HAND OUT No.

8 - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
By: Atty. Rene Cal1anta, jr.
Constitutional Law I, 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013 P.U.P. College . of Law .

THE CONSTITUTIONAL
Independent Constitutional Commissions

COMMISSIONS

Art. IX, A, Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission (CSC). the Commission on Elections and (COMELEC), and the Commission on Audit (COA). Safeguards insuring the independence of the Commissions: a. They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by statute. b. Each is expressly described as "independent". c. Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute. ' d. The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment. e. The Chairmen and members are given fairly long tem 6f office of seven years. f. T;he Ch?irmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting capacity [Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358]. . g. The salaries of the chairmen and members are relatively high and may not be decreased during continuance in office. h: The Commission enjoy fiscal autonomy. i. Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules; provided they do not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights [though subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court]. j. The Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to strengthen their integrity. \ k. The Commission may appoint their own officials and employees in accordance with Civil Service Law.

A. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS OF COMMISSIONERS

Art. IX, B, Sec.!. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirtyfive years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. Art. VII, sec. 13. xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the Presidentshall not during his tenure be appointed as Membersof the Constitutional Commissions,or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including governmentownedor controlledcorporationsand their subsidiaries. 2. . APPOINTMENT , AND TERM OF OFFICE Art. IX, B, Sec. 1. xxx (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any

js'

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vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Transitional terms Of the first appointment, the Chairman shall serve for 7 years, without reappointment. Of the Commissioners, the following periods apply: 1 Commissioner for 5 years; another for 3 years without reappointment
Gaminde v. COA, 347 SCRA 655 (2000)

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HELD: In Republic vs. Imperial (96 Phil. 770), we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissionersshould

start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term." Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissionersof the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appOintees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and "tenure." ''The terl)l of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent." In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain 'language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C). Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed seven-year term of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions,without reappointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to coincide with the effectiv'ity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987).

3. APPOINTMENT OF PERSONNEL OF CSC Art. IX, A, Sec. 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance wit,,! law. 4. SALARY Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise xxx the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions (shall receive an annual salary of) two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each. Art. IX, A, Sec. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure.

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The salary, of course, can be increased and the increase can take effect at once, since, likeHhe Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions have not part in the passage of such a law. 5. DISQUALIFICATIONS Art. IX, A, Sec. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Govel;nment, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries .. No members of a Constitutional Commission shall during his "tenure":

a. Hold any other office or employment.

This is similar to the prohibition against executive officers. both public and private offices and employment. It applies to

b. Engage in the practice of any profession.

c. Engage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may
be affected by the functions of his office.

d. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any

franchise or privilege granted by, the Government, instrumentalities, including GOCCsor their subsidiaries. 6. IMPEACHMENT Art. XI, Sec. 2. xxx [T]he members of the Constitutional Commissions xxx may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. xxx 7. FUNCTIONS OF THE CSC Art. IX, B, Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote ,morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel program. Art. IX, A, Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the its subdivisions, agencies or

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page40f 110
Supreme Court on certiorari by the days from receipt of a copy thereof. aggrieved party within thirty

Id., Section
as may

8. Each be provided

Commission by law.

shall

perform

such

other

functions

Bernas: The Civil Service Commission is an administrative agency, nothing more. As such, it can only perform powers proper to an administrative agency. It can perform executive powers, quasi-judicial powers, and quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. 8. SCOPE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE civil service embraces all branches, and agencies of the Government, or controlled corporations with

Art. IX, S, Sec. 2 (1) The subdivisions, instrumentalities, including government-owned original charters.

Art. XII, Sec. 16. xxx. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. Camporedondo v. NLRC, 312 SCRA 47 (1999)

HELD: The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the. general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The PNRCwas not "impliedly converted to a private corporation" simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and oth~r charges, etc. National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988)

L - b1lb::rt>
(GOCC) which are organized

The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations as subSidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

FACTS: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRCruled ordering her reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRChas no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC,the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v. Juco. ISSUE: WIN employees of NASECO, a GOCCwithout original charter, are governed by the Civil Service Law. HELD: NO. The holding in NHC v. Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Constitution but prior to the ruling in NHC v. Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of empioyment in GOCC's,among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC,the 1987 Constitution starkly differs from the 1973 constitution where NHC v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCCunder the general corporation law. Trade Unions of the Phil. and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. NHA, 173 SCRA 33 (1989) FACTS: Respondent NHC is a corporation organized in 1959 under the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations. Its shares of stock have been 100% owned by the Government from its incorporation. Petitioner TUPAS is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. TUPAS filed a petition for certification election with DOLE. It was denied.

Hand Out NQ. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 5 of 110 HELp: The civil service now covers only govt owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by 'an act of Congress of by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.
There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a govt owned and/ or controlled corp. without an original charter.

Alliance of Govt. Workers v. Min. of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 (1983) FACTS: Petitioner is a federation of unions in govt-owned corps. and in govt schools. It petitioned the SC for
a ruling that PD 851, requiring "all employers ... to pay their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than Pl,OOO a month ... a 13th month pay," applies to govt employees.

HELD: NO. It is an old rule of statutory construction that restrictive statutes and acts w/c impose burdens on the public treasury or w/c diminish rights and interests, no matter how broad their terms do not embrace the Sovereign, unless the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. The Republic of the Phil. as a sovereign cannot be covered by a general term like "employer" unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effeqt. ISSUE 2: May government
employees act through a labor federation power to secure increased compensation for its members? which uses the collective bargaining

HELD: NO. The terms and conditions of employment in the Government including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law. And this is effected through statutes or administrative rules and regulations and not through Collective Bargaining agreements. circulars,

Under the present constitution, (1973), GOCC's are now part of the civil service, thus, not allowed to use concerted activities to get other benefits or higher salaries different from that provided by law and regulation.

OVERRULED:
Government-Owned

or Controlled Corporations, Considered and Defined.

National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985) FACTS: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with MOLE but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the Sc. ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered by the
Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?

HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned and controlled corporation.
The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered. This constitutional provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements. "Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCc. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps. whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil service Law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that private. corporations owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corporations not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service. The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of sec. 1, Art. XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Constitution. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to create a

Hand Out No. g - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 6 of 110 hostlof subsidiary corps. under the Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt-owned corp. could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all govt-owned or controlled corporations could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporation under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed. Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 (1986)

61e, ~o. ::r~3

Tanodbayan Has Jurisdiction over all Government Owned Firms Regardless of How Organized. FACTS: F. Quimpo filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan (TB) charging G. Dimaano and D. Remo, manager and analyst of Petrophil, with violating RA 3019 for their refusal to pay Quimpo's fees as surveyor. The TB dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned corporations organized under a special law. Petrophil is a corporation organized under the General Corporation Code; it was acquired by the govt to carry out its oil and gasoline programs. Quimpo filed a petition for certiorari, questioning the decision of the TB. The new TB confessedjudgment.

ISSUE: WON PETROPHILis a government owned or controlled corporation whose employees fall within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of the Anti-graft and Corrupt PracticesAct?
HELD: YES. Uphold the Tanodbayan jurisdiction. While it may be that PETROPHILwas not originally "created" as a GOCC,PETROPHILbecame a subsidiary of PNOCand thus shed-off its private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to governmental programs and policies on oil. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government related functions.

The meaning thus given to "govt-owned or controlled corps." for purposes of the civil service provision [Art. IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] should likewise apply for purposes of the TB and SB provisions [Art. XI, Sees. 4 and 12], otherwise, incongruity would result; and a govt-owned corporation could create as many subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code it wishes, which would then be free from strict accountability and could escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided by law. xxx

A. iTerms, conditions of employment in the Civil Service (1) Oath of allegiance to the Constitution Art. IX, B, Sec. 4. All public officers and employees shall take a'n oath or affirmation to uphold and defend the Constitution. Art. XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. (2) Merit System Positions in the Civil Service mav be classified into: 1) Career Positions, and 2) NonCareer Positions. Career Positions are characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure. The Career Service shall include: (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;

1st

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(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems; (3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of who IT) are appointed by the President; Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs; Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system; Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

The Non-Career Service shall be characterized bv (1) entrflnce on bases other than of the usual tests of merit or fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
I

The Non-Career Service shall include: (1) (2) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; Department Heads and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s); Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff; Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and Emergency and seasonal personnel.

(3)

(4)

(5)

There is another type of non-career employee - the casual, where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature.

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CLASSES OF POSITIONS

IN THE CAREER SERVICE:

Three major levels. - Classes of positions in the career service appointments to which requires examinations are grouped into three major levels. (a) .The first level includes clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which involve non-professional or sub-professional work in a nonsupervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate studies. (b) The second level includes professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief level. The third level covers positions in the Career Executive Service.

(c)

Requirement of competitive examinations. - Except as otherwise provided, entrance to the first two levels are through competitive examinations, which shall be open to those inside and outside the service who meet the minimum qualification requirements. Entrance to a higher level does not require previous qualification in the lower level. Entrance to the third level is prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board. Within the same level, no civil service examination is required for promotion to a higher position in one or more related occupational groups. A candidate for promotion should, however, have previously passed the examination for the level. Bermudez v. Torres, 311 SeRA 733 (1999)
HELD: An "APPOINTMENT"to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The jilPpointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with. and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority. In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court reiterated in Flores v. Drllon, this Court has held:

"The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power x x x." Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral thereof.

Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154 (1990)

HELD: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is

Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College o/Law Page 90/110 considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Hand Out

No. 8 - Constitutional

Power of the Civil Service Commission to revoke appointment. - The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for.a particular position. It has also no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice or a successful protestant .
Lusteria v. lAC, 199 SCRA 255 (1991)
HELD: The well-entrenched doctrine in this jurisdiction, constantly strengthened and invigorated by pronouncements of this Court, is that the power of appointment is essentially discretionary, being vested by law in the head of office concerned. .

As We strongly emphasized in the Lapinid case: "We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time, that the Civil service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the . appointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among the aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice. "Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this COurt cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee - taking into account the totality' of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality - is the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil service Commission has no power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws." As We amplified further in the Abila case: "The choice of an appointee from among those who possessthe required qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of service which can best be made by the head of the office concerned, the person most familiar with the organizational structure and environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function." Barroza v. CSC, 198 SCRA 487 FACTS: On 11/10/88, David Borja retired as City Engineer of Baguio. At that time, petitioner Teodoro Barrozo was a Senior Civil Engineer of DPWHassigned to the office of the City Engineer of Baguio and resp. V. Julian was the Asst. City Engineer of Baguio. On 12/27/88, Mayor Labo extended to Barrozo a permanent appointment as City Engineer of Baguio. On 2/16/89, after his protest was rejected by Mayor Labo, private respondent Julian appealed to the MSPBof the CSC,claiming that as a qualified next-in-rank officer, he had a pre-emptive right over Barrozo. The CSC Cordillera Admin. Region, to which the appeal was referred, declared Barrozo's appointment void for being violative of Civil Service promotion rules. MFR was denied. CSC,on appeal, affirmed the decision.
HELD: The CSC has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other officers except only to ascertain if the appointee possessesthe required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the CSc. It cannot disallow an appointment bee. it believes another person is better qualified and mush lesScan it direct the appointment of its own choice.

