Nsa Rhel 5 Guide v4.2

Guide to the Secure Conguration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5
Revision 4.2 August 26, 2011
Operating Systems Division Unix Team of the Systems and Network Analysis Center National Security Agency 9800 Savage Rd. Suite 6704 Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6704
Warnings
Do not attempt to implement any of the recommendations in this guide without rst testing in a nonproduction environment. This document is only a guide containing recommended security settings. It is not meant to replace wellstructured policy or sound judgment. Furthermore this guide does not address site-specic conguration concerns. Care must be taken when implementing this guide to address local operational and policy concerns. The security changes described in this document apply only to Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5. They may not translate gracefully to other operating systems. Internet addresses referenced were valid as of 1 Dec 2009.
Trademark Information
Red Hat is a registered trademark of Red Hat, Inc. Any other trademarks referenced herein are the property of their respective owners.
Change Log
Revision 4.2 is an update of Revision 4.1 dated February 28, 2011.
Added section 2.5.3.1.3, Disable Functionality of IPv6 Kernel Module Through Option. Added discussion to section 2.5.3.1.1, Disable Automatic Loading of IPv6 Kernel Module, indicating that this is no longer the preferred method for disabling IPv6. Added section 2.3.1.9, Set Accounts to Disable After Password Expiration.
Revision 4.1 is an update of Revision 4 dated September 14, 2010.

Added section 2.2.2.6, Disable All GNOME Thumbnailers if Possible. Added Common Conguration Enumeration (CCE) identiers to associated sections within the guide, and a note about CCE in section 1.2.4, Formatting Conventions. Updated section 2.3.3.2, Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attempts. There is no longer the need to add the pam tally2 module into each programs PAM conguration le, or to comment out some lines from /etc/pam.d/system-auth. The pam tally2 module can now be referenced directly from /etc/pam.d/ system-auth. Corrected section 2.6.2.4.5 title from Ensure auditd Collects Logon and Logout Events to Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Event Information. Corrected section 2.6.2.4.6 title from Ensure auditd Collects Process and Session Initiation Information to Record Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information
Note: The above changes did not aect any of the existing section numbering.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1.1 General Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 Encrypt Transmitted Data Whenever Possible . . . . . 1.1.2 Minimize Software to Minimize Vulnerability . . . . . . 1.1.3 Run Dierent Network Services on Separate Systems . . 1.1.4 Congure Security Tools to Improve System Robustness 1.1.5 Least Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 How to Use This Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Read Sections Completely and in Order . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Test in Non-Production Environment . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Root Shell Environment Assumed . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.4 Formatting Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.5 Reboot Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 17 17 17 17 18 19 19 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 25 25 26 26 26 27 27 27
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2 System-wide Conguration 2.1 Installing and Maintaining Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Initial Installation Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1.1 Disk Partitioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1.2 Boot Loader Conguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1.3 Network Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1.4 Root Password . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1.5 Software Packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1.6 First-boot Conguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Updating Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2.1 Congure Connection to the RHN RPM Repositories . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2.2 Disable the rhnsd Daemon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2.3 Obtain Software Package Updates with yum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Software Integrity Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3.1 Congure AIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3.2 Verify Package Integrity Using RPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 File Permissions and Masks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Restrict Partition Mount Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1.1 Add nodev Option to Non-Root Local Partitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1.2 Add nodev, nosuid, and noexec Options to Removable Storage Partitions 2.2.1.3 Add nodev, nosuid, and noexec Options to Temporary Storage Partitions 2.2.1.4 Bind-mount /var/tmp to /tmp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Restrict Dynamic Mounting and Unmounting of Filesystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2.1 Restrict Console Device Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2.2 Disable USB Device Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.2.2.3 Disable the Automounter if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2.4 Disable GNOME Automounting if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2.5 Disable Mounting of Uncommon Filesystem Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2.6 Disable All GNOME Thumbnailers if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Verify Permissions on Important Files and Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3.1 Verify Permissions on passwd, shadow, group and gshadow Files . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3.2 Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3.3 Find Unauthorized World-Writable Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3.4 Find Unauthorized SUID/SGID System Executables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3.5 Find and Repair Unowned Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3.6 Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Proper Ownership . . . . . . . 2.2.4 Restrict Programs from Dangerous Execution Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4.1 Set Daemon umask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4.2 Disable Core Dumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4.3 Enable ExecShield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4.4 Enable Execute Disable (XD) or No Execute (NX) Support on 32-bit x86 Systems 2.2.4.5 Congure Prelink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Account and Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Protect Accounts by Restricting Password-Based Login . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1.1 Restrict Root Logins to System Console . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1.2 Limit su Access to the Root Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1.3 Congure sudo to Improve Auditing of Root Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1.4 Block Shell and Login Access for Non-Root System Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1.5 Verify Proper Storage and Existence of Password Hashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1.6 Verify that No Non-Root Accounts Have UID 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1.7 Set Password Expiration Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1.8 Remove Legacy + Entries from Password Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1.9 Set Accounts to Disable After Password Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Use Unix Groups to Enhance Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2.1 Create a Unique Default Group for Each User . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2.2 Create and Maintain a Group Containing All Human Users . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Protect Accounts by Conguring PAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3.1 Set Password Quality Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3.2 Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attempts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3.3 Use pam deny.so to Quickly Deny Access to a Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3.4 Restrict Execution of userhelper to Console Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3.5 Upgrade Password Hashing Algorithm to SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3.6 Limit Password Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3.7 Remove the pam ccreds Package if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 Secure Session Conguration Files for Login Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4.1 Ensure that No Dangerous Directories Exist in Roots Path . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4.2 Ensure that User Home Directories are not Group-Writable or World-Readable . 2.3.4.3 Ensure that User Dot-Files are not World-writable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4.4 Ensure that Users Have Sensible Umask Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4.5 Ensure that Users do not Have .netrc Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5 Protect Physical Console Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5.1 Set BIOS Password . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5.2 Set Boot Loader Password . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5.3 Require Authentication for Single-User Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5.4 Disable Interactive Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5.5 Implement Inactivity Time-out for Login Shells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5.6 Congure Screen Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 29 29 30 30 30 31 31 31 33 33 33 33 34 35 35 36 37 37 37 38 39 39 40 40 41 42 42 42 42 43 43 44 45 45 46 46 47 47 47 47 48 49 49 50 50 50 50 51 51 51 52
2.3
TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.3.5.7 Disable Unnecessary Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Use a Centralized Authentication Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Warning Banners for System Accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.7.1 Modify the System Login Banner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.7.2 Implement a GUI Warning Banner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SELinux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 How SELinux Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 Enable SELinux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2.1 Ensure SELinux is Properly Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3 Disable Unnecessary SELinux Daemons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3.1 Disable and Remove SETroubleshoot if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3.2 Disable MCS Translation Service (mcstrans) if Possible . . . . . . . 2.4.3.3 Restorecon Service (restorecond) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.4 Check for Unconned Daemons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.5 Check for Unlabeled Device Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.6 Debugging SELinux Policy Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.7 Further Strengthening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.7.1 Strengthen the Default SELinux Boolean Conguration . . . . . . . 2.4.7.2 Use a Stronger Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.8 SELinux References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Network Conguration and Firewalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1 Kernel Parameters which Aect Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1.1 Network Parameters for Hosts Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1.2 Network Parameters for Hosts and Routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1.3 Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Snier . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2 Wireless Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2.1 Remove Wireless Hardware if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2.2 Disable Wireless Through Software Conguration . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.3 IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.3.1 Disable Support for IPv6 unless Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.3.2 Congure IPv6 Settings if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.4 TCP Wrapper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.4.1 How TCP Wrapper Protects Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.4.2 Reject All Connections From Other Hosts if Appropriate . . . . . . 2.5.4.3 Allow Connections Only From Hosts in This Domain if Appropriate 2.5.4.4 Monitor Syslog for Relevant Connections and Failures . . . . . . . . 2.5.4.5 Further Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.5 Iptables and Ip6tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.5.1 Inspect and Activate Default Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.5.2 Understand the Default Ruleset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.5.3 Strengthen the Default Ruleset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.5.4 Further Strengthening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.5.5 Further Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.6 Secure Sockets Layer Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.6.1 Create a CA to Sign Certicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.6.2 Create SSL Certicates for Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.6.3 Enable Client Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.6.4 Further Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.7 Uncommon Network Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.7.1 Disable Support for DCCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.7.2 Disable Support for SCTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.7.3 Disable Support for RDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.6 2.3.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 53 54 54 54 55 55 56 56 57 57 57 58 58 58 59 59 61 61 61 62 62 63 63 63 64 64 64 65 66 66 67 68 69 69 70 70 71 71 71 72 73 76 76 76 77 78 78 80 80 80 80 81
2.4
2.5
6 2.5.7.4 Disable Support for TIPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.8.1 Using Openswan for IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Logging and Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1 Congure Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1.1 Congure Syslog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1.2 Congure Rsyslog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1.3 Logrotate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1.4 Logwatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2 System Accounting with auditd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2.1 Enable the auditd Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2.2 Congure auditd Data Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2.3 Enable Auditing for Processes Which Start Prior to the 2.6.2.4 Congure auditd Rules for Comprehensive Auditing . 2.6.2.5 Summarize and Review Audit Logs using aureport . . 2.5.8
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Audit Daemon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 81 81 82 82 82 84 86 86 87 88 89 89 90 94 95 95 95 95 96 97 97 97 97 98 98 98 98 99 99 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 101 101 101 101 102 102 102 102 102 103 103 103 103 104
2.6
3 Services 3.1 Disable All Unneeded Services at Boot Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Determine which Services are Enabled at Boot . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Guidance on Default Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Guidance for Unfamiliar Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Obsolete Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Inetd and Xinetd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Telnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2.1 Remove Telnet Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Rlogin, Rsh, and Rcp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3.1 Remove the Rsh Server Commands from the System . . . 3.2.3.2 Remove .rhosts Support from PAM Conguration Files 3.2.3.3 Remove the Rsh Client Commands from the System . . . 3.2.4 NIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.5 TFTP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.6 Talk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.6.1 Remove talk-server Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.6.2 Remove talk Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Base Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Installation Helper Service (firstboot) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Console Mouse Service (gpm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Interrupt Distribution on Multiprocessor Systems (irqbalance) . 3.3.4 ISDN Support (isdn) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4.1 Remove the isdn4k-utils Package if Possible . . . . . . . . 3.3.5 Kdump Kernel Crash Analyzer (kdump) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.6 Kudzu Hardware Probing Utility (kudzu) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.7 Software RAID Monitor (mdmonitor) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.8 IA32 Microcode Utility (microcode ctl) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.9 Network Service (network) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.9.1 Disable All Networking if Not Needed . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.9.2 Disable All External Network Interfaces if Not Needed . 3.3.9.3 Disable Zeroconf Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.10 Smart Card Support (pcscd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.11 SMART Disk Monitoring Support (smartd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.12 Boot Caching (readahead early/readahead later) . . . . . . . . 3.3.13 Application Support Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.3.13.1 D-Bus IPC Service (messagebus) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.13.2 HAL Daemon (haldaemon) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.14 Bluetooth Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.14.1 Bluetooth Host Controller Interface Daemon (bluetooth) . 3.3.14.2 Bluetooth Input Devices (hidd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.14.3 Disable Bluetooth Kernel Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.15 Power Management Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.15.1 Advanced Power Management Subsystem (apmd) . . . . . . 3.3.15.2 Advanced Conguration and Power Interface (acpid) . . . 3.3.15.3 CPU Throttling (cpuspeed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.16 Infrared Communications (irda) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.16.1 Disable the irda Service if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.16.2 Remove the irda-utils Package if Possible . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.17 Raw Devices (rawdevices) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.17.1 Disable the Raw Devices Daemon if Possible . . . . . . . . Cron and At Daemons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Disable anacron if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Restrict Permissions on Files Used by cron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Disable at if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.4 Restrict at and cron to Authorized Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SSH Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1 Disable OpenSSH Server if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1.1 Disable and Remove OpenSSH Software . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1.2 Remove SSH Server iptables Firewall Exception . . . . . 3.5.2 Congure OpenSSH Server if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2.1 Ensure Only Protocol 2 Connections Allowed . . . . . . . . 3.5.2.2 Limit Users SSH Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2.3 Set Idle Timeout Interval for User Logins . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2.4 Disable .rhosts Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2.5 Disable Host-Based Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2.6 Disable root Login via SSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2.7 Disable Empty Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2.8 Enable a Warning Banner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2.9 Do Not Allow Users to Set Environment Options . . . . . . 3.5.2.10 Use Only Approved Ciphers in Counter Mode . . . . . . . 3.5.2.11 Strengthen Firewall Conguration if Possible . . . . . . . . X Window System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.1 Disable X Windows if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.1.1 Disable X Windows at System Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.1.2 Remove X Windows from the System if Possible . . . . . . 3.6.1.3 Lock Down X Windows startx Conguration if Necessary 3.6.2 Congure X Windows if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.2.1 Create Warning Banners for GUI Login Users . . . . . . . Avahi Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7.1 Disable Avahi Server if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7.1.1 Disable Avahi Server Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7.1.2 Remove Avahi Server iptables Firewall Exception . . . . 3.7.2 Congure Avahi if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7.2.1 Serve Only via Required Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7.2.2 Check Responses TTL Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7.2.3 Prevent Other Programs from Using Avahis Port . . . . . 3.7.2.4 Disable Publishing if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 104 104 105 105 105 106 106 106 106 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 108 108 109 109 109 109 110 110 110 110 110 111 111 111 111 112 112 112 112 113 113 113 113 113 114 114 115 115 115 115 115 116 116 116 116 117
3.4
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3.6
3.7
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.7.2.5 Restrict Published Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disable the CUPS Service if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disable Firewall Access to Printing Service if Possible . . . . . . . . . Congure the CUPS Service if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8.3.1 Limit Printer Browsing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8.3.2 Disable Print Server Capabilities if Possible . . . . . . . . . . 3.8.3.3 Limit Access to the Web Administration Interface . . . . . . 3.8.3.4 Take Further Security Measures When Appropriate . . . . . 3.8.4 The HP Linux Imaging and Printing (HPLIP) Toolkit . . . . . . . . . 3.8.4.1 Disable HPLIP Service if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.1 Disable DHCP Client if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.2 Congure DHCP Client if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.2.1 Minimize the DHCP-Congured Options . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.3 Disable DHCP Server if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.4 Congure the DHCP Server if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.4.1 Do Not Use Dynamic DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.4.2 Deny Decline Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.4.3 Deny BOOTP Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.4.4 Minimize Served Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.4.5 Congure Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.4.6 Further Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10 Network Time Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10.1 Select NTP Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10.2 Congure Reference NTP if Appropriate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10.2.1 Congure an NTP Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10.2.2 Congure an NTP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10.3 Congure OpenNTPD if Appropriate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10.3.1 Obtain NTP Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10.3.2 Congure an SNTP Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10.3.3 Congure an SNTP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11 Mail Transfer Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.1 Select Mail Server Software and Conguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.1.1 Select Postx as Mail Server Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.1.2 Select Sendmail as Mail Server Software . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.2 Congure SMTP For Mail Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.2.1 Congure Postx for Submission-Only Mode . . . . . . . . . 3.11.2.2 Congure Sendmail for Submission-Only Mode . . . . . . . . 3.11.3 Strategies for MTA Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.3.1 Use Resource Limits to Mitigate Denial of Service . . . . . . 3.11.3.2 Congure SMTP Greeting Banner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.3.3 Control Mail Relaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.4 Congure Operating System to Protect Mail Server . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.4.1 Use Separate Hosts for External and Internal Mail if Possible 3.11.4.2 Protect the MTA Host from User Access . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.4.3 Restrict Remote Access to the Mail Spool . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.4.4 Congure iptables to Allow Access to the Mail Server . . . 3.11.4.5 Verify System Logging and Log Permissions for Mail . . . . . 3.11.4.6 Congure SSL Certicates for Use with SMTP AUTH . . . . 3.11.5 Congure Sendmail Server if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.5.1 Limit Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 Print 3.8.1 3.8.2 3.8.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 117 118 118 118 118 119 120 120 120 121 121 121 122 122 123 123 123 124 124 124 125 125 125 125 126 126 127 128 128 129 129 130 130 131 131 132 132 132 133 133 133 133 134 134 134 134 135 135 135 136 137
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.11.5.2 Congure SMTP Greeting Banner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.5.3 Control Mail Relaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.6 Congure Postx if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.6.1 Limit Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.6.2 Congure SMTP Greeting Banner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.6.3 Control Mail Relaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11.6.4 Require TLS for SMTP AUTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.1 Use OpenLDAP to Provide LDAP Service if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.2 Congure OpenLDAP Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.2.1 Congure the Appropriate LDAP Parameters for the Domain . . . . . . 3.12.2.2 Congure LDAP to Use TLS for All Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.2.3 Congure Authentication Services to Use OpenLDAP . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.3 Congure OpenLDAP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.3.1 Install OpenLDAP Server RPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.3.2 Congure Domain-Specic Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.3.3 Congure an LDAP Root Password . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.3.4 Congure the LDAP Server to Require TLS for All Transactions . . . . 3.12.3.5 Install Account Information into the LDAP Database . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.3.6 Congure slapd to Protect Authentication Information . . . . . . . . . 3.12.3.7 Correct Permissions on LDAP Server Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12.3.8 Congure iptables to Allow Access to the LDAP Server . . . . . . . . 3.12.3.9 Congure Logging for LDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NFS and RPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.1 Disable All NFS Services if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.1.1 Disable Services Used Only by NFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.1.2 Disable netfs if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.1.3 Disable RPC Portmapper if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.2 Congure All Machines which Use NFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.2.1 Make Each Machine a Client or a Server, not Both . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.2.2 Restrict Access to the Portmapper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.2.3 Congure NFS Services to Use Fixed Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.3 Congure NFS Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.3.1 Disable NFS Server Daemons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.3.2 Mount Remote Filesystems with Restrictive Options . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.4 Congure NFS Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.4.1 Congure the Exports File Restrictively . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13.4.2 Allow Legitimate NFS Clients to Access the Server . . . . . . . . . . . DNS Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14.1 Disable DNS Server if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14.2 Run the BIND9 Software if DNS Service is Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14.3 Isolate DNS from Other Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14.3.1 Run DNS Software on Dedicated Servers if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14.3.2 Run DNS Software in a chroot Jail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14.3.3 Congure Firewalls to Protect the DNS Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14.4 Protect DNS Data from Tampering or Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14.4.1 Run Separate DNS Servers for External and Internal Queries if Possible 3.14.4.2 Use Views to Partition External and Internal Information if Necessary . 3.14.4.3 Disable Zone Transfers from the Nameserver if Possible . . . . . . . . . 3.14.4.4 Authenticate Zone Transfers if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.14.4.5 Disable Dynamic Updates if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FTP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 137 137 139 139 140 140 142 142 143 143 143 143 144 145 145 145 145 146 148 150 151 151 151 152 152 152 153 153 154 154 154 154 155 155 155 155 156 157 157 157 158 158 158 158 159 159 159 160 161 162 163 163
3.12
3.13
3.14
3.15
10
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.15.1 Disable vsftpd if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15.2 Use vsftpd to Provide FTP Service if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15.3 Congure vsftpd Securely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15.3.1 Enable Logging of All FTP Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15.3.2 Create Warning Banners for All FTP Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15.3.3 Restrict the Set of Users Allowed to Access FTP . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15.3.4 Disable FTP Uploads if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.15.3.5 Place the FTP Home Directory on its Own Partition . . . . . . . . 3.15.3.6 Congure Firewalls to Protect the FTP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16 Web Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.1 Disable Apache if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.2 Install Apache if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.2.1 Install Apache Software Safely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.2.2 Conrm Minimal Built-in Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.3 Secure the Apache Conguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.3.1 Restrict Information Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.3.2 Minimize Loadable Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.3.3 Minimize Conguration Files Included . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.3.4 Directory Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.3.5 Congure Authentication if Applicable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.3.6 Limit Available Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.4 Use Appropriate Modules to Improve Apaches Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.4.1 Deploy mod ssl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.4.2 Deploy mod security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.4.3 Use Denial-of-Service Protection Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.4.4 Congure Supplemental Modules Appropriately . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.5 Congure Operating System to Protect Web Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.5.1 Restrict File and Directory Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.5.2 Congure iptables to Allow Access to the Web Server . . . . . . . 3.16.5.3 Run Apache in a chroot Jail if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16.6 Additional Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17 IMAP and POP3 Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17.1 Disable Dovecot if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17.2 Congure Dovecot if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17.2.1 Support Only the Necessary Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17.2.2 Enable SSL Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17.2.3 Enable Dovecot Options to Protect Against Code Flaws . . . . . . . 3.17.2.4 Allow IMAP Clients to Access the Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18 Samba (SMB) Microsoft Windows File Sharing Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.1 Disable Samba if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2 Congure Samba if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2.1 Testing the Samba Conguration File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2.2 Choosing the Appropriate security Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2.3 Disable Guest Access and Local Login Support . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2.4 Disable Root Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2.5 Set the Allowed Authentication Negotiation Levels . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2.6 Let Domain Controllers Create Machine Trust Accounts On-the-Fly 3.18.2.7 Restrict Access to the [IPC$] Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2.8 Restrict File Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2.9 Require Server SMB Packet Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2.10 Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using smbclient . . . . . . . 3.18.2.11 Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using mount.cifs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 163 164 164 164 164 165 166 166 166 166 167 167 167 167 167 168 173 173 174 176 176 176 178 179 179 180 180 181 181 181 181 181 182 182 182 184 184 184 185 185 185 185 187 187 187 188 188 188 189 189 189
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.18.2.12 Restrict Printer Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18.2.13 Congure iptables to Allow Access to the Samba Server 3.18.3 Avoid the Samba Web Administration Tool (SWAT) . . . . . . . . 3.19 Proxy Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.19.1 Disable Squid if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.19.2 Congure Squid if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.19.2.1 Listen on Uncommon Port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.19.2.2 Verify Default Secure Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.19.2.3 Change Default Insecure Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.19.2.4 Congure Authentication if Applicable . . . . . . . . . . 3.19.2.5 Access Control Lists (ACL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.19.2.6 Congure Internet Cache Protocol (ICP) if Necessary . . 3.19.2.7 Congure iptables to Allow Access to the Proxy Server 3.19.2.8 Forward Log Messages to Syslog Daemon . . . . . . . . . 3.19.2.9 Do Not Run as Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.20 SNMP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.20.1 Disable SNMP Server if Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.20.2 Congure SNMP Server if Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.20.2.1 Further Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11 189 190 190 191 191 191 191 191 192 193 193 195 195 195 196 197 197 197 197
12
TABLE OF CONTENTS
13
1. Introduction
The purpose of this guide is to provide security conguration recommendations for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 5 operating system. The guidance provided here should be applicable to all variants (Desktop, Server, Advanced Platform) of the product. Recommended settings for the basic operating system are provided, as well as for many commonly-used services that the system can host in a network environment. The guide is intended for system administrators. Readers are assumed to possess basic system administration skills for Unix-like systems, as well as some familiarity with Red Hats documentation and administration conventions. Some instructions within this guide are complex. All directions should be followed completely and with understanding of their eects in order to avoid serious adverse eects on the system and its security.
1.1
General Principles
The following general principles motivate much of the advice in this guide and should also inuence any conguration decisions that are not explicitly covered.
1.1.1
Encrypt Transmitted Data Whenever Possible
Data transmitted over a network, whether wired or wireless, is susceptible to passive monitoring. Whenever practical solutions for encrypting such data exist, they should be applied. Even if data is expected to be transmitted only over a local network, it should still be encrypted. Encrypting authentication data, such as passwords, is particularly important. Networks of RHEL5 machines can and should be congured so that no unencrypted authentication data is ever transmitted between machines.
1.1.2
Minimize Software to Minimize Vulnerability
The simplest way to avoid vulnerabilities in software is to avoid installing that software. On RHEL, the RPM Package Manager (originally Red Hat Package Manager, abbreviated RPM) allows for careful management of the set of software packages installed on a system. Installed software contributes to system vulnerability in several ways. Packages that include setuid programs may provide local attackers a potential path to privilege escalation. Packages that include network services may give this opportunity to network-based attackers. Packages that include programs which are predictably executed by local users (e.g. after graphical login) may provide opportunities for trojan horses or other attack code to be run undetected. The number of software packages installed on a system can almost always be signicantly pruned to include only the software for which there is an environmental or operational need.
1.1.3
Run Dierent Network Services on Separate Systems
Whenever possible, a server should be dedicated to serving exactly one network service. This limits the number of other services that can be compromised in the event that an attacker is able to successfully exploit a software aw in one network service.
14
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1.4
Congure Security Tools to Improve System Robustness
Several tools exist which can be eectively used to improve a systems resistance to and detection of unknown attacks. These tools can improve robustness against attack at the cost of relatively little conguration eort. In particular, this guide recommends and discusses the use of Iptables for host-based rewalling, SELinux for protection against vulnerable services, and a logging and auditing infrastructure for detection of problems.
1.1.5
Least Privilege
Grant the least privilege necessary for user accounts and software to perform tasks. For example, do not allow users except those that need administrator access to use sudo. Another example is to limit logins on server systems to only those administrators who need to log into them in order to perform administration tasks. Using SELinux also follows the principle of least privilege: SELinux policy can conne software to perform only actions on the system that are specically allowed. This can be far more restrictive than the actions permissible by the traditional Unix permissions model.
1.2
How to Use This Guide
Readers should heed the following points when using the guide.
1.2.1
Read Sections Completely and in Order
Each section may build on information and recommendations discussed in prior sections. Each section should be read and understood completely; instructions should never be blindly applied. Relevant discussion will occur after instructions for an action. The system-level conguration guidance in Chapter 2 must be applied to all machines. The guidance for individual services in Chapter 3 must be considered for all machines as well: apply the guidance if the machine is either a server or a client for that service, and ensure that the service is disabled according to the instructions provided if the machine is neither a server nor a client.
1.2.2
Test in Non-Production Environment
This guidance should always be tested in a non-production environment before deployment. This test environment should simulate the setup in which the system will be deployed as closely as possible.
1.2.3
Root Shell Environment Assumed
Most of the actions listed in this document are written with the assumption that they will be executed by the root user running the /bin/bash shell. Commands preceded with a hash mark (#) assume that the administrator will execute the commands as root, i.e. apply the command via sudo whenever possible, or use su to gain root privileges if sudo cannot be used. Commands which can be executed as a non-root user are are preceded by a dollar sign ($) prompt.
15
1.2.4
Formatting Conventions
Commands intended for shell execution, as well as conguration le text, are featured in a monospace font. Italics are used to indicate instances where the system administrator must substitute the appropriate information into a command or conguration le. Common Conguration Enumeration (CCE) identiers are presented at the lower right corner of those sections for which an associated identier exists. More information about CCE is available at http://cce.mitre.org.
1.2.5
Reboot Required
A system reboot is implicitly required after some actions in order to complete the reconguration of the system. In many cases, the changes will not take eect until a reboot is performed. In order to ensure that changes are applied properly and to test functionality, always reboot the system after applying a set of recommendations from this guide.
16
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
17
2. System-wide Conguration
2.1 Installing and Maintaining Software
The following sections contain information on security-relevant choices during the initial operating system installation process and the setup of software updates.
2.1.1
Initial Installation Recommendations
The recommendations here apply to a clean installation of the system, where any previous installations are wiped out. The sections presented here are in the same order that the installer presents, but only installation choices with security implications are covered. Many of the conguration choices presented here can also be applied after the system is installed. The choices can also be automatically applied via Kickstart les, as covered in [8].
2.1.1.1
Disk Partitioning
Some system directories should be placed on their own partitions (or logical volumes). This allows for better separation and protection of data. The installers default partitioning scheme creates separate partitions (or logical volumes) for /, /boot, and swap.
If starting with any of the default layouts, check the box to Review and modify partitioning. This allows for the easy creation of additional logical volumes inside the volume group already created, though it may require making /s logical volume smaller to create space. In general, using logical volumes is preferable to using partitions because they can be more easily adjusted later. If creating a custom layout, create the partitions mentioned in the previous paragraph (which the installer will require anyway), as well as separate ones described in the following sections.
If a system has already been installed, and the default partitioning scheme was used, it is possible but nontrivial to modify it to create separate logical volumes for the directories listed above. The Logical Volume Manager (LVM) makes this possible. See the LVM HOWTO at http://tldp.org/HOWTO/LVM-HOWTO/ for more detailed information on LVM.
2.1.1.1.1
Create Separate Partition or Logical Volume for /tmp
The /tmp directory is a world-writable directory used for temporary le storage. Ensure that it has its own partition or logical volume.
CCE 14161-4
Because software may need to use /tmp to temporarily store large les, ensure that it is of adequate size. For a modern, general-purpose system, 10GB should be adequate. Smaller or larger sizes could be used, depending on the availability of space on the drive and the systems operating requirements.
18
CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM-WIDE CONFIGURATION
2.1.1.1.2
Create Separate Partition or Logical Volume for /var
The /var directory is used by daemons and other system services to store frequently-changing data. It is not uncommon for the /var directory to contain world-writable directories, installed by other software packages. Ensure that /var has its own partition or logical volume.
CCE 14777-7
Because the yum package manager and other software uses /var to temporarily store large les, ensure that it is of adequate size. For a modern, general-purpose system, 10GB should be adequate.
2.1.1.1.3
Create Separate Partition or Logical Volume for /var/log
System logs are stored in the /var/log directory. Ensure that it has its own partition or logical volume. Make certain that it is large enough to store all the logs that will be written there.
CCE 14011-1
See Section 2.6 for more information about logging and auditing.
2.1.1.1.4
Create Separate Partition or Logical Volume for /var/log/audit
Audit logs are stored in the /var/log/audit directory. Ensure that it has its own partition or logical volume. Make absolutely certain that it is large enough to store all audit logs that will be created by the auditing daemon.
CCE 14171-3
See 2.6.2.2 for discussion on deciding on an appropriate size for the volume.
2.1.1.1.5
Create Separate Partition or Logical Volume for /home if Using Local Home Directories
If user home directories will be stored locally, create a separate partition for /home. If /home will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be congured later.
CCE 14559-9
2.1.1.2
Boot Loader Conguration
Check the box to Use a boot loader password and create a password. Once this password is set, anyone who wishes to change the boot loader conguration will need to enter it. More information is available in Section 2.3.5.2. Assigning a boot loader password prevents a local user with physical access from altering the boot loader conguration at system startup.
19
2.1.1.3
Network Devices
The default network device conguration uses DHCP, which is not recommended. Unless use of DHCP is absolutely necessary, click the Edit button and:
Uncheck Use Dynamic IP conguration (DHCP). Uncheck Enable IPv4 Support if the system does not require IPv4. (This is uncommon.) Uncheck Enable IPv6 Support if the system does not require IPv6. Enter appropriate IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and prexes as required.
With the DHCP setting disabled, the hostname, gateway, and DNS servers should then be assigned on the main screen. Sections 3.9.1 and 3.9.2 contain more information on network conguration and the use of DHCP.
2.1.1.4
Root Password
The security of the entire system depends on the strength of the root password. The password should be at least 12 characters long, and should include a mix of capitalized and lowercase letters, special characters, and numbers. It should also not be based on any dictionary word.
2.1.1.5
Software Packages
Uncheck all package groups, including the package groups Software Development and Web Server, unless there is a specic requirement to install software using the system installer. If the machine will be used as a web server, it is preferable to manually install the necessary RPMs instead of installing the full Web Server package group. See Section 3.16 for installation and conguration details. Use the Customize now radio box to prune package groups as much as possible. This brings up a two-column view of categories and package groups. If appropriate, uncheck X Window System in the Base System category to avoid installing X entirely. Any other package groups not necessary for system operation should also be unchecked. Much ner-grained package selection is possible via Kickstart as described in [8].
2.1.1.6
First-boot Conguration
The system presents more conguration options during the rst boot after installation. For the screens listed, implement the security-related recommendations: Screen Firewall Recommendation Leave set to Enabled. Only check the Trusted Services that this system needs to serve. Uncheck the default selection of SSH if the system does not need to serve SSH. Leave SELinux set to Enforcing mode. Leave Kdump o unless the feature is required, such as for kernel development and testing.
SELinux Kdump
20 Screen Set Up Software Updates Recommendation
If the system is connected to the Internet now, click Yes, Id like to register now. This will require a connection to either the Red Hat Network servers or their proxies or satellites. This can also be congured later as described in Section 2.1.2.1. If the system will require a local user account, it can be created here. Even if the system will be using a network-wide authentication system as described in Section 2.3.6, do not click on the Use Network Login... button. Manually applying conguration later is preferable.
Create User
2.1.2
Updating Software
The yum command line tool is used to install and update software packages. Yum replaces the up2date utility used in previous system releases. The system also provides two graphical package managers, pirut and pup. The pirut tool is a graphical front-end for yum that allows users to install and update packages while pup is a simple update tool for packages that are already installed. In the Applications menu, pirut is labeled Add/Remove Software and pup is labeled Software Updater. It is recommended that these tools be used to keep systems up to date with the latest security patches.
2.1.2.1
Congure Connection to the RHN RPM Repositories
The rst step in conguring a system for updates is to register with the Red Hat Network (RHN). For most systems, this is done during the initial installation. Successfully registered systems will appear on the RHN web site. If the system is not listed, run the Red Hat Network Registration tool, which can be found in the Applications menu under System Tools or on the command line: # rhn register Follow the prompts on the screen. If successful, the system will appear on the RHN web site and be subscribed to one or more software update channels. Additionally, a new daemon, rhnsd, will be enabled. If the system will not have access to the Internet, it will not be able to directly subscribe to the RHN update repository. Updates will have to be downloaded from the RHN web site manually. The command line tool yum and the graphical front-ends pirut and pup can be congured to handle this situation.
2.1.2.1.1
Ensure Red Hat GPG Key is Installed
To ensure that the system can cryptographically verify update packages (and also connect to the Red Hat Network to receive them if desired), run the following command to ensure that the system has the Red Hat GPG key properly installed: $ rpm -q --queryformat "%{SUMMARY}\n" gpg-pubkey The command should return the string: gpg(Red Hat, Inc. (release key <[email protected]>)
21
CCE 14440-2
To verify that the Red Hat GPG key itself has not been tampered with, its ngerprint can be compared to the one from Red Hats web site at http://www.redhat.com/security/team/key. The following command can be used to print the installed release keys ngerprint, which is actually contained in the le referenced below: $ gpg --quiet --with-fingerprint /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-release More information on package signing is also available at https://fedoraproject.org/keys.
2.1.2.2
Disable the rhnsd Daemon
The rhnsd daemon polls the Red Hat Network web site for scheduled actions. Unless it is actually necessary to schedule updates remotely through the RHN website, it is recommended that the service be disabled. # chkconfig rhnsd off
CCE 3416-5
The rhnsd daemon is enabled by default, but until the system has been registered with the Red Hat Network, it will not run. However, once the registration process is complete, the rhnsd daemon will run in the background and periodically call the rhn_check utility. It is the rhn_check utility that communicates with the Red Hat Network web site. This utility is not required for the system to be able to access and install system updates. Once the system has been registered, either use the provided yum-updatesd service or create a cron job to automatically apply updates.
2.1.2.3
Obtain Software Package Updates with yum
The yum update utility can be run by hand from the command line, called through one of the provided front-end tools, or congured to run automatically at specied intervals.
2.1.2.3.1
Manually Check for Package Updates
The following command prints a list of packages that need to be updated: # yum check-update To actually install these updates, run: # yum update
2.1.2.3.2
Congure Automatic Update Retrieval and Installation with Cron
The yum-updatesd service is not mature enough for an enterprise environment, and the service may introduce unnecessary overhead. When possible, replace this service with a cron job that calls yum directly.
22
Disable the yum-updatesd service: # chkconfig yum-updatesd off Create the le yum.cron, make it executable, and place it in /etc/cron.daily: #!/bin/sh /usr/bin/yum -R 120 -e 0 -d 0 -y update yum /usr/bin/yum -R 10 -e 0 -d 0 -y update
CCE 4218-4
This particular script instructs yum to update any packages it nds. Placing the script in /etc/cron.daily ensures its daily execution. To only apply updates once a week, place the script in /etc/cron.weekly instead.
2.1.2.3.3
Ensure Package Signature Checking is Globally Activated
The gpgcheck option should be used to ensure that checking of an RPM packages signature always occurs prior to its installation. To force yum to check package signatures before installing them, ensure that the following line appears in /etc/yum.conf in the [main] section: gpgcheck=1
CCE 14914-6
2.1.2.3.4
Ensure Package Signature Checking is Not Disabled For Any Repos
To ensure that signature checking is not disabled for any repos, ensure that the following line DOES NOT appear in any repo conguration les in /etc/yum.repos.d or elsewhere: gpgcheck=0
CCE 14813-0
2.1.3
Software Integrity Checking
The AIDE (Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment) software is included with the system to provide software integrity checking. It is designed to be a replacement for the well-known Tripwire integrity checker. The RPM software also includes the ability to compare the hashes of installed les with those in its own metadata database. Integrity checking cannot prevent intrusions into your system, but can detect that they have occurred. Such integrity checking software should be congured before the system is deployed and able to provides services to users. Ideally, the integrity checking database would be built before the system is connected to any network, though this may prove impractical due to registration and software updates.
23
2.1.3.1
Congure AIDE
Requirements for software integrity checking should be dened by policy, and this is highly dependent on the environment in which the system will be used. As such, a general strategy for implementing integrity checking is provided, but precise recommendations (such as to check a particular le) cannot be. Documentation for AIDE, including the quick-start on which this advice is based, is available in /usr/share/doc/aide-0.12. The prelinking feature can interfere with the operation of AIDE, because it changes binaries in an attempt to decrease their startup time. Set PRELINKING=no inside /etc/ sysconfig/ prelink and run /usr/sbin/prelink -ua to restore binaries to a non-prelinked state and prevent prelinking from causing false positive results from AIDE.
2.1.3.1.1
Install AIDE
AIDE is not installed by default. Install it with the command: # yum install aide
CCE 4209-3
2.1.3.1.2
Customize Conguration File
Customize /etc/aide.conf to meet your requirements. The default conguration is acceptable for many environments. The man page aide.conf(5) provides detailed information about the conguration le format.
2.1.3.1.3
Build, Store, and Test Database
Generate a new database: # /usr/sbin/aide --init By default, the database will be written to the le /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz. The database, as well as the conguration le /etc/aide.conf and the binary /usr/sbin/aide (or hashes of these les) should be copied and stored in a secure location. Storing these copies or hashes on read-only media may provide further condence that they will not be altered. Install the newly-generated database: # cp /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz Run a manual check: # /usr/sbin/aide --check If this check produces any unexpected output, investigate.
24
2.1.3.1.4
Implement Periodic Execution of Integrity Checking
By default, AIDE does not install itself for periodic execution. Implement checking with whatever frequency is required by your security policy. A once-daily check may be suitable for many environments. For example, to implement a daily execution of AIDE at 4:05am, add the following line to /etc/crontab: 05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check AIDE output may be an indication of an attack against your system, or it may be the result of something innocuous such as an administrators conguration change or a software update. The steps in Section 2.1.3.1.3 should be repeated when conguration changes or software updates necessitate. This will certainly be necessary after applying guidance later in this guide.
2.1.3.1.5
Manually Verify Integrity of AIDE
Because integrity checking is a means of intrusion detection and not intrusion prevention, it cannot be guaranteed that the AIDE binaries, conguration les, or database have not been tampered with. An attacker could disable or alter these les after a successful intrusion. Because of this, manual and frequent checks on these les is recommended. The safely stored copies (or hashes) of the database, binary, and conguration le were created earlier for this purpose. Manually verify the integrity of the AIDE binaries, conguration le, and database. Possibilities for doing so include: 1. Use sha1sum or md5sum to generate checksums on the les and then visually compare them to those generated from the safely stored versions. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that such output could also be faked. 2. Mount the stored versions on read-only media and run /bin/diff to verify that there are no dierences between the les. 3. Copying the les to another system and performing the hash or le comparisons there may impart additional condence that the manual verication process is not being interfered with.
2.1.3.2
Verify Package Integrity Using RPM
The RPM package management system includes the ability to verify the integrity of installed packages by comparing the installed les with information about the les taken from the package metadata stored in the RPM database. Although an attacker could corrupt the RPM database (analogous to attacking the AIDE database as described above), this check can still reveal modication of important les. To determine which les on the system dier from what is expected by the RPM database: # rpm -qVa A c in the second column indicates that a le is a conguration le (and may be expected to change). In order to exclude conguration les from this list, run: # rpm -qVa | awk '$2!="c" {print $0}'
25
CCE 14931-0
The man page rpm(8) describes the format of the output. Any les that do not match the expected output demand further investigation if the system is being seriously examined. This check could also be run as a cron job.
2.2
File Permissions and Masks
Traditional Unix security relies heavily on le and directory permissions to prevent unauthorized users from reading or modifying les to which they should not have access. Adhere to the principle of least privilege congure each le, directory, and lesystem to allow only the access needed in order for that le to serve its purpose. However, Linux systems contain a large number of les, so it is often prohibitively time-consuming to ensure that every le on a machine has exactly the permissions needed. This section introduces several permission restrictions which are almost always appropriate for system security, and which are easy to test and correct. Note: Several of the commands in this section search lesystems for les or directories with certain characteristics, and are intended to be run on every local ext2 or ext3 partition on a given machine. When the variable PART appears in one of the commands below, it means that the command is intended to be run repeatedly, with the name of each local partition substituted for PART in turn. The following command prints a list of ext2 and ext3 partitions on a given machine: $ mount -t ext2,ext3 | awk '{print $3}' If your site uses a local lesystem type other than ext2 or ext3, you will need to modify this command.
2.2.1
Restrict Partition Mount Options
System partitions can be mounted with certain options which limit what les on those partitions can do. These options are set in the le /etc/fstab, and can be used to make certain types of malicious behavior more dicult.
2.2.1.1
Add nodev Option to Non-Root Local Partitions
Edit the le /etc/fstab. The important columns for purposes of this section are column 2 (mount point), column 3 (lesystem type), and column 4 (mount options). For any line which satises all of the conditions:
The lesystem type is ext2 or ext3 The mount point is not /
add the text ,nodev to the list of mount options in column 4.

