude of increasing alienation
in man's life.
It is alienation that has turned him into a
cheerful and willing robot and yet lifeless.
The advent of the alienated man and all the
themes which lie behind his advent now affect
the whole of our serious intellectual life and
cause our immediate intellectual malaise. It
is a major theme of the human condition in the
contemporary epoch and of all studies worthy
of the name. I know of no idea, no theme, no
problem, that is so deep in the classic tradi-
tion--and so much involved in the possible de-
fault of contemporary social science (SI: 171).
The cult of the present is the theme of alienation and the
quest of the individual is to search out a breakthrough and
175
transcend powerlessness, fragmentation or manipulation. Aliena-
tion for of the individual from the social
and setting of his life, from his value commitments
and from his commitments to life.
6
The ascendancy of the
_cheerflJ,l robot is the ascendancy of the alienated man in the
mass social order. On the one hand, the individual has be-
come "always somebody's man, the corporation's, the govern-
mentIs, the army's; and he is seen as the man who does not
rise .... He is more often pitiful than tragic, as he is seen
collectively, figllting impersonal inflation, living oui: in
slow misery his yearning for the quick American climb. He
is pushed by forces beyond his control, pulled into movements
he does not understand; he gets into situations in which his
is the most helpless position" (we: xii). On the other hand,
the society has emerged as "a great salesroom, an enormous
file, an incorporated brain, a new universe of management and
man ipula t ion" (we: xv). Against the back-drop, let me illus-
trate different aspects of alienation to which Mills referred.
176
Rationalization and Bureaucratization
A basic aspect of Mills' theory of alienation traces
its genesis in rationalizing and bureaucratizing tendencies
inherent in the large-scale organizations that now make the
corporate mass society of America. Foreboding this ominous
trend, Weber states that "the fate of our times is character-
ized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above
all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'" (1968: 155).
Karl Mannheim advanced Weber's thesis in his classic Man and
Society in an Age of Reconstruction wherein he introduced the
dichotomy between 'functional rationality' and 'substantive
rationality'. Modern industrial societies bear the mark of
functional rationalization, and increasing industrialization
stands for increased functional rationalization (cf. Mannbeim,
1940: 55). With the ascendant trend of functional rational-
ization in the industrial society, m ~ gradually loses what
Mannheim calls 'self-rationalization' which implies his ca-
pacity to exercise systematic control over his impulses and
accordingly plan his action towards the goal he has in mind.
This leads to alienation. As he S?ys,
The average person surrenders part of his own
cultural individuality with every new act of in-
tegration into a functionally rationalized com-
plex of activities. He becomes increasingly
accustomed to being led by others and gradually
gives up his own interpretation of events for
those which others give him. When the rational-
ized mechanism of social life collapses in times
of crisis, the individual cannot repair it by
his own insight. Instead his own impotence re-
duces him to a state of terrified helplessness
(Mannheim, 1940: 59).
177
Mills combined points of view provided by both Weber
and Mannheim and applied the paradigm of 'bureaucratic ration-
ality' to the changed structural contexts of America's in-
dustrial society. In doing this he proceeded social psycho-
logically to reveal the differential dimensions of alienation,
as are experienced by the mass man. Like these classic
masters, he argues that the modern society is no longer char-
acterized by an identification of rationality with reason.
In the industrial society, increased rationality does not
provide the condition of increased freedom and this is due
to the decline of both Marxism and Liberalism. The triumph
of science and of its rationality does not mean that man now
lives "reasonably and without myth, fraud, and superstition"
(SI: 168). The man in the industrial-technological society
suffers from what may be called technological ~ a ~ a i s ~ When
technique, remarks Ellul, "Enters into every area of life, In-
comes his very substance. It is no longer face to face with
man but is integrated with him, and it progressively absorbs
him" (1965: 6). Rationally organized arrangements, far from
hing a means of increased freedom for the individual, are
"a means of tyranny and manipulation, a means of expropriating
the very chance to reason, the very capacity to act as a free
man" (SI: 169).
Technological development is no longer an
embodiment of reason in history or society. Instead of work-
ing toward human liberation, technological rationality works
toward human alienation.
"
The rational organization is .... an alienating
organization: the guiding principles of conduct
and reflection, and in due course of emotion as
well, are not seated in the individual conscience
of the Reformation man, or in the independent
reason of the Cartesian man. The guiding princ-
iples, in fact, are alien to and in contradiction
with all that has been historically understood
as individuality (SI: 170).
178
Mills' cry is, therefore, for the loss of individuality-- the
free man of the Renaissance or the Enlightenment ideal. The
alienated man, who has now flourished, is the antithesis of
the Western image of man. And the society in which this
aliena ted man, 'the cheerful robot', has flourished is the
antithesis of free society, a symptom of the decline of demo-
cracy in America. This signifies, for Mills, the decline of
the values of reason and freedom. The advent of the alienated
man is thus a problem of a loss of reason and freedom in the
society and, in this sense, alienation is the trouble of the
contemporary individual. In other words, "put as a trouble
of the individual-- of the terms and values of which he is un-
easily unaware--it is the trouble called 'alienation'" (SI: 172).
By the same token, alienation is a public issue, an issue of
democratic societys as fact and as aspiration (cf. SI: 172).
It is interesting to note that the same conclusion was
reached by Fromm. Fromm has found that "the rationality of
the system of production, in its technical aspects, is accom-
panied by the irrationality of our system of production in its
social aspects" (1965: 138). Though man has built his world,
factories, cars and clothes, he has become "estranged from
the product of his own hands, he is not really the master any
179
more of the world he has built" (Fromm, 1965: 138). Marcuse,
a Freudian like Fromm, also looks at the problem of aliena-
tion from the point of Vlew of irrationality of the capitalist
system of production. Though the techniques of industriali-
zation are ultimately political techniques, it is to be noted
that "as such, they prejudge the possibilities of Reason and
Freedom" (Marcuse, 1966: 18). The truth is that "the core
of Marcuse's work is a critique of technologial rationality--
that is, an evaluation of its present impact on individuals
and society and an analysis of its interconnected positive
and negative features" (Leiss, 1971: 399).7 In his own analy-
sis of commodity fetishism Marx has shown, quite decisively,
how the market mechanism within the capitalist society turns
not only the products of human labor but also human beings
into commodities.
"
.... the existence of things qua commo-
dities, and the value-relation between the products of labor
which stamps them as commodities , have ahsolutely no connec-
tion with their physical properties and with the material re-
lations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social re-
lation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic
form of a relation between things" (Marx, 1970: 72). In his
own analysis of alienation Mills, like Fromm, pursues Marx's
basic assertion that in capitalism every thing including man
is turned into a marketable commodity.8 This could be illus-
trated by Mills' reference to American society as The Great
Salesroom or The Enormous File.
180
(1) The Individual in the Great Salesroom: Whether one is
really a salesman or not, says Mills, "the salesman's world
has now become everybody's world, and, in some part, everybody
has become a salesman" (We: 161). The mass character of this
salesman's society has all the qualities of impersonal bu-
reaucratic and commercial relationships that permeate its
length and breadth. Salesmanship is almost an independent
force that keeps the mass consumption society in its highest
gear of production. The centralized control separates him
from the product of labor or the processes of the creation
of the product. Describing the alienation of the individual
salesman, Mills says:
As the organization of the market becomes
tighter, the salesman loses autonomy. He sells
the goods of others, and has nothing to do with
the pricing. He is alienated from the price
fixing and product selection. Finally, the
last autonomous feature of selling, the art
of persuasion and the sales personality involved,
becomes expropriated from the individual sales-
man. Such has been the general tendency and
drift, in the store as well as on the road {we: 181).
The salesgirl shares, probably more, the alienating experiences
of her male counterpart. There is seldom any area of her per-
sonality that remains immune from adroit management required
of successful salesmanship. The result of this is self-
alienation. "In the normal course of her work, because her
personality becomes the instrument of an alien purpose, the
salesgirl becomes self-alienated" (We: 184). The centraliza-
tion of salesmanship in the new society has given rise to the
personality traits and develop ruthless techniques for shar-
pening them.
The production of "high powered sales personal-
181
ity," to borrow a phrase of Mills', is only an aspect of
commodity production in the capitalist-mass society of America.
The new socioeconomic role that the individual occupies in
this personality market gives rise to what Mills calls "mar-
keting mentality" (We: 182). This reminds us of Fromm's
concept of "marketing orientation." "His sense of value
depends on his success: on whether he can sell himself
favorably, whether he can make more of himself than he started
out with, whether he is a success" (Fromm, 1955: 129). Mills'
analysis reaches the same conclusion, revealing the same self-
alienated image of the individual. On the one side, the
sales personality is a symbol for success since it has become
"a dominating type, a pervasive model of imitation for masses
of people, in and out of selling" (We: 187). On the other,
the personality market which has resulted from the conversion
of society into the great salesroom shows how unmistakable
signs of "all pervasive distrust and self-alienation so char-
acteristic of metropolitan people" (we: 187-88). In this
epoch of unabated rationalization and bureaucratization, mani-
fest in the managerial demiurge, the individual in the office
is a minute part of the gigantic apparatus. This has paved
the way for increased alienation from fragmentation of tasks,
from expropriation of a total view of the operative process,
from loss of solidarity of primary contacts and from negative
satisfaction in work. They constitute, in his words, "the
model of the future"
(W("
"., ....... . 212)
182
( 2 ) Alienation of the Intellectual: Mills' continued in-
terest in the alienation of the intellectuals, while adding
a new dimension to the contemporary theme, could be consider-
ed a part of the general tradition in the intellectual mood
of the Western world.
9
Attesting to this, Hofstadter writes:
"A self-conscious concern with alienation, far from being
peculiar to American intellectuals in our time, has been a
major theme in the life of the intellectual communities of
the Western world for almost two centuries" (1963: 398).
Amid a general acquiscent mood of the intellectuals toward
cultural adaptation and conformity following the turmoil-
ridden years of Second World War, Mills was one of the few,
prominently with Howe and Mailer, who raised the voice of
protest. In 1944 he said:
We continue to know more and more about modern
society, but we find the centers of political
initiative less and less accessibl-e. This
generates a personal malady that is particularly
acute in the intellectual who has labored under
the illustion that his thinking makes a differ-
ence. In of today the his know-
ledge of affairs grows, the less effective the
impact of his thinking seems to become.
he more frustrated as his knowledge in-
creases, it seeJ)lS that knowledge leads to power-
lessness (PPP: 293).
In 1959 he articulated the problem in terms of its relations
to capitalist social institutions. "In capitalist societies
over the last two centuries, all that has happened to work in
general--in a word, alienation--is now rapidly happening to
cultural, scientific, and artistic endeavor" (PPP: 226).
Elsewhere he urged the intellectuals to "confront capitalism
183
as one type of political economy (eWT: 142).
The estrangement of the intellectual is not a simple
retreat from reason or due to a lack of radical movements
and decline of "marxism as a packaged intellectual option."
In the corporate economy, there are "others"--capitalists--
who "own and operate the mass media" and stand between the
intellectuals and publics (cf. PPP: 226). They own the
cultural means of production, as they own the other means of
production. At the same time, many of the intellectuals are
salaried employeees in institutions directly or indirectly
controlled by corporate owners. Thus the intellectual has
become a hired man of an industry or corporate business and
the fact remains that,. as Mills remarks, "when a man sells the
lies of others he is also selling himself. To sell himself
is to turn himself into a commodity. A commodity does not
control the market; its nominal worth is determined by what
the market will offer" (we: 153). And one can anticipate
how much to. is mas s mark et can offer tne in telie ctua-ls in
the long run. The reason is not difficult to understand, for
ultimately in this society "science-technology, far from
being a negative force for critical assessment of events and
governmental policies, has been a positive instrument in as-
sessing the positive role of corporations and government to
influence events in the directions favorable to the interests
of the marketeers" (Smith, 1973: 166). It is in this light
that the shifts in the attitudes of contemporary intellectuals
184
towards America may be understood. In viewing this in terms
of "from what to what" Mills explains the nature of the shifts:
From a political and critical orientation
toward life and letters to a more literary
and less politically critical view. Or:
generally to a shrinking deference to the
status quo; often to a soft and anxious com-
pliance, and always a synthetic, feeble search
to justify this intellectual conduct, without
searching for alternatives, and sometimes
without even political good sense (1952: 446).
However, Mills' attitude to alienation is not merely
negative. For most intellectuals it provides an escape
route from facts of defeat and powerlessness. "I t is a
lament and a form of collapse into self-indulgence. It is
a personal excuse for lack of political w l l ~ It is a
fashionable way of being overwhelmed" (WC: 159-60). But
alienation is not a cul-de-sac in which the intellectuals
are predestined to live in a state of continued passivity.
Mills explicitly asserts that "there is no reason to make
a political fetish out of it" (PPP: 301'). Elsewhere he says
in no dubious terms:
So long as they are intellectuals, they must
reason and investigate and, with their passion
to know, they must confront the situations of
all men everywhere. That he expects this of
himself is the mark of the intellectual as a
type of social and moral creature. That he is
alienated is another way of saying that he is
capable of transcending drift, that he is
capable of being man on his own (CWT: 125).10
It is not an assertion of negativism towards responsibility,
but a positive stance, as also a way, to transcend negativism
and fulfil responsibility. It is not a resentment ~ o r ex-
clusion of intellectuals from places of power and recognition
185
but an exhortation to all those concerned in affairs of the
society. It is not, finally, an expression of defeatism,
but a realization that lithe capacity to formulate radical
views and higher standards is an advantage which the aliena-
tion that individual enjoy and suffer makes available to
them" (CWT: 140).
Work, Private Property and the Division of Labor
Although John Stuart Mill anticipated very well work-
erst alienation, it was in Marx that the theory reached its
1
. 11
c lmax. In course of time it became the root of modern in-
terest in the alienation of labor. It may be added, not
without reason, that it provides for many including Mills the
basis of an adequate social psychological framework within
which alienation of the worker could be fruitfully explained.
Mills' analysis of the workers' alienation is supportive, at
least in broad terms, of Marx's thesis. It also fills in the
gap left behind by Marx, for changes in the conditions of
labor in the advanced industrial societies have necessitated
a fresh reappraisal of the problem. Mills' thesis in this
respect is based upon cues from Weber, and therefore, Weber's
influence upon Mills may be looked upon, among others, as a
reason of his deviation from Marx.
12
The psychical exploita-
tions, of which Marx was quite aware, are not, as Mills argues,
"rooted in capitalism alone and as such. They are also coming
about in non-capitalist and post-capitalist societies. They
186
are not necessarily rooted either in the private ownership or
in the state ownership of the means of production; they may
be rooted in the facts of mass industrialization itself"
=
(TM: Ill). The fact that alienation is not a problem of any
1=
capitalist society, as Mills argued, has now found corrobora-
. b 13
tlon y many. The question, as Mills raises, is that "the
attitude of men towards the work they do, in capitalist and
in non-capitalist societies, is very much an empirical ques-
tion, and one to which we do not have adequate answers" (TM:
Ill) .
(1) Mills' Model of Craftsmanship and Alienation: It is
worthwhile to note how Mills proceeds to highlight the social
psychology of alienation that engulfs both the salaried em-
ployees and the wage workers in America's industrial-mass
society based upon concrete foundations of corporate capital-
ism. In this society the meaning of work no longer corres-
ponds either to the secularized gospel of work as compulsion
or to the humanist view of it as craftsmanship. The historical
work ethic does not provide the motive force for work. For
almost everyone "work has a generally unpleasant quality
For the white-collar masses, as for wage earners generally,
work seems to serve neither God nor whatever they may exper-
ience as divine in themselves. In them there is no taut will-
to-work, and few positive gratifications from their daily
round" (WC: 219). Elsewhere, he asserts, echoing Marx, "Under-
neath virtually all experience of work today, there is a
187
fatalistic feeling that work per se is unpleasant" (WC: 229).
Marx has provided in the 1844 Manuscripts a model of
"man in industrial society," not merely "a philosopher's pro-
jection of his ways of feeling on to a model of an industrial
worker" (cf. Clayre, 1974: 58). In the like manner, Mills
has constructed a model of craftsmanship that portrays man's
social role as a worker in the industrial society. The fea-
tures of his model may briefly be stated here as follows:
There is no ulterior motive in work other than
the product being made and the processes of its
creation. The details of daily work are mean-
ingful because they are not detached in the
worker's mind from the product of the work. The
worker is free to control his working action.
The craftsman is thus able to learn from his work;
and to use and develop his capacities and skills
in its prosecution. There is no split of work
and play, or work and culture. The craftsman's
way of livelihood determines and infuses his
entire mode of life (WC: 220).
In fact, Mills' conception of work as craftsmanship
is an amalgam of diverse intellectual traditions. He draws
upon the works of Tolstoy, Carlyle, Ruskin and Morris, on the
one hand, and of Marx and Engels on the other; and both groups,
in their turn, drew their inspiration from the Renaissance
tradition of work. Most of them harbor in their mind an image
of work that is supposed to have been better in the past days--
say, in the early origins of civilization, in the culture of
primitive peoples, in the medieval period or in the pre-in-
dustrial craftsmanship and agricultural labor. In constructing
his model of craftsmanship Mills has also an image of work
"as it should be,!! which he compared with work !!as it is!! lTI
Ii
G
=
188
the contemporary conditions of industrialization. The ques-
tion which remains to be answered is that how far these
theorists are justified, in the words of Clayre, "in believ-
ing that there was any past age in which ordinary experience

=
of most men at work was dramatically more happy and satisfy-
ing than that of men at work in their own time" (1974: 86).
(2) The Private Property: In this regard, Mills finds, like
Marx, capitalism as a breeding ground of alienation for both
white- and blue-collar workers. Mills points out in no less
clear terms that "the objective alienation of man from the
product and the process of work is entailed by the legal frame-
work of modern capitalism and the modern division of labor"
(WC: 225). Elsewhere, he reiterates the theme by saying that
"the alienation of the individual from the product and the
process of his work carne about, in the first instance, as a
result of the drift of modern capitalism" ;(WC: 233).
/
Work is
no longer self-creativity, as Marx thinks; it has been tri-
vialized into what Mills calls 'marketable activity' in which
worker's personality or his personal traits become part of
the means of production. In other words, man "instrumentalizes
and externalizes intimate features of his person and disposi-
tion (WC: 225). In so far as capitalism is concerned, if the
institution of private property is one reason, the division
of labor is then another. The structural transformation of
the rural world of small entrepreneurs into an urban society
of dependent employees has given rise to the institution of
"property conditions of alienation from product and processes
psychologically detached from him, and this
detachment cuts the nerve of meaning which
work might otherwise gain from its technical
processes As tool becomes machine, man
is estranged from the intellectual potential-
ities and aspects of work; and each individual
is routinized in the name of increased and
cheaper per unit productivity (We: 225-26).
But as essential difference between Marx and Mills may be
190
noted at this point of discussion. For Marx, the capitalist
market turns everything into commodities, not only the pro-
ducts which acquire exchange value and are sold as commodities
but also the producers, the makers themselves. In contrast
to this, for Mills, it is not so much the capitalist market
as it is the bureaucratized enterprise which is at the back
of expropriation of rationality, resulting thereby in aliena-
tion. In the Weberian tradition, he postulates that "not the
market as such but centralized administrative decisions deter-
mine when men work and how fast" (We: 226). At the same time
he also sounds very much alike when Mills says that "the
enterprise is an impersonal and alien Name, and the more that
is placed in it, the less is placed in man" (we: 226). The
harder the worker works in the bureaucratized enterprise,
whether in the office or in the factory, the more he builds
up that which dominates his work 'as an alien force, the commo-
dity'. In the manner characteristic of Mannheim, Mills thus
comes to conceive of alienation:
The expropriation which modern work organization
has carried through (thus) goes far beyond the
expropriation of ownership; rationality itself
has been expropriated from work and any total
view and understanding of its process. No
longer free to plan his work, much less to
modify the plan to which be is subordinated;
the individual is to a great extent managed
and manipulated in his work (We: 226).
191
( 4- ) Other Factors: Apart from the alienating grounds of pri-
vate property, the division of labor and the rational bureau-
cracy, Mills points to three other sources of workers' alien-
ation. He advances, following Weber, that "under modern con-
ditions, the direct technical processes of work have been
declining in meaning for the mass of employees, but other
features of work--income, power, status--have come to the
fore" (we: 230). First, since the work is a source of income
and therefore of security, economic motives operating in the
background are its firm rationale. In his the 184-4 Manuscripts
Marx reminded: "The power to confuse and invert all human
and natural qualities, to bring about fraternization of in-
compatibles, the divine power of money, resides in its charac-
ter as the alienated and self-alienating species life of man.
It is the alienated power of humanity" (1961: 166). For Mills
too, money-mindedness in the consumption-orientated society
is a new variable of meaninglessness in work. "The division
of labor and the routinization of many job areas are reduc-
ing work to a commodity, of which money has become the only
common denominator .... The sharp focus upon money is part
and parcel of the lack of intrinsic meaning that work has come
to have" (we: 230). Second, the meaninglessness in work is
correlated to status yearning which, in their turn, depend
more or less upon the money the worker is able to earn. The
193
growth of this development. Its main empirical bases stem
from the studies carried out between 1927 and 1939 at the
Hawthorne Plant of the Western Electric Company near Chicago.
Mills reacted quite violently to this approach, par-
ticularly as developed by Mayo, Roethlisberger, Dickson and
others. The new approach, he points out, is an ideologically
motivated political formula that attempts to psychologize
the problems of industrial relations in the private interests
of the growing big business. Put otherwise, the studies of
human relations may be considered "part of the attempt to
work up new symbols of justification, part of the effort to
sophisticate business rhetoric and business outlook II (Mills,
1948a: 202). In White Collar he was more pointed in his
criticism. "The need to develop new justifications, and the
fact that increased power has not yet been publicly justified,
give rise to a groping for more telling symbols of justifica-
tion among the more sophisticated business spokesmen, who have
felt themselves to be a small island in a politically hostile
sea of propertyless employees" (WC: 234). Later, Mills called
the approach an example of "new illiberal practicality II (SI: 92).
In speaking of the 'adaptive society' as the ideal of
the present or future society, Mayo suggests that "in a modern
and industrial society ultimate decisions, if they are to be
reasonable and progressive, must vest in groups that possess
both technical and social understanding" (1975: xlviii).
~ l t u r l l l l y he assumes that "modern civilization is greatly in
need of a new type of administrator who can, metaphorically
194
speaking, stand outside the situation he is studying" and
that, therefore, "the outstanding need of the modern world
is the need for investigation and study of organization and
the principles of intelligent administration" (Mayo, 1975: 109,
129). In this form of managerialism the management is to
understand "the feelings and sentiments of the bottom" and,
then, to decide on transferring, upgrading, downgrading, pro-
moting, demoting, placing and selecting the workers in accor-
dance with "the social values" that are conceivably made of
the managerial wisdom (cf. Roethlisberger, 1959: 192-93).
Trade unions do not appear as competing centers of loyalty
for the workers. The same is also true of 'status' and
particularly 'power' factors within the work organizations.
The fact of the matter is that any reference to power--poli-
tical and economic conflict of interests--is often dissolved
into the problem of securing collaboration from the workers.
As has clearly indicated, the managerial attempt
to boost up workers' morale is linked with the plain fact that
tbe workers are alienated in one form or another. The hier-
archical nature of the social structure of industrial work
places and the routinized character of job commitments, under
mechanized division of labor, demand that the workers be in
managerial terms. Stated otherwise, "morale in a modern
American factory has to do with the cheerful obedience on the
part of the worker, resulting in efficient prosecution of
the work at hand, - as judged by management"
ICT.
\LJ..L. 93) .
195
standably, such a morale approximates neither to that of the
Adam Smith-Jeffersonian unalienated man nor to that of Marx's
unalienated speciesbeirtg. Mills calls such a worker 'cheer-
ful robot'--the image of alienated man in Mills' political
sociology. (rris powerlessnes s, a product of alienation, follows
from his work roles in the authoritarian structure of modern
. d ' \
In USl:ry.: "The morale projected by the 'human relations'
experts is the morale of men who are alienated but who have
conformed to managed or conventional expectations of 'morale'"
(SI: 94).
Management's effort to create job enthusiasm reflects
lack of workers' spontaneity for job commitments which are
more often than not routinized tasks in the mechanized and
rationalized work situations of mass production. This amounts
to, as Mills reminds us of Marx's statement, attempts to con-
quer work alienation within the bounds of alienation. Power
is_not a negligible aspect in the work organizations and any
sociology of firms "must inquire into the relations between
strategy, balance and the politics of the firm" (Touraine,
1971: 147). Mills' emphasis on the power dimension is in
conformity to his discovery of structural trends In the society.
The question of 'morale' is not separate from but related to
'power' in the work milieus. Both provide clues to the etio-
logical background of work alienation. To sum up in the
words of Mills:
The theoretical problem of industrial sociology,
as it comes to an intellectual and political
climax in the conception of morale, is a problem
of exploring the several types of alienation and
morale which we come upon as we consider system-
atically the structure of power and its meanings
for the individual lives of workmen. It requires
us to examine the extent to which psychological
shifts have accompanied structural shifts; and
in each case, why. In such directions lies the
promise of a social science of modern man's
working life (SI: 95 footnote).
Leisure, Consumption and Alienation
196
Referring to the alienation of the individual worker
due to ascendant trends of rationalization, Mills says:
"Alienated from production, from work, he is also alienated
from consumption, from genuine leisure" (SI: 170). In his
The Theory of the Leisure Class Veblen traced how the rise
of the leisure class in America is linked with individual
ownership and the division of labor and how the feature of
leisure-class life is expressed in "the conventional mark
of superior pecuniary achievement and the conventional index
of reputability" through a "conspicuous exemption from all
useful employment" (cf. 1965: 86-87). Mills went further
than his sociological mentor, Veblen. If alienation from
labor is one characteristic of life of the industrial man,
then alienation from leisure, also consumption, is no less
important as a distinguishing mark of contemporary mass liv-
ing. Leisure ethic now runs through the consciousness of
modern man. The theme of leisure activity has turned into
an important aspect of mass society (cf. Touraine, 1971: 193).
The mass consumption society travels towards, to borrow a
phrase from Touraine, "leisure civilization." For Mills,
as for many others, the trend is the same.
As people have more time on their hands, most
of it is taken away from them by the debilitat-
ing quality of their work, by the pace of their
everyday routine, and by the ever-present media
of mass distraction (A)s work declines in
meaning and gives no inner direction or center,
leisure becomes the end of life itself, and the
leisure ethic swallows up all values, including
those of work (PPP: 349).
When work loses its significance or fails to infuse the
197
craftsman's mode of living, it becomes "a sacrifice of time,
necessary to building a life outside of it" (we: 228). Genuine
leisure releases, says Mills, "our attention so that we come
to know better our true selves and our capacities for creative
experience. Beyond animal rest, which is both necessary and
for many today quite difficult to get, genuine leisure allows
and encourages our development of greater and truer individ-
uality. Leisure ought to be what work ought to be, and what
neither of them usually is: a sphere of independent action"
(PPP: 350). Viewed in this light, modern worker rarely dis-
covers a genuine leisure which he can utilize privately 'to
discover, create and reinforce' his own individuality. As
Lasch says, "the work ethic has given way to a 'fun morality',
the spirit of calculation to concern with personal well-
being and psychic health" (1977: 14).
The ideology of alienated work automatically gener-
ates the ideology of alienated leisure. In the mass produc-
198
tion society leisure activities derive importance from the
innumerable ways that are available for consumption, and
the process of consumption is no less alienating than that
of production. The American worker, Bell remarks, has not
been tamed by the discipline of the machine but by the "con-
sumption society" (1967: 254). Consumption in America's mass
society means "the satisfaction of artificially stimulated
phantasies, a phantasy alienated from our con-
crete, real selves" (Fromm, 1955: 122). The increased avail-
ability of leisure time for man is a mark of this technological
society. In America the week's average working hours has de-
clined from 70.6 in 1850 to 40.8 in 1950, in addition to a
week-end of two complete days (cf. Friedmann, 1961: 105).