The law does not absolutely require that the person who is next in rank shall be promoted to fill a vacancy. In fact, the vacancy may be filled not only by promotion but "by transfer of present employees in the govt service, by reinstatement, by re-employment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by appointment of persons with the civil service eligibility appropriate to the position. What the Civil Service Act

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provides is that if a vacancy is filled by promotion, the person holding that position next-in-rank thereto "shall be considered for promotion."
One who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily fol/ow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right

to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position. .oebulgado v. CSC, 237 SCRA 184 (1994) (,f{. 1110

111t1'

HELD: A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of such appointment.

The Commission is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel actions, e.g., promotions. Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations. Province of Camarines Sur v. CA, 246 SCRA 281 (1995)
HELD: Private respondent does not dispute the fact that at the time he was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. In cases such as the one at bench, what is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment - these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority. X x x

Time and again, the Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments shall be exercised by the Civil Service Commission. In Luego v. Civil Service Commission (143SCRA 327), the Court ruled that CSChas the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. The esc can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person qualified it must so attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC is to attest appointments and after that function is discharged, its participation in the appointment I process ceases. In the case at bench, esc should have ended its participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter. De Leon vs. CA, 350 SCRA 1 (2001)
HELD: In the case at bar, there is no question that private respondent does not have the required CES eligibility. As admitted by private respondent in his Comment, he is "not a CESOor a member of the career Executive Service."

In the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al.(19S SCRA 235), the Court held that: It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed." Achacosodid not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a moment's notice," conformably to establishedjurisprudence. The Court, having considered these submissions and the additional arguments of the parties in the petitioner's Reply and the Solicitor-General 's Rejoinder, must find for the respondents. The mere fact that a position belongs to the career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.u.P. College of Law Page 11 of 110

Evidently, private respondent's appointment did not attain permanency. Not having taken the necessary career Executive Service examination to obtain the requisite eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess the needed eligibility for a position in the career Executive Service. Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESOIV/Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III, was merely temporary. Such being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure. General v. Roco, 350 SCRA 528 (2001) ISSUE: In the career executive service, is a career executive service (CES) eligibility all that an employee needs to acquire security of tenure? Is appointment to a CES rank necessary for the acquisition of such security of tenure?
HELD: The petitions are impressed with merit.

In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure which presupposes a permanent appdintment is governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the CESBoard. As clearly set forth in the foregoing provisions, two requisites must concur in order that an employee in the career executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit: a) CESeligibility; and b) Appointment to the appropriate CESrank. In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and second level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESOsuffers no diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CESrank and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies. In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible, does not possf!ssthe appropriate CESrank, which is - CESrank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V). Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES, respondent cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned to other positions In the career executive service. Moreover, under the mobility and flexibility principles of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, CES personnel may be reassigned or transferred from one position to another. One last point. Respondent capitalizes on the fact that petitioner Luis Mario M. General is not a CESeligible. The absence, however, of such CESeligibility is of no moment. As stated in Part III, Chapter I, Article IV, paragraph S(c), of the Integrated Reorganization Plan "x x x the President may, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a career Executive Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he qualified in such examination." Evidently, the law allows appointment of those who are not CES eligible, subject to the obtention of said eligi~i1ity, in the same manner that the appointment of respondent who does not possess the required CES rank:(CESrank level V) for the position of Regional Director of the LTO, is permitted in a temporary capacity.

EXEMPTION FROM RULE OF NON-COMPETITIVE

POSITIONS:

*Under the Constitution, policy-determining, primarily confidential, and highly technical positions are exempt from the rule requiring appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the basis of merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations. However, the Constitution does not exempt such positions from the operation of the principle emphatically and categorically laid down in Article IX-B, Section 2 (3) that no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. ]s'Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 12 of 110
I

sus'pended except for cause provided by law nor from the opportunities thereto shall be made according to merit and fitness. (1)

requirement

that

A position is policy-determining where its occupant is vested with the power of formulating policies for the government or any of its agencies, subdivisions, or instrumentalities, like that of a member of Cabinet. A policy-determining positio.n is one charged with the laying down of principal or fundamental guidelines or rules, such as that of a head of a department.

(2)

A position is primarily confidential where its occupants enjoys more than the ordinary confidence in his aptitude of the appointing power but bears primarily such close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving of betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of State, like that of private secretary or a confidential agent. (a) The President cannot nullify the constitutional provIsion by placing a position in an exempt class when the duties thereof are not policydetermining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature, or where it is practicable to determine by competitive examination merit and fitness therefore. The duties must have some relationship to the exemption and the classification must be reasonable.
\

Upon the enactment of the Civil Service Act, it is the nature of the position which finally determines wheth.er a position is primarily confidential. Thus, the positions of senior security guard and security guard were held as primarily confidential because of the duties and functions attached to said positions.

P)

A position is highly technical where its occupant is required to possess technical skills or training in the supreme or superior degree, like that of a scientist.

De Los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950) HELD: Three specified classes of positions - policy determining, primarily confidential and highly technical are excluded from merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service demands that appointments coming under this category may be terminable at the will of the officer who makes them. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, 359 SCRA 525 (2001)

bf., IVO. \411~1

HELD: Three (3) important points: first the classification of a particular position as primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. second, whether primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical, the exemption provided in the Charter pertains to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of tenure. Last and more to the point, Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts. Considerations vary so as to make a position primarily confidential. Private secretaries are indisputably primarily confidential employees. Those tasked to provide personal security to certain public officials have also

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 13 of 110 been deemed to hold primarily confidential positions for obvious reasons: the former literally are responsible for the life and well-being of the latter. Similar treatment was accorded to those occupying the posts of city legal officer and provincial attorney, inasmuch as the highly privileged nature of the lawyer-client relationship mandates that complete trust and confidence must exist between them. National interest has 'also been adjudged a factor, such that the country's permanent representative to the United Nations was deemed to hold her post at the pleasure of the Chief Executive. CSC v. Salas, 274 SCRA 414 (1997)

6~ 1110 pYi17C6

HELD: Under the proximity rule, the occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion without fear or embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Withal, where the position occupied is more remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.
I

Corpus v. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591 (1965) HELD: The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is different for those holding' highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such as an economist or a scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be removable at any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No technical man worthy of the name would be willing to accept work under such conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by the Bank would demand that highly technical positions be filled by persons who must labor always with an eye cocked at the humor of their su~riors. It would signify that the so-called highly technical positions will have to be filled by incompetents and yes- men, who must rely not on their own qualifications and skill but on their ability to carry favor with the powerful. The entire objective of the Constitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil service on the basis of merit,. would be t~\usnegated. '. " Of course a position may be declared both highly technical and confidential, as the supreme interests of the state may require. But the position of plaintiff-appellant Corpus is not of this category.

APPROVAL/RECALL

OF APPOINTMENTS

BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION:

Appointments required to be approved. - Among

the powers and functions of the Civil Service Commission is to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointments, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jail guards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the approp'riate eligibility or required qualifications.

Right of appointee to a hearing in case of disapproval. - Where

the Commission disapproves an appointment based on its non-conformity to applicable provisions of law andl on the qualifications of the appointee, the latter need not be previously heard since the' action does not involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure upon him. Furthermore, he is afforded an opportunity to be heard by filing a motion for reconsideration with the Commission and there challenge its disapproval. It may recall on its own initiative the erroneous initial approval of an appointment and review the same de novo.

Effectivity

An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission if this shall take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules .. An appointment to the civil service is required to be submitted to the Commission for approval in order to

of appointment

until

disapproval.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law . Page 14 of 110 determine, in the main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment are followed. But while the Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another is more qualified, it may order the reinstatement of an illegally demoted or dismissed employee. As the central personal agency charged with the constitutional task of protecting and strengthening the civil service, it has the obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. .

Attestation of appointment. - The commission

can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position. If it finds the person not qualified, the appointment must be disapproved. When the appointee is qualified, and all other requirements have been satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Once thisr function is discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases. It cannot encroach upon the discretion vested in the appointing authority. The only purpose of attestation is to determine whether the appointee possesses the requisite civil service eligibility; no more than that is left for the Commission. After all, not only is the appointing authority the officer precisely responsible for the administration of his office but also is in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can efficiently discharge the functions of the position. Tomali v. CSC, 238 SCRA S72 (1994)
HELD: An appointmentto a positionin the civil serviceis requiredto be submittedto the CSCfor approval in order to determine,in main, whether the proposedappointeeis qualified to hold the positionand whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment. Compliancewith the legal requirements for an appointmentto a civil service position is essentialin order to make it fully effective. Without the favorable certificationor approvalof the COmmission, in caseswhen such approval is required,no title to the office can yet be deemedto be permanentlyvested in favor of the appointee,and the appointmentcan still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointingauthority. Until an appointmenthas becomea completedact, it would likewise be precipitateto invokethe rule on securityof tenure.

(a) Appointment

of lame ducks

Art. IX, B, Sec. 6.

No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one .year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government, or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. (b) Ban on holding multiple
Art. positions

IX, B, Sec. 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to 'any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Art. VII, Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law PagelSofllO their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Under-secretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Art. VI, Sec.

13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Art. VIII, Sec. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice, as ex officio .Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. xxx (3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

Sec. 12.

The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

CivilLiberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA317 (1991)

FACTS: The petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed cabinet members, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the government, albeit, subject of the limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of Art. VIII, sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions. HELD: By ostensibly restricting the number of positions that cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and GOCCs,EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other government offices or employment.

The stricter prohibition applied to the President and his official family under Sec. 13, Art. VII as compared to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7, par. 2 are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. xxx However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII, sec. 13 must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive official~ specified therein without addition compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 16 of 110 official's office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials.

Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568 (1993)

61t No.

1o'ft:31.

FACTS: Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) under Sec. 13, par (d) of RA 7227 "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992.

ISSUE: WIN proviso in sec 13 par (d) of RA 7227 which states, "Provided, however that for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
HELD: YES. Sec 7 of Art IX-B of the Consti provides:
I

"No elective official shall be legible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure." In the case at bar, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e. Mayor of Olongapo City, to other governmental post. Sincethis is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, 1st par of Art IX-B. While the second par. authorizes the holding of multiple offices by an appointive position, there is no exception to the first paragraph except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself. Furthermore, the proviso is a legislative encroachment on appointing authority to only one eligible i.e. the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. The conferment of the appointing power is a penfectlyvalid legislative act but the proviso limiting his choice to one is an encroachment to his prerogative. Thus, Mayor Gordon is ineligible for appointment throughout his tenure but may resign first from his elective office before he may be considered for appointment. He has a choice. .
I

SeC' 13 par (d) is declared unconstitutional and the appointment of Mayor Gordon is invalid but his previous acts as Chairman of SBMAshall be considered that of a de facto officer.