CCE 4249-9
The nodev option prevents users from mounting unauthorized devices on any partition which is known not to contain any authorized devices. The root partition typically contains the /dev directory, which is the primary location for authorized devices, so this option should not be set on /. However, if system programs are being run in chroot jails, this advice may need to be modied further, since it is often necessary to create device les inside the chroot directory for use by the restricted program.
26
2.2.1.2
Add nodev, nosuid, and noexec Options to Removable Storage Partitions
Edit the le /etc/fstab. Filesystems which represent removable media can be located by nding lines whose mount points contain strings like floppy or cdrom. For each line representing a removable media mountpoint, add the text noexec,nodev,nosuid to the list of mount options in column 4.
CCE 3522-0, 4275-4, 4042-8
Filesystems mounted on removable media also provide a way for malicious executables to potentially enter the system, and should be mounted with options which grant least privilege. Users should not be allowed to introduce arbitrary devices or setuid programs to a system. In addition, while users are usually allowed to add executable programs to a system, the noexec option prevents code from being executed directly from the media itself, and may therefore provide a line of defense against certain types of worms or malicious code. Mount points in /etc/fstab may not exist on a modern system with typical hardware. The dynamic mounting mechanism may be controlled through other means (which may or may not allow control of the mount options). Adding noexec will cause problems if it is necessary in your environment to execute code from removable media, though that behavior carries risks as well.
2.2.1.3
Add nodev, nosuid, and noexec Options to Temporary Storage Partitions
Temporary storage directories such as /tmp and /dev/shm potentially provide storage space for malicious executables. Although mount options options cannot prevent interpreted code stored there from getting executed by a program in another partition, using certain mount options can be disruptive to malicious code.
2.2.1.3.1
Add nodev, nosuid, and noexec Options to /tmp
Edit the le /etc/fstab. Add the text ,nodev,nosuid,noexec to the list of mount options in column 4.
CCE 14412-1, 14940-1, 14927-8
2.2.1.3.2
Add nodev, nosuid, and noexec Options to /dev/shm
Edit the le /etc/fstab. Add the text ,nodev,nosuid,noexec to the list of mount options in column 4.
CCE 15007-8, 14306-5, 14703-3
2.2.1.4
Bind-mount /var/tmp to /tmp
Edit the le /etc/fstab. Add the following line: /tmp /var/tmp none rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,bind 0 0
CCE 14584-7
This line will bind-mount the world-writeable /var/tmp directory onto /tmp, using the restrictive mount options specied. See the mount(8) man page for further explanation of bind mounting.
27
2.2.2
Restrict Dynamic Mounting and Unmounting of Filesystems
Linux includes a number of facilities for the automated addition and removal of lesystems on a running system. These facilities may increase convenience, but they all bring some risk, whether direct risk from allowing unprivileged users to introduce arbitrary lesystems to a machine, or risk that software aws in the automated mount facility itself will allow an attacker to compromise the system. Use caution when enabling any such facility, and nd out whether better conguration management or user education might solve the same problem with less risk.
2.2.2.1
Restrict Console Device Access
The default system conguration grants the console user enhanced privileges normally reserved for the root user, including temporary ownership of most system devices. If not necessary, these privileges should be removed and restricted to root only. Restrict device ownership to root only. Edit /etc/security/console.perms.d/50-default.perms and locate the section prefaced by the following comment: # permission definitions Prepend a # symbol to comment out each line in that section which starts with <console> or <xconsole>: #<console> #<console> ... #<xconsole> #<console> 0660 <floppy> 0600 <sound> 0660 root.floppy 0600 root
0600 /dev/console 0600 root.root 0600 <dri> 0600 root
Edit /etc/security/console.perms and make the following changes: <console>=tty[0-9][0-9]* vc/[0-9][0-9]* :0\.[0-9] :0 <xconsole>=:0\.[0-9] :0
CCE 3685-5
2.2.2.2
Disable USB Device Support
USB ash or hard drives allow an attacker with physical access to a system to quickly copy an enormous amount of data from it.
2.2.2.2.1
Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driver
If USB storage devices should not be used, the modprobe program used for automatic kernel module loading should be congured to not load the USB storage driver upon demand. Add the following line to /etc/modprobe.conf to prevent loading of the usb-storage kernel module: install usb-storage /bin/true
CCE 4187-1
28
This will prevent the modprobe program from loading the usb-storage module, but will not prevent an administrator (or another program) from using the insmod program to load the module manually.
2.2.2.2.2
Remove USB Storage Driver
If your system never requires the use of USB storage devices, then the supporting driver can be removed. Though more eective (as USB storage certainly cannot be used if the driver is not available at all), this is less elegant than the method described in Section 2.2.2.2.1. To remove the USB storage driver from the system: rm /lib/modules/kernelversion(s) /kernel/drivers/usb/storage/usb-storage.ko This command will need to be repeated every time the kernel is updated. This command will also cause the command rpm -q --verify kernel to fail, which may be an undesirable side eect.
CCE 4006-3
Note that this guidance will not prevent USB storage devices from being mounted if a custom kernel (i.e., not the one supplied with the system) with built-in USB support is used.
2.2.2.2.3
Disable Kernel Support for USB via Bootloader Conguration
Another means of disabling USB storage is to disable all USB support provided by the operating system. This can be accomplished by adding the nousb argument to the kernels boot loader conguration. Disabling all kernel support for USB will cause problems for systems with USB-based keyboards, mice, or printers. This guidance is inappropriate for systems which require USB connectivity. To disable kernel support for USB, append nousb to the kernel line in /etc/grub.conf as follows: kernel /vmlinuz-version ro vga=ext root=/dev/VolGroup00/LogVol00 rhgb quiet nousb
CCE 4173-1
2.2.2.2.4
Disable Booting from USB Devices
An attacker with physical access could try to boot the system from a USB ash drive and then access any data on the systems hard drive, circumventing the normal operating systems access controls. To prevent this, congure the BIOS to disallow booting from USB drives. Also congure the BIOS or rmware password as described in Section 2.3.5.1 to prevent unauthorized conguration changes.
CCE 3944-6
2.2.2.3
Disable the Automounter if Possible
If the autofs service is not needed to dynamically mount NFS lesystems or removable media, disable the service:
29
# chkconfig autofs off

CCE 4072-5
The autofs daemon mounts and unmounts lesystems, such as user home directories shared via NFS, on demand. In addition, autofs can be used to handle removable media, and the default conguration provides the cdrom device as /misc/cd. However, this method of providing access to removable media is not common, so autofs can almost always be disabled if NFS is not in use. Even if NFS is required, it is almost always possible to congure lesystem mounts statically by editing /etc/ fstab rather than relying on the automounter.
2.2.2.4
Disable GNOME Automounting if Possible
The systems default desktop environment, GNOME, runs the program gnome-volume-manager to mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB ash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. Execute the following commands to prevent gnome-volume-manager from automatically mounting devices and media: # gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:readwrite:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --type bool \ --set /desktop/gnome/volume_manager/automount_media false # gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:readwrite:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --type bool \ --set /desktop/gnome/volume_manager/automount_drives false Verify the changes by executing the following command, which should return a list of settings: # gconftool-2 -R /desktop/gnome/volume_manager The automount drives and automount media settings should be set to false. Survey the list for any other options that should be adjusted.
CCE 4231-7
The systems capabilities for automatic mounting should be congured to match whatever is dened by security policy. Disabling USB storage as described in Section 2.2.2.2.1 will prevent the use of USB storage devices, but this step can also be taken as an additional layer of prevention and to prevent automatic mounting of CDs and DVDs if required. Particularly for kiosk-style systems, where users should have extremely limited access to the system, more detailed information can be found in Red Hat Desktop: Deployment Guide [5]. The gconf-editor program, available in an RPM of the same name, can be used to explore other settings available in the GNOME environment.
2.2.2.5
Disable Mounting of Uncommon Filesystem Types
Append the following lines to /etc/modprobe.conf in order to prevent the usage of uncommon lesystem types:
30
install install install install install install install
cramfs /bin/true freevxfs /bin/true jffs2 /bin/true hfs /bin/true hfsplus /bin/true squashfs /bin/true udf /bin/true
CCE 14089-7, 14457-6, 15087-0, 14093-9, 14853-6, 14118-4, 14871-8
Using the install command inside /etc/modprobe.conf instructs the kernel module loading system to run the command specied (here, /bin/true) instead of inserting the module in the kernel as normal. This eectively prevents usage of these uncommon lesystems.
2.2.2.6
Disable All GNOME Thumbnailers if Possible
Execute the following command to prevent the thumbnailers from automatically creating thumbnails for new or modied folder contents: # gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:readwrite:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --type bool \ --set /desktop/gnome/thumbnailers/disable_all true The systems default desktop environment, GNOME, uses a number of dierent thumbnailer programs to generate thumbnails for any new or modied content in an opened folder. This eectively prevents an attacker from gaining access to a system through a aw in GNOMEs Nautilus thumbnail creators.
2.2.3
Verify Permissions on Important Files and Directories
Permissions for many les on a system should be set to conform to system policy. This section discusses important permission restrictions gshadow which should be checked on a regular basis to ensure that no harmful discrepancies have arisen.
2.2.3.1
# # # #
Verify Permissions on passwd, shadow, group and gshadow Files

cd /etc chown root:root passwd shadow group gshadow chmod 644 passwd group chmod 400 shadow gshadow
CCE 3988-3, 3883-6, 3276-3, 3932-1, 4064-2, 4210-1, 3918-0, 3566-7, 3958-6, 3967-7, 3495-9, 4130-1
These are the default permissions for these les. Many utilities need read access to the passwd le in order to function properly, but read access to the shadow le allows malicious attacks against system passwords, and should never be enabled.
31
2.2.3.2
Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set
Locate any directories in local partitions which are world-writable and do not have their sticky bits set. The following command will discover and print these. Run it once for each local partition PART: # find PART -xdev -type d $ -perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000 $ -print If this command produces any output, x each reported directory /dir using the command: # chmod +t /dir
CCE 3399-3
When the so-called sticky bit is set on a directory, only the owner of a given le may remove that le from the directory. Without the sticky bit, any user with write access to a directory may remove any le in the directory. Setting the sticky bit prevents users from removing each others les. In cases where there is no reason for a directory to be world-writable, a better solution is to remove that permission rather than to set the sticky bit. However, if a directory is used by a particular application, consult that applications documentation instead of blindly changing modes.
2.2.3.3
Find Unauthorized World-Writable Files
The following command discovers and prints any world-writable les in local partitions. Run it once for each local partition PART: # find PART -xdev -type f -perm -0002 -print If this command produces any output, x each reported le file using the command: # chmod o-w file
CCE 3795-2
Data in world-writable les can be modied by any user on the system. In almost all circumstances, les can be congured using a combination of user and group permissions to support whatever legitimate access is needed without the risk caused by world-writable les. It is generally a good idea to remove global (other) write access to a le when it is discovered. However, check with documentation for specic applications before making changes. Also, monitor for recurring world-writable les, as these may be symptoms of a miscongured application or user account.
2.2.3.4
Find Unauthorized SUID/SGID System Executables
The following command discovers and prints any setuid or setgid les on local partitions. Run it once for each local partition PART: # find PART -xdev $ -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 $ -type f -print If the le does not require a setuid or setgid bit as discussed below, then these bits can be removed with the command: # chmod -s file
CCE 14340-4, 14970-8
32
The following table contains all setuid and setgid les which are expected to be on a stock system. The setuid or setgid bit on these les may be disabled to reduce system risk if only an administrator requires their functionality. The table indicates those les which may not be needed. Note: Several of these les are used for applications which are unlikely to be relevant to most production environments, such as ISDN networking, SSH hostbased authentication, or modication of network interfaces by unprivileged users. It is extremely likely that your site can disable a subset of these les with no loss of functionality. Any les found by the above command which are not in the table should be examined. If the les are not authorized, they should have permissions removed, and further investigation may be warranted.
File /bin/mount /bin/ping /bin/ping6 /bin/su /bin/umount /sbin/mount.nfs /sbin/mount.nfs4 /sbin/netreport /sbin/pam_timestamp_check /sbin/umount.nfs /sbin/umount.nfs4 /sbin/unix_chkpwd /usr/bin/at /usr/bin/chage /usr/bin/chfn /usr/bin/chsh /usr/bin/crontab /usr/bin/gpasswd /usr/bin/locate /usr/bin/lockfile /usr/bin/newgrp /usr/bin/passwd /usr/bin/rcp /usr/bin/rlogin /usr/bin/rsh /usr/bin/ssh-agent /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/sudoedit /usr/bin/wall /usr/bin/write /usr/bin/Xorg /usr/kerberos/bin/ksu /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign /usr/libexec/utempter/utempter /usr/lib/squid/pam_auth /usr/lib/squid/ncsa_auth /usr/lib/vte/gnome-pty-helper /usr/sbin/ccreds_validate /usr/sbin/lockdev /usr/sbin/sendmail.sendmail /usr/sbin/suexec /usr/sbin/userhelper /usr/sbin/userisdnctl Set-ID uid root uid root uid root uid root uid root uid root uid root gid root uid root uid root uid root uid root uid root uid root uid root uid root uid/gid root uid root gid slocate gid mail uid root uid root uid root uid root uid root gid nobody uid root uid root gid tty gid tty uid root uid root uid root gid utmp uid root uid root gid utmp uid root gid lock gid smmsp uid root uid root uid root Subsystem/Ref lesystems net (3.3.9) net (3.3.9),IPv6 (2.5.3) auth (2.3.1.2) lesystems NFS (3.13) NFS (3.13) net (3.3.9) PAM auth (2.3.3) NFS (3.13) NFS (3.13) PAM auth (2.3.3) cron/at (3.4) passwd expiry (2.3.1.7) user info user info cron/at (3.4) group auth locate database procmail group auth passwd auth rsh (3.2.3) rsh (3.2.3) rsh (3.2.3) SSH (3.5) sudo (2.3.1.3) sudo (2.3.1.3) console messaging console messaging X11 (3.6) Kerberos auth (2.3.6) SSH (3.5) terminal support squid (3.19) squid (3.19) X11, Gnome (3.6) PAM auth (2.3.3) lesystems sendmail client (3.11.2) apache (3.16) PAM auth (2.3.3.4) ISDN Disable? no no unless IPv6 is used no no unless NFS is used unless NFSv4 is used unless users must modify interfaces no unless NFS is used unless NFSv4 is used no no unless users must view expiry info unless users must change nger info unless users must change shells unless users must use cron no no unless procmail is used no no yes (rsh is obsolete) yes (rsh is obsolete) yes (rsh is obsolete) no no no unless console messaging is used unless console messaging is used unless X11 is used unless Kerberos is used unless sshd uses hostbased auth no unless squid is used unless squid is used unless X11 is used unless PAM auth caching is used no no unless apache is used restrict (see section 2.3.3.4) unless ISDN is used
33
File /usr/sbin/usernetctl Set-ID uid root Subsystem/Ref user network control Disable? unless users must modify interfaces
2.2.3.5
Find and Repair Unowned Files
The following command will discover and print any les on local partitions which do not belong to a valid user and a valid group. Run it once for each local partition PART: # find PART -xdev $ -nouser -o -nogroup $ -print If this command prints any results, investigate each reported le and either assign it to an appropriate user and group or remove it.
CCE 4223-4, 3573-3
Unowned les are not directly exploitable, but they are generally a sign that something is wrong with some system process. They may be caused by an intruder, by incorrect software installation or incomplete software removal, or by failure to remove all les belonging to a deleted account. The les should be repaired so that they will not cause problems when accounts are created in the future, and the problem which led to unowned les should be discovered and addressed.
2.2.3.6
Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Proper Ownership
Locate any directories in local partitions which are world-writable and ensure that they are owned by root or another system account. The following command will discover and print these (assuming only system accounts have a uid lower than 500). Run it once for each local partition PART: # find PART -xdev -type d -perm -0002 -uid +500 -print If this command produces any output, investigate why the current owner is not root or another system account.
CCE 14794-2
Allowing a user account to own a world-writable directory is undesirable because it allows the owner of that directory to remove or replace any les that may be placed in the directory by other users.
2.2.4
Restrict Programs from Dangerous Execution Patterns
The recommendations in this section provide broad protection against information disclosure or other misbehavior. These protections are applied at the system initialization or kernel level, and defend against certain types of badly-congured or compromised programs.
2.2.4.1
Set Daemon umask
Edit the le /etc/sysconfig/init, and add or correct the following line: umask 027
CCE 4220-0
34
The settings le /etc/sysconfig/init contains settings which apply to all processes started at boot time. The system umask must be set to at least 022, or daemon processes may create world-writable les. The more restrictive setting 027 protects les, including temporary les and log les, from unauthorized reading by unprivileged users on the system. If a particular daemon needs a less restrictive umask, consider editing the startup script or syscong le of that daemon to make a specic exception.
2.2.4.2
Disable Core Dumps
To disable core dumps for all users, add or correct the following line in /etc/security/limits.conf: * hard core 0
In addition, to ensure that core dumps can never be made by setuid programs, edit /etc/sysctl.conf and add or correct the line: fs.suid_dumpable = 0
CCE 4225-9, 4247-3
A core dump le is the memory image of an executable program when it was terminated by the operating system due to errant behavior. In most cases, only software developers would legitimately need to access these les. The core dump les may also contain sensitive information, or unnecessarily occupy large amounts of disk space. By default, the system sets a soft limit to stop the creation of core dump les for all users. This is accomplished in /etc/profile with the line: ulimit -S -c 0 > /dev/null 2>&1 However, compliance with this limit is voluntary; it is a default intended only to protect users from the annoyance of generating unwanted core les. Users can increase the allowed core le size up to the hard limit, which is unlimited by default. Once a hard limit is set in /etc/security/limits.conf, the user cannot increase that limit within his own session. If access to core dumps is required, consider restricting them to only certain users or groups. See the limits.conf(5) man page for more information. The core dumps of setuid programs are further protected. The sysctl variable fs.suid dumpable controls whether the kernel allows core dumps from these programs at all. The default value of 0 is recommended.
2.2.4.2.1
Ensure SUID Core Dumps are Disabled
The sysctl variable fs.suid dumpable should be checked to ensure that it has not been enabled at any time during system operation. To check this, issue the command: # sysctl fs.suid_dumpable The output should indicate that the setting is 0. (Use of the -n option causes output to consist of only the value, which may make automated checking easier.)
35
2.2.4.3
Enable ExecShield
ExecShield comprises a number of kernel features to provide protection against buer overows. These features include random placement of the stack and other memory regions, prevention of execution in memory that should only hold data, and special handling of text buers. To ensure ExecShield (including random placement of virtual memory regions) is activated at boot, add or correct the following settings in /etc/sysctl.conf: kernel.exec-shield = 1 kernel.randomize_va_space = 1
CCE 4146-7, 4168-1
ExecShield uses the segmentation feature on all x86 systems to prevent execution in memory higher than a certain address. It writes an address as a limit in the code segment descriptor, to control where code can be executed, on a per-process basis. When the kernel places a processs memory regions such as the stack and heap higher than this address, the hardware prevents execution there. However, this cannot always be done for all memory regions in which execution should not occur, so follow guidance in Section 2.2.4.4 to further protect the system.
2.2.4.3.1
Ensure ExecShield is Enabled
Exec-shield protection is enabled by default, but the sysctl variables kernel.exec-shield and kernel.randomize va space should be checked to ensure that it has not been disabled at any time during system operation. To check that ExecShield (including random placement of virtual memory regions) is currently running, issue the following commands: # sysctl kernel.exec-shield # sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space The output of both commands should be indicate that the setting is 1. (Use of the -n option causes output to consist of only the value, which may make automated checking easier.)
2.2.4.4
Enable Execute Disable (XD) or No Execute (NX) Support on 32-bit x86 Systems
Later 32-bit processors in the x86 family support the ability to prevent code execution on a per memory page basis. Generically and on AMD processors, this ability is called No Execute (NX), while on Intel processors it is called Execute Disable (XD). This ability can help prevent exploitation of buer overow vulnerabilities and should be activated whenever possible. Extra steps must be taken to ensure that this protection is enabled on 32-bit x86 systems. Other processors, such as Itanium, POWER, and 64-bit x86 (both AMD64 or Intel 64), have included such support since inception and the standard kernel for those platforms supports the feature.
2.2.4.4.1
Check for Processor Support on x86 Systems
Check to see if the processor supports the PAE and NX features: $ cat /proc/cpuinfo
36
If supported, the flags eld will contain pae and nx.
2.2.4.4.2
Install New Kernel on Supported x86 Systems
Systems that are using the 64-bit x86 kernel package do not need to install the kernel-PAE package because the 64-bit x86 kernel already includes this support. However, if the system is running 32-bit kernel package supports PAE and NX features as determined in the previous section, the kernel-PAE package should be installed to enable XD or NX support: # yum install kernel-PAE The installation process should also have congured the bootloader to load the new kernel at boot. Verify this at reboot and modify /etc/grub.conf if necessary.
CCE 4172-3
The kernel-PAE package should not be installed on older systems that do not support the XD or NX bit, as this may prevent them from booting.
2.2.4.4.3
Enable NX or XD Support in the BIOS
Computers with the ability to prevent this type of code execution frequently put an option in the BIOS that will allow users to turn the feature on or o at will. Reboot the system and enter the BIOS or Setup conguration menu. Navigate the BIOS conguration menu and make sure that the option is enabled. The setting may be located under a Security section. Look for Execute Disable (XD) on Intel-based systems and No Execute (NX) on AMD-based systems. See Section 2.3.5.1 for information on protecting this and other BIOS settings.
CCE 4177-2
2.2.4.5
Congure Prelink
Prelinking is designed to decrease process startup time by loading each shared library into an address for which the linking of needed symbols has already been performed. The /etc/sysconfig/prelink le describes what les the /usr/sbin/prelink program will modify and how often it should modify those les. A cron job is run daily that determines if the prelink program should be run. There are two types of prelinking: quick and full. Full prelinking occurs by default every fourteen days and relinks all shared libraries and the binaries that use them. Quick mode is run every day, but it only runs on modied binaries and libraries. After a binary has been prelinked, the address at which shared libraries will be loaded will no longer be random on a per-process basis, even if the kernel.randomize va space sysctl is set to 1. This is undesirable because it provides a stable address for an attacker to use during an exploitation attempt.
37
2.2.4.5.1
Disable Prelink
Prelink can be safely disabled by setting the following setting in /etc/sysconfig/prelink: PRELINKING=no
2.2.4.5.2
Undo Existing Prelinking
Execute the following command to revert binaries and libraries to their original content before they were prelinked: # /usr/sbin/prelink -ua
2.3
Account and Access Control
In traditional Unix security, if an attacker gains shell access to a certain login account, he can perform any action or access any le to which that account has access. Therefore, making it more dicult for unauthorized people to gain shell access to accounts, particularly to privileged accounts, is a necessary part of securing a system. This section introduces mechanisms for restricting access to accounts under RHEL5.
2.3.1
Protect Accounts by Restricting Password-Based Login
Conventionally, Unix shell accounts are accessed by providing a username and password to a login program, which tests these values for correctness using the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow les. Password-based login is vulnerable to guessing of weak passwords, and to sning and man-in-the-middle attacks against passwords entered over a network or at an insecure console. Therefore, mechanisms for accessing accounts by entering usernames and passwords should be restricted to those which are operationally necessary.
2.3.1.1
Restrict Root Logins to System Console
Edit the le /etc/securetty. Ensure that the le contains only the following lines:
The primary system console device:
console
The virtual console devices:
tty1 tty2 tty3 tty4 tty5 tty6 ...
38
If required by your organization, the deprecated virtual console interface may be retained for backwards compatibility:
vc/1 vc/2 vc/3 vc/4 vc/5 vc/6 ...

If required by your organization, the serial consoles may be added:
ttyS0 ttyS1
CCE 3820-8, 3485-0, 4111-1, 4256-4
Direct root logins should be allowed only for emergency use. In normal situations, the administrator should access the system via a unique unprivileged account, and use su or sudo to execute privileged commands. Discouraging administrators from accessing the root account directly ensures an audit trail in organizations with multiple administrators. Locking down the channels through which root can connect directly reduces opportunities for password-guessing against the root account. The login program uses the le /etc/securetty to determine which interfaces should allow root logins. The virtual devices /dev/console and /dev/tty* represent the system consoles (accessible via the Ctrl-Alt-F1 through Ctrl-Alt-F6 keyboard sequences on a default installation). The default securetty le also contains /dev/vc/*. These are likely to be deprecated in most environments, but may be retained for compatibility. Root should also be prohibited from connecting via network protocols. See Section 3.5 for instructions on preventing root from logging in via SSH.
2.3.1.2
Limit su Access to the Root Account
1. Ensure that the group wheel exists, and that the usernames of all administrators who should be allowed to execute commands as root are members of that group. # grep ^wheel /etc/group 2. Edit the le /etc/pam.d/su. Add, uncomment, or correct the line: auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid
CCE 14088-9, 15047-4
The su command allows a user to gain the privileges of another user by entering the password for that users account. It is desirable to restrict the root user so that only known administrators are ever allowed to access the root account. This restricts password-guessing against the root account by unauthorized users or by accounts which have been compromised. By convention, the group wheel contains all users who are allowed to run privileged commands. The PAM module pam_wheel.so is used to restrict root access to this set of users.
39
2.3.1.3
Congure sudo to Improve Auditing of Root Access
1. Ensure that the group wheel exists, and that the usernames of all administrators who should be allowed to execute commands as root are members of that group. # grep ^wheel /etc/group 2. Edit the le /etc/sudoers. Add, uncomment, or correct the line: %wheel ALL=(ALL) ALL
CCE 4044-4
The sudo command allows ne-grained control over which users can execute commands using other accounts. The primary benet of sudo when congured as above is that it provides an audit trail of every command run by a privileged user. It is possible for a malicious administrator to circumvent this restriction, but, if there is an established procedure that all root commands are run using sudo, then it is easy for an auditor to detect unusual behavior when this procedure is not followed. Editing /etc/sudoers by hand can be dangerous, since a conguration error may make it impossible to access the root account remotely. The recommended means of editing this le is using the visudo command, which checks the les syntax for correctness before allowing it to be saved. Note that sudo allows any attacker who gains access to the password of an administrator account to run commands as root. This is a downside which must be weighed against the benets of increased audit capability and of being able to heavily restrict the use of the high-value root password (which can be logistically dicult to change often). As a basic precaution, never use the NOPASSWD directive, which would allow anyone with access to an administrator account to execute commands as root without knowing the administrators password. The sudo command has many options which can be used to further customize its behavior. See the sudoers(5) man page for details.
2.3.1.4
Block Shell and Login Access for Non-Root System Accounts

Do not perform the steps in this section on the root account. Doing so might cause the system to become inaccessible.
Using /etc/passwd, obtain a listing of all users, their UIDs, and their shells, for instance by running: # awk -F: '{print $1 ":" $3 ":" $7}' /etc/passwd Identify the system accounts from this listing. These will primarily be the accounts with UID numbers less than 500, other than root. For each identied system account SYSACCT , lock the account: # usermod -L SYSACCT and disable its shell: # usermod -s /sbin/nologin SYSACCT
CCE 3987-5
These are the accounts which are not associated with a human user of the system, but which exist to perform some
40
administrative function. Make it more dicult for an attacker to use these accounts by locking their passwords and by setting their shells to some non-valid shell. The RHEL5 default non-valid shell is /sbin/nologin, but any command which will exit with a failure status and disallow execution of any further commands, such as /bin/false or /dev/null, will work.
2.3.1.5
Verify Proper Storage and Existence of Password Hashes

CCE 4238-2
2.3.1.5.1
Verify that No Accounts Have Empty Password Fields
To ensure that no accounts have an empty password eld, the following command should have no output: # awk -F: '($2 == "") {print}' /etc/shadow If this produces any output, x the problem by locking each account (see Section 2.3.1.4 above) or by setting a password. If an account has an empty password, anybody may log in and run commands with the privileges of that account. Accounts with empty passwords should never be used in operational environments.
2.3.1.5.2
Verify that All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed
To ensure that no password hashes are stored in /etc/passwd, the following command should have no output: # awk -F: '($2 != "x") {print}' /etc/passwd
CCE 14300-8
The hashes for all user account passwords should be stored in the le /etc/shadow and never in /etc/passwd, which is readable by all users.
2.3.1.6
Verify that No Non-Root Accounts Have UID 0
This command will print all password le entries for accounts with UID 0: # awk -F: '($3 == "0") {print}' /etc/passwd This should print only one line, for the user root. If any other lines appear, ensure that these additional UID-0 accounts are authorized, and that there is a good reason for them to exist.
CCE 4009-7
In general, the best practice solution for auditing use of the root account is to restrict the set of cases in which root must be accessed anonymously by requiring use of su or sudo in almost all cases. Some sites choose to have more than one account with UID 0 in order to dierentiate between administrators, but this practice may have unexpected side eects, and is therefore not recommended.
41
2.3.1.7
Set Password Expiration Parameters
Edit the le /etc/login.defs to specify password expiration settings for new accounts. Add or correct the following lines: PASS_MAX_DAYS PASS_MIN_DAYS PASS_MIN_LEN PASS_WARN_AGE 60 7 14 7
For each existing human user USER , modify the current expiration settings to match these: # chage -M 60 -m 7 -W 7 USER
CCE 4180-6, 4092-3, 4097-2
Users should be forced to change their passwords, in order to decrease the utility of compromised passwords. However, the need to change passwords often should be balanced against the risk that users will reuse or write down passwords if forced to change them too often. Forcing password changes every 90-360 days, depending on the environment, is recommended. Set the appropriate value as PASS MAX DAYS and apply it to existing accounts with the -M ag. The PASS MIN DAYS (-m) setting prevents password changes for 7 days after the rst change, to discourage password cycling. If you use this setting, train users to contact an administrator for an emergency password change in case a new password becomes compromised. The PASS WARN AGE (-W) setting gives users 7 days of warnings at login time that their passwords are about to expire. The PASS MIN LEN setting, which controls minimum password length, should be set to whatever is required by your site or organization security policy. The example value of 8 provided here may be inadequate for many environments. See Section 2.3.3 for information on how to enforce more sophisticated requirements on password length and quality.
2.3.1.7.1
Remove Password Parameters from libuser.conf
Ensure the following line exists within the le /etc/libuser.conf under the [import] section. login_defs = /etc/login.defs Also ensure that no lines beginning with the following appear in the [userdefaults] section of the le, as these override settings from /etc/login.defs: LU_SHADOWMAX LU_SHADOWMIN LU_SHADOWWARNING
The /etc/libuser.conf le contains conguration options for the libuser library, which is intended to implement a standardized interface for manipulating and administering user and group accouts. By default, it sources password settings from /etc/login.defs, but it can override these parameters. The man page libuser.conf(5) contains more information.
42
2.3.1.8
Remove Legacy + Entries from Password Files
The command: # grep "^+:" /etc/passwd /etc/shadow /etc/group should produce no output.
CCE 4114-5, 14675-3, 14071-5
The + symbol was used by systems to include data from NIS maps into existing les. However, a certain conguration error in which a NIS inclusion line appears in /etc/passwd, but NIS is not running, could lead to anyone being able to access the system with the username + and no password. Therefore, it is important to verify that no such line appears in any of the relevant system les. The correct way to tell the local system to consult network databases such as LDAP or NIS for user information is to make appropriate modications to /etc/nsswitch.conf.
2.3.1.9
Set Accounts to Disable After Password Expiration
In order to automatically disable local accounts some number of DAYS after password expiration, add or modify the following line in /etc/default/useradd: INACTIVE=DAYS For example, if INACTIVE=30 and if the password is currently on the verge of expiration, then 30 days remain until the account is automatically disabled. If the password will not expire for another 60 days, then 90 days remain until the account is automatically disabled. See useradd(8) for more information. Determining the inactivity timeout must be done with careful consideration of the length of a normal period of inactivity for users in your environment. Setting the timeout too low incurs support costs and also has the potential to impact availability of the system to legitimate users.
2.3.2
Use Unix Groups to Enhance Security
The access control policies which can be enforced by standard Unix permissions are limited, and conguring SELinux (Section 2.4) is frequently a better choice. However, this guide recommends that security be enhanced to the extent possible by enforcing the Unix group policies outlined in this section.
2.3.2.1
Create a Unique Default Group for Each User
When running useradd, do not use the -g ag or otherwise override the default group. The Red Hat default is that each new user account should have a unique primary group whose name is the same as that of the account. This default is recommended, in order to provide additional protection against les which are created with group write permission enabled.
43
2.3.2.2
Create and Maintain a Group Containing All Human Users
Identify all user accounts on the system which correspond to human users. Depending on your system conguration, this may be all entries in /etc/passwd with UID values of at least 500. Once, you have identied such a set of users, create a group named usergroup (substitute some name appropriate to your environment) and populate it with each human user: # groupadd usergroup # usermod -G usergroup human1 # usermod -G usergroup human2 ... # usermod -G usergroup humanN Then modify your procedure for creating new user accounts by adding -G usergroup to the set of ags with which useradd is invoked, so that new human users will be placed in the correct group by default. Creating a group of human users does not, by itself, enhance system security. However, as you work on securing your system, you will often nd commands which never need to be run by system accounts, or which are only ever needed by users logged into the graphical console (which should only ever be available to human users, even on workstations). Once a group of users has been created, it is easy to restrict access to a given command, for instance /path/to/graphical/command , to authorized users: # chgrp usergroup /path/to/graphical/command # chmod 750 /path/graphical/command Without a group of human users, it is necessary to restrict access by somehow preventing each system account from running the command, which is an error-prone process even when it is possible at all.
2.3.3
Protect Accounts by Conguring PAM
PAM, or Pluggable Authentication Modules, is a system which implements modular authentication for Linux programs. PAM is the framework which provides the systems authentication architecture and can be congured to minimize your systems exposure to unnecessary risk. This section contains guidance on how to accomplish that, and how to ensure that the modules used by your PAM conguration do what they are supposed to do. PAM is implemented as a set of shared objects which are loaded and invoked whenever an application wishes to authenticate a user. Typically, the application must be running as root in order to take advantage of PAM. Traditional privileged network listeners (e.g. sshd) or SUID programs (e.g. sudo) already meet this requirement. An SUID root application, userhelper, is provided so that programs which are not SUID or privileged themselves can still take advantage of PAM. PAM looks in the directory /etc/pam.d for application-specic conguration information. For instance, if the program login attempts to authenticate a user, then PAMs libraries follow the instructions in the le /etc/ pam.d/login to determine what actions should be taken. One very important le in /etc/pam.d is /etc/pam.d/system-auth. This le, which is included by many other PAM conguration les, denes default system authentication measures. Modifying this le is a good way to make far-reaching authentication changes, for instance when implementing a centralized authentication service. Be careful when making changes to PAMs conguration les. The syntax for these les is complex, and modications can have unexpected consequences.1 The default congurations shipped with applications should be
1 One reference to the conguration le syntax can be found at http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/Linux-PAM-html/ sag-configuration-file.html.
44 sucient for most users.
Running authconfig or system-config-authentication will re-write the PAM conguration les, destroying any manually made changes and replacing them with a series of system defaults.
2.3.3.1
Set Password Quality Requirements
The default pam_cracklib PAM module provides strength checking for passwords. It performs a number of checks, such as making sure passwords are not similar to dictionary words, are of at least a certain length, are not the previous password reversed, and are not simply a change of case from the previous password. It can also require passwords to be in certain character classes. The pam_passwdqc PAM module provides the ability to enforce even more stringent password strength requirements. It is provided in an RPM of the same name. The man pages pam cracklib(8) and pam passwdqc(8) provide information on the capabilities and conguration of each.
CCE 3762-2
2.3.3.1.1
Set Password Quality Requirements, if using pam cracklib
The pam_cracklib PAM module can be congured to meet recommendations for DoD systems as stated in [12]. To congure pam_cracklib to require at least one uppercase character, lowercase character, digit, and other (special) character, locate the following line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth: password requisite pam_cracklib.so try_first_pass retry=3
and then alter it to read (placing the text on one line, which is not possible here): password required pam_cracklib.so try_first_pass retry=3 minlen=14 \ dcredit=-1 ucredit=-1 ocredit=-1 lcredit=-1
If necessary, modify the arguments to ensure compliance with your organizations security policy. Note that the password quality requirements are not enforced for the root account for some reason.
CCE 14113-5, 14672-0, 14712-4, 14122-6, 14701-7, 15054-0
2.3.3.1.2
Set Password Quality Requirements, if using pam passwdqc
If password strength stronger than that guaranteed by pam_cracklib is required, congure PAM to use pam_passwdqc. To activate pam passwdqc, locate the following line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth: password requisite pam_cracklib.so try_first_pass retry=3
and then replace it with the line: password requisite pam_passwdqc.so min=disabled,disabled,16,12,8
45
If necessary, modify the arguments (min=disabled,disabled,16,12,8) to ensure compliance with your organizations security policy. Conguration options are described in the man page pam passwdqc(8) and also in /usr/share/doc/pam_passwdqc- version . The minimum lengths provided here supercede that specied by the argument PASS MIN LEN as described in Section 2.3.1.7. The options given in the example above set a minimum length for each of the password classes that pam passwdqc recognizes. Setting a particular minimum value to disabled will stop users from choosing a password that falls into that category alone.
2.3.3.2
Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attempts
The pam_tally2 PAM module provides the capability to lock out user accounts after a number of failed login attempts. Its documentation is available in /usr/share/doc/pam- version /txts/README.pam_tally2. The behavior of pam_ tally2 has changed during the lifetime of RHEL 5. Earlier guidance is dierent from what is listed here, and this guidance may not properly function on RHEL systems that are not up to date. If locking out accounts after a number of incorrect login attempts is required by your security policy, implement use of pam_tally2.so. To enforce password lockout, add the following to /etc/pam.d/system-auth. First, add to the top of the auth lines: auth required pam_tally2.so deny=5 onerr=fail unlock_time=900
Second, add to the top of the account lines: account required pam_tally2.so
Adjust the deny argument (which controls how many attempts are permitted before the account is locked) and the unlock time argument (which controls how many seconds elapse before the account is automatically unlocked) to conform to your system security policy. The pam_tally2 utility can also be used to unlock user accounts as follows: # /sbin/pam_tally2 --user username --reset
CCE 3410-8
Locking out user accounts presents the risk of a denial-of-service attack. The security policy regarding system lockout must weigh the risk of a denial-of-service attack against an account against the benets of thwarting password guessing attacks. The unlock time argument can be used to adjust this risk.
2.3.3.3
Use pam deny.so to Quickly Deny Access to a Service
In order to deny access to a service SVCNAME via PAM, edit the le /etc/pam.d/SVCNAME . Prepend this line to the beginning of the le: auth requisite pam_deny.so
Under most circumstances, there are better ways to disable a service than to deny access via PAM. However, this should suce as a way to quickly make a service unavailable to future users (existing sessions which have already
46
been authenticated, are not aected). The requisite tag tells PAM that, if the named module returns failure, authentication should fail, and PAM should immediately stop processing the conguration le. The pam deny.so module always returns failure regardless of its input.
2.3.3.4
Restrict Execution of userhelper to Console Users
If your environment has dened a group, usergroup containing all the human users of your system, restrict execution of the userhelper program to only that group: # chgrp usergroup /usr/sbin/userhelper # chmod 4710 /usr/sbin/userhelper
CCE 4185-5, 3952-9
The userhelper program provides authentication for graphical services which must run with root privileges, such as the system-config- family of graphical conguration utilities. Only human users logged into the system console are likely to ever have a legitimate need to run these utilities. This step provides some protection against possible aws in userhelpers implementation, and against further privilege escalation when system accounts are compromised. See Section 2.3.2.2 for more information on creating a group of human users. The userhelper program is congured by the les in /etc/security/console.apps/. Each le species, for some program, what user the program should run as, and what program should be executed after successful authentication. Note: The conguration in /etc/security/console.apps/ is applied in combination with the PAM conguration of the service dened in /etc/pam.d/. First, userhelper determines what user the service should run as. (Typically, this will be root.) Next, userhelper uses the PAM API to allow the user who ran the program to attempt to authenticate as the desired user. The PAM API exchange is wrapped in a GUI if the applications conguration requests one.
2.3.3.5
Upgrade Password Hashing Algorithm to SHA-512
In order to congure the system to use the SHA-512 algorithm, three les need to be edited. First, edit the le /etc/pam.d/system-auth to ensure that sha512 is used by the pam unix.so module in the password section, replacing any other algorithms (such as md5, bigcrypt, blowfish, or sha256) with sha512, as shown: password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 shadow nullok try_first_pass use_authtok
Second, edit the le /etc/login.defs to add or correct the following lines: MD5_CRYPT_ENAB no ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512 Third, edit the le /etc/libuser.conf to add or correct the following line: crypt_style = sha512 When users changes their passwords, hashes for the new passwords will be generated using the SHA-512 algorithm.
CCE 14063-2
47 The default algorithm for storing hashes in earlier releases of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 was MD5. In release 5.2 (and for those systems fully updated since its release), the algorithms SHA-256 and SHA-512 are available. The release notes available at http://www.redhat.com/docs/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/5.2/html/ Release_Notes/singles/relnotesU2-x86.html document this change. As noted there, only kickstart-installed systems can be congured to begin operation with this algorithm. Other systems will need to have this command issued and then all accounts will need to perform a password change in order to upgrade the stored hashes to the stronger algorithm.
2.3.3.6
Limit Password Reuse
Do not allow users to reuse recent passwords. This can be accomplished by using the remember option for the pam_unix PAM module. In order to prevent a user from re-using any of his or her last 5 passwords, append remember=5 to the password line which uses the pam_unix module in the le /etc/pam.d/system-auth, as shown: password sufficient pam_unix.so existing_options remember=5
CCE 14939-3
Old (and thus no longer valid) passwords are stored in the le /etc/security/opasswd.
2.3.3.7
Remove the pam ccreds Package if Possible
Unless its credential caching functionality is required, remove the pam ccreds package: # yum erase pam ccreds The pam ccreds package contains the setuid program /usr/sbin/ccreds_validate and should be removed unless it provides essential functionality. Any credentials cached on a system would also be compromised if an attacker obtains control of the system.
2.3.4
Secure Session Conguration Files for Login Accounts
When a user logs into a Unix account, the system congures the users session by reading a number of les. Many of these les are located in the users home directory, and may have weak permissions as a result of user error or misconguration. If an attacker can modify or even read certain types of account conguration information, he can often gain full access to the aected users account. Therefore, it is important to test and correct conguration le permissions for interactive accounts, particularly those of privileged users such as root or system administrators.
2.3.4.1
Ensure that No Dangerous Directories Exist in Roots Path
The active path of the root account can be obtained by starting a new root shell and running: # echo $PATH This will produce a colon-separated list of directories in the path. It is important to prevent root from executing unknown or untrusted programs, since such programs could contain malicious code. Therefore, root should not run programs installed by unprivileged users. Since root may often
48
be working inside untrusted directories, the . character, which represents the current directory, should never be in the root path, nor should any directory which can be written to by an unprivileged or semi-privileged (system) user. The following sections describe some entries which should not be seen in roots path. It is a good practice for administrators to always execute privileged commands by typing the full path to the command.
CCE 3301-9
2.3.4.1.1
Ensure that Roots Path Does Not Include Relative Paths or Null Directories
For each directory DIR in the path, ensure that DIR is not equal to a single . character, or that it contains any instances that lead to relative path traversal, such as .. or beginning a path without the slash (/) character. Also ensure that there are no empty elements in the path, such as in these examples: PATH=:/bin PATH=/bin: PATH=/bin::/sbin These empty elements have the same eect as a single . character.
2.3.4.1.2
Ensure that Roots Path Does Not Include World-Writable or Group-Writable Directories
For each element in the path, run: # ls -ld DIR and ensure that write permissions are disabled for group and other.
CCE 14957-5
2.3.4.2
Ensure that User Home Directories are not Group-Writable or World-Readable

