LCD's Loan Primer

A GUIDE TO THE
U.S. LOAN MARKET

LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA
SEPTEMBER 2012
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A GUIDE TO THE
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LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA
SEPTEMBER 2012
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STANDARD & POORS RATINGS SERVICES | S&P CAPITAL IQ 3
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TO OUR CLIENTS
S
tandard & Poors Ratings Services is pleased to bring you the 2012-2013 edition of our Guide To
The Loan Market, which provides a detailed primer on the syndicated loan market along with
articles that describe the bank loan and recovery rating process as well as our analytical approach
to evaluating loss and recovery in the event of default.
Standard & Poors Ratings is the leading provider of credit and recovery ratings for leveraged
loans. Indeed, we assign recovery ratings to all speculative-grade loans and bonds that we rate in
nearly 30 countries, along with our traditional corporate credit ratings. As of press time, Standard &
Poors has recovery ratings on the debt of more than 1,200 companies. We also produce detailed
recovery rating reports on most of them, which are available to syndicators and investors.
(To request a copy of a report on a specific loan and recovery rating, please refer to the contact
information below.)
In addition to rating loans, Standard & Poors Capital IQ unit offers a wide range of information,
data and analytical services for loan market participants, including:
U Data and commentary: Standard & Poors Leveraged Commentary & Data (LCD) unit is the leading
provider of real-time news, statistical reports, market commentary, and data for leveraged loan
and high-yield market participants.
U Loan price evaluations: Standard & Poors Evaluation Service provides price evaluations for leveraged
loan investors.
U Recovery statistics: Standard & Poors LossStats(tm) database is the industry standard for
recovery information for bank loans and other debt classes.
U Fundamental credit information: Standard & Poors Capital IQ is the premier provider of financial
data for leveraged finance issuers.
If you want to learn more about our loan market services, all the appropriate contact information
is listed in the back of this publication. We welcome questions, suggestions, and feedback on
our products and services, and on this Guide, which we update annually. We publish Leveraged
Matters, a free weekly update on the leveraged finance market, which includes selected Standard
& Poors recovery reports and analyses and a comprehensive list of Standard & Poors bank loan
and recovery ratings.
To be put on the subscription list, please e-mail your name and contact information to
[email protected] or call (1) 212-438-7638. You can also access that report
and many other articles, including this entire Guide To The Loan Market in electronic form, on our
Standard & Poors loan and recovery rating website: www.bankloanrating.standardandpoors.com.
For information about loan-market news and data, please visit us online at www.lcdcomps.com or
contact Marc Auerbach at [email protected] or (1) 212-438-2703. You can
also follow us on Twitter, Facebook, or LinkedIn.
Steven Miller Andrew Watt
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4
A GUIDE TO THE U.S. LOAN MARKET | SEPTEMBER 2012
CONTENTS
A Syndicated Loan Primer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rating Leveraged Loans: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Criteria Guidelines For Recovery Ratings on
Global Industrials Issuers Speculative-Grade Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Key Contacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
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A
syndicated loan is a commercial loan provided by a group of lenders
and is structured, arranged, and administered by one or several
commercial or investment banks known as arrangers.
Starting with the large leveraged buyout (LBO) loans of the mid-1980s,
the syndicated loan market has become the dominant way for issuers to
tap banks and other institutional capital providers for loans. The reason is
simple: Syndicated loans are less expensive and more efficient to
administer than traditional bilateral, or individual, credit lines.
Arrangers serve the time-honored investment-
banking role of raising investor dollars for an
issuer in need of capital. The issuer pays the
arranger a fee for this service, and, naturally,
this fee increases with the complexity and riski-
ness of the loan. As a result, the most profitable
loans are those to leveraged borrowersissu-
ers whose credit ratings are speculative grade
and who are paying spreads (premiums above
LIBOR or another base rate) sufficient to
attract the interest of nonbank term loan inves-
tors, typically LIBOR+200 or higher, though this
threshold moves up and down depending on
market conditions.
By contrast, large, high-quality companies
pay little or no fee for a plain-vanilla loan, typi-
cally an unsecured revolving credit instrument
that is used to provide support for short-term
commercial paper borrowings or for working
capital. In many cases, moreover, these borrow-
ers will effectively syndicate a loan themselves,
using the arranger simply to craft documents
and administer the process. For leveraged issu-
ers, the story is a very different one for the
arranger, and, by different, we mean more
lucrative. A new leveraged loan can carry an
arranger fee of 1% to 5% of the total loan
commitment, generally speaking, depending on
(1) the complexity of the transaction, (2) how
strong market conditions are at the time, and
(3) whether the loan is underwritten. Merger
and acquisition (M&A) and recapitalization
loans will likely carry high fees, as will exit
financings and restructuring deals. Seasoned
leveraged issuers, by contrast, pay lower fees
for refinancings and add-on transactions.
Because investment-grade loans are
infrequently drawn down and, therefore, offer
drastically lower yields, the ancillary business is
as important a factor as the credit product in
arranging such deals, especially because many
acquisition-related financings for investment-
grade companies are large in relation to the
pool of potential investors, which would consist
solely of banks.
The retail market for a syndicated loan
consists of banks and, in the case of leveraged
transactions, finance companies and institu-
tional investors such as mutual funds, struc-
tured finance vehicles, and hedge funds. Before
formally launching a loan to these retail
accounts, arrangers will often read the market
by informally polling select investors to gauge
their appetite for the credit. Based on these
Managing Director
Steven C. Miller
New York
(1) 212-438-2715
steven_miller@
standardandpoors.com
A Syndicated Loan Primer
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6
discussions, the arranger will launch the credit
at a spread and fee it believes will clear the
market. Until 1998, this would have been it.
Once the pricing was set, it was set, except in
the most extreme cases. If the loan were
undersubscribed, the arrangers could very well
be left above their desired hold level. After the
Russian debt crisis roiled the market in 1998,
however, arrangers adopted market-flex lan-
guage, which allows them to change the pricing
of the loan based on investor demandin some
cases within a predetermined rangeas well as
shift amounts between various tranches of a
loan, as a standard feature of loan commitment
letters. Market-flex language, in a single stroke,
pushed the loan syndication process, at least in
the leveraged arena, across the Rubicon, to a
full-fledged capital markets exercise.
Initially, arrangers invoked flex language to
make loans more attractive to investors by hiking
the spread or lowering the price. This was logical
after the volatility introduced by the Russian debt
debacle. Over time, however, market-flex became
a tool either to increase or decrease pricing of a
loan, based on investor demand.
Because of market flex, a loan syndication
today functions as a book-building exercise,
in bond-market parlance. A loan is originally
launched to market at a target spread or, as
was increasingly common by the late 2000s,
with a range of spreads referred to as price talk
(i.e., a target spread of, say, LIBOR+250 to
LIBOR+275). Investors then will make commit-
ments that in many cases are tiered by the
spread. For example, an account may put in for
$25 million at LIBOR+275 or $15 million at
LIBOR+250. At the end of the process, the
arranger will total up the commitments and
then make a call on where to price, or print,
the paper. Following the example above, if the
paper is oversubscribed at LIBOR+250, the
arranger may slice the spread further.
Conversely, if it is undersubscribed even at
LIBOR+275, then the arranger may be forced
to raise the spread to bring more money to
the table.
Loan Purposes
For the most part, issuers use leveraged loan
proceeds for four purposes:
U To support a merger- or acquisition-related
transaction,
U To back a recapitalzation of a companys bal-
ance sheet,
U To refinance debt,
U To fund general corporate purposes or proj-
ect finance.
Mergers and acquisitions
M&A is the lifeblood of leveraged finance. There
are the three primary types of acquisition loans:
1) Leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Most LBOs are
backed by a private equity firm, which funds the
transaction with a significant amount of debt in
the form of leveraged loans, mezzanine finance,
high-yield bonds, and/or seller notes. Debt as a
share of total sources of funding for the LBO
can range from 50% to upwards of 75%. The
nature of the transaction will determine how
highly it is leveraged. Issuers with large, stable
cash flows usually are able to support higher
leverage. Similarly, issuers in defensive, less-
cyclical sectors are given more latitude than
those in cyclical industry segments. Finally, the
Largest Loan Mutual Fund Managers
Assets under management (bil. $)
Eaton Vance Group $12.25 Franklin Funds $2.19
Fidelity Advisors $11.44 Blackrock $1.95
Oppenheimer & Co. $5.88 T. Rowe Price High Yield Fund $1.95
Hartford Asset Mgmt $5.57 DWS Investments $1.89
PIMCO $4.48 ING Investment Management $1.61
INVESCO $4.41 RS Investments $1.40
RidgeWorth $3.75 MainStay Investments $1.05
Lord Abbett $2.89 JP Morgan Chase $0.78
Nuveen $2.67 Goldman Sachs $0.68
John Hancock Asset Management $2.50 Pioneer Investments $0.61
A SYNDICATED LOAN PRIMER
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reputation of the private equity backer (spon-
sor) also plays a role, as does market liquidity
(the amount of institutional investor cash avail-
able). Stronger markets usually allow for higher
leverage; in weaker markets lenders want to
keep leverage in check.
There are three main types of LBO deals:
U Public-to-private (P2P)also called go-pri-
vate dealsin which the private equity firm
purchases a publicly traded company via a
tender offer. In some P2P deals, a stub por-
tion of the equity continues to trade on
an exchange. In others, the company is
bought outright.
U Sponsor-to-sponsor (S2S) deals, where one
private equity firm sells a portfolio property
to another.
U Noncore acquisitions, in which a corporate
issuer sells a division to a private equity firm.
2) Platform acquisitions. Transactions in
which private-equity-backed issuers buys a
business that they judge will be accretive by
either creating cost savings and/or generating
expansion synergies.
3) Strategic acquisitions. These are similar
to a platform acquisitions but are executed
by an issuer that is not owned by a private
equity firm.
Recapitalizations
A leveraged loan backing a recpitalization
results in changes in the composition of an
entitys balance sheet mix between debt and
equity either by (1) issuing debt to pay a divi-
dend or repurchase stock or (2) selling new
equity, in some cases to repay debt.
Some common examples:
U Dividend. Dividend financing is straightfor-
ward. A company takes on debt and uses
proceeds to pay a dividend to shareholders.
Activity here tends to track market condi-
tions. Bull markets inspire more dividend
deals as issuers tap excess liquidity to pay
out equity holders. In weaker markets activity
slows as lenders tighten the reins, and usu-
ally look skeptically at transactions that
weaken an issuers balance sheet.
U Stock repurchase. In this form of recap deal
a company uses debt proceeds to repurchase
stock. The effect on the balance sheet is the
same as a dividend, with the mix shifting
toward debt.
U Equity infusion. These transactions typically
are seen in distressed situations. In some
cases, the private equity owners agree to
make an equity infusion in the company, in
exchange for a new debt package. In others,
a new investor steps in to provide fresh capi-
tal. Either way, the deal strengthens the
companys balance sheet.
U IPO (reverse LBO). An issuer listsor, in the
case of a P2P LBO, relistson an exchange.
As part of such a deleveraging the company
might revamp its loans or bonds at more
favorable terms.
Refinancing
Simply put, this entails a new loan or bond
issue torefinance existing debt.
General corporate purposes
These deals support working capital, general
operations, and other business-as-usual purposes.
Build-outs
Build-out financing supports a particular project,
such as a utility plant, a land development deal,
a casino or an energy pipeline.
Types Of Syndications
There are three types of syndications: an
underwritten deal, a best-efforts syndication,
and a club deal.
Underwritten deal
An underwritten deal is one for which the
arrangers guarantee the entire commitment,
and then syndicate the loan. If the arrangers
cannot fully subscribe the loan, they are forced
to absorb the difference, which they may later
try to sell to investors. This is achievable, in
most cases, if market conditions, or the credits
fundamentals, improve. If not, the arranger may
be forced to sell at a discount and, potentially,
even take a loss on the paper (known as selling
through fees). Or the arranger may just be left
above its desired hold level of the credit. So, why
do arrangers underwrite loans? First, offering
an underwritten loan can be a competitive tool
to win mandates. Second, underwritten loans
usually require more lucrative fees because the
WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM
8
agent is on the hook if potential lenders balk. Of
course, with flex-language now common, under-
writing a deal does not carry the same risk it
once did when the pricing was set in stone prior
to syndication.
Best-efforts syndication
A best-efforts syndication is one for which
the arranger group commits to underwrite less
than the entire amount of the loan, leaving the
credit to the vicissitudes of the market. If the
loan is undersubscribed, the credit may not
closeor may need major surgery to clear the
market. Traditionally, best-efforts syndications
were used for risky borrowers or for complex
transactions.
Club deal
A club deal is a smaller loan (usually $25 mil-
lion to $100 million, but as high as $150 million)
that is premarketed to a group of relationship
lenders. The arranger is generally a first among
equals, and each lender gets a full cut, or nearly
a full cut, of the fees.
The Syndication Process
The information memo, or bank book
Before awarding a mandate, an issuer might
solicit bids from arrangers. The banks will out-
line their syndication strategy and qualifica-
tions, as well as their view on the way the loan
will price in market. Once the mandate is
awarded, the syndication process starts. The
arranger will prepare an information memo (IM)
describing the terms of the transactions. The
IM typically will include an executive summary,
investment considerations, a list of terms and
conditions, an industry overview, and a financial
model. Because loans are not securities, this
will be a confidential offering made only to
qualified banks and accredited investors.
If the issuer is speculative grade and seeking
capital from nonbank investors, the arranger
will often prepare a public version of the IM.
This version will be stripped of all confidential
material such as management financial
projections so that it can be viewed by
accounts that operate on the public side of the
wall or that want to preserve their ability to buy
bonds or stock or other public securities of the
particular issuer (see the Public Versus Private
section below). Naturally, investors that view
materially nonpublic information of a company
are disqualified from buying the companys
public securities for some period of time.
As the IM (or bank book, in traditional
market lingo) is being prepared, the syndicate
desk will solicit informal feedback from
potential investors on what their appetite for
the deal will be and at what price they are
willing to invest. Once this intelligence has been
gathered, the agent will formally market the
deal to potential investors. Arrangers will
distribute most IMsalong with other
information related to the loan, pre- and post-
closingto investors through digital platforms.
Leading vendors in this space are Intralinks,
Syntrak, and Debt Domain.
The IM typically contain the following sections:
U The executive summary will include a
description of the issuer, an overview of the
transaction and rationale, sources and uses,
and key statistics on the financials.
U Investment considerations will be, basically,
managements sales pitch for the deal.
U The list of terms and conditions will be a pre-
liminary term sheet describing the pricing,
structure, collateral, covenants, and other
terms of the credit (covenants are usually
negotiated in detail after the arranger
receives investor feedback).
U The industry overview will be a description of
the companys industry and competitive
position relative to its industry peers.
U The financial model will be a detailed model
of the issuers historical, pro forma, and pro-
jected financials including managements
high, low, and base case for the issuer.
Most new acquisition-related loans kick off
at a bank meeting at which potential lenders
hear management and the sponsor group (if
there is one) describe what the terms of the
loan are and what transaction it backs.
Understandably, bank meetings are more often
than not conducted via a Webex or conference
call, although some issuers still prefer old-
fashioned, in-person gatherings.
Whatever the format, management uses the
bank meeting to provide its vision for the
transaction and, most important, tell why and
how the lenders will be repaid on or ahead of
schedule. In addition, investors will be briefed
regarding the multiple exit strategies, including
second ways out via asset sales. (If it is a small
deal or a refinancing instead of a formal
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meeting, there may be a series of calls or one-
on-one meetings with potential investors.)
Once the loan is closed, the final terms are
then documented in detailed credit and security
agreements. Subsequently, liens are perfected
and collateral is attached.
Loans, by their nature, are flexible documents
that can be revised and amended from time to
time. These amendments require different levels
of approval (see Voting Rights section below).
Amendments can range from something as
simple as a covenant waiver to something as
complex as a change in the collateral package
or allowing the issuer to stretch out its
payments or make an acquisition.
The loan investor market
There are three primary-investor consisten-
cies: banks, finance companies, and
institutional investors.
Banks, in this case, can be either a commer-
cial bank, a savings and loan institution, or a
securities firm that usually provides invest-
ment-grade loans. These are typically large
revolving credits that back commercial paper or
are used for general corporate purposes or, in
some cases, acquisitions. For leveraged loans,
banks typically provide unfunded revolving
credits, LOCs, andalthough they are becoming
increasingly less commonamortizing term
loans, under a syndicated loan agreement.
Finance companies have consistently
represented less than 10% of the leveraged
loan market, and tend to play in smaller deals
$25 million to $200 million. These investors
often seek asset-based loans that carry wide
spreads and that often feature time-intensive
collateral monitoring.
Institutional investors in the loan market are
principally structured vehicles known as collat-
eralized loan obligations (CLO) and loan partici-
pation mutual funds (known as prime funds
because they were originally pitched to inves-
tors as a money-market-like fund that would
approximate the prime rate). In addition, hedge
funds, high-yield bond funds, pension funds,
insurance companies, and other proprietary
investors do participate opportunistically in
loans focusing usually on wide-margin (or
high-octane) paper.
CLOs are special-purpose vehicles set up to
hold and manage pools of leveraged loans. The
special-purpose vehicle is financed with several
tranches of debt (typically a AAA rated tranche,
a AA tranche, a BBB tranche, and a mezzanine
tranche) that have rights to the collateral and
payment stream in descending order. In
addition, there is an equity tranche, but the
equity tranche is usually not rated. CLOs are
created as arbitrage vehicles that generate
equity returns through leverage, by issuing debt
10 to 11 times their equity contribution. There
are also market-value CLOs that are less
leveragedtypically 3 to 5 timesand allow
managers more flexibility than more tightly
structured arbitrage deals. CLOs are usually
rated by two of the three major ratings
agencies and impose a series of covenant tests
on collateral managers, including minimum
rating, industry diversification, and maximum
default basket.