(3) Standardization of pay and ban double compensation Standardization of pay Art. IX, B, Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions. Ban on double compensation Art. IX, B, Sec. 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. Sec. 56. Additional or Double Compensation.-- No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law nor accept without the consent of the President, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign state.

]st

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 17 of 110

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation. (Book V, Title I, Chapter 8, Administrative Code of 1987.)

* There is additional compensation when for one and the same office for which a compensation has been fixed there is added to such fixed compensation an extra reward in the form, for instance, of a bonus. This is not allowed in the absence of a law specifically authorizing such extra reward. *Double compensation more properly refers to two sets of compensation for two different offices held concurrently by one officer. In the instances when holding a second office is allowed, when an officer accepts a second office, he can draw the salary att~ched to such second office only when he is specifically authorized by law to receive a double compensation.
Peralta v. Mathay, 38 SeRA 256 (1971)
HELD: It is expressly provided in the Constitution: "No officer or employee of the government shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law." This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a public office is a public trust. It is expected of a government official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the demands of public welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of the functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration. The intrusion of the thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The temptation to further personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the ideal. There is then to be an awareness on the part of an officer or employee of the government that he is to receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. With such a realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious or circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his position. It is an entirely different matter if the legislative body would itself determine for reasons satisfactory to it that he should receive something more. If it were to be thus though, there must be a law to that effect. So the Constitution decrees.

(4) Ban on partisan political activities Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. xxx (4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. Compare with Art. XVI, Sec. 5. xxx (3) Professionalism in the armed forces and .adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be'a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity except to vote.
'Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil 328 (1938)
FACTS: This is a

. L - tf'S""l3f

quo warranto petition to oust respondent Bonifacio from the office of Provincial Governor of Laguna. It is contended that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy and was elected to office, respondent was a Captain in the Philippine Army and for this reason, is ineligible to that office.
HELD: Section 2, Art. XI of the 1935 Const. (similar to the 1987 provision) prohibits members of the Armed

Forces from engaging in any partisan political activity or otherwise taking part in any election except to vote, but it does not ex vi termini grant or confer upon them the right of suffrage. As Section 431 of the Election Law, as amended disqualifies from voting only members in the active selYice of the Philippine Army and no claim is made that this discrimination is violative of the Constitution, it follows that the respondent, being in the reserve force, is not disqualified from voting. The respondent being a qualified elector and the

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P. U.P. College of Law Page 18 of 110 possessionby him of the other qualifications prescribed for an elective provincial office not being challenged, he is not ineligible to the office of provincial governor to which he has been elected. The constitutional provision mentioned contemplates only those in the active service otherwise it would lead to widespread disqualification of the majority of the able bodied men who are part of the reserve corps of the armed forces from voting and from being voted upon. Raison d' etre for the disqualification: Members of the armed forces are servants of the State and not the agents of any political group. Santos v. Yatco, 59 OG 548 (1959)
FACTS: This is petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the order of Judge Yatco disailowing then Secretary of Defense Alejo Santos from campaigning personally for Governor Tomas Martin in the province of Bulacan. HELD: The petition was granted for the ff. reasons:

The position of department secretaries is not embraced and included within the terms officers and employees in the Civil service; When Santos, a Nacionalista campaigned for Gov. Martin, a candidate of the NacionalistaParty, he was acting as a member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs; The question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign because of.its deleterious influence upon the members of the armed forces, who are administratively subordinated to the Secretary of National Defense and who are often called upon by the COMELECto aid in the conduct of orderly and impartial elections, is not justiciable by the court.

(5) Removal or suspension only for cause

Art. IX, B, 2. xx
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
Delos Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil 289
FACTS: Eduardo de los santos, petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on 7/16/46 by the President. He then began the exercise of the duties and functions of the position. On 6/1/50, Gil Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same position, after which, on 6/3, the Undersecretary of the DPW & Communications directed santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings. HELD: The provision of Sec. 2545 of the RevisedAdministrative Code that the Pres. may remove at pleasure any of the said appointive officers is incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." We therefore declare Sec. 2545 of the RACas repealed by the Constitution and ceased to be operative from the time that instrument came into effect.

For cause as provided by law.-- The phrase "for cause" in connection with removals of public officers has acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public." Three specified classes of positions-- policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical-- are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Consti. xxx

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 19 of 110 The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical.
Primarily confidentla!.-- The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Policy-determlnlng.-Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the govt or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. Highly technica!.-- Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to posses a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the Constitution. Corpus v. Cuaderno,
T

13 SCRA 591 (1965)

L-:Bl~)

FACTS: Mariano Corpus was the SpecialAssistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department of the Central Bank, a position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature. He was administratively charged by several co-employees in the export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of internal regulations of the central Bank. He was suspended from office while an investigation was being conducted over his complaint. The investigating committee found no basis upon which to recommend him for disciplinary action, hence, recommended that he be immediately reinstated to his office. Despite such recommendation, the Monetary Board approved a resolution dismissing Corpus from Office on the ground that the latter's continuance in office is prejudicial to the best interests of central Bank. Corpus moved to reconsider said resolution but the same was denied. He filed an action with the RTCwhich declared the resolution null and void.

Central Bank appeals and alleges that officers holding technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power and that such removal is implicit in Sec. 1 Art. XII of the Constitution which provide that : "x x x Appointments in the Civil Service, EXCEPTas to those which are policydetermining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness." CB also argues that for the three classes of positions referred to in the Constitution, lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal. ISSUE: WIN the removal of Respondent by resolution of the Monetary Board on the ground of loss of confidence was valid despite the fact that the committee which investigated the charges against him found no basis for his removal
HELD: NO. The removal of respondent on the ground of loss of confidence is a clear and evident afterthought

resorted to when the charges subject matter of the investigation were not proved or substantiated. It was a mere pretext to cure the inability to substantiate the charges upon which the investigation proceeded. The court therefore dismissed the reason of "loss of confidence" for the dismissal of Corpus. That being so, the constitutional mandate that No officer in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law must be applied. Persons holding positions which are highly technical in nature must be afforded the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal to be for cause as provided by law, and if the dismissal for "loss of confidence" be allowed, it must have basis in fact, which does not exist.in the case at bar. The I'xemption of the three positions adverted to earlier from the rule requiring APPOINTMENTS to be made on the basis of Merit and fitness DOESNOT EXEMPTsuch positions from the operation of the rule that no officer in the Civil Service shall be removed except for cause as provided for by law. This rule is absolute, in fact, the CB Charter provided for the same absolute rule. Furthermore, the Civil Service Law which classified Corpus' position as non-competitive provides that such positions are protected by the Civil service Law and that his removal must only be for cause recognized by law
(Garcia v. Exec. Secretary.)

While the tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, the tenure of officials holding highly technical posts does not end upon mere loss of confidence. The Constitution clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Officers holding highly-technical positions hold office on the basis of their special skills and qualifications. The court also said that if mechanics and engineers enjoy security of tenure with more reason should a highly technical officer, as Respondent Corpus, be protected by the Constitutional provision on security of tenure.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 20 of 110 Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171 (1968)

L':' '2. 03")D

FACTS: Plaintiffs herein are civil service eligibles, holding positions under the Office of the President. About the second week of January, 1962, plaintiffs received a communication from Executive Secretary Mutuc advising them that their services in the government were terminated. They appealed to the President but said appeal was denied. They filed an action against the Executive Secretary alleging that they had been removed from office without just cause and without due process. Defendant, on the other hand, averred that the positions which plaintiffs were then occupying were primarily confidential in nature and therefore, their appointmentswere subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing poiNer. ISSUE: WIN plaintiffs are occupying positions which are primarily confidential and therefore are subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing authority. HEL.b: NO. The fact that the plaintiffs held office for the "president's Private Office" under subdivision entitled "private secretaries" and that they handled "confidential Matters" even if they only performed clerical work do not make them officers and employees occupying highly confidential offices. There is nothing in the items of the plaintiffs (who were clerks and secretaries) to indicate that their respective positions are "primarily confidential" in nature. The fact that they handled at times "confidential matters" does not suffice to characterize their positions as primarily confidential. No officer or employee in the Civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided for by law and since plaintiffs positions were protected by this provision, their removal without cause was therefore illegal.
Officer holding position primarily confidential in nature; Statement in De los santos v. Mallare declared as mere obiter.-- The assumption that an officer holding a position wlc is primarily confidential in nature is

"subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power," is inaccurate. This assumption is evidently based upon a statement in De los santos v. Mallare to the effect that "t~ree specified classes of positions-policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical-- are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Consti. xxx. This was, however, mere obiter, because, the office involved in said case -' that of City Engineer of Baguio -- did not belong to any of the excepted classes,and, hence, it was not necessaryto determine whether its incumbents werE'jremovable or not at the pleasure of the appointing power. What is more, said obiter, if detached from the context of the decision of which it forms part, would be inconsistent with the constitutional command to the effect that "no officer or employee in the Civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" and it is conceded that one holding in the Govt a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil service."

Meaning of "term merely expires''; Distinguished from "removal" and "dismissal. "-- When an incumbent of a

primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power, and that pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office-- his term merely "expires," in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for wlc he had been appointed or elected, is not and can not be deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The main difference bet. the former-- primarily confidential officer-- and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when -the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office-- his term merely "expired." [NOTE: The Court in this case ruled that the one holding in the government a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service" and that "officers in the unclassified as well as those in the classified service" are protected by the provision in the organic law that "no officer shall be removed from office without cause as provided by law". While incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power and such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed or dismissed" but that his term, merely expires.] Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175 (1977)
A Civil Service Employee is Not Barred by Laches if before Bringing Suit He Continuously Pressed His Claim for Reinstatement.

FACTS: Cr.istobal,a third-grade civil service eligible, was employed as a ptivate Secretary in the Office of the President of the Philippines. In January 1962, he and some others were given notice of termination of their services effective January 1, 1962. On March 24, 1962, five of the employees concerned filed an action with the CFI, which culminated in an SC ruling ordering their reinstatement (Ingles v. Mutuc). Cristobal, however,

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 21 of 110 was not a party to the case because during the pendency of such case, he sought reinstatement and in fact, the Executive Secretary and several other Executive secretaries promised to look for placement for him. After the Supreme Court rendered the decision in the Mutuc case, Cristobal wrote the President requesting reinstatement. This request was denied in five successive letters from the Office of the President, the last letter declared the matter "definitely closed". Cristobal filed an action in the CFI (now RTC) of Manila. The dismissal was based on Rule 66 of the Rules of Court (Quo Warranto) which provides that an action for quo warranto may not be filed unless commenced within one year after the cause of the ouster. Since Cristobal did not bring the action until after the lapse of nine years, his case was barred by laches.
HELD: Cristobal is not guilty of laches. He sought reconsideration of his separation from the service and although he did not join in the Ingles court action, he continued to press "'is request for reinstatement during the pendency of the case. In fact Secretary Mutuc assured him that he would work for his reinstatement. The continued promise not only of Mutuc but of the subsequent Secretaries led Cristobal to wait but depite waiting for such a long time, his reinstatement never came about. It would be the height of inequity if after Cristobal relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former Executive Secretaries, the court would rule that he had lost his right to seek relief becauseof the lapse of time.

