LOTZE Metaphysics in Three Books

T^vtêtdeb to
of
ll|e
Professor Frederick Tracy Emeritus Professor of Ethics

Utii-wersity
College
HANDBOUND AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
LOTZE'S SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

PART
II
METAPHYSIC
o
Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
ft
'
HENRY FROWDE
Oxford University Press Warehouse
Amen Corner,
E.G.
PVulos
METAPHYSIC
IN
THREE BOOKS
ONTOLOGY, COSMOLOGY, AND PSYCHOLOGY

BY
HERMANN LOTZE
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
EDITED BY
BERNARD BOSANQUET,
M.A.
FORMERLY FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD
Second Edition, in two Volumes

Vol.
I
ff0rtr
^"^^^^
O^^^
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1887
\Âll rights reserved
'\
EDITOR'S PREFACE.
The
Book
ch.
Translation of the Metaphysic has been executed,
like that of the Logic,
by
several hands.
'
I (Ontology)
and the chapter

late
The whole of Of Time (Book II,

'
iii)
were translated by the
Mr. T. H. Green, Whyte's

;
Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford

iv,
chapters
i,
ii,
and
by
of
Book
II
by Mr. B. Bosanquet, Fellow of University

;
College, Oxford
chapters v-viii (inclusive) of
Book
II
the Rev. C. A. Whittuck,
Fellow of Brasenose College,
Oxford
and the whole of Book III by Mr. A. C. Bradley,
Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford.
The Index and Table
of
Contents were added by the Editor.
The who is
entire translation has
been revised by the Editor,

C. Wilson, of
responsible in every case for the rendering finally
adopted.
The
Editor has to thank Mr.
J.
Oriel College, Oxford, for
ample and ready assistance
when
consulted on passages involving the technical language of
Mathematics or Physics
if
the Author's meaning in such

is
places has been intelligibly conveyed, this result
wholly
due to Mr. Wilson's help.

In conveying his assent to the proposal of an English
translation, the
Author expressed a wish to work out Book
III of the Metaphysic (the Psychology)
more
fully,
but had
not time to carry out his intention. of the Author's

Preface,
'
For the third volume

in the
System of Philosophy,' alluded to

after his
no materials were found
death sufficiently
vi
EDITOR'S PREFACE.
for publication, excepting a
'
advanced
paper subsequently
published in
'
Nord und
Siid' (June 1882),
under the
title
Die Principien der Ethik.'
The
'
Author's views on the sub-
jects reserved for the
volume
work
in question
may be
gathered in
will soon,
part from his earlier

it
Mikrokosmus,' which
may be hoped, be made

fully
titles
accessible to English readers \
and more
the
from his lectures recently published under

'der
'Grundziige der Aesthetik,'
Praktischen
Philosophie,'
and
'
der Religionsphilosophie.'
In preparing the translation of the Metaphysic
for the
present (second) edition, no changes appeared to be necessary
beyond some verbal corrections
in the translation,
and
a few additions to the footnotes and to- the Index.
The
second German edition shows no

that
it
alterations,
excepting
does not contain the Author's Preface, which was

interest.
probably thought to be of no permanent

Preface
is
This
as
however retained
in
the present
edition,
throwing light on the Author's unfulfilled plan of his work.
The English
translation of the Microcosmus,

in 1885.
by Miss Hamilton and
Miss Jones, was published
(Clark, Edinburgh.)
AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
The
publication of this second volume has been delayed
inter-
by a variety of hindrances, which caused a lengthened

ruption of
its
passage through the press.
In the meantime
several works have appeared

to notice
;
which
should have been glad
but
it
was impossible,
for the
above reason, to
comment upon them

and
I
in the appropriate parts of
my book
I therefore reserve
what
have to say about them.
can promise nothing in respect of the third volume but

should
I
that,
have strength to
finish
it,
it
will
be confined
to a discussion of the
main problems of Practical Philosophy,

I shall treat
Aesthetic,
and the Philosophy of Religion.
each of these separately, and without the lengthiness which
was unavoidable in the present volume owing to a divergence from prevalent views.
The Author.
GOttingen
:
December
23, 1878.
li
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
BOOK
On
I.
the Connexion of Tilings.
INTRODUCTION.
PAGE
Section
I.
Reality, including Change, the subject of Metaphysic
II.
Origin of expectations which conflict with experience
III.
The foundation
of experience
IV. Consistent and inconsistent scepticism V. Probability depends on the assumption of connexion
according to
...
.
4
5 8
Law
VI. Relation of Metaphysic to experience VII. The method of Metaphysic not that of Natural Science VIII. In what sense the Essence of Things is unknowable IX. Metaphysic the foundation of Psychology, not vice versd X. Idea of Law and of P/an. Metaphysic must start from
....
. .
9
1
T5
the former XI. No clue to be found in the Dialectic Method XII. No clue to be found in the forms of Judgment XIII. Divisions of the subject
18
21
XIV. The natural conception of the universe
...
23 26 28
CHAPTER
I.
ON THE BEING OF THINGS.

1.
Real and unreal

Sensation the only evidence of Reality?
2. 3.
4.
Sensation gives assurance of nothing beyond itself
....-33
31
32
Being of Things apart from Consciousness. each other
Their action on
5. 6.
Questions.of the origin and the nature of reality distinguished

Objective relations presuppose the Being of Things
.
34 36
37
'
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
7.
tVou
PAGE
'
Being apart from relations meaningless 8-9. Pure Being a legitimate abstraction, but not applicable to
Reality
10.
*
....
38
40> 4^
Position Position
'
and 'Affirmation
'
meaningless apart from relations

difficulties
42
11.
'
'
appears to involve the

'
attaching to crea-
tive action
12. Herbart's
irrevocable Position
'
45 47
relations, inconsistent with
13. Herbart's indifference of
Things to
their entering into relations
14.
The
isolation of
Things a mere abstraction
.51
49
CHAPTER
II.
OF THE QUALITY OF THINGS.
^5. The
*-16.
essence of Things
is
Thing
taken to be more than
its qualities
"
fs.
...
*
53 54
17. Herbart's conception of the essence of
a Thing as a
simple
Quality'
18.
19.
A Quality need not be abstract nor dependent How can what is simple have varying states
*
on a subject
'
56 59
20.
21.
22.
The common element
in sensations of colour
Things only vary within

of a
certain limits
.61 .....66
?
.
. . .
64
The movement of consciousness not analogous

'
to the variations
simple Quality'
Qualities
'
67
23.
Simple
represented
by compoimd
expressions
(Herbart)
24. If there are Things, they
69
must be capable of change, as the

71
soul
is
CHAPTER
OF
25.
III.
THE REAL AND REALITY.

*
Things not of the nature of simple Qualities' commonly described by their states 27. A complete conception would include past and future history
26. Things
.
75
76
77
of Thing
28. Matter as imparting reality to Qualities
-29.
.
79
81
Matter which has no Qualities can receive none

it is
30. Matter explains nothing if
mere
'
Position
.
82
31.
32.
Real
a predicative conception, not a subject Thing as a Law

'
is
85 88
'
I]
TABLE OF CONTENTS,
A Law
What
need not be General ? is that which conforms to the
antithesis
xi
PACK
33. 34. 35.
89
Law?
93
95
between the world of Ideas and Reality 36. Difficulty of expressing the notion of a Law or Idea which is
naturally real
Danger of the
98
CHAPTER
IV.
OF BECOMING AND CHANGE.

37. Substance a
mode
of behaviour of Things, not a mysterious
nucleus
38.
100
.
loi change subject to certain limits, to be conceived? "^9. Law of Identity does not even prove the continuous existence of Things 103 ^40. Resolution of all permanence into Becoming .105
is
How
41. Mva\iis 42.
and kvcpycia
in
two
senses
Why
......
.
.
are consequences realised?

de such realisations
.
106 108
43.
44.
The Things must

'
no
.114 .115
of
a
116
.
This would only explain development, not causation '113 45. In ' transeunt action changes in the agent must be ' noticed
by the patient
46. 47.
'
Immanent
persistent
'
action usually assumed as obvious

'
Notion of Becoming compared with notion of
states
Thing
""48. Quantitative comparability of factors in every effect
.119
120
~H9. Degrees of Intensity of Being
CHAPTER
V.
OF THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL ACTION.

50.
No
effect
due to a single active cause

initiates action
effect
.
.
123
51. Cause,
Reason, and the Relation which
52. Modification of
53. 'Occasional Causes'
Causes and Relation by and Stimuli'

'
.125 .127
128
54.
Must the
relation
which
is
initiates action
be contact
?
.
-131
55.
'causa transiens'
only preliminary to action
I34
136
56. Difficulty of conceiving the passage of a force or state
from
to
^
and
effect
57. Origin of erroneous idea that cause

afid like
.
must be equal
138
xii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
ground may be synthetic as well
[Vol.
PAGE
58. Relation of consequence to
as analytic
69.
140
How far must

each other?
Things be homogeneous
in order to react
upon
142
60. Desire to explain all processes as of one kind.
Like known
144 146
148
61.
only by like' Attempt to dispense with 'transeunt' action. Occasionalism 62. Neither mere 'Law' nor mere 'relation' can explain interaction of two Things
63. Leibnitz's 'Pre-established

64. 65.
Harmony'
world gains by realisation
.
150
152
What
his completely determined
Complete determinism incredible

Corresponding states of
different
154
-< 66.
Monads.
Illustration of the
1
two clocks
67. Operation
56
according to general laws necessary for active
causation
159
CHAPTER
VI.
THE UNITY OF THINGS.

68.
What
is
involved in the idea of
'
transeunt' operation
163
165 166
69. Pluralism
and Monism 70. Separate Things not really independent of each other 71. Unity of Things analytically involved in reciprocal action
.
169 170
72.
How
The
their unity is consistent
with apparent degrees of inde-
pendence
73.
relation of the
One
to the
Many
cannot be exhibited to
172
.
Perception
Alleged contradiction of regarding the One as the Many 75. The Logical copula inadequate to the relation between the One
74.
73
and the Many

76. Reality subject to 77.
Law
of Identity in form but not in

illustrated
fact
174 178
179
The One and

views'
the
Many
by Herbart's
accidental
78.
Herbart admits multiplicity
in the nature
of individual Things
in
182
79. Leibnitz' world,
when ceasing
to be
immanent
God, has
.
no unity
183
80. Relations between the contents of ideas can only exist for
Thought
81. Variable Relations
i86
between Things must be modifications

.
the things
189
I.]
TABLE OF CONTENTS,
CHAPTER
VII.
xiii
CONCLUSION.
PAGE
82.
Real Relations are the reciprocal actions of Things conditioned by the unity which includes them 192 83. We have not to account for the origin of Motion 194 84. The assumption of Motion is not the same thing as the assumption of Life (as spiritual existence) -197 85. The dominant principles of any real world are prescribed by its nature and are not prior to it 198
.
.
86.
The
reference to 'any' real world, other than that
which
200
exists, is
imaginary and illustrative
87. Consistency of causation has
88.
no meaning apart from the comparison of cases within the actual world .202 Hegel, Schelling, Weisse, Necessity and Freedom 204
. .
an appearance produced within reality. ism and Realism 90. The Idea must have a concrete content 91. The Phases of the Idea must be causally connected
8?. Necessity as
Ideal-
....
.
207 208
210
213 216
92.
The Idea
realised
generates a mechanical system by which
it
is
93.
Realism recognises the necessity of regressive interpretation
94. Subjectivity in relation to the possibility of

95. Fichte
Knowledge
219
221
on the world of Spirits and the world of Things 96. A spiritual nature seems necessary for Things ?/"they are to be subjects of states 97. Need Things exist at all ? 98. As mere media of effects, they can hardly be said to exist
. .
222
224 226
BOOK
II.
Cosmology.
CHAPTER
99.
I.
OF THE SUBJECTIVITY OF OUR PERCEPTION OF SPACE
The
genesis of our idea of Space

is
no
test
of
its
validity
. .
231
100. Euclidean Space
what we have
to discuss
232
.
101. Space
is
not a Thing, Property, or Relation
102. Space not merely a Genus-concept

103.
104. 105.
Kant on empty Space Kant on Space as ^zV^w Why Kant denied the reality of Space
.
233 334 236 238
239
xiv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
World do not decide
is
[Vol.
PAGE
106. Finiteness or Infinity of

107.
the question
241
Nor does
Infinite divisibility of real elements, or the reverse
108. Real difficulties.
What
Space, and
its
how
are things in
.
it ?
244 246
247 248
251
109. Reality of Space does not explain 110.
properties
Do
the points of real Space act
upon each other?

.
111. Constructions of Space out of active points
112. Constructions
of real
Space and hypothesis of subjective
Space Nothing gained by the independent reality of Space 114. Things in Space; on hypothesis of its being subjective 115. Things in an independently existing Space 116. Relations between things and reactions ^things
113.
.
.
253 256
259
261
263
265
117.
The movability
of things
CHAPTER
118. Spinoza on Consciousness
II.
DEDUCTIONS OF SPACE.
119. Schelling on the
and Extension Nature and Mind 120. Limit of what can be done by speculative construction. Hegel and Weisse
....
.
two
factors in
267 268
270
271
121. Deductions of the three dimensions 122. Three questions involved in 'Psychological' Deductions of
Space
124.
273 278
123. Alternatives suggested by idea of subjective Space
.276
.
Can any Space
represent
what our Space
will not?
.
125. Symbolical spatial arrangements, of sounds, etc.

126.
Space will represent disparate qualities common Space jn what sense possible 128. Geometry dependent on its data 129. All constructions presuppose the Space-perception
. .
No
-279 .280
.
127. Other Spaces than
283
285
.
287 289
291
130. Constructions of straight line, plane, etc. presuppose
them
131.
132.
The sum
of the angles of a triangle

,
Helmholtz on the possible ignorance of a third dimension 133. Dwellers on a sphere-surface and parallel lines 134. Analogy from ignorance of third dimension to ignorance
.
293 297 299 303 307

311
of fourth
135. There cannot be four series
*
perpendicular' to each other
136. Extension must be
homogeneous
.
137. Riemann's 'multiplicities' are not Space unless uniform
I.]
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER
OF TIME.
III.
XV
PAGE
138. Spatial representations of
139. 140.
141.
The conception The connexion of Time* with events Kant's view of Time as subjective
'
Time of empty Time
315
it
....
Time
.
317 319 320

322 325
142. Kant's proof that the world has a beginning in 143. 144. 145. 146.
.321
.
The The
endlessness of
Time
not self-contradictory
is
past need not be finite becanse each event
finished
An
infinite series
may be
'
given'
327
147.
148. 149. 150.
Time as a mode of our apprehension Empty Time not even a condition of Becoming Time as an abstraction from occurrence Time as an infinite whole is Subjective
.... ....
.
329 330 334

335 336
No
mere systematic relation explains 'Present' and 'Past'

'
151. Indication of
152. Subjective
Present
'
to a Subject
33^
still exist
.
Time need not make
the Past
341
153. Absence of real succession conceivable 154.
by approximation Even thought cannot consist of a mere succession 155. But Future cannot become Present without succession 156. Empty Time Subjective, but succession inseparable from
.
. . . .
'
343 346
348
'
Reality
157. Existence of Past
35
and Future
354
IV.
CHAPTER
*" 158.
OF MOTION.
Law
of Continuity
^ 159. Continuity essential to
160.
_
Becoming
Grounds
for the
Law
of Persistence
357 359 362

363
365
The -162. The

161.
Persistence of Rest
Persistence of
Motion
163. Motion inconceivable without

164. Possibility of absolute Motion,
Law
of Persistence
on doctrine of real Space

like
165. Possibility of absolute Rotation

166.
367 369 37^
Amount and
constant
direction of
Motion to be accepted
any
373
167. Difficulty of alleged
indifference of
Things to change of
375
place
168.
On view
ganism
of phenomenal Space percipient subject with oris
essential to occurrence of
Motion
-377
xvi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Motion
is
[Vol.
169. Solitary
possible, if observer
is
granted
PAGE 381
170. 'State' corresponding to a Persistent 171. Motion

172. Parallelogram of Motions akin to
Motion
of Persistence
382
not the same as the Measure of Motion
Law
173. Parallelogram necessarily true
if
only motions are considered
384 386 388
CHAPTER
V.
ffVoLII.
THE THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OF MATERIALITY.

174. Matter homogeneous, or heterogeneous with
perties?
common
proI
175. Limitation of the problem
and Extension 177. Schelling and Hegel problems attempted by the latter 178. Kant does not connect his views of Matter and of Space 179. Why Kant explained Matter by Force
176. Descartes and Spinoza on Consciousness
;
4
8 9
12
180.
Force
'
involves relation between things
181. 'Force' as a property of one element a figure of speech
15 16
21
Kant rightly implies activity on the part of Things, not mere sequence according to Law 183. Kant's two forces a mere analysis of the position of a thing 184. Still a mechanical system of forces essential, and several
182.
....
23
may
attach to each element
26
185. Force can only act at a distance

186. Idea of 'communication' of
Motion
....
....
.
28
31
187. Space no self-evident hindrance to action
34
CHAPTER VL
THE SIMPLE ELEMENTS OF MATTER.
188. iVzwaya^zV grounds in favour of Atomism
189. Lucretius,
38 41
differences in the
Atoms
190. Consequences of the Unity of an extended
Atom
191. Notion of unextended
Atoms
.
192. Herbart's view modified
the
Herbart
Atoms not independent
?
43
47
of
each other
193. Is Matter
50
several kinds
homogeneous or of
194.
Homogeneous Matter
unity
not proved by constancy of
Mass
53 56
58
195. Connexion of the elements with each other in a systematic 196. Plurality in space of identical elements merely phenomenal
197- Self-multiplication of
60
63
Atomic centres conceivable
II.]
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER
VII.
xvii
THE LAWS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THINGS.

198.
199.
The
square of the distance,
200.
201. 202.
Force No mechanical deduction of a primary Force Alleged infinite attraction at no distance Herbart's view of the 'Satisfaction' of P'orce, not conclusive Philosophy desires one primary law of action
^
...
difficulties in the radiation

.
....
.
of
66
70
76
77
203. Affinity would naturally correspond to the Distance itself
204. Attempt to account for Square of Distance

205.
80
82
?
.
Can Force depend on motions of acting elements? Does Force require time to take effect at a distance 207. Causation and Time Reciprocal action 208. Idealism admits no special Laws as absolute 209. Conservation of Mass
206.
83 86
210.
Qoxi'i\.2inzy Qi\kiQ
Su7n of Motions
211. Absorption of Cause in Effect

212.
.... .....
no gain
in physical action
.
91
94
Not
self-evident that there can be
213. Equality and Equivalence distinguished 214. Equivalence does not justify reduction to one process 215. 216.
lOI
Compensation
'
in interaction of
Body and Soul
102
The
Principle of Parsimony
104
CHAPTER Vm.
THE FORMS OF THE COURSE OF NATURE.
217. Deductions of the forms of reality impossible
.
109
218. Possibility of explaining natural processes in detail on the
view of subjective Space

219. Success the test of the methods of physical science
220.
.
1 1
.114
to
Mechanism the action of combined elements according

general laws
221.
Mechanism
as a distinct
mode
of natural activity
.
a
.
fiction
.
115 118
222.
The
planetary system, light and sound
.122
124
223. Electricity and Chemistiy should not be sharply opposed to
Mechanism
224. Motives for forming the conception of a Vital Force 225. Vital Force could not be one for all Organisms
.
.
.128
.
130
131
226. Difference between organic and inorganic substances proves
nothing about Vital Force

227.
'Life-principle
'
would have
to operate mechanically
132
135
228. Mechanical aspect of Organisms
Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
'
xviii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
[Vol.
229. Mechanical view indispensable but not exhaustive 230. Purpose implies a subject
God, the soul
PAGE 137 138

141
231.
Von
Baer on purpose in 'Nature'
232. Unity of world determines all

233.
modes of action
.
144
145 150
151
The mechanical
order need not exclude progress
234. Is there a fixed
number of Natural Kinds?

'
235. Criticism of the question
Is real existence finite or infinite ?
236. Development of the
Cosmos
life
only
its
general principles a
question for Metaphysic

2-37.
157
a question for Natural History.
Actual development of Conclusion
160
BOOK
III.
Psychology.
CHAPTER
Introductory.
I.
THE METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OF THE SOUL.

Rational and Empirical Psychology
*
238. Reasons for the belief in a

239.
2.
Soul.'
163
i.
Freedom
.
is
no reason
Mental and physical processes disparate 240. Disparateness no proof of separate psychical substance 241. 3. Unity of Consciousness 242. Unity of the conscious Subject
165 166
168
....
its
169
171
243.
The
subject in
what sense called 'substance'

immortality
244. 245.
Kant on the
Substantiality of the Soul
What
the Soul is; and the question of
173 176 180

182
246. Origin of the Soul
may be
gradual
247. Ideas of psychical and psycho-physical

248. Interaction between
mechanism
186
187
249. Idea of a bond between

250.
Body and Soul Body and Soul
190
191
The Soul not a resultant of physical actions 251. Meaning of explaining the Soul as a peculiar form of com
bination between elements
.
...
194
'
252. Consciousness and Motion in Fechner's
Psycho- Physik
195
CHAPTER
253. 254. 255.
II.
SENSATIONS AND THE COURSE OF IDEAS.
The The The
physical Stimulus of sensation
physiological stimulus of sensation
conscious sensation
......
....
199
201
204
II.]
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
xix
PAGE
256. Adequate and inadequate stimuli of sense 257.
....
.
206
207 210
The connexion
of various classes of sensation
258. Weber's
Law
Law
.
.
259. Hypotheses as to the reason of Weber's

260.
261.
.212
214
The so-called chemistry of ideas The disappearance of ideas from

ing of ideas
consciousness.
The
check-
217
262.
263. 264.
The
strength of ideas
ideas
interesting idea conquers
219
221
Dim
The more
223
265. Association of ideas
.226
228
266. Herbart's theory respecting the reproduction of a successive

series of ideas
CHAPTER
267. Simple ideas and their relations 268.
III.
*
ON THE MENTAL ACT OF

The
RELATION.'
232
.
.
necessary distinction between them
233
269. Psycho-physical attempts to explain ideas of relation
270. Herbart's theory of the psychical mechanism 271.
234 237
240
The
truer view respecting simple ideas
and ideas of relation

241
expressed in Herbartian language

272.
The
referring activity as producing universal conceptions
273. Attention as an activity of reference
242
274. Attention and the
'
interest' possessed
by ideas
244
CHAPTER
275.
276.
IV.
THE FORMATION OF OUR IDEAS OF

The
subjectivity of our perception of
SPACE.
,
Space
.
.
How is
in the
the perception of spatial relations possible
247 248
251
277. Distinctions depending on Space cannot be preserved as such
Soul
of impressions by the Soul
'
278. 279. 280.
A clue needed for the arrangement

The Does
*
*
extra-impression
the
'
'
as a clue or
arise in the
local sign
'
. .
253 254
local sign
'
same
nerve-fibre as the
main impression? 256 Local signs must be not merely different but comparable 259 282. * Local signs must be conscious sensations 260 . 283-7. On the local signs connected with visual sensations 263-276 288-9. Local signs connected with the sense of touch 276-280
281.
'
' . .
290.
How
these feelings are associated with
movement
280
XX
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER
THE PHYSICAL
BASIS OF
[Vol.
II.
V.
MENTAL ACTIVITY.
PAGE
291.
292.
293.
The 'seat' of the Soul The Soul not omnipresent
within the body

it
....
at
283
284
285
No No
it
reason to suppose that
has an action graduated accord-
ing to distance
294.
suitable place can be found for
it
on the hypothesis that

287
295. It
acts by contact only must act directly and independently of Space, but only
certain necessary points
.......
^ .
. . .
.
288
291
296.
Which
these points are
is
determined from time to time by
the activities which go on in them

297.
Our ignorance of
organs
*
the special functions of the central nervous
293
Scnsorui?n cof?imune' and
298. Ideas of a
Motorium commune''
295
297
299. 300.
The organ
of language
How
the soul initiates action
.299
.
301. Reproduction of the right concomitant feeling
300
303
302. Application of this view to the organ of language
303. Phrenology
304.
305.
306.
The connexion of Consciousness with bodily states Does memory depend on physical traces left in the brain ? Loss of memory
.
304 306
310 313
307. Existence of the soul during imconsciousness
-315
318
Conclusion
Index
321
BOOK
I.
ON THE CONNEXION OF THINGS.
INTRODUCTION,
I.
Real
is
a term which
we apply
;
to things that are in
opposition to those that are not

distinction
happen in from those that do not happen; to actually

to events that
existing relations in contrast with those that
do not
exist.
To
this
usage of speech I have already had occasion to

I recall
it
appeal.
now
in order to give a
summary
It is
indica-
tion of the object of the following enquiries.
not the
world of the thinkable, with the inexhaustible multiplicity

of
its
inner relations
relations
which are eternally valid
that here occupies us.
Our
considerations are expressly
directed to this other region, of which the less palpable connexion with that realm of ideas, ever since the attention of Plato was first fastened upon it, has remained the
constantly recurring question of Philosophy.

that has
It is
It
a region
been described
in opposite terms.
has been
called a world of appearance, of

that in a depreciatory sense
mere phenomenaand by men who contrasted the
^ [* Wirklich.* For the distinction between * Wirklichkeit ' and ' Wirklichkeit' and ' Realitat' are Objectivitat ' see note, p. 23 below. less sharply distinguished, but the latter is perhaps applied exclusively ' to things, whereas Verhaltnisse ' (relations) are here called 'wirklich.' * Ein reales Gesetz ' ch. 3 (end) seems to be felt by the author as a contradiction in temas. See ch. 3 below and notes, and Logic, sect. 3470
'
Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
INTRODUCTION.
its
[Book
I.
variable multiplicity of
contents with the imperturbable
repose and clearness of the world of ideas.

presented
itself as
To
others
it
the true reality.
In
its
unfailing
movethey
ment, and in the innumerable
activities
pervading
it,
have a more valuable possession than could be found in the solemn shadow-land of unchangeable ideas. This diversity of appellation rests on a deep antithesis of conception, which will attract our notice throughout all philosophy. My only reason for mentioning
deemed themselves
to
it
here
is
that the two views, while wholly different in their
estimates of value, serve equally to bring to light the centre
round which metaphysical

is
enquiries, so far as their essence
concerned, will always
move
i.
e.
the
fact of
change.
While predicable only by metaphor of anything that is merely object of thought, change completely dominates the whole range of reality. Its various forms becoming and decay, action and suffering, motion and development are, as a matter of fact and history, the constant occasions of
those enquiries which, as forming a doctrine of the flux of

things in opposition to the permanent being of ideas, have
from antiquity been united under the name of Metaphysic. II. It is not that which explains itself but that which Metaphysic would perplexes us that moves to enquiry. never have come into being if the course of events, in that form in which it was presented by immediate perception,
had not
conflicted with expectations, the fulfilment of which
men deemed
themselves entitled to demand from whatever was to be reckoned as truly existing or truly taking place. These expectations might be accounted for in various ways. They might be held to be innate to the intelligent spirit. If that were true of them, it would follow that, in the form of necessary assumptions as to the mode of existence and connexion of anything that can possibly be or happen, they determine our judgment upon every occurrence with which observation presents us. Or they might be taken to consist in requirementsîsing in the heart out of its needs,
Bookl.i
WHERE EXPERIENCE
and wishes;
in
FAILS,
hopes,
which case
their fulfilment
by the
to
it,
external world,
as soon as attention
was recalled
would be no less strongly demanded. Or finally it might be held that, without carrying any intellectual necessity in their own right, they had arisen out of the de_Jacto_j:siIkstitution of experience as
^Tm"
confirmed habits of apprehension,
suggesting that in every later perception the same features
be met with as had been found in the earlier. The may convince us of the equally strong vivacity and assurance, with which these different views have asserted themselves. The tendency of the present
were
to
history of philosophy
day, however,
is
to
deny the possession of innate cognition,

heart every title to a share
to refuse to the
demands of the
in the determination of truth, to seek in experience alone
the source of that certain knowledge which
we would
fain
acquire in regard to the connexion of things.

III. Philosophy has
been too painfully taught by the
course of
itself,
the neglect of experience avenges any fresh reminder of its indispensableness to be required. Taken by itself, however, and apart from every
its
history
how
for
presupposition not furnished by
itself,
experience
is
not
competent to yield the knowledge which we seek. For our wish is not merely to enumerate and describe what has haêned or is happening. We also want to be able to predict what under definite circumstances will happen. But experience cannot show us the future; and cannot even help us to conjecture what it will be unles s we are certain beforehand that the course of the world is bound
to follow consistently,
beyond the
limits of previous obseris
vation, the plan of
which the beginning
presented to us
\^'
within those limits.
An
is
assurance, however, of the validity of this supposition
what experience cannot afford us. Grant as much as you please that observation in its ceaseless progress had up to a certain moment only lighted on cases of conformity
to the rules
'
which we had inferred from a careful use of

B 2
4
earlier perceptions
:
INTRODUCTION.
still
[Book
I.
the proposition that this accumula-
tion of confirmatory instances, which has so far
gone on
one that
without any exception being met with, has increased the

probability of a like confirmation in the future,
is
can only be maintained on the strength of a previous tacit admission of the assumption, that the same order which governed the past course of the world will also determine This one supposition, the shape to be taken by its future. accordingly, of there being a universal inner connexion of all reality as such which alone enables us to argue from
the structure of any one section of reality to that of the
rest, is
the foundation of every attempt to arrive at know-
ledge by means of experience, and
experience
itself.
Whoever
casts
is not derivable from doubt on the supposition,
not only loses the prospect of being able to calculate anything future with certainty, but robs himself at the same time of the only basis on which to found the more modest hope of being able under definite circumstances to consider the occurrence of one event as more probable than that of
another.
IV. There have been philosophers of
sceptical tendency
who have shown themselves
well aware of this.
Having
once given up the claim to be possessors of any such innate truth as would also be the truth of things, they have also consistently disclaimed any pretension from a given reality to infer a continuation of that reality which was not given with it. Nothing in fact was left, according to them, in the way of knowledge but the processes of pure Mathematics, in which ideas are connected without any claim being made
that they hold
tion of
good of
reality,
or history
and the
descrip-
what
is
or has been.
science of nature, which
should undertake from the facts of the present to predict

^
the necessity of a future result, they held to be impossible.

It
was only
in practical life that those
who
so thought relied
trust-
with as
much
confidence as their opponents on the
worthiness of those physical principles, which within the
Book
I.]
WHENCE COMES BELIEF IN LAW?

science,
school
they maintained to be quite without justification.
The
present professors of natural
who by
their
noisy glorification of experience compel every metaphysical
enquiry at the outset to this preliminary self-defence, appear
by a happy inconsistency from the With laudable modesty they question in many individual cases whether they have yet discovered the true law which governs some group of processes under investigation but they have no doubt in the abstract as to the presence of laws which connect all parts of the world's course in such a way that, if once complete knowledge had been attained, infallible inferences might be made from one to the other. Now experience, even if it be granted that in its nature it is capable of ever
to
be only saved
necessity
of a like disclaimer.
proving the correctness of this assumption, certainly cannot
be held
to
have yet done
so.
There
still
He before us vast v
of
regions of nature, as to which, since
we know nothing
any connexion of
their events according to law, the asser-
by a continuous on the evidence of experience, but must be ventured on the ground of a convictiori which makes the systematic connexion of all reality a primary
tion that they are throughout pervaded
system of law cannot
rest
c ertaint y.
difficulty.
V. There are various ways of trying to compromise the Sometimes the admission is made that the science of nature is only an experiment in which we try
how
far
wx can go with
the arbitrary assumption of a law

thai only the favourable
regulating the course of things;

result
which experience yields to the experiment convinces us of the correctness of the assumption made. Upon this we can in fact only repeat the remark already made, and
perhaps
question
it
will
not be useless actually to repeat
it.
If a
is
raised as to the nature of the connexion between
two processes, of which the mutual dependence is not deducible from any previously known truth, it is usual no doubt to arrive at the required law by help of an hypothesis,
INTRODUCTION.
[Book
I.
of which the proof Hes in the fact "that no exception can
be found
to
its
apphcation.
is
But
in
truth
an hypothesis
short
thus accredited
intrinsically after all
nothing more than
a formula ofthought in which

expression for the
servable in
in question.
all
we have found a
common
procedure which has been obonly imparted to this
instances, hitherto noticed, of the connexion
The
character of a law
is
expression by the further thought, which experience cannot
add, but which
we add
the
thought that in the future
members of
this endless series of instances the
same
relation
will hold go od which, as a matter of experience,
only found to hold good between the past

seHes.
It is again
we have members of the
only by a repetition of what I have already
said that I can reply to the further expansion of the view referred to.
It
may
readily
be allowed that the observation
of the same connexion between two occurrences,
when
constantly repeated without an instance to the contrary,

gives an ever increasing probabihty to the assumption of a
law connecting them and renders their coincidence explicable only on this assumption. But on what after all does
the growing power of this surmise rest
?
If to begin with
is
we
left it
an open question whether there

all in
any such thing

longer
as law at
the course of things,
we should no
be entitled to wish to find an e xplanati on for a succession of events, and in consequence to favour the assumption which makes it explicable. For every explanation is in the
last resort
nothing but the reduction of a mere coincidence

facts to
according to a universal law.
an inner relation of mutual dependence Every need of explanation, therefore, and the right to demand it, rests on the primary certainty of conviction that nothing can in truth be or happen which has not the ground of its possibility in a connected universe of things, and the ground of its necessary realisation at a definite place and time in particular facts of
between two
this
universe.
If
we once drop
this
primary conviction,
Book
I.]
EXPERIENCE ASSUMES LAW,

mutual dependence would no longer
*\
nothing any longer requires explanation and nothing admits

of
it
;
v
v
for that
exist s
which the explanation consists in pointing out. Or, to employ a different expression if we did not start from the assumption that the course of things was bound by a chain of law, then and for that reason it would not be a whit more improbable that the same processes should always
:
^ ^^
occur in a uniform, and yet perfectly accidental, connexion,

than that there should be the wildest variety of the most
manifold combinations.
And just
because of
fact of a constantly repeated coincidence
of the presence of a universal law,

further forecast might
this the mere would be no proof by the help of which a
become
facts
possible as to the yet unIt

is
is
observed cases that

as a universal
lie
in the future.
not
till
the
connexion of manifold
according to law
established
principle that
distinguishing a possible from
from an improbability. which has been observed to occur, to the exclusion of

the multitude of equally possible cases,
any standard can exist for an impossible, a probability Not till then can the one case
warrant
us in
assuming the persistency of a special relation, which in accordance with the universal reign of law yields this one result and excludes other results that are in themselves
equally possible.
All experience accordingly, so far as
it
believes itself to
discover a relation of mutual dependence between things

j
according to law,
If the supposition
is
in this only confirming the supposition,

'
previously admitted as correct, of there being such a relation.

is still left
in doubt, experience can never

is
prove
in
it.
And
the actual procedure of physical enquiry
complete harmony with this state of the case. Even where the processes observed seem to contradict every thought of a uniting law, the investigator never takes himself to
supposition
useless.
have found in these experiences a disproof of the stated, such as would render further effort He merely laments that a confirmation of it is
INTRODUCTION.
[Book
I.
not forthcoming, but never despairs of arriving at such a

confirmation by further research.
VI.
If then
we
enquire not so
much
into ostensible
which are generally drawn up for contentious purposes, as into those which without being put into words may take the are continually affirmed by practice, we prevalent spirit of the natural sciences to be represented by
principles,
\
the confession that the certainty of there being a relation
of mutual dependence between things according to law
is
independent of experience.
Nay,
it
is
common
in these
sciences to take that relation for granted in the particular
exclusiveness
form of a relation according to universal law with an which philosophy cannot accept off-hand.
But
in this admission that there are laws the investigator
still believes that all he has done has been to admit a general point of view. The question what the laws of reality are, which in fact includes every object of further enquiry, he reserves as one that is to be dealt with exclu-
of nature
sively
^
by the elaboration of experience.
He
denies the
necessity or possibility of any metaphysical enquiry which
might aspire to add anything to the results may give. Against such claims the only adequate defence of Metaphysic would consist in the complete execution of its aims ; for it would only be in detail that it could be made intelligible how the manipulation, which experience must undergo in order to yield any result,
in this region
that experience
is
impossible, unless by the aid of various definite interme-
diary ideas, which contain
much
that does not arise out of
the mere general idea of conformity to law, as such, and of
which, on the other hand, the certainty cannot in turn be
founded on empirical evidence. For the present this brief hint on the subject may be taken to suffice the more so as it is to be immediately followed by a comprehensive concession to our opponents. In our view Metaphysic ought not to repeat the attempt, which by its inevitable failure has brought the science into
Book
I.]
METAPHYSIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE,

It is
disrepute.
not
its
business to undertake a demonstra-
tion of the specid laws
which the course of things in
its
various directions actually follows.
On
the contrary, while
itself to an enquiry into the universal conditions, which everything that is to be counted as existing or happening at all must, according to it, be expected to fulfil, it must allow that what does in reality exist or happen is a thing which it cannot know of itself but can only come to
confining
know by
experience.
But
it
is
only from this final know-
ledge of fact that those determinate laws of procedure could
be derived, by which this particular reality satisfies those most general requirements which hold good for every
conceivable
reality.
Metaphysic accordingly
(if
will
only be
able to unfold certain ideal forms
that expression
may
be allowed),
which the relations between the elements ^ of everything real must conform. It can supply none of those definite ^proportions, constant or variable, by the assignment of which it might give to those forms the special
to
mathematical construction necessary to their applicability

to a real world that
quality,
is
throughout determined in respect of

All this MetaIt will
magnitude, number, and sequence.

still,
physic leaves to experience.

to
however, continue
arrives
demand
that the
results at
which experience
should admit of being so interpreted as to fit these ideal forms and to be intelligible as cases of their application;
and
to treat as fictions or as unexplained facts those which remain in contradiction with them. VII. There would be nothing then to forbid us from
identifying
facts with
make
it
Metaphysic with the final elaboration of the which the sciences of experiment and observation acquainted but an elaboration distinguished from
such sciences by the pursuit of other aims than those towards which they are directed with such laudable and unremitting energy. Natural science, while employing the
conceptions of certain elements and forces most effectually
for the acquisition of
knowledge, foregoes the attempt to
10
\
INTRODUCTION.
[Book
I.
penetrate to the proper nature of those elements and forces.
In a few cases important discoveries, leading to rapid

progress in further insight, have been
made by
application
of the calculus to certain assumed processes, at any possible

construction of which science itself has
arrive.
its
been unable to
over phe-
We
;
therefore
do no
in
injustice to science in taking
object
to consist
a practical
command
nomena
in other words, the capability,
however acquired,
of inferring from given conditions of the present to that
which either
,'
will follow
them, or must have preceded them,
or must take place contemporaneously with them in parts of the universe inaccessible to observation.
acquisition of such
That
for the
command, merely supposing a mutual dependence of phenomena according to some law or other, the careful comparison of phenomena should to a great
extent suffice, without any acquaintance with the true nature
of what underlies them,

itself
is
a state of things intelligible in
and of which the history of science gives ample evidence. That the same process should always suffice for
is
the purpose
it
not so easy to believe.
On
the contrar}',
seems likely that extent and depth of
after reaching a certain limit in the

its
enquiries, natural science will feel
the need, in order to the possibility of further progress, of

reverting to the task of defining exhaustively those centres
of relation, to which
its
\
i
it
had previously been able

a
to attach
calculations while leaving their nature undetermined.

it
In that case
will either originate
new Metaphysic
of
its
own
or
it
it
will
is
judge,
adopt some existing system. So far as I can now very actively engaged in doing the former.
Its efforts in that direction
but with mixed feelings.

of
facts, for
we observe with great interest The enviable advantage of having
acquired by many-sided investigation an original knowledge
which no appropriation of other men's knowadvance

the
for these
ledge can form a perfect substitute, secures a favourable
judgment
in
is
experiments of naturalists
and
there
more reason
that this should be so, since
Book
I.]
NA TURE AND MIND FALSE ANALOGIES.

:
the philosophical instinct, which

success,
is
is
able to ensure their

for itself with
not the special property of a caste, but an impulse

spirit
of the
human
and
which finds expression
equal intensity and inventiveness

scientific
among
those of every
But there is a drawback from the involuntary limitation of the range of thought to the horizon of the accustomed occupation, to external nature, and from the unhesitating transference of methods which served the primary ends of natural
practical calling.
even here.
It arises
science correctly enough, to the
treatment of questions
bearing on the ulterior relations of the facts of which
mastery has been obtained, and on their less palpable dependence upon principles to which reference has been studiously avoided in the ascertainment of the facts themselves.
Of
course
it
is
not
my
intention to indicate here the
it seems to me, have not been avoided. I content myself on the one hand to the inconsiderate habit regarding the wjiole spiritual life from the
several points at which, as
these dangers
with referring
of not merely
same ultimate
points of view as the processes of external nature, but of
'^
applying to
it
the
same
special analogies as have determined

;
our conception of those processes

inclination to count
and secondly
to the
any chance hypothesis of which the Jtt object is one that admits of being presented to the mind, or, failing of this, of being merely indicated in words, good enough to serve as a foundation for a wholly new and
paradoxical theory of the world.
I
do not ignore the many

of
valuable results that are due to this mobility of imagination.

I
know
that
man must make
trial
many
thoughts in
order to reach the truth, and that a happy conjecture is apt to carry us further and more quickly on our way than
Still there can the slow step of methodical consideration. be no advantage in making attempts of which the intrinsic impossibility and absurdity would be apparent if, instead of looking solely at the single problem of which the solution
12
is
INTRODUCTION,
[Book
I.
being undertaken, we carried our view to the entire
complex of questions to which the required solution must be equally appHcable. I do not therefore deny that the
metaphysical enterprises of recent physical investigators,
along with the great interest which they are undoubtedly

calculated to excite,
make pretty much the same impression on me, though with a somewhat different colouring, as was made on the votaries of exact science by the philosophy of
nature current in a not very remote past.
Our
business,
however,
impressions.
I only
is not with such individual gave a passing expression to them in
order to throw light on the purpose of the following dissertation.
The
qualification of being
conducted according to
it is
the
for
method of
every
natural science, by which
now
the fashion
one which I purposely disclaim for my treatise. Its object is indeed among other things to contribute what it can to the solution of the difficult problem of providing a philosophical foundaenquiry to
itself,
is
recommend
tion for natural science

is
rather
meant
to
It ; but this is not its only object. respond to the interest which the
thinking
spirit takes, not merely in the calculations by which the sequence of phenomena on phenomena may be
foretold, but in ascertaining the impalpable real basis of the

possibility of all
phenomena^ and of the necessity of their interest, reaching beyond the region on which natural science spends its labour, must necessarily
concatenation.
This
take its departure from other points of view than those with which natural science is familiar, nor would I disguise the fact that the ultimate points of view to which in the sequel
will lead us will not be in direct harmony with the accustomed views of natural science. VIII. There is a reproach, however, to which we lay ourselves open in thus stating the problem of Metaphysic. It is not merely that experience is vaunted as the single
it
actual source of our ascertained knowledge.
Everything
which cannot be learnt from
it
is
held to be completely
Book
I.]
THE UNKNOWABLE IMPLIES KNOWLEDGE.

:
13
unknowable
that
everything
which
in
opposition to the ob-
are apt to cover by comprehensive designation, the essence of thinjgs^ The efforts, therefore, to which we propose to devote ourselves will be followed with the pitying repudiation bestowed on all attempts at desirable but impracticable undertakings.
servable succession of
phenomena we
Beyond the general confidence

is
that there
is
such a thing as
a connexion of things according to law, the

held, has
human
spirit, it
j
no source of knowledge, which might serve the purpose of completing or correcting experience. It would be a mere eccentricity to refuse to admit that a confession of must
at last
the inscrutability of the essence of things, in a certain sense, )
be
elicited
from every philosophy ; but what
if
the rnore exact determination of this sense, and the
justifi-
cation of the whole assertion of such inscrutability, should
be
problem of Metaphysic, which only promises to fix beforehand the Hmits within which its enquiry may be successful ? And it is clear that the assertion in question, if prefixed to all enquiry, is one that to a certain extent contradicts itself. So long as it speaks of an essence of things, it speaks of something and presupposes the reaHty of something as to the existence of which according to its own showing experience can teach nothing. As soon as it maintains the unknowability of this essence, it implies a conviction as to the position in which
just the
enquire, but does not
the thinking spirit stands to the essence, which, since
it
cannot be the result of experience, must be derived from a previously recognized certainty in regard to that which the
nature of our thought compels us to oppose, as the essence
of things, to the series of phenomena.
tacit presuppositions,
which retain
their
But it is just these / power over us all^

\
the time that

that stand in
we
are disputing our capacity for knowledge,
need of that explanation, criticism, and limij Nor tation, which Metaphysic deems its proper business. have we any right to take for granted that the business is a very easy one, and that it may be properly discharged by
14
INTRODUCTION.
in
CBook
I.
prefixed by
some remarks well-accredited way of introduction

for.
general opinion, to be
to those interpretations of
is
experience from which alone a profitable result
looked
When we assume
signification
:
nothing but conformity to law in the

itself,
course of things, this expression, simple

in
its
seems simple
it
but the notions attached to
turn out
be various and far-reaching enough, as soon as it has to be employed in precisely that interpretation of experience which is opposed to Metaphysic. I will not enlarge on the point that every physical enquiry employs the logical principles of Identity and Excluded Middle for the attainment of its results both are reckoned as a matter of course among the methods which But meanwhile it is forgotten every investigation follows. that these principles could not be valid for the connected series of phenomena without holding good also of the completely unknown basis from which the phenomena issue. Yet many facts give sufficient occasion for the surmise that they apply to things themselves and their states in some different sense from that in which they apply to the judgments which are suggested to us in thinking about these states. We show as little scruple in availing ourselves of mathematical truths, in order to advance from deduction to deduction. It is tacitly assumed that the unknown essence of things, for one manifestation of which we borrow from experience a definite numerical value, will never out of its residuary and still unknown nature supply to the consequence which is to be looked for under some condition an incalculable coefficient, which would prevent the
to
:
correspondence of our mathematical prediction with the

actual course of events.
is this all. Besides these presumptions which are any rate general in their character and which are all that can be noticed at the outset, in the actual interpretation of experience there are implied many unproven judgments of a more special sort, which can only be noticed in the
Nor
at
Book
I.]
THEORIES OF COGNITION FUTILE,

For
logical laws
15
sequel.
hold good primarily of nothing

conceptions, mathematical
but the thinkable content of

applied to that which
suffers, in
laws of nothing but pure quantities.
If both are to be moves and changes, works and
space and time, they stand in constant need of
fresh ideas as to the nature of the real,
which as connecting
It is
links
laws
make it this new
possible to subordinate to the terms of those
region of their application.
vain for us
therefore to speak of a science founded

shall
be perfectly
all
free
on experience that While this from presuppositions.
science thinks scorn of seeking support from Metaphysic
and disclaims
regard to this
everywhere penetrated by
vising developments,
knowledge of the essence of things, it is unmethodised assumptions in very essence, and is in the habit of improas each separate question
it
suggests
it
them, of those principles which
does not
deem
worth
while to subject to any systematic consideration.
IX. In making these remarks I have no object in view may properly be served by an introduction. I wish to prepossess that natural feeling of probability, which
but such as
in the last instance
is
the judge of
all
our philosophical
undertakings, in favour of the project of putting together in
a systematic way the propositions in regard to the nature
and connexion of what is real, which, independently of experience and in answer to the questions with which experience challenges us, we believe ourselves to have no
option but to maintain.
I expressly disclaim,
however, the
desire to justify this belief, from
which as a matter of fact we are none of us exempt, by an antecedent theory of cognition. I am convinced that too much labour is at
present spent in this direction, with results proportionate
^
"
which such theories something convenient and seductive in the plan of withdrawing attention from the solution of
to the groundlessness of the claims
make.
There
is
definite questions
and applying oneself
to general questions
in regard to cognitive capacities, of
which any one could
INTRODUCTION.
who
set seriously
[Book
I.
avail himself
about
it.
In
fact,
however,
the history of science shows that those
who
resolutely set
themselves to mastering certain problems generally found

that their cognisance of the available appliances
and of the
use of them grew keener in the process
while on the other
hand the pretentious occupation with

has seldom led to any solid
those methods which
it
theories of cognition
result.
It
has not
itself
created
entertains itself with exhibiting but

it is
not employing.
they
On
the contrary,
the actual problems
that have compelled the discovery of the
methods by which
is
it.
may be
know
solved.
The
constant whetting of the knife
tedious,
I
if it is
not proposed to cut anything with
that such
an expression of opinion
is
in
unheard-
of opposition to the tendency of our time.
could not,
however, repress the conviction that there
unsoundness
I
in the efforts
made
to
is an intrinsic found a Metaphysic on
a^ psychological analysis of our cognition.
dissertations directedTo^this
The numerous end may be compared to the
tuning of instruments before a concert, only that they are
In the one case it is known what the harmony is which it is sought to produce in the other case the mental activities which are believed to have been discovered are compared with a canon which the discoverers profess that they have still to find out. In the last resort, however, every one allows that as to the truth of our cognition and its capability of truth no verdict can be compassed which is independent of that cognition itself. It must itself determine the hmits of its competence. In I order to be able to do this in order to decide how far it may trust itself to judge of the nature of the realj it must first arrive at a clear notion of the propositions which it is properly obliged obliged in thorough agreement with itself to assert of this real. It is by these assumptions, which are simply necessary to Reason, that the conception of the real which is supposed to be in question is determined ; and it is only their content that can justify Reason,
not so necessary or useful.
:
Bookl.l
METAPHYSIC AND PSYCHOLOGY,

the question
its
17
when
is
is
raised, in
forming any judgment with

its
regard to
further relation to this
object
its
either that
in maintaining the
unknowabiUty of
concrete nature,
or in coming to the conclusion as the only one compatible with the reconciliation of all its thoughts, that the con-
ception of things which

object,
it
generates has no independent

retaining a belief
itself
or in persistently
in
such an
object in
some sense which reason
determines
belief which, because of such a nature, neither requires nor
admits further proof.
On
the other
hand
it
strikes
all
me
as
quite unjustifiable to treat the most obscure of

tions, that of the psychological origin of
ques-
knowledge and the

it,
play of conditions which co-operate in producing
as
a|
preliminary question to be
issue
easily dealt with, of
which
the',
might
settle
decisively
the
validity
or
invalidity
collectively or severally of the
utterances of reason.
Oni
the contrary the psychological history of the origin of an
an error on supposition 1 that we are previously acquainted with the truth and can ^ thus be sure that the originating condition of the error^ involved a necessary aberration from that truth. Thus the doctrine which I would allege rests not on any
error only conveys a proof that
it is
conviction which has previously to be admitted as to the

psychological roots of our knowledge, but simply
easily recognisable fact, of
on an
which the admission is implied Every one, evade it as he disputing it. very by the act of will, must in the last instance judge of every proposition submitted to him and of every fact with which experience presents him upon grounds of which the constraining force I '^ presses itself upon him with an immediate assurance. undertakes he toj when say, in the last instance,' for even ^ examine this self-evidence, his final affirmation or denial of it must always rest on the like self-evidence as belonging In to his collected reasons for deciding on the matter. regard to that which this self-supported reason must affirm, now that by the space of centuries it has, in sequence on
'
Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
i8
experience, reflected
INTRODUCTION.
on
itself,
[Book
a comprehensive conscious-
But how all and how it comes about that those fundamental truths which are necessities of our thought acquire their self-evidence these are points on which enlightenment, if possible at all, can only be looked for in a remote future. But whenever it may come, it can only come after the first question has been answered. The process of our cognition and its relations to objects myst, whether we like it or no, be subject to those judgments which our reason passes as necessities of thought upon every real process and on the effect of every element of reality upon every other. These declarations are not in the least at war with the high interest which we take in
ness
may be
obtained or at least sought.
this takes place in us,
psychology as a proper region of enquiry.
They only
which every speculative philosophy must uphold, that while Psychology cannot be the foundation of Metaphysic, Metaphysic must be the
to a repetition of the assertion
amount
V-
foundation of Psychology.
X.
'
It is time,
however, for some more precise statements
as to the line which
enquiry.
it is proposed to take in the following In referring to the supposition of a universal
relation of
mutual dependence between

foundation of
all scientific
all
things real as
the
common
investigation, I at
the same time indicated a doubt with reference to the

exclusive form to which in the^resent stage of scientific
culture
it
is
the fashion to reduce this relation
the
form
has
of conformity to universal law.
This form
is
neither the
spirit
only one nor the oldest under which the
human
It
presented to
itself
the connexion of things.
was emphati-
cally not as instances of a universal rule but as parts of a
whole that
men
first
conceived things
as related to each
other not primarily by permanent laws but by the unchangeable purport of a p lan, of which the realisation required
from the several elements not always and everywhere an In this con.'identical procedure, but a changeable one.
Book
I.]
THE IDEA OF LA W AND OF END.
viction originated the dazzling forms of the idealistic con-
Starting from a supreme idea, which they claimed to have penetrated by immediate intuition, the authors of these schemes thought to ded uce the m anifold variety of phenomena in that order in which the phenomena were to contribute to
structions of the universe.
into the depths of
the realisation
of the
supposed ^lan.
It
was not the
discovery of laws that was their object, but the establish-
ment of the several ends which the development of things had gradually to attain and of which each determined all habits of existence and behaviour within the limits of that
section of the universe which
it
governed.
for.
of these schemes
that in
is
easily
accounted
The barrenness They failed in
which
men
always will
ive definition of that
fail, in the exact and exhaustsupreme thought, which they held in
Now any shortcoming in this outset of the theory must be a source of constantly increasing defect in its development, as it descends to particulars. If ever a happy instinct led it to results that could be accepted, it was only an^êsthetic satisfaction that such guesses yielded, not any certainty that could meet doubt by proof. Yet the general conviction from which the speculations in question set out does not yield in any way, either as less certain or as less
honour.
admissible, to the supposition of universal
law,
conformity to
accept,
which For
in our
time
is
deemed alone worthy of
ance.
my
part therefore
uncertainty on the point
and
wish there to be no
should reckon this theory^ of
the universe,
if it could be carried out in detail, as the completion of philosophy ; and though t cannot but deem
it
incapable of being thus carried out, I yet do not scruple

its
to allow to the conviction, that
virtually correct, all the influence
fundamental thought is which it is still possible
s
\
for
it
to retain
on the formation of
my
views.
this theory, at
But from among the objects of the enquiry before us, least as carrying any immediate certainty, remains excluded. For we are not to employ ourselves
C2
20
INTRODUCTION.
of ideas itself, with its constituents
[Book
I.
upon the world

in
arranged
and is eternally complete, but upon the given world, in which the process of Now it realisation of the ideas is supposed to be visible. is not once for all nor in a systematic order that this real world unfolds ectypes of the ideas. Ir^ that case it would scarcely be possible to say in what respect the series of the But ectypes is distinguishable from that of the archetypes. the world of reality presents innumerable things and occurrences distributed in space and time. It is by shifting
an order that holds good
eternally
relations of these that the content of the ideas
is
realised
in manifold instances
and with degrees of completeness or

realised
incompleteness
is
so
only again
to
disappear.
However then we may
think on the obscure question of
the position in which the ideas stand to the world of phe-
nomena and
of the regulation of this world by them,
it
is
certain that as soon as their realisation
becomes dependent
on the changing connexion between a number of points brought into relation, there must arise a system of universal
laws, in accordance with
which
is
in all like cases of recurrence
like result necessarily follows, in unlike cases
an unlike
result,
and a
certain
end
attained in one case, missed in
/another.
K
Accordingly, even the ideaHstic theory of the
world, which believes reality to be governed by ends that
belong to a plan,
I
if it
would render the process of
realisa-
tion
of these ends intelligible, necessarily generates the
conception of a universal connexion of things according to
law as a derived principle, though

\
it
may
refuse
it
the
dignity of an ultimate principle.

in admitting further that the
It will find
spirit
no
difficulty
human
does not possess
any immediate revelation as to an end and direction of the collective movement of the universe, in which according to Having its own supposition that spirit is a vanishing point. for its vocation, however, to work at its limited place in the service of the whole according to the same universal laws which hold good for all the several elements of the whole.
Book
I.]
REALITY AND DIALECTIC.

spirit
the
human
is
will
more
easily possess
it
an immediate
like everything
consciousness of this necessity by which

else
determined.
:
Considerations of this sort settle nothing objectively
but
they suffice to justify the abstract limitation of our present *~
problem.
of which
jtîs
or
versal conditions are
Metaphysic has merely to show what the uni-\ which must be satisfied by anything (
say without contradicting ourselves that (
we can
that
it
happens.
The
question remains open
whether these laws, which we hope to master, form the ^ ultimate object which our knowledge can reach, or whether ^ we may succeed in deducing them from a highest thought,
^
as conditions of
its
realisation
which
this
thought imposes
'
on
itself.
XI. In order
search of
it
to the discovery of the truths
we
are in
would be desirable to be in possession of a clue The remarks we have just made that could be relied on. at once prevent us from availing ourselves of a resource in which confidence was placed by the philosophers of a still
recent period.
The
followers of the idealistic systems to
s^
'
which I last referred imagined that in their dialectic method they had security for the completeness and certainty of the formulae in which they unfolded the true content of the
universe.
They
directed their attention but slightly to the
riddles of experience.
To
much
greater degree they
had
allowed themselves to be affected by the concentrated impression of

at
all the imperfections by which the world outrages once our knowledge, our moral judgment, and the wishes In opposition to that impression there arose of our hearts. in their minds with great vivacity but, as was not denied, in complete obscurity the forecast of a true being, which was to be free from these shortcomings and at the same time to
,
S
)
solve the difficult problem of rendering the presence of the
shortcomings
intelligible.
all
This forecast, into which they
had gathered
spirit,
the needs
and
aspirations of the
human
they sought by the application of their method to
22
INTRODUCTION.
its
[Book
I.
unfold into
outset
complete content.
In
their
^
own language
which
at
they sought to raise that into conception
the
had been apprehended only

^.
in the
incomplete form
of imagination
I
do not propose
It
is
to revert to the criticism of this method,
!
I
which I have enlarged elseremark that in accordance with the spirit of the theories in which it was turned to account, it has led only to the assignment of certain universal forms of appearance which cannot be absent in a world that is to be a complete ectype of the supreme idea. It has not led to the discovery of any principles available for the solution of questions relating to the mutual qualification of the several elements, by which in any case the realisation of those forms is completely or incompletely attained. The method might conceivably be transformed so as to serve this other end, for its essential tendency, which is to clear up obscure ideas, will give occasion everywhere for its use. But in this transformation it would lose the most potent part of that which formerly gave it its peculiar charm. Its
logical peculiarity of
on the
where.
enough here
to
{
'
5ittraction
consisted in
this,
that
it
sought in a series of
which it unfolded one out of the other, to convey an immediate insight into the very inner movement which forms the life of the universe, excluding that labour of discursive thought which seeks to arrive at certainty in roundabout ways and by use of the most various subsidiary methods of proof. As making such claims, the method can at bottom only be a form of that process of exhibiting already discovered truths which unfolds them in the order which after much labour of thought in other directions comes to be recognised as the proper and natural system of those If however the method is to be employed at the truths. same time as a form of discovering truth, the process,
intuitions,
questionable at best, only admits of being in some measure

carried out in relation to those universal
^
and
stable forms of
[Begriff.]
[Vorstellung.]
Book
I.]
REALITY AND
CLASSIFICATION',
23
events and phenomena, which

as
we have reason for regarding an objective development of the world's content or of its idea. In regard to the universal laws, by which the realisa'
tion of all these forms is uniformly governed, we certainly cannot assume that they constitute a system in which an indisputable principle opens out into a continuous series of
/
i
developments.
_about
cannot in this case ascribe the development to the reality^ as objective, but only to our thoughts
the
reality^ as
We
subjective.
The
Dialectic
method
would therefore have to submit to conversion into that simpler dialectic, or, to speak more plainly, into that mere
process of consideration in which the elementary thoughts,
that
the
and interconnection of compared with each other and with all the conditions which warrant a judgment as to their correctness, and in which it is sought to replace the contradictions and shortcomings that thereupon appear by better definitions. Nothing is more natural and familiar than this mode of
entertain as to the nature
real are
we
procedure, but it is also obvious that it does not of itself determine beforehand either the point of departure for the considerations of which it consists or in detail the kind of
progress which shall be
made
in
it.
XII. Other attempts at the discovery of a clue have ^ started from a conception of classification. There lies a y^ natural charm in the assumption that not only will the content of the universe be found to form an ordered and rounded whole according to some symmetrical method, but
also that the reason, of
which
it
is
the vocation to
possesses for this purpose innate
organised and
*
completed
array.
know it, modes of conception in The latter part of this
['Sache' in this work means whatever a name can stand for, is coextensive with ' Vorstellbarer Inhalt (a content which can be presented in an idea). Logic, sect. 342, and therefore has 'objectivity' (Objectivitat), Logic, sect. 3 on the other hand it is much wider than 'Ding' (a thing), which has not only 'Objectivitat' but also 'Wirklichkeit', or rather .'Realitat,' (concrete external reality); cp. ch. 3 below, and notes and Logic, sect. 3 and 347. There is no exact English equivalent for Sache' in this sense.]
' ; ; '
24
INTRODUCTION.
[Book
I.
notion, at any rate, was the source of Kant's attempt
by a
completion of Aristotle's doctrine of Categories to find the
sum
of truths that are necessities of our thought.
In the
sense which Aristotle himself attached to his Categories, as
a collection of the most universal predicates^ under which

every term that we can employ of intelligible import may be subsumed, they have never admitted of serious philosophical application; At most they have served to recall the points of view from which questions may be put in
'
regard to the objects of enquiry that present themselves.
The answers
to those questions always lay elsewhere

all,
not
in
conceptions at
but in fundamental judgments directing

Kant's
suffers primarily
the application of the conception in this way or that.
from the same defect ; but he sought to get rid of it by passing in fact from it to the 'principles of Understanding' which, as he held, were merely contracted in the Categories into the shape of conceptions and could therefore be again elicited from
reformed table of Categories
them.
The attempt
it
is
it
a work of genius, but against the

is
reasoning on which
founded and the consequences

themselves.
drawn from
found
other
many
scruples suggest
Kant
fault with Aristotle for
having set up his Categories
without a principle to warrant their completeness.
On
the
hand, plenty of people have been forthcoming to
point out the excellence of the principles of division which
^
\
supposed to have followed. I do not look for from the controversy on this point. Given a plurality of unknown extent, if it is proposed to resolve it and "non-M but not merely by way of dichotomy into
Aristotle
is
any
result
ultimately into
members of a purely
no
positive sort,
M^ N,
C?,
P,
(2,
there can be
security in the
way of method
for the
completeness of
of the case
From the nature this disjunctive process. we must always go on to think of a residuary member i?, of which nothing is known but that it is different from all the preceding members. Any one who boasts of
the completeness of the division
is
merely saying that for
Book
I.]
JUDGMENT-FORMS AND CATEGORIES,

he cannot add a fresh member R.
affirms
25
his part
Whoever denies
the completeness
that
a further
member
has
occurred to him which with equal right belongs to the

series.
Aristotle
;
may have had

properly
the most admirable principles

all
of division
the
but they do not prove that he has noticed

fall
But the same remark holds equally good against Kant. It may be conceded to him that it is only in the form of the judgment that the acts of thought are performed by means of which
members which
under them.
we
affirm anything of the real.
If
it
is
admitted further as
a consequence of this that there will be as

different logical forms of
many
different
primary propositions of this kind as there are essentially
judgment,
still
the admission that
these different forms of judgment have been exhaustively
discovered cannot be insisted on as a matter, properly

speaking, of methodological necessity.
The admission
will
be made as soon as we feel ourselves satisfied and have nothing to add to the classification ; and if this agreement were universal, the matter would be practically settled, for
every inventory must be taken as complete,
are interested in
its
if
those
who
completeness can find nothing more to
add
to
it.
conditional completeness, which
But that kind of theoretical security for an unKant was in quest of, is
logical considerations,
something
intrinsically impossible.
These however are

very decisive here.
which are not
more important to point out that the very admission from which we started is one that cannot be made. T^ê logical forms of judgment are applied
It is
to every possible subject-matter, to the merely thinkable as
well as to the real, to the doubtful
and the impossible as
well as to the certain

fore
and the
possible^
We
cannot there-
be the
least sure that all the different forms,

its
which are
indispensable to thought for this

application to the real.
wide-reaching employits
ment, are also of equal importance for
more limited
a significance
So
far
however as
it
their significance
is
in fact extends also to this latter region,
26
INTRODUCTION.
[Book
I.
which could not be gathered in its full determination from that general form in which it was equally applicable to the non-real. The categorical form of judgment leaves it quite an open question, whether the subject of the judgment to which it adds a predicate is a simple 'nominal essence^' \remaining identical with itself, or a whole which possesses each of its parts, or a substance capable of experiencing a
I
succession of states. The hypothetical form of judgment does not distinguish whether the condition contained in its antecedent clause is the reason of a consequence, or the cause of an effect, or the determining end from which the
fact
stated
in
its
the consequent
fulfilment.
proceeds as a necessary
different conceptions,
condition of
But these
which are here presented in a like form, are of different importance for the treatment of the real. The metaphysical
significance of the Categories
is,
therefore,
even according
\
;
happy conjecture, and rests upon material considerations, which are unconnected with the forms of judgment, and to which the systematisation of
to Kant's view, only a matter of
those logical forms has merely given external occasion.

;
It
is
only these incidentally suggested thoughts that have given
to the Categories in Kant's hands a semblance of importance and productiveness, which these playthings of philosophy, the object of so much curiosity, cannot properly claim. This roundabout road of first establishing a formal method affords us no better security than we should have if
we
I (
set
straight to
work
at the thing
at the matter of
our
enquiry.
XIII.
first
We
are encouraged to this direct course by the

it is
recollection that
not a case of taking possession for the

land.
time of an
unknown
efforts
of centuries the objects
Thanks we have to
to the zealous
deal with have
long been set forth in distinct order, and the questions about
them
collected which need an answer.
Nor had the
philo-
sophy which has prepared the way

^
for us itself to
break
[*
EinfachCTDenkinhalt.']
Book
I.]
ONTOLOGY MUST COME

new ground.
it
FIRST.
27
wholly
subject
In regard to the main divisions of our

to
anew from
what everyone learns Nature and sgirit are two regions so different as at first sight to admit of no comparison, and demanding two separate modes of treatment, each devoted to the essential character by which the two regions are alike self-involved and separate from
little
had
do but
to repeat
his
own experience
of the world.
each other.
But on the other hand they are destined to
such constant action upon each other as parts of one universe, that they constrain us at the same time to the
quest for those universal forms of an order of things which
(
they both have to satisfy alike in themselves and in the
]N^^
conne xion with each other. It might seem as if this lastmentioned branch of its enquiry must be the one to which early science would be last brought. As a matter of history, however, it has taken it in hand as soon as the other two branches, and has long devoted itself to it with greater
particularity than, considering the small progress
<
made
in
the
other branches,
it
could find conducive to success.
But whatever may be the case historically, now at least try to weigh the amount of tenable result which has been won from such protracted labour, we are justified in beginning with that which is first in the order of things j_ though not in the order of our knowledge ; I mean wit h \ Ontology, which, as a doctrine of the being and relations
when we
of
all reality,
had precedence given

its
to
it
over Cosmology
and Psychology
die reality into
the two branches of enquiry which follow

opposite distinctive forms.
It is to this
all
n
)
'^kiC
division of the subject that with slight additions or omissions,
Metaphysic under every form of treatment has to
and purposes returned. The variety in the choice of terms occasioned by peculiar points of view adopted
intents
antecedently to the consideration of the natural division of

the subject, has indeed been very great.
entering
But to take any
further account of these variations of terminology, before
on the
real matter in
hand, seems to
me
as useless
28
INTRODUCTION.
more
[Book
I.
as the attempt to determine
exactly that limitation of
the problems before us which metaphysicians have had
them in promising to treat only of rational cosmology and psychology, as opposed in a very intelligible manner to the further knowledge which only experience can convey. XIV. No period of human life is conceivable in which man did not yet feel himself in opposition to an external world around him. Long in doubt about himself, he found around him a multitude of perceptibly divided objects, and he could not live long without having many impressions forced upon him as to their nature and connexion. For none of the every-day business that is undertaken for the satisfaction of wants could go on without the unspoken conviction that our wishes and thoughts have not by themselves the power to make any alteration in the state of the
before
outer world, but that this world consists in a system of
mutually determinable things, in which any alteration of
one part that we may succeed in effecting is sure of a definite propagation of effects on other parts. Moreover no such undertaking could be carried out without coming on some resistance, and thus giving rise to the recognition of an unaccountable independence exercised by things in withstanding a change of state. All these thoughts as well as those which might readily be added on a continuation of these reflections, were primarily present only in the form of unconsciously determining prjnciples which regulated actions and expectations in real life. It is in the same form that with almost identical repetition they still arise in each individual, constituting the natural Ontology with which we all in real life meet the demand for judgments on events. The reflective attempt to form these assumptions into conscious principles only ensued when attention was called to the need of escaping contradictions with which they became embarrassed when they came to be applied without care for the consequences to a wider range
'of
knowledge.
Book
I.]
WHAT
arose.
IS
A THING?
its
29
ontological
en-
It
was thus that Philosophy, with
quiries,
In the order of their development these

Still owing have often drifted into
enquiries have not indeed been independent of the natural
order in which one question suggests another.

to accidental circumstances they
devious tracks; have assumed and again given up very

various
treatise
tendencies.
There
at
is
no need,
the
however,
in
which aims
gathering
product of these
It
labours, to repeat this chequered history.

directly
may
fasten
on the natural conception of the universe which we noticed just now that conception which finds the
course of the world only intelligible of a multiplicity of

sistent things, of variable relations
per-")
5^
between them, and of 7 events arising out of these changes of mutual relation. Fory it is just this view of the universe, of which the essential purport may be thus summarised, which renews itself with
constant identity in every age.
Outside the schools we
all
accommodate
itself as
ourselves to
it.
Not
to us merely, but to all

it
past labourers in the field of philosophy,
has presented
the point of departure, as that which had either
to
theories of
be confirmed or controverted. Unlike the divergent speculative men, therefore, it deserves to be reckoned as itself one of the natural phenomena which, in
the character of regular elements of the universe, enchain
For the present however all borrow from history is the general conviction that of the simple thoughts which make up this view there is none that is exempt from the need of having itsi actual and possible import scientifically ascertained in order to its being harmonised with all the rest in a tenable whole. '^ No lengthy prolegomena are needed to determine the course which must be entered on for this purpose. We cannot speak of occurrences in relations without previously thinking of the things between which they are supposed to \ take place or to subsist. Of these things, however mani- (
the attention of philosophy.
that
we need
to
fold
and unlike
as
we take them
to
be
we
at the
same
30
INTRODUCTION.
[Book
I.
time affirm, along with a distinction in the individual being

of each, a likeness in respect of that form of reality which
makes them things. It is with the simple idea of this being that we have to begin. The line to be followed in the
sequel
may be
left
for the present unfixed.
Everything
cannot be said at once. That natural view of the world from which we take our departure, simple as^TT'seems at
sight, yet contains various interwoven threads; and no one of these can be pursued without at the same time touching others which there is not time at the outset to follow out on their own account and which must be reserved to a more convenient season. For our earUer considerations, therefore, we must ask the indulgence of not being disturbed by objections of which due account shall be taken
first
in the sequel.
CHAPTER
On
1.
I.
the
Being of Things*
is
One
of the oldest thoughts in Philosophy
that of
Illu-
the opposition between true _bdngand_untruej^j^

sions of the senses, causing
what
is
unreal to be taken for
what
that
is real,
led to a perception of the distinction between

is
which only appears to us and that which
independent
oi us.
The
observation of things taught
men
to recognise a
cori^rtional
existence or a result of combination in that which to begin with seemed simple and self-dependent. Continuous becoming was found where only unmoving persistent identity had been thought visible. Thus there was occasioned a clear consciousness of that which had been understood by 'true being,' and which was found wanting in the objects of these observations. Independence not only of us but of everything other than itself, simplicity and unchanging persistence in its own nature, had always been reckoned its signs. Its signs, we say, but still only its signs ; for these characteristics, though they suffice to exclude that of which they are not predicable from the
region
of true
being,
do^not define
that
being
itself.
Independence of our own impressions in regard to it is what we ascribe to every truth. It holds good in itself, though no one thinks it. Independence of everything beside itself we affirm not indeed of every truth, but of many truths which neither need nor admit of proof. Simplicity exclusive of all combination belongs to every single sensation of
32
ON THE BEING OF
is
THINGS.
[Book
I.
sweetness or redness; and motionless self-subsistence,

accessible to any change,
in-
the proper character of that

reality
world of ideas which we oppose to

that while
on the ground
the
we can
say of the ideas that they eternally hold

are.
It follows that in
good we cannot say that they

/
Being not only is something wanting which has been thought though not expressed but the missing something is the most essential element of that which we are in quest of. \Ve still want to know what exactly that Being itself is to which those terms may be applied by way of distinguishing the true Being from the apparent, or what that reality consists in by which an independent simple and persistent Being distinguishes itself from the unreal image in thought of the same independent
characteristics stated of
simple and persistent content.
To this question a very simple answer may be attempted. seems quite a matter of course that the thinking faculty should not be able by any of its own resources, by any
2.
It
thought, to penetrate
real Being,
sition to all
and exhaust the

itself
essential property of
in
which thought of
it
recognises an oppo-
merely
will
intelligible existence.
we can
claim,
be
said, is that real
The most that Being yields us a
living experience of itself in a
thinking,
manner quite different from and such experiences being once given, a ground of cognition with reference to them thereupon admits of being stated, which is necessary not indeed for the purpose of inferring that presence of real Being which is matter of immediate experience but for maintaining the truth of this experience against every doubt. Upon this view no pretence is made of explaining by means of conceptions the
difference of real Being from the conception of the same,
.:
but immediate sensation

the
has always been looked upon as

is
ground of cognition which
our warrant
for
the
presence of real Being.
Even
after
the habit has been
formed of putting
*
trust in proofs
and credible communi-
['Sinnlichen Empfindung.']
Chap.
I.]
CONTENT AND BEING IN SENSATION.
33
we shall still seek to set aside any doubt that may have arisen by rousing ourselves to see and hear whether the_things_exist and the occurrences take place of which
cations,
information has been given us

the reaUty of
ness o f
its
nor does any proof prove
conclusion unless, apart from the cor rectconcatenatiorij not merely the truth of
its
its logical
original premisses, as matter of thought, but the reality of
which in the last resort It may be that even sensation sometimes deceives and presents us with what is Still in those cases unreal instead of with what is real.
its
content
is
established
â re ality
is
given only by sensuous perception.
Y'
(
where
reahty.
it
does not deceive,

It
it is
the only possible evidence of

sen-
may
in like
manner be questioned whether

it is.
it,
sation gives us insight into the real as
that something which really
is
underlies
of the fact sensation does

Still
|
'
not seem
3.
to allow a doubt.
t\v o
The
is
object ions just noticed to the value of sensafull,
--
tion cannot here be discussed in
but with the second

to consider at
there
a difficulty connected which
we have
once.
The
content of simple sensations cannot be so
separated from the sensitive act as that detached images of

the two, complete in themselves, should remain after the
separation.
We can
neither present redness, sweetness,
and
\
warmth
to ourselves as they
nor the feeling

feeling of
would be if they were not felt, of them as it would be if it were not a

qualities.
any of these particular
The
variety,
however, of the sensible qualities, and the definiteness of
each single quality as presented to the mind's eye,

the attempt which
is
facilitate
really
we all make to separate in thought what The particular matter which we feel, at indivisible.
^
"?
any rate, appears to us independent of our feeling, as if it were something of which the self-existent nature was only )
recognised and discovered by the act of feeling.
But we do not succeed so

element
easily in detaching the other
that real
it
being, of which, as the
being of this
sensible content,
was the business of actual sensation in
Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
34
ON THE BEING OF
It
THINGS.
it
[Book
I.
opposition to the mere recollection or idea of

assurance.
to give us
cannot be already given in this simplest affirmation or position which we ascribed to the sensible
and by which each of them is what it is and itself from other contents. Through this affirmation that which is affirmed only comes to hold good as an element in the world of the thinkable. It is not real merely because it is in this sense something, as opposed to
contents,
distinguishes
nothing void
affirmation
of
all
is
determination.
eternally
In virtue
allied
of such
Red
Red and
to Yellow,
is warm or sweet. But this identity with and difference from something else holds good of the Red of which there is no actual sensation as of that of which there is actual sensation. Yet it is only in the case
not allied to what

itself
of the latter that sensation

existence.
is supposed to testify to real Apart from that simplest affirmation, however,
the various sensible qualities in abstraction from the sensi-N

tive act
which apprehends them have nothing in common.
If therefore
we
assert of them, so far as they are
felt,
is
a real
Being
different
from
this affirmation, this
Being
not anyquality
thing which as attaching to the nature of the
felt
would merely be recognised and discovered by the

act.
sensitive
On
the contrary,
it
lies
wholly in the simple fact of
/
j
which forms the sole distinction between the actual sensation of the quahty that is present to sense and the^ mere idea of quality which is not so present. Thus it would appear that the notion with which we started must be given up ; for sensation is not a mere ground of cognition
being
felt^
'
something different from it and still to be stated ; and the being which on the evidence of sensation we ascribe to things consists in absolutely nothing else than the fact of their being felt. 4. This assertion, however, can only be hazarded when
of a real Being which
is still
of which the proper nature has
certain points of
advanced speculation have been reached,
which we
shall arrive at later.
The primary conception
of
Chap.
I.]
THE NATURAL THEORY OF BEING.

is
35
the world
ing to
it
quite remote from any such inference.

is
Accord'
sensation
certainly the only
'
causa cognoscendi
\/
which convinces us of Being, and
just
because
it
is
the
only one, there easily arises the mistake of supposing^ that
what it alone can show consists only of it whereas in fact Being is, notwithstanding, independent of our recognition of it, and all things, of which we learn the reality, it is true, only from sensation, will continue to be, though our attention is diverted from them and they vanish from our
;
consciousness.
Nothing indeed appears more self-evident We all do homage to it. Yet the question must recur, what remains to be understood by the Being of things, when we have got rid of the sole condition under which it is cognisable by us. It was as objects of our feeling that things wêre presented to us. In this alone consisted as far as we could see what we called their Being. What can be left of Being when we abstract from our feeling? W^hat exactly is it that we suppose ourselves to have
than this doctrine.
predicated of things, in saying that they are without being
felt ?
(,
Or what
is it
that for the things themselves,
by way
of proof, confirmation, and significance of their being, takes

the place of that sensation which for us formed the proof,
confirmation, and significance of their being.
The proper meaning

clearer, if I pass to the
of these
questions will
become
answers which the natural theory

;
of the world gives to them

that this theory
makes no
effort to Its
which we have noticed.

sists in
must not be supposed remedy the shortcoming simplest way of doing so confor
it
the reflection that on the disappearance of our

its
sensation that of others takes
place.
own The men whom
'
we
remain in intercourse with others. we are removed, will be seen by others as hitherto by us. This constitutes their persistency in Being, while they have vanished from our
leave
will
behind
Places and objects, from which
senses.
this
Ever)'one, I think, will find traces in himself of
primary way of presenting the case.
Yet
it
helps us
36
ON THE BEING OF
THINGS.
it.
[Book
I.
rather to put off the question than to answer

to repeat itself at
It is
sure
'
'
once in another form. Being was said to be independent of any consciousness on the part of a What then if consciousness is extinsentient subject. guished out of the entire universe and there is no longer any one who could have cognisance of the things that are
supposed to exist?
they stood
will
In that case, we answer, they
will
continue to stand in those relations to each other in which
when they were objects of perception. Each have its place in space or will change it. Each will -continue to exercise influences on others or to be affected
'
by
their
influence.
'
stitute that in
These reciprocal agencies will conwhich the things possess their being indepen-
dently of
all
observation.
Beyond
and
in
this
view of the matter In what

is
the natural theory of things scarcely ever goes.

respect
it
is
unsatisfactory
what
is
it
right
we have
now
5.
to attempt to consider.
There
is
one point on which

its
it
held to be defective,
its
but unfairly, because

ability to
defect
consists merely in
in-
answer an improper question, which we have
simply to get out of the habit of putting.

arises in this way.
The
question
All those relations, in which

reality
now supposed
i
the
of things
to
consist,
we just may be
But they must thought of equally as real and as unreal. be actually real and not merely thought of as real, if they
are to form the Being of things
and not merely the idea of
/this Being.
\
In what then, we ask, consists this reality of that which is in itself merely thinkable, and how does it That this question is unanswerable and self-conarise? In what properly tradictory needs no elaborate proof
consists the
there
is
fact how it comes about or is made that something and not nothing, that something and not
it
nothing takes place; this
is
eternally impossible to say.
whatever the form of the question in which this curiosity might find expression, it is clear that we should always presuppose in it as antecedent to that reality of
For
in fact,
Chap.
I.]
RELATIONS PRESUPPOSE BEING?
37
which we seek an explanation, a prior conn ected reality, in which from definite principles definite consequences necessarily flow, and among them the reality that has to be explained. And the origin of this latter reality would not be like that of a truth which arises as a consequence out of other truths but which yet always subsisted along with them in eternal validity. The origin in question would be expressly one in which a reality, that was previously itself unreal^ arises out of another reality. Everything accordingly
which we find in the given reahty
the occurrence of events,

upon each
other, the
the change in the action of things
existence of centres of relation between which such action
may
take
place all
tliis
we must assume
to begin with in
order to render the origin of reality intelligible.
has been avoided by the common be charged with having itself fallen into another circle in reducing the real Being of things to the reality of those relations the maintenance of which it supposed to constitute what was meant by this Being. For it could not be intended to analyse this most general conception of reality, of which the significance can only be conveyed in the living experience of feeling. All that could be meant by definitions of 5eing in the common theory was an indication of that which within this given miracle of reality is to be understood as the Being of the Things in distinction from other instances of the same reality, from the existence of the relations themselves and from the occurrence of events. Whether the common theory has succeeded in this latter object is what remains to be asked. 6. Philosophy has been very unanimous in denying that
This obvious
circle
view.
Nor can
it
it
has.
How,
it
is
asked, are
we
to understand those rela-
we would fain find the Being of the Things? If they are merely a result of arbitrary combinations in which we present things to our minds, we should equally fail in our object whether the
tions, in
the subsistence of which
things ordered themselves according to this caprice of ours
38
ON THE BEING OF
THINGS.
[Book
I.
or whether they did not.
In the form
case
not find the Being independent of ourselves which

in search of.
we should we were
would make
Being
it still
Xf thej atter wer e the true state of the case, it more plain that there must be something
involved in the Being of things which our definition of this

failed to include
the
on
they are qualified to exist

Being.
their
something in virtue of which own account, not changwithout supposing
ing with and because of our changeable conception of their
We
cannot be
satisfied therefore
which we assume the existence, exist between the things themselves, so as to be discoverable by bur thought but not created by or dependent on it. The however, we insist on this objective reality of relations, imore, the more unmistakeable we make the dependence of the
that the relations, of
Being of everything on the Being of everything

thing can have
'
else.
No
its
place
it
not there to receive

suffer,
among the other things, if these are among them. None can work or
before the others are there to exchange impressions
with
To put the matter generally ; in order to there it. being such a thing as an action of one thing upon another,
between which it^ must be established in independent reality. A Being in things, resting wholly on itself and in virtue of this independence rendering, the relations possible by which things are to be connected, must precede in thought every This is the pure Being, relation that is to be taken for real. It is" of which Philosophy has so often gone in quest. opposed by Philosophy, as being of the same significance for all things, to the empirical Being which, originating in the various relations that have come into play between things, is different for every second thing from what it is for the third, and which Philosophy hopes somehow to deduce
it
would seem
that the centred of relation
is
to take place
as a supervening result from the pure Being.