Sections 2.3.4.22.3.4.5 recommend modifying user home directories. Notify your user community, and solicit input if appropriate, before making this type of change.
For each human user USER of the system, view the permissions of the users home directory: # ls -ld /home/USER Ensure that the directory is not group-writable and that it is not world-readable. If necessary, repair the permissions: # chmod g-w /home/USER # chmod o-rwx /home/USER
CCE 4090-7
User home directories contain many conguration les which aect the behavior of a users account. No user should ever have write permission to another users home directory. Group shared directories can be congured
49 in subdirectories or elsewhere in the lesystem if they are needed. Typically, user home directories should not be world-readable. If a subset of users need read access to one anothers home directories, this can be provided using groups.
2.3.4.3
Ensure that User Dot-Files are not World-writable
For each human user USER of the system, view the permissions of all dot-les in the users home directory: # ls -ld /home/USER /.[A-Za-z0-9]* Ensure that none of these les are group- or world-writable. Correct each miscongured le FILE by executing: # chmod go-w /home/USER /FILE A user who can modify another users conguration les can likely execute commands with the other users privileges, including stealing data, destroying les, or launching further attacks on the system.
2.3.4.4
Ensure that Users Have Sensible Umask Values
1. Edit the global conguration les /etc/profile, /etc/bashrc, and /etc/csh.cshrc. Add or correct the line: umask 077 2. Edit the user denitions le /etc/login.defs. Add or correct the line: UMASK 077
3. View the additional conguration les /etc/csh.login and /etc/profile.d/*, and ensure that none of these les redene the umask to a more permissive value unless there is a good reason for it. 4. Edit the root shell conguration les /root/.bashrc, /root/.bash_profile, /root/.cshrc, and /root/.tcshrc. Add or correct the line: umask 077
CCE 3844-8, 4227-5, 3870-3, 14107-7, 14847-8
With a default umask setting of 077, les and directories created by users will not be readable by any other user on the system. Users who wish to make specic les group- or world-readable can accomplish this using the chmod command. Additionally, users can make all their les readable to their group by default by setting a umask of 027 in their shell conguration les. If default per-user groups exist (that is, if every user has a default group whose name is the same as that users username and whose only member is the user), then it may even be safe for users to select a umask of 007, making it very easy to intentionally share les with groups of which the user is a member. In addition, it may be necessary to change roots umask temporarily in order to install software or les which must be readable by other users, or to change the default umasks of certain service accounts such as the FTP user. However, setting a restrictive default protects the les of users who have not taken steps to make their les more available, and preventing les from being inadvertently shared.
50
2.3.4.5
Ensure that Users do not Have .netrc Files
For each human user USER of the system, ensure that the user has no .netrc le. The command: # ls -l /home/USER /.netrc should return the error No such le or directory. If any user has such a le, approach that user to discuss removing this le. The .netrc le is a conguration le used to make unattended logins to other systems via FTP. When this le exists, it frequently contains unencrypted passwords which may be used to attack other systems.
2.3.5
Protect Physical Console Access
It is impossible to fully protect a system from an attacker with physical access, so securing the space in which the system is located should be considered a necessary step. However, there are some steps which, if taken, make it more dicult for an attacker to quickly or undetectably modify a system from its console.
2.3.5.1
Set BIOS Password
The BIOS (on x86 systems) is the rst code to execute during system startup and controls many important system parameters, including which devices the system will try to boot from, and in which order. Assign a password to prevent any unauthorized changes to the BIOS conguration. The exact steps will vary depending on your machine, but are likely to include: 1. Reboot the machine. 2. Press the appropriate key during the initial boot screen (F2 is typical). 3. Navigate the BIOS conguration menu to add a password. The exact process will be system-specic and the systems hardware manual may provide detailed instructions. This password should prevent attackers with physical access from attempting to change important parameters, such as those described in Sections 2.5.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2.4. However, an attacker with physical access can usually clear the BIOS password. The password should be written down and stored in a physically-secure location, such as a safe, in the event that it is forgotten and must be retrieved.
2.3.5.2
Set Boot Loader Password
During the boot process, the boot loader is responsible for starting the execution of the kernel and passing options to it. The boot loader allows for the selection of dierent kernels possibly on dierent partitions or media. Options it can pass to the kernel include single-user mode, which provides root access without any authentication, and the ability to disable SELinux. To prevent local users from modifying the boot parameters and endangering security, the boot loader conguration should be protected with a password. The default RHEL boot loader for x86 systems is called GRUB. To protect its conguration: 1. Select a password and then generate a hash from it by running:
51
# grub-md5-crypt 2. Insert the following line into /etc/grub.conf immediately after the header comments. (Use the output from grub-md5-crypt as the value of password-hash ): password --md5 password-hash 3. Verify the permissions on /etc/grub.conf (which is a symlink to ../boot/grub/grub.conf): # chown root:root /etc/grub.conf # chmod 600 /etc/grub.conf
CCE 4144-2, 3923-0, 3818-2, 4197-0
Boot loaders for other platforms should oer a similar password protection feature.
2.3.5.3
Require Authentication for Single-User Mode
Single-user mode is intended as a system recovery method, providing a single user root access to the system by providing a boot option at startup. By default, no authentication is performed if single-user mode is selected. This provides a trivial mechanism of bypassing security on the machine and gaining root access. To require entry of the root password even if the system is started in single-user mode, add the following line to the /etc/inittab le: ~:S:wait:/sbin/sulogin
CCE 4241-6
2.3.5.4
Disable Interactive Boot
Edit the le /etc/sysconfig/init. Add or correct the setting: PROMPT=no

CCE 4245-7
The PROMPT option allows the console user to perform an interactive system startup, in which it is possible to select the set of services which are started on boot. Using interactive boot, the console user could disable auditing, rewalls, or other services, weakening system security.
2.3.5.5
Implement Inactivity Time-out for Login Shells
If the system does not run X Windows, then the login shells can be congured to automatically log users out after a period of inactivity. The following instructions are not practical for systems which run X Windows, as they will close terminal windows in the X environment. For information on how to automatically lock those systems, see Section 2.3.5.6. To implement a 15-minute idle time-out for the default /bin/bash shell, create a new le tmout.sh in the directory /etc/profile.d with the following lines:
52
TMOUT=900 readonly TMOUT export TMOUT To implement a 15-minute idle time-out for the tcsh shell, create a new le autologout.csh in the directory /etc/profile.d with the following line: set -r autologout 15 Similar actions should be taken for any other login shells used.
CCE 3689-7, 3707-7
The example time-out here of 15 minutes should be adjusted to whatever your security policy requires. The readonly line for bash and the -r option for tcsh can be omitted if policy allows users to override the value. The automatic shell logout only occurs when the shell is the foreground process. If, for example, a vi session is left idle, then automatic logout would not occur. When logging in through a remote connection, as with SSH, it may be more eective to set the timeout value directly through that service. To learn how to set automatic timeout intervals for SSH, see Section 3.5.2.3.
2.3.5.6
Congure Screen Locking
When a user must temporarily leave an account logged-in, screen locking should be employed to prevent passersby from abusing the account. User education and training is particularly important for screen locking to be eective. A policy should be implemented that trains all users to lock the screen when they plan to temporarily step away from a logged-in account. Automatic screen locking is only meant as a safeguard for those cases where a user forgot to lock the screen.
2.3.5.6.1
Congure GUI Screen Locking
In the default GNOME desktop, the screen can be locked by choosing Lock Screen from the System menu. The gconftool-2 program can be used to enforce mandatory screen locking settings for the default GNOME environment. Run the following commands to enforce idle activation of the screen saver, screen locking, a blank-screen screensaver, and 15-minute idle activation time: # gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:readwrite:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --type bool \ --set /apps/gnome-screensaver/idle_activation_enabled true # gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:readwrite:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --type bool \ --set /apps/gnome-screensaver/lock_enabled true # gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:readwrite:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --type string \ --set /apps/gnome-screensaver/mode blank-only # gconftool-2 --direct \
53
--config-source xml:readwrite:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --type int \ --set /apps/gnome-screensaver/idle_delay 15

CCE 3315-9, 3910-7, 14604-3, 14023-6, 14735-5
The setting of 15 minutes for idle activation is reasonable for many oce environments, but the setting should conform to whatever policy is dened. The screensaver mode blank-only is selected to conceal the contents of the display from passersby. Because users should be trained to lock the screen when they step away from the computer, the automatic locking feature is only meant as a backup. The Lock Screen icon from the System menu can also be dragged to the taskbar in order to facilitate even more convenient screen-locking. The root account cannot be screen-locked, but this should have no practical eect as the root account should never be used to log into an X Windows environment, and should only be used to for direct login via console in emergency circumstances. For more information about conguring GNOME screensaver, see http://live.gnome.org/GnomeScreensaver. For more information about enforcing preferences in the GNOME environment using the GConf conguration system, see http://www.gnome.org/projects/gconf and the man page gconftool-2(1).
2.3.5.6.2
Congure Console Screen Locking
A console screen locking mechanism is provided in the vlock package, which is not installed by default. If the ability to lock console screens is necessary, install the vlock package: # yum install vlock Instruct users to invoke the program when necessary, in order to prevent passersby from abusing their login: $ vlock The -a option can be used to prevent switching to other virtual consoles.
2.3.5.7
Disable Unnecessary Ports
Though unusual, some systems may be managed only remotely and yet also exposed to risk from attackers with direct physical access to them. In these cases, reduce an attackers access to the system by disabling unnecessary external ports (e.g. USB, FireWire, NIC) in the systems BIOS. Disabling USB ports is particularly unusual and will cause problems for important input devices such as keyboards or mice attached to the system. Disable ports on the system which are not necessary for normal system operation. The exact steps will vary depending on your machine, but are likely to include: 1. Reboot the machine. 2. Press the appropriate key during the initial boot screen (F2 is typical). 3. Navigate the BIOS conguration menu to disable ports, such as USB, FireWire, and NIC.
54
2.3.6
Use a Centralized Authentication Service
A centralized authentication service is any method of maintaining central control over account and authentication data and of keeping this data synchronized between machines. Such services can range in complexity from a script which pushes centrally-generated password les out to all machines, to a managed scheme such as LDAP or Kerberos. If authentication information is not centrally managed, it quickly becomes inconsistent, leading to out-of-date credentials and forgotten accounts which should have been deleted. In addition, many older protocols (such as NFS) make use of the UID to identify users over a network. This is not a good practice, and these protocols should be avoided if possible. However, since most sites must still make use of some older protocols, having consistent UIDs and GIDs site-wide is a signicant benet. Centralized authentication services do have the disadvantage that authentication information must be transmitted over a network, leading to a risk that credentials may be intercepted or manipulated. Therefore, these services must be deployed carefully. The following precautions should be taken when conguring any authentication service:
Ensure that authentication information and any sensitive account information are never sent over the network unencrypted. Ensure that the root account has a local password, to allow recovery in case of network outage or authentication server failure.
This guide recommends the use of LDAP. Secure conguration of OpenLDAP for clients and servers is described in Section 3.12. Kerberos is also a good choice for a centralized authentication service, but a description of its conguration is beyond the scope of this guide. The NIS service is not recommended, and should be considered obsolete. (See Section 3.2.4.)
2.3.7
Warning Banners for System Accesses
Each system should expose as little information about itself as possible. System banners, which are typically displayed just before a login prompt, give out information about the service or the hosts operating system. This might include the distribution name and the system kernel version, and the particular version of a network service. This information can assist intruders in gaining access to the system as it can reveal whether the system is running vulnerable software. Most network services can be congured to limit what information is displayed. Many organizations implement security policies that require a system banner provide notice of the systems ownership, provide warning to unauthorized users, and remind authorized users of their consent to monitoring.
2.3.7.1
Modify the System Login Banner
The contents of the le /etc/issue are displayed on the screen just above the login prompt for users logging directly into a terminal. Remote login programs such as SSH or FTP can be congured to display /etc/issue as well. Instructions for conguring each server daemon to show this le can be found in the relevant sections of Chapter 3. By default, the system will display the version of the OS, the kernel version, and the host name. Edit /etc/issue. Replace the default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal disclaimer.
55
CCE 4060-0
2.3.7.2
Implement a GUI Warning Banner
In the default graphical environment, users logging directly into the system are greeted with a login screen provided by the GNOME display manager. The warning banner should be displayed in this graphical environment for these users. The les for the default RHEL theme can be found in /usr/share/gdm/themes/RHEL. Add the following sample block of XML to /usr/share/gdm/themes/RHEL/RHEL.xml after the rst two pixmap entries: <item type="rect" id="custom-dod-banner"> <pos anchor="nw" x="20%" y="10" width="80%" height="100%"/> <box> <item type="label"> <normal font="Sans Bold 9" color="#ffffff"/> <text> Insert the text of your warning banner here. </text> </item> </box> </item>
CCE 4188-9
The full syntax that GDM theme les expect is documented elsewhere, but the above XML will create a text box at the top right of the screen. The font, text color, and exact positioning can all be easily modied by editing the appropriate values. The latest current GDM theme manual can be found at http://library.gnome.org/ admin/gdm/2.16/thememanual.html.en.
2.4
SELinux
SELinux is a feature of the Linux kernel which can be used to guard against miscongured or compromised programs. SELinux enforces the idea that programs should be limited in what les they can access and what actions they can take. The default SELinux policy, as congured on RHEL5, has been suciently developed and debugged that it should be usable on almost any Red Hat machine with minimal conguration and a small amount of system administrator training. This policy prevents system services including most of the common network-visible services such as mail servers, ftp servers, and DNS servers from accessing les which those services have no valid reason to access. This action alone prevents a huge amount of possible damage from network attacks against services, from trojaned software, and so forth. This guide recommends that SELinux be enabled using the default (targeted) policy on every Red Hat system, unless that system has requirements which make a stronger policy appropriate.
56
2.4.1
How SELinux Works
In the traditional Linux/Unix security model, known as Discretionary Access Control (DAC), processes run under a user and group identity, and enjoy that user and groups access rights to all les and other objects on the system. This system brings with it a number of security problems, most notably: that processes frequently do not need and should not have the full rights of the user who ran them; that user and group access rights are not very granular, and may require administrators to allow too much access in order to allow the access that is needed; that the Unix lesystem contains many resources (such as temporary directories and world-readable les) which are accessible to users who have no legitimate reason to access them; and that legitimate users can easily provide open access to their own resources through confusion or carelessness. SELinux provides a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) system that greatly augments the DAC model. Under SELinux, every process and every object (e.g. le, socket, pipe) on the system is given a security context, a label which include detailed type information about the object. The kernel allows processes to access objects only if that access is explicitly allowed by the policy in eect. The policy denes transitions, so that a user can be allowed to run software, but the software can run under a dierent context than the users default. This automatically limits the damage that the software can do to les accessible by the calling user the user does not need to take any action to gain this benet. For an action to occur, both the traditional DAC permissions must be satisifed as well as SELinuxs MAC rules. If either do not permit the action, then it will not be allowed. In this way, SELinux rules can only make a systems permissions more restrictive and secure. SELinux requires a complex policy in order to allow all the actions required of a system under normal operation. Three such policies have been designed for use with RHEL5, and are included with the system. In increasing order of power and complexity, they are: targeted, strict, and mls. The targeted SELinux policy consists mostly of Type Enforcement (TE) rules, and a small number of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) rules. It restricts the actions of many types of programs, but leaves interactive users largely unaected. The strict policy also uses TE and RBAC rules, but on more programs and more aggressively. The mls policy implements Multi-Level Security (MLS), which introduces even more kinds of labels sensitivity and category and rules that govern access based on these. The remainder of this section provides guidance for the conguration of the targeted policy and the administration of systems under this policy. Some pointers will be provided for readers who are interested in further strengthening their systems by using one of the stricter policies provided with RHEL5 or in writing their own policy.
2.4.2
Enable SELinux
Edit the le /etc/selinux/config. Add or correct the following lines: SELINUX=enforcing SELINUXTYPE=targeted Edit the le /etc/grub.conf. Ensure that the following arguments DO NOT appear on any kernel command line in the le: selinux=0 enforcing=0
CCE 3977-6, 3999-0, 3624-4
The directive SELINUX=enforcing enables SELinux at boot time. If SELinux is causing a lot of problems or preventing the system from booting, it is possible to boot into the warning-only mode SELINUX=permissive for
57 debugging purposes. Make certain to change the mode back to enforcing after debugging, set the lesystems to be relabelled for consistency using the command touch /.autorelabel, and reboot. However, the RHEL5 default SELinux conguration should be suciently reasonable that most systems will boot without serious problems. Some applications that require deep or unusual system privileges, such as virtual machine software, may not be compatible with SELinux in its default conguration. However, this should be uncommon, and SELinuxs application support continues to improve. In other cases, SELinux may reveal unusual or insecure program behavior by design. The directive SELINUXTYPE=targeted congures SELinux to use the default targeted policy. See Section 2.4.7 if a stricter policy is appropriate for your site. The SELinux boot mode specied in /etc/selinux/config can be overridden by command-line arguments passed to the kernel. It is necessary to check grub.conf to ensure that this has not been done and to protect the bootloader as described in Section 2.3.5.2.
2.4.2.1
Ensure SELinux is Properly Enabled
Run the command: $ /usr/sbin/sestatus If the system is properly congured, the output should indicate:
SELinux status: enabled Current mode: enforcing Mode from cong le: enforcing Policy from cong le: targeted
2.4.3
Disable Unnecessary SELinux Daemons
Several daemons are installed by default as part of the RHEL5 SELinux support mechanism. These daemons may improve the systems ability to enforce SELinux policy in a useful fashion, but may also represent unnecessary code running on the machine, increasing system risk. If these daemons are not needed on your system, they should be disabled.
2.4.3.1
Disable and Remove SETroubleshoot if Possible
Is there a mission-critical reason to allow users to view SELinux denial information using the sealert GUI? If not, disable the service and remove the RPM: # chkconfig setroubleshoot off # yum erase setroubleshoot
CCE 4254-9, 4148-3
The setroubleshoot service is a facility for notifying the desktop user of SELinux denials in a user-friendly fashion. SELinux errors may provide important information about intrusion attempts in progress, or may give information about SELinux conguration problems which are preventing correct system operation. In order to maintain a secure and usable SELinux installation, error logging and notication is necessary.
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However, setroubleshoot is a service which has complex functionality, which runs a daemon and uses IPC to distribute information which may be sensitive, or even to allow users to modify SELinux settings, and which does not yet implement real authentication mechanisms. This guide recommends disabling setroubleshoot and using the kernel audit functionality to monitor SELinuxs behavior. In addition, since setroubleshoot automatically runs client-side code whenever a denial occurs, regardless of whether the setroubleshootd daemon is running, it is recommended that the program be removed entirely unless it is needed.
2.4.3.2
Disable MCS Translation Service (mcstrans) if Possible
Unless there is some overriding need for the convenience of category label translation, disable the MCS translation service: # chkconfig mcstrans off
CCE 3668-1, 4129-3
The mcstransd daemon provides the category label translation information dened in /etc/selinux/targeted/ setrans.conf to client processes which request this information. Category labelling is unlikely to be used except in sites with special requirements. Therefore, it should be disabled in order to reduce the amount of potentially vulnerable code running on the system. See Section 2.4.7 for more information about systems which use category labelling.
2.4.3.3
Restorecon Service (restorecond)
The restorecond daemon monitors a list of les which are frequently created or modied on running systems, and whose SELinux contexts are not set correctly. It looks for creation events related to les listed in /etc/ selinux/restorecond.conf, and sets the contexts of those les when they are discovered. The restorecond program is fairly simple, so it brings low risk, but, in its default conguration, does not add much value to a system. An automated program such as restorecond may be used to monitor problematic les for context problems, or system administrators may be trained to check le contexts of newly-created les using the command ls -lZ, and to repair contexts manually using the restorecon command. This guide makes no recommendation either for or against the use of restorecond.
2.4.4
Check for Unconned Daemons
Daemons that SELinux policy does not know about will inherit the context of the parent process. Because daemons are launched during startup and descend from the init process, they inherit the initrc t context. This is a problem because it may cause AVC denials, or it could allow privileges that the daemon does not require. To check for unconned daemons, run the following command:
# ps -eZ | egrep "initrc" | egrep -vw "tr|ps|egrep|bash|awk" | tr ':' ' ' | awk '{ print $NF }'
It should produce no output in a well-congured system.
59
2.4.5
Check for Unlabeled Device Files
Device les are used for communication with important system resources. SELinux contexts should exist for these. If a device le is not labeled, then misconguration is likely. To check for unlabeled device les, run the following command:
# ls -Z | grep unlabeled_t
It should produce no output in a well-congured system.

CCE 14991-4
2.4.6
Debugging SELinux Policy Errors
SELinuxs default policies have improved signicantly over time, and most systems should have few problems using the targeted SELinux policy. However, policy problems may still occasionally prevent accesses which should be allowed. This is especially true if your site runs any custom or heavily modied applications. This section gives some brief guidance on discovering and repairing SELinux-related access problems. Guidance given here is necessarily incomplete, but should provide a starting point for debugging. If you suspect that a permission error or other failure may be caused by SELinux (and are certain that misconguration of the traditional Unix permissions are not the cause of the problem), search the audit logs for AVC events: # ausearch -m AVC,USER_AVC -sv no The output of this command will be a set of events. The timestamp, along with the comm and pid elds, should indicate which line describes the problem. Look up the context under which the process is running. Assuming the process ID is PID , nd the context by running: # ps -p PID -Z The AVC denial message should identify the oending le or directory. The name eld should contain the lename (not the full pathname by default), and the ino eld can be used to search by inode, if necessary. Assuming the le is FILE , nd its SELinux context: # ls -Z FILE An administrator should suspect an SELinux misconguration whenever a program gets a permission denied error but the standard Unix permissions appear to be correct, or a program fails mysteriously on a task which seems to involve le access or network communication. As described in Section 2.4.1, SELinux augments each process with a context providing detailed type information about that process. The contexts under which processes run may be referred to as subject contexts. Similarly, each lesystem object is given a context. The targeted policy consists of a set of rules, each of which allows a subject type to perform some operation on a given object type. The kernel stores information about these access decisions in an structure known as an Access Vector Cache (AVC), so authorization decisions made by the system are audited with the type AVC. It is also possible for userspace modules to implement their own policies based on SELinux, and these decisions are audited with the type USER AVC.
60
AVC denials are logged by the kernel audit facility (see Section 2.6.2 for conguration guidance on this subsystem) and may also be visible via setroubleshoot. This guide recommends the use of the audit userspace utilities to nd AVC errors. It is possible to manually locate these errors by looking in the le /var/log/audit/audit.log or in /var/log/messages (depending on the syslog conguration in eect), but the ausearch tool allows negrained searching on audit event types, which may be necessary if system call auditing is enabled as well. The command line above tells ausearch to look for kernel or userspace AVC messages (-m AVC,USER AVC) where the access attempt did not succeed (-sv no). If an AVC denial occurs when it should not have, the problem is generally one of the following:
The program is running with the wrong subject context. This could happen as a result of an incorrect context on the programs executable le, which could happen if 3rd party software is installed and not given appropriate SELinux le contexts. The le has the wrong object context because the current les context does not match the specication. This can occur when les are created or modied in certain ways. It is not atypical for conguration les to get the wrong contexts after a system conguration change performed by an administrator. To repair the le, use the command:
# restorecon -v FILE This should produce output indicating that the les context has been changed. The /usr/bin/chcon program can be used to manually change a les context, but this is problematic because the change will not persist if it does not agree with the policy-dened contexts applied by restorecon.
The le has the wrong object context because the specication is either incorrect or does not match the way the le is being used on this system. In this case, it will be necessary to change the system le contexts.
Run the system-config-selinux tool, and go to the File Labeling menu. This will give a list of les and wildcards corresponding to le labelling rules on the system. Add a rule which maps the le in question to the desired context. As an alternative, le contexts can be modied from the command line using the semanage(8) tool.
The program and le have the correct contexts, but the policy should allow some operation between those two contexts which is currently not allowed. In this case, it will be necessary to modify the SELinux policy.
Run the system-config-selinux tool, and go to the Boolean menu. If your conguration is supported, but is not the Red Hat default, then there will be a boolean allowing real-time modication of the SELinux policy to x the problem. Browse through the items in this menu, looking for one which is related to the service which is not working. As an alternative, SELinux booleans can be modied from the command line using the getsebool(8) and setsebool(8) tools. If there is no boolean, it will be necessary to create and load a policy module. A simple way to build a policy module is to use the audit2allow tool. This tool can take input in the format of AVC denial messages, and generate syntactically correct Type Enforcement rules which would be sucient to prevent those denials. For example, to generate and display rules which would allow all kernel denials seen in the past ve minutes, run: # ausearch -m AVC -sv no -ts recent | audit2allow It is possible to use audit2allow to directly create a module package suitable for loading into the kernel policy. To do this, invoke audit2allow with the -M ag: # ausearch -m AVC -sv no -ts recent | audit2allow -M localmodule If this is successful, several lines of output should appear. Review the generated TE rules in the le localmodule .te and ensure that they express what you wish to allow.
61 The le localmodule .pp should also have been created. This le is a policy module package that can be loaded into the kernel. To do so, use system-config-selinux, go to the Policy Module menu and use the Add button to enable your module package in SELinux, or load it from the command line using semodule(8): # semodule -i localmodule .pp Section 45.2 of [9] covers this procedure in detail.
2.4.7
Further Strengthening
The recommendations up to this point have discussed how to congure and maintain a system under the default conguration of the targeted policy, which constrains only the actions of daemons and system software. This guide strongly recommends that any site which is not currently using SELinux at all transition to the targeted policy, to gain the substantial security benets provided by that policy. However, the default policy provides only a subset of the full security gains available from using SELinux. In particular, the SELinux policy is also capable of constraining the actions of interactive users, of providing compartmented access by sensitivity level (MLS) and/or category (MCS), and of restricting certain types of system actions using booleans beyond the RHEL5 defaults. This section introduces other uses of SELinux which may be possible, and provides links to some outside resources about their use. Detailed description of how to implement these steps is beyond the scope of this guide.
2.4.7.1
Strengthen the Default SELinux Boolean Conguration
SELinux booleans are used to enable or disable segments of policy to comply with site policy. Booleans may apply to the entire system or to an individual daemon. For instance, the boolean allow execstack, if enabled, allows programs to make part of their stack memory region executable. This would apply to all programs on the system. The boolean ftp home dir allows ftpd processes to access user home directories, and applies only to daemons which implement FTP. The command $ getsebool -a lists the values of all SELinux booleans on the system. Section 2.4.6 discussed loosening boolean values in order to debug functionality problems which occur under more restrictive defaults. It is also useful to examine and strengthen the boolean settings, to disable functionality which is not required by legitimate programs on your system, but which might be symptomatic of an attack. See the manpages booleans(8), getsebool(8), and setsebool(8) for general information about booleans. There are also manual pages for several subsystems which discuss the use of SELinux with those systems. Examples include ftpd selinux(8), httpd selinux(8), and nfs selinux(8). Another good reference is the html documentation distributed with the selinux-policy RPM. This documentation is stored under /usr/share/doc/selinux-policy-version /html/ The pages global tunables.html and global booleans.html may be useful when examining booleans.
2.4.7.2
Use a Stronger Policy
Using a stronger policy can greatly enhance security, but will generally require customization to be compatible with the particular systems purpose, and this may be costly or time consuming. Under the targeted policy,
62
interactive processes are given the type unconfined t, so interactive users are not constrained by SELinux even if they attempt to take strange or malicious actions. The rst alternative policy available with RHEL5s SELinux distribution, called strict, extends the protections oered by the default policy from daemons and system processes to all processes. To use the strict policy, rst ensure that the policy module is installed: # yum install selinux-policy-strict Then edit /etc/selinux/config and correct the line: SELINUXTYPE=strict The mls policy type can be used to enforce sensitivity or category labelling, and requires site-specic conguration of these labels in order to be useful. To use this policy, install the appropriate policy module: # yum install selinux-policy-mls Then edit /etc/selinux/config and correct the line: SELINUXTYPE=mls Note: Switching between policies typically requires the entire disk to be relabelled, so that les get the appropriate SELinux contexts under the new policy. Boot with the additional grub command-line options enforcing=0 single autorelabel to relabel the disk in single-user mode, then reboot normally.
2.4.8
SELinux References
Web page: http://www.nsa.gov/research/selinux Mailing list information at: http://www.nsa.gov/research/selinux/list.shtml
NSA SELinux resources:
Fedora SELinux resources:
FAQ: http://docs.fedoraproject.org/selinux-faq User Guide: http://docs.fedoraproject.org/selinux-user-guide Managing Services Guide: http://docs.fedoraproject.org/selinux-managing-confined-services-guide

SELinux Project web page and wiki: http://www.selinuxproject.org Chapters 4345 of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5: Deployment Guide [9] The book SELinux by Example: Using Security Enhanced Linux [14]
2.5
Network Conguration and Firewalls
Most machines must be connected to a network of some sort, and this brings with it the substantial risk of network attack. This section discusses the security impact of decisions about networking which must be made when conguring a system. This section also discusses rewalls, network access controls, and other network security frameworks, which allow system-level rules to be written that can limit attackers ability to connect to your system. These rules can specify that network trac should be allowed or denied from certain IP addresses, hosts, and networks. The rules can also specify which of the systems network services are available to particular hosts or networks.
63
2.5.1
Kernel Parameters which Aect Networking
The sysctl utility is used to set a number of parameters which aect the operation of the Linux kernel. Several of these parameters are specic to networking, and the conguration options in this section are recommended. The ability to query the state of the systems network stack is also important, and such information is also available in /proc/net.
2.5.1.1
Network Parameters for Hosts Only
Is this system going to be used as a rewall or gateway to pass IP trac between dierent networks? If not, edit the le /etc/sysctl.conf and add or correct the following lines: net.ipv4.ip forward = 0 net.ipv4.conf.all.send redirects = 0 net.ipv4.conf.default.send redirects = 0
CCE 4151-7, 4155-8, 3561-8
These settings disable hosts from performing network functionality which is only appropriate for routers.
2.5.1.2
Network Parameters for Hosts and Routers
Edit the le /etc/sysctl.conf and add or correct the following lines: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0 net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0 net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0 net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0 net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0 net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1 net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_messages = 1 net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
CCE 3472-8, 4217-6, 4133-5, 4265-5, 3644-2, 4186-3, 4080-8, 3339-9, 4320-8, 3840-6, 4091-5, 4236-6
These options improve Linuxs ability to defend against certain types of IPv4 protocol attacks. The accept source route, accept redirects, and secure redirects options are turned o to disable IPv4 protocol features which are considered to have few legitimate uses and to be easy to abuse. The net.ipv4.conf.all.log martians option logs several types of suspicious packets, such as spoofed packets, source-routed packets, and redirects. The icmp echo ignore broadcasts icmp ignore bogus error messages options protect against ICMP attacks. The tcp syncookies option uses a cryptographic feature called SYN cookies to allow machines to continue to accept legitimate connections when faced with a SYN ood attack. See [13] for further information on this option.
64
The rp filter option enables RFC-recommended source validation. It should not be used on machines which are routers for very complicated networks, but is helpful for end hosts and routers serving small networks. For more information on any of these, see the kernel source documentation le /Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt.2
2.5.1.3
Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Snier
The system should not be acting as a network snier, which can capture all trac on the network to which it is connected. The output of /proc/net/packet should display exactly one header line, with entries similar to: sk RefCnt Type Proto Iface R Rmem User Inode
If numbers appear in a row below this header, then a sning process (such as tcpdump or wireshark) is using the interface and this should be investigated.
CCE 15013-6
2.5.2
Wireless Networking
Wireless networking (sometimes referred to as 802.11 or Wi-Fi) presents a serious security risk to sensitive or classied systems and networks. Wireless networking hardware is much more likely to be included in laptop or portable systems than desktops or servers. See Section 3.3.14 for information on Bluetooth wireless support. Bluetooth serves a dierent purpose and possesses a much shorter range, but it still presents serious security risks. Removal of hardware is the only way to absolutely ensure that the wireless capability remains disabled. If it is completely impractical to remove the wireless hardware, and site policy still allows the device to enter sensitive spaces, every eort to disable the capability via software should be made. In general, acquisition policy should include provisions to prevent the purchase of equipment that will be used in sensitive spaces and includes wireless capabilities.
2.5.2.1
Remove Wireless Hardware if Possible
Identifying the wireless hardware is the rst step in removing it. The systems hardware manual should contain information on its wireless capabilities. Wireless hardware included with a laptop typically takes the form of a mini-PCI card or PC card. Other forms include devices which plug into USB or Ethernet ports, but these should be readily apparent and easy to remove from the base system. A PC Card (originally called a PCMCIA card) is designed to be easy to remove, though it may be hidden when inserted into the system. Frequently, there will be one or more buttons near the card slot that, when pressed, eject the card from the system. If no card is ejected, the slot is empty. A mini-PCI card is approximately credit-card sized and typically accessible via a removable panel on the underside of the laptop. Removing the panel may require simple tools.
2A
recent version of this le can be found online at http://lxr.linux.no/source/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt.
65 In addition to manually inspecting the hardware, it is also possible to query the system for its installed hardware devices. The commands /sbin/lspci and /sbin/lsusb will show a list of all recognized devices on their respective buses, and this may indicate the presence of a wireless device.
2.5.2.2
Disable Wireless Through Software Conguration
If it is impossible to remove the wireless hardware from the device in question, disable as much of it as possible through software. The following methods can disable software support for wireless networking, but note that these methods do not prevent malicious software or careless users from re-activating the devices.
2.5.2.2.1
Disable Wireless in BIOS
Some laptops that include built-in wireless support oer the ability to disable the device through the BIOS. This is system-specic; consult your hardware manual or explore the BIOS setup during boot.
CCE 3628-5
2.5.2.2.2
Deactivate Wireless Interfaces
Deactivating the wireless interfaces should prevent normal usage of the wireless capability. First, identify the interfaces available with the command: # ifconfig -a Additionally,the following command may also be used to determine whether wireless support (extensions) is included for a particular interface, though this may not always be a clear indicator: # iwconfig After identifying any wireless interfaces (which may have names like wlan0, ath0, wifi0, or eth0), deactivate the interface with the command: # ifdown interface These changes will only last until the next reboot. To disable the interface for future boots, remove the appropriate interface le from /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts: # rm /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface
CCE 4276-2
2.5.2.2.3
Disable Wireless Drivers
Removing the kernel drivers that provide support for wireless Ethernet devices will prevent users from easily activating the devices. To remove the wireless drivers from the system: # rm -r /lib/modules/kernelversion(s) /kernel/drivers/net/wireless
CCE 4170-7
This command must also be repeated every time the kernel is upgraded.
66
2.5.3
IPv6
The system includes support for Internet Protocol version 6. A major and often-mentioned improvement over IPv4 is its enormous increase in the number of available addresses. Another important feature is its support for automatic conguration of many network settings.
2.5.3.1
Disable Support for IPv6 unless Needed
As with any networking protocol, IPv6 should be disabled unless needed. Despite conguration that suggests support for IPv6 has been disabled, link-local IPv6 address autoconguration occurs even when only an IPv4 address is assigned. The supported mechanisms for disabling IPv6 have changed over the lifetime of RHEL 5.
2.5.3.1.1
Disable Automatic Loading of IPv6 Kernel Module
To prevent the IPv6 kernel module (ipv6) from being automatically loaded, add the following line to /etc/ modprobe.conf or to a le in the directory /etc/modprobe.d: install ipv6 /bin/true
CCE 3562-6
When the kernel requests the ipv6 module, this line will direct the system to run the program /bin/true instead. Due to dependencies from other modules, particularly those that may be considered typical for some server environments, preventing the loading of the IPv6 kernel module in this manner is no longer the preferred method of disabling IPv6. For RHEL 5.4 and later, see 2.5.3.1.3 for information on how to congure the system so that such dependencies are satised while eectively keeping IPv6 disabled.
2.5.3.1.2
Disable Interface Usage of IPv6
To prevent conguration of IPv6 for all interfaces, add or correct the following lines in /etc/sysconfig/ network: NETWORKING_IPV6=no IPV6INIT=no For each network interface IFACE , add or correct the following lines in /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ ifcfg- IFACE as an additional prevention mechanism: IPV6INIT=no
CCE 3377-9, 4296-0, 3381-1
If it becomes necessary later to congure IPv6, only the interfaces requiring it should be enabled.
67
2.5.3.1.3
Disable Functionality of IPv6 Kernel Module Through Option
For RHEL 5.4 and later, disable the functionality of the IPv6 kernel module ipv6 by adding the following line to /etc/modprobe.conf or to a le in the directory /etc/modprobe.d: options ipv6 disable=1
2.5.3.2
Congure IPv6 Settings if Necessary
A major feature of IPv6 is the extent to which systems implementing it can automatically congure their networking devices using information from the network. From a security perspective, manually conguring important conguration information is always preferable to accepting it from the network in an unauthenticated fashion.
2.5.3.2.1
Disable Automatic Conguration
Disable the systems acceptance of router advertisements and ICMP redirects by adding or correcting the following line in /etc/sysconfig/network (note that this does not disable sending router solicitations): IPV6_AUTOCONF=no
CCE 4269-7, 4291-1, 4313-3, 4198-8
This setting results in ensuring that the following kernel (sysctl) parameters are set as follows, if IPv6 is used on the system: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra=0 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirect=0
2.5.3.2.2
Manually Assign Global IPv6 Address
To manually assign an IP address for an interface IFACE , edit the le /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ ifcfg- IFACE . Add or correct the following line (substituting the correct IPv6 address): IPV6ADDR=2001:0DB8::ABCD/64 Manually assigning an IP address is preferable to accepting one from routers or from the network otherwise. The example address here is an IPv6 address reserved for documentation purposes, as dened by RFC3849.
2.5.3.2.3
Use Privacy Extensions for Address if Necessary
To introduce randomness into the automatic generation of IPv6 addresses, add or correct the following line in /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg- IFACE : IPV6_PRIVACY=rfc3041
CCE 3842-2
68
Automatically-generated IPv6 addresses are based on the underlying hardware (e.g. Ethernet) address, and so it becomes possible to track a piece of hardware over its lifetime using its trac. If it is important for a systems IP address to not trivially reveal its hardware address, this setting should be applied.
2.5.3.2.4
Manually Assign IPv6 Router Address
Edit the le /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg- IFACE , and add or correct the following line (substituting your gateway IP as appropriate): IPV6_DEFAULTGW=2001:0DB8::0001 Router addresses should be manually set and not accepted via any autoconguration or router advertisement.
2.5.3.2.5
Limit Network-Transmitted Conguration
Add the following lines to /etc/sysctl.conf to limit the conguration information requested from other systems, and accepted from the network: net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 1
CCE 4221-8, 4137-6, 4159-0, 3895-0, 4287-9, 4058-4, 4128-5
The router solicitations setting determines how many router solicitations are sent when bringing up the interface. If addresses are statically assigned, there is no need to send any solicitations. The accept ra pinfo setting controls whether the system will accept prex info from the router. The accept ra defrtr setting controls whether the system will accept Hop Limit settings from a router advertisement. Setting it to 0 prevents a router from changing your default IPv6 Hop Limit for outgoing packets. The autoconf setting controls whether router advertisements can cause the system to assign a global unicast address to an interface. The dad transmits setting determines how many neighbor solicitations to send out per address (global and link-local) when bringing up an interface to ensure the desired address is unique on the network. The max addresses setting determines how many global unicast IPv6 addresses can be assigned to each interface. The default is 16, but it should be set to exactly the number of statically congured global addresses required.
2.5.4
TCP Wrapper
TCP Wrapper is a library which provides simple access control and standardized logging for supported applications which accept connections over a network. Historically, TCP Wrapper was used to support inetd services.
69 Now that inetd is deprecated (see Section 3.2.1), TCP Wrapper supports only services which were built to make use of the libwrap library. To determine whether a given executable daemon /path/to/daemon supports TCP Wrapper, check the documentation, or run: $ ldd /path/to/daemon | grep libwrap.so If this command returns any output, then the daemon probably supports TCP Wrapper. An alternative to TCP Wrapper support is packet ltering using iptables. Note that iptables works at the network level, while TCP Wrapper works at the application level. This means that iptables ltering is more ecient and more resistant to aws in the software being protected, but TCP Wrapper provides support for logging, banners, and other application-level tricks which iptables cannot provide.
2.5.4.1
How TCP Wrapper Protects Services
TCP Wrapper provides access control for the systems network services using two conguration les. When a connection is attempted: 1. The le /etc/hosts.allow is searched for a rule matching the connection. If one is found, the connection is allowed. 2. Otherwise, the le /etc/hosts.deny is searched for a rule matching the connection. If one is found, the connection is rejected. 3. If no matching rules are found in either le, then the connection is allowed. By default, TCP Wrapper does not block access to any services. In the simplest case, each rule in /etc/hosts.allow and /etc/hosts.deny takes the form: daemon : client where daemon is the name of the server process for which the connection is destined, and client is the partial or full hostname or IP address of the client. It is valid for daemon and client to contain one item, a comma-separated list of items, or a special keyword like ALL, which matches any service or client. (See the hosts access(5) manpage for a list of other keywords.) Note: Partial hostnames start at the root domain and are delimited by the . character. So the client machine host03.dev.example.com, with IP address 10.7.2.3, could be matched by any of the specications: .example.com .dev.example.com 10.7.2.
2.5.4.2
Reject All Connections From Other Hosts if Appropriate
Restrict all connections to non-public services to localhost only. Suppose pubsrv1 and pubsrv2 are the names of daemons which must be accessed remotely. Congure TCP Wrapper as follows. Edit /etc/hosts.allow. Add the following lines: pubsrv1 ,pubsrv2 : ALL ALL: localhost Edit /etc/hosts.deny. Add the following line: ALL: ALL
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These rules deny connections to all TCP Wrapper enabled services from any host other than localhost, but allow connections from anywhere to the services which must be publicly accessible. (If no public services exist, the rst line in /etc/hosts.allow may be omitted.)
2.5.4.3
Allow Connections Only From Hosts in This Domain if Appropriate
For each daemon, domainsrv , which only needs to be contacted from inside the local domain, example.com , congure TCP Wrapper to deny remote connections. Edit /etc/hosts.allow. Add the following line: domainsrv : .example.com Edit /etc/hosts.deny. Add the following line: domainsrv : ALL There are many possible examples of services which need to communicate only within the local domain. If a machine is a local compute server, it may be necessary for users to connect via SSH from their desktop workstations, but not from outside the domain. In that case, you should protect the daemon sshd using this method. As another example, RPC-based services such as NFS might be enabled within the domain only, in which case the daemon portmap should be protected. Note: This example protects only the service domainsrv . No ltering is done on other services unless a line is entered into /etc/hosts.deny which refers to those services by name, or which restricts the special service ALL.
2.5.4.4
Monitor Syslog for Relevant Connections and Failures
Ensure that the following line exists in /etc/syslog.conf. (This is the default, so it is likely to be correct if the conguration has not been modied): authpriv.* /var/log/secure
Congure logwatch or other log monitoring tools to periodically summarize failed connections reported by TCP Wrapper at the facility authpriv.info. By default, TCP Wrapper audits all rejected connections at the facility authpriv, level info. In the log le, TCP Wrapper rejections will contain the substring: daemon [pid ]: refused connect from ipaddr These lines can be used to detect malicious scans, and to debug failures resulting from an incorrect TCP Wrapper conguration. If appropriate, it is possible to change the syslog facility and level used by a given TCP Wrapper rule by adding the severity option to each desired conguration line in /etc/hosts.deny: daemon : client : severity facility .level By default, successful connections are not logged by TCP Wrapper. See Section 2.6 for more information about system auditing.
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2.5.4.5
Further Resources
For more information about TCP Wrapper, see the tcpd(8) and hosts access(5) manpages and the documentation directory /usr/share/doc/tcp wrappers-version . Some information may be available from the Tools section of the authors website, http://www.porcupine.org, and from the RHEL4 Reference Guide [6].
2.5.5
Iptables and Ip6tables
A host-based rewall called Netlter is included as part of the Linux kernel distributed with the system. It is activated by default. This rewall is controlled by the program iptables, and the entire capability is frequently referred to by this name. An analogous program called ip6tables handles ltering for IPv6. Unlike TCP Wrappers, which depends on the network server program to support and respect the rules written, Netlter ltering occurs at the kernel level, before a program can even process the data from the network packet. As such, any program on the system is aected by the rules written. This section provides basic information about strengthening the iptables and ip6tables congurations included with the system. For more complete information that may allow the construction of a sophisticated ruleset tailored to your environment, please consult the references at the end of this section.
2.5.5.1
Inspect and Activate Default Rules
View the currently-enforced iptables rules by running the command: # iptables -nL --line-numbers The command is analogous for the ip6tables program. If the rewall does not appear to be active (i.e., no rules appear), activate it and ensure that it starts at boot by issuing the following commands (and analogously for ip6tables): # service iptables restart # chkconfig iptables on
CCE 4167-3, 4189-7
The default iptables rules are:

Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT) num target prot opt source 1 RH-Firewall-1-INPUT all -Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT) num target prot opt source 1 RH-Firewall-1-INPUT all -Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) num target prot opt source Chain RH-Firewall-1-INPUT (2 references) num target prot opt source 1 ACCEPT all -- 0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
destination 0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
destination
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT REJECT icmp esp ah udp udp tcp all tcp all ---------0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0