Loan mutual funds are how retail investors
can access the loan market. They are mutual
funds that invest in leveraged loans. These
fundsoriginally known as prime funds
because they offered investors the chance to
earn the prime interest rate that banks charge
on commercial loanswere first introduced in
the late 1980s. Today there are three main cat-
egories of funds:
U Daily-access funds: These are traditional
open-end mutual fund products into which
investors can buy or redeem shares each day
at the funds net asset value.
U Continuously offered, closed-end funds:
These were the first loan mutual fund prod-
ucts. Investors can buy into these funds each
day at the funds net asset valueNAV.
Redemptions, however, are made via monthly
or quarterly tenders rather than each day like
the open-end funds described above. To
make sure they can meet redemptions, many
of these funds, as well as daily access funds,
set up lines of credit to cover withdrawals
above and beyond cash reserves.
U Exchange-traded, closed-end funds: These
are funds that trade on a stock exchange.
Typically, the funds are capitalized by an ini-
tial public offering. Thereafter, investors can
buy and sell shares, but may not redeem
them. The manager can also expand the fund
via rights offerings. Usually, they are only
able to do so when the fund is trading at a
premium to NAV, howevera provision that is
typical of closed-end funds regardless of the
asset class.
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10
In March 2011, Invesco introduced the first
index-based exchange traded fund, PowerShares
Senior Loan Portfolio (BKLN), which is based on
the S&P/LSTA Loan 100 Index.
The table lists the 20 largest loan mutual
fund managers by AUM as of July 31, 2012.
Public Versus Private
In the old days, a bright red line separated
public and private information in the loan mar-
ket. Loans were strictly on the private side of
the wall and any information transmitted
between the issuer and the lender group
remained confidential.
In the late 1980s, that line began to blur as a
result of two market innovations. The first was
more active secondary trading that sprung up
to support (1) the entry of nonbank investors in
the market, such as insurance companies and
loan mutual funds and (2) to help banks sell
rapidly expanding portfolios of distressed and
highly leveraged loans that they no longer
wanted to hold. This meant that parties that
were insiders on loans might now exchange
confidential information with traders and
potential investors who were not (or not yet) a
party to the loan. The second innovation that
weakened the public-private divide was trade
journalism that focuses on the loan market.
Despite these two factors, the public versus
private line was well understood and rarely con-
troversial for at least a decade. This changed in
the early 2000s as a result of:
U The proliferation of loan ratings, which, by
their nature, provide public exposure for
loan deals;
U The explosive growth of nonbank investors
groups, which included a growing number of
institutions that operated on the public side of
the wall, including a growing number of mutual
funds, hedge funds, and even CLO boutiques;
U The growth of the credit default swaps mar-
ket, in which insiders like banks often sold or
bought protection from institutions that were
not privy to inside information; and
U A more aggressive effort by the press to
report on the loan market.
Some background is in order. The vast major-
ity of loans are unambiguously private financing
arrangements between issuers and their lend-
ers. Even for issuers with public equity or debt
that file with the SEC, the credit agreement only
becomes public when it is filed, often months
after closing, as an exhibit to an annual report
(10-K), a quarterly report (10-Q), a current
report (8-K), or some other document (proxy
statement, securities registration, etc.).
Beyond the credit agreement, there is a raft
of ongoing correspondence between issuers
and lenders that is made under confidentiality
agreements, including quarterly or monthly
financial disclosures, covenant compliance
information, amendment and waiver requests,
and financial projections, as well as plans for
acquisitions or dispositions. Much of this infor-
mation may be material to the financial health
of the issuer and may be out of the public
domain until the issuer formally puts out a
press release or files an 8-K or some other
document with the SEC.
In recent years, this information has leaked
into the public domain either via off-line con-
versations or the press. It has also come to
light through mark-to-market pricing services,
which from time to time report significant
movement in a loan price without any corre-
sponding news. This is usually an indication
that the banks have received negative or posi-
tive information that is not yet public.
In recent years, there was growing concern
among issuers, lenders, and regulators that this
migration of once-private information into pub-
lic hands might breach confidentiality agree-
ments between lenders and issuers and, more
importantly, could lead to illegal trading. How
has the market contended with these issues?
U Traders. To insulate themselves from violat-
ing regulations, some dealers and buyside
firms have set up their trading desks on the
public side of the wall. Consequently, traders,
salespeople, and analysts do not receive pri-
vate information even if somewhere else in
the institution the private data are available.
This is the same technique that investment
banks have used from time immemorial to
separate their private investment banking
activities from their public trading and
sales activities.
U Underwriters. As mentioned above, in most
primary syndications, arrangers will prepare a
public version of information memoranda
that is scrubbed of private information like
projections. These IMs will be distributed to
accounts that are on the public side of the
wall. As well, underwriters will ask public
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accounts to attend a public version of the
bank meeting and distribute to these
accounts only scrubbed financial information.
U Buy-side accounts. On the buy-side there are
firms that operate on either side of the pub-
lic-private divide. Accounts that operate on
the private side receive all confidential mate-
rials and agree to not trade in public securi-
ties of the issuers in question. These groups
are often part of wider investment complexes
that do have public funds and portfolios but,
via Chinese walls, are sealed from these
parts of the firms. There are also accounts
that are public. These firms take only public
IMs and public materials and, therefore,
retain the option to trade in the public secu-
rities markets even when an issuer for which
they own a loan is involved. This can be tricky
to pull off in practice because in the case of
an amendment the lender could be called on
to approve or decline in the absence of any
real information. To contend with this issue,
the account could either designate one per-
son who is on the private side of the wall to
sign off on amendments or empower its
trustee or the loan arranger to do so. But its
a complex proposition.
U Vendors. Vendors of loan data, news, and
prices also face many challenges in man-
aging the flow of public and private infor-
mation. In generally, the vendors operate
under the freedom of the press provision
of the U.S. Constitutions First Amendment
and report on information in a way that
anyone can simultaneously receive itfor
a price of course. Therefore, the informa-
tion is essentially made public in a way
that doesnt deliberately disadvantage any
party, whether its a news story discussing
the progress of an amendment or an
acquisition, or its a price change reported
by a mark-to-market service. This, of
course, doesnt deal with the underlying
issue that someone who is a party to
confidential information is making it
available via the press or prices to a
broader audience.
Another way in which participants deal with
the public versus private issue is to ask coun-
terparties to sign big-boy letters. These let-
ters typically ask public-side institutions to
acknowledge that there may be information
they are not privy to and they are agreeing to
make the trade in any case. They are, effec-
tively, big boys and will accept the risks.
Credit Risk: An Overview
Pricing a loan requires arrangers to evaluate the
risk inherent in a loan and to gauge investor
appetite for that risk. The principal credit risk
factors that banks and institutional investors
contend with in buying loans are default risk and
loss-given-default risk. Among the primary ways
that accounts judge these risks are ratings,
collateral coverage, seniority, credit statistics,
industry sector trends, management strength,
and sponsor. All of these, together, tell a story
about the deal.
Brief descriptions of the major risk
factors follow.
Default risk
Default risk is simply the likelihood of a borrow-
ers being unable to pay interest or principal on
time. It is based on the issuers financial condi-
tion, industry segment, and conditions in that
industry and economic variables and intangi-
bles, such as company management. Default
risk will, in most cases, be most visibly
expressed by a public rating from Standard &
Poors Ratings Services or another ratings
agency. These ratings range from AAA for the
most creditworthy loans to CCC for the least.
The market is divided, roughly, into two seg-
ments: investment grade (loans to issuers
rated BBB- or higher) and leveraged (borrow-
ers rated BB+ or lower). Default risk, of course,
varies widely within each of these broad seg-
ments. Since the mid-1990s, public loan rat-
ings have become a de facto requirement for
issuers that wish to do business with a wide
group of institutional investors. Unlike banks,
which typically have large credit departments
and adhere to internal rating scales, fund man-
agers rely on agency ratings to bracket risk and
explain the overall risk of their portfolios to
their own investors. As of mid-2011, then,
roughly 80% of leveraged-loan volume carried a
loan rating, up from 45% in 1998 and virtually
none before 1995.
Seniority
Where an instrument ranks in priority of pay-
ment is referred to as seniority. Based on this
ranking, an issuer will direct payments with
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12
the senior-most creditors paid first and the
most junior equityholders last. In a typical
structure, senior secured and unsecured cred-
itors will be first in right of paymentalthough
in bankruptcy, secured instruments typically
move the front of the linefollowed by subor-
dinate bondholders, junior bondholders, pre-
ferred shareholders, and common
shareholders. Leveraged loans are typically
senior, secured instruments and rank highest
in the capital structure.
Loss-given-default risk
Loss-given-default risk measures how severe a
loss the lender is likely to incur in the event of
default. Investors assess this risk based on the
collateral (if any) backing the loan and the
amount of other debt and equity subordinated
to the loan. Lenders will also look to covenants
to provide a way of coming back to the table
earlythat is, before other creditorsand rene-
gotiating the terms of a loan if the issuer fails to
meet financial targets. Investment-grade loans
are, in most cases, senior unsecured instru-
ments with loosely drawn covenants that apply
only at incurrence, that is, only if an issuer
makes an acquisition or issues debt. As a result,
loss given default may be no different from risk
incurred by other senior unsecured creditors.
Leveraged loans, by contrast, are usually senior
secured instruments that, except for covenant-
lite loans (see below), have maintenance cove-
nants that are measured at the end of each
quarter whether or not the issuer is in compli-
ance with pre-set financial tests. Loan holders,
therefore, almost always are first in line among
pre-petition creditors and, in many cases, are
able to renegotiate with the issuer before the
loan becomes severely impaired. It is no sur-
prise, then, that loan investors historically fare
much better than other creditors on a loss-
given-default basis.
Credit statistics
Credit statistics are used by investors to help
calibrate both default and loss-given-default
risk. These statistics include a broad array of
financial data, including credit ratios measuring
leverage (debt to capitalization and debt to
EBITDA) and coverage (EBITDA to interest,
EBITDA to debt service, operating cash flow to
fixed charges). Of course, the ratios investors
use to judge credit risk vary by industry. In addi-
tion to looking at trailing and pro forma ratios,
investors look at managements projections and
the assumptions behind these projections to
see if the issuers game plan will allow it to ser-
vice its debt. There are ratios that are most
geared to assessing default risk. These include
leverage and coverage. Then there are ratios
that are suited for evaluating loss-given-default
risk. These include collateral coverage, or the
value of the collateral underlying the loan rela-
tive to the size of the loan. They also include the
ratio of senior secured loan to junior debt in the
capital structure. Logically, the likely severity of
loss-given-default for a loan increases with the
size of the loan as a percentage of the overall
debt structure so does. After all, if an issuer
defaults on $100 million of debt, of which $10
million is in the form of senior secured loans,
the loans are more likely to be fully covered in
bankruptcy than if the loan totals $90 million.
Industry sector
Industry is a factor, because sectors, naturally,
go in and out of favor. For that reason, having a
loan in a desirable sector, like telecom in the
late 1990s or healthcare in the early 2000s, can
really help a syndication along. Also, loans to
issuers in defensive sectors (like consumer
products) can be more appealing in a time of
economic uncertainty, whereas cyclical borrow-
ers (like chemicals or autos) can be more
appealing during an economic upswing.
Sponsorship
Sponsorship is a factor, too. Needless to say,
many leveraged companies are owned by one or
more private equity firms. These entities, such
as Kohlberg Kravis & Roberts or Carlyle Group,
invest in companies that have leveraged capital
structures. To the extent that the sponsor
group has a strong following among loan inves-
tors, a loan will be easier to syndicate and,
therefore, can be priced lower. In contrast, if
the sponsor group does not have a loyal set of
relationship lenders, the deal may need to be
priced higher to clear the market. Among
banks, investment factors may include whether
or not the bank is party to the sponsors equity
fund. Among institutional investors, weight is
given to an individual deal sponsors track
record in fixing its own impaired deals by step-
ping up with additional equity or replacing a
management team that is failing.
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Syndicating A Loan By Facility
Most loans are structured and syndicated to
accommodate the two primary syndicated
lender constituencies: banks (domestic and
foreign) and institutional investors (primarily
structured finance vehicles, mutual funds, and
insurance companies). As such, leveraged loans
consist of:
U Pro rata debt consists of the revolving credit
and amortizing term loan (TLa), which are
packaged together and, usually, syndicated
to banks. In some loans, however, institu-
tional investors take pieces of the TLa and,
less often, the revolving credit, as a way to
secure a larger institutional term loan alloca-
tion. Why are these tranches called pro
rata? Because arrangers historically syndi-
cated revolving credit and TLas on a pro rata
basis to banks and finance companies.
U Institutional debt consists of term loans
structured specifically for institutional inves-
tors, although there are also some banks
that buy institutional term loans. These
tranches include first- and second-lien
loans, as well as prefunded letters of credit.
Traditionally, institutional tranches were
referred to as TLbs because they were bullet
payments and lined up behind TLas.
Finance companies also play in the leveraged
loan market, and buy both pro rata and institu-
tional tranches. With institutional investors
playing an ever-larger role, however, by the late
2000s, many executions were structured as
simply revolving credit/institutional term loans,
with the TLa falling by the wayside.
Pricing A Loan In The Primary Market
Pricing loans for the institutional market is a
straightforward exercise based on simple risk/
return consideration and market technicals.
Pricing a loan for the bank market, however, is
more complex. Indeed, banks often invest in
loans for more than just spread income. Rather,
banks are driven by the overall profitability of
the issuer relationship, including noncredit
revenue sources.
Pricing loans for bank investors
Since the early 1990s, almost all large com-
mercial banks have adopted portfolio-manage-
ment techniques that measure the returns of
loans and other credit products relative to risk.
By doing so, banks have learned that loans are
rarely compelling investments on a stand-alone
basis. Therefore, banks are reluctant to allocate
capital to issuers unless the total relationship
generates attractive returnswhether those
returns are measured by risk-adjusted return
on capital, by return on economic capital, or by
some other metric.
If a bank is going to put a loan on its balance
sheet, then it takes a hard look not only at the
loans yield, but also at other sources of reve-
nue from the relationship, including noncredit
businesseslike cash-management services
and pension-fund managementand econom-
ics from other capital markets activities, like
bonds, equities, or M&A advisory work.
This process has had a breathtaking result
on the leveraged loan marketto the point that
it is an anachronism to continue to call it a
bank loan market. Of course, there are certain
issuers that can generate a bit more bank
appetite; as of mid-2011, these include issuers
with a European or even a Midwestern U.S.
angle. Naturally, issuers with European opera-
tions are able to better tap banks in their home
markets (banks still provide the lions share of
loans in Europe), and, for Midwestern issuers,
the heartland remains one of the few U.S.
regions with a deep bench of local banks.
What this means is that the spread offered to
pro rata investors is important, but so, too, in
most cases, is the amount of other, fee-driven
business a bank can capture by taking a piece
of a loan. For this reason, issuers are careful to
award pieces of bond- and equity-underwriting
engagements and other fee-generating busi-
ness to banks that are part of its loan syndicate.
Pricing loans for institutional players
For institutional investors, the investment deci-
sion process is far more straightforward,
because, as mentioned above, they are focused
not on a basket of returns, but only on loan-
specific revenue.
In pricing loans to institutional investors, its
a matter of the spread of the loan relative to
credit quality and market-based factors. This
second category can be divided into liquidity
and market technicals (i.e., supply/demand).
Liquidity is the tricky part, but, as in all mar-
kets, all else being equal, more liquid instru-
ments command thinner spreads than less
liquid ones. In the old daysbefore institutional
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14
investors were the dominant investors and
banks were less focused on portfolio manage-
mentthe size of a loan didnt much matter.
Loans sat on the books of banks and stayed
there. But now that institutional investors and
banks put a premium on the ability to package
loans and sell them, liquidity has become
important. As a result, smaller executions
generally those of $200 million or lesstend to
be priced at a premium to the larger loans. Of
course, once a loan gets large enough to
demand extremely broad distribution, the
issuer usually must pay a size premium. The
thresholds range widely. During the go-go mid-
2000s, it was upwards of $10 billion. During
more parsimonious late-2000s $1 billion was
considered a stretch.
Market technicals, or supply relative to
demand, is a matter of simple economics. If
there are a lot of dollars chasing little product,
then, naturally, issuers will be able to command
lower spreads. If, however, the opposite is true,
then spreads will need to increase for loans to
clear the market.
Mark-To-Markets Effect
Beginning in 2000, the SEC directed bank loan
mutual fund managers to use available price
data (bid/ask levels reported by dealer desks
and compiled by mark-to-market services)
rather than fair value (estimates based on
whether the loan is likely to repay lenders in
whole or part), to determine the value of
broadly syndicated loan portfolios. In broad
terms, this policy has made the market more
transparent, improved price discovery and, in
doing so, made the market far more efficient
and dynamic than it was in the past.
Types of Syndicated Loan Facilities
There are four main types of syndicated loan
facilities:
U A revolving credit line (within which are
options for swingline loans, multicurrency-
borrowing, competitive-bid options,
term-out, and evergreen extensions);
U A term loan;
U A letter of credit (LOC); and
U An acquisition or equipment line
(a delayed-draw term loan).
A revolving credit line allows borrowers to
draw down, repay, and reborrow. The facility acts
much like a corporate credit card, except that
borrowers are charged an annual commitment
fee on unused amounts (the facility fee).