7. I propose to
show
that expectation directed to this
metaphysical use of the conception of pure Being is a^ delusion, and that the natural theor)^ of the world, in
Chap.
I.]
BEING INVOLVES RELATIONS.

is
39
which nothing
truth
ception, which
heard of
first
it,
is
on
this point nearer the
than this
notion of Speculation.
Ever}' con-
is
to admit of any profitable application,

clear
distinction between that which is which is not meant by it. So long as we looked for the Being pf things in the reality of relations in which the things stand to each other, we possessed in these relations something by the affirmation of which the Being of that which is, distinguishes itself from the non-Being of that which is not. The more we' remove from the conception of Being every thought of: a relation, in the affirmation of which it might consist, the
must allow of a meant by it and
that
"more~~completely the
appears.
possibility
of this
distinction
dis-
'
For not to be at any place, not to have any position in the complex of other things, not to undergo any operation from anything nor to display itself by the exercise of any activity upon anything ; to be thus void of relation is just that in which we should find the nonentity ofathing if it was our purpose to define it. It is not to the purpose to object that it was not this nonentity but Being that was meant by the definition. It is not doubted that the latter was the object of our definition, but the object
is
not attained, so long as the same definition includes the
opposite of that which
No
in
doubt an
effort will
we intended to include in it. be made to rebut this objection

/
its turn. It will be urged that if, starting from the comparison of the multiform Being of experience, wê omit all the relations on which its distinction rests, that which remains as pure Being is not the mere privation of relations but that of which this very unrelatedness serves only as
a predicate, and which, resting on itself

is
distinguished
positive trait
our usage
that which
strictly
is
and independent, by this hardly to be indicated but still from that which is not. Now it is true that not to employ these and like expressions of
not or of the nothing, but the usage
so long as
is
is
not
ji|stifiable
we apply
the expressions to
40
this
ON THE BEING OF
pure Being.
live
THINGS.
intelhgible
[Book
I.
They only have an
sense
because we already
tions,
in the thought of manifold rela-
and within the sphere of these the true Being has

is
opportunity of showing by a definite order of procedure

w^hat
the meaning of
its
independence and
self-sub-
sistence.
Once drop
this
implication,
and
all
the above
in the complete emptiness of meaning to which they thereupon sink, are unquestionably as applicable to Nothing as they are to Being, for in fact independence of everything else, self-subsistence and complete absence of relation are not less predicable of the one than
expressions,
of the other.
8.
still
We may
expect here the impatient rejoinder
'
There
is
remains the eternal difference that the unrelated Being while the unrelated non-Being is not ; all that comes of
previous admission.
is a contradiction of your For the meaning of Being, in
your super-subtle investigation
own
the sense of reality and in opposition to not-being, is as you say undefinable and only to be learnt by actual living. The cognition thus gained necessarily and rightfully pre-
supposes the conception of pure Being, as the positive element in the experienced Being. We have not therefore
the problem of distinguishing
longer before us.
Being from not-Being any That is settled for us in the experience .Our problem merely is within real Being by of life. negation of all relations to isolate the pure Being, which must be there to begin with in order to the possibility of entrance into any relations whatever. ^ In forming this conception of pure Being therefore, Thought is quite within its right, although for that which it looks upon as the positive import of the conception it can only offer a name, of which the intelligibility may be fairly reckoned on, not
a description.'
Now
macy
by way of reply to these objections
must remind
all
the reader that what I disputed was not at
the
legiti-^
of the formation of the idea in question but only the
Chap.
I.l
PURE BEING
of
IS
AN ABSTRACTION.
which
it
41
allQwability, of the metaphysical use
is
sought to
make
first
it.
The
point of this distinction I will endeavour
to illustrate
by examples.
Bodies move in space with
various velocities
and
in various directions.
No
doubt we
are justified as a matter of thought in fixing arbitrarily
and
one-sidedly
now on one common
element,
now on
another,
in these various instances,
and thus
in forming the con-
ception of direction without reference to velocity, that of

velocity apart
from direction, that of motion as the con-
ception of a change of place, which leaves direction and

velocity unnoticed. in the formation of
There is nothing whatever any of these abstractions.
illegitimate
Nor
is
it
incompatible with the nature of the abstractions that

stances of each of
as to yield
in-
them should be
so connected in thought
of them, however, immediately and by itself allows of an application to reality without being first restored to combination with the rest from which our Thought, in arbitrary exercise of its right
further knowledge.
None
(,
^ '^v*
of abstraction, had detached them. There will never be a velocity without direction; never a direction ab in the proper sense of the term without a velocity leading from
a to
that
b^
is
not from b to
a.
There
will
never be a motion
qualifications
a mere change of place, as yet without direction and
velocity
later on.
and waiting to assume these two That which we are here seeking
to
convey
is
1
essentially, if not altogether, the familiar truth that general^
Jdeasare not applicable to the

that
real wôrld in their generality,
\y
H/f;
but only become so applicable
when each
of their marks,
has been left undetermined, has been Hmited to a completely individual determinateness, or, to use an expression
partial
more
suited to the case before us,
when
to each
conception necessary to the complete definition there has been again supplied in case it expresses a relation,
the elernent to which the relation attaches.
9. We take the case to be just the same with the cojv ception of pure Being. It is an abstraction formed in
42
ON THE BEING OF
THINGS.
[Book
I.
a perfectly legitimate way, which aims at embracing the common element that is to be found in many cases of
Being and that distinguishes them from not-Being. We do not value this abstraction the less because the simplicity of what it contains is such that a verbal indication of this common element, as distinct from any systematic
construction of
to which
it,
is
all
that
it
is
possible.
Still,
like those
does not admit, as it stands, of application to anything real. Just as an abstract motion cannot take place, just as it never occurs but in the form
it,
we compared
oi velocity in a definite direction, so pure Being cannot in

reality
be an antecedent or substance of such a kind as

its
that empirical existence witTi
manifold determinations
it,
[should be in any sort a secondary emanation from

1;;
either
as
its
consequence or as
its
modification.
It
has no
it,
reality
except as latent in these particular cases of
in
each of these definite forms of existence. It is merely in the system of our conceptions that these supervene upon it There was a as subsequent and subordinate kinds.
correct feeling of this in what I call the natural theory
of the world.
bility
It
was quite aware of the
intellectual possiis
of detaching the affirmation that
the
same
in all
cases from the differences of the manifold relations which

are affirmed by
it
in the different cases of Being, just as
the uniform idea of quantity can be detached from the

different
But
it
rightly held to
numbers and spaces which are subordinate to it. the view that the pure Being thus
it
constituted has not reality as pure but only in the various
instances in which
is
a latent element; just as
is
the
case with quantity, which never occurs as pure Quantity
but only as this or that definite

10.
Quantum
of something.
The
length of this enquiry, which leads to a result
seemingly so simple, must be justified by the sequel. It may be useful, I think, to repeat the same thought once
âgain in another form.
There are other terms which have been applied to pure Being, in the desire to make that

Chap.
I.]
'
POSITION' IS
AN ABSTRACTION.
43
which admits of no explanatory analysis at least more intelby a variety of signs. Thus it is usual to speak of it as an unconditional and irrevocable Position ^ or Putting. It will be readily noticed that as so applied, each of these terms is used with an extension of meaning in which it
ligible
ceases to represent any complete thought.
They
alike tend
by which they are properly used ; and when that on which their proper meaning rests has again to be expressly denied the result is obscurity and confusion. We cannot speak of a putting or Position in the proper sense of the term without stating what it is that is put. And not only so, this must be put somewhere, in some -L place, in some situation which is the result of the putting and distinguishes the putting that has taken place from one that has not taken place. Any one who applied this term to pure Being would therefore very soon find himself pushed back again to_a statement_ofLj;elôns, in order to
to give a sensuous expression to the idea in question
recalling the import in
give to tBis 'Position' or pure Being the

to
its
meaning necessary
from the not-putting, the pure non-Being. The notion which it is commonly attempted to substitute for this that of an act of placing pure and simple, which leaves out of sight every relation constituted by the act remains an abstraction which expresses only the purpose of the/person thinking to think of Being and not of notBeing, while on the other hand it carefully obliterates the conditions under which this purpose can attain its end and not the precise opposite of this end. Nor would it be of any avail to be always reverting to the proposition that after all it is by this act of putting that there is constituted the very intelligible though not further analysable idea of an objectivity which can be ascribed only to that which is, not to nothing. For, apart from every other consideration, if
distinction
['Position oder Setzung,'

'
It
word 'Position' should be used, though meaning such as belongs to Position' and
seems unavoidable that the English it has of course no active

'
Setzung.']
44
ON THE BEING OF
in fact not merely
it
THINGS.
[Book
I.
we
performed the act of mere putting,
as such, but by
put a definite content, without however
adding what
procedure or what relations were to from this act of putting, the consequence would merely be that the thing put would be presented to our consciousness as an essence which signifies something and distinguishes itself from something else, but not as one that is in opposition to that which is not. Real
sort of result to the object
Being, as distinct from the mere truth of the thinkable, can never be arrived at by this bare act of putting, but only by the addition in thought of those relations, to be placed in which forms just the prerogative which reality
has over cogitability.
The
'
other general
'
Position
signification, which the expressions and putting have assumed, illustrates the same
'
'
cannot affirm simply something, we can only affirm a proposition^not a subject, but only a predicate as belonging to a subject. Now it is psychologically very intelligible that from every act of affirmation we should look for a result, which stands objectively and permanently before thought, while all negation implies the opposite expectation, that something will vanish which
state of the case.
We
previously thus stood before

fore that
it.
It is quite natural there-
we should
if it
is
fall
into the delusion of imagining that

will to affirm there lies a creative
in the purpose
force,
and good
which
directed to no definite predicate but
exercised in abstraction would create that universal
and
pure Being which underlies
all
determinate Being.
In fact
however the affirmation does not bring into Being the predicate which forms its object, and it could just as well, though for psychological reasons not so naturally, assert the The Being of things, not-Being of things as their Being. therefore, which is in question, cannot be found in the
affirmation of
them merely
as such but only in the affirma-
tion of their Being.
We
are thus brought back to the
necessity of
first
determining the sense of this Being in order

Chap.
I.]
ACTIVE TERMS FALLACIOUS.
45
to the presence of a possible object of the affirmation,

this determination
we
have, so far at least, found no
and means
of carrying out except by presupposition of relations, in the
which the Being of that which is consists in anti-f which is not. 11. There is a further reason for avoiding the expression which I have just been examining. Position and putting forth' are alike according to their verbal form terms for actions^. Now it may seem trifling, but I count it imporreality of
thesis to the not-Being of that
'
'
'
tant all the same, to exercise a precaution in the choice of
philosophical expressions
and not
to
employ words which
almost unavoidably carry with them an association which

has a disturbing influence on the treatment of the matter
expressed.
In the case before us the prejudicial
effects
apprehended have not remained in abeyance. It has not indeed been believed possible to achieve a putting forth which should create Being but there was always associated with the application of the word the notion that it has been by a corresponding act, from whomsoever proceeding, that this Being so unaccountably presented to us has originated and that we then penetrate to its true idea when we repeat
:
in thought this history of
its
origin.
We
shall find the
im-
portance of this error,

in looking for the
if
we
revert to the reproach brought

It is
against the natural theory of the world.
objected that
Being of every thing in its relations to other things, it leaves no unconditioned element of reality none that would not have others for its presupposition. If a can only exist in relation to b^ then, it is said, b must be
r, then perchance there were a last element z dependent not on any further elements but on the first ^, this, it w411 be urged, would only make still more apparent the untenability of a construction of reality which after all has to make the being of a itself the pre;
there beforehand
c
if
b exists only in relation to
must be
its
antecedent.
And
if
supposition of this Being.

^
But
this
whole embarrassment
[v.
note on p. 43.]
46
ON THE BEING OF
THINGS.
[Book
I.
/could only be incurred by one, whose problem it was jto make a world nor would he incur it, unless a limitation on is mode of operation interfered with the making of many things at the same time and compelled him to let an interval of time elapse in passing from the establishment of the one
;
element to that of the other

sists
for
undoubtedly,
if
Being con-
only in the reality of relations, a could not stand by
and therefore could not exist till the creating hand had completed the condition of its Being by the after-creation But what could justify us in importing into the notion of b.
itself
of this productive activity this habit of our

faculty,
own
thinking
which does, it is true, in presenting relations to itself pass from one point of relation to another? Why should we not rather assume that the things as well as the relations between them were made in a single act, so that none of them needed to wait, as it were hung in the air during a certain interval, for the supplementary fulfilment of the conditions of its reality? We will not attempt however further to depict a process, which cannot be held to be
among
the objects of possible investigation.
It is
not our
way the reality of things has been brought about, but only to show what it is that it must be thought of and recognised as being when once in some way that we cannot conceive it has come to be. We have
business to discover in what
not to
they
make a world but so to may correspond without

it
order our conceptions as that

contradiction to the state of
the given world as
stands.
Such a contradiction we may
be inclined
'
to think
is
involved in the thought of a creative
Position,' which could only put forth things that really ar under the condition of their being mutually related, yet on the other hand could only put them forth one after the But there is no contradiction in the recognition of other. a present world of reality, of which the collective elements
are as a matter of fact so conditioned by the tension pf
mutual relatedness that only in this can the meaning of their Being and its distinction from not-Being be recognised.
Chap. I]
CAN A THING CEASE TO BE
47
12. The foregoing remarks contain an objection to the metaphysical doctrine of Herbart, which requires some It need not be said that Herbart never further explanation.
entertained the unphilosophical notion that the irrevocable
which he found the true Being of things, was' He too looked on it as to be exercised. an As to how the fact came to be so a fact to be recognised. it was in his eyes the more certain that nothing could be said as, being unconditioned and unchangeable according to his understanding of those terms, it excluded every quesBut a certain ambition in regard to origin and source.
'
position,' in
activity
still
guity seems to
'
me
to lie in the usage of this expression of
an irrevocable position.' There are two demands which may no doubt be insisted In the first place, assuming that we are in undoubted on. possession of the true conception of Being, we should be
be on our guard in its application against attachwhich on more exact consideration would be found to contradict it. Nothing can then compel us on this assumption to revoke the affirmation or 'position,' as an act performed by ourselves, by which we recognised the presence in some particular case of that position,' not to be performed by us, in which true Being consists. If on the other hand instead of being in possession of the correct conception of Being, we are only just endeavouring to form it, intending at a later stage to look about for cases of its application, in that case we have so to construct it as to express completely what we meant, and necessarily meant, to convey by it. Nothing therefore ought to be able to compel us again to revoke the recognition that in the characteristics found by us there is apprehended the true nature of that position which we have not to make but to accept as the Being presented to us. Here are two sorts of requirement or necessity, but in neither case have we to do with anything except an obligation incumbent on our procedure in thinking. The proposition Being consists in so
to
bound
ing
it
to qualities
'
48
ON THE BEING OF
THINGS.
[Book
I.
this is a case of Being, ought so, and the proposition aHke to be so formed as that we shall not have to revoke either as premature or incorrect. But as to the nature of Being itself nothing whatever is settled by either requirement and it is not self-evident that the 'position' which constitutes Being and which is not one that waits to be performed by us, is in itself as irrevocable as our thoughts
and
about
this
it
should be.
The common view

fact,
of the world does
not as a matter of
at least at the beginning,
make
it
claim for Being.
The
fixedness of Being, which
amounts to this, that they serve as relatively persistent points on which phenomena fasten and ;from which occurrences issue. But according to this view if once reason had been found to say of a thing, It has been,' it would in spite of this revocation of its further persistence still be held that, so long as it has been, it has had full enjoyment of the genuine and true Being, beside which there is no other specifically different Being. The question whether such a view is right or wrong
ascribes to things, only
'
Herbart decided completely to him is only conceived with irrevocable correctness, if it is apprehended as itself a wholly irrevocable 'position.' This necessary requirement, however, with him involved the other the requireI
reserve
for
the present.
against
it.
True Being according
one thing to another, which could be held necessary to the Being of the Thing, should be excluded, and that what we call the true Being should be found only in the pure position,' void of relation, which we have not to exercise but to recognise, ô d oubt it is__ our duty to seek such a cognition of the real as will, not have again to be given up. But I cannot draw the deduction that the object of that cognition must itself be permanent, and therefore I cannot ascribe self-evident truth
that every relation of the
'
ment
to this conviction of Herbart's.

trine in regard to
tunity later
It is a Metaphysical dochave more frequent opporon of expressing agreement and hesitation, and
which
I shall
Chap.l.l
UNRELATED BEING : HERBART.

I
49
which
would now only subject to consideration with
reference to the one point, with which
we
are specially
occupied.
In order to
preserve
the
connexion of our
thoughts, I once again recall the point that the conception
of a pure, completely unrelated Being turned out to be
formed indeed, but perfectly inapplicable. We were able to accept it only as an expression or indication of that most general affirmation, w^hich is certainly present in But we every Being, and distinguishes it from not-Being. maintained that it is never merely by itself, but only as
correctly
having definite relations for

constitutes the
its
object, that this affirmation
Being of the real; that thus pure Being of an unrelated neither itself is, nor as naked Position content forms the reality of that content, nor is rightly entitled to the name of Being at all. 13. On the question how determinate or empirical Being
' '
<!_..
from pure Being, the earlier theories, which started from the independence of pure Being, pronounced in a merely figurative and incomplete manner. The wishedAccording to his doctrine for clearness we find in Herbart. Each pure Being does not he behind in a mythical past. individual thing enjoys it continuously, for each thing is in virtue of a position which is alien to all relations and
issues
*
'
needs them not.
It is just
the complete indifference of

alone, that
^ngs
for
to all relations,
and
it
makes
it
possible
them
to enter into various relations towards each other,
of which in consequence of this indifference none can in any way add to or detract from the Being of the things. From this commerce between them, which does not touch their essence, arises the chequered variety of the course
of the given world.

I
cannot persuade myself that this
is
an admissible way
is such a thing as an element a in the enjoyment of this unrelated * Position' of being unaffected by others and not reacting upon them, it does not indeed contradict the conception of
of presenting the case.
Granting that there really
Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
50
this
ON THE BEING OF
THINGS.
[Book
I.
Being that ideas of relation should afterwards be conit. But in reality it is impossible for that to For a enter into relations which was previously unrelated. could not enter into relations in general. At each moment
nected with
it
could only enter into the definite relation
towards the
definite
/*
element
b^
to the exclusion of every other relation
towards the same element. There must therefore be some reason in operation which in each individual case allows and brings about the realisation only of w, not that
of a chance
\x.
But since a
is
indifferent
its
towards every
nature either
relation, there
cannot be contained in
own
the reason for this definite m^ nor even the reason
why
it
should enter into a relation, that did not previously obtain, That which decided the point with b and not rather with c.
can therefore only be looked for in some earlier relation /, which however indifferent it might be to a and b^ in fact subsisted between them. If a and b had been persistently
confined each to
ing at
all
its
own pure
Being, without as yet belong-
to this empirical reality
and
its
thousandfold order
of relations, they would never have issued from their ontological seclusion
and been wrought
into the
web of
this
universe.
For
this entry
could only have taken place into
direction somewhither
some point of time, and in a and all this would imply a determinate place outside the world, which the things must have
some region
in space, at
;
left
Therefore, while thus in a determinate direction. seemingly put outside the world into the void of pure Being,
all rela-
the Things would have already stood, not outside

tions to the world, but only in other
and looser
relations
instead of in the closer ones, which are supposed to be

established later.
And just as it would be impossible for them to enter into relations if previously unrelated, so it would be impossible for them wholly to escape again from the web of relations in which they had once become
involved.
It
may indeed be urged
with
some
plausibility that, since
Chap.
I.]
THINGS 'ENTER INTO' RELATIONS?
51
we take the
relations of things to be manifold and variable, Being can attach to no single one of them, and therefore to none at all that therefore it cannot be Being which the
:
we suppose all its relations successively to But this argument would only be a repetition of the confusion between the constancy of a general idea and
Thing
loses, if
disappear.
the reality of
is
it
its
individual instances.
it
Colour, for instance,

is
not necessarily green or red, but

is
no colour
it
at all if
none of these
different kinds.
Were
conceivably
possible that all relations of a thing should disappear with-
out in their disappearance giving rise to

of which I reserve the consideration
new ones
we
a point
1
could not look
upon
a
this as the return of the thing into its

its
pure Being, but
'
'
"
only as
lapse into nonentity.
A transition, therefore, from

.
state of unrelatedness into relation, or vice versa^ is un-
intelligible to us.
All that
is
intelligible is
a transition from
(
S
(
form of relation to another. And an assumption which + one would find the true Being of Things in their being put forth
without relations, seems at the same time to
ception of these things unavailable for the
explanation of the universe, while
it
make
the con-
Metaphysical
was only to render such
explanation possible that the

-Things was
14.
supposition that there are
made
is
at
all.
There
'
yet one
way out of the
difficulty to
is
be conforeign
sidered.
In
itself,' it
may be
said,
'
pure Being
be, has
to all relations,
and no Thing, in order to whatever of relations. But just because

different to
any need
is
ever}^thing
in-
them, there
all
is
nothing to prevent the assumption

actually to enjoy
that the entry of

effect.
things into relations has long ago taken

left
its
it,
No
thing has been
pure
Being without these relations that are indifferent to

it is
and
in this shape of relatedness that the
sum
of things forms
the basis of the world's changeable course.' Or, to adopt what is surely a more correct statement It has not been at any particular time in the past that this entry into rela-
tions has taken place, which, as
we pointed
out, is unthink-
'v,XL
aX>
^V.VR
JÛ-^-A-H^
J^
52
able.
ON THE BEING OF
Every thing has stood
for
its
THINGS.
from
[Book
I.
in
relations
eternity.
None
has ever enjoyed the pure Being which would have

nature.'
been possible
In
this latter transformation,
however, the thought would essentially coincide with that
which we alleged
simply to
this, that
in
opposition to
it.
It
would amount
without any no such Being,
there might be a pure Being, in which
Things, isolated and
each resting on
be
;
itself, is
mutual
relation,
would yet
its
that there
however, but in
stead only that manifoldly determined
empirical Being, in each several form of which pure Being

is
latently present.
Between the view thus put and our

it to be adhered to. would for us be no would only purport to
own
first
there would no longer be any difference, except the

part of the statement, supposing
is
4
(
Being, which might be but
not,
it
Being at all. be that of a
The conception
of
possibility of thought, not the conception of
that reality of which alone Metaphysic professes to treat.
We
so
should certainly persist in denying that this pure Being

as could be elsewhere than in our thoughts.
much
We
take the notion of such Being to be merely an abstraction
which
the
in the process of thinking,
and
in
it
only, separates
real
common
affirmation
of whatever
is
particular forms of reality, as applied to
from the which alone the
affirmation
is itself
reality.
CHAPTER
Of
15.
II.
the Quality
of Things.
According
to the natural theory of the world, as
we
have so far followed it, the Being of Things is only to be found in the reality of certain relations between one and
another.
There are two directions therefore
in
which we
first
'i
are impelled to further enquiry.

place,
We may
ask in the
what
is
the peculiar nature of these relations, in the

is
affirmation of which Being
In that case its definition would assign a number of conditions, which whatever is to be a Thing must satisfy. We feel, secondly,
?
supposed to he
^^\
first in the conception of the Thing the subject which would be capable
with equal strength the need of trying to find

entering into the presupposed relations.
^f
The
order of
)
these questions does not

able,
seem
to
me
other than interchange\
nor
is it
indeed possible to keep the answers to them

It
entirely apart.
may be taken
as a pardonable liberty of
treatment
precedence to the second of the mutually impHed forms of the problem. It too admits of a double signification. For if we speak of the essence of Things, we
if
I give
this expression to convey sometimes that by which Things are distinguished and each is what it is, sometimes that in virtue of which they all are Things in opposition to ^hat which is not a Thing. These two questions again are
mean
'--
obviously very closely connected, and it might seem that the mention of the first was for lis superfluous. For it can-
not be the business of ontology to describe the peculiar
54
qualities

by which the manifold Things that
It
[Book
I.
exist are really

in-
distinguished from each other.

I
could only have to
dicate generally
what that
is
which it may be possible for But this function it seems to fulfil in investigating the common structure of that which constitutes a Thing as such for this necessarily includes the idea and nature of that by particularisation of which every individual Thing is able to be what it is and to draw hmits between itself and other Things. The sequel of our discussion may however justify our procedure in allowing ourselves to be driven to undertake an answer to this second question by a preliminary
attempt at answering the
first.
on the possible varieties of distinctions of Things to rest.
!16.
What
the occasions
may be which
is
psychologically
give rise in us to the idea of the Thing,
a question by which the objects of our present enquiry are wholly unaffected. The idea having once arisen, and it being impossible for us in our natural view of the world to get rid of it, all that concerns us is to know what we mean by it, and whether we have reason, taking it as it is, for retaining it or for giving it up. As we have seen, sensation is our only warrant for the certainty that something is. It no doubt at the same time warrants the certainty of our own Being as
well as that
of something
in
this
other than
preliminary
ourselves.
It
is
necessary, however,
forget
consideration to
as the
the reference to the feeling

first
subject, just
it
natural view of the world at
forgets
likewise
and
loses itself completely in the sensible qualities, of which the
revelation before our eyes
is
at the
supposed stage of that

It is
view accepted by
^l
it
as a self-evident fact.
only in
for
sensation
therefore
that
it
can look, whether

or,
the
I certainty of there being something,

^^qualities of that
^
\
beyond
this, for
the
which
is.
Yet from
its
very earliest stage
it
is
far
with that which

till
from taking these sensible quahties as identical it regards as the true Being in them. Not
is
it
'
a later stage of reflection
attempted to maintain
Chap.
II.]
THINGS HAVE QUALITIES?
55
that
what we take to be the perception of a thing is never more than a plurahty of contemporary sensations, held
together by nothing but the identity of the place at which
('
they are presented to us, and the unity of our consciousness which binds
them together
in
its
intuition.
The
Undoubtedly It takes a thing to be sweety red, and warm, but not to be Although it is in sweetness, redness, and warmth alone.
natural theory of the world never so judges.
these sensible quahties that
we
find all that
we
experience
of
its
essence,
still
this
essence does not admit of being
exhaustively analysed into them.

is
In order to convey what

such
'
in
our minds when we predicate
qualities of a
Thing, the t^rms which connote them must, in grammatical

language, be construed into objects of that
in a
transitive
is
sense,
is^ understood which according to the usage of
language
only intransitive.
The
other wâys of putting

in the midst of these
the same proposition, such as 'the thing tastes sweet,' or

*it
looks red,'
help to show
how
its
predicates, as their subject or their active point of departure,
the Thing
is
thought of and
unity not identified with

far
it
their multiplicity.
This idea, however
may be from
we
act
being wrought out into clear consciousness, in every case

lies at
the bottom of our practical procedure where
aggressively
upon the external

to fashion them,
wôrld,
seeking to get a hold

their resistance
on
I
things,
to
overcome
according to our purposes.
themselves to the reader
on the occasions^readily suggesting which confirm us in this conception, while at the same time they urgently demand a Such transformation of it which will make good its defects. are the change in the properties in which the nature of a determinate thing previously seemed to consist, and the observation that none belongs to the thing absolutely, but each only under conditions, with the removal of which it disappears. The more necessary the distinction in consequence becomes between the thing itself and its changeable
need not
d^vell
56

pressing
[Book
I.
modes of appearance, the more

tion,
becomes the quesin abstraction
what
its
it is
that constitutes the thing
itself,
do not propose to dwell on the more obvious answers to this question any more than on Such are the statements the occasions which suggest it. that the Thing itself is that which is permanent in the change of these properties, that it is the uniting bond of their multiplicity, the fixed point to which changing states All this is attach themselves and from which eifects issue. no doubt really involved in our ordinary conception of the Thing, but all this tells us merely how the true Thing All that these propositions do is to behaves, not what it is. formulate the functions obligatory on that which claims to be recognised as a Thing. They do not state what we want to know, viz. what the Thing must be in order to be able to
from
properties.
But
perform these required functions.

tion whether
I reserve
here the ques-
and how far we may perhaps in the sequel be compelled, by lack of success in our attempts, to content
ourselves with this statement of postulates.
ontological thinking
is
in the first instance to
The object of make the
discovery on which the possibility of fulfilling the ontological problem depends to discover the nature of that to which the required unity, permanence, and stabihty belong. 17. It is admitted that sensation is the single source from which we not only derive assurance of the reality of some Being, but which by the multiplicity of its distinguishable phenomena, homogeneous and heterogeneous, first suggests and gives clearness to the idea of a particular essence ^ which distinguishes itself from some other particular essence.
It is quite inevitable therefore that
we should attempt
is
to think
of the required essence
'^
of things after the analogy of this
sensible material, so far at any rate as
compatible with the
simultaneous problem of avoiding everything which would

disqualify sensations for adequately expressing this essence ^
^
['
Die Vorstellving eines Was, das von einem andem

*
Was
sich
unterscheidet.']
['Was.']
'
['Wesen.']
Chap.
II.]
THINGS ARE QUALITIES?

made
57
This attempt has been resolutely

of Herbart.
in the ontology
on the mere unity, stability, and permanence of Things, was a common-place with every It was then left philosophy which spoke of Things at all. to the imagination to add in thought some content to which Herbart these formal characteristics might be applicable. defines the content. A perfectly simple and positive quality, he holds, is the essence of every single thing, i. e. of every single one among those^real essences, to the com-
To
insist
binations of which in endless variety
we
are compelled
5y
a chain of thought, of which the reader can easily supply

the missing links, to reduce the seemingly independent
Now if Herbart allows Things remain completely unknown to us; that nothing comes to our knowledge but appearances flowing from them as a remote consequence, then any advantage that might otherwise be derived from his view would disappear unless we ventured to look for it in this, that his unknown by being brought under the
*
Things
'
of ordinary perception.
that these simple qualities of
conception and general character of quality would at least

obtain an ontological qualification, by which
distinguished from a
it
\
'
would be
mere
postulate, as
being a concrete
fulfilment of such postulate.

If
however we
its
try to interpret to ourselves
what
is
gained
that
by
this
subordination,
we must
is
certainly
confess
Quality in
sensations,
proper sense
in
presented to us exclusively in
no other instances. Everything else way of speaking we so call consists in determinate relations, which we gather up, it is true, in adjectival expressions and treat as properties of their
which
in a looser
and
which the proper sense can only be apprehended by a discursive comparison of manifold related elements, not in an intuition. There would be nothing in
subjects, but of
this,
however, to prevent us from generalising the concep-
tion of Quality in the

view,
manner
to aim.
at which, to
meet Herbart's
offer us
we should have
Our own senses
58
[Book
I.
impressions which do not admit of comparison.
we
see
is
completely heterogeneous to the sound
The colour we hear
or the flavour
we
taste.
X^-^-?^^
^^^
^^' then,
the sensations
of the eye form a world of their own, into which those of
the ear have no entry, so
we
are prepared to hold of the

it is
whole
series of
our senses that
not a finished one, and
to ascribe to other spirits sensations
unknown
to us, but of which, notwithstanding,
which remain eternally we imagine

exhibit
that to those
who
are capable of
them they would
themselves with the same character of being vividly and

definitely
pictured,
with which to us the sensations of

the case of the simplest ideas by
to represent the characteristic
colour, for instance, appear as revelations of themselves.

It is
always
difficult in
the help of words about

trait,
them
scarcely expressible but
by the ideas themselves,

strongly
felt
if I
in
virtue of
which they
Still I trust
satisfy certain
needs of
find
thought.
to be sufficiently intelligible
in the character, just mentioned, of being presentable as a
mental picture or image immediately without the help of a

discursive process, the reason of our preference for appre-
hending the essence of a thing under the form of a simple

quality.
Just as the colour red stands before our consciousso to speak,

to exhibit
itself as
ness,
caring,
nothing but
itself,
pointing to nothing beyond
the condition of
its
being understood, not constituting a demand that something should exist which has still to be found out, but a
complete fulfilment
reveal
its
so
it is
thought that the super-sensible
Quality of the Thing,
simple and self-contained,

still
would
essence, not as something
to be sought for
further back, but as finally found
when
further reflection might
our faith in the possibility

intuitive
and present. And even be supposed to have shaken of satisfying this craving for an
knowledge and limited us to laying down mere forms of thinking which determine what the essence of
things
for the
is
not ; even then we constantly revert to this longing immediate presentability of this essence, which after
Chap.
II.]
A QUALITY NEED NOT BE GENERAL.

satisfied with the likeness of the
59
all
can only be
feel its
quaesitum
to a sensible quality.
We may
have to forego intuition
but we
absence as an abiding imperfection of our
knowledge.
18. That the abandoned is not
demand
in dispute.
in
question
must
really
Whatever
be said
eternal simple
be and
it
super-sensible Quality
we may choose
it
to think of as the
essence of the Thing,
will
that, as
a Quality,
it
always remains in need of a subject, to which

long.
may
be-
It may form a How, but not the What of the Thing. be something which the Thing has, not which it is. This objection, familiar as it is to us all, with the new relation which it asserts between Subject and Quality, rests meanwhile on two grounds of which the first does not suffice
It will
to render impossible the previously
assumed
identity of the
its
Thing with
its
simple quality.
verbal expression, the Qualities

as generalities, which await
tions, in the
In our thought and in

red, sweet,
warm
appear
and of
many more
precise determina-
way of shade, of
intensity, of extension,
form, from something which belongs to the nature of the

individual case in which they are sensible,
the qualities themselves.
and thus not to them to ourselves in an adjectival form, as not themselves amounting to reality but as capable of being employed by the real, which
We
thus present
lies
outside them, through special adjustment to clothe

;
its
essence
thing
as a store of predicable materials,
from which each
peculiar nature.
to
may choose those suitable to the expression of its JThen of course the question is renewed as the actual essence which with this nature of its own lies
behind this surface of Quality. But we must be on our guard against repeating in this connexion a question which in another form we have
already disclaimed.
able to find out
We^âve up all pretension of being how things are made and we confessed
position,' by which the real from the thinkable, may indeed
'
that the peculiar affirmation or

is
eternally distinguishable
6o
OF THE QUALITY OF THINGS,
[Book
I.
be indicated by us
this
but that we cannot follow

is
its
construc-
tion as a process that
But it is precisely objection that may now be brought up against us, that
taking place.
we
are illegitimately attempting to construe that idea of the
Thing, which must comprehend the simple supra-sensible

Quality along with
its reality,
into the history of a process
by which the two constituent ideas which make up the idea of the Thing or rather the objects of these ideas have come to coincide. For if we maintain the above objection in its full force [the objection founded on the distinction between the Quality of the Thing and the Thing itself] and refuse to keep reverting to the supposition that some still more subtle quality constitutes the Thing itself, while a quality of the kind just objected to merely serves as a predicate of the Thing, the result will be that we shall have on the one side a Quality still only generally conceived, unlimited, and unformed, as it presents itself merely in thought and therefore still unreal; on the other side a 'position' which is still without any content, a reality which is as yet no one's reality. It would be a hopeless such a quality enterprise to try to show how these two and such a position combine, not in our thought to produce an idea of the Thing, but in reahty to produce the Thing itself. This however was not what was meant by the view, which sought to identify the essence of the Thing with its simple supra-sensible Quality. It was emphatically not in the form of a still undetermined generality not as the redness or sweetness which we think of, but obviously only in that complete determination, in which red or sweet can be the it was only in this object of an actually present sensation form that the Quality, united with the position spoken of, was thought of as identical with the essential Being (the rl eari) of Things. It was not supposed that there had ever been a process by which the realities signified by these two constituent ideas had come to be united, or by which the
'
'
'
'
1'
Chap.
II.]
CAN SIMPLE QUALITIES CHANGE?
essential
complete determinateness of the Quality as forming the Being of the Thing, had been elaborated as
It is true, that in
a secondary modification out of the previous indeterminateness of a general Quality.
our usage of
*
terms there unavoidably attaches to the word

a notion of dependence, of a subject beyond
*
Quality
its
requiring the support of
it
and
in
it
is
this notion
which occasions
Quality' to be treated as synonymous with the
German
its
'
Eigenschaft\'
issues
But
truth
this
impression of
de-
pendence
from the general abstraction of Quality, which we form in thought, and is improperly transferred to those completely determined qualities, which form the content of real feelings and constitute the occaonly
sions of these abstractions.
19. But, true as this defence of the view referred to

be,
may
Undoubtedly, if a quality in the complete determinateness which we supposed, simple and unblended with anything else, formed an unchangeable object of our perception, we should have no reason to look for anything else behind it, for a subject to which it attached. But if we just now took this in the saise that this quality might in that case pass directly for the Thing itself, we must now subjoin the counter-remark that in that case, if nothing else were given, we should have no occasion at all to form the conception of a Thing and to identify that quality with it. For the impulse to form the conception and the jecond of the reasons which forbid the identificastill
it.
we
gain nothing by
//
tion of the simple quality with the Thing,
change.
The
fact
that
those
qualities
He in the given which form the
immediate objects of our perception, neither persist without change nor change without a principle of change, but
always in their transition follow
persistent subject of this
'
~^
/
)
.,
some law of
consecutive-
ness, has led to the attempt to think of the
Thing as the
\
i
change and of the felt qualities merely as predicates of which one gives place to the other,
'
[lit.
'Property.']
'
62

this
[Book
I-
Whether
tirely
attempt
is
justified
at all
whether
an en-
different
interpretation
of the facts
of experience
it is a question which we For the present our business is only to consider in what more definite form this assumption of Things, in case it is to be retained, must be presented to
ought not to be substituted for

reserve as premature.
thought,
if it is
to render that service to our cognition for

it is
the sake of which
made
if,
i.e., it is
to
make
the fact
of change thinkable without contradiction.
And
in regard to this point I
can only maintain that

find
speculative
philosophy,
while trying to
a unity of
nature
essence under change, was wrong in believing that this

unity was to be found in a simpHcity, which in
its
is
incapable of being a unity or of forming the persistent
essence of the changeable.
Change of a thing
,
is
only to
be found where an essence

state
which previously was in the

itself
a\ remains identical with

(?.
while passing into
the state
In
this
side the difficulties
connexion I still leave quite on one which he in the conception, apparently
For the present it may suffice to remark that we are obliged by the notion we attach to the term 'state' to say not that the essence is identically like^
so simple, of a state.
itself,
but only that
it is
identical with
itself,
in
its
various
For no one will deny that , if it finds itself in the state a\ cannot be taken to be exactly like a-, without again cancelling the difference of the states, which has been assumed. All that we gain by the distinction, however, is, For the question still remains to begin with, two words. In what sense can that at different moments remain identical with itself, which yet in one of these moments is not idenstates.
:
^ [* Gleichheit,' used here, and in 59 and 268, with a strict insistence on all that is involved in its meaning of equality ; viz. on the qualitative likeness, without which comparison by measurement is Thus in the places referred to the terms which are * gleich impossible. are a and a, and neither 'equal' nor 'like' translates 'gleich' ade-
'Identity' was used in Logic, 335 ff., quately; it includes both. but will not do here, because of the contrast with the continued identity, Identitiit,' imputed to a thing.']
'
Chap.
II.]
THE SIMPLE CANNOT CHANGE.

like itself as
63
scarcely
tically
it_was in the other
It is
necessary to remark
how
;
entirely unprofitable the answers
are which in the ordinary course of thought are
given to this question

the same with
itself,
such
as,
only the
commonly The essence always remains phenomenon changes the

;
\^^
matter remains the same, the form alters

perties persist, but
essential pro-
many
unessential ones
its
come and go;

All
to
the Thing itself abides, only
states are variable.
these expressions presuppose what
know. We have here pairs of related points, of which one term corresponds in each case to the Thing , the other is one of its states a\ a. How can the first member a of these pairs be identical with itself, if the several second members are not
we want
identical with each other,
and
if,
notwithstanding, the rela-
tion
between the two members of each pair is to be maintained, in the sense that the second member, which is the Form, the Phenomenon, the State, is to be Form, Phe-
nomenon, or State of the first member ? So long as we are deahng with the compounded
things of
is
visible
common
perception, the pressure of this difficulty
but
slight.
In such cases we look upon a connected
plurality of Predicates pqr^ as the essence of a thing.
This
in-
coherent stock
ternal
may
not only assume and again cast off
variable additions, s
and
of
/,
but
it
may
in itself in
by the
transposition
its
components
qrp, rpq, prq^
experience something which

in opposition to the
we might
call its
own
alteration
mere variation of those external relations. Or finally it may be the form of combination that remains the same, while the elements themselves,/ q and r,
vary within certain hmits.
still
.In these cases the imagination

its
finds the
two sides of
object before
it,
and can
ascribe to one of
ence'^.
them the
identity ^ to the other the differ-
that
What justifies it in understanding the fluctuations of which does not remain exactly hke itself as a series of states of the Identical, is a question which is left to take
^
['Identitat.']
=*
['
Ungleichheit.']
64
care of
OF THE QUALITY OF THINGS,

itself.
[Book
I.
The
difficulty
involved in
it
comes
plainly
into view to those

'
if
we
pass from the apparent things of perception

in truth regard as indepejident
which we might
elements in the order of the Universe, and we think of each

of these as determined by a simple quality,
if it alters at all, alters
a.
The
simple,
from a to b^ there remains nothing over to which the essence would withdraw, as to the kernel that remains the same in
altogether,
in the transition
and
the process of change.

essences
Only a succession,
abc^
of different
be left, and jwith this disappearance of all conbetween the different appearances there would disappear the only reason which led us to regard them as resting on subject Things. 20. This inference cannot be invalidated by an objection which readily suggests itself and which I have here other
tinuity
would
one
passing away, the other coming into being
reasons for noticing.
It is to
if
the instance of sensations that
we must
constantly revert,
what supra-sensible combine them with sensations under the common idea of Quality. Let us then take a simple Red colour, , in which we find no mixture with other colours, still less a combination of other colours, as representing the manner in which the simple quality, a^ of an essence would appear to us, if it were perceivable by the senses. It will then be argued as followl: If this Red passes into an equally simple Yellow, there still undoubtedly remains a common element, which we feel in both colours, though it is inseparable from a and
^,
we would explain to ourselves Qualities really mean to us when we
the universal
of colour.
Neither the redness in the

it
red, nor that
which makes the yellow what

in
is,
has any
existence either in fact or in thought apart from the lu-
minous appearance
nor has
this
which the nature of colour

its
consists,
appearance any existence of
own
other than
its
in the redness or yellowness.
On
the contrary
whole
nature shows
itself
now
in
one colour, now
in the other.
Jn
the same way the essence of the thing will
now be
the per-
Chap.
II.]
SIMPLE SENSATIONS.
now the
equally simple
b^
65
fectly simple a^
irig
without this imply-
a disappearance of the
common
C, the presence of w^hich
a and b merely as its varying states or would be idle to meet this argument by saying that the common element C of colour is only a product of our intellectual process of comparison ; nay, not
entitles us to regard
predicates.
It
even such a product, but merely the name for the demand, simply unrealisable, which we make upon our intellect to
possess
itself
of this
common
element presumed to be
present in red and yellow, in detachment from both colours.
For the
felt in
fact, it
should not
may be replied, wôuld still remain that we make this impracticable demand, if it were not
and yellow, There look for though we do not
'
the perception of red
is
someit
thing there, which wê
find
as
anything perceivable or separate, this
common
C, for which
we have made
the
name
colour.'
Now
since
we
readily forego the pretension of appre-
and confine ourselves under which we have
hending the essence of things in the way of actual intuition, to enquiring for the form of thought
to conceive
its
unknown
nature,
we
might certainly continue to look upon the comparison just stated as conveying the true image of the matter in hand, i. e. the image of that relation, in which the simple essence stands to its changeable states. We might at the same time regard
this
analogy of our sensations as a proof of the fact that
the
demand which we make upon
the nature of things for

not, as such, trans-
an identity within the difference does

the case might be put thus
persistent C,
gress the limits of the actually possible.

:
In more detail
the look of that
What may be
itself in
it
which maintains
little
the change of the

is
simple qualities of the Thing, of this
true
it
knowledge, and we as
the transition from
expect to
C,
know
as
we have no we insist
itself in
fact,
on seeing the general colour
which maintains
Red
to Yellow.
The mere
is
how-
ever, that in order to render this transition possible the
continuous existence of this universal

Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
not merely de-
66

without evidence by our thought, but
[Book
I.
manded
ately testified to
by sensation as
plainly present
is immedithough not
separable from particular sensible objects
this
proves to
us that the continuance of a
element in a series of different and absolutely simple members is at any rate something possible, and not a combination of words to
real instance could correspond.
will, I
common
which no
21.
The above
hope, have
made
plain the
meaning
it
of this rejoinder.
is
should wish ultimately to show that
inapplicable, but before I attempt this, I

it
may be
allowed
to avail myself of
for the
purpose of more exactly defining
certain points so as to save the necessity of enlarged ex-
When in our comparison we chose from the simple quality red to another equally simple, to point to yellow as this second quality seemed a selection which might be made without hesitation. But sour or sweet might equally have presented themselves. It was only the former transition, however, (from red to yellow) which left something actually in common between the different members; while the second on the contrar}' (from red to sweet) would have left no other community than that which belongs to our subjective feehng as directed Our selection therefore was natural, to those members. for we knew what the point was at which we wished to arrive and allowed ourselves to be directed by this reference. The fact however that the other order of procedure is one which we can equally present to ourselves reminds us that
planations further on.
to pass
the transition from one simple quality to another
is
not in
every case possible without loss of the

C.
common
be
to
element
at
But
this
is
no
its
valid objection.
It will
it
once
replied
that
in
speaking of change
has always been

certain
understood
definite
that
course was thus limited
one who takes the essence of a thing to admit of change can think of it as changeable without measure and without principle. To do so would be again to abolish the very reason that compelled us to
directions.
No
Chap.
II.]
THE ESSENCE MUST CHANGE,

the
67
to
assign
succession
of varying
phenomena
a real
^
subject in the
Thing
for that reason lay
merely in the
/'t~
consecutiveness with which definite transitions take place

while others remain excluded.
The
only sense therefore^
that has ever attached to the conception of change, the
only sense in which

consideration,
is
it
will
that in
be the object of our further which it indicates transformations
ormoyements of a thing within a limited sphere of qualities. Beyond this will be another equally limited sphere of
qualities,
^Ûf
'
forming the range within which another essence

it
undergoes change, but
is
understood that in change the
thing never passes over from one sphere into the other..
As regards the more

illustration.
precise definition of these spheres,
v/
our comparison with colours can only serve as a figure or
As colour
shifts
to
and
fro
from one of
its
V^
hues to another, without ever approximating to sounds or passing into them, it serves well as a sensible image of that
limitation of range
which we have in view.
But
this
does
a^.
.
not settle the question whether the various forms a^ a^
.,
mto which the essence a might change now and again, are kinds of a common C only in the same sense in which the
colours are so, or whether they are really connected with
each other in some different form, which logical subordination under the same generic idea does not adequately
symbolise.
22. It
this
is
time, however, to
show the
unsatisfactoriness of
attempt to justify a belief in the capacity for change on
the part of a Thing, of which the essence was confined to
a perfectly simple Quality. If our imagination ranges through the multiplicity of sensible qualities, it finds certain groups of these within
which it succeeds in arresting element C, while beyond them it fails to do so. This was the point of departure of our previous argument. Passing from this consideration of an intellectual process
common
to consideration of the Thing,
we
said
'^
the essence of
a thing changes, the limitation within

F 2
itself
of such a sphere
68

it
[Book
I.
of States affords
the possibility of completing

its
its
change
C.
within the sphere without loss of
abiding nature
all
Only
if it
passed beyond these limits would
continuity
disappear and a
new essence
is
take
its
place.'
Very well;
'if's'
but what correspondence
there between these two

if
which we allowed to follow each other as

intellect.
completely
homogeneous? The former refers to a movement of our Meanwhile the object presented to the intellect The general colour, stands before it completely unmoved.
of which
we
think,
is
not sometimes Red, sometimes Yellow,
but
is
always simultaneously present in each of these colours
and
in each of the other hues,
which we
class together as
equally external primary species of colour.
however, the supposed
C cannot
In the Thing, be made so simply to stand
towards the manifold a} a^ a^ in the relation of a universal
kind to
still,
their nature a} a^ a^
Even were it the case that in respect of admit of being regarded as species of C, if the thing changes, they are not contained in it, as
its
species.
in a universal C, with the eternal simultaneity of species
one along with the other. They succeed each and the essence /?, if it is a^, for that reason excludes from itself a^ and a^. Thus it is just this that remains to be asked, how that second if can be understood how we are to conceive the state of the case by which it comes about that the thing moves moves, if you like, within a circumscribed sphere of qualities a}-aâ^...^ but still within it does move, and so passes from one to the other
that exist
other,
;
of the qualities as that, being in the one, it excludes the others ; how it is that it so moves while yet these qualities
are the species of a universal C, eternally simultaneous
and And, be it observed, we are at present not enquiring for a cause which produces this motion, but only how the essence a is to be thought of, This question we cannot in case the motion takes place. answer without coming to the conclusion that the change is
only differing as parts of a system.
not reconcilable with the assumption of a simple quality,
Chap.
II.]
SIMPLE ESSENCES IN RELATION
69
constituting this essence.
At the moment when a has the

j I
form a^ and in consequence excludes the forms o^ and a^, it cannot without reservation be identified with a C, which It would have to be C^ includes a^ a^ a^ equally in itself.
in order to
C^ in order to be a^, and the same course we wished to combine with a persistent simple quality would find its way backwards into this quality be
a^,
of changes which
itself.
23. I could not avoid the appearance of idle subtlety

I
it
if
pursued
is
this
course of thought without having shown that

us.
forced
upon
Why,
it
will
be asked, do we trouble
\y
ourselves, out of obstinate partiality for the
common
view,
Thing in which it may do we not follow the enlightened view of men of science which finds no difficulty in explaining the multiplicity of phenomena by the help of changeable relations between unchangeable elements? There is the more reason for the question
to give a shape to the idea of the
include the capacity of change?
Why
since this supposition not only forms the basis of the actual
procedure of natural science but

physical enquirer.
is precisely that for which Herbart has enforced respect on the part of every meta-
Let us pursue
as
it
philosopher has given to

a
then in the definite form which this According to him, not only it.
u^
matter
change in
which undergo no the course of nature, underlie phenomena, but

of
fact
do
elements,
according to their idea the real essences, the true things
which we have to substitute for the apparent things of perception, are unchangeably identical with themselves, each resting on itself, standing in need of no relation to each other in order to their Being, but for that reason the more capable of entering into every kind of relation to each other. Of their simple qualities we have no knowledge,
but undoubtedly
different
we
are
entitled
to
think
of
them
as
from each other and even as opposed in various degrees without being obliged in consequence to transfer
70
[Book
I.
any such predicates, supposing them to be found by our

comparison, to the quahties themselves as belonging to
their essence;
if, that is, some of the qualities were by others, and some were presupposed by of others. This admission made, let us
as
actively negated
and because
suppose
relation
M
is
that
to each other
being together.
that
two essences, A and B^ come into that which Herbart describes as their I postpone my remarks about the proper
All that
sense of this 'together.'

it
we now know
of
it
is
the condition under which what Herbart con-
be the indifference of essences towards each Supposing them then to be together^ it might happen that A and without detriment to their simplicity might yet be representable by the compound equivalent expressions a + 7 and i3 7. In that case the continuance of this state of being 'together' would require the simultaneous subsistence of +y and y; i.e. the continuance of two opposites, which if we put them together in thought, seem necessarily to cancel each other. But they cannot really do sa_ Neither are the simple "''^ ffj<> kC^ essences A and according to their nature accessible to a_change7nor are the opposite elements which our Thought, ^^ in its comparing process, might distinguish in them, actually separable from the rest, in combination with which they belong to two absolutely simple and indivisible Qualities. But, if this be so, nothing happens at all and everything remains as it is This is the explanation which Herbart expects to hear, but he adds that we only use such language because we are in full sail for the abyss which should have been avoided. I must however repeat it. What has taken place has been this. We, the thinkers, have imagined that from the contact of opposites there arose some danger for the continuance of the real essences. We have then residers
to
other ceases.
'
'
minded
danger.
ourselves that their nature
is
inaccessible to this
Thus
it
has been
we who have maintained

its
the
conception of the real essence in
integrity against the
Chap.
II.]
SELF-MAINTENANCE.
which would have invaded
its
it
falsification
in every attempt
to~a'ccount
object
capable
essence
of being affected by any
disturbance from without.

thought,
but in
the
This has taken place in our itself nothing has in fact
happened.
The name
of self-maintenance, which Herbart
îves to this behaviour on tEe~part of the Things, can at
the comwhich in its nature Isjnaccessible to every disturbance that might threaten it. An activity issuing from the essences, a function exercisers by them, it indicates as little as a real event which might
this stage of his theory as yet
mean nothing but
pletely undisturbed continuance of that
occur to them.
And
just for this reason the multiplicity of

it
kinds and modes, in which Herbart would have

self-maintenance takes
effect,
that this
for
it.
cannot really
is
exist
The undisturbed continuance
alwâys
the same,
and
except the variation of the external relations, through which

the so-called 'being together' of the essences
is
brought
about and again annulled, nothing new whatever in consequence of this being together happens in the universe.
'
'
24. Quite different from this sense of self-maintenance,
which Herbart himself expressly allows in the Metaphysic, is that other sense in which he applies the same conception in the Psychology. Only the investigator of Nature could
have
satisfied
himself withTtTie conclusion just referred
to.
For him the only concern is to ascertain the external processes, on which for us the change in the qualitatively
different properties of things as a matter of fact
It
is
depends.
no part of
is
his
task to enquire in what

to take place, bring
us.
it
way these
about that
If
it
processes, supposing
them
there
such a thing as an appearance to

all
is
the
belief of the students of Natural Science that the theory,
which regards
for its
those processes as mere changes in the

in the sequel I shall
relations of elements themselves unchangeable, is
adequate have to deny that according to this way of presenting the case any but an incomplete view even of the course of external nature is
purpose
though

72
possible
[Book
I.
yet
for the present I
am
ready to allow that there
may be
to
apparent success upon this method in the attempt

all
eHminate
changes on the part of the real
itself
from
the course of the outer world.

.
But
this
only renders the admission of change a yet

if
J
\
more
inevitable necessity,
we bear
in
mind
that the entire
order of the universe which forms the object of Metaphysical
enquiry includes the origin of the
phenomenon
its
in us
no
less
than the external processes which are
de facto conditions.
Thus, if the physical investigator explains the qualitative change of things as mere appearance, the metaphysician has Herbart is to consider how an appearance is possible. and I do not for the present trouble myself quite right with the reproaches which might be brought against this point of his doctrine in assuming the simple real essence of the soul as the indispensable subject, for which alone an (appearance can arise. Whereas in regard to no other real essence do we know in what its self-maintenance consists,
this,
according to him,
idea,
is
clear in regard to the soul.
Each
of
its
primary acts of self-maintenance, he holds, has the

i.
form of an
e.
of a simple sensation.
Between these
aboriginal processes there take place a multitude of actions
and reactions, from which is supposed to result, in a manner which we need not here pursue in detail, the varied whole of the inner life. These acts of self-maintenance on the part of the soul, however consisting at one time in a sensation, at another in the hearing of a sound; now in the perception of a flavour, now in that of warmth are manifestly no longer simple continuations of the imperturbable essence of the soul. Taking a direction in kind and form according to the kind and form of the threatening
disturbance,
they are functions,
activities,
or reaction^
of
.the soul, which are not possible to an unchangeable but
only to a changeable Being.
For
lie
it
is
not in a merely
threatened disturbance but only in one which has actually
taken effect that the ground can
of the definite reaction,
Chap.
II.]
THE SOUL MUST CHANGE,

at every
73
which ensues
possible for
it.
moment
to the exclusion of
many
others that, as far as the nature of the soul goes, are equally
In order to be able to meet the threatened

a,
disturbance a by an act of self-maintenance disturbance b by another act

or
^,
the other
the soul must take
some
b^
note of the fact that at the given

/5
moment
it is
a and not
and not , that demands the exercise of its activity. It must therefore itself suffer in both cases, and differently in one case from the other. This change on its own part say change, for it would be useless to seek to deny that
various kinds of suffering are inconceivable without various
kinds of change on the part of the subject suffering
cannot
be replaced by the mere change in the relations between the soul unchanged in itself, and other elements. Any such relation would only be a fact for a second observer, which might awaken in him the appearance of a change taking place in the observed soul, which in reality does not take place but even for this observer the appearance could only arise, if he on his own part at least actually possessed that
:
change which be a mere appearance.

capability of
It
is
in the observed soul
he holds to
therefore
to
quite impossible
entirely to banish the

real
inner
liability
change on the part of the

If
it
from an
explanation of the course of the universe.

to exclude
were feasible
it from a theory of the outer world, it would belong the more inevitably to the essence of that real Being, for which this outer world is an object of perception. Butj^^^
once admitted
in this position,
it
impossibility for the real elements,
cannot be a self-evident which we regard as the

it is
vehicles of natural operations.

a_ necessity
That, on the contrary,

shall try to
even
for these,
we
show
later on.
\
Our consideration of the question, however, so far rests on a certain supposition ; on the necessity, in order to render
the fact of appearance intelligible, of conceiving a simple S real subject, the soul. There is no need for me here to C
justify
this
asFumption against the objections which are
74
[Book
I.
specially directed against
so
far,
to decide
it. It is no object of our enquiry, whether the conception of Things is tenable
at all;
whether
it
does not require to be superseded by

I repeat
;
another conception.
to
it is
only in case Things are
make the world inwhat way they must be thought of. And to that question we have given the answer that Essence, Thing or Substance, can only be that which admits of Change. Only the predicates of Things are unchangeable. They vary indeed in their applicability to Things, but each of them remains eternally the same with itself. It is only the Things that change, as they admit of and reject now one predicate, now another. This thought indeed is not new. It has already been expressly stated by Aristotle. For us, however, it necessarily raises at once
be taken to
exist
and
to serve to
in
telligible, that
we then enquire
questions that are new.
CHAPTER
Of
25.
III.
'
the
Real mtd RealityK

7
?
fi^
changes which we see going on, and the consecutiveness which we believe to be discoverable in them,
The
compelled us to assume the existence of Things, as the

sustainers or causes of this continuity.
if
The
next step was,
ascend from that which needs explanation to the unconditioned, in regard to which only recognition is
possible, to
possible.
For
this
as unchangeably the
purpose we tried to think of the Thing same with itself, and, impressed with
it
the need of assimilating the idea of

to what
actually
is
as
much
as possible
contained in sensation, since sensation alone

us an
it,
gives
independent
its
something
instead
of
merely requiring
quality.
we took
nature to consist in a simple
We
changeable and simple quality

ject of
convinced ourselves, however, that an unis not thinkable as a sub-
changeable states or appearances, and thus we are compelled to give up the claim to any such immediate cognition as might reveal the essence of Things to us in a simple perception. I do not mean to imply by this that we should have hoped really to attain this perception. But we indulged the thought that, for such a spirit as might be
capable of
it, there would be nothing in the essence of Things incompatible with their being thus apprehended. This conviction in its turn we have now to abandon. In its very nature that which is to be a Thing in the sense of
^ ['
Von dem Realen und
der Realitat.']
76
OF THE REAL AND REALITY.
[Book
I.
being a subject of change would repel the possibility of

being presented as an unmoving object of any intuition.
therefore to be sought for that which is be accounted the essence of any Thing and in order to find it we again take our departure from that natural theory of the world which without doubt has tried answers
to
;
new form has
of
its
own
to all these questions that are constantly re-
asserting themselves with fresh insistence.
26. In regard to the common objects of perception we answer the question, What are they ? in two ways, of which \^ one soon reduces itself to the other. Products of art, which exhibit a purpose on the part of a maker, we denote by reference to the end for which they are intended, setting aside the variety of forms in which they fulfil that end.
The changeable
products of nature,
is
in
the structure of
which a governing purpose
we characterise according to mena into which they develope
more or less obscure to us, the kind and order of phenoof themselves or which
could be elicited from them by external conditions.
In
both cases by the essence of the thing that we are in quest of we understand the properties and modes of procedure, by which the Thing is distinguished from other things.
The
other series of answers, on the contrary, exhibits as
this essence the material out of
which the things are made,
overlooking the various kinds of behaviour and existence

to which in the case of each thing the particular formation
of this material gives
rise.
Yet
after all this
second
mode
of answering the question ultimately passes over into the
former^
It
satisfies
only so long as
to
it
consists in a re-
duction of a
compound
more simple components.
Sup-
posing us to have discovered this simple matter,
how then
do we answer the
matter itself?
question.
What
after all
is
is
the simple
What
for instance
the Quicksilver, of
which we will suppose ourselves to have discovered that So long as our concern something else consists of it ? was to reduce this other thing to it, it was taken for some-
Chap.
III.]
THE IDEA OF ESSENCE.

But
itself in its simplicity,
77
is it ?
thing simple.
find
it
what
We
(J
our ordinary temperatures, fixed at lower temperatures, vaporous at higher ones ; but we could not say what it is in itself, supposing it not to be acted on by
fluid at
\
C
any of these external conditions or by any of the other conditions, under which its phenomenal properties change
in yet other ways.
We
can in
fact
only answer, that
it
is
in itself the un-
assignable something, which under one condition appears

as a\ under another as
under a third as a^, and of which succeed each other in reverse order, it will pass again from a^ into a^ and a^, without ever being converted into /3\ iS^ or /3^ forms which in
a^,
we assume
that, if these conditions
a like mutual connexion exhibit the various phenomena of

another thing, say Silver.
Thus,
it
may be
stated
as a
general truth, that our idea of that which makes a Thing
what
states
it is
consists only in the thought of a certain regularity
with which
it changes to and fro within a limited circle of whether spontaneously or under visible external con-
ditions, without passing out of this circle,
having an existence on
its
own account and
and without ever apart from any
one of the forms which within this circle it can assume. This way of presenting the case, while fully sufficient for
the needs of ordinary judgment, has given
various further metaphysical experiments.
27. If attention is directed to the quaHties by which one Thing distinguishes itself from another, its essence in this sense cannot any longer be thought of as object of a simple perception, but only in the logical form of a conception, which expresses the permanently uniform observance of law in the succession of various states or in the combination of manifold predicates.
occasion to
From
this point
a very natural
'
course of thought leads us to two ways of apprehending the Thing. We may define it first by the collective marks,
which
at
a given
moment
it
exhibits,
in their de facto
condition.
This gives us a statement of what the essence
78
[BookL
But it is, TO Ti ecTTL according to Aristotle's expression. would be conceivable that, like two curves which have an infinitely small part of their course in common, so two different things, A and B, should coincide in the momentary condition of their marks, but should afterwards diverge
into paths of that
development as
different as
brought them to the state of coincidence.

if
were the paths In that

is
case the essence of each will be held only to be correctly
apprehended,
the given condition of each

it
interpreted
as the result of that which
previously was,
and
at the
LL
j
which it will be. This seems the natural point of departure from which Aristotle arrived at the formula W rjv dvat. He did not complete it by the other equally valuable ri earai elvai, though the notion that might have been so expressed was not alien In practice, it must be admitted, to his way of thinking. these determinations of the idea of the Thing, which theoretically are of interest, cannot be carried through. Even the actual present condition of a Thing would not admit of exhaustive analysis, without our thinking of the mutual connexion between the manifold phenomena which
as
same time
the
germ of
that
it
exhibits, as already specifically
ordered according to the

still
same law which would appear

of the Thing.
more
plainly
upon a
consideration of the various states, past and to be expected,
The second formula
therefore only gives
general expression to the intention of constantly gaining
a deeper view of the essence of the Things, in a proj
gression
which admits
is
of
indefinite
continuance,
while
a fuller regard
2^
for ever being paid to the multiplicity
of the different ways in which the Thing behaves under

different conditions, to its
connexion with the
rest
of the
world,
and
lastly
according
to a direction of enquiry very
natural,
though
still
out of place in this part of Metaphysics
to the final purpose of
which the fulfilment
is
the Thing's
vocation in the universe.

difficulties,
As a means of
at
setting aside the
which beset us
this
point, the expressions

Chap. III.]
MATTER AS THE
REAL.
79
referred to have not in fact
been used, nor do they seem

4
.
at all available for the purpose.
-.^
^-
'XÎm^
proceed to particularise some of these.^' Had we succeeded in making the essential idea of a thing so completely our own, that all modes of procedure of the
28.
"
We
thing under
evidently as
all
all
its
conditions would flow from the idea
self-
necessary consequences,
essentia the
we should
is
after
in
so doing have only attained an intellectual image

its
of that by which as by
Thing
distinguished
from everything else. The old question would repeat itself, what it is which makes the thing itself more than this its image in thought, or what makes the object of our idea of the thing more than thinkable, and gives it a place as a
real thing
in the world.
it
Just as the Quality
demanded
a Subject to which
idea, less
might attach, so still more does the independent than the quality, seem to require
its
a fixed kernel to give
matter that reality which, as the
it does not possess. If we have once forbidden ourselves to look for the essence of the Thing in a simple uniform quality that may be grasped
material contained in an idea,
in perception
for
it
if
we
resolved rather to find an expression
in
the law which governs

that
the
succession
of
its
-
phenomena; then
fulfil
which we are
it
in quest of has to
for all
things
the
same indistinguishable
function.
Itself
without constituent qualities
has to give reality
to the varying qualities constituent of things.
We are
thus
\
brought to the notion of a material of reality, a Real pure and simple \ which in itself is neither this nor that, but the
principle of reality for everything.
might recount numerous forms but it is need; less to treat them here in detail. The natural requirements of the case have always led, when once this path has been
history of Philosophy
this
The
under which
notion has been renewed
entered on, to the same general determinations as Plato assigned to this vkt]. The consideration that observation
^
['
Eines Wirkliehkeitstoffes, eines Realen schlechthin.']
8o

indefinite
[Book
I.
presents us with an
number of mutually
inde-
pendent Things, permanent or transitory, caused this primary matter of all things to be regarded by the imagination as divis ible, in order that there might be a piece of it in each single thing, sufficient to stiffen the thing's ideal content into reality^. But this conception of divisibility in its turn had to be to a certain extent withdrawn. For it would imply that before its division the matter has possessed a continuity, and this would be unthinkable without the assumption of its having properties of some kind, by which it would have been possible for this material of reality to be distinguished from other thinkable materials. But thus understood, as already definitely qualified, it would not have disposed of the metaphysical question which it was meant to solve. For the question was not, what quality of primary matter as a matter-of-fact formed
I
1
the basis of the individual things that fashion themselves out
needed to help any and every thinkable, to be real. If therefore the imagination did notwithstanding, as we do not doubt that it did, present this ultimate Real to itself mainly as a continuous and divisible substance, this delineation of it, occasioned by reference to the observation of natural objects, strictly speaking went beyond that which in this connexion it was intended to postulate. All that had to be supposed was the presence in every single thing, however many things there might be, of such a kernel of reality, wholly void of properties. There were therefore according to this notion an indefinite number of instances of this conception of the real, but they did not stand in any connexion with each other any more than in any other
of
it,
but what
it
is
that
is
thinkable quality to be
more than
case
many
all
instances of a general idea, merely
because
they are
subordinate to that idea, stand in any actual

will
connexion with each other. But I line of remark ; for the obscurity of
^
not continue this
this
whole conception
sect. 347.]
f'Realer Wirklichkeit.'
Cp. Logic,
Chap. III.]
MATTER MUST HAVE
QUALITIES.
is its
not to be got rid of by criticism, but by pointing out

entire uselessness.
29.
It
is
manifest that a representation which
has
its
value in the treatment of ordinary objects of experience, has been appHed to a metaphysical question, which it is wholly
insufficient to answer.
In sensuous perception we are pre-
sented with materials, which assume under our hands such forms as we will, or are transformed by operations of nature
into things of the
most various appearance.

possibility of
But a
little
attention informs us that they are but relatively formless and.
undetermined.
The
assuming new forms and
of manifold transmutation they
all
owe
to the
perfectly
determinate properties which they possess, and by which

they offer definite points of contact to the conditions operating
on them.
The
wax, which to the ancients represented
the primary matter on which the ideas were supposed to be
impressed in order to their realisation, would not take this

impression,
and would not

parts,
retain the
form impressed on
it
but for the peculiar unelastic ductility and the cohesion of

its
inclined to substitute for
which we might be though it might possess a still more many-sided plasticity, would at the same time be still less capable of preserving the form communicated to it. It is therefore a complete delusion to hope by this way of ascent to arrive at something which, without any qualification on its own part, should still bear this character of pure receptivity, necessary to the Real we are in quest of. After
minute
and any
finer material
it,
all
we should only arrive at a barren matter R, which would be equally incapable of receiving a definite shape, and of
duly retaining
it
out any nature of

dition
when received. For that w^hich was withits own different from anything else, could
p at all, nor by any conby another q. No position of circumstances therefore would ever occur under which that indeterminate subject R could be any more compelled or entitled to assume a certain form -n rather than any other Metaphysic, Vol, I. G
not be acted on by any condition
otherwise than
82
OF THE REAL AND REALITY,
[Book
I.
we
to
like, k. If we supposed however this unthinkable event come about and R to be brought into the form tt, there would be nothing to move it to the retention of this form
/c,
since every other would be and equally indifferent to it. In this absence of any resistance, which could only rest on some nature of ^'s own, every possibility of an ordered course of the world would disappear. In every moment of time ever)thing that was thinkable at all would have an equal claim to reality, and there would be none of that predominance of one condition over another which is indispensable to account for any one state of things or to bring about a determinate change of any state of things. But not only would any origin or preservation of individual forms be reduced to nothing by the complete absence of qualities on the part of the Real. The relation itself, which at each moment must be supposed to obtain between it and the content to which it gives reality, would from a metaphysical point of view be unmeaning. Words no doubt may be found by which to indicate it metaphorically. We speak of the properties which constitute the whole essence of a
to the exclusion of any other,
equally
possible
Thing, as inhering in the unqualified substance of the Real,

or as attaching to
it. But all these which language cannot dispense, are in contradiction with the presupposed emptiNothing can sustain ness and formlessness of the matter.
it,
or as sustained by
figurative expressions with the use of
anything, or allow
it
to attach to or
depend upon
itself,
which does not by

points of contact
figure,
it
its
own form and powers
afford this other
and support.
Or, to speak without a
is
impossible to see what inner relation could be

ascribed to a certain Real a property
tt
meant,
if
we
tt
or a
group of properties
it,
as
its
own.
would be as void of
relation to the property or
group of properties, as alien to
as any other R^.
30. These shortcomings on the part of the conception of

the Real would
make themselves
acutely
felt
as soon as an
Chap.
III.]
MATTER CLAIMS REALITY.
83
attempt was made, not merely to set it up in isolated abstraction, but to turn it to account for the actual explanation of
the course of things.
would then become evident that it which had any likeness to a But it will be objected that Static or Mechanic of change. we are fighting here against ghosts raised by ourselves, so long as we speak of processes by which the connexion of the real with the qualities it contains is supposed for the This, however, it will be first time to have come about. Even the ancients, said, is what has never been meant.
It
nothing could be built on
who
originated the conception of matter in question,
we
no place or time did the naked and unformed matter exist by itself. It had existed from eternity in union with the Forms, by means of which the different Things, now this, now that, had been fashioned out of it. In the plainest way it was stated that, taken by itself, it was rat her wit hout being a 6 v, and that Being first arose out
find were aware that at
,
\x.r]
of
its
indefeasible union with the qualitative content supplied

Ideas.
byjhe
nation
This
may be
fairly
urged,
it
and
in this expla-
were one that really admitted of being taken at its word. If it were so taken, it would amount simply to a confession that what the theory understood and looked for under the designation of the Real is nothing more than the 'Position,' throughout inperfectly acquiesce, if
we might
separable from the constituent qualities of Being, by which

these qualities not merely are thought of but are ;
consequently
and that would be improper for this Position,' which only in thought can be detached as the uniform mode of putting forth from that which is put forth by it, to be
it
'
regarded in a substantive character as itself a something, a Real, the truly existing Thing; improper that, compared
it, everything which on other grounds we took to form the essence of the Thing, should be forced into the secondj ary position of an unessential appendage.
with
The doctrines, however, which speak of the real material of Being, are far from conveying this unreserved admission
G
2
84
[Book
I.
even in the explanation adduced.

that gives reality
On
it
the contrary, they
continue to interpret the distinction between the principle
and the
real itself as if
represented some-
thing actual.
When
they ascribe to the matter, which has
no independent existence, successive changes of form, they do not merely mean by this that the inexplicable 'Position'
passes from the content
tt
to the other content
k.
In that
case
all
that
would be attained would be a succession,

is
regulated or unregulated, of states of fact without inner
connexion.
matter
experiences
Their object rather
to
be able to
treat the
R as the really permanent connecting

tt
/f,
member which
and or exchanges the one for the other, as and which, in virtue of its own nature, forbids and ^, or the realisathe assumption of other phenomena tion of another order of succession. Without this last addition the conception of the Real R would not, upon this view any more than upon other, have any value. For I repeat, it is only under the obligation of explaining a particular consecutiveness in the course of the world, which does not allow any and every thinkable variation in the state of facts,
states of itself,
that
we
are constrained, instead

for
of resting in the pheto
nomena, to look
something behind them under the

is
name
of the Real, however that
be conceived.
flux
of absolute becoming without any principle, once allowed,
demands no explanation and needs no assumption
to
be
made which could

therefore,
lead to such an explanation, intrinsically
impossible, as the one given.
The
doctrines in question,
under the guidance of this natural need which they think to satisfy by the supposition of the Real pure and simple, do not in fact make the admission which they seem to make. Although their 'matter' nowhere exists
in
its
nakedness, this
is,
so to speak, only a fact in the
'^
world's history, which need not follow from the idea of R.
Although as a matter of
variously qualified forms,
fact
everywhere imprisoned in
forms
still
in all those
R continues
and
to exist as the single self-subsistent independent Being
Chap.
III.]
FALLACY OF EMPTY REAL,
85
imparts its own reality to the content which changes in L^ dependence on it. Thus the matter, considered by itself and in detachment from the forms in which it appears, is
still
not properly, as
it
is
called, a
/mi?
oj/,
but according to
the proper sense even of the doctrines which so designate

it,
merely an ovk
ov,
if
of these expressions. of the doctrine of the

their force.
It is
weight may be laid on the selection And against this permanent residuum
the objections already
vXrj
made
retain
[
impossible to transfer the responsibility of
providing for the reality of the determinate content to a
Real without content, understood in a substantive sense,
none of the connecting thoughts are possible which would be needed in order to bring this Real into the desired
for
relation with the qualities assigned to
it.
31. I cannot therefore believe that interpreters, as they
went deeper into this ancient notion of an empty Real as such, of an existing nothing which yet purports to be the ground of reality to all definite Being, would find in it a proportionately deeper truth. To us it is only an example of an error of thought, which is made too often and too
easily not to deserve
an often-repeated notice. If we ask whence the colour of a body proceeds, we usually think at first of a pigment which we suppose to communicate the colour to it. And in this we are often right ; for in compound things it may easily be that a property, which seems
be spread over the whole of them, attaches only to a
single constituent.
to
But we are wrong already
in as far as
its
our phrase implies that the pigment communicates

to the
colour
whole body. Nothing of the sort really happens, but a combination of physical effects brings it about that in our sensation the impression of colour produced by the pigment completely disguises the other impression, which would have been produced by the other constituents of the body, that have throughout remained colourless. But when we repeat
our question,
it
appears that the same answer cannot always

its
be repeated.
The pigment cannot owe
colour to a
new
86
.
[Book
I.
pigment.
as the
Sooner or later the colouring must be admitted immediate result of the properties which a body possesses on its own account as its proper nature, and does not borrow from anything else. Our procedure has been just the- same with reference to
the things and their
their
reality.
We
is
desired to
derivedj^
know whence
in imagina-
common
property of reality
and
them a grain of the stuff of reality which we supposed to communicate to the properties gathered about it the fixedness and consistency of a Thing.
tion introduced into each of
What
actual behaviour, however, or what process this exis
pression of 'communication' so easily used,
to signify,
remained more than we could say. In fact, just as little as a pigment would really convey its colouring to anything else, could the mere presence of the Real convey the reality, which is emphatically held to be peculiar to it, to an essence in the way of qualities, which, we are to suppose, have somehow grouped themselves around it. Indeed, the metaphysical representation is in much worse case than that which we made use of in the example just instanced. For of the pigment we did not dream that it was itself not merely colourless, but in its nature completely indifferent to the various colours that may be thought of, and that it proceeded to assume one of them as if the colours, before they were properties of a thing, already possessed a reality which enabled them to enter into a relation to bodies and to let themselves be assumed by bodies. In this case we were aware that the Redness, which we ascribe to the pigment, is the immediate result of its own nature under definite circumstances ; that it could not exist, that nothing could have
until these circumstances acted on this nature, and that would change if the body, instead of being what it is, were another equally determinate body. But in our metait
) it,
physical language,
opposition to the real essence of things,

if
when we spoke of the properties we in fact spoke

one thing
is
in
as
the thinkable qualities, by which
distin-
Chap.
III.]
REAL
AN ADJECTIVAL
IDEA.
87
guished from another, before they really existed as qualities of a Thing might already possess a reality which should
enable them to enter into a definite relation to an empty Real a relation by which, without having any foundation
more than
I
all
other qualities in the nature of this Real,
it
was possible
for
them
to
become
its
properties.
leave this
comparison, however, to be pursued on
another occasion.
Apart from
figure,
is
our mistake was
this.
We
on which that Being of Things which makes them Things^ rests.
demanded
to
know what
it
reality or
By way
repre-
of answer
we invented
the Substantive conception of the

it
Real pure and simple, and believed that by

fact
we had
sented a real object, or rather the ultimate Real

a
In however real is an adjectival or predicative conception,

itself.
title
belonging to everything that in some manner not yet
explained behaves as a Thing

states, acts
changes,
this that
that
is
to say, in
a regular order, remains identical with
itself in its
various
to
and
suffers
for
it is
we assumed
be
the case with Things, supposing that there are Things.
The
rests.
question was, on what ground this actual behaviour