At the same time leisure activities have multiplied, but the
result has been alienation in one form or another. The work
ethic is replaced by the leisure ethic, and the split between
work and leisure becomes so absolute that "now work itself
is judged in terms of leisure values. The sphere of leisure
provides the standards by which work is judged; it lends to
work such meanings as work has" (WC: 236). Alt has rightly
noted that the development of consumerism, accelerated by
rise in wages and greater labor, has plagued the working
population and has caused erosion of the work ethic. Con-
sumerism is 'a major mechanism for shaping consciousness
and reproducing cppitalist hegemony'. In his words:
Concerned primarily with the immediate gratifi-
cations of familial intimacy and consumerism,
they come to tolerate the exploitative labor
and even political authoritarianism so long as
the system sustains a rising standard of living.
Given its centrality in the reproduction of the
economy the culture of daily existence, and
political legitimation consumerism has become
the major form of domination and reification
(Alt, 1976: 55).
199
When the leisure ethic is stretched over to most spheres of
conscious and conspicuous enjoyment, the woker experiences
a dysjunction between his work and the rest of his life. The
cycle of work gives rise to one image of self--the everyday
image based on work. The leisure ethic generates another
image of self--the holiday image of self based on leisure.
The split within the self produces tensions that usually
remain suppressed but which find occasional outbursts especial-
ly in the week-end when they stearn off along the erotic roads
of frenzied enjoyment. Thus, exposure to mass leisure ac-
tivities, an incidence of commercialization of leisure and
culture, does not accelerate but retard the creative life of
the working Illasses.
So work is an unsatisfactory means to ulterior
ends lying somewhere in the sphere of leisure.
The necessity to work and the alienation from
it make up its grind, and the more grind there
is, the more need to find relief in the jumpy
or dreary models available in modern leisure
To modern man leisure is the way to spend money,
work is the way to make it. When the two com-
pete, leisure wins hands down (We: 237-38).
Alienation from Status
Mills enriched the sociology of alienation by introduc-
ing into it the psychological dimension of status striving.
200
Following World War II, when the American era of fabled plen-
ty and mass merchandisers made its appearance, the rising
standard of living accompanied the growth of a generation of
status seekers. As Mills has noted, the preoccupation of
Americans with more and more status is a feature of "over-
developed" society with its production techniques and mass
consumption outlets. The overdeveloped society is one in
which lithe means of livelihood are so great that life is
dominated by the struggle for status, based on the acquisi-
tion and maintenance of commodities" (PPP: 150). The frantic
search for new roads for higher status and its symbols sur-
rounds the new little men more than others in this production-
consumption society of the masses. By the mid-fifties America
came to be marked, so to say, as society crowded by status
seekers--"the people who are continually straining to surround
themselves with visible evidence of superior rank they are
claiming" (Packard, 1960: 7). For Mills, the distinguishing
mark of alienation in this status society is manifest in what
he calls "status panic" (cf. WC: 240). Mills has rightly noted
that "the enjoyment of prestige is often disturbed and uneasy,
that the bases of prestige, the expressions of prestige claims,
and the ways these claims are honored, are now subject to a
great strain, a strain which often puts men and women in a
virtual status panic" (WC: 240). The theoretical postulates
of status alienation have been neatly formulated by Packard:
A society that encourages status striving ~
duces .... a good deal of bruising, disappoint-
ment and ugly feelings. If a society promotes
201
the idea that success is associated with
upward mobility, those who can't seem to
get anywhere are likely to be afflicted
with the feeling that they are personal
failures, even though the actual situation
may be pretty much beyond their control or
capacity to change (1960: 326).
The psychology of the middle class man is 'the psychology of
status striving' and the phenomenon of status alienation is
more a characteristic of the white collar rather than the
blue collar workers. However, Mills addds that, in conform-
ity to his thesis of 'blurring the class lines', dominant
tendencies are leading to what he designates as
"status proletarianization" (We: 249) of the white collar
14
strata. The traditional bases of prestige and, therefore,
of status have become inform and fragile. It has meant that
alienation from status, the result of morbid strivings for
status, has found newer ways of expression.
First, minute gradations of rank and fragmentation
of skills cause, because of continuous bureaucratization,
the break up of the occupational bases of workers' prestige
and, thus lead to status competition and estrangement (cf. we: 254).
Second, the breakdown of community relations and the growing
economic insecurity make the prestige relations fleeting and
transitory. Leisure activities tend to justify the individual's
claims to higher status and, in turn, cause further status
alienation. Finally, many individuals, mostly those in the
white collar strata, often seek release from the long-run
reality of rather fixed positions ln life through efforts to
202
raise themselves, at least temporarily, to higher status.
Status cycles provide people In a lower class a chance to
act like persons on higher social levels and get away
temporarily with it. "Urban masses look forward to vacations,
not 'just for the change,' and not only for a 'rest from work'--
the meaning behind such phrases is often a lift in success-
ful status claims" (We: 257).
Alienation from Politics
Alienation in America's mass society is not merely a
characteristic of rationalization and bureaucratization pro-
cesses, of work roles in the capitalist economy, of leisure
and consumption, or of status strivings. It has penetrated
into the,arena of politics and, so argues Mills, political
alienation is bound up with mass indifference to politics
of this society. The mass man is neither radical nor con-
servative, neither liberal nor socialist. He is a stranger
to politics, either a visionary or an inactionary. The
questions of legitimacy of political decisions and institutions
appear to have receded apparently behind mass man's estrange-
ment from all concerns of his polity. Rosenberg points out,
among other reasons: "In our complex urban mass society,
individuals devote themselves to minute specialized tasks
woven into the complex fabric of the economy. The great
economic and power blocs, typified by giant corporations and
unions, thrust the individual about with pressures too power-
203
ful to resist. As a consequence the individual is likely
to feel overwhelmed and powerless" (1951: 9).
For Mills, political alienation meant indifference to
or estrangement from "politics as a sphere of loyalties, de-
mands, and hopes" (WC: 326). Whereas politically _conscious
person finds 'a political meaning' in his own insecurities
and desires, and considers himself a demanding ipolitical
force', one who is politically indifferent does not find
such meanings in life. Mills defines the politically in-
different persons in the following manner:
The politically indifferent are detached from pre-
vailing political symbols but have no new attach-
ments to counter-symbols. Whatever insecurities
and demands and hopes they may have are not fo-
cused politically, their personal desires and
anxieties being segregated from political symbols
and authorities. Neither objective evens nor
internal stresses count politically in their con-
sciousness To be politically indifferent is
to see no political meaning in one's life or in
the world in which one lives, to avoid any
political disappointments or gratifications. So
politici:il sYITlbols have lost :their
as motives for action and as justifications for
institutions (WC: 326-27).
When most are preoccupied in private pleasures that so-called
Affluence has brought for them all, 'a revulsion from politics
and the strain it induces' is anything but natural. Thus to
the question, does the ordinary American feel a revulsion from
politics? Birnbaum has the following answer which brings out
the import of what Mills calls political alienation.
The most striking thing about the country that
considers herself the world's most thorough-
going democracy is the political passivity of


the populace, the absence of pOlitics. I
had the feeling of residing under an ancien
regime, which though one without clerics,
censors and magistrates to keep down opposi-
tion, because without opposition. Consent
and affirmation fill the press, are found
every other page of serious and scholarly
journals, envelop classroom and fall instinc-
tively from the ordinary mouths of ordinary
men and women (1958: 43).
204
Political indifference, as Mills saw, manifests principally
in two ways: political meaninglessness and political power-
lessness. Both are interrelated since one entails the other.
Political meaninglessness exists when the individual is unable
or incapacitated to distinguish between alternative political
choices because they have lost their meanings for him. Po-
litical powerlessness, on the other hand, implies precisely
a lack of control over processes of political decision making.
Like Fromm or Marcuse, Mills has discovered manipulation at
the bottom of political powerlessness.
From the individual's standpoint, much that
happens seems the result of manipulation, of
management, of blind drift; authority is often
n-ot explicit; tnose- with power often -feel no
need to make it explicit and to justify it.
That is one reason why ordinary men, when they
are in trouble or when they sense that they are
up against issues, cannot get clear targets
for thought and for action; they cannot deter-
mine what it is that imperils the values they
vaguely discern as theirs (SI: 169-70).
Political powerlessness is indicative of a 'malaise' of
America's mass social order. Very recently another commentator
attests to this:
(Another) aspect of the malaise of American
society in the 1960's and th.e early 19.70's is
a sense of powerlessness that permeates almost
every major stratum and segment of society--
an indication of politics having become more
subjective, and unconnected with the more
clear-cut issue of measurable social-economic
interest and privation .
205
.... Almost every major stratum of the popula-
tion simultaneously attributes power and in-
fluence to some other group: the blacks to
whites, militant feminists to men, the lower
middle-class whites to the students and ghetto
residents, the radical students to the Establish-
ment, the middle classes to the manipulators of
the mass media, the alienated intellectuals to
the 'silent majority' (Hollander, 1973: 398-99).
When, therefore, Mills says that "political estrangement in
America is widespread and decisive" (we: 331), it is not
difficult to comprehend how it makes sense in the current
political realities of American society.
At the back of mass indifference to politics there
lies the fact that, speaking historically, politics was never
an autonomous region in the capitalist social structure of
America. Stated otherwise, in the words of Weinstein,"Liberal-
ism became the movement for state intervention to supervise
. corporat.e activity., r.ather than a ID()Yement fQr the remQval of
state control over private enterprise" (1972: 191). It thus
explains that politics has always been anchored in the
economic sphere and that, therefore, the economic rather than
the political institutions have been the reigning aspects of
the capitalist social structure of America. Mills has also
rightly drawn attention to the role of the bi-party system
and its working as a contributory cause of fostering political
apathy among the masses of people. The traditional two-party
system is responsible for the rise of 'opportunistic politics'
206
Neither party has any explicit or articulate view. Nor do
they fundamentally differ In issues or making promises.
Often it is, to borrow a phrase from Reagan, lIa politics of
silence, a campaign without issues
ll
(1956: 355). For Mills,
By virtue of their increased and centralized
power, political institutions become more ob-
jectively important to the course of American
history, but because of mass alienation, less
and less of subjective interest to the popula-
tion at large. On the one hand, politics is
bureaucratized, and on the other, there is mass
indifference. These are the decisive aspects
of U.S. politics today (We: 350).
The conditions of mass apathy towards politics have not
abated but, on the contrary, they have shownsymptoms of
continuance as well as of increment, as Mills prophesied in
1951, Most recently, in 1976, Aberbach attests to this.
following observation further illumines what Mills said
earlier:
The last decade has been marked by intense
social stress, increased ideological
ga-tLGn <1ud- l - third - pary revolt. tical
disaffection has increased steadily as citizens
have lost confidence in and opera-
tions of government. Accompanying this situa-
tion has been an erosion of party fidelity, in
which some voters have drifted away from iden-
tification with the major parties and the in-
fluence of the parties on voting behavior has
diminished .... We are now at juncture where
political distrust is growing rapidly, accom-
panied by a rise in the percentage of the popu-
lation which does not identify with either of
the two major parties (Aberbach, 1976: 26).
Political Alienation from the Mass Media
The role of the mass media has acquired a new
His
significance in so far as it has become a factor in causing
207
alienating experiences for the people in the society of the
masses. "With the broadening of the base of politics within
the context of a folk-lore of democratic decision-making, and
with the increased means of mass persuasion that are avail-
able, the public of public opinion has become the object
of intensive efforts to control, manage, manipulate, and
increasingly intimidate" (PE: 310). Indeed, the role of
the media as a causal factor of political alienation is a
unique phenomenon of the large-scale industrial society of
contemporary generation of the masses. They are now a new
intermediary between the individual's material existence and
the psychological awareness of this experience.
Between consciousness and existence stand
communications, which influence such con-
sciousness as men have of their existence.
Men do 'enter into definite, necessary rela-
tions which are independent of their will',
but communications enter to slant the mean-
ings of these relations for those variously
involved in them. The forms of political con-
sciousness may, in the end, be relative to
means of p-rouuction, but, in the beg-inning,
they are relative to the contents of the
communication media (We: 332-33).
These words sum up precisely the political significance of
the media in the modern society; simultaneously it indicates
how pervasive the one-dimensionality of the media could be
when they are controlled by a single dominant group In the
society. In assessing the scope of shared communication in
the participation of the public concerns of a political com-
munity, Pool notes that "to play that game they must to some
extent be informed. There must be a communication system that
208
tells the public about the state of the world and identifies.
the issues that must be resolved. Without shared information
of those kinds, there would be only private experiences, not
a public forum" (1973: 792). Considering this as a starting
point, the role of the media in the mass society presents a
dismal picture. In the United States the communications
system is neither 'autonomous' nor independent; it reflects
society selectively, reinforces a generalized version of
reality and creates its own world (cf. WC: 334). Or, as Mar-
cuse said: "If mass communications blend together harmon-
iously, and often unnoticeably art, politics, religion and
philosophy with commercials, they bring these realms of cul-
ture to their common denominator--the commodity form" (1966: 57).
The political role of the media in the mass society
could be better explained in terms of its content and accom-
panying message. They create, process, refine and transmit
messages and information that give rise to a world of false
consciousness and that never correspond to the actual life
conditions of the individual. On the contrary, by using
myths they explain, justify and at times glamorize the pre-
vailing conditions of existence. In a nation that has
"6,700 commercial radio stations, more than 700 commercial
TV stations, 1,5000 daily newspapers, hundreds of periodi-
cals, a film industry that produces a couple of hundred new
features a year, and a billion-dollar private book-publishing
industry" (Schiller, 1973: 19), it is amazing to note that
209
the world created by the mass media contains little political
discussion. Despite this existence of enormous media plural-
ism, the multichannel ecommunication flow does not provide
adequate political message or information in their media
content. The controversial issues are eliminated in order
to maximize the numer of consumers and therefore the media
exhibit manifest symptoms of ingrained institutional in-
ability to highlight latent bases of social conflict. Freire
notes that "the oppressors develop a series of methods pre-
eluding any presentation of the world as a problem and show-
ing it rather as a fixed reality, as something given--some-
thing to which man, as mere spectators, must adapt" (1971: 135)
As the present day cultural-informational apparatus of the
mass media functions, they rarely highlight what Mills calls
'the deprivations and insecurities' arising from structural
positions and historical changes. In terms of ideological
politics, the mass media have become entertainment media in
the leisure-oriented mass society.
the mass media do not display counter-
loyalties and demands to the ruling loyalties
and demands which they make banal. They are
polite, disguising indifference as tolerance
and broadmindedness; and they further buttress
the disfavor in which those who are 'against
things' are held. They trivialize issues into
personal squabbles, rather than humanize them
by asserting their meanings for you and for me.
They formalize adherence to prevailing symbols
by pious standardization of worn-out phrases,
and when they are 'serious', they merely get
detailed about more of the same, rather than
give big close-ups of the human meanings of
political events and decisions (We: 335).
"
210
This brings us to the central aspect of political
the mass media. In the same
manner it is here that the question of ownership and manage-
ment of the media networks assumes importance since it is
the mainspring of manipulation of the masses. Manipulation
is a technique of social control and an instrument of domina-
tion. It lacks public legitimation, and in this sense it is
"the 'secret' exercise of power, unknown to those who are
influenced" (PE: 316). In the mass society, divided into
elites and masses, manipulation is a necessary instrument of
control in the hands of those who have the power to exercise
but not the legitimation to do so. The technology of mass
media is made to respond to the needs of capitalist growth
and the entire system of media production, distribution and
consumption is geared to this. The primary role of the media
is to instill and reinforce the capitalism's belief, though
indubitably false, that material goods bring individual
happiness and are path to personal salvation (cf. Gintis,
1972: 283). It is in this context that the question which
Mills raises in regard to media's role becomes
Why do mass communication agencies contain such per-
sistently non-political or falsely political content" (We:
339)? His answer is also too clear:
These agencies are of course owned and directed
by a small group of people, to whose interest
it is to present individual success stories and
other divertissement rather than the facts of
collective successes and tragedies (we;
211
The fact of the matter is that in America mass media have
developed into a large-scale industry and operate according
to commercialized norms of capitalist ownership. They are
firmly tied to the corporate economy. The corporate structure
that controls the media networks has now transcended the
national boundaries (cf. Read, 1976: 3). It is widening the
chasm between elites and masses in the developing nations.
It is meddling with their internal affairs. It is manipulat-
ing the public op inion at the national and in terna t lona1. 1eve 1.
Above all, it has become the purveyor of American mass stand-
ards and homogenizing influences. To state otherwise, the
transnational flow of the American media of communication has
established a process of socializing foreign media consumers
into the corporate norms predetermined by media merchants
and managers in the United States. "The international com-
merce in mass media, insofar as U.S. merchants are concerned,
~ d-ominated by a hanElfulererg-anizeA;ieng tbEltEl-lso hold
commanding positions in the American domestic market" (Read,
1976: 4). It is in this respect that Mills' apprehensions
as to the role of the media in the mass society acquire valid-
ity:
The mass media hold a monopoly of the ideological-
ly dead; they spin records of political emptiness.
To banalize prevailing symbols and omit counter-
symbols, but above all, to divert from the explicit-
ly political, and by contrast with other interests
to make 'politics' dull and threadbare--that is
the political situation of the mass media, which
reflect and reinforce the political situation of
the nation (we: 335-36).
212
If this is not true ln toto one must not ignore, then, the
point that, in the words of Read, "America's mass media
merchants have become controversial both for what they say
and for having their ability to say it" (1976: 179).
Mills and Alienation: An Assessment
With regard to alienation in America's mass society,
Mills' depiction, without any doubt, conforms by and large
to that of many other theorists, both Liberal and Marxist.
The present debate no longer concerns its existence but
rather centers around the extent to which it exists. The
development of the vast literature of the sociology of a-
lienation has proceeded generally alongside the tremendous
growth of sociology in America, and much of the literature
has developed on the basis of America social experience. On
the one side, much of the theoretical development of aliena-
tion literature took place because American social scientists
became involved in the debate about the validity of Marx's
formulations of the concept and its applicability to the
modern industrial-social situations. A glance over the con-
tents of the leading journals of sociology and its allied
social sciences especially from 1950 on will evidence the
social scientists' enthusiasm for alienation studies.
15
On
the other side, the rapid development of the literature was
only possible because the studies were largely fed by data
from the American society especially following the World War II.
213
In this evolution of the sociology of alienation Mills' con-
tribution, as has been illustrated throughout this present
chapter, is scarcely insignificant. A modest estimate is
provided by Horowitz in these words:
Once Marx opened (this) pandora's box of the
social and corss-cultural locale of alienation,
it was just a matter of time before others
would see alienation of different social sectors
from those Marx had dealt with. ThuB, for ex-
ample, in a modern view of bourgeois society,
that held by C. Wright Mills, alienation comes to
be understood as a lower middle class phenomenon,
something that debases salesgirls, technicians,
and even intellectuals in a similar way. In this
Mills provided not only a bridge from one class
to another, but even more importantly, a way of
viewing alienation as a problem for all nonruling
se o-t-o"n ly--t h ef a'<:! to ry -an ch 0 red urban
proletariat (1968: 105).
In spite of the charges against the concept of alien-
ation that it is used to signify "the most banal of dyspepsias
as well as the deepest of metaphysical fears" (Jay, 1973:
xiii), that this all-inclusive term "denotes practically
everything and connotes "( ZOr'dOIl, 1972: 20), that
it is "an atrocious word" (Johnson, 1973: 3), and that "what
it says can be better said without it" (Feuer, 1963: 145),
social scientists have gone well with the alienation studies.
16
In this connection a brief comparison of Mills with Marx may
be made since, as has been noted, both have attached central
importance to the concept of alienation, though for different
reasons and in different ways.
As a plain ma.rxist, Mills accepts Marx's concept as
"brilliant and illuminating" or as "a quick rationalist
214
conception." As has been noted, like Marx, he has also
found origins of alienating causes in the core of capitalism.
His discussion of work, private property, the division of
labor or money bear much testimony to Marx's influence, as a
classic sociOlogist, on Mills. Plasek has rightly said that
the more Marxist approaches among contemporary sociological
and empirical studies "include some of the works of C. Hright
Mills" (1974: 320 footnote). However, in spite of Mills1
marxist bias in his analysis of alienation, unable to
accept capitalism as the fountain source of alienation In
modern man's life. On the contrary, he says that "the variety
and the causes of alienation go beyond Marx's cryptic and
not too clear comments about it" (TM: Ill). Although as a
matter of fact Mills revealed at times more dimensions of
alienation than Marx, it seems, on the basis of a vast array
of Marxist literature on alienation, that he has underrated
the all-round significance of the capitalist contexts of
social and self-alienation.
17
Mills' differences with Marx
in respect of this theme may be illustrated in terms of his
own intellectual orientations as well as institutional
developments within American sociology itself. On the one
hand, Mills was intellectually more predisposed to influences
of Heber and Mannheim, especially in regard to the rise of
bureaucratic rationality in course of industrializing processes
of t'he society. In later days of his life he was disillusioned
215
with what he calls 'labor metaphysic'
18
In addition, Mills'
acceptance of the intelligentsia in preference to the masses
as the main agency of sociohistorical change has stood in his
way of realizing the pervasiveness of alienation In a parti-
cular mode of production, that of capitalism. Rather than
looking, therefore, from a Marxist standpoint, he approached
the theme admittedly declaring to be a liberal democrat in
the classic tradition. Herein lies the importance of differ-
ence arising out of his intellectual and political orienta-
tions. On the other hand, Mills' deviation from Marx can
be understood as a function of dual set of facts. First,
Mills' attitude to Marx is in part linked with Weber's, not
Marx's, reception in the mainstreams of American sociology,
although lithe American respons e to vleber is considerably
differentiated" (Horowitz, 1968: 189). It is needless to
mention here that overwhelming impact of Weber's reception
in American 'sociology is an important reason behind the
critical attitude of mainstream sociologists such as Parsons
and other members of his structural-functional school. In
this sense, the firmament toward more Marxist approach In
sociological themes is of fairly recent origin in American
sociology.19
Second, Mills' approach to alienation lS also
a part of the tradition along which most of American studies
of alienation have proceeded. Plasek has found that Ameri-
can studies estimate alienation as "one of the forms of
consciousness found among those involved in social problems.
Certain structural conditions and their interaction with
216
various beliefs may be found to produce alienation1! (1974: 325).
In contrast to this, Marxist studies treat consciousness of
alienation as a function of capitalism, that is of a given set
of socioeconomic conditions. While both approaches are help-
ful in revealing the multidimensionality of the alienation
phenomena, the difference can hardly be underestimated.
In criticizing Marx, Mills states that his conception
of alienation contains "mixed moral judgements." Into his
conception, Marx has jammed, says Mills, "his highest and
most noble image of man--and his fiercest indignation about
the crippling of man by capitalism. And he has the strong
tendency to impute in an optative way, these judgements to
the psychological realities of the work men do and the life
men lead. Often these are not the realities men experience"
(TM: Ill). Even if Mills' description of the sociopsychological
faces of alienation in different sectors of social life is
considered to be an improvement upon Marx's own, it can hardly
be said that his own conception of the image of man "as an
actor in historic crises, and of man as a whole entity" (ess:
xiii-iv) is empirically more valid. Mills' own conception is
rather a standard image of man as a social creature in socio-
logy. In spite of many inadequacies that it might have, Marx's
theory no where misses the basic point of human exploitation.
Just like Mills, Marx was not a 'Messiah' indeed. The plain
fact is that both started with the background images of man
in their respective minds and then subsequently followed
different routes only to prove humanists at the end. In
217
regard to the elimination of alienation, Marx was positive
in its transcendance with the disappearance of capitalism and
establishment of a communist society. Communism, says Marx,
"turns existing conditions into conditions of unity. The
reality, which communism is creating, is precisely the true
basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist
independently of individuals, insofar as reality is only a
product of the preceding intercourse of individuals them-
selves" (1972: 157). Compared to this Marxist solution,
Mills called for the restoration of 'free individuality' and
for the restoration of 'reason' in human affairs. Put other-
wise, Mills wished the return of men of the Renaissance tra-
dition, that is, " men of substantive reason, whose independent
reasonjng would have structural consequences for their so-
cieties, its history, and thus for their own life fates"
(SI: 174). In effect he wanted a revival of liberal demo-
cracy in its classic tradition. But this was, as it were,
running against the tide of times. Had he lived beyond 1962,
at least for some time, he would have seen, given the trans-
formation of corporate-capitalist economy of America, that the
prospect of restoration of reason and freedom in the liberal
democratic tradition is a far fetched one. One cannot over-
come alienation within the existent world of alienation. The
beneficiaries of post-Worl War II prosperity are now involved
in the paradox of alienation. The American social system is
facing "onslaught from all sides and alienation has been the
218
harbinger of the depth of the crisis
ll
(Mizruchi, 1973: 124).
The problem of alienation is a problem of political economy,
that of capitalism. The point is whether abolition of the
capitalist mode of production should precede abolition of
anti-people bureaucracies as the for the onset
of progressive disalienation .. For the time being, one can
agree with what Pappenheim says: IlCapitalism can no longer
playa positive role today. And a system geared to commodity
production and based on competition cannot help man to con-
tend with the forces of alienation
l1
(1967: 31). In :pite of
his failure to realize this, it is heartening to learn from
Mills, even when he is betrayed by the on-march of events
and the run of times, the following:
'Man's chief danger' today lies in the unruly
forces of contemporary society itself, with its
alienating methods of production, its eveloping
techniques of political domination, its inter-
national anarchy--in a word, its pervasive trans-
formations of the very 'nature' of man and the
conditions and aims of his life (SI: 13).
219
Notes
1. The list of mass theorists is long. However, for many
parallels in respect of alienating tendencies in Ameri-
can social life, see Marcuse (1966), Fromm (1955, 1965)
and Riesman (1973) in particular.
2. See Seeman (1967) and Lystadt (1972: 91,102).
3. See Nisbet (1953: 47-54) and Meadows (1965: 453-54).
4. It is to be noted that Mills does not offer any precise
definition of the concept of alienation. Rather he
describes its differential aspects. Naturally, I have
avoided attempting its conceptualization or specifying
its indices.
5. For example see hi s articles (1) "Mas s Soc ie ty and Lib eral
Education" (1954) and (2) "The Big City: Private Troubles
and Public Issues" (1959), both of which are contained
in Power, Politics and People.
6. More or less in this way Israel calls this "a discrepancy
theory of alienation" (1971: 203).
7. 'For an earlier but different version, see Andrew (1970).
8. It must, however, be noted that there is a basic differ-
ence between Mills and Marx in their respective analyses
of alienation. Mills does not focus on alienation with
any specific discussion of the forces and relations of
production, as Marx did in his Capital.
9. Mills' views on how intellectuals have emerged as hired
research technicians of the Establishment appear in Chap-
ter 3, especially at pp. 112-114. See also pp. 133-35
of Chapter 4.
10. Italics added.
11. See Marx (1961: 98-99; 1970: 71-83).
12. A comparison betwBen two viewpoints of Marx and Mills
has been attempted in the concluding section of this
chapter.
13. For example, see Almasi (1965), Vranicki (1966),
Schaff (1970) and also Novack (1973).
14.
220
Briefly stated, Mills' thesis about the blurring of any
worthwhile distinction between the white- and blue-collar
workers is as follows: In the present capitalist so-
ciety both the wage workers and the salaried employees
are fast becoming dependent occupational category. "In
terms of property, the white-collar people are not 'in
between Capital and Labor'; they are exactly same
property-class position as the wage workers" (WC: 71).