Cristobal, just like the Plaintiffs in the Ingles v. Mutuc case, was not holding an office characterized as "highly confidential", he was performing purely clerical work although he handled "confidential matters" occasionally. He is therefore protected in his tenure and may not be therefore removed without just cause. He is entitled to backwages for five years although he had been dismissed for nine years, applying by analogy the award of backwages in casesof unfair labor practice.

Unconsented transfer of the officer, resulting in demotion of rank or salary is a violation of the security of tenure clause in the constitution. (Palma-Fernandez v. De La Paz,
160 SCRA 751)

Valid abolition of office does not violate the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure

Reorganization of office does not necessarily result in abolition of the office, and does not justify the replacement of permanent officers and employees
I

(6) Right of Self-Organization Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Art. IX, 8, Sec. 2. xxx (5) The right to self-organization government employees.

shall

not

be

denied

to

Sec. 38. Coverage.-- (1) All government empJoyees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, can form, join or assist employees' organizations of their own choosing for the furtherance and protection of their interests. They can also form, in conjunction with appropriate government authorities, labor-management committees, work councils and other forms of workers' participation schemes to achieve the same objectives. (2) The provisions of this Chapter shall not 'apply to the members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards. (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Administrative Code of 1987.)
Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor, 124 SeRA 1 (1983)

HELD: The dismissal of this petition should not, by any means, be interpreted to imply that workers in govtowned or controlled corporations or in state colleges and universities may not enjoy freedom of association. These workers whom the petitioners purport to represent have the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law. But they may not join associations which impose the obligation to engage in

_J

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College afLaw Page 22 of 110 concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher than or different from those provided by law and regulation. TUPAS v. NHA, 173 SCRA 33 (1989), supra . . ISSUE: WIN employees of NHC have undoubtedly the right to form unions.
HELD: The right to unionize is now explicitly recognized and granted to both employees in both governmental and the private sectors. There is no impediment to the holding of a certificate of election among the workers of NHCfor it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, for NHC is a GOCCwithout an original charter. Statutory implementation of the Constitution (par S sec 2 art IX-B) is found in Art 244 of the Labor Code. '.

(7) Right to strike

I

SSSEmployees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 690 (1989)

Public Sector Labor-Management has jurisdiction but not damages arising from acts of a union. of dispute concerning terms and conditions (of employment)

FACTS: SSSfiled with the RTC-QCa complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners SSSEA,alleging that the officers and members of the latter staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSSbuilding preventing non-striking employees from reporting to work and SSSmembers from transacting business with SSS. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to do so. The SSSEAwent on strike because SSSfailed to act on the union's demands. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied. The restraining order which was previously issued was converted into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. The latter held that since the employees of SSS are government employees, they are not allowed to strike.
HELO: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exerciseof the Right of Government employees to Self-Organization which took effect after the initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and controlled corporations with original charters, are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof.

The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SeRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and govt employees with regard to the right to strike?
Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is

that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion of law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through CBA's. EO 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. . Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions. Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. pi Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 23 of 110

ISSUE:

WIN the RTC can enjoin the SSSEA from striking.

Held: Yes. EO 180 vests the Public Sector Labor-Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute. The RTC was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under BP 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the PSLM Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council and the NLRC that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate. . Manila Public SChool Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 (1991)

6'Vfo/u~, 'J)\f'1S" ~

q 5">110

FACTS: On September 17,1990, Monday, at least 800 public school teachers proceeded to the national office of thb DECS and aired their grievances. The mass action continued into the week despite the DECS Secretary's RETURN TO WORK order. The Secretary filed administrative charges against the protesting teachers. The Secretary rendered the questioned decisions in the administrative proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under suspension. Two separate petitions were filed to assail the validity of the return to work order and his decisions in the administrative proceeding. ISSUE: whether or not the mass actions are considered as strikes?

HELD: Yes. The mass actions constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from work, which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons. ISSUE: whether or not public school teachers can strike?

HELD: No. Employees of the public service do not have the right to strike although they have the right to self organization and negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of working conditions. ISSUE: whether or not due process was observed during the administrative
I

proceedings?

HELD: This court is a court of last resort. It resolves questions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or that the facts have been already determined by the lower tribunals. It is not a trier of facts. It can not resolve the issue which requires the establishment of some facts. The remedy is for the petitioners to participate in the administrative proceedings. If they lost, they may appeal to the Civil Service Commission. If pending said administrative proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary, recourse is with the RTC where there would be opportunity to prove relevant facts.

9. REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF THE CSC

Art. IX, A, Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote

of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decisi9n or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Manalansang v. CSC, , 203 SCRA 797 (1991)

FACTS: This is a resolution of the Court en bane denying petitioner's second motion for reconsideration. The Court wishes, however, to devote a few words to one issue raised by the petitioner which appears of sufficient importance to merit separate treatment and disposition: that concerning the effect of the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, or final order or resolution of the CSC on the 3D-day period prescribed for taking an appeal therefrom. . HELD: The Court holds that the thirty day period prescribed by Sec. 7, Part A, Art. IX of the Constitution shall be interrupted from the time a motion for reconsideration is timely and properly filed until notice of the order overruling the. motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel. In other words, in computing

1st

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 24 of 110

the period of appeal from the CSC,the time during which a motion for reconsider or set aside its judgment, order or resolution has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails the requirements set therefor. Mancita v. Barcinas, 216 SCRA 772 (1992) FACTS: On 10{15{90, Mayor Divinigracia, Jr., who had succeeded Mayor Prila, informed private respondent Nacario that her services as MPDC would be terminated effective 11{16{90 to pave the way for the reinstatement of petitioner (w{c CSCordered.) Meanwhile, on 11{8{90, private respondent Nacario filed with the RTC of Pili, camarines Sur, a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with preliminary injunction against CSC xxx As prayed for by the petitioner (now pvt. resp. Nacario), the respondent Judge .issued on the same day a temljorary restraining order and set the hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on 11{22{90. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to rule, pass upon or review a final judgment, order or decision of the CSc. On 2{2S{91, respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion. MFR was also denied, Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The CSC,under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorarijurisdiction. (Lopez v. et. a~195 SCRA 777.)

csc,

Since the decision, order, or ruling of the CSCis subject to review only by this Court on certiorari under Rule 65, ROC,the RTC has no jurisdiction over the civil case, an action which seeks a review of a decision of the CSc.

.10. FISCAL AUTONOMY Art. IX, A, Sec. 5.

The Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

B. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS

1. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS OF COMMISSIONERS Art. IX, C, Sec. 1. (1)

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Art. VII, Sec. 13. xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991) FACTS: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment despite cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. cayetano filed this certiorarifmd prohibition.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr .. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 25 of 110 ISSUE:
HELD:

win monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years?

YES.The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLAvs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the BusineSS Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corpmation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOMin 1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc. ISSUE: win the commission on appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming monsod's appointment?
HELD: NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possessthe qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

2. APPOINTMENT AND TERM OF OFFICE OF COMMISSIONERS; RULE AGAINST REAPPOINTMENT

Art.

IX, C, Sec. 1. xxx

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the -consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista, 85 PHIL 103 (1949)
FACTS: President Quirino designated the Solicitor-General as Acting member of the Comelec in November,

1949. The Nacionalista Party filed this prohibition on the following grounds: (1) the SG did not resign from the office of the Solicitor-General; (2) there is no vacancy in the Comelec because the retirement of the Comelec member causing the vacancy, was accepted by the President in bad faith; and (3) the functions of a SolicitorGen?ral are incompatible with those of a Comelec member. . ISSUE:

win the designation was valid?

HELD: NO, it was not. By the nature of the Comelec'sfunctions, the Comelec must be independent. Members are not allowed to perform other functions, powers and duties to preserve its impartiality. The SolicitorGeneral's duties also require an undivided time and attention for efficiency. Furthermore, when there is a vacancy, appointment is preferred to designation.

ISSUE:
HELD:

win prohibition would lie?

NO. The case is by nature a quo warranto proceeding because it questions the legality of the respondent's designation or his right to office. The proceeding is instituted by the other party claiming the

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.u.P. College of Law Page 26 of 110 position occupied and/or the Solicitor-General. Prohibition however, has a different purpose, which is to prevent the usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court. Although there is no other party who claims a right over the position occupied nor will the SG file a case against himself, the court must grant the remedy of a quo warranto proceeding because the SG'scontinued occupancy as member of the Comelec is illegal. 'Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990) FACTS: Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac was appointed by Pres. Aquino as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario Davide, who had been named chairman of the factfinding commission to investigate the Dec. 1989 coup detatattempt. ISSUE: WON the appointment is unconstitutional HELD: NO. Art. IX-A, section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as "independent". Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the SCas provided by the Constitution in Art. IX-A, section 7. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. NP v. De Vera, 85 Phil 149 FACTS: This is an action brought by the Nacionalista Party against De Vera on the ground that his appointment as Chairman of the COMELECis a violation of the Constitutign particularly Art. X, Sec. 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides that the members of the COMELEC shall hold office for nine years without reappointment. HELD: The prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the ComfTIission shall hold office for a term of nine years. Reappointment is not prohibited provided his term will not exceed nine years in all. In July 1945, three Commissioners were appointed. De Vera was appointed for three years. If he were to succeed himself, he cannot be reappointed to do so because that would preclude the appointment of a new member after 3 years and would furthermore increase his term to 12 years since upon the expiration of his term, his successormust be appointed for nine years. But in this case, de Vera's appointment was by virtue of the death of the Chairman in 1947 and he was promoted to occupy the chairmanship of the Commission for the unexpired term only. Thus, this is not offensive to the Constitution because it does not increase de Vera's term of office to more than nine years nor does it preclude the appointment of a new member upon the expiration of the first term of three years. Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil 770

FACTS: This is a quo warranto proceeding to test the legality of the continuance in office of Imperial as Chairman and Perezas member of COMELEC.
.J