Revolvers to speculative-grade issuers are
sometimes tied to borrowing-base lending for-
mulas. This limits borrowings to a certain per-
centage of specified collateral, most often
receivables and inventory (see Asset-based
loan section below for a full discussion of this
topic). Revolving credits often run for 364 days.
These revolving creditscalled, not surprisingly,
364-day facilitiesare generally limited to the
investment-grade market. The reason for what
seems like an odd term is that regulatory capital
guidelines mandate that, after one year of
extending credit under a revolving facility, banks
must then increase their capital reserves to
take into account the unused amounts.
Therefore, banks can offer issuers 364-day
facilities at a lower unused fee than a multiyear
revolving credit. There are a number of options
that can be offered within a revolving credit line:
A swingline is a small, overnight borrowing
line, typically provided by the agent.
A multicurrency line allows the borrower to
borrow in one or more alternative currencies (in
most agreements this option is capped).
A competitive-bid option (CBO) allows bor-
rowers to solicit the best bids from its syndi-
cate group. The agent will conduct what
amounts to an auction to raise funds for the
borrower, and the best bids are accepted. CBOs
typically are available only to large, investment-
grade borrowers.
A term-out will allow the borrower to convert
borrowings into a term loan at a given conver-
sion date. This, again, is usually a feature of
investment-grade loans. Under the option, bor-
rowers may take what is outstanding under the
facility and pay it off according to a predeter-
mined repayment schedule. Often the spreads
ratchet up if the term-out option is exercised.
An evergreen is an option for the borrower
with consent of the syndicate groupto extend
the facility each year for an additional year. For
instance, at the end of each year, a three-year
facility would be reset to three years if the
lenders and borrower agree. If the evergreen is
not exercised, the agreement would simply run
to term.
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A term loan is simply an installment loan,
such as a loan one would use to buy a car. The
borrower may draw on the loan during a short
commitment period (during which lenders
usual share a ticking fee, akin to a commit-
ment fee on a revolver) and repays it based on
either a scheduled series of repayments or a
one-time lump-sum payment at maturity
(bullet payment). There are two principal types
of term loans:
U An amortizing term loan (A-term loans,
or TLa) is a term loan with a progressive
repayment schedule that typically runs six
years or less. These loans are normally syn-
dicated to banks along with revolving credits
as part of a larger syndication.
U An institutional term loan (B-term, C-term,
or D-term loans) is a term loan facility carved
out for nonbank accounts. These loans came
into broad usage during the mid-1990s as
the institutional loan investor base grew. This
institutional category also includes second-
lien loans and covenant-lite loans, which are
described below.
LOCs are guarantees provided by the bank
group to pay off debt or obligations if the bor-
rower cannot.
Acquisition/equipment lines (delayed-draw
term loans) are credits that may be drawn
down for a given period to purchase specified
assets or equipment or to make acquisitions.
The issuer pays a fee during the commitment
period (a ticking fee). The lines are then repaid
over a specified period (the term-out period).
Repaid amounts may not be reborrowed.
Bridge loans are loans that are intended to
provide short-term financing to provide a
bridge to an asset sale, bond offering, stock
offering, divestiture, etc. Generally, bridge loans
are provided by arrangers as part of an overall
financing package. Typically, the issuer will
agree to increasing interest rates if the loan is
not repaid as expected. For example, a loan
could start at a spread of L+250 and ratchet up
50 basis points (bp) every six months the loan
remains outstanding past one year.
Equity bridge loan is a bridge loan provided by
arrangers that is expected to be repaid by sec-
ondary equity commitment to a leveraged buy-
out. This product is used when a private equity
firm wants to close on a deal that requires, say,
$1 billion of equity of which it ultimately wants
to hold half. The arrangers bridge the additional
$500 million, which would be then repaid when
other sponsors come into the deal to take the
$500 million of additional equity. Needless to
say, this is a hot-market product.
Second-Lien Loans
Although they are really just another type of
syndicated loan facility, second-lien loans are
sufficiently complex to warrant a separate sec-
tion in this primer. After a brief flirtation with
second-lien loans in the mid-1990s, these
facilities fell out of favor after the 1998 Russian
debt crisis caused investors to adopt a more
cautious tone. But after default rates fell pre-
cipitously in 2003, arrangers rolled out second-
lien facilities to help finance issuers struggling
with liquidity problems. By 2007, the market
had accepted second-lien loans to finance a
wide array of transactions, including acquisi-
tions and recapitalizations. Arrangers tap non-
traditional accountshedge funds, distress
investors, and high-yield accountsas well as
traditional CLO and prime fund accounts to
finance second-lien loans.
As their name implies, the claims on collat-
eral of second-lien loans are junior to those of
first-lien loans. Second-lien loans also typically
have less restrictive covenant packages, in
which maintenance covenant levels are set
wide of the first-lien loans. For these reasons,
second-lien loans are priced at a premium to
first-lien loans. This premium typically starts at
200 bps when the collateral coverage goes far
beyond the claims of both the first- and sec-
ond-lien loans to more than 1,000 bps for less
generous collateral.
There are, lawyers explain, two main ways in
which the collateral of second-lien loans can
be documented. Either the second-lien loan
can be part of a single security agreement with
first-lien loans, or they can be part of an alto-
gether separate agreement. In the case of a
single agreement, the agreement would appor-
tion the collateral, with value going first, obvi-
ously, to the first-lien claims and next to the
second-lien claims. Alternatively, there can be
two entirely separate agreements. Heres a
brief summary:
U In a single security agreement, the second-
lien lenders are in the same creditor class as
the first-lien lenders from the standpoint
of a bankruptcy, according to lawyers who
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16
specialize in these loans. As a result, for
adequate protection to be paid the collateral
must cover both the claims of the first- and
second-lien lenders. If it does not, the judge
may choose to not pay adequate protection
or to divide it pro rata among the first- and
second-lien creditors. In addition, the sec-
ond-lien lenders may have a vote as secured
lenders equal to those of the first-lien lend-
ers. One downside for second-lien lenders is
that these facilities are often smaller than
the first-lien loans and, therefore, when a
vote comes up, first-lien lenders can outvote
second-lien lenders to promote their
own interests.
U In the case of two discrete security agree-
ments, divided by a standstill agreement, the
first- and second-lien lenders are likely to be
divided into two creditor classes. As a result,
second-lien lenders do not have a voice in the
first-lien creditor committees. As well, first-
lien lenders can receive adequate protection
payments even if collateral covers their
claims, but does not cover the claims of the
second-lien lenders. This may not be the case
if the loans are documented together and the
first- and second-lien lenders are deemed a
unified class by the bankruptcy court.
For more information, we suggest Latham &
Watkins terrific overview and analysis of sec-
ond-lien loans, which was published on April 15,
2004 in the firms CreditAlert publication.
Covenant-Lite Loans
Like second-lien loans, covenant-lite loans are
a particular kind of syndicated loan facility. At
the most basic level, covenant-lite loans are
loans that have bond-like financial incurrence
covenants rather than traditional maintenance
covenants that are normally part and parcel of
a loan agreement. Whats the difference?
Incurrence covenants generally require that if
an issuer takes an action (paying a dividend,
making an acquisition, issuing more debt), it
would need to still be in compliance. So, for
instance, an issuer that has an incurrence test
that limits its debt to 5x cash flow would only
be able to take on more debt if, on a pro forma
basis, it was still within this constraint. If not,
then it would have breeched the covenant and
be in technical default on the loan. If, on the
other hand, an issuer found itself above this 5x
threshold simply because its earnings had
deteriorated, it would not violate the covenant.
Maintenance covenants are far more
restrictive. This is because they require an
issuer to meet certain financial tests every
quarter whether or not it takes an action. So,
in the case above, had the 5x leverage maxi-
mum been a maintenance rather than incur-
rence test, the issuer would need to pass it
each quarter and would be in violation if either
its earnings eroded or its debt level increased.
For lenders, clearly, maintenance tests are
preferable because it allows them to take
action earlier if an issuer experiences financial
distress. Whats more, the lenders may be able
to wrest some concessions from an issuer
that is in violation of covenants (a fee, incre-
mental spread, or additional collateral) in
exchange for a waiver.
Conversely, issuers prefer incurrence
ovenants precisely because they are
less stringent.
Lender Titles
In the formative days of the syndicated loan
market (the late 1980s), there was usually one
agent that syndicated each loan. Lead man-
ager and manager titles were doled out in
exchange for large commitments. As league
tables gained influence as a marketing tool,
co-agent titles were often used in attracting
large commitments or in cases where these
institutions truly had a role in underwriting and
syndicating the loan.
During the 1990s, the use of league tables
and, consequently, title inflation exploded.
Indeed, the co-agent title has become largely
ceremonial today, routinely awarded for what
amounts to no more than large retail commit-
ments. In most syndications, there is one lead
arranger. This institution is considered to be on
the left (a reference to its position in an old-
time tombstone ad). There are also likely to be
other banks in the arranger group, which may
also have a hand in underwriting and syndicat-
ing a credit. These institutions are said to be on
the right.
The different titles used by significant partic-
ipants in the syndications process are adminis-
trative agent, syndication agent, documentation
agent, agent, co-agent or managing agent, and
lead arranger or book runner:
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U The administrative agent is the bank that
handles all interest and principal payments
and monitors the loan.
U The syndication agent is the bank that han-
dles, in purest form, the syndication of the
loan. Often, however, the syndication agent
has a less specific role.
U The documentation agent is the bank that
handles the documents and chooses the
law firm.
U The agent title is used to indicate the lead
bank when there is no other conclusive
title available, as is often the case for
smaller loans.
U The co-agent or managing agent is largely a
meaningless title used mostly as an award
for large commitments.
U The lead arranger or book runner title is a
league table designation used to indicate the
top dog in a syndication.
Secondary Sales
Secondary sales occur after the loan is closed
and allocated, when investors are free to trade
the paper. Loan sales are structured as either
assignments or participations, with investors
usually trading through dealer desks at the
large underwriting banks. Dealer-to-dealer
trading is almost always conducted through a
street broker.
Assignments
In an assignment, the assignee becomes a
direct signatory to the loan and receives inter-
est and principal payments directly from the
administrative agent.
Assignments typically require the consent of
the borrower and agent, although consent may
be withheld only if a reasonable objection is
made. In many loan agreements, the issuer
loses its right to consent in the event of default.
The loan document usually sets a minimum
assignment amount, usually $5 million, for pro
rata commitments. In the late 1990s, however,
administrative agents started to break out spe-
cific assignment minimums for institutional
tranches. In most cases, institutional assign-
ment minimums were reduced to $1 million in
an effort to boost liquidity. There were also
some cases where assignment fees were
reduced or even eliminated for institutional
assignments, but these lower assignment fees
remained rare into 2012, and the vast majority
was set at the traditional $3,500.
One market convention that became firmly
established in the late 1990s was assignment-
fee waivers by arrangers for trades crossed
through its secondary trading desk. This was a
way to encourage investors to trade with the
arranger rather than with another dealer. This is
a significant incentive to trade with arranger
or a deterrent to not trade away, depending on
your perspectivebecause a $3,500 fee
amounts to between 7 bps to 35 bps of a $1
million to $5 million trade.
Primary assignments
This term is something of an oxymoron. It
applies to primary commitments made by off-
shore accounts (principally CLOs and hedge
funds). These vehicles, for a variety of tax rea-
sons, suffer tax consequence from buying loans
in the primary. The agent will therefore hold the
loan on its books for some short period after
the loan closes and then sell it to these inves-
tors via an assignment. These are called pri-
mary assignments and are effectively primary
purchases.
Participations
As the name implies, in a participation agree-
ment the buyer takes a participating interest in
the selling lenders commitment.
The lender remains the official holder of the
loan, with the participant owning the rights to
the amount purchased. Consents, fees, or mini-
mums are almost never required. The partici-
pant has the right to vote only on material
changes in the loan document (rate, term, and
collateral). Nonmaterial changes do not require
approval of participants. A participation can be
a riskier way of purchasing a loan, because, if
the lender of record becomes insolvent or
defaults, the participant does not have a direct
claim on the loan. In this case, the participant
then becomes a creditor of the lender and often
must wait for claims to be sorted out to collect
on its participation.
Loan Derivatives
Loan credit default swaps
Loan credit default swaps (LCDS) are standard
derivatives that have secured loans as refer-
ence instruments. In June 2006, the
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18
International Settlement and Dealers
Association issued a standard trade confirma-
tion for LCDS contracts.
Like all credit default swaps (CDS), an LCDS
is basically an insurance contract. The seller is
paid a spread in exchange for agreeing to buy
at par, or a pre-negotiated price, a loan if that
loan defaults. LCDS enables participants to
synthetically buy a loan by going short the LCDS
or sell the loan by going long the LCDS.
Theoretically, then, a loanholder can hedge a
position either directly (by buying LCDS protec-
tion on that specific name) or indirectly (by
buying protection on a comparable name or
basket of names).
Moreover, unlike the cash markets, which are
long-only markets for obvious reasons, the
LCDS market provides a way for investors to
short a loan. To do so, the investor would buy
protection on a loan that it doesnt hold. If the
loan subsequently defaults, the buyer of protec-
tion should be able to purchase the loan in the
secondary market at a discount and then and
deliver it at par to the counterparty from which
it bought the LCDS contract. For instance, say
an account buys five-year protection for a given
loan, for which it pays 250 bps a year. Then in
year 2 the loan goes into default and the market
price falls to 80% of par. The buyer of the pro-
tection can then buy the loan at 80 and deliver
to the counterpart at 100, a 20-point pickup. Or
instead of physical delivery, some buyers of pro-
tection may prefer cash settlement in which the
difference between the current market price and
the delivery price is determined by polling deal-
ers or using a third-party pricing service. Cash
settlement could also be employed if theres not
enough paper to physically settle all LCDS con-
tracts on a particular loan.
LCDX
Introduced in 2007, the LCDX is an index of 100
LCDS obligations that participants can trade.
The index provides a straightforward way for
participants to take long or short positions on a
broad basket of loans, as well as hedge their
exposure to the market.
Markit Group administers the LCDX, a product
of CDS Index Co., a firm set up by a group of
dealers. Like LCDS, the LCDX Index is an over-
the-counter product.
The LCDX is reset every six months with par-
ticipants able to trade each vintage of the index
that is still active. The index will be set at an
initial spread based on the reference instru-
ments and trade on a price basis. According to
the primer posted by Markit (http://www.markit.
com/information/affiliations/lcdx/alertPara-
graphs/01/document/LCDX%20Primer.pdf),
the two events that would trigger a payout
from the buyer (protection seller) of the index
are bankruptcy or failure to pay a scheduled
payment on any debt (after a grace period), for
any of the constituents of the index.
All documentation for the index is posted at:
http://www.markit.com/information/affiliations/
lcdx/alertParagraphs/01/document/LCDX%20
Primer.pdf.
Single-name total rate of return swaps (TRS)
This is the oldest way for participants to pur-
chase loans synthetically. In essence, a TRS
allows an institution to buy a loan on margin. In
simple terms, under a TRS program a partici-
pant buys from a counterparty, usually a dealer,
the income stream created by a reference
asset (in this case a syndicated loan). The par-
ticipant puts down some percentage as collat-
eral, say 10%, and borrows the rest from the
dealer. Then the participant receives the spread
of the loan less the financial cost. If the refer-
ence loan defaults, the participant is obligated
to buy the facility at par, or cash settle the
position, based on a mark-to-market price or
an auction price.
Heres how the economics of a TRS work, in
simple terms. A participant buys via TRS a $10
million position in a loan paying L+250. To
affect the purchase, the participant puts $1
million in a collateral account and pays L+50 on
the balance (meaning leverage of 9:1). Thus,
the participant would receive:
L+250 on the amount in the collateral
account of $1 million, plus
200 bps (L+250 minus the borrowing cost of
L+50) on the remaining amount of $9 million.
The resulting income is L+250 * $1 million
plus 200 bps * $9 million. Based on the
participants collateral amountor equity
contributionof $1 million, the return is
L+2020. If LIBOR is 5%, the return is 25.5%. Of
course, this is not a risk-free proposition. If the
issuer defaults and the value of the loan goes
to 70 cents on the dollar, the participant will
lose $3 million. And if the loan does not default
but is marked down for whatever
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reasonmarket spreads widen, it is
downgraded, its financial condition
deterioratesthe participant stands to lose
the difference between par and the current
market price when the TRS expires. Or, in an
extreme case, the value declines below the
value in the collateral account and the
participant is hit with a margin call.
TRS Programs
In addition to the type of single-name TRS
described above, another way to invest in loans
is via a TRS program, in which a dealer provides
financing for a portfolio of loans, rather than a
single reference asset. The products are similar
in that an investor would establish a collateral
account equal to some percent of the overall
TRS program and borrow the balance from a
dealer. The program typically requires manag-
ers to adhere to diversification guidelines as
well as weighted average maturity maximums
as well as weighted average rating minimums.
Like with a single-name TRS, an investor
makes money by the carry between the cost of
the line and the spread of the assets. As well,
any price appreciation bolsters the returns. Of
course, if loans loss value, the investors losses
would be magnified by the leverage of the vehi-
cle. Also, if collateral value declines below a
predetermined level, the investor could face a
margin call, or in the worst-case scenario, the
TRS could be unwound.
TRS programs were widely used prior to the
2008 credit contraction. Since then, they have
figured far less prominently into the loan
landscape as investors across the capital
markets shy away from leveraged, mark-to-
market product.
Pricing Terms
Base rates
Most loans are floating-rate instruments that are
periodically reset to a spread over a base rate,
typically LIBOR. In most cases, borrowers can
lock in a given rate for one month to one year.