For different evaluations of Mills' thesis, see Hamilton
And Wright (1975: 21-22), Rainwater (1971: 207),
Dahrendorf (1959: Westley and Westley (1971: 54),
Carchedi (1975a; 1975b; 1975c) and Johnson (1977). -
15. To be noted is the fact that it was Fromm who popularized
the concept of alienation as far back as 1941 when he
published his Escape from Freedom. In 1961, he intro-
duced Marx's Manuscripts to American readers through his
publication of Marx's Concept of Man. The critical po-
litical mood then prevailing--the McCarthy period--is
understandable in the fact that Marx's writings were
published not in Marx's but in Fromm's name. The publi-
cations of Schacht (1970) and Israel (1971) attest to
continued interest of the sociologists in the theme of
alienation.
16. See, for example, Seeman (1975). A less useful but, on
the whole, a readable summary of empirical studies on
alienation can be found in Mouledoux and Mouledoux (1975).
17. For example, Ollman and Meszaros, along with Fromm,
Sweezy, Korsch, Novack, Mandel and others, have made
abundantly clear the pervasiveness of alienation in
capitalist society. See especially Meszaros (1970)
Elnd (Ulman (1976).
18. In Chapter 7, I trace the origins of Mills' disillusion-
ment with the Marxian thesis of the working class as a
revolutionary change agent for social transformation.
19. In this revival of Marxism in American sociology, Mills
was, however, one of the leading sociologists. See
Swingehood (1975: 2) and Friedrichs (1970: 259-60).
CHAPTER SIX
Political Sociology
Introduction: Towards the Radical Alternative
In offering a radical alternative to the academic
model of establishment sociology, Mills sought to construct
a conception of sociology in all its political, intellectual
and moral implications relevant to the changed contexts of
self and society since World War II. As early as 1942, when
Mills reviewed W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Hunt's The Social
Life of a Modern Community, he came to realize the need for
a basic reorientation of focus in the studies of sociological
theory and research. Along with the various theoretical and
methodological issues which he raised in the review, Mills
directly pointed to a lack of "sociological imagination"
(PPP:5D) in the work. Few years in 1953,
covered how sociologists, in their search for generalized
model, slipped into the grip of the methods of the physical
!/
sciences and essentially fetishized these techniques. At
the same time his commitment to the basic tradition of SOClO-
logy became increasingly evident, and he continued to speak
of an imaginative sociology that would rest on both molecular
terms and macroscopic concepts_ Stressing the need for a
"consciousness," he says that "the sociological enterprise
requires macroscopic researchers to imagine more technically,
221
222
as well as with scope and insight; it requires technicians
to go about their work with more imaginative concern for
macroscopic meaning as well as with technical ingenuity"
(pPP: 566). A year later, in 1954, Mills conceived sociology
as a human enterprise. He intended sociology to be a "common
denominator" and, accordingly, raised questions as to society,
personality and history (cf. PPP: 572). For him these are
the major themes, as also orienting points, of sociological
analysis. Both theorists and research technicians of socio-
logy, contends Mills,
are o i n ~ to have to drop their trivia-
lization of subject matter and their preten-
~ i o n s about method. Both are going to have
to face up to the realities of our time. And
both are going to have to acquire the human-
ist concern for excellence of clear and
meaningful expression (PPP: 576).
At the bottom of Mills' humanistic concern there lie
the agonizing experiences of the common man--the alienated
J
man in the_ emergent mass society of postwar America. In
the mid-fifties he notes the impact on mass man of the
levelling influences of urban and industrial civilization,
of the standardization of big technology and of the media
of mass communication. It was a period "moral uneasiness"
and of disintegration of "liberal values in the modern world."
As he writes: "Internationally and domestically, the death
of political ideas in the United States coincides with the
general intellectual vacuum to underpin our malaise" (PPP: 188)
Elsewhere, speaking in more explicit terms, he goes on to say
in a clear Durkheimian language:
The moral uneasiness of our time--in politics
and economics, in family life, educational in-
stitutions, and even in our churches--is due
to this key fact: the older values and codes
of uprightness no longer grip us, nor have
they been replaced by new values and codes
which would lend moral meaning and sanction
to the life-routines we must now follow
(PPP: 332).
Gradually the theme of "private uneasiness and public
223
in-
difference" as also "the political default of cultural work-
men" to recognize "imperilled values" came to occupy the
focus of Mills' sociological imagination. From the point of
view of a politically conceived sociology, "the unfulfilled
promise of political thinking that is also culturally sens-
ible stems from the failure to assert the values as well as
the perils, and the relationship between them" (PPP: 387).
The task of his political sociology would then, predictably,
be a study of troubles and issues in the context of the de-
cline of liberal values of reason, freedom and truth--the
watchwords of the Enlightenment. And the questions which
such a sociology raises in fulfillment of these tasks are as
follows:
(1) What is the structure of this particular
society as a whole? What are its essential
components, and how are they related to one
another? How does it differ from other vari-
ties of social order? Within it, what is the
meaning of any particular feature for its
continuance and for its change?
(2) Where does this society stand in human
history? What are the mechanics by which it
is changing? What is its place within and
its meaning for the development of humanity
~ a whole? How does any particular feature
we are examining affect, and how is it affected
'./
by, the historical period in which it moves?
And this period--what are its essential
features? How does it differ from other
periods? What are its characteristic ways
of history making?
(3) What varities of men and women now pre-
vail in this society and in this period? And
what varities are coming to prevail? In what
ways are they selected and formed, liberated
and repressed, made sensitive and blunted?
What kinds of 'human nature' are revealed in
the conduct and character we observe in this
society in this period? And what is the mean-
ing for 'human nature' of each and every
224
feature of the society we are examining (SI: 6-7).
These fundamental questions, underlying the territorial ambit
of the Millsian sociology, are in effect an articulation of
the sociological tasks which Mills conceived in 1954. In
raising these questions as to the structure of society, the
role of this specific society in this specific historical
period, and the dominant personality types now prevailing
at the helm of institutional arrangements, Mills has made
an appreciable(attempt in The Sociological Imagination (1959)
t-o d-ireet soeio-logists' Gl-tt@Ilti-On to su-eh isslleB as
would provide the goals and orientations for sociology itself)
It has been rightly asserted that "unbiased answers to
h
. h .... h .
t ese questlons would ave radlcal lmpllcatlons. T at lS,
an objective analysis in the direction that these questions
point would undermine the established theories and unexamln-
ed assumptions on which corporate capitalism lS based"
(Szymanski, 1970: 7-8). Stated in critical words, the
answers provide, on the one hand, a radical critique of the
liberal mythology theorized in the rhetorics of the establish-
v
225
ment sociology, and on the other, outline a counter concep-
tion of sociology as a preferred alternative.
Let me illustrate this. From the point of view of
its component social structures American society is unden-
iably a social structure of corporate capitalism in its form.
The state exists to articulate the needs of corporate in-
stitutions and has been an ideological and legitimating ap-
paratus to maintain the equilibrium of the liberal society
and also to promote the goals of capitalism. Whereas cor-
porations, the institutions of state apparatus, the military,
the universities or the Church are the essential ingredients
of the social structure of capitalist society in America,
the primary functions of the family, the mass media or educ-
ational institutions have been positive expedients to socialize
masses to the ideological consciousness of a liberal society.
Next, American society stands, from the standpoint of history,
at this historical moment for monopoly capitalism in all its
global consequences for every nations, developed or develop-
ing. The internationalized capitalist system has been, among
other things, an alliance of the ruling classes in both de-
veloped and developing nations. The "Free World" is not now
conducive to reason and freedom, as Mills thought, but it is
"always receptive to capitalism" (Gurley, 1970: 50). Again,
there is little doubt that in the modern societies the domin-
ant human type now prevailing is one of the bureaucrat. Its
prominence has followed the historic development of capital-
ism in its organic-solidary relationship with the principle
226
of bureaucratic rationality. the be-
tween capitalism and bureaucracy has been consequential not
because of bureaucracy's inherent rationality and efficiency
but because of its ability to organize the productive apparatus
for accumulation and internationalization of capital (cf. Ed-
wards, 1972: 119). The conception of sociology which Mills
conceives in radical terms has to realize its potential
through, on the one hand, what he calls lithe sociological
imagination," and through, on the other, its revitalization
in terms of the political ideals of classic liberalism. While
the sociological imagination constitutes the life-essence of
this new sociology of radicalism, liberal ideals of reason
and freedom give it necessary direction and orientation. Both
are symbiotic aspects of one and same sociological enterprise.
The Sociological Imagination: What then is the concept of
the sociological imagination? What does it stand for? How
is the concept the of radical sociology? Mills,'
own answer is as follows:
The sociological imagination enables its
possessor to understand the larger historical
scene in terms of its meaning for the inner
life and the external career of a variety of
individuals. It enables him to take into ac-
count how individuals, in the welter of their
daily experience, often become falpely con-
scious of their social positions.
V
Within that
welter, the framework of modern society is
sought, and within that framework the psycho-
logies of a variety of men and women are formu-
lated. By such means the personal uneasiness
of individuals is focused upon explicit troubles
and the indifference of publics is transformed
into involvement with public issues (SI: 5).
/
227
The concept of sociological imagination indicates, without
doubt, the culmination of Mills I vision of ultimate moral,
intellectual and political fulfillment of the promises of
sociology. While the very formulation of the concept marks
the acme of personal glory in the entire intellectual career
of Mills as a sociologist, nothing less can be said of the
relevance of the concept for the development of sociology itself.
By adding sociological imagination to sociology, which suffered
apoplexy in the locked-up iceberg of grand theory and abstracted
empiricism, Mills infused necessary life-blood to the discipline;
he revitalized the consciousness of sociology; he generated
its radical spirit and instilled critical stance; he brought
down sociology from the high paradise of system theory and
system sanctioning research to the lower levels of systematic
analysis of the experiential realities of mundane life. Seek-
ing to place sociology in the apostolic tradition, by propos-
ing to initiate the sociological endeavor at the grass root
-Mills llasGGnsctJelu.ci;@d, as Horowitz a "man-s ized
sociology" which does not convert "men into data, and history
into autobiography" (1969a: 2). If the social sciences are
becoming the common denominator of this epoch the sociological
imagination is also becoming, so argues Mills,the most desir-
able quality of mind required of botEL th_e ma.sses a.nd tILe
social scientists.
For the masses tILe sociological imagina-
tion is an aid to understanding the ongoing realities of
historical and structural significance.
For the sociologists,
228
it provides the most fruitful form of self-consciousness,
self-awareness and intellectual sensibility with which to
realize the cultural meaning of sociological substance. It
lays down the procedural rules of work; it is also substantive
in that it tells the sociologists where to focus and how to
channel intellectual effort. Procedurally it equips the
sociologist with
the capacity to shift from one perspective
to another--from the political to the psycho-
logical; from examination of a single family to
comparative assessment of the national budgets
of the world; from the theological school to
the military establishment; from considerations
of an oil industry to studies of contemporary
poetry. It is the capacity to range from the
most impersonal and remote transformations to
the most intimate features of the human self--
and to see the relations between the two (SI: 7).
At the same time the concept is more than a procedural rule
of sociology. From the substantive point of view it requires
that
..... we seek a fully comparative understanding
of the social structures tha! have appeared and
do now exist in the world history. Ii requires
that smaller-scale milieux be selected and
studied in terms of large-scale historical
structures (SI: 134).
In brief, the substantive focus is on the building up of a
macrosociology, but not necessarily at the expense of a micro-
sociological conception of reality. The sociological imagi-
nation provides realism and relevance to both theory and
research; while it seeks a replacement of grand theory and
abstracted empiricism, on its own part it does not seek to
divorce either theory or research.
On the contrary, it en-
229
riches theory by providing necessary nutriment; it guides
research to more pertinent goals of reason and freedom for
the masses of men and women. And above all, it is the most
desirable quality of mind required for sociological work.
However, as Mills points out, lIit is not merely one quality
of mind among the contemporary range or cultural sensibilities
--it is the quality whose wider and more adroit use offers
the promise that all such sensibilities--and in fact, human
reason itself--will come to playa greater role in human af-
fairs
ll
(SI: 15). More concretely understood, the concept pro-
vides one with lIadequate summations, cohesive statements,
comprehensive orientations.
1I
The concept may be understood,
as Shils elaborates, lias that body of categories, estimations,
and preconditions which an experienced and realistic socio-
logist carries in the boundary area of the mind beyond the
systematic articulations of research and theory II (1961: 616).
M-i-lls I GQ1"lGept ion o the s_ociolQg ieal t ion clos ely
parallels what Polyani calls IIpersonal knowledge
ll
signifying
not only a fusion of the personal and the objective but also
anchoring points of intellectual commitment. He shows that
lIinto every act of knowing there enters a passionate contri-
but ion of the person knowing what is being known, and that
this coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component
of his knowledge
ll
(Polyani, 1964-: xiv). The phrase IIsocio-
logical imagination" is not simply a catchword; an invitation
to sociology and to practice it can be extended to someone
230
only when he manifests his willingness to grasp its meanings.
It is a passionate appeal, perhaps more than that.
The Sociology of Political Liberalism: The other important
aspect of Mills' radical sociology pertains to its education-
al and political role in the establishment of a democratic
V
society. As a matter of fact he conceives the role of socio-
logy in terms of its programmatic implications for a radical
restructuring of the existing institutional arrangements along
t/.
democratic lines. In his article entitled "Mass Society and
Liberal Education" (1954), he specifically dealt with the
role of liberal education in the context of postwar mass
societal trends. Remindful of both Tocqueville and Mill, the
most famous proponents of the Western democratic tradition,
he placed his faith in liberal education as an integral con-
dition for the establishment of a democratic society of self-
conscious and knowledgeable publics (cf. PPP: 370-73). In
The Sociological Imagination (1959) he proposes:
It is the political task of the social scientist
--as of any liberal educator--continually to
translate personal troubles into public issues,
and public issues into the terms of their human
meaning for a variety of individuals. It is his
task to display in his work--and, as an educa-
tor, in his life as well--this kind of sociologi-
cal imagination. And it is his purpose to culti-
vate such habits of mind among the men and women
who are publicly exposed to him. To secure these
ends is to secure reason and individuality, and
to make these the predominant values of a demo-
cratic society (SI: 187-88).
In this way the political role of sociology becomes relevant
to the extent it sustains democracy.V Mills' radical socio-
logy is therefore a political on the funda-
231
mental values of democratic liberalism. In trying to help
build a democratic society Mills envisages what he calls "a
liberating educational role" of sociology. "The education-
al and the political role of social science in a democracy
is to help cultivate and sustain publics and individuals that
are able to develop, to live with, and to act upon adequate
definitions of personal and social realities" (SI: 192).
In other words, this assertion makes his political sociology
essentially an updated version of liberal political sociology,
notwithstanding all qualifications which Mills makes in re-
gard to liberalism as ideology and rhetoric. Its radical-
ism in the form of a critical and oppositional stance plus a
powerful plea to substitute the status quo by major institu-
tional changes provides strength and legitimation to claims
of this variant of to be sure, its radical-
ism falls short of rev9lutionsim inherent in the Marxian al-
ternative for the complete, rather than radical, restructuring
of the society. This becomes evident when one takes note of
his concluding remarks in The Sociological Imagination (1959):
What I am suggesting is that by addressing our-
selves to issues and to troubles, and formulat-
ing them as problems of social science, we
stand the best chance, I believe the only chance,
to make reason democratically relevant to human
affairs in a free society, and so realize' the
classic values that underlie the promise of our
studies (SI: 194).
Sociology of Private Troubles and Public Issues
It 1S now clear from the preceding analysis that Mills'
232
political sociology centers around what he calls "the personal
troubles of milieu" and "the public issues of social struc-
ture." Sociologically he refers to the structural problems
facing the individual in the mass society; politically he
relates these problems to the decline of the liberal values
of reason and freedom. Political sociologically Mills pro-
poses to formulate structural problems of both private and
public nature in terms of values that are assumed to have
been threatened by the rise of the power elite and consequent
mass society. His political sociology is therefore as much
a sociology of private troubles and public issues as it is
a political area of social analysis for enthroning liberal
ideals towards establishing a democratic society of free men
and women. From this standpoint, in taking up the substantive
problems at the contemporary historical level of corporate
capitalist reality Mills argues, explicating the theoretical
contours of his envisioned political sociology, that
..... the formulation of problems, then, should
include explicit attention to a range of public
issues and of personal troubles; and they should
open up for inquiry the causal connections be-
tween milieux and social structure. In our for-
mulation of problems we must make clear the
values that are really threatened in the troubles
and issues involved, who accept them as values,
and by whom or by what they are threatened (SI: 130)
Closely related to this is his designation of the area as "a
sort of public intelligence apparatus." Sociology is, said
otherwise, a goal related enterprise. Primarily purposive,
it is concerned with "public issues and private troubles and
with structural trends of our time underlying them both"
233
(SI: 181). While sociology can be directed at kings and
citizens at the same time, sociologists are required, con-
tends Mills, to attempt to uphold the liberal values. The
dethronement of reason from public activity and mass societal
captivity of individuals in the situations of unfreedom lead
him not to think of the revolutionary or even radical role
of the individual but to postulate that "it is a prime task
of any social scientist to determine the limits of freedom and
the limits of the role of reason in history" (SI: 184). This
kind of elitist conferment of a superior role on the social
scientist, rarely supported by any adequate theory of history-
making of which Mills is so often vociferous, can however be
explained in terms of his totalist and somewhat negativist
assumption that mass man's revolutionary or radical role to
enforce reasoh and freedom has been too jeopardized to be-
come effective. While this is typically a dilemma of many
classical democrats, such as Mosca, Mannheim or Mill, it can
be said that such a conception constitutes a potential contra-
diction in Mills' postulated democratic sociology.l Keeping
this aside, let me return to his focus on troubles and issues
as themes of his mainly reformist political sociology. The
question is, what qre these troubles and issues?
,)
Private Troubles:
For Mills, "it lS the uneasiness itself that
is the trouble; it is the indifference itself that is the
issue.
And it is this condition, of uneasiness and indiffer-
ence, that is the signal feature of our modern period" (SI: 12)
234
The concept of trouble is a narrower one; it is the experience
of one individual or an individual phenomenon. Troubles oc-
cur, says Mills,
within the character of the individual and
within the range of his immediate relations with
others; they have to do with his self and with
those limited areas of social life of which he
is directly and personally aware. Accordingly,
the statement and resolution of troubles proper-
ly lie within the individual as a biographical
entity and within the scope of his immediate
milieu--the social setting that is directly open
to his personal experience and to some extent
his willful activ.ity (8I: 8).
Troubles, occurring at the personal level, demand personal
intervention. This is so in view of the fact that a person
is the best judge of his interests; he knows more than anyone
what to do when he himself is personally and directly aware
of his troubles. If the person fails there are ways of as-
sisting him, as is the case now after the rise of techniques
of social casework. The suffering individual can overcome
his troubles with the help of those concerned with his welfare.
Experiences in modern industries and urban societies increas-
ingly point to this direction. At the same time these may be
approached rather sociologically. As Rex puts it, "A more
approach to 'troubles' is that which looks at
the problem, not merely as one of personality disturbance, but
as one in which the immediate structure of social relations
around the individual has been fractured and needs repair, or,
if we may put it that way, the replacement of a part" (1974:
'"lna\
L. V ..J I
235
Public Issues: The distinction between troubles and issues
is less real than apparent. The dichotomy which Mills draws
between them is merely a ploy to invite attention to the same
matters but at different levels.
2
Public issues are personal
troubles which take on wider social dimensions of affliction.
For example, says Mills, "in modern society insecurity tends
to be experienced not as a personal mishap or misfortune, nor
as an irrevocable fate due to supernatural forces nor even to
the natural forces. And men, full of the tension of insecure
positions correctly blame social factors for personal defeat"
Cess: 462). The public issues require, for their resolution,
social intervention at the public level. These larger issues,
says Mills
. have to do with matters that transcend
these local of the individual and
the range of his inner life. They have to do
with the organization of many such milieux in-
to the institutions of an historical society
as a whole, with the ways in which various
overlap and interpenetrate to form the
larger structure of social arid ilistorical lire.
An issue is a public matter: some value cher-
ished by publics is felt to be threatened
(I)t is the very nature of an issue, unlike even
widespread trouble, that it cannot very well
be defined in terms of the immediate and every-
day environments of ordinary man. An issue,
in fact, often involves a crisis in instituional
arrangements, and often too involves what
Marxists call 'contradictions' or 'antagonisms'
(SI: 8-9).
The relevance of the twin aspects--troubles and issues--of
his political sociology can be illustrated by concrete examples
which Mills himself provides. In particular he names, among
others, only four.
n ; \
236
Unemployment: Referring to unemployment Mills asserts, quite
rightly, that "when a handful of men do not have jobs, and do
not seek work, we may look for the causes in their immediate
situation and character. But when 12 million men are unem-
ployed, then we cannot believe that all of them suddenly 'got
lazy' and turned out to be 'no good!!' (pPP: 331). In both
cases
.... the very structure of opportunities has
collapsed. Both are correct statements of the
problem and the range of possible solutions
require us to consider the economic and politi-
cal institutions of the society, and not merely
the personal situation and the character of a
s ca tter of individuals" (SI: 9).
There is no doubt that the example which Mills cites to sub-
stantiate his case for a problem orientated political socio-
logy is very important. By itself, is one of
the few major structural public issues of American society.
Despite fabulous achievements by American economy, the problem
ofunemploYlJlE2Ilt, together with its attendant incidents, has
continued to draw attention since the 1930s. "If there is
any consistent pattern in the postwar era it is that the
recoveries after the recessions tend to become ever more hesi-
tant and to result in an even more incomplete employment of
the labor force in proportion to the rise in output" (Myrdal,
1963: 3). Combining the data provided by Bertram Gross,
Stanley Moses and Paul M. Sweezy, Anderson reports recently
that "we may total some 14.2 million military-dependent
employed with the 25.6 million real civilian unemployed to
237
obtain nearly 40 million persons out of a real labor force of
104 million who are either military-dependent or out of work"
(1974: 220). There are other collateral issues which Mills
has not dealt with but which are legitimately related to his
example of unemployment. For instance, although in general
more w h ~ t s are unemployed than nonwhites, there is an evident
tendency of growing unemployment among thB latter group. The
income gap between them is also growing. "While the Negro
was earning $1 in 1949, his white counterpart earned $1.90;
in 1959, every time the Negro earned $1.75 the white man earned
$ 3 . 20" (S hr i v er, 1965: 157). In addition, the impact of
automation affects more black workers than their white counter-
parts. In effect racism has become an ideological arsenal in
respect of job opportunities. Another glaring aspect is over-
all poverty which stands directly face to face with "affluence"
in the postwar American society. The attack on the so-called
"magnificient abundance" was launched by many radicals in the
early years of the 1960s. The other Americans, the invisible
millions sunk into "huge, enormous, and intolerable fact of
poverty in America", are "the victims of the very inventions
and machines that have provided a higher living standard for
the rest of the society. They are upside-down in the economy,
and for them greater productivity often means worse jobs;
agricultural advance becomes hunger" (Harrington, 1968a: 19).
For many social scientists poverty was only an after thought
(cf. Kolko, 1970: 130).
The 1964 Report of the President's
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) put the figure at 35 million
238
and concluded that one-fifth of the US population was poor.
Of the total, 22 percent were Negroes who comprised nearly
50 percent of the entire Negro population of the United
States (cf. Seligman, 1972: 101). Despite problems involved
in the computation of the exact number of the poor, especially
in view of differences as to the changing nature of standard
living or the base line of income level for families or un-
attached families, it may reasonably be said that "poverty
is built into the system, that it is neither accidental nor
individual, but is due to the way the social system is struc-
tured" (Henslin and Reynolds, 1973: 206). On the -one hand,
these problems are not a creation of the moral and education-
al lapses of the poor; rather they should be understood as
result's of government's deliberate policy (cf. Birenbaum
and Sagarin, 1972: 96). On the other hand, to solve them
adequately is to change the social structure of capitalism
whose major function is, ironically though, to maintain a
massive permanent shortage of jobs. The truth of the matter
is that capitalism actually benefits by its presence "since
it is primarily by means of such high unemployment that
wages are kept down" (Christoffel, 1970: 259).
War, Militarism and Multinational Corporate Capitalism
Mills' sociology calls for an abandonment of the
politics of war in favor of "the politics of peace." Individ-
ually war is a problem of personal survival. Socially it is
239
a problem of the existence of homo sapiens and of human society.
And
.... the structural issues of war have to do
with its causes; with what types of men it
throws up into command; with its effects upon
economic and political, family and religious
institutions, with the unorganized irrespons-
ibility of a world of nation-states (SI: 9).
For Mills the questions of war and peace are now political
and moral questions. He calls for the sociological imagina-
tion in this respect since it is also required "to stimulate
the dialogues which will result in basic shifts from cold war
strategies, from the politics of oversimplification, to an
emphasis upon conflicts which threaten mankind" (Fox, 1965:
479). Mills' interest in and concern for issues of war are
basically humanistic in nature, the very roots of which are
interlinked with the political influences behind his intellec-
tual formation.
3
In 1936, when he was only twenty years of
age, Mills found himself "at the watershed of events leading
to WW II" (Gerth, 1962b; 2). The very year of 1936 wit-
nessed a sequence of world-shaking events: Hitler's pene-
tration into Rhineland, his defiance of the Versailles treaty,
and his denunciation of the Locarno pact; the onset of Spanish
civil war, the formation of Rome-Berlin Axis and Japan's par-
ticipation in anti-commitern treaty with Germany. The "news-
paper headlines" created in him a consciousness that would
later find expression in what he termed "the blind drift of
history. " For him, who did not take a "moral stand" at the
240
beginning, war years exercised deep-lying influences on his
intellectual devotion to the study of blind drifts faced by
powerless man within the historical social structure, The
later years only attested to his growing aversion to war or
any violence associated with it. In reviewing Neumann's
Behemoth (1942) he states that any adequate explanation of
Germany's imperialistic war would have to be explained by
drawing attention to "the economic structure and its pOliti-
cal apparatus that lead dynamically to war" (PPP: 173). In
April 1945, few months before the Atomic Bombardment of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki (6th and 9th of August, 1945 respective-
ly) Mills pointed out the following which, inter alia, at-
tested to his continuing concern for "war," "the integration
of big business with the military elite," "universal military
conscription" or "the drift toward a permanently militarized
society":
1'he aBeli t-ionof war ana. -unemployment requires
changes that neither monopoly business nor the
Washington army is apparently willing to accept
or permit. Both war and depression tend to
bring these two elites together, and in war, or
under warlike conditions, both gain in power
and honor .... In modern industrial warfare, the
men controlling organized violence need the men
controlling industry, and both must have some
arrangement with those in control of educational
institutions and of labor (Mills, 1945a: 16-17).
In addition, he also noted the dangers in the over-all struc-
tural trends: "If those who monopolize the means of produc-
tion and the means of military violence are unified, they will
continually threaten any democratic control of the political
241
system" (Mills, 1945a: 17). His democratic concerns as to
war, militarized capitalism, permanent militarization or
military society continued to find expression in various forms
in.most of his writings (NMP: 4; CSS: 390; PE: 212). The
most dramatic expression of Mills' anti-militarism, culminat-
ing so far, found its way in The Causes of World War Three
(1958), published a year before The Sociological Imagination
and, from the vantage point of world politics, Fidel Castro's
takeover in Cuba. The Causes, centering around the contention
that "war is not inevitable today" (CWT: 129), signified his
continuing quest for stabilized global peace. While it shows
manifestly Mills' humanist and pacificist concerns, it also
captured the essential spirit of powtwar years--that of the
Cold War (1917/1945-1956/1962) which, though remaining "the
most enigmatic and elusive international conflict of modern
time" (Graebner, 1969: 123), involved in several ways the two
sQPe.rstatesof the USA and the US3"R in a politically bipolar-
ized world: ideological disdain, political distrust, arms
race, diplomatic espionage, psychological
warfare, military alliances and so on (cf. Fleming, 1961;
Horowitz, 1971; Alperovitz, 1965). The Causes establishes
beyond doubt, I think, that Mills, the Texan Trotsky, was not
intellectually a man of war but morally, politically and in-
tellectually committed against war. The Causes volume is not
flawless (cf. Wisley, 1959: 8-9; Aptheker, 1960: 46-88; Howe,
1959: 195; War de, 1960: 90; C 1 e c ak, 1973: 66). Despite the
242
validity of many of the criticisms that may be levelled
against Mills' theses in the book, his discussion of war and
other ancillary matters is extremely important from the point
of view of political sociology which, in its discussion of
the problems of man and society, is being increasingly drawn
into the arena of underdevelopment, militarism and imperial-
ism. In this light let me illustrate some points of his
fruitful suggestions.