When Chairman de Vera died in August 1951, before the expiration of the maximum term of nine years of the Chairman of the Commission, Imperial was appointed Chairman to succeed de Vera. His appointment provided for a term expiring July 12, 1960. The SG contended that the term for which he will legally serve as Chairman legally expired on July 12, 1954, the expiration of the 9 year term for which the first Chairman was appointed. Comelec member Perez on the other hand, was appointed for a term of 9 years expiring on 24 November 1958. The SG contended that his term legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term of 6 years for which Commissioner Enage, his predecessorwas appointed. Held: The terms cannot begin from the first appointments made in July 12, 1945 but from the date of the organization of the COMELEC under CA 657 on June 21, 1941. Thus, the term of office of the first Chairman, Lopez Vito began on June 21, 1941 and ended June 20, 1950. That of member Enage began on June 21, 1941 to June 20,1944 (butthis was not filled). Since the first 3 year terrtl had already expired in 1944, the

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 27 of 110
appointment of De Vera on June 12, 1945 must be for the full term of nine years (June 1944 to June 1953). The first vacancy occurred by the expiration of the term of Enage. His successor, Perez, was named for a full 9 year term which shall have started on June 1947 to June 1956. The second vacancy happened upon the death of Lopez Vito on May 1947. To succeed him, de Vera appointed and lasted only up to June 1950, the unexpired period of Lopez Vito's term. Thus, on June 1950, a vacancy occurred which De Vera could no longer fill because his appointment was expressly prohibited by the Con~titution. Thus, the next Chairman was respondent Imperial whose term of 9 years must be deemed to have began on June 21, 1990 to expire on June 20, 1959. Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49 {2002}

FACTS: Benipayo, Tuason and Borra were appointed Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, of the Commission on Elections, by the President when Congress was not in session. Did their appointment violate the Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C of the Constitution that substantially provides that "No member of the Commission (on Elections) shall be appointed in an acting or temporary capacity? HELD: In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Bri//antes v. Yorac and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Naciona/ista Party v. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately. Whil~ the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent," this provIsion should be harmonized with the President's power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President's power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The President's power to extend ad interim appointments may indeed briefly put the appointee at the mercy of both the appointing and confinming powers. This situation, however, in only for a short period - from the time of issuance of the ad interim appointment until the Commission on Appointments gives or withholds its consent. The Constitution itself sanctions this situation, as a trade-off against the evil of disruptions in vital government services. This is also part of the check-and-balance under the separation of powers, as a tradeoff against the evil of granting the President absolute and sole power to appoint. The Constitution has wisely subjected the President's appointing power to the checking power of the legislature. This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body. The vacancies in the COMELEC are precisely staggered to insure that the majority of its members hold confirmed appointments, and no one President will appoint all the COMELEC members. x x x The special constitutional safeguards that insure the independence of the COMELEC remain in place (see Sections, 3, 4, S and 6, Artic/e IX-A of the Constitution). . In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason as Chainman and Commissioners, respectively, of the COMELEC were by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. However, they were subsequently reappointed by the President to the same positions. Did their subsequent reappointment violate the prohibition against reappointment under Section 1(2), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution? HELD: There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a.refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any apPEjilI from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on appointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.

ISSUE: The ad interim appointments

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 28 of 110 An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold 'its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passeq appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments x x x. Hence, under the Rules of the Commissionon Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered agai? if the President renews the appointment. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renew the ad interim appointments of by-passed appointees. Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. lucidly explained in his concurring opinion in Guevarra v. Inocentes why by-passed ad interim appointees could be extended new appointments, thus: "In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the . Commission, because the incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive objection of the Commission. It ceases, also, upon "the next adjournment of the Congress", simply because the President may then issue new appointments - not because of implied disapproval of the Commission deduced from its intention during the session of Congress, for, under the Constitution, the Commission may affect adversely the interim appointments only by action, never by omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied disapproval of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the President could no longer appoint those so by-passed by the Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint them, thus clearly indicating that the reason for said termination of the ad interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of the Commission, but the circumstance that upon said adjournment of the Congress, the President is free to make ad interim appointments or reappointments. " Guevarra was decided under the 1935 Constitution from where the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the present Constitution on ad interim appointments was lifted verbatim. The jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution governing ad interim appointments by the President is doubtless applicable to the present Constitution. The established practice under the present Constitution is that the President can renew the appointments of by-passed ad interim appointees. This is a continuation of the well-recognized practice under the 1935 Constitution, interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution which did not provide for a Commission on Appointments but vested sole appointing power in the President. The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment cannot be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years. The 'framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any term of office as . COMELEC member - whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even an unexpired term for any length of time - can no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC.X x x In Visarra v. Miraflor, Justice Angelo Bautista, in his concurring opinion, quoted Naciona/ista v. De VelCl that a [r]eappointment is not prohibited when a Commissioner has held, office only for, say, three or six years, provided his term will not exceed nine years in all." This was the interpretation despite the express provision in the 1935 Constitution that a COMELEC member "shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed." To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without reappointment" appears twice in Section 1 (2), Article IXC of the present Constitution. The first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the first set of appointees under the Constitution. In either case, it does not matter if the person previously appointed completes his term of office for the intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any kind. However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commissionon Appointments does not cons.btutea term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 29 of 110 of the Commission on Appointments. Commissionon Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the

The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the President's power to make ad interim appointments.
I

In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the President to make ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services. The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions. The framers of the present Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years. The second is to insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years. x x x. . Plainly, the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be no reappointment of any kind. On the other hand, the prohibition on temporary or acting appointments is intended to prevent any circumvention of the prohibition on reappointment that may result in an appointee's total term of office exceeding seven years. The evils sought to be avoided by the twin prohibitions are very specific reappointment of any kind and exceeding one's term in office beyond the maximum period of seven years. Not contented with these ironclad twin prohibitions, the framers of the Constitution tightened even further the screws on those who might wish to extend their terms of office. Thus, the word "designated" was inserted to plug any loophole that might be exploited by violators of the Constitution x x x. The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and renewal of appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the appointments and renewals of appointments of 8enipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office. Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of these three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the twin prohibitions in the Constitution. The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Secti,on1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
QUERY: What are the four situations where section 1(2), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "(t]he Chairman and the Commissioners (of the COMELEC) shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment" will apply? HELD: Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that "(t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment" There are four situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC,after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC,whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving more than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result"in the appointee also serving more than seven years.
I

, ,,
I

The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 30 of 110
similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation.

3. APPOINTMENT OF PERSONNEL Art. IX, A, Sec. 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law. 4. SALARY Art. IX, A, Sec. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the .Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise x x x the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions (shall receive), two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thou~and pesos each. The salary, of course, can be increased and the increase can take effect at once, since, like the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions have not part in the passage of such a law. ! S. DISQUALIFICATIONS Art. IX, A, Sec. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. No members of a Constitutional Commission shall during his "tenure": (IX, V, 2)

a. Hold any other office or employment.

r
This is similar to the prohibition agaihst executive officers. public and private offices and employment. It applies to both

b. Engage in the practice of any profession.

c. Engage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may
be affected by the functions of his office.

d. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCsor their subsidiaries.
6. IMPEACHMENT Art. XI, Sec. 2. The members of the Constitutional Commissions may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 31 of 110

7. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMELEC

* The COMELECis an administrative agency. As such, the power that it possesses are executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. By exception, however, it has been given judicial power as judge with exclusive original jurisdiction over "all contests relating to thel, elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction".
The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: A. Enforce election laws Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. INITIATIVE - The power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for that purpose. REFFRENDUM - The power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose ' RECALL- The termination of official relationship of a local elective official for loss of confidence prior to the expiration of his term through the will of the electorate. PLEBISCITE - The submission of constitutional amendments or important legislative measures to the people for ratification.
Carlos v. Angeles, 346 SCRA 571 (2000) HELD: In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people." "Specifically, the term 'election', in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes." The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. "SOUfldpolicy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast'in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election." In case of protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for the candidates decides the election protest case. The candidate receiving the highest number or plurality of votes shall be proclaimed the winner. Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer, can not be declared elected. ''The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected." In other words, "a defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office." "Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. The Supreme Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that woultJ hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results." .

'.'
Gallardo v. Tabamo, 218 SCRA 253 (1993)

Hand Out No, 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty, Rene Callanta, Jr, 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, PU,P, College of Law Page 32 of 110

ISSUE: May the COMELEC promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of election laws? HELD: In Zaldivar vs, Estenzo (23 SCRA533), decided by this Court on 3 May 1968, had squarely resolved the issue above posed. Speaking through then Associate Justice Enrique Fernando (who later became Chief Justice), this Court explicitly ruled that considering that the Commission on Elections is vested by the Con~itution with exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a cases involving the enforcement of the Election Code "is at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and unmistakable in recent decisions." Said case was decided under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution and R.A. No. 180, otherwise known as the Revised Election Code, which took effect on 21 June 1947, The present Constitution and extant election laws have further strengthened the foundation for the above doctrine; there can be no doubt that the present COMELEChas broader powers than its predecessors. While under the 1935 Constitution it had "exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections." exercised "all other functions ... conferred upon it by law" and had the power to deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections. and under the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the power to (a) "[E]nforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections" (b) "[D]eputize, with the consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forcesof the Philippines, for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections," and (c) "[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law," it was not expressly vested with the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of an election. That power could only originate from a special law enacted by Congress; this is the nece~sary implication of the above constitutional provision authorizing the Commission to "[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law." The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows: "SEC.2.The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." (Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is thus clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into account the Comm,ission'spower under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Big. 881), which was already in force when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified, to: xxx xxx xxx "Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission lies required to enforce and administer, .... " Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest. peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage - the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability. Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454 (1982) FACTS: Sanchez, a mayoralty candidate, who lost in the 1980 San FernaFldo,Pampanga elections, filed with the Comelec a petition to nullify the said elections due to large scale terrorism, which took place after the people had cast their votes. The Comelec, after hearing, issued the resolution which ordered the nullification of the elections and the certification of the failure of elections to the president or prime minister for remedial legislation and the appointment of municipal officials. The winning mayoralty candidate questioned the validity of the resolution. ISSUE: win the COMELEC has the power to nullify elections on the ground of post election terrorism?

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 33 of 110 HELD: YES, it has. The Comelec is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa,elective provincial and city officials. In line with its duty to protect and preserve the integrity of tlie elections, the Comelec 'must be deemed possessed of the authority to annul elections where the will of the voters has been defeated and the purity of elections sullied. The fact that the failure of elections was due to terrorism after the votes were cast is not material.

ISSUE: win the comelec has the power to call special elections?
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HELD: YES.The Comelec, being the sole judge of elections, returns and qualifications, has the power to call

special elections. During the time the Comelecwas not the sole judge, the president, upon certification to him by the Comelec of a failure of elections, had the power to call special elections. The Comelec has the duty to take necessary steps to complete the elections, that is, to see to it that the real winners are proclaimed. But when the winners cannot be determined from the elections, which was marred by massive and pervasive terrorism, the Comelec must call for a special election in order to proclaim the real winners.