It is
a question that cannot be settled by thinking of our

satisfied in general
all,
whole requirement as
could not point out
reality
of a Real as such, of which after
as has
by the assumption been shown, we
how in each single case it explains the which itself is never presented to us as universal and homogeneous, but only as a sum of innumerable different
individual cases.
The conception
criticism similar to
of the Real therefore
is
liable
to a
which
latter
is
called for
though somewhat different from that by the conception of pure Being. This
we found
correctly formed, but inapplicable, so long
made good again, which had by the process of abstraction. Of the conception of the Real on the contrary it may be maintained that it is untruly formed. That which is conceived
as the definite relations are not
been suppressed
in
it
['
Das
dinghafte Sein der Dinge, ihre Realitat.']
88
[Book
I.
in this conception everywhere presupposes the subject to
this reason
belong, and cannot itself be subject. For cannot be spoken of in substantive form as the Real, but only applied adjectivally to all that is real. It would be well if the usage of language favoured this way
which
it
may
it
of speaking, more lengthy though it is, in order to keep the thought constantly alive that it is not through the presence
of a Real in them that Things

of behaviour which
this
I
become
if
or are real, but that
primarily they are only called real
they exhibit that
mode
we have
it
stated
we denominate reality. In regard to what we mean by it. The mode under

still
which
32.
may be
thinkable has
to
With a view
to answering the
be ascertained. above question we are
naturally led to the opposite path to that hitherto pursued.
Let us see
ideas,
how
far
it
will
take us.
The^two incomplete
'
by the union of which we form the conception of the Thing that of the content by which it is distinguished from other things and that of its reality cannot be any longer taken to represent two actually separable elements of its The Reality must simply be the form in which the Being. content actually exists, and can be nothing apart from it. But the requirement that this should be so meets at once with a serious objection. So long as we could answer the question What the Thing is by calling it a simple quality, we had a uniform content, apprehensible in intuition, before us, to which it seemed, to begin with at least, that the Position of reality might be applied without contradiction. We have now decided that this essence is only to be found in a law, according to which the changeable states, properties or phenomena, a^ d^ a^ of the thing, are connected But how could a law be that which, if with each other. simply endowed with reality, would constitute a thing? How could it be gifted with those modes of behaviour which we demand of whatever claims to be a Thing ?
'
This question involves real difficulty, but it also expresses doubts which merely arise from a scarcely avoidable imper-
Chap.
III.]
LAW NEED NO 7 BE
GENERAL.
89
The first of these doubts is fection in our linguistic usage. analogous to that which we raised against the simple Quality
as essence of the Thing,
justification.
As long
as
and which we found to have no we thought of the Quality in the

by
adjectives, as a generality'
way presented
qualities
to us in language
abstracted from
many
instances, distinct indeed
from other
but undetermined in respect of intensity, extent

;
and
limitation
so long
it
could not be accepted as the

all
essence of a Thing.
lacking to
it
After
the determinateness
it
still
might have been so accepted, if the necessary requirement of capability of change had not prevented this. In like%ianner the conception of law is at the outset understood in a similar general sense. Abstracted from a comparison between the
had been made good,
modes of behaviour of different
things,
it
represents primarily
the rule, according to which from a definite general class of

conditions a definite class of results
is
derived.
The
rule
indeed
is
such that there
is
a permanent proportion accordconditions;
ing to which definite
changes in the results correspond

but the cases in
to definite changes in the
which the law
will
hold good, and the determined values of
the conditions which give rise in each of these cases to

equally determined values
on the
part of the efiects

it
these
only as
are not contained in the law itself or contained in

possibilities
which are thought of along with it, but of which it asserts none as a fact. In this shape a law cannot be that of which the immediate reality, even if it were thinkable, would form a Thing. But this is not what is meant by the theories which employ such an expression [which identify thing and law]. What they have in view, to put it shortly, is not a general law but an instance of its application. This latter expression, however, needs further explanation and limitation.
33. If in the ordinary general expression of a law, for all
quantities left indefinite,
we
substitute definite values,
it is
not our habit,
it is
true, to call the individual instance
thus
'
90

all,
[Book
I.
obtained any longer a law at

the general form of which
fitted
because unless we revert to an application it is no longer to serve as a ground of judgment upon other like
it is
cases,
and
this assistance in
reasoning
is
the chief service

law.
Intrin-
which
sically,
in ordinary thinking
we expect from a
between the individual instance and the universal as would forbid us from subsuming the former under the name of Law. On the contrary, it is itself what it is in respect of its whole nature only in consequence of the law, and conversely the law has no other reality but in the case of its application.
however, there
is
no such
real difference
It is therefore
if
a legitimate extension of the usage of terms,
we apply
the
name
of a law to the definite state of facts
which includes a plurality of relations between elej ments which are combined according to the dictates of the
itself,
general law.
It
may be
It is not,
the general law of a series of
quantities that each sequent
member
is
the
n^"^
power of the
till
preceding one.
however, in this general form
that the law forms a series.
We
have no
series
we
introduce in place of
;?
a definite value, and at the same

first,
time bo give to some one of the members, say the

a definite quantitative value.
Applying this to our present case, the general law would correspond only to the abstract conception of a Thing as such; the actual series on the other hand, which this law governs, to the conception of some individual Thing. And it is only in this latter sense as corresponding to the actual series that it can be intended to represent a law as being the essence to which Position
*
as a
Thing belongs.
this illustration
Upon
two remarks have to be added.
In
our parallel the definite series appears as an example of a general law, of which innumerable other examples are
equally possible.
It
may
turn out in the sequel that this
thought has an equally necessary place in the metaphysical

treatment of things
our enquiry.
It
; but at this point it is still foreign to does not belong to that essence of a thing
Chap. III.]
PLURALITY NOT ESSENTIAL.
91
of which we are here in quest, that the law which orders its content should apply also to the content of other things.
On
the contrary,
it is
completely individual and single of

all
its
kind, distinguishing this thing from

this point
other things.
On
we
are often in error, misled

reality
by the universal
tendency to construct
the reality
out of the abstractions, which
The course, itself has alone enabled us to form. which investigation cannot avoid taking, thoroughly accustoms us to look on general laws as the Frius, to which the manifold facts of the real world must afterwards, as
a matter of course, subordinate themselves as instances.
We
might, however, easily remind ourselves that as a matter

all
of fact
parison
general laws arise in our minds from the com-
of individual cases. These are the real Prius, and the general law which we develope from them is
primarily only a product of our thought.
Its validity
in
reference to
many
cases
is
established by the experiences

it
from the comparison of which
has arisen, and

it.
is
estab-
lished just so far as these confirm
Had
our comparison,
instead of being between one thing and other things, been a comparison of a thing with itself in various states and_^ that is the sort of comparison to which alone our present ( course of enquiry would properly lead then it would by \ no means have been self-evident that the consecutiveness and conformity to law, which we had found to obtain between the successive states of the one thing, must be \ transferable to the relations between any other elements whatever they might be, and thus to the states and nature of another thing. AVe should have no right therefore to regard the essence of the Thing as an instance of a universal law to which it was subject. At the same time it is obvious
/
'
that this law of the succession of states in a single thing,
wholly individual as it is, if it were apprehended in thought, would continue logically to present itself to us as an idea, of
quite possible to attempt to
which there might be many precisely similar copies. It is make plurals even of the idea of
92

It
is
[Book
I.
the universe and of the supreme Being.
consider-
ations in a different region, not logical but material, that
alone exclude the possibility of there being such plurals
and
it
is
these alone which in our Metaphysic can in the
sequel decide for or against the multiplicity of precisely

similar things, for or against the validity of universal laws
which they have to obey. To make my meaning clearer, I will supplement the previous illustration of a numerical series by another. We may compare the essence of a thing It is not disputed that the successive sounds to a melody. of a melody are governed by a law of aesthetic consecutiveness, but this law is at the same time recognised as one perfectly individual. There is no sense in regarding a particular melody as a kind, or instance of the application, of a general melody. Leaving to the reader's reflection the task, which might be a long one, of making good the shortcomings from which this illustration, like the previous one, suffers, I proceed to the second supplementary remark which I have to make. If we develope a general law from the comparison of different things under different circumstances, two points are left undetermined one, the specific nature of the
things, the other, the particular character of the conditions
under which the things will behave in one way or in another. Let both points be determined, and we arrive at that result, identical with itself and unchangeable, which we represented by comparison with a definite series of quanthe purpose tities, but which cannot answer our purpose of apprehending that essence of the Thing which remains uniform in change. We have therefore, as already remarked, only to carry out the comparison of a thing with
itself in its
The consecutiveness and conwould thus appear, would be the individual law or essence of the Thing in opposition to the changeable conditions that have now to be left undetervarious states.
that
formity to
law,
mined.
One more misunderstanding
should like to get
Chap.
III.]
CONFORMITY TO LAW,
93
rid of in conclusion.
It is no part of our present question comparison and the discovery of the abiding law is possible for us with reference to any particular Our problem merely is to find the form of thought thing. in which its essence could be adequately apprehended supposing there to be no hindrance in the nature of our
whether and how
this
cognition and in
its
position towards Things to the perform-
ance of the process.
other metaphysical view.
The same reserve is made by every Even the man who looks for the
essence of the Thing in a simple Quality does not expect to know that Quality and therefore satisfies himself with
establishing the general form in
which
it
would appear to
him, but denies himself the prospect of ever looking on this

appearance.
34. So
much
for those objections to the notion of a
law
fact,
as constituting the essence of the Thing, which admit of
being set aside by an explanation of our meaning.

lighting
In
ifji^ thought of the 'Position' which conveys reality as
upon this individual law, it would forrn just that permanent yet changeable essence^ of a Thing which we
are in search
satisfaction
of.
The
this.
reader,
however,
question
will
find
little
in
all
The
keeps
recurring
whether
after all that 'Position' of reality, applied to this
content, can in fact exhaustively constitute the essence of
a real Thing; whether we have not constantly to search

afresh for the something which, while following this law,
would convey to
thinkable
it
convey
to
what
is
mode
of procedure reality?
in itself a merely In presence of this
constantly recurring doubt I have no course but to repeat
the answer which I believe to be certainly true. the

first
place, recall the fact that in
Let us, in what we are now asking
for there
is something intrinsically unthinkable. We are not satisfied with the doctrine that the Thing is an indi-
vidual law.
We believe that we
its
gain something by assuming
of
it
that in
^
own
nature
it is
something more and other

veranderliche Was.']
[*
Das besfandige und dennoch
94
/

this,
[Book
I.
than
and
that
its
conformity to this law, by which

is
it
distinguishes itself from everything else,
merely
its
mode
of procedure.
process which
Can we however form any notion we indicate by this

for,
of what constitutes the

familiar
name
of con-
(formity to law ?
it
If this nucleus of reality,
which we deem
necessary to seek
possessed a definite nature, alien to
that which the law enjoins,

to adjust itself to the law
?
how could it nevertheless come And if we would assume that

upon
it
there are sundry conditions of which the operation
'!
might compel it to such obedience, would this compulsion be itself intelligible, unless its own nature gave it the law that upon these conditions supervening it should obey that [other law supposed to be quite alien to its nature ? In any /case that which we call conformity to law on the part of a i Thing would be nothing else than the proper being and behaviour of the Thing itself. On the other side What
: r
exactly are
we
to ?
to
take the laws to be before they are

sort of reality, other than that of the
conformed
I
What
Things, could belong to them, such as they must certainly

i
have
if it is
hitherto
'
There
is
be possible for a nature of Things, assumed beyond them, to adjust itself to them? only one answer possible to these questions. It is
to to
lie
not the case that the things follow a
mode
of procedure
which would in any possible form be actually separable from them. Their procedure is whatever it may be, and by it they yield the result which we afterwards, upon
reflective comparison, conceive as their
mode
of procedure
and thereupon endow
in our thought with priority to the
Things themselves, as if it were the pattern after which they had guided themselves. If we would avoid this conclusion by denying to the required nucleus of the Thing any nature of its own, we should be brought back to that conception of the absolute Real, R^ which we have already found so Even if this real Nothing were itself thinkable, it useless. would certainly not be capable of distributing the reality,
Chap.
III.]
IDEA NOT PRIOR TO REALITY.
95
which it is supposed to have of. its own, over the content which forms the essence of a determinate Thing. It could not therefore represent our quaesitum^ the something of
which we require a so-called conformity to a determinate mode of procedure. There is therefore, it is clear, nothing left for us but to attempt to defend the proposition, that the real Thing is nothing but the realised individual law of its^"
procedure.
--^
-
^5.
shall
reflections
theories.
be less wearisome if I connect my further on the subject with an historical antithesis of Idealism and Realism have always been looked
upon
two opposite poles of the movement of philoeach having different though closely connected significations, according as the enquiry into what really is, or the reference to that which is to be valued and
as
sophical
thought,
striven after in
tion was in the
was the more prominent. The opposiinstance occasioned by the question which now occupies us. In the inexhaustible multiplicity
life,
first
of perceivable
phenomena Plato noticed the recurrence of
permanent store from which, in endless variety of combination, all things derive their particular essence or the nature by which one distinguishes itself from the other and each is what it is. And just as the simple elements, so the real combinations of these which the course of nature exhibited, were no multiplicity without a Principle, but were subject on their own part to permanent types, within which they moved. Further, the series of relations, into which the different things might enter with each other ultimately even the multiplicity of that world which our own action might and
certain uniform Predicates, forming the
should institute
reality.
testified
no
not
less to this inner
order of
all
The
case was
such
as
the Sophists,
his
predecessors in philosophy, had tried to

It
make
it
out to be.
was not the case that a stream of Becoming, with no check upon its waves, flowed on into ever new forms, unheard of before, without obligation to return again to a
96
State the

same with or Hke
to that
it
[Book
I.
On
the contrary, everything which
from which it set out. was to be possible for
ReaHty to bring about was confined within fixed hmits. Only an immeasurable multiplicity of places, of times, and of combinations remained open to it, in which it repeated
with variations this content of the Ideal world.
The
full
value of this metaphysical conception I shall

later.
have to bring out

into
For the present
wish to
call
attention to the misleading path, never actually avoided,
which
it
multipUoity in
1
It was just the has drawn men astray. ^pace and time of scattered successive and
intersecting
phenomena
the course of things that properly

That world of Ideas, on the
constituted the true reality, the primary object given us to
be perceived and known.

in this changing multiplicity
other hand, which comprehended the permanent element
and the recurrent forms in the was in contrast wîth it something secondary, having had its origin in the comparisons instituted by our thought, and, so far as of this origin, neither real nor calculated to produce in turn any
transmutation of the manifold,
reality
out of
itself.
is
However
great the value of the obser-
vation that Reality
such as to enable us by the connexion

this
of those ideas of ours to arrive at a correspondence with

its
course
still it
was wrong to take
world of ideas
in-
for
anything else than a system of abstractions or
]
*
which only have reality so far as they can be considered the modes of procedure of the things themselves, but which could in no sense be opposed to the course of things as a Frius to which this course adjusts itself, completely or incompletely, as something
tellectual forms,
secondary.
In order to make
reality,
;
my meaning
quite clear, I
must empha-
size the proposition that the only reality given us, the true
includes as an inseparable part of itself this varying
flow of
phenomena
in space
and
time, this course of Things
that happen.
This ceaselessly advancing melody of event

Chap.
III.]
IDEAS IN WHAT SENSE GENERAL.

else
97
j
its
it
and nothing
is
the metaphysical place in which
the connectedness of the world of Ideas, the multiplicity of
found by us but alone Within this reality single products and single occurrences might be legitimately regarded as transitory instances, upon which the world of ideas impressed for before and itself and from which it again withdrew after and beside them the living Idea remained active and present in innumerable other instances, and while changing But the whole of its forms never disappeared from reality.
harmonious
its
relations, not only is
has
reality.
'
reality,
the whole of this world,
known and unknown
to-
gether, could not properly
be separated from the world of were possible for the latter to exist andL hold good on its own account before realising itself in thev given world, and as though there might have been innumerIdeas as though
it
able
instances innumerable other worlds which the antecedent system of pure Ideas might equally have realised itself. Just as the truth about the individual Thing is not that there is first the conception of the Thing which ordains how it is to be, and that afterwards there comes the mere unintelligible fact, which obeys
equivalent
this, in
besides
this conception,
but that the conception

itself;
is
nothing more
is
than the
life
of the real
so none of the Ideas

is.
an
antecedent pattern, to be imitated by what
Rather,
each Idea
the
the imitation essayed by Thought of one of which the eternally real expresses itself. If the individual Ideas appear to us as generalities, to which innumerable instances correspond, we have to ascribe this
is
traits in
also to the nature of that
gather the individual Ideas.
supreme Idea, into which we The very meaning of there
being such an Idea

whirl
is
that a stream of
phenomena does not
on into the immeasurable with no identity in successive moments, without ever returning to what it was before and without relationship between its manifold elements.
The
generality
of the Ideas therefore

fills
is
implied in the
systematic character of what

Metaphysic,
the universe, in the inner
Vou
I.
98
design

of the
pattern,
[Book
I.
of which
the
the
unbroken reaHty
It
is
and
\
realisation
constitute
world.
completely
misinterpreted as an outline-sketch of what might be in im-
peachment of what is of a possibility which, in order to would require the help of a second Cosmos, of a real and of movements of the real that are no part
arrive at reality,
of
itself.
36. I shall have frequent opportunity in the sequel of
dwelling again on this system of thought
nor in fact can I
hope
to
make
it
perfectly clear
difficulties
detail the
manifold
I say expressly
have handled in which oppose a return to it. a return to it; for to me it seems the
till
I shall
simplest
and most primary
truth, while to representatives of

it
the present intricate phase of scientific opinion
usually
it
appears a rash and obscure imagination.

is
Psychologically
almost an unavoidable necessity that the general laws,
which we have obtained from comparison of phenomena, should present themselves to us as an independent and ordaining Frius, which precedes the cases of its application^^ For in relation to the movement of o ur cogn ition they are
y. really so. But if by their help we calculate a future result beforehand from the given present conditions, we forget that what comes first in our reflection as a major premiss f is yet only the expression of the past and of that nature of own which Reality in the past revealed to us. So ac\ its customed are we to this misunderstanding, so mastered by the habit of first setting what is in truth the essence of the Real over against the Real, as an external ideal for it to strive after, and of then fruitlessly seeking for means to unite what has been improperly separated, that every assertion of the original unity of that which has been thus sundered appears detrimental to the scientific accuracy to which we aspire. True, the need of blending Ideal and is, has at all times been keenly felt ; but \ Real, as the phrase ;;it seems to me that the attempts to fulfil this problem have In ^sometimes promoted the error which they combated.
j
\
Chap.
III.]
LAW THAT
IS REAL,
99
^
demanding a
special act of speculation in order to achieve)
this great result, they
maintain the belief in a
gulf,
not really
Wthere, which it needs a bold leap to pass. For the present, however, I propose to drop these general
considerations, and,
if
possible, to get rid of the obscurity
and apparent inadmissibility of the result just arrived at. One improvement is directly suggested by what has been
said.
We
:
the form
cannot express our Thesis, as we did just now, in Jl The Thing is the realised individual law of its
*
behaviour.'
This expression,
Instead of the
*
if
we weigh
'
its
terms,
would be
.
contain
all
the false notions against which

realised law
it
we were anxious
would
clearly
to guard.
better to speak of the law never realised, but that always
has been
real.
But no verbal expression that we could find
would serve the purpose of excluding the suggested notion which we wish to be expressly excluded. For in speaking of a law, we did not mean one which, though real as a law, had still to wait to be followed, but one followed eternally and so followed that the law with the following of it was not a mere fact or an event that takes place, but a self-completing activity. And this activity, once more, we look upon not in the nature of a behaviour separable from the essence which so behaves, but as forming the essence itself the essence not being a dead point behind the activity, but identical with it. But however fain we might be to speak
of a real
Law\
of a living active Idea, in order the better
to express our thought, language
would always compel us to on which the ordinary course of thinking has stamped two incompatible and contradictor^' meanings. We therefore have to give up the pretension of
put two words together,
remaining in complete accord with the usage of speech.

^
['
Einem
realen Gesetze,' see note on p.
i,
above.]
CHAPTER
Of Becoming and
37.
IV.
Change.
years ago,
When
I first ventured,
many
ment of metaphysical
convictions, I gathered
on a stateup the essence
of the thoughts, with which we were just then occupied, in

the following proposition
qualified to
:
'
It is
not in virtue of a substance

\
contained in them that Things are

stance in them.'
they are,
when they
are
produce an appearance of there being a sub-
grounds.
I was found fault with at the time on two was said that the proposition was materially untrue, and that in respect of form the two members of the The proposition appeared not to correspond as antitheses. but latter objection would have been unimportant, if true I have not been able to convince myself of its truth, or of the material incorrectness of my expression. According to a very common usage the name Substance was employed to indicate a rigid real nucleus, which was taken, as a selfIt
:
'
'
evident truth, to possess the stability of Reality
stability
which could not be admitted as belonging to the things that change and differ from each other without special justification being
demanded of its
possibility.
itself
From such
nuclei
the Reality was supposed to spread

properties
over the different
by which one thing distinguishes itself from was thus by its means, as if it was a coagulative agent, which served to set what was in itself the unstable fluid of the qualitative content, that this content was supposed to acquire the form and steadfastness that belong to
another.
It
THING AND SUBSTANCE,

the
loi
was matter of indifference whether this an occurrence that liad once taken place and had given an origin in time to Things, or whether the solidifying operation of the substance was regarded as an eternal process, carried on in things equally eternal and without origin in time as an essential
Thing.
It
peculiar crystallisation was thought of as
characteristic of their nature.

relation
In either case the causal

It
remained the same.
was by means of a subits
stance empty in itself that Reality, with
fixedness in the
course of changes, was supposed to be lent to the deter-
minate content.
I
believe
myself to have shown that no one of the

is
thoughts involved in this view

virtue
possible.
In going on,
it
however, to supplement the conclusion that
is
not in
of a substance that Things

if
are,
proposition that,
they are qualified to
by the further produce an appear-
ance of the substance being in them, then they are, I did not intend any correspondence between this and the other
member
of the antithesis in the sense of opposing to the
rejected construction of that which
makes a Thing a Thing

I
another like construction.

stitute for
What
intended was to subis
that
an impossibility) what constitutes the Thing. The notion which it was sought to convey could only be this, that when we speak of something that makes a Thing, as such ('die Dingheit'), we mean the form of real existence belonging to a content, of which the behaviour presents to us the appearance of a substance
which alone
is
every such construction (which
possible, the definition of
being present in
it
-,
the truth being that the holding-ground
which under
substance we suppose to be merely the manner of holding itself exhibited by that which we seek to support in this imthis designation of
is
supplied to Things
possible way.
38. There was no great difficulty in showing the unthink-
ableness of the supposed

is
real-in-itself. The denial is easy, but the affirmation of a tenable view equally easy? Setting aside

102
[Book
I.
the auxiliary conception just excluded, have

better
means
are we
we
other and
left
with means that
still
satisfy
us
of explaining the functions which

still
we cannot but continue
to expect of Things,
if
the assumption of their existence
is
which it was made ? even for a man who resolves to adopt by way of experiment the result of the
to satisfy the
for the sake of
will
demands
On
this question
doubts
arise
I repeat A world of unmoved were thinkable without presupposing motion at least on the part of him to whom it was object of observation, would contain nothing to occasion a quest for Things behind this given multiplicity. Nor is it the mere variety of these phenomena, but only the regularity of some kind perceived or surmised in it, that compels us to the assumption of persistent principles by which the manifold is
previous considerations.
it
ideal contents, if
connected.
Common opinion, under a mistake soon refuted, had thought to find these subjects of change in the Things
perceivable by the senses.
sensible essences of perfectly simple quality.
For these we substituted supraBut the very simplicity of these would have made any alternative but Being or not-Being impossible for them, and would thus have excluded change. Yet change must really take place somewhere, if only to render possible the appearance of change somewhere else. Then we gave up seeking the permanent element of Things in a state of facts always
identical with
itself,
and credited ourselves with finding
it
in
the very heart of change, as the uniform import of a Law,
which connects a
whole.
one rounded an expression had been gained for that in virtue of which each Thing is what it is, and distinguishes itself from what it is not. As to the question how an essence so constituted can partake of existence in the form of a Thing, there remained a doubt which, being insufficiently silenced, evoked the attempt to represent the real-in-itself as the unyielding stem
multiplicity of states into
it
Even
thus, however,
seemed
that only
Chap. IV.]
BECOMING AND IDENTITY,
103
to which all qualities, with their variation, were related as
the changeable foliage.
us
still
in
is
presence of the same doubt.

this
:
The attempt has failed, and leaves The first point to

as taking place, then
its
be met
7/^
we think of change
serve
the law which comprehends
various phases as
members^
the
of the same series will

character
to represent the constant

persists
of the
Thing which
throughout
change; but how can we think the change itself, which we thus presuppose? How think its limitation to these connected members of a series ? And then we shall have
to ask
:
Would
as
the
a^,
regularity
a^
. . .
in
the
succession
of the
several states a\
really
amount
Thing,
to
to that which,
conceived
persistence
of
we
believe
it
necessary to
seek
for
in
order
will
the explanation
of_
phenomena ? These questions

consideration.
be the object of our next^

first
30.
lurks
Under the name

a
difficulty,
change,' in the
place, there
which we must
bring into
view.
It
conveys the notion that the new

thing else,
is
real, as
other than somereality.
only the continuation of a previous
It
tends to avoid the notion of a naked coming into being,
which would imply the origin of something real out of a complete absence of reality. Yet after all it is only the distinctive nature of the new that can anyhow be thought of
as contained in the previously existing.
The
re ality of the
new, on the other hand,

the old.
It
is
not contained in the reality of

thus beyond a doubt becofnes
it
presupposes the removal of that reality as the

its
beginning of
own.
It
(comes into being) in that sense of the term which

sought to avoid.
tinction
is
It is just this that constitutes the dis- "^

;
between the object of Metaphysic and that world in which the content of a truth a is indeed founded on that of another b, but, far from arising out of
of ideas,
^,
y
[
j
the annihilation of
validity.
holds good along with
it
in eternal
If
now we
enquire,
how
this
becoming, involved in every
104
change,
is

to
[Book
I.
be thought
is
of,
what we want to know, as we
\
I
it comes would be too obvious of again assuming the unintelligible becoming in this process by which we would make it intelligible. Nor can even the notion of becoming be represented as made up of simpler In each of its forms, notions without the same mistake. origination and decay, it is easy to find a unity of Being and not-Being. But the precise sense in which the widereaching term Unity' would have in this connexion to be taken, would not be that of coincidence, but only that of transition from the one to the other, and thus would already include the essential character of becoming. There is no alternative but to give up the attempt at definition of the notion as well as at construction of the thing, and to recognise Becoming, like Being, as a given perceivable fact
naturally
suppose,
not a process by which
about.
The
necessity
of the cosmos.
it
Only on one side is -^ curiosity. It may appear

law of Identity,
abstract sense,
more than object of barren

of the deductions thought
to contain a contradiction of the

least
or
at
No doubt this law in the which I previously stated^, holds good of every object that can be presented to thought, a will never That which is, never is cease to = till it ceases to be.
to be derivable from this law.
anything that
principle that
is
not, so long as
it is
at
all.
On
the
same
which becomes, originates, passes away, is only something that becomes so long as it is becoming, only something that originates so long as it originates, only something that passes away so long as it passes away. There does not therefore follow from the law of Identity Let 771 anything whatever in regard to the reality of any 771, be what it will, it will be = ;;z, in case it is and so long as it is. But whether it is, and whether, once being, it must always be, is a point on which the principle of Identity does not Yet such an inference from it is directly decide at all.
1
[Logic, 55.]
Chap. IV.]
IS
ALL BEING BECOMING^

like
105
every
attempted.
Because the conception of Being,
other conception, has an unchangeable import,

that the reality,
it is
thought
as unchangeably to that to
which the conception indicates, must belong which it once belongs. The
is
doctrines
of the irremoveability and indiscerptibility of

are thus constantly recurrent pro-
everything that truly ducts of the
movement of metaphysical
thought.
But
is
this inference is limited
without clear justification to
the subsistence of the Things
on which the course of nature
supposed to rest. That relations and states of Things come into Being and pass away is admitted without scruple as a self-evident truth. It is true that without this admission
the content of our experience could not be presented to the
mind
that
at
all.
If,
however,
it
were the principle of Identity

Things,
the
required
the
indestructibility of
same
would also require the unchangeableness of all relations and states. For of everything, not merely of the special form of reality which attaches to Things, it demands permanent absence of variation. This consideration might
principle
lead us to repeat the old attempts at a denial of
all
Be-
coming, or
since
it
cannot be denied
to undertake the
self-contradictory task of explaining at least the
becoming
of the appearance of an unreal becoming.

to
But
if
we
refuse
from the principle of Identity, then that persistency in the Being of Things, which we hitherto tacitly presupposed, needs in its turn to be established on special metaphysical grounds, and the question arises whether the difficult task of reconciling it with the undeniable fact of change cannot be altogether avoided by adopting an
this inference
draw
entirely opposite point of view.
40. This question has in answered in the affirmative.

in the history of
fact already
been often enough
Theories have been advanced
Thought, which would allow of no fixed Being and reduced everything to ceaseless Becoming. They issued, however, as the enthusiasm with which they were generally propounded was enough to suggest from
I06
OF BECOMING AND CHANGE,
[Book
I.
more complex motives than we can here examine. We must Hmit ourselves to following the more restricted range of thoughts within which we have so far moved. Still, we
too
have seen reason to hold that
it
is
an impossible
division of labour to refer the maintenance of the unity
which we seek
to
for in succession to the rigid unalterableness
of real elements, and the production of succession merely

the
fluctuation
of
external
find
its
relations
between
these
elements.
/
Change must
it
way
to the inside of Being.
We
therefore
agree with the last-mentioned theorists
in
all
thinking
worth while to attempt the resolution of
Being into Becoming, and in the interpretation of its permanence, wherever it appears, as merely a particular form of Becoming; as a constantly repeated origination and decay of Things exactly alike, not as a continuance of 'the same Thing unmoved. But it would be useless to speak of Becoming without at the same time adding a more precise definition. Neither do we find in experience an origination without limit of everything from everything, nor,
if
we did
find
it,
would
its
nature permit
it
to
be the object
of scientific enquiry, or serve as a principle of any explanation.
Even those
theorists
who found
in
enthusiastic delight
by the honour as contrasted with the hfeless rigidity of Being even they, though they have set such value on the inexhaustible variety of Becoming, and on its marvellous complications, have yet never held its Even eternal flux to be accidental or without direction. in Heraclitus we meet with plain reference to inexorable laws which govern it. It is only, then, as involving this
in the sense of the unrestrained mobility enjoyed
Becoming which they held
representation of a definite tendency that the conception
of Becoming merits further metaphysical examination.

41.
The thought
it
just stated
first
had
clear expression
given
by
Aristotle in his antithesis of dvvafiis
and
evepyeia.
The
undirected stream of event he encloses, so to speak,

is
within banks, and determines what
possible
and what
Chap. IV.]
REAL POSSIBILITY.
it.
07
is
For what he wishes to convey is not is to be real must be possible. It is of this possibiHty rather that he maintains that it cannot be understood as a mere possibility of thought, but must itself be understood as a reality. A Thing exists Swa/xft when the conditions are really formed beforehand for its admission as an element of reality at some later period, while that alone can exist eWpyem, of which a ^vvafiis is contained in something else already
impossible in
merely the modest truth, that anything which
existing
evepyeia.
Thus
real,
all
Becoming
is
characterised
throughout by a fixed law, which only allows the origination of real
from
nay more, of the determinate from
the determinate.
have here the first form of a principle of Sufficient Reason, transferred from the connected world of Ideas to the world of events. The first conscious assertion of a truth, which human thought has made unconscious use of from the beginning, is always to be looked
We
on with
does not
respect as a philosophical achievement, even

oifer the further fruits
if it
which one would fain gather from it. Barren in detail, however, these two Aristotelian conceptions certainly are, however valuable the general principle which they indicate. They would only be applicable on two conditions ; if they were followed by some specific rule as to what sequent can be contained dwaixci in what antecedent, and if it could be shown what is that which must supervene in order to give reality to the possible transition from dvpafiis into evepyeia.
effort
problem has been the On the second point a clearer explanation might have been wished for. The examples of which Aristotle avails himself include two cases which it is worth while to distinguish. If the stones lying about are dwdâ the house, or the block of marble
find a solution of the
it
To
first
of centuries, and
is still
unfound.
bvvafifi
the statue, both stones and marble await the exertion of activity from without, to make that out of them ivepyela which indeed admits of being made out of them but into
Io8
[Book
I.
which they do not develope themselves. They are possiof something future because they are available for that something if made use of by a form-giving motion. On
bilities
the other hand,

it
if
the soul
is
the activity of the living body,
is
in another sense that the
body
is
dwafxei the soul.
It
does not wait to have the end to which it is to shape itself determined from without, as the stone waits for external handling to be worked into a house or into a statue. On
the contrary
it involve s in itself the necessary C, the active impulse which presses forward to the realisation of that
single end, of
which the conditions are involved

all
in
it
to
the exclusion of
important.
other ends.
in
The
first is
Each case is metaphysically point where we have to deal with

to
the connexion between different elements of which one acts
on the other and with the conveyance of a motion

thing which as yet
is
somecase
without the motion.

in the
The second
apart from anything else involves the question, on which
we propose
to
employ ourselves
a,
immediate sequel
granted that a thing

in
instead of awaiting from without

it
the determination of that which

its
is
to
become, contains
this is
own
nature the principle of a and the principle of

/3,
exclusion of every
how comes
come
it
about that
not
the end of the matter but that the a of which the principle
is
present proceeds to
into actual being,
and ceases
to exist merely in principle?
42. I shall most easily explain at once the meaning of

this question
and the reason
for
propounding
it,
by ad-
ducing a simple answer, which we might be tempted to
employ by way of
It
is
setting the question aside as superfluous.
we might say, that a proceeds from a because a conditions this a and nothing but this a, not any jS. Now it is obvious that this answer is only a repetition of the questionable supposition which we just made. The very point we wanted to ascertain was, what process
self-evident,
it
is
in the thing that injyality
issue
compels the conditioned to from that which conditions it, as necessarily as in our
Chap. IV.]
RATIONAL AND REAL CONNEXION.
109
thought the consciousness of the truth of the proposition
which
asserts the condition carries with
it
the certainty of
the truth of that which asserts the conditioned.
We
do
not in this case any more than elsewhere cherish the unreasonable object of finding out the means by which in any case a realised condition succeeds further in realising its consequence. But to point to it as a self-evident truth that one fact should in reality call another into being, if to the eye of thought they are related as reason and conse-
quence,
in
is
the present the enquiry into the
no settlement of our question. I reserve for manner in which we think

intelligible nature of
its
any case of the
a consequence
F as
this
contained in the nature of

relation
reason G^.
Whatever
may be, the mere fact that it obtains does not suffice to make the idea of F arise out of G even in our consciousness. Were it so, every truth would be imme-
No roundabout road of enquiry would be needed for its discovery, nor should we even have a motive to seek for it. The universe of all truths connected in the way of reason and consequent would
diately apparent to us.
all,
stand before our consciousness, so long as we thought at in constant clearness. But this is not the case. Even in us the idea of the consequence arises out of that of
only because the nature of our soul, with the peculiar unity which characterises it, is so conditioned by
its
reason
particular
rest
in
the idea of
accompanying circumstances, /, that it cannot G and, supposing no other circumit
stances, q, to condition
otherwise, cannot
but pass on
that
account of
its
own
essence to the idea of
Fto
and
no
In the absence of those accompanying conditions, /, which consist in the whole situation of our soul for the moment, the impulse to this movement is absent hkewise ; and for that reason innumerable ideas pass away
other. in
our consciousness without evoking images of the
in-
\G and
'Folge.']
refer
to
the
German words used
here *Grnnd' and
no
OF BECOMING AND CHANGE,
[Book
I.
numerable consequences, F, of which the content is in principle involved in what these ideas contain. If instead
of the conditions, /, those other circumstances, q, are consisting equally in the general situation of the present
soul for the
moment
then the movement may indeed

It
arise
but
at
it
does not necessarily issue in the idea of F.
may
any moment experience a diversion from this goal. This is the usual reason of the distraction and wandering of our thoughts. It is never directly by the logical affinity and
concatenation of their thinkable objects that their course
determined but by the psychological connexion of our momentary states of our own nature. Of the connexion of reason and consequence in Things we never recognise more than just so much as the like connexion on the part of our own states enables us
is
ideas, so far as these are the
to see of
It
is
it.
not enough therefore to appeal to the principle,

of
that
the content
in
itself,
logically
or necessarily,
conditions that of F,
will
and
that therefore in reality also
ensue upon G. The question rather is why the Things trouble themselves about this connexion between necessities which of thought ; why they do not allow the principle
they contain to be for ever a barren principle, but actually
procure for
it
the consequence
^ which
it
requires; in other
words, what addition of a complementary
must be sup-
posed in order that the Things in their real being may pass not always or unconfrom G to just as our thought ditionally passes from the knowledge of G to the know-
ledge of i^
43.
We
are thus brought back to a proposition which I
shall often in the sequel
have occasion to repeat

first
namely
that the error lies just in this, in
setting
up
in thought
an abstract
giving power, to which
may
and consequences as a lawsupposed that every world that possibly be created must be subject, and in then
series of principles
it
is
adding
that, as a
matter of self-evidence, the real process
Chap. IV.]
LAIV INVOLVES CONTINUITY,
III
.
of becoming can and must in concreto strike only into those paths which that abstract system of law has marked out
beforehand.
It will
never be intelligible whence the conformity of Things to rules of intellectual necessity should | arise, unless their own nature itself consists in such con- j
formity.
in detail
is
Or, to put the matter

;
more
correctly, as I stated
above (34) the First in Being

its
it is
just this real nature of things that
nay the only Being.

It is
Those necessary
^
laws are images in thought of this nature, secondary repetitions of

original procedure.
??
only for our cognition
that they appear as antecedent patterns
which the Things
resemble.
indefeasible
It
is
therefore
of no avail to appeal to the
necessity,
by which Heraclitus thought the
waves of Becoming to be directed. Standing outside the range of Becoming, this 'Amy/c^ would have had no control over its course. It became inevitable that Becoming should
be recognised as containing the principle of its direction in itself, as soon as we admitted the necessity of substituting
its
mobility for
the stationariness of things.
Now
if
we
is
attempt to find the necessity in the Becoming, one thing

clear.
Between the extinction of the reality of m and the new reality of //, no gap, no completely void chasm can be fixed. For the mere removal of m would in itself be exactly equivalent to the removal of anything else,
origin of the
or
q,
that
tt
we
k,
like to imagine.
therefore,
to follow
or
would have
definite
just as
Any other new reality much or as little right

\x\
on the abolished w, as that

that
and
it
impossible
consequents
should
flow
would be from
definite antecedents.
It is
impossible therefore that the
course of nature should consist in successive abolitions of one
and
originations of another reality.
Every
effort to
conceive
^1
t:
the order of events in nature as a
nomena according to law, that it may be temporarily
mere succession of phecan only be justified on the ground

desirable for methodological
ÂJt
HH^
reasons to forego the search for an inner connexion.
As
.U'-
a theory of the true constitution of reality
it is
impossible.
112
[Book
But the theory of Becoming might with perfect justificaand only complain of a misinterpretation of its meaning. Just as motion, it will be said, cannot be generated by stringing together moments of rest in the places , ^, so Becoming cannot be apprehended by supposing a succession of realities, , b^ c, of which each is detached from the rest and looked upon as a self-contained and for however brief an interval motionless Being. On the contrary, to each single one of these members the same conception of Becoming must be applied as to the series, and just as the definitely directed velocity, with which the moving object without stopping
tion admit all this
<:,
traverses
momentary place a, necessarily carries it over and again through it into another, soothe inner. Becoming of the real a, as rightly apprehended, is ^he_principle of its transition into b and into b only. For
its
into the place b
this is self-evident
\
that, just as
it
it is
not Being that
is,
but
Things that
is
are, so
is
not Becoming that becomes, but
the particular becoming thing
; and that consequently there no lack of variety in the qualities a, b, c, which at each moment mark out in advance the direction in which the Becoming is to be continued. I do not doubt that this defence would have expressed the mind of Heraditus, with whose more living thought that modern invention of the schools which explains Becoming as a mere succession of phenomena stands in unfavourable contrast. And we might go further in the You,' we might say, who treat a motionless same spirit. content as existing, have certainly no occasion to contemplate its change ; but for all that we have nothing but your own assurance for it that the " Position " by which you suppose a to have been once constituted will endure for In reality you can assign no reason why such should ever. be the case with it, unless you look upon the a of one moment as the condition of a in the next moment and thus But in the nature of reality after all make a become a.
' '

Chap. IV.]
DEFECTS OF BECOMING,
contained the springs of
If
13
there
may be
lacking to mere thought.
essence consists only in the

little
movement which are we think of an a, of which the motion to b, we are indeed as
able to state
to state
would be
how this a and its efflux is made, as you how your a and its rest is made. But
For the
your conception has no advantage over ours.
motion, which (as extended to Things themselves) you find

fault
with,
you
after
all
have to allow in regard to the
external relations of your Things,
where you are as
little
able to construct
us,
it
as in the inner nature of Things.
To
however,
real,
it
if
admitted (within Things) as a characteristic
of the
affords the possibility of explaining not
merely
the manifold changes in the course of nature but also as a

special case that persistency in
it
which you are fond of
putting in the foreground, without going into particulars, as
something
thoughts.
intelligible of itself,
but which at bottom you
present to yourselves merely as an obstruction to your
own
would be equally suited by our assumption. We could not indeed suppose a to become b and c in three successive moments, unless it were precisely b in the second moment and c in the third thus at each moment exactly what it is. More than this more than the equality with itself of each of these momentary forms cannot be required by the law of Identity. That the reality of the one moment should be the same as that of the other, could not be more properly demanded as a consequence of this law than could the exact opposite of its meaning; namely that everything should be simply
Identity, moreover,
Your law of
identical with everything else.'
44. If the view just stated were the true meaning of the
theories which
their
maintained the sole reality of Becoming, fundamental thought would not be exactly expressed either by this conception of Becoming or by that of Change. It would not be expressed by the former, because when in connexion with such speculations we oppose Becoming to
Being we do not commonly associate with

Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
it
in thought
any
114

;
[Book
I.
such continuity as has been described a continuity according to which every later phase in the becoming, instead
of merely coming into being after the earlier, issues out of it. It would not be expressed by the conception of change, because in it the later does in fact arise out of the complete
; because ^ is consequently another than a and, apart from that constancy of connexion, there is no thought of a permanent residuum of a which would have
extinction of the earlier
undergone a change in adopting d as its state. We may go on to remark that, however much of the interpretation given we may take to be of use, it is at once
apparent that the theory
is
insufficient to explain everything
which we believe to be presented to us in experience. It would be convincingly applicable only to the case of a development which, without any disturbance from without,
gradually exhibited the phases
^, c, d,
lying in the direction
of the moving
artificial view,
a.
In
reality,
however,
we
find
mistakeable instance of such development.
None
no unbut an
which we must notice
later,
has attempted to
explain away what seems to be an obvious fact
the mutual
apprehend be
is
influence of several such developments on each other, or
the change that proceeds from the reciprocal action of

difTerent things.
The
next point for our consideration will

to think in order to
it
therefore be, what

this
we have
mutual
influence,
taking
for
the
present to
matter of indifference
how we judge
of the metaphysical
ex-
nature of the Things between which the influence
changed.
45. In the first instance we only find occasion for assuming the exercise of an influence by one element a over another ^ in a change to /^ which occurs in d when a having been constantly present incurs a change into a. It is not merely supposed that the contents of and fi, as they exist for thought, stand to each other once for all in the relation of reason and consequence ; but that a sometimes is, sometimes is not, and that in accordance with this changeable
Chap. IV.]
TRANSEUNT AND IMMANENT ACTION.
115
major premiss the change from b into /3 sometimes will ensue, sometimes will not. Now we know that it might be ordained by a law external to a and b that b should direct its course according to these
different circumstances
:
but
it
would only obey
this ordi-
nance
it
were superfluous and if its own nature moved In order to to carry out what the ordinance contains.
if it
the possibility of this that difference of conditions, con-
one time a is, at another is not, must make a difference for b itself, not merely for an observer reflecting on the two. b must be in a different state, must be otherwise affected, must experience something different in itself, when a is and when a is not or, to put it in a short and general form if Things are to take a different course according to different conditions, they must
sisting in the fact that at
:
take
note
whether
or
those conditions
exist
or
no.
Two
thoughts thus unite here.
In order that a
may be
followed
by
/3
not by
iS^
/S^^
principle or ratio sufficiens

that
/3
may
actually
jS must stand in the relation of and consequence. But in order come into being and not remain the for
and
ever vainly postulated consequence of
a,
the ratio sufficiens
must become causa_eîciens, the foundation in reason must become a productive agency for the general descriptive conception of the agency of one thing on another consists in this that the actual states of one essence draw after them actual states of another, which previously did not exist. Now how it can come about that an occurrence happening to the one thing a can be the occasion of a new occurrence in the thing b, is just what constitutes the mystery of this interference or transeunt action, with which we shall shortly be further occupie'3. We" introduce it here, to begin with, only as a demand, which there must in some way be a possibility of satisfying, if an order of events dependent on conditions is to be possible between individual
: ' '
things.
48. Supposing
us
however to assume
I
that
this
un-
Ii6
[Book
I.
intelligible act
has taken place, from the impression which b

its
has experienced as
effects
own
inner state
we look
for after
Being or of its Becoming different from what it would have been without that excitement. To determine in outline the form of this continuation is a task which we leave to the sequel. As
its
within itself; a continuation of
regards the question of

difficulties as
its origin,
we
are apt to look on our
This rnimanent operation, which develops state out of state

this point is reached.
got rid of
when
within one
matter of
fact,
and the same which calls

in
essential Being,
for
we
treat
as a
no further
effort
of thought.
That
about,
this
operation
turn
remains completely incom-
prehensible in respect of the
manner
in
which
it
comes
are meanwhile very well aware. ^ For how a state o> of a thing a begins to bring about a consequent state, a^,
we
in the
how
in
the
same thing, we do not understand at all better than same a^ sets about producing the consequence ^
b.
in another being
It is
only that the unity of the essence,
which the unintelligible process in this case goes on, makes it seem superfluous to us to enquire after conditions
of
its possibility.
We
acquiesce therefore in the notion of
we had any insight into no hindrance to recognising it without question as a given fact. Conditions of the same subject, we fancy, must necessarily have influence on each Other: and in fact if we refused to be guided by this fundamental thought, there would be no hope left of finding means of explanation for any occurrence whatever. 47. Towards these notions the two theories as to the essence of things, which we have hitherto pursued, stand in
iffimanenL operation, not as though
its
genesis, but because
we
feel
different
relations.
On
the preliminary
question
how
it
an influence over the equally passing b the doctrine of Becoming must like every other admit ignorance for the present. But supposing this to have come about, it will look for the operation of this influence only in an altered form of Becoming, which
attains
comes about
that the inwardly
moving a
Chap. IV.]
PHASES AND STATES,

impress on
b.
117
strives to
The
next-following phase of b
will
consequently not be
3,
but a resultant compounded of
^ and the tendency imparted from without. Henceforth this new form would determine the progressive Becoming of that original b^ if it continued to be left to itself: but every new influence of a ^ would alter its direction anew. If each of these succeeding phases is called a Thing, on the ground that it is certainly capable of receiving influences from without and of exerting them on its likes, then Thing will follow Thing and in its turn pass away, but it will be impossible to speak of the unity of a Thing which maintains itself under change. It is possible that the residuary effects of an original b in all members of the series may far outweigh the influence of action from without. In that case they would all, like different members of a single pedigree,
bear a common family characteristic in spite of the admixture of foreign blood, but they would be no more one than are such members. It is another possible case that b
without disturbance from without should develope

into
its
itself
series b^ /3\
^.
Its
parable to the successive
members would then be comgenerations of an unmixed people,

little
but again would form a real unity as
as
do
these.
Even
as
if
b reproduced itself without change, each
member
of
the series b b b would indeed be as Hke the preceding one
one day
is
like another,
is
but would as
little
be the pre-
ceding one as to-day
yesterday.
This lack of unity will afford matter of censure and complaint to the theory which treats the Thing as persistent ; but it is time to notice that this theory has itself
no unquestionable claim to the possession of such unity. Those who profess the theory rightly reject the notion which would represent the vanishing reality of one thing
as simply followed
\
^
by the incipient reality of the other without connecting the two by any inward tie but they think scorn of recognising this continuity in an actual, though unintelligible, becoming of the one out of the other
;
Il8

to
[Book
I.
and hope
make
it
intelligible
by the interpolation of
implies
that they are
the persistent
Essence.
But
this
on which we have already touched, of attaching the manifold of change by a merely outward tie to the unchangeable stock of the Thing. This is merely disguised from them by the power of a word, the use of which we have found it impossible
in fact reduced simply to the impossibility, to avoid but are here called
upon
to rectify.
When we
called a\
a^, a^
states of , wê
could reckon only too well
on the prospect that this expression would remain unchallenged and would be thought to contain the fulfilment Quite of a demand, for which it merely supplies a name.
of
itself this
expression gives rise incidentally to the repreis
sentation of an essence which

states,
itself
of a kind to sustain these

thus to maintain
to cherish
them as
them.
its
own and
But what does this mean, and how can that be, which under the impression that we are saying something that explains itself we call the state of an essence ? And in what does that relation consist relation at once of inseparableness and difference which we indicate by the innocent-seeming possessive pronoun? So long as we maintain the position that a as in the state a^ is something other than what it is as in the state a^ so
as
against
long again as
we
forego the assumption that there
is
present
an identical residuum of a in a^ and a^, on which both alike might have a merely external dependence so long as we thus represent a as passing in complete integrity into both while this is so, the expressions referred to convey states merely the wish or demand, that there should be something which would admit of being adequately expressed by them, or which would satisfy this longing after identity in differThey do not convey ence, after permanence in change. the conception of anything which would be in condition to satisfy this demand. In saying this I must not be understood to take it as settled that this Postulate cannot be fulfilled, only as un;
Chap. IV.]
CONDITIONS AND RESULTANT.
119
proven that it can be. Reality is richer than Thought, nor can Thought make Reality after it. The fact of Becoming was'enough to convince us that there is such a thing as a union of Being and not-Being, which we even when it
lies
before us are not able to reconstruct in thought,
much
had not been presented one day find a forni may we that possible to us.' It is of reality which may teach us by its act how those unreconcilable demands are fulfilled, and prove, in doing so, that in their nature they are capable of fulfilment, and that the relation, seemingly so clear, between Thing and state is other than an empty combination of words, to which
less
could have guessed at
if
it
nothing in reality corresponds.

late stage in these enquiries that
It will
not be
till
a very
we
shall
have opportunity
of raising this question again.
For the present we take
the real permanent unity of the Thing under change of
be a doubtful notion, which is of no value for the immediate objects of our consideration. 48. If or a is to act on b^ b must in all cases be differently affected by the existence of a and by its nonstates to
existence.
The
'transeunt' action of a
'
on
<^
would thus
lead back to an operation
immanent
'
in b.
The proximate T
3, must have an impression from the reaction a usage of speech on which we may have to dwell below. For the present we satisfy ourselves with the reflection that anything which b is to experience through the action of a must result from the conflux of two principles of motion ; from that which a ordains or strives to bring about and from that w^hich ^, either iir* self-maintenance or in self-transformation, would seek to produce, if a were not. Two principles are thus present in b^ of which in general the one conditions something else than what the other conditions. Neither of these two com-
condition which brings about the change of

lain in b itself
We
usually distinguish
it
as
mands
therefore could realise
absolute.
itself, if each of them wêre For neither the one nor the other of them would
120
[Book
I.
have any prerogative, both being, to revert to the old phrase,

states of the
same essence, b. A determinate result is onlyon supposition that not only a third general form of consequence is thinkable, into which both impulses may be blended, but that also the two principles have comparable
possible
quantitative values.
it
In the investigations of natural science
not doubted that the determination of a result from various coincident conditions always presupposes, over and
is
above the assignment of that which each condition demands, the measure of the vivacity with which it demands it. It
not merely in nature, however, but in all reality that something goes on which has no place in the syllogistic system formed by the combination of our thoughts. In the latter, of two opposite judgments only one can be valid. In
is
reality different or opposite
premisses confront each other
with equal claim to validity and both ask to be satisfied
on the ground of a common

filling
right.
I
left
am
therefore only
a gap which has hitherto been
unfilled in
Metaleaving
physic,
when
seek to bring out the necessity of this

all
mathematical element in
its
our judgments of
reality,
further examination to the sequel.
49. 'Quo plus
realitatis
aut esse unaquaeque res habet,
eo plura attributa ei competunt.' So says Spinoza ^ ; and nothing seems to forbid the converse proposition, that a greater or less measure of Being or of reality belongs to
things according to the degree of their perfection.
I
cannot
It
share
the
disapproval
which
this
notion
of there being
various degrees of strength of Being has often incurred.

is
no doubt quite correct
to say that the general conception
of Being, identical with itself, is applicable in the same sense wherever it is applicable at all, and that a large thing has no more Being in being of large size than a little thing in
being of small size. I do not find any reason, however, for emphasizing in Metaphysic this logical equality of the conception of Being with
itself,
since Metaphysic
i.
is
concerned
[Eth.
Prop,
ix.]
Chap. IV.]
DEGREES OF BEING,
it is
121
its
with this conception not as

to
its
by
itself
but in
application
But in this applime, seems to be looked upon as it cation it should not, as if the Position which it expresses remained completely unaffected by the quantity of that on which the Position falls. In the same way motions, the slowest as well as We cannot say the quickest, all enjoy the same reality. that they are^ but they all take place^ one as much as another. Neither in their case does this reality admit of The increase or diminution for any single one of them. motion with the velocity C cannot, while retaining this But for all velocity, be taking place either more or less.
content
to the things that are.
*
'
'
that the velocity

to the motion.
is
not matter of indifference in relation
ceases
into
it is reduced to nothing the motion and conversely no motion passes out of reality unreality otherwise than by the gradual reduction
;
When
of velocity.
which we admit in the case of the extreme connexion of Being, or in this case of taking place, with that which is or happens why should we not allow to hold good within that interval, in which this
that
limit
Now
the
quantity
still
has a real value?
Why
should we look on
only accidentally
the velocity as a secondary
property,
attaching to that character of the motion which consists

in
its
being something that occurs,
when
after all
it
is
just so far as this property vanishes that the
motion contin?
uously approximates to the rest in which nothing occurs
The
fact is that the velocity is just the
degree of intensity
its
with which the motion corresponds to

the occurrence of the quicker motion
occurrence.
If
is
'
own
Idea,
and
the
more
intensive
is
now we
apply the term
Being,' as
proper
in Metaphysic, not to the

fall
upon a
certain
determinate reality
empty 'Position' which might content, but to the filled and perfectly as already including that on which the
different quantities or inten-
'Position' has actually fallen, I should in that case have
no scruple about speaking of
122
sities

of the Being of Things, according to the measure of
itself in
the power with which each thing actively exerts the course of change and resists other impulses.
this
Nor
in
in
I
argument am I by any means merely interested rescuing a form of expression that has been assailed.
it
should seriously prefer this expression for the reason that

helps to keep
more
viz.
clearly in
mind what
is
I take to
be
the correct view;

(Wiergy,
that Being
really a
continuous
an
activity
or function
'
of things,
not a
doom
thrust
upon them of passive position '\ The constant reminder of this would be a more effectual security against shallow attempts to deduce the Real from the coincidence
of a
still
unreal essence with a 'Position' supposed to

this
be foreign to
indifferently.
content and the same for
all
Things
'
[*
Passivischer Gesetzheit.']
CHAPTER
Of
Our
Real.
V.
the
Natwe
far
of Physical Action.
concern so
has been to give to the conception of

it
Becoming a form
in
which
admits of being apphed to the
In seeking to do so we were led to think that the connexion between a cause and its effects must be more than a condttioni?tg of the one by the other ; that it must
an action
on the part of the cause, or require such Only thus could it become intelligible that effects, which in a world of ideas are consequences that follow eternally from their premisses premisses no less eternally thinkable, should in the world of reality sometimes occur, sometimes not. Many and various have been the views, as the history of Philosophy shows, which have been successively called forth by the need of supplying this complement to the idea of cause and by the difficulty
consist in
an
action
for its completion.
of doing so without contradiction.

are for us already excluded,
Many
it
of them, however,
to
now
that
becomes our turn
make
the same attempt, by the preceding considerations.

first
no longer indeed admitted among men of science but prevalent the untutored thoughts of mankind ascribe
in
50. In the
place
we meet
at times with a disposition
still
to
the nature and reality of a consequent wholly and exclusively to
^^
some one
being, which
is
supposed to be the cause,
the single cause, of the newly appearing event.
The
un/
reasonableness of this view

all
is
easily evinced.
It
condenses
while
productive activity into a single element of
reality,
124
at the

same time
it
[Book
I.
deems
it
necessary that the results of the
activity
should be exhibited in certain other elements, which
stand to the exclusively causal element in the relation of
empty receptacles for effects with the form and amount of which they have nothing to do. As we have already seen, everything which we can properly call a receptivity consists, not in an absence of any nature of a thing's own, but in the active presence of determinate properties, which alone make it possible for the receptive element to take up into itself the impressions tendered to it and to convert them into states of its own. Deprived of these qualities or condemned
to a constant inability of asserting them, the elements in
which the ordinance of the active cause is supposed to fulfil itself, would contribute no more to its realisation by their existence than by their non-existence. Instead of something being wrought by the cause, it would rather be created by it
in that peculiar sense in which, according to a
common
but
singular usage,
it
we
talk of a creation out of nothing.
I call
a singular usage because
of creation, to which
thing in particular.
we should properly speak simply we might add, merely in the way of
negation, that the creation does not take place out of any-
Trained by experience, however, to look merely as changes of what is already in existence, our imagination in this case gives an affirmative
upon new
states
meaning even to the nothing as the given material out of which something previously unreal is fashioned.
' '
The same
spoken.
extraordinary process
is
repeated
that
manner
of conceiving the action of a cause of which I have just
The
supposition
is
allowed to stand of things

in order to fulfil
its
which the active cause requires

impulse in them
in
:
active
but as these according to the conception
question contribute nothing to the nature of the
new
event, they are in fact merely

to
empty images which serve
meet the requirements of our mental vision. They repreupon which an act, wholly unconditioned by these scenes of its exhibition, originates, out of
sent imaginary scenes
Chap, v.]
RECIPROCAL ACTION.
reality.
125
I re serve the
nothing and in nothing, some new

application at
question whether this conception of creation admits any

all
and,
if so,
in
what case.
It is certainly
inapplicable in studying the course of the already existing
universe
inapplicable
when the
fact that requires explana-
tionTis this, that individual things in their changing states
determine each other's behaviour.

of these finite elements,
Were
it
possible for
its will,
one
/3,
>
'
or B^ to reahse
a or
in
other elements after this creative manner, without furtherance

or hindrance from the co-operation of any nature which these
'
other elements have of their own, there would be nothing to
<
j
decide upon the conflicting claims which any one of these
omnipotent beings might make on any other. The ordinances, a or 3 or y, would be realised, with equal independence of all conditions, in all beings C, D^ E. This notion,
if it
were possible to carry
it
out in thought, would at any

different elements
rate
not lead to the image of an ordered course of the
universe, in
which under definite conditions
are liable to different incidents, while other incidents remain
impossible to them.
give reality to
its
Any assumption that A ox B can only command upon C or D, not upon E or F^
would force us back upon the conception that C or are not only different from and F^ but that m virtue of their own nature they are joint conditions of the character and reahty of the new occurrence, which we previously regarded as due to a manifestation of power on one side only, to a single
active cause.
51.
Natural science, so long as

is
it
maintains
its scientific
character,
constrained by experience to recognise this

It
is
state of the case.
has reduced
it
to the formula that
every natural action

of elements.
It
a reciprocal action between a plurality
was apt to be thought, however, that the
proposition in this form expressed a peculiarity of natural

processes,
and
it
was a service rendered by Herbart to point

is
\^
out
its
universal validity as a principle of Metaphysics in his
doctrine that every action
due
to several causes.
Though
126
OF THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL ACTION
[Book
I.
these things are ultimately self-evident, the mere establish-
ment of a more exact phraseology calls for some enquiry. In the first place Reasons^ and Causes^ will have to be distinguished more precisely than is done in ordinary speech.
causes,' consistently with the etymology of the German term *Ursache,' we understood all those real things of which the connexion with each other a connexion that remains leads to the occurrence of facts that to be brought about were not previously present. The complex of these new an amfacts we call the effect, in German 'Wirkung' biguous term which we shall employ to indicate not the productive process but only the result produced. Wherever
By
'
it
shall
appear necessary and admissible to take notice of
this distinction,
we
shall reserve the infinitive
Wirken
'
to
express the former meaning.
The 'Reason' on
the other
hand
of
all
is
neither a thing nor a single fact^, but the complex
relations
is
between things and their natures from which the character of the supervening effect deducible as a logically necessary consequence.
relations obtaining
Now
the
just
because we do not think of the new event as
issuing from a creative activity independent of conditions,
explanation of any effect would require us, besides

entitles the causes to
assigning the causes (Ursachen) to show the reason (Grund)
which
be causes of
just this effect
and no
other.
Further, just because several constituents of
1^
this
reason (Grund) are not merely given as possible in
thought, but are embodied or realised in the form of real

properties of real things
and of
actually subsisting relations
between them, the consequence does not merely remain one logically necessary which we should be entitled to postulate, but becomes a postulate fulfilled^ an actual effect instead of
an unreal necessity of thought.
Finally, observation con-
vinces us that things, without changing their nature, yet
sometimes do, sometimes do not, exercise their influence on each other. It appears therefore that it is not the relations
['Griinde.']
j-<Ursache.']
='
['
Nicht Ding noch Sache.']

Chap, v.]
CAUSE AND REASON.
27
/
of similarity^ or contrast between the things
relations
which
upon comparison of their natures would always be found / the same that qualify them to display their productive; activity, but that, as a condition of this activity, there must
besides supervene a variable relation, C.
reserve the
'
^^
question whether
we
are right in thinking of this relation as
other than one of those included in what
we meant
to
be
understood by the complete Reason (Grund) of the effect. A doubt being possible on this point, which will demand
its
own
special investigation,
we
will provisionally
conform
to the ordinary
way of looking
at the
matter and speak of
as the condition of the actual production of the effect
a condition which
is something over and above the Reason (Grund) that determines the form of the ensuing effect. 52. According to this usage of terms the causes (Ursachen) of a gunpowder-explosion are two things or facts, viz. the powder A and the heated body which forms the spark B. The condition, C, of their action upon each other is presented to us in this case as their approximation or contact in space. The reason (Grund) of the effect lies in this, that the heightened temperature and the expansiveness of the gaseous elements condensed in the powder are the two premisses from which there arises for these elements a necessity of increase in their volume as effect. The final question,
how
in this case the efficient act takes place,
we do not
profess to be able to answer.
Of whatever
conjecture as to
the nature of heat
we may
avail ourselves for the purpose,
we
find
it
impossible in the last resort to state
how
it is
that
the heightened temperature operates in bringing about in
the expansive materials the
movement of
is
dilatation
effect,
which
they actually undergo.
It
only the
the result
brought about, which in this case is not a motionless state but itself a movement, that is open to our observation. In one respect this instance is unsatisfactory. In the
case supposed
we have no experience
*
['
as to
what becomes
Aehnlichkeit.']
128
[Book
I.
of the spark which was supposed to form one of the two

If on the other hand we throw a red-hot body, B^ into some water, A^ we notice, over and above the sudden conversion of water into steam, which in
causes of the total event.
this instance
corresponds to the explosion of the powder in
the other, the change which

its
B has undergone.
its
Lowered
in
temperature, perhaps with

is
structure shattered, or itself
dissolved in what
left
of the water, there remains what
was previously the heated body.

this
Thus even
the effect in
case consists of several different changes which are

Finally, since the evaporating
air,
shared by the different concrete causes (Ursachen) that have
been brought into contact.

water dissipates
itself in
the
leaving behind
it
the cooled
motionless body, that contact between the two which previously formed the condition of their effect
has changed into a

bodies.
that,
new relation Combining all these
in space
upon each other, between the altered
circumstances,
C,
we may
say
where a
definite relation,
gives
occasion to an
exercise of reciprocal action between the things
passes into
53.
a,
B into
The
take in individual cases, can only be determined by so many special investigations, and these would be beyond the province of Metaphysics. Even the task of merely showing that all kinds of causation adjust themselves in general to the formula just given would be one of inordinate length, and must be left to be completed by the attentive reader. The only point which I would bring into relief is this, that alike the contributions which the several causes (Ursachen) make to the form of the effect, and the changes which they themselves undergo through the process of producing it, admit of variation m In view of this variety the usage of a very high degree.
sitions
* '
A a, B^, Cy,
particular
A and B^ and C into y. forms and values which these tran/3,
speech has created many expressions for states of the case,

of which the distinction
is
well-founded and valuable for the
collective estimate of the importance of what takes place but
Chap. v.]
OCCASIONAL CAUSES.
129
which do not exhibit any distinctions that are fundamental an ontological sense. If elastic bodies, meeting, exchange their motions with each other wholly or in part, we have no doubt about the necessity of regarding both as They both metaphysically equivalent causes of this result.
in
contribute alike, though in different measure, to determine
the form of the result, and the effect produced visibly divides
itself
between the two.

otherwise in the instance of the exploding powder.
result
It is
Here everything that conditions the form of the appears to lie on one side, viz. in the powder,
capability of expansion
in
the
possessed by the
elements con-
densed in it. The spark contributes nothing but an ultimate complementary condition the high temperature, namely, which is the occasion of an actual outburst on the part of the previously existing impulse to expansion, but which would not be qualified to supply the absence of that impulse. For this reason we look upon these two causes of the effect in different lights. It is not indeed as if, in accordance with the reason given, we
assigned
the
designation
'cause'
par
excellence
is
to
the
powder.
itself to
On
the contrary this designation
assigned
by
ordinary usage rather to the spark, which alone presents
our sensuous apprehension as the actively supercontrast

this
vening element in
of the powder.
with the
expectant attitude
But
usage at least we are ready to
modify when we enter upon a more scientific consideration of the case ; we then treat the spark as merely an occasional cause which helps an occurrence, for which the preliminaries were otherwise prepared, actually to happen.
Though
that
undoubtedly important, however, to note of the case which is indicated by the expression occasional cause,' yet from the ontological point of view the spark, even in its character as occasional cause, falls completely under the same conception of cause under which we subordinate the powder. For whatever
it
is
peculiarity
'
Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
130
OF THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL ACTION,
[Book
I.
tendency to expansion we may ascribe to the elements united in the powder, taken by itself this merely suffices
to maintain the present state
of things.
It
is
only the
introduction
of a heightened temperature that produces
the necessity of explosion.
The
'
occasional cause
'
there-
fore brings about this result, not in the sense of giving
to
an event,
for
constituted, but
which the reason (Grund) was completely which still delayed to happen, the impulse
it
which projected
into reality, but in the sense of being
the last step in the
completion of that
'
reason
'
of the
Similar
event which was incompletely constituted before.

^
reflections will have to be made in all those cases where one cause seems only to remove a hindrance which impedes the other causes in actually bringing about an effect for which the preliminarj^ conditions are completely provided by them. The setting aside of an obstruction can only be understood as the positive completion of that which
'
'
the obstruction served to cancel in the complete
'
Reason.'
life
Phenomena such
as occur in the processes of
call
J
J
for
still
further distinctions of this kind.
The same
occa-
sional
causes.
Light,
Warmth, and Moisture,
excite
the
seeds of different plants to quite different developments.
In whatever amounts we combine these external forces, though we may easily succeed in destroying the power of germination in any given seeds, we never succeed in The same eliciting different kinds of plants from them
remark applies
stage,
to the behaviour of living things at a later
when
fully
formed.
The form
of action which they
exhibit,
upon occasion being given from without, is comdetermined by their own organization, and we look pletely upon the occasional causes in this case as mere sti?nuli^ necessary and fitted to excite or check reactions of which
the prior conditions are present within the organism, but with no further influence on the form which the reactions
take.
I
do not pause
in
this
to
last
correct any inexactness
that
may be found
expression,
nor do
repeat
Chap, v.]
HERBART'S
I
'
together!
131
remarks which
have previously made and which would

It is
enough to say that, in a natural which the process of causation may assume, all those that have been just referred to, as well as many others, fully deserve to be distinguished by designations of their own and to have their peculiarity
be applicable here.
history of the various forms
exhibited in
full
relief.
It is
the
office
of ontology, on_
the contrary, to hold fast the general outline of the relation
of reciprocal action, in respect of which none of these
forms contain any essential

ontology
its
difference.
In__the_view_of_
all
causes of an effect are just as necessary to
production the one as the other.
small the share
may be which each

effect,
mining the form of the

tribution without
wholly without such a share.
However great or them has in deterno one of them will be Each of them is a conof
' '
which the complete reason (Grund) of the actual effect cannot be constituted. No one of
them
a
in
serves
as
a mere means without

It
is
it,
of converting into
fact
possibility
already,
completely
determined
onto-
kind and quantity.

are here concerned.
it
exclusively with this
logical equivalence of the
manifold causes of a fact that

It will
we
that
only be at a later stage
will
become necessary
this
to refer to those other cha-
racteristics
of the causal relation of which the existence

stage
easily
might even at
be
established
farther consideration of the instances already given.
by the Such
would be the
itself
fact that the effect
exclusively to
produced does not attach any one of the co-operative causes

itself
but rather distributes
among them
it.
all,
and,
finally,
the change, after the resulting action
has been exerted,
of the relation which served to initiate

54. After
all
these remarks, however, the proper object of
enquiry has
to
still
been
left
untouched.
_How
is^
this relation
elicit
Cj_of which the^ estabhshment was necessary to

jflfectj
the
in
be understood metaphysically?
The need
is
which
this question stands
of special consideration
most
132

apprehended
if
[Book
I.
readily
we
transfer ourselves to the onto-
His theory started expressly from the suppositioiT'or'a complete mutual independence on the part of the real Beings, of their being unconcerned with any Relation. If it allows the possibility of their
logical position of Herbart.
falling into relations with
each other, the readiness to make
this
admission rests simply on the supposition that they remain unaffected by so doing. At the same time this metaphysical theory recognises a relation, under the name
of the c oexistenc e^ of the real Beings, which does away
with their complete indifference towards each other, and
compels them to acts of mutual disturbance and of selfmaintenance. In what, however, does this 'coexistence,' so pregnant with consequences, consist? So long as we confine ourselves to purely ontological considerations,
this
we can
is
find in
expression
merely the indication of a postulate, not

fulfilled.
the indication of that by which this postulate
The
'coexistence'
is
so far nothing but that relation, as yet
completely unknown, of two real Beings, upon the entry of which their simple qualities can no longer remain unaffected by each other but are compelled to assert an active reciprocal influence.
existence' r.
spatial
Thus understood,
having
let
us call the 'co-
The term
'coexistence,' however,
with
its
once been chosen for this Quaesitufn, appears to have been the only source of Herbart's cosmological conviction that, as a self-evident truth, the only form in which the ontological 'coexistence' r, the condition of efficient causation, can occur in^^the world, is
associations,
that of coincidence in space.
At
least I
do
iôt
find
any
further proof of the
title
to hold that the abstract meta-
physical
in
postulate
no other
imaginable'^ form.
r admits of realisation in this and I shall have occasion below
to express
assumption
^
an opinion against the material truth of this against the importance thus attached to contact
lit.
[*
Zusammen,'
'together.']
['
Anschaulich.']
Chap. V.J
CONTACT IN SPACE.
133
in
Here we may very

opinion,
if
space as a condition of the exertion of physical action. well concede the point to the common
appeal
is
made
to the
many
instances in which,
as a matter of fact, the approximation of bodies to each
other presents
their action
itself to
us as a necessary prehminary to
upon each other. Assuming, then, that contact can be shown universally to be an indispensable preliminary
condition of physical action, even then
we should only have
discovered or conjectured the empirical form
under
which as a matter of fact that metaphysical r, the true_ ground of all physical action, presents itself in the world. The question would remain as to the law which entitles this
connexion in space to make that possible and necessary which would not occur without it We are all at times liable to the temptation of taking that
in
the last
resort
to
explain
itself,
of which continued
It
observation has presented us with frequent instances.

cannot, therefore, be matter of surprise to
me
if
younger
and consequently keener intellects undertake to teach me Whatever my that in this case I do not understand myself. error may be, I cannot get rid of it. I must repeat that, so far as I can see, there is no such inner connexion between the conception of contact in space and that of mutual action as to make it self-evident that one involves the other. Granted that two Beings, A and B^ are so independent of each other, so far removed from any mutual relation that
each could maintain
to the other, as
it it
its
complete existence without regard

its
were in a world of
space,
own
then, though
may be
easy to picture the two as 'coexisting' in the

it
same point of a
seems to
me
impossible to show
that for this reason alone their indifference to each other
must disappear. The external union of their situations which we present to our mind's eye must remain for them
as
unessential as previously every other relation was. Inwardly their several natures continue alien to each other, unless it can be shown that this 'coexistence' in space, C,
134
is

'coexistence' in
space,
that
it
[Book
I.
more than a
includes
precisely that metaphysical coexistence,
which renders the

susceptible
in
Beings that would otherwise be and receptive towards each other.

the correctness, as a matter of
I
fact,
self-sufficing,
Not believing myself
of this theory of contact,
have naturally no reason to attempt such a proof, which,
moreover, would carry us prematurely beyond the province

of ontology.
As a
is,
i.
question of ontology,
e.
?.
ask what the r
suppose
contact
fulfilled, if
it only remains to what is the condition which we must in any relation C, whether it be one of
in space
or
of
some wholly
indifferent
different
form,
we
to
suppose
things
previously
to
each other
become subject to the necessity of having respect to each other and of each ordering its states according to the states
of the other.
This question
is
the starting-point of the
various views that have been held on the problem,
how
one thing comes to act on another.

avoid enquiring for a
!
None
of
mode
of transition
is
them could of some sort
or other from
to
the state which

so.
It is
not one of coexistence

or to
one that
is
according as they claim to have

transition,
discovered the
i
mode
is
of transition
deny that there

the universe.
55.
any such
that
be entitled to they have
resulted in notably divergent conceptions of the course of

I
/
The
transfer of
an
injiuence^
E^
is
the process by
which according to the
common
view
it is
sought to explain
the excitement of Things, previously unaffected by each

other, to the exercise of their active force
is
generally conceived in a one-sided
proceeding from an active

passive
and the process way as an emanation Being only, and directed upon a
:
Being.
That
if
this
representation
is
only serves to
sought,
indicate the fact of which an explanation

at
once apparent
we attempt
to define the proper
becomes meaning
and nature of
influence,
that to which,
under the
figurative
name of
we
ascribe that transition from the one Being to
the other.
Only one supposition would make the matter
Chap, v.]
IN TRANSEUNT ACTION WHAT ACTS ^

;
135
perfectly clear
the supposition, namely, that this
E which
makes the
reality,
transition ^s a Thing;
capable of independent
which detaches itself from its former connexion with and enters into a similar or different connexion with something else B. But precisely in this case unless something further supervened, there would be no implication of that action of one thing on another, which it is sought to If a moist body A^ becoming dry itself, render intelligible. which makes a dry body B^ moist, it is the palpable water If, however, what we underhere effects this transition. stood by moisture was merely the presence of this water, at would have the end of the transition neither A nor undergone a change of its own nature, such a change as it was our object to bring under the conception of an effect attained by an active cause. The transition itself is all that
has taken place.