(1) World War and Its Possibility: Mills says that "the
ethos of war is now pervasive .... The drive toward war is
massive, subtle, official and self-directed" (CWT: 2). With-
out entering the debate as to why world war has not broken
out so far since 1958, it may be reasonably asserted that the
danger of its occurence "still exists, even though the present
industrial and military weakness of ~ h i n a and the detente
between the USSR and the USA conceals the fact" (Rex, 1974:
217). In -the pre:sent mul-tipolar world regional conflicts,
containing always potential of global war, are more probable.
They more often either provoke new ones or revive old ones,
rather than stabilize peace. The general tendency "in world
affairs is not toward unity and great common endeavors. The
old sources of conflict have not disappeared but new ones
have emerged. A more stable world is not in sight. The
statesmen will have to work hard in the years ahead to pre-
vent chaos" (Laqueur, 1975: 18-19). Stated plainly, globali-
243
zation of the world has not assured global peace for the com-
munity of mankind. "The forces making for militarism, how-
ever, are increasing the opportunities for extinction, and
within this milieu of increasing militarism lies the age-old
scenario of human tragedy" (Rising, 1973: 110). It is th ere-
fore not a casual interest to note that "during 5,560 years
of recorded human history there had been 14,531 wars, or
2.6135 a year. with only about 10 generations enjoying re-
latively undisturbed peace" (Grieves, 1977: 107). That there
has not been a global war since 1945 "may be a matter for
congratulations; but it does not dispose of all problems in-
volved" (Modelski, 1972: 312). It does not evidence that post-
war years are any more peaceful than those prior to 1945.
The Powers themselves may not have clashed, but they
did collide indirectly in cases where third parties were in
between.
In view of this, passionate appeal to ban war and
call for an adoption of the policy of "peaceful coexistence",
first outlined by Khruschev in an address to the 20th Party
Congress in February, 1956, is neither cheap journalism nor
mere pamphleteering.
4
(2) Continuing Arms Race: Related to the first point, Mills
asserts, not without reason, that the existence of a bureau-
cratic state, and especially lethal machinery, is the first
cause of the next world war. "Without them there could be
no war The immediate cause of World War III is the pre-
paration of it" (CWT: 46-47). Stated otherwise, despite the
244
Great Powers' tautologous assertion of the impossibility of
total war, both are engaged in "arms race" and yet they
"search for peace by warlike means" (CWT: 49). The existence
of arms may not directly cause war but war, it may be remind-
ed, is not fought without arms. The international political
scenario has undergone many characteristic changes since
Millsi death: the era of detente, strengthened by Brezhnev's
policy, has replaced the Cold War; detente has relaxed tension
and normalized the Great Powers' relations, thus accelerating
agreements over disarmament, increased social, economic and
cultural ties, settlement of territorial disputes, and so on;
it has softened America's anti-communism since Russia no
longer represents any demonic totalitarianism; and the world
has seen the proliferation of new states freed from colonial-
ism. But all these do not make the world any safer than be-
fore. The nuclear overhang continues to exist and the arms
race GontinuB to -remai-n u-nabated. "B5th parties accuse each
other of waging Cold War policy to extend their spheres of
influence, and of using their reppective ideas of deterrence
and prevention of war to justify the arms race and intensive
preparations for war as well as to assert their preeminence
within their own camp" (Lider, 1976: 369). Approximately
nine-tenths of world's nuclear potency is still with the two
superstates that have "tens of thousands of nuclear weapons,
amounting, it is estimated, to the equivalent of over 10 tons
of explos i ve power per inhab i tan t of the planet" ~ l ess on,
245
1977: 47). Side by side there has also been an upward trend
in the development of tactical weaponry with increased of-
fensive capability. Satellites, rockets, MIRVs (multiple
independently targeted reentry vehicles), ABMs, ICBM, long-
range bombers, scores of nuclear missile firing submarines,
together with highly developed computers and sophisticated
delivery systems and guidance mechanisms--are all pointer to
the "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). The Soviet-American
agreement of 1961 to work for "general disarmament, abolish-
ing all military forces under the UN inspection," which still
technically remains in force, and the signing in subsequent
years of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Ban on the
Employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction on Seabeds, the Ban
on the Production and Stockpiling of Biological (Bacterio-
logical) Agents and Toxins, or the Strategic Arms Limitation
(SALT) agreements may have helped both superstates in their
management of the crisis; they ma,y have reduced risk-taking
in a dubious gamble of diplomacy. But the nightmarish po-
tential of turning the world into a veritable inferno still
exists. The much publicized agreements and treaties, though
breakthroughs, "not only failed to reduce the nuclear over-
hang but also permitted, and perhaps even encouraged, an ac-
celeration of the arms race" (Wesson, 1977: 56). The very
presence of the unimaginably potent nuclear arsenals is an
indication that the Great Powers have acquired more insecurity
in lieu of desired security (cf. Carter, 1974). In all these
Mills' concern to outlaw war is quite conceivable. There is
doubt that in the meantime "the proliferation of nuclear
weapons threatens to sever the hair supporting the sword of
Damocles above the arena of world politics" (Grieves, 1977:
128) .
246
In this regard it will not be out of place to add a
few words to what has generally been called "peripheral mili-
tarism." The phenomenon of peripheral militarism has been
an aftermath of the dynamics of increased arms production,
proliferating nuclearization and continuing transfer of weapons
from major powers--the USA, the USSR, the UK and France--to
the peripheral societies in the developing countries. The
peripheral societies are increasingly becoming testing grounds
for the use and further development of newer sophisticated
weaponry. The development and maintenance of-militarization
in peripheral societies is a "necessary pre-condition for
the prevalence and further penetration of the capitalist mode
of production" (Albrecht et al., 1975: 206). The gravity
of peripheral militarization can be assessed from the fact
that, whereas the Third World in 1955 accounted for 5 percent
of world military expenditure, in 1973 the figure rose to
14 percent of the total. In 1974, 60 percent of American major
weapons went to peripheral societies whereas the correspond-
ing figure was only 35 percent for the period between 1962-
1968 (cf. Oberg, 1975: 215). Inherent in the arms race and
peripheral militarization is what may be called "peripheral
nuclearization." Strikingly parallel to arms race and nuclear
247
confrontation are stories of military competition between
peripheral societies, Argentinian-Brizilian, Israeli-Egyptian
or Indian-Pakistani, which can result in the outbreak of
small-scale nuclear warfare without superpower participation
(cf. Dunn, 1977).
(3 ) Increased Militarization of American Society: In view
of advances in global militarism it is instructive to note
that Mills' reference to American society, its "permanent war
economy" and the imperialist designs of its military-corporate
capitalism merits significant attention. Given the contempor-
ary radical and Marxian analyses of American social structure,
it seems that subsequent developments have in the main jus-
tified Mills' apprehensions. His reviews of Neumann's Behemoth
(1942) and Brady's Business as a System of Power (1943), and
his articles (1) "A Marx for the Managers" (1942) with Gerth,
and (2) "The Conscription of America" (1945) contained his
major ideas which in 1958 became firm principles of radical
humanism in his Kantian quest for perpetual peace. In 1956
Mills warned about the structural trends of American society
by saying that, behind increased personnel traffic between
the military and corporate realms, the expansion of the mili-
tary and the increased military budget, there lies "the great
structural shift of modern American capitalism toward a per-
manent war economy" (PE: 215). Two years later he said:
.... military institutions and aims have come
to shape much of the economic life of the
United States, without which the war machine
could not exist .... Military men have enter-
ed political and diplomatic circles; they have
gone into the higher echelons of the corporate
economy; they have taken charge of scientific
and technological endeavor; they have in-
fluenced higher educational institutions; they
are operating a truly enormous public-relations
and propaganda machinery (CWT: 54).
248
This characterization portrays the other face of what Galbraith
has called The Affluent Society or The New Industrial State.
The other face is the exact opposite of what President Johnson
promised Americans on May 22, 1964: The Great Society. Mills
spoke of the advent of the warlords and the ascendancy of the
military. Whether or not in his tradition, others have point-
ed in other ways to the same developments. Cook designates
America as "the Warfare State" and points illustratively to
the magnitude of the "military-industrial self-interest that
makes peace the antithesis of the new American way of life"
(1962: 175). Aware of "the substantial militarization of
American capitalism," Heilbroner predicts that this semi-
militarized economy "will probably become even more so during
the next decade" (1967: 104-05). The product of overdevelop-
ed capitalism is pentagonism, as Bosch argues. For him,
"the natural expression of a mass society in a system of
free competition is pentagonism, not liberalism" (Bosch, 1968:
71) . Nieburg saw it as "The Contract State."
The interaction between government and its
contractors has brought a kind of back-
handed national planning which tends to con-
fuse the definition of legitimate defense
needs, the requirements of economic health,
and the manpower and educational needs of
the nation with demands for preservation of
a subsidized and sheltered process of in-
dustrial and political empire-building.
The public consensus for defense, space and
science is distorted to serve the interests
of the private contractors who penetrate
government at all levels and inevitably in-
terpret narrow special interests as those of
the nation (Nieburg, 1970: 380).
249
While Lasswell conceptualized the notion of "the Garrison State"
(1941: 1962) and Neumann (1942) saw in Hitler's Germany, Mills
bore their influence in his conceptions of "permanent war
economy," "permanently militarized society" etc. The theme
reoccurs in Dibble's notion of "the Garrison Society" in
which, among others, "the military penetrates into education,
into research and scholarship, into labor unions, into the
political decisions of Senators and Congressmen, and, most
crucially, into business and the economy" (1968: 274). An
essential feature of the garrison society is its possession
of what Lapp calls "Weapons Culture" that has fastened "an
insidious grip upon the entire nation" and that stands for
"massive commitment to weapons development and deployment
in time of peace" (1969: 18). For example, "in 1968 two-
thirds of the total 28,000 million dollars alloted for
scientific research were spent on military research" (Aboltin,
1972: 103).
It is also of interest to note how American mili-
tarism, while establishing a pentagonized-mass society at
home, is exporting its weapons culture abroad. Corporations
like Lockheed, Martin-Marietta or North American Aviation can
250
hardly survive without contracts from the DOD (cf. Lapp,
1969: 192-93,197-200). That is to say, with Mills, the
leading corporations "now profit from the preparation of
war. Insofar as the business elite are aware of their pro-
fit interests-- and that is their responsible business--
they press for a continuation of their sources of profit,
which often means a continuation of the preparation of war"
(CWT: 57). While military assistance has always been a part
of American overseas aid program, rising from approximately
26 percent in 1950 to 70 percent of the total aid in 1951-
1954, arms sales are now increasingly occupying the most sig-
nificant role in America's expanding military capitals. Arms
sale has spiralled from $3.6 billion in fiscal 1973 to near-
ly $14 billion in 1975. This may be compared to the world
arms trade which amounted to only $300 million in 1952, but
which jumped to $5 i ~ l i o n in 1969 and nearly $18 billion in
197& (c. Wesson, 1977; 81-83). Business Week recently re-
ported that "foreign countries have sustained the U.S. in-
dustry through the famine years. They ordered $9 billion
worth of U.S. military hardware in fiscal 1976; the year
before $12 billion in military deliveries went abroad" (January,
1977: 53).
(4)
America_ and its Corporate Capitalist Imperialism: Follow-
ing from the preceding analysis, it remains to focus on what
Mills calls "capitalist imperialism" and its concomitant COD-
sequences. It is here that Mills r views remain typically open
251
to contradictions. For him, the prime cause of war is not
capitalism or capitalist imperialism, but mainly militarism.
He states that "to a considerable extent, militarism has
become an end in itself and economic policy a means of it"
(CldT: 57). This position reflects an acceptance of E. H. Carr's
espoused epigram that "the principa.l cause of war is war it-
self." On the one hand, it is, among other reasons, because
of his rejection of Marxism as an inadequate social theory.
In an interview with Victor Flores Olea, Enrique Conzales
Pedrero, Carlos Fuentes and James Gracia Terres in Mexico City
on March 30, 1960, Mills said:
I don't believe that the prosperity of
United States capitalism can be accounted
for only by reference to a theory of imper-
ialism .... As an economic fact, the adequate
reasons for U.S. economic prosperity cannot
be cound in any theory of imperialism of
which I know. It has many other sources,
that may be one of them, but it is not the
major one, in my opinion. The permanent
war economy for example, is probably more
important (Mills, 1961: 116).
As is probably evident, .this position is an affirmation of
what Mills had in mind when reviewing Neumann's Behemoth
(1942) or writing on "The Conscription of America" (1945).
His rejection of the Marxist-Leninist explanation has been
coupled with illis one-sided reliance on the power elite theory
to explain theoretically disparate societies, e.g . America
and Russia. As he states, liThe categories of political,
military, and economic elites are thus as important (or more
so) to the analysis and understanding of our times as the
mechanics of economic classes and other more impersonal forces
252
of history-making
ll
(TM: 121). This is indeed an alternative
point of view which he sought to apply IIwith appropriate
modifications, to the understanding of Soviet types of so-
ciety, to underdeveloped countries, as well as to advanced
capitalist societies" (TM: 121). Therefore, in locating the
causes of the obstacles to "development-," which he identifies
with "modernism" and lIindustrialization," Mills holds, among
other things, that one of them "lies with the ruling groups
of these countries" (Mills, 1961: 117). This theory, though
not without explanatory relevance, is highly questionable
in view of the current assertion by radicals and Marxists alike
that underdevelopment is related to and a consequence of capi-
talist development in all its global ramifications (cf. Baran,
1957; Frank, 1967, 1970; Jalee, 1968; Magdoff, 1969; Rhodes,
1970; Weisskopf. 1972; Cohen, 1973; Amin, 1974; Helen, 1975).
By conceiving socialism as an alternative method of industrial-
ization, Mills tends not only to confuse socialism with in-
dustrialization but also tends to ignore the point that IIde-
veloping capitalism, and especially monopoly capitalism, has
restrained the industrialization of the so-called undeveloped
areas" (Aptheker, 1960: 76). Given the current evidence pro-
vided by Development sociologists, it is unlikely that both
capitalist and socialist ways of industrialization--or two
models of development, as Mills implies--could coexist; it is
rather the former that obstructs any development of a society
except what is needed to make it a periphery to its expanding
253
system. In the modern context capitalist imperialism "com-
prises a complex of private corporate policies, supplemented
by induced governmental support, seeking to develop secure
sources of raw materials and food, secure markets for manu-
factures, and secure outlets for both portfolio and direct
capital investment" (Wolff, 1973: R341-1). Without an analy-
sis of war and its causes within the context of capitalism,
it makes little sense to say that "war, not Russia, is- now
the enemy" (CWT: 97). For, he does not get closer to realism
to which capitalism is inevitably leading. "War is not a
super-class phenomenon .... Preparations for war and the
waging of war are integral parts of the politics of the class
holding power and reflect the basic drives and aims of its
social structure" Olarde, 1960: 87).
Whatever his contradictions, it must be noted that
Mills was not unaware of the problems of capitalist imperial-
ism or underdevelopment. Though lacking Marxian sophistica-
tion in his analysis of capitalist imperialism, Mills is quite
aware of how "the ba(!hv<i:rd pegioIl P o m e s a sphere for the
investment of capital accumulated by the advanced nation"
(CWT: 64). He thus calls for the abandonment of the doctrin-
aire idea of capitalism by America. Mills was also not al-
together unaware of the international consequences of capital-
ism, which modern theorists of dependency so illustratively
evidence. He said:
"That the underdeveloped countries--con-
taining two thirds of mankind--are still underdeveloped is a
world historical default of Wes tern cap i tal ism" (CWT: 69).5
254
The post-Millsian analyses of America's capitalist imperial-
ism by radical and Marxist theorists have thrown new light on
the continuing defaults of Western capitalism. Business Week
reports that the US has an overseas investment of about $120
billion and that 30 percent of all corporate profits are made
abroad (May 12, 1975: 72). It also reports that in 1974
Britain had about $35 billion, West Germany $13 billion,
Switzerland $16 billion and Japan $12 billion in their res-
pective foreign investments (July 14, 1975: 65). The follow-
ing tables indicate some pertinent aspects of the US capital-
ist imperialism:
TABLE A
US direct foreign investment: 1950, 1960
00untry
or
Region
Europe
Canada
Latin America
Asia
Africa
Oceania
Total
and 1970
(Book value in billion US dollars
1950 1960
1.73 6.69
3.58 11.18
4.59 8.32
1.00 2.48
.29 1.07
.26
1. 01
11. 79 31.82
1970
24.52
22.79
14.76
5.56
3.48
3.49
78.18
Source:
Landsberg (1976: 27); see also Wilkins (1974: 330).
2 Si 5
Table A shows characteristically that the major area for US
investment has shifted from Latin America in 1950 to Canada
in 1960 and then to Europe in 1970. It is needless to point
out that long-term effect of the foreign investment is "to
expand and control U.S. foreign markets and hence to support
the home country" (O'Connor, 1973: 152). Table B shows the
increasing rate of returns from direct investment:
Date
1950
1960
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Source:
TABLE B
Returns from direct investment
(in billion dollars)
US direct
investments
.62
1. 67
4.45
4.77
3.40
4.87
7.46
Landsberg (1976: 28).
Direct
investment income
1.29
2.95
7.91
9.46
10.43
9.42
17.68
The most important aspect of internationalized capitalism is
evident in the dominance of the US multinational corporations.
Despite its positive assessments by many, emphasizing its
256
role in promoting "globalism," "peace and world order,"
"development/modernization' or in transferring entrepreneur-
ial and managerial skills, or capital and industrial techno-
logy from the developed to the developing nations (cf. Rolfe,
1969; Quinn, 1969; Johnson, 1970; Stauffer, 1973), the ad-
vent of the multinationals is symptomatic of a totalitarian
transformation of the world economy into an integrated global
capitalist system (cf. Baran, 1957; Frank, 1967; Mandel,
1968; Emmanuel, 1972). Bukharin describes the process:
There grows the intertwining of 'national
capitals '; there proceeds the 'internation-
alization'of capital. Capital flows into
foreign factories and mines, plantations and
railroads, steamship lines and banks; it
grows in volume; it sends part of the surplus
value 'home' where it may begin an independ-
ent movement; it accumulates the other part;
it widens over and again the sphere of its
application; it creates an ever thickening
network of international interdependence
(1975: 26).
The multinational corporations are now vanguards of totali-
tarian on a global scale; they are ominously in-
dicative of a regime of satellite transnational managerial
elites; they are neither a prologue to any new world of unity
nor a major force of international integration. They are
the means "to protect 'the free world' and to extend its
boundaries wherever and whenever possible" (Baran and Sweezy,
1972b: 442). Their growth is "a process of centralizing and
perfecting the process of capital accumulation" (Hymer,
1975: 49). They are out in the world to turn it into a
257
"global factory" i-.rith internationalization of finance capital
and alienated labor in the background. On the one hand,
whether or not production goals and techniques, investment
policies, labor relations, profit allocation, purchasing,
distribution and marketing policies are consistent with the
local country's development, they are all decided from the
standpoint of the profit goals of the multinational corpora-
tions (O'Connor, 1970: 46). Thus they offer little hope for,
in the words of Barnet and Muller, "the problems of mass
starvation, mass unemployment and gross inequality" and
create additionally "social, ecological and psychological
imbalance." They are an "institution of unique power"
which has the potential for "colonizing the future" (Barnet
and Muller, 1974: 363). On the other hand, by consolidating
the ownership and control of global production and distri-
bu1:ion in the hands of "an international entrepreneurial
eli tel' they spell ":theen-d of -the political boundaries of
capital" (Kimmel, 1975-76: 110). They are also potential
precursors of a global mass society. Turning national so-
cieties into markets for mass consumption, many of them are
increasingly becoming standardizers of mass consumer taste
and culture.
Soft drinks, automobiles, transistor radios
and blue jeans are the symbols of a more
profound homogeneization of culture that is
well under way and despite possible "nativ-
istic" reversals, can only be stimulated by
continued MNC consolidation (Wells, 1977: 53).
258
Of the world's 50 largest industrial corporations, the number
of US based corporations was 24 in 1975 and 23 in 1976. In
both years 8 companies were American out of top 12 in the
list. The Fortune reports that "the U.S. is still the domin-
ant country on the list, by far. American companies account
for 57 percent of the total sales, 53 percent of the assets,
52 percent of the employees, and 68 percent of the net income"
(August, 1975: 163). Although in recent years American com-
panies are increasingly facing those of Japan, France, Ger-
many and Britain for the hegemonic control over the global
corporate business, their over-all performance statistics
do not forecast their disappearance in the immediate future
from the international market. Recently Fortune reported that
.... . their sales grew 40 percent, and their
net profits 37 percent. As a result, the
American companies loom larger than last
time. They account for 56 percent of the
total sales, 50 percent of the assets and
42 percent of the net income If National
Iranian ~ set aside as ~ special case, the
profits of the American companies look much
heftier--two-thirds of the combined profits
of the forty-nine non-Iranian companies on
the list (August, 1977: 240).
The fact that global corporate investments are more guided
by considerations of profit, on the one hand, and of acquir-
ing a hold over such strategic materials--oil, iron, baux-
ite, chromium, copper, lead, manganese, tin, natural gas
etc. (Barnet and Muller, 1974: 126-27)--, on the other,
than by genuine .motives of development and democracy is
more evident. For instance, Business Week reports that
the US has a great deal at stake in Southern Africa which
is one of the world's great storehouses of vital minerals
and that the US companies have more than $1.5 billion in
259
the racist country of South Africa alone (February 14, 1977:
64) It is reasonable to predict that Americanization of
the host countries is likely to continue for many years to
come in view of the different government maneuvering that
is possible to protect the interests of American or America-
based international corporations. "If means for bringing
other countries into compliance with preferred American
policies are desired, the American government does not have
to look far to find them" (Waltz, 1972: 222). The US govern-
ment may very well manipulate in favor of the multinationals
through its control over such financial institutions as the
Agency for International Development, the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance
Corporati-on, tll-e Export-Import Bank etc. 6 It can influence
directly by making it difficult for an offending host country
to receive foreign assistance from these financial institu-
tions. The case of Chile, where Marxist Allende's election
to the presidency in 1970 threatened corporate interests of
the International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), is a case
in point. Finally, it can be said in summing up that "in-
stability, dependence, 'over-kill' of incentives, the lack of
linkages, etc. makes worldwide sourcing a doubtful tool in
the longer term for solving the problems of the Third World,
260
despite some job creation and export earnings" (Adam, 1975:
102) .
The Family and Marriage
Tonnies could well see that the ordinary human being,
in the long run and for average of cases, "feels best and
most cheerful if he is surrounded by his family and relatives.
He is among his own .... " (1964: 43). Since the family is
the most general expression of social reality, he necessarily
assumes that "the study of horne is the study of the Gemein-
schaft, as the study of the organic cell is the study of life
itself" (Tonnies, 1964: 53). What has happened in the course
of its transformations throughout history is that many of
its functions have been transferred to other institutions
like the state, corporate bodies, wefare agencies, etc., and
consequently the family has declined as a preservative influence
in the industrial society. Referring to the family's role in
the context of suicide Durkheim said: "For most of the time,
at present, the family may be said to be reduced to the
married couple alone, and we know that this union acts feebly
against suicide" (1966: 377). Turning especially to the
changes in the role of the family in the corporate capitalism
one can observe that the familial institutions, conditioned
apparently by urbanization, industrialization and bureaucrati-
zation, have become supportive institutions of capitalist
society oriented to goals and interests of corporate owners.
261
Corporate capitalism is at the bottom of the formation of the
economic and political macrostructure of the society and the
psychological structure of mass attitudes, values and be-
liefs. Having transformed mainly into an instrumentality
for maintaining and reproducing labor power (Morton, 1972:
121l--thus separating men from women in economic corporation,
throwing the former into the wage labor market, subjecting
women to inferior roles in the occupational hierarchy and de-
grading them into sexual objects, and also emphasizing over-
socialization of the children--the family in the industrial-
mass society becomes more repressive and less directive. The
family's functions such as the sexual function, the reproduc-
tion function, the socialization function, the personality-
forming function, the economic provider function, the con-
sumptive function, the expressive or emotional function and
status placement function together with transmission of as-
cribed elements of social position, property, power, culture
and life styles are all"fed into, convincingly argues
lithe overriding labor-producing function." In corporate cap-
italism these functions serve lito channel the labor force in-
to work, class, economic, and power structures advantageous
to the material well-being and compensatory, life-inimical,
polluting achievement and thus in the long run really false
interests of the upper classes and power elites"
1973: 257). The power elite is thus emerging as a new exploit-
er and expropriator of the labor-producing function of the family.
262
When it started, the family in America was for most
people a place where they both lived and worked. American
society was then, in Mills' words, "the world of small en-
trepreneur" which was at the same time "self balancing."
Its economy was agricultural and predominantly based on
family-owned and family-operated business enterprises. There
was "a linkage of income, status, work, and property" (We: 9).
The family had the basic productive function in that it was
a productive unit in which domestic-familial functions were
scarecly distinguishable from economic functions. The pat-
tern ran its full circle until the industrial and technologi-
cal changes gave way to capitalist transformation of the
society resulting in what Mills calls "the transformation
of property" with its concomitant "rural debacle." As the
American farmer became both "the tool and the victim of the
rise of American capitalism" so the American ideal of the
famLly-s ized farm beeame JIm-ore and more ideal and less and
less a reality." The centralization of property signalled
the end of the union of property and work, and it also sever-
ed the individual from independent means of livelihood.
Within a period of less than 100 years, following the gradual
rise of the cities, national markets, transportation systems,
mills, mines or factories, the basic productive function of
the family was transferred to corporate industry and business,
giving way to a sharp differentiation between economic/work
roles and familial roles of American people. Whereas in 1882
263
approximately 72 percent of those gainfully employed were en-
gaged in agriculture, in 1974 the percentages of self-employed
men and women fell to 3.1 and 0.35 respectively. Between
1935 and 1975 the number of family farms also declined. While
the average size of the American farm was 155 acres in 1935,
in 1975 it rose to 385 acres, indicating centralization and
consolidation. In 1974 only 4.1 percent of the farms received
as much as 45 percent of total cash receipts for agricultural
sales in America (cf. Fullerton, 1977: 10-11). In brief, the
urban pattern replaced the rural one. In the process of the
incorporation of industrial capitalism into corporate capital-
ism the family was turned into a corporative institution re-
fleeting, among other things, mass man's frantic search for
new corporate status and identity commensurate with the role
demands of industrial-mass society. To quote Mills:
In identifying with a firm, the young executive
can sometimes lin@ 1.lp -his care-er expectations
with it, and so .identify his future with that
of the firm's. But lower down the ranks, the
identification has more to do with security and
prestige than with expectations of success.
In either case, of course, such feelings can be
exploited in the interests of business loyal-
ties (We: 244).