B. .Decide administrative questions pertaining to election except the right to vote

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. xxx

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
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C. Petition for inclusionor exclusion of voters

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. xxx

File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices.
(6)

Omnibus ElectionCode
Rigtlt to Vote

The right to vote may be challenged in the MTC by:

challenging the right of a voter to be registered; b) 'lin action instituted by a voter for reinstatement; c) proceeding filed by an individual to exclude any voter whose list of voters.

a) a proceeding

name

appears

in the

* There are dates which the law allots for the registration of voters. Any person, under article 136, during this period may challenge the registration of voters on the grounds of the qualifications and disqualifications in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
Qualifications (Articles 5, 117) a) Filipino citizen b) 18 years old c) Resident of the Philippines, to vote for 6 months. Disqualifications

for one year and of the municipality .

where

he proposes

(Art. 118) by final judgment and have been sentenced to imprisonment for at leaStt one year and such disqualifications has not been removed by absolute pardon or amnesty. This. disqualification lasts for 5 years unless restored by absolute pardon or amnesty. (Cristobal v Labrador) b) Those convicted of crimes involving the national security, or disloyalty to the government, rebellion, sedition, subversion, etc ..

a) Those convicted

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c) Insanity or incompetency
Inclusion Proceedings If the Board of Registration cancels the name of a voter, he can file in the MTC a petition for an order to include his name in the list of voters or to reinstate him. Action mu~t be filed within 20 days form the last day of registration. Appeal can be made to the;RTC within 5 days, and the decision shall be final and unappealable and no motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Exclusion Proceedings (Articles 138, 139, 142)

A petition for exclusion must be filed with the MTC within 20 days from the last day of registration. D. Prosecute election law violators Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. xxx (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on' its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices.
Kilosbayan v. COMELEC, 280 SCRA 892 (1997)

HELD: section 2 (7) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Comelec shall exercise the power to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices". Discerning the rationale for this grant of prosecutorial powers to the Comelec, we already had occasion to rule, thus: "The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote:' This constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec finds statutory expression under Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Big. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

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"SEC. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the .assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted." Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the Comelec is the "public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus Election] Code before the competent court:' This constitutional and statutory mandate for the Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing, an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued. For the effective investigation and prosecution of cases of election offenses and in the exercise by the Comelec of its quasi-legislative power under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, the Comelec Rules of Procedure were promulgated, providing, among others, the guidelines pertinent to election offenses. They are as follows:

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P. U.P. College of Law Page 35 of 110 "Rule 34 - Prosecution of Election Offenses SEC. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. - The Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. SEC.2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution Arms of the Government. The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are hereby given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the commission or its duly authorized representatives and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the Commission whenever in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the Commission, promote the common good, or when it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the Commission. SEC.3. Initiation of Complaint. - Initiation of complaint for election offenses may be done motu proprio by the Commission, or upon written complaint by any citizen of the Philippines, candidate, registered political party, coalition of political parties or organizations under the party-list system or any accredited citizen arms of the Commission. SEC.4. Form of Complaint and Where to File. - (a) When not initiated motu proprio by the Commission, the complaint must be verified and supported by affidavits and/or any other evidence. Motu proprio complaints may be signed by the Chairman of the Commission, or the Director of the Law Department upon direction of the chairman, and need not be verified. (b) The complaint shall be filed with the Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars.... xxx xxx xxx SEC.S. Referral for Preliminary Investigation. - If the complaint is initiated motu proprio by the Commission,or is filed with the Commission by any aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the Law Department for investigation. Upon direction of the Chairman of the Commission, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any lawyer of said Department, or to any of the Regional Election Directors or Provincial Election Supervisors, or any lawyer of the Commission. SEC.6. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. - (a) If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and the supporting evidence, the investigating officer finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint and shall follow the procedure prescribed in Section 8 (c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents giving said respondent ten (10) days from receipt within which to submit counteraffidavits and other supporting documents. The respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant. (b) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall be furnished by him to the complainant. (c) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counteraffidavits within the ten-day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. (d) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound c1arificatoryquestions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties. shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the partiesor witnesses concerned. (e) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. SEC.7. Presumption of Existenceof Probable cause. - A complaint initiated motu proprio by the Commission is presumed to be based on sufficient probable cause and the investigating officer must forthwith issue the subpoena mentioned in the immediately preceding section.

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Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law . Page 36 of 110 SEC.8. Duty of Investigating Officer. - The preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days after receipt of the counter-affidavits and other evidence of the respondents, and resolution thereof shall be made within five (5) days thereafter. (a) If the investigating officer finds no cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall recommend dismissal of the complaint. (b) If the investigating officer finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution, and the corresponding information wherein he shall certify under oath that he has examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. (c) In either case, the investigating officer shall, within five (5) days from the rendition of his recommendation, forward the records of the case to 1) The Director of the Law Department of the Commission in cases investigated by any of the Commission lawyers or field personnel and 2) The State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscalor Fiscal City, as the case may be, pursuant to the continuing authority provided for in Section 2 of this Rule. SEC.9. Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal Upon Receipt of Records. - (a) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the records stated in paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding section, the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal shall take appropriate action thereon, immediately informing the parties of said action. (b) In cases investigated by the lawyers or the field personnel of the Commission, the Director of the Law Department shall review and evaluate the recommendation of said legal officer, prepare a report and make a recommendation to the Commission affirming, modifying or reversing the same which shall be included in the agenda of the succeeding meeting en banc of the Commission. If the Commission approves the filing of an information in court against the respondent/s, the Director of the Law Department shall prepare and sign the information for immediate filing with the appropriate court. (c) In all other cases, if the recommendation to dismiss or the resolution to file the case in court is approved by State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal,they shall likewise approve the Information prepared and immediately cause its filing with the proper court. (d) If the recommendation to dismiss is reversed on the ground that a probable cause exists, the State. Prosecutor, or the Provincial or City Fiscal, may, by himself, prepare and file the corresponding information against the respondent or direct any of his assistants to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation. xxx xxx xxx" The Comelec, whenever any election offense charge is filed before it, must have first, before dismissing the same or filing the corresponding information, conducted the preliminary investigation proper of the case. At this initial stage of criminal prosecution, the primordial task of the Comelec is the determination of probable cause, Le., whether or not there is reason to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial or as the Comeiec Rules of Procedure phrase it, whether or not "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed".

The determination of probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable by the Bill of Rights which enshrines every citizen's right to due process, the presumption that he is presumed innocent, and the inadmissibility against him of any damaging evidence obtained in violation of his right against selfincrimination. As Justice Reynato S. Puno has pointed out, probable cause is neither an "opaque concept in our jurisdiction" or a "high level legal abstraction to be the subject of warring thoughts". It constitutes those "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed" by the person sought to be judicially indicted. In determining probable cause, however, the public prosecutor must have been apprised by the complainant of his evidence in support of his accusatory allegations. In other words, determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or quaiifying the allegations in the complaint. Xxx xxx xxx The contention of petitioner Kilosbayan - that it is the Comelec that is duty-bound to search for evidence to prove its letter-complaint - is downright erroneous. The task of the Comelec as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a cOj11plaint for an alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his complaint. If the complainant fails to proffer the necessary

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Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 37 of 110
evidence to show probable cause, notwithstanding the lack of denial or any evidence in controversion, of the accusation, the complaint must be dismissed, since any person accused of a crime is presumed innocent and does not at all have to make a response or reaction to the charges against him. The Comelec, in acting upon an election offense complaint in the course of preliminary investigation, initially facilitates the confrontation process between the complainant and the respondents by requiring the submission of and interfacing, their respective evidences. Ultimately, the Comelee passes upon the contending parties' respective submissions and proofs and weighs the fact and circumstances established therefrom. Contrary to the asseveration of petitioner Kilosbayan, the preliminary investigation is not an occasion for the Comelec to, as a duty, spoonfeed the complainant with evidence needed to prove its case.
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De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983) HELD: it was ruled that a government official (COMELEC Registrar) who violated the election law (tampering with returns to make it appear that there were more registered voters) must be prosecuted by the COMELEC, before the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan. The 1978 Election Code is clear that the COMELEC shall have the power to conduct preliminary investigations of all election offenses, and that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide such cases. It is not the character or personality of the offender (public official) but the crime committed (violation of election law) that determines jurisdiction. This provision of the 1978 Election Code has been integrated in the 1987 Constitution. Corpuz v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 (1987) FACTS: The complaint for electioneering against the Director of Trade et. aI., filed before the Comelec was withdrawn and later on refiled with the Tanodbayan. The Comelee Legal Assistance Office moved to enter its appearance for the complainants. The Tanodbayan denied the motion on the ground that it has exclusive authority to prosecute the election offenses of public officials.
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ISSUE: whether or not the tanodbayan has exclusive authority to prosecute election offenses? HELD: NO. There is no constitutional provision granting the Tanodbayan, either explicitly or implicitly, authority to prosecute, investigate and hear election offenses. Instead the constitution granted such power exclusively to the Comelec in order to insure a free, orderly and honest elections. It is the nature of the offense that determines the exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec regardless of who the offender is, whether a private individual or a public officer. People v. Basilia, 179 SCRA 87 (1989) FACTS: Three complaints were filed with the provincial fiscal alleging violations of the Omnibus Election Code. After conducting preliminary investigation, the fiscal filed the information with the RTC. The judge, motu proprio, dismissed the information on the ground that the Comelec has .the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses. Hence this review. ISSUE: HELD:

win

fiscals may conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses?

YES, they may. Although the Comelee is granted the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses, it is also authorized by the Omnibus Election Code to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of government. To ensure credible elections, the Comelec may deputize law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities, whether before or after elections. Pursuant to such authority granted by law, the Comelee issued Resolution no 1862 providing that fiscals may conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses.