0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 224.0.0.251 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmp type 255
udp dpt:5353 udp dpt:631 tcp dpt:631 state RELATED,ESTABLISHED state NEW tcp dpt:22 reject-with icmp-host-prohibited
The ip6tables default rules are similar, with its rules 2 and 10 reecting protocol naming and addressing dierences. Instead of rule 8, however, ip6tables includes two rules that accept all incoming udp and tcp packets with a particular destination port range. This is because the current Netlter implementation for IPv6 lacks reliable connection-tracking functionality.
2.5.5.2
Understand the Default Ruleset
Understanding and creating rewall rules can be a challenging activity, lled with corner cases and dicult-todebug problems. Because of this, administrators should develop a thorough understanding of the default ruleset before carefully modifying it. The default ruleset is divided into four sections, each of which is called a chain: INPUT, FORWARD, OUTPUT, and RH-Firewall-1-INPUT. INPUT, OUTPUT, and FORWARD are built-in chains.
The INPUT chain is activated on packets destined for (i.e., addressed to) the system. The OUTPUT chain is activated on packets which are originating from the system. The FORWARD chain is activated for packets that the system will process and send through another interface, if so congured. The RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain is a custom (or user-dened) chain, which is used by the INPUT and FORWARD chains.
A packet starts at the rst rule in the appropriate chain and proceeds until it matches a rule. If a match occurs, then control will jump to the specied target. The default ruleset uses the built-in targets ACCEPT and REJECT, and also the user-dened target/chain RH-Firewall-1-INPUT. Jumping to the target ACCEPT means to allow the packet through, while REJECT means to drop the packet and send an error message to the sending host. A related target called DROP means to drop the packet on the oor without even sending an error message. The default policy for all of the built-in chains (shown after their names in the rule output above) is set to ACCEPT. This means that if no rules in the chain match the packets, they are allowed through. Because no rules at all are written for the OUTPUT chain, this means that iptables does not stop any packets originating from the system. The INPUT and FORWARD chains jump to the user-dened target RH-Firewall-1-INPUT for all packets. RH-Firewall-1-INPUT tries to match, in order, the following rules for both iptables and ip6tables:
Rule 1 appears to accept all packets. However, this appears true only because the rules are not presented in verbose mode. Executing the command
# iptables -vnL --line-numbers reveals that this rule applies only to the loopback (lo) interface (see column in), while all other rules apply to all interfaces. Thus, packets not coming from the loopback interface do not match and proceed to the next rule.
Rule 2 explicitly allows all icmp packet types; iptables uses the code 255 to mean all icmp types.
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Rule 3 explicitly allows all esp packets; these are packets which contain IPsec ESP headers. Rule 4 explicitly allows all ah packets; these are packets which contain an IPsec authentication header SPI. Rule 5 allows inbound communication on udp port 5353 (mDNS), which the avahi daemon uses. Rules 6 and 7 allows inbound communication on both tcp and udp port 631, which the cups daemon uses. Rule 8, in the iptables rules, allows inbound packets that are part of a session initiated by the system. In ip6tables, rules 8 and 9 allow any inbound packets with a destination port address between 32768 and 61000. Rule 9 (10, for ip6tables) allows inbound connections in tcp port 22, which is the SSH protocol. Rule 10 (11, for ip6tables) rejects all other packets and sends an error message to the sender. Because this is the last rule and matches any packet, it eectively prevents any packet from reaching the chains default ACCEPT target. Preventing the acceptance of any packet that is not explicitly allowed is proper design for a rewall.
2.5.5.3
Strengthen the Default Ruleset
The default rules can be strengthened. The system scripts that activate the rewall rules expect them to be dened in the conguration les iptables and ip6tables in the directory /etc/sysconfig. Many of the lines in these les are similar to the command line arguments that would be provided to the programs /sbin/iptables or /sbin/ip6tables but some are quite dierent. The program system-config-securitylevel allows additional services to penetrate the default rewall rules and automatically adjusts /etc/ sysconfig/ iptables . This program is only useful if the default ruleset meets your security requirements. Otherwise, this program should not be used to make changes to the rewall conguration because it re-writes the saved conguration le. The following recommendations describe how to strengthen the default ruleset conguration le. An alternative to editing this conguration le is to create a shell script that makes calls to the iptables program to load in rules, and then invokes service iptables save to write those loaded rules to /etc/sysconfig/iptables. The following alterations can be made directly to /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables. Instructions apply to both unless otherwise noted. Language and address conventions for regular iptables are used throughout this section; conguration for ip6tables will be either analogous or explicitly covered.
2.5.5.3.1
Change the Default Policies
Change the default policy to DROP (from ACCEPT) for the INPUT and FORWARD built-in chains: *filter :INPUT DROP [0:0] :FORWARD DROP [0:0]
CCE 14264-6
Changing the default policy in this way implements proper design for a rewall, i.e. any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be accepted.
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2.5.5.3.2
Restrict ICMP Message Types
In /etc/sysconfig/iptables, the accepted ICMP messages types can be restricted. To accept only ICMP echo reply, destination unreachable, and time exceeded messages, remove the line: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type any -j ACCEPT and insert the lines: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-reply -j ACCEPT -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -j ACCEPT -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -j ACCEPT To allow the system to respond to pings, also insert the following line: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT Ping responses can also be limited to certain networks or hosts by using the -s option in the previous rule. Because IPv6 depends so heavily on ICMPv6, it is preferable to deny the ICMPv6 packets you know you dont need (e.g. ping requests) in /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables, while letting everything else through: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type echo-request -j DROP If you are going to statically congure the machines address, it should ignore Router Advertisements which could add another IPv6 address to the interface or alter important network settings: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type router-advertisement -j DROP Restricting other ICMPv6 message types in /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables is not recommended because the operation of IPv6 depends heavily on ICMPv6. Thus, more care must be taken when blocking ICMPv6 types.
2.5.5.3.3
Remove IPsec Rules
If the system will not process IPsec trac, then remove the following rules: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p 50 -j ACCEPT -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p 51 -j ACCEPT
2.5.5.3.4
Log and Drop Packets with Suspicious Source Addresses
Packets with non-routable source addresses should be rejected, as they may indicate spoong. Because the modied policy will reject non-matching packets, you only need to add these rules if you are interested in also logging these spoong or suspicious attempts before they are dropped. If you do choose to log various suspicious trac, add identical rules with a target of DROP after each LOG. To log and then drop these IPv4 packets, insert the following rules in /etc/sysconfig/iptables (excepting any that are intentionally used): -A -A -A -A INPUT INPUT INPUT INPUT -i -i -i -i eth0 eth0 eth0 eth0 -s -s -s -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF A: " 172.16.0.0/12 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF B: " 192.168.0.0/16 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF C: " 224.0.0.0/4 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP MULTICAST D: "
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-A INPUT -i eth0 -s 240.0.0.0/5 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF E: " -A INPUT -i eth0 -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP LOOPBACK: " Similarly, you might wish to log packets containing some IPv6 reserved addresses if they are not expected on your network: -A -A -A -A -A -A -A -A INPUT INPUT INPUT INPUT INPUT INPUT INPUT INPUT -i -s -s -s -s -s -s -s eth0 -s ::1 -j 2002:E000::/20 2002:7F00::/24 2002:0000::/24 2002:FF00::/24 2002:0A00::/24 2002:AC10::/28 2002:C0A8::/32 LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 DROP LOOPBACK: " -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " " " " " " "
If you are not expecting to see site-local multicast or auto-tunneled trac, you can log those: -A INPUT -s FF05::/16 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 SITE-LOCAL MULTICAST: " -A INPUT -s ::0.0.0.0/96 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv4 COMPATIBLE IPv6 ADDR: " If you wish to block multicasts to all link-local nodes (e.g. if you are not using router autoconguration and do not plan to have any services that multicast to the entire local network), you can block the link-local all-nodes multicast address (before accepting incoming ICMPv6): -A INPUT -d FF02::1 -j LOG --log-prefix "Link-local All-Nodes Multicast: " However, if youre going to allow IPv4 compatible IPv6 addresses (of the form ::0.0.0.0/96), you should then consider logging the non-routable IPv4-compatible addresses: -A -A -A -A INPUT INPUT INPUT INPUT -s -s -s -s ::0.0.0.0/104 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP NON-ROUTABLE ADDR: " ::127.0.0.0/104 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP LOOPBACK: " ::224.0.0.0.0/100 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP MULTICAST D: " ::255.0.0.0/104 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP BROADCAST: "
If you are not expecting to see any IPv4 (or IPv4-compatible) trac on your network, consider logging it before it gets dropped: -A INPUT -s ::FFFF:0.0.0.0/96 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv4 MAPPED IPv6 ADDR: " -A INPUT -s 2002::/16 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 ADDR: " The following rule will log all trac originating from a site-local address, which is deprecated address space: -A INPUT -s FEC0::/10 -j LOG --log-prefix "SITE-LOCAL ADDRESS TRAFFIC: "
2.5.5.3.5
Log and Drop All Other Packets
To log before dropping all packets that are not explicitly accepted by previous rules, change the nal lines from -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-host-prohibited COMMIT to -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -j LOG
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-A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -j DROP COMMIT The rule to log all dropped packets must be used with care. Chatty but otherwise non-malicious network protocols (e.g. NetBIOS) may result in voluminous logs; insertion of earlier rules to explicitly drop their packets without logging may be appropriate.
2.5.5.4
Further Strengthening
Further strengthening, particularly as a result of customization to a particular environment, is possible for the iptables rules. Consider the following options, though their practicality depends on the network environment and usage scenario:
Restrict outgoing trac. As shown above, the OUTPUT chains default policy can be changed to DROP, and rules can be written to specically allow only certain types of outbound trac. Such a policy could prevent casual usage of insecure protocols such as ftp and telnet, or even disrupt spyware. However, it would still not prevent a sophisticated user or program from using a proxy to circumvent the intended eects, and many client programs even try to automatically tunnel through port 80 to avoid such restrictions. SYN ood protection. SYN ood protection can be provided by iptables, but might run into limiting issues for servers. For example, the iplimit match can be used to limit simultaneous connections from a given host or class. Similarly, the recent match allows the rewall to deny additional connections from any host within a given period of time (e.g. more than 3 state NEW connections on port 22 within a minute to prevent dictionary login attacks).
A more precise option for DoS protection is using TCP SYN cookies. (See Section 2.5.1.2 for more information.)
2.5.5.5
Further Resources
More complex, restrictive, and powerful rulesets can be created, but this requires careful customization that relies on knowledge of the particular environment. The following resources provide more detailed information:
The iptables(8) man page The Netlter Projects documentation at http://www.netfilter.org The Red Hat Enterprise Linux Reference Guide
2.5.6
Secure Sockets Layer Support
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol provides encrypted and authenticated network communications, and many network services include support for it. Using SSL is recommended, especially to avoid any plaintext transmission of sensitive data, even over a local network. The SSL implementation included with the system is called OpenSSL. Recent implementations of SSL may also be referred to as Transport Layer Security (TLS). SSL uses public key cryptography to provide authentication and encryption. Public key cryptography involves two keys, one called the public key and the other called the private key. These keys are mathematically related such that data encrypted with one key can only be decrypted by the other, and vice versa. As their names suggest, public keys can be distributed to anyone while a private key must remain known only to its owner.
77 SSL uses certicates, which are les that hold cryptographic data: a public key, and a signature of that public key. In SSL authentication, a server presents a client with its certicate as a means of demonstrating that it is who it claims it is. If everything goes correctly, the client can verify the servers certicate by determining that the signature inside the certicate could only have been generated by a third party whom the client trusts. This third party is called a Certicate Authority (CA). Each client system should also have certicates from trusted CAs, and the client uses these CA certicates to verify the authenticity of the servers certicate. After authenticating a server using its certicate and a CA certicate, SSL provides encryption by using the server certicate to securely negotiate a shared secret key. If your server must communicate using SSL with systems that might not be able to securely accept a new CA certicate prior to any SSL communication, then paying an established CA (whose certicates your clients already have) to sign your server certicates is recommended. The steps for doing this vary by vendor. Once the signed certicates have been obtained, conguration of the services is the same whether they were purchased from a vendor or signed by your own CA. For setting up an internal network and encrypting local trac, creating your own CA to sign SSL certicates can be appropriate. The major steps in this process are: 1. Create a CA to sign certicates 2. Create SSL certicates for servers using that CA 3. Enable client support by distributing the CAs certicate
2.5.6.1
Create a CA to Sign Certicates
The following instructions apply to OpenSSL since it is included with the system, but creating a CA is possible with any standards-compliant SSL toolkit. The security of certicates depends on the security of the CA that signed them, so performing these steps on a secure machine is critical. The system used as a CA should be physically secure and not connected to any network. It should receive any certicate signing requests (CSRs) via removable media and output certicates onto removable media. The script /etc/pki/tls/misc/CA is included to assist in the process of setting up a CA. This script uses many settings in /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf. The settings in this le can be changed to suit your needs and allow easier selection of default settings, particularly in the [req distinguished name] section. To create the CA: # cd /etc/pki/tls/misc # ./CA -newca
When prompted, press enter to create a new CA key with the default name cakey.pem. When prompted, enter a password that will protect the private key, then enter the same password again to verify it. At the prompts, ll out as much of the CA information as is relevant for your site. You must specify a common name, or generation of the CA certicate will fail. Next, you will be prompted for the password, so that the script can re-open the private key in order to write the certicate.
This step performs the following actions:

creates the directory /etc/pki/CA (by default), which contains les necessary for the operation of a certicate authority. These are:
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CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM-WIDE CONFIGURATION serial, which contains the current serial number for certicates signed by the CA index.txt, which is a text database le that contains information about certicates signed crl, which is a directory for holding revoked certicates private, a directory which stores the CAs private key
creates a public-private key pair for the CA in the le /etc/pki/CA/private/cakey.pem. The private key must be kept private in order to ensure the security of the certicates the CA will later sign. signs the public key (using the corresponding private key, in a process called self-signing) to create the CA certicate, which is then stored in /etc/pki/CA/cacert.pem.
When the CA later signs a server certicate using its private key, it means that it is vouching for the authenticity of that server. A client can then use the CAs certicate (which contains its public key) to verify the authenticity of the server certicate. To accomplish this, it is necessary to distribute the CA certicate to any clients as covered in Section 2.5.6.3.
2.5.6.2
Create SSL Certicates for Servers
Creating an SSL certicate for a server involves the following steps: 1. A public-private key pair for the server must be generated. 2. A certicate signing request (CSR) must be created from the key pair. 3. The CSR must be signed by a certicate authority (CA) to create the server certicate. If a CA has been set up as described in Section 2.5.6.1, it can sign the CSR. 4. The server certicate and keys must be installed on the server. Instructions on how to generate and sign SSL certicates are provided for the following common services:
Mail server, in Section 3.11.4.6. Dovecot, in Section 3.17.2.2. Apache, in Section 3.16.4.1.
2.5.6.3
Enable Client Support
The system ships with certicates from well-known commercial CAs. If your server certicates were signed by one of these established CAs, then this step is not necessary since the clients should include the CA certicate already. If your servers use certicates signed by your own CA, some user applications will warn that the servers certicate cannot be veried because the CA is not recognized. Other applications may simply fail to accept the certicate and refuse to operate, or continue operating without ever having properly veried the server certicate. To avoid this warning, and properly authenticate the servers, your CA certicate must be exported to every application on every client system that will be connecting to an SSL-enabled server.
2.5.6.3.1
Adding a Trusted CA for Firefox
Firefox needs to have a certicate from the CA that signed the web servers certicate, so that it can authenticate the web server.
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To import a new CA certicate into Firefox 3: 1. Launch Firefox and choose Preferences from the Edit menu. 2. Click the Advanced button. 3. Select the Encryption tab. 4. Click the View Certicates button. 5. Select the Authorities tab. 6. Click the Import button at the bottom of the screen. 7. Navigate to the CA certicate and import it. Determine whether the CA should be used to identify web sites, e-mail users, and software developers and trust it for each accordingly.
2.5.6.3.2
Adding a Trusted CA for Thunderbird
Thunderbird needs to have a certicate from the CA that signed the mail servers certicates, so that it can authenticate the mail server(s). To import a new CA certicate into Thunderbird 2: 1. Launch Thunderbird and choose Preferences from the Edit menu. 2. Click the Advanced button. 3. Select the Certicates tab. 4. Click the View Certicates button. 5. Select the Authorities tab. 6. Click the Import button at the bottom of the screen. 7. Navigate to the CA certicate and import it. Determine whether the CA should be used to identify web sites, e-mail users, and software developers and trust it for each accordingly.
2.5.6.3.3
Adding a Trusted CA for Evolution
The Evolution e-mail client needs to have a certicate from the CA that signed the mail servers certicates, so that it can authenticate the mail server(s). To import a new CA certicate into Evolution: 1. Launch Evolution and choose Preferences from the Edit menu. 2. Select Certicates from the icon list on the left. 3. Click the Authorities tab. 4. Click the Import button. 5. Navigate to the CA certicate and import it.
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2.5.6.3.4
Remove Certicate Authorities, if Appropriate
Survey the certicate authorities trusted by Firefox, Thunderbird, Evolution, or other network clients. The list of certicate authorities for each program can be found via GUI, as described in the previous sections. Remove the certicate authorities which are not appropriate for your network connectivity needs. This may only make sense for some environments, and may create operational problems for a general purpose Internet-connected system.
2.5.6.4
Further Resources
The OpenSSL Project home page at http://www.openssl.org The openssl(1) man page Jeremy Matess how-to: http://sial.org/howto/openssl
2.5.7
Uncommon Network Protocols
The system includes support for several network protocols which are not commonly used. Although security vulnerabilities in kernel networking code are not frequently discovered, the consequences can be dramatic. Ensuring uncommon network protocols are disabled reduces the systems risk to attacks targeted at its implementation of those protocols. Although these protocols are not commonly used, avoid disruption in your network environment by ensuring they are not needed prior to disabling them.
2.5.7.1
Disable Support for DCCP
If the DCCP protocol is not needed, its kernel module can be prevented from loading. To do so, add the following line to /etc/modprobe.conf: install dccp /bin/true
CCE 14268-7
The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) is a relatively new transport layer protocol, designed to support streaming media and telephony.
2.5.7.2
Disable Support for SCTP
If the SCTP protocol is not needed, its kernel module can be prevented from loading. To do so, add the following line to /etc/modprobe.conf: install sctp /bin/true
CCE 14132-5
81 The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a transport layer protocol, designed to support the idea of message-oriented communication, with several streams of messages within one connection.
2.5.7.3
Disable Support for RDS
If the RDS protocol is not needed, its kernel module can be prevented from loading. To do so, add the following line to /etc/modprobe.conf: install rds /bin/true
CCE 14027-7
The Reliable Datagram Sockets (RDS) protocol is a transport layer protocol designed to provide reliable highbandwidth, low-latency communications between nodes in a cluster.
2.5.7.4
Disable Support for TIPC
If the TIPC protocol is not needed, its kernel module can be prevented from loading. To do so, add the following line to /etc/modprobe.conf: install tipc /bin/true
CCE 14911-2
The Transparent Inter-Process Communication (TIPC) protocol is designed to provide communications between nodes in a cluster.
2.5.8
IPsec
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) provides the ability to encrypt and authenticate IP communications.
2.5.8.1 2.5.8.1.1
Using Openswan for IPsec Install the openswan Package
The Openswan software is recommended over the default ipsec-tools package for IPsec. Install it with the command: # yum install openswan
2.5.8.1.2
Remove the ipsec-tools Package
Since the openswan package provides a superset of its functionality, remove the ipsec-tools package: # yum erase ipsec-tools
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2.6
Logging and Auditing
Successful local or network attacks on systems do not necessarily leave clear evidence of what happened. It is necessary to build a conguration in advance that collects this evidence, both in order to determine that something anomalous has occurred, and in order to respond appropriately. In addition, a well-congured logging and audit infrastructure will show evidence of any misconguration which might leave the system vulnerable to attack. Logging and auditing take dierent approaches to collecting data. A logging infrastructure provides a framework for individual programs running on the system to report whatever events are considered interesting: the sshd program may report each successful or failed login attempt, while the sendmail program may report each time it sends an e-mail on behalf of a local or remote user. An auditing infrastructure, on the other hand, reports each instance of certain low-level events, such as entry to the setuid system call, regardless of which program caused the event to occur. Auditing has the advantage of being more comprehensive, but the disadvantage of reporting a large amount of information, most of which is uninteresting. Logging (particularly using a standard framework like syslogd) has the advantage of being compatible with a wide variety of client applications, and of reporting only information considered important by each application, but the disadvantage that the information reported is not consistent between applications. A robust infrastructure will perform both logging and auditing, and will use congurable automated methods of summarizing the reported data, so that system administrators can remove or compress reports of events known to be uninteresting in favor of alert monitoring for events known to be interesting. This section discusses how to congure logging, log monitoring, and auditing, using tools included with RHEL5. It is recommended that rsyslog be used for logging, with logwatch providing summarization). auditd should be used for auditing, with aureport providing summarization.
2.6.1
Congure Logging
This section presents two packages available in RHEL 5 for performing logging, and recommends that rsyslog be used. No matter which logging software is used, a system should send its logs to a remote loghost. An intruder who has compromised the root account on a machine may delete the log entries which indicate that the system was attacked before they are seen by an administrator. If system logs are to be useful in detecting malicious activities, it is necessary to send them to a remote server.
CCE 3679-8
2.6.1.1
Congure Syslog
The sysklogd software provides the default logging daemon for RHEL, but has a number of downsides, including a lack of authentication for client or server, lack of encryption, or reliable transport for messages sent over a network. For these reasons, rsyslog is recommended instead (and it is also part of RHEL). It is described next in Section 2.6.1.2. If using the sysklogd software for logging is still necessary, this section discusses how to congure its syslog daemon for best eect.
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2.6.1.1.1
Ensure All Important Messages are Captured
Edit the le /etc/syslog.conf. Add or correct whichever of the following lines are appropriate for your environment: auth,user.* kern.* daemon.* syslog.* lpr,news,uucp,local0,local1,local2,local3,local4,local5,local6.* /var/log/messages /var/log/kern.log /var/log/daemon.log /var/log/syslog /var/log/unused.log
When a message is sent to syslog for logging, it is sent with a facility name (such as mail, auth, or local2), and a priority (such as debug, notice, or emerg). Each line of syslogs conguration le is a directive which species a set of facility/priority pairs, and then gives a lename or host to which log messages of matching types should be sent. In order for a message to match a type, the facility must match, and the priority must be the priority named in the rule or any higher priority. (See syslog.conf(5) for an ordered list of priorities.) Older versions of syslog mandated a very restrictive format for the syslog.conf le. However, the version of syslog shipped with RHEL5 allows any sort of whitespace (spaces or tabs, not just tabs) to separate the selection criteria from the message disposition, and allows the use of facility.* as a wildcard matching a given facility at any priority. The default RHEL5 syslog conguration stores the facilities authpriv, cron, and mail in named logs. This guide describes the implementation of the following conguration, but any conguration which stores the important facilities and is usable by the administrators will suce:
Store each of the facilities kern, daemon, and syslog in its own log, so that it will be easy to access information about messages from those facilities. Restrict the information stored in /var/log/messages to only the facilities auth and user, and store all messages from those facilities. Messages can easily become cluttered otherwise. Store information about all facilities which should not be in use at this site in a le called /var/log/ unused.log. If any messages are logged to this le at some future point, this may be an indication that an unknown service is running, and should be investigated. In addition, if news and uucp are not in use at this site, remove the directive from the default syslog.conf which stores those facilities.
Making use of the local facilities is also recommended. Specic conguration is beyond the scope of this guide, but applications such as SSH can easily be congured to log to a local facility which is not being used for anything else. If this is done, recongure /etc/syslog.conf to store this facility in an appropriate named log or in /var/log/messages, rather than in /var/log/unused.log.
2.6.1.1.2
Conrm Existence and Permissions of System Log Files
For each log le LOGFILE referenced in /etc/syslog.conf or /etc/rsyslog.conf, run the commands: # touch LOGFILE # chown root:root LOGFILE # chmod 0600 LOGFILE
CCE 3701-0, 4233-3, 4366-1
Syslog will refuse to log to a le which does not exist. All messages intended for that le will be silently discarded, so it is important to verify that all log les exist. Some logs may contain sensitive information, so it is better to
84
restrict permissions so that only administrative users can read or write logles.
2.6.1.1.3
Send Logs to a Remote Loghost
Edit /etc/syslog.conf. Add or correct the line: *.* @loghost.example.com
where loghost.example.com is the name of your central log server.

CCE 4260-6
It is particularly important that logs be stored on the local host in addition to being sent to the loghost, because syslogd uses the UDP protocol to send messages over a network. UDP does not guarantee reliable delivery, and moderately busy sites will lose log messages occasionally, especially in periods of high trac which may be the result of an attack. In addition, remote syslogd messages are not authenticated, so it is easy for an attacker to introduce spurious messages to the central log server. Also, some problems cause loss of network connectivity, which will prevent the sending of messages to the central server. For all of these reasons, it is better to store log messages both centrally and on each host, so that they can be correlated if necessary.
2.6.1.1.4
Enable syslogd to Accept Remote Messages on Loghosts Only
Is this machine the central log server for your organization? If so, edit the le /etc/sysconfig/syslog. Add or correct the following line: SYSLOGD_OPTIONS="-m 0 -r -s example.com " where example.com is the name of your domain. If the machine is not a log server, edit /etc/sysconfig/syslog, and instead add or correct the line: SYSLOGD_OPTIONS="-m 0"
CCE 3382-9
By default, RHEL5s syslog does not listen over the network for log messages. The -r ag enables syslogd to listen over a network, and should be used only if necessary. The -s example.com ag strips the domain name example.com from each sending machines hostname before logging messages from that host, to reduce the amount of redundant information placed in log les. See the syslogd(8) man page for further information.
2.6.1.2
Congure Rsyslog
The rsyslog software is recommended as a replacement for the default sysklogd daemon. rsyslog provides improvements over sysklogd, such as connection-oriented (i.e. TCP) transmission of logs, the option to log to database formats, and the encryption of log data en route to a central logging server.
2.6.1.2.1
Install the rsyslog Package
Install the rsyslog package manager as follows: # yum install rsyslog
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2.6.1.2.2
Ensure the rsyslog Service is Activated
To ensure that the rsyslog service is activated, and that sysklogds syslog daemon will not interfere with it by trying to run, execute the following: # chkconfig syslog off # chkconfig rsyslog on This will ensure the startup of rsyslog on the next system boot. The /sbin/service command can be used to change to make these changes happen immediately.
2.6.1.2.3
Ensure Important Messages are Captured
Edit the le /etc/rsyslog.conf. Add or correct whichever of the following lines are appropriate for your environment: auth.*,user.* /var/log/messages kern.* /var/log/kern.log daemon.* /var/log/daemon.log syslog.* /var/log/syslog lpr,news,uucp,local0,local1,local2,local3,local4,local5,local6.* /var/log/unused.log See the man page rsyslog.conf(5) for more information. By default, rsyslog uses a timestamp format that Logwatch does not understand. If your environment uses Logwatch, edit the le /etc/ rsyslog. conf and add or edit the following line: $ActionFileDefaultTemplate RSYSLOG TraditionalFileFormat
2.6.1.2.4
Conrm Existence and Permissions of Log Files
For each log le LOGFILE referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf, run the commands: # touch LOGFILE # chown root:root LOGFILE # chmod 0600 LOGFILE
2.6.1.2.5
Send Logs to a Remote Host Using Reliable Transport
Edit /etc/rsyslog.conf. Add or correct the line: *.* @@loghost.example.com
where loghost.example.com is the name of your central log server. This directive should appear on all systems except a syslog server itself. The double @ symbol in front of the log host means that TCP will be used to send log messages to the server. Rsyslog supports TCP for log transmission, which ensures more reliable network communication than UDP.
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2.6.1.2.6
Enable rsyslog to Accept Remote Messages on Loghosts Only
Is this machine the central log server for your organization? If so, edit the le /etc/rsyslog.conf. Add or correct the following lines: $ModLoad imtcp.so $InputTCPServerRun 514 These directives instruct rsyslogd to receive messages from the network. Directives that enable receiving messages over the network such as $InputTCPServerRun, $InputUDPServerRun, and $InputRELPServerRun should not appear on client systems. By default, rsyslog does not listen over the network for log messages. The ModLoad tells rsyslog to load the imtcp.so module so it can listen over a network via TCP, and should be used only if necessary. The InputTCPServerRun option instructs rsyslogd to listen on the specied TCP port. See the rsyslogd(8) man page for further information.
2.6.1.3 2.6.1.3.1
Logrotate Ensure All Logs are Rotated
Edit the le /etc/logrotate.d/syslog. Find the rst line, which should look like this (wrapped for clarity): /var/log/messages /var/log/secure /var/log/maillog /var/log/spooler \ /var/log/boot.log /var/log/cron { Edit this line so that it contains a one-space-separated listing of each log le referenced in /etc/syslog.conf.
CCE 4182-2
All logs in use on a system must be rotated regularly, or the log les will consume disk space over time, eventually interfering with system operation. The le /etc/logrotate.d/syslog is the conguration le used by the logrotate program to maintain all log les written by syslog. By default, it rotates logs weekly and stores four archival copies of each log. These settings can be modied by editing /etc/logrotate.conf, but the defaults are sucient for purposes of this guide. Note that logrotate is run nightly by the cron job /etc/cron.daily/logrotate. If particularly active logs need to be rotated more often than once a day, some other mechanism must be used.
2.6.1.4 2.6.1.4.1
Logwatch Monitor Suspicious Log Messages using Logwatch
The system includes an extensible program called Logwatch for reporting on unusual items in syslog. Logwatch is valuable because it provides a parser for the syslog entry format and a number of signatures for types of lines which are considered to be mundane or noteworthy. Logwatch has a number of downsides: the signatures can be inaccurate and are not always categorized consistently, and you must be able to program in Perl in order to customize the signature database. However, it is recommended that all Linux sites which do not have time to deploy a third-party log monitoring application run Logwatch in its default conguration. This provides some useful information about system activity in exchange for very little administrator eort.
87 This guide recommends that Logwatch be run only on the central logserver, if your site has one, in order to focus administrator attention by sending all daily logs in a single e-mail.
2.6.1.4.2
Congure Logwatch on the Central Log Server
Is this machine the central log server? If so, edit the le /etc/logwatch/conf/logwatch.conf. Add or correct the following lines: HostLimit = no SplitHosts = yes MultiEmail = no Service = -zz-disk_space Ensure that logwatch.pl is run nightly from cron. (This is the default): # cd /etc/cron.daily # ln -s /usr/share/logwatch/scripts/logwatch.pl 0logwatch
CCE 4323-2
On a central logserver, you want Logwatch to summarize all syslog entries, including those which did not originate on the logserver itself. The HostLimit setting tells Logwatch to report on all hosts, not just the one on which it is running. If SplitHosts is set, Logwatch will separate entries by hostname. This makes the report longer but signicantly more usable. If it is not set, then Logwatch will not report which host generated a given log entry, and that information is almost always necessary. If MultiEmail is set, then each hosts information will be sent in a separate e-mail message. This is a matter of preference. The Service directive -zz-disk space tells Logwatch not to run the zz-disk space report, which reports on free disk space. Since all log monitoring is being done on the central logserver, the disk space listing will always be that of the logserver, regardless of which host is being monitored. This is confusing, so disable that service. Note that this does mean that Logwatch will not monitor disk usage information. Many workarounds are possible, such as running df on each host daily via cron and sending the output to syslog so that it will be reported to the logserver.
2.6.1.4.3
Disable Logwatch on Clients if a Logserver Exists
Does your site have a central logserver which has been congured to report on logs received from all systems? If so: # rm /etc/cron.daily/0logwatch If no logserver exists, it will be necessary for each machine to run Logwatch individually. Using a central logserver provides the security and reliability benets discussed earlier, and also makes monitoring logs easier and less time-intensive for administrators.
2.6.2
System Accounting with auditd
The audit service is provided for system auditing. By default, the service audits about SELinux AVC denials and certain types of security-relevant events such as system logins, account modications, and authentication events
88 performed by programs such as sudo.
Under its default conguration, auditd has modest disk space requirements, and should not noticeably impact system performance. The audit service, congured with at least its default rules, is strongly recommended for all sites, regardless of whether they are running SELinux. DoD or federal networks often have substantial auditing requirements and auditd can be congured to meet these requirements. Typical DoD requirements include:
Ensure Auditing is Congured to Collect Certain System Events
Information on the Use of Print Command (unsuccessful and successful) Startup and Shutdown Events (unsuccessful and successful)
Ensure the auditing software can record the following for each audit event:
Date and time of the event Userid that initiated the event Type of event Success or failure of the event For I&A events, the origin of the request (e.g., terminal ID) For events that introduce an object into a users address space, and for object deletion events, the name of the object, and in MLS systems, the objects security level.
Ensure les are backed up no less than weekly onto a dierent system than the system being audited or backup media. Ensure old logs are closed out and new audit logs are started daily Ensure the conguration is immutable. With the -e 2 setting a reboot will be required to change any audit rules. Ensure that the audit data les have permissions of 640, or more restrictive.
2.6.2.1
Enable the auditd Service
Ensure that the auditd service is enabled (this is the default): # chkconfig auditd on
CCE 4292-9
By default, auditd logs only SELinux denials, which are helpful for debugging SELinux and discovering intrusion attempts, and certain types of security events, such as modications to user accounts (useradd, passwd, etc), login events, and calls to sudo. Data is stored in /var/log/audit/audit.log. By default, auditd rotates 4 logs by size (5MB), retaining a maximum of 20MB of data in total, and refuses to write entries when the disk is too full. This minimizes the risk of audit data lling its partition and impacting other services. However, it is possible to lose audit data if the system is busy.
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2.6.2.2
Congure auditd Data Retention
Determine STOREMB , the amount of audit data (in megabytes) which should be retained in each log le. Edit the le /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line:
max_log_file = STOREMB
Use a dedicated partition (or logical volume) for log les. It is straightforward to create such a partition or logical volume during system installation time. The partition should be larger than the maximum space which auditd will ever use, which is the maximum size of each log le (max log file) multiplied by the number of log les (num logs). Ensure the partition is mounted on /var/log/audit. If your site requires that the machine be disabled when auditing cannot be performed, congure auditd to halt the system when disk space for auditing runs low. Edit /etc/audit/auditd.conf, and add or correct the following lines:
space_left_action = email action_mail_acct = root admin_space_left_action = halt The default action to take when the logs reach their maximum size is to rotate the log les, discarding the oldest one. If it is more important to retain all possible auditing information, even if that opens the possibility of running out of space and taking the action dened by admin space left action, add or correct the line: max_log_file_action = keep_logs By default, auditd retains 4 log les of size 5Mb apiece. For a busy system or a system which is thoroughly auditing system activity, this is likely to be insucient. The log le size needed will depend heavily on what types of events are being audited. First congure auditing to log all the events of interest. Then monitor the log size manually for awhile to determine what le size will allow you to keep the required data for the correct time period. Using a dedicated partition for /var/log/audit prevents the auditd logs from disrupting system functionality if they ll, and, more importantly, prevents other activity in /var from lling the partition and stopping the audit trail. (The audit logs are size-limited and therefore unlikely to grow without bound unless congured to do so.) Some machines may have requirements that no actions occur which cannot be audited. If this is the case, then auditd can be congured to halt the machine if it runs out of space. Note: Since older logs are rotated, conguring auditd this way does not prevent older logs from being rotated away before they can be viewed. If your system is congured to halt when logging cannot be performed, make sure this can never happen under normal circumstances! Ensure that /var/ log/ audit is on its own partition, and that this partition is larger than the maximum amount of data auditd will retain normally.
2.6.2.3
Enable Auditing for Processes Which Start Prior to the Audit Daemon
To ensure that all processes can be audited, even those which start prior to the audit daemon, add the argument audit=1 to the kernel line in /etc/grub.conf, in the manner below: kernel /vmlinuz-version ro vga=ext root=/dev/VolGroup00/LogVol00 rhgb quiet audit=1
CCE 15026-8
90
Each process on the system carries an auditable ag which indicates whether its activities can be audited. Although auditd takes care of enabling this for all processes which launch after it does, adding the kernel argument ensures that it is set for every process during boot.
2.6.2.4
Congure auditd Rules for Comprehensive Auditing
The auditd program can perform comprehensive monitoring of system activity. This section describes recommended conguration settings for comprehensive auditing, but a full description of the auditing systems capabilities is beyond the scope of this guide. The mailing list [email protected] may be a good source of further information. The audit subsystem supports extensive collection of events, including:
Tracing of arbitrary system calls (identied by name or number) on entry or exit. Filtering by PID, UID, call success, system call argument (with some limitations), etc. Monitoring of specic les for modications to the les contents or metadata.
Auditing rules are controlled in the le /etc/audit/audit.rules. Add rules to it to meet the auditing requirements for your organization. Each line in /etc/audit/audit.rules represents a series of arguments that can be passed to auditctl and can be individually tested as such. See documentation in /usr/share/doc/ audit- version and in the related man pages for more details. Recommended audit rules are provided in /usr/share/doc/audit- version /stig.rules. In order to activate those rules: # cp /usr/share/doc/audit-version /stig.rules /etc/audit/audit.rules and then edit /etc/audit/audit.rules and comment out the lines containing arch= which are not appropriate for your systems architecture. Then review and understand the following rules, ensuring rules are activated as needed for the appropriate architecture. After reviewing all the rules, reading the following sections, and editing as needed, activate the new rules: # service auditd restart
2.6.2.4.1
Records Events that Modify Date and Time Information
Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S stime -k time-change -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S clock_settime -k time-change -w /etc/localtime -p wa -k time-change
CCE 14051-7
3 List
information can be found at http://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
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2.6.2.4.2
Record Events that Modify User/Group Information
Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules, in order to capture events that modify account changes: -w -w -w -w -w /etc/group -p wa -k identity /etc/passwd -p wa -k identity /etc/gshadow -p wa -k identity /etc/shadow -p wa -k identity /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k identity
CCE 14829-6
2.6.2.4.3
Record Events that Modify the Systems Network Environment
Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a -w -w -w -w exit,always -F arch=ARCH -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k system-locale /etc/issue -p wa -k system-locale /etc/issue.net -p wa -k system-locale /etc/hosts -p wa -k system-locale /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k system-locale
CCE 14816-3
2.6.2.4.4
Record Events that Modify the Systems Mandatory Access Controls
Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy

CCE 14821-3
2.6.2.4.5
Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events
The audit system already collects login info for all users and root. To watch for attempted manual edits of les involved in storing logon events, add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -w /var/log/faillog -p wa -k logins -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins
CCE 14904-7
2.6.2.4.6
Record Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information
The audit system already collects process information for all users and root. To watch for attempted manual edits of les involved in storing such process information, add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules:
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-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session -w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session -w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session