In other words, the rise of corporation men coincides with the
rise of "the managerial demiurge," in Mills' words, or of
"the organization society," in Whyte's appellation. Whereas
for lower middle class men families are quite dependent on
corporate business and industry, to many career men, on the
264-
other hand, "the home is almost an adjunct to the job" (Cuber
and Harroff, 1965: 117). When the dividing line between
economic life and family life is indistinct or grows thinner,
business crises become family crises and may turn out to be
sources of private troubles as well as public issues. As
Mills describes it, pointing out th plight of "the marginal
victim" or "unpaid family workers":
Business and economic anxiety thus
come out in family relations and in the iron
discipline required to keep afloat. Since there
is little or no outlet for feelings beyond the
confines of the shop or farm, members of these
families may grow greed for gain. The whole force
of their nature is brought to bear upon trivial
affairs which absorb their attention and shape
their character. They come to exercise, as Bal-
zac has said, 'the power of pettiness, the pene-
trating force of the grub that brings down the
elm tree by tracing a -ring under the bark' (WC: 30).
An example of the familial trouble or issue is divorce. As
Mills refers to this:
Consider marriage. Inside a marriage a man
and a woman may experience personal troubles,
but when the di 'lorc-e rate d-urlng the fir st four
years of marriage is 250 out of ever 1000 at-
tempts, this is an indication of a structural
issue having to do with the institutions of
marriage and the family and other institutions
that bear upon them In so far as the
family as an institution turns women into
darling little slaves and men into their chief
providers and unweaned dependents, the problem
of a satisfactory marriage remains incapable
of purely private solution (SI: 9-10).
A certain amount of divorce is likely to occur since at times
it provides "an escape valve for the tension which inevitably
arises from the fact that two people must live together"
(Goode, 1970: 81).
Again, divorce is no longer treated as a
265
personal stigma and can be preferred as an alternative to a
dead marriage. Sometimes its increased rate can be explained
by such factors as liberalization of divorce laws, changes in
the value system of the society, lessened emphasis on marital
instability or availability of new alternatives. Despite
all these countervailing factors, a continuous or sudden rise
in divorce rate is a matter of public concern. When such is
the case, there are other accompanying problems. As a matter
of fact, the divorce rate in the US has doubled between 1965
and 1975. In 1974 there were 19.3 divorces for every 1,000
married women (cf. Fullerton, 1977: 421). Reiss reports that
in 1975 there were over a million of
divorces among a total population of about
51 million married women or a rate of rough-
ly 20 divorces for every 1,000 marriages in
existence that year. This indicates that
2 in every 100 marriages ended in divorce
in this particular year. If this divorce
rate of 2 in 100 continues, then 45 percent
of all married couples will eventually ex-
perience a divorce during their life times
(1976: 306).
To be sure, the effects of divorce are somewhat neutralized
by remarriage- sin ce there is "no larger k in un it to abs orb
the children and no unit to prevent the spouses from re-enter-
ing the free marriage market" (Goode, 1970: 9). In 1973,
28 percent of all marriages were remarriages Even then,
it remains a question whether remarriages are in effect a
real solution, especially in view of involvement of increas-
ing number of children affected by divorce and its impact
upon them. In fact their number has tripled since 1953 and,
until 1964, rose at a higher rate than that of divorce ~
In 1972 there were more than a million of children inyolved
in divorce (cf. Reiss, 1976: 323).
1
,
Metropolis
It is instructive to note that sociology "was born in
a world in ferment. The fermentation process was nurtured
in the cities of the West" (Meadows and Mizruchi, 1976: 2).
For classic sociologists too, the problems of the city were
a central aspect of their sociology. To Tonnies, the city
was typical of Gesellschaft in general, and metropolis a
result of the synthesis of capital and city. Here, "money
and capital are unlimited and almighty" and here people corne
"from all corners of the earth, being curious and hungry
for money and pleasure" (Tonnies, 1964: 228). Weber regarded
the city as "the seat of commerce and industryll (1961: 235),
~ k i n g intD its various acbnomic and extra-economic facets
and tracing its relationship to rational capitalism at various
historical stages of evolution. But it was Simmel who bril-
liantly wrote on, in the words of Mills, "the big city from
a humanist as well as a sociological point of view" (1M: 12).
This classic concern on the problems of the city or metro-
polis is reflected quite strongly in Mills who, in his turn,
took it up as both private trouble and public issue.
What should be done with this wonderful mon-
strosity? Break it all up into scattered units,
combining residence and work? Refurbish it as
it stands? Or, after evacuation, dynamite
it and build new cities according to new
plans in new places. What would those plans
be? And who is to decide and to accomplish
whatever choice is made .... And insofar as
the overdeveloped megalopis ~ t h e over-
developed automobile are built-in features
of the overdeveloped society, the problems of
urban living will not be solved by personal
ingenuity and private wealth (PPP: 395-97).
Despite many improvements in some directions, most of these
267
problems are still responsible for what may be called "urban
crisis" in America. To highlight some of the problems con-
nected with urban crisis in America:
(1) The Urban Apartheid: Though Mills never refers to this
important problem, there is no doubt that the most noticeable
cause of urban crisis relates to continuous concentration of
blacks in the major cities of America. In fact the racial
schism is one of the biggest public issues of contemporary
America (cf. Grodzins, 1973). Given the fact of urban con-
centration of the black population, it is likely that "the
present trends may take .the nation farther down the road to-
ward a de facto 'apartheid society'" (Hauser, 1975: 14).
(2)
The Housing Crisis: Although many years have passed by
since America was urbanized, the problem of housing seems to
have persisted without any remarkable sign of abatement for
most of the urban dwellers, especially the poor and the blacks.
Still there is no clear set of national housing policies.
Whereas the Department of Housing and Development was initiated
only in 1965, other public housing programs envisaged
268
in such legislation as the Housing Act of 1943, the Housing
Act of 1949 (Urban Renewal), the Demonstration Cities Act
of 1966 (Model Cities Program) and the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968 have had less appreciable effect on
the urban housing blight. The victims are generally the
poor or the blacks, while the affluent whites move to suburbs.
At the present time 500,000 additional units of housing are
required each year for the poor while the yearly construction
averages about 30,000, leaving a net deficit of 470,000
units per year (cf. Butler, 1977: 138). The federal govern-
ment has begun to approach the problem of housing on a
national level but it is unlikely that the private housing
industry, which has annual business close to $25 billion,
employs over 5 million workers and creates a vast market,
would risk investment for building construction for the poor.
The profit motive remains the insurmountable barrier Ccf.
Turner, 1976: 218-19).
(3 )
America as "automobile" and "effluent" society: Ameri-
ca can appropriately be called an automobile city. Most of
the cities are now automobile cities though the poor, blacks,
Chicanos, or Puerto Ricans have rarely any access to private
cars. While a nationally coordinated network of transporta-
tion and construction of highways can be traced to the pros-
perity and growth of corporate capitalism, there has been few
improvements in the direction of cheaper and speedy mass transit
269
systems. In 1970 there were 90 million automobiles as against
2.5 million of them in 1915. Around the 1970s the number of
accidental deaths from automobiles rose to about 40,000 a
year. The automobiles are also a source of urban air pollu-
tion which ranges between 25 and 50 percent a year depending
upon the city involved. The automobiles are a great symbol
of ecological abuse. However, the question of pollution,
implying ecological crisis, has assumed greater dimension.
Heilbroner goes so far as to predict, commenting on the special
environment-destroying potential of newly developed science
and technology, that the continued ecological decay, if not
arrested ahead of time, may result in "the decline or even
destruction of Western civilization, and of the hegemony of
the scientific-technological view that has achieved so much
and cost us so dearly" (1972: 69). Whatever the blessings
of urban industrialism, negatively it creates environmental
pollution by concentrating residues and wastes into an ever
shrinking ecological space. It is thus no wonder that Marine
characterizes America as "the effluent society.,,7
Although current attempts to counter environmental
hazards and ecosystemic disruption have continued to grow,
in the meanwhile "the greatest polluters are the affluent,
who generate the greatest economic demand (and hence stimulate
industrial pollution), consume the most polluting goods, and
dispose of a majority of nondegradable or nonrecyclable
'.-Tastes" (Turner, 1976: 265-66). The emergent pattern resulting
270
from "the incest between the pollution control business and
the industrial polluters" is increasingly leading to what
Gellen has called "the making of a Pollution-Industrial com-
plex." It is interesting to note that many of the pollution
control agencies are subdivisions or subsidiaries of the
largest corporations which are themselves polluters.
Thus the capitalist motive remains the same: profit seeking
rationality of exploitation and market economics, and oligo-
polistic corporate integration of polluters and controllers.
Indeed this is aparadox of the suzerainty of capitalism of
the few in the public society of liberalism. To.sum up:8
A society whose principal ends and incentives
are monetary and expansionist inevitably pro-
duces material and cultural impoverishment--
in part precisely because of the abundance of
profitable goods. To make an industry out of
cleaning up the mess that industry itself
makes is a logical extension of corporate
capitalism (Gellen, 1973: 306-07).
271
Notes
1. An attempt to highlight Mills' contradiction arising out
of his moral, intellectual and political faith in demo-
cracy, on the one hand, and his loss of faith in the
masses as an instrument of radical social change, on the
other, has been made in Chapters 7 and 8.
2. I agree with Bray that Mills "does not argue that we
should spend our time as political sociologists con-
centrating on our personal troubles or worrying about
them. Instead, he argues that we spend our time con-
centrating on the analysis of structural troubJ.es and
the turning of them into public issues" (1973: 44).
Whereas Mills' thrust is to turn troubles into issues,
not issues into troubles, it is interesting to note
that Gouldner's reflexive sociology is somewhat closed
because of its focus on personal troubles, and because
of its failure to turn them into larger issues. Gould-
ner's "reflexive sociology," as contained in The Coming
Crisis of Western Sociology, achieves in the end "the
opposite of what Wright Mills advocated at the beginning
of the radical revival: instead of turning personal
troubles into public issues, it turns public issues into
personal troubles, by exhorting the sociOlogist to give
his attention narcissistically to the problem of the
relationship 'between being a sociOlogist and being a
person' and to worry about his relation to his work
They are a symptom of intellectual malaise, not a re-
medy" (Bottomore, 1971: 40).
3. I must point out that Mills' humanism has its roots,
not in socialism or communism, but in democratic or
political liberalism. See Chapter 8 or this work.
4. Scimecca (1977: 17) reports that Mills himself called
The Causes volume a pamphlet.
5. Italics added.
6. In a much powerful critique a recent observer contends
that the pOlicies of these institutions "are based on
the acceptance and upholding of the existing internation-
al and national framework of the capitalist world ....
there is a strong emphasis in the agencies' policies
and demands on the principles of free enterprise, or re-
liance on market mechanisms, and on the respect of pri-
vate property, domestic and especially foreign" (Hayter,
1971: 151-52).
7. For many faces of pollution, see Marine (1972).
8. An assessment of Mills' political sociology will be
included in my general criticism of radical sociology
contained in Chapter 9.
272
CHAPTER SEVEN
New Leftism
Introduction
As I have already pointed out, Mills was not only a
sociological theorist but also a
_ 1
sociological
As a sociological ideologist, he was one of the leading
theoretical architects of the movement known as New Leftism
in sociology or political science. In the present chapter
my purpose is, therefore, to focus on the nature of Mills'
new leftism, and also to show that his protest against the
Bell-Lipset thesis of the end of ideology has become the
cornerstone of his sociological radicalism. While his theory
is not without drawbacks, it has nevertheless pointed to
the urgency and indispensability of structural changes in
American social system.
Mills as an Ideologist: If Mills is a radical, his radical-
ism lies in making issues politically explicit, and as poli-
tically radical, he lS also an ideologist. He knows that any
"political reflection that is of possible public significance
is ideological: in its terms, policies, institutions, men
of power are criticized or approved" (PPP: 251).
The word 'ideology' was introduced on 23 May 1979
by the French theorist de Tracy in his newly conceived
273
274
"Science of ideas" (cf. Drucker, 1974: 3). Since then, the
word 'ideology' has retained its political implications, and
as such both 'politics' and 'ideology' go together. This
is, however, not to suggest that the word 'ideology' has
an all-accepted meaning. On the contrary, it has a wide
range of meanings that has changed over the generations.
In any case, ideology stands for a complex of ideas. and
ideological postulates are politically formulated ideas. Put
in the political contexts of American society, the concept
of ideology as more or less an integrated body of political
belief system implies three distinct but related categories,
as suggested by Dolbeare and Dolbeare:
(1) The 'world view' or general perspective on
how the American economic and political system
works today, for whom and why; (2) the values
that are central to the ideology and the goals
that it holds out as most desirable for the
United States; (3) the image of the process of
social change to which it subscribes and the
tactics that it deems appropriate in the light
of its world view, values and goals, and image
of change (1971: 7).
This definition also fits the facts of Mills' ideological
politics. To call him an ideologue, as may be seen, is
neither unwarranted nor unjustified. Mills' ideological
orientations are a mark of his political understanding of
the historical epoch when "our basic definitions of society
and of self are being overtaken by new realities" (PPP: 236).
In the 1930s and 1940s radical movements in America
had diversified origin in a broad spectrum of organizations
and were based on contending interpretations of political
ideologies.
The national political scene included the
275
communists, the socialists, Trotskyists, other anti-Stalin-
ists and trade union organizations like CIa etc. In this
forum of ideological clashes radicalism flourished through
political debates between liberal and socialist intellectuals.
By the mid-fifties the radical movements came to a halt the
reasons for which are both complex and varied. In the be-
ginning of the 1960s, Bell wrote: "Such calamities as the
Moscow Trials, the Nazi-Soviet pact, the concentration camps,
the suppression of the Hungarian workers, form one chain;
such social changes as the modification of capitalism, the
rise of the Welfare State, another. In philosophy, one can
trace the decline of simplistic, rationalistic beliefs, and
the emergence of new stoic-theological images of man, e.g.
Freud, Tillich, Jaspers, etc. But out of all this
history, one simple fact emerges: for the radical intelli-
gentsia, the old ideologies have lost their "truth" and their
power to persuade" (1967: 402). As a necessary result from
this decline in ideological_thinking, the radical tradition
in America reached the point of exhaustion since the intell-
ectuals in place of responding ideologically through divisive
dogmas have now arrived at a rough consensus on political
issues.
Thus one finds, at the end of the fifties, a
disconcerting caesura. In the West, among the
intellectuals, the old passions are spent. The
new generation, with no meaningful memory of
these old debates, and no secure tradition to
build upon, finds itself seeking new purposes
within a framework of political society that has
rejected, intellectually speaking, the old apo-
calyptic and chiliastic visions (Bell, 1967: 404).
276
The first sociologist to note the end of ideology was, per-
haps, Raymond Aron, writing in The Opium of the Intellectuals
(1955). In America Lipset is the other sociologist who found
closest agreement with Bellon the decline of political ideo-
logy. For him the decline of ideology in
. ... Western political life reflects the fact
that the fundamental political problems of the
industrial revolution have been solved: the
workers have achieved industrial and political
citizenship; the conservatives have accepted
the welfare state; and the democratic left has
recognized that an increase in over-all state
power carries with it more dangers to freedom
than solutions for economic problems. This
very triumph of the democratic social revolution
in the West ends domestic politics for those
intellectuals who must have ideologies or uto-
pias to motivate them to political action (Lip-
set, 1963: 442-43).
Lipset finds that at the back of this general tendency there
lies lithe shift away from ideology towards sociology. The
very growth of sociology as an intellectual force outside the
academy in many Western nations is a tribute, not primarily
to the power of sociological analysis but to the loss of in-
terest in political inquiry" (Lipset, 1963: 453).
The Thesis of the End of Ideology and Mills
Mills' response to this anti-ideological thesis was
both instantaneous and violent. He summed up his own ideo-
logical position in "Letter to the New Left," published
originally in the British New Left Review, September-October
1960, and this critique has become the "Das Capital of the
present radicalism" (Berman, 1968: 136).
277
Mills defines the thesis as 'an intellectual celebra-
tion of apathy' and calls it 'a slogan of complacency.' He
writes: "It is no exaggeration to say that since the end of
World War II in Britain and the United States smug conserva-
tives, tired liberals and disillusioned radicals have carried
on a weary discourse in which issues are blurred and potential
debate muted; the sickness of complacency has prevailed, the
bi-partisan banality flourished
ll
(pPP: 247). Bereft of li-
beralism as any political theory, the thesis is rather a
liberal rhetoric to be used ultimately "as an uncriticized
weapon with which to attack marxism." It is based upon "a
disillusionment with any real commitment to socialism in any
recognizable form" (PPP: 248). Along with their ideological
hostility to Marxism or socialism, the end of ideologists,
the self-selected intellectuals of affluent society, seek
to discover rationale and then legitimate the corporate-
liberal establishment. "The mixed economy plus the welfare
state plus prosperity--that is the formula. US capitalism
will continue to be workable; the welfare state will continue
along the road to ever greater justice" (PPP: 248). Stated
otherwise, the anti-ideological perspective is the ideology
of corporate liberalism. It is 'a mechanical reaction', and
not 'a creative response.' It is an escapade not an involve-
ment, a release from concerns of public issues not a commit-
ment to work out 'an explicit political philosophy.' It is
an apotheosis of methodological scientism that stands for
and, presumably, stands upon "a fetish of empiricism". At
one end, the Bell-Lipset thesis either ignores the problem
of the historical agencies of change or identifies those
278
with the existing social institutions. It is also a denial,
at the other, of the human and political ideals. That is why
the anti-ideologists fail to understand 'structural realities'
of the present day social transformations. The end of ideo-
logy, self-managed as it is, is empty pragmatism, a fashion
and, finally, a posture of what Marx calls false conscious-
ness. Therefore, says Mills, "the end-of-ideology is of
course itself an ideology--a fragmentary one, to be sure, and
perhaps more a mood. The end-of-ideology is in reality the
ideology of an ending: the ending of political reflection
itself as a public fact. It is a weary know-it-all justifi-
cation--by tone of voice rather than by explicit argument--
of the cultural and political default of the NATO intellec-
tuals" (PPP: 249).
Despite the amount of truth contained in the Bell-
Lipset thesis, it seems that subsequent events--within and
beyond America--and assessments have pointed to the contrary.
In this light, Mills' critique, the product of the master
ideologue, seems to have been established beyond any reason-
able doubt. Bell has unduly emphasized radicalism to the
extent it was developed in the 1930s. When Germany had Hitler
and Third Reich, America produced Roosevelt and the New Deal.
In the decade of the 1940s, radicalism had its roots in the
economic depression that persistently grew Slnce the beginning
279
of the last World War, although even then the assumption of
affluence was widespread, By that time there was also a
growing alignment between the private corporations and govern-
ment which is marked by an increase in the military expendi-
ture. Then came, in the 1950s, the sombre and tormented
era of McCarthyism. Politically, during this era communist
suppression reached its all-time peak level; in the realm of
ideas, it was rabidly anti-intellectual; and socially, it was
a period of what Hofstadter calls "status anxiety" due to
rootlessness and heterogeneity in American ways of life.
Despite all this, Bottomore says rightly, "it would be wrong
to conclude, however, that the age was therefore 'unpolitical';
it was simply a time in which the political offensive was
taken by thinkers and politicians of the right" (1968: 52
footnote) . In fact there took place a revival of critical
thought in the fifties, and in this revival one of the pro-
minent figures was Mills. Instead of battle cries, founded
on Marx or Mill, there were shifts in the bases of ideological
conflict. To quote Young:
In the late 1950s, new issues to make an impact
on our politics, the following of Ayn Rand be-
came something of a cult, the works of C. Wright
Mills progressively shifted in emphasis from
sociology to ideology, and the radical right has
grown apace. More important have been the grow-
ing critique of the basic assumptions of American
foreign policy emanating from both right and left
and the varitable revolution in civil rights
(1968: 204).2
The anti-ideological stance of the Bell-Lipset doctrine
280
is rather an ideological attempt to castigate those ideologies
they disapprove of. It not only confuses the line between
description and exhortation but also provides, in conformity
to their anti-Marxist proclivity, a justifying and solidar-
izing ideology to the new class of managers to legitimate
their status quo in a politically "managed economy." The
slogan of the end of ideology functions selectively as an
anti-ideological perspective on the surface but supports, as
Mills rightly pointed out, consistently the ideological posi-
tion of its proponents. Beneath the apparent differences of
terminology that may be imagined, Lipset's "conservative
socialism" has much common ideological alliance with the
"managerial" "welfare" liberalism of Bell. This may be
termed as the ideology of pluralistic liberalism suited to
provide legitimation to the status quo of the bureaucratic
Welfare State that has come into existence in what Eric Gold-
man calls the Crucial Decade following the World War II.
The verity of Mills' fundamental assumptions is distinct in
what Kleinberg has here to say:
At the least, both seem very serious about res-
pecting the existing :rules of the game" of
bargaining among organized collective interests,
broadly within the established boundaries of
modern corporate capitalism The overlapping
of conservative-revisionist socialism and mana-
gerial-welfare liberalism expresses a peculiar
ideological combination of equilitarianism as a
political end and centralized bureaucratic organ-
ization as a technical means, mixing governmental
acceptance Ol responsibility for the general wel-
fare with sophisticated managerialism as a prac-
tical way of attaining it (1973: 13).
281
In a powerful critique of the Bell-Lipset thesis, Aiken con-
firms the same apprehensions of Mills. He asserts that the
end of ideology is a liberal-pluralistic posture, a doctrine
of mock pragmatism directed mainly at those political radi-
cals who suggest a thorough-going social change. He says,
therefore, that "what Bell appears to be calling for is, among
other things an end to moral discourse and a beginning of
consistent 'pragmatic discourse' in every sphere of political
life" (Aiken, 1964: 36). At the same time, the thesis is a
reflex-product of methodological scientism based on a facile
interpretation of Weber and also on a typical ideological
positivism.
3
Mills' reaction to the anti-ideological perspective
takes further ideological posture when he identifies utopian
vision with structural criticism of social institutions re-
miniscent of the Mannheimian tradition. Mills' ideological
stand is quite implicit in what Mannheim says here:
The disappearance of utopia brings about a static
state of affairs in which man himself becomes no
more than a thing. We would be faced then with
the greatest paradox imaginable, namely, that
man, who has achieved the highest degree of ra-
tional mastery of existence , left without any
ideals, becomes a mere creature of impulses.
Thus, after a long tortuous, but heroic develop-
ment, just at the highest stage of awareness,
when history is ceasing to be blind fate, and is
becoming more and more man's own creation, with
the relinquishment of utopias, man would lose
his will to shape history and therewith his
ability to understand it (1936: 262-63).
As the master ideologue, Mills, the utopian intellectual hero
in the Mannheimian tradition, conceives that the end of ideo-
logy would only result ln shaping human history by default of
282
few powerful men in the society. It means acceptance prac-
tically of some kind of fatalism as the inevitable aftermath
of the blind drift of history-making through organized poli-
tical interests. However, Mills' ideological role is not,
as Feuer suggests, to provide a redefinition of what he calls,
'the Mosaic myth. ' Feuer contends: "During the last decade,
ideologists beginning with C. Wright Mills have given a fresh
version to the Mosaic myth; they have perceived the intell-
ectuals as clearly called upon by history to make the revo-
lution, abetted by their allies located among the colored
races of Asia, Africa, and Latin America" (1975: 7). Feuer's
misjudgement of Mills' position becomes all the more open in
terms of his conclusion which flatly denies intellectuals
any potentials to be of any political use as seekers of
social change in required circumstances. To note this: "Then,
when intellectuals cease to be ideologists, that is, cease
to be 'intellectuals' and bBceme instead scientists, scholars,
teachers, they will find a vocation more enduring than any
that myth can confer, more sincere because without self-
illusion" (Feuer, 1975: 210). This amounts to a denial of
any 'right' of the intellectuals to conceive of social real-
ity that has now become increasingly political. Mills'
politics has beginnings in ideological commitment. For him,
"Indeed, the way to political reality is through ideological
analysis" (PPP: 176), as Neumann taught him by his analysis
283
in the Nazi Behemoth. To be sure, ideology was not a myth for
Mills, but for those who resist a reversal of capitalists I
so c ial ism. Neither was it based on any self-illusion. His
ideological-utopianism is based upon "any criticism or pro-
posal that transcends the up-close milieux of a scatter of
individuals; the milieux which men and women can understand
directly and which they can reasonably hope directly to
change" (PPP: 254). Stating in unambiguous terms, Mills
enunciates his ideological role: "If there is to be a
pOlitics of a New Left, what needs to be analysed is the
structure of institutions, the foundation of policies. In
this sense, both in its criticisms and in its proposals, our
work is necessarily structural--and so, for us, just now--
utopian" (pPP: 254). It is this ideological Weltanschauung
of Mills that makes him react to the welfare-planning ~ r i n t
tion of the New Deal liberalism implicit in the anti-ideo-
ligical manifesto. Whatever the limitations in Mills posi-
tion as a radical ideologue, there are many who openly sought
identification with his sort of radicalism.
4
Mills: The Ideologist as a New Left
As a political ideologue, Mills identifies logically,
because of his radicalism, with the New Left. His ideologi-
cal leftism is opposed to the imperialist militarism and the
Rightist McCarthyism, both of which are responsible for the
emergence and continuation of the garri30n state in America.
284
At the theoretical level, his leftism is neither liberalism
nor Marxism but rather a product of an assimilation of the
human values of both. In brief, it is radical humanism.
Mills' leftism seeks to connect "up cultural with political
criticism, and both with demands and programmes. And it means
all this inside every country of the world" (PPP: 253). To
be of the Left politically means, for Mills, to know of lm-
personal forces at work within the society, to know how they
lead to structural changes, to apprehend that these changes
have not eliminated problems or issues, and finally, to con-
ceive of historical agency of social structural change. ,What
is, therefore, the theoretical content of Mills' radical
Leftism? To Mills, it consists in
structural criticism and reportage and
theories of society, which at some point or
another are focussed politically as demands
and programmes. These criticisms, demands,
theories, programmes are guided morally by
the humanist and secular ideals of Western
civilization--above all, reasons and freedom
and justice (PPP: 253).
This enables him also to encounter the substantive problem
of ideological politics in his political sociology. As he
singles out:
Which brings us face to face with the most im-
portant issue of political reflection--and of
pOlitical action--in our time: the problem of
the historical agency of change, of the social
and institutional means of structural change
(PPP: 254).
Furthermore,
The seeming collapse of our historic agencies
of change ought to be taken as a problem, an
issue, a trouble--in fact, as the political
problem which we must turn into issue and
trouble (pPP: 255).
285
Indeed he tried to turn the structural issue and the
individual problem into themes--and also problems--of his
political sociology. It is here that Mills stands in sharpest
contrast to the anti-ideological politicaL sociology of Bell
or Lipset. In both of them there is a conspicuous absence of
any concern for historical function of ideological politics.
Bell's depoliticized ideology of the "Affluent society,"
implicit in the exhaustion of ideology, found its logical ex-
tension in the ideology of technocratic elitism in his The
Coming of Post-Industrial Society. Very recently his thesis
now, being in the nature of further dialectical improvement
upon the preceding ones, researches out the cultural contra-
dictions of capitalism. This time the problem--the cultural
contradictions--has locus in the "post-modern" culture of
postindustrial society itself. It is a 'dysfun9tional con-
flict' between "functional rationality, technocratic decision
making, and meritocratic rewards" on the one hand, and "apo-
Galypticmoods and anti-rational modes of behavior,lI on the
other. Put otherwise, "efficiency, least cost, maximization,
optimization and functional rationality," characteristic
principles of the "scientifically managed" industrial society,
are now in direct conflict with the "anti-cognitive and anti-
intellectual cultural trends" of the modernist culture (cf.
Bell, 1976: 84). Therefore, on the one hand, "the theory
of the end-of-ideology makes a full reversal to suggest,
not the exhaustion of movements of ideological or cultural
opposition in the developing postindustrial society, but their
286
expansion to cover the entire culture" (Kleinberg, 1973: 215).