Syndication pricing options include prime, as well
as LIBOR, CDs, and other fixed-rate options:
U The prime is a floating-rate option. Borrowed
funds are priced at a spread over the refer-
ence banks prime lending rate. The rate is
reset daily, and borrowings may be repaid at
any time without penalty. This is typically an
overnight option, because the prime option
is more costly to the borrower than LIBOR
or CDs.
U The LIBOR (or Eurodollar) option is so called
because, with this option, the interest on
borrowings is fixed for a period of one month
to one year. The corresponding LIBOR rate is
used to set pricing. Borrowings cannot be
prepaid without penalty.
U The CD option works precisely like the LIBOR
option, except that the base rate is certifi-
cates of deposit, sold by a bank to institu-
tional investors.
U Other fixed-rate options are less common
but work like the LIBOR and CD options.
These include federal funds (the overnight
rate charged by the Federal Reserve to mem-
ber banks) and cost of funds (the banks own
funding rate).
Spread (margin)
Borrower pay a specified spread over the base
rate to borrow under loan agreements. The
spread is typically expressed in basis points.
Further, spreads on many loans are tied to per-
formance grids. In this case, the spread adjusts
based on one or more financial criteria. Ratings
are typical in investment-grade loans. Financial
ratios for leveraged loans. Media and communi-
cations loans are invariably tied o the borrowers
debt-to-cash-flow ratio.
LIBOR floors
As the name implies, LIBOR floors put a floor
under the base rate for loans. If a loan has a 3%
LIBOR floor and LIBOR falls below this level, the
base rate for any resets default to 3%.
Fees
The fees associated with syndicated loans are
the upfront fee, the commitment fee, the facil-
ity fee, the administrative agent fee, the LOC
fee, and the cancellation or prepayment fee.
U An upfront fee is a fee paid by the issuer at
close. It is often tiered, with the lead
arranger receiving a larger amount in con-
sideration for structuring and/or under-
writing the loan. Co-underwriters will
receive a lower fee, and then the general
syndicate will likely have fees tied to their
commitment. Most often, fees are paid on a
lenders final allocation. For example, a
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20
loan has two fee tiers: 100 bps (or 1%) for
$25 million commitments and 50 bps for
$15 million commitments. A lender com-
mitting to the $25 million tier will be paid
on its final allocation rather than on initial
commitment, which means that, in this
example, the loan is oversubscribed and
lenders committing $25 million would be
allocated $20 million and the lenders would
receive a fee of $200,000 (or 1% of $20
million). Sometimes upfront fees will be
structured as a percentage of final alloca-
tion plus a flat fee. This happens most
often for larger fee tiers, to encourage
potential lenders to step up for larger com-
mitments. The flat fee is paid regardless of
the lenders final allocation. Fees are usu-
ally paid to banks, mutual funds, and other
non-offshore investors at close. CLOs and
other offshore vehicles are typically
brought in after the loan closes as a pri-
mary assignment, and they simply buy
the loan at a discount equal to the fee
offered in the primary assignment, for
tax purposes.
U A commitment fee is a fee paid to lenders on
undrawn amounts under a revolving credit or
a term loan prior to draw-down. On term
loans, this fee is usually referred to as a
ticking fee.
U A facility fee, which is paid on a facilitys
entire committed amount, regardless of
usage, is often charged instead of a commit-
ment fee on revolving credits to investment-
grade borrowers, because these facilities
typically have CBOs that allow a borrower to
solicit the best bid from its syndicate group
for a given borrowing. The lenders that do not
lend under the CBO are still paid for their
commitment.
U A usage fee is a fee paid when the utilization
of a revolving credit is above, or more often,
below a certain minimum.
U A prepayment fee is a feature generally asso-
ciated with institutional term loans. Typical
prepayment fees will be set on a sliding
scale; for instance, 2% in year one and 1% in
year two. The fee may be applied to all repay-
ments under a loan including from asset
sales and excess cash flow (a hard fee) or
specifically to discretionary payments made
from a refinancing or out of cash on hand (a
soft fee).
U An administrative agent fee is the annual fee
typically paid to administer the loan (includ-
ing to distribute interest payments to the
syndication group, to update lender lists, and
to manage borrowings). For secured loans
(particularly those backed by receivables and
inventory), the agent often collects a collat-
eral monitoring fee, to ensure that the prom-
ised collateral is in place.
An LOC fee can be any one of several types.
The most commona fee for standby or finan-
cial LOCsguarantees that lenders will support
various corporate activities. Because these
LOCs are considered borrowed funds under
capital guidelines, the fee is typically the same
as the LIBOR margin. Fees for commercial LOCs
(those supporting inventory or trade) are usu-
ally lower, because in these cases actual collat-
eral is submitted). The LOC is usually issued by
a fronting bank (usually the agent) and syndi-
cated to the lender group on a pro rata basis.
The group receives the LOC fee on their respec-
tive shares, while the fronting bank receives an
issuing (or fronting, or facing) fee for issuing
and administering the LOC. This fee is almost
always 12.5 bps to 25 bps (0.125% to 0.25%) of
the LOC commitment.
Original issue discounts (OID)
This is yet another term imported from the
bond market. The OID, the discount from par at
loan, is offered in the new issue market as a
spread enhancement. If a loan is issued at 99
cents on the dollar to pay par, the OID is said to
be 100 bps, or 1 point.
OID Versus Upfront Fees
At this point, the careful reader may be wonder-
ing just what the difference is between an OID
and an upfront fee. After all, in both cases the
lender effectively pays less than par for a loan.
From the perspective of the lender, actually,
there is no practical difference. From an
accounting perspective, an OID and a fee may
be recognized, and potentially taxed, differently.
Voting rights
Amendments or changes to a loan agreement
must be approved by a certain percentage of
lenders. Most loan agreements have three lev-
els of approval: required-lender level, full vote,
and supermajority:
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U The required-lenders level, usually just a
simple majority, is used for approval of non-
material amendments and waivers or
changes affecting one facility within a deal.
U A full vote of all lenders, including partici-
pants, is required to approve material
changes such as RATS (rate, amortization,
term, and security; or collateral) rights, but,
as described below, there are occasions
when changes in amortization and collateral
may be approved by a lower percentage of
lenders (a supermajority).
U A supermajority is typically 67% to 80% of
lenders and is sometimes required for cer-
tain material changes such as changes in
amortization in term loan repayments and
release of collateral.
Covenants
Loan agreements have a series of restrictions
that dictate, to varying degrees, how borrowers
can operate and carry themselves financially.
For instance, one covenant may require the
borrower to maintain its existing fiscal-year
end. Another may prohibit it from taking on new
debt. Most agreements also have financial
compliance covenants, for example, that a bor-
rower must maintain a prescribed level of per-
formance, which, if not maintained, gives banks
the right to terminate the agreement or push
the borrower into default. The size of the cove-
nant package increases in proportion to a bor-
rowers financial risk. Agreements to
investment-grade companies are usually thin
and simple. Agreements to leveraged borrowers
are more restrictive.
The three primary types of loan covenants
are affirmative, negative, and financial.
Affirmative covenants state what action the
borrower must take to be in compliance with
the loan. These covenants are usually boiler-
plate and require a borrower to, for example,
pay the bank interest and fees, provide audited
financial statements, maintain insurance, pay
taxes, and so forth.
Negative covenants limit the borrowers
activities in some way. Negative covenants,
which are highly structured and customized to
a borrowers specific condition, can limit the
type and amount of acquisitions and invest-
ments, new debt issuance, liens, asset sales,
and guarantees.
Financial covenants enforce minimum finan-
cial performance measures against the bor-
rower, such as that he must maintain a higher
level of current assets than of current liabilities.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of finan-
cial convenants: maintenance and incurrence.
Under maintenance covenants, issuers must
pass agreed-to tests of financial performance
such as minimum levels of cash flow coverage
and maximum levels of leverage. If an issuer
fails to achieve these levels, lenders have the
right to accelerate the loan. In most cases,
though, lenders will pass on this draconian
option and instead grant a waiver in return for
some combination of a fee and/or spread
increase; a repayment or a structuring con-
censsion such as additional collateral or senior-
ity. An inccurence covenant is tested only if an
issuer takes an action, such as issuing debt or
making an acquisition. If, on a pro forma basis,
the issuer fails the test then it is not allowed to
proceed without permission of the lenders.
Historically, maintenance tests were associ-
ated with leveraged loans and incurrence tests
with investment-grade loans and bonds. More
recently, the evolution of covenant-lite loans
(see above) has blurred the line.
In a traditional loan agreement, as a borrow-
ers risk increases, financial covenants become
more tightly wound and extensive. In general,
there are five types of financial covenants
coverage, leverage, current ratio, tangible net
worth, and maximum capital expenditures:
U A coverage covenant requires the borrower to
maintain a minimum level of cash flow or
earnings, relative to specified expenses,
most often interest, debt service (interest
and repayments), fixed charges (debt ser-
vice, capital expenditures, and/or rent).
U A leverage covenant sets a maximum level of
debt, relative to either equity or cash flow,
with total-debt-to-EBITDA level being the
most common. In some cases, though, oper-
ating cash flow is used as the divisor.
Moreover, some agreements test leverage on
the basis of net debt (total less cash and
equivalents) or senior debt.
U A current-ratio covenant requires that the
borrower maintain a minimum ratio of cur-
rent assets (cash, marketable securities,
accounts receivable, and inventories) to cur-
rent liabilities (accounts payable, short-term
debt of less than one year), but sometimes a
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22
quick ratio, in which inventories are
excluded from the numerate, is substituted.
U A tangible-net-worth (TNW) covenant
requires that the borrower have a minimum
level of TNW (net worth less intangible
assets, such as goodwill, intellectual assets,
excess value paid for acquired companies),
often with a build-up provision, which
increases the minimum by a percentage of
net income or equity issuance.
U A maximum-capital-expenditures covenant
requires that the borrower limit capital
expenditures (purchases of property, plant,
and equipment) to a certain amount, which
may be increased by some percentage of
cash flow or equity issuance, but often allow-
ing the borrower to carry forward unused
amounts from one year to the next.
Mandatory Prepayments
Leveraged loans usually require a borrower to
prepay with proceeds of excess cash flow, asset
sales, debt issuance, or equity issuance.
U Excess cash flow is typically defined as cash
flow after all cash expenses, required divi-
dends, debt repayments, capital expendi-
tures, and changes in working capital. The
typical percentage required is 50% to 75%.
U Asset sales are defined as net proceeds of
asset sales, normally excluding receivables or
inventories. The typical percentage required
is 100%.
U Debt issuance is defined as net proceeds
from debt issuance. The typical percentage
required is 100%.
U Equity issuance is defined as the net pro-
ceeds of equity issuance. The typical per-
centage required is 25% to 50%.
Often, repayments from excess cash flow and
equity issuance are waived if the issuer meets a
preset financial hurdle, most often structured
as a debt/EBITDA test.
Collateral and other protective loan provisions
In the leveraged market, collateral usually
includes all the tangible and intangible assets
of the borrower and, in some cases, specific
assets that back a loan.
Virtually all leveraged loans and some of the
more shaky investment-grade credits are
backed by pledges of collateral. In the asset-
based market, for instance, that typically takes
the form of inventories and receivables, with
the maximum amount of the loan that the
issuer may draw down capped by a formula
based off of these assets. The common rule is
that an issuer can borrow against 50% of
inventory and 80% of receivables. There are
loans backed by certain equipment, real estate,
and other property as well.
In the leveraged market, there are some loans
that are backed by capital stock of operating
units. In this structure, the assets of the issuer
tend to be at the operating-company level and
are unencumbered by liens, but the holding
company pledges the stock of the operating
companies to the lenders. This effectively gives
lenders control of these subsidiaries and their
assets if the company defaults. The risk to lend-
ers in this situation, simply put, is that a bank-
ruptcy court collapses the holding company with
the operating companies and effectively renders
the stock worthless. In these cases, which hap-
pened on a few occasions to lenders to retail
companies in the early 1990s, loan holders
become unsecured lenders of the company and
are put back on the same level with other senior
unsecured creditors.
Subsidiary guarantees
Although not collateral in the strict sense of the
word, most leveraged loans are backed by the
guarantees of subsidiaries so that if an issuer
goes into bankruptcy all of its units are on the
hook to repay the loan. This is often the case,
too, for unsecured investment-grade loans.
Negative pledge
This is also not a literal form of collateral, but
most issuers agree not to pledge any assets to
new lenders to ensure that the interest of the
loanholders are protected.
Springing liens/collateral release
Some loans have provisions that borrowers that
sit on the cusp of investment-grade and spec-
ulative-grade must either attach collateral or
release it if the issuers rating changes.
A BBB or BBB- issuer may be able to con-
vince lenders to provide unsecured financing,
but lenders may demand springing liens in the
event the issuers credit quality deteriorates.
Often, an issuers rating being lowered to BB+
or exceeding its predetermined leverage level
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will trigger this provision. Likewise, lenders may
demand collateral from a strong, speculative-
grade issuer, but will offer to release under cer-
tain circumstances, such as if the issuer
attains an investment-grade rating.
Change of control
Invariably, one of the events of default in a
credit agreement is a change of issuer control.
For both investment-grade and leveraged
issuers, an event of default in a credit agree-
ment will be triggered by a merger, an acquisi-
tion of the issuer, some substantial purchase of
the issuers equity by a third party, or a change
in the majority of the board of directors. For
sponsor-backed leveraged issuers, the spon-
sors lowering its stake below a preset amount
can also trip this clause.
Equity cures
These provision allow issuers to fix a covenant
violationexceeding the maximum leverage
test for instanceby making an equity contri-
bution. These provisions are generally found in
private-equity backed deals. The equity cure is
a right, not an obligation. Therefore, a private
equity firm will want these provisions, which, if
they think its worth it, allows them to cure a
violation without going through an amendment
process, through which lenders will often ask
for wider spreads and/or fees in exchange for
waiving the violation even with an infusion of
new equity. Some agreements dont limit the
number of equity cures while others cap the
number to, say, one a year or two over the life
of the loan. Its a negotiated point, however, so
there is no rule of thumb.
Asset-based lending
Most of the information above refers to cash
flow loans, loans that may be secured by col-
lateral, but are repaid by cash flow. Asset-
based lending is a distinct segment of the loan
market. These loans are secured by specific
assets and usually governed by a borrowing
formula (or a borrowing base). The most
common type of asset-based loans are receiv-
ables and/or inventory lines. These are revolving
credits that have a maximum borrowing limit,
say $100 million, but also have a cap based on
the value of an issuers pledged receivables and
inventories. Usually, the receivables are pledged
and the issuer may borrow against 80%, give or
take. Inventories are also often pledged to
secure borrowings. However, because they are
obviously less liquid than receivables, lenders
are less generous in their formula. Indeed, the
borrowing base for inventories is typically in the
50% to 65% range. In addition, the borrowing
base may be further divided into subcatego-
riesfor instance, 50% of work-in-process
inventory and 65% of finished goods inventory.
In many receivables-based facilities, issuers
are required to place receivables in a lock box.
That means that the bank lends against the
receivable, takes possession of it, and then col-
lects it to pay down the loan.
In addition, asset-based lending is often
done based on specific equipment, real
estate, car fleets, and an unlimited number
of other assets.
Bifurcated collateral structures
Most often this refers to cases where the issuer
divides collateral pledge between asset-based
loans and funded term loans. The way this
works, typically, is that asset-based loans are
secured by current assets like accounts receiv-
ables and inventories, while term loans are
secured by fixed assets like property, plant, and
equipment. Current assets are considered to be
a superior form of collateral because they are
more easily converted to cash.
Loan maththe art of spread calculation
Calculating loan yields or spreads is not
straightforward. Unlike most bonds, which have
long no-call periods and high-call premiums,
most loans are prepayable at any time typically
without prepayment fees. And, even in cases
where prepayment fees apply, they are rarely
more than 2% in year one and 1% in year two.
Therefore, affixing a spread-to-maturity or a
spread-to-worst on loans is little more than a
theoretical calculation.
This is because an issuers behavior is unpre-
dictable. It may repay a loan early because a
more compelling financial opportunity presents
itself or because the issuer is acquired or
because it is making an acquisition and needs a
new financing. Traders and investors will often
speak of loan spreads, therefore, as a spread to
a theoretical call. Loans, on average, between
1997 and 2004 had a 15-month average life.
So, if you buy a loan with a spread of 250 bps at
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24
a price of 101, you might assume your spread-
to-expected-life as the 250 bps less the amor-
tized 100 bps premium or LIBOR+170.
Conversely, if you bought the same loan at 99,
the spread-to-expect life would be LIBOR+330.
Of course, if theres a LIBOR floor, the minimum
would apply
Default And Restructuring
There are two primary types of loan defaults:
technical defaults and the much more serious
payment defaults. Technical defaults occur
when the issuer violates a provision of the loan
agreement. For instance, if an issuer doesnt
meet a financial covenant test or fails to pro-
vide lenders with financial information or some
other violation that doesnt involve payments.
When this occurs, the lenders can accelerate
the loan and force the issuer into bankruptcy.
Thats the most extreme measure. In most
cases, the issuer and lenders can agree on an
amendment that waives the violation in
exchange for a fee, spread increase, and/or
tighter terms.
A payment default is a more serious matter. As
the name implies, this type of default occurs
when a company misses either an interest or
principal payment. There is often a pre-set period
of time, say 30 days, during which an issuer can
cure a default (the cure period). After that, the
lenders can choose to either provide a forbear-
ance agreement that gives the issuer some
breathing room or take appropriate action, up to
and including accelerating, or calling, the loan.
If the lenders accelerate, the company will
generally declare bankruptcy and restructure
their debt through Chapter 11. If the company is
not worth saving, however, because its primary
business has cratered, then the issuer and lend-
ers may agree to a Chapter 7 liquidation, in
which the assets of the business are sold and
the proceeds dispensed to the creditors.