True, the withdrawal of the water alters the drying body,
its
accession alters the body that becomes moist.
The
connexion between the minutest particles changes as the liquid forces its way among them. As they are forced
asunder, they form a larger volume and the connexion
between them becomes tougher, while the drying body becomes more brittle as it shrinks in extent. These are effects of the kind which we wish to understand, but the supposed transition of the water does not suffice for their explanation. After the water has reached its new position in the second body B^ the question arises completely anew what the influence is which, so placed, it is able to exercise an influence such that the constituents of are compelled to alter their relative positions. In like manner the question would arise how the removal of the water from A could become for this body a reason for the reversal of its properties. This illustration will be found universally applicable. Wherever an element E, capable of independent motion, passes from A to thus in all cases where we observe what can properly be called a 'causa
136
[Book
I.
transiens'
there
universally this
transition
is
only preli-
minary to the action^ of one body on another.

follows the transition, beginning in a
This action
explained only
when
the transition
is
manner wholly unNor completed.
would it be of the slightest help if, following a common tendency of the imagination, we tried to sublimate the transeunt element into something more subtle than a thing.' Whatever spiritual entity we might suppose to radiate from A to B, at the end of its journey it would indeed be in B^ but the question how, being there, it might begin to exert its action upon constituents different from it, would recur
*
wholly unanswered.
56. This difficulty suggests the next transformation of
the
common
view.
Instead of the causative thing (Ursache),
we suppose a force, an action, or a state, -", to pass from A We may suppose these various expressions, which to B. are to some extent ambiguous, to have so far a clear notion attached to them that they denote something else than a thing. They thus avoid the question how the thing acts on
other things after
its
transition
has been effected.
But
in
that case they are liable to the objection, familiar to the old
attributa non separantur a substantiis.' No Metaphysic jE", can so far detach itself from the Thing A^ of which it was a state, as to subsist even for an infinitesimal moment between A and B^ as a state of neither, and then to unite
'
:
state,
itself
with
B in order to become
state
its state.
The same remark would
apply
if
that
which passed from
X.O
B were
itself
supposed, by a change of expression, to be an
action,
No event can change of which it consists, and leave this A unchanged behind it in order to make its way independently to B. According to this conception of
and thus not a
but an event
.
detach
from the A,
in a
it,
so far as
it is
a possible conception at
itself
all,
the action thus
supposed to transfer
process of efficient
would simply be the whole causation which it is the problem to

1
['Wirkung.']
Chap, v.]
TRANSEUNT ACTION HOW RECEIVED.
137
explain^not a condition, in itself intelligible, which would account for the result being brought about. And after all these inadmissible representations would not
even bring the advantage they were meant to bring. As in regard to the transition of independent causative things, so from A to in regard to the transition of the state or event
the old question would recur.
Granting that
it
could
y^
separate itself from A^ what gave

particular
its
direction at the
E
it
B, rather than to C ? If we assume we presuppose the same process of causative action as taking place between A and for which we have not yet found an intelligible account
moment
to
\^
that
has given
it
this direction,
as taking place between

will
and B.
Nor
is
this all.
Since
not be merely on
B and
what
C, but
presumably on many
other Beings that
will
put forth
its activity,
we
shall
have
to ask the further question
it is
that at a given
moment
determines
to impart to
C,
E the
C
direction towards
B and
An
not towards
answer to this assumption that already at this moment A is subject to some action of B^ and not at the same time to any action of C,
and not towards B, question could only be found in the

or towards
and
that there thus arises in

it
it
the counter-action, in the
exercise of which
now
enjoins
upon
E the transition to B
as the possibility of
to a
and not
second time we should have to presuppose an action which we do not understand before
to C.
for the
Thus
we could present
that condition
to ourselves so
is
much
which
no more than the prehminary
determinate action.
Finally
it
is
important to realise
how completely
im-
possible
will all
is
the innocent assumption that the transferred
B^ when once it has completed its journey to B. Had this homeless state once arrived at the metaphysical place which occupies, it would indeed be there, but what would follow from that ? Not even that it would remain there. It might continue its mysterious journey to infinity and, as it was once a no-man's
state of
of a sudden
become a
138
State,

so remain.
[Book
I.
For the mere purpose of checking
it
in
its
course,
we must make
the yet further supposition of an
arresting action of
upon
it.
And
given
this
singular
would still be a long way to the consequence that E, being an independent state, not belonging to anything in
notion,
it
particular,
should not only somehow attach
itself to
the
become a state of These acthis B itself, an affection or change of B. cumulated difficulties make it clear that the coming to pass
equally independent being B, but should
of a causative action can never be explained by the transfer

of any influence, but that what
we
call
such a transfer
is
nothing but a designation of that which has taken place in

the
still
unexplained process of causation or which

its result.
may be
regarded as
67. Apart from its being wholly unfruitful, the view of which we have been speaking has become j)Ositively rnis^ chievous through prejudices which very naturally attach as one It treats the transmitted effect themselves to it.
ready-made, and merely notices the change on the part of No the things of which incidentally it becomes a state.
doubt there
over to B^
train of
is
a tacit expectation that,
upon
its
being carried
its
many
further incidents will there follow in
which no more explicit account is taken. But in that the view may have any sort of clearness, it must order on its arrival the will afford to in any case assume that same possibility of reception and of existence in it which was offered it by A. There thus arise jointly the notions that the effect must be the precise counterpart of itsdcause or at least resemble it, and that all beings, between ^w* 'ch a reciprocal action is to be possible, must be qualified for it
'
by homogeneity of nature.
Our previous considerations compel us

views at every point.
to contradict these
No
thing
is
passive or receptive
Jn
^ [' Gleich Oder doch ahnlich sein miisse.' Cp. note on * Gleichheit,' 19 supra. Sect. 59 makes it clear that the term 'gleich' does not merely refer to the alleged equality of cause and effect.]
Chap, v.]
CA USE A ND EFFE CT
its
HOMOGENEO US?
it
139
the sense of
being possible for
to take to itself
its
any
ready-made
there
dition
is
state
from without as an accession to

is
nature.
For everything which
supposed to
It is
arise in
it
as a state,
some
in
its
essential
and indispensable co-operating cononly jointly

with
this
own
nature.
condition that an external impact can form the sufficient
reason which determines the kind and form of the resulting
justification,
So long as there is speaking generally a certain owing to that peculiarity of the cases contemplated which we mentioned above, for treating one
change.
thing
A par
excellence
as the cause, a
second
as the
sustainer of the effect or as the scene of
its
manifestation, in
effect
such cases we shall even find that the form of the
produced by A depends in quite a preponderating degree on the nature of the B^ which suffers it. It is only to forms of occurrence which are possible and appropriate to this its
nature that
influences.
B
is
allows
itself to
be constrained by external
It is little
more than the determination of the
degrees in which these occurrences are to present themselves that
external exciting causes.
dependent on corresponding varieties in the This is the case not only with
its
living beings, but with inanimate bodies.
the
same blow one changes

fragments, a third
splits into
falls
Upon one and form yieldingly, another into continuous vibrations,

is
v/
some explode.
completely
What each does
determinate
structure
the consequence of its and constitution upon
occasion of the outward excitement.
Thir being
so, if
it is
improper to speak of a transmission

it is
^
of? e?dy-made
still more so to speak of a unikind and degree of cause with effect. It would in itself be an inexactness, to begin with, to try to establish an equation between the cause (Ursache), which is a Thing, and the effect which is a state or an occurrence.
effect,
versal identity in
'
'
All that could
takes place
in
be attempted would be to maintain that what the one 'cause' considered as active is
*
['
Gleichheit,' v. note
on
p. 138.]
140

which
or, to
[Book
I.
identical with that
will take place in
the other con-
sidered as passive
put the proposition more correctly,

are equally entitled
considering the
to
number of objects which
be causes, each will produce in the other the same state in which it was itself. Expressed in this form, we might
easily
truth.
be misled
into looking
upon
it
as in fact a universal
at
least,
The
science
of mechanics,
in
the disputs a
tribution
of motions from one body to another,

instances at
number of
command which would admit
of
being reduced to this point of view and which might
awaken the conjecture that other occurrences of a different kind would upon investigation be found explicable in the same way. Against this delusion I must recall the previous expression of my conviction that even in cases where as a
;
matter of fact a perfectly identical reciprocal action, Z,

exercised between
is
and B^
it
yet cannot arise in the
way
state, Z; that what takes and B is even in these cases always the production anew of a Z, conformably with the necessity with which Z under the action of B arises out of the nature of A^ and under the action of A arises out of the nature of B that, while it is a possible case, which our theory by no means excludes, that these two actions should be of the same nature, their homogeneousness is not a universal condition which we are to consider in the abstract as essential to the occurrence of any reciprocal action. 58. The fatal error on which we have been dwelling, is not one to be lightly passed over. The conviction must be established that of the alleged identity between cause and effect nothing is left but the more general truth with which
of a transmission of a ready-made
place in
we
This truth is that the natures of the are familiar. Things which act on each other, the inner states in which for the moment they happen to be and the exact relation which prevails between them that all this forms the complete reason from which the resulting effect as a whole issues. Even that this consequence is contained in its
'
'

Chap. v.]
LAW
is
VERSUS PLAN.
entitled to say, unless
41
reason
more than we should be
we
at least conceive as
immediately involved in the nature of
the things and already in living operation those highest
grounds of determination, according to which
it is
decided
what consequence
actual world.
shall follow
this
tacit
from what reason in the

completion of our thought
And
would emphatically not lead back to the view which we are here combating. For of what is contained in those highest conditions which determine what shall emanate from what,
in the actual world, as
have not in
consequent from cause or reason, we knowledge which we might here be inclined to claim. There is nothing to warrant the assurance that it is exclusively by general laws, the same in innumerable instances of their application, that to each state of facts, as it may at any time stand, the new state, which is to be its consequence, is adjusted. It is an assurance in which the wish is father to the thought. It naturally arises
fact the
out of our craving for knowledge, for
it
is
doubtless only
upon
this supposition that
analytically
from
is
its
'
any consequence can be derived reason or be understood as an

'
instance of a general characteristic.
But what
there to
exclude
plan,
în
lUnine'
the
other
possibility; that
which in the complex of reality only once completes itself and nowhere hovers as a univerâl^law over an indefinite number of instances, should assign to each state of facts that consequence which belongs
to
it
some one
as a further step in the realisation of this

it,
one history
so belongs to
however, but once at this definite point of
On that suppo? indeed our knowledge would no longer confront reality with the proud feeling that it can easily assign its place to everything that occurs in it, as a known instance of general laws, and can predetermine analytically the consequence which must attach to it. The series of events
the whole, never again at any other point
sition
would unfold itself for us synthetically; an object of wondering contemplation and experience, but not an object
142

till
[Book
I.
of actual understanding
we should have apprehended

that
the
meaning of the whole,

nexion between
69.
I
its
as distinguished from
which
of con-
repeats itself within the whole as a general

several
mode
members.
We will not, however, pursue these ultimate thoughts. merely hint at them here in order to dislodge certain
widely-spread prejudices from their resting-place, but cannot

out. We will take it for granted that every world admits of being apprehended in accordance with the requirements of knowledge as the conclusion
now work them
effect in the
of a syllogism, in which the collective data of a special case serve as minor premiss to a major premiss formed by a general law. Even on this supposition it would still be an
\ /
j
unwarrantable undertaking to seek to limit the content of that general law itself and that relation between its constituent
members which
this
is
supposed to serve as a model
for
the connexion between the facts given in the minor premiss.
Supposing
"
content of the law to be symbolised by

to
+ ^=/ we
title
are not to go
/3
the
of a -f
on for ever attempting to deduce be accepted as the reason of / from
higher and more general laws.
Each of
these higher laws
which we might have reached would repeat the same form "i + î-/i ^"d would compel us at last to the confession that while undoubtedly a conception of the individual admits of being derived analytically from the general, the
jnost general laws are given synthetic relations of reason
-Land consequent, which we have simply

in turn
to recognise without
making
their recognition
dependent on the fulfilment
of any conditions whatever. No doubt, in the plan of the world as a whole these given relations are not isolated, unconnected, data. Any one who was able to apprehend
and express
this
highest
together, not indeed necessarily
but by an ae sthet ic knowledge this actual system of reality is hidden. It has no standard at command for deciding with what combination
find them bound by a logical connexion; necessity and justice. From finite
idea would
Chap. v.]
HOMOGENEITY WHY BELIEVED,
143
+ 3 this system associates a consequence f, to what other combination a^ + ^^ it forbids every consequence. In judging of particular phenomena the natural sciences conform to this
sound
principle.
It is to
all
experience alone that they look for

those simplest and most primary
other, to
enlightenment as to
modes of action of bodies upon each

the given cases.
which by way
of explanation they reduce the individual characteristics of
This makes us wonder the more at the general inclination

to venture recklessly just at this
most decisive point, upon an a priori proposition of a kind from which science would shrink if it were a question of the primary laws of matter
and motion, and to make the possibility of any reciprocal L.^^ action depend on identity of kind and degree', comparability or likeness on the part of the agents between which it is to
take place.
^Vhere this identity really
exists,
it
help to explain anything
neither
it
does not^
the nature of the effect
nor the manner in which

minds, no doubt,
a
is
brought about.
For our
upon coming together form the sum 2 a, but how they would behave in reality whether one would add itself to the other, whether they would fuse with each other, would cancel, or in some way alter each other is what no one can conjecture on the ground of this precise likeness between them. As little can we conjecture why they should act upon each other at all and
a
and
not remain completely indifferent. In spite of this likeness they were, on the supposition, two mutually independent
things
before
they
came
together.
Why
their
likeness^
should compel them to become susceptible to each other's influence is far less immediately intelligible than it would
be that difference and opposition should have this effect. These at least imply a demand for an adjustment to be effected by a new event, whereas from an existing likeness the absence of any reciprocal action would seem the thing
^
['
Gleichheit,' v. note
on
57.
'Equality' would not suit the
argument here.]
144
to
OF THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL ACTION,

for.
[Book
I.
be naturally looked
Such considerations however
we can be certain of is complete groundlessness of every proposition which connects the possibility of reciprocal action between things, with any other homogeneity on the part of the things than that which is guaranteed by the fact of this reciprocal action.
simply settle nothing.
All that
the
To
an
'
connect the reciprocal action with

identical proposition.
this
homogeneity
is
7^ the things
act upon,
and are
that
affected by, each other, they have just this in
common
under the conception of substance, of which the essence is determined merely by these two predicates. But there is no other obligation to any further uniformity on
they
fall
their part in order to their admitting of

this
subsumption under
in
conception of substance.
60. There
have
been
of
two
directions
which
its
the
mischievous influence
the prejudices
itself.
we have been
natural
combating has
chiefly asserted
effort to
One_ of
consequences was the

a single
reduce whateve. happens to
common
denomination, to discover perhaps in
spatial motion, at present, for instance, in the favourite
form
all
of vibration, not one kind of event, but that in which
-f-events, as such, consist; the primary process, variations of
which
none of them being more than had not only other

to afford to all
unintelligible one.
variations in quantity
events, differing in
kind and form, the occasions for their occurrence, but to produce them as far as possible entirely out of themselves,
an accession to their own being, though indeed an This impoverishment of the universe, by reduction of its whole many-coloured course to a mere distribution of a process of occurrence which is always identical, was in fact scarcely avoidable if every effect in respect of all that it contained was to be the analytical consequence of its presuppositions. It is enough here to have raised this preliminary protest against the ontological principles on which this reduction is founded. There will be
as
occasions later for enlarging further upon the objections to
it.
Chap, v.]
LIKE
KNOWN BY
LIKE.
45
'
The
other equally natural consequence of the prejudice
was the offence taken at the manifold variety in the natures of things. This has been at the bottom of views now prevalent on many questions, and especially on that of the reciprocal action between soul and body. On this point ancient philosophy was already under the influence of That^ like can only be known by the misleading view. like was an established superstition to which utterance had been given before the relation of causality and reciprocal action became an object of enquiry in its more general"*^
in question
-y^^^^^-fi-C
aspect.
What truth there may be in this ancient view is one of the questions that must be deferred for special investigation ; but I can scarcely pass it over at once, for
do
I
not already hear the appeal,
the nature of the sun,
how
could
the finest verses do not settle
If the eye were not of behold the light^?' But any metaphysical question,
'
it
and
it
this greatly
misapplied utterance of Goethe's
is
not an
exception.
To
the logical analyst, in search for clearness,
conveys another impression than to the sensibility that to be excited. It is not the eye at all that sees the sun the soul sees it. Nor is it the sun that shines,
demands
:
but the seen image', present only in the soul, that yields to the soul the beautiful impression of illumination. Light in
that
sense in
which
it
really
issues
from the sun
systematic vibratory motions of the ether

all,
the we do not see

at
owing to the nature of our soul the new phenomenon, wholly incomparable with it, of luminous clearness. What confirmation then could there be in Goethe's inspired lines for the assumption that like can only be known by like, kin by kin ? To the poet it is no reproach that he should have seized and expressed a
it
1
but there supervenes upon
['Gleich.']
[I
['War nicht das Auge sonnenhaft Wie konnte es das Licht erblicken?' Zahme Xenien IV.] know of no other word than 'image' by which 'Bild' can here
be rendered, but it must be understood that no meaning of attaches to the word in this connexion. T. H. G.]
Metaphvsic, Vol.
I.
likeness''
146
[Book
I.
general truth of great interest in a beautiful form, though
the persuasive force of that form of expression

its
lies less in
exactness than
in
the
seductive
presentation to
the
mind's eye of a fascinating image.

privilege
Perhaps
this
poet's
been somewhat too freely used in these which the matter is false in every single fibre ; but we must candidly confess what we all feel, that at all events they express forcibly and convincingly the pregnant thought of a universal mutual relativity which connects all things in the world, and among them the knowing spirit with the object of its knowledge, and which
has
charming
verses, of
is
neither less real nor less important
if it is
not present in
the limited and one-sided form of a homogeneity of essence.
The
truth
on the contrary
by the mutual
is
that there
is
no
limit to the
by this and reciprocal action The metaphysician, who stands up for this of things. wealth of variety against every levelling prejudice which would attenuate it without reason, is certainly in deeper sympathy with the spirit of the great poet than are those who use this utterance, itself open to some objection,
possible
variety of the ties constituted
susceptibility
relativity,
number and
as a witness in favour of a wholly objectionable scientific
mistake.
So much by way of digression. Let us return to the It was impossible, we found, in the case of two causes operating on each other, to represent anything as passing from each to the other which would explain their Yet it appeared to be only under this reciprocal influence. condition that the conception of causal action was appli61.
object before us.
cable.
The
only alternative
left,
therefore,
is
to render the
course of the universe explicable, without presupposing this

impossible action.
The
first
attempt in this direction
is
the doctrine of
treat a relation
Occasionalism
the doctrine which would
arising between A and B only as the occasion upon which in A and B^ without any mutual influence of the two upon
Chap, v.]
OCCASIONALISM,
147
commonly
this
each other, those changes take place into a and ^, which we In ascribe to reciprocal action between them.
simple form there would be
It
is
little
in the doctrine to
excite our attention.
easy to see that an occasion _
which cannot be used is no occasion. But in order to be used, it must be observable by those who are to^ make use of it. If A and B^ upon an occasion C, are to
behave otherwise than they would have done upon an occasion 7, they must already in case C be otherwise That this affected than they would have been in case y.
should be so
action,
effect
is
only thinkable on supposition that

it
some
wherever
upon them.
it
may have come The occasion,
from, has already taken

accordingly, which was
to
make
possible for the active process to be dispensed

it
with, presupposes
place.
Otherwise
on the contrary as having already taken the occasion could not serve as an
Occasionalism therefore
^
occasion for a further reaction.
cannot be accepted as a metaphysical theory. The notion that it can is one that has only been ascribed to me by a
misinterpretation which I wish expressly to guard against.
As
remarked above,
can only regard 'Occasionalism*
as a precept of Methodology,
definite enquiries excludes
which for the purpose of an insoluble question one at

for
any
able,
rate
which does not press

If
it
a solution
in order to
concentrate effort upon the only attainable, or only desirend.

is
a question of the reciprocal action

it
between soul and body,
is
of importance to investigate
1.
the particular spiritual processes that are in fact so associated

with particular bodily ones according to general rules that
the manifold and complex occurrences, presented to us- by
our inner experience, become reducible to simple fundamental relations, and thus an approximate forecast of the
future
becomes
possible.
On
the other hand,
it
is
for this
purpose a matter of indifference to

ultimate
series
know what
are
the
means by which the connexion between the two of events is brought about. Thus for this question
L 2
148
as to

body and
soul
[Book
history, the doctrine of
it
it was this that, as a matter of Occasionahsm was framed to meet may be as serviceable as for Physics, which itself is
and
content to enquire in the
first
instance into the different
modes of connexion between different things, not into the way in which the connexion is brought about. Metaphysics,
however, having this
latter
problem
it
for its express object,
cannot be
solution.
satisfied with passing
over, but
must seek
its
62. Meanwhile I
this view,
will
may mention
a special expression of
'
which
'
is
not without some plausibility.
Why,'
it
be asked, if it is once allowed that the relation C is the complete reason of a definite between A and consequent F^ do we go on to seek for something further by which the sequence of this consequent is to be conditioned ? What power in the world could there be which would be able to hinder the fulfilment of a universal law of
nature,
if all
conditions are fulfilled to the realisation of
which the law itself attaches the realisation of its consequent ? Such is the argument that will be used, and it may be supplemented by a previous admission of our own, that whenever there is an appearance as if the occurrence of a consequent, of which all the conditions are present, were yet delayed, pending a final impulse of realisation, it will always be found on closer observation that in fact the sum of conditions was not completed and that it was for its completion, not for the mere realisation of something of which the cause was already completely given, that the missing detail required to be added'. This argument, however, is only a new form of an old error, and our rejoinder can do no more than repeat what is
'
familiar.
The
assertion that there obtains a general law,
which not only connects necessary truths with each other but reality with reality, is simply an expression of the recollection, observation, and expectation that in all cases where
^
[Cp. 53.]
Chap, v.]
ACTION PRESUPPOSES ACTION.
149
the condition forming the hypothesis of the law has been,

is,
or will be realised, the event forming

is
its
conclusion has
occurred,
occurring, or will occur.
We
are therefore not
entitled to treat the validity of the law as
an independently
it
thinkable
itself as
fact, to
which
its
supervening fulfilment attaches
a necessary consequence.
Rather
is
simply the
observed or expected fulfilment itself, and we should have to fall back on the barren proposition that wherever the law
fulfils itself it
does
fulfil
itself,
while the question
how
this
comes about would remain wholly unanswered. Or, to express the same error in another way were we really to conceive the law to be valid merely as a law, it would follow that it was only hypothetically valid, and was not in a state of constant fulfilment for in the latter case it would be no Even on this supposition it will law, but an eternal fact.
result
;
:
only
fulfil
itself
when
the
conditions
involved
in
its
antecedent, which
form the sole legitimation of its conIf then the force clusion, have been actually realised. compelling the realisation proceeded from the law, this must be incited to the manifestation of its force by the given case of its application, which implies that it must itself be otherwise affected in that case than in the case where
applicable.
it is
not
We
should thus be clearly presupposing an
action exercised
upon the law itself in order, by help of the power of the law, to dispense with the action of the things upon each other. If, then, we decide to give up these peculiar views in which the law is treated as a thing that can act and suffer if we allow that, whatever be the ordinance of the law, it must always be the things that take upon themselves to execute it, then A and B^ at the moment when they find themselves in the relation C, must be in some way aware of this fact and must be affected by it otherwise than they would be by any other relation 7, not at present obtaining.
:
The upshot
of these considerations
is
that
neither
the
validity of a general
law nor the mere subsistence of a
ISO

between two things
is
[Book
I.
relation
result
enough
to explain the
new
thereupon arising without the mediation of some
action.
On
the contrary, what
we
call in this
connexion
is
the action supervening in consequence of the relation,

fact only the reaction
in
and
to
other.
upon another action that precedes it which the things had already been subject from each It was our mistake to look upon this as a relation
merely subsisting but not yet operative, a relation merely

introducing and conditioning the causative action.
recognition of this truth
shall
is
The
of fundamental importance.
We
be often occupied in the sequel with its further exThis preliminary statement of it may serve to position. throw light on the complete untenableness of Occasionalism even in this refined form and to show that it can as little
dispense as can any other theory with the problematical
process of causative action, by help of which alone
explain
fulfilled
it
can
how
it is
that a law
its
is
alternately fulfilled
and not
according as
conditions are fulfilled or no.
may be grouped under the name given by Leibnitz to the most elaborate of In laying Pre-established Harmony.' them, that of the
63. Another series of kindred attempts
'
down
the principle that
'
the
Monads
are without windows,'
Leibnitz starts from the supposition of a relation of complete
mutual exclusion between the simple essences on which he builds his universe. The expression is one that I cannot admire, because I can find no reason for it, while it summarily excludes a possibility as to which at any rate a question still remained to be asked. That Monads, the powers of which the world consists, are not empty spaces which become penetrated by ready-made states through openings that are left in them, was a truth that did not need explanation, but this proved nothing against the possibility of a less palpable commerce between them, to which the name reciprocal action might have been fitly apphed. It
* '
would not therefore have caused me any surprise if Leibnitz had employed the same figure in an exactly opposite way
Chap, v.]
LEIBNITZ' MONADS.
151
and had taught that the Monads had windows, through which their inner states were communicated to each other. There would not have been less reason, perhaps there would have been more, for this assertion than for that which he preferred. To let that pass, however, when once reciprocal action had been rejected, there was nothing left for explanation of the de facto correspondence which takes place between the states of things but an appeal to a higher all-encompassing bond, to the deity which had designed
their developments.
Before the understanding of

:
God there
hover innumerable images of possible worlds

so ordered in the multitude of
its
each of them
required with
details as
is
consistent necessity by certain eternal laws of truth, binding

for
God
himself and not alterable at his pleasure.
In this
If
inner arrangement of each world

in the various worlds his
God
can
alter nothing.
wisdom
finds various degrees of
perfection,
he yet cannot unite their scattered superiorities one wholly perfect world. His will can only grant for that one which is relatively most perfect, just as it is, adinto
mission to
reality.
The
further elaboration of the doctrine might
for in either of
two
different directions.
It
be looked might have been
expected either to take the line of confining the original

determination to the general laws governing the world that
has been called into existence, as distinct from the

the cases in which these laws
sum of
may be
applied, or that of
supposing these cases of their application also to have been
once
for all irrevocably
determined.
The
first
assumption
would only
have led back to the embarrassments of Occasionalism just noticed. Leibnitz decided unhesitatingly
for the second.
Just as in our
is
first
parents the whole series

all
of descendants
contained, with
details
is
of their in-
dividuality, with their acts
and
destinies, so
every natural
occurrence, down to the direction which the falling raindrop takes to-day in the storm, completely predetermined. But this is not to be understood as if the manifold con-
152

by
[Book
I.
stituent agents of the world
their co-operation at
each
next
con-
moment brought about what is contained in the moment of the world's existence. For each single
stituent the series of all
its
states is established
all
from the
beginning, and the inner developments of

after the
take place
manner of a
parallel
interference with each other.
independent course, without The correspondence which is
nevertheless maintained between them is the unavoidable consequence of their first arrangement, if we consider the world as a creation of the divine design, or simply their de facto character, if we consider it merely as an unalterable
object of the divine intellect.
64. This notable theory impresses us in different ways,
according as one or other of

relief.
(
its
features
is
put in clearer
The
doctrine of a thorough mutual relation between
all
elements of the universe, and the other doctrine of the
\^
independence of those elements, are in it alike carried to a degree of exaggeration at which both conceptions seem to approach the unintelligible. The whole content of the Universe and of its history is supposed to be present to the divine understanding at one and the same time as a system
of
elements
mutually
and
unalterably
conditioned
in
manifold ways, so that what appears in time as following an

antecedent
is
is
not less the condition of that antecedent than
any antecedent the condition of that which it precedes. Thus Leibnitz could say that not merely do wind and waves impel the ship but the motion of the ship is the condition of the motion of wind and waves. 1 he immediate consequence of thus substituting the connexion of a system of consistent ideas for a connexion in the way of active
all intelligible meaning from the supposed to have vouchsafed to this world, while he denied it to the other imaginary worlds which were present to his intellect as consistent articulations The development in of what was contained in other ideas.
causation
is
to take
away
Reality which
God
is
time adds nothing to the eternally predetermined order.
It
Chap, v.]
THE VALUE OF REALITY.

it
153
relation then
it
merely presents
is
as a succession.
What new
constituted for
God
or the world by this reality, so that
should count for something more and better than the

previous presentation of the idea of a world to the
mind of
God
It is
of no avail to say that then the world was

of,
merely thought
whereas
now
it
is.
It
is
not open
it
to us consistently with the
system of Leibnitz, as
this antithesis
be elsewhere, simply to recognise

that
is
as
might one
given,
sition is that of a wise will,
however hard to define. When the suppowhich had the alternative of

it,
allowing reality to an idea or of refusing
the question,
f
what new Good could arise merely by the realisation of what previously was present to Thought, must be plainly
answered.
If the artist
is
not satisfied with the completed image of

or the hearer
it is
^^^
the work, which hovers before his mind's eye, but wishes to
see
it
in bodily
form with the bodily eye
if
of a tale betrays his interest by enquiring whether
true
what
cases,
is
the source of the craving for reality in these two

?
which we may compare with the case in question

first
In the
tacit
case, I think,
it
is
simply
this, that
there
is
expectation of
some growth
its
in the content of the
work
of art arising from
realisation.
To
walk about in the
building as actual ly built is something different from the range of imagination through the details of the plan. Not only the materials of the building, but the world outside it,
among
the influences of which
calculable
change
the
influences
when
subject to inis
work,
realised,
placed,
create a multitude of
new
impressions, which the inventive
fancy might indeed hope for but without being able to create
the impressions themselves.
is
This advantage of realisation one that Leibnitz could not have had in view, since his
^^^^
theory of the Pre-establishment of all that is contained in the world had excluded the possibility of anything new as well as the reciprocal action from which alone anything new
could have issued.
The
other wish
the wish
that a story
154
heard

may be
true or (in other cases) that
interest
[Book
I.
true, arises
it may not be which the heart feels in the depicted relations of the figures brought on the scene. It is not enough that every happy moment of spiritual life should merely be a thought of the Poet and an enjoyment imparted to the hearer, of which the exhibition of unreal
from the
forms
live,
is
the medium.
it
We
wish these forms themselves to

for
in order that
might be possible
them
also to
enjoy the good which delights us in the imaginary

like
tale.
manner we console we hear or read, if we
ourselves, with the unreality of
In what
are distressed by the images pre-
sented to us of unhappiness or wrong.
This Hne of thought was not excluded by the conception it could only be worked out on one supposition. To give reality to an idea of a world was only worth doing if the sum of the Good was increased
with which Leibnitz began, but
by the sum of those who might become independent centres of its enjoyment ; if, instead of that which was the object of God's approval remaining simply His thought, the beings, of whom the image and conception were included in the approved plan of a world, were enabled themselves to think I reserve the it and have experience of it in their lives.
question
theory.
how
Alien
far
this
view corresponds with

it
Leibnitz'
Something at least was not. analogous to spiritual life was accepted by him, for whatever reason, as the concrete import of the being which his
to
him
Monads
to
possessed.
65. This hne of thought, however, which alone seems
me
to correspond to the notion of
an admission to
is
reality
of a world otherwise only present in idea to God,

consistent with the complete pre-establishment of
scarcely
events.
all
When we
find that
causality
turn to the implications of natural science,

it
we
too, if
it
allows
no
limits to its
principle of
and denies the
for events,
possibility of any new starting-point cannot avoid the conclusion that every detail in
is
the established course of the universe
a necessary conse-
Chap, v.]
WE SHRINK FROM DETERMINISM,
1 55
quence of the past, and ultimately, though this regress can never be completed, of some state of the universe which it But it does not decides to regard as the primary state.
take this doctrine to
mean
that the
sum
of
all
these con-
sequences has been fixed in some primary providential

computation.
The consequences
first
is
are supposed really to
come
into
being for the
time,
and the
validity of
universal laws
taken to be sufficient to account for their
realisation without
are
any such pre-arrangement. These laws enough to provide for limitation to a definite direction in the development of the new out of the old. In their ultimate consequences the two doctrines coincide so far as this, that they lead to the belief in an irrevocable arrangement of all events. Yet in the actual pursuit of physical investigations something else seems to me to be implied.
We shrink
from surrendering ourselves to this last deduction from the causal nexus. No natural law, as expressed by a universal hypothetical judgment, indicates by itself the cases in which it comes to be applied. It waits for the requisite points of application to be supplied from some
other quarter.
know, of course, that upon supposition of the univalidity of the causal nexus neither accident nor freedom is admissible; that accordingly what remains undetermined in our conception of the law cannot be really undetermined that thus every later point of application of
versal
;
We
a law
is
only a product of earlier applications. This admitted without qualification in reference to every
is
itself
limited section of reality, since behind

vestigated
it
may be conceived
kept.
in
its
in the past, as to
one still uninwhich silence

treat
may be
spiritual
But with every inclination to

turn according to
flatly
the
life
like principles,
we
shrink from pronouncing

including the histor>' of
-^'^S-^^
that the whole of reality,!
spirits, is
only the successive unfold-
consequences absolutely predetermined.
That
in
the real passage of events something should really
come
to
156
jpass,
I

something new which previously was not
;
[Book
I.
that history
should be something more than a translation into time of

;
/the eternally complete content of an ordered world
this is
/a deep and
I
irrepressible
demand
of our
spirit,
under the
-^
we all act in life. Without its satisfacwould be, not indeed unthinkable and selfcontradictory, but unmeaning and incredible. When we admit the universal validity of laws, it is at bottom only in the tacit hope that, among the changing points of application which are presented to those laws in the course of events, there may turn out to be new ones introduced from which the consequences of the laws may take directions not
influence of which
tion the world
previously
determined.
Natural
sympathy, therefore,
not
is
what
the Pre-established
if it fulfilled
its
Harmony does
artificiality
command.
Even
it
metaphysical purpose, this hypothesis
of Leibnitz would have an
which would prevent
from commending
this
admit that
I our sense of probability. repugnance rests more upon feeling than

itself to
;
upon
theoretical reasons
fall
more
at
reasons as
It
within the proper
any rate than upon such domain of Metaphysics.
remains, therefore, for us to enquire
how
far this
view
serves the purpose of a theoretical explanation of the universe.
66. In each single Monad, according to Leibnitz, state

follows
upon
state
throughan immanent
action,
which
is
accepted as a
fact, unintelligible
indeed but free from con-
tradiction. It was only 'transeunt' action of w^hich the assumption was to be avoided. If this exclusion of transeunt action is to accord with the facts, the two states a and /3 of the Monads A and B^ which observation exhibits to us
as apparent products of a reciprocal action,
must occur
in
the separate courses of development of the two beings at the
same moment.
If
we had a
right
to
separated from a previous state a of
assume that a was by as many intera,
vening phases as ^ from a state d corresponding to
we
should not need to ascribe anything but an equal velocity
Chap, v.]
SYNCHRONOUS PHASES OF MONADS.

development of
i
157
to the progress of the
all
Monads.
But
t^
since a
may be removed from a hy

I?,
larger
number of
in
phases than 3 from

every single
we should be obliged
special velocity of
to attribute to
Monad
its
development
order to understand the coincidence of the corresponding

states.
This assumption does not seem to me in contradicfundamental view which governs the theory in question. As was above remarked, the thought of Leibnitz
tion with the
approximates to that interpretation of becoming which we

conceived to be the pre-supposition of Heraclitus
grant that the being of every Thing,
to
if
:
once
is
the
name Thing'
'
be accepted
for a closed cycle of phases, consists in a

it
constant effort to pass from one state to another, then
is
natural that different things should be distinguished from
each other not merely by the direction but also by the velocity of their becoming, i. e. by an intensity of their being
or reality which,
if it is
to express itself subject to the

least as velocity.
form
of time,
I
will
appear partly at
recall
any explanation given by Leibnitz on this have refused any answer. He might have said that the hidden rationahty, without which no image of a world would have been possible at all, had provided for this correspondence of all occurrences that go together. Only in that case it would be difficult to say how the whole doctrine was distinguished from the modest explanation, that everything is from the beginning so arranged that the universe must be exactly what it is. The feeling which Leibnitz had of the necessity of accounting in some way for
cannot
point.
He might
the correspondence
to the example,
is betrayed, I think, by his reference borrowed from Geulinx, of the two clocks which keep the same time ; for it was scarcely required as a mere illustration of the meaning of his assertion, which is simple enough. As an explanation, however, this Vo^ comparison is of no avail. Mutual influence, it is true, the two clocks do not exercise. But in order that they should at every moment point to the same time, it was not
158
[Book
I.
enough that the artificer ordered it so to be. And on the other hand the mechanism, which he had to impart to them
with a view to this end,
is
according to
its
idea precisely
not transferable to the Monads, shut up in themselves as
they are supposed to be.
Each of the two
clocks,
and
B^
is
a system of different, mutually connected parts.

constructed, as well as
The
the
materials of which they are
movements which may be imparted

to general
to these, are subject
mechanical laws, which apply to one as
much
as
to the other.
From them
is
it
follows that with reference to a
time,
which
for the rate of
measurable according to the same standard motion of A and B^ different quantities of
matter can be so arranged that the entire systems,
can pass
at the
ing positions,
A and B^ same moments into constantly corresponda and b^ a and /3. But that which in this case
is
carries out the corresponding transition
nothing but the
'transeunt' action, which one element by communication
of its force and motion exercises on the other. The independence of mutual influence on the part of the two clocks is compensated by the carefully pre-arranged influence which the elements of each of them exercise upon each
other.
It is
merely the place, therefore, of the

shifted
transeunt'
action that
that
it
is
by
this
comparison.
It is not
shown
can be dispensed with spondence of the events.

All
this
in accounting for the corre-
For it must indeed is of little importance. be admitted that in this case of the clocks, as much as in any other, Leibnitz would deny the 'transeunt' action which appears to us to be discoverable in it. It is not, he would say, that one wheel of the clock acts motively on the other ; it is of its own impulse that the latter wheel puts itself in motion the motion which according to our
certainly
ordinary apprehension
is
the effect of the former wheel.

that comparisons are usually as described
Upon
this
it
may be remarked
employed
generally,
in order that
some process which,
seems improbable or cannot be brought before
Chap.V.i
WHY PREFER GENERAL

may be
illustrated
ZAPVS?
in
159
the mind's eye,

it
by an instance
which
is
presented with a clearness that allows of no contra-
diction.
The
cases therefore which

as,
one
selects for
com-
parison are not such
before they can supply the desired
demonstration, require, like Leibnitz' clocks, to be rendered
by an effort of thought into instances of the process of which a sensible illustration is sought. Granting all this, however, our enquiry will have shown no more than what was well known without it, that Leibnitz was never very happy in his comparisons. The possibility in itself of what he maintains must nevertheless be allowed. 67. For the complete reconciliation of theory and expeThat the connexion of rience one thing more is needed.
occurrences according to general laws
is
intelligible,
we
may,
a
at least with reference to all natural events, regard as

It
is
however which, like any other, would not indeed an explanation of how it comes about, for that would be pre-established like everything else, but an explanation of the meaning which its pre-establishment would have in the Leibnitzian theory of the universe taken as a whole. Images of possible worlds, to which God might vouchsafe reality, we found distinguished from impossible ones, which must always remain without reality. The advantage of consistency, which distinguishes the former sort, we might suppose to lie in this, that they not merely combine their manifold
fact.
fact
demand
its
explanation
elements according to a plan, but that at the same time the elements which, in so doing, they bring together are such
as are really connected with each other according to general
laws.
It
is
obvious, that
is
to say, that every imaginary

its
world must appear as a whole, and

phases of the internally
development
in time
as the realisation of a preconceived plan, in which for all
moved Monads
for a\
a^, a^
and
/a*,
^',
ti^,
as for the several pieces of a mosaic, their
sequence and their coincidence are prescribed. But there was no necessity for any single one of these phases to occur
l6o

in this whole.
It
[Book
I.
more than once
was accordingly no
self-
evident necessity that there should be general laws
laws
With-
connecting the repetitions of a with repetitions of ^. out any such repetition, these series of events might
constantly
carrying
still
be
a
out
a predetermined
plan.
I
It
is
somewhat
adopt,
matter,
arbitrary interpretation
which
take leave to
since
Leibnitz himself gives

I
us no light
on the
distin-
when
understand that
rationality,
which
guishes the realisable images of worlds from the unrealisable,

to imply not merely
an agreement with
logical truths
of
thought, but this definite character of conformity to general

laws,
which
in
itself is
no necessity of thought
in
other
words, the fact that the

the world-plan are
able elements, which
demands made by the realisation of met by help of a multiplicity of comparfall
and by
repetitions of
under common generic conceptions, comparable events, which fall under

nor without
it
it
general laws.
But neither with

properly satisfied.
perfection
this interpretation
are
we
If in the last resort
is
the greatest
which
determines the divine choice between
different rational
images of worlds,
is
it
then self-evident
per-
that
among
is
the indispensable pre-conditions of the
be reckoned above all this conformity to universal law, and that anything which lacked it was not even open to choice ? For the coherence of our scientific efforts this conformity to law, which is the sole foundation for our knowledge of things, has indeed attained such overpowering importance, that its own independent value seems
fection
to to us almost unquestionable.
Yet, after
all,
is
it
certain
good is attained, if every a is always followed by the same 3, than if it were followed sometimes by /3, sometimes by y, sometimes by 5, just as was at each moment required by the constantly changing residue of the plan still to be fulfilled ? Might there not be as good reason to find fault with those general laws as at bottom vexatious hindrances, cutting short a multitude of
that intrinsically a greater
Chap, v.]
CA USA TION INVOL VES LA WS,

which but
for
beautiful developments
their
troublesome
this thought,
intervention
perfect world
it
might have
still
made
?
the
If
system of the most

confidence in
more
is
perfect
we pursue
becomes
clear
what
for us the source of
the necessary validity of universal laws.
In a dream, which
needs no fulfilment, we find a succession possible of the most beautiful events, connected only by the coherence of
their import
:
and the case would be the same
if
a realisation
of this dream could

spell
come about through
the instantaneous
of
its
admission as a whole to
reality,
without the
requirement by each successive constituent of a labour of

production on the part of the previous ones.
If,
on the other hand, we follow our ordinary conception
of the world which finds this labour necessary, the state of

the case
is different. Supposing that in the moment t an element a of the world happened to be in the state a, and supposing it to be indispensable that, in order to the completion of the plan of the world or to the restoration of
its
equilibrium or to consecutiveness in
its
development, at
/3,
the same
moment
/,
b also should pass into the state

i.e.
then
the fact z of this necessity,
the present state of the
remaining elements, R, of the world, together with the change of a into a, must exert an action upon b. But in order that only /3 and not any other consequence may arise in b^ z and /S therefore also a and ^ must merely in
respect of their content, without reference to the phase of
development of the universe as a whole, belong together as members that condition each other and for that reason in
:
every case of the repetition of a the same consequence j3 will occur, so far as it is not impeded by other relations that condition the state of the case for the moment. Upon
this supposition, therefore,
which
is
habitual to us, that the
course of the world

active causation,
is
a gradual becoming produced by
its connexion according to general laws appears to us to be necessary. But this way of thinking is not reconcileable with the views of Leibnitz He looks Metaphysic, Vou I. RI
62
upon the whole sum of reahty as predetermined in all the details of its course and as coming into being all at once
through that mysterious admission to existence which he has
unhappily done so
little
it.
to define.
No work
is
left
is
to
be
gradually done within
But
if this
supposition
granted
him, the limitation of realisability to such projected worlds

as have their elements connected according to general laws
is
an
arbitrary assumption.
manifold occurrences
Jtherefore
any dreammight
Any combination whatever

in this
of
way have
We have here an inconsistency in Leibnitz' doctrine. If the necessity of general laws was to be saved from disappearing, there were only, it would seem, two ways of doing it. He should either have exhibited them as a condition of that perfection of the world which renders it worthy of existence and it is not improbable that he would have decided for or he should have given up the attempt this alternative to substitute for the unintelligible action of one thing on another an even more unintelligible pre-establishment of all
just as well obtained a footing in reality.
things.
CHAPTER
The
68.
VI.
Unity of Things.
There
is
only one condition, as
we have
found,
under which the conception of a 'transeunt' operation can be banished from our view of the world and replaced by that of a harmony between independent inner developThe condition is that we make upi ments of Things. our minds to a thoroughly consistent Determinism, which regards all that the world contains as collectively pre-J determined to its minutest details. So long, however, as we shrink from this conclusion, and cling to the hope, for which we have in the meantime no justification but which is still insuppressible, that the course of Things in which we live admits of events being initiated, which are not the necessary consequence of previous development
so long as this
is
the case the assumption of 'transeunt'
operation cannot be dispensed with by help either of the

theory of a predetermined sympathetic connexion, or by that
of an unconditioned validity of universal laws.

persuasion, therefore, might
seem
to
Our final depend on the choice
we make between
(that of
the two above-mentioned pre-suppositions complete determinism, and that which allows of new beginnings) a choice which theoretical reasons are
no longer
case
sufficient to decide.
But
if this
were
really the
point which I reserve for later investigation

left
the
)
option
open
the
to
us would be a justification for deplace

hypothetically,
to
veloping,
in
first
the
further
conceptions which
we should have
form as to 'transeunt'
\
(
64
if
THE UNITY OF
we maintained
I
THINGS.
[Book
I.
operation
stated
ation.
having adopted the second of the suppositions
the necessity of assuming such opercannot however apply myself to this task without
in order to prevent misunderstandings,
once again repeating,
a warning that has already been often given. My purpose cannot be to give such a description of the process by which every operation comes about as may
enable the reader to present
thus by demonstrating
it
to his
mind's eye, and
how
proof that it merely to get rid the conception of a 'transeunt' operation obscure to us while, although in fact understanding just as little how an
convincing
is
view
happens to give the most can happen. The object in of the difficulties which make
it
*
I
immanent
'
operation comes about,

it
we make no
scruple
about accepting
condition,
effect,
as a given fact.
How
in
any case a
its
if realised,
begins in turn to give reality to
about uprooting a present state of anything and planting another state in the real world of that no account can be given. Every description that might be attempted would have to depict processes and
or
it
how
sets
modes of
action which
necessarily
presuppose the very
operation that has to be explained as already taking place
many times over between the several elements which are summoned to perform it. Indeed the source of many of
the obscurities attaching to our notion of operation
lies in
by images derived from complex applications of the notion itself, which for that reason lead necessarily to absurdity if supposed to have any bearing on its simplest sense. If we avoid these unprofitable attempts, and confine ourselves to stating that which opereifort to explain
it
our persistent
ation actually consists
in,
we must
is
state
it
simply thus
that
the reality of one state
the condition of the realisation
of another.
as
its
product
This mysterious connexion we allow so long is merely the development of one and the
same Being within the unity of that Being's nature. What seems unthinkable is how it can be that something which
Chap. VI.]
THINGS NOT INDEPENDENT.
165
occurs to one Being, A^ can be the source of change in

another, B.
69. After so many failures in the attempt to bridge a gulf of which we have no clear vision, in the precise mode demanded by imagination, we can only hope for a better result if we make the point clear in which the cause of our
difficulty lies.
In the course of our consideration of the

led, at the outset, to the
world we were
of Things.
notion of a plurality
offer the
Their multiphcity seemed to
most con-
venient explanation for the
equally great
multiplicity of
appearances.
Then
the impulse to
become acquainted with

lie at
the unconditioned Being which must
the foundation
of this process of the conditioned was the occasion of our

ascribing this unconditioned Being without suspicion to the
very multiplicity of elements which
we found
to exist.
If
we stopped
short of assigning to every reality a pure Being
that could dispense with all relations to other Beings, yet
even while allowing relations we did not give up the independence of Things as against each other which we assumed It was as so many independent unities that to begin with. we supposed them to enter into such peculiar relations to
each other as compelled their self-sufficing natures to act and react upon each other. But it was impossible to state in what this transition from a state of isolation to metaphysical combination might consist, and it remained a standing contradiction that Things having no dependence on each other should yet enter into such a relation of dependence as each to concern itself with the other, and to conform itself in its own states to those of the other. This prejudice must be given up.
multiplicity
There cannot be a
all
of independent
is
Things, but
elements,
if
be possible between them, must be regarded as parts of a single and real Being. The Pluralism with which our view of the world began has to give place to a Monism, through which the transeunt operation, always unintelligible, passes into an immanent operation.
reciprocal action
to
' '
'
'
66
THE UNITY OF
first
THINGS.
[Book
I.
suggestion of the impossibility of that unlimited
pluralism was, strictly speaking, afforded as soon as
we
felt
the necessity of apprehending the events which" form the
course of the world, as Consequents that can be known from Antecedents. If no elements of the world admitted of
comparison any more than do our feelings of sweet and red, would be impossible that with the union of the two A and in a certain relation C there should be connected a consequence F^ to the exclusion of all other consequences. For in that case the relation of A to B^ which alone could justify this connexion, would be the same the two elements being completely incomparable and alien to each other as
it
between any two other elements, A and M, B and A^ and N. There would accordingly be no legitimate ground for connecting the consequence with one rather than another pair of related elements, or indeed for any definite connexion whatever. Hence it appears that the independent elements of the world, the many real essences which we supposed that there were, could by no means have had unlimited licence of being what they liked as soon as each single one by simplicity of its quality had satisfied the conditions under which its position was possible. Between their qualities there would have had to be throughout a commensurability of some kind which rendered them, not indeed members of a single series, but rnembers of a system in which various series are in some way related to each other. All however that this primary unity necessarily implied on the part of the elements of the world was simply this commensurability. Their origin from a single root, or their permanent immanence in one Being, it only rendered
that
'
'
probable.
It is
not
till
we come
to the consideration of
cause and effect that we find any necessity to adopt this

further view
to hold that
Things can only
exist as parts of
a single Being, separate relatively to our apprehension, but
not actually independent.

70. This conclusion of our considerations requires so
Chap. VI.]
THE ONE REALITY.

be added
in the
167
much
to
way of
justification
is
and defence
it.
that to begin with
my
only concern
to explain
Let
be the single truly existing substance, A, B, and i? the single Things into which, relatively to our faculties of presomehow resolves sentation and observation, the unity of itself ^4 and B being those upon the destinies of which our the sum of all the other attention has to be employed, things to which has to be applied, by help of analogy, all Then by the formula that we lay down about A and B.
M=
If
<t>
(A
B J^)
we
express
the thought that a certain
definite
connexion of
the whole nature
^ ^ and of M.
B, indicated by
<^,
exhibits
we allow
ourselves further to assume that one of the
individual elements has undergone a transition from
into
however the excitement to transition may have arisen B B) and M then the former equation between
this
(f>
(a
will
would only be re-established by a corresponding change on the part of the other members of the {a b R') = J/ would anew express the whole group, and Let us now admit the supposition that the nature of M. susceptibility, which we had to recognise in every finite Being a susceptibility in virtue of which it does not ex-
no longer
hold.
It
(f)
perience changes without maintaining itself against
them
by reaction
existing
in
that this belongs also to the one, the truly
M\
then the production of the

will
new
states b
and R^
be the necessary consequence of the change to a that has occurred in A But this change a was throughout not merely a change of the one element A^ for
.
and
such a change would have needed some medium to extend its consequences to and R. It was at the same time, without having to wait to become so, a change of M, in
which alone, in respect of Being and content, A has its reality and subsistence. In like manner this change of does not need to travel, in order as by transition into a domain not its own, to make its sign in and R. It too, without having to become so by such means, is already a
68
[Book
I.
change of
and Or
what they contain and subsistence only in M. if we prefer another expression, in which we start from the apparent independence of A B and R the only mediation which causes the changes of B and R to follow on with itself, and in its those of A consists in the identity of susceptibility which does not admit a change a without again restoring the same nature by production of the compensatory change d and R^. To our observation a presents itself as an event which takes place in the isolated element A d SiS a second event which befalls the equally
in respect of
are,
B and R^
which
equally have reality
isolated B.
In accordance with
'
this
appearance we
call
upon B, which in truth is only an immanent operation of upon M. A process thus seems to us to be requisite to bring the elements A and B,
that a
*
transeunt
operation of
originally
indifferent towards
of mutual sympathy.
relation, for at
each other, into a relation In truth they always stand in that every moment the reality which they simulits
taneously possess has
connexion in the import of
M, and
(as the
^
its
or
is
the complement to
be), required
itself,
B and B,
sls
or to d
and B^
case
may
by AI in order to the maintenance of

just
equality with
or d
is
the complement
required to
and
i? or to
and B^.
manifold original essences,
Our
only
earlier idea, therefore, of
jmconditionally existing and of independent content, which
came
that
afterwards to
fall
together into variable actions

other,
and
idea,
reactions
upon each
passes
into
a different
of manifold elements, of which the existence
and content is throughout conditioned by the nature and reality of the one existence of which they are organic members; whose maintenance of itself places them all in a constant relation of dependence on each other as on it; according to whose command, without possibility
of offering
resistance or of rendering any help which should be due to their own independent reality, they so order themselves at every moment that the sum of
Chap.Vl.i
GRADATIONS OF CONNEXION.
169
Things presents a new identical expression of the same^ meaning, a harmony not pre-established, but which at each^ moment repr oduces its elf through the power of the one^
existence^
71. Before passing to details, let me remark that I would not have these statements regarded as meant to describe a
process which needed to be hit upon by conjecture, and did not naturally follow from the metaphysical demand which it was its purpose to satisfy. Or, to use another
do not imagine myself to have stated what we have to think in order to render reciprocal action intelligible, but what we in fact do think as soon as we explain to ourselves what we mean by it. If we suppose a certain Being A to conform itself to the state b of another Being
expression, I
and
to
fall
into the state ^, this thought directly implies the
other, that the
change b which at first seemed only to befall change for the other Being, A. There may be required investigation of the mode in which /5 is a change also for A^ but there can be no doubt that it has to be brought under the same formal conception of a state of A which we at first only applied to a. But the idea that the states of a Being are at the same time states of another Being A^ involves the direct negation of the proposition that A and are two separate and independent Beings for a unity of the exclusive kind by which each would set a barrier between itself and the other, if it is to be more than verbally maintained if it is to be measured according to what may be called its practical value can only consist in J complete impenetrability on the part of the one against all/l
is
also a
conditions of the other.
'
was not necessary that the unity of all individual Beings should be conjectured or discovered as an hypothesis enabling us to set aside certain difficulties that are in our
it
Thus
way.
It
is,
as
it
analysis can be
shown
If
seems to me, a thought which by mere to be involved in the conception of
reciprocal action.
we fancy
it
possible to maintain that
I70
THE UNITY OF THINGS,
[Book
I.
Things are to begin with separate and mutually independent Unities, but that there afterwards arises between them a relation of Union in operation, we are describing, not an actual state of Things or a real process, but merely the movement of thought which begins with a false supposition and afterwards, under the pressure of problems which it has
itself raised,
seeks m. imperfect fashion to restore the correct

it
View which
should have had to

all
start with.
72. Moreover, in the logical requisites of a theory, this
view of the original unity of

inferior to the other
It
Things in
is
by no means
all all
view of their changeable combinations.
might be urged indeed that our view represents
Things
in the
too indiscriminately as comprehended once for

unity of
M^ and
thus has no place for the gradations that
exist in the intimacy of their relations to
each other
that
the opposite view, by recognising on the one hand the

progress from a complete absence of relation to an ever
greater closeness of relation,
and on the other the
relaxation
of relations that previously existed, alone admits of due
adjustment to experience, which

lively action
testifies in one case to a and reaction of Things upon each other, in
another to their mutual indifference.
In truth the reverse

far
seems to
me
to
be the
case.
So
we
regard
all
as
comprehensive Being. As to the concrete content of that which is we know nothing, to occupy this supreme position of and therefore can settle nothing as to the form 0, in which
expressing only the formal thought of the one
according to
its
nature
it
at
each
is
moment comprehends
the
sum
our
(a
of
finite realities.
There
nothing, however, against
assuming the
R).
possibility
of
M=4>{ABJ^\ M=
/3
{A Brp),
M=
the various
<\>
equations;
{A 2 R'\
Af=
Of
these equations the second would express the
into r change in the sum of the members is balanced by a second p, and therefore does not require a compensatory change on the part of A and B. This being so, the two latter would appear
possibility of a
a change which
1;
Chap. VI.]
APPARENT INDEPENDENCE,
by the
alteration of the rest of the world in
17
unaflfected
which
they are included.
Of
the
third
equation the meaning
change of i?, viz. into i?S only requires a change ^ in B, to which A would appear indifferent; while the fourth would represent a reciprocal action which exhausts itself between A and B^ leaving the
would be
that another
rest of the
It
world unaffected.
is
thus appears that our view
not irreconcileable with
any of the gradations which the mutual excitability of the There would be nothing world's elements in fact exhibits. to prevent us even from ascribing to the unity, in which
they are
all
comprehended,
at
various
moments
various
degrees of closeness
down
to the extreme cases in
which
two elements, having no effect whatever on each other, have all the appearance of being two independent entities or in which, on the other hand, limited to mutual operation,
they detach themselves from
all
other constituents of the
world as a pair of which each belongs to the other. But the source of these gradations would not be that elements
originally
relations ranging in intensity

like to imagine.
independent were drawn together by variable from nought to any degree we

Their source would be that the plan of which holds things permanently together, obliges
that unity
them
at every
moment
either to
new
reciprocal action of
definite kind
and degree or to the maintenance of their previous state, which involves the appearance of deficient^
reciprocal action.
Thus the reason why
things take the
appearance of independence as against each other is not that the Unity M^ in which they are always comprehended, is sometimes more, sometimes less, real, or even altogether
ceases to be, but that the offices which
M imposes on them
vary
so that every degree of relative independence which
things exhibit as against each other
is itself the consequence of their entire want of independence as against J/, which never leaves ihem outside its unity. That relations, on the
other hand,
which did
not
previously subsist
between

1^2
[Book
I.
independent things, can never begin to subsist, I have already pointed out, nor is it necessary to revert to this
impossible notion.
73. The 7^ consists
is, not indeed what how, even as a mere matter of logical relation, the connexion assumed between it, the One, and the multiplicity of elements dependent on it is to be thought of. We have contented ourselves with describing these
next question to be expected

in but
elements as parts of the
infinite
if
M,
We
should find no
lack of other designations
we cared
to notice all the
theories which the history of philosophy records as having
on various grounds arrived at a similar Monism. We might read of modifications of the infinite substance, of its developments and differentiations, of emanations and Much discussion and enthusiasm has radiations from it. gathered round these terms. Their variety serves in some measure to illustrate the variety of the needs by which men were led to the same persuasion. Stripped of their figurative clothing a clothing merely intended to serve the unattainable purpose of presenting to the mind's eye the process by which the assumed relation between the one and the multitude of finite beings is brought about all that
they collectively contain in regard to the import of this

relation
amounts merely
to
a negation.
They
all
den}^
the independent reality of

'them.
cannot determine positively the nature of the bond which' unites

finite
things, but they
This inability by itself would not to my mind form any ground of objection to the view stated. The exact determination of a postulate, whether effected by means of affirmations or by means of negations, may claim to be a philosophic result even when it is impossible to present anything to the mind's eye by which the postulate is fulfilled. An intuition, however a presentation to the mind's eye of that which according to its very idea is the source of all what we shall not look for. is possibility of intuition
Chap. VI.]
THE ONE AND THE MANY,
173
"
Neither the One, before its production of the manifold capable of arrangement in various outlines, nor the metaphysical process, so to speak, by which that production is
brought about, can be described by help of any
figure, for
the possibility of presentation as a figure depends on they previous existence of the manifold, and the origin of the
]
manifold world in the case before us

issue.
is
just the point at

is
But
it
does not follow that there
no meaning
in
the conception of that relation of dependence of the
many
upon the one.

persistent
things in
Though unable to state what constitutes the of the bond which connects individual reality, we can yet seek out the complex modes in
force
:
which its unimaginable activity conditions the form of their connexion and the general ideas, which I have already indicated on the subject, in their application to our given experience, warrant the hope, on this side, of an unlimited growth of our knowledge. 74. In saying this however I do not overcome the objecIt will readily be allowed that tion which our view excites. the relation of the One being to the many does not admit It will be urged of being exhibited in any positive way. however that it ought not to involve a contradiction if it is to be admitted even as a postulate; yet how is it to be conceived that what is one should not only cause a manifold to issue out of itself, but should continue to be this manifold? This question has at all times formed one of the
difficulties
of philosophy for the reason that in
fact,
what-
ever
may have been

it.
the point of departure, a thousand ways
lead back to
past of
German
in
philosophy.
need not go further back than the latest For the idealistic systems,
vitality
which ended
thing
finite,
Hegel, not merely the relativity of everyof the infinite which

its
but also the inner
projects the fullness of the manifold out of
unity,
was a
primary certainty which forced

aesthetic
itself
on the
spirit
with an
necessity
It
accordingly.
and determined every other conviction must be allowed that this prerogative of
174
[Book
I.
the so-called reason in the treatment of things, as against
made by the understanding on behalf of an adherence to its law of identity, has been rather vigorously asserted than clearly defended against the attacks made on
the claims
it
in the interest of this law.
In the bold paradox, that
it
is
just in contradiction that there rests the deepest truth,
originally been conceived as the mystery of be transferred in a very questionable way to our methods of thought. There ensued in the philosophy of Herbart a vigorous self-defence on the part of formal logic against this attack a defence which no doubt had its use as restoring the forms of investigation that had disappeared during the rush and hurry of dialectical development,' but which in the last resort, as it seems to me, can only succeed by presupposing at the decisive points the actual existence, in some remote distance, of that unity of the one and the many, which in its metaphysic it was so shy of admitting. On this whole question, unless I am mis-
that
which had
things
came
to
'
taken, there
is
not
much
'
objected by the young Socrates in the

assertions of Zeno.
Is
be said than what is Parmenides' to the there not one idea of likeness and
else
to
'
another of unlikeness?
unlike according as
And
are
in
we not
called
like
or
one or the other ? Now if something partook in each of the opposed ideas, and then had to be called like and unhke at the same time, what would there be to surprise us in that ? No doubt if a man tried to make out likeness as such to be equivalent to unlikeness as such, that would be incredible. But that something should partake in both ideas and in consequence should be both like and unlike, that I deem as little absurd as it is to call everything one on account of its participation
we partake
in the idea of unity
and
at the
same time many on account
of
its
equal participation in the idea of multiplicity.
The
only thing that

city,
we may not do
at
first
is
to take unity for multipli-
or multiplicity for unity.'
76. It
may seem
sight as if Socrates
had only
Chap. VI.]
COMPATIBILITY OF OPPOSITES.
difficulty
175
possibility,
pushed the
it
a step further back.
The
may be
is
said,
of simultaneous participation in those two
ideas
ject.
just
With
this objection I
what the laws of thought forbid to every subcannot agree. I have previously
All that
it
pointed out the merely formal significance of the principle

of identity.
says
;
is
that
= A-,
that
is
and
that
many
are
many
in
that the real

short,
real
one is one and the

is
t-vry-,-*..*^
impossible
impossible;
itself,
that
every predicate
less so.
equivalent to
it
and every subject no
By
itself
says nothing as to the possibility of attaching several
predicates simultaneously, or even only one, to a single subject.
For that which we properly mean by connecting two 6* and P, as subject and predicate the which metaphysical copula subsisting between 5 and justifies this mode of logical expression is what cannot itself be expressed or constructed by means of any logical form. The only logical obligation is when once the connexion has been supposed or recognised, to be consistent
thinkable contents
'
with ourselves in regard to
it.
Therefore the law of ex-
cluded middle in
unambiguous form asserts this, and only this ; that of two judgments which severally affirm and deny of the same subject 6* the same predicate only one can be true. For even that metaphysical copula, which unites S and P^ whatever it may consist in, must be equivalent to itself. If it is F, it cannot be non- V\ if nonF, it cannot be V. Thus the propositions, S is P, and
its
.S is
not P^ are irreconcileable with each other
but the
propositions,
until
it
is
P, and
is
non-P, are reconcileable

is
is
established as a matter of fact that there
no
non-/*
= Q
is
W^
that
which can be connected with 6" by a copula, reconcileable with V. No one therefore disputes
'
the simultaneous validity of the propositions,
the body
S is
extended
P^ and
It
compatible.
Logic finds them could not however state the reason of their
'
,5
has weight
Q'
compatibility, for the metaphysical copula, F,
and
i.
e.
the real behaviour on the part of the
between S body
176

its its
[Book
I.
which constitutes
tension attaches to
extension, or the
essence
is
as
mode unknown
in
which ex-
as the copula
W\ki^ behaviour which makes it heavy^ Still less could we show positively how it is possible for V and to subsist undisturbed along with each other. That is and remains a mystery on the part of the thing.
Let us
hand.
unity,
now
If
M
If
apply these considerations to the matter in

is
one, then
it
is
untrue that
it
is
not this
it
P.
it is
many, then
it is
impossible that
it
should
not be this multiplicity, Q.

multiplicity,
If
is
at
once unity and
it is impossible that either should be But from the truth of one determination there is no inference to the untruth of the other. This would only be the case if it could be shown that the concrete is incapable of uniting the two modes of nature of behaviour in virtue of which severally it would be unity and multiplicity. On the contrary, it might be held that their reconcileability is logically shown by pointing out that the
then
untrue of
it.
apparently conflicting predicates are not applicable to the

that we took to same subject, since it was not the one be equivalent to many M^ but the one unconditioned that we took to be equivalent to the many conditioned m.
But, although this

proposition
is
is
correct, yet the material content of our

this
inconsistent with
logical
justification.
supposed to be neither outside the many m nor It was supposed to possess the to represent their sum. same essential being, that of a real existence, which belongs to every m. Not even the activity which renders it one would, upon our view, be other than that which renders it many. On the contrary, by the very same act by which it
For
Mwas
constitutes the multiplicity,
it
opposes
it
itself to this as unity,

it
and by the same

opposes
where,
act
by which
constitutes the unity
itself to this
as multiplicity.
Thus
and
here,
if
any-
we
expressly presuppose the essential unity of the
subject to which
we
ascribe at once unity
multiplicity.
At the same time
that other consideration
must be
in-
Chap. VI .]
IDENTITY FORBIDS NO THING.

;
77
sisted
on
that
it
is
quite unallowable to leave out of sight
the peculiar significance of the whole procedure which our
theory ascribes to
M, and
to generate a contradiction
thinking of unity and multiplicity as united with

express by the bald copula,
by
in that
!
meaningless way which the logical schemata of judgment

is.
If this
word
is
to
have an
unambiguous logical meaning of its own, it can only be the meaning of an identity between the content of two ideas as such. The various meanings of the metaphysical copula, ^-""^ on the contrary, it never expresses that copula which, as subsisting between one content and another, justifies us in connecting them, by no means always in the same sense, Ls~^\^ but in very various senses, as subject and predicate. While it cannot be denied, then, that the one is the many, if we must needs so express ourselves, still in this colourless expression it is impossible to recognise what we mean to convey. The one is by no means the many in the same neutral sense in which we might say that it is the one. It
is
the
many
rather in the active sense of bringing

in
it.
it
forth
and being present
This definite concrete import of our proposition the assertion that such procedure is really possible is what should have been disputed. There is no
1^
meaning whatever in objections derived from the treatment of unity and multiplicity, in abstractor apart from their
actual points of relation, as opposite conceptions.
That
they are, and cannot but be so opposed,

manifold.
is
self-evident.
Every one allows it the moment he speaks of a unity of the For there would be no meaning in what he says if he did not satisfy the principle of identity by continuing to understand unity merely as unity, multiplicity merely as
multiplicity. Neither this principle, then, nor that of excluded middle, is violated by our doctrine. On the other hand, they are alike quite insufficient to decide the possibility
of a relation, of which the

into
full
brought under these abstract formulae.
we
fall
an error already noticed.

Vou
I.
meaning cannot be In applying them From the laws which
Metaphysic,
178

its
[Book
I.
our thought has to observe in connecting

nature of things,
infer limitations
-
ideas as to the
we deem upon what
ourselves able immediately to

is
possible in this nature of
things.
V
/*
\j/
^t3#S
"
76. I must dwell for a moment longer on this point, which I previously touched upon. Reality is infinitely "^^^^ ^^^^ thought. It is not merely the case that the complex material with which reality is thronged can only be
presented by perception, not produced by thought.

^-'
Even
the universal relations between the manifold do not admit
of being constructed out of the logical connexions of our

ideas.
'
*^
^j
The
principle of identity inexorably bids us think of
every
as
=
it
A.
as
If
we
followed this principle alone and

limit of that
looked upon
an ultimate
which the nature
^
'*
we should never arrive at the thought of there being something w^hich we call Becoming. Having recognised, however, the reality of becoming, we persuade
of reality can yield,
ourselves that
Identity,
result,
it
at every
moment
satisfies
the principle of
J^
**
though
in a
and that its no connexion, which Logic allows, of elements identical or not-identical. For certainly if a passes through the stages a^ a^ a^ into d, it is true that at each moment a = a, a^=a}j a^=za\ a^=a^^ b=d, and the principle of Identity is satisfied but, for all that, it remains the fact that the same a which was real is now unreal, and the b which was unreal is real. How this comes about how it is that the reality detaches itself from one thing, to which it did belong, and attaches itself to another from which it was absent this remains for ever inexplicable by thought, and even the appeal to the
;
manner which outrages it in the total proper nature can be comprehended by
I
1
lapse of time does not

that
make
the riddle clearer.

b^
It is true
between the extremities, a and

in
of that chain, our

a^,
perception traverses the intermediate links, n\
and so
on.
an indivisible moment into its successor. If we thought of a^ as broken up into the new chain a^ o.^ Og, each of these links in turn would be identical
But each of these passes
Chap. VI.]
THOUGHT INADEQUATE TO REALITY.

so long as
it
179
with
itself,
the immediately sequent
empty time from Og, still not-being would have to be thought of as taking place in one and the same moment, and could not be expanded into
a
remained in existence, and even if a^ were separated by an interval of the transition of Og from being into
new
series of transitions.
Undoubtedly therefore, if we want to think ^/ Becoming^ wejiave to face the requirement of looking upon being and
not-being as fused with each other.
This, however, does j.
is
not imply that the import of either idea

other.
apprehended
not.
I
otherwise than as identical with itself and different from the
How
the fusion
is
to
be effected we know
Even
the intuition of
Time
only presents us with the de
facto solution of the problem without informing us

solved.
how
it is
But we know that in

are not, as
fact the
It
nature of reality
yields a result to us unthinkable.
teaches us that being
and not-being
there
is
we could not help thinking them

but that
to be, contradictory predicates of every subject,
an alternative between them, arising out of a union This of the two which we cannot construct in thought. explains how the extravagant utterance could be ventured upon, that it is just contradiction which constitutes the truth of the real. Those who used it regarded that as contradictory which was in fact superior to logical laws which does not indeed abrogate them in their legitimate ap plication, but as to which no sort of positive conjecture || \it*^ could possibly be formed as a result of such application.
77.
The
like over-estimate of logical principles, the habit

is
of regarding them as limitations of what
really possible,
would oblige us to treat as inadmissible the most important assumptions on which our conception of the world is
founded.
activity,
All ideas of conditioning, of cause
and
effect,
of
connexions of things, which no thought can succeed in constructing. For thought

require
us to presuppose
occupies
itself
with the eternally subsisting relations of that
which forms the content of the knowable, not with real
l8o
existence
[Book
I.
and with that which renders this existence for ever something more than the world of thoughts. In regard, however, to all the rest of these assumptions the imaginings
'
of
^
,
speculation' have been busied, though in our eyes in-
effectually, in
It
banishing them from our theory of the world.

itself that
it
was only Becoming

effect,
could not deny, even
after reducing
professedly every activity to a relation of
cause and
cession
substituted
of phenomena.
for
and every such Even if
relation to a
in
mere
sucit
the
outer world
the actual
succession of events a mere
appearance of such succession, it could not but recognise a real Becoming and succession of events at least in those
beings in and for which the supposed appearance unfolded
itself.
It
is
to this
one instance,
therefore, of
Becoming,
that
we confine ourselves in order to convey the impression of how much may exist in reality without possibility of being
reproduced by a logical connexion of our thoughts. One admission indeed must be made. Of the fact of Becoming
at
immediate perception convinced us. It cannot connexion which we assumed between the one unconditioned real and the multiplicity of its conditioned forms, is more than a postulate of our reflection, that it is a problem eternally solved in a fashion
rate
any
similarly convince us that the
as mysterious as
is
Becoming
itself.
This makes
it
of the more interest to see
how this
Even
require-
ment of the
is
unity of the manifold, in one form or another,

itself
always pressing
upon us anew.
the metait,
physic of Herbart, though so unfavourably disposed to
has to admit
at things,
qualities,
it
among
those 'jLCcidental' ways of looking
by which it sought to make the perfectly simple a and ^, of real beings, so far comparable with
each other as to explain the possibility of a reciprocal action taking place between them. If the simple a was taken to
=^p-^x^ the no less simple b \.q z=g~x, these substitutions were to be called 'accidental' only for the reason that the preference of these to others depended on the use to which
Chap
VI.]
HERBAR TS A CCIDENTAL ASPECTS:

'
was intended to put them, not on the nature of the things. had been the explanation of another process, a might just as well have been taken to = r-\-y in order However to be rendered comparable with (say) c= s~y. unaffected, therefore, by these 'accidental' modes of treatment the essence of things might be held to be, their
it
If the object
application
always involves the pre-supposition
that
the
perfect simplicity of quality,
from which any
sort of
com-
is held to be excluded, may in respect of its content be treated as absolutely equivalent not merely to some one but to a great number of connected multiplicities.
position
complex exbe equivalent to a simple one, has made the application of this view to the essence of things seem less questionable than it is. For that which is indicated by those simple mathematical expressions makes
ease with which, in mathematics, a
pression can be
The
shown
to
no
sort of claim to
an indissoluble metaphysical unity of
content as do the real essences.

possibility of
On
the contrary, the
rests
innumerable equivalents being substituted for in this case on the admitted infinite divisibility of_iz,
its
which allows of
being broken up, and the fragments re;
compounded, in any number of forms or else, in geometry, on the fact that a is included in a system of relations of position, which implies the possibility in any given case of
bringing into view those external relations of a to other
elements of space by which it may contribute to the solution of a problem proposed without there being any necessity for
an alteration
in the conception of the content of
itself.
The
essence of things cannot be thought of in either of
these ways.
The
'
introduction of mathematical analogies
could only serve to illustrate, not to justify, this metaphysical use of accidental' points of view. Whoever counts it admissible maintains, in so doing, the new and independent
proposition that the unity of the
uncompounded
quality,
by which one
is
real essence is distinguished
from another,
identical with
many mutually connected
multiplicities.
t82
78.
lBooIc I.
further
step
must be taken.
its
The
'
accidental
views' are not merely complex expressions, by which
our
thought according to a way of

to itself one
different
own
contrives to present
ways of arriving
oi b
2i%
and the same simple essence ; not merely our at the same end. The course of
In the presentation of a
events
as
itself
corresponds to them.
=p-^x and
qx there was
more than a mere
view of ours.
In the opposition that we assumed to take place between \-x and x^ which wôuld destroy each other if they could, lay the active determining cause of an
effort
of self-maintenance on the part of each being, which

elicited
was not
q.
Now
by the mutually indifferent elements, / and whether we do or do not share Herbart's views as
to the real or apparent to the
happening of what happens and as this in any case amounts to an admission that not merely the content of the simple qualities is at once unity and multiphcity, but also that the
meaning of self-maintenance,
things, so far as they are things, in their doing
and
suffering
are at once one
and many.
It is
itself
only with that element
of
its
essence that a asserts
all that x which finds remains no less in indissoluble connexion with /, which for the present has no occasion for activity, and which would come into play if in another being d it met with a tendency, /, opposed to it. For reasons to be mentioned presently I cannot adopt this way of thinking. I have only pursued it so far in order to show that it asserts the unity of the manifold, and that in regard to the real, though in a different place from that That which in it is in which it seemed to me necessary. taken to be true of every real essence is what in our theory is required of the one Real ; except that with Herbart that abrupt isolation of individual beings continues in which we
and becomes an opposite element in b. But for
operative,
find a standing hindrance to the real
explanation of the
course of the world.

\
Herbart was undoubtedly right in holding that an unconditioned was implied in the changes
Chap. VI.]
RA TIONALITY OF WORLD WHA T?

But there was no necessity
183
\
-i-of the conditioned.
to seek this
unconditioned straightway in the manifold of the elements
which no doubt have to be presupposed as proximg-te

principles of explanation for the course of events.
The
experiment
is
not
made
of admitting this multiplicity, but

is
only as a multiplicity that

in the unity of
conditioned and comprehended
a single truly real Being.
Yet
it
is
only
avoided at the cost of admitting in the individual real a

multiphcity so conditioning itself as to
very
become
one, of the
same kind
I
as that
which
is
ostensibly denied to the
Real as a whole.
79.
return once
more
to Leibnitz.
He
too conceives
manifold mutually-independent
Monads
as the elements of
the world, in antithesis, however, to the unity of God, by
whose understanding, according

reality is
to Leibnitz,
is
determined
its
.
the content of what takes place in the world, even as
determined by his will. If we can make up our minds to abstain from at once dismissing the supports drawn from a philosophy of religion, which Leibnitz has
given to his theory, there
going back
is nothing to prevent us from an eternally mobile Phantasy on the part of God, the creative source of those images of worlds which hover before His understanding. Those of the images which by the rationality of their connexion
still
further to
justify
themselves to this understanding are the possible
so long as
among which His will renders real. Now we think of a world-image. A, as exposed to this testing inspection on the part of the divine Being, so long we can understand what is meant by that truth, rationality or consistency, on which the possibility of its realisation is
worlds the best
held to depend.
part of
It is the state of living satisfaction on the God, which arises out of the felt frictionless harmony between this image as unfolding itself in God's consciousness and the eternal habits of his thought. In this active
divine intelligence which thinks
and enjoys every
feature of
the world image in
its
connexions with other features
in

knows how
to
84
which
[Book
I.
it
hold everything
together
the
image are combined and form not a scattered multiplicity but the active totality of a world which I have is possible because it forms such a complete whole. previously noticed the difficulty of assigning any further
several lines of the
determination which accrues to this world, already thought

of as possible,
if it is
not merely thought but by God's will
called into reality.
Howsoever
It
this
may
be,
it
could only
enjoy this further something which reality yielded under
one of two conditions.

the inner
enter
life
must
either continue within
of
God
as an eternal activity of his Being, or

its own, as a product which an independence scarcely to be
on an existence of
itself
detaches
defined.
from him,
in
The first Immanence
of these
in
suppositions
God
we
that
of
the
world's
It
do not
further pursue.
will
lead directly back to our view that every single thing
and
_
event can only be thought as an

tory,
activity,
constant or transi-
and substance as the mode of being and substance of this one Existence, its nature and form as a consistent phase in the unfolding of
of the one ExistencCj,
its
reality
the same.
If,
on the other hand, we follow Leibnitz

is
in preferring
the other supposition that the real world
constituted by a
sum of developments of isolated Monads developments merely parallel and not interfering with each other, in what
precise form has this world preser\'ed the very property
on
it
which rested
its
claim to be called into reality?

or rationality, which
mean
?
that truth, consistency,
rendered
superior to the unrealisable dreams of the divine Phantasy
What would be gained by saying that in this world, while none of its members condition each other, everything goes
on
as
if
they
all
did so
that accordingly, while
it
does not
form a whole, yet to an intelligence directed to it, it will have the appearance of doing so ; that, in one word, its reality consists in a hollow and delusive imitation of that
really
Chap. VI.]
HOW DO
reason
RELATIONS EXIST?
185
inner consistency which was pronounced to be, as such, the

ultimate
why
its
reahsation was possible
can
anticipate an objection that will here

it
be made
doubtless,
exist reciprocal conditions,
between the elements of this world there though it may not follow that the elements actually operate on each other in accordance with these conditions ; they exist in the form of a sum of
will
be
said,
actually present
relations
of
all
elements to
truth, they
all,
but the
presence of these relations does not imply an Intelligence

that
comprehends them;
like
any
continue to
hold though no one thinks of them.
The
I
substance of what I have to say against the ad-
such views I postpone for a moment. Here would only remind the reader that all this might equally be said of the unrealised world-image A as supposed to be still hovering before the divine understanding. At the same time something more might be said of it. For in this living thought of God it was not merely the case that a part a of this image stood to another part b in a certain relation, which might have been discovered by the attention of a mind directed to it. For in fact this consciousness actually was constantly directed to it, and
missibility of
in
this
consciousness, in
their
its
relating activity,
these rela-
tions
fact in
had
being.
The
presentation
of a
was
in
such an instance the
efficient
cause which brought
the presentation of b into the divine consciousness, or

this is
held to be the office of the Phantasy

it
which
it
if
at
any
of
rate retained
in consciousness
and recognised
as
the consistent
<^
complement
to a.
The
active conditioning
is
by ^
is
absent from the elements of reality and

to
expressly replaced, according
the theory in
question,
by the mere coexistence, without any active operation of one on the other, of things the same in content with the
presentations of the
divine consciousness.
Thus, to say
the least, the realised world, so far from being richer, is poorer in consequence of its supposed independent exist-
86
[Book
l.
ence as detached from the Divine Being in consequence of its course resulting no longer from the living presence of God but only from an order of relations established by him. The requirement that God and the world should not be so blended as to leave no opposition between them is in itself perfectly justified. But the right way to satisfy it would have been not by this unintelligible second act of constitution, by the realisation of what was previously an image of a merely possible world, but by the recognition that what in this theory is presented as a mere
possibility
is
and preliminary suggestion

full
(to the
mind
of
God)
in
fact the
reality,
all
but that nevertheless the one

the manifold, which only exists
remains different from

in
and through the one.

80. I
now
return to
the thesis, of which I just

for
now
postponed the statement
an
instant.
It at
once forms
the conclusion of a course of thought previously entered
on and has a
in the sequel.
decisive bearing
on all that I have to say At the outset of this discussion we came

'
to the conclusion that the proposition,
things
exist,'
has
no
meaning except that they stand in relations to each other. But these relations we left for the present without a name, and contented ourselves, by way of a first
intelligible
interpretation
relations
effect,
of our thought,
the
with
reference to
various
and of cause and of which the subsistence between things constituted

in
way of
space, time,
for
our every-day apprehension that which we
call
the
real existence of the world.
But between the constituents

merely thinkable as
of the world of ideas
opposed
found a complex of relations no less rich. Nay, our mobile thought, it seemed, had merely to will it, and the number of these relations might be indefinitely increased by transitions in the way of comto real
we
constituents
parison between points selected at pleasure.

sideration could not but
tions
elicit
This con-
the
demand
rests
that the rela-
on which the being of things
should be sought
Chap. VI.]
IN LOGIC RELATION IS REFERENCE.
187
only not
among those which obtain objectively between them, among such as our subjective process of thinking
^-^^
can by arbitrary comparisons establish between them. This distinction however is untenable. I repeat in regard to it what I have already in my Logic ^ had opportunity
of explaining in detail.
In the passage referred to
started
with considering
condition of
how
a representation of relations between
two matters of consciousness, a and b^ is possible. The its possibility I could not find either in the
mere succession or in the simultaneity of the two several presentations, a and ^, in consciousness, but only in a relati ng activity, which directs itself from one to^ the, other,"lwlding"IlTeTwcr Together. ^He who finds red and yellow to a certain extent different yet akin, becomes conscious, no doubt, of these two relations only by help of the changes which he, as a subject of ideas, experiences
from the idea of red to that of yellow ;' but, I added, he will not in this transition entertain any apprehension lest the relation of red to yellow may in itself be something different from that of the affections which they severally occasion in him lest in itself red should be like yellow and only appear different from it
in the transition
;
>,
^"''^^
to us, or lest in reality there should
be a greater difference between them than we know, which only appears to us

involve
to
nevertheless
certain
affinity.
Doubts
like
these might be entertained as to the external causes, to
us
still
unknow^n, of our feelings.
But so long as
it
is
not these causes but only our ow^n ideas, after they have
been excited
parison,
in
us,
that
form the object of our comthat the likenesses'^, differences,
we do not doubt
and
relations
which these exhibit on the part of our preat

is
sentative susceptibility indicate

relation"
the same time a real
on the part of what

is
represented to us.
Yet
how
exactly
this
possible?
How
'
can the propositions,

2
'[337.338.]
^
['
Sachliches Verhalteri
'
not
reales.'
See
['Gleichheiten.*] p. i, note.]
88
[Book
I.
is the same as , and, a is different from b^ express an objective relation, which, as objective, would subsist independently of our thought and only be discovered
or recognised by
_pose
himself to
identity^ of
it ? Some one may perhaps sti ll supknow what he means by a self-existent^ a with a\ but what will he make of a self-
existent distinction
relation will
between a and b
to
this
'
correspond
space
betiveen^ to
it
and what objective which we

suggests to us the
only attach a meaning, so long as

distance
in
which
?/<?,
metaphorically interpolated for
comparing a and b^ the purpose of holding the

in
two apart, and at the same time as a connecting path on which our mind's eye might be able to travel from one to the other ? Or to put the case otherwise since difference, like any other relation, is neither a predicate of a taken by itself nor of b taken by itself, of what is it a predicate ? And if it only has a meaning when a and b have been brought into relation to each other, what objective connexion exists between a and b in the supposed case where the relating activity, by which we
connected the two
in consciousness, is not
being exercised
The
to
only possible answer to these questions we found

If
to be the following.
a and
b,
as
we have
so far taken
be the
case,
are
not
things
belonging to
reality
and independent of our thought, but simply contents of possible ideas like red and yellow, straight and curved, then a relation between them exists only so far as we think it and by the act of our thinking it. But our soul is so constituted, and we suppose every other soul
outside
that
which inwardly resembles our own to be so constituted, the same a and b, how often and by whomsoever they may be thought, will always produce in thought
the same relation
relation that has
its
being only in
rela-
thought and by means of thought.