On the other hand, it consistently neglects the persistent
increase of economic power and political influence of the
privately managed corporations in the economy. Let me now
turn to the point of view of Bendix and Lipset who also
stand in sharp contrast to Mills' point of view. For Bendix
and Lipset, "The task of political sociology is to
analyze the status structure of a society in terms of the
abstract or logical possibilities of decision-making and
to compare these possibilities with actual decisions made"
(1967: 23). Elsewhere they write, "Like political science,
political sociology is concerned with the distribution and
exercise of power in society. Unlike political science, it
is not concerned with the institutional provisions for that
distribution and exercise, but takes these as given" (Bendix
and Lipset, 1967: 26).5 It is now probably evident how Mills'
ideological position both as a political man and as a social
scientist differs from that of Bell or Bendix and Lipset.
While the anti-ideology of Bell is addressed to finding out
and also lamenting over the cultural contradictions of capi-
talism, Bendix and Lipset's politics in political sociology
is limited paralytically to the studies of voting behavior
only in terms of documentary evidence, attitude and opinion
research, psychological testing, content analysis or mathe-
matical models. In neither is there any concern for the
political and economic contradictions of the military-expan-
287
sionist capitalism of America. Nor is there any concern, to
repeat, for historical agency to restructure the institution-
al system. It is in this that Mills' Leftism consists, and
this enables him progressively to look forward to changing
the social order and formulating the problems of private and
public life as themes of political sociology.
Naturally this leads Mills to search for ideological-
political reasons for the absence of a "Left establishment
anywhere that is truly international and insurgent--and at
the same time, consequential" (PPP: 221). If there is any
decline of ideological thinking following the last World War,
Mills argues, unlike Bell and Lipset, that is due to the cul-
mination of increasing disappearance of the Left from the
arena of cultural and political activities in the world
dominated by two super powers with nuclear war-heads in their
possession. Mills' Leftism has roots, therefore, in this:
In both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) as the political
order is enlarged and centralized, it becomes less
political and more bureaucratic; less the locale
of a struggle than an object to be managed. Within
both, most men are objects of history, adapting to
structural changes with which they have little or
nothing to do (pPP: 227).
Here in this evaluation of the state of affairs in both the
USA and the USSR, Mills comes closest to Marcuse, the other
Marxist-minded theorist of the New Left movement.
the contradictions of corporate capitalism
today are as serious as ever before, but we have
immediately to add that today the resources of
corporate capitalism are equally strong and they
are daily strengthened by the cooperation, or
shall I say, the collusion, between the United
States and the Soviet Union. What we are faced
with, and I think this is one of the old-fashioned
terms we should save and recapture, is a
temporary stabilization of the capitalist
system, a temporary stabilization, the task
of the left is a task of enlightenment, a
task of education, the task of developing
a political consciousness (Marcuse, 1969: 470).
Like Marcuse, who believes that the task of the new Left is
to 'prepare itself and others in thought and action,
morally and politically,' Mills also rests his hope on this
and, thus, in this vein suggests formation of a Left estab-
288
lishment that II creates and sustains a cultural and political
climate, sets the key task, the suitable themes, and estab-
lishes the proper canons of value, taste, and realityll
(PPP: 221). The existence of a strong Left establishment is,
however, as important as an effective strategy--a lever of
action to cope with the magnitude of structural changes in
the contemporary society. And, here, in respect of the
historical agency of social change Mills and Marcuse differ.
Whereas Mills is on the side of Plato and Mill, Marcuse approx-
imates to Marx. Basieally anti-Marxist in this cOntext, Mills'
preference for a leftist approach to issues and problems and
his choice of historical agency are at bottom yearnings of a
liberal democrat for realization of the cherished values of
human life. This differentiates Mills from Marcuse who speci-
fically opts for 1I1ibertarian socialism which has always been
the integral concept of socialism, but only too easily re-
pressed and suppressed" (1969: 469). Mills and Marcuse are
close to each other as new Lefts in general sense rather than
as theorists.
289
Mills, the Role of Labor and the Intelligentsia
At the outset, Mills' political evolution is marked
by an extraordinary enthusiasm about the role of labor as the
live agent of structural change. In the spring of 1943, when
he confronted the labor problem for the first time, he took
up the case for the coal miners against the mine owners and
the Federal administration. Taking a brief on behalf of
those who seek "a way out of the present political situation"
and who "believe intelligently in democracy," Mills thought
in terms of "the formation of an independent labor party,"
though he qualified it by saying that on the basis of the
present labor union it would not come into being "at all in
the forseeable future" (1943: 697). In the same year, Mills
writes, in a review of Brady's Business as a System of Power,
that somehow labor "must become a militant political movement"
(pPP: 76). In 1948 Mills' enthusiasm reached its peak. He
writesl "Inside this country today, the labor leaders are
the strategic actors: they lead the only organizations cap-
able of stopping the main drift towards war and slump
What the U.S. does, or fails to do, may be the key to what
will happen in the world" (NMP: 3). By the middle of the
1950s Mills discovers that "the labor unions have become or-
ganizations that select and form leaders who, upon becoming
successful, take their places alongside businessmen in and
out of government and politicians in both major parties among
the national power elite" (pPP: 97).
In 1959 Mills' growing
290
pessimism ran its full circle and he became more disillusion-
ed than not. In categorically open terms he declares: "I do
not believe, for example, that it is only 'Labor' or 'The
Working Class' that can transform American society and change
its role in world affairs I do not believe in ab-
stract social forces--such as The Working Class--as the uni-
versal historical agentii (pPP: 232). In the following year
he reaffirms his belief by saying that he does not understand
why some New Leftists still "cling so mightily to 'the work-
ing class' of the advanced capitalist societies as the his-
toric agency, or even as the most important agency
"
(PPP: 256). Such a labor metaphysic, so he thinks, is a
'legacy from Victorian marxism that is now quite unrealis-
tic.' But it must be noted, with much caution, that Mills
never rules out the potentiality of the labor to bring about
structural change. As Mills clearly points out:
The social and historical conditions under which
industrial workers tend to become a-class-for-
themselves, and a decisive political force, must
be fully and precisely elaborated. There have
been, there are, there will be such conditions
Of course we can't "write off the working
class." But we must study all that, and freshly.
Where labor exists as an agency, of course we
must work with it, but we must not retreat it
as The Necessary Lever (PPP: 256).
Closely linked to Mills' disillusionment with, if
not rejection of, the working class are his views on the in-
ability of the mass to act as the chief agency.6 Standing
at the bottom of the mass society, now the mass is "political-
ly fragmented, and even as a passive fact, increasingly power-
291
less" (PE: 324). At the same time, "The new middle class of
white-collar employees is certainly not the political pivot
of any balancing society. It is in no way politically unified.
Its unions, such as they are, often serve merely to incorporate
it as hanger-on of the labor interest" (PPP: 34). The incapa-
city of the mass or of the white-collar to act politically
leads Mills to explore whether the cultural apparatus is a
substitute for effecting sociocultural change. He finds out
that in America, as also in other advanced industrial societies,
the politics of culture and the culture of politics have
coalesced in the overdeveloped capitalist-industrial economy
of the garrison state.
"
culture is part of an ascendant
capitalist economy and this economy is now a condition of
seemingly permanent war. Insofar as cultural activities are
established, they are established commercially or militarily"
(pPP: 417). So Mills rules out the possibility of this capi-
talistic cultural apparatus to act as the agency.
Whatever the amount of Mills' early optimism and
subsequent pessimism about the role of the working class, his
final dependency on the intelligentsia is neither sudden nor
logically unconnected in point of his own political evolution.
In 1944, Mills finds himself, on the one hand, a political
intellectual and also discovers, on the other, how intellectuals
are incapacitated to act politically and culturally in the
pursuit of "a politics of truth in a democratically respons-
ible society" (PPP: 304). In face of organized irresponsibility,
endangering both freedom and security,and of expropriation of
292
the intellectual worker from the means of effective communl-
cation, Mills realizes "why it is in politics that intellec- .....
tual sOlidarity and effort must be centered" (PPP: 299). In
,
order to cope responsibly with the problems of his life ex-
perience, the intellectual needs to relate himself to the
values of truth in political struggle. In White Collar he
focuses on how a new kind of patronage system for free in-
tellectuals has caused "a loss of political will and even
of moral hope" (WC: 144). In 1955 Mills points out that "the
intellectual ought to be the moral conscience of his society,
at least with reference to the value of truth, for in the
defining instance, that is his politics. And he ought also
to be a man absorbed in the attempt to know what is real and
what is unreal" (pPP: 611). In The Causes of the World War
Three (1958) Mills now addresses "neither to power elites
nor to people In general, but to those who are generally
aware of what is going on" (CWT: 8). To break the political
monopoly of the current powers as also TO break their mono-
poly of ideas, Mills directly calls upon the intellectuals
"to act at once politically and intellectually" (C\'lT: 137).
He now makes it clear:
It is our first task as an intellectual community
publicly to confront the new facts of history-
making and so of political responsibility and
irresponsibility (CWT: 139).
In the celebrated article, "The Decline of the Left," pub-
lished in 1959, Mills states that "in our present situation
of the impoverished mind and lack of political will, United
293
States intellectuals, it seems to me, have a unique opportun-
ity to make a new beginning. If we want to, we can be in-
dependent craftsmen" (PPP: 231). As a master political
ideologue and a left radical, he urges upon the intellectuals
'to offer alternative definition of reality.' In 1960,
Mills' conviction in the role of the intelligentsia as the
leading live agency of historical change becomes once more
solidified. He writes in Listen, Yankee that the revolution
in Cuba is "not a revolution made by labor unions or wage
workers in the city, or by labor parties, or by anything
like that" (LY: 46). The first moves were taken by young
intellectuals joined by the students. The Cuban revolution
"really began .... when a handful of these young intellectuals
really got together with the peasants" (LY: 46). Since 1958,
in Cuba "the peasnats have remained decisive, now the wage
workers have become very important too" (LY: 47). What is
interesting to note is that, whereas these quotes evidence
Mills' emphasis on the role of intellectuals as revolution-
aries, he does not rule out altogether the role to be played
by peasants and industrial workers. As he himself admits,
Mills was uncertain, accelerated by experiences in America,
Soviet Union, Hungary and elsewhere, about the role of the
peasantry and the working class as to their revolutionary
potential. This position differentiates Mills from Lenin,
and the reason of this basic difference is that, like Lenin,
Mills was never a revolutionary in the field of action. Of
course he was aware of this limitation. But Mills reminds us
294
that they should not be "bypassed." Alternatively he said:
"So far as structural change is concerned, these don't seem
to be at once available and effective as our agency any more.
I know this is a debatable point among us, and among many
others as well; I am by no means certain about it" (PPP: 255).
In place of a cultural apparatus, Mills argued in 1960 for
an alternative r!cultural apparatus, the intellectuals--as
a po s s ib Ie, immediate, radical agency of change" (pPP: 256)
An Assessment
By now it is probably evident that Mills' early op-
timism and later pessimism about the role of the working class
matches his early negativism and later positivism about in-
telligentsia as an alternative agency. By the same token,
it is also evident that, in spite of his predominant emphasis
on the political role of the intelligentsia, Mills does
neither underestimate nor rule out the potential ability of
political parties, the peasants or the working class to ini-
tiate and effect historical change. However, in whatever way
he might have justified his thesis, Mills has been SUbjected
to searching criticism fvom all quarters, regardless of their
political affiliation. There is no denying the fact that
Mills' theory suffers from a Platonic variety of elitism and
is, therefore, somewhat "closed," as I see it, in point of
politics of democracy for all. Warde says that Mills, as a
295
new Left, mistakes 'the prologue for the play.' The typical
failure of the new Left is that "they fail to grasp the un-
stable and transitory causes for the lethargy of the labor-
ing masses or to foresee the emergence of new conditions which
can transform the mood and movements of the labor into their
opposite" (Warde, 1961: 71). Thus "the error of the New
Left ~ ... consists in identifying and confusing the betrayals
of the labor bureaucracies with the disorientation these cause
in the ranks. The setbacks due to faulty leadership are read
as evidence of a congenial incapacity of the working class
to fulfill its historical mission" (Warde, 1961: 71). Apthe-
ker, another Marxist theorist, notes that one of his basic
failures, among others, is that "Mills' analysis of the poli-
tical situation within the United States leads him to rule
out any significant mass democratic movement for real reno-
vation and change " (1960: 80). Closely linked to this
is his "impatience with the imperfections and failures of
socialism. He tends to view socialism in exactly the same
terms as capitalism--and capitalism at its best and most
stable, as in Great Britain and the United States--forgetting
the centuries of political instability, terror and civil war
that marked the achievement of relative stabilization in the
Anglo-American world" (Aptheker, 1960: 81).
~ o m a Marxist point of view, as also viewed in the
general context, it appears in the reappraisal of Mills'
thesis that both Warde and Aptheker are correct by and large
296
in their respective assessment. But the point needed to be
emphasized is that Mills' was not focusing on the role of
intelligentsia as an agency of change from the Marxist point
of view.
7
He is not Marxist In the sense in which he has
been criticized, although it is contestable whether Mills'
thesis is basically compatible with the world realities of
today. He rather conceives of Marxism in a "plain" way, his
basic point being this:
Is there any doubt about this after Max Weber,
Thorstein Veblen, Karl Mannheim--to mention
only three? We do now have ways--better thari
Marx's alone--of studying and understanding m
man, society, and history, but the work of
these three is quite unimaginable without
his work (TM: 13).
Yet Mills believes that Marx's Marxism is as much a part of
European culture as is Italian Renaissance architecture. In
line with William Morris, Antonio Gramsci, Rosa Luxemberg,
G. D. H. Cole, Georg Lukacs, Christopher Caldwell, Jean-Paul
Sartre, John Strachey, Georges Sorel, Edward Thompson, Lezlo
Kolakowski, William A. Morris, Paul Sweezy and Eric Fromm,
Mills claims to be a plain marxist theoretically and intellec-
tually in the classic tradition. How far Mills, as he claims,
is a Marxist at least in comparison with some of those he
mentioned remains a question which needs to be answered in
the near future.
8
For the time being, Mills points out that
these plain marxists have stressed "the humanism of marxism,
especially of the younger Marx, and the role of the super-
structure in history; they have pointed out that to under-
297
emphasize the interplay of bases and superstructure in the
making of history is to transform man into that abstraction
for which Marx criticized Feuerbach" (TM: 97-98). More
specifically, as also politically, Mills joined Weber in
"rounding out" and revising Marxism. Neither to Weber nor
to Mills was the state a product of class antagonism, a
capitalist apparatus for human exploitation. Sounding like
Weber, Mills believes that "class struggle in the marxist
sense does not prevail" (TM: 126). In addition, "the dia-
lectical method' is either a mess of platitudes, a way of
double talk, a pretentious obscurantism--or all three"
(TM: 128-29 footnote). Evaluating Marx's influence on him,
Mills says: "We agree with Weber's evaluation of Marx's
emphasis upon the economic order in the modern capitalist
era: It is a heuristic choice which holds that the economic
order is the most convenient way to an of this
specific social structure. So much is fruitful in the Marx-
ist perspective .... " (ess: 384). It is in this plain marx-
ist perspective that Mills looked at the problem of historical
change, and this posture is thus different from the standpoint
of Warde's and Aptheker's criticisms. However Mills goes
beyond. He justifies, theoretically, the inadequacy of "the
labor metaphysic."
Behind the labor metaphysic and the erroneous
views of its supporting trends there are de-
ficiencies in the marxist categories of strati-
fication; ambiguities and misjudgements about
the psychological and political consequences
of the development of the economic base; errors
concerning the supremacy of economic causes within
the history of societies and the mentality of
classes; inadequacies of a rationalist psycho-
logical theory; a generally erroneous theory
of power; an inadequate conception of the
state CTM: 127).
298
It is this Mills' theoretical standpoint that confronts him
to face the Marxist criticism of Warde and Aptheker, who seem
to be on more solid grounds than Mills, and this renders his
thesis more vulnerable than he probably thought. Since his
Marxism amounts to some kind of "liberal Marxism,,,9 it is not
unreasonable for Schneider to say that "instead of calling
himself a 'plain marxist,' Mills should have said along with
Marx and in the precise sense that Marx meant it: 'I, at
least, am not a Marxist!!' (1963: 556). Anyway, Mills'
radicalism in his leftist posture of an ideologist includes
three distinct components: (1) the acceptance of the "Weber-
ian" marxism; (2) a "Veblenite" critique of American social
institutions; and (3) a "Mannheimian" utopianism of the role
of the intelligentsia. Precisely put, Mills as a Weberian
marxist poses concerns qf the Mannheimian intellectual through
the Veblenite terms in the post-industrial and corporate-
capitalist America. In fact Mills' thesis of the historical
agency of change has its genesis in two sets of circumstances.
In the first place, since liberalism, robbed of its classic
role, has become merely the ideology of legitimation in a
military-industrial complex and the decline of politics has
coincided with the rise and consolidation of the power elite,
Mills correctly thinks that the structural consequences of
299
capitalism are integrally connected with liberalism. He is
largely backed by evidence to find out that, on the one hand,
the labor leaders, once they are up in the public limelight,
join the axis of the national power elite, and that the work-
ing class movement, on the other, is more a failure than
success in promoting its supposed mission to initiate radical
changes that are long overdue. Therefore, Mills is left with
only one alternative, the intelligentsia. This reliance is
not simply an outcome of but surely related to his independent
radicalism that is embodied in his Leftism.
Secondly, Mills'
experience with the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the
Cuban revolution of 1958 in both of which the intelligentsia
took a leading political role along with the workers and
peasants led him to realize the intelligentsia's hidden po-
tential as the probable, at the same time effective and
powerful, prime mover of change. But it seems very difficult
to buttress Mills' ratiOnale for what may be called excessive
optimism about the intelligentsia which is usually and his-
torically constituted of the rank and file of the bourgeoisie.
To make the point clear, Mills' preference for the intelli-
gentsia, not as a substitute for the governing power elite,
but as a prime mover of historical change and as participants
In the joint cultural and political struggle thus automatical-
ly compels him, despite apparent truths of the apolitical
mass, to underestimate the potential political power of the
mass including the white collar workers. Thompson, a British
300
laborite, says in this context:
It is possible that when Wright Mills offers
the intellectual 'as a possible, immediate,
radical agency of change' he is thinking of
them, not as the leading agents of revolution,
but as the force which may precipitate a new
and initiate much broader pro-
cesses. In this case I am much closer to
agreement with him .... since it seems to me
to be a crucial role of socialist intellectuals
to do exactly this; and this in fact is what
is happening all around the world today. But
while socialist intellectuals may 'trigger
off' these processes, they will only defeat
and isolate themselves if they assume the
hubris of 'main agents,' since the kind of
socialism we want is one which is impossible
without the participation of the whole people
every level (Quoted in Warde, 1961: 76).
Regardless of the ambiguities in the concept of the whole
people, the conclusion that Mills has underemphasized the
role of the working class seems on all counts inescapable.
However, one should not forget that Mills was one of the very
few intellectuals who took up "the theme of the 'growing
together' of union bureaucracies and the controlling insti-
t uti 0 n s 0 f cap ita 1 ism" (H ym an, 19 7 3: 20). Hyman has correct-
ly evaluated him in this regard: "Mills was one of the few
prominent academic writers on industrial relations to dis-
play a basic sympathy for the underlying orientations of the
Marxist tradition. He was also very much in the minority in
his sensitivity to the dialectic between trade unions and
capitalist society" (1973: 21).
Mills' lack of emphasis on the potential political
role of the mass has also invited charges of elitism in his
call for intellectuals' participation in politics.
lO
Arti-
culating the charge of elitism in Mills' radical Leftism,
Schneider has the following to say:
In sum, Mills offers us a view of society that is
elitist in several senses. First, he views so-
ciety as dominated by a power elite. Second, he
calls upon an intellectual elite to influence
the men of power. Third, he sees in the power
elite not only a danger to mankind but, perhaps,
the only opportunity to avoid catastrophe. For
the power elite can really make and remake his-
tory as it chooses. In this respect, rule by
the power elite, dangerous as it is, may be pre-
ferable to rule by non-rational masses, open to
the influence of demagogues (1963: 562).
301
My own findings, however, point to the contrary.ll Schneider's
assessment of his radical politics is largely based upon his
misunderstanding of the spirit and tenor of the body poli-
tic of Mills' sociology. It certainly remains uncorroborated
by greater weight of evidence, and at the same time, it mis-
understands the over-all impact of Marx on Mills. It under-
values Mills' democratic aspirations. Lawrence Goldman has
also indicated that Schneider's assertion is a "distortion
of Mills' position." As a political sociologist Mills has justi-
fiably depicted that the power elite, despite differences of
opinion as to its magnitude and role or its internal cohesion,
exists and rules in the monopoly capitalist social structure
of America. What Mills means by saying that the power elite
retains the opportunity to make and remake history is that it
could have done so had it not been the case as it is in the
present. He makes it abundantly clear, often repititiously,
that the power elite are "crackpot realists" only interested
in continuing politics by other means: He does talk of
302
creating the Left establishment--international, insurgent
and consequential in scope and effect--independent of the
power elite and suggests such an establishment as "creates
and sustains a cultural and political climate, sets the key
tasks, the suitable themes, and establishes the proper canons
of value, taste and reality" (pPP: 221). In so far as the
role of the mass is concerned, Goldman nicely estimates
Mills' position in these words:
The mass could be transformed into a community
of publics if they rejected the politics of
drift and blind fate and tried to solve the
basic political problems of their society.
Mills did not regard this as a very likely
possibility but he would not have emphasized
the importance of reason in political affairs
or insisted on the need to control the cul-
tural apparatus if he did not believe that
the creation of a community of publics was a
vital task for the radical intellectual (1963:
342) .
The Millsian political role of the intelligentsia emphasizes
wholesale disaffection and radical dissent from politics of
status quo as practised by the higher circles or politically
immoral men of power. "He was not an eli tis t ," concludes
Goldman quite rightly, "but an intense democrat who believed
in the egalitarian the continuity of publics. This
ideal is the best hope for America, and Mills insisted that
the radical intellectual must take the responsibility upon
himself and point the way" (1963: 343). Whatever the con-
tinuities with or departures from the other members of the
Left, Mills' work represents more than a mere rebellion
deceit and irresponsibility of the power elite. Even
303
if one finds disconcerting caesura in the anti-intellectual-
ism of the 1950s or a lack of political issues at the presi-
dential election of the 1960s, as Macdonald saw, Mills was
consistently a Left in his political radicalism and in his
commitment to the cause of democracy. As a successor to
and a carrier of the values of the Enlightenment, Mills was
one of the very few exceptions to the usual style of life
manifest in most new Leftists in the fifties. "To take this
seriously," says Berman, "is to admit that C. Wright Mills
had some logic when he proposed the intellectual as the
immediate and radical agency of change. It need not be
reiterated that our cultural task is to make that kind of
change unnecessary" (1968: 32).
Notes
1. See Chapter 1, pp. 29-30.
2. Italics added.
3. For an elaboration of this point see Rousseas and
Farganis (1965).
304
4 . For example, see Johnson (1966: 99).
(1977) and Szymanski (1970).
See also Scimecca
5. Italics added.
6. For details of the rise of the masses and the mass
society, see Chapter 4 of this work.
7. Mills' differences with Marx on the theme of alienation
have already been discussed in Chapter 5, especially at
pp. 213-18. For an assessment, from a non-Marxist
point of view, of Mills' theory of the intelligentsia
as a change agent, see Bachrach (1967; 55-59).
8. As already been pointed out in Chapter 1, at pp. 13, 37
(note 3), Mills is Weberian rather than Marxian in all
his essential ideas.
9. The term "liberal Marxism" may sound contradictory.
Whatever it is, in using the term I have in mind the
fact that Mills was, unlike many liberal sociologists
of the Establishment, fully aware of the relevance in
soaiology of at least certain principles of Marxism
as a social theory.
10. One critique of Mills' position, not covered in this
work, can be found in Bachrach's The Theory of Demo-
cratic Elitism. Generally speaking he argues "that
democratic elitism, as an empirical theory, is basically
unsound; and that viewed normatively, it fails to meet
the essential political needs of twentieth century man"
(Bachrach, 1967: 9). Specifically in connexion with
Mills, he puts forward that despite Mills' "aversion
to 'men of power,' he could not bring himself to ad-
vocate the abolition of the power elite here and now"
(Bachrach, 1967: 57).
11. For elements of Mills' commitment to democracy, see
the next chapter, i.e., Chapter 8.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Democracy and Liberalism
Introduction
I have shown in different places of this work
l
that
many found elements of elitism in Mills' political
orientations or in his political sociology. While these
theorists are not entirely without some points in favor of
their accusation, it seems to me that despite his ap-
parent elitist tendencies, was at bottom a democrat, rather
a stubborn democrat. In this chapter, I specifically focus
on this issue, pointing to the different elements of his com-
mitment to democracy and liberalism.
The New Left as a Democrat
Beneath what appears to be contradictions in many of
his political sociological formulations, not necessarily
limited to the intelligentsia, the power elite, the mass
society, the organized irresponsibility, the collapse of both
liberalism and socialism and so on, there is
tl:'uth in life, i.e., Mills was a stubborn democrat. Be-
hind all his sociological themes this democratic tradition
is the most dominating fact. In actuality, Mills' lament
for the collapse of both liberalism and socialism has its
root in his unbounded faith in the heritage of the Enlighten-
305
306
ment and in a call for restoration of democracy in America.
Let me illustrate Mills' commitment to democracy in his own
words:
We should take democracy seriously and literal-
ly. Insofar as we accept the democratic heritage
--as not only our heritage but as of use and of
value to the world tomorrow--we must realize that
it has been a historically specific formation,
brought about by a set of factors, a union of pro-
cedural devices and ideological claims quite speci-
fic to Western civilization; and that it is now in
a perilous condition not only in the world but in
the West itself, and especially in the United
States of America (CWT: 1 4 0 ~ 4 1 .
Elsewhere,
We are free men. Now we must take our heritage
seriously. We must make clear the perils that
threaten it. We must stop defending civil liber-
ties long enough to use them. We must attempt to
give content to our formal democracy by acting
within it (PPP: 233).
Mills' commitment to democracy is unequivocal and total. It
is spectacular in view of doubts about democracy of such
classic sociological thinkers as Pareto, Mosca and Michels.
But at the same time he also resembles Weber and Durkheim or
Mill and Schumpeter in their commitment to the cause of de-
mocracy. For Mills, the Enlightenment is the main fount of
liberalism and Marxism, and in both the values of reason and
freedom coincide. In their turn they provide the content of
Mills' democratic tradition. Freedom and reason, the predom-
inant values of liberalism and Marxism, are not mutually ex-
clusive because he believes, not without reason, that increased
rationality is also a condition for increased freedom. On the
one hand, liberalism recognizes freedom and reason as the
307
supreme facts of the individual being. On the other, Marxism
gives central importance to man in the political making of
history for himself. However, as it would follow, Mills, as
a democrat, is a liberal in an ultimate choice between liberal-
ism and Marxism. Mills is aware that neither Mill examined
the kinds of political economy now arising in the world nor
Marx analysed the kind of society now in formation in the
socialist world. But, compared to the egalitarian classless
social tradition of Marx, Mills is rather on the side of the
representative democratic tradition of Mill. This becomes
evident in spite of Mills I concern that the fundamental values
of reason and freedom have become problematic as the ideological
mark of "The Fourth Epoch" in the social contexts of post-
industrial society. Put otherwise, Mills thinks "liberalism,
as a set of ideals, is still viable, and even compelling to
Western men" (pPP: 189).
Both liberalism and democracy are reciprocally inter-
linked political and social phenomena. Whereas democracy is
more often a form of government, it has roots in liberalism
as a set of political ideas and ideals.