Amend-To-Extend
This technique allows an issuer to push out part
of its loan maturities through an amendment,
rather than a full-out refinancing. Amend-to-
extend transactions came into widespread use in
2009 as borrowers struggled to push out maturi-
ties in the face of difficult lending conditions that
made refinancing prohibitively expensive.
Amend-to-extend transactions have two
phases, as the name implies. The first is an
amendment in which at least 50.1% of the bank
group approves the issuers ability to roll some
or all existing loans into longer-dated paper.
Typically, the amendment sets a range for the
amount that can be tendered via the new facil-
ity, as well as the spread at which the longer-
dated paper will pay interest.
The new debt is pari passu with the existing
loan. But because it matures later and, thus, is
structurally subordinated, it carries a higher
rate, and, in some cases, more attractive terms.
Because issuers with big debt loads are
expected to tackle debt maturities over time,
amid varying market conditions, in some cases,
accounts insist on most-favored-nation pro-
tection. Under such protection, the spread of
the loan would increase if the issuer in question
prints a loan at a wider margin.
The second phase is the conversion, in which
lenders can exchange existing loans for new
loans. In the end, the issuer is left with two
tranches: (1) the legacy paper at the initial
spread and maturity and (2) the new longer-
dated facility at a wider spread. The innovation
here: amend-to-extend allows an issuer to term-
out loans without actually refinancing into a new
credit (which obviously would require marking the
entire loan to market, entailing higher spreads, a
new OID, and stricter covenants).
DIP Loans
Debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans are made to
bankrupt entities. These loans constitute
super-priority claims in the bankruptcy distri-
bution scheme, and thus sit ahead of all pre-
pretition claims. Many DIPs are further
secured by priming liens on the debtors
collateral (see below).
Traditionally, prepetition lenders provided DIP
loans as a way to keep a company viable during
the bankruptcy process and therefore protect
their claims. In the early 1990s, a broad market
for third-party DIP loans emerged. These non-
prepetition lenders were attracted to the mar-
ket by the relatively safety of most DIPs based
on their super-priority status, and relatively
wide margins. This was the case again the early
2000s default cycle.
In the late 2000s default cycle, however, the
landscape shifted because of more dire
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economic conditions. As a result, liquidity was
in far shorter supply, constraining availability of
traditional third-party DIPs. Likewise, with the
severe economic conditions eating away at
debtors collateral, not to mention reducing
enterprise values, prepetition lenders were
more wary of relying solely on the super-priority
status of DIPs, and were more likely to ask for
priming liens to secure facilities.
The refusal of prepetition lenders to consent
to such priming, combined with the expense
and uncertainty involved in a priming fight in
bankruptcy court, greatly reduced third-party
participation in the DIP market. With liquidity in
short supply, new innovations in DIP lending
cropped up aimed at bringing nontraditional
lenders into the market. These include:
U Junior DIPs. These facilities are typically pro-
vided by bond holders or other unsecured
debtors as part of a loan-to-own strategy. In
these transactions, the providers receive
much or all of the post-petition equity inter-
est as an incentive to provide the DIP loans.
U Roll-up DIPs. In some bankruptcies
LyondellBasell and Spectrum Brands are two
2009 examplesDIP providers were given
the opportunity to roll up prepetition claims
into junior DIPs, that rank ahead of other
prepetition secured lenders. This sweetener
was particularly compelling for lenders that
had bought prepetition paper at distressed
prices and were able to realize a gain by roll-
ing it into the junior DIPs.
Junior and roll-up DIPs are suited to chal-
lenging markets during which liquidity is scarce.
During more liquid times, issuers can usual
secure less costly financing in the form of tra-
ditional DIPs from prepetition lenders and/or
third-party lenders.
Exit Loans
These are loans that finance an issuers emer-
gence from bankruptcy. Typically, the loans are
prenegotiated and are part of the companys
reorganization plan.
Sub-Par Loan Buybacks
This is another technique that grew out of the
bear market that began in 2007. Performing
paper fell to price not seen before in the
loan marketwith many trading south of 70.
This created an opportunity for issuers with
the financial wherewithal and the covenant
room to repurchase loans via a tender, or in
the open market, at prices below par.
Sub-par buybacks have deep roots in the
bond market. Loans didnt suffer the price
declines before 2007 to make such tenders
attractive, however. In fact, most loan docu-
ments do not provide for a buyback. Instead,
issuers typically need obtain lender approval via
a 50.1% amendment.
Distressed exchanges
This is a negotiated tender in which classhold-
ers will swap their existing paper for a new
series of bond that typically have a lower prin-
cipal amount and, often, a lower yield. In
exchange the bondholders might receive
stepped-up treatment, going from subordi-
nated to senior, say, or from unsecured to
second-lien.
Standard & Poors consider these programs
a default and, in fact, the holders are agreeing
to take a principal haircut in order to allow the
company to remain solvent and improve their
ultimate recovery prospects.
This technique is used frequently in the bond
market but rarely for first-lien loans. One good
example was from Harrahs Entertainment. In
2009, the gaming company issued $3.6 billion
of new 10% second-priority senior secured
notes due 2018 for about $5.4 billion of bonds
due between 2010 and 2018.
Bits And Pieces
What follows are definitions to some common
market jargon not found elsewhere in this
primer, but used constantly as short-hand in
the loan market:
U Staple financing. Staple financing is a
financing agreement stapled on to an
acquisition, typically by the M&A advisor. So,
if a private equity firm is working with an
investment bank to acquire a property, that
bank, or a group of banks, may provide a sta-
ple financing to ensure that the firm has the
wherewithal to complete the deal. Because
the staple financing provides guidelines on
both structure and leverage, it typically forms
the basis for the eventual financing that is
negotiated by the auction winner, and the
staple provider will usually serve as one of
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26
the arrangers of the financing, along with the
lenders that were backing the buyer.
U Break prices. Simply, the price at which loans
or bonds are initially traded into the second-
ary market after they close and allocate. It is
called the break price because that is where
the facility breaks into the secondary market.
U Market-clearing level. As this phrase implies,
the price or spread at which a deal clears the
primary market.
U Running the books. Generally the loan
arranger is said to be running the books,
i.e., preparing documentation and syndicat-
ing and administering the loan.
U Disintermediation. Disintermediation refers
to the process where banks are replaced (or
disintermediated) by institutional investors.
This is the process that the loan market has
been undergoing for the past 20 years.
Another example is the mortgage market
where the primary capital providers have
evolved from banks and savings and loan
institutions to conduits structured by Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the other mortgage
securitization shops. Of course, the list of
disintermediated markets is long and grow-
ing. In addition to leveraged loans and mort-
gages, this list also includes auto loans and
credit card receivables.
U Loss given default. This is simply a measure
of how much creditors lose when an issuer
defaults. The loss will vary depending on
creditor class and the enterprise value of the
business when it defaults. All things being
equal, secured creditors will lose less than
unsecured creditors. Likewise, senior credi-
tors will lose less than subordinated credi-
tors. Calculating loss given default is tricky
business. Some practitioners express loss as
a nominal percentage of principal or a per-
centage of principal plus accrued interest.
Others use a present value calculation using
an estimated discount rate, typically 15% to
25%, demanded by distressed investors.
U Recovery. Recovery is the opposite of loss
given defaultit is the amount a creditor
recovers, rather than loses, in a given default.
U Printing (or inking) a deal. Refers to the
price or spread at which the loan clears.
U Relative value. This can refer to the relative
return or spread between (1) various instru-
ments of the same issuer, comparing for
instance the loan spread with that of a bond;
(2) loans or bonds of issuers that are simi-
larly rated and/or in the same sector, com-
paring for instance the loan spread of one
BB rated healthcare company with that of
another; and (3) spreads between markets,
comparing for instance the spread on offer
in the loan market with that of high-yield or
corporate bonds. Relative value is
a way of uncovering undervalued, or
overvalued, assets.
U Rich/cheap. This is terminology imported
from the bond market to the loan market. If
you refer to a loan as rich, it means it is trad-
ing at a spread that is low compared with
other similarly rated loans in the same sec-
tor. Conversely, referring to something as
cheap means that it is trading at a spread
that is high compared with its peer group.
That is, you can buy it on the cheap.
U Distressed loans. In the loan market, loans
traded at less than 80 cents on the dollar
are usually considered distressed. In the
bond market, the common definition is a
spread of 1,000 bps or more. For loans, how-
ever, calculating spreads is an elusive art
(see above) and therefore a more pedestrian
price measure is used.
U Default rate. Calculated by either number of
loans or principal amount. The formula is
similar. For default rate by number of loans:
the number of loans that default over a given
12-month period divided by the number of
loans outstanding at the beginning of that
period. For default rate by principal amount:
the amount of loans that default over a
12-month period divided by the total amount
outstanding at the beginning of the period.
Standard & Poors defines a default for the
purposes of calculating default rates as a
loan that is either (1) rated D by Standard &
Poors, (2) to an issuer that has filed for
bankruptcy, or (3) in payment default on
interest or principal.
U Leveraged loans. Just what is a leveraged
loan is a discussion of long standing. Some
participants use a spread cut-off: i.e., any
loan with a spread of LIBOR+125 or
LIBOR+150 or higher qualifies. Others use
rating criteria: i.e., any loan rated BB+ or
lower qualifies. But what of loans that are not
rated? At Standard & Poors LCD we have
developed a more complex definition. We
include a loan in the leveraged universe if it is
WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM
rated BB+ or lower or it is not rated or rated
BBB- or higher but has (1) a spread of
LIBOR +125 or higher and (2) is secured by a
first or second lien. Under this definition, a
loan rated BB+ that has a spread of
LIBOR+75 would qualify, but a nonrated loan
with the same spread would not. It is hardly a
perfect definition, but one that Standard &
Poors thinks best captures the spirit of loan
market participants when they talk about
leveraged loans.
U Middle market. The loan market can be
roughly divided into two segments: large cor-
porate and middle market. There are as many
was to define middle market as there are
bankers. But, in the leveraged loan market,
the standard has become an issuer with no
more than $50 million of EBITDA. Based on
this, Standard & Poors uses the $50 million
threshold in its reports and statistics.
U Axe sheets. These are lists from dealers with
indicative secondary bids and offers for
loans. Axes are simply price indications.
U Circled. When a loan or bond is full sub-
scribed at a given price it is said to be circled.
After that, the loan or bond moves to alloca-
tion and funding.
U Forward calendar. A list of loans or bond that
has been announced but not yet closed.
These include both instruments that are yet
to come to market and those that are
actively being sold but have yet to be circled.
U BWIC. An acronym for bids wanted in com-
petition. Really just a fancy way of describ-
ing a secondary auction of loans or bonds.
Typically, an account will offer up a portfolio
of facilities via a dealer. The dealer will then
put out a BWIC, asking potential buyers to
submit for individual names or the entire
portfolio. The dealer will then collate the bids
and award each facility to the highest bidder.
U OWIC. This stands for offers wanted in com-
petition and is effectively a BWIC in reverse.
Instead of seeking bids, a dealer is asked to
buy a portfolio of paper and solicits potential
sellers for the best offer.
U Cover bid. The level that a dealer agrees to
essentially underwrite a BWIC or an auction.
The dealer, to win the business, may give an
account a cover bid, effectively putting a
floor on the auction price.
U Loan-to-own. A strategy in which lenders
typically hedge funds or distressed inves-
torsprovide financing to distressed
companies. As part of the deal, lenders
receive either a potential ownership stake if
the company defaults, or, in the case of a
bankrupt company, an explicit equity stake
as part of the deal.
U Most favored nation clauses. Some loans
will include a provision to protect lenders for
some specified amount of time if the issuer
subsequently places a new loan at a higher
spread. Under these provisions, the spread
of the existing paper ratchets up to the
spread at which the new loan cleared
(though in some cases the increase
is capped). G
WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM
28
T
he two primary credit risk factors facing loan lenders are default risk
and loss-given-default risk. To help lenders assess these risks,
Standard & Poors Ratings Services publishes a separate indicator for each
risk for speculative-grade issuers. Standard & Poors corporate credit
rating represents the agencys opinion regarding the borrowers relative
ability and willingness to meet its financial obligations in full and on time.
In other words, this is a measure of an entitys relative default risk.
Separately, Standard & Poors assigns recovery ratings to individual debt
instruments as a measure of our opinion of the level of recovery, of
principal and pre-petition interest, lenders could expect in the event of a
payment default by the borrower (1 minus loss-given-default). These two
indictors are then combined into an issue rating. The level of expected
recovery dictates whether the assigned issue rating for a specific loan or
other debt instrument will be above, below, or equal to the corporate
credit rating.
In December 2003, Standard & Poors
became the first rating agency to establish a
separate, stand-alone rating scale to evalu-
ate the potential recovery investors might
expect in the event of a loan default. Before
that, we used our traditional rating scale,
which focused almost exclusively on the like-
lihood of default rather than on what the ulti-
mate repayment would be if the borrower
failed to make timely payments. Since then,
Standard & Poors has assigned recovery rat-
ings to more than 3,000 speculative-grade
secured loans and bonds. In March of 2008,
Standard & Poors began assigning recovery
ratings to the unsecured debt of speculative-
grade issuers.
Why A Separate Recovery Scale?
Investors in loans recognize that they are incur-
ring both types of risks: the risk of default and
the risk of loss in the event of default. In tradi-
tional bond markets, especially bonds issued by
investment-grade companies, the risk of default
is relatively remote, and little attention is paid to
covenants, collateral, or other protective fea-
tures that would mitigate loss in the event of
default. Indeed, such protective features are
rare in such markets. But in the leveraged loan
market, where the borrowers tend to be specu-
lative grade (i.e., rated BB+ and below), the risk
of default is significantly higher than it is for
investment-grade borrowers. Therefore, we have
Senior Director
Thomas L. Mowat
New York
(1) 212-438-1588
tom_mowat@
Rating Leveraged Loans: An Overview
RATING LEVERAGED LOANS: AN OVERVIEW
WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM
the necessity of collateral, covenants, and simi-
lar features of secured lending.
But the challenge for investors is that not all
loans labeled secured are equally secured, or
even protected at all. In the past, data has
shown, for example, that the majority of all
secured loans do, in fact, repay their lenders
100% of principal in the event of default, with
another sizable percentage providing substan-
tial, albeit less than full, recoveries. But a sig-
nificant number do not do nearly so well, and,
indeed, might as well be unsecured in terms of
the actual protection afforded investors.
A primary purpose of Standard & Poors
recovery ratings is to help investors differentiate
between loans that are fully secured, partially
secured, and those that are secured in name
only. (See chart 1.) Second-lien loans are a spe-
cific example of secured loans whereby recovery
prospects in a bankruptcy could vary dramati-
cally depending on the overall makeup of the
capital structure in question. These deals have
attributes of both secured loans and subordi-
nated debt, and determining post-default
recovery prospects requires detailed analysis of
the individual deal. Most second-lien loans that
we rate have fallen into the lower recovery rating
categories (categories 5 and 6; see table 1), but
occasionally a second lien has been so well pro-
tected that it has merited a higher rating.
Hence, once again, we have the need for recov-
ery ratings to make that differentiation.
As of July 2, 2012
Total number of ratings: 3,049. Average recovery rating: 2.49. Standard deviation: 1.35.
Standard & Poors 2012.
No. of ratings (left scale) % of ratings (right scale)
1+ 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Chart 1 Total Distribution Of Current/Outstanding Speculative Grade Secured Issues
With Recovery Ratings
Table 1 | Recovery Rating Scales And Issue Rating Criteria
For issuers with a speculative-grade corporate credit rating

Recovery rating*

Recovery description

Recovery expectations (%)
Issue rating notches relative
to corporate credit rating
1+ Highest expectation, full recovery 100 +3 notches
1 Very high recovery 90100 +2 notches
2 Substantial recovery 7090 +1 notch
3 Meaningful recovery 5070 0 notches
4 Average recovery 3050 0 notches
5 Modest recovery 1030 -1 notch
6 Negligible recovery 010 -2 notches
*As noted above, recovery ratings in certain countries are capped to adjust for reduced creditor recovery prospects in these
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the recovery ratings on unsecured debt issued by corporate entities with corporate credit ratings
of BB- or higher are generally capped at 3 to account for the risk that their recovery prospects are at greater risk of being
impaired by the issuance of additional priority or pari passu debt prior to default. Recovery of principal plus accrued but
unpaid interest at the time of default. Very high confidence of full recovery resulting from significant overcollateralization
or strong structural features.
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30
Comparing Issuer And Recovery Ratings
Standard & Poors recovery rating methodology
builds upon its traditional corporate credit
issuer rating analysis. The traditional analysis
focuses on attributes of the borrower itself,
which we tend to group under the heading of
business risk factors (the borrowers industry,
its business niche within that industry, and
other largely qualitative factors like the quality
of its management, overall strategy, etc.) and
financial risk factors (cash flow, capital struc-
ture, access to liquidity, as well as financial
reporting and accounting issues, etc.). The
companys ability to meet its financial obliga-
tions on time and, therefore, avoid default, is
based on a combination of all these qualities,
and it is the analysts job to balance them
appropriately in coming up with an overall rat-
ing. (See chart 2.)
In assigning its corporate credit ratings,
Standard & Poors is actually grouping the
rated companies into categories based on the
relative likelihood of their meeting their finan-
cial obligations on time (i.e., avoiding default.)
The relative importance of the various attri-
butes may vary substantially from one credit to
another, even within the same rating category.
For example, a company with a very high busi-
ness risk (e.g., intense competition, minimal
barriers to entry, constant technology change,
and risk of obsolescence) would generally
require a stronger financial profile to achieve
Standard & Poors 2012.