[
Therefore this
thinking
tion
is
independent of the
* [
individual
subject,
Gleichheit. gleich/ v. note on 19.]
Chap.VI.3
REAL RELATION
IS
ACTION.
189
and independent of the several phases of that subject's thought. This is all that we mean when we regard it as having an existence in itself between a and b and believe it to be discoverable by our thought as an object which has a permanence of its own. It really has this J permanence, but only in the sense of being an occurrence which will always repeat itself in our thinking in the same way under the same conditions. So long therefore as the question concerns an a and b^ of which the content is given merely by impressions and ideas, the distinction of objective relations obtaining between them, from subjective relations established between them by our thought, \ All relations which can be dis- T is wholly unmeaning. covered between the two are predicable of them on exactly all, that is to say, as inferences which the same footing their own constant nature allows to our thought and enjoins upon it; none as something which had an existence of its own between them prior to this inferential activity on our part. The relation of to ^ in such cases means, conformably to the etymological form of the term, our
I
act of referenced
81.
We
now
pass to the other case, which concerns us
here as dealing no longer with logic, but with metaphysics.
Let a and b indicate expressly Realities, Entities, or Things.
The
groups, a and b, of sensible or imaginable qualities, by which these things are distinguished from each other, we can still submit with the same result as before to our
arbitrary acts of comparison,
so doing
we
nificance for
unessential,
and every relation which by between the qualities will have a sigthe two things a and b equally essential or
find
objective
or non-objective.
No
relation
be-
>
tween them could be discovered if it were not founded on the nature of each, but none is found before it is
sought.
But
*
it
is
not these relations that

=*
we have
in view
if,
in
Beziehung.']
[*
Unsere Handlung des Beziehens.']
ipo
[Book
I.
order to render intelligible a connexion of the things a and b
which experience forces on our notice, we appeal to a relation C, which sometimes does, sometimes does not, obtain between a and b ; which is thus not one that belongs to the constant natures, a and ^, of the two things, but a relation into which the things, as already constituted independently of it, do or do not enter. In this case the conclusion is unavoidable that this objective relation C, to which we appeal, cannot be anything that takes place between a and b^ and that just for that reason it is not a relation in the ordinary sense of the term, but more than this. For it is only in our thought, while it passes from the mental image or presentation of a to that of b^ that there arises, as a per^ption immediately intelligible to thought, that which we here call a betiveen. It would be cjuite futile to try, on the contrary, to assign to this between, at once connecting and separating a and b^ which is a mere memorial of an act of
thought achieved solely by means of the unity of our consciousness, a real validity in the sense of its having an
independent existence of
ness which thinks
it.
its
own
apart from the conscioustrue,
We
are
all, it is
accustomed to
think of things in their multiplicity as scattered over a space,
through the void of which stretch the threads of their coni
necting relations whether we insist on and consider the existence of things

;
this
way of thinking
to
in the space
which we see around
us,
be only possible or whether we are
disposed with more or less clearness, as against the notion

of a sensible space, to prefer that of an intelligible space which would afford the web composed of those threads of But even if we relation equal convenience of expansion. cannot rid ourselves of these figures, we must at least allow that that part of the thread of relation which lies in the void between a and 3, can contribute nothing to the union of the two immediately but only through its attachment to a and b Nor does its mere contact with a and b suffice respectively. It must communicate to both a definite to yield this result.
Chap. VI.i
'BETWEEN^ THINGS UNMEANING.

its
19]
tension, prevalent throughout
own
length, so that they
are in a different condition from that in which they
would
be
if
this
tension were of a different degree or took a
different direction.
on these modifications of their inner state, which/ on these alone that the and these are 1 result of the relation between them depends obviously independent of the length and of the existence \' The termini a and b of the imagined thread of relation.
It is
A
'
v^,
a and b sustain from each other
can produce immediately in each other these reciprocal modifications, which they in the last resort must produce even on supposition that they communicated their tension to each other by means of the thread of relation ; since no one would so far misuse the figure as to make the thready which was ostensibly only an adaptation to sense of the
relation
between the termini, into a new

its
real
material^
/.r.^
capable of causing a tension, that has arisen in

the reciprocal action of
things,
itself
from
own
elements, to act on inert
a and ^, attached to it. Let us discard, then, this Let us admit that easy, but useless and confusing, figure. Jthere is no such thing as this interval between things, in
which, as
its
various possible modifications, we sought a place
for those relations, C, that
we supposed
to
form the ground
of the changing action of things upon each other.
That
which we sought under this name of an objective relation' between things can only subsist if it is more than mere relation, and if it subsists not between things but immediately in them as the mutual action which they exercise \ on each other and the mutual effects which they sustain from each other. It is not till we direct our thought in the way of comparison to the various forms of this action that we come to form this abstract conception of a mere relation, not yet amounting to action but preceding the action which
;
really takes place as its
ground or condition.
CHAPTER
Conclusion,
82.
VII.
We
may now attempt by way
of
summary
to deter-
mine how many of the
ontological questions, so far proposed,
admit of a final answer. In the first place, to stand in relations appeared to us at the beginning of our discussion to be the only intelligible import of the beginning of things. These relations are nothing else than the immediate internal reciprocal actions themselves which the things unremittingly exchange. Beside the things and that which goes on in them there is nothing in reality. Everything which we regard as mere relation all those relations which seem to
extend through the complete void of a

that
the real might enter into
them
between things^' so
subsist
its
solely
as/
images which our presentative faculty on
own account
originate in it and for it, as in its compares the likeness, difference, and sequence of the impressions which the operation of A^ B, C upon us brings into being this operation at each moment corresponding to the changeable inner states a, d, c, which A^B^C experience through their action on each other. To pursue this Thesis further is the problem of Cosmology,
makes
for itself
They
restless
activity
it
which deals with things and events as resting or passing in forms of space and time, and which will have to show how all relations of space and time, which we are accustomed to regard as prior conditions of an
the seemingly pre-existent
WHAT EXISTS IS A CONCRETE PHASE.

operation yet
to
193
ensue,
are
only expressions and con- ^
sequences of one already taking place. We find an answer further to the enquiry as to that
metaphysical C, that relation which it seems necessary should supervene, in order that things, which without it would have remained indifferent to each other, might be
placed under the necessity, and
tion
become
capable, of opera-
on each other. The question is answered to the effect that juch a thing as a non-C, a separation which would have jeft the things indifferent to each other, is not to be met with in reality and that therefore the question as to the transition from this state into that of combination is a
question
^^
concerning nothing.
The
unity
of
is
this
eternally present
cond ition of ^n_ interchange; of
action,
miremitting but varying to the highest degree of complexity.
For neither does this unity ever really exist in the general form indicated by this conception and name of unity and by this sign M. It really exists at each moment only as a ^L-^ case, having a definite value, of the equation for which I gave the formula \ and in such form it is at the same time
the efficient cause of the actuality of the state next-ensuing
as well as
the conditioning ground
of
what
this
state
contains.
Thu s
itself
the stream of this self-contained operation
propagates
out of
itself
sensible image
is
needed
to help us to
from phase to phase. apprehend
If a
it,
\^^
we
should not think of a wide-spread net of relations, in the
meshes of w^hich things

the threads,
together
lie
scattered, so that tightening of
now
at this point,
now
at that,
may draw them
and
force
them
to share each other's states.
We
L*^
should rather recall the many simultaneous 'Parts' of a piece of polyphonic music, which without being in place
are external to each other in so far as they are distinguished
by
their pitch
and
tone,
and of which
first
one and then

all
another, rising or falling, swelling or dying away, compels

the rest to vary correspondingly in
^
harmony with
itself
and
[Cp.
70.]
Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
194
CONCLUSION.
series of
is
[Book
I.
one another, forming a

itself.
the unity of a melody which
consistent
movements that result and complete
in in
83.
Our
last
considerations started from the supposition
that in a certain element
of
M a new
state a has
somehow
been introduced.
from the
real
It is natural that
now a
this
further question
should be raised as to the possibility of

actions depicted.
primary change,
re-
occurrence of which follows the course of
This question as to the beginning of
motion has been a recognised one since the time of Aristotle, but it has been gradually discovered that the answer to it cannot be derived from the unmoved, which seemed to Aristotle the ultimate thing in the world. The most various beliefs as to the nature and structure of reality agree upon
-
this, that
out of a condition of perfect rest a beginning of

arise.
motion can never

ally
Not merely a
all
multiplicity of origin-
given real elements, but also given motions between

the theories in which professors
them, are presupposed in

the
of the natural sciences, no less than others, strive to explain

origin of the actual course of the world
out of
its
simplest principles.
To
us,
with that hunger for explanation

it
which characterises our thought,

general
fact,
looks like an act of
despair to deny the derivability from anything else of
some
is
when
to
in regard to
its
individual forms one
accustomed
existence.
enquire for the conditions of their real

experience this feeling of despair
if
We
we
find
compelled to trace back the multiplicity of changeable bodies to a number of unchangeable elements. Yet the question, why it is just these elements and no others that enjoy the prerogative of original reality, does
ourselves
not force
others,
itself
upon
us.
Our fancy does not
avail,
beyond
the elements given by experience, to produce images of
which might have existed but were in some unin-
telligible
way cheated of
their equal claim to reality.
Of
the motions, on the contrary, of which these elements, once

given, are capable,
we
see
first
one and then another take
Chap. VII.]
FUTILE ENQUIRIES.
I95
place in reality according as their changing conditions bring
them about.
the rest that
turn
None
it
of
exclusively,
them appears to us so superior to and without depending in its

be regarded as
on
similar conditions, should claim to
the
first
actual motion of the real.
These considerations lead on the one side to an endless It is not necessary however at this point to complicate our enquiry by reference to the difficulties
regress in time.
connected with occurrence in time.

exclude them for the present.
But,
believe ourselves to reach a really
Our effort will be to no matter whether we

beginning or whether
single reality
first
we prolong the chain of occurrence

the established course of the world
in contrast with the
in endless retrogression,
is
anyhow a
which would have been realised if either the primary motion had been different, as it might have been, or if, which is equally thinkable, the endless progression, as a whole, had taken a different direction. For whether in reality it be finite or infinite, in either case its internal arrangement admits of
possibilities,
innumerable
permutations which, as
it is,
are not real.
All these doubts, however, are only different off-shoots of
a general confusion in our way of thinking and a complete
misunderstanding of the problems which a metaphysical

enquiry has to solve.
in
it.
The world once

Thought, which
for all
is,
and we are
It is constituted in
a particular way, and in us for

is
that reason there lives a
able to distinguish
all this is so,
different cases of a universal.
Now
that
there
may
this
arise in us the
in reality
which
images and conceptions of possibilities are not and then we imagine that we, with
;
Thought of
ours, are there before all reality
and have the
business of deciding what reality should arise out of these
empty
possibilities,
is
because there
reality
When
once, in this
which are yet all alike only thinkable from which this Thought springs. Thought, affirmation and denial of the
possible,
same content have become

o
those perverted questions against which

2
we can propose all we have so often
196
protested
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
Why there
is
a world
at
all,
when
it
is
thinkable
none ? Why, as there is a world, its and not some other drawn from the far-reaching content is domain of the non-M ? Given the real world as M^ why is it not in rest but in motion ? Given motion, why is it motion in the direction and not in the equally thinkable direction Z? To all these questions there is only one answer. It is
that there should be
not the business of the metaphysician to

recognise
it
;
make
reality
but to
is
to investigate the inward order of
what
deduce the given from what is not given. In order to fulfil this office, he has to guard against the mistake of regarding abstractions, by means of which he fixes single determinations of the real for his use, as constructive and independent elements which he can employ, by help of his own resources, to build up the real. In this mistake we have often seen metaphysicians entangled. They have formed the idea of a pure being and given to this a significance apart from all relations, in the affirmation of which and not otherwise it indicates reality. They have petrified that reality which can only attach to something completely determined, into a real-in-itself destiThey have spoken of laws as a tute of all properties. controlling power between or beyond the things and events In like in which such laws had their only real validity.
given, not to
manner we
existing
are inclined to think at the outset of the truly
M,
the complex of
;
all
things, as a motionless object

right in
of our contemplation
as in conceiving
identical with
it
and we are
it
doing so as long
us.
we think merely of the

which
that
signifies
fujiction, constantly
itself,
to
From
this
function,
it is
true,
simply as conceived, no motion follows.

it is
But we
forget
meantime
is
not this conception of this
function that
the
real,
but that which at each
function executes, and of which the concrete nature
moment the may

all
contain a kind of fulfilment of the function, which does not
follow from that conception of
embracing
it.
In what way that one
solves
its
problem
whether by maintaining a
'
Chap.
VII]
'
LIFE'
AND motion:
'
197
constant equality of content, or by a succession of innumerable different instances, of which each satisfies the
general equation prescribed by
affair.
its
plan
that
is
its
it
own
not
Between these two thinkable

choose as we
is
possibilities
is
is
for us to
will.
Our
business
to recognise
is
whichever of them
to us
it
given as
reality.
Now
what
given
is
the fact of Becoming.

It
is
No
denial of ours can banish
from the world.

itself,
not therefore as a stationary
identity with
but only as an eternally self-sustained
motion that we have to recognise the given being of that which truly is. And as given with it we have also to recognise the direction which its motion takes. 84. I have referred to the theories which agree with my own in being Mpmstic. In all of them motion is at the same time regarded as an eternal attribute of the supposed ^ This motion, however, was ultimate ground of the world. generally represented as a ceaseless activity, on the oppoj
sition of which, as living
and animating,
to the unintelligible
conception of a stark and dead reality the writers referred to

loved to dwell.
Such language shows
that the metaphysical
reasons for believing in the Unity of Being have been reinforced by aesthetic inclinations which have yielded a certain
is to be counted was not the mere characteristic of life and activity but their worth and the happiness found in the enjoyment of them which it was felt must belong in some supreme measure to that in which all things have their cause and reason. Such a proposition is more than at this stage!
prejudice as to the nature of the Being that
supreme.
It
to maintain. Life and meaning thus associated with them on supposition of the spirituality of the Being of which
of our enquiry
we
are
entitled
Activity only carry the special
they are predicated.
The only necessary inference, however, from the reasoning which has so far guided us is to an immanent operation, through which each new state of what Is becomes the productive occasion of a second sequent upon it, but which for anything we have yet seen to the
198
contrary
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
may be
a blind operation.
is
would not indeed

notwithis
conceal
my
conviction that there
justification,
standing, for a belief in the Life of that which
the ground
of the world, but

the statement.
it is
a justification of which
must postpone
would only
ask, subject to this proviso, to
be allowed the use of expressions, for the sake of brevity, of which the full meaning is indeed only intelligible upon a supposition, as we have seen, still to be made good, but which will give a more vivid meaning to the propositions we have yet to advance than the constant repetition of more
abstract terms could do.
85. So long as
is
all
we know oiMis
that,
the function which
it
required to
fulfil
namely, of being the Unity which
all that the world contains what it is so long we can derive nothing from this thought but a series of general and abstract deductions. Every single being which exists, exists in virtue not of any being of its own but of the com-
renders
mTssion given
just
it,
so to speak, by the one

its
and
is
it
exists
so
long as
particular
being
is
required for the

it
fujfilment of the equation
M:= M.
Again,
what
it
is
not absolutely and in immemorial independence of anything

else
;
it is
that
which the one J^ charges
it
to be.
One
thing,
finally,
operates on another not by
own, but in virtue
means of any force of its of the One present in it, and the mode
prejust
and amount of its operation at each moment is that scribed it by il/for the re-establishment of the equation
spoken
I
of.
To the
further interpretation of these propositions in detail
return presently.
That which
is
implied in
all
all
of them
is
a denial of any knowledge antecedent to
experience
i^-
denial which goes
much
is
deeper,
and indeed bears quite
another meaning than
fond of insisting on this It is not in philosophy merely, but in the propositions on
understood by those who are so renunciation of a priori knowledge.
which
scientific
men
venture that
we
trace the influence of
the prejudice that, independently of the content realised in
Chap.
VIM
NO PRE-MUNDANE TRUTHS.
199
this world,
M = M,
JV=
there are certain universal
modes of
procedure, certain
rights
and
duties,
which
self-evidently
belong to
all
elements, as such, that are to be united in any
possible world,
different world,
and which would be
just as valid for
a wholly
live.
JV,d.s for that in
which we actually
There has thus arisen in philosophy a series of propositions ) which purport to set forth the properties and prerogatives of )
substances as such independently of that course of the world
j
in
which they are inwoven.
They obviously
rest
on the
it
impression that every other order of a universe, whatever
might be, that could ever come into Being, would have to respect these properties and prerogatives and could exact no
function from Things other than what, in virtue of a nature
belonging to them antecedently to the existence of a world,

they were
they
fact,
fitted
and necessitated
to render.
And no
less in
the procedure of the physical sciences, however
many
laws
may
treat as obtaining
is
merely in the way of matter of
there
yet implied the notion of there being a certain
more limited number of mechanical principles, to which ever}' possible nature, however heterogeneous from nature as it is, would nevertheless have to conform. The philosophers, it is true, have imagined that the knowledge of the prerogatives of Substance was to be attained by pure thinking, while the men of science maintain that the knowledge of ultimate But as to the laws is only to be arrived at by experience.
metaphysical value of that which they suppose to be dis-
covered in these different ways they are both at one.

take
it
They
worlds,
M=
its
is
as the
sum of pre-mundane truth, which AT and N, do but exhibit in
different
different
cases of
application.
I
This
the notion which
seek to controvert.
thing that was
real,
Prior to
the world, or prior to the
first
there was
no ^re-mundane or pre-real reality, in which it would have been possible to make out what would be the rights which, in the event of there coming to be a reality, each element to be employed in its construction could urge for its protection
200
CONCLUSION.
its
[Book
I.
against anything incompatible with
right as a substance,
or to which every force might appeal as a justification for
imposed on it by the terms of its There is really neither primary being nor primary law, but the original reality, AI or N. Given_:^ or = M^ the N^ there follows from the one for its world, series of laws and truths, which hold good for this world. If not but were the original reality, then for the world =1 there would follow the other series of regulated processes which would hold good for this other world. There is nothing which could oppose to these ordinances
refusing functions not
original charter.
N N
or
iVany claim of its own to preservation or respect. Granting this, are 86. Here the objector will interpose
'
:
you not
liable to the
charge of having here in your turn
pre-mundane truths, of which you refuse to admit the validity ? Have you not of your own accord expressly alleged the case of two worlds, and N^ which you suppose would both be obliged to conform to the general rule stated ? Now I have purposely chosen these expressions in order to make my view, which certainly stands in need of justification against the above objection, perfectly clear. In the first place, as regards the world N^ which I placed in opposition to the real world M^ I have to repeat what I have already more than once pointed out. The world is, and we, thinking, spirits, are in it, holding a position which in virtue of its
given utterance to one of those
'
nature as
could not but assign to

at
us.
To
this position
are adjusted those general processes of our Thought, by
which we are to arrive

rest of the world.
what we
these
is
call
a knowledge of the
Among
that very important one,
no doubt corresponding
is
to the plan
on which the world
ordered, which enables us not only to form general ideas
as such, but to
subsume any given manifold under any one
of
its
marks, of which a general idea has been formed, as a
species or instance thereof. This intellectual capability, once given, does not subject itself to any limits in its
Chap.
VIM
POSSIBLE UNIVERSE A FICTION.
201
exercise.
Even that which, when we consider it metawe recognise as in reality the all-containing and unconditioned, we may as a matter of logic take for one of
physically,
general idea of the unconditioned.
the various instances admitting of subsumption under the Hence, while it is only
we assert multiplicity as a matter we attempt on the other hand to form a plural of to many the conception 'Universe,' and oppose the real
of particular things that of
reality,
other possible Universes.
of a law to which
that
But the capacity of doing and
this
we owe not
to the
knowledge
alike are subject, but only to
which actually takes place in M^ and to a certain tendency transferred from it to us as constituents of M\ the tendency to think of everything real as an instance of a kind_, of which the conception is derived by abstraction from that thing, and thus at last to think even of the primary allembracing Real, itself, as an instance representing the idea we form of it, and so to dream of other instances
it. Thus arises the notion of that world N^ a perfectly empty fiction of thought to which we ascribe no manner of reality, and of no value, except, like other
existing along with
imaginary formulae, to
illustrate
the other conception

I
which
is
not imaginary'.
Further,
And
employed
M^
^
exclusively
for this purpose.
when we
said that,
if
existed,
the laws valid for iV^ would flow from the equation
in just the
equation
flow from the was not a conclusion drawn from knowledge of an obligation binding on both of them. On the contrary, it was an analogy in which what was true of the real was transferred to the imaginary N. In reality we have no title to make this transfer, for to put it simply who can tell what would be and would happen if everything were other than it is ? But if we do oppose this imaginary case to the real one in order to explain the latter, we must
M=
same way
i7/,
as those valid for
NN\
/
this
treat
it
after the type of the real.

it
Otherwise, as wholly disillustrating
parate,
would not even serve the purpose of
202
CONCLUSION.
it
[Book
I.
the real by contrast with

introduced.
the only purpose

does not
for
which
it is
87. Yet a third objection remains to be noticed.
statement that from
The
that
follows the series of laws that hold
good
for this
world
M^ obviously
anyhow from
its
'
mean merely
is
these laws proceed
M;
it
it
means
that they are
the proper consequences of

)
'
nature.
But what
meant
dis-
by a
to
'
proper consequence
rule to
?
when
can no longer be
tinguished from an improper consequence as corresponding
some
correspond
Have we
which the improper consequence does not not after all to presuppose some law
of the necessity or possibility of thought, absolutely prior to the world and reality, which determines, in regard to
every reality that
may come
or
to be,
what development of
its
particular nature can follow consistently from the nature of
the primary
real,
N^ in
distinction from such a develop?
ment
as
would be inconsistent
This variation of the old error can only be met by a

variation of the old answer. At first sight it seems a pleonasm to demand that actual consequences should not be inconsequent. Still the expression has a certain meaning. Hitherto we have taken the idea of reason and consequent to be merely this, that from a determinate something there flows another determinate something. The question, what determinate something admits of being connected with what other, by coherence of this sort, has been left aside. The idea of reason and consequent, as above stated, would be
satisfied, if
with the various reasons g^ g^
g'^
the completely
I
[
q r were as a matter of fact associated, without there being any affinity between p q and
determinate consequences
'
r corresponding to that between g^ g"^ g^. We shall find that our knowledge of reality is in fact ultimately arrested For instance, by such pairs of cohering occurrences. between the external stimuli on which the sensations of sight and hearing depend, we are able to point out affinities which make it possible to present those several modes of
Chap. VII.i
CONSECUTION OF CONSEQUENTS.
203
stimulation as kinds, g^
g.
and g ^ of one process of vibration, But between sounds and colours we are quite unable to
same affinity, or to prove that, if sensations of sound follow upon ^\ sensations of colour must in consistency present themselves on occasion of ^-. This example illustrates the meaning of that consistency of consequence which, in our view as stated above, can within certain limits be actually discovered and demonstrated in the real world, but beyond those limits is assumed to obtain universally in some form or other. The Unity of %/ Being, without which there would be no possibility of the reciprocal action within a world of the seemingly though not
discover the
really separate
elements of that world, excludes the notion

fatalistic
of a multiplicity of isolated and
ordinances, which
without reference to each other should bind together so
many
single pairs of events.
There must be some
rule or
v^
other according to which the connexion of the
members of
each single
of
all
pair, g^
and
f, with
each other determines that

It is
the other pairs,
and/^^.
that
only in reference to
other, which any meaning in
the comparison of various cases with each
thus becomes
possible,
there
is
speaking as we did of 'consistency.'
The
expression has
no meaning
might have
in relation to
any single
pair,
g ^.ndf, which we
made
the point of departure for our preliminary

rest.
consideration of the
The coherence between two
members would
at
the outset be an independent fact of
which nothing could be known but simply that it was the fact. For supposing we chose to think of their adjustment to each other as connected with the fulfilment of a supreme
condition
requiring
consistency, they
would
still
only
in
correspond to this condition.
The
actual concrete
mode
which they
satisfied
it,
the content in virtue of which they

it,
subordinated themselves to
^
would be something which

'
it
['g' and
also p. 126
'f stand for Grund' and Folge' here, as on p. 109. Cp. where 'Grund' (Reason) is distinguished from 'Ursache'
'
(Cause ").]
204
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
would be impossible to suppose determined by Z itself the more so in proportion as Z was more expressly taken to be an ordinance that would have to be fulfilled indifferently in innumerable cases, nay even in the most various worlds. Supposing Z to be neither the determining ground of the content of g and f^ nor the productive cause of their real existence, the proposition that a connexion between the two ensues in accordance with Z, cannot be a statement of a real metaphysical order of supremacy and subordination
;
but
is
just the reverse of the real order.

fact of the
The primary
is
in-
dependent
connexion between ^^ and/^

to
of such
a character that the comparison of
and
/'^ enables us
first
g'^ it with g"- and /^, apprehend a universal mode of
procedure on the part of the various connexions of events

in the world
\
Mand
concrete procedure, peculiar to this world

abstraction, to generate the
then,
upon continued
conception of a condition Z, which would hold good for the

organization of any world, N., so long as the mental image
of iV^was formed after the pattern of the given

for the persistency with
reality,
M.
88. At the present day few will understand the reasons
which I dwell on these consideraand so often return to them. We Hve quickly, and have forgotten, without settling, a controversy which forty years ago was still a matter of the liveliest interest among The difficulties involved in the philosophers of Germany.
tions
Hegel's system of thought were then beginning to
make
even by those who looked with favour on his enterprise of repeating in thought by a constructive process the actual development of the world from the ground of the
themselves
felt
It was not after Hegel's mind to begin by determining the subjective forms of thought, under which alone we can apprehend the concrete nature of this ground of the From the Universe a nature perhaps to us inaccessible. outset he looked on the motion of our thought in its effort
absolute.
to gain a clear idea of this tion as the proper inward
still
obscure goal of our aspira-
development of the absolute
Chap. VII.3
HEGEL'S DIALECTIC.
only needed to be pursued
205
consiste ntly, in
all
itself,
w hich
/i^
order_gradually to bring into
consciousness
that
the,
/
/< ,^
0-
unive rse contains.
i^
^J
came to be thought of as the root of the most concrete a way of thinking which it was soon found impossible to carry out. Even in dealing with the phenomena of nature, though they were forced into categories and classifications without sufficient knowThus
the most abstract of objects
ledge, it had to be supposed that the process of development, once begun, was carried on with a superabundance in the multiplication of forms for which no explanation was to be found in the generalities which preceded the theory of
nature.
All that these could
do was
to
make
us anticipate
one determination into its opposite, or at any rate into an otherness,' had been one of the supposed characteristics of the motion which was held to generate the world. The same difficulty might have been felt when the turn came for the construction of the spiritual and historical world, into which nature was supposed to pass over. There are many reasons, however, even in actual life, for not being content with the derivation of our ideas of the beautiful and the good from the living feehng which in fact alone completely apprehends their value, but for giving them greater precision by requiring
saltus ; for the transition of
'
some such
them
to satisfy certain general formal determinations.
It is
undergo a sensible degradation if they are looked on merely as instances of abstract relations of thought, but this was taken almost less notice of than the same fact in regard to the phenomena of nature, for owing to the latter being objects of perception, it could not be ignored how much more they were than the abstract problems which according to the Hegelian philosophy they had to fulfil. Hegel himself was quite aware of the error involved in
true that they too
this
way of representing the
world's
course of developin
it
ment.
He
repeatedly insists that what appears
as

2o6
the third and
last
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
member
of the
dialectical
movement
described
is
in truth rather the
first.
And
assuredly this
remark is not to be looked upon as an after-thought of which no further application is made, but expresses the true intention of this bold Monism, which undertook far more than human powers can achieve, but of which the leading idea by no means loses its value through the
great defects in
its
execution.
us.
From
It
the errors
noticed
us,
Schelling thought to save

that
was time, he told

antithesis
the
higher,
the
only
proper,
brought into view

)^-N
the
antithesis
be between freedom and

should
^
'^
'
y- necessity, in apprehending which, and not otherwise,

*
we
reach the inmost centre of philosophy.
I will
not dwell
Si" on the manner in which he himself worked out this view It was in its application to the philosophy of religion.
iC>.
Weisse who first sought to develope it systematically. That which Hegel had taken for true Being, he looked upon merely as the sum of prior conditions without which such Being would be unthinkable and could not be, but which themselves have not being;. Thusûnderstood, they formed in his view the object of a certain part of philosophy, and that comparatively speaking a negative part, namely
Metaphysic.
religious
_us
It
was
for experience
on the other hand
the experience of the senses and that of the moral and
consciousness
as
a positive revelation to give
knowledge of the
reality built
on that abstract founda-
tion^
be explained in a sense would be a different sense, however, from that which they were intended to convey. According to that original sense the general thoughts, which it was the business of Metaphysic to unfold, were more than those forms of apprehending true Being withThey were understood indeed out which we cannot think. In their sum they to be this, but also something more. were held to constitute an absolutely necessary matter for
easily
It
Such expressions might
with which
we could
agree.
'
Ch^v-WUA
FREEDOM AND NECESSITY:
WEISSE.
207
which
than
it it
was impossible either not to be or to be other

is,
but which, notwithstanding this necessity, notall
^
^"^
withstanding this unconditional being, was after

thing, without
a noover
essence
and without
reality;
while
against
this
it is,
it
stood the true

it
Being, for which according to
theory,
is
possible not to be or to be other than

"^
thus being constituted not by necessity but by freedom.
shall
not spend time in discussing this usage of the
terms, freedom
and
necessity.
wo uld merely
point out
^
that the latter term, if not confined to a necessity of thought
on our part, but extended to that which is expressly held_ to be the unconditioned condition of all that is conditioned, would have simply no assignable meaning and would nSave to be replaced by the notion of a de facto universal validity. The adoption of the term Freedom
'
to indicate the other sort of reality expressly recognised
of that which might the be explained by the influence of ideas derived from another sphere of philosophy the philosophy of which cannot be further noticed
as merely de facto as well not be
reality
just
is
to
religion
here.
Taken
atic
as a whole, the theory
is
the explicit and system\
expression of that Dualism which I find wholly un-
thinkable,
and against which
my
discussions have so far

|
form at any rate it cannot be' true. It is impossible that there should first be an absolute Prius consisting in a system of forms that carry necessity with them and constitute a sort of unaccountable j^te, and that then there should come to be a world, however created, which should submit itself to the con-
been directed.
^n
this
straint of these
laws for the realisation of just so
much
is
as these limits will allow.

real
The
real alone is
and
it
the
Being brings about the appearance of there being a necessity antecedent to it, just as it is the living body that forms within itself the skeleton around which it has the appearance of having grown. 89. We have not the least knowledge how it is that
its
which by
208
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
the seemingly homogeneous content of a germ-vesicle deposits

vital
those
fixed
elements of form, around which the

Still less shall
movements
are carried on.
we succeed
in
deducing from the
simple original character,
M^
of
a world, the organization of the necessity which prevails in

it.
There are two general ways, however, of understanding

which remain to be noticed
the matter, alike admissible consistently with our assumption of the unity of the world,
here.
I will indicate
previous
formulae,
them symbolically by means of our AI = [A B R], and the converse (p

cj)
[A
to
B J^] = M.
By
the former I
mean
to
be considered the form-giving
Prius, of
convey that which the
is
ac-
tivity,
whether in the way of self-maintenance or develop-
ment, at every
variable
moment
conditions the state of the world's
elements and the form of their combination, both being
infixes for them.
between the limits which their harmony with In the second formula \^ presented as the variable resulting form, which the world at each moment assumes through the reciprocal effects of its elements this form again being confined within limits which the necessity, persistently and equally prevalent in these effects, imposes. I might at once designate these views as severally Idealism and Realism, were it not that the familiar but at the same time somewhat indefinite meaning
of these terms makes a closer investigation necessary.
90. Availing ourselves once again, for explanatory purposes, of the opposition between two worlds,
M and N^ we
might designate the form in which, according to the sense of the former view, we should conceive the different characters of- the two worlds to be alike comprehended, as that of an Idea^ or, in the vernacular, as that of a Thought^ It is thus that in Esthetic criticism we are accustomed
to speak of the Idea or
Thought of a work of Art,

its
in the
sense of the principle which determines

tion to the particular outlines in
1
form in opposi-
which indeed the principle

*
['Idee.']
['Gedanke.']
Chap. VII.]
THE IDEA
IS
it
CONCRETE.
is
209
is
manifested but to which
not so absolutely tied

different,
that other
kindred means, even
might not be combined to

life
means wholly express it. So again
in active
we speak of a project as an Idea or Thought, when we mean to censure it for including no selection between
the manifold points capable of being related by the combination
of which
it
might be carried out.

lacks that concrete
If
now we
drop the imaginary world N^ we cannot thereupon suppose

character by from N, although that character would no longer be needed for the purpose of distinguishing it from something else now that it is understood that
that the
real world which we distinguished
it
there
is
nothing external to
it.
It
correct to call the Idea, simply as the Idea, the

principle of the
would therefore be in: supreme

idea, although,
world.Êven the absolute
which it itself conditions as constituents of its meaning, it might fitly be called *(./' unlimited, would not on that account be free from a definitely concrete content, with which it fills the general form of the Idea.
in opposition to the partial ideas
In other cases
error
it
is
more easy
to
avoid this logical
of putting
us,
conceived by
case,
an abstract designation of essence, as in place of the subject to which the
essence belongs.
We
are
more
liable to
it
in the present
where the reality, being absolutely single, can only be compared with imaginary instances of the same con-
ception.
quality
We
are then apt to think that every determinate

this
would rest on a denial of the other determinate qualities which we excluded from it, and which, in order to the possibihty of such exclusion, must at the same time be classed with ât which excludes them as coordinate instances of a still higher reality. This reality can then only be reached by an extinction of all content whatever. Thus the tendency, which so often recurs in the history of philosophy,
reality
which we might leave to
spins out
its
thread
I.
the tendency
P
to look
on the supreme
Metaphysic,
Vou
2IO
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
creative principle of the world not merely as undefinable

i
jDy
any predicates within our reach but as in itself empty and indefinite. These ways of thinking are only justifiable so far as they imply a refusal to ascribe to the supreme
M^
as a sort of presupposition of
its
being, a multitude
as
of ready-made predicates, from which

store
it
was to
collect
its
proper nature.
It
from a given is no such
that we mean to convey in asserting that the supreme principle of reality is to be found in a definitely [concrete Idea, M, and not in the Idea merely as an Idea.
doctrine
The
I
'
truth
is
rather this.
being in existence, or in
consequence of its existence, it becomes possible for our Thought, as included in it, to apprehend that which is in the form of a sufnmum genus to which admits of being subordinated and as a negation of the non-M. It is not
every determination that rests on negation.

trary, there is
On
the con-
an original Position without which it would be impossible for us to apprehend the content of that Position as a determination and to explain it by the negation of something else. 91. The mode of development, accordingly, which is imposed on the world by the Idea of which it is the expression, would depend on the content of the Idea itself, and could only be set forth by one who had previously made himself master of this content. So to make himself master of it must be the main business of the Idealist as much as of any one else. The only preliminary enlightenment which he would have to seek would relate to that characteristic of the cosmic order in the way of mere form which is implied in the fact that, according
to him,
it
is
in
the form of a governing Idea that the

of,
content just spoken
whatever
the basis of this order.
For him means simply a persistent Thought, of which the import remains the same, whatever and how great soever in each instance of its realisation may be the collection of elements combined
it
may
be, constitutes

Chap. VII.]
THE IDEA DETERMINES SUCCESSION.

The world
the
therefore
211
would not be bound of the same elements or to the maintenance of an identical form in admit of replacetheir connexion. Not only would A B ment by adr and a lip, but also their mode of connexion
to this end.
by
either to
constant maintenance
by X or \/^, if it was only in these new forms that those altered elements admitted of being combined into
</)
identity with M. It would be idle to seek universally binding conditions which in each single form of il/'s realisation the coherent elements would have to satisfy simply
in
order to be
coherent.
What each
is
requires
on the
part of the other in these special cases
not ascertainable
from any source whatever either by computation or by syllogism. We have no other analogy to guide us in
judging of this connexion than that
of aesthetic
fitness
_
often noticed above

is
which,
when once we have become

a perfect com-
acquainted with the fact of a combination between manifold elements, convinces us that there
patibility,
deep-seated mutual
understanding,
between
them, without enabling us to perceive any general rule

in
consequence of which
this
result
about.
The
relation,
however, of the
its
various forms, thus constituted, of
might have come to the Idea (^[ÂBR\ expression
X\abr\ ^\a{ip\
passes
It is not that of a genus to its species. from one into the other not indifferently from any one into any other, but in definite series from through X iJ^to \/^. No Idealism at any rate has yet
<\>
failed to
insist
on the supposition
experience bears out
that
a
at
supposition which
it
is
not merely in any section
of the world which might be
made
its
any given moment,
but also in the succession of of the Idea will assert itself.
phases, that the unity
The
question
may indeed be
<^
repeated.
What
it
are the
conditions which
possibility
and x have to of sequence upon each

-^
satisfy in
order to the
is
other, while
(/>
im-
possible for
to arise directly out of
Of
all
theories
p 2
212
.Idealism
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
is most completely debarred from an appeal to a supra-mundane mechanism, which makes the one suc-
cession necessary, the other impossible.
In consistency
in the
it
must place the maintenance of

as the formation of
its
this
order as unconditionally
successive
is
members
hands of
its
the Idea
nature.
itself
which
directed by nothing but
own
depend the adoption of one or other of certain courses or rather it will consist in one or other of them. It will require either a perfectly unchanged self-maintenance, or the preservation, along with more or less considerable variations, of the same idea and outline in the totality of phenomena either a progress to constantly new forms which never returns upon itself or a repetition of the same periods. It is only the first of these modes of procedure which observation contradicts in the case of the
this nature will
; ;
On
given world.
if
Of the
others
we
find instances in detail
but
which of them bears the stamp of reality as a whole, our collective experience would afford no guide to an answer. All that we know is that the several phases of the cosmic order, whatever the nature of the coherent chain formed by their series as a whole, are made up of combinations of comparable elements, that is, as we are in the habit of supposing, of states and changes of persistent things. This is the justification of our way of employing the equivalent letters of different alphabets to
called to say
we were
indicate the constituents which in different sections of the cosmic order seem to replace each other. If we allow ourselves then to pursue this mode of representation and concede to Idealism that the Idea determines the series of its forms without being in any way conditioned by any-
itself, still by this very act of determination it makes each preceding phase, with its content, the condition of the realisation of that which follows. It is no detached existence, however, that we can ascribe to the Idea, as if it were an as yet unformed J/ apart from all the several forms
thing alien to
of
its
possible reahsation.
We may
not present
it
to our-
Chap. VI 1. 1
PHASES INCLUDE TENDENCIES.
213
selves as constantly dipping afresh into such a repertory of
forms, with a definite series in view, for the purpose, after
discarding the prior phase, of clothing itself in the
new one which might be next in the series. At each moment the It is only as Idea is real only in one of these forms.
having at this particular time arrived at this particular its meaning, that it can be the determining
for the surrender of this
expression of
ground
momentary form and
for
the realisation of the next succeeding one.
The
aesthetic
or, if that term is preferred, the dialectic connexion between such phases of reality as stand in a definite order of succession, which was implied in their being regarded as an expression of one Idea, must pass over into a causal connexion, in which the content and organization of the world at each moment is dependent on its content and organiza-
tion at the previous
moment.
92.
too
The difficulties involved in this doctrine have been much ignored by Idealism, in the forms which it has so
In seeking to throw
light
far taken.
on them,
propose to
in 72
confine myself to the succession of two phases of the simple
form
(^
\A
B K\
and
\abR\^ which were treated
as possible cases.
This determinate succession can never become thinkable, if each of these phases is represented as
:
an inert combination of inert elements for in that case and the transition each is an equivalent expression for from each into each of the innumerable other expressions or
phases of
is
equally possible
and equally unnecessary.
Either the included elements must be considered to be in a
process of becoming, or the common form of combination, (^, must be considered a motion which distributes itself upon them in various definite quantities. This assumption is not inconsistent either with the principles previously laid down, according to which a stationary being of things could not be held to be anything
definitely directed
but a self-maintenance of that which of becoming, or with the

spirit
is
in constant process
;
of Idealism
for Idealism
214
includes in
its
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
conception of every form of being the dialec-
tical negativity,
form of
which drives the being out of one given For these two unmoving members therefore we should have at once to substitute the one independent fact of a process by which A passes into a
its
reality into another.
and B into b^ while R remains the same. Now this fact is an equivalent expression of that form of becoming which at A-a and B b^ this moment constitutes the reality of M.
accordingly, are two occurrences of which, in the expression
of the idea which constitutes

without the other.
il/,
one cannot take place
Taken by themselves, indeed, they
would have no such mutual connexion. The connexion does not represent any supra-mundane law, holding good
for the
this real
world
N as Mwhich means
is
well as for the real
M.
It
is
only in
for us in fact u7iconditionally
that they belong together as

other, so long as there
each the condition of the

part of the re-
no change on the
maining member on each other.

Supposing
it,
R to
affect the
pure operation of the two

this
rise
now, to come about in the course of
world J/, that certain preceding phases once again gave

to the occurrence
A-a and along with

effect,
it
to
an unchanged
or an
changed only
in respect of internal modifications
without external
then we should infer that in this

re-
case of repetition of A-a^ the occurrence B-b must also
appear as its consequence required by the nature of M. If, however, the preceding phases necessitated along with A-a a transition of to r^ then the tendency of the former
occurrence to produce B-b^ while continuing, would not be
What would really take place would be a resulting occurrence, the issue of those two impulses, determined by a relation of mutual implication in just in the same way as, in the case of the indifference of R, B-b is determined by A-a. Or to express the same generally into the other the transition of the one phase X is brought about by the combination of the reciprocal
able to realise itself purely.
Chap, vil.j
MECHANISM OF THE IDEA.

in
</>
215
effects,
which the several movements contained
once
for all exercise in virtue of their nature,
independently of
the phase in which they happen to be
combined or of the
point in the world's course at which they from time to time
appear.
We
thus
come
that
to believe in the necessity of a mechanical!
system, according to which each

the Idea
is
momentary
realisation of;
which the preceding states of fact according to certain laws of their operation had the power to bring about. Nor is it, in any fatalistic way, as an alien necessity imposing itself on the Idea, that this mechanism is thought of, but as an analytical consequence of our conception of the Idea of the supposition that it enjoins upon itself a certain order in its manifold possible modes of manifestation and by so doing makes the one an antecedent condition of that which follows. __So _long, however,, as. Ideali sm continuesjo regard the import of the Idea as the metaphysical Prius which determines the succession of
events, so long there lies a difficulty in this twofold
demand
the
demand
that
what
is
conditioned by the Idea a
fronte should be always identical with that to which this
mechanism of
stage of
its
realisation
I shall
my
enquiry
At a later impels a tergo. have occasion to return to this

which the reader
will
question.
It will
be
at the point, to
have
been long
looking forward, where the appearance
within nature of living beings brings
home
to us with special
cogency the thought of relation to an end as governing the course of things, or of an ideal whole preceding the real parts and their combination. The question can then be discussed on more definite premisses. In the region of
generality to which I at present confine myself Idealism
could scarcely answer otherwise than by the mere assertion
Such is the fact such is the nature of the concrete Idea, and such the manner of its realisation at every moment,
'
:
that everything
which
it
ordains in virtue of
its
own import
must
issue as a necessary result in ordered succession from
CONCL USION.
all
[Book
\the blind co-operation of

I
the several
movements
into^
which which
it
distributes
itself,
and according
to the general laws
it
has imposed on
is
itself.'
'
93. It
not every problem that admits of a solution, nor
every goal, however necessarily

that can be reached.
;
we present
it
to ourselves,
We
shall
never be able to state the

take
to
full
import of that Idea
M^ which we
be the
animating soul of the Cosmos.

vation,
/
which
full
is
alone at
Not the fragmentary obserour command, but only that

is
complete view of the whole which
denied, could teach us
what that
it,
import
is.
Nay, not even an unlimited ex-
To know we must live it with all the organs of our soul. And even if by some kind of communication we had been put in
tension of observation would serve the purpose.
it, all forms of thought would be lacking to by which the simple fulness of what was given to us in vision could be unfolded into a doctrine, scientifically articulated and connected. The renunciation of such hopes has been prescribed to us by the conclusion to which we were brought in treating of Pure Logic. It remains, as we had there to admit \ an unrealisable ideal of thought to follow the process by which the supreme Idea draws from no other source but itself those minor Premisses by means of which its import, while for ever the same, is led up to the development of a reality that consists in a manifold
possession of
us,
change.
viction that in reality that
Here, however, as there we can maintain the conis possible which our thoughts
It is
are inadequate to reproduce '^
not any construction of

is
the world out of the idea of which the possibility

implied,
thus
but
merely
regressive
interpretation,
is
which
to
attempts to trace back the connexion of what

experience, as
its
given us in
with
it,
we
gradually
become acquainted
ineffable source.
To
ledge
1
this actual limitation
upon our
Logic,
possibilities of
know-
the
second of the views

'
above ^
distinguished
=*
Logic, 151.
loc. cit.
[ 89.]
Chap.
VIM
'
LIMITS OF REALISM.
217
it
'
Realism
adjusts
itself
itself better
than Idealism, though
has not at bottom any other or more satisfactory answer to

give to the questions just raised.
Realism does not enquire

to
how
It
the course of the world
came
be determined as
it is.
contents
with treating the collective structure of the

as the inevitable product of the forces
world at any
moment
of the past operating according to general laws.

those
On one
by
r
^
'
point, however, I think the ordinary notion entertained
who hold this view has already been corrected. They commonly start from the assumption of an indefinite number
of mutually independent elements, which are only brought
even into combination by the force of laws.

stituted a
That
this is
t
impossible and that for this Pluralism there must be sub-
have tried to show and need not repeat. It is not thus, from the nature of objects \ but from the nature of the one object^, that we must, even in Realism, derive the course of things. In fact, the distinction between the two views would reduce itself to this, that while the Idealist conceives his one principle as a restlessly active Idea, the Realist conceives his as something objective ^ which merely suffers the consequences of an original disintegration into a multitude of elements that have to be combined according to law a disintegration which belongs
is
Monism
what
i'
to the de facto constitution of
its
nature, as given before
knowledge begins.
The mode
of their combinations
may
:
become known to us through the elaboration of experience and this knowledge gives us as much power of anticipating
the future as satisfies the requirements of active
life.
An
understanding of the universe is not what this method will help us to attain. The general laws, to which the reciprocal
operations of things conform
each group of phenomena are presented as hmitations coeval with knowledge, imposed by Reality on itself and within
in the first instance special to
which
it
is,
as a matter of fact,
its
compelled to restrain the

impression,
multiplicity of
products.
The overpowering
'
['Sachen.']
['Sache.']
['Sache.']
2l8
however, which
is
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
is made by the irrefragability of these limits, not justified by any value which in respect of their content
they possess for our understanding.
They would
thus only satisfy
him who could content
himself with the mere recognition of a state of things as

unconditional matter of
1
fact.
But even within the range of

itself
realistic
views the invincible spiritual assurance asserts

is
that the world not merely
but has a meaning.
To succeed
found as a matter of fact to an expression as makes the reason in them, the ratio legis, matter of direct apprehension, is everywhere reckoned one of the finest achievements of science. Nor can the realistic method of enquiry resist the admission that the ends to which events contribute cannot always be credibly
in giving to the laws, that are
obtain, such
explained as mere products of aimless operation.
It is
not
merely organic structures to which this remark applies.
Even
in
its
the planetary system exhibits forms of self-maintenance

periodic changes, which have the appearance of being
cases
especially
particular
selected
easily
out
of
innumerable
settle
equally possible, or
\
more
possible, results of such

is
operations.
It is true that
our observation
unable to
the question whether these cases of adaptation to ends are

to
be thought of as single islands

its
floating in a boundless sea
of aimless becoming, or whether
order in
we should ascribe a like changes to the collective universe. Realism can find an explanation of these special forms only in the
assumption of an arrangement of all operative elements, which for all that depends on the general laws might just as
well have
<
been another, but which, being what

It
it is
and not
another, necessarily leads in accordance with those laws to
the given ends.
thus appeals on
its
part to the co-
operation, as a matter of fact, of two principles independent
of each other which
it
hand the general
laws,
knows not how to unite on the one on the other hand the given special
;
arrangement of their points of application. In this respect Realism can claim no superiority over Idealism. At the
Chap.
VIM
it
'ABSOLUTE' TRUTH.
is
219
spirit
same time
only enquiries conducted in the
of
Realism that will satisfy the mshes^pUdealism. indeed never unveil the full meaning of the Idea.
is
They
will
'
But there
-
nothing but recognition of the de facto relations of things that can make our thoughts at least converge towards this
centre of the universe.
J)
04. The conception of a Thing which we adopt has been exposed to many transformations, hitherto without decisive issue. Doubts have at last been raised whether the union
of oneness of essential being with multiplicity of so-called
any meaning at all and is anything better than an empty juxtaposition of words. In approaching our conclusion on this point we must take a roundabout road. The misstates has
In all the arguments which we ultimately adduced, and in which we passed naif judgments on the innermost essence of the real, on what is
giving just expressed reaches further.
possible
and impossible
for
it,
according to principles unto our subjective
avoidable for our thought, what warranted the assurance

that the nature of things
^necessities of thought ?
must correspond
amount to more than a human view of things, bearing perhaps no sort
Can such
reasonings
of likeness to that which
it is
credited with representing
This general doubt I meet with an equally general confession, which it may be well to make as against too aspiring an estimate of what Philosophy can undertake. I re adily admit that I take Philosophy to be throughout merely an
inner
spirit
\
j
movement
of the
human
its
spirit.
In the history of that

It is
alone has Philosophy
history.
an
effort,
within
the presupposed limits, even to ourselves absolutely unknown,
^sistent
which our earthly existence imposes on us, to_îri a con-, view of the world an effort which carries us to^^ something beyond the satisfaction of the wants of life, teaching us to set before ourselves and to attain worthy
objects in living.
in
An absolute truth, such as the archangels heaven would have to accept, is not its object, nor does the failure to realise such an object make our efforts bootless.
2 20
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
We
admit therefore the completely human subjectivity of

it
all
our knowledge with the less ambiguity, because we see clearly
moreover that
\
is
unavoidable and
all
that,
although we
may
knowledge whatever, we could put no other knowledge in the place of that on which doubt is thrown, that would not be open to the same reproach. For in whatever mind anything may present itself which may be brought under the idea of knowledge, it will always be selfevident that this mind can never gain a view of the objects of its knowledge as they would seem if it did not see them, but only as they seem if it sees them, and in relation to it
forego the claim to
the seeing mind.

truth
still
It is
quite superfluous to
make this
simple
'
by a delineation of all the several steps in our knowledge, each monotonously followed by a proof that we everywhere remain within the limits of our subjectivity and that every judgment, in the way of recognition or correction, which we pass from one of the higher of these steps upon one of the lower, is still no more than a necessity
plain
more
of thought for us.

that
At most
it
is
worth the trouble to add
still,
of course, according to our wây of thinking
this
;j
is
no
specially prejudicial lot of the
human
spirit,
but must
recur in every being which stands in relation to anything

it.
''beyond
Just for this reason this universal character of subjectivity,
belonging to
or untruth.
all
knowledge, can
settle
nothing as to
its
truth
In putting trust in one component of ostensible
justified only
knowledge while we take another to be erroneous we can be by a consideration of the import of the two components. We have to reject and alter all the notions, which we began by forming but which cannot be maintained
without contradiction
when our thoughts
are systematized,
while they can without contradiction be replaced by others.
As
I
1
regards the ultimate principles, however, which

it is
in this criticism of our thoughts,

left
quite true that
we follow we are
itself,
with nothing but the confidence of Reason in
or
is
the certainty of belief in the general truth that
there
Chap. VII.]
SUBJECTIVITY : FICHTE,
221
reality, /
I
a meaning in the world, and that the nature of that
which includes us
in
itself,
has given our
spirit
only such
harmonise with it. 95. Of the various forms in which the scepticism in question reappears the last is that of a doubt not as to the general capacity for truth on the part of our cognition, but as to the truth of one of its utterances a determinate though very comprehensive one. It relates to that whole world of things which so far, in conformity with the usual way of thinking,
necessities of thought as
for granted. After the admirable exposition which Fichte has given us of the subject in his 'Vocation of Man,' I need not show over again how everything which informs us as to the existence of a world without us, consists in the last resort merely in affections of our own ego^ or to use language more free from assumption in forms which hover before our consciousness, and from the manifold variations and combinations of which there arises the idea and always as our idea of something present without us, of a world of things. Now we have a right to enquire what validity this idea, irrespectively of its proximate origin, may claim in the whole of our thoughts ; but it would have been
we have taken
a simple fallacy merely on account of the subjectivity of the elements out of which it has been formed, to deny
truth
all
its
and
to
creation of our imagination.
be no other, knowledge in
pronounce the outer world to be merely a For the state of the case could were there things without us or no. Our the one case, our imagination in the other,
could alike only consist in states or activities of our own being in what we call impressions made on our nature, supposing these to be things, but on no supposition in any-
thing other than a subjective property of ours.
As
is
well
ference which
offensive as
reality,
known, Fichte did not draw the primary init is would be logically involved
in the error noticed, the inference,
namely, that the single

inner world generated
jubject, adopting such a philosophy, would have to consider

itself
the sole
which
in its
own
222
CONCL USION,
[Book
the appearance of a companion Universe.

Spirits
In regard to
he followed the conviction which I just now stated. It is only by means of subjective effects produced upon him, like those which mislead him into believing in things, that any one can know of the existence of other Spirits ; but just because this must equally be the case if there really are
proved nothing against their existence. the existence of a world of Spirits, while he inexorably denied that of a world of Things, the ground of his decision would only lie in the judgment
Spirits,
this
fact
If therefore Fichte allowed
simply of their content
which he passed on the several conceptions in respect in the fact that he found the con-
ception of Spirit not only admissible but indispensable in

the entirety of his view of the world, that of the Thing on
the contrary as inadmissible as superfluous.
viction he
To
this con-
was constant. To have no longer an eye for mere things was in his eyes a requirement to be made
96. I proceed to connect this brief historical retrospect
of every true philosophy.

with the
with.
difficulties
which, as
we
saw, have
still
to
be dealt
We
found
it
impossible for that to be unchangeable
which we treated as a thing, a. It did not even admit of being determined by varying persistencies on the part of different qualities ^ We were forced to think of it as in continuous becoming, either unfolding itself into the one series, n^, a^, a', or maintaining itself, in the other, , , a^ by
constantly new production.
Each of these momentary phases,
o} is however, we saw must be exactly like itself, but c^ different from every other. Even the exactly similar
members of the latter series, though exactly similar, were not one and the same. For all that we asserted that in
this
could not but assert
change the Unity of a thing maintained itself. We this if we were to conceive the mutual succession of the several forms, which could not arise out of nothing but only out of each other. We were not in
[ 24
ff.]
Chap. VII.]
'STA TES
'
OR THINGS AND OF SPIRITS.
223
a condition, however, to say what it was that remained We took identical with itself in this process of becoming.
advantage of the term
'
states,'
which we applied to the
changing forms, but we came to the conclusion that in so doing we were only expressing our mental demand without satisfying it. We saw that an immediate perception
was needed to show us

possibility.
this relation of
a subject to
its
states
its
as actually under our hands
and thereby convince us of
Perhaps the reader then cherished the hope that there
would be no
case of need.
find
difficulty in
adducing many such instances in

to this question,
Now, on returning
seems
we only
possiis
one being, from the

of that relation
special nature of
which the
This
bility
inseparable.
the \
^jritual subject, which exercises the wonderful function

not merely of distinguishing sensations, ideas, feelings from
itself
but at the same time of knowing them as
its
own, as
I
Jts states,
and which by means of

if this
its
own
unity connects the
series of successive events in the
compass of memory.
should be misunderstood
to
its
statement were interpreted
mean
inner
that the Spirit understands

life
how
to bring itself
and
in the
way of
its
logical
relation of a subject to
states
subsumption under the or to recognise itself as an

It
instance
of this
subordination.
experiences
the
fact
it
of there being this relation at the very

lives
moment when
It is
through the process of
its
own
action.
only
for
it
its
later reflection
its
on
itself
which thereupon generates
in
thinking capacity the general conception of this relation

relation in
which
it
stands quite alone without possibility

It is only_
of another homogeneous instance being found.
injhe sensitive act, which at once repels the matter of sense from us as something that exists for itself and reveals it to us as our own, that we become aware what is meant by the
apprehension of a certain as a state of a subject A. It is onl^_through the fact that our attention, bringing events into
'[47.]
224
relation,
CONCLUSION.
comprehends past and present
in
[Book
I.
memory, while
at
the same time there arises the idea of the persistent
which both past and present belong, that
Ego to we become aware
what
it
is
manifold
is
meant by Unity of Being throughout a change of states, and that such unity is possible. In short
ability
through our
to appear to
ourselves as such
unities that
we
are unities.
Thus the proximate conclusion

this.
to
j^
which we are forced would be

things.
If there are to
be
things with the properties
we demand
fulfil
of things, they must

this character of the
be more than
Only by sharing
spiritual nature
can they
fulfilled
the general requirements
which must be
in order to constitute a Thing.
They can only be

unities if they
distinct
from
their states if they dis-
tinguish themselves from their states.
They can only be oppose themselves, as such, to the multiplicity
of their
97.
states.
The
favourite
notion that things have souls has always been a one with many and there has been some extrava-
gance in the imaginative expression of it. The reasoning which has here led us up to it does not warrant us in demanding anything more than that there should belong to things in some form or other that existence as an object for itself which distinguishes all spiritual life from what is only an object for something else. The mere capacity of feeling
pain or pleasure,
activity,
without any higher range of spiritual
would
suffice to fulfil this requirement.

life
There
is
the less reason to expect that this psychical

will ever force itself
of things
on our observation with the clearness of its existence will always be looked on as an imagination, which can be allowed no influence in the decision of particular questions, and which we can only indulge when it is a question, in which no practical consequences are involved, of making the most
of a
fact.
The assumption
general theories apprehensible.

It is therefore natural to
enquire whether after
all
it
is
necessary to retain in any form that idea of an existence
Chap. VII.]
MUST WE POSTULATE REAL THINGS?
225
There of Things which forced this assumption upon us. are two points indeed which I should maintain as
essential
:
one, the^ existence of spiritual beings like our-
selves which, in feeling their states
and opposing themselves
to those states as the unity that feels, satisfy the idea of a
permanent subject^: the other, theîmityi^tha^ Beingjîn which these subjects in turn have the ground of their existence, the source of their peculiar nature, and which
is
')
the true activity at work in them.

this
But why over and
above
should there be a world of things, which them-
selves gain nothing
by
existing,
but would only serve as a
system of occasions or means for producing in spiritual

subjects representations which after
all would have no likeCould not the creative power dispense with this roundabout way and give rise directly in spirits to the phenomena which it was intended to present to them ? Could it not present that form of a world which was to be' seen without the intervention of an unseen world which could never be seen as it would be if unseen ? An3 this power being in all spirits one and the same, why should there not in fact be a correspondence between the several activities which it exerts in those spirits of such a kind that while it would not be the same world-image that
ness to their productive causes
**
was presented to
spirits,
all spirits
but different images to different

fit
the different presentations should yet
into each
other, so that all spirits should believe themselves planted

at different positions of the
same world and should be able
to adjust themselves in
it,
each to each, in the way of har-
As to the effects again which Things each other and which according to our habitual notions appear to be the strongest proof of their independent existence why should we not substitute for
interchange with
monious action?
them a
life
reciprocal conditionedness
able actions, which cross
of the one Being that

*
on the part of innumerand modify each other within the truly is ? If so, the changes which
[*
Eines Wesens.']
Meta PHYSIC, Vol.
I.
226
CONCLUSION.
[Book
I.
our world-image undergoes would at each

directly
moment
issue
from the collision of these activities which takes effect also in us, not from the presence of many independent sources of operation bringing these changes about externally
to us.
In
I
fact, if
the question was merely one of rendering the
world, as phenomenally given to us, mtelligible,
we could
dispense with the conception of a real operative atom,
I
'
which we regard only as a point of union for forces and resistances that proceed from it, standing in definite relations to other like atoms and only changing according to fixed laws through their effect upon it. We could everywhere substitute for this idea of the atom that of an elementary action on the part of the one Being an action which in like manner would stand in definite relations to others like it, and would through them undergo a no less orderly change. The assumption of real things would have no advantage but such as consists in facility of expression. Even this we
could secure
if,
while retaining the term

it;
'
things,'
established this definition of
that 'things'
we simply may be accepted
in the course of our enquiry as secondary fixed points, but

for all that are not real existences in the metaphysical sense,
but elementary actions of the one Being which forms the ground of the world, connected with each other according to the same laws of reciprocal action which we commonly take to apply to the supposed independent things. 98. For the prosecution of our further enquiries it is of little importance to decide between the two views delineated. But a third remains to be noticed which denies the necessity of this alternative, and undertakes to justify the common notion of a Thing without a Self. When we set about constructing a Being which in the change of its states should remain one, it was the experience of spiritual life, it will be said, which came to our aid, and by an unexpected actual solution of the problem convinced us that it was soluble. What entitles us, however, to reckon this solution the only
Chap.vil]
HOW
COULD THINGS EXIST?
227
one ?
Why might
there not just as well be another, of which

picture only for the reason that
it
we can form no mental
have had no experience of
as our
Why may
not the
'
thing
'
be a
we own mode of existence ? Being of its own particular

it
kind, defined for us only by the functions which
fulfils,
but not bound in the execution of these to maintain any
such resemblance to our Spirit as, with the easy presumption of an anthropomorphic imagination, we force upon it ?
This counter-view
as what
is
Iv.^'
one that
is
I
is
cannot accept.
So long
we propose
fill
to ourselves
to give shape to that con-
ception oiLihe world which

ourselves to
to
necessary to us,
we
allow
up the gaps
in our
knowledge by an appeal
the unlaiowiL object, to which our thoughts converge

it
;
without being able to attain
but
we may not assume an
object of such a kind as would without reason i_ conflict with the inferences which we cannot avoid. Now
it
unknown
seems
to
me
it
that the suggestions just noticed imply a
^^
/
resort to the
fi rst
unknown
is
of this unwarrantable kind.
In the
place
not easy to see
why
the conception of the
Thing, in the face of the duly justified objections to it, needs to be maintained at the cost of an appeal to what is
after all
a wholly
unknown
possibility of its
being true.'
Secondly, while readily allowing that anything which really

exists
JJ_
may have
if it
its
own mode
of existence, and
is
not to be
it,
treated as
followed the type of an existence alien to
we must
is
point out that where such peculiarity of existence
asserted
the
further
predicates
assigned to
it
must
correspond.
What manner
of being, however, could
we
which we had expressly excluded the universal characteristics of animate existence, every active relation to itself, every active distinction from anything else ? Of that which had no consciousness of its own nature and qualities, no feeling of its states, which in no way possessed itself as a Self? Of that of which the whole function consisted in serving as a medium to convey effects, from which it suffered nothing itself, to other things
consistently predicate of that from
2 28
CONCLUSION.
itself,
[Book
I.
like
just as little affected
by those
effects,
till
at last
animate Beings there should arise in these, and not before, a comprehensive image of the whole series of facts. If we maintain that in fact such a thing cannot be said to be^ it is not that we suppose our-
by
their propagation to
selves to
to
be expressing an inference, which would still have be made good as arising out of the notion of sucha
:
thing
it
is
that
we
find directly in the description of such
a thing the definition of a mere operation, which, in taking^

place, presupposes a real
Being from which

is not, itself,
it
proceeds and
another in which
the two.
it
ends, but
as a third outside
That our imagination
will nevertheless cling to
'^'^ the presentation of

;
independent and blindly-operating

dispute nor do
indiit
vidual things,
we do not
we seek
It is
to
make
otherwise
this
but in the
effort to find
a metaphysical truth in
share.
mode
of expression
we cannot
not enough
to try to give a being to these things outside their
immanence
/^
one Real, unless it is possible to show that in their nature there is that which can give a real meaning to the figure of speech conveyed in this ''outside.^ As to the source of our efforts in this direction and their fruitlessness, I may be allowed in conclusion to repeat some remarks which in a previous work ^ I have made at greater length. We do not gain the least additional meaning for Things without self and without consciousness by ascribing to them a being outside the one Real. All the stability and energy which they ensure as conditioning and motive forces
in the
in the
changes of the world we

of the
Infinite.
see,
they possess in precisely

as
the same definiteness and fulness

activities
when considered
it
mere
their
Nay
is
only through
common immanence
in the Infinite, as
we have
seen, that
they have this capability of mutual influence, which would
not belong to them as isolated beings detached from that

substantial basis.
function that
'
Thus for the purpose of any being or we would ascribe to things as related to and
iii.
Mikrokosmus,
530 [E. Trans,
ii.
645].
'
Chap. VII.]
IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE.
229
connected with each other, we gain nothing by getting rid of their immanence. It is true however that things, so long as they are only states of the infinite, are nothing in relation
to themselves
:
it
is
in order to
this relation or
on
their
make them something in own account that we insist on their

But
this
existence outside the Infinite.
genuine true
reality,
which consists
in relation to self
whether in being something
as related to self or in that relation simply as such
is
not
acquired by things through a detachment from the one

Infinite, as though this 'Transcendence,' to which in the supposed case it would be impossible to assign any proper meaning, were the antecedent condition on which the required relation to self depended as a consequence. On the contrary, it is in so far as something is an object to itself, relates itself to itself, distinguishes itself from some-/ thing else, that by this act of its own it detaches itself from the Infinite. In so doing, however, it does not acquire but possesses, in the only manner to which we give any meaning in our thoughts, that self-dependence of true Being, which by a very inappropriate metaphor from space we represent
as arising from the impossible act of

is
'
Transcendence.'
It
not that the opposition between a being in the Infinite

outside
it
and a being
while
it
is
obviously intelligible as explaining
why self-dependence should belong

is
to the one sort of being permanently denied to another. It is the nature of the two sorts of being and the functions of which they
are capable that
make
the one or the other of these figurative
expressions applicable to them.

to feel
Whatever
is
is
in condition
and
assert itself as a Self, that
entitled to
Be
described as detached from the universal all-comprehensive basis of being, as outside it whatever has not this capability will always be included as immanent within it, however
:
'
'
much and
for
whatever reasons we
may be
inclined to
make
a separation and opposition between the two.
BOOK
II.
OF THE COURSE OF NATURE (COSMOLOGY).
CHAPTER
Of
I.
the Subjectivity of our Perception of Space.

it was imand Time
In the course of our ontological discussion

possible not to mention the forms of Space
within which,
things
and not otherwise, the multiphcity of finite and the succession of their states are presented to But our treatment did not start perceptive cognition.
first questions that induce enquiry, rather it presupposed the universal points of view which have already been revealed in the history of philosophy. We were able therefore to deal with abstract ontological ideas apart from
from the
these two forms which are the conditions of perception.
Any
further difficulties
must look
for a
solution to
the
Cosmological discussions on which we are now entering. Among the subjects belonging to Cosmology it may seem
that
Time should come
first
in our treatment
seeing that
for that of
we
substituted the idea of a continual
Becoming
Being as unmoved 'position '.' Accessory reasons however induce us to speak first of Space, which indeed is as directly connected with our second requirement, that we should be able in every moment of time to conceive the real world as
a coherent unity of the manifold.
[v.
Bk.
I.
38.]
MEANING OF THE QUESTION

Space,
entirely
231
99. In proposing to speak of the metaphysical value of

I
exclude at present various
questions
to
which, with considerable interest of their own, have none

for this
immediate purpose.
of reality
it,
At present we only want

are to ascribe to space as
know what kind

have to picture
we
we
credit the real things
and with what relation to it we are to which it appears to put in our way.
nor materials for one, can be got fromjj
){
No
answer to
this,
psychological discussions as to the origin or no-origin of our

spatial perception.
To
designate
it
as
an a priori or innate
mind is to say nothing decisive, and indeed, nothing more than a truism of course it is innate, in the only sense the expression can bear\ and in this sense colours and sounds are innate too. As surely as we could see no colours, unless the nature of our soul included a
possession of the
;
faculty
which could be stimulated to that kind of sensation, we represent to ourselves no images in space without an equally inborn faculty for such combination of the manifold. But again, as surely as we should not see colours, if there were no stimulus independent of our own
so surely could
'
^ ^
N*C.
being to excite us to the manifestation of our innate faculty,

so
surely
^w
we should not have the perception of space

it.
without being induced to exert our faculty by conditions
which do not belong to
On
^
the other hand, one
who should
regard our spatialS^ ^"^s^

*
perception as an abstraction from facts of experience, could
have nothing before him, as direct experience out of which to abstract, beyond the arrangement and the succession of
the sense-images in his
own mind. He might be able to show how, out of such images, either as an unexplained matter of fact, or by laws of association of ideas which he professed to know, there gradually arose the space-perception, as a perception in our minds. He might perhaps show too,
there originated in us the notion of a world of things
as
'
how
outside our consciousness

'
the cause of these spatial
Logic, 324.
232
SUBJECTIVITY OF PERCEPTION OF SPA CE.
[Book
II.
appearances.
later
We
shall find this a

it
hard enough problem,

still
on; but granting
completely solved,
the
mere
development-history of our ideas of space would be in no
way
decisive of their validity as representing the postulated

this postulate
world of things, nor of the admissibility of

itself.
mode of mental representation grows up can be decisive of its truth or untruth, only in cases where a prior knowledge of the object to which it should relate convinces us that its way of growth
wâs said
As
above, the way in which a
must necessarily lead w^hether

vergence.
to approximation or to di-
Therefore, for this latter view, as well as for the
former which maintains the a priori nature of the spaceperception, there

its
is
only one sense in which the question of

is
objective validity
answerable
possess
namely, whether such a
perception as
we
in fact
is
and cannot
;
get rid
of,
however
it
arose,
consistent with our notions of what a
reality apart
from our consciousness must be

its results, it is
or whether,
directly or in
incompatible with them.
100.
further introductory
remark
is
called for
by recent
investigations.
We
admitted that our ideas of Space are
conditioned by the stimuli which are furnished to our faculty

It is conceivable that these stimuli do minds with equal completeness, and that hence the space-perception of one mind need not include But this indefiniteall that is contained in that of another.
for
forming them.
not
come
to all
ness in the object of our question
is
easily
removed.
Modes
differstill
of mental presentation which are susceptible of such
ences of development
may have
their simplest phases
in
agreement with the object to which they relate, while their consistent evolution evokes germs of contradiction latent Therefore when their truth is in question, we have before. only to consider their most highly evolved form; in which
all possibility
of further self-transformation
to begin with,
is
is
exhausted, and
their relation to the entirety of their object
is
completed.
finite
We
all live,
under the impression of a
extension, which
presented tp our senses as surrounding
Chap.
I.l
SPACE NOT A THING OR RELATION.

;
233
us,
though with undetermined or unregarded limits it is our subsequent reflection that can find no ground in the nature of this extension for its ceasing at any point, and
brings the picture to completion in the idea of infinite space.
This then, the inevitable result of our

trayal
mode
of mental por-
when once
are
It is
set in motion, is the
matter whose truth
and
But scepticism has gone and self-evident that the final idea of a space uniform and homogeneous in all directions, at which men have in fact arrived, and which geometry had hitherto supported, is the only possible and consistent form of combination for simple perceptions of things beside one another. Some hold that other final forms are conceivable, though impossible for men; some credit even mankind with the capacity to amend their customary perception of space by a better guided habituation of their representative powers. This last hope we may simply neglect, till the moment when it shall be crowned with success ; the former suggestion, in itself an object of
validity
in
question.
further.
no longer held
certain
lively interest,
we
are also justified in disregarding for the
present
for all the other
forms of space whose conceivability
these speculations undertake to demonstrate, would share

the properties
on which our decision depends with the only form which we now^ presuppose that, namely, whose nature
;
the current geometr}' has unfolded.

101.
The kind
;
of reality which
we ought
to ascribe to the
content of an idea must agree with what such a content

claims to be
table existence to what
we could not ascribe the reality of an immuwe thought of as an occurrence; nor
endow what seemed

persistence which
to be a property with the substantive would only suit its substratum. Therefore we first try to define what space as represented in our minds claims to be or, to find an acknowledged category of established existence under which if extended to it, it could fairly be said to fall. Some difficulty will be found in the attempt. The only
;
234
SUBJECTIVITY OF PER CEPTION OF SPA CE.

is
Book
II.
point which
it
clear
as a thing but distinguish
moveable in it ; which are possible in space are properties of things, space itself is never such a property. Further ; the definitions
actually attempted are untenable
things, but every such limit
itself
is
;
is that we do not regard from the things which are and that though many determinations
and conceded
it
space
is
not a limit of
;
a figure in space
and space
ftq)
extends without interruption over any spot

the things.
It is neither
which
we remove
form, arrangement, nor
relation of things, but the peculiar principle
which
is
essential
to the possibility of countless different forms, arrangements,
and
relations of things
is
and, as their absolutely unchange-
by the alternation and one into another. Even if we called it form in another sense, like a vessel which enclosed things within it, we should only be explaining it by itself; for it is only in and by means of Space that there can be vessels which enclose their contents but are not identical with them. These unsuccessful attempts show that there is no known general concept to which we can subordinate space it is sui generis and the question of what kind its reality is, can only be decided according to the claims of this its
able background,
unaffected
transition of these determinations
'
'
distinctive position.
102. As the condition of possibility for countless forms,
and arrangements of things, though not itself any one of them, it might seem that Space should be on a level with every universal genus-concept, and as such, merit no further validity. Like it, a genus-concept wears none of the definite forms, which belong to its subordinate species ; but contains the rule which governs the manifold groupings of marks in them, allows a choice between certain combinations as possible, and excludes others as impossible. Although formless in Just such is the position of Space. comparison with every outline which may be sketched in it, yet it is no passive background which will let any chance thing be painted on it ; but it contains between its points
relations,
definite
Chap.
1.1
SPACE NOT A MERE GENUS.
235
unchangeable relations, which determine the possibility of any drawing that we may wish to make in it. It is not essential to find an exhaustive expression for these relations
at this
moment
we may content
ourselves, leaving
far
:
much
undetermined, with defining them thus
that any point
may be placed with any other point in a connexion homogeneous with that in which any third point may be placed with any fourth that this connexion is capable of measurable degrees of proximity and that its measure between any
;
two points
is
defined by their relations
to
others.
No
matter, as I said, what
more accurate expression may be
substituted for that given, in as far as our perception of space
contains such a legislative rule
we might regard every group

But we should feel at such a group ;
of manifold elements, which satisfied this rule, as subordinate

to the universal concept of Space.
once, that such a designation was unsuitable
might be called a combination of multiplicity in space, but not an instance of space, in the sense in which we regard
every animal whose structure follows the laws of his genus
as a species or instance of that genus.
The
peculiarities of
what we indicated above as the law of space in general^ create other relations between the different cases of its application, than obtain between the species of natural Genera.
Each of the
latter requires
indeed that
its
rule of the groupits
ing of marks shall be observed in each of
species
but
it
puts the different species which do this in no reciprocal
connexion.
They
are therefore subordinate to
it
but
when
we
call
them, as species of the same genus, co-ordinate with

really
one another, we
mean nothing by
fishes,
this co-ordination
but the uniformity of their lot in that subordination.
Sup-
posing we unite birds,
and other creatures under the universal concept 'animal,' all we find is that the common features of organization demanded by the concept occur in all of them this tells us nothing of the reciprocal attitude and behaviour of these classes the most we can do is,
; ; ^
['
Raumlichkeit.']
236
SUBJECTIVITY OF PERCEPTION OF SPA CE. [Book II.
conversely, to attempt afterwards a closer systematic union,
by the formation of narrower genera, between those which
we have
ascertained from other sources of experience to
possess reciprocal connexions.
On
the other hand, the character of Space in general^,
requiring every point to be connected with others, forbids
us to regard the various particular figures which

its
may
satisfy
requirements as isolated instances
it
compels us to
connect them with each other under the same conditions
under which points are connected with points within the

figures themselves.
far
If
we conceive
this
demand
satisfied, as
as the addition of fresh elements brings a constantly
recurring possibility
and necessity of
''
satisfying
it,
the result
which
that
is
wê
obtain
is
Space'''"-,
the single
and
entire picture,
its
not only present by the uniformity of
nature in
every limited part of extension, but at the same time contains
them
to
all as its parts, though of course it is not, as a whole, be embraced in a single view: it is like an integral obtained by extending the relation which connects two
points, to the infinite
number
is
of possible points.
The
only
as
parallel to this condition,
in our habit of representing to
ourselves the countless multitudes of
mankind not merely
instances of their genus, but as parts united with the whole
of Humanity; in the case of animals the peculiar ethical r^SGU^ which bring this about are wanting, and we are not
in the habit of speaking in the
same sense of
'animality.'
above remarks, I owe to the guidance of Kant all that I have here said in agreement with his account in Sect. 2 of the Transcendental Aesthetic as regards w^hat I have not mentioned here, I avoid for the moment expressing assent or dissent, excepting on
103.
Of
course,
in
the
two points which

is
lie
in the track
says^,
'
of
my
discussion.
'It
impossible,'
is
1
Kant
to represent to one's self that

it
there
no
space, though
is
possible to conceive that

^
['Raumlichkeit.'l 3 [trans. Aesth.
['derRaum.']
2.
(2).]
Chap.
I.]
EMPTY SPACE CONCEIVABLE.
237
no objects should be met with in space.' Unnecessary been raised against the second part of this assertion, by requiring of the thought of empty space, which Kant considers possible, the vividness of an actual perception, or of an image in the memory recalling all the accessory conditions of the perception. Then, of course, it is quite right to pronounce that a complete vacuum could not be represented to the mind, without
objections have
at least reserving a place in
it
for ourself;
for
whatever
place, outside the
vacuum which we were
observing,
we
might attempt, as observer, to assign ourself, we should unavoidably connect that place in its turn, by spatial relations, with the imagined extension. We should have
the same right to assert that
we could not conceive space

an absolutely
invisible
without colour and temperature;

extension
is
obviously not perceptible or reproducible as

:
an image in memory it must be one which is recognised by the eye at least as darkness, and in which the observer would include the thought of himself with some state of
he transfers as a property But the question is not in the least about such impossible attempts; the admitted mobility of things is by itself a sufficient proof that we imply the idea of completely empty space, as possible in its own nature, even while we are actually considering it as filled with something real. This is most simply self-evident for atomistic views if the atoms move, every point of the space they move in must be successively empty and full; but motion would mean nothing and be impossible, unless the abandoned empty places retained the same reciprocal positions and distances which they had when occupied; the empty totality of space is therefore unskin-sensation, which, like colour,
to his surroundings.
;
avoidably conceived as the independent background, for which the occupation by real matter is a not unvarying
destiny.
To
prefer
the
dynamical view of continuously
filled
238
SUBJECTIVITY OF PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

result.
[Book
II
space leads to the same
Degrees of density could
and would be impossible, unless the same volume could be continuously occupied by
absolutely nothing,
different
mean
quantities
of real matter;
but this too implies

their
that the limits of the
volume possess and preserve

independently of the
;
geometrical
relations
actual
thing
of which they are the place

to possess them,
if
and they would continue

the density to
we supposed
decrease
without limit and to approach an absolute vacuum.

fore
it
There-
is
certain that
its
we cannot imagine
;
objects in space
without conceiving
present to begin
with
it
of a perception of
empty extension as a background although no remembered image is possible without a remembrance

it
of the objects which

part of the
made
perceptible to sense.
104. With this interpretation

first
we may
It
also
is
admit the
that
Kantian
assertion.
true
we
cannot represent to ourselves the non-existence of space as something that can be experienced, and re-experienced
in
memory.
It
is
however not
inconceivable to us abso-
lutely;
but only under the condition that an aggregate

to
it
of actual existence, capable of combination, in short a real

world,
is
be given, and that the subjects which have

before
Now this real are our minds. metaphysic rests entirely on this fact, II and only investigates its inner uniformity without indulging in contemplation of the unreal it is enough then for
to bring
them
world
is
given us
her to consider space to be given, as the universal, unchangeable, and ever present environment of things, just
as
much as things and their qualities are recognised to be given as changeable and alternating. In this sense I may couple Kant's assertion with another space is imagined as an infinite given saying of his magnitude^' It has been objected against this too, that an infinite magnitude cannot be imagined as given ; but
'
:
no one knew
this
^
better than
[Trans. Aesth.
Kant.
2. (4).]
reasonable ex-
Chap.
I.]
REAL REASONS FOR KANT'S VIEW,
239
position can only take his expression to mean, that space

is above all things given^ and is not like a universal of which there can be a doubt whether it applies to any-
thing
or not;
and
is
that further, in
every actual limited
perception space
given, as a
magnitude whose nature

to
;
demands and
every
limit,
permits, that, as extending uniformly

it
should
be pursued
is
infinity.
the infinity of space clearly
given
for there is
beyond Hence, no hmit
such that progress beyond it, although conceivable, yet would not be real in the same sense as the interval left
behind
every
increment of extension, as
it
is
progres-
sively imagined,
must be added
to the former quantity as
equally a given magnitude.