2
Speaking historical-
ly, liberalism as a set of political and social orientations
has sustained democracy as a form of government since the
seventeenth century. However, it is unwise to make any rigid
dichotomy between the two concepts of democracy and liberal-
ism. In consonance with the tradition of the Renaissance and
the Reformation, the most fundamental assumption of liberal-
308
ism consists in viewing man as autonomous individual or as
the "masterless" man. Liberalism, therefore, attaches highest
value to the moral worth and equality of human personality.
Articulating in the Deweyan tradition of liberalism, Mills
says that it looks at "man as the measure of all things:
policies and events are good or bad in terms of their effect
on men; institutions and societies are to be judged in terms
of what they mean to and for the individual human being"
(pPP: 190). In order to develop his dormant potentialities
as fully as possible, liberalism is based ultimately upon
the postulate that the individual is the essential criterion
of all public policy and that he is the maker of his own life
fate. In this autonomous conception of man, there are two
essential ideals which constitute integral aspects of liberal-
ism: freedom and reason. Freedom for the autonomous individual
consists in the cherished fulfilment of his potentialities,
and this can only occur through The faith
on man's capacity to reason stresses his participation in
decision-making. In brief, "Based upon a conception of in-
dividuality that emphasized the autonomy of individual will,
the autonomy of human reason, and the essential goodness and
perfectability of human nature, liberalism was the political
expression of this individualistic Weltanschauung" (Hallowell,
1954: 70).
Mills' concept of man "as an actor in historic crises,
and of man as a whole entity," though rooted in intellectually
309
diverse traditions of James, Mead, Freud and Marx, is not
far removed from this classic liberal view of human nature.
Based on this concept of man, Mills superimposes his 'socio-
logical conception of fate.' Fate is not an universal con-
stant in man's life; neither is it rooted in the nature of
history nor in man's nature. It is intimately connected with
the specific,kind of social structure within which history-
making decisions, affecting life fates of individuals, are
made. This is to indicate that "the extent to which the
mechanics of fate are the mechanics of history-making is it-
self a historical problem. How large the role of fate may be,
in contrast with the role of explicit decision, depends first
of all upon the scope and the concentration of the means of
power that are available at any given time in any given
society" (CWT: 12-13). Conceived in this way, Mills argues
that modern social structures, especially those of the USA
and the USSR, offer unique opportunities to shaping human
fate and industry. The enormous enlargement and the decisive
centralization of all means of power and decision that ac-
companied the rise of industrial s9cieties have now become
unique means of history-making. In the Eighteenth Brumaire,
Marx writes: "Men make their own history, but they do not
make it just as they please; they do not make it under cir-
cumstances chosen by themselves, but rather circumstances
directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past"
(1959: 320).
Mills quotes Marx in order to emphasize the
310
circumstances when man is or is not the maker of his life
fate and history. But it is extremely important to note that
the underlined portions of Marx's statement are conspicuous
by its absence in Mills' quote. This indicates that Mills,
as a plain marxist, is averse to following the Marxian route
of dialectical inevitability of historical materialism.
3
For
certain, he appears to have taken 'inevitability' and 'fatal-
ism' synonymously, contrary to the intent of Marx or Engels.
Considering this aspect, Aptheker was right to observe: "The
inevitability of historical materialism is exactly the oppo-
site of fatalism--and only its position is the opposite, by
the way. The inevitablity of historical materialism is the
unfolding of human history not regardless of man's activity
but rather because of that activity" (1960: 73-74). What
appears apprently to be a misconception of or deviation from
this interpretation of Marxism on Mills' part is in fact in
conformity to his professed position as a "plain marxist."
Like Marx, Mills contends that 'men are free to make history';
but he immedaitely adds, in the context of modern overdevelop-
ed society, that "some men are now much freer than others to
do so, for such freedom requires access to the means of de-
cision and of power by which history can now be made" (CWT:
14) . And in this, Mills was haunted by the vision of the
historic capacity of man ingrained in a conception of the
Enlightenment. To quote Mills:
The facts about the newer means of history-
making are a signal that men are not necessar-
ily in the grip of fate, that men can now
make history (SI: 183).
311
In view of Mills' conception of man, as based upon the ideal
of the Renaissance or the Enlightenment, it is difficult to
sustain the argument that Mills is basically an elitist. On
the other hand, Mills' theory of democracy is closely connect-
ed with and proceeds upon this basic assumption of free man.
The essence of democracy consists in "the rehabilitation of
political life, making politics again central to decision-
making and responsible to broader publics." Mills defines
democracy in the following way:
By democracy I mean a system of power in which
those who are vitally affected by such decisions
as are made--and as could be made but are not--
have an effective voice in these decisions and
defaults (CWT: 118).
Elsewhere,
In essence, democracy implies that those vitally
affected by any decision men make have an effec-
tive voice in that decision. This, in turn,
means that all power to make such decisions be
publicly legitimated and that the makers of such
decisions be held publicly accountable (SI: 188).
To define democracy seems to be a futile task since
to date there is no all-accepted definition of this concept.
Macpherson has rightly indicated that "democracy has become
an ambiguous thing, with different meanings--even apparently
opposite meanings--for different peoples" (1974: 2). There
is no single definition that fulfills all criteria which are
spoken of by different theorists of democracy. In other
words, it is to say that, without attempting to discover its
technical deficiencies, Mills' conceptualization of demo-
cracy includes three components: first, persons affected by
312
binding decisions of men In power in the government should
have an effective voice, implying their 'consent' and volun-
tary 'participation' in the political process; second, power
exercised by the government must be publicly legitimated,
not necessarily implying in terms of mere constitutional
validity; and thirdly,'the decision makers must be account-
able to the publics. This aspect indicates what is called
the principle of public accountability, especially pOlitical
accountability. However, there are certain apparent de-
ficiencies in Mills' concept of democracy. For example, he
does not specify the ambit of 'public legitmation'; he does
not indicate how the policy makers could be made accountable
to the public; he does not specifically say how the present
acts of the government suffer from lack of legitimation;
again it is not enough to say that democracy is a system of
power since any system of government is always a system of
power. In democracy, it is people's participation that
counts most, and if so, then the question arises as to how
to maximize their participation. To be sure, Mills was not
concerned with problems of government or state as such.
Naturally, his theoretical limitations are easily understand-
able because after all he was a sociologist. On the other
hand, the point is whether or not Mills was a democrat, not
as a theorist but as a believer. If this is taken as the
starting point, it would seem that the corpus of his writings
indicates that he was a stubborn democrat. As a democrat,
313
Mills is very close to John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the best
known political theorist on representative democracy. At
horne, he has some parallels to Schumpeter, among others. All
of them--Mill, Schumpeter and Mills--believed in indirect,
or representative, form of democracy. But, it must be noted
here that Mills, like Mill, was not at all concerned as such
to defend how far, to what extent and when the representative
democracy is the most ideally suited form of government to best
serve the needs of the people. Instead, Mills started with
the primary acceptance of the superiority of representative
political institutions. With Schumpeter, Mills regards that
democracy is now a method, a kind of political institutional
arrangement. In this context it is fruitful to remember
Schumpeter's notion of democracy since it appears that Mills
has also been influential in his formulations of democracy.
Schumpeter says that "the democratic method is that institu-
tional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people's vote" (1962: 269).
His book, Capitalism, Democracy and Socialism was published
in 1942. Here he formulated a catalogue of conditions for
the successful functioning of democracy, and this catalogue
has a striking parallel in Mills'. Against this backdrop,
it seems worthwhile to discuss Mills, Schumpeter and Mill
together, although my own interest centers around Mills'
position only. Mills particularly mentions that "the poli-
314
tical structure of a modern democratic state requires
at least six conditions" (CWT: 118).
Elements of Mills' Commitment to Democracy
(1) The Existence of a Community of Publics: The idea of a
successful democracy presupposes the existence of a community
of publics who form discussion circles. In its turn, it en-
abIes people to carry opinion form one to another and helps
them participate in the struggle for power. In this sense,
"Congress or Parliament, as an institution, crowns all the
scattered publics." The existence of a community of publics
is, therefore, integrally linked with the idea of public opin-
ion as the ultimate source of all public legitimation. Speak-
ing of the liberty of thought and expression for the individ-
ual, Mill once remarked: "If all mankind minus one were of
one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion,
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one per-
son, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in
silencing mankind" (1951: 104). Mills' statement expresses
a vigorous political individualism, the utility of man's free-
dom of expression of opinion in a democracy. In Mills it
has a noteworthy reflection since he always considers that
freedom of political expression of the individual in the form
of public opinion provides an indispensable formal content to
democracy. Therefore, as Mills says, the first condition for
democracy "requires not only that such a public as is projected
315
by democratic theorists exist, but that it be the very forum
within which a politics of real issue is enacted
ll
(CHT: 118).
Public opinion initiates the free ebb and flow of discussion.
liThe possibilities of answering back, of organizing autonomous
organs of public opinion, of realizing opinion in action, are
held to be established by democratic institutions
ll
(PE: 298)
What Mills says of the public opinion is supplemented by
Schumpeter's observation made earlier: lI e ffective competition
for leadership requires a large measure of tolerance for
difference of opinion
ll
(1962: 295). As Mills understands,
the essence of democracy's success consists in organizing
an effective public opinion as the legitimating source of all
exercise of power by the government.
/
J
( 2 ) The Need for a Responsible Party System: For its success-
ful operation, democracy requires the existence of "national-
ly responsible parties which debate openly and c l e ~ l y the
issues which the nation, and indeed the world, now so rigidly
confronts" (CWT: 118). Mills' concern for an effective party
system was reflected in his review of Wilfred E. Binkley's
American Political Parties, published as far back as 1943.
Therein he notes with characteristic seriousness that the
political parties play important role in the making as well
as democratizing the public decisions in a democracy. Parties
decline with the number of compromises they make, and thus,
lithe idea of parties as representative of definite interests
becomes a fiasco" (Quoted in Gillam, 1966: 97).
316
( 3 ) The Indispensability of a Bureaucracy: Mill, Schumpeter
and Mills--all of them particularly recognize the importance
of a well trained, efficient and independent civil service
as an indispensable component of democracy. Schumpeter
pointed out,
"
democratic government in modern industrial
society must be able to command, for all purposes the sphere
of public activity is to include--no matter whether this be
much or services of a well-trained bureaucracy
of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense
of duty and a no less strong espirit de corps" (1962: 293).
Echoing this tradition, Mills considers that the success of
democracy "requires a senior civil service firmly linked to
the world of knowledge and sensibility and composed of skilled
men who, in their careers and in their aspirations, are truly
independent of any private--that is to say, corporation--
interests" (CWT: 118). Mills r emphasis on a public spirited
and merit based civil service also reminds us of Mill who
lent his support to the reform of the British civil service
through competitive public examinations in 1854.
( 4) The Requirement of an Independent Intelligentsia: To be
successful, democracy "requires an intelligentsia, inside as
well as outside the universities, who carryon the big discourse
of the Western world, and whose work is to and in-
fluential among parties and movements and publics. It requires,
in brief, truly independent minds which are directly relevant
to powerful decisions" (CWT: 118). It is now probably clear
317
that Mills' reliance on the intelligentsia as the prime mover
of historical change does not indicate elitism in his asp ira-
tions as a democrat. He does never say that the intelli-
gentsia is a substitute to take the place of the power elite
in the administration of the government or public business.
On the contrary, his reliance on the potential of the in-
telligentsia is a part of his intention, as a democrat, that
they should play the prominent part in the forefront of nation-
al politics in view of the decline of the publics, the working
class or the political parties. What Mills means, insofar
as its role is concerned, is that the intelligentsia, being
men of power by virtue of their knowledge, is better suited
to taking the initiative in the interplay of diverse poli-
tical forces in a democratic society. To be sure, he does
not intend, as Plato does in The Republic, to stratify the
intelligentsia as the political category of ruling class.
Therefore Mills' emphasis on the role of the intelligentsia
should be construed as part of his intellectual concern for
the establishment of a viable democratic society. In this
respect there is an excellent parallel between Mills and Mill.
The latter's enthusiasm ran so high as to lead him to suggest
even more than one vote to the educated intelligentsia.
Though Mill recognizes equal voting for all, he pointed out
this necessity of additional franchise in his Thoughts on
Parliamentary Reform:
if the most numerous class, which (saving
honourable exceptions on one side, or disgrace-
ful o ~ s on the other) is the lowest in the ed-
ucational scale, refuses to recognise a right
(5)
in the better educated, in virtue of their
superior qualifications, to such plurality of
votes as may prevent them from being always
and hopelessly outvoted by the comparatively
incapable, the numerical majority must submit
to have the suffrage limited to such portion
of their numbers, or to have such a distribu-
tion made of the constituencies, as may effect
the necessary balance between numbers and educa-
tion in another manner (Quoted in Robson, 1968:
226).
./
318
The Need for an Impartial Media: Mills' fifth condition
requires that "there be media of genuine communication which
are open to such men and with the aid of which they can trans-
late the private troubles of individuals into public issues,
and public issues and events into their meanings for the
private life" (CWT: 119). The unprecedented feats of science
and technology have revolutionized the domain of mass communi-
cation and have lessened the distance between the people and
government. In enlarging and broadening the forum of public
discussion, it possesses the unique opportunity to multiply
'the scope and place of personal discussion,' to 'encourage
competition of ideas,' to further 'the conventional dynamic
of classic democracy,' and finally, to stimulate 'the growth
of rational and free individuality. I Recognizing the import-
ance of mass media, the quintessence of any democracy in
large scale industrial societies, Mills goes on to say, "so
long as the media are not entirely monopolized, the individ-
ual can play one medium off against another; he can compare
them, and hence resist what anyone of them puts out. The
more genuine competition there is among the media, the more
319
resistance the individual might be able to command" (PE: 313).
In brief, mass media provide the necessary means of opinion
formation among the publics who, in their turn, make demo-
cracy function.
(6)
V
Pluralism as a Requirement: Lastly, "democracy certain-
ly requires, as a fact of power, that there be free associa-
tions linking families and smaller communities and publics
on the one hand with the state, the military establishment,
the corporation on the other. Unless such associations exist,
there are no vehicles for reasoned opinion, no instruments
for the rational exertion of public will" (CWT: 119). Demo-
cracy in the sense of a balance of constitutionally demarcated
rights and obligations between government and citizens re-
quires the plurality of associations--trade unions, cultural
organizations, educational or vocational institutions, centers
of professional activities, etc. that operate at various social
levels and act as countervailing powers. In large scale in-
dustrial societies, the need for a variety of free associa-
tions is felt in terms of the bureaucratic tendencies that
are characteristic of such societies and also in terms of
their political role in opinion formation and channelizing
the political power and processes ultimately towards the
values of democracy. That Mills was aware of the role of
voluntary associations as a condition for the operation of
democracy is, therefore, needless to mention.
320
In this regard, it is also worthwhile to take notice
of certain other prerequisites that are needed to make de-
mocracy viable in any society. Mills does not state them
as in a catalogue, but those are emphasized in his writings
here and there. Let me refer to some of them:
(7) The Role of Education: Mills mentions the role of liberal
education in the formation of a politically conscious commun-
ity of publics consisting of knowledgeable men. This pro-
vides the much-needed forum where they can participate in
the political debates that are really open and free. It
was.Mill who took the lead in relentlessly emphasizing the
role of education as the essential support of a stable and
progressive society. In Principles of Political Economy Mill
wrote: "The institutions for lectures and discussion, the
collective deliberations on questions of common interest,
the trades unions, the political agitation, all serve to
awaken public spirit, to diffuse a variety of ideas among
the mass, and to excite thought and reflection in the more
intelligent" (1973: 262). Reminding Mill's Inaugural Address
at St. Andrews University in 1967, Mills says, "Alongside
skill and value we ought to put sensibility, which includes
them both and more besides; it includes a sort of therapy in
the ancient sense of clarifying one's knowledge of one's self,
it includes the imparting of all those skills of controversy
with oneself which we call thinking, and ~ i t others which
we call debate" (PPP: 369).
As far as the political task of
321
public education is concerned, it aids lito make the citizen
more knowledgeable and thus better able to think and to
judge of public affairs" (PE: 317). Mills thus elaborates:
In a community of publics the task of liberal
education would be: to keep the public from
being overwhelmed; to help produce the dis-
ciplined and informed mind that cannot be
overwhelmed; to help develop the bold and
sensible individual that cannot be sunk by
the burdens of mass life (FE: 319).
In regard to the role of educational institutions ln the
popular participation in democracy, both Mill and Mills
were influenced by Tocqueville's analysis of democracy in
America.
(8) Moral Commitment as Prerequisite: Unlike Machiavelli,
both Mill and Mills stood for a politics that is based upon
morals. Both of them displayed the Platonic distaste for
any differentiation of politics from morality. 'Mill viewed
with concern, like Mills, that American social institutions,
unless reformed, might prevent the intellectual and moral
improvement of men. For Mill, the community, together with
its institutions, customs and ways of life, must be permeated
with morality. Pointing out the moralizing effects of state,
Mill says in his On Liberty:
The worth of a State, in the long run, is the
worth of the individuals composing it; and a
State which postpones the interests of their
mental expansion and elevation to a little
more of administrative skill, or of that sem-
blance of it which practice gives, in the
details of business; a State which dwarfs
its men, in order that they may be more docile
instruments in its hands even for beneficial
purposes--will find that with small men no
great thing can really be accomplished (1951:
229).
322
About Mills, Horowitz writes, he "personally was a man with
deep moral convictions; quite willing to stake his profession-
al reputation on the line in defense of these convictions"
(pPP: 14). And this personal morality in Mills also finds
reflection in public concerns. Reverberating Mill, he
says that "our moral level is now primarily a matter of
corrupting society" (PPP: 331). Individuals are at present
morally defenseless and politically indifferent. Mills thus
views that a mere "call for 'administrative reorganization'"
does not improve what he calls "a moral culture." Like Mill,
he believes that there is "in a democracy no dilemma on this
score, but a dialectic, in which the moral quality of both
men and institutions can be progressively improved" (PPP:
337) . In realization of the need for moral men and for
moralizing institutions Mills says, rather in a more caustic
terms that Mill:
Where there are moral men in immoral institutions,
you seek to improve the institutions. When there
are immoral men in moral institutions, you kick
the rascals out. When you are confronted by im-
moral men in immoral institutions, you follow
Jefferson's advice and revolt. If you are fortunate
enough to encounter moral men in moral institutions,
you seek to maintain them as a standard for other
areas of your public life (PPP: 337).
In particular defense of democracy, Mills says in positive
terms that "the moral quality of both men and institutions
must be progressively improved" (PPP: 338).
323
( 9 ) Commitment to Truth: Mills is in favor of a politics
of truth as the essence of all democracy. Here he also comes
to Mill for whom the role of intellect is the consistent
search for truth. In his Inaugural Address Mill says, liThe
most incessant occupation of the human intellect throughout
life lS the ascertainment of truth. We are always needing
to know what is actually true about something or other"
(Quoted in Robson, 1968: 154). This enables Mill to conceive
of the realization of his utilitarian ideal, the greatest
good of the greatest number, through continuous approximation
to truth. Basically as a sociologist, orientated in the
pragmatist tradition of Peirce and Dewey or in the sociology
of knowledge tradition of Mannheim, Mills approaches truth
"in terms of some accepted model or system of verification,"
which is not transcendental. On the one hand, Mills views
that truthfulness of propositions may be tested by the veri-
ficatory model generalized by Peirce and Dewey. On the other,
Mills learned from Mannheim that relativity of truth depends
on "the structure of consciousness in its totality" within
specific social-historical situations. Truth is therefore
a probability.4 The quest for truth is a perennial intellec-
tual concern for Mills. In the realm of politics, he carries
this lesson of the sociology of knowledge further and links
to the ends of his liberal democratic aspirations. In 1944
he opined that the political intellectual should pursue the
iipoli tic s of truth in a demo cra t ically res pons ible soc iety II
324
(PPP: 304). Fifteen years later, in 1959, he states cate-
gorically that "the p(])litics of truth" is the only possible
realistic politics open to the intellectuals.
(10) The Need for Representative Men: Mills, just as Weber
or Mannheim or Mill, also displays his profound concern for
what he calls lack of "Representative Hen" in America. The
problem is one of leadership. Stating his position on the
type of public man who might be a popular representative,
Mill said: "One who desires to be a legislator should rest
on recommendations not addressing themselves to a class, but
to feelings: and interests common to all classes: the simple
as well as the learned should feel him to be their representa-
tive; otherwise his words and thoughts will do worse than
even fall dead on their minds; will be apt to rouse in them
a sentiment of opposition" (Quoted in Robson, 1968: 236).
In brief, the free-floating representatives are the physicians
of the body-politic and, as leaders, elevate the moral and
intellectual standard of the citizenry, developing their
active capacities and strengthening protection against tyran-
ny and class welfare. In Mills this tradition continues.
also feels the need for a set of Representative Men "whose
conduct and character are above the taint of the pecuniary
morality, and who constitute models for American imitation
He
and aspiration" (PPP: 337). For the quality and the mainten-
ance of representative institutions, these Representative Men
are the political leaders vested with the task of improving
325
moral and intellectual standards of people. They are to demand
moral change by dramatizing moral issue of public affairs.
In the light of the Watergate scandal that is yet to evaporate
from the memory of the American public, Mills is not without
reason when he laments that "we are today a leaderless demo-
cracy" (pPP: 337). "If public officials are to be morally
responsible, there must also be a sense of morally political
purpose. For in politics those who have no moral beliefs are
likely to become the tools of those who do" (pPP: 336). It
is in this sense that Mills' Representative Men are also moral
men, that political intellectuals are moral men and that de-
mocracy is meaningless without moral ends. To sum up:
It is to create, to force, to make articulate
such crises that Representative Men would find
one major role in a democracy. Being men of
conscience, they would stand up to corrupting
institutions and thus become the pivots around
which these institutions could be redirected.
But they could not do that if they were not
sustained by a morally oriented movement ....
I do believe that the creation of such Repre-
sentative Men sbould be a major aspiration of
our collective political life. For only the
presence of such men, and the moving conditions
for their maximum influence, could change the
sourness of the higher immorality into the
everyday sweetness of a morally free society
(PPP: 338).
Mill and Mills: Few Points of Contrast
The broad purpose behind this preceding comparison of
Mills with Mill is that it illustrates how Mills, primarily a
326
sociologist, shared many of the fundamental democratic aspira-
tions of Mill, the classic exponent of representative demo-
cracy. Both were afraid of moral, intellectual and, ultimate-
ly, political stagnation of representative democracy in their
respective societies. However, it is now necessary to in-
dicate certain discontinuities between the two. Quite under-
standably, since Mill is a political theorist, he is more
comprehensive than Mills. Though both were radicals in their
styles of thought and shared similar reformist zeal, Mills'
realization of the political role of public opinion and of
parties seems to place him in a unique position compared to
that of Mill. Though none of them had any political affilia-
tion, they differed much on these points. Mill values the
worth of the freedom of expression or the liberty of political
dissent for the citizen. But, unlike Bentham or Mills, he
is sceptic about the public opinion. For Mill, the rule of
public opinion virtually means the rule of the majority, and
in the political circumstances of realistic politics, the
majority is intolerant of any other opinion but its own. So
he can write: "The majority have not yet learnt to feel the
power of the government their power, or its opinions their
opinions. When they do so, individual liberty will probably
be as much exposed to invasion from the government, as it al-
ready is from public opinion." ( Mi 11, 1 9 5 1: 9 4) . Therefore,
Mill ultimately comes to realize that "in politics it is
almost triviality to say that public opinion now rules the
world" (1951: 165).
Mills was not unaware of Mill's anxiety
327
about the tyranny of the majority. In addition, he also knew
Mill's elevation of the selfless, public-minded, knowledge-
able and conscientious few in the forefront of democratic
politics against the obvious mediocrity of the majority.
Mill points to them as "the tribunal of the specially in-
structed" or the "intellectual benefactors of humanity."
This only parallels Mills' primacy attached to the intelli-
gentsia. Despite all these and other similarities with Mill,
Mills recognizes the indispensability of public opinion in
the functioning of democracy, as e v i d e ~ t at least, by his
lament for the transformation of the community of publics
into a community of masses. However, both of them typically
share what might be called some sort of political inability
of the general mass to be the real rulers in the regime of
democracy. But that Mills was in favor of restoring the
public to the seat of legitimate power is much evident in
his analysis of the decline of American democracy. Closely
related to Mill's apprehension of the quality and role of
public opinion was his negative opinion towards political
party system. In fact Mill had no love for it. One immediate
reason is that in his time political parties were looser
bodies than what we find today. However, in spite of this,
Mill always emphasized popular participation in the political
processes of democracy. As Duncan remarks, "Mill, who
certainly had little of Dahl's enthusiasm for party and in-
328
t r s ~ group competition, did believe strongly that continu-
ous participation in political life, even by men who were
initially selfish and short-sighted, would bring about greater
agreement and close community ties than had previously existed"
(1973: 271). Insofar as Mills is concerned, he repeatedly
points out that political parties have much to do with func-
tioning of democracy. Although he was critical of the parties
as they worked in America, Mills strongly believed in the
parties as leading agent and catalyst of political sociali-
zation for the people in general and also as mechanism that
would shape decision-making at various policy levels of demo-
cratic government. At the level of social change, while Mill
favored gradualism, Mills believed in radicalism and, there-
fore, wanted immediate restructuring of American society
within the democratic framework. However, Mills was quite
aware of the hindrances to the resurgence of democracy in
America. As he reminded:
I do not believe that these six conditions can be
brought about so long as the private corporation
remains as dominant and as irresponsible as it
is in national and international decisions; I do
not believe that they can be brought about so
long as the ascendancy of the military, in per-
sonnel and in ethos, is as dominant and as poli-
tically irresponsible as it is; and certainly they
cannot be brought about without filling the poli-
tical vacuum that is now the key fact of U.S.
politics (CWT: 119-20).
An Assessment
Any conclusion of Mills' position as a democrat seems
to be a negative one, no matter how authentic h ~ was in his
/
/
democratic aspirations. In terms of realpolitik, Mills'
democratic visions of American democracy remain an utopia
far beyond immediate possibilities of any realization.
329
As a democrat he shares, as already noted, the values
of classic socialism and liberalism, especially the latter.
With Weber and Durkheim, on the side of sociology, and Mill
and Schumpeter, on the side of political theory, Mills ex-
hibits his manifest conviction in the basic superiority of
the democratic ideal as the most utilitarian arrangement of
power sharing between the rulers and the ruled. He is not
a democrat in the sense of what he calls "liberal rhetoric."
Speaking theoretically, he pegan his intellectual odyssey
with virulent criticism of liberalism, especially that of
pragmatist tradition of Peirce, James and Dewey. Approach-
ing Peirce on a social psychological level, Mills criticized
him on the ground that "he did not have a worked-out view of
politics" (SP: 194--95). James, to whom Mills owes his hu-
manism, moralism and the reverence for truth, was an apolo-
gist of war, a "conservative" and a protagonist of "laissez-
faire." In estimating him, Mills was quick to point out that
he was "at bottom conservative. In his pronouncements on
morals, family life, and temperance this is true. In religion,
the only thing not conservative about his view, the only thing
original is his explanation, the grounds on which he justi-
fied theism. In political matters we have seen that his in-
dividualism was bound to place his weight with the regnant
laissez-faire attitude. On economic and political questions
he was usually in the classic liberal position" (SP: 273).
330
However, it was In criticism of Dewey's pluralistic relativism
that Mills elaborated his concern for unequal power distribu-
tion in the modern industrial-democratic society. On the
one hand, it is a kind of "politics of reform of situation."
On the other, Dewey's biological model of action and reflec-
tion "serves to minimize the clevage and power divisions
within society." (SP: 382). Commenting on the limitations
of pragmatism, Mills' first love according to Horowitz, he
states that politically "pragmatism is less expediency than
it is a kind of perennial mugwump confronted with rationalized
social structures" (SP: 394). Elsewhere he repeats: "As
a method, pragmatism is overstuffed with imprecise social
value; as a social-political orientation, it undoubtedly has
a tendency toward opportunism" (PPP: 167).