People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 (1990) FACTS: In 1988, Mrs. Barba filed a letter complaint against OIC- Mayor Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Or. with the COMELEC, for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, in the office of the Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from the COMELEC as required by law.
The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City (Atty. Lituanas) to, among others, conduct the preliminary investigation of the. case. Said directive was pursuant to a COMELEC resolution which in turn, is based on the constitutional mandate that the. COMELEC is charged with the enforcement and admilnistration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanto, Jr. 1st Semester, ~y 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 38 of 110 After a preliminary investigation, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, he filed with the respondent RTC of Dumaguete City a criminal case against the OIC-Mayor. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against the accused which was later cancelled on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. The court stated that it "will give due course to the information fried if the same has the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and control of the latter." Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the condition. Hence the RTC quashed the information. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
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Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WIN a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal, before the RTC may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists.
HELD: NO. The Court emphasizes the important features of the constitutional mandate that "xxx no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge xxx." (Art. III, Sec. 2, Constitution)

First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not'for the Prov'l Fiscal nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination. second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other suppporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification wlc are material in assisting the judge to make his determination.
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Third, judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper--whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore whether or not he should be subjected to trial--is the function of the prosecutor. Article IX-C, sec. 2 of the Constitution provides: "Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. xxx xxx xxxx (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of votes, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omission constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." In effect, the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with the COMELEC. Hence, the Prov'l Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, wl}en the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuanceof a warrant of arrest. People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715 (1990)
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Upon recommendation of the provincial election supervisor, who conducted a preliminary investigation of the alleged election offenses of Delgado, et. ai, the Comelec filed an information against the
FACTS:

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 39 of 110 latter. The respondents moved for reconsideration and the suspension of the warrants of arrests on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. The trial court ordered for reinvestigation. The Comelec opposed the order on the ground that only the SC may review the decisions, orders, resolutions of the Comelec.The trial court denied the Comelec motion. Hence this certiorari. ISSUE: win the comelec action may be reviewed only on certiorari by the sc? HELD: NO. According to the constitution, the Comelec has the following functions: (1) enforcement of election laws; (2) decision of election contests; (3) decision of administrative questions; (4) deputizing law enforcement agencies; (5) registration of political parties; and (6) improvement of elections. What are revielwableon certiorari by the SC are those orders, decisions, etc., rendered in actions or proceedings before the Comelec in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Thus decisions of the COmelecon election contests or on administrative questions are subject to judicial review orily by the SC .. In this case, no Comelec adjudicatory power is exercised. As a public prosecutor, the Comelec has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute offenses punishable under the election code before the competent court. But when the Comelec files the information, the subsequent disposition of the case is subject to the court's approval. The COmeleccan't conduct reinvestigation unless so ordered by that court nor refuse its order of reinvestigation.

E. Recommend pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence of election law violators

Art. IX, C, Sec. 5.

No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

F. Deputize law enforcement agents and recommend their removal

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. xxx

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. xxx (8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard, or disobedience to its directive, order or decision. xxx
Tan IV. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 353 (1994) HELD: The COMELEC'sauthority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the COnstitution is virtually allencompassing when it comes to election matters. In respect particularly to sanctions against election offenses, we quote: "Sec. 2. functions: The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and

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xxx xxx xxx "(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. xxx xxx xxx. "(8) Recommendto the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision." Addifionally, Section 52, Article VII, of the Omnibus Election COde,provides:

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 40 of 110 "Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of eiections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall: "a. Exercisedirect and, immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMPcadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders. ''The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process be found guilty of such violation or failure." It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC,is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials a,ndemployees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided that upon the COMELEC's recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decisions or rulings of the COMELEC. Unavoidably, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first satisfy itself that there indeed has been an infraction of the law, or of its directives issued conformably therewith, by the person administratively charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC,being in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties, that should conduct the administrative inquiry. To say that the COMELECis without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of due processto the official or employee concerned. Observe, nevertheless, that the COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action but that it is the executive department to which the charged official or employee belongs which has the ultimate authQrity to impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detratt from, but is congruent with, the general administrative authority of the department of government concerned over its own personnel.

G. Registration of political parties, ACCREDITATION of citizens' arms

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organizations

and

coalitions

and

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. xxx

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 41 of 110

cancellation of their registration with the Commissions, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

* Section 80 of the 1965 Election Code and Section 22 of the 1971 Election Code defined a political party as an "organized group of persons pursuing the same political ideals in a government and includes its branches and di.visions." The 1978 Election Code adopted the aforequoted definition by providing in Section 199 that "any other group of persons pursuing the same political ideals in government may register with the Commission and be entitled to the same rights and privileges.
What is the importance of registration of a political party 1. Registration confers juridical personality on the party 2. It informs the public of the party's existence and ideals 3. It identifies the party ant its officers for purposes of regulation by the COMELEC The following shall not be registered: a. Religious denominations and sects. b. Those seeking to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means. c. Those refusing to uphold and adhere to this Constitution. d. Those which are supported by any foreign government.

* Financial contributions from foreign government and their, agencies to political parties or candidates related to elections constitute "interference in national affairs." and when accepted, shall be an additional ground for cancellation of registration, in addition to other penalties the law may prescribe.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 7.
No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Art. IX, C, Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions

registered under the party-list systems, shall not be presented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Art. VI, Sec. 5. xxx (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per

centum of the total number of representatives inclu.dingthose under

the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to the party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided bylaw, by selection or election from labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by
appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.

H. Regulation of public utilities and media of information Art. IX, C, Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment of utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation or transportatior' and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal oppor-

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 42 of 110

tunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure (i) equal opportunity, time and space, (ii) the right to reply, including reasonable equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and from among candidates, in connection with the object of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
UNIpO v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17 (1981) HELD: The Court views Section 5, Article XII-C as applicable also to plebiscites, particularly one relative to constitutional amendments. Be it borne in mind that it has been one of the most steadfast rulings of this Court in connection with such plebiscites that it is indispensable that they be properly characterized to be fair SUbmission-bywhich is meant that the voters must of necessity have had adequate opportunity, in the light of conventional wisdorj1,to cast their votes with sufficient understanding of what they are voting on. We are of the firm conviction that the charter's reference to honest elections connotes fair submission in a plebiscite. It cannot be otherwise, for then the. importance of suffrage for the election of officials would be more significantly valued than voting on the ratification of the constitution or any amendment thereof. We cannot yield to such an unorthodox constitutional concept that relegates the fundamental law of the land which is the source of all powers of the government to a level less valued than the men who would run the same. The provisions of all election laws regulating propaganda through the mass media, Section 41 of the Election Code of 1978, must be deemed applicable to plebiscites. Therefore, it is the duty of the Comelec to see to it that the sale of air time by TV and radio stations "insures that time equal as to the duration and quality is available to all candidates for the same office or political parties, groups or aggrupations at the same rates or given free of charge."
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PPIv. COMELEC, GR No. 119654, May 22,1995 HELD: To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half Page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The taking of private property for public use it, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purpose, or as an exhortion, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. section :2 of resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. Nati\:mal Press Club v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 84 (1989) FACTS: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were prevented from selling and donating space or air time for political advertisements under RA 6646. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purposes of such power are to ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums amoong candidates." Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and of accessto mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.
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Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 43 of 110 TELEBAP, Inc. v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998)

Q. The constitutionality of Sec. 92 of B.P. BIg. 881 (requiring radio and television station owners and operators
to give to the Comelec radio and television time free of charge) was challenged on the ground, among others, . that It violated the due process clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of radio and television stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize a taking which is not 'a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property." Will you sustain the challenge? HELD: All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted x x x shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congresswhen the common good so requires." (Art. XII, Sec. 11)

Indeed, provisions for ComelecTime have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and such provisions have not been thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, Sec. 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free airtime for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the Issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free airtime. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free airtime to candidates in an election.
I

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and television stations, the State spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations. It would be strange if it cannot even require the licenseesto render public service by giving free airtime. The claim that petitioner would be losing P52,380,OOO.OO in unrealized revenue from advertising is based on the assumption that airtime is "finished product" which, it is said, become the property of the company, like oil produced from refining or similar natural resources after undergoing a process for their production. As held in Red lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.CC, which upheld the right of a party personally attacked to reply, "licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of designated frequencies. but only the temporary privilege of using them." Consequently, "a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the F,irstAmendment which prevents the government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves." As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves. no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide airtime to the Comelec. Sanidad v. COMELEC, GR No. 90878, January 29, 1990
FACTS: Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: "Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. - During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues." Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather, it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express
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Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 44 of 110
his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime. This is provided under Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881. HELD: It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, incl\lding reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective officfi! is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section l1(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence. However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section l1(b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the . exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Come/ec, L-32546, OCt. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite. Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and or from campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is stili a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the' right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.

Adidng v. COMElEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)

FACTS: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347 insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limits their location or publication to authorized postiing areas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional.

right of free speech. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial government or public interest. Under the clear and present danger rule, not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's 11]0uth or a writing instrument to be stilled. Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displpying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but

RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental

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once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. Moreover, The restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

Art. IX, C, Sec. 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter. I. Decide election contests

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. xxx (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. Art. IX, C, Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en bane or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedures in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en bane. RA 7166, Sec. 22 Election Contests for Municipal Offices.-All election contests involving municipal offices with the Regional Trial Court shall be decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the Commission within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party. The Commission shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for decision, but not later than six (6) months after the filing of the appeal, which decision shall be final, unappealable, and executory. "Contests" Prior to the proclamation of the winning candidate, the case is deemed to be still in its administrative stage, and so is to be resolved by the COMELECunder its power to administer all election laws, and not under its authority as the sole judge of election contests. Only after a winner has been proclaimed can there be a "contest", with a contestant who seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to have himself installed into office. Under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), a ore-proclamation controversv concerns the regularity of proceedings of a board of canvassers. It includes the questions of: i) the legajity of the composition of the Board of Canvassers, and ii) questions of fraudulent election returns.
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Sec. 22.

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Candidates for public office usually grab the proclamation to be able to take the office, and thus anyone filing an electoral contest against the person would now find himself at a disadvantage because his opponent is now enjoying the power of the office. (Lagumbay v. COMELEC). Thus, the purpose of a pre- proclamation contest is to prevent the proclamation of tiis opponent. i. Municipal - original with the RTC; appeal to the COMELEC. II. Barangay - original with inferior court; appeal to COMELEC Appeal to the COMELECfrom the RTC must be filed within 5 days from receipt of a copy of the decision. A motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision is a prohibited pleading, and does not interrupt the running of the period for appeal.
Flores v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484 (1990)
HELD: Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that "decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable" applies only to questions of fact and not of law. That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution. We eschew a literal reading of that provision that would contradict such authority.

Ramas v. COMELEC, 286 SCRA 189 (1998)

In Gahol v. Riodique (64 SCRA 494), we explicitly ruled that the assumption of office provided for in the aforementioned section "is that of the protestant, which is made possible by the provisions of the Rules of Court regarding execution pending appeal, which is none other than Section 2 of Rule 39." . The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971 does not mean that execution of judgment pending appeal is no longer available in election cases. In election contests involving elective municipal officials, which are cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials, which are cognizable by courts of limited jurisdiction, execution of judgment pending appeal under section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are permissible pursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This Section 4 provides: SEC. 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (R143a). As to election cases involving regional, provincial, and city officials, which fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the authority to promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. Additionally, Section 52(c), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code empowers the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Code or other laws which it is required to enforce and administer. Accordingly, the COMELEC promulgated the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 41 thereof expressly provides that "[i]n the absence of any applicable provision in [said] Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippin~s shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect." This Court has explicitly recognized and given approval to execution of judgments pending appeal in election cases filed under existing election laws. In those cases, the immediate execution was made in accordance with Sectipn 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court 27 reading as follows:

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SEC. 2. Execution pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasonsto be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion and the special order shall be included therein. All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution should be based "upon good reasonsto be stated in special order." X x x In a nutshell, the following constitute "good reasons," and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending. The filing of a bond, which was mentioned in Toben Uy, does not conshtute a good reason. Nevertheless, the trial court may require the filing of a bond as a condition for the issuance of a corresponding writ of execution to answer for the payment of damages which the aggrieved party may suffer by reason of the execution pending appeal.