Finally, all
these observations strictly speaking do no-
thing but repeat
and depict the impression under which
we
The moment we exert our nothing seems surer to us than that we are environed by Space, as a reality in whose depths the actual
all
are in every-day hfe.
senses,
world
may
lose itself to our sight, but

;
from which
it
can
never escape
tion readily
therefore while every particular sense-percep-
jective excitement in us, to
under suspicion of being a purely subdoubt the objectivity of Space has always seemed to the common apprehension an unintelligible paradox of speculation.
falls
105.
The motives
to such a startling transformation of
the ordinary view were found by Kant not in the nature of space itself, but in contradictions which seemed to
result
from
its
presupposed relation to
the
real
world.
The attempt
strate
of the Transcendental Aesthetic, to
demon-
our mental picture of space to be an a priori posof our mind, does not in itself run counter to common opinion. For suppose a single space to extend
session
all
round us and to contain within

;
it
ourselves
and
all
things
precisely in that case
it
is
of course impossible
that the several visions of
it, existing in several thinking beings, could be the space itself; they could not be more
40
[Book
II.
so than subjective representations of it in those beings whether they belong to us originally, or arise in us by
:
action from without, there

their being,
is no prima facie hindrance to qua images belonging to cognition, similar to a space which exists in fact. Nothing short of the antinomies in which we become
entangled,
if
we attempt
its
to unite our ideas of the entirety
of the world or of
ultimate constituent parts with this
presupposition of an actual Space, decided Kant for his
assumption that the space-perception was nothing but a subform of apprehension with which the nature of the 'real world that had to be presupposed had nothing in
jective
common.
I
With
;
this indirect establishment of his doctrine
cannot agree
because the purely phenomenal nature

felt
of space does not properly speaking remove any of the

difficulties
on account of which Kant

It is quite inadmissible, after
compelled to
assert
cially
it.
the fashion espe-
of popular treatises of the Kantian school which
exulted in this notion, to treat Things in themselves as

utterly foreign to the forms
under which they
wêre never-
theless to appear to us
there must be determinations in
the realm of things in themselves prescribing the definite

places, forms, or motions,
which we observe the appearat
ances in space to occupy, sustain, or execute, without the
power of changing them
our pleasure.
If
Things are
not themselves of spatial form and do not stand in spacerelations to one another, then they must be in some net-
work of changeable
spatial
intelligible relations with
one another
to each of these, translated
by us into the language of images, there must correspond one definite space-
relation to the exclusion of every other.
How
we
are in
a position to apply our innate and consequently uniform perception of space, which we are said to bring to our experiences ready made, so that particular apparent things find their definite places in it, is a question the whole of
which Kant has
left
unanswered
the results of this omis-
Chap.
I.]
INFINITE, SPATIAL
it
AND UNSPATIAL.
briefly,
241
sion, as I think
worth while to show

is
encumber
even his decision upon the antinomy of Space.

106.
The
real world,
it
said,
space, because infinity can only
cannot be infinite in be conceived as unlimited
succession,
position
and not
as
simultaneous.
all
Now how
to
is
our our
bettered by
denying
extension
the real
all
world, while forced, with Kant, to admit that in
experience space
this
is
the one persistently valid form under

?
which that world appears

so-called
empirical
reality
cannot persuade myself that of space is reconcilable

its
with the grounds which cause the rejection of scendental validity

selves.
tran-
for
the world
of
Things
in
them-i
Tn this world, the world of experience, if we proceed onwards in a straight line, we shall, admittedly, never come to the end of the line ; but how do we suppose that our perceptions would behave during our infinite linear progress? Would there always be something to perceive, however far we advanced ? And if there was, would there be some point after which it would be always the same or would it keep changing all through ? In both of these cases there must be precisely as many distinguishable
elements in the world of things in themselves as there are different points of space in this world of perception;
for all the things that
like
appear in different places, whether

different
or
unlike,
must be somehow
in
order to
have the power of so appearing, and so must at least consist in a number of similar elements, corresponding
to
the
quently,
number of their distinguishable places. Conseon this assumption, space could only possess its
empirical reality if there were conceded to the real world that very countlessness or infinity the impossibility of admitting
which was the reason

reality.
for restricting space to

will
an empirical
I trust that
it
not be attempted to object that
in
fact
the infinite rectilinear progression
can never be
completed.
Metaphysic,
Most
Vou
I.
certainly
it
cannot, and doubtless
we
are
: ;
242
[Book
II.
secure against advancing so far in space as to give practical urgency to the question how our perceptions will behave but in treating of the formation of our idea of the world, we
must consider the distances which we know we
shall
never
reach as in their nature simultaneously existent, just as
much
as those
simultaneously persistent
which we have actually traversed are held ; it is impossible for us to assume

till
that the former are not there
our perception arrives at
them, and that the

perceive them.
latter
cease to be,
when we no longer
Now, one would think, the other assumption remains suppose at a definite point reached in our advance, the
world of perception came to an end, and with
contents of the distances previously traversed.
the infinite extension of empty space.
possible
;
it,
all trans-
mission of perceptions arising from the actually existing
This would
give the image of a finite actual world-volume floating in
his idea
is
that in such a case
Kant thinks it imwe should have not

it
merely a relation of things in space, but also one of things

to
is
space
but as the world
is
a whole, and outside

it
there
no object of perception with which

relation of
it
can stand in the
alleged relation, the world's relation to
be a
to
no
object.
The
empty space would note' which Kant

is
subjoins here, shows clearly what his only reason
for
scrupling to admit this relation of a limitation of the real
world by space he starts with his own assumption that space is only a form to be attached to possible things, and not an object which can limit other objects. But the
:
popular view, which he ought not to disregard as up to this

point
'^
he has not
explicitly disputed
be a
self-existent
it, apprehends space to form such as to include possible things,
but clearly in treating
it
thus by no
means takes
it
for a
form which can only

*
exist in
attachment to things as one of

1868.
Raum
^
[Kritik d. r. V. p. 307, Hartenstein's ed. ist bios die Form,' etc.]
Footnote,
'
der
[Cp. 205.]
II
Chap.
1.
FINITE, SPATIAL
AND
UNSPATIAL.
Rather
it is
243
held
their qualities, or for a simple non-entity.
to be a something of
its
own enigmatic
kind, not indeed an
object like other objects, but withîts peculiar sort of reality,
and such therefore as could not be known without proof to be incapable of forming the boundary of the real world. But in any case we should have no occasion to expect of empty space a restricting energy, which should actively set
limits to the world, as if
it
were obvious that in default of

infinity.
such resistance the world must extend into

fact is rather that the
The
world must stop at

;
its limit,
because
nothing
there
is
*
no more of
it
we may
;
call this
a relation of the
is
world
to
no
object,'
but such a relation
at least
would have to remain true even of our unspatial world of things in themselves this also, the totality of existence, wôuld be in the same way bounded by Nothing. So if in our progression through the world of experience, the coherent whole of our observations convinced us that at any point the real world came to an end, this fact alone would not cause us the difficulty by which Kant wâs impelled to overthrow the common idea were it but clear what is meant by saying of things that they are in space, we should not be disturbed at
mysterious
or
suspicious
moreover,
it
their not
being everywhere.
other
On
the
hand
it
cannot be
in space
if this
denied,
that
this
boundedness of the world

able with Kant's doctrine,
would also be reconcilwere once accepted, and

If the world of things
;
supplemented
in
in the
way
I suggest.
themselves were a completed whole
if
they
all
stood to
each other in graduated
intelligible relations,
which our
then the
perception had to transform
into spatial ones;
phenomenal image of such a world would be complete when all these actually existing relations of its elements had found their spatial expression in our apprehension. But beyond this bounded world-picture there would appear to extend an unbounded empty space all conceivable but
;
unrealised
continuations
or
higher
2
intensities
of
those
44

would
like
[Book
II.
intelligible conditions
them enter
into our per-
ception, but
briefly
;
only as empty possibilities.
To
indicate
it
every pair of converging lines a b and c
d whose
extremities
we found attached
them not
to impressions of real things,
would require
real world.
their point of intersection to
be
in the infinite
void, supposing
to find
it
within the picture of the

is
The boundedness
of the real world
therefore
admissible both on Kant's view of space and on the popu-
and so the choice between them is undetermined if we assume the unboundedness of the world, as neither of the views in question by itself
lar view,
it is
equally undetermined
removes the
difficulties
which are found
in the conception
of the infinity of existing things.

107. I intend merely to subjoin in a few words the corresponding observations on the infinite divisibility, or the indivisibleness, of the ultimate elements of real existence.
If
we abide
strictly
by the empirical
reality of space,
then
in thinking of the subdivision of
extended objects as con-
we must come to one of two conclusions about the result; either we must arrive at ultimate actual shapes, indivisible not only
tinued beyond the limits attainable in practice,
by our methods but
in their nature
or else the divisibility
really continues to infinity.
If real things were infinitely divisible the difficulty which
see in the fact would be no more removed by assuming space to be purely phenomenal, than was the
we should
similar difficulty in the idea of infinite extension
every real
phenomenally to our perception as something single and finite occupying space, would have to be itself infinitely divisible into unspatial
itself
Thing, which presented
multiplicities; for every part of the divisible space-image,-
must, as
it
appears in a different point of space from every
other part, be dependent on a real element which has an

its own and in its unspatial fashion is distinct, somehow, from all other points. If on the contrary we arrived at the conviction, that
existence of
Chap.
I.]
INFINITE DIVISIBILITY.
245
definite
minimum volumes
divisibility,
all
of real things were indivisible,

its infinite
while the space they occupied of course retained
geometrical
we might
still
think
it
obscure what
could be meant at
space
:
by saying that
real things
occupy
but
if
we assume
this as intelligible,
we should not
of
be astonished that in virtue of its nature as a particular kind unit, each real thing should occupy just this volume and no other, and allow no subdivision of it. Here once more the obscure point remarked upon is made no clearer by the assumption that space is merely phenomenal. We should
have to represent to ourselves that every Thing in itself, though in itself unspatial, yet bore in its intelligible nature
the reason
why
it
is
forced to present
itself
as a limited
it
extension to any perception which translated
into spatial
This idea involves another; that the real Thing, though indivisibly one, is yet equivalent to an inappearance.
dissolubly
conceived
order to
combined unity of moments, however to be every point of its small phenomenal volume, in distinguish itself from every other and form an
;
extension with their help, presupposes a cause of

ing cause of every other point,
its
pheno-
menality in the Thing-in-itself, distinct from the correspond-
and yet indissolubly bound
up with those
causes.
How
common
tended
wise,
to satisfy these
postulates
we do not
Thing
is
yet
know;
opinion, which says that the
actually ex-
in an actual space, probably thinks that it is no less and much more clear, about the fact of the matter than the view of the unreality of space, which common opinion holds to be at all events not more successful in comprehending it.
Here, as in the
there
is
last section, I
dismiss the objection that

get so far in
a practical limit; that

is
we can never
or
the actual subdivision of what

to
assert
extended, as to be enabled
the existence of
either
infinite
divisibility
indivisible volumes.
One
of the two must necessarily be

reality
thought of as taking place as long as the empirical
246
SUBJECTIVITY OF PER CEPTION OF SPA CE. [Book

is
11
of space
allowed universal validity

far
that
is
as long as
we
assume that however

our direct
application to
all
we go
in dividing the objects of
experience,
spatial
ideas
will
find
necessary
that
the products of this
subdivision;
there would never be a
moment when
the disruption
of
what
is
in space
would suddenly present us with non-spatial
elements.
108.
The
foregoing discussions have brought
me
to the
his
conviction that the difficulties which
Kant discovers by
treatment of the Antinomies, neither suffice to refute the

ordinary view of the objectivity of space, nor would be got
rid of
by
its
opposite
coming, though
less noticed
but that other motives are forthby Kant, which nevertheless

is
force us to agree with him.
The want
of objective validity in the spatial perception
revealed before
we come
;
to apply
it
to the universe or to
its
We have only to ask two other and more general questions how can space, such as it is and must be conceived whether occupied or not, have ascribed
ultimate elements.
own, in virtue of which it exists before ? And how can what we call the existence of things in space be conceived, whether such occupation by real things concerns its entire infinite extent,
to
it
a reality of
its
its
possible
content
or only a finite part of
it ?
The
first
of
our questions,
more
especially,
but the
second as
well, require a further introductory
remark.
We
must give up all attempt to pave the way for answering the two questions by assigning to space a diiferent nature from that which we found for it in our former description. There is obvious temptation to do so in order to make the substantive existence of space, and its limiting action on real things, seem more intelligible. Thus we are inclined to supply to space, which at first we took for a mere tissue of relations, some substratum of properties, undefinable of
course, but
still
these relations.
such as to serve for a substantive support to We gain nothing by doing so ; we do not
Chap.
I.]
TRUE CRUCES OF REAL SPACE.
247
so the
much
corrupt the conception of space, as merely throw

back, and that quite uselessly.
diflficulty
For the second

all
of our questions was,

relation to space.
how
real
things can at
stand in
Precisely the
same question
in
over again by the
new substratum
be raised which space is somewill

;
how
to inhere.
Therefore we must abide by this

to ourselves as space
there
is
simply nothing behind that tissue of relations which at

starting
we represented
its
if
we ask
questions about
existence, all that

reality
we do
or can want to
know
is,
what kind of
can belong to a thing so represpace.
sented, to this
empty and unsubstantial
109.
No
decided in
when so stated, the question is already my own conviction by what I said above condoubt,
all
cerning the nature of
'relations^': that they only exist
either as ideas in a consciousness
as inner states, within the real elements of existence,
which imposes them, or which

'
according to our ordinary phrase stand in the

Still I
relations.'
do not wish to answer the present question merely by a deduction from this previous assertion of mine; but
should think
it
arriving at the
more advantageous if I could succeed in same result by an independent treatment.

liable
But
to
do not hide from myself how

;
such an attempt
is
fail
it
is
a hard achievement to expound by discursive

the
essential
considerations
absurdity of an idea which

it
appears to be justly formed because
is
every
moment
forming
cisely
all
itself
anew under the overpowering impression of a

;
direct perception
an
idea, too,
which never defines pre-
what
is
it
means, and which therefore escapes, impalpably,

It is
attempts at refutation.
This
all
our present case.
an impression which we
share that space extends before our contemplating vision,
not merely as an example of external being independent of

us,
but as the one thing necessary to making credible to us
the possibility and import of any such being.

it
The
no
idea that
would
still
remain there, even

1
if
there were
vision for
[ 81, end.]
248
it

is
[Book
II.
to extend before,
an inference hard to refute
for
it
does
not explain in what the alleged being of that space would any
longer consist
if it is
which can
act,
to be neither the existence of a thing nor the mere validity of a truth, nor a mental
It is
representation in us.
vain to repeat, that space
itself
teaches us with dazzling clearness that there are other and

peculiar kinds of reality besides these
;
this is only to repeat
the confusion of the given perception with the inference
drawn from
it
the former does find space appearing in

;
its
marvellous form of existence

outside itself
but perception cannot go
which
not
is
;
and vouch that there corresponds to this reality an object of perception a similar reality which is this notion can only be subjoined by our thought, and
is
prima fade a questionable

I
supposition.
now wish to attempt to show how little this hypothesis does to make those properties intelligible, which we can easily understand to be true of space if we conceive it merely
as an image created by our perceptive power,
and
forth-
coming
for
it
only.
110. Every point/ of empty space must be credited with
the same
may be, which belongs to whether we regard this latter as a sum of points, or as a product of their continuous confluence with one another, in any case it could not exist, unless they
reality,
whatever that
for
space as a whole
existed.
other q or
of/
as
we find every point J> exactly like every and no change would be made if we thought replaced by q or by r. At the same time such an
Again,
^,
is quite impossible, only real elements can change their relations (which we are not now discussing), to empty space-points ; but these latter themselves stand immovable in fixed relations, which are different for any one pair and for any other. Of course, no one even who holds space to be real, regards its empty points as things like other things, acting on each other by means of physical forces. Nevertheless, when we say Space exists,' it is only the shortness of the phrase that
interchange
'
Chap.
I.]
POINTS DETERMINE EACH OTHER?
249
gives a semblance of settling the matter

'
by help of a simple
easily assigned or
position^' or act
of presenting
itself,
thought of as assigned to this

ever)'thing that
totality,
which we comprehend
under the name of space. But, in fact, for space to exist, we have alluded to must occur; every point must exist, and the existence of each, though it is like every other, must consist in distinguishing itself from every other,
and determining an unalterable position for itself compared Hence the fabric of with all, and for all compared with it. space, if it is to exist, will have to rest on an effectual this can in reciprocal determination of its empty points any case be brought under the idea of action and reaction, whatever distinction may be found between it and the operation of physical force, or between empty points and
;
real atoms.
This requirement cannot be parried by the objection

that as
as existing,
we have not to make space, but only we have no occasion to construct

it,
to consider
its fabric,
it
but
may
accept
and therefore the position of
all its
points, as
if it
given.
True,
we do not want
to
make
space, as
had
it
not existed before, but this very

given,
act,
the recognition of
as
means presupposing
points which
I
that precise action
and reaction
of
its
described.
No
points or elements,
unless
thought of as distributed in an already existing
space, could conceivably be asserted simply to be in particular places, without
being responsible for
it
themselves,
and
between these places but the points of empty space cannot be taken as localised in turn in a previous space, so as to have their reciprocal relations derived from their situation in it ; it must be in consequence of what they themselves are or do, that they have these relations, and by their means constitute space as a whole. Hence, if the two points / and q exist, their
to share in the relation subsisting
distance / ^
is
something which would not be there without
them, and which they must

^
make
for themselves.
['
Position,' V. 10.]
250
I
[Book
li.
in
another shape;
can imagine the former objection being here repeated that we did not conceive the spatial
in order to place the points in them and so now, we are not to assume the points first, so that they have to create the relations afterwards; the two together, thought in complete cohesion, the points m these relations, put before us, at once and complete, the datum which we call existing space. Granting then, that I could attach any meaning to points being in relations simply as a fact, without either creating or sustaining them by anything in themselves still I should have to insist on the circumstance that every reality, which is merely given in fact, admits of being done away and its non-existence assumed at least in thought. Now not only does no one attempt to make an actual hole in actual empty space but even in thought it is vain to try to displace one of the empty space-points out of that relation to others which we are told is a mere datum of fact the lacuna which we try to create is at once filled up by space as good as that suppressed. Now of course I cannot suppose that anyone
relations as prior,
afterwards
who
affirms the reality of space will set
down
this invulnerit,
ability only to his subjective perception of
and not
to
existing space itself;
obviously this miraculous property

real extension as well.
would have
to
be ascribed to
is
This property
very easily intelligible on the view of the

If a
purely phenomenal nature of space.
consciousness
which
a
recollects
its
own
different acts or states, experiences
number ?i of impressions of any kind in a succession which it cannot alter at pleasure ; if, in the transition from each impression to the next, it experiences alterations, if, sensibly homogeneous and equal, of its own feeling again, it is compelled to contemplate these differences not merely as feelings, but owing to a reason in its own nature, as magnitudes of a space whose parts are beside each
;
and if, same kind of

other;
finally,
after
it
frequently
abstracts
experiencing the
progression,
from the various
Chap.
I.]
EMPTY POINTS INDIFFERENT,

and only
calls to
251
qualities of the impressions received
mind
the form under which they cohered

ness,
then, for this conscious-
and
for this only, there will arise before the
mind's eye
impossible
the picture of an orderly series or system of series, in each
of which between the terms

for
m i
and m-\-\
it is
be missing. If there were no impression to occupy the place m, still the image of the empty place in the series would be at once supplied by help of the images of the two contiguous places and by means of the single
to
self-identical activity of the representing consciousness.
All
is
different
if
we
require an
existing space,
and
conceive the absence of this consciousness, which combines

its
images, evokes
some
to join others,
and never
passes from one to the others without also representing the

difference which divides them.
Then, the empty points of
space would have to take upon themselves what the active

consciousness
did;
they would have to prescribe their
places to each other by attraction
and
repulsion,
exert of themselves the extraordinary reproductive
and to power by
which space healed its mutilations. And in spite of all at once get into fresh difficulties. 111. For, the relation or interval / ^, which the two existing points / and q would be bound according to their nature to establish between them, ought at the same time to be different from every other similar relation which p and r or q and r for similar reasons would set up between them. But the complete similarity of all empty points involves, on the contrary, an impossibility of/ and q determining any other relation between themselves, than any other pair of points could between themselves; even A^ a number of connected points, conceived with determinate relations
we should
already existing between them, could assign no place in

particular to
another point
s
/
thrown
It
is
in,
because any other,
which we might suppose or u, would have as good
a right to the same place. easy to foresee the answer that will at once be
252
SUBJE CTIVITY OF PER CEPTION OF SPA CE. [Book 1

;
made
that
it
is
quite
indifferent,
it is
whether the point

it
it
is
designated by
soxtorw,
it
in itself a yet undefined,

is
and
therefore, in strictness, a nameless point;
only after
N has
becomes the point which is now distinct from the points t and u^ which are differently localised by N. But this observation,
assigned
a particular place that
i",
though quite correct in itself, is out of place here. It would only apply if we were regarding s as the mere idea of begun in our conan extreme term belonging to a series sciousness ; such an idea of s would be created by our
consciousness, in the act of requiring

relations to
it,
;
in the particular
no inducement to the production of any other image which had not these relations. Or again our consciousness may not restrict itself to its immediate problem, but recalling previous experiences may first form the idea of an extreme term e.g. for two series which converge, without being aware what place it will hold in a system of other independent terms which is to serve as the measure of its position then we have a term x, which has as yet no name, and
which belonged to
it
there would be
which
series
is
not particularised as
s,
/,
or u,
till
we come
each
accurately to consider the law according to which

progresses,
and so the simultaneous determining
equations are both solved.
Such a productive process of determination, realising what it aims at, is explained in this case by the nature of our single consciousness, which connects with each other all the particular imagined points of its content; but if instead of mental images of empty points we are to speak of actual empty points, then we should really be compelled
to assume, either that every existing
number
of points
is
constantly creating
new
points,
which by the act of
their
production enter into the relations appropriate to them ; or imposes these that by exerting a determining activity
relations
on points already
them.
existing
whose own nature
is
indifferent to
Obviously we should not conceive
Chap.
I.]
SPA CE- GENERA TION IMPLIES SPA CE.
253
either of these constructions as a history of something that
had once taken

sustains in every
space.
place,
but only as a description of the

activities
continually present
unmoving tension of
which
moment
the apparently inactive nature of

far into this region of interest-
Having once got so

;
ing fancies I wish to pursue the former of these hypotheses
me
one step further the second, from considering.
my
readers will gladly excuse
112. We cannot seriously mean to regard a particular ready-made volume iVas the core round which the rest of Not merely any JV whatever, but ultispace crystallises. mately every individual empty point, would have the same right to possess this power of propagation, and we should arrive at the idea of a radiant point in space, fundamentally in the same sense in which it is known to geometry. Then, the radiant point p would produce all the points with which its nature makes a geometrical relation possible, and each of them in the precise relation which belongs to it in respect of p among others the point ^, which is determined by the distance and direction/ q. All this is just as true of any other empty point it would still hold good if among them was a ^, and then among the innumerable points which q would create there would be one standing to g in the relation q p, the same which was above designated, in a different order, hy p q. And now it might be supposed that we had done what we wanted, and obtained a con; ;
struction of space corresponding to
its
actual nature
for
it
seems obvious that / q and q p indicate the same distance between the same points, and that thus the radiant activities
of
all
points coincide in their results,

its
so as to produce
ordinary extension with
geometrical structure.
But
this expectation is
founded on a subreption.
Before
we completed our
construction
we knew nothing more of
the empty points from which it was to start, than that they are all similar to one another, and that the same reahty
attaches to
all
of them
but beyond this they had no com-
254

other.
It is therefore
[Book
II.
by no means selfstarts from the existing point / will ever meet the other, emitted by the independent point q ; both of them may, instead of meeting, extend as if into two different worlds, and remain ever strange to each other, even more naturally than two lines in space which not being in the same plane, neither intersect
evident,
that
munity with each
the pencil
of rays
which
nor are
parallel.
The
point
-^j
generated by the radiant
point /, is not obviously the same ^, with that which, as given independently, we expected to generate/; the second
J)
/, nor the line q what is generated

points
generated by the given q need not coincide with the first word, p with the previous line/ q ;
:x.
is
not a single space, in which

in a
all
empty
re-
would be arranged
;
system, but as
many
ciprocally
points
independent spaces, as we assumed radiant and from one of these spaces there would be
absolutely
no
transition into another.

is
Our
anticipation of
finding that only a single space
generated, started with
the tacit assumption that space was present as the
common
all-comprehending background,
in
which
the
radiations
from the points could not help meeting.

Still, if all
the resources of a disputatious fancy are to be

;
exerted in defence of the attempted construction
there
Suppose there are countless different spaces, it might be said; still, just because they do not concern each other, for that very reason they do not concern us excepting that particular one in which we and all our experiences are comprehended, and with which
might be
this escape.
;
alone', as
the others never
come
in contact with us at
all,
Metaphysic has to do. Then let us confine ourselves to the space which is generated by the radiant point /. The point q which it creates, has equal reality with /, and so shares its radiant power ; it must, in its turn, determine a point towards which it imposes on itself the relation q p and this point / will certainly be no other than, but the
;
same
with, that
which
first
imposed on
itself
towards q the
Chap.
I.]
SOLUTION 'B Y SUBJECTIVITY.
255
will certainly
relation/ q\ therefore the Hnes q

coincide.
p and p
But even
this
does not give us the result aimed
at.
As
we cannot
regard a particular point
exclusively, but are
able to regard any whatever, as the starting-point of this genesis of space, the result of our representation translated
from the past tense of construction into the present of

definition,
is
simply this
its
that
it is
the fact that in existing
space every point has

site direction
particular place,
and
that a line/
of determinate direction and magnitude, taken in the oppo-
this is correct
q /, returns to but no one ;
its
starting-point.
No
doubt
con-
will affirm that this last
struction
fulfils its
;
purpose of explaining such a condition

is
of things
there
notion that an existing point generates out of

infinite
something too extraordinary in the itself an
number of
points with equally real existence,
and
something too strange in the result that every existing empty point has as it were an infinite density, being created and put in its place by every other point, not merely by
one; and
with
its
finally,
the whole idea

if it is
is
too empty a fiction,
radiant power which

multiplication
not to lead to a purely

into
itself,
intensive
of being
but to an
Extension, must in any case presuppose a space, in which

its effect
may assume
all
this very character
of radiation.
Nevertheless
these incredibilities appear to
me
to
be
but
unavoidable, as long as
we
persist in thinking of
empty
;
space with
its
geometrical structure as actually existing

its
the doctrine of
purely phenomenal nature avoids
them
from the beginning ; and it is hardly requisite to prove this by a protraction of this long exposition. One can understand how, for a consciousness which
remembers
its
previous progression through the terms p q
r,
there arises the expectation of a
homogeneous continuance
;
of this series in both directions, which implies an apparent
power of
radiation, as above, in those points

is
only what
takes place here
not a self-multiplication of something
256
SUBJECTIVITY OF PERCEPTION OF SPACE,

but a generation of ideas out of ideas, former
i.e.
[Book
II.
existent,
of fresh
states of a single subject out of its
states, in
accord-
ance with the laws of its faculty of ideas and the movement It is on this of its activities which was in progress before.
hypothesis equally easy to understand, that -the converse
march of the movement returns from q to the same p, i.e. reproduces the identical image/ from which it started ; for
representing to the
the image q has only such radiant power as it derives from mind the purport of the series ; so that
itself,
q by
series,
as long as
it
is
represented as a term in the
can never induce a divergence from the direction of

the other hand, starting with a qualitatively deter-
that series.
On
tt, which fills the geometrical place of the term /, there may be an advance to other impressions < and p, such that the differences tt-k, K-p, may be comparable with each other, though not comparable with the difference Then we have the case which we of the series /, ^, r. mentioned above; tt radiates too, but, so to speak, into
mined impression
another world, and the series

in space-perception,
itself
tt,
k, p,
finds in fact
no place
and
in respect to its relations within
can only be metaphorically or symbolically represpatial situation.

I
sented by constructions in space, but cannot be shown to
have a
113.
am
sure that the whole of this account of the
matter has only convinced

before,
those
who were convinced
and will not have done much to shake the preference for an existing space. Let us therefore ask once more where in strictness the difference of the two views lies ; and what important advantage there is that can only be secured by the assumption of this enigmatic existence, so constantly reaffirmed, of an empty extension, and that must be lost by conceding that its import is purely phenomenal? The clearness and self-evidence, with which
our perception sees space extended around
great for both views
;
us, is equally
we do not
in the least traverse this
Chap.
SUBJECTIVE NOT = UNREAL.

is
257
;
perception, which
endowed with such
self-evidence
it,
but
only the allegation of a being that underlies

evidence.
which must
be inaccessible to perception and so cannot share its selfNo doubt for common opinion every perception but carries a revelation of the reality of what is perceived
;
in the world of philosophy Idealism claims the first hearing,
with
its
proof that what
is
perceived, in this case, space,
is
given to begin with merely as the subjective perception of
our minds.
Now
of course in
toil
common
life
we do not
perceived
is
is
need to go through the long
of inference from percepis
tion before attaining the idea that what
real; but in the world of philosophy this investigation

essential, to
I
decide whether
we may
retain this idea
for
repeat that in this region
it is
not the primary datum^ but
remains problematic
till it is
proved to be necessary.
;
Such a proof, in strictness, has never been attempted the burden of disproof has been thrown on the opposite view, and its opponents have taken their stand on the
probability
of their
presumption of
this;
its truth.
own opinion as importing a valid The probability seems to rest on

it
that
a space, which exists

to
properties ascribed
by itself with all the by our perception, makes the

natural than
it
origin of this perception
seem much more

doctrine
;
does our more

arises
artificial
according to which
from a combination of inner states of our consciousness wholly dissimilar to it. But the artificiality here objected to must be admitted, even if space were as real as could be wished. The pictures which are made of it in the countless minds which are all held to be within space, could not be more than pictures of it, they could not be it
;
and
as pictures they could only have arisen
by means of
operations on the mind which could not be extensions, but could only be inner states corresponding to the nature of the subject operated upon. In every case our mental
representation of space must arise in this
get
it
way we cannot more cheaply, whether we imagine beneath the

;
Metaphvsic, Vol.
I.
258

mind an
existence like
it
[Book
II.
picture presented to our

us, or
outside
one entirely disparate. What can be gained then by maintaining the view which we oppose ? Men will go on repeating the retort that it is impossible to doubt the reality of space, which is so clearly brought home to us by immediate perception. But are we denying this reality? Ought not people at length to get tired of repeating this confusion of ideas, which sees reality in nothing but external existence, and yet is ready to ascribe
;
it
to absolute vacuity
Is pain
it
merely a deceitful appear-
ance,
in
and
unreal, because
it is
subsists only for the
moment
which
felt ?
Are we
to
deny the
reality of colours
and tones because we admit that they only shine and sound while they are seen and heard ? Or is their reality less loud and bright because it only consists in being felt and not in
a self-sustained being independent of
all
consciousness?
only in
So then space would

for our perception if
lose nothing of
its
it
convincing reality
it
we admitted
that
possesses
our perception.
We
to
long ago rejected the careless exaggeration which

;
attaches to this idea
space
is
not a mere semblance in us,
which nothing in the
real
world corresponds
rather
every particular feature of our spatial perceptions corre-
sponds to a ground which there is for it in the world of things ; only, space cannot retain the properties which it has in our consciousness, in a substantive existence apart from thought and perception. In fact, there is only one distinction forthcoming, and that of course remains as between the two views for our view all spatial determinations are secondary qualities, which the real relations put on for our minds only; for the opposite view space as the existing background which comprehends things is not merely secondary but primary as a totality of determining laws and limits, which the Being and action of things has to
;
obey, so that the things and ourselves are in space
while
our view maintains that space
is
in us.
This brings us
Chap.
I.]
SPATIAL RELATIONS AS FEELING,
259
naturally to the second of the questions, which were pro-
posed^ above.
114. When I want to know what precisely we mean by saying that things are in space, I can only expect to meet with astonishment, and wonder what there is in the matter that is open to question nothing, it will be said, is
;
plainer.
And
in fact this spatial relation is
given so clearly
to our perception, that
we
find all other relations, in them-
selves not of the spatial kind, expressed in language
designations borrowed from space.

philosophical views which not only
in space
We
by even meet with

constructions
demand
by way of sensuous elucidation of abstract thought, but prefer to regard the problem of cognition as unsolved till such constructions are found. I have no hope of making clear the import of my question to such a scientific mind.' But the assumption of a purely phenomenal space
*
in answering it. compelled to repeat the warning, that this assumption does not any more than the other aim at denying or modifying the directness of the overwhelming impression which makes space appear to us to include things
has
little difficulty
Only
I feel
it only propounds reflections on the true state of the which makes this impression possible; and we expressly admit of our reflections that they are utterly foreign to the common consciousness. The power of our senses to see colours and forms or to hear sounds, seems to us quite as simple we need, we think, only to be present, and it is a matter of course that sensations are formed in us, which apprehend and repeat the external world as it really is the
in
it
facts,
natural consciousness never has an inkling of the manifold
intermediate processes required to produce these feelings;
and one who has gained scientific insight into their necessity does not feel them a whit more noticeable in the
moment
It
is
of actual sensation.
the task
of psychology to ascertain these inter^
[Sect.
108]
S 2
26o

for the case
[Book
II.
mediate processes
all
in
hand
its
solution will
not point to an image of empty space, formed prior to

perceptions, into which the
its
mind had subsequently
to
transplant
impressions
it is
rather the series of peculiar
concomitant feelings of homogeneous change of its condition, experienced in the transition from the impression/ to
q^ that is felt by it as the distance p q ; and from the comparison of many such experiences there
the other impression
arises, as I indicated just
now, by help of abstraction from

arisen, to localise
the content of the various impressions, the picture of empty

extension.
After
it
has
an impression
:
q in a. particular point of this space simply means taking an impression / as the initial state from which the movement of consciousness starts, to contemplate the magnitude
of the change which consciousness
to reach q,
felt or must feel in order under the form of a distance / q. These different concomitant feelings, which distinguish the impressions/ and q, are independent of the qualitative
difference of their content,

as to unlike impressions.
and may attach
to like as well
Therefore metaphysic can only
derive the feehngs from a difference in the effects produced
on the soul by the
real
elements which correspond to them,
in conformity with a difference of actual relations in
which
the reahties stand to the soul, and consequently, with a de-
terminate actual relation in which they stand to each other.

I reserve for a
moment my
further explanations concerning
these intelligible relations, as

realities,
we may
call
them, of the
which we regard as causes of our perceived relations of space I only emphasise here the fact that they
;
consist in actual relations of thing
and
thing, not of things
and space
and
that
it
is
not they, as merely subsisting

in the unity of
between the things, but the concentration

our consciousness of
spatial idea in
effects of the things varying in

is
contheir
formity with them, that
the proximate active cause of our

their locality,
which we picture
and
distance from each other.
Chap.
I.]
SPA TIAL RELA TIONS IN THEMSEL VES.
26 r
115.
From
this point
we may
obtain a conspectus of the
difficulties
which spring from the opposite view, that space has an existence of its own, and that things are in it. If space exists, and consequently the point / exists, what is meant by saying that a real element -n is in the point/?
Even if/ itself is not to be taken to be a real thing, still, between it as something existent, and the reality tt, some reciprocal operation must be conceivable by the subsistence of which the presence of tt in / is distinguished from its not being present in /. But as regards tt we do not believe that its place does anything to it; on the contrary, it remains the same in whatever placie it may be; therefore there is nothing which comes to pass in it by which its being in / is distinguishable from its being in q ; the two cases would only be distinguishable to an observer, who had reason on the one hand to distinguish p from ^, and on
the other to associate the image of
tt
in the
moment
tt
of
perception only with/ and not with

If in
it,
q.
is
we go on to ask what happens to the point / when we should suppose that the nature of/ would be
changed as that of
tt
;
just
as
little
:
but no doubt the answer will
occupied by -n distinguishes which is now not the place occupied by tt. Against this answer I am defenceless. It is indeed unassailable if we can once conceive, and accept as a satisfactory solution, that between two realities, the point/ and the actual element tt, there should be a relation as to which
be
it
the very fact that

^,
is
from
neither of the related points takes note of anything except

that
it,
the relation, subsists, while in every other respect

if it
the two things are exactly as they would be

subsist.
filled
did not
or p;
I
tt,
might add, that

but, in turn,
would not be permanently

real
by
by other
elements
one case ought somehow to distinguish itself from the other, and the point / to be different when occupied by -n from what it is when occupied by k. But this would be unavailing; I should be answered with
surely the
262
the

:
[Book
II.
just the
that in all these cases p remains same acuteness same in every other respect, and the distinction between them is constituted by the simple fact, that the
it
occupation of/, which does not affect

out by
TT
in
itself, is
carried
all
in
is
one case and by
k in
J>,
another.
I
As
this
moreover
reassertion
as true of q as oi
can only meet
this
by reasserting the opposite notion; that the

of things alleged
is
whole
state
inconceivable to
me
as
in real existence,
and only conceivable
as in the thought of
an observer, who, as I indicated, has reason to distinguish from q and, at the moment, to combine either tt or k with/ or q to make one combination and not another. Finally, taking / ^ as the distance between the real elements tt and < which occupy the points p and q, we
do not
in fact treat this
localisation
as
unimportant in
k to
our further investigation of things; for we beheve the

intensity of reciprocal action
between
this
tt
and
ditioned according to the magnitude of the distance.

their action cannot
be conBut
be guided by
changeable distance
unless
somehow brought home suppose this to be done? The

it is
to
them
how
are
is
we
to
distance
/
if
not in
the points
/ and
q but between them;
we suppose
the empty point q represented
produced by q on /, which makes the distance / q always present to /, and consequently, though I can see no reason for the inference, present also to the element tt in / and determining its behaviour, still this would hold equally good of any other empty point r or s. All of. them would be represented at /, consequently they would all have an equal
at/ by some
effect
right to
determine the behaviour of the element
tt
at
the pre-eminence of q which is at the moment occupied by the real element k, could only depend on the latter, and
would have
to
be accounted
for thus
the empty point
q must undergo a change of state by becoming filled, must transmit the change to/ through qp and there transfer it to
the element
tt;
a reaction between real existence and the
Chap.
I.]
RELATIONS ARE REACTIONS.

it
263
inexplicable.
void,
which would be as inevitable as
is
The argument might be pursued

here,
farther,
but I conclude
the inconceiv-
hoping that the mass of extravagances in which

simple assumption that space has
we should be involved has persuaded us of

ability of the apparently
independent existence and that things have their being

in space.
116.
The
opposite view which I
am now
maintaining
leads to a series of problems which I will not undertake

to treat at present
;
it is
enough
to characterise their import
as far as
is
requisite to establish the general admissibility of
the doctrine.
that
We may
begin by expressing ourselves thus
;j
we
regard a system of relations between the
realities,!
unspatial, inaccessible to perception,
and purely
intelligible,)
as the fact which lies at the root of our spatial perceptions.
When
finds
these
objective
relations
are
translated
into
the
subjective
its
language of our consciousness, each of them

all others.
'
counterpart in one definite spatial image to the

I
exclusion of
should avoid calling this system

space
'
of relations an
is
intelligible
and discussing whether
it
like or unlike the
space which
I start
we
represent to ourselves
by help of our
would
all
senses.
from the opposite conviction,

for
it
that there exists
no resemblance between the two;
transfer to the reality of the

diflEiculties
new condition
of things
the
which we found
in the reality of
empty
space.
However,
it
is
not worth while to keep up the idea of
such a system of relations, which was only of use as a brief

preliminary expression of the fact;
conviction
we now
return to the
expressed above;
it
is
not relations, whether
spatial or intelligible, between the things,
but only direct
reactions which the things are subject to from each other,
and experience
stitute
which conwhose perception we spin out into a semblance of extension. and Q be two real Let elements thought of as unrelated let i^ k and Q tt indicate
as inner states of themselves,
fact
the
real
264
[Book
II.
them when in the states of themselves which are set up by a momentary mutual reaction these states of theirs contain the reason why P and Q, or at the moment F k and Q tt, appear in our perception in the places / and q, separated by It need hardly be observed that the mere the interval p q. fact of the reaction subsisting between P and Q cannot by but can only do so by means itself set up our perception of an action of P and Q upon us, conformable to their momentary states k and tt; and therefore other than it
;
would have been in the moment of a different mutual The meeting of these two actions in our conreaction.
sciousness causes,
first,
in virtue of
its
unity, the possibility
of a
comparison
and
its
reciprocal
reference of the two;
secondly, in virtue of
peculiar nature the necessity that
the result of this comparison should assume the form of

distance in space to our perception
;
and
finally,
the magni-
tude of the diiference which is felt between the two actions on us, determines, to put it shortly, the visual angle by
which we separate the impressions of the two elements.
Thus the theory
attaches itself to a
more general point of
view, which I adopt in opposition to a predominant ten-
dency of the philosophic spirit of the age; holding that thought should always go back to the living activities of things, which activities are to be considered as the efificient cause of all that we regard as external relation between
things.
jfact
For
in
calling these latter 'relations'
we
are in
using a mere
name
we cannot
seriously conceive
I regret
jthem to be real and to subsist apart from thought.

that there
is
an increasingly widespread inclination in the opposite direction, namely, to apprehend everything that takes place as the product of pre-existing and varying relations ; overlooking the circumstance that ultimately, even
supposing that such relations could exist by themselves, nothing but the vital susceptibility and energy which is in
Things could
utilise
them, or attach to any one of them
a result different from that attaching to the others.
Chap.
I.]
IMPORT OF DISTANCE AND MOVEMENT.
265
117.
I
As an elucidation, and more or less as a caution, add what follows. If the arrangement of perceivable
objects in space were always the same,
we might
in
think
of
them
as the
image of a systematic order

its
its
which every
element had a right to

essential
particular place, in virtue of the
idea of
that the elements
It would not be necessary which presented a greater resemblance of
nature.
nature should occur in closer contiguity in space, or that
be more widely separated; the scheme of M, which realises itself in the simultaneously combined manifold of things, might easily nedissimilar things should
entire
cessitate
multitude
of crossing relations
or reactions
between them, of such a kind that similar elements should

repeatedly occur as necessary centres of relation at very
whole system, while very dissimilar ones would have to stand side by side, as immediately conditioning each other.
different parts of the
The
movability of things
this
makes
it
superfluous to
is
go
deeper into
incident
notion
the ground of localisation
clearly
not in the nature of the things alone, but in
some
variable
their
which
it
occurs
to
them,
compatible with
nature, but not determined
by
it
alone.
This might lead to
the idea, that
was simply the intensity of the subsisting them which dictated the apparent situation of things in space; whether we presume that in all things what takes place is the same in kind and varies
reaction between
only in degree
or, that
the inner states produced in things
by
their reactions
are different in kind, but so far
com-
parable that their external effects are calculable as degrees of one and the same activity.
It would be no objection to this that it is observed that there often are elements contiguous in space which
seem
torn
its
quite indifferent to each other, while distant ones

lively
its
betray a
from
states
reciprocal action. No element must be connexion with all others, and none of from their cohesion with previous ones; con-
266

are
indifferent are
tiguous elements which
together not
rela-
because they demand one another, but because their

tions to all others
deny them every other place, and only leave them this one undisputed; the remote elements in question act powerfully on one another, because the ceaseless stream of occurrence has produced counteractions, which hinder the two elements from attaining the state towards which they are now striving. However, it is not my intention to continue the subject now, or to show by what general line of thought my view of space might be reconciled with the particular facts of The following sections will compel us to make Nature. this attempt, but they would entirely disappoint many expectations unless I began by confessing that the theory of a phenomenal space when applied to the explanation of the most general relations of nature will by no means distinguish itself for facility and simplicity in comparison
with the
common
view.
On
the contrary
the latter
is
which our mental nature gives us as a means to clearBut I insist upon it that my ness and vivid realisation. view is not propounded for its practical utility, but simply because it is necessary in itself, however much it might ultimately embarrass a detailed enquiry were we bound to
gift
keep
that
it
explicitly before us at every step.
We
all
shall see
we
are not obliged to
do so
but
at present I
maintain
with a philosopher's obstinacy, that above
things that
must hold good which we

In no case
truth
to
I
find to be in
all
its
nature a nebreak.
cessary result of thought, though
else
bend or
may we
regard other hypotheses as definitive
(convenient as they
in use),
if
may be
for use
and therefore
which the
be admitted
they are in themselves as unreality,
thinkable as the indefinite species of
ordinary view attributes to empty space.
CHAPTER
II.
Deductions of Space.
118.
Among
the
commonest undertakings of modern
philosophy are to be found attempted deductions of Space ; and they have been essayed with different purposes.
Adherents of ideahstic views, convinced that nothing could be or happen without being required by the highest thought which governs reality, had a natural interest in showing that Space was constrained to be what it is, or to be represented as it is represented to us, because it could not
otherwise
fulfil
its
assigned purpose.
is,
Self-evident as the
belief fundamentally
that everything in the world belongs
to a rational whole, there are obvious reasons
why
it
should
be equally
connexion
unfruitful in the actual demonstration of this

in a
whole
and even the deduction of Space

it is
has hardly given results which
necessary to dwell on.
whole content of the universe was! maintained, in the dawn of modern philosophy, by Spinoza but in a way which rather excluded than favoured the / deduction of Space. The reason lay in an enthusiasm, somewhat deficient in clearness, for the idea of Infinity, and for everything great and unutterable that formal logical ^
solidarity of the
;l
The
acumen combined with an imagination bent on things of price could concentrate in that expression. Hence he
spoke of
infinitely
numerous
attributes of his
it
one
its
infinite
substance, and represented
as
manifesting
to
eternal
nature by means of modifications of each of them.
Our
human
experience,
indeed,
was
restricted
two only
2 68
[Book
1 1.
of them, consciousness and extension, the two clear funda-
mental notions under which Descartes had distributed the

total
content of the universe
and the
further progress of
the Spinozistic philosophy takes account of these two only.
But
it
adheres to the principle laid
down
at its starting
about all attributes ; each of them rests wholly on itself, and can be understood by us only by means of itself; we find it expressly subjoined, that though it is one and the same substance which expresses its essence as well in forms of extension as in forms of thought ; yet the shape which it
assumes in one of these attributes can never be derived from that which it has assumed in the other. This prohibits any attempt to deduce the attributes of Space from what is not Space ; but at the same time Consciousness and Extension are considered to be as manifestations of the absolute quite on the same level; in assuming the shape of extension, it does a positive act as much as in giving existence to forms of consciousness ; neither of these is the mere result or semblance of the other. After Kant 119. These notions influenced Schelling. had destroyed all rational cohesion between things-in-themselves and spatial phenomena, it was natural to make the attempt to restore Space to some kind of objective validity. If we may here eliminate the many slight alterations which Schelling's views underwent, the following will be found a Empty Space is pretty constant series of thoughts in him. for him too only the subjectively represented image, which
remains to our pictorial imagination when
it is
it
disregards the
is,
definite forms of real existence in Space, that
of matter
not a prior creation of the absolute which goes before

it,
the production of the things to be realised in

itself is this first
but matter
is
production, and spatial extension

iii
only
sub-
real in matter, but
it is
actually real
and not a mere coming

it is
jective
mode
of the
spectator's
apprehension.
How
he
represents the creation of matter as
to pass,
need not describe here ; but
in general
easy to see
we how
Chap.
II.l
SCHELLING AND HEGEL.

and the same root the
269
dis-
the desire to explain by one

tinction
which experience presents between the material and spiritual world might lead to denying the primary presence of the characteristic predicates of these two worlds
in the Absolute, the root required;
while conceiving, in
the complete indefiniteness thus obtained of this absolute

Identity,
factors,
two eternally co-existent impulses, tendencies, or

arise.
out of which the distinction that had been cancelled
might again
Some
interest attaches to the different
expressions which Schelling employs to designate
opposes to the
real objective
producing
finite,
factor,
them ; he which em-
bodies the infinite in forms of the
the ideal subjective
defining factor which re-moulds the finite into the infinite

it
is
the former whose predominance creates Nature, the
latter that creates the
world of
Mind
though the two are

its
so inseparably united that neither can produce

factor, of the other.
result
without the co-operation, and participation as a determining
Space;
This account admits of no idea of a deduction proper of still I think that the equal rank assigned to the
above designations contains an indication of the reason which made the space-generating activity of the absolute
appear indispensable to the idea of it. It became obvious not only that nothing could be generated out of the void of
absolute Identity, but
it was also impossible for the determinations which might have been held to be included in it as merely ideal, to be more than unrealisable problems,
failing
ing, given, with content,
one condition; that something should be forthcomand for perception; such as the
its
ideal forms could never create,
qua forms of
reality.
relations,
and as applied to which, and so only, they would possess and contracting
the productive
forces,
factor,
Thus, not without a reminiscence of Kant's con-
struction of matter out of expanding
Schelling
makes the one,

all
that
is
provide above
things for the creation of that which the
ideal factor has only to
form and to determine
it
is
only
270
[Book
II.
by the activity of the first that results are made real, which for all the second could do, would never be more than a postulate, that is, an idea. Even the actual form which the creation assumes is determined by the character
of the productive factor; for
factor, create
it
is
only this character that
can, though under the control
and guidance of the other
such shapes of
reality as are within its range.
120.
The
indefiniteness of the absolute Identity has dis-
appeared in Hegel, and the position of the two factors has altered ; the comprehensive system of notions which forms his Logic may be regarded as the interpretation of what the
ideal factor,
now
the proximate and primary expression of

;
the Absolute,
demands
the consciousness,
how
strongly all
these determinations involve and postulate that as deter-
minations of which they must be presented in order to be

real,
purely logical idea, to pass over into

that
tion,
is,
appears as the urgency of the ideal factor or hitherto its form of otherness
into a shape capable of direct or pictorial presentaexist in the
forms by which a multione another is connected plicity whose Therefore the logical idea, doing away its into a whole. own character as logical, produces Space as 'the abstract Hegel says on this universality of its being outside itselF.'
such as can only
parts are outside
point ^, 'As our procedure
is,
after establishing the
thought
it
which
like in
is
necessitated by the notion^, to ask, what

it;
looks
our sensuous idea^ of
we go on
to assert, that
what corresponds
in direct presentation to the
thought of
pure externality is Space. Even if we are wrong in this, I that will not interfere with the truth of our thought.'
refer to this
limits
is
remarkable passage in order to indicate the

this
which such speculative constructions of Space as
can never overstep. They may of course derive in a general way, from the thought in which they conceive them1 ^ 3
[* Die abstracte Allgemeinheit ihres Aussersichseins.*] Naturphilosophie. Sammtliche Werke, Bd. VII. 47.
['BegrifiF.']
['Vorstellung.']
Chap.
II.]
DEDUCTIONS OF THE THREE DIMENSIONS,
271
selves to express the
postulate which must be fulfilled
supreme purpose of the world, a certain if the end is to be fulfilled
but they are not in a position to infer along with the postulate
should
what appearance would be presented by that which satisfy it. In the passage quoted Hegel admits this in pronouncing Space to be the desired principle of externality he professes to have answered a riddle by free conjeche
ture; the solution might be wrong, but the problem,

asserts,
would
still
be there.
says^ 'That primary quality
Just in the
same way Weisse
of what
infinity
exists,
the idea of which arises from quantitative
being specified and
made
;
'
qualitative
by the
specific
character of triplicity
is
Space
only that he, although in
this sentence expressly separating
enigma and answer by a
mark of
interruption, yet regards the latter as a continuous

is
deduction of the space which

his abstract
present to perception from
and obscure postulate. It can never be otherwise; after, on the one hand, we feel justified in making certain abstract demands which reality is to satisfy, and after, on the other hand, we have become acquainted with Space, then it is possible to put the two together and to show that Space, being such as it is, satisfies these demands. But it is impossible to demonstrate that only it, and no other form, can satisfy them we are confined to a speculative interpretation of space, and any deduction of it is an impossibility on this track. One would think that the opinion Hegel expresses could not but incHne him prima facie to the view of the mere phenomenality of the sensuous idea of space but what he adds on the subject can make no one any wiser as to his true meaning; as a rule the
;
views of his school have adhered to extension as a real

activity of the Absolute.
121. Philosophical constructions, it was held, were under the further obligation, to demonstrate not merely of Space
as a whole, but further of each

*
and every property by which

p. 317.
Metaphysik,
272
it,
[Book
1 1.
geometry characterises
of
ideal
it is a necessary consequence Attempts have been made on obvious and natural grounds to conceive the infinite divisi-
that
requirements.
bihty
and the homogeneousness of an
infinite extension, as
antecedent conditions of that which the idea sets itself to realise within space; but the most numerous and least
have been devoted to the three There are two points in these innumerable attempts that have always been incomprehensible to me.
fortunate
endeavours
dimensions.
The
first is,
the entire neglect of the circumstance that
space contains innumerable directions starting from every
one of its
three
is
points,
and
that the hmitation of their
number
to
only admissible under the further condition that
each must be perpendicular to the two others. Accessory reasons, which are self-evident in the case of geometry and
mechanics, have no doubt led to the habit of
standing,
fulfil
tacitly
under-
by dimensions of space, such par

condition;
if
excellence as
this
but
the
philosophical
deductions
and was unnecessary to find among the abstract presuppositions from which space is to be deduced, a special reason why the dimensions which are to correspond to three distinct ideal moments (however these may be distinguished), should be at right angles to one another. The second point which I cannot understand is the fastidiousness with which every demonstration partaking of mathematical form, that a fourth perpendicular dimension must necessarily coincide with one of the other three, is always rejected as an external and unphilosophical process of proof. I think, on the contrary, that if we once supposed ourselves to have deduced that certain relations which we postulated in an abstract form must take the shape of lines and angles between them, then the correct philosophical
proceed as
as
if it
the only point was to secure a
triplicity,
progress
would consist
its
in
the demonstration that these
elementary forms of space being once obtained were completely decisive of
whole possible
structure.
As a whole
Chap.
II.]
PS YCHOLOGICAL
law
it
BED UC TIONS.
273
subject to
stituted in
have no properties but those conit can by the relations of its parts ; if its properties
it
are to correspond besides to certain ideal relations then
ought to have been shown that this correspondence demanded just those primary spatial relations from which the
properties
is
must proceed as inevitable
result.
However,
it
not worth while to go at greater length into these unsuccessful undertakings, which are not to the taste of the
present time, and,
122.
will not be renewed. be much longer detained by other investigations which are sometimes wrongly comprehended under the name of Psychological Deductions of In virtue of the title 'Psychological' they would Space.
we may hope,
will
Our
attention
till later; but they treat in detail or touch in passing three distinct questions, the complete separation of which seems to me indispensable.
not claim mention
first, were it capable of being solved, would belong to Pyschology it is this what is the reason that the soul, receiving from things manifold impressions which can only be to begin with unextended states of its
I.
The
really
own
receptive nature,
is
obliged to envisage them at
all
under the form of a space with parts outside each other? The cause of this marvellous transfiguration could only be found in the peculiar nature of the soul, but it never will be
found
;
the question
is
just as
unanswerable as
effects
how it comes
it
to pass that the soul brings before consciousness in the
form of brightness and sound the

mitted through the senses.
to ourselves that these
It is
which
can only
clear,
experience by means of light and sound vibrations trans-
important to
make
two questions are precisely alike in nature ; and that to answer the first is neither more essential nor more possible than to answer the second, which every one has long desisted from attempting. All endeavours to
derive this elementary and universal character of ideas of
space, this externality,
an extended
line,
I.
which appears to us in the shape of from any possible abstract relations, which
Metaphysic, Vol.

274
are
still
unspatial,
[Book
II.
between psychical
affections,
ably led to nothing but fallacies of subreption

space, as
at
it
could not be
other
made
if
in this
have invari; by which way, was brought in

as
some
2.
step of the deduction as an unjustified addition.
On
the
hand,
we
postulate
to
given the
apprehend an unspatial multiplicity as in space, then there arises the second problem, which I hold to be capable of being solved though What sort of multiplicity does a long way from being so the soul present in this peculiar form of its apprehension ? And under for there are some which it does not treat thus. what conditions, by what means, and following what clue, does it combine its occasional particular impressions in the definite situation in space in which they are to us the exAs no perception of this press image of external objects ? variable manifold can take place but by the instrumentality
capacity
;
and obligation of the soul
of the senses, the solution of this question concerning the

localisation of sensations
belongs wholly to that part of
psychology which investigates the connexion of sensations, and the associations of these remembered images; which
latter are partly
stimuli, partly
by the
caused by the conjoint action of nervous activity of consciousness in creating

third question, that of the geometrical
relations.
3.
There remains a
structure of extension
which
arises
if
we develope
all
the
consequences that the given character of the original externality necessitates or admits ; and which is wanted to complete the totality of the Space-image in whose uniformly
present environment
we
are obliged
to set
in
array the
various impressions of sensation.
This investigation, which
has fallen to the share of Mathematics, has hitherto been conducted by that science in a purely logical spirit it took no account of the play of psychical activities, which bring about in the individual apprehending subject a perception of the truth of its successive propositions, a play of which in
;
these days
we think we know a
great deal,
and
really
know
Chap.
II.]
TRUTH OF OUR SPACE-PERCEPTION,

;
275
nothing
to the
it
attached the convincingness of their truth purely

their conclusions.
which given But the premisses themselves, as well as that combination of them on which the conclusion has to rest, were simply accepted by Mathematics from what it called Direct or Intuitional Perception'-. Nor could the word perception" be held to designate any psychical activity, which could be shown to possess a peculiar and definite mode of procedure; every impartial attempt to say what perception'^ does, must end
objective^ necessity of thought with
premisses
demand
with the admission that
it
really
does nothing, that there
is
no
visible
working or process
its
at all as a
means
to the pro-
duction of
content
but that on the contrary
it is
nothing
but a direct receptivity, with an entirely

basis,
unknown
its
psychical
which merely becomes aware of
object
and the
peculiar nature of that object.
Obviously, an investigation
cannot begin before the matter is given to which it is to refer ; but again, it will only consist, even when the matter
is
forthcoming, in presenting one by one to this receptivity

the details which
;
do not fall at once in the line of our and defining their differences or similarities by help of marks which make it possible to transfer from one to the other of these features the judgments about them made by direct perception, and to connect all such features
all
mental vision
systematically together.
I shall return later
on
to
what
it is
indispensable to say
it
on
this
head ;
I will
only add
now
that
was possible
for
the Euclidean geometry, which arose in the above way, to
remain unassailed as long as no doubt was raised of the

objective validity of space; while
that
it
was believed, that

It
is,
we had we
in
it if
not a real thing, at least the actual and
peculiar form attaching to real things.

solely, as
was not indeed
shall see,
but chiefly, the modern notion which
sees in it only a subjective mode of perception, that disturbed this unsuspicious security and raised such questions
*
['
Sachliche.']
['
Anschauung.']
276
as these
;
DED UCTIONS OF
of
SPA CE.
[Book
11
how much
;
that
is
true about the world can
we
properly be said to get experience by help of this form of
apprehension
could there not be other species of percep-
tion that might teach us the
or other truths quite
same truth about Things better, unknown; and finally, may not the
whole fabric of our spatial perceptions be incomplete, perhaps charged with inner contradictions which escape our notice for want of the empirical stimuli which would bring them to light ? The diversity of opinions propounded
in relation to the
above matters compels
me
in
my
metaits
physic to enter upon the essential nature of space in
geometrical aspect;
confession.
I
and
begin
my
task by a very frank

all
am
quite unable to persuade myself that
those
the
among my new theories
fellow-students of philosophy,
who
accept
with applause, can really understand with
such ease what is quite incomprehensible to me; I fear, that from over-modesty they do not discharge their office, and fail, on this borderland between mathematics and
philosophy, to
vindicate
their
full
weight for the grave
doubts which they should have raised in the name of the latter against many mathematical speculations of the present
day.
I shall not imitate this
procedure
but while on the

speculation
contrary I plainly say that the whole of this
seems to
risk
my
one huge coherent error, I am quite happy to being censured for a complete misapprehension, in case remarks should have the good fortune to provoke a
me
thorough and decisive refutation. 123. I begin with the first inference suggested by the doctrine that space is only the subjective form of apprehension which is evolved from the nature of our souls, though not deducible by us. Then, there is nothing to interfere with our thinking of beings endowed with mental
images as differing in nature within very wide limits; or with our assigning to each of these kinds a mode of apprehension of its own, which, as is commonly said, it holds in
readiness to apply to
its
future perceptions.
Meantime we
Chap.
II.]
OTHER SPACES FOR SAME WORLD?
277
have convinced ourselves how little use such forms could be to these minds, if they were only a subjective manner of
behaviour and destitute of
did not
all
comparability with the things.

1
'
In short, things would not be caught in nets whose meshes

fit
them
far less
could there be in purely subjective
forms any ground of distinction which could compel things

to prefer
one place to appear in rather than another. We) must therefore necessarily give a share in our consideration to the connexion in which the forms of apprehension are bound to stand with the objects which they are to graspy The following cases will have to be distinguished. and Z be two of those modes of perception, difLet ferent from our space 6", which we arbitrarily assign to two kinds of beings endowed with mental images, and organized This assumption would cause us no differently from us. difficulty as long as, (i.) we supposed the worlds which are to be perceived by their means, to differ from the world accessible to our experience, but to be such as to admit of apprehension in the forms and Z as easily as the world lends itself to our apprehension in the form of our space S. Only, this assumption would not interest us much ; though free from internal contradiction, in fact, strictly, a mere tautology, it has no connexion whatever with the object of our doubt ; the interest of our question depends entirely on a different presupposition ; (ii.) that this same world M^ which we represent to ourselves as enclosed in the frame of
';
M M
Euclidean space
6",
appears to other intellectual beings in
the utterly heterogeneous systematic forms

this supposition also there are
or Z.
On
two cases to be kept separate. The actions and reactions which the things of this world reciprocate with each other may be extremely various ; it is neither necessary nor credible that they only consist in such
activities as
in
cause us to locaHse the things in spatial relations accordance with them ; on the contrary, much may go on
is
within the things that
not able to find expression in their
appearance in space even with the help of motion.
There-
278
fore there
is
DEDUCTIONS OF SPACE,
still
[Book
II.
this alternative; either, (a.) the
perception
and
forms of reproduce relations of things which
cannot be represented in our space ^S and do not occur in it; about this assumption we can have no decisive judgment, but only a conjecture, which I will state presently
or (/3.) we assert that the same relations of things which appear to us as relations in space S are accessible to other beings under the deviating modes of perception or Z; and on this point we shall have something more definite to
say.
124. Let us begin with the former alternative

are justified in subordinating the idea of space
6*
(ii. a).
We
more universal conception of a system of arrangement of empty places, within which the reciprocal position of any two terms is fully determined by a number n of relations of the
to the
two to others. And there is nothing to prevent us, as long as no other requirements are annexed, from conceiving many other species of this genus, in which the reciprocal definition of the terms might be effected by other rules than those valid for the space 6*, or might require a greater
or smaller
Still, it
number of conditions than
are required in
it.
seems to me unfruitful to refer for further illustration of such ideas to the well-known attempts to arrange in a spatial conspectus either the whole multiplicity of sensations of musical sound, with reference to strength, pitch,
and harmonic affinity or the colours in all their on similar grounds. Nothing indeed is more certain than that (i) we here have before us relations of the terms to be arranged for the adequate representation of which our space S is unfitted but at the same time I think nothing can be more doubtful than the implied idea by which, whether furtively, or explicitly, we console ourselves, that ox Z which (2) there may be other modes of perception permit to beings of different organization the feat which we cannot perform. I must speak more fully of both parts of
quality,
;
variety
my
assertion.
Chap.
II.]
SYMBOLIC ARRANGEMENTS.
279
125. (i)
We may
arrange musical notes in a straight line
but as there appears to be ; an increasing divergence from the character of the keynote up to the middle of the octave, and from that point again an increasing approximation to it, having regard to this we may represent the notes still more clearly, by arranging them as Drobisch does in a spiral, which after every circuit
according to their
rise of pitch
corresponding to an octave returns to a point vertically
above the
mind
But in doing so we should bear in any other appropriate device which might be added to the scheme, is still a symbolical construction ; the notes are not in the space in which we
starting-point.
that all this, like
localise
them
for the
convenience of our perception, nor
is
the increment-element
A/
^,
of the pitch/ really the element
AJ
of a line in space
to which, for the purpose of our
perception,
we
;
treat
it is
it
as equivalent.
No
one refuses
this
concession
but
not precisely in this that the ground of
difficulty lies. Seeing that I have asserted the phenomenal nature of space there is no longer any meaning for me in distinguishing Things as in space, from sounds as only to be projected into it by way of symbolism. When Things appear to us in space, what we do to them is just the same as the treatment to which we submit the ideas of notes in the above constructions; like them, things have
my
neither place nor figure in space, nor spatial relations
it is
only within our combining consciousness and only to

vision that the living reactions
its
which Things interchange with each other and with us expand into the system of extension, in which every phenomenal element finds its completely definite place. So if the innumerable mental representations of sounds compelled us as unambiguously to place each of them in definite spatial relations to others, I should not be able to see how such an arrangement must be less legitimate for them than for things, for which also it
remains a subjective apprehension in our minds. It will further be observed, and quite correctly, that
28o
[Book
II.
Things are movable in space, and their place at any time sum of relations in which they stand to other things, which subsists at the moment but is essenonly expresses the
tially variable ; it tells nothing of the Thing's own nature whereas such constructions of the realms of colour or sound aim at a completely different result they attempt to assign
;
each one of these sensations, conformably with the peculiar combination in which each unites definite values of the universal predicates of colour or of sound, a systematic
to
can never exchange for is important as regards the nature of the elements which it is proposed to systematise in the two cases; still there is no essential obstacle to copying the eternal and permanent articulation
all
it
position between
others which
another place.
No
doubt
this difference
of a system of contents^ fixed in the shape of ideas by
means of the same mode of perception which

for every
is
represent the variable arrangement of real Things.

single indivisible
used to In fact,
moment
the existing arrange-
ment of
real things in
space would be precisely the total
expression of the complete systematic localisation appropriate to the individual things in virtue of the actions
which
cir-
intersected each other in
them
at that
moment.
The
cumstance that within things there is motion, which will not admit of being represented for ever by the same fixed
system,
is
a fact with
its
is
own importance, but

felt
not a proof
that the
relations.
space form
inadequate to express systematic
fitted
articulation, though what we perceive in it, is not fitted for such matter as these sensations which we project into it. 126. Things then obviously do not arrange themselves in
fact that its
Therefore the can only rest on the

for
inadequacy of the space-form
space according to a constant affinity of their natures, but according to some variable occurrence within them, conWe are sisting of the reactions which they interchange.
not justified in assuming an entirely homogeneous form
1
['
Inhaltsystem.']
Chap.
II.]
DISPARATE QUALITIES.
all
281
actions
all
of event as produced in
of
but
we cannot
help regarding as
designating
them by these homogeneous

effect
that
their
*
part of such events which has
its
it
in
fixing
place in space;
in
chanical
relations' of things
by the name of mewe approach the common
view of physical science, which considers that in everjT moment the place which a body occupies abandons or
tends
to,
is
determined by the joint action of entirely

just
this
comparable forces and impulses.
Now
perties,
it
is
comparability which
of sounds;
that
is,
is
wanting to
felt
the musical properties

for
the
pro-
we
are
only speaking
of them, not of the
comparable physical conditions of their production. The graduated series of loudness^ i and of pitch p may no doubt be formed, each separately, by addition of homogeneous increments; but when we come to the series of
qualities
and
q we find it cannot be exhibited in this way; any case A /, A/, and A q would remain quite incomparable with each other. The lines /, p, and q, though
in
we might suppose
itself,
that each could be constructed by would diverge from any point in which they were united, as it were into different worlds and if one of them were arbitrarily fixed in space still there would be nothing to determine the angles at which the others would cross it or part from it.
yet
It will
of course be said that this as well as the
diffi;
culties raised in the last section
was known long ago

(2)
but
that
no one can be sure
that
beings different from
or Z, command forms of apprehension which attach themselves to the content to be arranged just as unambiguously and perfectly, as our space S does to its matter, the mechanical relations of things. Yet I cannot
us have not at
see
how
['
this
should be supposed possible as long as we

I
'
Tonstarken.'
'
have retained the
because
it
probably stands for
Intensitat
(intensity).]
82
same achievement
of the
[Book
II.
ascribe to those beings the
as that in
which we
colours
fail.
If instead
quahtatively different
and tones which we see and hear, they perceived only uniform physical or psychical actions, from a mixture of which those sensations arose in us, I do not dispute that
in that case they
might have
for
such actions an adequate
Z; but the relations which they would have to arrange would again be purely mechanical, only mechanical in a different way from those which we reproduce in our space
S.
if those beings are supposed to feel between red and blue as we do, or to
perceptive form Jf or
On
the
feel
the other hand,

difference
same
the pitch of a
quality as
note as
feel
it,
independently of loudness
and
we
then the different progressions
h pj ^5 would be as incomparable for them as for us though they might arbitrarily reduce the relations of tones
and colours to the forms and Z by way of symbolism, with the same sort of approximation as we obtain in our space S. But I hold that a special colour-space or tone-space Z is an impossibility an impossibility that is, as an endowment of the supposed beings, with two faculties of the nature of empty forms of apprehension, prior to all content and so having none of their own, but able to
dictate particular
situations to disparate
elements subse-
quently received into them, solely in virtue of the rules

of connexion between individual places which they contain.
No
form of perception X, be it what it may, can enable elements which remain disparate even for it to prescribe
places in
it
their
and unambiguously to each may no doubt be rules of criticism for variously combined values of disparate predicates, which, being based on an estimate of the efficient causes which produce such combinations, show how to exclude impossible terms and to arrange possible ones in
definitely
other.
And
conversely; there
series
according to their various aspects; but a form of
perception
such as to unite
all
these
different series
; ;
Chap.
II.]
COMPARABLE RELATIONS.
me
283
of ideas
about the material into a single image of the

impossible.
;
material seems to
I
cannot see how we lose much if we admit this the many-sided affinities, resemblances, and contrasts of colours and tones are not lost to us because we cannot satisfactorily
all
symbolise them in space
we have
the enjoyment of
of them
other.
this
Now
sum
when we compare the impressions with each it seems to me that no being can get beyond
knowledge in respect of elements which
of predicates combine different properties that
discursive
in their
remain disparate even for that being ; a form of perception, in the sense of an ordered system of empty places, can only exist for such relations of elements as are completely comparable, and each of which is separated from a second by a difference of the same kind as separates this second
from any third or fourth. It is possible that things contain some system of uniform occurrences which escape us, but form the object of perception for other beings, and are in fact apprehended by them in forms of perception which
differ
from our space-form
and adapt themselves

;
to the
peculiar articulation of the occurrences
but this idea being
motived by no definite suggestion need not be pursued

further, at least for the
moment.
interested in the other of the
^) ^
If the
(ii.
127.
We
are
much more
cases distinguished above

things which are
to
same
imaged by us as
in space
relations of were supposed
meet with forms of a
different kind in
other beings
at least
we know that there is nothing in the nature of these relations to make them intractable to combination before
;
such an or Z undoubtedly might bear the character of perceptive forms. They would not need to be in the least like our space 6* the difference between two places of the system which appears to us in our space as the line j, would represent itself in them in the form ^ or both of which would
the mind's eye into one entire image
s:
;
^[123, end.]
284
[Book
II.
be as disparate from s as the interval between two notes from the distance between two points. As long as we
maintain these postulates, we have no reason to deny the possibility of these perceptions and Z; but as we do not
possess
them
their
assumption remains an empty idea, and
we know
absolutely nothing further of how things present themselves and what they look Hke under those forms.
Only we must not require more of them than our own

space-apprehension can achieve;
not, therefore, that the
beings which enjoy them shall be enabled by them in each

individual perception to apprehend the true relations
of
what does
in
it,
is
perceived.
;
This
is
more than even our space
for us
for instance
we have
;
to assign ourselves a place
with the change of which the whole constellation of

is
our impressions
of
displaced
even to
us,
owing to the laws

us,
the
optical
impressions
made on
parallel
lines
magnitudes to diminish, and the horizon of the sea to rise above the level of the shore. As we require the comparison of many experiences to enable us to apprehend the true relations in despite of the persistent semblance of the false, no more and Z than this ought to be demanded of the nature of that is, that combined experiences should give criteria for
inevitably appear
to converge at a distance,
the
elimination
of the
contradictions
and mistakes of
isolated ones.
tions,
We may
same
say then, subject to such condi-
that
the
relations of things as appear to us
in
space admit of other kinds of perception completely

to us but leading to equally true cognition.
Still
unknown
;
even this is by no means what is as a rule in people's minds it is expressly other j/J^r^-perceptions than ours that It is to be it is hoped to make conceivable in this way. taken as settled that the relation of two elements presented to perception is given by perception the shape of the extended line s^ and the relation of two such relations that and still even so there is to be a possibility of the angle a that by help of other combinations this s and a may form
;
Chap.
II. j
SPACE A AW QUASI-SPACE.
285
not our space

in
respect
of the character of
but a different one S^ or 5^, like ours its elements s and a as
pictured to the mind, but unlike in the fabric of the whole
which they generate.

or
S""
Perhaps
if I
it
the feelings of philologists
will not be too painful to propose for these forms S^

['
the
name
of
Raumoids ^
quasi-spaces
'].
know
no shorter way and Z and as I mean to forms and our previous forms maintain that there cannot be Raumoids, their name will
of expressing the difference between these
X
it
soon disappear again supposing I

wrong,
I
make
a present of
to
am right if my antagonists
;
am
as the
only thing I can do for their cause.
For
shall hardly
be brought to surrender my conviction that to accept s and a as elements of space is to decide its total form and inner structure, fully, unambiguously, and quite in the sense of the geometry which has hitherto
myself
prevailed.
128.
hold
it,
strictly
speaking, unreasonable to require
any other proof of
this
than that which Hes in the develop-
ment of the science down to the present time. That assuming the elements s and a they admit of other modes of combination than can be presented in our space S; and that these other combinations do not remain mere abstract names, but lead to kinds of perception S^ and S"^ ; all this -L could only be proved by the actual discovery of the perceptions in question. But it is admitted that our human mode of representation cannot discover S^ and S^ nothing
* ;
but
can be evolved out of it therefore if the logical sequence of this evolution were established, and we still believed in other beings who could form divergent percep-S"
;
credit
same elements s and a, we should have to them with other laws of thought than those on which the truth of knowledge rests for us. Such an assumption would destroy our interest in the question; though no
tions out of the
doubt
it
would not
*
in the least
run counter to the taste of

*
[From
'
Raum,'
Space.']
286
[Book
II.
an age whose tendency is so indulgent as to take anything for possible, which cannot be at a moment's notice demonstrated impossible.
But there
is
a point at which our geometry has long been

;
thought deficient in consecutiveness of deduction

in the doctrine of parallel lines
that
is
and of the sum of the angles
of a triangle. Still it appears to me as if philosophical logic could neither advance nor properly speaking admit the
peculiar claims
to
strictness
of procedure
made
all,
at this
point by the logic of mathematics.

of space with the variety of
After
it.;
discursive
proof cannot make truth, but only finds

its
the perception
inner relations faces us as

;
the given object of inner experience

given,
one which,
if
not so
we should never be
able to construct by a logical
combination of unspatial elements, or even of those elements of space which we assumed ; all demonstrations can but serve to discover certain definite relations between
a number of
of reasoning
tion
arbitrarily
nature of the whole.

is
chosen points to be implied in the For such discovery perfect strictness indispensable and elegance of representa;
may
also require that the multiplicity of relations shall
be reduced to the minimum number of directly evident and fundamental ones ; but it will always be fruitless to assume fewer independent principles than the nature of the facts requires, and always erroneous to presuppose that it does not require a considerable number. We convinced ourselves in the Logic that all our cognition of facts rests on our application of synthetic judgments; the law of Identity
will
more than that every A is the same as no formal maxim which gives us any help about the relation of A to B^ except the one law which simply disjoins them because they are not the same ; every positive relation which we assert between A and B can only express a content which is given us, a synthesis such as could be derived neither from A nor from B^ nor from any other relation between them which was not itself in
never
tell
us
itself;
there
is
Chap.
II.]
COMPLEXITY OF DATA.
same way.
It
it
287
is
turn given to us in the
impossible to
pursue this here in

elucidate
it
its
general sense, but
will
be useful to
in relation to space in particular.

first
is
129.
is
The
that a case
consequence of what has been referred to possible in which we are unable to give
the relation
without involving adequate definitions either of A or of C in which they are given to us, and equally It would bei so to define this relation apart from A and B.
impossible to say what a point of space
tinguished from a point of time, unless
is
and how
treat
it,
dis-j
we
include in ouij
for
thought the extension in which

instance, as
it
is,
and
Euclid does, as the extremity of a line; no

this line out of points
more could we construct

like presupposition.
without a
co-existent
Two
precisely similar
and
may have innumerable different relations of the kind which we know as their greater or less distances from one another ; but how could we guess or understand this unless the space in which they are distributed, being present to the mind's eye, taught us at once that the problem is soluble and what the solution looks like ? Just as little can a Hne be generated by motion ; it can only be followed for we could not set about to describe the track left behind us without the idea of a space in general which furnishes the place for it; again any definite line could only be\
points
generated in space
if
in every point
the further direction which
we mean
which we pass through to take were already
'
present to our imagination.
when we compare it with others we be able to distinguish its length from its direction; but we cannot make the simplest assertions about either proAgain, in any line
shall
perty without learning
them from perception.
That the addi-
tion of two lines of the length a gives a line of the length 2 a
seems a simple application of an arithmetical principle ; but strictly arithmetic teaches only that such an addition results in the sum of two lines of the length , just as putting together two apples weighing half an ounce each gives only the sum
288
[Book
II.
of these two, not one apple twice the weight.

other so that
The
possi-
biHty of uniting the one Hne with the extremity of the

it becomes its unbroken continuation and the two lengths add up into one only follows from the mental portrayal of a space within which the junction can be for not even the effected. I say expressly, 'of a space^ consideration that the things to be united are two lines is sufficient; on the contrary, we know that a thousand lines if thought of as between the same extremities, will form no more than one and the same line; they must be put together lengthways, and to do this the image of the
\
surrounding space which gives the necessary room

pensable.
is indis-
Geometry only expresses the same thing

it
in
another form, when
says that every line
is
capable of
a delusion
being produced to
infinity.
it is
As
to
regards direction,
easily
seen that
it is
suppose that we have a conception of it to which straightness and curvedness can be subordinated as coordinate species
;
its
conception
is
only intelligible as com-
pletely coinciding with that of the straight line
which
is
called from another point of view, in relation to

ties,
its
extremi-
the distance between
them; every idea of a curve
includes that of a deviation from the straight direction of
the tangents and can only be fixed in the particular case by
the measurement of this deviation.

for its straightness;
Thus we can
is
it is
true
assign a criterion for any extended line which
security
the distance between its extremities must be equal to the sum of the distances between all pairs of points by which we may choose to divide the line but of course we do not by this get rid of the conception of straightness in principle ; the distance between the extremities and each of these intermediate distances can only be conceived under that conception. So in fact it is not
;
proper to say that the straight line
is
the shortest distance the
between two points;

^
it
is
rather the distance itself;

'
['
Straight lines
of course.]
Chap.II.i
NEEDLESS COMPLEXITY OF DATA.

may be made
this distance
289
different circuits that
in going from a\.o b which is always one and the same ; but their possibihty calls our attention to the circumstance that perception is in that fact telling us something more than would follow from its teaching up to that
have nothing to do with
point taken alone.
130. If a straight line can be drawn between a and b and
another between a and
r,
it
does not in the least follow
from these isolated premisses that the same thing can or must take place between b and c, the two lines might diverge from a as if into different worlds, and their extensions have
no
relation to each other.
But they have
our spatial perception and nothing else reveals to us the angle , and shows us that space extends between the
;
one
two lines and allows a connexion between the points b and by means of a straight line be of the same kifid as ab and
it
ac\
teaches us at the same time that there
is
this
possibility for all points
of ab and
ac^
and so
creates the
third element of our idea of space, the plane p.
This, after
having so discovered
in space
it,
we
are able to define as the figure
any point of which may be connected with any