In his discussion of the prospects of a new individual-
ism, Alexander makes a suggestive remark: "liberalism, if
it is to pursue its historic ideals, must become radical"
(1972: Ill). By the late 1960s, like many, Mills fought to
break with the liberal establishment; protested against the
merger of political-corporate power system; attacked the manl-
pulative system of pseudo-politics; bemoaned for growing poli-
tical apathy of the intellectuals, the mass and the working
class; and finally, sought a remedy in resuscitation of demo-
cratic reason and freedom for the modern man in the confines
of the technological society. In trying to reinstate "the
image of the self-cultivating man as the goal of the human
331
being,1I to overcome social, technological and bureaucratic
rationality as lIa means of tyranny and manipulation, a means
of expropriating the very chance to reason, the very capacity
to act as free man,1I to warn against the advancing menace of
the soft cell of the managerial-technological-welfare and
warfare society as successor to gospels of the New Deal,
Mills indeed became a radical. Rather he became what may be
called lithe radical liberal.
IIS
Or, in other words, he turned
\ -""
into !fa democratic Left.
1I6
This is the reason why he wrote
on the decline of the Left and appealed to the democrats in
the leftist tradition. Suggesting in broadest terms the ob-
jectives of a realistic politics of truth, Mills summarizes
the tasks lying ahead of all:
In summary, what we must do is to define the
reality of the human condition and to make our
definitions public; to confront the new facts
of history-making in our time, and their mean-
ings for the problem of political responsibility;
to release human imagination by transcending the
mere exhortation of grand principle and opportun-
ist reaction in order to explore all the alter-
natives now open to the human community (PPP: 23S).
But, tragically though, it remains more an ideal, an
utopian vision for changed self and society. Despite reform-
ist postures and Leftist offensives, the triumphant march of
corporatre"capitalism, the liberalized democracy and bureaucra-
tized state apparatus has remained and has grown unhindered.
Smith has said that lithe collapse of liberalism might well
lie in the future, but it is not the impending doom or the
imminent inevitability of t11e near future
rt
(1972: 88). In all
332
probability, it lS more than a prophesy. The question, how-
ever, remains the same which Mills himself raised in 1942:
As government and business become increasingly
interlocked, economic questions will more and
more become: who is to staff the points of
political decision in governmental hierarchies
and pinnacles? The new questions of freedoms
and securities must be put in the fore of these
decisions for today "the political freedom
of free enterprise
ll
means the power of Corpora-
tions over and within the state (PPP: 186).
Considered in the Millsian terms, the political problem of
unfreedom has become even more acute in the days subsequent
to Mills' death in 1962. I have already drawn attention to
the chain of developments in America. American society is
now variously designated as "Warfare State" (Cook, 1972"
"Pentagonized Society" (Bosch, 1968), "The Contract State"
(Neiburg, 1970), "The Garrison Society" (Dibble, 1968),
"Weapons Culture" (Lapp, 1969), etc.7 In fact, these de-
velopments are not so much a pointer to the crisis of de-
mocracy as it is to that of capitalism within which demo-
cracy has been dissolved or is, at least, in the process of
dissolution. In a capitalist society where liberty lS a func-
tion of the ownership and possession of property, the im-
portant question which Mills should have asked, is not
"whether democracy will survive, but whether capitalist de-
mocracy will survive, for that is the system which is attack-
ed" (Laski, 1933: 185). Mills, being on the side of Mill,
failed to understand that liberal democracy, in changed cir-
cumstances of modern times, would have to be revised in order
333
to resolve its built-in contradiction, "the contradiction
between equal freedom to realize one's human powers and
freedom of unlimited appropriation of others' powers, or
between the maximization of powers in the ethical sense and
the maximization of powers in the descriptive market sense
.... " (Macpherson, 1973: 23). How far, if at all, this con-
tradiction can be resolved is one question. If resolved,
whether it will remain "liberal" is another. But insofar as
current developments within advanced capitalist societies in-
cluding the US are concerned, they point unmistakably at
least to one uniform pattern: ever increasing accumulation
of private economic power and a concomitant rise of the state
as a guardian and protector of the dominant economic interests.
In a situation like this even the success of the reformist
proposal for a participatory democracy inVOlving "a down-
grading or abandonment of market assumptions about the nature
of man and society, a departure from the image of man as a
maximizing consumer, and a great reduction of the present
economic and social inequality" (Macpherson, 1977: 115), seems
to be quite remote. For, the growing "unequal economic
power, on the scale and of the kind encountered in advanced
capitalist societies, inherently produces political inequality,
on a more or less commensurate scale, whatever the constitu-
tion may say" (Miliband, 1976: 237). The prospect of democracy
then recedes in face of mounting tensions between economic
and political equality in the capitalist contexts of the
334
society. The democratic state fully emerges as a capitalist
state with the function of sustaining and maintaining a class
structure and relations of production suited to the pre-
dominance of private ownership of property and capitalistic
competition. In the epoch of "late capitalism," to borrow
Mandel's (1975) phrase, the state also becomes repressive,
revealing the "seamy side of derfIocracy!! (cf. Wolfe, 1973).
Whatever the other results that might follow, the people are
increasingly separated from centers of democratic participa-
tion. In the crisis of capitalism, while the democratic
form of the state is maintained, its democratic content
suffers constant erosion. commenting on the growing conflict
between capitalism and democracy in America, Reich and Ed-
wards go on to say the following:
The isolation of government from the electoral
system, the capitalists' financial weight with
both parties, and the sterility of the present
two-party system have wrung from American govern-
ment much of its democratic content. Many civil
liberties and personal freedoms remain, but the
basic elements of democratic government--consent
of the governed and control of the government by
popular majority--have been seriously eroded
(1978: 53).
Against this backdrop of all these developments, what remains
of American democracy or of Mills' vision for a democratic
society based on values of classic liberalism? Insofar as
Mills' position as a democrat is concerned, it seems that
posterity would remember him ultimately as a humanist. His
success lies in the rebirth and rejuvenation of democratic
ideals of reason and freedom that now form the inexhaustible
335
fountain of radical protest. With full knowledge of the
constraint of bureaucratized liberalism to contain and sub-
vert "the humanistic tradition with greater and more stream-
lined ease" (Smith, 1972: 83), let us wait to see how soon
Lasch proves right in what he says in conclusion of his own
essay:
The post-industrial order, far from transcending
the contradictions inherent in capitalism, em-
bodies them in an acute form. Having outlasted
its principal historical function--that of capi-
tal accumulation--the system of privately owned
production for profit can only survive by devot-
ing itself more and more to the production of
waste. Yet the social effect of waste is to
generate mounting political tensions. How these
tension will be resolved--whether in the long
run they will furnish the basis of a socialism
of abundance or whether efforts to resolve them
will usher in a new age of barbarism--no one can
say with any confidence. What can be said is
that the post-industrial order is an inherently
unstable form of society. There are good reasons
to think that it may not even survive the twen-
tieth century (1972: 47-48).
Notes
1. See Chapter 4, pp. 161-63; also Chapter 7, pp.
2. Although not directly relevant here, I agree with
Macpherson who says that "it was the liberal state
that was democratized, and in the process, democracy
was liberalized" (1974: 5).
3. I have already made the point clear in Chatper 7 at
pp. 296-98.
336
4. For further discussion on Mills' views about truth, its
origin or nature, see Chapter 3, especially pp. 89-91,
96-97.
5. The epithet has been taken from Kaufman (1968).
6. See Harrington (1968b) for an assessment of American
social developments from the viewpoint of the democratic
Left.
7. For further discussion on these developments, see
Chapter 6, pp. 265-67.
CHAPTER NINE
Conclusion
Having finished the main burden of the work, I now
propose, in this concluding chapter, to accomplish two re-
maining tasks. First, I intend to summarize the main find-
ings of this work, indicating also Mills' contribution to
sociology in general. Second, I undertake a critical assess-
ment of his radical political sociology, pointing out some
of its major deficiencies.
Summary of the Findings
(A) The basic importance of Mills as a sociologist, it seems
to me, lies in his over-all contributions to the different
areas of modern sociology. As already pointed out in the
first chapter, the importance of Mills as a sociologist or
pOlitical sociologist does not consist solely in his thesis
of the power elite. This is to say that his reliance on the
concept of power or his use of the thesis of the power elite
does not exhaust his other basic contributions to the differ-
ent areas of sociology, although there is a distinct tendency
among many sociologists to overstate Mills' position as a
theorist of power or power elite. This becomes quite evident
if one focuses, as I have done throughout this work, on his
337
338
t
con trikll_tions in other areas such as his cri tique of Pars ons
or abstracted empiricism, sociological methodology, mass

(B) In Chapter 2, I have shown that an important contribution
of Mills' lies in his demonstrating how Parsons' sociology
is a sociology of legitimation of, and status quo for, the
corporate capitalist society of America. In this demonstra-
tion, Mills was one of the earliest and leading sociologists
who broke with the mainstream currents in academic sociology.
This has the rise of the opposing
current, the radical point of view, in modern American socio-
logy.
(C) Mills' methodological contributions, made out in Chapter 3,
are quite unique. Many of the issues he dealt with are cer-
tainly not beyond controversy. But, in general, they attest
to his methodological consciousness of the discipline and are
significant in laying foundation for a humanistic sociology.
Needless to mention, his discussion of the issues of sociology
of knowledge, values and objectivity, quantification, role of
historical dimension in sociology, and the role of problem
consciousness is quite significant. In this connexion, it
may also be added that his critique of modern empiricism has
become theoretical basis of the radical, and sometimes Marxist,
attack on the establishment sociological theory and research. -,-'
Mills' concept of the ;?()_ciological imagination and his re-
search strategy of sociological craftsmanship have now become
rules of methodological guidance for many of the recent socio-
)
339
logists.
(D) Mills' theses of the power elite, the rise of the mass
A.gciety, and the advent of alienation in modern industrial and
social life of man are powerful weapons with which he launched
his onslaught against corporate capitalist institutions of
American society. There is no need to repeat the point that
Mills' thesis of the power elite has been very much influential
in stimulating, in modern sociology or political science,
critical debates about the trends of power distribution in
American society. Its importance is quite well known. Mills'
theory of mass society (Chapter 4), as I have constructed it
out of ~ i f f r n t elements in his writings, is no less important
as a heuristic device for assessing the mass life of individuals
in a society dominated by elites in power. While his theory
of mass society lS not necessarily scientific in view of its
lack of coherent or logical postulates, it nevertheless pro-
vides a diagnosis of the emergent social order in America.
In Mills' political sociology, the concepts of mass society
and alienation appear as interrelated aspects of societal
developments that have taken place since World War II. Insofar
as the different aspects of alienation are concerned, as I
/
discussed in Chapter 5, it is apparent that Mills is not a
systematic theorist comparable to the position of Marx. Al-
though he agreed with Marx on a number of aspects regarding
the origin or nature of the problem of alienation, he differed
fundamentally from Marx in not
context of political economy.
"fT' F"'\ 1.1' 'r'"'I ".
Y -L.. IV VY .J... LL 15 alienation from the
Since he was more Weberian, he
340
relied on other variables in addition to its capitalist contexts.
Whatever it is, my own finding is that Mills attached, like
Marx, central importance to the problem of alienation in modern
industrial society. What is really significant in this con-
nexion is that Mills revealed, unlike Marx, more dimensions
of the problem of alienation.J /ci'
(E) In Chapter
c
U , wherein I discuss the ingredients of Millsi
political sociology, demonstrates that Mills is fundamentally
a problem-centered sociologist. He conceives of his political
sociology in terms of what he calls private troubles and public
issues; at the same time, it is oriented to the goals of poli-
tical liberalism, that is, attainment of reason and freedom
for all. Here Mills' uniqueness, as a political sociologist,
consists in three things: Fir.st, it is now widely acknowledged
that sociological theory or research should be guided by what
he termed as "the sociological imagination." My investiga-
. ,
tions have illustrated how this concept can be fruitful in
sociological or social analysis. Second, Mills has tried, at
least in his own way, to link sociology to political goals
of liberalism. No matter whether one accepts a sociology
based on political liberalism, it is clear that Mills fought
and stood for it. In this he was quite open and explicit.
h i r d ~ Mills' views on war, militarism, capitalist imperial-
ism or private troubles and public sissues in regard to mar-
riage and the family or metropolis have largely stood the test
of time.
It is my impression that many of Mills' ideas are
still valid and will continue to remain valid.
341
(F) An important characteristic of_Mills' political sociology
is that it is not only radical but also Leftist in orientation;
at the same time, although his is a liberal sociology, it is
Qat simply based upon liberalism pure and simple. In Chapter
7 I have shown that Mills' political sociology, though based
on premises of liberalism, is sharply different from other
varities of liberal political sociology in
that Mil18
- - .,e-- -r - -
Leftism as a component of sociological tasks. In other words,
he criticizes the existing corporate institutions, attacks
their status quo and stands for immediate restructuring of
the society within the framework of democratic values and
ideals. His preference for the intelligentsia as an agency
of historical change, which has invited charges of
is not a sudden appearance. This is also true of
his disillusionment with the working class. As a matter of
fact, Mills' early optimism and later pessimism about the role
of the working class matches his early negativism and later
positivism about the intelligentsia as an alternative agency
of change. My own findings indicate that Mills' disillusion-
ment with the working class was due primarily to two reasons:
first, Mills' orientations in pragmatism, liberalism and his
acceptance of the Weberian evaluation of Marx are one important
reason; second, he was rather a prisoner of circumstances in
the sense that he saw how labor leaders or labor bureaucracy
gradually become integrated with the national power elite.
Similarly, it has been found that Mills' reliance on the in-
telligentsia is not a simple case of personal preference but
rather a consequence of a chain of events and a series of
experiences. Therefore, charges of elitism against him can
only be made with risks.
(G) I have shown, in Chapter 8, that Mills was at heart a
liberal democrat who believed in its classic values. His
faith in democracy is quite comparable to that of Mill, who
lS considered to be the best theorist on representative in-
stitutions. I called Mills "a stubborn democrat." My own
342
enumeration of the different elements of his commitment to
democracy makes this characterization all the more compelling.
While this rules out charges of elitism against Mills, I have
also found that his democratic visions of American society
are likely to remain an utopia in view of subsequent develop-
ments there. Mills failed to realize that the crisis of
democracy is a crisis of capitalism; he also failed to realize
that growing economic inequality In capitalism cannot bring
about political equality for all in the society. In general,
it seems to me that Mills failed to appreciate the consequenoes
of growing conflict between capitalism and democracy.
(H) A final point need to be added here. It is my impression,
having done this work, that Mills' sociological contributions
are of wide-ranging scope and diversity. In him, there flows
a rich intellectual tradition; he is a carrier of several
currents of sociological tradition. As I see, Mills is a
link between classic sociology and modern sociology. In this
sense his sociology represents an integrating point between
classic sociology and modern sociology.
343
A Critique of Mills' Radical Political Sociology
The signal contribution of Mills, in contrast to the
conservative and consensual Weltanschauung of the mainstream
sociologists, consists in the fact that he provides a radical
break which, in later years, became the fountain source of
radical school of modern sociology.l While this constitutes
a noteworthy achievement of Mills and thus entitles him to
a place in the history of modern sociology, it is also true
at the same time that his political sociology from
s",rious theoretical and methodological deficiencies. Both
liberals and Marxists have subjected Mills' political socio-
logy to searching criticism. Let me illustrate this, while
drawing my own conclusions.
Shils, a noted liberal sociologist, considers that
Mills' scheme of sociology, centering around society, history
personality, leads to a kind of "hyper-political histori-
cism." On the one hand he thinks that Mills' "recommenda-
tion that sociologists help ordinary men to translate their
'private troubles' into public issues is reminiscent of the
Marxian idea of 'false consciousness' and its transformation
into 'class consciousness' through the adoption of the Marxian
outlook" (Shils, 1961: 612 footnote). Whereas this statement
reflects a liberal reaction to Marxism in general, he accuses
Mills, on the other hand, of concentrating too much on power.
Somewhat one-sidedly he remarks: "But in our present condi-
tion, where power is and the 'troubles' which occur in sub-
344
systems (' Milieux'?) are functions of 'public' events, these
lesser phenomena are not worth studying except as emanations
of that all-creative essence: power" (Shils, 1961: 614).
Aptheker, a Marxist theorist, accuses Mills of "moderation-
ist-liberal" approach and of an exaggeration of "the univers-
ality of the defeat of reason in the social sciences" in
America. Mills' limitations in the analysis of capitalist
social structure and its accoutrements--depression, unemploy-
ment, war-making, male supremacy, inhabitable cities--are
apparent because his "main point is not the substantive cri-
tique of the status quo; it is, rather, to insist upon the
social roots of what appear to be and so often are labeled
purely personal problems or difficulties" (Aptheker, 1960: 99).
A more direct criticism has been made by Warde who contends
that Mills' faith in the endurance of capitalist sovereignty,
his underestimation of the role of labor and an acceptance
of the predominant economic and political conditions of the
past have debarred him to expect "countertendencies" and "fresh
advances of the anticapitalist forces" in the capitalist
economy of the US.
His thinking was a mass of contradictions.
Repelled by the decay of liberalism and its
apology for capitalist reaction and militarism,
he nevertheless adhered to its fundamental
pragmatic method of approach to the major so-
cial processes of our epoch. He was attracted
by socimlism but could not accept its scienti-
fic doctrine. He was a partisan of the Latin-
American revolution who had no faith in a North
American revolution. He opposed the autocracy
of the Power Elite and aspired to a rebirth of
democracy in our country. But he despaired
of the capacities of the working people to
clear the way for its realization (Warde, 1962: 95).
The validity of this characterization of Mills' political
orientation and his coiology derives from the fact that he
either turned to classic masters who were old liberals or
conservatives, or attempted to work out a theoretical syn-
thesis between Weber, Marx and pragmatist liberalism. The
345
result has not been satisfactory and the failure is especial-
ly visible in that he, despite his attempt to stretch dem9-
cratic liberalism to its maximum point of radicalism, ends
up eventually with political liberalism and envisages all
radical changes within the order.
2
His
simplistic adherence to "plain marxism" and antipathy for
revolutionary role of the labor or the masses had its impact
on the content of his political sociology. It is of no sur-
prise that Mills' eclectic program fails to produce any "pO_
litically-credible synthesis" of Weber, Marx and pragmatism
(cf. Binns, 1977: 141). At the same time the big range socio-
logy, which follows from and is built upon Mills' conception
of a problem-oriented political sociology, has come under
severe attack:
.... much of the new sociology is over-ambitious,
pretentious, even downright shoddy, sometimes
journalistic in the worst sense and only held
together by the distorted simplifications of the
ideologically blinkered. The stakes are raised.
The good is superb, the bad is appalling, the
average is poor; it is easier to come to grief.
The have no conception of ..
utopla In WhlCh freedom, reason and responslblilty
are permanently secured for all men. They may
bedazzle with striking phrases but they proclaim
no eschatology (Bryant, 1976: 311).
346
My own findings indicate that this criticism is too much to
be said of Mills or any other sociologists in the radical
tradition. If it is at all applicable, in which case it tends
almost to nullify the claim of the radicals to conceive of
sociology anew and restructure society accordingly, the same
also holds good for establishment-liberal brand, probably
to a greater extent. The truth of the matter is that both
establishment sociology and Mills' variant are committed,
though in varying degrees in terms of their respective theo-
retical emphases and ideological orientations, to the
J/
reformist tradition. ( Mills' sociology ,takes the side of a
"----..
new social order when it criticizes the existing societal
status quo; it calls for, though in vague terms, basic struc-
tural changes; focuses often social psychologically rather
than structurally on the major social problems; and, finally,
develops a theoretical standpoint, as distinct from social
pathology framework, in dealing with those problems. It also
proposes to be "an action sociology," "a humanistic sociology"
or even "a long range sociology." In spite of these plus
points, whereby it gains advantages over mainstream sociology
and draws popular support of the younger generation of socio-
logists, Mills' political sociology is likely to remain a
perspective, a rising but not a dominating tendency, in socio-
logical enterprise. Its thrust on the immediacy of action
does not in fact radically alter the non-radical character
' ......'-,
\
of his sociOlogy.3) Its so-publicized radicalism finds expres-
sion only in proposals of reformism, and that too within a
347
framework of, as I see it, "limited conflict" conception.
In practical terms it advocates institutional-structural
changes and speaks of, politically, individualistic rehabili-
tation of reason and freedom. Its programs are ad hoc and
eclectic. It borrows from and is in turn strengthened by
Marxism but it rarely rises above mere acceptance of certain
Marxian humanist or social psychological fundamentals. One
can also find in Mills' political sociology a conception that
modern monopoly capitalism could be turned into a democratic
ethic of equal opportunities for all in the United States.
Compared to Marxism as a social theory, Mills' radical poli- \
tical sociology neither offers a science of society nor takes)
I
I
into account objective, structrual and material forces deter-
mining the formation of the society or polity. At the same
time a conception of sociology that is obligated to translate
the personal troubles of the milieu into the public issues of
social structure unnecessarily delimits the range of socio-
logical imagination Ccf. Shils, 1961: 619). It is not an
objective analysis of social structure but results in an
exhortation of, as I call it, a moralistic individualism. Its
stress on the role of history does not fully conform to the
way in which it analyses contemporary problems; the relevance
of its idealized version of the role of reason and freedom to
the current capitalist structural realities inside or out-
side of America is also questionable. Within such realities
men are seldom free enough either to make their own history
348
or to establish the democratic regime of reason and freedom.
Thus both mainstream and Mills' sociology can be seen as, in
the words of Sklair, "sociological utopias fulfilling differ-
ent but complementary functions."
Now 'Radical' sociOlogy is best understood in
terms of a relatively unrealizable utopia pre-
cisely because the social order towards which
it points has no scientific basis as such. ~ ~ ~
talk about disalienating mankind, restoring u ~
man dignity, putting an end to inequalities and
misery without reference to the particular forms
of economic exploitation characteristic of so-
cieties in which labor and capital (private or
state) are in antagonistic relations, is indeed
more Or less utopian (Sklair, 1977: 64).
The radical sociology of Mills mistakes the contradictions of
capitalism as mere reformable failings; for example, the ad-
vent of mass society and its accompanying consequences of
alienation is apparently traced to the postwar changes in the
institutional structures of the society, to the decline of
reason, freedom and therefore democracy, and to urbanization,
industrialization and bureaucratization. Rather than looking
into the internal operations and contradictions of capital-
ism, Mills' political sociology locates mass society or aliena-
tion mainly at the "super"-structural levels. It sees pgwer
relations as the fountain of inequality but turns away from
treating the state as a repressive institutional-administra-
tive apparatus. It catalogues deleterious consequences of
the rise of the mass consumption society but it does not take
into account how production relations are manipulated and
who manipulate them. It is afraid of bureaucratic tendencies
349
in the modern state but does not treat its growth as a com-
ponent constituent of the capitalist state. It seeks to re-
p l ~ e corporate capitalism but it does not seek socialism; it
rests its hope on the goodwill of capitalism and the capital-
ists. As a matter of fact, Mills' sociology has not accom-
plished a theoretical integration of its basic, but divergent,
postulates on the basis of which a systematic theory or science
of society is possible. On this count its immediate problem
is, I think, methodological. Its critique of formalistic
methodological empiricism lS both encouraging and time honor-
ed. Mills' methodological contributions are quite insightful
and important. The point, however, is that its own critique
of so-called scientism is self-defeating so long as it is
not able to offer its own "science" of society. For this
reason radical sociology, Mills' own variant included, has
to develop at least a scientific framework by which to examine
objective/material social realities of everyday human life
outside the subjective experiences of individuals. Its avoid-
ance of historical materialism has resulted in a virtual ac-
ceptance of historical idealism. As a consequence it has not
only failed to recognize the historical specificity of capi-
talism and its mode of production but was also practically
led to accept the rationality of capitalism and its relations
of production as a necessary, or at least as an alternative,
way of development of the productive forces of other societies.
In this regard, therefore, the future prospect of radical
350
sociology, Mills' sociology included, will be conditional to
the extent to which its principles rest upon a foundation of
interrelated and consistent propositions about society. It
will succeed to the extent to which it can claim to be a
scientific, and not merely a critical, sociology. The defin-
ing characteristics of this science would have to be, I think,
materialist, deductive and dialectical, rather than only ideal-
ist or historicist. Practically this means that the only kind.
,..! ..
of methodology available to radical sociology is Marxist
methodology (cf. Sklair, 1977: 64).
'-------
The need for a reformulation of "science" in
Marxist terms, and the development of a mater-
ialist epistemOlogy are the problems which face
intellectuals today, and if "radical sociology"
is to confront these problems it must come down
from the abstract pedestal of "crid:ical theory!;
to the materialistic praxis demanded by real
life (Pitch, 1974: 58).
Having said all these, the important question, which
demands an answer, is this: What is, then, the future of
Mills' political s o ~ o l o g y or of radical sociOlogy in general?
To answer this obviously is a risky venture of prophesy-making.
It may be suggested however that, despite its theoretical and
methodological deficiencies, Mills' political sociology or
radical sociology of more or less of the Millsian tradition
will continlJeb().gr:'0w in mass and attract attention as long
as it capitalizes on the failings of corporate capitalism in
America. As long as it takes on the role of the critic of
corporate capitalist society and focuses mainly on its failings,
such a sociOlogy will have enough grist for its mill since
351
continuous production of such problems are a function of
corporate capitalism. These problems are many, ranging from
unemployment to militarism of the para state (cf. Kolko, 1976:
346; Melman, 1970: 226). To describe capitalist contradictions
in terms of problems of fiscal crises:
In modern America individual well-being, class
relationships, natural wealth and power are
bound up in the agony of the cities, poverty
and racism, profits of big and small business,
inflation, unemployment, the balance-of-payments,
problem, imperialism and war, and other crises
that seem a permanent part of daily life. No
one is exempt from the fiscal crisis and the
underlying social crises, which it aggravates
(O'Connor, 1973: 3).
If this is any description of the contemporary problems of
American society, let me conclude by a recent radical response
in the Millsian tradition:
Men suffer, we are saying, and the direction of
the world opened up by capitalism and the En-
lightenment is to ensure an increase in that
suffering. But the suffering is not due simply
to the wickedness of individuals. It is not
even due to the evils of one system as against
another. The fact is that, having escaped from
the pre-capitalist, pre-industrial world, this
is where we are (Rex, 1974: 222).
352
Notes
1. Although all the members of this school of radical socio-
logy are not unanimous on the issues of their area, the
scope of their sociology or the nature of methodology in-
volved, it is suggested here that they draw their main
inspiration from Mills. See Horowitz (1968: 203), Howard
(1970: 7), Coalfax and Roach (1971: 18), Szymanski (1970)
and Scimecca (1977).
2 . In a sense, Mills was also conservative. However radical
may be his sociology, the appeal of Mills "was not for
the dismantlement of the American society but rather for
its purification, for its return, not to the form and
rhetoric, but to the reality of the principles which first
animated and were the source of the original American
vitality and strength" (Kraetzer, 1975: 249). See also
Hofstadter (1955) who initially put forward this line of
estimation.
3. For a'similar criticism of radical sociology, see Deutsch
(1970:
4. My own impression about this is that Mills neglected to
explore, somewhat because of his total rejection of ab-
stracted empiricism, the possibilities of making socio-
logy a scientific endeavor or of putting sociology on
scientific foundations. Mills sharply distinguished
sociology from physical science, stood for the primacy
of the individual as opposed to team research, and was
too concerned with .all that passed on in the name of
science. These points, among others, which sustain
the view that Mills rejected science. Thus, Willer says,
"If Concept and Method are the fetishes of some, Science
was the taboo of Mills'l C1967:xviii-xix). However, I
think that Willer has overstated his case because Mills
was not completely against science or the use of scienti-
fic method. The point is that he had his own views.
I
\!

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