Getting To The Corporate Credit Rating (CCR)
Country Risk
Industry Characteristics
Company Position
Protability / Peer Group Comparisons
Business Risk
Rating
Financial Risk
G
Accounting
Governance, Risk Tolerance,
Financial Policy
Cash Flow Adequacy
Capital Structure, Asset Protection
Liquidity / Short-Term Factors
G
G
G
G
Chart 2 Standard & Poors Criteria
Table 2 | Global Corporate Average Cumulative Default Rates (19812011)
Time horizon (years)
(%) 1 2 3 4 5 10 15
AAA 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.25 0.37 0.78 1.06
AA 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.26 0.37 0.86 1.23
A 0.08 0.18 0.32 0.48 0.66 1.77 2.66
BBB 0.24 0.67 1.13 1.71 2.30 4.88 7.22
BB 0.90 2.70 4.80 6.80 8.61 15.59 19.24
B 4.48 9.95 14.57 18.15 20.83 28.70 33.01
CCC/C 26.82 35.84 41.14 44.27 46.72 51.65 55.13
Sources: Standard & Poors Global Fixed Income Research and Standard & Poors CreditPro.
RATING LEVERAGED LOANS: AN OVERVIEW
WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM
the same overall rating level as a company in a
more stable business. The companies that
Standard & Poors rates BB, for example, may
present a wide range of combinations of busi-
ness and financial risk, but are all expected to
have a similar likelihood of defaulting on the
timely payment of their financial obligations.
Over the years, Standard & Poors has tracked
the actual default rates of companies that it has
rated. Table 2 shows the cumulative default
rates for the past 30 years by rating category.
As we might expect, the rate of default
increases substantially moving across rating
categories. For example, over five years, compa-
nies originally rated BB default, as a group,
almost four times the rate BBB rated compa-
nies do while B rated companies default at a
rate of more than nine times that of BB rated.
Saying that a given set of debt issuers in the
same rating category have similar characteris-
tics and are equally default-prone does not tell
an investor which of the companies in that rat-
ing category will actually be the ones to default.
No amount of analysis can tell us that, since if
we knew for certain that a given company that
has the attributes of, for example, a BB, were
actually going to default at some point, it would
not, in fact, be rated BB, but instead would be
rated much lower.
As investors move down the rating scale, they
may not know exactly which deals will default,
but they surely know that a larger percentage of
their deals will default. Companies rated BBB
and which generally default at the rate of about
2% over five years, are more likely to borrow
unsecured. In effect, lenders are comfortable
with a default rate of that magnitude without
requiring collateral. But for BB rated credits,
where the likelihood of default occurring is
almost four times greater, lenders have drawn a
line and decided that, for that degree of default
risk, it will generally insist on collateral security.
Lenders are, in effect, willing to treat a BBB
rated credit as though it will not likely default.
But the presumption is reversed for BB (and
below) credits, where the increased default risk
is so severe that the market insists on treating
every credit as though it might well default.
Standard & Poors recovery ratings take a
similar approach by assigning recovery rat-
ings to speculative-grade issuers. While we do
not assume that a given deal will default, our
analysts--the industry specialists who cover
companies on an ongoing basis, working
along with the recovery specialist who is
assigned to that industry team specifically to
do recovery analysisdetermine together the
most likely default scenario that is consistent
with our assessment of the companys funda-
mental business and financial risks. In other
words, if this company were to default, what
would be the most likely scenario? They then
project what the companys financial condi-
tion would be at the time of default and,
equally important, at the conclusion of the
workout process. Then they evaluate what the
company itself and/or the collateral (which
may be the same, but not always) would be
worth and how that value would be distributed
among the various creditors. (For a detailed
description of the analytical methodology
used, see the accompanying article in this
book, Criteria Guidelines For Recovery
Ratings On Global Industrials Issuers
Speculative-Grade Debt.)
Role Of Ratings In The Loan Market
Syndicated leveraged loans are commonly rated
to fulfill the requirements of institutional inves-
tors. Ratings assist fund managers in assess-
ing individual loan purchases and in managing
portfolio risk. In addition, ratings are often
mandated by the documentation controlling
structured investment vehicles.
In addition to the recovery rating, with its spe-
cific estimate of recovery in the event of default,
and issue rating assigned to a loan, Standard &
Poors analysts provide a complete recovery
report that explains in detail the analysis, the
default scenario, the other assumptions, and the
reasoning behind the recovery rating. This allows
investors to look behind and, if they wish, even to
reverse engineer our analysis, selecting what
they agree or disagree with, and altering our
scenarios to reflect their own view of the com-
pany, the industry, or the collateral valuation. G
For further information about Standard &
Poors Recovery Ratings, or to receive the
weekly S&P Leveraged Matters by email, please
contact Andrew Watt at 212-438-7868 or
[email protected], or visit
our Global Leveraged Finance and Recovery
Ratings web site at: www.standardandpoors.
com/ratings/recovery-ratings/en/eu.
WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM
32
S
tandard & Poors Ratings Services has been assigning recovery
ratingsdebt instrument-specific estimates of post-default recovery
for creditorssince December 2003. At that time, we began issuing
recovery ratings and analyses for all new secured bank loans in the U.S.
Since that time, we have steadily expanded our recovery ratings to cover
secured debt issued in other countries and, in March 2008, to unsecured
and subordinated debt instruments. This article provides an overview of
Standard & Poors general recovery analysis approach for global Industrials
issuers, including specific jurisdictional considerations for the U.S. market.
This framework is the basis for our recovery methodology worldwide
although, where appropriate, our analysis is tailored to consider
jurisdiction-specific features that impact the insolvency process and
creditor recovery prospects.
Recovery Ratings For Global Industrials
Definition And Context
Recovery ratings assess a debt instruments
ultimate prospects for recovery of estimated
principal and pre-petition interest (i.e., interest
accrued but unpaid at the time of default)
given a simulated payment default. Standard &
Poors recovery methodology focuses on esti-
mating the percentage of recovery that debt
investors would receive at the end of a formal
bankruptcy proceeding or an informal out-of-
court restructuring. Lender recoveries could be
in the form of cash, debt or equity securities of
a reorganized entity, or some combination
thereof. We focus on nominal recovery (versus
discounted present value recovery) because we
believe that discounted recovery is better iden-
tified independently by market participants
that are best positioned to apply their own pre-
ferred discount rate to our nominal recovery.
However, in jurisdictions with creditor-
unfriendly features, we will cap both recovery
ratings and issue ratings to account for incre-
mental uncertainty.
While informed by historical recovery data,
our recovery ratings incorporate fundamental
deal-specific, scenario-driven, forward-looking
analysis. They consider the impact of key struc-
tural features, intercreditor dynamics, the
nature of insolvency regimes, multijurisdictional
issues, and potential changes in valuation after
a simulated default. Ongoing surveillance
through periodic and event-specific reviews
help ensure that our recovery ratings remain
forward looking by monitoring developments in
these issues and by evaluating the impact of
Director
Steve Wilkinson
New York
(1) 212-438-5093
steve_wilkinson@
Senior Director
Anne-Charlotte Pedersen
New York
(1) 212-438-6816
anne-charlotte_pedersen@
Senior Director
Craig Parker
Melbourne
(61) 3-9631-2073
craig_parker@
Criteria Guidelines For Recovery Ratings
On Global Industrials Issuers
Speculative-Grade Debt
CRITERIA GUIDELINES FOR RECOVERY RATINGS ON GLOBAL INDUSTRIALS ISSUERS SPECULATIVE-GRADE DEBT
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changes to a borrowers business risks and
debt and liability profile over time.
We acknowledge that default modeling, valu-
ation, and restructuring (whether as part of a
formal bankruptcy proceeding or otherwise)
are inherently dynamic and complex processes
that do not lend themselves to precise or cer-
tain predictions. These processes invariably
involve unforeseen events and are subject to
extensive negotiations that are influenced by
the subjective judgments, negotiating posi-
tions, and agendas of the various stakeholders.
Even so, we believe that our methodology of
focusing on a companys unique and funda-
mental credit riskstogether with an informed
analysis of how the composition and structure
of its debt, legal organization, and nondebt lia-
bilities would be expected to impact lender
recovery ratesprovides valuable insight into
creditor recovery prospects.
In this light, our recovery ratings are intended
to provide educated approximations of post-
default recovery rates, rather than exact fore-
casts. Our analysis also endeavors to comment
on how the specific features of a companys
debt and organizational structure may affect
lender recovery prospects. Of course, not all
borrowers will default, but our recovery ratings,
when viewed together with a companys risk of
default as estimated by Standard & Poors cor-
porate credit rating, can help investors evaluate
a debt instruments risk/reward characteristics
and estimate their expected return. Our
approach is intended to be transparent (within
the bounds of confidentiality), so that market
participants may draw value from our analysis
itself rather than merely from the conclusion of
the analysis.
Recovery Rating Scale And Issue
Rating Framework
The table summarizes our enhanced issue rat-
ing framework. The issue rating we apply to the
loans and bonds of companies with specula-
tive-grade corporate credit ratings is based on
the recovery rating outcome for the specific
instrument being rated. Issues with a high
recovery rating (1+, 1, or 2) would lead us to
rate the loan or bond above the corporate
credit rating, while a low recovery rating (5 or
6) would lead us to rate the issue below the
corporate credit rating.
Jurisdiction-Specific Adjustments For
Recovery And Issue Ratings
Standard & Poors due diligence for extending
recovery ratings beyond the U.S. has entailed
an assessment of how insolvency proceedings
in practice in various countries affect post-
default recovery prospects. This work has
enabled us to consistently incorporate jurisdic-
tion-specific adjustments when we assign
recovery and issue ratings outside the U.S. With
the help of local insolvency practitioners, we
have assessed each jurisdictions creditor
friendliness in theory as well as how the law
works in practice. For the latter, we so far lack
empirical data, as outside of the U.S. very little
reliable historical default and recovery data is
available to verify in practice the predictability
of insolvency proceedings and actual recovery
rates. We will refine and update our analysis
and methodology over time as appropriate if
more actual loss data and practical evidence
becomes available.
The four main factors that shape our analysis
of the jurisdictions creditor friendliness are:
U Security,
U Creditor participation/influence,
U Distribution of value/certainty of
priorities, and
U Time to resolution.
Based on the score reached on each of these
factors, we have classified the reviewed coun-
tries into three categories, according to their
creditor-friendliness. This classification has
enabled us to make jurisdiction-specific adjust-
ments to our recovery analysis. Namely, relative
to our standard assignment of recovery and
debt issue ratings, we cap both recovery ratings
and the differential between the issuer credit
and debt issue ratings in countries if and to the
extent we expect the recovery process and
actual recovery rates to be negatively affected
by insolvency regimes that favor debtors or
other noncreditor constituencies. We believe
that by transparently overlaying analytical judg-
ment on top of pure numerical analysis, we
increase the transparency and consistency of
our assessments of the impact of countries
insolvency rulesespecially those that are less
creditor friendly when assigning recovery and
issue ratings.
To review the details of our adjustments, the
grouping of various countries into groups with
similar characteristics, and the extent of our
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34
issue-notching caps for each group, see
Jurisdiction-Specific Adjustments To Recovery
And Issue Ratings.
General Recovery Methodology And
Approach For Global Industrials
Recovery analytics for Industrials issuers has
three basic components: (1) determining the
most likely path to default for a company; (2)
valuing the company following default; and (3)
distributing that value to claimants based upon
the relative priority of each claimant. Our ana-
lytical process breaks down these components
into the following steps:
U Establishing a simulated path to default;
U Forecasting the companys profitability and/
or cash flow at default based on our
simulated default scenario;
U Determining an appropriate valuation for the
company following default;
U Identifying and estimating debt and nondebt
claims in our simulated default scenario;
U Determining the distribution of value based
on relative priorities;
U Assigning a recovery rating (or ratings),
including a published recovery report
that summarizes our assumptions
and conclusions.
Establishing a simulated path to default
This is a fundamental part of our recovery
analysis because we must first understand
the forces most likely to cause a default
before we can estimate a reasonable valua-
tion given default. This step draws on the
company and sector knowledge of Standard &
Poors credit analysts to formulate and quan-
tify the factors most likely to cause a com-
pany to default given its unique business risks
and the financial risk inherent in the capital
structure that we are evaluating in our default
and recovery analysis.
At the outset of this process, we deconstruct
the borrowers projections to understand
managements general business, industry, and
economic expectations. Once we understand
managements view, we make appropriate
adjustments to key economic, industry, and
firm specific factors to simulate the most likely
path to a payment default.
Forecasting profitability and/or cash flow at default
The simulated default scenario is our assess-
ment of the borrowers most likely path to a pay-
ment default. The insolvency proxy is the point
along that path at which we expect the borrower
to default. In other words, the insolvency proxy is
the point at which funds available plus free cash
flow is insufficient to pay fixed charges:
(Funds available + Free cash flow)/
Fixed charges <= 1.0
The terms in this equation are defined as:
Funds available. The sum of balance sheet
cash and revolving credit facility availability (in
excess of the minimal amount a company needs
to operate its business at its seasonal peak).
Free cash flow. EBITDA in the year of default,
less a minimal level of required maintenance
capital expenditures, less cash taxes, plus or
minus changes in working capital. For default
modeling and recovery estimates, our EBITDA
and free cash flow estimates ignore noncash
compensation expenses and do not use Standard &
Poors adjustments for operating leases.
Fixed charges. The sum, in the year of
default, of:
U Scheduled principal amortization (We generally
do not include bullet or ballooning
maturities as fixed charges, as lenders
typically would expect such amounts to be
refinanced and would presumably be reluctant
to force a company into default that can
otherwise comfortably service its fixed
charges. Consequently, our default and
recovery modeling will typically assume that
additional business and cash flow deterioration
is necessary to trigger a default.);
U Required cash interest payments (including
assumed increases to LIBOR rates on
floating-rate debt and to the margin charged
on debt obligations that have maintenance
financial covenants); and
U Other cash payments the borrower is either
contractually or practically obligated to pay
that are not already captured as an expense
on the borrowers income statement. (Lease
payments, for example, are accounted for
within free cash flow and, thus, are not
considered a fixed charge.)
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The insolvency proxy at the point of projected
default may be greater than 1.0x in a few spe-
cial circumstances:
U For strategic bankruptcy filings, when a
borrower may attempt to take advantage of
the insolvency process primarily to obtain
relief from legal claims or
onerous contracts;
U When a borrower may rationally be expected
to retain a greater amount of cash (e.g., to
prepare for a complex, protracted
restructuring; if it is in a very capital-
intensive industry; or if it is in a jurisdiction
that does not allow for super-priority
standing for new credit in a post-petition
financing); and
U When a borrowers financial covenants have
deteriorated beyond the level at which even
the most patient lender could tolerate
further amendments or waivers. (Lenders
with no financial maintenance covenants
have effectively surrendered this option and
have reduced their ability to influence
company behavior.)
Conversely, free cash flow may decline below
the insolvency proxy when the borrowers oper-
ating performance is expected to continue to
deteriorate due to cyclicality or business model
contraction resulting from the competitive and
economic conditions assumed in the simulated
default scenario. In any event, our analysis will
identify the level of cash flow used as the basis
for our valuation.
Determining valuation
To help us determine an appropriate valuation
for a company (given our simulated default
scenario), we may consider a variety of valua-
tion methodologies, including market multiples,
discounted cash flow (DCF) modeling, and dis-
crete asset analysis. The market multiples and
DCF methods are used to determine a compa-
nys enterprise value as a going concern. This is
generally the most appropriate approach when
our simulated default and recovery analysis
indicates that the borrowers reorganization (or
the outright sale of the ongoing business or
certain segments) is the most likely outcome of
an insolvency proceeding. We use discrete
asset valuation most often for industries in
which this valuation approach is typically used,
or when the simulated default scenario indi-
cates that the borrowers liquidation is the
most likely outcome of insolvency. In addition,
we may use a combination of the discrete and
enterprise valuation methods when we believe
that a company will reorganize, but that its
debt and organizational structure provides cer-
tain creditors with priority claims against par-
ticular assets or subsidiaries.!For example,
Standard & Poors will consider whether a com-
panys decision to securitize or not securitize
material assets impacts the value available to
distribute to other creditors.
Market multiples. The key to valuing a firm
using a market multiples approach is to select
appropriate comparable companies, or
comps. The analysis should include several
comps that are similar to the firm being val-
ued with respect to business lines, geographic
markets, margins, revenue, capital require-
ments, and competitive position. Of course, an
ideal set of comps does not always exist, so
analytical judgment is often required to adjust
for differences in size, business profiles, and
other attributes. In addition, in the context of
a recovery analysis, our multiples must con-
sider the competitive and economic environ-
ments assumed in our simulated default
scenario, which are often very different than
present conditions. As a result, our analysis
strives to consider a selection of multiples
and types of multiples
Ideally, we are interested in multiples for
similar firms that have reorganized due to cir-
cumstances consistent with our simulated
default scenario. In practice, however, the exis-
tence of such emergence multiple comps is
rare. As a result, our analysis often turns to
transaction or purchase multiples for com-
parable firms because these are generally more
numerous. With transaction multiples, we try to
use forward multiples (purchase price divided
by projected EBITDA) rather than trailing multi-
ples (purchase price divided by historical
EBITDA). This is because we believe that for-
ward multiples, which are generally lower
because they incorporate the benefit of per-
ceived cash flow synergies used to justify the
purchase price, provide a more appropriate ref-
erence point. In addition, trading multiples for
publicly traded firms can be useful because
they allow us to track how multiples have
changed over economic and business cycles.