CCE 14679-5
2.6.2.4.7
Ensure auditd Collects Discretionary Access Control Permission Modication Events
At a minimum the audit system should collect le permission changes for all users and root. Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S chmod -S -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S chown -S -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S setxattr lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=500 \ fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=500 \ -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S \ auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
CCE 14058-2
2.6.2.4.8
Ensure auditd Collects Unauthorized Access Attempts to Files (unsuccessful)
At a minimum the audit system should collect unauthorized le accesses for all users and root. Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S creat -S open -S openat -S truncate -S ftruncate \ -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S creat -S open -S openat -S truncate -S ftruncate \ -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
CCE 14917-9
2.6.2.4.9
Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands
At a minimum the audit system should collect the execution of privileged commands for all users and root. This requires adding an audit rule to watch execution of each setuid or setgid program. First, run the following command for each local partition PART to generate rules, one for each setuid or setgid program: # find PART -xdev $ -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 $ -type f | awk '{print \ "-a always,exit -F path=" $1 " -F perm=x -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 \ -k privileged" }' Next, add those lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules.
CCE 14296-8
93
2.6.2.4.10
Ensure auditd Collects Information on Exporting to Media (successful)
At a minimum the audit system should collect media exportation events for all users and root. Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k export
CCE 14569-8
2.6.2.4.11
Ensure auditd Collects Files Deletion Events by User (successful and unsuccessful)
At a minimum the audit system should collect le deletion events for all users and root. Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S renameat -F auid>=500 \ -F auid!=4294967295 -k delete
CCE 14820-5
2.6.2.4.12
Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions
At a minimum the audit system should collect administrator actions for all users and root. Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions
CCE 14824-7
2.6.2.4.13
Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading
Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules in order to capture kernel module loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: -w -w -w -a /sbin/insmod -p x -k modules /sbin/rmmod -p x -k modules /sbin/modprobe -p x -k modules always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module -S delete_module -k modules
CCE 14688-6
2.6.2.4.14
Make the auditd Conguration Immutable
Add the following as the last rule in /etc/audit/audit.rules in order to make the conguration immutable: -e 2 With this setting, a reboot will be required to change any audit rules.
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CCE 14692-8
2.6.2.5
Summarize and Review Audit Logs using aureport
Familiarize yourself with the aureport(8) man page, then design a short series of audit reporting commands suitable for exploring the audit logs on a daily (or more frequent) basis. These commands can be added as a cron job by placing an appropriately named le in /etc/cron.daily. See the next section for information on how to ensure that the audit system collects all events needed. For example, to generate a daily report of every user to login to the machine, the following command could be run from cron: # aureport -l -i -ts yesterday -te today To review all audited activity for unusual behavior, a good place to start is to see a summary of which audit rules have been triggering: aureport --key --summary If access violations stand out, review them with: # ausearch --key access --raw | aureport --file --summary To review what executables are doing: # ausearch --key access --raw | aureport -x --summary If access violations have been occurring on a particular le (such as /etc/shadow) and you want to determine which user is doing this: # ausearch --key access --file /etc/shadow --raw | aureport --user --summary -i Check for anomalous activity (such as device changing to promiscuous mode, processes ending abnormally, login failure limits being reached) using: # aureport --anomaly The foundation to audit analysis is using keys to classify the events. Information about using ausearch to nd an SELinux problem can be found in Section 2.4.6.
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3. Services
3.1 Disable All Unneeded Services at Boot Time
The best protection against vulnerable software is running less software. This section describes how to review the software which Red Hat Enterprise Linux installs on a system and disable software which is not needed. It then enumerates the software packages installed on a default RHEL5 system and provides guidance about which ones can be safely disabled.
3.1.1
Determine which Services are Enabled at Boot
Run the command: # chkconfig --list | grep :on The rst column of this output is the name of a service which is currently enabled at boot. Review each listed service to determine whether it can be disabled. If it is appropriate to disable some service srvname , do so using the command: # chkconfig srvname off Use the guidance below for information about unfamiliar services.
3.1.2
Guidance on Default Services
The table in this section contains a list of all services which are enabled at boot by a default RHEL5 installation. For each service, one of the following recommendations is made:
Enable: The service provides a signicant capability with limited risk exposure. Leave the service enabled. Congure: The service either is required for most systems to function properly or provides an important security function. It should be left enabled by most environments. However, it must be congured securely on all machines, and dierent options may be needed for workstations than for servers. See the referenced section for recommended conguration of this service. Disable if possible: The service opens the system to some risk, but may be required by some environments. See the appropriate section of the guide, and disable the service if at all possible. Servers only: The service provides some function to other machines over the network. If that function is needed in the target environment, the service should remain enabled only on a small number of dedicated servers, and should be disabled on all other machines on the network.
Service name acpid anacron apmd atd auditd
Action Enable Disable if possible Disable if possible Congure Congure
Reference 3.3.15.2 3.4 3.3.15.1 3.4 2.6.2
96 Service name autofs avahi-daemon bluetooth cpuspeed crond cups rstboot gpm haldaemon hidd hplip ip6tables iptables irqbalance isdn kdump kudzu mcstrans mdmonitor messagebus microcode ctl netfs network nfslock pcscd portmap readahead early readahead later restorecond rhnsd rpcgssd rpcidmapd sendmail setroubleshoot smartd sshd syslog xfs yum-updatesd Action Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Enable Congure Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Congure Congure Enable Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Enable Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Enable Disable if possible Disable if possible Disable if possible Congure Disable if possible Enable Servers only Congure Disable if possible Disable if possible Reference 2.2.2.3 3.7 3.3.14 3.3.15.3 3.4 3.8 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.13.2 3.3.14.2 3.8.4.1 2.5.5 2.5.5 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.3.5 3.3.6 2.4.3.2 (SELinux) 3.3.7 3.3.13.1 3.3.8 3.13 (NFS) 3.3.9 3.13 (NFS) 3.3.10 3.13 (NFS) 3.3.12 3.3.12 2.4.3.3 (SELinux) 2.1.2.2 3.13 (NFS) 3.13 (NFS) 3.11 2.4.3.1 (SELinux) 3.3.11 3.5 2.6.1.1 3.6 (X11) 2.1.2.3.2
CHAPTER 3. SERVICES
3.1.3
Guidance for Unfamiliar Services
If the system is running any services which have not been covered, determine what these services do, and disable them if they are not needed or if they pose a high risk. If a service srvname is unknown, try running: $ rpm -qf /etc/init.d/srvname to discover which RPM package installed the service. Then, run:
97 $ rpm -qi rpmname for a brief description of what that RPM does.
3.2
Obsolete Services
This section discusses a number of network-visible services which have historically caused problems for system security, and for which disabling or severely limiting the service has been the best available guidance for some time. As a result of this consensus, these services are not installed as part of RHEL5 by default. Organizations which are running these services should prioritize switching to more secure services which provide the needed functionality. If it is absolutely necessary to run one of these services for legacy reasons, care should be taken to restrict the service as much as possible, for instance by conguring host rewall software (see Section 2.5.5) to restrict access to the vulnerable service to only those remote hosts which have a known need to use it.
3.2.1
Inetd and Xinetd
Is there an operational need to run the deprecated inetd or xinetd software packages? If not, ensure that they are removed from the system: # yum erase inetd xinetd
CCE 4234-1, 4252-3, 4023-8, 4164-0
Beginning with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, the xinetd service is no longer installed by default. This change represents increased awareness that the dedicated network listener model does not improve security or reliability of services, and that restriction of network listeners is better handled using a granular model such as SELinux than using xinetds limited security options.
3.2.2
Telnet
Is there a mission-critical reason for users to access the system via the insecure telnet protocol, rather than the more secure SSH protocol? If not, ensure that the telnet server is removed from the system: # yum erase telnet-server
CCE 3390-2, 4330-7
The telnet protocol uses unencrypted network communication, which means that data from the login session, including passwords and all other information transmitted during the session, can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network, and also that outsiders can easily hijack the session to gain authenticated access to the telnet server. Organizations which use telnet should be actively working to migrate to a more secure protocol. See Section 3.5 for information about the SSH service.
3.2.2.1
Remove Telnet Clients
In order to prevent users from casually attempting to use a telnet server, and thus exposing their credentials over the network, remove the telnet package, which contains a telnet client program:
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# yum erase telnet If Kerberos is not used, remove the krb5-workstation package, which also includes a telnet client: # yum erase krb5-workstation
3.2.3
Rlogin, Rsh, and Rcp
The Berkeley r-commands are legacy services which allow cleartext remote access and have an insecure trust model.
3.2.3.1
Remove the Rsh Server Commands from the System
Is there a mission-critical reason for users to access the system via the insecure rlogin, rsh, or rcp commands rather than the more secure ssh and scp? If not, ensure that the rsh server is removed from the system: # yum erase rsh-server
CCE 3974-3, 4141-8, 3537-8, 4308-3
SSH was designed to be a drop-in replacement for the r-commands, which suer from the same hijacking and eavesdropping problems as telnet. There is unlikely to be a case in which these commands cannot be replaced with SSH.
3.2.3.2
Remove .rhosts Support from PAM Conguration Files
Check that pam rhosts authentication is not used by any PAM services. Run the command: # grep -l pam rhosts /etc/pam.d/* This command should return no output. The RHEL5 default is not to rely on .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv for any PAM-based services, so, on an uncustomized system, this command should return no output. If any les do use pam rhosts, modify them to make use of a more secure authentication method instead. For more information about PAM, see Section 2.3.3.
3.2.3.3
Remove the Rsh Client Commands from the System
In order to prevent users from casually attempting to make use of an rsh server and thus exposing their credentials over the network, remove the rsh package, which contains client programs for many of r-commands described above: # yum erase rsh Users should be trained to use the SSH client, and never attempt to connect to an rsh or telnet server. The krb5-workstation package also contains r-command client programs and should be removed as described in Section 3.2.2.1, if Kerberos is not in use.
99
3.2.4
NIS
The NIS client service ypbind is not activated by default. In the event that it was activated at some point, disable it by executing the command: # chkconfig ypbind off The NIS server package is not installed by default. In the event that it was installed at some point, remove it from the system by executing the command: # yum erase ypserv
CCE 3705-1, 4348-9
The Network Information Service (NIS), also known as Yellow Pages (YP), and its successor NIS+ have been made obsolete by Kerberos, LDAP, and other modern centralized authentication services. NIS should not be used because it suers from security problems inherent in its design, such as inadequate protection of important authentication information.
3.2.5
TFTP Server
Is there an operational need to run the deprecated TFTP server software? If not, ensure that it is removed from the system: # yum erase tftp-server
CCE 4273-9, 3916-4
TFTP is a lightweight version of the FTP protocol which has traditionally been used to congure networking equipment. However, TFTP provides little security, and modern versions of networking operating systems frequently support conguration via SSH or other more secure protocols. A TFTP server should be run only if no more secure method of supporting existing equipment can be found.
3.2.6
Talk
The Talk software makes it possible for a user to send messages to the terminal session of another user on another system. The talk-server package is not installed by default, although the talk client package is. Both are obsolete and can be removed.
3.2.6.1
Remove talk-server Package
To remove the talk daemons from the system, run the following command: # yum erase talk-server
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3.2.6.2
Remove talk Package
To remove the talk daemons from the system, run the following command: # yum erase talk
3.3
Base Services
This section addresses the base services that are congured to start up on boot in a RHEL5 default installation. Some of these services listen on the network and should be treated with particular discretion. The other services are local system utilities that may or may not be extraneous. Each of these services should be disabled if not required.
3.3.1
Installation Helper Service (firstboot)
Firstboot is a daemon specic to the Red Hat installation process. It handles one-time conguration following successful installation of the operating system. As such, there is no reason for this service to remain enabled. Disable rstboot by issuing the command: # chkconfig firstboot off
CCE 3412-4
3.3.2
Console Mouse Service (gpm)
GPM is the service that controls the text console mouse pointer. (The X Windows mouse pointer is unaected by this service.) If mouse functionality in the console is not required, disable this service: # chkconfig gpm off
CCE 4229-1
Although it is preferable to run as few services as possible, the console mouse pointer can be useful for preventing administrator mistakes in runlevel 3 by enabling copy-and-paste operations.
3.3.3
Interrupt Distribution on Multiprocessor Systems (irqbalance)
The goal of the irqbalance service is to optimize the balance between power savings and performance through distribution of hardware interrupts across multiple processors. In a server environment with multiple processors, this provides a useful service and should be left enabled. If a machine has only one processor, the service may be disabled: # chkconfig irqbalance off
101
CCE 4123-6
3.3.4
ISDN Support (isdn)
The ISDN service facilitates Internet connectivity in the presence of an ISDN modem. If an ISDN modem is not being used, disable this service: # chkconfig isdn off
CCE 14825-4
3.3.4.1
Remove the isdn4k-utils Package if Possible
If the isdn service will not be used, then the isdn4k-utils package can be deleted: # yum erase isdn4k-utils The package also contains a setuid program as discussed in Section 2.2.3.4.
3.3.5
Kdump Kernel Crash Analyzer (kdump)
Kdump is a new kernel crash dump analyzer. It uses kexec to boot a secondary kernel (capture kernel) following a system crash. The kernel dump from the system crash is loaded into the capture kernel for analysis. Unless the system is used for kernel development or testing, disable the service: # chkconfig kdump off
CCE 3425-6
3.3.6
Kudzu Hardware Probing Utility (kudzu)
Is there a mission-critical reason for console users to add new hardware to the system? If not: # chkconfig kudzu off
CCE 4211-9
Kudzu, Red Hats hardware detection program, represents an unnecessary security risk as it allows unprivileged users to perform hardware conguration without authorization. Unless this specic functionality is required, Kudzu should be disabled.
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3.3.7
Software RAID Monitor (mdmonitor)
The mdmonitor service is used for monitoring a software RAID (hardware RAID setups do not use this service). This service is extraneous unless software RAID is in use (which is not common). If software RAID monitoring is not required, disable this service: # chkconfig mdmonitor off
CCE 3854-7
3.3.8
IA32 Microcode Utility (microcode ctl)
microcode ctl is a microcode utility for use with Intel IA32 processors (Pentium Pro, PII, Celeron, PIII, Xeon, Pentium 4, etc) If the system is not running an Intel IA32 processor, disable this service: # chkconfig microcode ctl off
CCE 4356-2
3.3.9
Network Service (network)
The network service allows associated network interfaces to access the network. This section contains general guidance for controlling the operation of the service. For kernel parameters which aect networking, see Section 2.5.1. For detailed conguration of IPv6, see Section 2.5.3.
CCE 4369-5
3.3.9.1
Disable All Networking if Not Needed
If the system is a standalone machine with no need for network access or even communication over the loopback device, then disable this service: # chkconfig network off
3.3.9.2
Disable All External Network Interfaces if Not Needed
If the system does not require network communications but still needs to use the loopback interface, remove all les of the form ifcfg-interface except for ifcfg-lo from /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts: # rm /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface
103
3.3.9.3
Disable Zeroconf Networking
Zeroconf networking allows the system to assign itself an IP address and engage in IP communication without a statically-assigned address or even a DHCP server. Automatic address assignment via Zeroconf (or DHCP) is not recommended. To disable Zeroconf automatic route assignment in the 169.245.0.0 subnet, add or correct the following line in /etc/sysconfig/network: NOZEROCONF=yes
CCE 14054-1
Zeroconf addresses are in the network 169.254.0.0. The networking scripts add entries to the systems routing table for these addresses. Zeroconf address assignment commonly occurs when the system is congured to use DHCP but fails to receive an address assignment from the DHCP server.
3.3.10
Smart Card Support (pcscd)
The pcscd service provides support for Smart Cards and Smart Card Readers. If Smart Cards are not in use on the system, disable this service: # chkconfig pcscd off
CCE 4100-4
3.3.11
SMART Disk Monitoring Support (smartd)
SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Technology) is a feature of hard drives that allows them to detect symptoms of disk failure and relay an appropriate warning. This technology is considered to bring relatively low security risk, and can be useful. Leave this service running if the systems hard drives are SMART-capable. Otherwise, disable it: # chkconfig smartd off
CCE 3455-3
3.3.12
Boot Caching (readahead early/readahead later)
The following services provide one-time caching of les belonging to some boot services, with the goal of allowing the system to boot faster. It is recommended that this service be disabled on most machines: # chkconfig readahead early off # chkconfig readahead later off
CCE 4421-4, 4302-6
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The readahead services do not substantially increase a systems risk exposure, but they also do not provide great benet. Unless the system is running a specialized application for which the le caching substantially improves system boot time, this guide recommends disabling the services.
3.3.13
Application Support Services
The following services are software projects of freedesktop.org that are meant to provide system integration through a series of common APIs for applications. They are heavily integrated into the X Windows environment. If the system is not using X Windows, these services can typically be disabled.
3.3.13.1
D-Bus IPC Service (messagebus)
D-Bus is an IPC mechanism that provides a common channel for inter-process communication. If no services which require D-Bus are in use, disable this service: # chkconfig messagebus off
CCE 3822-4
A number of default services make use of D-Bus, including X Windows (Section 3.6), Bluetooth (Section 3.3.14) and Avahi (Section 3.7). This guide recommends that D-Bus and all its dependencies be disabled unless there is a mission-critical need for them. Stricter conguration of D-Bus is possible and documented in the man page dbus-daemon(1). D-Bus maintains two separate conguration les, located in /etc/dbus-1/, one for system-specic conguration and the other for session-specic conguration.
3.3.13.2
HAL Daemon (haldaemon)
The haldaemon service provides a dynamic way of managing device interfaces. It automates device conguration and provides an API for making devices accessible to applications through the D-Bus interface.
CCE 4364-6
3.3.13.2.1
Disable HAL Daemon if Possible
HAL provides valuable attack surfaces to attackers as an intermediary to privileged operations and should be disabled unless necessary: # chkconfig haldaemon off
3.3.13.2.2
Congure HAL Daemon if Necessary
HAL provides a limited user the ability to mount system devices. This is primarily used by X utilities such as gnome-volume-manager to perform automounting of removable media. HAL conguration is currently only possible through a series of fdi les located in /usr/share/hal/fdi/
105 Note: The HAL future road map includes a mandatory framework for managing administrative privileges called PolicyKit. To prevent users from accessing devices through HAL, create the le /etc/hal/fdi/policy/99-policy-all-drives.fdi with the contents: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <deviceinfo version="0.2"> <device> <match key="info.capabilities" contains="volume"> <merge key="volume.ignore" type="bool">true</merge> </match> </device> </deviceinfo> The above code matches any device labeled with the volume capability (any device capable of being mounted will be labeled this way) and sets the corresponding volume.ignore key to true, indicating that the volume should be ignored. This both makes the volume invisible to the UI, and denies mount attempts by unprivileged users.
3.3.14
Bluetooth Support
Bluetooth provides a way to transfer information between devices such as mobile phones, laptops, PCs, printers, digital cameras, and video game consoles over a short-range wireless link. Any wireless communication presents a serious security risk to sensitive or classied systems. Section 2.5.2 contains information on the related topic of wireless networking. Removal of hardware is the only way to ensure that the Bluetooth wireless capability remains disabled. If it is completely impractical to remove the Bluetooth hardware module, and site policy still allows the device to enter sensitive spaces, every eort to disable the capability via software should be made. In general, acquisition policy should include provisions to prevent the purchase of equipment that will be used in sensitive spaces and includes Bluetooth capabilities.
3.3.14.1
Bluetooth Host Controller Interface Daemon (bluetooth)
The bluetooth service enables the system to use Bluetooth devices. If the system requires no Bluetooth devices, disable this service: # chkconfig bluetooth off
CCE 4355-4
3.3.14.2
Bluetooth Input Devices (hidd)
The hidd service provides support for Bluetooth input devices.
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If the system has no Bluetooth input devices (e.g. wireless keyboard or mouse), disable this service: # chkconfig hidd off
CCE 4377-8
3.3.14.3
Disable Bluetooth Kernel Modules
The kernels module loading system can be congured to prevent loading of the Bluetooth module. Add the following to /etc/modprobe.conf to prevent the loading of the Bluetooth module: alias net-pf-31 off alias bluetooth off
CCE 14948-4
The unexpected name, net-pf-31, is a result of how the kernel requests modules for network protocol families; it is simply an alias for the bluetooth module.
3.3.15
Power Management Support
The following services provide an interface to power management functions. These functions include monitoring battery power, system hibernate/suspend, CPU throttling, and various power-save utilities.
3.3.15.1
Advanced Power Management Subsystem (apmd)
The apmd service provides last generation power management support. If the system is capable of ACPI support, or if power management is not necessary, disable this service: # chkconfig apmd off
CCE 4289-5
APM is being replaced by ACPI and should be considered deprecated. As such, it can be disabled if ACPI is supported by your hardware and kernel. If the le /proc/acpi/info exists and contains ACPI version information, then APM can safely be disabled without loss of functionality.
3.3.15.2
Advanced Conguration and Power Interface (acpid)
The acpid service provides next generation power management support. Unless power management features are not necessary, leave this service enabled.
CCE 4298-6
107
3.3.15.3
CPU Throttling (cpuspeed)
The cpuspeed service uses hardware support to throttle the CPU when the system is idle. Unless CPU power optimization is unnecessary, leave this service enabled.
CCE 4051-9
3.3.16
Infrared Communications (irda)
The irda service provides short-range wireless communications for systems with infrared hardware support. The need for IR communication is uncommon and is being superceded by Bluetooth for many applications. As with any wireless communications, it presents an attacker with the ability to communicate with the system and should be disabled unless required.
3.3.16.1
Disable the irda Service if Possible
Disable the irda service unless there is a compelling need for it: # chkconfig irda off
3.3.16.2
Remove the irda-utils Package if Possible
If the irda service will not be used, then the irda-utils package can be deleted: # yum erase irda-utils
3.3.17
Raw Devices (rawdevices)
The rawdevices service assigns raw devices to block devices and is commonly used by database systems. As such, it should not be activated on systems such as desktops.
3.3.17.1
Disable the Raw Devices Daemon if Possible
Disable the rawdevices service unless there is a compelling need for it: # chkconfig rawdevices off
3.4
Cron and At Daemons
The cron and at services are used to allow commands to be executed at a later time. The cron service is required by almost all systems to perform necessary maintenance tasks, while at may or may not be required on a given system. Both daemons should be congured defensively.
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CCE 4324-0
3.4.1
Disable anacron if Possible
Is this a machine which is designed to run all the time, such as a server or a workstation which is left on at night? If so: # yum erase anacron
CCE 4406-5, 4428-9
The anacron subsystem is designed to provide cron functionality for machines which may be shut down during the normal times that system cron jobs run, frequently in the middle of the night. Laptops and workstations which are shut down at night should keep anacron enabled, so that standard system cron jobs will run when the machine boots. However, on machines which do not need this additional functionality, anacron represents another piece of privileged software which could contain vulnerabilities. Therefore, it should be removed when possible to reduce system risk.
3.4.2
Restrict Permissions on Files Used by cron
1. Restrict the permissions on the primary system crontab le: # chown root:root /etc/crontab # chmod 600 /etc/crontab 2. If anacron has not been removed, restrict the permissions on its primary conguration le: # chown root:root /etc/anacrontab # chmod 600 /etc/anacrontab 3. Restrict the permission on all system crontab directories: # cd /etc # chown -R root:root cron.hourly cron.daily cron.weekly cron.monthly cron.d # chmod -R go-rwx cron.hourly cron.daily cron.weekly cron.monthly cron.d 4. Restrict the permissions on the spool directory for user crontab les: # chown root:root /var/spool/cron # chmod -R go-rwx /var/spool/cron
CCE 4322-4, 4450-3, 4331-5, 3851-3, 4379-4, 4388-5, 4054-3, 4441-2, 4212-7, 4380-2, 3833-1, 3604-6, 4106-1, 3983-4, 3626-9, 4022-0, 4304-2, 4203-6, 4251-5, 3481-9, 4250-7
Cron and anacron make use of a number of conguration les and directories. The system crontabs need only be edited by root, and user crontabs are edited using the setuid root crontab command. If unprivileged users can modify system cron conguration les, they may be able to gain elevated privileges, so all unnecessary access to these les should be disabled.
109
3.4.3
Disable at if Possible
Unless the at daemon is required, disable it with the following command: # chkconfig atd off
CCE 14466-7
Many of the periodic or delayed execution features of the at daemon can be provided through the cron daemon instead.
3.4.4
Restrict at and cron to Authorized Users
1. Remove the cron.deny le: # rm /etc/cron.deny 2. Edit /etc/cron.allow, adding one line for each user allowed to use the crontab command to create cron jobs. 3. Remove the at.deny le: # rm /etc/at.deny 4. Edit /etc/at.allow, adding one line for each user allowed to use the at command to create at jobs. The /etc/cron.allow and /etc/at.allow les contain lists of users who are allowed to use cron and at to delay execution of processes. If these les exist and if the corresponding les /etc/cron.deny and /etc/at.deny do not exist, then only users listed in the relevant allow les can run the crontab and at commands to submit jobs to be run at scheduled intervals. On many systems, only the system administrator needs the ability to schedule jobs. Note that even if a given user is not listed in cron.allow, cron jobs can still be run as that user. The cron.allow le controls only administrative access to the crontab command for scheduling and modifying cron jobs.
3.5
SSH Server
The SSH protocol is recommended for remote login and remote le transfer. SSH provides condentiality and integrity for data exchanged between two systems, as well as server authentication, through the use of public key cryptography. The implementation included with the system is called OpenSSH, and more detailed documentation is available from its website, http://www.openssh.org. Its server program is called sshd and provided by the RPM package openssh-server.
3.5.1
Disable OpenSSH Server if Possible
Unless the system needs to provide the remote login and le transfer capabilities of SSH, disable and remove the OpenSSH server and its conguration.
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3.5.1.1
Disable and Remove OpenSSH Software
Disable and remove openssh-server with the commands: # chkconfig sshd off # yum erase openssh-server
CCE 4268-9, 4272-1
Users of the system will still be able to use the SSH client program /usr/bin/ssh to access SSH servers on other systems.
3.5.1.2
Remove SSH Server iptables Firewall Exception
Edit the les /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). In each le, locate and delete the line: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -m state --state NEW -m tcp -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT
CCE 4295-2
By default, inbound connections to SSHs port are allowed. If the SSH server is not being used, this exception should be removed from the rewall conguration. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about Iptables.
3.5.2
Congure OpenSSH Server if Necessary
If the system needs to act as an SSH server, then certain changes should be made to the OpenSSH daemon conguration le /etc/ssh/sshd_config. The following recommendations can be applied to this le. See the sshd config(5) man page for more detailed information.
3.5.2.1
Ensure Only Protocol 2 Connections Allowed
Only SSH protocol version 2 connections should be permitted. Version 1 of the protocol contains security vulnerabilities. The default setting shipped in the conguration le is correct, but it is important enough to check. Verify that the following line appears: Protocol 2
CCE 4325-7
3.5.2.2
Limit Users SSH Access
By default, the SSH conguration allows any user to access the system. In order to allow all users to login via SSH but deny only a few users, add or correct the following line: DenyUsers USER1 USER2
111
Alternatively, if it is appropriate to allow only a few users access to the system via SSH, add or correct the following line: AllowUsers USER1 USER2
3.5.2.3
Set Idle Timeout Interval for User Logins
SSH allows administrators to set an idle timeout interval. After this interval has passed, the idle user will be automatically logged out. Find and edit the following lines in /etc/ssh/sshd_config as follows: ClientAliveInterval interval ClientAliveCountMax 0 The timeout interval is given in seconds. To have a timeout of 15 minutes, set interval to 900.
CCE 14061-6
If a shorter timeout has already been set for the login shell, as in Section 2.3.5.5, that value will preempt any SSH setting made here. Keep in mind that some processes may stop SSH from correctly detecting that the user is idle.
3.5.2.4
Disable .rhosts Files
SSH can emulate the behavior of the obsolete rsh command in allowing users to enable insecure access to their accounts via .rhosts les. To ensure that this behavior is disabled, add or correct the following line: IgnoreRhosts yes
CCE 4475-0
3.5.2.5
Disable Host-Based Authentication
SSHs cryptographic host-based authentication is slightly more secure than .rhosts authentication, since hosts are cryptographically authenticated. However, it is not recommended that hosts unilaterally trust one another, even within an organization. To disable host-based authentication, add or correct the following line: HostbasedAuthentication no
CCE 4370-3
3.5.2.6
Disable root Login via SSH
The root user should never be allowed to login directly over a network, as this both reduces auditable information about who ran privileged commands on the system and allows direct attack attempts on roots password.
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To disable root login via SSH, add or correct the following line: PermitRootLogin no
CCE 4387-7
3.5.2.7
Disable Empty Passwords
To explicitly disallow remote login from accounts with empty passwords, add or correct the following line: PermitEmptyPasswords no
CCE 3660-8
Measures should also be taken to disable accounts with empty passwords system-wide, as described in Section 2.3.1.5.1.
3.5.2.8
Enable a Warning Banner
Section 2.3.7 contains information on how to create an appropriate warning banner. To enable a warning banner, add or correct the following line: Banner /etc/issue
CCE 4431-3
3.5.2.9
Do Not Allow Users to Set Environment Options
To prevent users from being able to present environment options to the SSH daemon and potentially bypass some access restrictions, add or correct the following line: PermitUserEnvironment no
CCE 14716-5
3.5.2.10
Use Only Approved Ciphers in Counter Mode
Limit the ciphers to those which are FIPS-approved and only use ciphers in counter (CTR) mode. The following line demonstrates use of FIPS-approved ciphers in CTR mode: Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
CCE 14491-5
The man page sshd config(5) contains a list of the ciphers supported for the current release of the SSH daemon.
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3.5.2.11
Strengthen Firewall Conguration if Possible
If the SSH server must only accept connections from the local network, then strengthen the default rewall rule for the SSH service. Determine an appropriate network block, netwk , and network mask, mask , representing the machines on your network which must be allowed to access this SSH server. Edit the les /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). In each le, locate the line: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -m state --state NEW -m tcp -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT and replace it with: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s netwk /mask -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT If your site uses IPv6, and you are editing ip6tables, use the line: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s ipv6netwk::/ipv6mask -m tcp -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT instead because Netlter does not yet reliably support stateful ltering for IPv6. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about Iptables conguration.
3.6
X Window System
The X Window System implementation included with the system is called X.org.
3.6.1
Disable X Windows if Possible
Unless there is a mission-critical reason for the machine to run a GUI login screen, prevent X from starting automatically at boot. There is usually no reason to run X Windows on a dedicated server machine, since administrators can login via SSH or on the text console.
3.6.1.1
Disable X Windows at System Boot
Edit the le /etc/inittab, and correct the line id:5:initdefault: to: id:3:initdefault:
CCE 4462-8
This action changes the default boot runlevel of the system from 5 to 3. These two runlevels should be identical except that runlevel 5 starts X on boot, while runlevel 3 does not.
3.6.1.2
Remove X Windows from the System if Possible
Remove the X11 RPMs from the system:
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# yum groupremove "X Window System"

CCE 4422-2
As long as X.org remains installed on the system, users can still run X Windows by typing startx at the shell prompt. This may run X Windows using conguration settings which are less secure than the system defaults. Therefore, if the machine is a dedicated server which does not need to provide graphical logins at all, it is safest to remove the X.org software entirely. The command given here will remove over 100 packages. It should safely and eectively remove X from machines which do not need it.
3.6.1.3
Lock Down X Windows startx Conguration if Necessary
If X is not to be started at boot time but the software must remain installed, users will be able to run X manually using the startx command. In some cases, this runs X with a conguration which is less safe than the default. Follow these instructions to mitigate risk from this conguration.
3.6.1.3.1
Disable X Font Server
Disable the xfs helper service: # chkconfig xfs off

CCE 4448-7
The systems X.org requires the X Font Server service (xfs) to function. The xfs service will be started automatically if X.org is activated via startx. Therefore, it is safe to prevent xfs from starting at boot when X is disabled, even if users are allowed to run X manually.
3.6.1.3.2
Disable X Window System Listening
To prevent X.org from listening for remote connections, create the le /etc/X11/xinit/xserverrc and ll it with the following line: exec X :0 -nolisten tcp $@
CCE 4074-1
One of X.orgs features is the ability to provide remote graphical display. This feature should be disabled unless it is required. If the system uses runlevel 5, which is the default, the GDM display manager starts X safely, with remote listening disabled. However, if X is started from the command line with the startx command, then the server will listen for new connections on Xs default port, 6000. See the xinit(1), startx(1), and Xserver(1) man pages for more information.
3.6.2
Congure X Windows if Necessary
If there is a mission-critical reason for this machine to run a GUI, improve the security of the default X conguration by following the guidance in this section.
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3.6.2.1
Create Warning Banners for GUI Login Users
Edit the le /etc/gdm/custom.conf. Locate the [greeter] section, and correct that section to contain the lines: [greeter] InfoMsgFile=/etc/issue
CCE 3717-6
See Section 2.3.7 for an explanation of banner le use. This setting will cause the system greeting banner to be displayed in a box prior to GUI login. If the default banner font is inappropriate, it can be changed by specifying the InfoMsgFont directive as well, for instance: InfoMsgFont=Sans 12
3.7
Avahi Server
The Avahi daemon implements the DNS Service Discovery and Multicast DNS protocols, which provide service and host discovery on a network. It allows a system to automatically identify resources on the network, such as printers or web servers. This capability is also known as mDNSresponder and is a major part of Zeroconf networking. By default, it is enabled.
3.7.1
Disable Avahi Server if Possible
Because the Avahi daemon service keeps an open network port, it is subject to network attacks. Disabling it is particularly important to reduce the systems vulnerability to such attacks.
3.7.1.1
Disable Avahi Server Software
Issue the command: # chkconfig avahi-daemon off

CCE 4365-3
3.7.1.2
Remove Avahi Server iptables Firewall Exception
Edit the les /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). In each le, locate and delete the line: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p udp --dport 5353 -d 224.0.0.251 -j ACCEPT By default, inbound connections to Avahis port are allowed. If the Avahi server is not being used, this exception should be removed from the rewall conguration. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about the Iptables rewall.
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3.7.2
Congure Avahi if Necessary
If your system requires the Avahi daemon, its conguration can be restricted to improve security. The Avahi daemon conguration le is /etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf. The following security recommendations should be applied to this le. See the avahi-daemon.conf(5) man page or documentation at http://www.avahi.org for more detailed information about the conguration options.
3.7.2.1
Serve Only via Required Protocol
The default setting in the conguration le allows Avahi to use both IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. If you are using only IPv4, edit /etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf and ensure the following line exists in the [server] section: use-ipv6=no Similarly, if you are using only IPv6, disable IPv4 sockets with the line: use-ipv4=no
CCE 4136-8, 4409-9
3.7.2.2
Check Responses TTL Field
Avahi can be set to ignore IP packets unless their TTL eld is 255. To make Avahi ignore packets unless the TTL eld is 255, edit /etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf and ensure the following line appears in the [server] section: check-response-ttl=yes
CCE 4426-3
This helps to ensure that only mDNS responses from the local network are processed, because the TTL eld in a packet is decremented from its initial value of 255 whenever it is routed from one network to another. Although a properly-congured router or rewall should not allow mDNS packets into the local network at all, this option provides another check to ensure they are not trusted.
3.7.2.3
Prevent Other Programs from Using Avahis Port
Avahi can stop other mDNS stacks from running on the host by preventing other processes from binding to port 5353. To prevent other mDNS stacks from running, edit /etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf and ensure the following line appears in the [server] section: disallow-other-stacks=yes
CCE 4193-9
This is designed to help ensure that only Avahi is responsible for mDNS trac coming from that port on the system.
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3.7.2.4
Disable Publishing if Possible
The default setting in the conguration le allows the avahi-daemon to send information about the local host, such as its address records and the services it oers, to the local network. To stop sending this information but still allow Avahi to query the network for services, ensure the conguration le includes the following line in the [publish] section: disable-publishing=yes
CCE 4444-6
This line may be particularly useful if Avahi is needed for printer discovery, but not to advertise services. This conguration is highly recommended for client systems that should not advertise their services (or existence).
3.7.2.5
Restrict Published Information
If it is necessary to publish some information to the network, it should not be joined by any extraneous information, or by information supplied by a non-trusted source on the system. Prevent user applications from using Avahi to publish services by adding or correcting the following line in the [publish] section: disable-user-service-publishing=yes Implement as many of the following lines as possible, to restrict the information published by Avahi: publish-addresses=no publish-hinfo=no publish-workstation=no publish-domain=no Inspect the les in the directory /etc/avahi/services/. Unless there is an operational need to publish information about each of these services, delete the corresponding le.
CCE 4352-1, 4433-9, 4451-1, 4341-4, 4358-8
These options should be used even if publishing is disabled entirely via disable-publishing, since that option prevents publishing attempts from succeeding, while these options prevent the attempts from being made in the rst place. Using both approaches is recommended for completeness.
3.8
Print Support
The Common Unix Printing System (CUPS) service provides both local and network printing support. A system running the CUPS service can accept print jobs from other systems, process them, and send them to the appropriate printer. It also provides an interface for remote administration through a web browser. The CUPS service is installed and activated by default. The project homepage and more detailed documentation are available at http://www.cups.org. The HP Linux Imaging and Printing service (HPLIP) is a separate package that provides support for some of the additional features that HP printers provide that CUPS may not necessarily support. It relies upon the CUPS service.
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3.8.1
Disable the CUPS Service if Possible
Do you need the ability to print from this machine or to allow others to print to it? If not: # chkconfig cups off
CCE 4112-9, 3755-6
3.8.2
Disable Firewall Access to Printing Service if Possible
Does this system need to operate as a network print server? If not, edit the les /etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). In each le, locate and delete the lines: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p udp -m udp --dport 631 -j ACCEPT -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 631 -j ACCEPT
CCE 3649-1
By default, inbound connections to the Internet Printing Protocol port are allowed. If the print server does not need to be accessed, either because the machine is not running the print service at all or because the machine is not providing a remote network printer to other machines, this exception should be removed from the rewall conguration. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about the Iptables rewall.
3.8.3
Congure the CUPS Service if Necessary
CUPS provides the ability to easily share local printers with other machines over the network. It does this by allowing machines to share lists of available printers. Additionally, each machine that runs the CUPS service can potentially act as a print server. Whenever possible, the printer sharing and print server capabilities of CUPS should be limited or disabled. The following recommendations should demonstrate how to do just that.
3.8.3.1
Limit Printer Browsing
By default, CUPS listens on the network for printer list broadcasts on UDP port 631. This functionality is called printer browsing.
3.8.3.1.1
Disable Printer Browsing Entirely if Possible
To disable printer browsing entirely, edit the CUPS conguration le, located at /etc/cups/cupsd.conf: Browsing Off BrowseAllow none
CCE 4420-6, 4407-3
The CUPS print service can be congured to broadcast a list of available printers to the network. Other machines on the network, also running the CUPS print service, can be congured to listen to these broadcasts and add and congure these printers for immediate use. By disabling this browsing capability, the machine will no longer generate or receive such broadcasts.
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3.8.3.1.2
Limit Printer Browsing to a Particular Subnet if Necessary
It is possible to disable outgoing printer list broadcasts without aecting incoming broadcasts from other machines. To do so, open the CUPS conguration le, located at /etc/cups/cupsd.conf. Look for the line that begins with BrowseAddress and remove it. The line will look like the following: BrowseAddress @LOCAL If the intent is not to block printer sharing, but to limit it to a particular set of machines, you can limit the UDP printer broadcasts to trusted network addresses. BrowseAddress ip-address :631 Likewise, to ignore incoming UDP printer list broadcasts, or to limit the set of machines to listen to, use the BrowseAllow and BrowseDeny directives. BrowseDeny all BrowseAllow ip-address This combination will deny incoming broadcasts from any machine except those that are explicitly allowed with BrowseAllow. By default, when printer sharing is enabled, CUPS will broadcast to every network that its host machine is connected to through all available network interfaces on port 631. It will also listen to incoming broadcasts from other machines on the network. Either list one BrowseAddress line for each client machine and one BrowseAllow line for each print server or use one of the supported shorthand notations that the CUPS service recognizes. Please see the cupsd.conf(5) man page or the documentation provided at http://www.cups.org for more information on other ways to format these directives.
3.8.3.2
Disable Print Server Capabilities if Possible

Disabling the print server capabilities in this manner will also disable the Web Administration interface.
To prevent remote users from potentially connecting to and using locally congured printers, disable the CUPS print server sharing capabilities. To do so, limit how the server will listen for print jobs by removing the more generic port directive from /etc/cups/cupsd.conf: Port 631 and replacing it with the Listen directive: Listen localhost:631 This will prevent remote users from printing to locally congured printers while still allowing local users on the machine to print normally.
By default, locally congured printers will not be shared over the network, but if this functionality has somehow been enabled, these recommendations will disable it again. Be sure to disable outgoing printer list broadcasts, or remote users will still be able to see the locally congured printers, even if they cannot actually print to them. To limit print serving to a particular set of users, use the Policy directive.
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3.8.3.3
Limit Access to the Web Administration Interface
By default, access to the CUPS web administration interface is limited to the local machine. It is recommended that this not be changed, especially since the authentication mechanisms that CUPS provides are limited in their eectiveness. If it is absolutely necessary to allow remote users to administer locally installed printers, be sure to limit that access as much as possible by taking advantage of the Location and Policy directive blocks. For example, to enable remote access for ip-address for user username , modify each of the Location and Policy directive blocks as follows: <Location /> AuthType Basic Require user username Order allow,deny Allow localhost Allow ip-address </Location> As with the BrowseAllow directive, use one Allow directive for each machine that needs access or use one of the available CUPS directive denition shortcuts to enable access from a class of machines at once. The Require user directive can take a list of individual users, a group of users (prexed with @), or the shorthand valid-user. Host-based authentication has known limitations, especially since IP addresses are easy to spoof. Requiring users to authenticate themselves can alleviate this problem, but it cannot eliminate it. Do not use the root account to manage and administer printers. Create a separate account for this purpose and limit access to valid users with Require valid-user or Require user printeradmin .
3.8.3.4
Take Further Security Measures When Appropriate
Whenever possible, limit outside networks access to port 631. Consider using CUPS directives that limit the number of incoming clients, such as MaxClients or MaxClientsPerHost. Additionally, there are a series of Policy and Location directives intended to limit which users can perform dierent printing tasks. When used together, these may help to mitigate the possibility of a denial of service attack. See cupsd.conf(5) for a full list of possible directives.
3.8.4
The HP Linux Imaging and Printing (HPLIP) Toolkit
The HPLIP package is an HP printing support utility that is installed and enabled in a default installation. The HPLIP package is comprised of two separate components. The rst is the main HPLIP service and the second is a smaller subcomponent called HPIJS. HPLIP is a feature-oriented network service that provides higher level printing support (such as bi-directional I/O, scanning, photo card, and toolbox functionality). HPIJS is a lower level basic printing driver that provides basic support for non-PostScript HP printers.
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3.8.4.1
Disable HPLIP Service if Possible
Since the HPIJS driver will still function without the added HPLIP service, HPLIP should be disabled unless the specic higher level functions that HPLIP provides are needed by a non-PostScript HP printer on the system. # chkconfig hplip off
CCE 4425-5
Note: If installing the HPLIP package from scratch, it should be noted that HPIJS can be installed directly without HPLIP. Please see the FAQ at the HPLIP web site at http://hplip.sourceforge.net/faqs.html for more information on how to do this.
3.9
DHCP
The Dynamic Host Conguration Protocol (DHCP) allows systems to request and obtain an IP address and many other parameters from a server. In general, sites use DHCP either to allow a large pool of mobile or unknown machines to share a limited number of IP addresses, or to standardize installations by avoiding static, individual IP address conguration on hosts. It is recommended that sites avoid DHCP as much as possible. Since DHCP authentication is not well-supported, DHCP clients are open to attacks from rogue DHCP servers. Such servers can give clients incorrect information (e.g. malicious DNS server addresses) which could lead to their compromise. If a machine must act as a DHCP client or server, congure it defensively using the guidance in this section. This guide recommends conguring networking on clients by manually editing the appropriate les under /etc/sysconfig. It is also possible to use the graphical front-end programs system-config-network and system-config-network-tui, but these programs rewrite conguration les from scratch based on their defaults destroying any manual changes and should therefore be used with caution.
3.9.1
Disable DHCP Client if Possible
For each interface IFACE on the system (e.g. eth0), edit /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg- IFACE and make the following changes: 1. Correct the BOOTPROTO line to read: BOOTPROTO=static 2. Add or correct the following lines, substituting the appropriate values based on your sites addressing scheme: NETMASK=255.255.255.0 IPADDR=192.168.1.2 GATEWAY=192.168.1.1
CCE 4191-3
DHCP is the default network conguration method provided by the system installer, so it may be enabled on many systems.
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3.9.2
Congure DHCP Client if Necessary
If DHCP must be used, then certain conguration changes can minimize the amount of information it receives and applies from the network, and thus the amount of incorrect information a rogue DHCP server could successfully distribute. For more information on conguring dhclient, see the dhclient(8) and dhclient.conf(5) man pages.
3.9.2.1
Minimize the DHCP-Congured Options
Create the le /etc/dhclient.conf, and add an appropriate setting for each of the ten conguration settings which can be obtained via DHCP. For each setting, setting , do one of the following:
If the setting should not be congured remotely by the DHCP server, select an appropriate static value, and add the line:
supersede setting value ;