I
other point by a straight line lying wholly in that figure.
This definition however, though

cient one, contains
should think
it
suffi
no
;
rule for construction according to

for ourselves the plane
which we could produce

having had
all
it
without
before
for
what
is
really
meant by requiring
clear
connecting lines to be contained in the spatial figure

is
which
to
be drawn
is
only
made
I will
by the
spatial
it
perception of the plane.
Now
not deny that
may
be of use in the course of scientific investigations to demon strate even simple conceptions as the result of complicated
constructions; in cases, that
object to
is to say, in which it is our show that the complicated conditions present in a problem must have precisely this simple consequence ; but I cannot comprehend the acumen which seeks as the basis of geometry to obtain the most elementary perceptions by Metaphysic, Vol. I. U
290
[Book
II.
help of presuppositions, which not only contain of necessity

the actual
elements in question but also more besides

regard the straight hne as a limiting case
;
them.
It is possible to
would not be possible to form some way employing for their determination and measurement the mental presentation of the straight line from which they show a measurable deviation. Whoever should give it as a complete designation of a straight line, that it was the line which being rotated between its extremities did not change its place, would plunge us into silent reflexion as to how he conceived the axis of that rotation and by what, without supposing a straight Hne somewhere, he would measure the change of place which the curve experienced in such a
but
it
in a series of curves
the series of these curves without in
rotation.
I
hold
it
quite as useless to construct the plane

it
over
again, after
has once been given by perceptive cognition

surface in which two spheres intersect,
result
fair
no doubt it is also the and reappears as the

the kind
;
of countless constructions of
will
but every
judge
think that
it
is
the
perception of the plane which elucidates the idea of the

intersection
and not
if
vice versa.
let
And
what
is
now,
we may
alone these attempts to clear up
are invited to a more serious defence of the rights of universal Logic by the dazzling play of ambiguities which endeavours to controvert and
clear already,
we
threatens
to falsify perception
itself.
finite
arc
of a
circle of course
becomes perpetually more
like a straight
line as the radius of the circle to
creased
which it belongs is inbut the whole circle never comes to be like one.
infinitely great
However
plete
we may conceive
the radius as
it
being, nothing can prevent us from conceiving
to
com-
its rotation round the centre ; and till such rotation is completed we have no right to apply the conception of a circle to the figure which is generated ; discourse about a
Chap.
IM
PARALLELS AND THE TRIANGLE,

line which,
291
straight
being in secret a circle of infinite

itself,
is
diameter, returns into
not a portion of an esoteric

Just the
science but a proof of logical barbarism.
same
is
shown by phrases about

to cut each other at
parallel lines
which are supposed

\
an
infinite distance
they do not cut
each other at any finite distance, and as every distance when conceived as attained would become finite again, there simply is no distance at which they do so; it is
utterly inadmissible to pervert this negation into the positive
assertion, that in infinite distance there
is
a point at which
intersection occurs.
Here
again, however, I
am
not deny-
ing that in the context of a calculation
good
;
service
may be
rendered within certain limits by modes of designation

rest on assumptions like these so much the more would be a precise investigation within what limits they may be employed in every case, without commending to notice absolute nonsense by help of pretentious calcula-
which
useful
tion.
131.
It
is
obvious that according to the above general
discussion, I cannot propose to solve the

parallels
dispute about by the demonstrative method commonly desiderated; I am content with expressing my conviction by saying that in presence of direct perception I can see no
reason whatever for raising the dispute.

the two straight lines a
in space,
We
call parallel
and b which have the same
direction
by the same plane /, the straight lines a and b form on the same side of them the same angle a. In saying this I do not hesitate to presuppose the plane p and side s as perfectly clear data of perception; still they might both be eliminated by the following expression a and b are parallel if the extremities a and |3 of any equal lengths a a and b /3 taken on the two straight lines from their starting points a and b, are always at the same distance from one another. It follows from this as a mere verbal definition, that a b will also be parallel
test the identity of their direction
and we
criterion that with a third straight line c in the
J",
292
to a
jS
;
and
at the
b,
[Book
II.
same time from the matter of the

other,
defini-
tion, that
a and
as long as they are straight lines,
remain
as
finity
at the
same distance from each
above ; every question whether to would make any change in contradicts the presupposition which conceives identity of direction to infinity as involved in the direction of a finite portion of a straight line. That the sum of the interior angles which a a and I? ^ make with a b or with a /3 is equal to two right angles, only requires the familiar elucidation.
must measured produce them to inthis is otiose, and
Now
if
a triangle
is
to
be made between a
the lines must change their position, or one of
and b /3 both them its
position relatively to the other. If we suppose a a to turn about the point a so that the angle which it forms with a b is diminished, our spatial perception shows us that the
interval
/3
between
its
intersection with a
;
jS
and the extremity

is
of that fine must also diminish
if
the turning
continued
this interval is necessarily
reduced to zero, and then ab,a^,
and b jS, enclose the required triangle. When this has been done the line a ^ and the line of its former position a a
make an
parallels
angle,
which
is
now excluded from
the
sum
of the
angles which were before the interior angles between the
angle,
a a and b ^ ; but the vertical angle opposite to this and therefore the angle itself, is equal to the new angle which a /3 produces by its convergence with b fi ; the
latter
which
forms a part of the sum of the angles of the triangle is being made, which sum as it loses and gains equally, remains the same as it was in the open space between the
;
parallels
that
is,
in every triangle, whatever
its
be,
it is
equal to two right angles.
If this simple
shape may connexion
between the two cases will not serve, still we could attach no importance to any attempt to postulate a different sum for the angles of a triangle, except on one condition ; that it should not only proceed by strictly coherent calculations but should also be able to present the purely mathematical
Chap.
I.J
PLANE AND SPHERE-DWELLERS.

its
293
assumption
it
perception of the cases which corresponded to

with equal obviousness and lucidity.
obvious, why,
if
For
in fact
is
not
the
sum
of the angles of a triangle were
generally or in particular cases different from what

it,
we made
this state of things
should never be discovered to exist or
be demonstrated to be necessary. But here we plainly have misunderstandings between philosophy and mathematics which go much deeper. Philosophy can never come to an understanding with the attempt which it must always find
utterly incomprehensible, to decide
upon the
validity of
one
or the other assumption by external observations of nature.
So far these observations have agreed with the Euclidean geometry; but if it should happen that astronomical measurements of great distances, after exclusion of all
errors of observation, revealed a less
a triangle, what then
we had discovered a
sum for the angle of Then we should only suppose that new and very strange kind of refraction,
?
which had diverted the rays of

termine the direction
;
light
which served to deinfer
that
is,
we should
a peculiar
condition of physical realities in space, but certainly not a

real condition of space itself
perceptive presentations
tional presentation of
its
which would contradict all our and be vouched for by no excepthe special concern of geometry,
own.
132.
However
all this is
without essential importance for metaphysic.
There
is
another set of ideas in which the

I
latter
has a greater interest.
admitted above that a being endowed with ideas would
not evolve forms of space-perception which no occasion was given him to produce. Others have connected with such
an idea the conjecture of a possibility that even our geometry may admit of extensions the stimulus to which in human
experience
is
either absent or as yet unnoticed.
Helmholtz (Popular Scientific Lectures, III) in his first example supposes the case of intelligent beings living in an
infinite plane,
and incapable of perceiving anything outside
the plane, but capable of having perceptions like ours within
294
move
[Book
II.
the extension of the plane, in which they can

It will
freely.
be admitted that these beings would establish precisely the same geometry which is contained in our Planimetry ; but their ideas would not include the third dimension
of space.
Not
quite so obvious, I think, are the inferences
drawn
from a second case, in which intelligent beings with the same free power of movement and the same incapacity of
receiving impressions from without their dwelling-space, are
supposed to live on the surface of a sphere. At least, I suppose I ought to interpret as I did in the last sentence the expression that they^ 'have not the power of perceiving
anything outside this surface'; the other interpretation that
even
if
impressions
came
to
them from without the
surface,
it,
they nevertheless are unable to project them outside
would give the appearance of an innate defect in the intelligence of these beings to what according to the import of such descriptions ought only to result from the lack of
appropriate stimuli.
Under such conditions
the direct perfirst
ceptions of these beings would certainly lead in the

place to the ideas which Helmholtz ascribes to
;
cannot persuade myself that supposing we assume that the mental nature of such beings has the tendency with which our own is inspired, to combine single perceptions into a whole as a self-consistent and
them but I the matter would end there,
complete image of all that we perceive. For shortness' sake I take two points and S as the North and South poles of the surface of the sphere, and suppose the whole net of geographical circles to be drawn
upon
that
it. Suppose first that a being a along the meridian of this point.
We
moves from a point must assume then
is
not only capable of receiving qualitatively different
or similar impressions from East
informed by some
^
feeling,
and West; it must be by whatever means produced, of

; '
[*
Popular Lectures on
Scientific Subjects
Atkinson's translation,
2nd
series, p. 34.]
Chap.
II.]
SPHERE-DWELLER^ SPACE.
of
its
295
have
the
fact
own motion, and

change of
its
at
the same time

its
capacity to interpret this feeling into the fact of

that
is,
motion,
into the
relation to objects
it
the time at least are fixed;

direct feelings
must
finally
which for have equally
which enable
it
to distinguish the persistent
and
motion or change from a change of direction or a return in the same direction. However these postulates may be satisfied in the being B^ it is certain that if we are to count upon any definite combination of the impressions it receives, it can experience no change of its feeling of direction in its continuous journey
similar continuance of this
along the meridian

the concavity of
for
by the hypothesis
it
it is
insensible to
its
path towards the centre of the sphere.

passes through
So
if
having started from a
iVand S and
returns to a, keeping to this path, such a fact admits of the
following interpretations for
its
intelligence.
As long
as a only distinguishes itself from b ox c \yj the

it
quality of the impression
makes on
it
will
established that the a which has recurred

its
is
that from
remain unwhich
first
movement
started
it.
it
may be
a second, like the
but
a
is
not identical with

arise in
On
the other hand, the feelings which
B
in
from
its
actual
movement may prove
to
it
change
all it is
its
own
relation to objects, but as long as this
not self-evident that the feelings can only indicate a

;
change of spatial relation to them

a
regular
is
the feelings are simply
series of states, the
repeated
passage through
which
the
always combined with the recurrence of one and
same sensation a ; very much, though not exactly, like running up the musical scale, when we feel a continuous
increase in the
same
direction of our exertion of the vocal
organs, which brings us back in certain periods not indeed

to the
If
same
note, but to
feel
;
its
octave which resembles

this,
it.
B can
is
no more than
it
no space-perception can
be generated
postulate
in order that
should be, a further separate
required;
must be forced by the peculiar
nature of
its
intelligence to represent to itself every difference
; ;
296
[Book
II.
between two of its felt states as a distance in space between two places or points. Under this new condition the interpretation of the experience gained
identity of the
is still
;
doubtful, until the
determined as does not experience a deviation to East or West, and by the hypothesis does not feel the curvature of its path inwards, it might suppose itself to have moved along an infinitely extended
's is
two
straight
line,
furnished at
definite
equal
intervals
with
similar objects a.
But
let
it is
not worth while to spend time on this hypothesis
us suppose at once that

is
B
its
moves
;
freely
on the surface
will find
and
able to compare in
consciousness innumerable
experiences acquired in succession
then
it
means
to establish not only the exact resemblance^ but the identity
of the two
's.
If this has taken place
meridian from a hy
N and S back
it
its
journey along the

it
to a will appear to
to
establish the fact that
by following a rectilinear movement in space, without change of direction or turning back, it has returned to its starting-point. At least I do not know how
its
path could appear to
other than rectilinear

to
it
measure the whole distance from a

length of the journey accomplished,
; a it can by nothing but the
is
of course equal to
the
sum
of
all
the
intermediate distances from point to
straightness
and so falls under the conception of which was determined above ; and on the other hand we cannot assume that B would detect in every element that made part of his journey, therefore in each of the minimum distances from point to point, the character of the arc of a circle ; it would then possess the power denied to it of perceiving convexity in terms of the third dimension and therein it would at once have a basis for the complete development of the idea of that dimension, its possession of which is disputed. But such an idea- must undoubtedly arise in its mind, not on grounds of direct perception, but by reason of the intolerpoint of this journey
[' Gleichheit.']
Chap.
II.]
SPHERE-DWELLER^ PARALLELS.
297
able contradiction which would be involved in this straight

line returning into
itself, if this apparent result of experience were allowed to pass as an actual fact. For a power of mental portrayal which has got so far as to imagine manifold
points
ranged beside each other in a spatial order the

of the
content
experience which
has been acquired

all
is
nothing but the definition of a curve, and indeed,

considered, of the uniform curve of the circle;
things
it
but as
cannot turn either East or West, there must necessarily be a third dimension, out of which immediate impressions
never come, and which cannot therefore be the object of a
sense-perception for the being
in the
same way
as the
two other dimensions; but which nevertheless would be mentally represented by with the same certainty with which we can imagine the interior of a physical body although hidden by its surface. As soon as this conception of the third dimension is established the being would evolve from the comparison of all its experiences according to the most universal laws of logic and mathematics precisely the same geometry that we acquire more easily, not having to call to our aid a dimension which for our sensuous per-
ception
is
imaginary, to reduce things to order; the being
would by this time understand its dwelling-space to be what it is, a figure in space which is extended in three dimensions; and would be in a position to explain the extraordinary phenomena which its experience of motion had presented to it by help of this form of idea. 133. Parallel lines, Helmholtz continues, would be quite unknown to the inhabitants of the sphere; they would assert that any two lines, the straightest possible, would if sufficiently produced, cut one another not merely in one point but in two. It depends somewhat on the definition of parallelism and on the interpretation of the assumptions which are made whether we are forced to agree to the
former assertion.
Movements along the meridians could of course not lead to the idea of parallel lines ; but still.
298
in case of free
circles of the
[Book
II.
two
power to move, B might traverse successively same north and south latitude it would find that these circles have equal lengths to their return
; ;
to the starting-point, that they never either cut or touch
each other
the
extremities
but that counting from the same meridian of equal segments of the two have
This seems to ground for calling them parallel, and in fact we use the term parallel of the circumferences of similarlydirected sections of a cyhnder, which in this case the two circles would really be. But that would be, as I said, merely a question of names I mention these movements here for a different reason.
always the same distance from each other.
me
sufficient
The
tangential
planes
of the
successive
points
of the
southern circle cut each other in straight lines which converge to the south;
the corresponding sections for the
;
northern circle do the same to the north

is
the question
whether the being

If
it
not.
were
B would be aware of this difference or not, then B would really suppose itself to
parallel in the
traverse two paths of precisely the
would
in fact
be
;
cylinder-sections
and then
it
same direction, which same sense as the above might, as long as no other
experiences contradicted the idea, conceive both paths to
be in one plane as circles, the centre of which are joined by a straight line greater than the sum of their radii. This would not be so in the. other case, which we must
anyhow regard
it is
as the more probable hypothesis. Of course hard to obtain a perfectly clear idea of what we mean
by
calling
B sensitive
but we
only to impressions in the surface of
that it Would become aware of the slope of the tangential planes to North and South from the fact that the meridians, known to it from
the sphere;
may assume
other
experiences,
make
smaller
angles
with
its
path
on the side on which the plane inclines to the pole, and greater on the opposite side. However this might produce its further effect on ^'s feelings of motion, the only
Chap.
II.i
THE FOURTH DIMENSION.

it
299
its
credible result would be that
would think
;
path along
that along
in
the southern parallel concave to the south
and
the
northern
it
parallel
concave to
the
north;
other
respects
selves.
would take them for circles, returning into themThese two impressions given by this second case
would not be capable of being reconciled with the experience above mentioned of the constant distance maintained between equal segments of the two paths, taking these
latter as transferred into
a plane
and
this case also
would
it
necessitate,
in
order
to
reconcile
the
contradiction
involves, the invention of the third

directly perceptible.
dimension though not
134. This result must guide us in forming our opinion on the vexed question of the fourth dimension of space. I omit all reference to fancies which choose to recommend
to notice either time, or the density of real things in space,
if we do we must take it for granted at least that any new dimension is fully homogeneous and interchangeable with those to the number of
or anything else as being this fourth dimension
not intend an unmeaning play upon words
which
it
is
it
added
moreover
if it
is
to
be a dimension
to the three
|
of space,
must as the fourth be perpendicular
others, just as each of

It is
them
is
to the remaining two.
conceded that
fulfilled
;
for our perception this condition canis
not be
but the attempt
made
to invalidate this
by referring to the beings which have been depicted, whose knowledge stops short even of the third dimension of space because perception affords them no
objection
stimulus to represent
it
to their minds.
Therefore,
it
is
argued, a further
development of our receptivity might perhaps permit to us an insight into a fourth dimension, now unknown to us from lack of incitement to construct it.
The
possibility that
part of the space-perception attainable can of course
some beings content themselves with a be no

form of perception is not in itself or that it admits of perpetual ;
proof by
itself that this
a whole with certain limits
'
300
moment
[Book
II.
additions even beyond the boundary
we have reached
but
we must admit
that for the
the appeal to these
imaginary cases at least obscures the limit at which we
may suppose
This makes
the mental
the
image to have reached such

to see
a degree of completeness as forbids any further additions.

it
all
more necessary
what that
appeal can really claim.
The imaginary
situation,
beings which
could only receive perceptions from a single plane, would have
been
in the
most favourable
supposing changed
them impressions from outside it, for the utilisation of such new perceptions they would have been able to add the geometry of the newly dislife-conditions to bring
;
covered direction to the Planimetry which they possessed without having to change anything in their previous perceptions.
When we came
to the beings
;
on the sphere-surface we
at
once found a different situation they were forced to devise the third dimension by the contradictions in which the combination of their immediate perceptions entangled them ; but yet they never found a direct presentation of it given, and could not do so without remodelHng all their initial
ideas of space.
If
in our
we mean to use this analogy to support the possibility own case of a similar extension of our perceptive
hope
that attention will
capacity, I
be given to the
differ-
ences which exist between our position and that of those
In particular; they were compelled by the contradictions in their observations to postulate the new dimension we have no contradiction present to us, of a kind to force us as in their case to regard
imaginary beings.
precisely
;
our space-image as incomplete, and to add a fourth to

three dimensions.
its
At the same time we are
not,
at all
events just now, in the position of the beings in the plane,
who were
know
;
unsuspectingly content with their Planimetry and

third
never even conjectured the
dimension, which we
is
for the idea of a fourth
dimension which
now
Chap.
II.J
\-DIMRNSIONAL SPACE NOT OURS,

all
301
mooted on
sides
is
so far a substitute for the absent

it
incitements of experience that
does not leave us quite
unsuspicious of the enlargement of our space-perception
which may be possible, but draws our attention to it, more If such an enlargeis worth while. ment were possible, things would have to go on very strangely for the examination of space as we picture it to ourselves not to reveal it to us even without suggestions on the part of observation ; on the other hand if the required observations came to us, without the possibility of remouldseriously than in fact
ing our space-image so as to reconcile their contradictions,
we should simply have
to acquiesce in the contradictions.
Now
the following difference subsists; the beings on the
sphere-surface were
no doubt compelled by observations

;
to alter their initial geometrical images, but then they found
the alteration practicable

to
we
it
are not in any
way compelled
utterly imprac-
make
;
the attempt, and besides,

in
we
find
it
ticable
our space
is
admittedly impossible to
construct a fourth dimension perpendicular to the other

three
to settle the matter
bility
and coincident with none of them. This seems to me for no one should appeal to the possithat the space 6", without itself becoming different,
;
may
still
admit of a different apprehension, exhibiting
dimension in it. As long as the condition is maintained that the dimensions must be at right angles to each other, such an apprehension is impossible; if it is dropped, what we obtain is no novelty; for in order to adapt our formulae to peculiar relations of what exists or can be constructed in space it has long been the practice to select a peculiar and appropriate system of axes. Nothing would prevent us from assigning to the plane alone three dimensions cutting each other at angles of 60; which would give a more convenient conspectus of many relations
a fourth
of points distributed in space than two dimensions at right
angles.
Therefore only the other question remains provisionally
302
admissible
;
[Book
II.
hension
X or Z,
whether there can be another form of appreunhke the space 6", which presents four or
more dimensions, perfectly homogeneous, interchangeable, and having that impartial relation to each other which
appears in the property of being at right angles as
the space S.
insist
I shall
known
in
return to
it
directly
upon the
;
logical objection for
meantime I must which I have been

;
censured
it is
absolutely unallowable to transfer the
name
of
and conception of a space

only be co-ordinate with
to
it
to formations
which would
title
under the
common
are
a system of arrangement capable of direct presentation

the
mind; but whose

is
special properties
entirely
incompatible with the characteristic differentia of the space

with the line s, the plane/, the angle , and the which subsist between these elements. It is this dangerous use of language that produces the consequences which we have before us ; such as the supposition that the space S in which we live really has a fourth dimension over and above its three, only is malicious enough not to let us find it out ; but that perhaps in the future we may succeed in getting a glimpse of it ; then by its help we should be
6",
that
relations
able to
make equal and
similar bodies coincide, as

figures.
we now
can equal and similar plane
This
last
reason for
is moreover one which I fail to understand ; what good would it do us to be occupied with folding over each other bodies of the same size and shape, and what do we lose now by being unable to do it? and further; must everything be true which would be a fine thing if it were? No doubt it would be convenient if the circumference of the circle or any root with index raised to any power in the case of any number could be expressed rationally ; but no one hopes for an extension of arithmetic which would make this possible.
the probability of the fourth dimension
What have we come to?

killed all our sense
Has
the exercise of ingenuity
of probability?
The
anticipation of
such transfigurations of our most fundamental kinds of per-
Chap.
II.]
TRIPLICITY IN ALL SPACES.
303
ception can only remind us of the dreams of the Fourierists, who expected from the social advance of man a corresponding regeneration of nature, extending to the taming of
all
But perhaps the two processes may help each other ; it will be a fine thing when we can ride on tame whales through the fourth dimensavageness and ferocity in
its
creatures.
sion of the eau sucre sea.
135.
To
return to the above question
am
convinced,
is
certainly, that the triplicity of perpendicular
dimensions
no
special
property of our space S\
but the necessary
property of every perception

differently
which presents, however from our space, a background or comprehending

could wish that
I
form
for all the systematic relations of a co-existent multiStill I
plicity.
had a stronger argument
to sustain
my
all
conviction than what I
am now
going to add.
To
avoid
confusion with ideas taken from existing space
which of course press upon us as the most obvious symbols to adopt, let us conceive a series of terms X^ between which, putting out of sight their qualitative character which we treat therefore as wholly uniform, there are such relations, homogeneous in nature but now not otherwise known, that every term is separated from its two next neighbours by a difference x. How in such a system of arrangement
R this
difference x would be imagined, or pictured to the mind, we leave quite out of the question ; it is merely a form or value of an unknown r, and corresponds to what
appears in our space-perception as the straight line

the distance in space between two points. the term of the series
differences
j-
or as
Now
start
;
let
be
X from
which we
then the
between
is
its
place in the series
and
that of
any
other term, that

the
the differences between the
particular
elements of the required perception
R itself measured in be of the form + mx^ where m is Now to be replaced by the numbers of the natural series. O may be at the same time a term of another series Fof precisely similar formation, whose terms we will designate
unknown form
r, will
304
[Book
II.
by
+ my
so that each
my is
not merely like in kind but also
equal to mx.
There are two conditions which these two series and Y would have to satisfy in order to stand in a relation corresponding to that of two lines in space at right angles to each other. First, progression in the series Y^ however far continued, should bring no increment of one-sided resemblance in the terms
every
my
its
so arising to -{-mx or
difference from
-j-
~mx^
but
my should have
mx
equally great
with that from
mx
in
whatever such difference consists.
Secondly, this difference should not consist in any chance
but should be comparable both in kind and in magnitude both with x and with y. This second condition must be remarked; obviously countless series like Fcan be conceived, starting from a term O common to it and and extending, so to speak, into different worlds, whose terms would approach neither -^xnox ^ because quite incomparable with either but such suppositions would have nothing In our space S the difference to do with our subject. between my and mx is a line s^ just as mx and my themselves are lines of the kind s ; in the other system of places jR which we are here supposing this difference is of the otherwise unknown kind r, just as mx and my are comparquality,
able forms or values of
r.
From
this point
we might proceed
in different ways.
We
might attempt to form the idea, still problematic, of several series Y, all of which satisfy these conditions ; but against
this suggestion
it
is
rightly urged, that as long as
we
are
without the conception of a space whose plainly presented

differences of direction
these several F's, so long they are
keep asunder X, (and so far they are defined by nothing else), to be considered they would not be many, till the same as one single series difference should subsist between them, as between them
to
all in their
would show us how
relation to
and Xj and
that without
interfering with their

let
difference from X.
Now
us consider one of these
common Ys
; ;
Chap.
II.]
ABSTRACT PROOF OF TRIPLICITY.

;
305
as given
the others, which, in the abstract sense which
we
explained, are as well as the given

series
Y perpendicular
but
to the
their progressive terms
X^ may have the most diverse relations to the former may approximate more or less to the
+ my
or
7ny
of the
first
given series
among
all
these
series there
can conceivably be only one which we will call Z, whose successive terms 7nz though commensurable with -Vmy still have equally great differences from the positive
Y.
It is true
and from the negative branch of

series
too of this third

its
as long as
it
it
is
defined by nothing but
relation
it
to Y^ that
is
only to be regarded as one; but of
too
we may form the problematic idea that it is forthcoming in a number of instances, all of which stand in the same If we now choose relation of being perpendicular to K
one of these many in the most diverse
Z's,
then the rest

;
may
stand to
it
again
relations
but again only one, which we
will call V, could be such that its progressive terms mv would have always equal differences from the + 7fiz and the 7nz of that one determinate Z. Observations of this kind might be continued for ever; but there is an absolutely essential and decisive point which as they stand they just
omit.
We have so far only supposed the K's perpendicular to X^ the Z's to y, and the F's to Z, but have not decided the
question,
how
brings this
or that of
or X.
If
far the relation of Z as at right angles to Y Z into a necessarily deducible relation with Jf, F to Z has a similar effect upon V as regards Y
added nothing further this would be a more than once expressed in metaphor the Zs would no doubt have the same relation to the K's
really
we
case of what I have
that the K's have to the
^s
only the relation of the Z's as
it were point into another world from that of the F's as perpendicular to X\ and though we should be able to have a perception of each particular one of these relations, that of the K's to the X's
perpendicular to
would as
and
that of the
I.
Zs
to the F's, yet
we should not
bring
Mktaphysic, Vol.
3o6
any definite mental picture
starting-point O.
[Book
II.
together these two instances of one and the same relation

into
at
all,
in
spite
of the
common
Therefore in this way we shall never obtain the collective
we were looking for and within which we hoped to distribute in determinate places all the points we met with in its alleged n dimensions only the accuswhich we introduce unawares, tomed perception of space
perception ^, which
;
-5",
misleads us into the subreption that

F, of the
it
is
self-evident that
these successive perpendicular branchings of the X's from
y's from Z, and of the Z's from Ftake place in

intuitional
common
form R.
But
is
in fact, to secure this,
the particular condition must be added to which I drew

attention above.
A Z
which
perpendicular to a
1^ or
deviates in a measurable degree from the perpendicular to

it,
must by
this
circumstance enter also into a perfectly
which that Fis perpendicular. At present we have only to do with one of these various which is this among the Z's perpendicular to K, relations that one which is also to be perpendicular to must necessarily be one among the many K's, as they included all the series that had this relation to X; therefore even
definite relation with Jf, to
;
:
this third
dimension cannot
exist
in
without
its
coin-
ciding with one,
and taking
less
X as given, with a particular one

all
of the
many
instances of the second dimension

',
perpen-
dicular to
at
still
can there be a fourth dimension F,
once perpendicular to X, V, and Z, and yet distinct from Z which stands alone in answering to the and at the same two conditions of being perpendicular to time to K I maintain therefore that in no intuitional form R, however unlike our space S, provided that it really is to have the character of a comprehensive intuitional form for all co-existing relations of the content arranged in it, can there be more than three dimensions perpendicular to each
the one particular
other
taking the designation

I assigned
it,
'
perpendicular' in the abstract
meaning which
and which
refers not only to
Chap.
II
SPACE
IS
HOMOGENEOUS.
r,
307
lines s
and angles a but

in
to every element
however
consti-
tuted,
such a form of perception R. Of course this whole account of the matter is, and in view of the facts can be, nothing but a sort of retranslation from the concrete of
geometry into the abstract of logic; perhaps others may I believe that I succeed better in what I have attempted. on this question as Schmitz-Dumont with in agreement am
well as
it
on some of the points already discussed, but
I find
hard to adopt the point of view required by the whole

136.
context of his exposition.
Among
the properties which our
common
is
appre-
hension believes most indispensable to Space
the absolute
real ele-
homogeneousness of ments which occupy
its
it
infinite extension.
The
or
move
in
it
may, we think, have
different densities of their aggregation
and
different rules for

;
their relative positions at different points
space
all
itself,
on
the other hand, as the impartial theatre of
these events,
cannot possess local differences of
its
own
nature which
is
might interfere with the liberty of everything that
or
happens at one of tion at any other.
its
points to repeat itself without alteraif
Now
we conceive a number of
rest,
real
elements either united in a system at
or set in motion,
by the reactions which their nature makes them exert on one another, then there arise surfaces and lines, which can be drawn in space, but are not a part of its own structure they unite points in a selection which is solely dependent on the laws of the forces which act between the real things. Mathematics can abstract from the recollection of these causes of special figures in space and need not retain more
than the supposition of a law, (disregarding its origin,) according to which definite connected series of points
present
themselves to our perception out of the infinite
uniformity of extension as figures, lines, or surfaces.
So far ordinary ideas have no difficulty in following the endeavours of geometry when in obedience to the law of combination of a multiplicity given in an equation it
3o8
[Book
II.
searches for the spatial outhnes which unite in themselves the particular set of spatial points that correspond to this
most recent speculations we meet with a we meet with it, which we cannot understand and do not know how to justify. It is possible that the difficulties which I am going to state are based on a misconception of the purposes aimed at by the analytically conducted investigations of this subject; but then it is at least necessary to point out plainly where the need exists for intelligibility and explanation which has not been in the least met by the expositions hitherto given.
law.
in the
But
notion, or at least imagine
only
To put it shortly, may there be in

and
lines
is
am
alluding to the notion that not
infinite
uniform extension innumerable

particular
is,
surfaces
whose structure within the
extent of each
very far from uniform, that
variously
spaces
their
formed figures
of
in space ; but that also there

structure,
is
may be
to
peculiar
such
that
It
is
uniformity of
clear
entire
extension
to
excluded.
us
what
we
are
think
of as a
spherical
or
pseudo-spherical
what can be meant by a spherical or pseudo-spherical space designations which we meet with in the discussion of these subjects without any help being given to us in comprehending their meaning. In the following remarks I shall only employ the former of these designations ; the mention of pseudo-spherical space,' which is harder to present definitely to the mind, could
surface, but not clear
;
'
only reinforce our impression of mysteriousness, without

contributing to the explanation of the matter any
more than
idea of a
the allusion to the familiar spherical figure.

spherical
surface,
The
;
being that of a figure in space, preperception of space

the situation of
supposes the
its
common
points
is
determined, at least has been hitherto, by some
system of co-ordinates which measures their distance and

the direction of that distance from an assumed point of
origin according to the rules
which hold
for a
uniform space.
To
pass from the spherical surface to a spherical space, one
Chap.
II.]
SPACES,
AND FIGURES IN
me
to be
SPACE.
309
this
of two assertions seems to

surface
is
needed; either
the whole space which exists, really or to the

;
mind's eye
or
this
totality
of space arises out
of the
spherical surface by
making the co-ordinates pass continuIf
ously through the whole series of values compatible with
the law of their combination.

arises
we do the
latter there
by the unbroken attachment of each spherical surface to the previous one, the familiar image of a spherical Volume, which we may either limit arbitrarily at a particular
point or conceive as growing to infinity, as the equation of
the surface remains capable of construction for the radius
;
all
values of
in this
way we
of
attain to nothing
more than the

infinite
admissible but purely incidental aspect, that the
uniform
extension
space
is
capable
of
a complete
if from any given point of origin we supposed a minimum spherical surface to expand in all directions conformably to its equation. But in the interior
secondary construction,
of this spherical volume there
is
no further structure
re-
vealed than that of uniform space, on the basis of which the co-ordinates of the boundary-surface at each particular
moment had been determined
the interior does not consist
permanently and exclusively of the separate spherical shells

out of which in this case our representing faculty created
its representation the passage from point to point is not in any way bound to respect this mode of creation of the whole, as though such a passage could take place better or more easily in one of the spherical surfaces than in the direction of a chord which should unite any places in the interior. The conception of a measure of curvature has its proper and familiar import for each of the surfaces, distinguishable in this space by thought, but wholly obliterated
;
in the
space
itself;
but
it
is
impossible
it
to conceive a
property of space
itself to
which
its
could apply.
but equa-
In the case of the sphere

tions are conceivable
law of formation permitted

;
the continuous attachment of surface to surface
which
if
constructed as a system of
3IO
DEDUCTIONS OF SPACE,
would produce
all.
[Book
II.
positions in space
either a series of discrete
points or one of discrete surfaces, perhaps partially con-
nected or perhaps not at
We
know such
construc-
and nothing else, and conceive their production as conditioned by equations between co-ordinates whose power of being reciprocally defined by each other corresponds to the nature of
tions primarily as figures in space
uniform space,
us
now known
as Euclidean space;
but
let
assume that we had escaped from that postulate and had employed co-ordinates which themselves partook of the special nature of the variously formed space which is to be obtained. It may then be difficult to project an image of these strange figures within our accustomed modes of space-perception; I attach more weight to another difficulty, that of determining what we properly mean when we speak of them as spaces. Let us assume that the
fundamental law, being capable of algebraical expression, which prevails in a system of related points not yet
explicitly
apprehended as
spatial,
conditions a systematic
order of them which could only be represented in our space
S by
number of curved
;
sheets not wholly attached to one
another
then the
fact,
form,
and degree of
their divergence
could only be observed by us through the
medium
of
^S",
distance measured according to the nature of the space
as existing between particular points in the different sheets.
However, let us even put out of the question all idea of a space S as the neutral background on which the figure was constructed, and attempt to regard this as the sole
represented space
possibly extend as
still
the different sheets of
it
could not
if
into different worlds, so as to prevent
there being any measurable transition from one to another

just as little could that
which separates them and makes them diverge be a mere nothingness when compared to the space itself, and capable of no measurable degrees
whatever
even
in this case that
their being separate could not but
which gave the reason for be a spatial magnitude or
Chap.
II.]
CONSTANT CURVATURE.
311
and commensurable with the magnitudes which formed the actual space X. Thus our attempt would be a failure; we should not be able to regard that as space, but only as a structure in a space ; we might no
distance, uniform
moment, of this space that in each of had a structure other than that of our space S, but we should have to admit at once that it formed a continuous whole with the same inner structure in every one of its parts. For, provided that this tentatively assumed space is not to be regarded as something real, but as the empty form of a system for the reception of possible realities, there can be no difference of reality or value between the points contained in those sheets and the other points by the interposition of which their divergence arises they would all accordingly have equal claims to be startingpoints of the construction in question, and from the intersection of all these constructions there would once more be formed the idea of a space uniform through an infinite -extension, and indifferent to the structure of the fabrics
doubt assume,
its
for the
it
minutest parts
designed in
extension
is
it.
Not even a break

;
in the otherwise
uniform
in the first
such a break is only conceivable if place there is a something between the terms
possible
which keeps them asunder, and if moreover that something is comparable in kind and magnitude with what it bounds on both sides of itself; hence space cannot consist of an infinite number of intersecting lines which leave meshes of what is not space between them ; it uncontrollably becomes
again the continuous and uniform
;
extension
v/hich
we
supposed it to be at first and the manifold configurations of the kind are conceivable in it only as bounded structures, not as themselves forms of space. 137. I feel myself obliged to maintain the convictions which I have expressed even against Riemann's investigations into a multiplicity extended in n directions. My objections are on the whole directed to the point, that here again the confusion which seems to me to darken the whole
312
question
has
not
[Book
II.
been avoided ; the confusion of the empty places presented to the mind, a system in which structures of any shape or any extent can be arranged, with the structure and articulation belonging to that which has to be arranged in this system or to repeat the expression employed above, the confusion
universal locaHsation-system of
of space with structures in space.
In
II.
4 of his treatise
on the hypotheses which
lie at
the foundation of Geometry,

:
Riemann
expresses himself as follows

is
'
Multiplicities
whose
measure of curvature
ture
is
everywhere zero,
may be
treated as
a particular case of multiplicities whose measure of curva-
everywhere constant.
all
The common
is
character of
multiplicities
whose degree of curvature

figures
expressed by saying that
without stretching.
may be can be moved in them For, obviously, figures could not be

constant
made
to slide or rotate in
them
at pleasure,
unless the
degree of curvature were constant.
On
the other hand, by
means of the constant degree of curvature the relations of measurement of the multiplicity in question are completely
determined
another,
starting
;
accordingly in
all
directions about
the relations of measurement are exactly the
one point same as about
and therefore the same constructions
are practicable
from the one as from the other and consequently in multiphcities with a constant measure of curvature figures can be given any position.' Now I have no doubt at all that by analytical treatment
of
more
universal formulae the properties of space indicated

as a special case
it
;
may be deduced
but I must adhere to

a space, or corre-
my
assertion that
is
only with these special properties

is
that such an 'extended multiplicity'
sponds to the idea of a system of arrangement for perception ; all formulae which do not contain so much as these determinations, or which contain others opposed to them, mean either nothing, or only something which as a special or peculiar formation may be fittingly or unfittingly reduced A system of places which to order in that universal frame.
3;
Chap.
II.]
ANALOG Y FROM ARITHMETIC.
31
was otherwise formed in any one of its parts than in another, would contradict its own conception, and would not be what it ought to be, the neutral background for the manifold it would be itself relations of what was to be arranged in it a special formation, 'a multiplicity extended in n directions'
;
instead of being the ^-dimensional multiplicity of extension^
about which the question

I
really was.
skill in analysis
;
cannot believe that any
can compensate
for this
misconception in the ideas
alleged spaces of such
structure that in
to receive,
one part of them they would not be able

size,
without stretching or change of

in another,
a figure
can only be conceived as real shells or walls, endowed with such forces of resistance as to hinder the entrance of an approaching
which they could so receive
to be shattered by its on this point philosophy will not allow itself to be imposed upon by mathematics space of absolutely uniform fabric will always seem to philosophy the one standard by the assumption of which
real figure, but inevitably
doomed
more
violent impact.
I trust that
all
these other figures

illustrated
become
intelligible to
it.
This
may
be
series
direct
by the analogy of arithmetic. The natural of numbers with its constant difference i, and its progression, according to which the difference of any
is
two terms
terms,
the
sum
of the differences of
all
intermediate
may be
treated as a special case of a
more general
form of series just as much as can uniform space. But, by whatever universal term it might be attempted to express the law of formation of this series, it could have no possible meaning without presupposing the series of numbers. Every exponent or every co-efficient which this universal
formula contained, would be of unassignable import unless
it
had
either a constant value in the natural series of
num-
bers, or else a variable one,
depending
this
it
in particular cases
on the
value,
measurable only in
series of
the magnitudes whose function

arithmetical series only states in
might be.
numbers, of Every other
its
law of formation
how
it
314
deviates
from the progression of terms of equal rank which
its
forms the series of numbers; no other standard can be

substituted for this, without standing in need in
turn of
the simple series of numbers to

cisely the
make
it
intelligible.
Pre-
space
same seems to me to be the case in the matter of and I cannot persuade myself that so much as the
formed and defined, without
of
pre-
idea of multiform space or of a variable measure of curvature in space could be
supposing
tangents
in
its
the
elements
tangential
as
uniform
in
space,
fact
rectiHnear
and
planes,
uniform space
could
entirety,
the one intelligible and indispensable

if it
standard, from which the formation of the other,
be pictured to the mind

deviations.
at
all,
would present
definite
CHAPTER
Of
Time.
III.
The Psychologist may if he pleases make the gradual development of our ideas of Time the object of his enquiry, though, beyond some obvious considerations which lead to nothing, there is no hope of his arriving at any important result. The Metaphysician has to assume that this development has been so far completed that the Time in which, as a matter of fact, we all live is conceived as one comprehensive form in which all that takes place between things as The only well as our own actions are comprehended. question which he has to ask is how far Time, thus conceived, has any application to the Real or admits of being predicated of it with any significance. 138. In regard to the conception I must in the first place protest against the habit, which since the time of Kant has been prevalent with us, of speaking of a direct perception of Time, co-ordinate with that of space and with it forming a connected pair of primary forms of our presentative faculty. On the contrary we have no primary and proper
perception of
attaching
which are
follow
teristics
The character of direct perception to our idea of Time is only obtained by images borrowed from Space and which, as soon as we
it
|2. *
I
at
all.
J j
them
prove incapable of exhibiting the characnecessary to the thought of Time. We speak of

out,
Time
as a line, but
believe ourselves able to

in space in
however large the abstraction which we make from the properties of a line order to the subsumption of Time under the
3l6
OF TIME,
line,
it
[Book
II.
more general conception of the

reality
must
certainly
be
admitted that the conception of a line involves that of a

belonging equally to
this
all its
elements.
does not correspond to

line,
it
requirement.
Time however Thought of as a
would only possess one real point, namely, the From it would issue two endless but imaginary arms, each having a peculiar distinction from each other and from simple nullity, viz. Past and Future. The distinction between these would not be adequately expressed by the opposition of directions in space. Nor can we stop here. Even though we leave out of sight the relation in which empty Time stands to the occurrences which fall within it, still even in itself it cannot be thought of as at rest. The single real point which the Present constitutes is in a state of change and is ceaselessly passing over to the imaginary points of the Past while its place is taken by the
present.
reahsation of the next point in the Future.
Hence
stream.
arises the familiar representation
of
Time
as a
All
however that
in this
representation can be
mentally pictured originates in recollections of space and

leads only to contradictions.
We
cannot speak of a stream

:
without thinking of a bed of the stream

ever
and
in fact,
when-
we speak
of the stream of Time, there always hovers
before us the image of a plain which the stream traverses, but which admits of no further definition. In one point of
it
we plant ourselves and call it the Present. On one side we represent to ourselves the Future as emerging out of the distance and flowing away into the Past, or conversely to make the ambiguity of this imagery more manifest we think of the stream as issuing from the Past and running on into an endless Future. In neither case does the image
correspond to the thought.

is
For
this
never-ending stream
and remains of equal reality throughout, whether as it already flows on the side where we place the future or as it and the is still flowing on that which stands for the past same reality belongs to it at the moment of its crossing the
;
Chap.
III.]
CRUCES OF EMPTY TIME.
317
Present.
the image.
Nor is it this alone that disturbs us in the use of Even the movement of the stream cannot be
presented to the mind's eye except as having a definite

celerity,
in
which would compel us to suppose a second Time, which the former (imaged as a stream) might traverse
of that unintelligible
longer or shorter distances
back-
ground.
139. Suppose then that
we
try to
dispense with this
in-
appropriate imagery, and consider what empty time must
be supposed to be, when it is merely thought of, without Nothing the help of images presented to the mind's eye. is gained by substituting the more abstract conception of a series for the unavailable image of a line. It would only be the order of the single moments of Time in relation to each other that this conception would determine. It is, no doubt, involved in the conception of Time that there is a
fixed order of
its
its
constituents
and
:
that the
moment
its its
has
is
place between m-\-\ and
in\
also that
advance
uniform and that the interval between two of

is
members
be comline.
the
sum
of the
intervals
between
if
all
the intervening
is
members.
Thus we might
at all,
it
say that
Time
to
pared with a line
could only be with a straight
Time
this
itself
could not be spoken of as running a circular
course.
There may be a recurrence of events in it, but would not be a recurrence if the points of Time, at which what is intrinsically the same event occurs, were not themselves different. So far the conception of a series serves to explain what Time is, but it does so no further. Time does not consist merely in such an order as has been described. That is an order in virtue of which the moment m would have its place eternally between m-\-\ and mi.
The
and
characteristic of
Time
is
that this order
is
traversed
that the vanishing
is
constantly replaced by w-f-i,
never hy
m~i.
Our thoughts
in
thus turn to that motion of
our consciousness
which
it
ranges backwards and foris
wards at pleasure over a series which
in itself at rest.
If
31
OF TIME.
itself
[Book
II.
Time were
this
a real existence,
it
would correspond
of being a
to
motion,
with
the
qualification
process
directed only one way, in which the reality of every stage
would be the
cessation
offspring of the vanished or vanishing reality

itself in
of the preceding one and
turn the cause of
its
own
and of the commencing reality of the next stage. We might fairly acquiesce in an impossibility of learning what the moments properly are at which these occurrences take place and what are the means by which existence is In the first place it transferred from one to the other. would be maintained that Time is something sui generis^ not to be defined by conceptions proper to other realities and secondly we know that the demand for explanation must have its limit and may not insist on making a simplest possible occurrence intelligible by constructions which would presuppose one more complex. But without wanting to know how Time is made, it would still be the fact
that
we were
bringing
it
under the conception of a process
and we should have to ask whether to such a conception of it any complete and consistent sense could be given.
We
cannot think of a process as occurring in which

in-
nothing proceeds, in which the continuation would be

distinguishable
from the beginning, the result produced from the condition producing it. This however would be the case with empty Time. Every moment in it would be exactly like every other. While one passed away, another would take its place, without differing from it in anything but its position in the series. This position however it
would not
with
its
itself indicate by a special nature, incompatible occupying another. It would only be the consciousness of an observer, who counted the whole series, that
it by the number of was reached from other moments But if so, there would with which it might be compared. not in Time itself be any stream, bringing the new into the Nor can appeal be made to the view place of the old.
would have occasion
to distinguish
it
places counted before
Chap.
III.]
TIME AND ITS CONTENT
319
duration of a certain state
previously stated, according to which even the unchanged is to be regarded as the product
of a process of self-maintenance in constant exercise and thus as a permanent event, though there would be no outward change to make this visible. If this view were applied
to Time,
it
would only help us

in
it
to the idea of a
all.
Time
for
ever stationary, not flowing at
distinction of earlier
and
later
moments
would only be possible on the basis
of the presentation to thought of a second Time, in which we should be compelled to measure the extent in a definite
direction of the
first
Time, the Time supposed to be
at rest.
140. Such
is
the obscurity which attaches to the notion
of a stream of empty Time,
when taken by itself. The same obscurity meets us when we enquire into the relation of Time to the things and events which are said to exist and take place i7i it. Here too the convenient preposition
only disguises the unintelligibleness of the relation which
it
has the appearance of enabling us to picture to the mind.
There would be no meaning

exist in
in the statement that things
Time
if
they did not incur

this?
some modification by so
if
existing
which they would not incur
they were not in
Time.
carries
What
is
To
say that
the stream of
Time
them along with it would be a faulty image. Not only would it be impossible to understand how empty Time could exercise such a force as to compel what is not empty The result too would be but real to a motion not its own.
something impossible to state. For even supposing the real to be thus carried along by the stream of Time, it would be in just the same condition as before, and thus our expression would contradict what we meant it to convey. For it is not / a mere change in the place of something which throughout / retains its reality, but an annihilation of one reality and an i
.
fr^
'
origination of another, that

at
we mean to signify by the power once destructive and creative of the stream of Time. But, so understood, this power would involve a greater riddle still. Its work of destruction would be unintelligible
320
in
itself,
OF TIME.
nor would
it
[Book
II.
be possible to conceive the relation power of things to which must be ascribed the greater or less resistance which they offer to Empty Time would be the last thing their annihilation. that could afford an explanation of the selection which we
between
it
and
that vital
should have to suppose

all
it
to exercise in calling events, with
their variety, into existence in a definite order of suc-
cession.
But
if,
aware of
this impossibility,
we
transfer the motive
causes of this variety of events to that to which they really

viz. to the nature and inner connexion of things, what are we then to make of the independent efflux of empty Time, with which the development of things would have to coincide without any internal necessity of doing so ? There would be nothing on this supposition to exclude the
belong,
adventurous thought that the course of events runs counter

to time
I
and brings the cause

first
into reality after the effect.

at the matter,
In short, whichever way

impossibility of this
we look
we
see the
which an empty Time has an existence of its own, either as something permanent or in the way of continual flux, including the sum of events within its bounds, as a power prior to all But the certainty reality and governed by laws of its own.
familiar view, according to
with which
we
reject this
view does not help us to the
any other. 141. Doubts have indeed been constantly entertained in regard to the reality which is commonly ascribed to Time and many attempts have been made, in the interests of a
affirmation of
philosophy of religion, to establish the real existence of a
Timeless Being as against changeable phenomena. A more metaphysical basis was first given to this exceptional view
by the labours of Kant. He was led by the contradictions, which the supposition of the reality of Time seemed to introduce even into a purely speculative theory of the world, to regard it equally with space as a merely subjective form of our apprehension. This is not the line which I have myself
Chap.
III.]
ENDLESS REGRESS IN TIME.

It
321
taken.
in
itself,
as
seemed to me a we understand
it
safer course to
it
and
as
show that Time we cannot cease to
understand
without a
common
to
I!
view, excludes every attribute

it
complete transformation of the which would have

if it
7-
i to
had an independent the other hand I cannot find in the assumption of its merely phenomenal reality a summary solution of difficulties, which only seem
be supposed to belong to
existence prior to other existence.
On
arise out of the application of
Time
to the
Real but in
truth are inseparable from the_ iatrinsic nature of the Real.
On
this subject I
may be
allowed to interpose some remarks.
142.
Were
it
intrinsically conceivable that
existence of any kind should belong to Time,

further possible to conceive any
way
in
it,
an independent and were it which the course of

then the
difficulties
the world could enter into relation to
which Kant found in the endlessness of time would cause me no special disturbance. That the world has of necessity a beginning in Time, is the Thesis of his antinomy, and this according to the method of oTraycoyr/ he seeks to prove by disproving the antithesis. It may be noticed in passing that for those who do not, to begin with, find something unthinkable in empty Time as having an existence of its. own, the reference to the world which fills Time is even' here really superfluous. The Thesis might just as well assert of Time itself that it must have a beginning, and then proceed as it does. For^ on supposition that Time has no beginning, before any given moment of Time there must have elapsed an eternity, an endless series of successive
'
moments.
that
it
Now
the endlessness of a series consists in this,
can never be completed by successive synthesis.

lapse of
An
endless past
Time
is
therefore impossible
and a
beginning of it necessary.' I confess to having always found something questionable

in
*
the
relative position
which Kant here assigns
to the
ed.).
[Altered from Kant's Kritik d. r. Vemunft, p. 304 (Hartenstein's The words in italics are Lotze's alterations.]
I.
Metaphysic, Vol.
'\i^22
OF TIME.
[Book
II.
^'
"^'^
thought of the endlessness of Time on the one hand, and that of the impossibihty of completing the endless series by
(synthesis on the other.
He
thinks
it
obvious that the
latter
constitutes a reason against the former, whereas
be tempted on the contrary to consider it but unimportant consequence of this doubtedly, in contemplating an endless lapse of time, we suppose that a regress from the present into the past would never come to an end, and that accordingly we could not
exhaust the elapsed time by a successive synthesis of the
one might merely an obvious thesis. For un-
The two thoughts are thus and the endlessness of the past would not be found to involve any contradiction until we could succeed in discovering a last stage in the regress. Presumably indeed Kant merely meant by the second thought to exhibit more clearly an absurdity already implicit in the first. But it is just on this point that I cannot accord him an unqualified assent.
steps taken in
this regress.
perfectly consistent,
143.
To
begin with,
I
:
propose to put
my objection
in the
following general form
the right and duty to admit that
something is or happens does not depend on our ability by combining acts of thought to make it in that fashion in which we should have to present it to ourselves as being or happening, ît were to be or to happen. It is enough that the admission is not rendered impossible by any inner contradiction, and is rendered necessary by the bidding of experience. By no effort of thought can we learn how the world of Being is made but there was no contradiction in the conception of it, and experience compelled us to adopt We have had no experience how the world the conception. of Becoming is made, on the contrary, the attempt to construct it in thought constantly brings us to the edge of inner contradictions, and it is only experience that has shown us that there may happen in reality what we cannot re-create in We cannot make out how the operation of one thought. thing on another is brought about, and in this case we found
;
Chap. III.]
ENDLESS SYNTHESIS IN SPACE
TIME. 323
it
impossible to overcome the inner contradiction implied
independent elements, in no way concerned with each other, should yet concern themselves with each other so far that the movement of one should be regulated by that of the other. This conception of operation, accordingly, we could not admit without discarding the supposition of the obstructive independence of things, and so rendering possible that mutual regulation of their
in the supposition that
motions, which experience shows to be a

ascription to
fact.
its
Could the
own, independent of our consciousness, be carried out without contradiction, the infinite extension, inseparable from its nature, would not have withheld us from recognising its reality, although we were aware that we could never exhaust this, infinity by a successive addition of its points or of the steps' taken by us in traversing it. It was no business of ours to
empty space of an existence of
make
Space.
It is the
concern of Space
itself
how
it
brings
>
that to pass
which the
activity of our imagination
cannot
compass.
Certainly, if a self-sustained existence, it was not be small enough for us to be able to find its limits. In its infinity no contradiction was involved. From every limit, at which we might halt for the moment, progress to another limit was possible, which means that such progress was always possible. A contradiction would only have arisen upon a point being found beyond which -a further progress would not have been allowed, without any reason for the stoppage being afforded by the law which has governed the process through the stages previously traversed, and against the requirement of that law. From this infinity of Space the impossibility of exhausting it by successive synthesis would have followed as a necessary, but at the same time, unimportant consequence unimportant, because the essence of Space, as a complex of simultaneous not successive elements, would have been quite unaffected by the question whether a mode of origination, which is
bound
to
certainly not that of Space,
is
possible.
Y 2
324
OF TIME,
[Book
II.
In this respect the case

regard to Time.
It is
is undoubtedly quite different in by the succession of moments that
Time comes into being. Therefore no done it by the question whether its infinity is attainable by the method of successive synthesis, which ceases in this case to be merely the subjective method But even here the impossibility followed by our thought. of coming to an end cannot be regarded as disproving the Kant speaks expressly of a successive endlessness of Time. synthesis, and of the certainty that the infinite series can never be exhausted by it. If we insist on these expressions, it is clear that the course of Time, the infinity of which is
every section of
wrong
is
alone ostensibly impugned,

real condition
is
itself
already regarded as a
antecedent of that activity of imagination,

fruitless.
which attempts the synthesis said to be
The
whatto
several steps of this activity follow each other.
Now
ever the celerity with w^hich this task of adding
moment
moment may be supposed
be carried on, no one will maintain that it is achieved more quickly than the lapse of The mental reconstruction the moments which it counts.
to
of
Time in time by means of the successive synthesis of its moments will take as much time as Time itself takes for its own construction; therefore an endless Time, if Time is
endless.
And this is in fact, as it seems to me, the real meaning of the word 7iever in the above connexion. It cannot have the mere force of negation, not. It only asserts what is in itself intelligible, that no succession in Time,
.
neither that of our mental representation of
Time nor
that
of Time
itself,
can measure an
infinite
Time
in a finite
Time.
to point.
But no inner contradiction lies in this progress from point This is the more apparent from the consideration that the progress must be supposed really to take place if
to conceive the possibility of the successive synthesis,
(we are
by which we are said to learn that it continues so endlessly It is not with itself therefore as never to be completed.
that the endlessness of
Time
is
in contradiction, but only
Chap.
III.]
INFINITE,
FUTURE AND
its infinite
PAST,
325
with our effort to include
progress in a finite one
of the same kind.
144. In writing thus, I am not unaware of the possible objection that this view admits of unforced application only
which no one would seriously doubt to be It may be said that the Future, as we conceive it, contains that which is coming to be but has not yet taken shape, and the endlessness of its progression agrees with this conception whereas the Past (if Infinity is to be ascribed to it) would compel us to assume a finished
to the Future,
without limits.
and ready-made
that
Infinity.
cannot help thinking, however,

difficulty
we have here
first
a confusion of ideas.
In the
place, I
would dispose of the
which
may be moment
elapsed.'
suggested by Kant's
expression, that ''up to any
of the present an infinite series of

It
seems to
me
Time must have improper to represent the Present
as the
end of this series. It is not the stream of Time ofi which the direction can be described by saying that it flowsl
out of the Past, through the Present, into the Future.
It is
fills
only that which
Time
the concrete course of the world

contained in the later by what
is
that conditions what

contained in the
is
earlier.
Empty Time
itself, if
there were
such a thing, would take the opposite direction. The Future wôuld pass unceasingly into the Present and this In presenting it to ourselves we should have into the Past.
to seek the source of this stream in the past. This correction, however, only alters the form of the If the above objection, which might be repeated thus
no occasion
Past
to
is
held to be infinite, then there must be considered
process,
have elapsed an infinite repetition of that mysterious by which every moment of the empty Future becomes the Present, and again pushes the Present before it as a Past. The true ground, however, of the misunderstanding is as follows. Future and Past alike are not ; but
the
manner of
their not-being
is
not the same.
It is true
that in regard to
empty Time, though we would
fain
make
326
this
OF TIME.
distinction,
[Book
II.
we cannot show
is
that
it
obtains, for
one
point of the elapsed void
exactly like every point of the
come. But if we think of that course fills Time, then the Future presents itself to us as that which, for us at any rate, is shapeless, dubious, still to be made, while the Past alone is definitely formed and ready-made. Only the Past which indeed is not, but still has known what Being is we take as given,
void that has
still
to
of the world which
and
as in a certain
way belonging
to reality.
For every
is
moment
of what has been the series of conditions
finished
the
conditions which must have been thought or must
have been active in order to make it the definite object which it is. This character of what has been, since it belongs to every moment of the past, is shared by the whole past of the world's history, and is transferred by us to empty Time. Thus, as a matter of course, when we speak of an
endless Past,
this endless
be the same thing as saying that But it is quite a different notion that Kant conveys by his expression 'gone by'^ This is the term used of a stream, of which it is already
it
we take
^
to
Past
has been'\
known
its
assumed that it has an end and exhausts itself in But there is nothing in the essential character of the Past to justify this assumption. Nothing is finished but
or
lapse.
the
it
sum
of conditions which
made each
single
moment what
is
has been.
To
say,
is
however, that this determination

is itself
in
each case finished
quite a different thing from saying that

closed,
the series of repetitions of this process
and
must be held
by,
if it
is
to
be given as a closed
series or to
have gone
to
The
latter is
be equivalent to the series of what has been. indeed the assertion of Kant, but the thought
is
so expressed
not one necessarily involved in the conAll that can
ception of that which has been, so as to be alleged as a

disproof of the assumption of an infinite past.
be said is that whoever thinks of an infinite past, thinks of an infinite that has been. Why he should not think this
'
[*
Sei geweseni']
"^
['
Verflossen.']
Chap. III.]
A GIVEN INFINITY.
327
does not appear.
He
will
simply deny that the conception

its
of what has been contains a presumption of
being
finite.
But
that,
come
to
on supposition of an infinite past, we should never an end in an attempt to reconstruct the past by
is
the successive synthesis of a process of imagination,
not
anything to surprise
assumption.
145.
us.
It
is
the natural result of our
A contradiction would
only arise
if
the infinity
asserted broke off anywhere.
The
doctrine that our imagination can only approach
the infinitely great by a progress which can be continued
beyond every limit that may be fixed for the moment may be met with elsewhere than in Kant. I do not dispute the correctness of this doctrine. But if it is meant to convey a definition of the infinite I must object, that it would be a definition of the object only by one of its consequences which may serve as a mark of it, not by the proper nature from which these consequences flow. For that the progress in question admits of being continued beyond every limit is something that cannot have been learned by any actual experiment. Any such experiment must necessarily have stopped at some finite limit without any certainty that the next step in advance, which had unfortunately not been
taken, might not have exhausted the infinite.
Rather we
its
derive this certainty, that the imagination with
posterior
constructions will not exhaust
it,
from a prior conception
which does exhaust

that the
infinite
it,
were
it
only the simple recognition
has
not an end, and that therefore, as
a matter of course, such an end cannot be found.
The above
standing, have
definition
its
by consequences may, notwith-
use.
What
must, on the contrary, be
disputed
in
it, that in the range of our thoughts about the real a case can never occur
is
the conclusion connected with
which we might recognise the

or, to
infinite as actually present
and given ;
possess the
put
it
otherwise, that
an
infinite
can never
same reality which we ascribe to finite magnitudes of the same kind. If we continue the series of
328
OF TIME.
[Book
II.
numbers by the addition of units, the infinite cannot, it is be found as a number. To require that it should be so found would be to contradict our definition of it. But to every further number admitted beyond the last which we presented to ourselves, we have to ascribe the same validity
true,
as to this
synthesis
last.
The
series
does not so break off where our
comes to an end as that the further continuation should be in any way distinguishable from the piece already
counted, as the merely possible or imaginary from something

real or giveri.
On
the contrary, to our conception the series
has undiminished validity as an infinite one, although on

the
for
method of addition of
our imagination.
units
it
could never be begotten

of an angle increases
only, however,
its
The Tangent
Not
with the increase of the angle.
do we
value
is
continuously approximate to the case in which
becomes
finite
infinite
we
actually arrive at
it
if
the angle
right angle
and the Tangent

:
parallel to the Secant.
This
in-
length remains throughout unmeasurable by successive
synthesis of finite lengths
but we are at the same time
forced to admit that as the concluding
member
itself
of a series
of
finite
Tangent-values, which admit of being stated, this
infinite inexhaustible
Tangent presents
is all
with just the
same vahdity
as those that are exhaustible. that
We
say with
equal validity, and that
we can
say, for
none of these
lines are realities, but only
images which we present to the

there
is
mind's eye.
ception of
But
I find
nothing to prove that in the con-
reality, as such,
anything to hinder us
from recognising, beside
finite
values which
we
are forced
to admit, the reality of the infinite, as
soon as the necessary
connexion of our thoughts compels us to do so. Now for those who consider a stream of empty Time, as such, possible, such a necessity lies not merely in the fact that no moment of this time has any better title than
another to form the beginning.
On
the contrary, try as
we
may, an independent stream of Time cannot be regarded as anything but a process, in which every smallest part has the
Chap.
III.]
THOUGHT IN
its reality
TIME,
NOT IN
SPACE.
329
arises
condition of
in a previous one.
There thus
the necessity of an infinite progression
necessity equally
on the other hand, we look merely to the and regard this as producing in some way the illusion of there being an empty Time. It is impossible to think of any first state of the world, whicli contains the first germ of all the motion that takes place inl the world in the form of a still motionless existence, and yet) more impossible to suppose a transition out of nothing, by^. means of which all reality, together with the motive impulses
unavoidable
if,
real process of events
contained in
it,
first
came
into being.
146. All these remarks, however, have only been
made
far
Time possible. Since we found it impossible, we will we are helped by the opposite view, that Time
on supposition
that a stream
of empty
is
in itself''
try
is
how
subjective
difficulty is
way of apprehending what is not in Time. A here obvious, which had not to be encountered by the analogous view of Space. Ideas, ex parte nostra, do
merely a y
not generally admit of that which forms their content being

predicated of them.
The
idea of
Red
is
not
itself red,
nor
that of choler choleric, nor that of a curve curved.
These
and credible to us which in itself, most strange; the nature, namely, of every intellectual presentation, not itself to be that which is presented in it. It may indeed be difficult for the imagination, when the expanse of Space spreading before our perception announces itself so convincingly as present
instances
that clear
is
make
notwithstanding,
outside us, to regard
it
as a product, only present for us,
of an activity working in us which

conditions of Space.
there
is
Still,
in the conception of
nothing to
make
us look for
no an activity extension in Space on

is
itself
subject to
the part of the activity itself as a condition of
its activity.
On
the contrary, had
we believed
that the impressions of
Space in our inner man could themselves have position in Space, we should have been obliged to seek out a new activity of observation which had converted this inner
33
OF TIME.
it,
[Book
II.
condition into a knowledge of

for that strange
and
to look to this activity
is in Space which must do its work without being in Space itself. If, on the other hand, we try to speak in a similar way of a timeless presentation of what is in time, the attempt seems to break down. The thought that Time is only a form or product of our presentative susceptibility, cannot take away from the presentation itself the character of an activity or at least of an event, and an event seems inconceivable without presupposition of a lapse of time, of which the end is disThus Time, unlike Space, tinguishable from the beginning. is not merely a product of the soul's activity, but at the same time the condition of the exercise of the activity by which Time itself as a product is said to have been obtained, and ^the presentation to consciousness of any change seems impossible without the corresponding real change on the part of the presenting mind. Now it must be borne in mind that in no case could Time be a subjective form of apprehension in such a sense as that the process of events, which we present to ourselves in it, should be itself opposed to the form of apprehension as being of a completely alien nature. Whatever basis in the way of timeless reality we may be disposed to supply to phenomena in Time, it must at any rate be such that its own nature and constitution remain translateable into forms of Time. To this hidden timeless reality, it may be suggested, that activity of thought would itself belong, of which the product in our consciousness would be that course of occurrences and of our ideas which is seemingly in Time. Of it, and by consequence of every activity as such, it must be sought to show, according to the view which takes Time to be merely our form of apprehen-
apprehension of what
sion, that while not itself
present,
it
may
yet present itself to sense in
running a course in a time already its products as

vindicate this paradoxical notion.
running such a course.
Let us pursue the consideration by
which
it
may be attempted to
147.
No one
will
maintain that the stream of empty
Time
Chap.
III.]
TIME AND REALITY.
33
brings forth events in the sense of being that which deter-
and the succession of the various would be admitted that all this is deBut although cided by the actual inner connexion of things. that which happens at one moment contains the ground G of that which at the next is to appear as consequence F^ it may be fancied that the lapse of Time is a conditio sine qua 71011 which must be fulfilled if the grounded consequence is A reference to the general really to follow from its ground. remarks previously made, upon the several kinds of cause distinguished in common parlance, may meanwhile suffice to convince us that what we call a conditio sine qua non can stand in no other relation to the effect resulting than does every other co-operative cause. The mere presence of that which in each case is so called is never sufficient to draw a The case distinct event in the way of consequence after it. rather is that the presence of such a complementary condition must always manifest itself by an effect exercised on the other real elements which without it would not have sufficed for the production of the consequence F. Now if upon such a supposition we assume first that at a certain moment a state of things, G^ is really given which forms the complete ground of a necessary consequence, F^ there is no conceivable respect in which the lapse of an empty Time, 7] should be necessary, or could contribute, by G. Granted that, to bring about the production of
mines
their character
series of
them.
It
during the time
7",
has continued without change, neither
producing
everything
F nor
.will
liminary to the other, then at the
a more immediate consequence, f^ preend of the interval
be just as at the beginning, and the lapse of time will have been perfectly barren. If, on the other hand, during the same interval G has passed into the series of consequences /j, /g, /^ each related to the next ., following as ground to consequence, the same remark is applicable to any two proximately related members of this
series.
If 7^
is
the sole ground of
^, then the
lapse of the
332
OF TIME.
Time
t^
[Book
II.
smaller interval of empty
t^
can be neither conits effect /g.
tributory nor essential to the production by/^ of

It will
no doubt be objected that the flaw of our argument
consists in this, that

things, G^
we fix a certain momentary state of and consider this fixed state of things, in complete
itself,
identity with
to act as the operative cause of
an
effect;
whereas in
lapse of
fact
only becomes such a cause through a

it is
Time during which

For
itself in
it
continuous process
said, the series of
of becoming.
events, while
this reason,
will
be
determinate causes and effects unfolds
itself as
a process of
on our supposition it remains out of Time and just for that reason cannot form more than a system of members which stand to each other eternally in graduated relations of dependence without ever moving in these relations. It must be admitted that whoever puts this objection strikes a most essential point. He is perfectly right in (insisting upon ceaseless motion or uninterrupted becoming as constituents of the real. For undoubtedly, if once the perfectly unchanging fact G were recognised as given, then the consequent F^ of which it contains the sufiicient reason, y would as speculatively valid truth, subsist permanently along with G^ while considered as reality it would either always
exist along with
it
or never
come
into being out of
it.
then the addition of the lapse of an empty

not produce the motion absent from
Time
.
For would
G at all, at any
rate not
.
produce it more or less than would the lapse of o / or co /. For the preThis shall be more fully considered below. sent my concern is to show that for the very process of Becoming in question the mere lapse of Time can afford no means, any possible application of which could be necessary
to bringing
it
about.
The proof
of
this,
however,
hold to
be involved in what has been already said. For here it comes to the same thing in effect whether we only speak of
a series of distinct causes which produce their several
tinuity
effects,
so to speak, by jumps, or whether taking the case of con-
we understand by /j, ^, /j constituents of a continuous

EMPTY TIME INDIFFERENT.
Chap.
III.]
333
Stream of causation constituents which are only arbitrarily fixed in thought but of which really each in turn moves.
On
/j,
/^
the latter supposition
it
would be
just as impossible that
the internal motion, which results in the emission of^^ from
in
should be dependent on the lapse of the empty time 4 such a way as that it could not take place unless this
lapse of time preceded.
unless
we suppose
that the lapse of
Such an influence is unintelligible empty time can announce
itself to /^
nay
that the completion of the period
t^
makes
t^
itself felt as different
from that of the longer period
/2)
i^ order that in the former there
may be
occasion for
the advance of the process of becoming from_^ only to_^,

in the latter to f^.
But the ends of the two periods are
completely like each other and like every other
moment
of
empty
time.
The
entry of the one has
no such
distinction
from that of the other as can give to^ the signal for this or For that reason the sum of the that amount of advance. continuously flowing moments, which forms the duration of
each period, cannot make
production of Becoming.
in the
itself felt
it
by the operative power

has to do in the way of
^ as a measure of the work which

same way
in
On the contrary, it will only be which we measure a period of Time for purposes of our knowledge that the length of this period can announce itself to f^ so as to determine the magnitude This is by the of the change which f^ has to undergo. enumeration of the repetitions of a similar process, which at
the
reality
end of some period of Time exhibits a different state of from what it did at the beginning. So far as our knowledge is concerned, the perception of the different positions which a pendulum, for instance, occupies at the beginning and at the end of its vibration, would suffice for the purpose. For a reality, which was to take account of the lapse of Time in order to direct its becoming accordingly, there would be needed the constant summing of the impressions received by it from another real process, by means of which it itself or its own condition had been so changed
334
OF TIME,
[Book
II.
as to be able to serve as indicator of the length of
Time
elapsed.
The
conclusion plainly
is
that a process of be-
coming, B, which required a lapse of time in order to come

about, must have already traversed in itself a succession of
different stages, in order to feel in that succession the lengths
it is supposed to direct supposed to employ for the purpose of effecting the transition from one stage to another. 148. These considerations do not lead us at once to the end of our task. For the present I may put their result, which I shall not again discuss, as follows. It is quite unallowable to put the system of definite causes and effects, which gives its character to any occurrence, on one side and on the other side to suppose a stream of empty Time, and
of the periods according to which

itself,
and which
it is
then to throw the definitely characterised event into the

stream in expectation that
sion, in
its
fabric of simultaneous con-
ditions will in the fluidity of this stream melt into a succes-
which each of the graduated relations of dependence appropriate point of time and the period of its manifestation. It is only in the actual content of what happens, not in a form present outside it into which it may fall, that the reason can be found for its elements being related to each other in an order of succession, and at the same time for the times at which they succeed each other.
will find its
The
other view therefore begins to press

it
itself
upon us
the view that
is
not
Time
that precedes the process of
Becoming and
Activity, but this that precedes
brings forth from itself either the real course of
appearance in us of there being such a thing.

contradiction to this reversal of the habitual
at the matter
Time and Time or the The constant
way of looking
which our imagination would present, we could

than we could of the habit of saying that
sets.
no more get
rid of
What we might hope to do would be to understand one illusion as well as the other. It is also our habit to speak of general laws, standing outside things and occurrences and regulating their course ; yet we
the sun rises and
Chap.
III.]
TIME, AS A WHOLE, SUBJECTIVE.
335
reality
have been forced to the conviction that these have no
except in the various particular cases of their application.
Only that which happens and

the
real.
acts in determinate forms
is
The
general law
After
is
the product of our comparison

it, it
of the various cases.

to us as the
first,
we have discovered
its
appears
and the
realities,
out of the consideration
of which
the
it
arose, as
dependent on
antecedence.
In just
same way,
after the
manifold web of occurrence has in
countless instances assumed for us forms of succession in Time, we misunderstand the general character of these forms, which results from our comparison of them the empty flowing Time and take it for a condition antecedent, to which the occurrence of events must adjust itself in order to be possible. That we are mistaken in so doing and that the operation of such a condition is unthinkable this reductio ad impossibile,' which I have sought to make out, is, it must be admitted, the only thing which can be opposed to this unavoidable habit of our mental vision. 149. The positive view, which we found emerging in place of the illusion rejected, is still ambiguous. Is it a real Time that the process of events, in its process, produces In answering this or only the appearance of Time in us ? question we cannot simply affirm either of the alternatives.
'
One
thing
is
certainly clear, that the production of
Time
I
must be a production sui generis. Time does not remain as a realised product behind the process that produces it. As little does it he before that process as a material out of which the process can constantly complete itself. Past and future are not, and the representation of them both as dimensions of Time is in fact but an artificial projection, which takes place only for our mind's eye, of the unreal upon the plane which we think of as containing the world's
real state of existence.
'
Undoubtedly therefore Time, conceived as an infinite its two opposite extensions, is but a subjective presentation to our mind's eye or rather it is an attempt,
whole with
;
336
OF TIME.
to
[Book
II.
by means of images borrowed from space,

presentable a thought which
render so
we
entertain as to the inner
dependence of the individual constituents of that which

happens.
What we
call Past,
we regard
primarily as the
condition 'sine qua non^ of the Present, and in the Present
we
see the necessary condition of the Future.
This onein
sided relation of dependence, abstracted from the content

so related
and extended over
all
cases which
it
its
nature
admits
of,
leads to the idea of an infinite Time, in which
every point of the Past forms the point of transition to
Present and Future, but no point of Present or Future forms

a point of transition to the Past.
appear
lie
infinite
scarcely needs
to
That this process must be pointed out. The

Every
state
condition of that which has a definite character can never

in a complete absence of such character.
of
as
facts, accordingly,
of which
we might
think for a
moment
the beginning of reality, would

as a product of
immediately appear to us
in like
either as a continuation of a previous like state of facts, or
one unlike
and
manner every
state
of facts momentarily assumed to be an end would appear as
the condition of the continuance of the

in turn as the
same
state of facts, or
beginning of a new one.

still
If finally the course
of the world were thought of as a history, which really had

a beginning
and end,
beyond both
alike
sent to ourselves the infinite void of a Past
we should and P'uture,
prejust
as two straight lines in space which cut each other at the

still demand an empty extension beyond in which they may again diverge. 150. It will be felt, however, that we have not yet reached It will be maintained that though the end of our doubts. the process of Becoming does indeed make no abiding Time, it yet does really bring into being or include the course of Time, by means of which the various parts of the content of what happens, standing to each other in the relation of dependence described above, having been at first only some-
limit of the real,
thing future, acquire seriatim the character of the Present
Chap.
III.]
THE MEANING OF PRESENT:

'
337
and the
Past.
If
we chose
to confine ourselves simply to
highly developed thought, and to regard the dimensions of Time merely as expressions for conditionedness or the
power of conditioning, then the whole content of the world would again change into a motionless systematic whole, and everything would depend on the position which a consciousness capable of viewing the whole might please to take up From this facing, so to speak, some one part of it, in. point of departure, m, the contemplator would reckon everything as belonging to the Past, mi, in which he had recognised the conditions that make the content of m what
it is, while he would assign to the Future, m-\-i, all the consequences which the necessities of thought compelled him to draw from it and this assignment of names would change according as m or n might be made the point of departure for this judgment. This however does not repre:
sent the real state of the case.
This capacity of tracing out
the connexion of occurrences in both directions forwards
and backwards
would only be possible to a consciousness

It
far as
standing outside the completed course of the world.
belongs to us only in relation to the past, so

has become
is
the past
known
to us through tradition.
Immediate
confined to a definite range, and neither does experience the recollection of the past reproduce for experience its
actual duration, nor does the sure foresight of the future, in
|
the few cases where
it is
possible, take the place for experi-
ence of the real occurrence of the foreseen event. What then is the proper meaning of the Reality, which in this connexion of thought we ascribe only to the Present ?
conversely, what constitutes this character of the present, which we suppose to belong successively in unalterable series to the events of which each has its cause in the other, and to be equivalent to reality? I will not attempt to prepare the way for an answer to this question, or to lead up to it as a discovery. I will merely state what seems to me the
Or
only possible answer to

Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
it.
It is
not the mere fact that they
338
OF TIME,
this character to the
[Book
1 1.
happen which attaches
content of events.
On
the contrary the
import of the statement that they

'
happen is only explained by the expression the Present,' in which Language aptly makes us aware of the necessity of a subject, in relation to which alone the thinkable content of the world's course can be distinguished either as merely thinkable and absent on the one hand, or on the other as real and present. To explain this, however, I am obliged to go into detail to an extent for which I must ask indulgence and patience. 151. Let us consider one of the finite spiritual beings like ourselves, which shall be called S. In the collective content of the world, M^ which to begin with we will think of as we did before, merely as a regularly arranged whole of causes and effects, -S'has its proper place in the system at m between a past m i, which contains its conditions, and a future m-\-ij of which it is itself a joint condition. We will first assume that the place m, which -5" holds in M, is without
extension.
By
this I
mean
that
it
is
only in this single
plane of a section
through the manifold interlacing series

1
of causes and effects which forms the content of
any other
others
mi
orm-}-
Af not
in
-S:
that there lie the conditions of
while at the same time every element of
Jf 6" among
have knowledge, immediately and not by gradual acquisition, as to the whole structure and content of M. All that would be implied in this supposition would be that -S" would no longer be able at its pleasure to seek out positions indifferent as concerned itself Being only able to plant for its survey of the whole of A/. itself in the position m, everything in which it recognises a
to
joint condition of
different branch,
its
may be supposed
own being
its
will
appear to belong to a
existence
m i,
of the world's content, from that in
which it finds reactions from ence which is confined to m.

ledge on the part of S^ that
own
that existthis
At the same time
knowin this
it is
merely co-ordinated
entire system of conditions with the other parts of the world's
Chap.
III.]
'
PRESENT' IMPLIES MEDIATION.
339
content that are included in m^ would remain a mere speculative insight,
which would excite in S no stronger interest and one of no other nature, than the interest in the fact of the dependence of m upon m\ and of m+i upon m. Thus, although S would distinguish according to
in this
;;/,
their import the
two branches of the system of conditions it would yet have no occasion to oppose them both to m as what is unreal and And this would still be absent to what is real and present. the case, though we so far altered our assumption as to
that have their point of departure in m,
suppose
-S*
to
be not only contained
in the
one section-plane
of AT, but also to be co-ordinated with the contents of
other planes
m a and m + a, without undergoing any change in itself. To us indeed, who are accustomed to the idea of Time, this position of 6" in a system would present itself as a duration, as the filling by 6" of the period of time, 2a but to 5 itself, if 6" continued to possess the immediate knowledge supposed, it could only convey the speculative impression that S is interwoven in an extended section of Mj while S would still have no occasion to oppose this sec:
tion as present to others as absent.
All this
indeed
for other reasons
would be changed on one supposition only, which must be made; the supposition,
.S*
namely, that the place of

the conditions of
its
in the
system contains not only

its
existence but those of
knowledge./'
an object of
can be knowledge which not only systematically precede it as conditions but of which the consequences are contained in w, and only as far as their consequences are so contained. Of m-\-i on the contrary all that will be knowable will be the impulse, already present in w, which is
In this
is
implied that only those elements oi

its
mi
the condition oi m-\-i.

not,
Even
the entire content of
will
merely as such, form an object of knowledge to S. Even the fact of belonging to m is for each element of it only the condition of a more special relation to S, which we
may
call its effect
on
6"
in the
way of producing knowledge.
z 2
340
If
OF TIME.
return to our supposition that
[Book
II.
now we
is
a place with-
6^ will be an unchangeable presentation to consciousness, without there being any occasion for the distinction of Present from Future If on the contrary 6" found itself contained in the in it. whole extended section 2 a of M, then it would follow since we are now supposing its knowledge to rest upon the
out extension, then the knowledge possessed by
produced in it by the content of this section that ^S" no longer identical with itself in all points of 2 a, but has to be defined by s^y s^, s^, corresponding to the various conditions to which it is subject in the various points of 2 a. But thus 6" would fall asunder into a multiplicity of finite beings,
effect
is
unless something supervened to justify us in adhering to the
and this justification, if it is not merely to an accidental view about s in us but to constitute an essential unity on the part of s, can only consist in an action of its own on the part of ^ by which it unites the several /s. This requirement however is not satisfied by the assumption of an -S" having unity, which distinguishes the several / -5' as thus constituted would still never in itself as its states. The whole content of its being live through any experience. would be presented to it just in the same way as on our previous supposition. There would indeed be a clear insight into the plan upon which the elements are formed into a connected whole, but the whole would be presented simultaneously, just as is the frame-work of theoretic propositions which appear to us not as arising out of each other in a course of time but as always holding good at the same time, although we understand their dependence on each Only one of the /s can in any case be the knowing other. in s^, let us say subject, but in it the content of s^ must not only be contained by its consequences, through which
unity asserted of it,
establish
it
helps to constitute the nature of
jg,
but this content as

s^
presented to consciousness must be distinguishable in the
form of a recollection from that which belongs to
as
is
its
it
own
feeling
or perception.
On
this
condition only
Chap. III.]
'TIMELESS'
s^
NOT =' simultaneous:
341
possible for
to distinguish this latter experience as present
from that represented content as absent, and on the same

condition, since the
same reproduction of
i-^
in s^ has already
taken place, the whole series of these mutually dependent contents, as represented in consciousness, while preserving
its
inner order, will be pushed back to various distances of
absence.
The
question indeed as to the foundation of this
from a question upon which any psychological or physiological explanation may be thankfully accepted in its place. Here however it would be useless. What we are now concerned with is merely the fact itself,
faculty of distinguishing a represented absent object
is
one experienced as present
that
we
are able to
make
this distinction
and
to represent
what we have experienced without experiencing it again. This alone renders it possible for ideas of a proper succession to be developed in us, in which the member n has a different kind of reality from n-\-\. It would have been more convenient to arrive at this result otherwise than by this tedious process of development. I thought the proto ourselves
cess indispensable, however, because
it
leads to
some
peculiar
deductions, which require further patient consideration.
152. For instance

intelligible
not
;
what has been said
will
be found very
to say, obvious
if
only
we
allow ourselves
to interpolate the thought that
s^
ceases to exist
when
it
it
has
produced
planes of
before
s^
that thus there
is
a time in which those section-
or of 2 a succeed each other.
But
will
it
thought to be as impossible after our discussion as

it,
be was
to look
upon the content of the world

which the members
are,
as out of
time, a whole of
ally
it
related systematic-
but not successively, while yet there arises in parts of
the appearance of there being a lapse of time on the part
of the periods which those parts observe.