This is especially relevant for cyclical industries
and for sectors entering a different stage of
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36
development or experiencing changing
competitive conditions.
A selection of multiples helps match our val-
uation with the conditions assumed in our sim-
ulated default scenario. For example, a firm
projected to default in a cyclical trough may
warrant a higher multiple than one expected to
default at a cyclical midpoint. Furthermore, two
companies in the same industry may merit
meaningfully different multiples if their simu-
lated default scenarios are very different. For
example, if one is highly levered and at risk of
default from relatively normal competitive
stresses while the other is unlikely to default
unless there is a large unexpected fundamental
deterioration in the cash flow potential of the
business model (which could make historical
sector multiples irrelevant).
Our multiples analysis may also consider
alternative industry specific multiplessuch as
subscribers, hospital beds, recurring revenue,
etc.where appropriate. Alternatively, such
metrics may serve as a check on the soundness
of a valuation that relied on an EBITDA multiple,
DCF, or discrete asset approach.
Discounted cash flow (DCF). Standard & Poors
DCF valuation analysis for recovery analytics gen-
erally uses a three-stage model. The first stage is
the simulated default scenario; the second stage
is the period during insolvency; and the third
stage represents the long-term operating perfor-
mance of the reorganized firm. Our valuation is
based on the third stage, which typically values a
company using a perpetuity growth formula,
which contemplates a long-term steady-state
growth rate deemed appropriate for the borrow-
ers business. However, the third stage may also
include specific annual cash flow forecasts for a
period of time following reorganization before
assigning a terminal value through the perpetuity
growth formula. In any case, the specifics under-
lying our cash flow forecast and valuation are
outlined in Standard & Poors recovery reports.
Discrete asset valuation. We value the rele-
vant assets by applying industry- and asset-
specific advance rates in conjunction with
third-party appraisals (when we are provided
with the appraisals).
Identifying and estimating the value
of debt and nondebt claims
After valuing a company, we must then iden-
tify and quantify the debt obligations and
other material liabilities that would be
expected to have a claim against the com-
pany following default. Potential claims fall
into three broad categories:
U Principal and accrued interest on all debt
outstanding at the point of default, whether
issued at the operating company, subsidiary,
or holding company level;
U Bankruptcy-related claims, such as debtor-
in-possession (DIP) financing and
administrative expenses for professional fees
and other bankruptcy costs;
U Other nondebt claims such as taxes payable,
certain securitization programs, trade
payables, deficiency claims on rejected
leases, litigation liabilities, and unfunded
post-retirement obligations.
Our analysis of these claims and their poten-
tial values strives to consider each borrowers
particular facts and circumstances, as well as
the expected impact on the claims as a result
of our simulated default scenario.
We estimate debt outstanding at the point of
default by reducing term loans by scheduled
amortization paid prior to our simulated default
and by assuming that all committed debt, such
as revolving credit facilities and delayed draw
term loans, is fully funded. For asset-based
lending (ABL) facilities, we will consider whether
the borrowing base formula would allow the
company to fully draw the facility in a simulated
default scenario. For letters of credit, especially
those issued under dedicated synthetic letter of
credit tranches, we will assess whether these
contingent obligations are likely to be drawn
following default. Our estimate of debt out-
standing at default also includes an estimate of
pre-petition interest, which is calculated by
adding six months of interest (based on histori-
cal data from Standard & Poors LossStats
database) to our estimated principal amount at
default. The inclusion of pre-petition interest
makes our recovery analysis more consistent
with regulatory credit risk capital requirements.
Our analysis focuses on the recovery pros-
pects for the debt instruments in a companys
current or pro forma debt structure, and gener-
ally does not make estimates for other debt
that may be issued prior to a default. We feel
that this approach is prudent and more relevant
to investors because the amount and composi-
tion of any additional debt (secured, unsecured,
and/or subordinated) may materially impact
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lender recovery rates, and it is not possible to
know these particulars in advance. Further,
incremental debt added to a companys capital
structure may materially affect its probability of
default, which, in turn, could impact all aspects
of our recovery analysis (i.e., the most likely
path to default, valuation given default, and
loss given default). Consequently, changes to a
companys debt structure are treated as events
that require a reevaluation of our default and
recovery analysis. This is a key aspect of our
ongoing surveillance of our default and recov-
ery ratings. We do, however, make some excep-
tions to this approach. Such exceptions will be
outlined in our recovery reports and generally
fall under two categories:
U Permitted, but uncommitted, incremental
debt may be included as part of our default
and recovery analysis if this is consistent
with our expectations and our underlying
corporate credit rating on a given issuer.
U Our default and recovery analysis may
assume the repayment of near-term debt
maturities if the company is expected to
retire these obligations and has the liquidity
to do so. Similarly, principal prepayments
whether voluntary or part of an excess cash
flow sweep provisionmay be considered for
certain credits when deemed appropriate.
Otherwise, we generally assume that debt
that matures prior to our simulated default
date is rolled over on similar terms but at
current market rates.
Our analytical treatment and estimates for
bankruptcy-related and other nondebt claims in
default is generally specific to the laws and
customs of the jurisdictions involved in our
simulated default scenario. Please refer to
Appendix 1 for a review of our approach and
methodology for these claims in the U.S.
Determining distribution of value
The distribution follows a waterfall approach
that reflects the relative seniority of the claim-
ants and will be specific to the laws, customs,
and insolvency regime practices for the rele-
vant jurisdictions for a company. For example,
the quantification and classification of bank-
ruptcy-related and nondebt claims for insolven-
cies outside of the U.S. might be very different
from the methodology for U.S. Industrials com-
panies discussed in the Appendix. Furthermore,
local laws and customs may warrant deviations
from the waterfall distribution we follow in the
U.S. Where relevant, we will publish our guide-
lines and rationale for these differences before
rolling out our unsecured recovery ratings in
these jurisdictions. In the U.S., our general
assumption of the relative priority of claimants
is as follows:
U Super-priority claims, such as DIP financing,
U Administrative expenses,
U Federal and state tax claims,
U Senior secured claims,
U Junior secured claims,
U Senior unsecured claims,
U Subordinated claims,
U Preferred stock,
U Common stock.
However, this priority of claims is subject to
two critical caveats:
U The beneficial position of secured creditor
claims, whether first-priority or otherwise, is
valid only to the extent that the collateral
supporting such claims is equal to, or greater
than, the amount of the claim (including
higher priority and pari passu claims). If the
collateral value is insufficient to fully cover a
secured claim, the uncovered amount or
deficiency balance will be pari passu with
all other senior unsecured claims.
U Structural issues and contractual
agreements can also alter the priority of
certain claims relative to each other or to the
value attributable to specific assets or
entities in an organization.
As a result of these caveats, the recovery
prospects for different debt instruments of the
same type (whether they be senior secured,
senior unsecured, senior subordinated, etc.)
might be very different, depending on the
structure of the transactions. While the debt
type of an instrument may provide some indi-
cation as to its relative seniority, it is the legal
structure and associated terms and conditions
that are the ultimate arbiter of priority.
Consequently, a fundamental review of a com-
panys debt and legal entity structure is
required to properly evaluate the relative prior-
ity of claimants. This requires an understanding
of the terms and conditions of the various debt
instruments as they pertain to borrower and
guarantor relationships, collateral pledges and
exclusions, facility amounts, covenants, and
debt maturities. In addition, we must under-
stand the breakout of the companys cash flow
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38
and assets as it pertains to its legal organiza-
tional structure and consider the effect of key
jurisdictional and intercreditor issues.
Key structural issues to explore
include identifying:
U Higher priority liens on specific assets by
forms of secured debt such as mortgages,
industrial revenue bonds, and ABL facilities;
U Non-guarantor subsidiaries (domestic or
foreign) that do not guarantee a companys
primary debt obligations or provide asset
pledges to support the companys
secured debt;
U Claims at non-guarantor subsidiaries that
will have a higher priority (i.e., a structurally
superior) claim on the value related to
such entities;
U Material exclusions to the collateral pledged
to secured lenders, including the lack of
asset pledges by foreign subsidiaries or the
absence of liens on significant domestic
assets, including the stock of foreign or
domestic non-guarantor subsidiaries
(whether due to concessions demanded by
and granted to the borrower, poor
transaction structuring, regulatory
restrictions, or limitations imposed by other
debt indentures); and
U Whether a companys foreign subsidiaries are
likely to file for bankruptcy in their local
jurisdictions as part of the default and
restructuring process.
The presence of obligations with higher-pri-
ority liens on certain assets means that the
enterprise value available to other creditors
must be reduced to account for the distribution
of value to satisfy these creditors first. In most
instances, asset-specific secured debt claims
(such as those previously listed) are structured
to ensure full collateral coverage even in a
default scenario. As such, our analysis will typi-
cally reduce the enterprise value by the amount
of these claims to determine the remaining
enterprise value available for other creditors.
That said, there may be exceptions that will be
considered on a case-by-case basis if the
amounts are material. Well-structured secured
bank or bond debt that does not have a first
lien on certain assets will get second-priority
liens on assets that are significant and may
have meaningful excess collateral value. For
example, this is often the case when secured
debt collateralized by a first lien on all
noncurrent assets also takes a second-priority
lien on working capital assets that are already
pledged to support an asset-based revolving
credit facility.
Significant domestic or foreign non-guaran-
tor entities must be identified because these
entities have not explicitly promised to repay
the debt. Thus, the portion of enterprise value
derived from these subsidiaries does not
directly support the rated debt. As a result, debt
and certain nondebt claims at these subsidiar-
ies have a structurally higher priority claim
against the subsidiary value. Accordingly, the
portion of the companys enterprise value
stemming from these subsidiaries must be
estimated and treated separately in the distri-
bution of value to creditors. This requires an
understanding of the breakout of a companys
cash flow and assets. Because these subsidiar-
ies are still part of the enterprise being evalu-
ated, any equity value that remains after
satisfying the structurally superior claims would
be available to satisfy other creditors of the
entities that own these subsidiaries. Well-
structured debt will often include covenants to
restrict the amount of structurally superior
debt that can be placed at such subsidiaries.
Furthermore, well-structured secured debt will
take a lien on the stock of such subsidiaries to
ensure a priority interest in the equity value
available to support other creditors. In practice,
the pledge of foreign subsidiary stock owned by
U.S. entities is usually limited to 65% of voting
stock for tax reasons. The residual value that is
not captured by secured lenders through stock
pledges would be expected to be available to all
senior unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis.
The exclusion of other material assets (other
than whole subsidiaries or subsidiary stock)
from the collateral pledged to support secured
debt must also be incorporated into our analy-
sis. The value of such assets is typically deter-
mined using a discrete asset valuation
approach, and our estimated value and related
assumptions will be disclosed in our recovery
report as appropriate. We expect the value of
excluded assets would be shared by all senior
unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis.
An evaluation of whether foreign subsidiaries
would also be likely to file for bankruptcy is also
required, because this would likely increase the
cost of the bankruptcy process and create
potential multijurisdictional issues that could
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impact lender recovery rates. The involvement
of foreign courts in a bankruptcy process pres-
ents a myriad of complexities and uncertain-
ties. For these same reasons, however,
U.S.-domiciled borrowers that file for bank-
ruptcy seldom also file their foreign subsidiar-
ies without a specific benefit or reason for
doing so. Consequently, we generally assume
that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. borrowers do
not file for bankruptcy unless there is a com-
pelling reason to assume otherwise, such as a
large amount of foreign debt that needs to be
restructured to enable the company to emerge
from bankruptcy. When foreign subsidiaries are
expected to file bankruptcy, our analysis will be
tailored to incorporate the particulars of the
relevant bankruptcy regimes.
Intercreditor issues may affect the distribu-
tion of value and result in deviations from
absolute priority (i.e., maintenance of the
relative priority of the claims, subject to
structural and contractual considerations, so
that a class of claims will not receive any dis-
tribution until all classes above it are fully
satisfied), which is assumed by Standard &
Poors methodology. In practice, however,
Chapter 11 bankruptcies are negotiated set-
tlements and the distribution of value may
vary somewhat from the ideal implied by
absolute priority for a variety of intercreditor
reasons, including, in the U.S., accommoda-
tions and substantive consolidation.
Accommodations refer to concessions
granted by senior creditors to junior claimants
in negotiations to gain their cooperation in a
timely restructuring. We generally do not
explicitly model for accommodations because it
is uncertain whether any concessions will be
granted, if those granted will ultimately have
value (e.g., warrants as a contingent equity
claim), or whether the value will be material
enough to meaningfully affect our projected
recovery rates.
Substantive consolidation represents a
potentially more meaningful deviation from the
distribution of value according to absolute pri-
ority. In a substantive consolidation, the entities
of a corporate group may be treated as a single
consolidated entity for the purposes of a bank-
ruptcy reorganization. This effectively would
eliminate the credit support provided by unse-
cured guarantees or the pledge of intercom-
pany loans or subsidiary stock, and dilutes the
recovery prospects of creditors that relied on
these features to the benefit of those that did
not. Even the threat of substantive consolida-
tion may result in a negotiated settlement that
could affect recovery distribution. While sub-
stantive consolidation can meaningfully impact
the recovery prospects of certain creditors, it is
a discretionary judicial doctrine that is only rel-
evant in certain situations. It is difficult to pre-
dict whether any party would seek to ask a
bankruptcy court to apply it in a specific case,
or the likelihood that party would succeed in
persuading the court to do so. As such, our
analysis does not evaluate the likelihood of
substantive consolidation, though we acknowl-
edge that this risk could affect recoveries in
certain cases.
Recovery Rating Scales And Issue Rating Criteria
For issuers with a speculative-grade corporate credit rating

Recovery rating*

Recovery description

Recovery expectations (%)
Issue rating notches relative
to corporate credit rating
1+ Highest expectation, full recovery 100 +3 notches
1 Very high recovery 90100 +2 notches
2 Substantial recovery 7090 +1 notch
3 Meaningful recovery 5070 0 notches
4 Average recovery 3050 0 notches
5 Modest recovery 1030 -1 notch
6 Negligible recovery 010 -2 notches
*As noted above, recovery ratings in certain countries are capped to adjust for reduced creditor recovery prospects in these
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the recovery ratings on unsecured debt issued by corporate entities with corporate credit ratings
of BB- or higher are generally capped at 3 to account for the risk that their recovery prospects are at greater risk of being
impaired by the issuance of additional priority or pari passu debt prior to default. Recovery of principal plus accrued but
unpaid interest at the time of default. Very high confidence of full recovery resulting from significant overcollateralization
or strong structural features.
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Assigning recovery ratings
We estimate recovery rates by dividing the
portion of enterprise or liquidation value pro-
jected to be available to cover the debt to
which the recovery rating applies, by the esti-
mated amount of debt (principal and pre-peti-
tion interest) and pari passu claims
outstanding at default. We then map the
recovery rate to our recovery rating chart to
determine the issue and recovery ratings.
Standard & Poors accompanies its recovery
ratings with written recovery reports, which
identify the simulated payment default, valua-
tion assumptions, and other factors on which
the recovery ratings are based. This disclosure
is intended to improve the utility of our analy-
sis by providing investors with more informa-
tion with which to evaluate our conclusions
and to allow them to consider different
assumptions as they deem appropriate.
Surveillance of recovery ratings
After our initial analysis at debt origination, we
monitor material changes affecting the bor-
rower and its debt and liability structure to
determine if the changes might also alter cred-
itor recovery prospects. This is essential given
the dynamic nature of credit in general and
default and recovery modeling in particular.
Therefore, a fundamental component of recov-
ery analysis is periodic and event specific sur-
veillance designed to monitor developing risk
exposures that might affect recovery. Any
material changes to our default and recovery
ratings or analysis will be disclosed in updates
to our recovery reports. Factors that could
impact our default and recovery analysis or
ratings include:
U Acquisitions and divestitures;
U Updated valuation assumptions;
U Shifts in the profit and cash flow
contributions of borrower, guarantor, or
non-guarantor entities;
U Changes in debt or the exposure to
nondebt liabilities;
U Intercreditor dynamics; and
U Changes in bankruptcy law or case histories.
Conclusion
We believe that our recovery ratings are benefi-
cial because they allow market participants to
consider disaggregated analyses for probability
of default and recovery given default. We also
believe our recovery analysis may provide inves-
tors insight into how a companys debt and orga-
nizational structure may affect recovery rates. G
Appendix: U.S. Industrials Analysis Of
Claims And Estimation Of Amounts
This appendix covers Standard & Poors analyt-
ical considerations regarding the treatment of
bankruptcy-specific and other nondebt claims
in our default and recovery analysis of U.S.-
domiciled Industrials borrowers. Our approach
endeavors to consider the borrowers particular
facts and circumstances, as well as the
expected impact on the claims as a result of
the simulated default scenario. Still, the poten-
tial amount of many of these claims is highly
variable and difficult to predict. In addition,
these claims are likely to disproportionately
affect the recovery prospects of unsecured
creditors because most of these claims would
be expected to be classified as general unse-
cured claims in bankruptcy. This contributes to
the historically higher standard deviation of
recovery rates for unsecured lenders (relative
to secured lenders).
While these issues make projecting recovery
rates for unsecured debt challenging, we
believe that an understanding of the analytical
considerations related to these claims can help
investors make better decisions regarding an
investments risks and recovery prospects. Our
recovery reports endeavor to comment on our
assumptions regarding the types and amounts
of the claims as appropriate.