If the setting should be congured remotely by the DHCP server, add the lines:
request setting ; require setting ; For example, suppose the DHCP server should provide only the IP address itself and the subnet mask. Then the entire le should look like: supersede supersede supersede supersede supersede supersede supersede domain-name "example.com "; domain-name-servers 192.168.1.2 ; nis-domain ""; nis-servers ""; ntp-servers "ntp.example.com "; routers 192.168.1.1 ; time-offset -18000 ;
request subnet-mask; require subnet-mask; By default, the DHCP client program, dhclient, requests and applies ten conguration options (in addition to the IP address) from the DHCP server: subnet-mask, broadcast-address, time-offset, routers, domain-name, domain-name-servers, host-name, nis-domain, nis-servers, and ntp-servers. Many of the options requested and applied by dhclient may be the same for every system on a network. It is recommended that almost all conguration options be assigned statically, and only options which must vary on a host-by-host basis be assigned via DHCP. This limits the damage which can be done by a rogue DHCP server. If appropriate for your site, it is also possible to supersede the host-name directive in /etc/dhclient.conf, establishing a static hostname for the machine. However, dhclient does not use the host name option provided by the DHCP server (instead using the value provided by a reverse DNS lookup). Note: In this example, the options nis-servers and nis-domain are set to empty strings, on the assumption that the deprecated NIS protocol is not in use. (See Section 3.2.4.) It is necessary to supersede settings for unused services so that they cannot be set by a hostile DHCP server. If an option is set to an empty string, dhclient will typically not attempt to congure the service.
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3.9.3
Disable DHCP Server if Possible
If the dhcp package has been installed on a machine which does not need to operate as a DHCP server, disable the daemon: # chkconfig dhcpd off If possible, remove the software as well: # yum erase dhcp
CCE 4336-4, 4464-4
The DHCP server dhcpd is not installed or activated by default. If the software was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a DHCP server, it should be disabled and removed. Unmanaged DHCP servers will provide faulty information to clients, interfering with the operation of a legitimate site DHCP server if there is one, or causing miscongured machines to exhibit unpredictable behavior if there is not.
3.9.4
Congure the DHCP Server if Necessary
If the system must act as a DHCP server, the conguration information it serves should be minimized. Also, support for other protocols and DNS-updating schemes should be explicitly disabled unless needed. The conguration le for dhcpd is called /etc/dhcpd.conf. The le begins with a number of global conguration options. The remainder of the le is divided into sections, one for each block of addresses oered by dhcpd, each of which contains conguration options specic to that address block.
3.9.4.1
Do Not Use Dynamic DNS
To prevent the DHCP server from receiving DNS information from clients, edit /etc/dhcpd.conf, and add or correct the following global option: ddns-update-style none;
CCE 4257-2
The Dynamic DNS protocol is used to remotely update the data served by a DNS server. DHCP servers can use Dynamic DNS to publish information about their clients. This setup carries security risks, and its use is not recommended. If Dynamic DNS must be used despite the risks it poses, it is critical that Dynamic DNS transactions be protected using TSIG or some other cryptographic authentication mechanism. See Section 3.14 for more information about DNS servers, including further information about TSIG and Dynamic DNS. Also see dhcpd.conf(5) for more information about protecting the DHCP server from passing along malicious DNS data from its clients. Note: The ddns-update-style option controls only whether the DHCP server will attempt to act as a Dynamic DNS client. As long as the DNS server itself is correctly congured to reject DDNS attempts, an incorrect ddns-update-style setting on the client is harmless (but should be xed as a best practice).
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3.9.4.2
Deny Decline Messages
Edit /etc/dhcpd.conf and add or correct the following global option to prevent the DHCP server from responding the DHCPDECLINE messages, if possible: deny declines;
CCE 4403-2
The DHCPDECLINE message can be sent by a DHCP client to indicate that it does not consider the lease oered by the server to be valid. By issuing many DHCPDECLINE messages, a malicious client can exhaust the DHCP servers pool of IP addresses, causing the DHCP server to forget old address allocations.
3.9.4.3
Deny BOOTP Queries
Unless your network needs to support older BOOTP clients, disable support for the bootp protocol by adding or correcting the global option: deny bootp;
CCE 4345-5
The bootp option tells dhcpd to respond to BOOTP queries. If support for this simpler protocol is not needed, it should be disabled to remove attack vectors against the DHCP server.
3.9.4.4
Minimize Served Information
Edit /etc/dhcpd.conf. Examine each address range section within the le, and ensure that the following options are not dened unless there is an operational need to provide this information via DHCP: option option option option option option option domain-name domain-name-servers nis-domain nis-servers ntp-servers routers time-offset
CCE 3724-2, 4243-2, 4389-3, 3913-1, 4169-9, 4318-2, 4319-0
Because the conguration information provided by the DHCP server could be maliciously provided to clients by a rogue DHCP server, the amount of information provided via DHCP should be minimized. Remove these denitions from the DHCP server conguration to ensure that legitimate clients do not unnecessarily rely on DHCP for this information. Note: By default, the RHEL5 client installation uses DHCP to request much of the above information from the DHCP server. In particular, domain-name, domain-name-servers, and routers are congured via DHCP. These settings are typically necessary for proper network functionality, but are also usually static across machines at a given site. See Section 3.9.2.1 for a description of how to congure static site information within the DHCP client conguration.
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3.9.4.5
Congure Logging
Ensure that the following line exists in /etc/syslog.conf: daemon.* /var/log/daemon.log
Congure logwatch or other log monitoring tools to summarize error conditions reported by the dhcpd process.
CCE 3733-3
By default, dhcpd logs notices to the daemon facility. Sending all daemon messages to a dedicated log le is part of the syslog conguration outlined in Section 2.6.1.1.1.
3.9.4.6
Further Resources
The man pages dhcpd.conf(5) and dhcpd(8) ISC web page http://isc.org/products/DHCP
3.10
Network Time Protocol
The Network Time Protocol is used to manage the system clock over a network. Computer clocks are not very accurate, so time will drift on unmanaged systems. Central time protocols can be used both to ensure that time is consistent among a network of machines, and that their time is consistent with the outside world. Local time synchronization is recommended for all networks. If every machine on your network reliably reports the same time as every other machine, then it is much easier to correlate log messages in case of an attack. In addition, a number of cryptographic protocols (such as Kerberos) use timestamps to prevent certain types of attacks. If your network does not have synchronized time, these protocols may be unreliable or even unusable. Depending on the specics of the network, global time accuracy may be just as important as local synchronization, or not very important at all. If your network is connected to the Internet, it is recommended that you make use of a public timeserver, since globally accurate timestamps may be necessary if you need to investigate or respond to an attack which originated outside of your network. Whether or not you use an outside timeserver, congure the network to have a small number of machines operating as NTP servers, and the remainder obtaining time information from those internal servers.
3.10.1
Select NTP Software
The Network Time Protocol (RFC 1305) is designed to synchronize time with a very high degree of accuracy even on an unreliable network. NTP is therefore a complex protocol. The Simple Network Time Protocol (RFC 4330) implements a subset of NTP which is intended to be good enough to meet the time requirements of most networks. The primary implementation of NTP comes from ntp.org, and is shipped with RHEL5 as the ntp RPM. An alternative is OpenNTPD, which is an implementation of SNTP, and which can be obtained as source code from http://www.openntpd.org. OpenNTPD may be simpler to congure than the reference NTP implementation, at the cost of the need to install and maintain third-party software.
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This guide does not recommend the use of a particular NTP/SNTP software package, but does recommend that some NTP software be selected and installed on all machines. The remainder of this section describes how to securely congure NTP clients and servers, and discusses both the reference NTP implementation and OpenNTPD.
3.10.2
Congure Reference NTP if Appropriate
The ntp RPM implements the reference NTP server.
3.10.2.1
Congure an NTP Client
There are a number of options for conguring clients to work with the reference NTP server. It is possible to run ntpd as a service (i.e., continuously) on each host, conguring clients so that the ntp protocol ignores all network access. This still introduces an additional network listener on client machines, and is therefore not recommended. This guide instead recommends running ntpd periodically via cron. It is also possible to run ntpdate via cron with the -u option, but it is being obsoleted in favor of ntpd. Alternately, even if the server is running the reference NTP implementation, it is possible for clients to access it using SNTP. See Section 3.10.3.2 for information about conguring SNTP clients.
3.10.2.1.1
Set Up Client NTP Conguration File
A valid conguration le for the client systems ntpd must exist at /etc/ntp.conf. Ensure that /etc/ntp. conf contains the following line, where ntp-server is the hostname or IP address of the site NTP server: server ntp-server Note: The ntpd software also includes authentication and encryption support which allows for clients to verify the identity of the server, and thus guarantee the integrity of time data with high probability. See ntpd documentation at http://www.ntp.org for more details on implementing this recommended feature.
3.10.2.1.2
Run ntpd using Cron
Create a le /etc/cron.d/ntpd containing the following crontab: 15 * * * * root /usr/sbin/ntpd -q -u ntp:ntp The -q option instructs ntpd to exit just after setting the clock, and the -u option instructs it to run as the specied user. Note: When setting the clock for the rst time, execute the above command with the -g option, as ntpd will refuse to set the clock if it is signicantly dierent from the source. This crontab will execute ntpd to synchronize the time to the NTP server at 15 minutes past every hour. (It is possible to choose a dierent minute, or to vary the minute between machines in order to avoid heavy trac to the NTP server.) Hourly synchronization should be suciently frequent that clock drift will not be noticeable.
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3.10.2.2
Congure an NTP Server
The sites NTP server contacts a central NTP server, probably either one provided by your ISP or a public time server, to obtain accurate time data. The server then allows other machines on your network to request the time data. The NTP server conguration le is located at /etc/ntp.conf.
3.10.2.2.1
Enable the NTP Daemon
If this machine is an NTP server, ensure that ntpd is enabled at boot time: # chkconfig ntpd on
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3.10.2.2.2
Deny All Access to ntpd by Default
Edit the le /etc/ntp.conf. Prepend or correct the following line: restrict default ignore
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Since ntpd is a complex software package which listens for network connections and runs as root, it must be protected from network access by unauthorized machines. This setting uses ntpds internal authorization to deny all access to any machine, server or client, which is not specically authorized by other policy settings.
3.10.2.2.3
Specify a Remote NTP Server for Time Data
Find the IP address, server-ip , of an appropriate remote NTP server. Edit the le /etc/ntp.conf, and add or correct the following lines: restrict server-ip mask 255.255.255.255 nomodify notrap noquery server server-ip
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If your site does not require time data to be accurate, but merely to be synchronized among local machines, this step can be omitted, and the NTP server will default to providing time data from the local clock. However, it is a good idea to periodically synchronize the clock to some source of accurate time, even if it is not appropriate to do so automatically. The previous step disabled all remote access to this NTP servers state data. This NTP server must contact a remote server to obtain accurate data, so NTPs conguration must allow that remote data to be used to modify the system clock. The restrict line changes the default access permissions for that remote server. The server line species the remote server as the preferred NTP server for time data. If you intend to synchronize to more than one server, specify restrict and server lines for each server. Note: It would be possible to specify a hostname, rather than an IP address, for the server eld. However, the restrict setting applies only to network blocks of IP addresses, so it is considered more maintainable to use the IP address in both elds.
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3.10.2.2.4
Allow Legitimate NTP Clients to Access the Server
Determine an appropriate network block, netwk , and network mask, mask , representing the machines on your network which will synchronize to this server. Edit /etc/ntp.conf and add the line: restrict netwk mask mask nomodify notrap Edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain:
-A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s netwk /mask -m state --state NEW -p udp --dport 123 -j ACCEPT
If the clients are spread across more than one netblock, separate restrict and ACCEPT lines should be added for each netblock. The iptables conguration is needed because the default iptables conguration does not allow inbound access to any services. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about iptables. Note: The reference NTP implementation will refuse to serve time data to clients until enough time has elapsed that the server hosts time can be assumed to have settled to an accurate value. While testing, wait ten minutes after starting ntpd before attempting to synchronize clients.
3.10.3
Congure OpenNTPD if Appropriate
OpenNTPD is an implementation of the SNTP protocol which is provided as a simple alternative to the reference NTP server. Advantages of OpenNTPD include simplicity of conguration and a smaller codebase, though it also lacks many of the management and other protocol features used by the reference NTP server. This simplicity comes at the cost of degraded time accuracy, but SNTP is probably accurate enough for most sites with typical monitoring requirements.
3.10.3.1
Obtain NTP Software
If your site intends to use the OpenNTPD implementation, it is necessary to compile and install the software. (If your site intends to use the reference NTP implementation, no installation is necessary.) 1. Obtain the software by downloading an appropriate source version, openntpd-version .tar.gz, from http://www.openntpd.org/portable.html. 2. Unpack the source code: $ tar xzf openntpd-version .tar.gz 3. Congure and compile the source. (By default, the code will be compiled for installation into /usr/ local): $ cd openntpd-version $ ./configure --with-privsep-user=ntp $ make 4. As root, install the resulting program into /usr/local: # make install
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129 The conguration option --with-privsep-user=ntp tells OpenNTPD to use the existing system account ntp for the non-root portion of its operation.
3.10.3.2
Congure an SNTP Client
OpenNTPD runs only in daemon mode there is no command line suitable to be run from cron. However, this is considered reasonably safe for client use because the daemon does not listen on any network ports by default, and because OpenNTPD is a small codebase with no remote management interface or other complex features. However, it is possible to run a time-stepping program, such as rdate(1), from cron instead of conguring the daemon as outlined in this section.
3.10.3.2.1
Edit the le /etc/rc.local. Add or correct the following line: /usr/local/sbin/ntpd -s

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3.10.3.2.2
Congure the Client NTP Daemon to Use the Local Server
Edit the le /usr/local/etc/ntpd.conf. Add or correct the following line: server local-server.example.com where local-server.example.com is the hostname of the sites local NTP or SNTP server.
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3.10.3.3
Congure an SNTP Server
The SNTP server obtains time data from a remote server, and then listens on a network interface for time queries from local machines.
3.10.3.3.1
Edit the le /etc/rc.local. Add or correct the following line: /usr/local/sbin/ntpd -s Since OpenNTPD is third-party software, it does not have a standard startup script, so the daemon is started at boot using the local facility.
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3.10.3.3.2
Listen for Client Connections
Edit the le /usr/local/etc/ntpd.conf. Add or correct the following line: listen on ipaddr where ipaddr is the primary IP address of this server. By default, ntpd does not listen for any connections over a network. Listening must be actively enabled on NTP servers so that clients may obtain time data.
3.10.3.3.3
Allow Legitimate NTP Clients to Access the Server
Determine an appropriate network block, netwk , and network mask, mask , representing the machines on your network which will synchronize to this server. Edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain:
-A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s netwk /mask -m state --state NEW -p udp --dport 123 -j ACCEPT
The iptables conguration is needed because the default iptables conguration does not allow inbound access to any services. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about iptables.
3.10.3.3.4
Specify a Remote NTP Server for Time Data
Find the hostname, server-host , of an appropriate remote NTP server. Edit the le /usr/local/etc/ ntpd.conf, and add or correct the following line: server server-host This setting congures ntpd to obtain time data from the remote host. To use multiple time servers, add one line for each server.
3.11
Mail Transfer Agent
Mail servers are used to send and receive mail over a network on behalf of site users. Mail is a very common service, and MTAs are frequent targets of network attack. Ensure that machines are not running MTAs unnecessarily, and congure needed MTAs as defensively as possible.
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3.11.1
Select Mail Server Software and Conguration
Follow one of the following options for conguring e-mail on the machine, depending on the systems role in the network:
131
If this machine does not need to operate as a mail server, follow the remaining instructions in this section to select either Sendmail or Postx and see Section 3.11.2 for information on how to ensure this software run only in a submission-only mode. MTA software must still be installed in order to ensure local mail delivery for services such as cron. If the machine must operate as a mail server, follow the remaining instructions in this section to select either Sendmail or Postx and then read the strategies for MTA conguration in Section 3.11.3 for information about conguration options. Then apply both the MTA-independent operating system conguration guidance in Section 3.11.4, and the specic guidance for your MTA in Section 3.11.6 or Section 3.11.5.
Very few machines at any site should be congured to receive mail over a network. However, it may be necessary for most machines at a given site to send e-mail, for instance so that cron jobs can report output to an administrator. Postx and Sendmail support a submission-only mode in which mail can be sent from the machine to a central site MTA (or directly delivered to a local account), but the machine cannot receive mail over a network. If a Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) is needed, the system default is Sendmail. Postx, which was written with security in mind, is also available and is preferred. Postx can be more eectively contained by SELinux as its modular design has resulted in separate processes performing specic actions. More information on these MTAs is available from their respective websites, http://www.sendmail.org and http://www.postfix.org. The alternatives system in RHEL will automatically take care of directing dependent software on the system to use either Postx or Sendmail if only one is installed. See its man page alternatives(8) for more information.
3.11.1.1
Select Postx as Mail Server Software
By default, systems are installed with Sendmail as the MTA software. To use Postx instead, run the following commands: # yum install postfix # yum erase sendmail Postx is preferred because it was designed with security in mind and can be more eectively contained by SELinux.
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Choosing Postx over Sendmail can also be achieved at system installation time via kickstart, by adding the following lines to the kickstart le in its %packages section: postfix -sendmail
3.11.1.2
Select Sendmail as Mail Server Software
By default, systems are installed with Sendmail as the MTA software and so no action is required if Sendmail must be used as the MTA, although Postx is recommended. If, however, Postx was installed in addition to Sendmail or in place of it, but there is a compelling need to use Sendmail, run the following commands: # yum install sendmail # yum erase postfix
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3.11.2
Congure SMTP For Mail Clients
This section discusses settings for Postx and Sendmail in a submission-only e-mail conguration.
3.11.2.1 3.11.2.1.1
Congure Postx for Submission-Only Mode Disable Listening on the Network
Edit the le /etc/postfix/main.cf. Ensure that only the following inet interfaces line appears: inet_interfaces = localhost
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This ensures that Postx will only accept mail messages from processes running on the local system, and not from the network.
3.11.2.2 3.11.2.2.1
Congure Sendmail for Submission-Only Mode Disable the Listening Sendmail Daemon
Edit the le /etc/sysconfig/sendmail. Add or modify the line: DAEMON=no

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The MTA performs two functions: listening over a network for incoming SMTP e-mail requests, and sending mail from the local machine. Since outbound mail may be delayed due to network outages or other problems, the outbound MTA runs in a queue-only mode, in which it periodically attempts to resend any delayed mail. Setting DAEMON=no tells sendmail to execute only the queue runner on this machine, and never to receive SMTP mail requests.
3.11.2.2.2
Congure Mail Submission if Appropriate
If it is appropriate to congure mail submission with a central MTA, edit /etc/mail/submit.cf. Locate the line beginning with D{MTAHost}, and modify it to read: D{MTAHost}mailserver where mailserver is the hostname of the server to which this machine should forward its outgoing mail. This suggestion is provided as a simple way to migrate away from a conguration in which each machine at a site runs its own MTA, to a conguration in which client machines do not run listening daemons. If this modication is made to /etc/mail/submit.cf, then, when a local process on a machine attempts to send mail, the message will be forwarded to the machine mailserver for processing. Modifying /etc/mail/submit.cf directly is only appropriate if your site does not perform any other mailserver customization on clients. If other customization is done, use your usual Sendmail change procedure to dene the MTA host.
133 Note: In addition to making this change on the client, it may also be necessary to recongure the MTA on mailserver so that it will relay mail on behalf of this host.
3.11.3
Strategies for MTA Security
This section discusses several types of MTA conguration which should be performed in order to protect against attacks involving the mail system. Though conguration syntax will dier depending on which MTA is in use (see Section 3.11.5 for Sendmail conguration syntax and Section 3.11.6 for Postx), these strategies are generally advisable for any MTA, including ones not covered by this guide.
3.11.3.1
Use Resource Limits to Mitigate Denial of Service
It is often desirable to constrain an attackers ability to consume a mail servers resources simply by sending otherwise valid mail at a high rate, whether maliciously or accidentally. Relevant resource limits include constraints on: the number of MTA daemons which may run at one time, the rate at which incoming messages may be received, the size and complexity of each message, or the amount of mail queue space which must remain free in order for mail to be delivered. That last parameter deserves additional explanation. Most MTAs require queue space for temporary les in order to process existing messages in their queues. Therefore, if the queue lesystem is allowed to ll completely in a denial of service, the MTA will not be able to clear its own queue even when the malicious trac has stopped. This will delay recovery from an attack.
3.11.3.2
Congure SMTP Greeting Banner
When remote mail senders connect to the MTA on port 25, they are greeted by an initial banner as part of the SMTP dialogue. This banner is necessary, but it frequently gives away too much information, including the MTA software which is in use, and sometimes also its version number. Remote mail senders do not need this information in order to send mail, so the banner should be changed to reveal only the hostname (which is already known and may be useful) and the word ESMTP, to indicate that the modern SMTP protocol variant is supported.
3.11.3.3
Control Mail Relaying
The sending of Unsolicited Bulk E-mail, referred to variously as UBE, UCE, or spam, is a major problem on the Internet today. The security implications of spam are that it operates as a Denial of Service attack on legitimate e-mail use. Strategies for ghting spam receipt at your site are complex and quickly evolving, and thus far beyond the scope of this guide. The problem of relaying unauthorized e-mail, however, can and should be addressed by any network-connected site. Most MTAs perform two functions: to accept mail from remote sites on behalf of local users, and to allow local users to send mail to remote sites. The former function is relatively easy mail whose recipient address is local can be assumed to be destined for a local user. The latter function is more complex. Since it is typically considered neither secure nor desirable for users to log in to the MTA host itself to send mail, the MTA must be able to remotely accept mail addressed to anyone from the users workstation. If the MTA is running very old software or is congured poorly, it can be possible for attackers to take advantage of this feature, using your MTA to relay their spam from one remote site to another. This is undesirable for many reasons, not least that your site will quickly be blacklisted as a spam source, leaving you unable to send legitimate e-mail to your correspondents.
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The simplest solution described in this guide is to congure the MTA to relay mail only from the local sites address range, and some variant on this is the default for most modern MTAs. That solution may be insucient for sites whose users need to send mail from remote machines, for instance while travelling, as well as for sites where mail submission must be accepted from network ranges which are not considered secure, either because authorized machines are unmanaged or because it is possible to connect unauthorized machines to the network. If remote or mobile hosts are authorized to relay, or if local clients exist in insecure netblocks, the SMTP AUTH protocol should be used to require mail senders to authenticate before submitting messages. For better protection and to allow support for a wide range of authentication mechanisms without sending passwords over a network in clear text, SMTP AUTH transactions should be encrypted using SSL. Another approach is to require mail to be submitted on port 587, the designated Message Submission Port. Use of a separate port allows the mail relay function to be entirely separated from the mail delivery function. This may become a best practice in the future, but description of how to congure the Message Submission Port is currently beyond the scope of this guide. See RFC 2476 for information about this conguration.
3.11.4
Congure Operating System to Protect Mail Server
The guidance in this section is appropriate for any host which is operating as a site MTA, whether the mail server runs using Sendmail, Postx, or some other software.
3.11.4.1
Use Separate Hosts for External and Internal Mail if Possible
The mail server is a frequent target of network attack from the outside. However, since all site users receive mail, the mail server must be open to some connection from each inside users. It is strongly recommended that these functions be separated, by having an externally visible mail server which processes all incoming and outgoing mail, then forwards internal mail to a separate machine from which users can access it.
3.11.4.2
Protect the MTA Host from User Access
The mail server contains privileged data belonging to all users and performs a vital network function. Preventing users from logging into this server is a precaution against privilege escalation or denial of service attacks which might compromise the mail service. Take steps to ensure that only system administrators are allowed shell access to the MTA host.
3.11.4.3
Restrict Remote Access to the Mail Spool
If users directly connect to this machine to receive mail, ensure that there is a single, well-secured mechanism for access to the directory /var/spool/mail (the directory /var/mail is a symlink to this). Allowing unrestricted access to /var/spool/mail can be dangerous, since this directory contains sensitive information belonging to all users. Protocols such as NFS, which have an insecure authorization mechanism by default, should be considered insucient for these purposes. See Section 3.17 for details on secure conguration of POP3 or IMAP, which are the preferred ways to provide user access to mail.
135
3.11.4.4
Congure iptables to Allow Access to the Mail Server
Edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 25 -j ACCEPT The default Iptables conguration does not allow inbound access to the SMTP service. This modication allows that access, while keeping other ports on the server in their default protected state. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about Iptables.
3.11.4.5
Verify System Logging and Log Permissions for Mail
Edit the le /etc/syslog.conf. Add or correct the following line if necessary (this is the default): mail.* -/var/log/maillog
Run the following commands to ensure correct permissions on the mail log: # chown root:root /var/log/maillog # chmod 600 /var/log/maillog The mail server logs contain a record of every e-mail which is sent or received on the system, which is considered sensitive information by most sites. It is necessary that these logs be collected for purposes of debugging and statistics, but their contents should be protected from unauthorized access.
3.11.4.6
Congure SSL Certicates for Use with SMTP AUTH
If SMTP AUTH is to be used (see Section 3.11.3.3 for a description of possible anti-relaying mechanisms), the use of SSL to protect credentials in transit is strongly recommended. There are also congurations for which it may be desirable to encrypt all mail in transit from one MTA to another, though such congurations are beyond the scope of this guide. In either event, the steps for creating and installing an SSL certicate are independent of the MTA in use, and are described here.
3.11.4.6.1
Create an SSL Certicate
Note: This step must be performed on your CA system, not on the MTA host itself. If you will have a commercial CA sign certicates, then this step should be performed on a separate, physically secure system devoted to that purpose. Change into the CA certicate directory: # cd /etc/pki/tls/certs Generate a key pair for the mail server: # openssl genrsa -out mailserverkey.pem 2048 Next, generate a certicate signing request (CSR) for the CA to sign, making sure to supply your mail servers fully qualied domain name as the Common Name:
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# openssl req -new -key mailserverkey.pem -out mailserver.csr Next, the mail server CSR must be signed to create the mail server certicate. You can either send the CSR to an established CA or sign it with your CA. To sign mailserver.csr using your CA: # openssl ca -in mailserver.csr -out mailservercert.pem This step creates a private key, mailserverkey.pem, and a public certicate, mailservercert.pem. The mail server will use these to prove its identity by demonstrating that it has a certicate which has been signed by a CA. Mail clients at your site should be willing to send their mail only to a server they can authenticate.
3.11.4.6.2
Install the SSL Certicate
Create the PKI directory for mail certicates, if it does not already exist: # mkdir /etc/pki/tls/mail # chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/mail # chmod 755 /etc/pki/tls/mail Using removable media or some other secure transmission format, install the les generated in the previous step onto the mail server:
/etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem: the private key mailserverkey.pem /etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem: the certicate le mailservercert.pem
Verify the ownership and permissions of these les: # # # # chown chown chmod chmod root:root /etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem root:root /etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem 600 /etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem 644 /etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem
Verify that the CAs public certicate le has been installed as /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem, and has the correct permissions: # chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem # chmod 644 /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem
3.11.5
Congure Sendmail Server if Necessary
When sendmail is congured to act as a server for incoming mail, it listens on port 25 for connections, and responds to those connections using the conguration in /etc/mail/sendmail.cf. This le has a somewhat opaque format, and modifying it directly is generally not recommended. Instead, the following procedure should be used to modify the sendmail conguration: 1. Install the sendmail-cf RPM, which is required in order to compile a new conguration le: # yum install sendmail-cf 2. Edit the M4 source le /etc/mail/sendmail.mc as directed by the conguration step you are applying.
137 3. Inside the directory /etc/mail/, use make to build the conguration according to the Makele provided by Sendmail: # cd /etc/mail # make sendmail.cf
3.11.5.1
Limit Denial of Service Attacks
Edit /etc/mail/sendmail.mc, and add or correct the following options: define(`confMAX_DAEMON_CHILDREN',`40 ')dnl define(`confCONNECTION_RATE_THROTTLE', `3 ')dnl define(`confMIN_FREE_BLOCKS',`20971520 ')dnl define(`confMAX_HEADERS_LENGTH',`51200 ')dnl define(`confMAX_MESSAGE_SIZE',`10485760 ')dnl define(`confMAX_RCPTS_PER_MESSAGE',`100 ')dnl Note: The values given here are examples, and may need to be modied for any particular site, especially one with high e-mail volume. These conguration options serve to make it more dicult for attackers to consume resources on the MTA host. (See Section 3.11.3.1 for details on why this is done.) The MAX DAEMON CHILDREN option limits the number of sendmail processes which may be deployed to handle incoming connections at any one time, while CONNECTION RATE THROTTLE limits the number of connections per second which each listener may receive. The MIN FREE BLOCKS option stops e-mail receipt when the queue lesystem is close to full. The MAX HEADERS LENGTH (bytes), MAX MESSAGE SIZE (bytes), and MAX RCPTS PER MESSAGE (distinct recipients) options place bounds on the legal sizes of messages received via SMTP.
3.11.5.2
Edit /etc/mail/sendmail.mc, and add or correct the following line, substituting an appropriate greeting string for $j : define(`confSMTP_LOGIN_MSG', `$j ')dnl and recompile sendmail's configuration. The default greeting banner discloses that the listening mail process is Sendmail rather than some other MTA, and also provides the version number. See Section 2.3.7 for more about warning banners, and Section 3.11.3.2 for strategies regarding SMTP greeting banners in particular. The Sendmail variable $j contains the hostname of the mail server, which may be an appropriate greeting string for most environments.
3.11.5.3
This guide will discuss two mechanisms for controlling mail relaying in Sendmail. The /etc/mail/relay-domains le contains a list of hostnames that are allowed to relay mail. Follow the guidance in Section 3.11.5.3.1 to congure relaying for trusted machines. If there are machines which must be allowed to relay mail, but which cannot be trusted to relay unconditionally, congure SMTP AUTH with TLS support using the guidance in Sections 3.11.5.3.2 and following.
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3.11.5.3.1
Congure Trusted Networks and Hosts
If all machines which share a common domain or subdomain name may relay, then edit /etc/mail/ relay-domains, adding a line for each domain or subdomain, e.g.:
example.com trusted-subnet.school.edu ...

If the machines which are allowed to relay must be specied on a per-host basis, then edit /etc/mail/ relay-domains, adding a line for each such host:
host1.example.com host5.subnet.example.com smtp.trusted-subnet.school.edu Then edit /etc/mail/sendmail.mc, add or correct the line: FEATURE(`relay_hosts_only')dnl and recompile sendmails conguration. The le /etc/mail/relay-domains must contain only the set of machines for which this MTA should unconditionally relay mail. This congures both inbound and outbound relaying, that is, hosts mentioned in relay-domains may send mail through the MTA, and the MTA will also accept inbound mail addressed to such hosts. This is a trust relationship if spammers gain access to these machines, your site will eectively become an open relay. It is recommended that only machines which are managed by you or by another trusted organization be placed in relay-domains, and that users of all other machines be required to use SMTP AUTH to send mail. Note: The relay-domains le must be congured to contain either a list of domains (in which case every host in each of those domains will be allowed to relay) or a list of hosts (in which case each individual relaying host must be listed and the sendmail.cf must be recongured to interpret the relay-domains le in the desired way).
3.11.5.3.2
Require SMTP AUTH Before Relaying from Untrusted Clients
By default, Sendmail uses the Cyrus-SASL library to provide authentication. To enable the use of SASL authentication for relaying, edit /etc/mail/sendmail.mc and add or correct the following settings: TRUST_AUTH_MECH(`LOGIN PLAIN') define(`confAUTH_MECHANISMS', `LOGIN PLAIN') and recompile sendmail.cf. Then edit /usr/lib/sasl2/Sendmail.conf and add or correct the following lines: pwcheck_method: saslauthd Enable the saslauthd daemon: # chkconfig saslauthd on The AUTH MECHANISMS conguration option tells sendmail to allow the specied authentication mechanisms to
139 be used during the SMTP dialogue. The two listed mechanisms use SASL to test a password provided by the user. Since these mechanisms transmit plaintext passwords, they should be protected using TLS as described in the next section. The TRUST AUTH MECH command tells sendmail that senders who successfully authenticate using the specied mechanism may relay mail through this MTA even if their addresses are not in relay-domains. The le /usr/lib/sasl/Sendmail.conf is the Cyrus-SASL conguration le for Sendmail. The pwcheck method directive tells SASL how to nd passwords. The simplest method, described here, is to run a separate authentication daemon, saslauthd, which is able to communicate with the system authentication service. On Red Hat, saslauthd uses PAM by default, which should work in most cases. If you have a centralized authentication system which does not work via PAM, look at the saslauthd(8) manpage to determine how to congure saslauthd for your environment.
3.11.5.3.3
Require TLS for SMTP AUTH
Edit /etc/mail/sendmail.mc, add or correct the following lines: define(`confAUTH_OPTIONS', `A p')dnl define(`confCACERT_PATH', `/etc/pki/tls/CA')dnl define(`confCACERT', `/etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem')dnl define(`confSERVER_CERT', `/etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem')dnl define(`confSERVER_KEY', `/etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem')dnl and recompile sendmail.cf. These options, combined with the previous settings, tell Sendmail to protect all SMTP AUTH transactions using TLS. The rst four options describe the location of the necessary TLS certicate and key les. The AUTH OPTIONS parameter congures the SMTP AUTH dialogue. The A option is enabled by default, and simply says that authentication is allowed if an appropriate mechanism can be found. The p option tells Sendmail to protect against passive attacks. The PLAIN and LOGIN authentication mechanisms, recommended by this guide for compatibility with PAM, send passwords in the clear. (Cleartext password transmissions are vulnerable to passive attack.) Therefore, if p is set, the SMTP daemon will not make the AUTH command available until after the client has used the STARTTLS command to encrypt the session. If other authentication mechanisms were enabled which did not send passwords in the clear, then TLS would not necessarily be required.
3.11.6
Congure Postx if Necessary
Postx stores its conguration les in the directory /etc/postfix by default. The primary conguration le is /etc/postfix/main.cf. Other les will be introduced as needed.
3.11.6.1
Limit Denial of Service Attacks
Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf. Add or correct the following lines: default_process_limit = 100 smtpd_client_connection_count_limit = 10 smtpd_client_connection_rate_limit = 30 queue_minfree = 20971520
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header_size_limit = 51200 message_size_limit = 10485760 smtpd_recipient_limit = 100 Note: The values given here are examples, and may need to be modied for any particular site. By default, the Postx anvil process gathers mail receipt statistics. To get information about about what connection rates are typical at your site, look in /var/log/maillog for lines with the daemon name postfix/anvil. These conguration options serve to make it more dicult for attackers to consume resources on the MTA host. (See Section 3.11.3.1 for details on why this is done.) The default process limit parameter controls how many smtpd processes can exist at a time, while smtpd client connection count limit controls the number of those which can be occupied by any one remote sender, and smtpd client connection rate limit controls the number of connections any one client can make per minute. By default, local hosts (those in mynetworks) are exempted from per-client rate limiting. The queue minfree parameter establishes a free space threshold, in order to stop e-mail receipt before the queue lesystem is entirely full. The header size limit, message size limit, and smtpd recipient limit parameters place bounds on the legal sizes of messages received via SMTP.
3.11.6.2
Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf, and add or correct the following line, substituting some other wording for the banner information if you prefer: smtpd_banner = $myhostname ESMTP The default greeting banner discloses that the listening mail process is Postx. See Section 2.3.7 for more about warning banners, and Section 3.11.3.2 for strategies regarding SMTP greeting banners in particular.
3.11.6.3
Postxs mail relay controls are implemented with the help of the smtpd recipient restrictions option, which controls the restrictions placed on the SMTP dialogue once the sender and recipient envelope addresses are known. The guidance in Sections 3.11.6.3.13.11.6.3.2 should be applied to all machines. If there are machines which must be allowed to relay mail, but which cannot be trusted to relay unconditionally, congure SMTP AUTH with SSL support using the guidance in Sections 3.11.6.3.3 and following.
3.11.6.3.1
Congure Trusted Networks and Hosts
Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf, and congure the contents of the mynetworks variable in one of the following ways:
If any machine in the subnet containing the MTA may be trusted to relay messages, add or correct the line:
mynetworks_style = subnet
If only the MTA host itself is trusted to relay messages, add or correct:
141
mynetworks_style = host
If the set of machines which can relay is more complicated, manually specify an entry for each netblock or IP address which is trusted to relay by setting the mynetworks variable directly:
mynetworks = 10.0.0.0/16 , 192.168.1.0/24 , 127.0.0.1 The mynetworks variable must contain only the set of machines for which this MTA should unconditionally relay mail. This is a trust relationship if spammers gain access to these machines, your site will eectively become an open relay. It is recommended that only machines which are managed by you or by another trusted organization be placed in mynetworks, and users of all other machines be required to use SMTP AUTH to send mail.
3.11.6.3.2
Allow Unlimited Relaying for Trusted Networks Only
Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf, and add or correct the smtpd recipient restrictions denition so that it contains at least: smtpd_recipient_restrictions = ... permit_mynetworks, reject_unauth_destination, ... The full contents of smtpd recipient restrictions will vary by site, since this is a common place to put spam restrictions and other site-specic options. The permit mynetworks option allows all mail to be relayed from the machines in mynetworks. Then, the reject unauth destination option denies all mail whose destination address is not local, preventing any other machines from relaying. These two options should always appear in this order, and should usually follow one another immediately unless SMTP AUTH is used.
3.11.6.3.3
Require SMTP AUTH Before Relaying from Untrusted Clients
SMTP authentication allows remote clients to relay mail safely by requiring them to authenticate before submitting mail. Postxs SMTP AUTH uses an authentication library called SASL, which is not part of Postx itself. This section describes how to congure authentication using the Cyrus-SASL implementation. See below for a discussion of other options. To enable the use of SASL authentication, edit /etc/postfix/main.cf and add or correct the following settings: smtpd_sasl_auth_enable = yes smtpd_recipient_restrictions = ... permit_mynetworks, permit_sasl_authenticated, reject_unauth_destination, ... Then edit /usr/lib/sasl/smtpd.conf and add or correct the following line with the correct authentication mechanism for SASL to use:
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pwcheck_method: saslauthd Enable the saslauthd daemon: # chkconfig saslauthd on Postx can use either the Cyrus library or Dovecot as a source for SASL authentication. If this host is running Dovecot for some other reason, it is recommended that Dovecots SASL support be used instead of running the Cyrus code as well. See http://www.postfix.org/SASL_README.html for instructions on implementing that conguration, which is not described in this guide. In Postxs conguration, the directive smtpd sasl auth enable tells smtpd to allow the use of the SMTP AUTH command during the SMTP dialogue, and to support that command by getting authentication information from SASL. The smtpd recipient restrictions directive is changed so that, if the client is not connecting from a trusted address, it is allowed to attempt authentication (permit sasl authenticated) in order to relay mail. The le /usr/lib/sasl/smtpd.conf is the Cyrus-SASL conguration le. The pwcheck method directive tells SASL how to nd passwords. The simplest method, described above, is to run a separate authentication daemon, saslauthd, which is able to communicate with the system authentication system. On RHEL5, saslauthd uses PAM by default, which should work in most cases. If you have a centralized authentication system which does not work via PAM, look at the saslauthd(8) manpage to nd out how to congure saslauthd for your environment.
3.11.6.4
Require TLS for SMTP AUTH
Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf, and add or correct the following lines: smtpd_tls_CApath = /etc/pki/tls/CA smtpd_tls_CAfile = /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem smtpd_tls_cert_file = /etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem smtpd_tls_key_file = /etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem smtpd_tls_security_level = may smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes These options tell Postx to protect all SMTP AUTH transactions using TLS. The rst four options describe the locations of the necessary TLS key les. The smtpd tls security level directive tells smtpd to allow the STARTTLS command during the SMTP protocol exchange, but not to require it for mail senders. (Unless your site receives mail only from other trusted sites whose sysadmins can be asked to maintain a copy of your site certicate, you do not want to require TLS for all SMTP exchanges.) The smtpd tls auth only directive tells smtpd to require the STARTTLS command before allowing the client to attempt to authenticate for relaying using SMTP AUTH. It may not be possible to use this directive if you must allow relaying from non-TLS-capable client software. If this is the case, simply omit that line.
3.12
LDAP
LDAP is a popular directory service, that is, a standardized way of looking up information from a central database. It is relatively simple to congure a RHEL5 machine to obtain authentication information from an LDAP server. If your network uses LDAP for authentication, be sure to congure both clients and servers securely.
143
3.12.1
Use OpenLDAP to Provide LDAP Service if Possible
The systems default LDAP client/server program is called OpenLDAP. Its documentation is available at the project web page: http://www.openldap.org.
3.12.2
Congure OpenLDAP Clients

Before conguring any machine to be an LDAP client, ensure that a working LDAP server is present on the network. See Section 3.12.3 for instructions on conguring an LDAP server.
This guide recommends conguring OpenLDAP clients by manually editing the appropriate conguration les. RHEL5 provides an automated conguration tool called authconfig and a graphical wrapper for authconfig called system-config-authentication. However, these tools do not give sucient exibility over conguration. The authconfig tools do not allow you to specify locations of SSL certicate les, which is useful when trying to use SSL cleanly across several protocols. They are also overly aggressive in placing services such as netgroups and automounter maps under LDAP control, where it is safer to use LDAP only for services to which it is relevant in your environment.
3.12.2.1
Congure the Appropriate LDAP Parameters for the Domain
Assume the fully qualied host name of your LDAP server is ldap.example.com and the base DN of your domain is dc=example,dc=com (it is conventional to use the domain name as a base DN). Edit /etc/ldap. conf, and add or correct the following lines: base dc=example,dc=com uri ldap://ldap.example.com / Then edit /etc/openldap/ldap.conf, and add or correct the following lines: BASE dc=example,dc=com URI ldap://ldap.example.com / The machine whose hostname is given here must be congured as an LDAP server, serving data identied by the base DN used here. See Section 3.12.3 for details on conguring an LDAP server.
3.12.2.2
Congure LDAP to Use TLS for All Transactions
1. Ensure a copy of the sites CA certicate has been placed in the le /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem. 2. Congure LDAP to enforce TLS use and to trust certicates signed by the sites CA. First, edit the le /etc/ldap.conf, and add or correct the following lines: ssl start_tls tls_checkpeer yes tls_cacertdir /etc/pki/tls/CA tls_cacertfile /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem Then edit /etc/openldap/ldap.conf, and add or correct the following lines:
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TLS_CACERTDIR /etc/pki/tls/CA TLS_CACERT /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem

CCE 14894-0
Section 2.5.6 describes the system-wide conguration of SSL for your enterprise. It is possible to place your certicate information under some directory other than /etc/pki/tls, but using a consistent directory structure across all SSL services at your site is recommended. The LDAP server must be congured with a certicate signed by the CA certicate named here.
3.12.2.3
Congure Authentication Services to Use OpenLDAP
Edit the le /etc/ldap.conf, and add or correct the following lines: pam_password md5 Edit the le /etc/nsswitch.conf, and add or correct the following lines: passwd: files ldap shadow: files ldap group: files ldap Edit the le /etc/pam.d/system-auth-ac. Make the following changes, which will add references to LDAP in each of the four sections of the le:
Immediately before the last line in the auth section (the one containing pam deny.so), insert the line:
auth
sufficient
pam_ldap.so use_first_pass
Modify the rst line in the account section by adding the option broken shadow. The line should then read:
account
required
pam_unix.so broken_shadow
Immediately before the last line in the account section (the one containing pam permit.so), insert the line:
account
[default=bad success=ok user_unknown=ignore] pam_ldap.so
Immediately before the last line in the password section (the one containing pam deny.so), insert the line:
password
sufficient
pam_ldap.so use_authtok
At the end of the le (after the last line in the session section), append the line:
session
optional
pam_ldap.so
The rst modication tells LDAP to expect passwords in MD5 hash format, rather than clear text. Red Hat systems use the le /etc/nsswitch.conf to determine the appropriate sources to search for certain kinds of data, such as usernames, groups, hostnames, netgroups, or protocols. It is possible to manage many other types of data using LDAP, but this guide recommends that only usernames (passwd data), passwords (shadow data), and groups (group data) be managed using LDAP. If your site uses netgroups, it may be appropriate to manage these via LDAP as well. However, data which almost never changes, such as the contents of the /etc/services le, is a poor choice for
145 central administration, since it introduces risk with little benet. It is recommended that the automounter not be used at all, so LDAP control of automounter maps is unlikely to be appropriate. The le /etc/pam.d/system-auth-ac is used by PAM to control access to most authenticated services. The syntax of the PAM conguration le is somewhat cryptic. The lines recommended here have the combined eect of using LDAP to nd authentication data for users who cannot be found in the local /etc/passwd le. This means that, for instance, it is still possible to use a local root password. The details of options such as broken shadow, use authtok, and use first pass may be looked up in the man pages for the various PAM modules. Their basic eect is to attempt to authenticate given a password against both the local /etc/shadow and the central LDAP server, without forcing the user to type the password more than once. PAM conguration is discussed further in Section 2.3.3.
3.12.3
Congure OpenLDAP Server
This section contains guidance on how to congure an OpenLDAP server to securely provide information for use in a centralized authentication service. This is not a comprehensive guide to maintaining an OpenLDAP server, but may be helpful in transitioning to an OpenLDAP infrastructure nonetheless.
3.12.3.1
Install OpenLDAP Server RPM
Is this machine the OpenLDAP server? If so: # yum install openldap-servers # chkconfig ldap on
CCE 3501-4
The openldap-servers RPM is not installed by default on RHEL5 machines. It is needed only by the OpenLDAP server, not by the clients which use LDAP for authentication.
3.12.3.2
Congure Domain-Specic Parameters
Edit the le /etc/openldap/slapd.conf. Add or correct the following lines: suffix "dc=example,dc=com " rootdn "cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com " where dc=example,dc=com is the same root you will use on the LDAP clients. These are basic LDAP conguration directives. The suffix parameter gives the root name of all information served by this LDAP server, and should be some name related to your domain. The rootdn parameter names LDAPs privileged user, who is allowed to read or write all data managed by this LDAP server.
3.12.3.3
Congure an LDAP Root Password
Ensure that the conguration le has reasonable permissions before putting the hashed root password in that le:
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CHAPTER 3. SERVICES
# chown root:ldap /etc/openldap/slapd.conf # chmod 640 /etc/openldap/slapd.conf Generate a hashed password using the slappasswd utility: # slappasswd New password: Re-enter new password: This will output a hashed password string. Edit the le /etc/openldap/slapd.conf, and add or correct the line: rootpw {SSHA}hashed-password-string
Be sure to select a secure password for the LDAP root user, since this user has permission to read and write all LDAP data, so a compromise of the LDAP root password will probably enable a full compromise of your site. Protect conguration les containing the hashed password the same way you would protect other les, such as /etc/shadow, which contain hashed authentication data. In addition, be sure to use a reasonably strong hash function, such as SHA-1,1 rather than an insecure scheme such as crypt.
3.12.3.4
Congure the LDAP Server to Require TLS for All Transactions
Because LDAP queries and responses, particularly those containing authentication information or other sensitive data, must be protected from disclosure or modication while in transit over the network, this guide recommends using SSL to protect all transactions. In order to do this, it is necessary to have a site-wide SSL infrastructure in which a CA certicate is used to verify that other certicates, such as that presented by the LDAP server to its clients, are authentic. Therefore, this procedure involves using the CA system to create a certicate for the LDAP server, then installing that certicate on the LDAP server and conguring slapd to require its use. See Section 2.5.6 for details about the process of creating SSL certicates for use by servers at your site.
3.12.3.4.1
Create the Certicate for the LDAP Server
Note: This step must be performed on the CA system, not on the LDAP server itself. Change into the CA certicate directory: # cd /etc/pki/tls/certs Generate a key pair for the LDAP server: # openssl genrsa -out ldapserverkey.pem 2048 Next, generate a certicate signing request (CSR) for the CA to sign: # openssl req -new -key ldapserverkey.pem -out ldapserver.csr Sign the ldapserver.csr request: # openssl ca -in ldapserver.csr -out ldapservercert.pem
1 If
you are using SHA-1, the hashed password string will begin with {SHA} or {SSHA}.
147 This step creates a private key, ldapserverkey.pem, and a public certicate, ldapservercert.pem. The LDAP server will use these to prove its identity by demonstrating that it has a certicate which has been signed by the site CA. LDAP clients at your site should only be willing to accept authentication data from a veried LDAP server.
3.12.3.4.2
Install the Certicate on the LDAP Server
Create the PKI directory for LDAP certicates if it does not already exist: # mkdir /etc/pki/tls/ldap # chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/ldap # chmod 755 /etc/pki/tls/ldap Using removable media or some other secure transmission format, install the les generated in the previous step onto the LDAP server:
/etc/pki/tls/ldap/serverkey.pem: the private key ldapserverkey.pem /etc/pki/tls/ldap/servercert.pem: the certicate le ldapservercert.pem
Verify the ownership and permissions of these les: # # # # chown chown chmod chmod root:ldap /etc/pki/tls/ldap/serverkey.pem root:ldap /etc/pki/tls/ldap/servercert.pem 640 /etc/pki/tls/ldap/serverkey.pem 640 /etc/pki/tls/ldap/servercert.pem
Verify that the CAs public certicate le has been installed as /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem, and has the correct permissions: # mkdir /etc/pki/tls/CA # chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem # chmod 644 /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem
CCE 4360-4, 4378-6, 4492-5, 4263-0, 3502-2, 4449-5, 4361-2, 4427-1, 4321-6, 4339-8, 4105-3, 3718-4
As a result of these steps, the LDAP server will have access to its own private certicate and the key with which that certicate is encrypted, and to the public certicate le belonging to the CA. Note that it would be possible for the key to be protected further, so that processes running as ldap could not read it. If this were done, the LDAP server process would need to be restarted manually whenever the server rebooted.
3.12.3.4.3
Congure slapd to Use the Certicates
Edit the le /etc/openldap/slapd.conf. Add or correct the following lines: TLSCACertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem TLSCertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/ldap/servercert.pem TLSCertificateKeyFile /etc/pki/tls/ldap/serverkey.pem security simple_bind=128 The rst set of lines tell slapd where to nd the appropriate SSL certicates to present to clients when they request an encrypted transaction. The last setting tells slapd never to allow clients to present credentials (i.e.
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CHAPTER 3. SERVICES
passwords) in an unencrypted session. It is a good security principle never to allow unencrypted passwords to traverse a network, so ensure that LDAP mandates this.
3.12.3.5
Install Account Information into the LDAP Database
There are many ways to maintain an OpenLDAP database. Methods include:

