Abakada Guro v. ErmitaG.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005J.

Puno En Banc Facts: Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist. Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove. Issue: Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional? Held: The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistic aldata and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it

is not a property or a property right, and a VAT-registered person s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION 63 PHIL 143 FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, (2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has

provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof. As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government. In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission

The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. HELD: The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

VERA V. AVELINO, 77 Phil. 863 FACTS: Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress of the Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.

During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the protest lodged against their election. Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution. . ISSUE: 1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid. 2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections. RULING: The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to suspension of the petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.

The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for any speech or debate" in congress, Senators and congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other place." The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted this privilege to include the giving of a vote or the presentation of a resolution. . . . It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it towards spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, . . . (Kilbourn vs. thompson, 103 U.S., 204; 26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.)

In the above case, Kilbourn, for refusing to answer questions put to him by the House of Representatives of the United States Congress, concerning the business of a real estate partnership, was imprisoned for contempt by resolution of the house. He sued to recover damages from the sergeant at arms and the congressional members of the committee, who had caused him to be brought before the house, where he was adjudged to be in contempt. The Supreme Court of the United States found that the resolution of the House was void for want of jurisdiction in that body, but the action was dismissed as to the members of the committee upon the strength of the herein above-mentioned congressional immunity. The court cited with approval the following excerpts from an earlier decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts: These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal. I, therefore, think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be answered. . . (103 U.S., 203.) (Emphasis ours.) Commenting on this Congressional privilege, Willoughby relates apparently as controlling, the following incident: In 1910, several Members of Congress having been served with a writ of mandamus in a civil action brought against them as members of the Joint Committee on Printing and growing out a refusal of a bid of the Valley Paper Company, for the furnishing of paper, the Senate resolved that the Justice issuing the writ had "unlawfully invaded the constitutional privileges and prerogatives of the Senate of the United States and of three Senators; and was without jurisdiction to grant the rule, and Senators are directed to make no appearance in response thereto." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. I, Second Edition, p. 616.) Respondents are, by this proceeding, called to account for their votes in approving the Pendatum Resolution. Having sworn to uphold the Constitution, we must enforce the constitutional directive. We must not question, nor permit respondents to be questioned here in connection with their votes. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra.) Case dismissed.