Bankruptcy-specific priority claims
Debtor in possession financing. DIP facilities
are usually super-priority claims that enjoy
repayment precedence over unsecured debt
and, often, secured debt. However, it is exceed-
ingly difficult to accurately quantify the size or
likelihood of DIP financing or to forecast how
DIP financing may affect the recovery pros-
pects for different creditors. This is because
the size or existence of a theoretical DIP com-
mitment is unpredictable, DIP borrowings at
emergence may be substantially less than the
DIP commitment, and such facilities may be
used to fully or partially repay some pre-peti-
tion secured debt. Furthermore, the presence
of DIP financing might actually help creditor
WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM
recovery prospects by allowing companies to
restructure their operations and preserve the
value of their business. As a result of these
uncertainties, estimating the impact of a DIP
facility is generally beyond the scope of our
analysis, even though we recognize that DIP
facilities may materially impact recovery pros-
pects in certain cases.
Administrative expenses. Administrative
expenses relate to professional fees and other
costs associated with bankruptcy that are
required to preserve the value of the estate
and complete the bankruptcy process. These
costs must be paid prior to exiting bankruptcy,
making them effectively senior to those of all
other creditors. The dollar amount and materi-
ality of administrative claims usually corre-
spond to the companys size and the
complexity of its capital structure. We expect
that these costs will be less for simple capital
structures that can usually negotiate an end
to a bankruptcy quickly and may even use a
pre-packaged bankruptcy plan. Conversely,
these costs are expected to be greater for
large borrowers with complex capital struc-
tures where the insolvency process is often
characterized by protracted multiple party dis-
putes that drive up bankruptcy costs and
diminish lender recoveries. When using an
enterprise value approach, our methodology
estimates the value of these claims as a per-
centage of the borrowers emergence enter-
prise value as follows:
U Three percent for capital structures with one
primary class of debt;
U Five percent for two primary classes of debt
(first- and second-lien creditors may be
adversaries in a bankruptcy proceeding
and are treated as separate classes by
Standard & Poors);
U Seven percent for three primary classes of
debt; and
U Ten percent for certain complex
capital structures.
When using a discrete asset valuation
approach, these costs may be implicitly
accounted for in the orderly liquidation value
discounts used to value a companys assets.
Other nondebt claims
Taxes. Various U.S. government authorities suc-
cessfully assert tax claims as either adminis-
trative, priority, or secured claims. However, it is
very difficult to project the level and status of
such claims at origination (e.g., tax disputes en
route to default are extremely hard to predict).
We also expect that, while such claims will nor-
mally be paid before senior secured claims,
their overall amount is seldom material enough
to impact lender recoveries. Therefore, we
acknowledge that tax claims may indeed be
priority claims, but we generally do not, at origi-
nation, reduce our expectation for lenders
recovery by estimating the amount of potential
tax claims.
Swap termination costs. The Bankruptcy
Code accords special treatment for counter-
parties to financial contracts, such as swaps,
repurchase agreements, securities contracts,
and forward contracts, to ensure continuity in
the financial markets and to avoid systemic
risk (so long as both the type of contract and
the type of counterparty fall within certain
statutory provisions). In addition to not being
subject to the automatic stay that generally
precludes creditors from exercising their rem-
edies against the debtor, financial contract
counterparties have the right to liquidate, ter-
minate, or accelerate the contract in a bank-
ruptcy. Most currency and interest rate swaps
related to secured debt are secured on a pari
passu basis with the respective loans. Other
swaps are likely to be unsecured. While we
acknowledge the potential for such claims,
quantifying such claims will usually be imprac-
tical and beyond the scope of our analysis at
origination. That said, making estimates for
these claims may be more practical in surveil-
lance as a company approaches bankruptcy
and the potential impact of these types of
claims becomes clearer.
Cash management obligations. Obligations
under automated clearing house programs and
other cash management services provided by a
borrowers banks may be incremental to its
exposure to its bank lenders under its credit
facilities. In some cases, these obligations may
be material and may be secured on a pari passu
basis by the bank collateral. When we are aware
of these situations, our estimates for these
claims will be disclosed in our recovery reports.
Regulatory and litigation claims. These
claims are fact- and borrower-specific and are
expected to be immaterial for the vast majority
of issuers. For others, however, they may play a
significant role in our simulated default
WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM
42
scenario and represent a sizable liability that
impairs the recovery prospects of other credi-
tors. Borrowers that fall into this category may
be in the tobacco, chemical, building materials,
environmental services, mining, or pharmaceu-
tical industries. Even within these sectors, how-
ever, we are most likely to factor these issues
into our analysis in a meaningful way when a
borrower is either already facing significant
exposure to these liabilities or is unlikely to
default without a shock of this type to its busi-
ness (such as a high speculative-grade-rated
company with low to moderate leverage and
relatively stable cash flow).
After determining whether it is reasonable
to include such claims in our default and
recovery analysis, we are left with the chal-
lenge of sizing the claims and determining
how they might impact creditor recovery pros-
pects. Unfortunately, the case history is very
limited in this area and does not offer clear
guidelines on how to best handle these inher-
ent uncertainties. As such, we tailor our
approach on a case-by-case basis to the bor-
rowers specific circumstances to help us
reach an appropriate solution. When signifi-
cant, our approach and assumptions will be
outlined in our recovery report so that inves-
tors can evaluate our treatment, and consider
alternative assumptions if desired, as part of
their investment decision. We note that claims
in this category would typically be expected to
have general unsecured status in a bank-
ruptcy, although they may remain ongoing
costs of a reorganized entity and thus reduce
the value available to other creditors.
Securitizations. Standard accounts receiv-
able securitization programs involve the sale of
certain receivables to a bankruptcy-remote
special purpose entity in an arms length trans-
action under commercially reasonable terms.
The assets sold are not legally part of the debt-
ors estate (although in some circumstances
they may continue to be reported on the com-
panys balance sheet for accounting purposes),
and the securitization investors are completely
reliant on the value of the assets they pur-
chased to generate their return. As a result, the
securitization investors do not have any
recourse against the estate, although the sale
of the assets may affect the value available to
other creditors. When a discrete asset valuation
approach is used and the sold
receivables continue to be reported on the
companys balance sheet, we will consider the
securitized debt from such programs to be a
secured claim with priority on the value from
the receivables within the securitization.
Securitizations may also be in the form of a
future flow-type structure, which securitizes all
or a portion of the borrowers future revenue
and cash flow (typically related to particular
contracts, patents, trademarks, or other intan-
gible assets), would have a claim against our
estimated valuation. Such transactions effec-
tively securitize all or a part of the borrowers
future earnings, and the related claims would
have priority claim to the value stemming from
the securitized assets. This claim would dimin-
ish the enterprise value available to other cor-
porate creditors. Such transactions are typically
highly individualized, and the amount of the
claims and the value of the assets in our simu-
lated default analysis are evaluated on a case-
by-case basis.
Trade creditor claims. Typically, trade creditor
claims are unsecured claims that would rank
pari passu with a borrowers other unsecured
obligations. However, because a borrowers via-
bility as a going concern hinges upon continued
access to goods and services, many pre-peti-
tion claims are either paid in the ordinary
course or treated as priority administrative
claims. This concession to critical trade ven-
dors ensures that they remain willing to carry
on their relationships with the borrower during
the insolvency proceedings, which preserves
the value of the estate and enhances the recov-
ery prospects for all creditors. Consequently,
our analysis does not make an explicit estimate
for trade creditor claims in bankruptcy for com-
panies that are expected to reorganize, but
rather, it assumes that these costs continue to
be paid as part of the companys normal work-
ing capital cycle (and, thus, are already
accounted for in our valuations using market
multiples or DCF). For firms expected to liqui-
date, an estimate of accounts payable will be
made, with the amount treated as an unse-
cured claim.
Leases. U.S. bankruptcy law provides compa-
nies the opportunity to accept or reject leases
during the bankruptcy process (for commercial
real property leases, the review period is limited
to 210 days, including a one-time 90-day
extension, unless the lessor agrees to an
WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM
extension). If a lease is accepted, the company
is required to keep rent payments on the lease
current, meaning that there will be no claim
against the estate. This also allows the lessee
to continue to use the leased asset, with the
cash flow (i.e., value) derived from the asset
available to support other creditors.
If a lease is rejected, the company must dis-
continue using the asset, and the lessor may
file a general unsecured claim against the
estate. As a result, we must estimate a reason-
able lease rejection rate for the firm given the
types of assets leased, the industry, and our
simulated default scenario. Leases are typically
rejected for one of three reasons:
U The lease is priced above market rates;
U The leased asset is generating negative or
insufficient returns; or
U The leased asset is highly vulnerable to
obsolescence during the term of the lease.
Our evaluation may ballpark the rejection
rate by assuming it matches the percentage
decline in revenue in our simulated default
scenario or, if applicable, by looking at com-
mon industry lease rejection rates. If leases are
material, we may further evaluate whether our
knowledge of a companys portfolio of leased
assets is likely to result in a higher or lower
level of unattractive leases (and rejections) in
a default scenario. For example, if a companys
leased assets are unusually old, underutilized,
or priced above current market rates, then a
higher rejection rate may be warranted. In
practice, this level of refinement in our analysis
will be most relevant when a company has a
substantial amount of lease obligations and a
significant risk of near-term default.
Uneconomical leases that are amended
through renegotiation in bankruptcy are con-
sidered to be rejected.
In bankruptcy, the amount of unsecured
claims from rejected leases is determined by
taking the amount of lost rental income and
subtracting the net value available to the lessor
by selling or re-leasing the asset in its next
best use. However, the deficiency claims of
commercial real estate lessors is further
restricted to the greater of one years rent or
15% of the remaining rental payments not to
exceed three years rent. Lessors of assets
other than commercial real property do not
have their potential deficiency claims capped,
but such leases are generally not material and
are usually for relatively short periods of time.
With these issues in mind, Standard & Poors
quantifies lease deficiency claims for most
companies by multiplying their estimated lease
rejection rate by three times their annual rent.
However, there are a few exceptions to our
general approach. Deficiency claims for leases
of major transportation equipment (e.g., air-
craft, railcars, and ships) are estimated on a
case-by-case basis, with our assumptions dis-
closed in our recovery reports. This is necessary
because these lease obligations do not have
their claims capped, may be longer term, and
are typically for substantial amounts. In addi-
tion, we use a lower-rent multiple for cases in
which a company relies primarily on very short-
term leases (three years or less). Furthermore,
we do not include any deficiency claim for
leases held by individual asset-specific subsid-
iaries that do not have credit support from
other entities (by virtue of guarantees or co-
lessee relationships) due to the lack of recourse
against other entities and the likelihood that
these subsidiaries are likely to be worthless if
the leases are rejected. This situation was rele-
vant in many of the movie exhibitor bankrupt-
cies in the early 2000 time period.
Employment-related claims. Material unse-
cured claims may arise when a debtor rejects,
terminates, or modifies the terms of employ-
ment or benefits for its current or retired
employees. Principally, these claims would arise
from the rejection of labor contracts, the volun-
tary or involuntary termination of defined benefit
pension plans, or the modification of retiree
benefits. Because these types of employee
arrangements are not common in many indus-
tries, these liabilities would only be relevant for
certain companies. Where relevant, the key issue
is whether these obligations are likely to be
renounced or changed after default, since no
claim results if they are unaltered. Of course,
employment-related claims are more likely to
arise when a company is at a competitive disad-
vantage because of the costs of maintaining
these commitments. Even then, some past
bankruptcies suggest that some companies may
not use the bankruptcy process to fully address
these problems. What is clear, however, is that
employment-related claims may significantly
dilute recoveries for the unsecured creditors of
certain companies and that these risks are most
acute for companies that are grappling with
WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM
44
burdensome labor costs. To reflect this risk, we
are likely to include some level of employment-
related claims for companies where uncompeti-
tive labor or benefits costs are a factor in our
simulated default scenario.
Collective bargaining agreement rejection
claims. A borrower that has collective bargaining
agreements (CBA), including above-market
wages, benefits, or work rules, is likely to seek to
reject these contracts in a bankruptcy. In order
to reject a CBA, the borrower must establish, and
the bankruptcy court must find that the bor-
rower has proposed, modifications to the CBA
that are necessary for its successful reorganiza-
tion. In addition, the court must find that all
creditors and affected parties are treated fairly
and equitably, that the borrower has bargained
fairly with the relevant union, that the union
rejected the proposal without good cause, and
that equity considerations clearly favor rejection.
Proceedings to reject a CBA typically result in a
consensual reduction in wages and benefits, and
modified work rules under a replacement or
modified agreement prior to the bankruptcy
courts decision on the motion to reject.
If a CBA were rejected, the affected employ-
ees would have unsecured claims for damages
that would be limited to one years compensa-
tion plus any unpaid compensation due under
the CBA. However, if a CBA were modified
through negotiation without rejection, the dam-
ages for lost wages and benefits and modified
work rules may not be limited to this amount.
Pension plan termination claims. The ability to
terminate a defined benefit pension plan is pro-
vided under the U.S. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA). Under ERISA, these
plans may be terminated voluntarily by the
debtor as the plan sponsor, or involuntarily by
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC) as
the agency that insures plan benefits. Typically,
any termination during bankruptcy will be a dis-
tress termination, in which the plan assets are,
or would be, insufficient to pay benefits under
the plan. However, the bankruptcy of the plan
sponsor does not automatically result in the ter-
mination of its pension plans, and even under-
funded plans may not necessarily be terminated.
For example, a borrower may elect to maintain
underfunded plans, or may not succeed in termi-
nating a plan, if it fails to demonstrate that it
would not be able to pay its debts and success-
fully reorganize unless the plan is terminated.
In a distress termination, the PBGC assumes
the liabilities of the pension plan up to the
limits prescribed under ERISA and gets an
unsecured claim in bankruptcy against the
debtor for the unfunded benefits. The
calculation of this liability is based on different
assumptions than the borrowers reported
liability in its financial statements. This, in
addition to the difficulty of predicting the
funded status of a plan at some point in the
future, complicates our ability to accurately
assess the value of these claims.
Retiree benefits modification claims. Non-
pension retiree benefits are payments to
retirees for medical, surgical, or hospital care
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, or death. The requirements
for modifying these benefits for plans covered
under a union contract during bankruptcy are
similar to the requirements for the rejection of
a CBA, but they may be modified by order of the
bankruptcy court without rejecting the plan or
program under which the benefits are provided
in its entirety. However, these obligations are
often amended prior to bankruptcy for
companies that are placed at a competitive
disadvantage because of these costs. As such,
we must consider whether the borrower has
modified, or is likely to modify, the benefits
prior to bankruptcy.
In the case of benefits provided to employ-
ees that were not represented by unions, the
borrower may be able to revise the benefits
prior to bankruptcy with little or no negotiation
with the retirees. For union retirees, benefit
modifications prior to bankruptcy likely would
occur in the context of concessions in negoti-
ations with the relevant union. In either case,
modifications prior to bankruptcy would not
result in claims in bankruptcy that could dilute
recoveries. If the borrower reduces its retiree
benefits liability prior to bankruptcy, further
modifications in bankruptcy may result in a
smaller unsecured claim than if it had entered
the proceeding with a greater liability. If we
conclude that the borrower will modify its
retiree benefits prior to bankruptcy, our recov-
ery analysis will consider the likely effect of
that modification on the borrowers reduced
benefit liability in bankruptcy. Conversely, if we
conclude that these plans will be modified in
bankruptcy, but not before, then the potential
liability will be more significant. G
The analyses, including ratings, of Standard & Poors and its afliates are opinions and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold,
or sell securities. They do not address the suitability of any security, and should not be relied on in making any investment decision. Standard & Poors
does not act as a duciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such.
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KEY CONTACTS
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46
Bank Loan & Recovery Ratings
New York
Marketing and Syndication Liaison
Scott Cassie
V.P. & North American HeadIndustrials
Client Business Management
212-438-7898
scott_cassie
Terrence Streicher
Managing Director, Global Product
Management
212-438-7196
Terrence_streicher@
David Hauff
Director, Loan & Recovery Rating
Operations
212-438-2731
david_hauff@
Bank Loan & Recovery Rating Analytics
Andrew Watt
Managing Director
212-438-7868
andrew_watt@
Thomas Mowat
Senior Director
212-438-1588
tom_mowat@
Steve Wilkinson
Director
212-438-5093
steve_wilkinson@
Anne-Charlotte Pedersen
Senior Director
212-438-6816
anne-charlotte_pedersen@
John Sweeney
Senior Director
212-438-7154
john_sweeney
London
Marketing and Syndication Liaison
Paul Watters
Director, European Loan & Recovery
Ratings
440-207-176-3542
paul_watters@
Analysis
David Gillmor
Senior Director, European Leveraged
Finance Rating Analytics
440-207-176-3673
david_gillmor@
Melbourne
Analysis
Craig Parker
Director, Ratings
61-(0) 3-9631-2073
craig_parker@
Mexico City
Analysis
Jose Coballasi
Director, Ratings
52-55-5081-4414
jose_coballasi@
Santiago Carniado
Director, Ratings
52-55-5081-4413
santiago_carniado@
Structured Credit Ratings
Peter Kambeseles
Managing Director
212-438-1168
peter_kambeseles@
Henry Albulescu
Managing Director
212-438-2382
henry_albulescu@
Standard & Poors Leveraged
Commentary & Data
New York
Steven Miller
Managing Director
212-438-2715
steven_miller@
Marc Auerbach
Vice President
212-438-2703
marc_auerbach@
London
Sucheet Gupte
Director
440-207-176-7235
sucheet_gupte@
S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index
Robert Polenberg
Vice President
212-438-2717
robert_polenberg@
Standard & Poors European
Leveraged Loan Index
Sucheet Gupte
Director
440-207-176-7235
sucheet_gupte@
Syndicated Bank Loan Evaluations
Mark Abramowitz
Director Taxable Evaluations
212-438-4413
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Senior Pricing Analyst
212-438-1965
Jason_oster@
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NOTES
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48
NOTES
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