Input entries in ldif(5) format into a le /path/to/new entries , and use slapadd to import those entries while slapd is not running:
# slapadd -l /path/to/new entries

Write a script to create and modify LDAP entries by connecting to the LDAP server normally. The Perl Net::LDAP module is appropriate for this, there is a Python API called python-ldap, and functionality is likely available for other scripting languages as well. Use an LDAP front-end program which provides an interface for editing the database. If the front-end program is web-based or otherwise accessible over a network, ensure that authentication information is protected via SSL between the administrators client and the program, as well as between the program and the LDAP database.
Any of these methods or others may be appropriate for your site. This guide does not provide a recommendation, and there will be no further discussion of the syntax of entering LDAP data into the database.
3.12.3.5.1
Create Top-level LDAP Structure for Domain
Create a structure for the domain itself with at least the following attributes: dn: dc=example,dc=com objectClass: dcObject objectClass: organization dc: example o: Organization Description This is a placeholder for the root of the domains LDAP tree. Without this entry, LDAP will not be able to nd any other entries for the domain.
3.12.3.5.2
Create LDAP Structures for Users and Groups
Create LDAP structures for people (users) and for groups with at least the following attributes: dn: ou=people,dc=example,dc=com ou: people structuralObjectClass: organizationalUnit objectClass: organizationalUnit dn: ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com ou: groups structuralObjectClass: organizationalUnit objectClass: organizationalUnit
149 Posix users and groups are the two top-level items which will be needed in order to use LDAP for authentication. These organizational units are used to identify the two categories within LDAP.
3.12.3.5.3
Create Unix Accounts
For each Unix user, create an LDAP entry with at least the following attributes (others may be appropriate for your site as well), using variable values appropriate to that user. dn: uid=username ,ou=people,dc=example,dc=com structuralObjectClass: inetOrgPerson objectClass: inetOrgPerson objectClass: posixAccount objectClass: shadowAccount cn: fullname sn: surname gecos: fullname gidNumber: primary-group-id homeDirectory: /home/username loginShell: /path/to/shell uid: username uidNumber: uid userPassword: {MD5}md5-hashed-password If your site implements password expiration in which passwords must be changed every N days (see Section 2.3.1.7), then each entry should also have the attribute: shadowMax: N In general, the LDAP schemas for users use uid to refer to the text username, and uidNumber for the numeric UID. This usage may be slightly confusing when compared to the standard Unix usage. You should not create entries for the root account or for system accounts which are unique to individual systems, but only for user accounts which are to be shared across machines, and which have authentication information (such as a password) associated with them.
3.12.3.5.4
Create Unix Groups
For each Unix group, create an LDAP entry with at least the following attributes: dn: cn=groupname ,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com cn: groupname structuralObjectClass: posixGroup objectClass: posixGroup gidNumber: gid memberUid: username1 memberUid: username2 ... memberUid: usernameN Note that each user has a primary group, identied by the gidNumber eld in the users account entry. That group must be created, but it is not necessary to list the user as a memberUid of the group. This behavior should
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CHAPTER 3. SERVICES
be familiar to administrators, since it is identical to the handling of the /etc/passwd and /etc/group les. Do not create entries for the root group or for system groups, but only for groups which contain human users or which are shared across systems.
3.12.3.5.5
Create Groups to Administer LDAP
If a group of LDAP administrators, admins , is desired, that group must be created somewhat dierently. The specication should have these attributes: dn: cn=admins ,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com cn: admins structuralObjectClass: groupOfUniqueNames objectClass: groupOfUniqueNames uniqueMember: cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com uniqueMember: uid=admin1-username ,ou=people,dc=example,dc=com uniqueMember: uid=admin2-username ,ou=people,dc=example,dc=com ... uniqueMember: uid=adminN-username ,ou=people,dc=example,dc=com LDAP cannot use Posix groups for its own internal authentication it needs to compare the username specied in an authenticated bind to some internal groupOfUniqueNames. If you do not specify an LDAP administrators group, then all LDAP management will need to be done using the LDAP root user (Manager). For reasons of auditing and error detection, it is recommended that LDAP administrators have unique identities. (See Section 2.3.1.3 for similar reasoning applied to the use of sudo for privileged system commands.)
3.12.3.6
Congure slapd to Protect Authentication Information
Edit the le /etc/openldap/slapd.conf. Add or correct the following access specications: 1. Protect the users password by allowing the user himself or the LDAP administrators to change it, allowing the anonymous user to authenticate against it, and allowing no other access:
access to attrs=userPassword by self write by group/groupOfUniqueNames/uniqueMember="cn=admins ,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com " write by anonymous auth by * none access to attrs=shadowLastChange by self write by group/groupOfUniqueNames/uniqueMember="cn=admins ,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com " write by * read
2. Allow anyone to read other information, and allow the administrators to change it:
access to * by group/groupOfUniqueNames/uniqueMember="cn=admins ,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com " write by * read
Access rules are applied in the order encountered, so more specic rules should appear rst. In particular, the rule restricting access to userPassword must appear before the rule allowing access to all data. The shadowLastChange attribute is a timestamp, and is only critical if your site implements password expiration. If
151 your site does not have an LDAP administrators group, the LDAP root user (called Manager in this guide) will be able to change data without an explicit access statement.
3.12.3.7
Correct Permissions on LDAP Server Files
Correct the permissions on the ldap servers les: # chown ldap:root /var/lib/ldap/*
CCE 4484-2, 4502-1
Some manual methods of inserting information into the LDAP database may leave these les with incorrect permissions. This will prevent slapd from starting correctly.
3.12.3.8
Congure iptables to Allow Access to the LDAP Server
Determine an appropriate network block, netwk , and network mask, mask , representing the machines on your network which will synchronize to this server. Edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following lines, ensuring that they appear before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain:
-A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s netwk /mask -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 389 -j ACCEPT -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s netwk /mask -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 636 -j ACCEPT
The default Iptables conguration does not allow inbound access to any services. These modications allow access to the LDAP primary (389) and encrypted-only (636) ports, while keeping all other ports on the server in their default protected state. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about Iptables. Note: Even if the LDAP server restricts connections so that only encrypted queries are allowed, it will probably be necessary to allow trac to the default port 389. This is true because many LDAP clients implement encryption by connecting to the primary port and issuing the STARTTLS command.
3.12.3.9
Congure Logging for LDAP
1. Edit the le /etc/syslog.conf. Add or correct the following line: local4.* 2. Create the log le with safe permissions: # touch /var/log/ldap.log # chown root:root /var/log/ldap.log # chmod 0600 /var/log/ldap.log 3. Edit the le /etc/logrotate.d/syslog and add the pathname /var/log/ldap.log to the space-separated list in the rst line. /var/log/ldap.log
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CHAPTER 3. SERVICES
4. Edit the LDAP conguration le /etc/openldap/slapd.conf and set a reasonable set of default log parameters, such as: loglevel stats2 OpenLDAP sends its log data to the syslog facility local4 at priority debug. By default, RHEL5 does not store this facility at all. The syslog conguration suggested here will store any output logged by slapd in the le /var/log/ldap.log, and will include that le in the standard log rotation for syslog les. By default, LDAPs logging is quite verbose. The loglevel parameter is a space-separated list of items to be logged. Specifying stats2 will reduce the log output somewhat, but this level will still produce some logging every time an LDAP query is made. (This may be appropriate, depending on your sites auditing requirements.) In order to capture only slapd startup messages, specify loglevel none. See slapd.conf(5) for detailed information about the loglevel parameter. See Section 2.6.1.1 for more information about syslog.
3.13
NFS and RPC
The Network File System is the most popular distributed lesystem for the Unix environment, and is very widely deployed. Unfortunately, NFS was not designed with security in mind, and has a number of weaknesses, both in terms of the protocol itself and because any NFS installation must expose several daemons, running on both servers and clients, to network attack. This section discusses the circumstances under which it is possible to disable NFS and its dependencies, and then details steps which should be taken to secure, as much as possible, NFSs conguration. This section is relevant to machines operating as NFS clients, as well as to those operating as NFS servers.
3.13.1
Disable All NFS Services if Possible

The steps in Section 3.13.1 will prevent a machine from operating as either an NFS client or an NFS server. Only perform these steps on machines which do not need NFS at all.
Is there a mission-critical reason for this machine to operate as either an NFS client or an NFS server? If not, follow all instructions in the remainder of Section 3.13.1 to disable subsystems required by NFS. NFS is a commonly used mechanism for sharing data between machines in an organization. However, its use opens many potential security holes. If NFS is not universally needed in your organization, improve the security posture of any machine which does not require NFS by disabling it entirely.
3.13.1.1
Disable Services Used Only by NFS
If NFS is not needed, perform the following steps to disable NFS client daemons:
153
# chkconfig nfslock off # chkconfig rpcgssd off # chkconfig rpcidmapd off

CCE 4396-8, 3535-2, 3568-3
The nfslock, rpcgssd, and rpcidmapd daemons all perform NFS client functions. All of these daemons run with elevated privileges, and many listen for network connections. If they are not needed, they should be disabled to improve system security posture.
3.13.1.2
Disable netfs if Possible
Determine whether any network lesystems handled by netfs are mounted on this system: # mount -t nfs,nfs4,smbfs,cifs,ncpfs If this command returns no output, disable netfs to improve system security: # chkconfig netfs off
CCE 4533-6
The netfs script manages the boot-time mounting of several types of networked lesystems, of which NFS and Samba (see Section 3.18) are the most common. If these lesystem types are not in use, the script can be disabled, protecting the system somewhat against accidental or malicious changes to /etc/fstab and against aws in the netfs script itself.
3.13.1.3
If:
Disable RPC Portmapper if Possible
NFS is not needed The site does not rely on NIS for authentication information, and The machine does not run any other RPC-based service
then disable the RPC portmapper service: # chkconfig portmap off

CCE 4550-0
By design, the RPC model does not require particular services to listen on xed ports, but instead uses a daemon, portmap, to tell prospective clients which ports to use to contact the services they are trying to reach. This model weakens system security by introducing another privileged daemon which may be directly attacked, and is unnecessary because RPC was never adopted by enough services to risk using up all the ports on a system. Unfortunately, the portmapper is central to RPC design, so it cannot be disabled if your site is using any RPCbased services, including NFS, NIS (see Section 3.2.4 for information about NIS, which is not recommended), or any third-party or custom RPC-based program. If none of these programs are in use, however, portmap should be disabled to improve system security.
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In order to get more information about whether portmap may be disabled on a given host, query the local portmapper using the command: # rpcinfo -p If the only services listed are portmapper and status, it is safe to disable the portmapper. If other services are listed and your site is not running NFS or NIS, investigate these services and disable them if possible.
3.13.2
Congure All Machines which Use NFS
The steps in this section are appropriate for all machines which run NFS, whether they operate as clients or as servers.
3.13.2.1
Make Each Machine a Client or a Server, not Both
If NFS must be used, it should be deployed in the simplest conguration possible to avoid maintainability problems which may lead to unnecessary security exposure. Due to the reliability and security problems caused by NFS, it is not a good idea for machines which act as NFS servers to also mount lesystems via NFS. At the least, crossed mounts (the situation in which each of two servers mounts a lesystem from the other) should never be used.
3.13.2.2
Restrict Access to the Portmapper
Edit the le /etc/hosts.deny. Add or correct the line: portmap: ALL Edit the le /etc/hosts.allow. Add or correct the line: portmap: IPADDR1 , IPADDR2 , ... where each IPADDR is the IP address of a server or client with which this machine shares NFS lesystems. If the machine is an NFS server, it may be simpler to use an IP netblock specication, such as 10.3.2. (this is the TCP Wrappers syntax representing the netblock 10.3.2.0/24), or a hostname specication, such as .subdomain.example.com. The use of hostnames is not recommended. The /etc/hosts.allow and /etc/hosts.deny les are used by TCP Wrappers to determine whether specied remote hosts are allowed to access certain services. The default portmapper shipped with RHEL5 has TCP Wrappers support built in, so this specication can be used to provide some protection against network attacks on the portmapper. (See Section 2.5.4 for more information about TCP Wrappers.) Note: This step protects only the portmap service itself. It is still possible for attackers to guess the port numbers of NFS services and attack those services directly, even if they are denied access to the portmapper.
3.13.2.3
Congure NFS Services to Use Fixed Ports
Edit the le /etc/sysconfig/nfs. Add or correct the following lines: LOCKD_TCPPORT=lockd-port LOCKD_UDPPORT=lockd-port
155
MOUNTD_PORT=mountd-port RQUOTAD_PORT=rquotad-port STATD_PORT=statd-port STATD_OUTGOING_PORT=statd-outgoing-port where each X-port is a port which is not used by any other service on your network.
CCE 4559-1, 4015-4, 3667-3, 4310-9, 4438-8, 3579-0
Firewalling should be done at each host and at the border rewalls to protect the NFS daemons from remote access, since NFS servers should never be accessible from outside the organization. However, by default, the portmapper assigns each NFS service to a port dynamically at service startup time. Dynamic ports cannot be protected by port ltering rewalls such as iptables (Section 2.5.5). Therefore, restrict each service to always use a given port, so that rewalling can be done eectively. Note that, because of the way RPC is implemented, it is not possible to disable the portmapper even if ports are assigned statically to all RPC services.
3.13.3
Congure NFS Clients
The steps in this section are appropriate for machines which operate as NFS clients.
3.13.3.1
Disable NFS Server Daemons
# chkconfig nfs off # chkconfig rpcsvcgssd off

CCE 4473-5, 4491-7
There is no need to run the NFS server daemons except on a small number of properly secured machines designated as NFS servers. Ensure that these daemons are turned o on clients.
3.13.3.2
Mount Remote Filesystems with Restrictive Options
Edit the le /etc/fstab. For each lesystem whose type (column 3) is nfs or nfs4, add the text ,nodev,nosuid to the list of mount options in column 4. If appropriate, also add ,noexec.
CCE 4368-7, 4024-6, 4526-0
See Section 2.2.1.2 for a description of the eects of these options. In general, execution of les mounted via NFS should be considered risky because of the possibility that an adversary could intercept the request and substitute a malicious le. Allowing setuid les to be executed from remote servers is particularly risky, both for this reason and because it requires the clients to extend root-level trust to the NFS server.
3.13.4
Congure NFS Servers
The steps in this section are appropriate for machines which operate as NFS servers.
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3.13.4.1
Congure the Exports File Restrictively
Linuxs NFS implementation uses the le /etc/exports to control what lesystems and directories may be accessed via NFS. (See the exports(5) manpage for more information about the format of this le.) The syntax of the exports le is not necessarily checked fully on reload, and syntax errors can leave your NFS conguration more open than intended. Therefore, exercise caution when modifying the le. The syntax of each line in /etc/exports is /DIR ipaddr1 (opt1 ,opt2 ) ipaddr2 (opt3 )
where /DIR is a directory or lesystem to export, ipaddrN is an IP address, netblock, hostname, domain, or netgroup to which to export, and optN is an option.
3.13.4.1.1
Use Access Lists to Enforce Authorization Restrictions on Mounts
Edit /etc/exports. Ensure that each export line contains a set of IP addresses or hosts which are allowed to access that export. If no IP addresses or hostnames are specied on an export line, then that export is available to any remote host which requests it. All lines of the exports le should specify the hosts (or subnets, if needed) which are allowed to access the exported directory, so that unknown or remote hosts will be denied.
3.13.4.1.2
Use Root-Squashing on All Exports
Edit /etc/exports. Ensure that no line contains the option no root squash.
CCE 4544-3
If a lesystem is exported using root squashing, requests from root on the client are considered to be unprivileged (mapped to a user such as nobody). This provides some mild protection against remote abuse of an NFS server. Root squashing is enabled by default, and should not be disabled.
3.13.4.1.3
Restrict NFS Clients to Privileged Ports
Edit /etc/exports. Ensure that no line contains the option insecure.

CCE 4465-1
By default, Linuxs NFS implementation requires that all client requests be made from ports less than 1024. If your organization has control over machines connected to its network, and if NFS requests are prohibited at the border rewall, this oers some protection against malicious requests from unprivileged users. Therefore, the default should not be changed.
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3.13.4.1.4
Export Filesystems Read-Only if Possible
Edit /etc/exports. Ensure that every line contains the option ro and does not contain the option rw, unless there is an operational need for remote clients to modify that lesystem.
CCE 4350-5
If a lesystem is being exported so that users can view the les in a convenient fashion, but there is no need for users to edit those les, exporting the lesystem read-only removes an attack vector against the server. The default lesystem export mode is ro, so do not specify rw without a good reason.
3.13.4.2
Allow Legitimate NFS Clients to Access the Server
Determine an appropriate network block, netwk , and network mask, mask , representing the machines on your network which must mount NFS lesystems from this server. Edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following lines, ensuring that they appear before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain:
-A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s netwk /mask -m state --state NEW -p udp --dport 111 -j ACCEPT -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s netwk /mask -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 111 -j ACCEPT -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s netwk /mask -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 2049 -j ACCEPT -A -A -A -A -A -A -A -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT RH-Firewall-1-INPUT RH-Firewall-1-INPUT RH-Firewall-1-INPUT RH-Firewall-1-INPUT RH-Firewall-1-INPUT RH-Firewall-1-INPUT RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s -s -s -s -s -s -s -s netwk /mask netwk /mask netwk /mask netwk /mask netwk /mask netwk /mask netwk /mask netwk /mask -m -m -m -m -m -m -m -m state state state state state state state state --state --state --state --state --state --state --state --state NEW NEW NEW NEW NEW NEW NEW NEW -p -p -p -p -p -p -p -p tcp udp tcp udp tcp udp tcp udp --dport --dport --dport --dport --dport --dport --dport --dport lockd-port -j ACCEPT lockd-port -j ACCEPT mountd-port -j ACCEPT mountd-port -j ACCEPT rquotad-port -j ACCEPT rquotad-port -j ACCEPT statd-port -j ACCEPT statd-port -j ACCEPT
where the variable port numbers match those selected in Section 3.13.2.3 The default iptables conguration does not allow inbound access to any services. This modication will allow the specied block of remote hosts to initiate connections to the set of NFS daemons, while keeping all other ports on the server in their default protected state. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about iptables.
3.14
DNS Server
Most organizations have an operational need to run at least one nameserver. However, there are many common attacks involving DNS, be congured defensively.
3.14.1
Disable DNS Server if Possible
Is there an operational need for this machine to act as a DNS server for this site? If not, disable the software and remove it from the system:
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# chkconfig named off # yum erase bind

CCE 3578-2, 4219-2
DNS software should be disabled on any machine which does not need to be a nameserver. Note that the BIND DNS server software is not installed on RHEL5 by default. The remainder of this section discusses secure conguration of machines which must be nameservers.
3.14.2
Run the BIND9 Software if DNS Service is Needed
It is highly recommended that the BIND9 software be used to provide DNS service. BIND is the Internet standard Unix nameserver, and, while it has had security problems in the past, it is also well-maintained and Red Hat is likely to quickly issue updates in response to any problems discovered in the future. In addition, BIND version 9 has new security features and more secure default settings than earlier versions. In particular, BIND version 4 is no longer recommended for production use, and BIND4 servers should be upgraded to a newer version as soon as possible.
3.14.3
Isolate DNS from Other Services
This section discusses mechanisms for preventing the DNS server from interfering with other services. This is done both to protect the remainder of the network should a nameserver be compromised, and to make direct attacks on nameservers more dicult.
3.14.3.1
Run DNS Software on Dedicated Servers if Possible
Since DNS is a high-risk service which must frequently be made available to the entire Internet, it is strongly recommended that no other services be oered by machines which act as organizational DNS servers.
3.14.3.2
Run DNS Software in a chroot Jail
Install the bind-chroot package: # yum install bind-chroot Place a valid named.conf le inside the chroot jail: # cp /etc/named.conf /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf # chown root:root /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf # chmod 644 /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf Create and populate an appropriate zone directory within the jail, based on the options directive. If your named.conf includes: options { directory "/path/to/DIRNAME "; ... }
159
then copy that directory and its contents from the original zone directory: # cp -r /path/to/DIRNAME /var/named/chroot/DIRNAME Edit the le /etc/sysconfig/named. Add or correct the line: ROOTDIR=/var/named/chroot
CCE 3985-9, 4487-5, 4258-0
Chroot jails are not foolproof. However, they serve to make it more dicult for a compromised program to be used to attack the entire host. They do this by restricting a programs ability to traverse the directory upward, so that les outside the jail are not visible to the chrooted process. Since RHEL5 supports a standard mechanism for placing BIND in a chroot jail, you should take advantage of this feature. Note: If you are running BIND in a chroot jail, then you should use the jailed named.conf as the primary nameserver conguration le. That is, when this guide recommends editing /etc/named.conf, you should instead edit /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf.
3.14.3.3
Congure Firewalls to Protect the DNS Server
Edit the le /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following lines, ensuring that they appear before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -m state --state NEW -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT These lines are necessary in order to allow remote machines to contact the DNS server. If this server is only available to the local network, it may be appropriate to insert a -s ag into this rule to allow trac only from packets on the local network. See Section 3.5.1.2 for an example of such a modication. See Section 2.5.5 for general information about iptables.
3.14.4
Protect DNS Data from Tampering or Attack
This section discusses DNS conguration options which make it more dicult for attackers to gain access to private DNS data or to modify DNS data.
3.14.4.1
Run Separate DNS Servers for External and Internal Queries if Possible
Is it possible to run external and internal nameservers on separate machines? If so, follow the conguration guidance in this section. If not, see Section 3.14.4.2 for an alternate approach using BIND9. On the external nameserver, edit /etc/named.conf. Add or correct the following directives: options { allow-query { any; }; recursion no; ... };
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zone "example.com " IN { ... }; On the internal nameserver, edit /etc/named.conf. Add or correct the following directives, where SUBNET is the numerical IP representation of your organization in the form xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/xx: acl internal { SUBNET ; localhost; }; options { allow-query { internal; }; ... }; zone "internal.example.com " IN { ... }; Enterprise nameservers generally serve two functions. One is to provide public information about the machines in a domain for the benet of outside users who wish to contact those machines, for instance in order to send mail to users in the enterprise, or to visit the enterprises external web page. The other is to provide nameservice to client machines within the enterprise. Client machines require both private information about enterprise machines (which may be dierent from the public information served to the rest of the world) and public information about machines outside the enterprise, which is used to send mail or visit websites outside of the organization. In order to provide the public nameservice function, it is necessary to share data with untrusted machines which request it otherwise, the enterprise cannot be conveniently contacted by outside users. However, internal data should be protected from disclosure, and serving irrelevant public name queries for outside domains leaves the DNS server open to cache poisoning and other attacks. Therefore, local network nameservice functions should not be provided to untrusted machines. Separate machines should be used to ll these two functions whenever possible.
3.14.4.2
Use Views to Partition External and Internal Information if Necessary
If it is not possible to run external and internal nameservers on separate physical machines, run BIND9 and simulate this feature using views. Edit /etc/named.conf. Add or correct the following directives (where SUBNET is the numerical IP representation of your organization in the form xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/xx): acl internal { SUBNET ; localhost; }; view "internal-view" { match-clients { internal; };
161
zone "." IN { type hint; file "db.cache"; }; zone "internal.example.com " IN { ... }; }; view "external-view" { match-clients { any; }; recursion no; zone "example.com " IN { ... }; };
The view feature is provided by BIND9 as a way to allow a single nameserver to make dierent sets of data available to dierent sets of clients. If possible, it is always better to run external and internal nameservers on separate machines, so that even complete compromise of the external server cannot be used to obtain internal data or confuse internal DNS clients. However, this is not always feasible, and use of a feature like views is preferable to leaving internal DNS data entirely unprotected. Note: As shown in the example, database les which are required for recursion, such as the root hints le, must be available to any clients which are allowed to make recursive queries. Under typical circumstances, this includes only the internal clients which are allowed to use this server as a general-purpose nameserver.
3.14.4.3
Disable Zone Transfers from the Nameserver if Possible
Is it necessary for a secondary nameserver to receive zone data via zone transfer from the primary server? If not, follow the instructions in this section. If so, see the next section for instructions on protecting zone transfers. Edit /etc/named.conf. Add or correct the following directive: options { allow-transfer { none; }; ... }
If both the primary and secondary nameserver are under your control, or if you have only one nameserver, it may be possible to use an external conguration management mechanism to distribute zone updates. In that case, it is not necessary to allow zone transfers within BIND itself, so they should be disabled to avoid the potential for abuse.
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3.14.4.4
Authenticate Zone Transfers if Necessary
If it is necessary for a secondary nameserver to receive zone data via zone transfer from the primary server, follow the instructions here. Use dnssec-keygen to create a symmetric key le in the current directory: # cd /tmp # dnssec-keygen -a HMAC-MD5 -b 128 -n HOST dns.example.com Kdns.example.com .+aaa +iiiii This output is the name of a le containing the new key. Read the le to nd the base64-encoded key string: # cat Kdns.example.com .+NNN +MMMMM .key dns.example.com IN KEY 512 3 157 base64-key-string Edit /etc/named.conf on the primary nameserver. Add the directives: key zone-transfer-key { algorithm hmac-md5; secret "base64-key-string "; }; zone "example.com " IN { type master; allow-transfer { key zone-transfer-key; }; ... } Edit /etc/named.conf on the secondary nameserver. Add the directives: key zone-transfer-key { algorithm hmac-md5; secret "base64-key-string "; }; server IP-OF-MASTER { keys { zone-transfer-key; }; }; zone "example.com " IN { type slave; masters { IP-OF-MASTER ; }; ... }; The BIND transaction signature (TSIG) functionality allows primary and secondary nameservers to use a shared secret to verify authorization to perform zone transfers. This method is more secure than using IP-based limiting to restrict nameserver access, since IP addresses can be easily spoofed. However, if you cannot congure TSIG between your servers because, for instance, the secondary nameserver is not under your control and its administrators are unwilling to congure TSIG, you can congure an allow-transfer directive with numerical IP addresses or ACLs as a last resort. Note: The purpose of the dnssec-keygen command is to create the shared secret string base64-key-string . Once this secret has been obtained and inserted into named.conf on the primary and secondary servers, the key
163 les Kdns.example.com .+NNN +MMMMM .key and Kdns.example.com .+NNN +MMMMM .private are no longer needed, and may safely be deleted.
3.14.4.5
Disable Dynamic Updates if Possible
Is there a mission-critical reason to enable the risky dynamic update functionality? If not: Edit /etc/named.conf. For each zone specication, correct the following directive if necessary: zone "example.com " IN { allow-update { none; }; ... }
CCE 4399-2
Dynamic updates allow remote servers to add, delete, or modify any entries in your zone le. Therefore, they should be considered highly risky, and disabled unless there is a very good reason for their use. If dynamic updates must be allowed, IP-based ACLs are insucient protection, since they are easily spoofed. Instead, use TSIG keys (see the previous section for an example), and consider using the update-policy directive to restrict changes to only the precise type of change needed.
3.15
FTP Server
FTP is a common method for allowing remote access to les. Like telnet, the FTP protocol is unencrypted, which means that passwords and other data transmitted during the session can be captured and that the session is vulnerable to hijacking. Therefore, running the FTP server software is not recommended. However, there are some FTP server congurations which may be appropriate for some environments, particularly those which allow only read-only anonymous access as a means of downloading data available to the public.
3.15.1
Disable vsftpd if Possible
Is there a mission-critical reason for the machine to act as an FTP server? If not, disable the software and remove it from the system: # chkconfig vsftpd off # yum erase vsftpd
CCE 3919-8, 14881-7
3.15.2
Use vsftpd to Provide FTP Service if Necessary
If this machine must operate as an FTP server, install the vsftpd package via the standard channels: # yum install vsftpd
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After RHEL 2.1, Red Hat switched from distributing wu-ftpd with RHEL to distributing vsftpd. For security and for consistency with future Red Hat releases, the use of vsftpd is recommended.
3.15.3
Congure vsftpd Securely
The primary vsftpd conguration le is /etc/vsftpd.conf, if that le exists, or /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf if it does not. For the remainder of this section, the phrase the conguration le will refer to whichever of those les is appropriate for your environment.
3.15.3.1
Enable Logging of All FTP Transactions
Edit the vsftpd conguration le. Add or correct the following conguration options: xferlog_std_format=NO log_ftp_protocol=YES
CCE 4549-2
The modications above ensure that all commands sent to the ftp server are logged using the verbose vsftpd log format. The default vsftpd log le is /var/log/vsftpd.log. Note: If verbose logging to vsftpd.log is done, sparse logging of downloads to /var/log/xferlog will not also occur. However, the information about what les were downloaded is included in the information logged to vsftpd.log.
3.15.3.2
Create Warning Banners for All FTP Users
Edit the vsftpd conguration le. Add or correct the following conguration options: banner_file=/etc/issue
CCE 4554-2
See Section 2.3.7 for an explanation of banner le use. This setting will cause the system greeting banner to be used for FTP connections as well.
3.15.3.3
Restrict the Set of Users Allowed to Access FTP
This section describes how to disable non-anonymous (password-based) FTP logins, or, if it is not possible to do this entirely due to legacy applications, how to restrict insecure FTP login to only those users who have an identied need for this access.
3.15.3.3.1
Restrict Access to Anonymous Users if Possible
Is there a mission-critical reason for users to transfer les to/from their own accounts using FTP, rather than using a secure protocol like SCP/SFTP? If not: Edit the vsftpd conguration le. Add or correct the following conguration option:
165
local_enable=NO If non-anonymous FTP logins are necessary, follow the guidance in the remainder of this section to secure these logins as much as possible.
CCE 4443-8
The use of non-anonymous FTP logins is strongly discouraged. Since SSH clients and servers are widely available, and since SSH provides support for a transfer mode which resembles FTP in user interface, there is no good reason to allow password-based FTP access. See Section 3.5 for more information about SSH.
3.15.3.3.2
Limit Users Allowed FTP Access if Necessary
If there is a mission-critical reason for users to access their accounts via the insecure FTP protocol, limit the set of users who are allowed this access. Edit the vsftpd conguration le. Add or correct the following conguration options: userlist_enable=YES userlist_file=/etc/vsftp.ftpusers userlist_deny=NO Edit the le /etc/vsftp.ftpusers. For each user USERNAME who should be allowed to access the system via ftp, add a line containing that users name. USERNAME If anonymous access is also required, add the anonymous usernames to /etc/vsftp.ftpusers as well: anonymous ftp Historically, the le /etc/ftpusers contained a list of users who were not allowed to access the system via ftp. It was used to prevent system users such as the root user from logging in via the insecure ftp protocol. However, when the conguration option userlist deny=NO is set, vsftpd interprets ftpusers as the set of users who are allowed to login via ftp. Since it should be possible for most users to access their accounts via secure protocols, it is recommended that this setting be used, so that non-anonymous ftp access can be limited to legacy users who have been explicitly identied.
3.15.3.4
Disable FTP Uploads if Possible
Is there a mission-critical reason for users to upload les via FTP? If not: Edit the vsftpd conguration le. Add or correct the following conguration options: write_enable=NO If FTP uploads are necessary, follow the guidance in the remainder of this section to secure these transactions as much as possible.
CCE 4461-0
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Anonymous FTP can be a convenient way to make les available for universal download. However, it is less common to have a need to allow unauthenticated users to place les on the FTP server. If this must be done, it is necessary to ensure that les cannot be uploaded and downloaded from the same directory.
3.15.3.5
Place the FTP Home Directory on its Own Partition
By default, the anonymous FTP root is the home directory of the ftp user account. The df command can be used to verify that this directory is on its own partition. If there is a mission-critical reason for anonymous users to upload les, precautions must be taken to prevent these users from lling a disk used by other services.
3.15.3.6
Congure Firewalls to Protect the FTP Server
Edit the le /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following lines, ensuring that they appear before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 21 -j ACCEPT Edit the le /etc/sysconfig/iptables-config. Ensure that the space-separated list of modules contains the FTP connection tracking module: IPTABLES_MODULES="ip_conntrack_ftp" These settings congure iptables to allow connections to an FTP server. The rst line allows initial connections to the FTP server port. FTP is an older protocol which is not very compatible with rewalls. During the initial FTP dialogue, the client and server negotiate an arbitrary port to be used for data transfer. The ip conntrack ftp module is used by iptables to listen to that dialogue and allow connections to the data ports which FTP negotiates. This allows an FTP server to operate on a machine which is running a rewall.
3.16
Web Server
The web server is responsible for providing access to content via the HTTP protocol. Web servers represent a signicant security risk because:
The HTTP port is commonly probed by malicious sources Web server software is very complex, and includes a long history of vulnerabilities The HTTP protocol is unencrypted and vulnerable to passive monitoring
The systems default web server software is Apache 2 and is provided in the RPM package httpd.
3.16.1
Disable Apache if Possible
If Apache was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a web server, then it should be disabled and removed from the system:
167
# chkconfig httpd off # yum erase httpd

CCE 4338-0, 4514-6
3.16.2
Install Apache if Necessary
If the Apache web server must be run, follow these guidelines to install it defensively. Then follow the guidelines in the remainder of Section 3.16 to congure the web server machine and software as securely as possible.
3.16.2.1
Install Apache Software Safely
Install the Apache 2 package from the standard Red Hat distribution channel: # yum install httpd
CCE 4346-3
Note: This method of installation is recommended over installing the Web Server package group during the system installation process. The Web Server package group includes many packages which are likely extraneous, while the command-line method installs only the required httpd package itself.
3.16.2.2
Conrm Minimal Built-in Modules
The default Apache installation minimizes the number of modules that are compiled directly into the binary (core prefork http core mod so). This minimizes risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the webserver. Query the set of compiled-in modules using the following command: $ httpd -l If the number of compiled-in modules is signicantly larger than the aforementioned set, this guide recommends reinstallating Apache with a reduced conguration.
3.16.3
Secure the Apache Conguration
The Apache conguration le is /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf. Apply the recommendations in the remainder of this section to this le.
3.16.3.1
Restrict Information Leakage
The ServerTokens and ServerSignature directives determine how much information the web server discloses about the conguration of the system. ServerTokens Prod restricts information in page headers, returning only the word Apache. ServerSignature Off keeps Apache from displaying the server version on error pages. It is a good security practice to limit the information provided to clients.
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Add or correct the following directives in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf so that as little information as possible is released: ServerTokens Prod ServerSignature Off
CCE 4474-3, 3756-4
3.16.3.2
Minimize Loadable Modules
A default installation of Apache includes a plethora of dynamically shared objects (DSO) that are loaded at run-time. Unlike the aforementioned compiled-in modules, a DSO can be disabled in the conguration le by removing the corresponding LoadModule directive. Note: A DSO only provides additional functionality if associated directives are included in the Apache conguration le. It should also be noted that removing a DSO will produce errors on Apache startup if the conguration le contains directives that apply to that module. Refer to http://httpd.apache.org/docs/ for details on which directives are associated with each DSO. Follow each DSO removal, the conguration can be tested with the following command to check if everything still works: # service httpd configtest The purpose of each of the modules loaded by default will now be addressed one at a time. If none of a modules directives are being used, remove it.
3.16.3.2.1
Apache Core Modules
These modules comprise a basic subset of modules that are likely needed for base Apache functionality; ensure they are not commented out in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule LoadModule auth_basic_module modules/mod_auth_basic.so authn_default_module modules/mod_authn_default.so authz_host_module modules/mod_authz_host.so authz_user_module modules/mod_authz_user.so authz_groupfile_module modules/mod_authz_groupfile.so authz_default_module modules/mod_authz_default.so log_config_module modules/mod_log_config.so logio_module modules/mod_logio.so setenvif_module modules/mod_setenvif.so mime_module modules/mod_mome.so autoindex_module modules/mod_autoindex.so negotiation_module modules/mod_negotiation.so dir_module modules/mod_dir.so alias_module modules/mod_alias.so
3.16.3.2.2
HTTP Basic Authentication
The following modules are necessary if this web server will provide content that will be restricted by a password.
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Authentication can be performed using local plain text password les (authn_file), local DBM password les (authn_dbm) or an LDAP directory (see Section 3.16.3.2.5). The only module required by the web server depends on your choice of authentication. Comment out the modules you dont need from the following: LoadModule authn_file_module modules/mod_authn_file.so LoadModule authn_dbm_module modules/mod_authn_dbm.so authn alias allows for authentication based on aliases. authn anon allows anonymous authentication similar to that of anonymous ftp sites. authz owner allows authorization based on le ownership. authz dbm allows for authorization based on group membership if the web server is using DBM authentication. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule #LoadModule #LoadModule #LoadModule authn_alias_module modules/mod_authn_alias.so authn_anon_module modules/mod_authn_anon.so authz_owner_module modules/mod_authz_owner.so authz_dbm_module modules/mod_authz_dbm.so
3.16.3.2.3
HTTP Digest Authentication
This module provides encrypted authentication sessions. However, this module is rarely used and considered experimental. Alternate methods of encrypted authentication are recommended, such as SSL (Section 3.16.4.1) If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule auth_digest_module modules/mod_auth_digest.so
3.16.3.2.4
mod rewrite
The mod rewrite module is very powerful and can protect against certain classes of web attacks. However, it is also very complex and has a signicant history of vulnerabilities itself. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule rewrite_module modules/mod_rewrite.so
3.16.3.2.5
LDAP Support
This module provides HTTP authentication via an LDAP directory. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related modules: #LoadModule ldap_module modules/mod_ldap.so #LoadModule authnz_ldap_module modules/mod_authnz_ldap.so If LDAP is to be used, SSL encryption (Section 3.16.4.1) should be used as well.
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3.16.3.2.6
Server Side Includes
Server Side Includes provide a method of dynamically generating web pages through the insertion of server-side code. However, the technology is also deprecated and introduces signicant security concerns. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule include_module modules/mod_include.so If there is a critical need for Server Side Includes, they should be enabled with the option IncludesNoExec to prevent arbitrary code execution. Additionally, user supplied data should be encoded to prevent cross-site scripting vulnerabilities.
3.16.3.2.7
MIME Magic
This module provides a second layer of MIME support that in most congurations is likely extraneous. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule mime_magic_module modules/mod_mime_magic.so
3.16.3.2.8
WebDAV (Distributed Authoring and Versioning)
WebDAV is an extension of the HTTP protocol that provides distributed and collaborative access to web content. Due to a number of security concerns with WebDAV, its use is not recommended. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related modules: #LoadModule dav_module modules/mod_dav.so #LoadModule dav_fs_module modules/mod_dav_fs.so If there is a critical need for WebDAV, extra care should be taken in its conguration. Since DAV access allows remote clients to manipulate server les, any location on the server that is DAV enabled should be protected by encrypted authentication.
3.16.3.2.9
Server Activity Status
This module provides real-time access to statistics on the internal operation of the web server. This is an unnecessary information leak and should be disabled. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule status_module modules/mod_status.so If there is a critical need for this module, ensure that access to the status page is properly restricted to a limited set of hosts in the status handler conguration.
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3.16.3.2.10
Web Server Conguration Display
This module creates a web page illustrating the conguration of the web server. This is an unnecessary security leak and should be disabled. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule info_module modules/mod_info.so If there is a critical need for this module, use the Location directive to provide an access control list to restrict access to the information.
3.16.3.2.11
URL Correction on Misspelled Entries
This module attempts to nd a document match by allowing one misspelling in an otherwise failed request. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule speling_module modules/mod_speling.so This functionality weakens server security by making site enumeration easier.
3.16.3.2.12
User-specic directories
The UserDir directive provides user-specic directory translation, allowing URLs based on associated usernames. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: #LoadModule userdir_module modules/mod_userdir.so If there is a critical need for this module, include the line UserDir disabled root (at a minimum) in the conguration le. Ideally, UserDir should be disabled, and then enabled on a case-by-case basis for specic users that require this functionality. Note: A web servers users can be trivially enumerated using this module.
3.16.3.2.13
Proxy Support
This module provides proxying support, allowing Apache to forward requests and serve as a gateway for other servers. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related modules: #LoadModule #LoadModule #LoadModule #LoadModule #LoadModule proxy_module modules/mod_proxy.so proxy_balancer_module modules/mod_proxy_balancer.so proxy_ftp_module modules/mod_proxy_ftp.so proxy_http_module modules/mod_proxy_http.so proxy_connect_module modules/mod_proxy_connect.so
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If proxy support is needed, load proxy and the appropriate proxy protocol handler module (one of proxy http, proxy ftp, or proxy connect). Additionally, make certain that a server is secure before enabling proxying, as open proxy servers are a security risk. proxy balancer enables load balancing, but requires that mod status be enabled. Since mod status is not recommended, proxy balancer should be avoided as well.
3.16.3.2.14
Cache Support
This module allows Apache to cache data, optimizing access to frequently accessed content. However, not only is it an experimental module, but it also introduces potential security aws into the web server such as the possibility of circumventing Allow and Deny directives. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related modules: #LoadModule #LoadModule #LoadModule #LoadModule cache_module modules/mod_cache.so disk_cache_module modules/mod_disk_cache.so file_cache_module modules/mod_file_cache.so mem_cache_module modules/mod_mem_cache.so
If caching is required, it should not be enabled for any limited-access content.
3.16.3.2.15
CGI Support (and Related Modules)
This module allows HTML to interact with the CGI web programming language. If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related modules: #LoadModule cgi_module modules/mod_cgi.so #LoadModule env_module modules/mod_env.so #LoadModule actions_module modules/mod_actions.so #LoadModule suexec_module modules/mod_suexec.so If the web server requires the use of CGI, enable the cgi module. If extended CGI functionality is required, include the appropriate modules. env allows for control of the environment passed to CGI scripts. actions allows CGI events to be triggered when les of a certain type are requested. su exec allows CGI scripts to run as a specied user/group instead of as the servers user/group.
3.16.3.2.16
Various Optional Components
The following modules perform very specic tasks, sometimes providing access to just a few additional directives. If this functionality is not required (or if you are not using these directives), comment out the associated module:
External ltering (response passed through external program prior to client delivery)
#LoadModule ext_filter_module modules/mod_ext_filter.so

User-specied Cache Control and Expiration
#LoadModule expires_module modules/mod_expires.so
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Compression Output Filter (provides content compression prior to client delivery)
#LoadModule deflate_module modules/mod_deflate.so