successive alternation of Being
For
if
there
is
no
.f,,
and not-Being,
s^,
then,
it
will
be
said, every stage of
development,
which a subject,
believes itself to have experienced in the past, will possess,

as a
ground of s^ the same

,
reality as a
consequence
s^ itself.
342
OF TIME.
it
[Book
II.
would seem, to think and states of an and every inearlier time as still existing and happening dividual being i", would have alongside of itself as many doubles, s^^ j-g, i^g, completing themselves one after another, as it counts various moments in the existence which it seems to have lived through. Against this objection, however, we must maintain that such peculiar views would not be the logical consequence of our denial of the lapse of Time, but on the contrary of the inconsistency of allowing the succession that has been denied again to mix itself with our thoughts. For only this
of
all
Accordingly we should be compelled,

that
is
past
all
histories, actions,
habituation of our imagination to the idea of

are of equal value
to the whole
Time could
mislead us into treating the elements of the world, which
as
if
all,
that
is
to say, equally indispensable
they must be contemporaneous unless
they are to be successive,
when all the while our purpose was to show that every determination in the way of time is inapplicable to them, as such. We shall never succeed in ridding ourselves of this habit of fantasy. Only in thinking shall we be able to convince ourselves, in standing conflict with our demand for images presentable to the mind's eye, that adherence to the assumption of timelessness does not lead to the consequences in which we have just found a stumbling-block. There would not indeed on our view be that kind of past into which the conditioning stage of development would be supposed to vanish, instead of illegitimately continuing in the present alongside of the consequence conditioned by it that consequence to which it ought to
have transferred the exclusive possession of the quality of being present. The histories of the past would not continue to live in this present, petrified in each of their phases, alongside of that which further proceeded to happen in the It would not be the case that s^ really course of things.
existed earher than
s^
and
strangely continued along with
it,
but rather that
it
had
reality
only so far as
it
was contained
Chap. III.]
RELATIVITY OF TIME.
343
will
and was presented by the latter to itself as earlier. It be with Time as with Space. As we saw, there is no such thing as a Space in which things are supposed to take
in
.^2
their places.
The
case rather
is
that in spiritual beings
there
formed the idea of an extension, in which they themselves seem to have their lot and in which they spatially present to themselves their non-spatial relations to each other. In hke manner there is no real Time in which
is
occurrences run their course, but in the single elements

of the
Universe which are capable of a limited knowledge

i
there developes itself the
dea of a
T ime
in
which they\
assign themselves their position in relation to their
more re-' mote or nearer conditions as to what is more or less long past, and in relation to their more remote or nearer consequences as to a future that is to be looked for more or less late. It is not out of wantonness that I have gone so far in delineating this paradoxical way of looking at things. It is what we must come to if we wish to put clearly before us
the view of the merely subjective validity of
to a timeless reality.
It is
\
*
Time
in relation
vexatious to listen to the
mere
asseveration of this antithesis without the question being
asked whether, when adopted, it intrinsically admits of being in any way carried out, and whether it would be a sufficient guide to the understanding of that experience from which we all start. The description which has been
given will be enough to raise a doubt whether the latter
the case.
is
The
reasons for this doubt, however, are not
all
of equal value.
In regard to them again, while passing to
the consideration of this contradiction, I must ask to be
allowed some
detail.
is
153. In order to find a point of departure in what

familiar, I will first repeat the objection
which
will
always
will
recur.
enquire
Pointing the external world the objector not then the case that something ever
to
'
Is
it
is
for
happening ? Do not things change ? Do they not operate on each other ? And is all this imaginable without a lapse

344
of time of
?
'
OF TIME,
Imaginable
it is it
[Book
II.
maintained that
Time and
this
is not, and we have never But in what relation do the lapse happening stand to each other, which
certainly
so.
might enable us to maintain the correctness of this imagination of ours? That it is only in what is contained in a
sufficient cause,
G^ that there
lies
if
a necessity for the conseotherwise lacking, could
quence,
Fthat
the necessity,
not supervene through lapse of a time,

obviously true.
It
this we found was admitted also that, G being given, it would neither be intelligible where the hindrance should come from which should retard its transition into Fy nor how the lapse of empty Time could overcome that
hindrance.
Thus constrained
to
confess that
our habit
of thinking the effect as after the cause does not point to
anything which in the things themselves contributes to the
production of the
effect,
draw than
our
this, that
succession in
what other conclusion can we Time is something which
mode
of apprehension alone introduces into things
introduces in a way absolutely inevitable for us, so that our
thought about things remains constantly in contradiction

with our habit of presenting them to the mind's eye
?
One may
is
attempt to
make
this
thought clear to oneself
by gradual approximation.
our habit in
To
a definite period of
Time
it
common
absolute quantity.
the
apprehension to ascribe a certain If we ask ourselves, however, how long

lasts,
a century or an hour properly

that
we
at
once recollect
time
filled
by one
series
of events
we always
measure simply according to its relation to another series, with the ends of which those of the first series do or do not
coincide.
Our ordinary impression of the duration of

of time
is
periods
itself
the uncertain result of such a
comparison, in which we are not clearly conscious of the

standard of our measurement.
may appear
imagination.
long or short in memory.

it
Hence the same period The multiplicity of

it
the events contained in
gives
greater extent for the

it
Poverty of events makes
shrink into nothing.
Chap. III.]
TIME RELATIVE TO WHAT?

no extensive quantity which
is
345.
its
It
has
itself
properly
own.
Therefore no hindrance meets us in the attempt to suppose

as short a time as
However
small
we will for we think it,
the collective course of events.

still
it
is
not in
it
but in the
dependence of events on each other that the reason lies of the order in which events occur; and the entire history which fills centuries admits of being presented in a similar image, as condensed into an infinitely small space of Time
through proportional diminution of
all
dimensions.
be thought necessary to come to a stop. However small, it will be said, still this differential of Time must contain a distinction of before and after, and thus a lapse, though one infinitely small. But we want to know exactly why. Undoubtedly the transition to a moment completely without extension would deprive History of the character of succession in Time ; but then our question is just this, whether the real needed this succession on its own part in order to its appearance as successive to us. And in regard to this we must constantly repeat what has been already said that neither could the order of events be constituted by Time, if it were not determined by the inner connexion of things, nor is it intelligible how Time should begin to bring that which already has a
this
it
With
admission however
will
sufficient
cause to
reality, if that reality is still
lacking to
it.
On
the other hand,
we
believe that
a presentative faculty such as to
we do understand how derive from its own nature
the habit of viewing the world as in time, should find
occasion in the inner connexion between the constituents of that world, as conditioning and conditioned by each
other, to treat
its
parts as following each other in a definite
order and as assuming lengths
definite in relation to
each
this
other but, apart from such relation, quite arbitrary
of
imagined Time.
the idea
Thus even upon this method, by help of of an infinitely small moment, we should have
mastered the thought of a complete timelessness on the part of what fills the world. For in that case we should
346
certainly not
OF TIME.
[Book
II.
go out of our way to think of that extenmoment would seem of a vanishing smallness, and so bring on the world the reproach
sion of time, within which this
of a short and fleeting existence, as compared with the

duration which expansion into infinite
Time would have
promised
it.
154. After all, it will be objected, we have not yet touched the proper difficulty. If all that we had to take account of were an external course of the world, then it would indeed cost us little effort to regard all that it
contains as timeless, and to hold that
to
it is
only in relation
itself
our way of looking at
it
that
it
unfolds
into a
But the motion, which we should thus have excluded from the outer world, would so much the more surely have been transferred into our Thought, which, on the given supposition, must itself pass from one of the elements which constitute the world to another, in order to make them successive for its contemplation. For the unfolding, by which what is in itself timeless comes to be in
succession.
time, cannot take place in us without a real lapse of
Time
the appearance of succession cannot take place without a

succession of images in
transition
consciousness,
nor an apparent
of a into b without the real transition

in such a case effect
we should
that of
b.
which from the image of a to
But convincing as these assertions are, they are as far from containing the whole truth. On the contrary, without the addition of something further, the doctrine which they allege would be fatal to the possibility of that which it is
sought to establish.
If the idea of the later b in fact merely
^, then a change of ideas would indeed take place, but there would still be no idea of There would be a lapse of time, but not an this change. appearance of such change to any one. In order to a comparison in which b shall be known as the later it is necessary in turn that the two presentations of a and b should be
followed on that of the earlier
Chap. III.]
CONSCIOUSNESS ITSELF IN TIME?
347
objects, throughout simultaneous, of a relating knowledge,
which,
itself
completely indivisible, holds them together in

act.
it
a single indivisible
this
If there
is
a belief on the part of

its
knowledge that
it
passes from one of

itself
related points
to another,
will
not
form
this idea of its transition
through the mere fact of the transition taking place. In order that the idea may be possible, the points with which
its course severally begins and ends, being separate in time, must again be apprehended in a single picture by the mind as the limits between which that course lies. All ideas of a course, a distance, a transition all, in short, which contain a comparison of several elements and the relation between them can as such only be thought of as products of a timelessly comprehending knowledge. They would all be
impossible,
if
the presentative act
itself
it
were wholly reducible
to that succession in
Time which
it.
regards as the peculiarity
of the objects presented by
make
the provisional admission that
of a before
we had
that of
<5,
Nay if we go further and we really had the idea still a can only be known asi
moment,
later.
the earlier on being held together with b in an indivisible!

act of comparison.
It is at this
at
longer the earlier nor b the
later,
that for
which a is no knowledge a
appears as the earlier and b as the
In assigning these
determinate places, however, to the two, the soul can only
be guided by some
content
sort of qualitative differences in their

if
by
temporal signs,
we
like to say so,
corre-
sponding to the local signs in accordance with which the

consciousness expands system of spatial juxtaposition.
6'-spatial
its
impressions into
Such could not but be the state of the case even ^/" there were a lapse of Time in which our ideas successively formed
themselves.
The
real lapse of
Time would
not,
immediately
as such, be a sufficient cause to that
which combines and knows of the succession in Time which it presents to itself. It would be so only mediately through signs derived by each constituent element of the world from that place in the
348
order of
OF TIME.
Time
into
[Book
II.
signs could not be
which it had fallen. But such various stamped on the various elements by empty time, even though it elapsed, since one of its elements
exactly like every other.
in
They could only be derived which each element is inwoven into the texture of conditions which determine the content of the world. But just for that reason there was no need of a real sequence in Time to annex them to our ideas as characteristic incidental distinctions. Thus it would certainly be possible for a presentative consciousness, without any need of Time, to be led by means of temporal signs, which in their turn need not have their origin in Time, to arrange its several objects in an apparent succession in the way of Time. 155. I am painfully aware that my reader's patience must be nearly exhausted. Granted, he will say, that in every single case in which a relation or comparison is instituted this timeless faculty of knowing is active it remains none the less true that numberless repetitions of such action really succeed each other. Yesterday our timeless faculty of knowledge was employed in presenting the succession of a and b, to-day it presents that from c to d. There are thus, it would seem, many instances of Timeless occurrence which really succeed each other in Time. I venture, however, once again to ask. Whence are we to know that this is so ? And if it were so, in what way could we know of it ? That consciousness, to which the comparison made yesterday appears as earlier than that made to-day, must yet be the consciousness which we have to-day, not that which may have been yesterday and have vanished in the course of Time. That which appears to us as of yesterday cannot
is
from the peculiar manner
so appear to us because
it
is
not in our consciousness, but

it is
because
it its
it is
in
it
while at the same time
somehow
so
qualitatively determined, that our
mental vision can assign

last reply yields
place only in the past branch of apparent Time.
I will allow,
however, that this
no
result.
Chap.
III.]
PAST AND FUTURE IN THOUGHT?

we beheve
349
The
Past indeed, of which
ourselves already to
have had living experience, one may try to exhibit as a system of things which has never run a course in Time, and which only consciousness, for its own benefit, expands into a preceding history in Time. But how then would the case stand v,'ith the Future, which we suppose ourselves still on
the
way
to
meet?
Let
s^^
according to the symbols prei-.,
viously used, stand for this Ego, which
and
s^
never really
preceded but always seem to have preceded, what then is s^ which ^"3 in turn will thus seem to have preceded ? What
could prevent
future,
if
^"3
from being conscious also of
i-^,
its
own
the temporal signs which teach us to assign to
single impressions their position in
Time, depended only on
the systematic position which belongs to their causes in the
complex of conditions of a timeless universe ? It may be which follows systematically upon s^^ 5*4 is not determined merely by the conditions, which are contained in i-g and previously in s^ and j^, but jointly by others, resting on the states of other beings which do not cross those of -S till a later stage of the system. For that reason s^ might be obscure to s^ and this might constitute the temporal character which gives it in the consciousness of s^ the stamp of something future. But if this were the case, the process would have to stop at this point. It would only be for another being s^ that what was Future to ^-3 could, owing to its later place in the system, be present. On the other hand in a timeless system there would be no possibility of the change by means of which ^-3 would be moved out of its place into that of s^^ yet this would be necessary if to one and the same consciousness that is to become Present which was previously Future to it. If one and the same timeless being by its timeless activity of intellectual presentation gives to one constituent of its existence the
that the content of
,
:
Past character of a recollection, to another the significance

of the Present, to a third
Future,
it
unknown element
to
that of the
could never,
if it is
be
really timeless,
change

35
this distribution
OF TIME.
[Book
II.
of characters. The recollection could never have been Present, the Present could never become Past and the Future would have to remain without change the
same unknown
obscurity.
it
But
is
if
there
is
a change in this
distribution of light; if
the case that the indefinite
burden of the Future gradually enters the presence of living experience and passes through it into the other absence of the Past ; and finally if it is impossible for the activity of
intellectual
presentation to alter this order of sequence;
then
it
follows necessarily that not merely this activity, but

it
the content of the reality which
presents to
itself,
is
involved in a succession of determinate direction.
This being
as
so,
is
we must
finally
decide as follows
Time,
it
a whole,
without doubt merely a creation of our

It neither is
presentative intellect.
elapse.
It is
permanent nor does
but the fantastic image which we seek, rather
than are able, to project before the mind's eye, when we think of the lapse of time as extended to all the points of
relation
which
it
admits of ad infinitum^ and at the same
time
make
abstraction of the content of these points of
/ eliminate
But the lapse of events in time we do not from reality, and we reckon it a perfectly hopeless undertaking to regard even the idea of this lapse as an a priori merely subjective form of apprehension, which
relation.
developes
itself
within a timeless reality, in the conscious-
ness of spiritual beings.
156. Thus, at the end of a long and troublesome journey,
we come back, as it will certainly appear, to complete agreement with the ordinary view. I fear however that remnants
still survive which call for a special attack remnants of an error with which we are already familiar and which have here needed to be dealt with only in a new
of an error
form,
its
viz.
the disintegration of the real into
its
content and
reality.
We
are unavoidably led by our comparison of
the manifold facts given to us to the separation of that on the one hand which distinguishes
one
real
object
from
Chap.
III.]
ABSTRACTION OF REALITY.
its
351
another
that in
peculiar content which our thought can fix in

its
abstraction from
existence
and
on the other hand of
which every thing
real
resembles every other
the
reality itself which, as
For
tion,
this is just
we fancy, has been imparted to it. what we go on to imagine that this separa-
achieved in our thoughts, represents a metaphysical

;
history
once
for
all,
do not mean a history which has been completed but one which perpetually completes itself; a
such a kind that that content,
this
reality
its
real relation, that is to say, of
apart from
reality,
is
something to which
comes to belong. The prevalence of this error is evidenced by the abundant use which philosophy, not least since the
time of Kant, has
reality.
made
of the conception of a
'
Position,'
its
which meeting with the thinkable content estabhshes

In an
earlier part of this
work we declared ourselves against this mistake. We were convinced that it was simply unmeaning to speak of being as a kind of placing which may simply supervene upon that intelligible content of a
thing, without
changing anything in that content or essence

a condition
into
its
or
entering as
completeness.
passion, in
it
As
separate from the energy of action
and
we found the
real
being of the thing to consist,
which was im-
possible even to think of that essence, impossible to think
of it as that to which this reality of action and passion comes from without, as if it had been already, in complete rest, the same essence which it is under this motion. It is the same impossible separation that we have here
understanding, carefully pursued to
once again, in consideration of the prevalence of the misits consequences in the form of the severance of the thing which happens from its happening. It was thus that we were led to the experiment of seeking the essence^ of what happens that by which the
is still the content that which distinguishes one real from another.' A verbal difficulty is caused by the distinction being here, per accidens, between the actual world and an imaginary world, so that but for the context we might take essence to be used
^ ' ' '
[This
object
'
352
OF TIME,
[Book
II.
actual history of the world
is distinguished from another which might happen but does not in a complex system of relations of dependence on the part of a timeless content of thought; while the motion in this system, which alone constitutes the process of becoming and happening, was regarded as a mode of setting it forth which might simply be imposed on this essential matter, or on the other hand, might be wanting to it without changing the distinctive
character of the
essence.
We
could not help noticing,

latter the
indeed, the great difference between reality and that system

of intelligible contents.
its
In the
reason includes
consequence as eternally coexisting with it. In the former the earlier state of things ceases to be in causing Then began the attempts to understand this the later. succession, which imposes itself hke an alien fate on the system in its articulation. They were all in vain. When once the lapse of empty time and the timeless content had been detached from each other, nothing could enable the
set nature of the latter to resolve itself into a constant flux
in the former.
It
was clear that
in this separation
we had
to
forgotten something which forced that content

as
it
did, if it
involving moved, the basis of an order of time pass

I will
in fact into such a state of motion.
not suppose that
crudest attempt to be
made at supplying the necessary complement the reference to a power standing outside the world which laid hold on the eternal content of things, as
on a Time
store of material, in order to dispose

in
its
elements in
such a way as their inner order, to which it looked as a pattern, directed it to do. Let us rather adopt the view that in the content itself lies the impulse after realisation
which makes its manifold members issue from each other. Still, even on that view it would be a mistake, as I hold, to think of the measure and kind of that timeless conditionedness, which might obtain between two elements of the
in just the opposite sense to that explained a few lines before, and to which distinguishes what is real from what is unreal.]
refer to that
Chap.
III.]
SUCCESSION
IS
REAL.
353
world's content, as the antecedent cause which
commanded
or forbade that operative impulse to eHcit the one element
from the other. What I am here advancing is only a further application of a thought which I have previously expressed. Every relation, I have said, exists only in the spirit of the
person instituting the relation and for him.
believe that
When we
is
we
find
it
in things themselves,
it
in every
case
more than a mere

instead
relation
it
is
itself
already an
efficient process
effects.
of being merely prehminary to
On
there
the
is
same
principle
we
say
It is
not the case that
unchanging conditionedness between the elements of the world, and that afterwards in accordance with this relation the productive operation, even though it may not come from without but may lie in the
first a relation of
things themselves, has to direct itself in order to give reality
and avoid those that are illegitiand alone is there this full living operation itself. Then, when we compare its acts, we are able in thought and abstraction to present to ourselves the constant modus agendi, self-determined, which in all its
to legitimate consequences
mate.
On
the contrary
first
manifestations has remained the same. This abstraction made, we can subordinate each single product of the operation, as
we look backward, to this mode of procedure as to an ordaining /r/?/j and regard it as determined by conditions which are in truth only the ordinary habit of this operation
This process of comparison and abstraction leads us one direction to the idea of general laws of nature, which are first valid and to which there then comes a world, which
itself.
in
submits
itself to
them.
In another direction
it
leads to the
supposition of an empty Time, in which the series of occur-
rences succeed each other and which, in the character of an
antecedent conditio sine qua non, makes
all
operation possible.
way of looking at the matter we have found as untenable as would be the attempt to represent velocities as prior to motions (somewhat as if each motion had to choose Metaphvsic, Vol. I. A a
But
this last
354
OF TIME.
velocity),
[Book
II.
an existing
sion, according to
or that velocity,
truth the motion
definite direction.
and to interpret the common expreswhich the motion of a body assumes this as signifying an actual fact; whereas in
is
nothing but the velocity as following a
In this sense we
sions that
may find more
correctness in the expresit
may be
is
often heard, according to which
is
not
Time
that
the condition of the operation of things, but
this operation that

forth, while
it
produces Time.
its
Only what
it
brings
takes
course,
is
not an actually existing

existing or flowing or
Time Time
total
as an abiding product,
somehow
influencing things, but only the so-called 'vision' of this

in the comparing consciousness. Of this the empty image of that order in which we place events as a series it is thus true that it is only a subjective form of
apprehension
operation
possible, the
while of the succession belonging to that
itself,
which makes
is
this
arrangement of events
it
reverse
true,
namely that
if
is
the most
proper nature of the

157.
I
real.
should not be surprised
the view which
thus
put forward met with an invincible resistance from the imagination.
The unconquerable
them
habit,
which
will see
nothing
on which they alone render possible, must here at last confess to being confronted by a riddle which cannot be thought out. What such is the question which this habit will exactly happens
wonderful in the primary grounds of things but
explaining
insists
after the pattern of the latest effects
prompt
when the operation

is
sion takes place, which
operative process
it
come
to pass
work or when the succesbe characteristic of the How does it come to pass what makes that the reality of one state of things
is
at
said to
ceases,
and
that of another begins
What
process
is it
that
constitutes what
we
call
perishing, or transition into not-
being,
and in what other different process consists origin or becoming ? That these questions are unanswerable that they arise
Chap.
III.]
REALITY OF PAST AND FUTURE.

is first
355
world
out of the wish to supply a prius to what
in the
need not now repeat but in this connexion they have a much more serious background than elsewhere, for here they are ever anew excited by the obscure pressure of an unintelligibility, which in ordinary thinking we are apt somewhat carelessly to overlook. We lightly repeat the words 'bygones are bygones'; are we quite conscious of their gravity ? The teeming Past, has it really ceased to be at all ? Is it quite broken off from connexion with the world and in no way preserved for it ? The history of the world, is it reduced to the infinitely thin, for ever changing, strip of light which forms the Present, wavering between a darkness of the Past, which is done with and no longer anything at all, and a darkness of the Future, which is also nothing ?
this I
:
Even
the
'
in thus expressing these questions, I
am
ever again
yielding to that imaginative tendency, which seeks to soften
monstrum infandum which they contain. For these two abysses of obscurity, however formless and empty, would still be there. They would always form an environment which in its unknown within would still afford a kind of local habitation for the not-being, into which it might have disappeared or from which it might come forth. But let any one try to dispense with these images and to banish from thought even the two voids, which limit being he will
'
:
then
feel
how
impossible
antithesis of being
is
the
demand
to
naked and not-being, and how unconquerable be able to think even of that which is not
it
is
to get along with the
as
some unaccountable constituent of the real. Therefore it is that we speak of distances of the Past and
nothing
of the Future, covering under this spatial image the need of

letting
reality,
though
the Present.
completely from the larger whole of belong not to the more limited reality of For the same reason even those unanswerable
slip
it
Becoming had their meaning. So long as the abyss from which reality draws its continuation, and that other abyss into which it lets the precedent A a 2
questions as to the origin of
356
'
OF TIME.
is
pass away, shut in that which
on each
side, so
long there
this
may
still
be a certain
law, valid for the
whole realm of
heterogeneous system, according to the determinations of
which that change takes place, which on the other hand becomes unthinkable to us, if it is a change from nothing to being and from being to nothing. Therefore, though we were obliged to give up the hopeless attempt to regard the
course of events in
Time merely
as
an appearance, which
reality,
forms
itself
within
a system of timeless
efforts
we
yet
understand the motives of the
renewed to include the real compass of an abiding reality.
which are ever being process of becoming within the
They
will
not, however,
is
attain their object, unless the reality,
which
greater than
our thought, vouchsafes us a Perception, which, by showing

us the
ing
mode
of solution, at the same time persuades us of

I
the solubility of this riddle.
abstain at present from say-
more on the
subject.
The ground
efforts
afforded by the philo-
sophy of
religion,
on which
of this
kind have
it is
commonly begun, is also that on which alone for them to be continued.
possible
CHAPTER
Of
The
able
IV.
Motion.
perceived facts of motion are a particularly favourfor
subject-matter
is
numerical
calculation
but our
present interest
not in the manifold results obtained
by the mathematical treatment of accepted relations of proportion between intervals of space and of time ; but solely in the question which phoronomic and mechanical investigations are able to disregard for their immediate purpose ; the question what motion implies as taking place in the things that move.
158.
Common
apprehension takes motion, while

;
it
lasts,
an interval of space and its result at every moment in which we conceive it as arrested to be a change of place on the part of the thing moved. We shall be obliged for the moment to invert this order of our ideas, in order to remain in agreement with our view of the merely phenomenal validity of space. Things cannot actually traverse a space which does not actually extend around them, and whose only extension is in our consciousness and for its perception what happens is rather that just as the sum aS* of all the intelligible relations in which an
to be the traversing of
;
element
^ at
a given
moment
stands to
;
all
others assigns
it
a place / in our spatial image
exactly in the
same way any
change of that sum of relations ^S" into 2 will demand the new place TT for the impression which is to us the expression, image, or indication of e. Therefore change of place is the first conception to which we are led in this connexion ; and from that point we do not arrive quite directly at the notion
358
OF MOTION.
is
[Book
II.
that a journey through space
essential to the
for
change;
even an apparent journey, that

a real one possible.
It
is,
we no
longer think
that in every
is
only follows from what was said just

the thing's situation
now
moment
or
tt
in apparent space
determined by the then forthcoming sum -S" or 2 of its intelligible relations; it is still undecided in what way the transition takes place from one situation to another. However, it only happens in fairy-tales that a thing disappears in one place and suddenly reappears in another, without having traversed a path leading in space from the one place to the other ; all observation of nature assumes as self-evident that the moving object remains in all successive moments an
object of possible perception in
some point of a
straight or
curved path, which unites

doubting the validity of
its
former and subsequent position
without breach of continuity.

this
We have no intention of assumption ; it involves for us

-S
the further one, that in like
manner the sum
of intelligible
relations does not pass into another S without traversing all
intermediate values that can be intercalated, without break though not necessarily with uniform speed. And this is what we really think of all variable states which are in things, as far as our modern habit of referring every event to an
alteration of external relations will allow us to speak of such
states at
all.
We
do not believe
that a sensation
comes
suddenly into being with its full intensity ; nor that a body at a temperature t^ passes to another t^^ without successively
assuming all intermediate temperatures; nor that from a position of rest it acquires the velocity z/, without acquiring in unbroken series all degrees of it between o and v. Thus we speak of a Law of Continuity to which we believe that all natural processes are subject yet however familiar the idea may be to us, and however irresistible in most
;
cases to which
it
is
applied,
still
its
necessity
is
not so
self-evident to thought that all consideration of the
ground
and
limits of
its
validity
is
wasted.
Chap. IV.]
LAW OF
Of
CONTINUITY.
359
is
159.
course the application of the law of Continuity

possibility of a path leading
not attempted where disparateness between two extremes
excludes
all
other in the same medium.
No
from one to the one conceives a musical

;
note as changing continuously into colour
a transition
between the two could only be effected by annihilation of the one and creation of the other anew ; but that negation of the note would not have the import of a definite zero in a series such as could not but expand into colours on the other side of it it would be a pure nothing, of which taken by itself nothing can come, but after which anything may
;
follow, that
we choose
to say
is
to follow.
On
the other
hand, in what relation to each other are Being and notBeing, the actual transition between which
is
put before us in
Are we to assume that because this transition takes place it too must come to pass by continuous traversing of intermediate values between Being and
every instance of change
?
not-Being
it is
We
unhesitatingly negative this suggestion, if
to require for
of existence such as without changing a

attach
one and the same content a a gradation itself to remove it
by degrees from reality to unreality or vice versa ; we could no meaning to the assertion of a varying intensity of being which should make a permanent unvarying^ a partake
of reality in a greater or less degree.
other hand assent to this
;
We
into
should on the
that the content of a itself could
not disappear and could not
come
being without
between o and , which its nature made possible ; the not-being of a is always in the first place the being of an a, which is continuous with a as the value immediately above or below it. Therefore the transition from being to not-being of the same content is no continuous one, but instantaneous ; still, no value a of
traversing all the values intermediate
a natural process or state arises thus instantaneously out of

absolute nothingness, but always out of a reality of
*
its
own
[v.
note on 19, jw/ra.]
360
kind,
OF MOTION,
whose value
own.
case
is
[Book
II.
is
the proximate increase or diminution
of
its
which exposed to in games of chance or in commerce. A sum of money which we have staked on a cast of the dice becomes ours or not ours in its whole amount at once, and is whichever it is immediately in the
different with the increase or decrease
is
The
property, for instance,
fullest sense.
was no one's property so long as the game our hopes of calling it our own are a matter of degree, and no doubt might rise per saltus^ though
It
was undecided;
not continuously, as one die after another came to rest

neither this nor any other intermediate process, even
if
but
some
of them were continuous, can alter the essential state of

the facts
;
on the one hand our complete

certain,
right of
ownership
less
begins instantaneously on the aggregate result of the throw
becoming quite
degree the
moment
sum
before,
and so far from existing to a had then no existence at all.
On
the other hand, this suddenly created right applies at once

to the whole
in question, without extending
it.
by degrees
innumer-
over more and more of
In
this instance
and
in
able similar ones presented by

absolutely peculiar case
human
intercourse based
contract, a perfectly arbitrary ordinance has attached to

-S*
on an
a consequence
;
F of
which
6" is
not the obvious producing cause

arbitrary ordinance
all
therefore by an equally
Jj
s.^
the cases
belong to the same series as

ineffectual
;
S may
s^ which naturally be made completely
and
all
equally so, irrespective of their greater
or less approximation to the favourable condition S.

relations can only occur in artificial institutions, in
Such
which a
covenant, quite foreign to the nature of the thing, attaches
anything we please to anything
else,
and
at the
same time
our loyalty to the covenant

tion of
is
;
the only pledge for the execu-
what was agreed on as it will not execute itself. natural processes on the contrary the S to which a. is supposed to correspond is the actual and approresult priate ground G of this consequent F\ such as not only
In
all
Chap. IV.]
CONTINUITY AND SUCCESSION.
361
demands the
.^1
result in question but brings it about by itself and unaided by any ordinance of ours ; hence the cases which we have a right to regard as other quantitative values of the same condition S cannot be without effect, but must in like manner produce the consequents fxfifi proportional to their own magnitudes and of the same kind
i-.
i-g
with F. Hence arises the possibility of regarding the amount of a natural phenomenon obtained under a condition 6" as the sum of the individual consequents produced
by the successive increments of the condition. same time in a certain sense a necessity. We are not here concerned with a relation of dependence, valid irrespective of time, between the ideal and that of G its sufficient reason, but with the content of genesis of an effect 7^ which did not exist before; so that the condition 6* in hke manner cannot be an eternally subsisting relation, but can only be a fact which did not exist before and has now come into being. Now, if we chose to assume that ^ arose all at once with its highest quantitative value, no doubt it would seem that 7^ as the consequence of this cause could not but enter upon its reality all at once but in fact it would not still have to enter upon its reality, for it would be in existence simultaneously with S) nothing could conceivably have the power to interpose an interval of time, vacant as in that The case it would be, between cause and consequence. same would hold good regressively ; if 6* arose all at once, the cause of its reality too must have arisen all at once, and therefore, strictly speaking, have existed contemporaneously
in succession
But
this possibility is at the
with
-5
rather than arisen before
it.
Thus we
find that
it is
impossible to regard the course of the world as a series

of sudden discrete states conditioning each other without
completely re-transforming
it into a mere system of elements have their validity or existence simultaneously; quite unlike reality, the terms of which are successive because mutually exclusive. I shall not prolong this in-
which
all
362
vestigation
transition
validity,
;
OF MOTION.
it
LBookll.
was only meant to show that continuity of

still
is
not a formal predicate of

true
in
problematic
after
which we might assign to Becoming

as
fact
;
some
in-
hesitation
its
validity
is
rather
an
dispensable presupposition without which
the
reality
of
Becoming
160.
I
in general
is
inconceivable.
have now to give a somewhat different form to In the artificial arrangements which we mentioned, the conscious deliberation of
the ideas with which I began.
the parties to the agreement had previously determined the
result
which was to follow from a particular occurrence

;
in
re-
the future
and
presentation in
same way in our minds of an aim

in the
all
our actions the

is
that
not yet realised,

itself
of a goal that has yet to be reached,
may
be present
should be
and
effectual
among
the conditions of the activities which
are set in motion to attain our purpose.
We
wrong
analogy to our present subjectmatter, by choosing to regard the altered sum of relations 2
in transferring this
which by itself would be the cause of the quiescence of the element e at the point tt, as being at the same time the
cause of
its
seeking and finding this
new
place.
There
cannot be an inner state q of any thing such as to be for that thing the condition of its being in another particular
this state
reflexion might anticipate with certainty that r would contain no reason for further change; but the thing itself could not feel that it was so until the
state r.
Our
state began,
and turned out

;
to be the condition of a
more
if
perfect or quite perfect equilibrium.
Thus
it
in our instance
the
sum
2 of a thing's relations,
had always existed, would have corresponded to the place tt; but when something new has to arise out of the transition
from
to 2,
its
action cannot consist in assigning to the

tt,
thing a
new
particular place
if it
as
one which would

it
suit the
thing better,
once were there ; pelling the thing from the place

it
can only consist in ex-
where
its
nature and
in the real
conditions no longer hold
in equilibrium.
But
Chap. IV.]
LAW OF
PERSISTENCE,
363
affirmation of another
as
world the negation of an existing state can only be the besides, there can be no such thing ;
want of equilibrium in general, but only between specific and between them only with a specific degree of vivacity. Therefore, the power of negation exerted by a state which is to act as the condition of a fresh occurrence can only consist in displacing the element in question from its present intelligible relations in a specific direction,
points in relation,
which we have still unspatial, and with a
in
the
first
place to
conceive as
spatial phe-
specific intensity.
The
would be a specific velocity with which the element departs from its place/ in
to this process
nomenon corresponding
a specific direction, impelled therefore a tergo without a
predetermined goal but not attracted a froute by the new

place n
;
this latter
till
impelling,
it
is
reached.
cannot act either by retaining or by So what takes place in the

call,
things themselves,
and what we might

is
of course in
quite a different sense from that recognised in mechanics,
the
vt's
viva of their motion,
this velocity, with
which
in the
intelligible
system of
realities
they leave the place where they
were out of equilibrium,

a situation in space
lines or in curves,
;
or, to
our perception, appear to leave
what length of space they may traverse, whether with uniform or varying motion, whether in straight
is
the result of the existing circumstances;
that
is,
of the
new
positions into
which they are brought by
the actual motion which takes place, which positions react
on that motion as modifying factors. 161. In this way we have arrived

Persistence, the
first
directly at the law of
principle of the doctrines of mechanics,

its
according to which every element maintains

or motion unaltered as long as
it
state of rest
does not come in contact
with the modifying influence of external causes.

part of the law, the persistence of rest, has
The
first
seldom caused any difficulty ; for it can hardly be urged as a serios objection that the nature of an actual element e is quite inaccessible to us and that element may contain inner
364
reasons
OF MOTION.
unknown
still
[Book
II.
to us for setting itself in motion.
What-
ever unconjecturable states the inner being of a thing

experience,
may
to
they can only set up a motion which did
not exist before by beginning at a particular

case they presuppose a previous
within the thing
;
moment
manifest themselves as reasons for that motion.

history of a
In that
Becoming
but
if
there had once been a

all
moment
of
complete
rest, in
which
states of things
were in
equili-
brium with each other, and there was no velocity inherited from an antecedent process of Becoming with which they might have made their way through the position of equilibrium, such quiescence could never have given rise to a beginning of change. Our ignorance of the real nature of things only justifies us in assuming as a possibility that such a succession of states remains for a time a movement within the thing, neither conditioned by influences from without, nor capable of altering the relations of the thing to external related points ; and that, as a result of this hidden labour, a reason sufficient to alter even those external relations whether
to other things or to surrounding space,
as a
may be generated new factor at one particular moment. But even then the movement in space would not be produced out of a state of rest, but out of a hidden movement which was not
of the same kind with
it;
as
is
the case with animated
bodies which
impulse.
initiate their
first
In the
changes of place by independent place, however, even these owe the
them which generates their resolutions to the stimuli of the outer world and in the second place their resolutions can only give rise to movement in space by a
activity within
;
precontrived connexion of several parts which are accessible

to the action of the
mind and under
its
influence
move
in
the directions prescribed to them by their permanent position

in the plan of the organic structure
and
their situation at the
moment
in external space.
This analogy is not transferable to a solitary element, to be conceived as setting itself in motion in empty space. In
Chap. IV.]
PERSISTENCE OF MOTION,
365
animated beings the element which is charged with the unspatial work within does not set itself in motion, but only other elements with which it is in interaction and it does
;
so by destroying the equilibrium of the forces operative
between them, and leaving the want of equilibrium which determine the amount and direction of the motion to be generated. The solitary element has none of these
results to
determining reasons
exclusion of
it
could not
to
move without
taking a
definite direction through the point z of

all
others
empty space to the secure this it would not be
enough
e z should be geometrically from any other ; the distinction would have to be brought to the cognisance of ^'s inner nature, that is, z would have to act on e differently from any other point in
that
the
direction
distinct
space.
But as an empty point

all
it is
'
in
no way distinguished
from
the other points

all
it
could only be given preif
eminence before
of inner
life
the others by the presence of a real
element occupying
in
initiation of a
it.
So even
every thing,
still
we admit an abundance we cannot derive the
movement in space from that life, but only from external determining conditions. Still, this is an expression which we shall do well to
modify.
to
Whatever
its
(?,
attractive or repulsive force

it
we conceive
proceed from
reason of
arrival at
cannot determine e to motion by own starting from z, but only by reason of its
z^
it
or rather through the alteration which

e.
effects
in the inner states of
It is therefore, in fact, this state
of
inner want of equilibrium which hinders e from remaining

at rest
;
only this state cannot have arisen in a way to deterline of
mine the
motion, unless
e is
conceived as part of a
its
universe which by the configuration of
other parts at any
moment helps to determine that of ^'s inner being. 162. The other part of the law, the continuance
of every
motion that has once begun, remains a paradox even when we are convinced of it. If we separate the requirements which we may attempt to satisfy ; in the first place the cer-
366
tainty of the law, or
for
its
OF MOTION.
validity in point of fact,
is
[Book
II.
vouched
both by the results of experiment and by its place in the system of science. The better we succeed in excluding the
resistances
that has
we are aware of as interfering with a motion been imparted, the longer and more uniformly it we
rightly
if it
continues;
conclude that
it
would continue unleft
varyingly for ever,
were permanently
to itself without
any counteraction. And on the other hand, however a motion that is going on may be modified at every moment by the influence of fresh conditions, still we know that our
only way of arriving at the actual process of calculation is to estimate the velocity attained in every moment as continuing, in order to combine it with the effect of the next
succeeding force.
If
we go on
to ask whether this doctrine being certain in
point of fact has also any justification as conceivable and
we can which prevailed

rational,
at least see the futility of the
in antiquity,
assumptions when, under the influence of
inappropriate analogies,
ing of
all
men
held that the gradual slacken-
motion was the behaviour more naturally to be expected. If they had said that all motion is wholly extinguished in the very moment in which the condition that produces it ceases to act, the idea put forward would at least have been an intelligible one in itself; but by treating the motion as becoming gradually weaker they actually admitted the law of persistence for as much of the motion as at any given moment had not disappeared. Still, the more definitely we assume the ordinary ideas of motion, the more remarkable does the law of persistence appear if motion is nothing but an alteration of external relations by which the inner being of the moving object is in no way affected, and which in no way proceeds from any impulse belonging to that object, why should such an alteration continue when the condition which compelled it has
;
ceased
We
look in vain for more general principles which might
Chap. IV.]
INDIRECT PROOF OF PERSISTENCE.

I
367
decide the question.

that the law
'
said above in the Logic ( 261)

'
cannot safely be held to mean more than that after the cessation of a cause we do not find the effect which the cause would have had if it had continued ; but that it remains doubtful
Cessante causa cessat effectus
whether the
effect
which
its
is
already produced requires

It
appeared to me then that every state which had in reality once been produced would continue to exist, if it were neither in contradiction with the nature of the subject to which it occurs, nor with the totality of the conditions under which that subject stands towards other things. But even this formula is useless ; for there is still this very question, whether motion which has been generated in a thing not by
preserving cause for
continuance.
its
own
nature, but only
by means of external conditions,
is
to count
among
the states which are conceivable as going
on
to infinity without contradicting that nature
and those
relations.
On
the other hand,
it
has been suggested that

I
the reason for the persistence of states of motion in things
must
in every case lie in the actual nature of the things

is
am
convinced that no explanation

;
to
be found
in this
direction
we should only be
obliged, after executing
some
useless circuits, to assert the principle of Persistence about
some motion
or other within real things, with

it
no more
in space.
success in deducing
than
if
we had taken
once
for
the shorter
way of granting
nothing more
I
is
its
validity at
motion
Instead of a direct demonstration of the law,

subjoin.
I believe that
possible than an indirect treatment, which
163. Let Cj be the condition which sets in motion an
element
that
with definite velocity and direction so as to
traverse the distance
d x'm.
effect
the time
t.
Let us suppose
e
the activity and
of
continue through the
duration of
position,
/,
but cease when at the end of that interval

for this reason
has traversed the short distance
and has
d x, has thus changed its come under the influence
368
of the new condition
equal time
OF MOTION.
Cg.
[Book
II.
This again,
if
operative during an
make another equal journey d x possible for e, and will cease when e has traversed it. It is plain that as long as we treat d x as a. real distance however
t,
will
small,
the
element
e,
acted upon by this series of suc-
cessively annihilated influences, will pass through a finite
length of space in the time
t.
But our assumptions, as we made them just now, have to be modified. C, must cease to act not wken, but before, e has arrived at the extreme point of the first distance dx ; by the time e has accomplished the smallest portion of that short distance its position would be changed, and would no longer be that which acted upon it as the motive impulse C, ; if in spite of this we suppose e to traverse the whole distance d x m. consequence of the impulse Cj, the only possible reason for its doing so will be the postulated validity of the law of persistence the motion produced by itself had ceased to exist or act. Cj will have lasted after But if we do not regard this law as valid, then not even the smallest portion of the short journey in question will really be
;
achieved; the
moment
e,
that
C^ so
much
as threatens to
and so transform itself into Q, the determining force with which it purposed to produce this result must disappear at once, and the matter will never get
change the place of
as far as the entrance into action of the fresh condition C^
which could maintain the motion

begins.
If
_y is
for the
motion never
a function of x, there
tegral of the formula
magnitude
jF^^ as long as and the calculation would be more exact as this interval is less for which we take a value of y as constant but the whole integral becomes o, if we regard ^^ as
;
may be a finite inwe regard dxzs>a real
vanishing entirely.
In the present case we should apply

of representation as follows
;
this
common mode
if
is
the velocity generated
by
Cj, or existing
along with some
initial
value of x, accord-
ing to the law of Persistence this
will
hold good for the
Chap. IV.]
RELATIVITY OF MOTION.
for
369
required.
whole interval
of what
it
which the integral

with
C^^
is
The
succeeding condition C^ will be partly satisfied, in respect

has in
common
by the motion y which

\
already takes place in consequence of C^
only that in
which Cj deviates from C^ is a fresh active condition whose consequence dy^ a positive or negative increment of velocity, continues in like manner from that moment through the It is the summation of entire interval of the integration.
the
initial
increases or decreases,
value y^ and of these continuously succeeding that gives the total of the result
obtained between the limits in question.
The tendency
tell
of
all this
is
obvious
it
of course
us how, strictly speaking,
comes
itself;
to pass that
when once generated maintains

that the law of Persistence
is
but
still
cannot motion we can see

it
not a marvellous novelty of
which it might be questioned whether it would or would not be true of a given natural motion ; in fact its truth is an integral part of our idea of motion. Either there is no such thing as motion, or, if and as there is, it necessarily obeys the law of Persistence, and could not come to pass at all if really and strictly the effect produced had to end with the cause that produced it. For the law holds good not merely
as applied
to motion, but with this
more general
signifi-
cance.
is,
No
condition can act without having a result which
speaking generally, a modification of the state of things

;
that contained the stimulus or impulse to action

fore apart
and
there-
from the principle of Persistence no result could ever be reached ; the excitation would begin to be inactive at the moment in which it began to act. 164. If two elements change their distance from one another in space, real motion must in any case have occurred ; but it remains doubtful which of the two moved or whether both did so, and in the latter case the same new
position may have been brought about either by opposite motions of the two, or by motions in the same direction but of different amount. This possibility of interpreting
Metaphysic, Vol.
I.
B b
370
what to our perception
OF MOTION,
is
[Book
II.
the same result by different con-
most obviously as long as we look exclusively to the reciprocal relations of two elements without regard to their common environment ; nor does it cease when we consider the latter also; only in that case
structions continues to exist
all seem equally approshould prefer to regard as in motion the element which is alone in altering its position relatively to
the possible constructions will not

priate.
We
many which
retain their reciprocal situations
still
there
is
nothing to prevent us from conceiving that one as at rest, and the whole system of the numerous others as moving in
the opposite direction.
need not pursue the advantages from this plasticity of our ideas but the casuistic difficulties which metaphysic attaches to
I
which we gain
in practice
this Relativity of
motion, seem to
me
to rest
on mere miselement in a
in
apprehensions.
Let us conceive to begin with a

perfectly void world of space;
is
solitary
there any meaning
moves, and that in a particular direction? Again, in what can its motion consist, seeing that the element cannot by moving alter its relations to related points,
saying that
it
as there are none, while
we should not even be able to it would move from the other directions in which it would not move ? I think we must answer without hesitation as long as we adhere to
distinguish the direction in which
:
ordinary ideas by speaking of real space, and by setting
down
the traversing of
possible occurrence, there
motion of
place,
'
this solitary
under whatever condition as a no reason against regarding the element as one which actually takes
it
is
and none therefore against recognising so-called If perfectly empty space is absolute motion' as a reality.
wholly devoid of related points for purposes of comparison,
even of distinctions between the quarters of the heavens, still this does not plunge the motion itself into any such ambiguity or indefiniteness of nature as to prohibit it from
actually occurring
;
only
we
lose all possibility of designating
Chap. IV.]
ABSOLUTE MOTION.
However
371
little we may be in a position to between the point z which is in the direction of the moving object e and other points which are not, still it would be distinct from all others as long as
what occurs.
distinguish intelligibly
we regard
however
e
as real the extension of space

all
which by
its
definite
position towards
little
other points
it
helps to constitute.
And
we could
distinguish the direction e z'va which
moves from other directions, before we had a given line in a particular plane which would define the position of ^ 2- by
help of the angle formed between them,
still
e z
would
be
in itself a perfectly definite direction; for
such an angle
would not be capable of being ever ascertained and determined, unless the position oi e z were already unambiguously
fixed at the
moment when we appHed

it.
our standard of com-
parison in order to define
So the assertion that a motion is real is certainly not dependent for admissibility on the implication of a change of relations in which the real element in motion stands to Indeed, during every moment for which we others like it.
conceive a previously attained velocity to continue according to the law of persistence, the moving element
moves
with precisely the kind of reality which

case to be of doubtful possibility.
in a
is
held in the above
True, in this case
we
are in a position to assign the direction of the motion, with-
world in which
it
took place, by relations to other
realities
Still all
and
to the space
which they divide and
indicate.
these relations in this case only enter into considerainterfering
tion
modifying causes ; the persistent which we must not leave out of our calculation, is in itself, in fact, simply such a motion of a solitary element that takes no account of anything else. Thus, so far from being a doubtful case, it is truer to say that absolute motion is an occurrence which is really contained in all motion that takes place, only latent under
as
or
velocity of the element,
other accretions.
On
the other hand,

is
if
acknowledge no motion but what B b 2
relative, in
we intended to what way
372
should we suppose
it
it
OF MOTION.
to take place ?
real
[Book
II.
If
we understand by
rela-
one which involves a
and assignable change of
tive position
on the
part of the elements,
how can
this
change have arisen unless one or several of the elements in order to approach or to separate from each other had actually traversed the lengths of space which form the interval that distinguishes their new place from their old? But suppose we understood by relative motion one which was merely apparent, in which the real distances between underwent no change. Still it is clear that such an appearance could not itself be produced apart from motion really occurring somewhere, such that the subject to whom the appearance is presented changes its position towards one or more of the elements in question. 165. Our conclusion would naturally be just the same about the other case which is often adduced ; the rotation No doubt it would be of a solitary sphere in empty space. absolutely undefinable till a given system of co-ordinates should determine directions of axes, with which its axis could be compared. But there is also no doubt that the specific direction of the rotation is not made by these axes which serve to designate it; the rotation must begin by being thoroughly definite in itself, and different from all others, that it may be capable of being unambiguously reduced to a system of co-ordinates. All that such a reduction is wanted for, is to make it definable; but what happens happens, whether we can define it or not; of course a capacity for being known demands plenty of auxiliary conditions, whose absence no one would conceive
pairs of elements
as
destroying
the
possibility
of
the
occurrence
itself.
Suppose we had the clearest possible system of co-ordinates at our disposal, and saw a sphere in a particular place of that system ; still we should fail to ascertain whether it was turning or not, or in what direction, if it consisted of perfectly similar parts a distinguished to our eye neither by At every colouring nor by variable reflexions of light.
Chap. IV.]
MOTION AS A DATUM.
373
moment we should observe the similar appearance a in the same point of space; we should have no means of distinguishing one instance of the impression from another
are
we
to infer
from
this that a sphere of
uniform colour
;
cannot turn round in space, but only a chequered one
and
even
this only with a limited velocity, for fear the different
impressions of colour should blend into an undistinguishable mixture to our eyes

?
Hence we may be
an
axis
is
sure that such absolute rotation about

;
perfectly conceivable
is
in fact
it is
not in the least
a problematic case, but
continually going on.
We
it
have
no proof of any action of the heaven of the

the motions within our planetary system, nor
to explain those motions
;
fixed stars
is
on
required
both
it
and the
influences of the
other planets can never claim to be regarded as

disturbing causes
more than
when we
are considering the revolution of
the earth and sun round their
common
move
centre of gravity;
as a solitary pair
these two bodies therefore actually

in universal space.
And
its
again, the earth,

its
by
itself,
con-
tinues
its
existing rotation about

it
axis without help or
hindrance in
really occurs,
from
relation to the sun.
So
is
in fact,
rotation of this kind, the possibility of
which
doubted,
only concealed by accessory circumstances which have no influence on it; indeed the instance of a spinning top which maintains its plane of rotation and opposes resistance to any change of it, presents it strikingly to our senses. The idea of the reality of an infinite empty space and the other of an absolute motion of real elements in space are thus most naturally united and are equally justifiable ; nor will it ever be feasible to substitute for this mode of representation another which could form as clear a picture in the mind. 166. As we have surrendered the former of these ideas, we have now to reconcile the latter with the contrary notion which we adopt. Our observations up to this point could not do more than prove that the absolute motion of an
374
OF MO TION.
[Book
II.
element in empty space was conceivable as a process already in action ; what still appeared impossible was its beginning
and the choice of a direction and
velocity out of the infinite
number of
This alone would give no decisive argument against an existing space and an actual motion through it whatever inner development we choose to substitute for this apparent state of facts as the real and
equally possible ones.
;
true occurrence, the impossibility of a
first
beginning
will
always recur.
We
should have to be satisfied with setting

its
down
the fact of motion with
direction
with the other original realities which
and velocity along we have to look on as

yet un-
simply given, and which
we cannot deduce from a

possibilities.
decided choice between different
In
fact,
every
permanent property of
all
things, the degree of every force,
and
physical constants whatever, might give rise in infinite

;
recurrence to the same question

specific
why
are
they of this
amount and no
other,
out of the innumerable
amounts conceivable? I need only mention

'
in passing
avoidable relativity of
is
all
once more, that the unour designations of such constants
not to seduce us into the mistake of considering the
constants themselves as indefinite.

refer the
The
units to
measurement of a
certain force g^
;
and
express
it
are arbitrarily chosen but after from the peculiar and definite intensity of the force that according to this standard its measurement must be g and cannot \i^ n g. A semicircular movement which
it,
which we which we they are chosen

in
results
goes from right to
left when looked at from the zenith, will go from left to right when looked at from the nadir of its This does not prove that its direction is only deteraxis.
mined
it
relatively to
our position, but just the reverse
that
is
definite in itself independently of that position,
and
therefore
to suit
the observer's different points of view

different definitions relating to those
must be expressed by
points.
Undoubtedly
therefore, the
real
world
is
full
of such
Chap. IV.]
MOTION AS A STATE,
they must be set
to adhere to the
375
constants, perfectly definite, yet taken by themselves incap-
able of being designated
down
as definite
under example of the force above mentioned, its intensity under a new and definite condition will always be measured by a function of It is, as has g^ and never by the same function of n g. been observed more than once already, only by application of our movable thought, with its comparisons of different real things, that there can arise either the idea of countless possibilities, which might equally well have existed but do not; or the strange habit of looking on what is real as
even while they vary
varying conditions;
in value according to a law,
for,
existent to
some extent before
it
exists,
and
as then pro-
ceeding to acquire complete existence by a selection from
among
first
possibilities.
Therefore,
is
if
we
recognise that the
genesis of real things
altogether incapable of being

us,
though we find their conabsolute motion in space and its direction as one of the immemorial data from which our further considerations must start. 167. But it cannot be denied that one thorny question is left. We admit all constants which, speaking generally, form the essence of the thing whose further behaviour is to be accounted for ; but here we have on one side an empty
brought before our minds by
intelligible,
tinuance
we may accept
space which
is
absolutely indifferent to
all real
things
and
could exist without them, and on the other side a world of real things which, even supposing it to seem to us in need
of a spatial extension of
its
own,
is
yet expressly conceived

it
as wholly indifferent to the place which
occupies,
therefore just as indifferent to the change of that place,
and and
incapable of determining by its own resources the direction of any motion to be initiated, although actually engaged in
one motion out of infinitely many. Sensuous perception may find no difficulty in such a fundamental incoherence between determinations which nevertheless do cohere together ; but thought must pronounce it quite incredible
376
for the
OF MOTION.
endeavours of thought
will
[Book
II.
always be directed to
deriving the causes which determine the destiny of existing

things from the nature of the things themselves.
that
To
say
motion
is
the natural state of things

;
is
utterly worthless
as a philosophical idea
nothing
is
natural to a thing but to
be what it is ; states of it may be called matter of fact, but cannot be called natural; they must always have their
conditions either in the things or without them.
particular thing,
Each on the other hand, cannot be in motion merely in general, but its motion must have a certain direction and velocity; further, the whole assumption of original motion is only of use by ascribing different directions and velocities to different elements but as, at the same
;
time,
all
it
persists in regarding the elements as uniform,
it
is
the less able to conceive such differences as natural states,

fact,
and
is compelled to treat them simply as matter of indeed as alien to the nature of the thing.
and
In
reality
it
was
this causelessness that
was the principal

;
obstacle to the recognition of absolute motion

strictly
for what,
speaking, does happen
if
the advancing element e
traverses
one empty space-point
after another, without
being
in itself at all different

it
when
it
reaches the third from what

or, fruitless as
was when
is,
in the first or
second ?
the transi-
tion
without so
much
as receiving an indication of the

:
fact of its fruitless
occurrence
finally,
without making
it
it
possible for even an observer from without, were
only by
help of relations to other objects, so
much
as to give a bare
designation of the supposed proceeding?
And
are
we
to
suppose that a process so unreal as this, a becoming which brings nothing to pass, must of necessity last for ever when once stimulated to action, though to begin with incapable
of originating without external stimulus
bilities
?
These inconceivayields so
clear a
have
at all times led to
some
rebellion against the

it
view adopted by mechanics (though
mental picture and
is
so indispensable in practice), which
makes the moving element merely the substratum of the
Chap. IV.]
CONDITIONS OF APPARENT MOTION.
377
motion, without any peculiar nature which
is affected by the motion or generates it by being affected. It is objected that motion cannot consist in the mere change of external relations, but must in every moment be a true inner state of the moving body in which it is other than it would be in a
moment
of rest or of different movement. Then can the view which concedes to space no more than a phenomenal validity offer anything satisfactory by way of a resolution of
^
this
doubt
168. Let us suppose a real element
e to
be
in inner states
which we
motion
will
sum up
in the expression /.
Then
the
question for us could not be whether e^ would produce a

in space, but only
whether
e
e^
could form the ground
of an apparent motion of
within space for a consciousness
which should possess the perception of such space. We will begin by making the same assumption as we made in
the discussion of time^; that the consciousness in question
an absolutely immediate knowledge of everything, inand is not based on the acquisition of impressions by means of any effect produced by e^. on the knowing subject ; and therefore does not compel us to attribute to this subject any specific and assignable relation
is
cluding therefore e^
tO^p.
Then, I think, we may consistently conclude as follows. Such a consciousness has no more ground for ascribing a
particular spot in the space of
which
it
has a mental picture,

it is
or motion in a particular direction, to the e^ of which
empty space to prefer one place to another as its abode, or one direction to others for its motion which has to be initiated. If we want to
aware, than e^ has power in an actual
bring before ourselves in sensuous form what appears the
reasonable result under such imaginary conditions,

ascribe reality in space, but localise
we can
only think of a musical note, to which we do no doubt

it
:
and then only
in respect of
1
its
origin
or
most imperfectly, we must think of
[Cp. p. 338 sup.]
37
OF MOTION,
[Book
II.
outside space, but which
a succession of notes, which we do not exactly take to sound still remains a purely intensive succession, and has definite direction only in the realm of
sound, and not in space.
I should not adduce such utterly fictitious circumstances, were they not about on a par with what is usually put forward by popular accounts of the Kantian view ; a readymade innate perception of space, without any definite relations between the subject which has it, and the objects which that subject has to apprehend under it. But in
reality
we
find
the consciousness
in
question invariably
f,
attached to a definite individual being
and
in place of
immediate knowledge we find a cognition which is always confined to the operations of e on e. Besides this postulate, however, something more is required for the genesis of phenomena of motion in the experience of f Whatever the inner state / within e may be, and in whatever way it may alter into q and its effect tt on e into k^ still, for an f that is simple and undifferentiated in itself all this could only be
.
the ground for a perception of successive contents, not for

their localisation in space
and
for their
apparent motion.
<?p,
More
is
required than even a plurality of elements,
^g,
in different states of excitation, operating simultaneously
on
a simple f. No doubt, the felt differences of their action might furnish f, supposing it able and obliged to apprehend
them by
spatial perception, with a clue to the determina-
which their images would have to occupy in space. And alterations of their action would then lead to the perception of the relative motions by which these images changed their apparent places as compared with each other. But the whole of the collective mental picture which had thus arisen, whether at rest or in motion, would still be without any definite situation The complete relatively to the subject which perceived it. homogeneousness of this latter would make it analogous to a uniform sphere, so that it could turn round within the
tion of the relative positions
Chap. IV.]
PERCEPTION OF DIRECTION,
379
multiplicity
in
doing
so,
which it pictured to itself without experiencing, any alteration in the actions to which it is subits
jected, or any, therefore, in
own
d,
perceptions.
To make
from
one arrangement of phenomena a b

another arrangement c b a ox
right
it is
c distinguishable
from
its
counterpart in
downward motion to the an upward motion to the left,

e itself,
essential that the directions in question should
mistakably distinguished in the space-image for

qualitative
be unby a
it
mark
then
will
be able to
refer every action or
modification of an element to that direction to which
belongs according to the qualitative nature of the impression
made or of the modification of that impression. The result of the argument comes to this,
sertion of
after the in-
some intermediate
It is true that a
ideas which I reserve for the
psychology.
simple atom, endowed with a
perception of space, might find occasion in the qualitative

differences of the impressions received
from innumerable
others to project a spatial picture of

definite configuration of
there
its own. would be no meaning in the question what place or direction in absolute space such images or their motions occupied or pursued. What could be meant by such an expression in general would not become intelligible to it till it had ceased to be an isolated atom endowed with knowledge, and had come into permanent union with a plurality of other elements, we may say at once, with an Organism such that its systematic fabric, though still to be conceived as itself unspatial, should supply polar contrasts between the qualitatively definite impressions conducted from its different limbs to the conscious centre. The directions along which
phenomena with a But for this same atom
consciousness distributes these impressions as they reach

in
its
it,
picture of space,
it
and
in
which
it
disposes such images
as appear to
of
its
own
bodily organism, would alone
furnish
consciousness with a primary and unambiguous
system of co-ordinates, to which further all impressions would have to be reduced which might arise from variable
380
OF MOTION,
e
[Book
II.
intercourse with other elements,
the subject of perception
may then
gain further experiences in this intercourse, such

it
as prove to
that
permanent
positions
relations exist
other elements towards the totality of which
and
its
body varying
between the can give itself and then the inducement
arises to look in the spatially presented picture of the outer
world for a fresh system of co-ordinates belonging to that world, to which both its permanent relations and e's varying
positions shall be
most readily reducible.
But
that
it
it
will
again be essential to any such fresh system
should be defined by a qualitative distinction between

its
the perceptions which are assigned to the opposite extremities
of one of
axes^; though on the other hand what

its
place this whole system with
inner articulation holds in
absolute space, or in what direction of absolute space this

its axes extends, are questions which on our view would cease to have any assignable meaning at all. For this is just what does not exist, an absolute space in which
or that of
it
is
possible for the subject of spatial perception with

its
all
the objects of
perception, to be contained over again,

there.
and occupy a place here or

articulated for
Space only
for
exists within
is
such subjects, as a mental image
them; and
so
them by the
qualitative difference of their
impressions, that they are able to assign the appearances of
other elements their definite places in

the thorough coherence of
pictured
totality
all
it
and
finally,
it
is
reality
which brings about

appropriate to
the
that each of these subjects also presents itself in the space
by every other
of
;
in a station
its
relations with
it
the rest of what the world
contains
and thus
is
happens that each of them can regard

its
the space which

to
all,
in
it
own
perception as a stage
common
on which
than
can
subjects
itself,
meet with other percipient and can be in relations which agree

itself
with theirs, to yet another set of subjects.

^
by the
and down furnished [This alludes to the distinction of * up Cp. 287.] feeling of resistance to the force of gravity.
' ' '
Chap. IV.]
APPARENT MOTION AND OBSERVER.
381
169. But it is still necessary to return expressly to the two cases given above, in order to insist on the points in them which remain obscure. We saw that they present no special difficulties on the common view; if we have once decided to accept empty space as a real extension, and motion as an actual passage through it, then rectilinear progress and rotation of a solitary element might be accepted into the bargain as processes no less real although But we should now have to substitute for undefinable. both of them an internal condition of ^, say/, whose action 77 on an e endowed with perception produces in this latter the spectacle of a motion of e through the space mentally represented by e. Now according to the common view the absolute motion of ^, whether progressive or rotatory, though it really took place, yet was undefinable. The reason was that the observing consciousness which had to define it was treated only as an omnipresent immediate knowledge, possessing itself no peculiar relation with its object which
helped to define
its
perception
therefore the designation
of the actual occurrence would have been effected in this

case by co-ordinates independent of the observer
none such were found

designating this
reality
; and as empty space the problem of occurrence remained insoluble, though its
in
was not thereby made less real. For us the case is different. What we want to explain is not a real movement outside us, but the semblance of one, which does not take place outside, within us therefore for
;
us the presence of the observing subject
for
whom
the
semblance
relation of
is
is
supposed to be forthcoming, and the definite
e to the external efficient cause of this semblance, not merely the condition of a possible designation and
definition of the apparent motion, but
is at
the
the condition of
its
occurrence, as apparent.
same time So we too,

e for
within the phenomenal world which
we
represent to our
minds,
may
accept the progress or rotation of a solitary

if
a real occurrence,
we do not
forget to include ourselves in
382
OF MOTION.
[Book II
the conception as the observer
e, in whose mind alone there can be a semblance at all. For then there must in any case be a reaction and a varying one between e and as elements in one and the same world, and it is the way in which the action of e on us changes from tt to while e is itself undergoing an inner modification, that will define the direction of the apparent motion in question with reference to some system of co-ordinates with which we must imagine the space-perceiving f to be equipped from the first if its universal perception is to admit of any method of applica-
tion to particular things.
170.
Still
feel that these doctrines are inadequate, as
strongly as I
am
persuaded that they are correct; they leave
in obscurity a particular point
on which
It
I will not
pretend
to see
more
clearly than others.
concerns that transition
of
from one inner
state to another
which
in acting
e.
produces for us the semblance of a motion of

course be conceived as going on at times
act
It
it
on us must of
when
;
does not
at those
on
it
us, or before
it
begins to act on us
and
times
can be nothing but an inner unspatial occurrence which has a capacity of appearing at some later time as motion in space by means of that action upon us which it is Here we are obstructed by an for the moment without. inconvenience of our doctrine which I regret, but cannot
remove
we have no
lifelike
idea of inner states of things.

in order to give a possibility
We
are forced to assume
them
which were and anyone who absolutely scorns to conceive them as even analogous to the mental states which we experience in ourselves, has no possible image or illustration of the constitution by help of which they accomplish this fulfilment of essential requireof fulfilling certain
;
postulates
of
cognition
discussed above
but
we cannot
portray
them
ments.
This lack of
this
pictorial realisation
hindrance to a metaphysical enquiry

particular
would not in itself be a but it becomes one in

;
case where
we
are
dealing with the con-
Chap. IV.]
A PERMANENT PROCESS ?
383:
ceivability of the
motions in question. When the element ean apparent path in our perception it is true that the beginning of the series of inner states, whose successive action on us causes this phenomenon, must be looked for
traverses
not in
still
e itself,
but in the influence of other elements
but
has
the undeniable validity of the law of persistence compels
us to the assumption that an impulse to motion
when
it
once arisen in e becomes to our perception independently of any further influences the cause of an apparent change of
place of the sense-image, with uniform continuance.
The
same assumption
the same
diameter.
circle,
is
that of two similar
on us by another instance, elements e which unceasingly traverse

forced
at the
being
opposite extremities of
its
We
can easily employ the ordinary ideas of mechanics to
help out our view so far as to assume an inner reaction
between the two elements, which, if left to itself, would shorten the distance between their sense-images in our perception then there would still remain to be explained the
;
rectilinear tangential motion,
which, continuing in conse-
quence of the Law of Persistence, would counteract this attraction to the amount needed to form the phenomenal circle. Now what inner constitution can we conceive e to
possess, capable of producing in our eyes the
phenomenon
of this inertia of motion
Considered as a quiescent state it could never condition anything but a permanent station of e in our space ; considered as a process it still ought not to change fp into Cg in such a way that the new momentary
?
state q should remove the reason for the continuance of the same process which took place during e^ ; we should have
to suppose
that flows
an event that never ceases occurring, like a river on ever the same without stopping, or an unresting endeavour, a process which the result that it generates neither hinders nor prohibits from continuing to produce it
afresh.
This
conception appears
extraordinary
enough,
it
and
justifies
a mistrust which objects to admitting
before
384
it
OF MOTION.
[Book
II.
is proved by an example to signify something that does happen, and not to be a mere creation of the brain.
It is certainly
my belief,
though
life
I will
not attempt a more
definite proof, that mental
would present instances of such a self-perpetuating process, which would correspond in their own way to the idea, extraordinary as it is though not foreign to mechanics, of a state of motion. Perhaps there may even be someone who cares to devote himself to pursuing these thoughts further; after we have been so long occupied with the unattainable purpose of reducing all true occurrence to mere change of external relations between
unmoved, even fashion might require a transition to an attempt at a comprehensive system of mechanics of inner states; then we should perhaps find out what species are admitted as possible or excluded as impossible by this conception of a state as such, which has hitherto been as a rule rather carelessly handled. Till then, our notions on the subject have not the clearness that
might be desired, and the law of persistence remains a paradox for us as for others ; I will only add that it presents no more enigmas on our view than on the common one. The fact of such an eternal continuance of one and the
substrata which are in themselves
by mechanics ; the what it ignores by help of the convenient expression which I have quoted, ''State of
is
same process
strangeness
actually
fact
admitted
of
the
is
motion.'
171. I may expect to be met with the question whether it would not be more advisable to abstain from such fruitless
considerations
it
is
not, however,
merely the peculiarity of

to
the presuppositions that

occasions them.
sistence, observes
is
we happen
have made which
Poisson, in 112 of his 'Mechanics,' in
speaking of uniform motion according to the law of per;

'
the space traversed in a unit of time

itself;
only the measure of velocity, not the velocity
the
velocity of a material point
which
is
in motion,
it,
is
something
it
which resides
in that point,
moves
and
distinguishes
Chap. IV.]
POISSON
AND
is
ZENO.
;
'
385
that
it
from a material point which

is
at rest
and he adds
I
incapable of detailed explanation.
am
better pleased
that the illustrious teacher should have expressed himself
somewhat cavalierly on a difficult problem, the solution of which was not demanded by his immediate purpose, than if he had philosophised about it out of season. He, however, is not open to the charge of taking a mere formula of measurement furnished by our comparing cognition for a reality in things ; on the contrary, he justly censures the common notion as overlooking a reality to which that formula should only serve as measure. Velocity and acceleration are not merely the first and second differential quotients of space and time ; in that case they would only have a real value in as far as a length of space was actually traversed ; but it is not only within an infinitely short
distance, but in every indivisible
moment
that the
moving
if
body
time
is
is
distinguished from one not moving; although

zero, that
the
which distinguishes them has no opportunity to make itself cognisable, by the body describing a path in space and by the ratio of that interval to the time expended. It is impossible to deny this while we speak of the law of If an element in motion, that passes through a persistence. point, were even in the unextended moment of passing precisely like another which merely is in the point, its condition of rest would according to the law last for ever. Therefore, we shall not indeed conclude with Zeno that the flying arrow is always at rest, because it is at rest in every 'point of its course. But we shall maintain that it would have to remain at rest for ever if it were at rest in a single point, and that so it would never be able to reach the other places in which, according to Zeno's sophism (which rather forgets itself at this point), the same state of rest is to be assigned to it. Now if that in which this essence of motion
consists cannot exist in
i.
an indivisible moment as
velocity,
e.
as a relation of space
I.
and
C C
time, but nevertheless
must
Metaphysic, Vol.
386
exist with full
reality
OF MOTION.
in
[Book
ii.
such a moment, then of course

it
nothing remains but to regard

of the moving object which
result.
as
an inner
state or
impulse
its
is
in existence prior to
admit too that this impulse moves the element ; for however it may itself have arisen by the action of external forces, still Poisson and we were only speaking of the impulse which has arisen, in as far as it is for the
future the cause of the persistence of the motion.
We may
172.
The
parallelogram of motions teaches us the result
of
the meeting
of two
Its
impulses in the same movable

is
material point.
validity
so certain that
its
all
proofs
which only aim
have merely logical interest ; we should here be exclusively concerned with any which might adduce at the same time the meaning of the doctrine, or the ratio legis which finds in this proposition its mathematical expression as applicable to facts.
at establishing
certainty
it under a by tt could possess no other predicate q \ for every condition can be the ground of one consequent only and of no other. Thus, the two propositions S^, is /, and S^. is ^, each of which may be correct in itself, speak of two different cases or two different subjects ; mere logical consideration gives no determining principle to decide for what predicate ground would be given by the coexistence of the two conditions tt and k in the same case or in the same subject. The real world is constantly presenting this problem ; different conditions may seize upon an element, which they can determine, not merely in succession, but at once; and as long as no special presuppositions are made no one of them can be postponed
If a subject
tt
S has
a predicate
attributed to
condition
this
same
as determined
or preferred to the others.

their claims
Just as
;
little
can the conflict of
remain undecided
is
in every case a result
must
be generated which
together.
determined by the two conditions
I thought this characteristic of the real world worth a few words of express notice it is generally presupposed as self;
Chap. IV.]
PARALLELOGRAM OF MOTLONS.
If
387
evident and attention turned at once to determining the
form of such a
possibility
result.
we
are to attempt this in an
absolutely general way,

that
we
shall first
have to
reflect
on the
the conditioning force of
the two
may
depend on their priority in time, and consequently there may be a different result if < follows tt and if tt follows k. In the case of motion this doubt is solved by the law of persistence. The element moved by the condition tt is at every moment in the exact state of motion into which it was thrown at the moment in which the motion was first
imparted.
Therefore at whatever
moment
the second con-
dition K begins to act all the relations are just the
same
was only beginning to exert its influence simultaneously with K, and so the order of the two conditions in time is indifferent. But even so it remains doubtful whether < will endeavour to give an element e acted on at the same time by the condition tt the same new movement q which it would have imparted to it in the absence of tt. If we conceived p as the motion produced first by tt alone, then the motion resulting from the two conditions might possibly be not merely/ + ^ or p q, but also {p + q) (i + S) or p q [i+b); if, first, q had been produced alone by the addition of tt would turn it into qp (i f) or (p + q) (i + e). It is obviously indifferent which of the two formulae we choose; the only function of the mathematical symbol is to designate p and q as absolutely equal in rank ; the result which is produced is strictly speaking neither sum nor
as
if
77
*f,
product.
indifferent,
is
Now as the order in p q [r^) must=/ ^
time of the conditions is (i ^) ; and this equation
f, or that by either of two assumptions ; that 5 I do not think it possible to decide on general grounds for one or other of these assumptions with reference to the joint action of any two conceivable conditions however constituted on the contrary, I am convinced that the
satisfied
both
= 0.
sphere of application as well as the other; therefore though it is a familiar fact that the second holds
first
has
its
c c 2
388
OF MOTION.
for
its
[Book
II.
good
it,
motions and their combinations,

place in
can only regard

established
in
my
treatment of the subject, as a fact of

is
the real world, such as
easily interpreted
when
on other evidence, but such as in default of that confirmation could not be reliably proved a priori. The meaning of this fact then is, that n simultaneous motions produce in the element ^ in a unit of time the same change of place which they would have produced in n units of time if they had acted on e successively, each beginning at the place which e had already reached. It is unnecessary to observe how the final place of e and also, as the same relations hold good for every infinitely small portion of time, the path of e as well, determine themselves by this principle in accordance
with the parallelogram of motions.
This behaviour of things

of persistence;
existence
is
is
akin in significance to the law

latter
itself,
just
as
by the
if left
a motion once in
so too in
its
never lost
to
it
com-
position with others

collective
result
none of
is
lost,
in so far as the
completely includes the result of each
Only, the process by which this collective consequence is attained must be single at every moment and cannot contain the multiplicity of impulses as a persistent multipHcity ; it is the resultant, which blends them.
separate motion.
The
expression p-\-q would correspond to the former idea by indicating the two motions which may be allowed to succeed one another with a view to obtaining the same result the other, p q, would express the latter, the process by which this result is reached ; namely that the motion in the direction/ would be continuously displaced parallel to
;
itself
through the condition
q.
173. In declining the
problem of a deduction of the law

I
of the parallelogram I expressly said that

place in
only did so in
its
my
mere
discussion.
But
I
if
we make
that
the ordinary
assumptions of mechanics
of
it
believe
is
the restriction
I find
it
to
empirical validity
all
quite baseless.
it
maintained that
attempts to prove
as a necessary truth
Chap. IV.]
MECHANICS TREATS OF MOTIONS ONLY.
389
of the understanding have to meet the argument that there

is
nothing in our reason to compel us to assume precisely
this
said,
arrangement to
exist in nature.
There would
be,
it
is
no contradiction
to the nature of our reason in such
an
assumption as that the physical or chemical quality of the

material points
and the mode of generation of the
forces
brought into play had an influence on the amount and

direction of the resultant.
origin might influence degree
differently
differently
For instance, forces of electric and direction of the resultant
from forces of gravitation, or attractive forces from repulsive ; it is admitted that this is not the
it
case, but alleged that
is
only experience that
tells
us so.
must remind my readers that the general science of mechanics treats of forces only in as far as they are causes of perfectly homogeneous motions, distinguished by nothing but direction, velocity, and intensity, and not with reference to other and secret properties. The law of the parallelogram applies directly to none but the above motions, and to them only as already imparted and so brought under the uniform law of persistence and this application excludes all reference to the history of what precedes their origin. In the same way the movable elements are taken to be simply and solely substrata of motion, and perfectly indiflerent to it. That component, with respect to which they are purely homogeneous masses possessing a quantitatively measurable influence on the course of their motions only by the resistance of inertia, is
As
against this argument I
conceived as standing out separately to begin with from the

rest of their qualitative nature.
Granting these postulates our reason has no longer a
number
of possible cases before
it
on the
contrary,
it
is
two motions which are nothing but changes of place, and have no force behind them which can influence their persistence, can produce no more than their sum if
certain that
they are similar, or their diflerence
if
they are opposed.

of the change,
This determines the
maximum and minimum
390
OF MOTION.
place without a reason.
because no increase or diminution of what exists can take But supposing that there are other
relations between two motions besides complete agreement and complete opposition, it is equally certain that if the nature of the case admits of both impulses being obeyed
at
once both
will
again, nothing can
have to be satisfied as far as it admits for be subtracted from their complete satis;
faction unless the
new phenomenon
of subtraction has a
compelling cause that hinders the complete continuance

of what already exists. Now it is the nature of space which in virtue of the infinite variety of directions possible
in
it
admits of these relations of imperfect opposition
between motions.
And
this
same nature of
space,
by
permitting the different directions to be combined, and
compensated by each other, makes possible the complete and simultaneous fulfilment of the different impulses ; and
therefore the determination of the result in accordance with
the law of the parallelogram

there
is
no
alternative
is of course a necessity and which can be treated as equally
possible.
This was the proper occasion to notice

;
the
was how the inner movements of things modify each other it was possible for the total result of two simultaneous impulses to be an increase or diminution of the phenomenon in question dependent on the qualitative peculiarities of the impulse itself. But when it comes to be decided that their results in the e which is acted on are nothing but two homogeneous motions, and when these motions come to be regarded as already produced or as communicated to ^, then the further composition of the motions can only result according to a simple law that regards what they are at the moment and
objection just refuted
for as long as the question
not the utterly extinct history of their past.
END OF VOLUME
I.
'963
ii

LOTZE Metaphysics in Three Books

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T^vt^etdeb to

Professor Frederick Tracy Emeritus Professor of Ethics

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

LOTZE'S SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

Oxford University Press Warehouse

ONTOLOGY, COSMOLOGY, AND PSYCHOLOGY

FORMERLY FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD

Second Edition, in two Volumes

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

Translation of the Metaphysic has been executed,

like that of the Logic,

and the chapter

The whole of Of Time (Book II,

were translated by the

Mr. T. H. Green, Whyte's

Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford

by Mr. B. Bosanquet, Fellow of University

chapters v-viii (inclusive) of

the Rev. C. A. Whittuck,

Fellow of Brasenose College,

and the whole of Book III by Mr. A. C. Bradley,

Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford.

The Index and Table

Contents were added by the Editor.

entire translation has

been revised by the Editor,

responsible in every case for the rendering finally

Editor has to thank Mr.

Oriel College, Oxford, for

ample and ready assistance

consulted on passages involving the technical language of

the Author's meaning in such

places has been intelligibly conveyed, this result

due to Mr. Wilson's help.

Author expressed a wish to work out Book

III of the Metaphysic (the Psychology)

not time to carry out his intention. of the Author's

For the third volume

System of Philosophy,' alluded to

no materials were found

Siid' (June 1882),

Die Principien der Ethik.'

Author's views on the sub-

jects reserved for the

part from his earlier

may be hoped, be made

accessible to English readers \

from his lectures recently published under

'Grundziige der Aesthetik,'

In preparing the translation of the Metaphysic

present (second) edition, no changes appeared to be necessary

beyond some verbal corrections

a few additions to the footnotes and to- the Index.

second German edition shows no

does not contain the Author's Preface, which was

probably thought to be of no permanent

throwing light on the Author's unfulfilled plan of his work.

translation of the Microcosmus,

by Miss Hamilton and

Miss Jones, was published