HTTP Response/Request Header Customization
#LoadModule headers_module modules/mod_headers.so

User activity monitoring via cookies
#LoadModule usertrack_module modules/mod_usertrack.so

Dynamically congured mass virtual hosting
#LoadModule vhost_alias_module modules/mod_vhost_alias.so
3.16.3.3
Minimize Conguration Files Included
The Include directive directs Apache to load supplementary conguration les from a provided path. The default conguration loads all les that end in .conf from the /etc/httpd/conf.d directory. To restrict excess conguration, the following line should be commented out and replaced with Include directives that only reference required conguration les: #Include conf.d/*.conf If the above change was made, ensure that the SSL encryption remains loaded by explicitly including the corresponding conguration le: (see Section 3.16.4.1 for further details on SSL conguration) Include conf.d/ssl.conf If PHP is necessary, a similar alteration must be made: (see Section 3.16.4.4.1 for further details on PHP conguration) Include conf.d/php.conf
3.16.3.4
Directory Restrictions
The Directory tags in the web server conguration le allow ner grained access control for a specied directory. All web directories should be congured on a case-by-case basis, allowing access only where needed.
3.16.3.4.1
Restrict Root Directory
The Apache root directory should always have the most restrictive conguration enabled. <Directory / > Options None AllowOverride None Order allow,deny </Directory>
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3.16.3.4.2
Restrict Web Directory
The default conguration for the web (/var/www/html) Directory allows directory indexing (Indexes)and the following of symbolic links (FollowSymLinks). Neither of these is recommended. The /var/www/html directory hierarchy should not be viewable via the web, and symlinks should only be followed if the owner of the symlink also owns the linked le. Ensure that this policy is adhered to by altering the related section of the conguration: <Directory "/var/www/html"> # ... Options SymLinksIfOwnerMatch # ... </Directory>
3.16.3.4.3
Restrict Other Critical Directories
All accessible web directories should be congured with similar restrictive settings. The Options directive should be limited to necessary functionality and the AllowOverride directive should be used only if needed. The Order and Deny access control tags should be used to deny access by default, allowing access only where necessary.
3.16.3.5
Congure Authentication if Applicable

Basic authentication is handled in plaintext over the network. Therefore, all login attempts are vulnerable to password sning. For increased protection against passive monitoring, encrypted authentication over a secure channel such as SSL (Section 3.16.4.1) is recommended.
1. Set up a password le. If a password le doesnt yet exist, one must be generated with the following command: # htpasswd -cs passwdfile user WARNING: This command will overwrite an existing le at this location.
Once a password le has been generated, subsequent users can be added with the following command: # htpasswd -s passwdfile user 2. Optionally, set up a group le (if using group authentication). The group le is a plain text le of the following format (each group is on its own line, followed by a colon and a list of users that belong to that group, separated by spaces): group : user1 user2 group2 : user3 3. Modify le permissions so that Apache can read the group and passwd les:
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# chgrp apache passwdfile groupfile # chmod 640 passwdfile groupfile 4. Turn on authentication for desired directories Add the following options inside the appropriate Directory tag:
For single-user authentication:
<Directory "directory "> # ... AuthName "Private Data" AuthType Basic AuthUserFile passwdfile require user user # ... </Directory>
For multiple-user authentication restricted by groups:
<Directory "directory "> # ... AuthName "Private Data" AuthType Basic AuthUserFile passwdfile AuthGroupFile groupfile require group group # ... </Directory>
For multiple-user authentication restricted by valid user accounts:
<Directory "directory "> # ... AuthName "Private Data" AuthType Basic AuthUserFile passwdfile require valid-user # ... </Directory> The AuthName directive species a label for the protected content. The AuthType directive species the kind of authentication (if using Digest authentication, this line would instead read AuthType Digest) The AuthUserFile and AuthGroupFile directives point to the password and group les (if using Digest authentication, these directives would instead be AuthDigestFile and AuthDigestGroupFile.) The require user directive restricts access to a single user. The require group directive restricts access to multiple users in a designated group. The short-hand require valid-user directive restricts access to any user in the passwdle
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Note: Make sure the AuthUserFile and AuthGroupFile locations are outside the web server document tree to prevent remote clients from having access to restricted usernames and passwords. This guide recommends /etc/httpd/conf as a location for these les.
3.16.3.6
Limit Available Methods
Web server methods are dened in section 9 of RFC 2616 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt). If a web server does not require the implementation of all available methods, they should be disabled. Note: GET and POST are the most common methods. A majority of the others are limited to the WebDAV protocol. <Directory /var/www/html> # ... # Only allow specific methods (this command is case-sensitive!) <LimitExcept GET POST> Order allow,deny </LimitExcept> # ... </Directory>
3.16.4
Use Appropriate Modules to Improve Apaches Security
Among the modules available for Apache are several whose use may improve the security of the web server installation. This section recommends and discusses the deployment of security-relevant modules.
3.16.4.1
Deploy mod ssl
Because HTTP is a plain text protocol, all trac is susceptible to passive monitoring. If there is a need for condentiality, SSL should be congured and enabled to encrypt content. Note: mod nss is a FIPS 140-2 certied alternative to mod ssl. The modules share a considerable amount of code and should be nearly identical in functionality. If FIPS 140-2 validation is required, then mod nss should be used. If it provides some feature or its greater compatibility is required, thenmod ssl should be used.
3.16.4.1.1
Install mod ssl
Install mod ssl: # yum install mod ssl
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3.16.4.1.2
On your CA (if you are using your own) or on another physically secure system, generate a key pair for the web server: # cd /etc/pki/tls/certs # openssl genrsa -des3 -out httpserverkey.pem 2048 When prompted, enter a strong, unique passphrase to protect the web server key pair. Next, generate a Certicate Signing Request (CSR) from the key for the CA: # openssl req -new -key httpserverkey.pem -out httpserver.csr Enter the passphrase for the web server key pair and then ll out the elds as completely as possible (or hit return to accept defaults); the Common Name eld is especially important. It must match the fullyqualied domain name of your server exactly (e.g. www.example.com) or the certicate will not work. The /etc/pki/tls/openssl.conf le will determine which other elds (e.g. Country Name, Organization Name, etc) must match between the server request and the CA. Leave the challenge password and an optional company name blank. Next, the web server CSR must be signed to create the web server certicate. You can either send the CSR to an established CA or sign it with your CA. To sign httpserver.csr using your CA: # openssl ca -in httpserver.csr -out httpservercert.pem When prompted, enter the CA passphrase to continue and then complete the process. The httpservercert. pem certicate needed to enable SSL on the web server is now in the directory. Finally, the web server key and certicate le need to be moved to the web server. Use removable media if possible. Place the server key and certicate le in /etc/pki/tls/http/, naming them serverkey.pem and servercert.pem, respectively.
3.16.4.1.3
Install SSL Certicate
Add or modify the conguration le /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf to match the following: # establish new listening port Listen 443 # seed appropriately SSLRandomSeed startup file:/dev/urandom 1024 SSLRandomSeed connect file:/dev/urandom 1024 <VirtualHost site-on-certificate.com:443> # Enable SSL SSLEngine On # Path to server certificate + private key SSLCertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/http/servercert.pem SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/pki/tls/http/serverkey.pem SSLProtocol All -SSLv2
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# Weak ciphers and null authentication should be denied unless absolutely necessary # (and even then, such cipher weakening should occur within a Location enclosure) SSLCipherSuite HIGH:MEDIUM:!aNULL:+MD5 </VirtualHost> Ensure that all directories that house SSL content are restricted to SSL access only in /etc/httpd/conf/ httpd.conf: <Directory /var/www/html/secure> # require SSL for access SSLRequireSSL SSLOptions +StrictRequire # require domain to match certificate domain SSLRequire %{HTTP HOST} eq "site-on-certificate.com" # rather than reply with 403 error, redirect user to appropriate site # this is OPTIONAL - uncomment to apply # ErrorDocument 403 https://site-on-certificate.com </Directory>
3.16.4.2
Deploy mod security
mod security provides an application level rewall for Apache. Following the installation of mod security with the base ruleset, specic conguration advice can be found at http://www.modsecurity.org/ to design a policy that best matches the security needs of the web applications.
3.16.4.2.1
Install mod security
Install mod security: # yum install mod_security
3.16.4.2.2
Congure mod security Filtering
mod security supports a signicant number of options, far too many to be fully covered in this guide. However, the following list comprises a smaller subset of suggested lters to be added to /etc/httpd/conf/ httpd.conf: # enable mod security SecFilterEngine On # enable POST filtering SecFilterScanPost On
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# Make sure that URL encoding is valid SecFilterCheckURLEncoding On # Accept almost all byte values SecFilterForceByteRange 1 255 # Prevent directory traversal SecFilter "\.\./" # Filter on specific system specific paths SecFilter /etc/passwd SecFilter /bin/ # Prevent cross-site scripting SecFilter "<[[:space:]]* script" # Prevent SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SQL injection "delete[[:space:]]+from" "insert[[:space:]]+into" "select.+from"
3.16.4.3
Use Denial-of-Service Protection Modules
Denial-of-service attacks are dicult to detect and prevent while maintaining acceptable access to authorized users. However, there are a number of trac-shaping modules that attempt to address the problem. Well-known DoS protection modules include: mod_throttle mod_bwshare mod_limitipconn mod_dosevasive It is recommended that denial-of-service prevention be implemented for the web server. However, this guide leaves specic conguration details to the discretion of the reader.
3.16.4.4
Congure Supplemental Modules Appropriately
Any required functionality added to the web server via additional modules should be congured appropriately.
3.16.4.4.1
Congure PHP Securely
PHP is a widely used and often miscongured server-side scripting language. It should be used with caution, but congured appropriately when needed. Make the following changes to /etc/php.ini: # Do not expose PHP error messages to external users display_errors = Off # Enable safe mode safe_mode = On
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# Only allow access to executables in isolated directory safe_mode_exec_dir = php-required-executables-path # Limit external access to PHP environment safe_mode_allowed_env_vars = PHP_ # Restrict PHP information leakage expose_php = Off # Log all errors log_errors = On # Do not register globals for input data register_globals = Off # Minimize allowable PHP post size post_max_size = 1K # Ensure PHP redirects appropriately cgi.force_redirect = 0 # Disallow uploading unless necessary file_uploads = Off # Disallow treatment of file requests as fopen calls allow_url_fopen = Off # Enable SQL safe mode sql.safe_mode = On
3.16.5
Congure Operating System to Protect Web Server
The following conguration steps should be taken on the machine which hosts the web server, in order to provide as safe an environment as possible for the web server.
3.16.5.1
Restrict File and Directory Access
Minimize access to critical Apache les and directories: # chmod 511 /usr/sbin/httpd # chmod 750 /var/log/httpd/ # chmod 750 /etc/httpd/conf/ # chmod 640 /etc/httpd/conf/* # chgrp -R apache /etc/httpd/conf
CCE 4509-6, 4386-9, 4029-5, 3581-6, 4574-0
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3.16.5.2
Congure iptables to Allow Access to the Web Server
Edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following lines, ensuring that they appear before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT The default Iptables conguration does not allow inbound access to the HTTP (80) and HTTPS (443) ports used by the web server. This modication allows that access, while keeping other ports on the server in their default protected state. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about Iptables.
3.16.5.3
Run Apache in a chroot Jail if Possible
Putting Apache in a chroot jail minimizes the damage done by a potential break-in by isolating the web server to a small section of the lesystem. In order to congure Apache to run from a chroot directory, edit the Apache conguration le, /etc/httpd/ conf/httpd.conf, and add the directive: SecChrootDir /chroot/apache It is also necessary to place all les required by Apache inside the lesystem rooted at /chroot/apache , including Apaches binaries, modules, conguration les, and served web pages. The details of this conguration are beyond the scope of this guide.
3.16.6
Additional Resources
Further resources should be consulted if your web server requires more extensive conguration guidance, especially if particular applications need to be secured. In particular, [27] is recommended as a more comprehensive guide to securing Apache.
3.17
IMAP and POP3 Server
Dovecot provides IMAP and POP3 services. It is not installed by default. The project page at http://www. dovecot.org contains more detailed information about Dovecot conguration.
3.17.1
Disable Dovecot if Possible
If the system does not need to operate as an IMAP or POP3 server, disable and remove Dovecot if it was installed: # chkconfig dovecot off # yum erase dovecot
CCE 3847-1, 4239-0
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3.17.2
Congure Dovecot if Necessary
Dovecots main conguration le is /etc/dovecot.conf. The settings which appear, commented out, in the le are the defaults.
3.17.2.1
Support Only the Necessary Protocols
Edit /etc/dovecot.conf. Add or correct the following lines, replacing PROTOCOL with only the subset of protocols (imap, imaps, pop3, pop3s) required: protocols = PROTOCOL
CCE 4384-4, 3887-7, 4530-2, 4547-6
Dovecot supports the IMAP and POP3 protocols, as well as SSL-protected versions of those protocols. Congure the Dovecot server to support only the protocols needed by your site. If possible, require SSL protection for all transactions. The SSL protocol variants listen on alternate ports (995 instead of 110 for pop3s, and 993 instead of 143 for imaps), and require SSL-aware clients. An alternate approach is to listen on the standard port and require the client to use the STARTTLS command before authenticating.
3.17.2.2
Enable SSL Support
SSL should be used to encrypt network trac between the Dovecot server and its clients. Users must authenticate to the Dovecot server in order to read their mail, and passwords should never be transmitted in clear text. In addition, protecting mail as it is downloaded is a privacy measure, and clients may use SSL certicates to authenticate the server, preventing another system from impersonating the server. See Section 2.5.6 for general SSL information, including the setup of a Certicate Authority (CA).
3.17.2.2.1
Note: The following steps should be performed on your CA system, and not on the Dovecot server itself. If you will have a commercial CA sign certicates, then these steps should be performed on a separate, physically secure system devoted to that purpose. On your CA (if you are using your own) or on another physically secure system, generate a key pair for the Dovecot server: # cd /etc/pki/tls/certs # openssl genrsa -out imapserverkey.pem 2048 Next, generate a certicate signing request (CSR) for the CA to sign, making sure to enter the servers fully-qualied domain name when prompted for the Common Name: # openssl req -new -key imapserverkey.pem -out imapserver.csr Next, the mail server CSR must be signed to create the Dovecot server certicate. You can either send the CSR to an established CA or sign it with your CA. To sign imapserver.csr using your CA: # openssl ca -in imapserver.csr -out imapservercert.pem
183 This step creates a private key, imapserverkey.pem, and a public certicate, imapservercert.pem. The Dovecot server will use these to prove its identity by demonstrating that it has a certicate which has been signed by a CA. POP3 or IMAP clients at your site should only be willing to provide users credentials to a server they can authenticate.
3.17.2.2.2
Install the SSL Certicate
Create the PKI directory for POP and IMAP certicates if it does not already exist: # mkdir /etc/pki/tls/imap # chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/imap # chmod 755 /etc/pki/tls/imap Using removable media or some other secure transmission format, install the les generated in the previous step onto the Dovecot server:
/etc/pki/tls/imap/serverkey.pem: the private key imapserverkey.pem /etc/pki/tls/imap/servercert.pem: the certicate le imapservercert.pem
Verify the permissions on these les: # # # # chown chown chmod chmod root:root /etc/pki/tls/imap/serverkey.pem root:root /etc/pki/tls/imap/servercert.pem 600 /etc/pki/tls/imap/serverkey.pem 600 /etc/pki/tls/imap/servercert.pem
Verify that the CAs public certicate le has been installed as /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem, and has the correct permissions: # chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem # chmod 644 /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem
3.17.2.2.3
Congure Dovecot to Use the SSL Certicate
Edit /etc/dovecot.conf and add or correct the following lines (ensuring they reference the appropriate les): ssl_cert_file = /etc/pki/tls/imap/servercert.pem ssl_key_file = /etc/pki/tls/imap/serverkey.pem ssl_ca_file = /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem These options tell Dovecot where to nd the TLS conguration, allowing clients to make encrypted connections.
3.17.2.2.4
Disable Plaintext Authentication
To prevent Dovecot from attempting plaintext authentication of clients, edit /etc/dovecot.conf and add or correct the following line: disable_plaintext_auth = yes
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CCE 4552-6
The disable plaintext auth command disallows login-related commands until an encrypted session has been negotiated using SSL. If client compatibility requires you to allow connections to the pop3 or imap ports, rather than the alternate SSL ports, you should use this command to require STARTTLS before authentication.
3.17.2.3
Enable Dovecot Options to Protect Against Code Flaws
Edit /etc/dovecot.conf and add or correct the following line: login_process_per_connection = yes mail_drop_priv_before_exec = yes
CCE 4371-1, 4410-7
IMAP and POP3 are remote authenticated protocols, meaning that the server must accept remote connections from anyone, but provide substantial services only to clients who have successfully authenticated. To protect against security problems, Dovecot splits these functions into separate server processes. The imap-login and/or pop3-login processes accept connections from unauthenticated users, and only spawn imap or pop3 processes on successful authentication. However, the imap-login and pop3-login processes themselves may contain vulnerabilities. Since each of these processes operates as a daemon, handling multiple sequential client connections from dierent users, bugs in the code could allow unauthenticated users to steal credential data. If the login process per connection option is enabled, then a separate imap-login or pop3-login process is created for each new connection, protecting against this class of problems. This option has an eciency cost, but is strongly recommended. If the mail drop priv before exec option is on, the imap-login or pop3-login process will drop privileges to the users ID after authentication and before executing the imap or pop3 process itself. Under some very limited circumstances, this could protect against privilege escalation by authenticated users. However, if the mail executable option is used to run code before starting each users session, it is important to drop privileges to prevent the custom code from running as root.
3.17.2.4
Allow IMAP Clients to Access the Server
Edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain: -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 143 -j ACCEPT The default iptables conguration does not allow inbound access to any services. This modication will allow remote hosts to initiate connections to the IMAP daemon, while keeping all other ports on the server in their default protected state. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about iptables.
3.18
Samba (SMB) Microsoft Windows File Sharing Server
When properly congured, the Samba service allows Linux machines to provide le and print sharing to Microsoft Windows machines. There are two software packages that provide Samba support. The rst, samba-client,
185 provides a series of command line tools that enable a client machine to access Samba shares. The second, simply labeled samba, provides the Samba service. It is this second package that allows a Linux machine to act as an Active Directory server, a domain controller, or as a domain member. Only the samba-client package is installed by default.
3.18.1
Disable Samba if Possible
If the Samba service has been enabled and will not be used, disable it: # chkconfig smb off
CCE 4551-8
Even after the Samba server package has been installed, it will remain disabled. Do not enable this service unless it is absolutely necessary to provide Microsoft Windows le and print sharing functionality.
3.18.2
Congure Samba if Necessary
All settings for the Samba daemon can be found in /etc/samba/smb.conf. Settings are divided between a [global] conguration section and a series of user created share denition sections meant to describe le or print shares on the system. By default, Samba will operate in user mode and allow client machines to access local home directories and printers. It is recommended that these settings be changed or that additional limitations be set in place.
3.18.2.1
Testing the Samba Conguration File
To test the conguration le for syntax errors, use the testparm command. It will also list all settings currently in place, including defaults that may not appear in the conguration le. # testparm -v
3.18.2.2
Choosing the Appropriate security Parameter
There are two kinds of security in Samba, share-level (share) and user-level. User-level security is further subdivided into four separate implementations: user, domain, ads, and server. It is recommended that the share and server security modes not be used. In share security, everyone is given the same password for each share, preventing individual user accountability. server security mode has been superseded by the domain and ads security modes. It may now be considered obsolete. The security parameter is set in the [global] section of the Samba conguration le. It determines how the server will handle user names and passwords. Some security modes require additional parameters, such as workgroup, realm, or password server names. All security modes will require that each remote user have a matching local account. One workaround to this problem is to use the winbindd daemon. Please consult the ocial Samba documentation to learn more.
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3.18.2.2.1
Use user Security for Servers Not in a Domain Context
This is the default setting with a new Samba installation and the best choice when operating outside of a domain security context. The relevant parameters in /etc/samba/smb.conf will read as follows: security = user workgroup = MYGROUP Set the value of workgroup so that it matches the value of other machines on the network. In user mode, authentication requests are handled locally and not passed on to a separate authentication server. This is the desired behavior for standalone servers and domain controllers.
3.18.2.2.2
Use domain Security for Servers in a Domain Context

When using Samba as a Primary or Backup Domain Controller, use security = user, not security = domain. This tells Samba that the local machine is hosting the authentication backend.
First, change the security parameter to domain. Next, set the workgroup and netbios name parameters (if necessary): security = domain workgroup = WORKGROUP netbios name = NETBIOSNAME domain mode is used for any machine that will act as a domain member server. It lets Samba know that the authentication information it needs can be found on another machine. Primary and Backup Domain Controllers host copies of this information. Samba will try to automatically determine which machine it should authenticate against on a domain network. If this detection fails, it may be necessary to specify the location manually. Unlike the Microsoft Windows implementation of the SMB standard, a Samba machine can freely change roles within a domain without requiring that the machine be reinstalled (such roles include primary and backup domain controllers, domain member servers, and ordinary domain workstations). However, there are some limitations on how each machine can fulll each role in a mixed network.
3.18.2.2.3
Use ads (Active Directory Service) Security For Servers in an ADS Domain Context
The security mode ads enables a Samba machine to act as an ADS domain member server. Since ADS requires Kerberos, be sure to set the realm parameter appropriately and congure the local copy of Kerberos. If necessary, it is also possible to manually set the password server parameter. security = ads realm = MY REALM password server = your.kerberos.server Currently, it is possible to act as an Active Directory domain member server, but not as a domain controller. Be sure to operate in mixed mode. Native mode may not work yet in current versions of Samba. Future support
187 for ADS should be forthcoming in Samba 4. See the Samba project web site at http://www.samba.org for more details.
3.18.2.3
Disable Guest Access and Local Login Support
Do not allow guest users to access local le or printer shares. In global or in each share, set the parameter guest ok to no: [share] guest ok = no It is safe to disable local login support for remote Samba users. Consider changing the add user account script to set remote user shells to /sbin/nologin.
3.18.2.4
Disable Root Access
Administrators should not use administrator accounts to access Samba le and printer shares. If possible, disable the root user and the wheel administrator group: [share] invalid users = root @wheel If administrator accounts cannot be disabled, ensure that local machine passwords and Samba service passwords do not match. Typically, administrator access is required when Samba must create user and machine accounts and shares. Domain member servers and standalone servers may not need administrator access at all. If that is the case, add the invalid users parameter to [global] instead.
3.18.2.5
Set the Allowed Authentication Negotiation Levels
By default, Samba will attempt to negotiate with Microsoft Windows machines to set a common communication protocol. Whenever possible, be sure to disable LANMAN authentication, as it is far weaker than the other supported protocols. [global] client lanman auth = no Newer versions of Microsoft Windows may require the use of NTLMv2. NTLMv2 is the preferred protocol for authentication, but since older machines do not support it, Samba has disabled it by default. If possible, reenable it. [global] client ntlmv2 auth = yes For the sake of backwards compatibility, most modern Windows machines will still allow other machines to communicate with them over weak protocols such as LANMAN. On Samba, by enabling NTLMv2, you are also disabling LANMAN and NTLMv1. If NTLMv1 is required, it is still possible to individually disable LANMAN.
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3.18.2.6
Let Domain Controllers Create Machine Trust Accounts On-the-Fly
Add or correct an add machine script entry to the [global] section of /etc/samba/smb.conf to allow Samba to dynamically create Machine Trust Accounts:
[global] add machine script = /usr/sbin/useradd -n -g machines -d /dev/null -s /sbin/nologin %u
Make sure that the group machines exists. If not, add it with the following command: /usr/sbin/groupadd machines When acting as a PDC, it becomes necessary to create and store Machine Trust Accounts for each machine that joins the domain. On a Microsoft Windows PDC, this account is created with the Server Manager tool, but on a Samba PDC, two accounts must be created. The rst is the local machine account, and the second is the Samba account. For security purposes, it is recommended to let Samba create these accounts on-the-y. When Machine Trust Accounts are created manually, there is a small window of opportunity in which a rogue machine could join the domain in place of the new server.
3.18.2.7
Restrict Access to the [IPC$] Share
Limit access to the [IPC$] share so that only machines in your network will be able to connect to it: [IPC$] hosts allow = 192.168.1. 127.0.0.1 hosts deny = 0.0.0.0/0 The [IPC$] share allows users to anonymously fetch a list of shared resources from a server. It is intended to allow users to browse the list of available shares. It also can be used as a point of attack into a system. Disabling it completely may break some functionality, so it is recommended that you merely limit access to it instead.
3.18.2.8
Restrict File Sharing
Only users with local user accounts will be able to log in to Samba shares by default. Shares can be limited to particular users or network addresses. Use the hosts allow and hosts deny directives accordingly, and consider setting the valid users directive to a limited subset of users or to a group of users. Separate each address, user, or user group with a space as follows: [share] hosts allow = 192.168.1. 127.0.0.1 valid users = userone usertwo @usergroup It is also possible to limit read and write access to particular users with the read list and write list options, though the permissions set by the system itself will override these settings. Set the read only attribute for each share to ensure that global settings will not accidentally override the individual share settings. Then, as with the valid users directive, separate each user or group of users with a space: [share] read only = yes write list = userone usertwo @usergroup
189 The Samba service is only required for sharing les and printers with Microsoft Windows workstations, and even then, other options may exist. Do not use the Samba service to share les between Unix or Linux machines.
3.18.2.9
Require Server SMB Packet Signing
To make the server use packet signing, add the following to the [global] section of the Samba conguration le: server signing = mandatory The Samba server should only communicate with clients who can support SMB packet signing. Packet signing can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks which modify SMB packets in transit. The Samba service is only required for sharing les and printers with Microsoft Windows workstations, and even then, other options may exist. Do not use the Samba service to share les between Unix or Linux machines.
3.18.2.10
Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using smbclient
To require samba clients running smbclient to use packet signing, add the following to the [global] section of the Samba conguration le: client signing = mandatory
CCE 14075-6
A Samba client should only communicate with servers who can support SMB packet signing. Packet signing can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks which modify SMB packets in transit.
3.18.2.11
Require Client SMB Packet Signing, if using mount.cifs
Require packet signing of clients who mount Samba shares using the mount.cifs program (e.g., those who specify shares in /etc/fstab). To do so, ensure that signing options (either sec=krb5i or sec=ntlmv2i) are used.
CCE 15029-2
See the mount.cifs(8) man page for more information. A Samba client should only communicate with servers who can support SMB packet signing. Packet signing can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks which modify SMB packets in transit.
3.18.2.12
Restrict Printer Sharing
By default, Samba utilizes the CUPS printing service to enable printer sharing with Microsoft Windows workstations. If there are no printers on the local machine, or if printer sharing with Microsoft Windows is not required, disable the printer sharing capability by commenting out the following lines, found in /etc/ samba/smb.conf:
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[global] ; load printers = yes ; cups options = raw [printers] comment = All Printers path = /usr/spool/samba browseable = no guest ok = no writable = no printable = yes There may be other options present, but these are the only options enabled and uncommented by default. Removing the [printers] share should be enough for most users. If the Samba printer sharing capability is needed, consider disabling the Samba network browsing capability or restricting access to a particular set of users or network addresses. Set the valid users parameter to a small subset of users or restrict it to a particular group of users with the shorthand @. Separate each user or group of users with a space. For example, under the [printers] share: [printers] valid users = user @printerusers The CUPS service is capable of sharing printers with other Unix and Linux machines on the local network without the Samba service. The Samba service is only required when a Microsoft Windows machine needs printer access on a Unix or Linux host.
3.18.2.13
Congure iptables to Allow Access to the Samba Server
Determine an appropriate network block, netwk , and network mask, mask , representing the machines on your network which should operate as clients of the Samba server. Edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following lines, ensuring that they appear before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain:
-A -A -A -A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT RH-Firewall-1-INPUT RH-Firewall-1-INPUT RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s -s -s -s netwk /mask netwk /mask netwk /mask netwk /mask -m -m -m -m state state state state --state --state --state --state NEW NEW NEW NEW -p -p -p -p tcp tcp tcp tcp --dport --dport --dport --dport 137 138 139 445 -j -j -j -j ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT ACCEPT
The default Iptables conguration does not allow inbound access to the ports used by the Samba service. This modication allows that access, while keeping other ports on the server in their default protected state. Since these ports are frequent targets of network scanning attacks, restricting access to only the network segments which need to access the Samba server is strongly recommended. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about Iptables.
3.18.3
Avoid the Samba Web Administration Tool (SWAT)
SWAT is a web based conguration tool provided by the Samba team that enables both local and remote conguration management. It is not installed by default. It is recommended that SWAT not be used, as it requires
191 the use of a Samba administrator account and sends that password in the clear over a network connection. If SWAT is absolutely required, limit access to the local machine or tunnel SWAT connections through SSL with stunnel.
3.19
Proxy Server
A proxy server is a very desirable target for a potential adversary because much (or all) sensitive data for a given infrastructure may ow through it. Therefore, if one is required, the machine acting as a proxy server should be dedicated to that purpose alone and be stored in a physically secure location. The systems default proxy server software is Squid, and provided in an RPM package of the same name.
3.19.1
Disable Squid if Possible
If Squid was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a proxy server, then it should be disabled and removed: # chkconfig squid off # yum erase squid
CCE 4556-7, 4076-6
3.19.2
Congure Squid if Necessary
The Squid conguration le is /etc/squid/squid.conf. The following recommendations can be applied to this le. Note: If a particular tag is not present in the conguration le, Squid falls back to the default setting (which is often illustrated by a comment).
3.19.2.1
Listen on Uncommon Port
The default listening port for the Squid service is 3128. As such, it is frequently scanned by adversaries looking for proxy servers. Select an arbitrary (but uncommon) high port to use as the Squid listening port and make the corresponding change to the conguration le: http port port Run the following command to add a new SELinux port mapping for the service: # semanage port -a -t http_cache_port_t -p tcp port
3.19.2.2
Verify Default Secure Settings
Several security-enhancing settings in the Squid conguration le are enabled by default, but appear as comments in the conguration le (as mentioned in Section 3.19.2). In these instances, the explicit directive is not present,
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which means it is implicitly enabled. If you are operating with a default conguration le, this section can be ignored. Ensure that the following security settings are NOT explicitly changed from their default values: ftp_passive on ftp_sanitycheck on check_hostnames on request_header_max_size 20 KB reply_header_max_size 20 KB cache_effective_user squid cache_effective_group squid ignore_unknown_nameservers on
CCE 4454-5, 4353-9, 4503-9, 3585-7, 4419-8, 3692-1, 4459-4, 4476-8
ftp passive forces FTP passive connections. ftp sanitycheck performs additional sanity checks on FTP data connections. check hostnames ensures that hostnames meet RFC compliance. request header max size and reply header max size place an upper limit on HTTP header length, precautions against denial-of-service and buer overow vulnerabilities. cache effective user and cache effective group designate the EUID and EGID of Squid following initialization (it is essential that the EUID/EGID be set to an unprivileged sandbox account). ignore unknown nameservers checks to make sure that DNS responses come from the same IP the request was sent to.
3.19.2.3
Change Default Insecure Settings
The default conguration settings for the following tags are considered to be weak security and NOT recommended. Add or modify the conguration le to include the following lines: allow_underscore off httpd_suppress_version_string on forwarded_for off log_mime_hdrs on
CCE 4181-4, 4577-3, 4344-8, 4494-1
allow underscore enforces RFC 1034 compliance on hostnames by disallowing the use of underscores. httpd suppress version string prevents Squid from revealing version information in web headers and error pages. forwarded for reveals proxy client IP addresses in HTTP headers and should be disabled to prevent the leakage of internal network conguration details. log mime hdrs enables logging of HTTP response/request headers.
193
3.19.2.4
Congure Authentication if Applicable
Note: Authentication cannot be used in the case of transparent proxies due to limitations of the TCP/IP protocol. Similar to web servers, two of the available options are Basic and Digest authentication. The other options are NTLM and Negotiate authentication. As noted in Section 3.16.3.5, Basic authentication transmits passwords in plain-text and is susceptible to passive monitoring. If network sning is a concern, basic authentication should not be used. Negotiate is the newest and most secure protocol. It attempts to use Kerberos authentication and falls back to NTLM if it cannot. It should be noted that Kerberos requires a third-party Key Distribution Center (KDC) to function properly, whereas the other methods of authentication are two-party schemes. Squid also oers the ability to choose a custom external authenticator. Designating an external authenticator (also known as a helper module) allows Squid to oer pluggable third-party authentication schemes. LDAP is one example of a helper module that exists and is in use today. There are comments under the auth param tag inside /etc/squid/squid.conf that provide extensive detail on how to congure each of these methods. If authentication is necessary, choose a method of authentication and congure appropriately. The recommended minimum congurations illustrated for each method are acceptable. To force an ACL (as discussed in Section 3.19.2.5) to require authentication, use the following directive: acl name-of-ACL proxy_auth REQUIRED Note: The keyword REQUIRED can be replaced with a user or list of users to further restrict access to a smaller subset of users.
3.19.2.5
Access Control Lists (ACL)

Be very careful with the order of access control tags. Access control is handled top-down. The rst rule that matches is the only rule adhered to. The last rule on the list denes the default behavior in the case of no rule match.
The acl and http access tags are used in combination to allow ltering based on a series of access control lists. Squid has a list of default ACLs for localhost, SSL ports, and safe ports. Following the denition of these ACLs, a series of http access directives establish the following default ltering policy:
Allow cachemgr access only from localhost Allow access to only ports in the safe access control list Limit CONNECT method to SSL ports only Allow access from localhost Deny all other requests
The default ACL policies are reasonable from a security standpoint. However, the number of ports listed as safe could be signicantly trimmed depending on the needs of your network. Out of the box, ports 21, 70, 80, 210, 280, 443, 488, 591, 777, and 1025 through 65535 are all considered safe. Some of these ports are associated with deprecated or rarely used protocols. As such, this list could be trimmed to further tighten ltering. The following actions should be taken to tighten the ACL policies:
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CHAPTER 3. SERVICES
1. There is a lter line in the conguration le that is recommended but commented out. This line should be uncommented or added to prevent access to localhost from the proxy: http access deny to_localhost 2. An access list should be setup for the specic network or networks that the proxy is intended to serve. Only this subset of IP addresses should be allowed access. Add these lines where the following comment appears: # INSERT YOUR OWN RULE(S) HERE TO ALLOW ACCESS FROM YOUR CLIENTS acl your-network-acl-name src ip-range http_access allow your-network-acl-name Note: ip-range is of the format xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/xx 3. Ensure that the nal http access line to appear in the document is the following: http access deny all This guarantees that all trac not meeting an explicit ltering rule is denied. Further lters should be established to meet the specic needs of a network, explicitly allowing access only where necessary. 4. Consult the chart below. Corresponding acl entries for unused protocols should be commented out and thus denied.
CCE 4511-2, 4529-4, 3610-3, 4466-9, 4607-8, 4255-6, 4127-7, 4519-5, 4413-1, 4373-7
Port 21 70
Service ftp gopher
80 210
http wais
280 443 488 591
http-mgmt https gss-http lemaker
777
multiling http
Summary File Transfer Protocol(FTP) is a widely used le transfer protocol. The gopher protocol is a deprecated search and retrieval protocol that is almost extinct, with as few as 100 gopher servers present worldwide. Support for gopher is disabled in most modern browsers. A web proxy needs to allow access to HTTP trac. The Wide Area Information Server port is similar to gopher, serving as a text searching system to scour indexes on remote machines. Today, it is deprecated and nearly non-existent on the Internet. No documentation of any kind could be found on the obscure service that resides on this port. SSL trac is likely (and recommended) for any proxy and should be allowed. No documentation of any kind could be found on the obscure service that resides on this port. Filemaker is a database application originally offered by Apple in the 1980s. Although development continues and it remains in use today, it should be disabled if your network does not require such trac. No documentation of any kind could be found on the obscure service that resides on this port.
Recommendation ALLOW DENY
ALLOW DENY
DENY ALLOW DENY DENY
DENY
195 Port 1025-65535 Service unregistered ports Summary Random high ports are used by a variety of applications and should be allowed. Recommendation ALLOW
3.19.2.6
Congure Internet Cache Protocol (ICP) if Necessary
The ICP protocol is a cache communication protocol that allows multiple Squid servers to communicate. The ICP protocol was designed with no security in mind, relying on user-dened access control lists alone to determine which ICP messages to allow. If a Squid server is standalone, the ICP port should be disabled by adding or correcting the following line in the conguration le: icp_port 0 If the Squid server is meant to speak with peers, strict ACLs should be established to only allow ICP trac from trusted neighbors. To accomplish this, add or correct the following lines: icp_access allow acl-defining-trusted-neighbors icp_access deny all
3.19.2.7
Congure iptables to Allow Access to the Proxy Server
Determine an appropriate network block, netwk , and network mask, mask , representing the machines on your network which should operate as clients of the proxy server. Edit /etc/sysconfig/iptables. Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the nal LOG and DROP lines for the RH-Firewall-1-INPUT chain:
-A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s netwk /mask -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport port -j ACCEPT
For port , use either the default 3128 or the alternate port was selected in Section 3.19.2.1. The default Iptables conguration does not allow inbound access to the Squid proxy service. This modication allows that access, while keeping other ports on the server in their default protected state. See Section 2.5.5 for more information about Iptables.
3.19.2.8
Forward Log Messages to Syslog Daemon
The default behavior of Squid is to record its log messages in /var/log/squid.log. This behavior can be supplemented so that Squid also sends messages to syslog as well. This is useful for centralizing log data, particularly in instances where multiple Squid servers are present. Squid provides a command line argument to enable syslog forwarding. Modify the SQUID OPTS line in /etc/init.d/squid to include the -s option: SQUID_OPTS="${SQUID_OPTS:-"-D"} -s"
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3.19.2.9
Do Not Run as Root
Since Squid is loaded by the systems service utility, it starts as root and then changes its eective UID to the UID specied by the cache effective user directive. However, since it was still executed by root, the program maintains a saved UID of root even after changing its eective UID. To prevent this undesired behavior, Squid must either be congured to run in a chroot environment or it must be executed by a non-privileged user in non-daemon mode (the service utility must not be used).
3.19.2.9.1
Run Squid in a chroot Jail
Chrooting Squid can be a very complicated task. Documentation for the process is vague and a great deal of trial and error may be required to determine all the les that need to be transitioned over to the chroot environment. Therefore, this guide recommends instead the method detailed in Section 3.19.2.9.2 to lower privileges. If chrooting Squid is still desired, it can be enabled with the following directive in the conguration le: chroot chroot-path Then, all the necessary les used by Squid must be copied into the chroot-path directory. The specics of this step cannot be covered in this guide because they are highly dependent on the external programs used in the Squid conguration. Note: The strace utility is a valuable resource for discovering the les needed for the chroot environment.
3.19.2.9.2
Modify Service Entry to Lower Privileges
The following modication to /etc/init.d/squid forces the service utility to execute Squid as the squid user instead of the root user: # determine the name of the squid binary [ -f /usr/sbin/squid ] && SQUID="sudo -u squid squid" Making this change prevents Squid from writing its pid to /var/run. This pid le is used by service to check to see if the program started successfully. Therefore, a new location must be chosen for this pid le that the squid user has access to, and the corresponding references in /etc/init.d/squid must be altered to point to it. Make the following modication to the Squid conguration le: pid_filename /var/spool/squid/squid.pid Edit the le /etc/init.d/squid by changing all occurrences of /var/run/squid.pid to /var/spool/squid/ squid.pid Also modify the following line in /etc/init.d/squid: [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/squid and add the following lines immediately after it: rm -f /var/lock/subsys/squid status squid
197
3.20
SNMP Server
The Simple Network Management Protocol allows administrators to monitor the state of network devices, including computers. Older versions of SNMP were well-known for weak security, such as plaintext transmission of the community string (used for authentication) and also usage of easily-guessable choices for community string.
3.20.1
Disable SNMP Server if Possible
The system includes an SNMP daemon that allows for its remote monitoring, though it not installed by default. If it was installed and activated, it is important that the software be disabled and removed. If there is not a mission-critical need for hosts at this site to be remotely monitored by a SNMP tool, then disable and remove SNMP as follows: # chkconfig snmpd off # yum erase net-snmpd
CCE 3765-5, 14081-4
3.20.2
Congure SNMP Server if Necessary
If it is necessary to run the snmpd agent on the system, some best practices should be followed to minimize the security risk from the installation. The multiple security models implemented by SNMP cannot be fully covered here so only the following general conguration advice can be oered:
use only SNMP version 3 security models and enable the use of authentication and encryption for those write access to the MIB (Management Information Base) should be allowed only if necessary all access to the MIB should be restricted following a principle of least privilege network access should be limited to the maximum extent possible including restricting to expected network addresses both in the conguration les and in the system rewall rules ensure SNMP agents send traps only to, and accept SNMP queries only from, authorized management stations ensure that permissions on the snmpd.conf conguration le (by default, in /etc/snmp) are 640 or more restrictive ensure that any MIB les permissions are also 640 or more restrictive
3.20.2.1
Further Resources
The following resources provide more detailed information about the SNMP software:
The CERT SNMP Vulnerabilities FAQ at http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/snmp_faq.html The Net-SNMP project web page at http://net-snmp.sourceforge.net The snmp config(5) man page the snmpd.conf(5) man page
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199
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Nsa Rhel 5 Guide v4.2

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Guide to the Secure Conguration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5

Revision 4.2 August 26, 2011

Revision 4.1 is an update of Revision 4 dated September 14, 2010.

Encrypt Transmitted Data Whenever Possible

Minimize Software to Minimize Vulnerability

Run Dierent Network Services on Separate Systems

Congure Security Tools to Improve System Robustness

How to Use This Guide

Read Sections Completely and in Order

Test in Non-Production Environment

Root Shell Environment Assumed

Initial Installation Recommendations

Create Separate Partition or Logical Volume for /tmp

CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM-WIDE CONFIGURATION

Create Separate Partition or Logical Volume for /var

Create Separate Partition or Logical Volume for /var/log

Create Separate Partition or Logical Volume for /var/log/audit

Boot Loader Conguration

20 Screen Set Up Software Updates Recommendation

CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM-WIDE CONFIGURATION

Congure Connection to the RHN RPM Repositories

Ensure Red Hat GPG Key is Installed

Disable the rhnsd Daemon

Obtain Software Package Updates with yum

Manually Check for Package Updates

Congure Automatic Update Retrieval and Installation with Cron

CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM-WIDE CONFIGURATION

Ensure Package Signature Checking is Globally Activated

Ensure Package Signature Checking is Not Disabled For Any Repos

Software Integrity Checking

Customize Conguration File

Build, Store, and Test Database

CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM-WIDE CONFIGURATION

Implement Periodic Execution of Integrity Checking

Manually Verify Integrity of AIDE

Verify Package Integrity Using RPM

File Permissions and Masks

Restrict Partition Mount Options

Add nodev Option to Non-Root Local Partitions

add the text ,nodev to the list of mount options in column 4.

CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM-WIDE CONFIGURATION

Add nodev, nosuid, and noexec Options to Removable Storage Partitions

Add nodev, nosuid, and noexec Options to Temporary Storage Partitions

Add nodev, nosuid, and noexec Options to /tmp

Add nodev, nosuid, and noexec Options to /dev/shm

Bind-mount /var/tmp to /tmp

Restrict Dynamic Mounting and Unmounting of Filesystems

Restrict Console Device Access

0600 /dev/console 0600 root.root 0600 <dri> 0600 root

Disable USB Device Support

Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driver

CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM-WIDE CONFIGURATION

Remove USB Storage Driver

Disable Kernel Support for USB via Bootloader Conguration

Disable Booting from USB Devices

Disable the Automounter if Possible

# chkconfig autofs off

Disable GNOME Automounting if Possible

Disable Mounting of Uncommon Filesystem Types

CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM-WIDE CONFIGURATION