In the instant case, the trial court relied on the following as "good reasons" for its grant of execution pending appeal: (1) public interest, (2) near expiration of the term of office involved, and (3) pendency of the election protest for one year. The trial court cannot, therefore, be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the COMELEC acted correctly when it.denied SPRNo. 14-96. Edding v. COMELEC, 246 SCRA 502 (1995) HELD: The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the instant case when it enjoined the order of the RTCgranting petitioner's motion for immediate execution. The mere fjling of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending incidents. Where the motion for execution pending appeal was filed within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, as in the case at bench, the filing of a notice of appeal by the opposing party is of no moment and does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve the motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal because the Gourtmust hear and resolve it for it would become part of the records to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the motion at the time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the matter was resolved and was not lost by the subsequent action of the opposing party. Alunan III v. Mirasol, 276 SCRA 501 (1997) HELD: As already stated, by !i4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELECplaced the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG. Contrary to respondents' contention, this did not contravene Art. IX, C, !i2( 1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELECshall have the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of the COMELECin the same way that as we have recently held. contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. In Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors (243 SCRA422), it was contended that: COMELECResolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it prescribes a separate set of rules for the election of the SK Chairman different from and inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus Election Code, thereby contravening Section 2, Article 1 of the said Code which explicitly provides that "it shall govern all elections of public officers"; and, (b) it constitutes a total, absolute, and complete abdication by the COMELEC of its constitutionally and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all election laws as provided for in Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII of the Omnibus Election Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code. 9 Rejecting this contention, this Court, through Justice Davide, held: Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELEC'sexclusive appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Big. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. They were to be elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. They are also the same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and municipal trial courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to the RegionalTrial Courts.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 48 of 110 xxx XXX xxx In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution had made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His being an exofficio member of the sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang barangay members who are elected at large by those who are qualified.to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and who are duly registered voters of the barangay. . Taule v. Sec. santos, GR No. 90336, August 12, 1991 HELD: The jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined thrOl\gh the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Specifically, the term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes which do not characterize the election of officers in the katipunan ng mga barangay. "Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, milde before or after proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after th~ proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The authority of the COMELEC oyer the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective organization. Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 (1986)
Undbr the 1973 Constitution, even Pre-Proclamation Pambansa Must be Decided by the COMELEC en bane. Controversies Involving Members of the Batasang

FACTS: Petitioner Evelio Javier filed a petition for certiorari to annul a decision of the COMELEC'sSecond Division proclaiming Arturo Pacificador elected member of the BP representing Antique Province. He contended that under the 1973 Constitution, all contests, involving members of the BP, must be decided by the COMELEC en bane. Art. XII, C, Sec. 2 (2) of the 1973 Constitution provided that the COMELEC"(shall) be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all members of the BP and elective provincial and city officials," Sec. 3, on the other hand, provided that "All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the BP, w/c shall be heard and decided en bane." The former Sol.-Gen. argued that the controversy in this case is still in the administrative stage and so is to be resolved by the COMELEC under its power to administer all election laws, not under its authority as sole judge of election contests, because until one of the candidates was proclaimed, there could be no contest, in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to have himself inducted into office. On the other hand, the new Sol-Gen sought the dismissal of the case as moot and academic on the ground that the petitioner had been killed apparently for political reason and that the BP had been abolished after the Feb. 1986 Revolution. HELD: xxx (2) It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "preproclamation controversies" is a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only in 1978, through the 1978 Election Code. Before that time, all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers came under the complete jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not have been the intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth charter was imposed, to divide the electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first admin. and the second juridical.
Contests. -- The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 49 of 110 matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute.

Elections, returns and qualifications.-- The phrase "elections, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted
in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, holding of electoral campaign, and casting and counting of votes. "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty, or imiligibility, or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Sec. 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the BP be heard and decided by the Commission en bane was to insure the most careful consideration of such caset Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en bane only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are only too familiar wI the "grab-theproclamation-and-delay-the protest" strategy in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election.

*The jurisdiction of the COMELEC as the judge of election contests involving the election, returns, and qualifications of elective officials has been been restricted to elective local officials under the 1987 Constitution. The judge in the Presidential Election, as noted, is the SC acting as Electoral Tribunal. The judge in the Congressional elections, is the respective Electoral Tribuna.l of the Senate and House of Representatives.
Carlos v. Angeles, 346 SCRA 571 (2000)
HELD: The Supreme Court is vested with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus against the decision of,the regional trial court in the election protest case before it, regardless of whe~her it has appellate jurisdiction over such decision. Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "SECT10N5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: "( 1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus." xxx xxx xxx Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides that: "SECT10N1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its .or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46." By Constitutional fiat, the Commission on Election (Comelec) has appellate jurisdiction over election protest cases involving elective municipal officials decided by courts of general jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX (C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution: "SECT10N2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: "(1) "(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate

,
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jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial. courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." In like manner, the Comelec has original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This point has been settled in the case of Re/ampagos vs. Cumba (243 SCRA 690), where we held: "In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases.We now hold that the last"paragraph of section 50 of B.P. Big. 697 providing as follows: The Commission is vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisQiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." (Emphasis ours). Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent jurisdiq:ion to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (regional trial courts) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusivejurisdiction over the case.

8. RULE MAKING Art. IX, A, Sec. 6. Each Commission en bane may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Art. IX, C, Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en bane or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedures in order to expedite disposition of election cases,".including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en bane. *Should there be a conflict between a rule of procedure promulgated by the COMELEC and a Rule of Court, if the proceeding is before the COMELEC,the COMELECrule should prevail; but if the proceeding is in court, the Rules of Court should prevail.
Soller v. COMELEC, GR No.139853, september 5, 2000
HELD: Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution reads:

''TherCommission on Elections may sit en bane or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Commissionen bane," Thus, in Sarmiento vs. COMELEC (212 SCRA307) and in subsequent cases, we ruled that the COMELEC, sitting en. bane, does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including preproclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en bane as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void. As can be gleaned from the proceedings aforestated, petitioner's petition with the COMELEC was not referred to a division of that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly to the Commission en bane. The petition for certiorari assails the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss pfivate respondent's election protest. The questioned order of the trial court is interlocutory because it does not end the trial court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other. In our

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page Sl of 110 view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banco Note that the order denying the motion to dismiss is but an incident of the election protest. If the principal case, once decided on the merits, is cognizable on appeal by a division of the COMELEC, then, there is no reason why petitions for certiorari relating to incidents _ of election protest should not be referred first to a division of the COMELECfor resolution. Clearly, the COMELECen banc acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizanceof petitioner's petition in the first instance.

What the Constitutions says must be heard en banc are. motions for reconsideration of "decisions", that is resolutions of substantive issues.

* Even cases appealed from the RTC or the MTC have to be heard and decided in Division of the COMELEC before they may be heard en banc on motion for recOnsideration
Canicosa v. COMElEC, GR No. 120318, December S, 1997 HELD: canicosa finally insists that it was error on the part of COMELEC sitting en banc to rule on his petition. He maintains that his petition should have first been heard by a division of COMELECand later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for reconsideration, pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the Constitution. But this provision applies only when the COMELECacts in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions and not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions. To reiterate, the grounds cited by canicosa in his petition are that: (a) the names of the registered voters did not appear in the list of voters in their respective precincts; (b) more than one-half of the legitimate registered voters were not able to vote with strangers voting in their stead; (c) he was credited with less votes. than he actually received; (d) the controi data of the election returns was not filled up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer were unsecured, i. e., without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in the delivery of election returns. Clea~iy,all these matters require the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions. section 2, Art. IX-C of the- 1987 Constitution grants extensive administrative powers to the COMELECwith regard to the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. Likewise, Sec. 52 of BP Big. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, states: Sec. 52.Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections ... Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that the COMELECis mandated to hear and decide cases first by Division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en bancoThis is when it is jurisdictional. In the instant case, as aforestated, the issues presented demand only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions. Ramirez v. COMElEC, 270 SCRA (1997) HElb: Although in Ong, Jr. V. COMELEC (216 SCRA 806) it was said that "By now it is settled that election cases which include pre-proclamation controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of the Commission" - and a petition for correction of manifest error in the Statement of Votes, like SPCNo. 95-198 is a pre-proclamation controversy - in none of the cases cited to support this proposition was the issue the correction of a manifest error in the Statement of Votes under !i231 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 6216 SCRA806 (1992). Big. 881) or !i15 of R.A. No. 7166. On the other hand, Rule 27, !is of the 1993 Rules of the COMELECexpressly provides that pre-proclamation controversies involving, inter alia, manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with the COMELEC en banc, thus !is. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly With the Commission. (a) The following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the Commission: xxx xxx xxx 2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors .in the tabulation or tallying of the results during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3)

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 52 of 110 there had been a mistake in the copying of the figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates had already been made. xxx xxx xxx (e) The petition shall be heard and decided by the Commissionen bane. Accordingly in castromayor v. Commission on Elections (250 5CRA 298), and Mentang v. Commission on Elections (229 SCRA666), this Court approved the assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC en bane over petitions for correction of manifest error directly filed with it. Our decision today in Torres v.COMELEC (G.R. No. 121031, March 26, 1997) again gives imprimatur to the exercise by the COMELEC en bane of the power to decide petition for correction of manifest error. . Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, 244 SCRA 41 {1995} HELD: The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC,raises a fundamental question. He contends that the filind of the present petition without petitioner first filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en bane, violates Art. IX, A, Sec. 7 of the Constitution because under this provision only decisions of the COMELEC en bane may be brought to the Supreme Couit on certiorari. This is correct. It is now settled that in providing that the decisions, orders and rulings of COMELEC"may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari" the Constitution in its Art. IX, A, Sec. 7 means the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, Sec. 1. Since a basic condition for bringing such action is that the petitioner first file a motion for reconsideration, it follows that petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to his present action.

9. OTHER FUNCTIONS

Art. IX, A, Sec. 8.

Each Commission shall perform functions as may be provided by law.

such other

sanchez v. COMELEC, GR No. L-55513, June 19, 1982 ISSUE: Does the COMELEChave the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of postelection terrorism? HELD: It may be true that there is no specific provision vesting the COMELECwith authority to annul an election. However, there is no doubt either relative to COMELEC's extensive powers. Under the Constitution, the COMELECis tasked with the function to "enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections." The 1978 Election Code (PO No. 1296) accords it exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections (Sec. 185). The COMELECfound that the local election in San Fernando, Pampanga, was vitiated by post-election widespread and pervasive terrorism and resulted in the submission of gun-point or coerced" returns. In other words, there were no election returns worthy of faith and credit and from which could be gauged a fair and true expression of the popular will. Its action, therefore, of rejecting all ele9:ion returns and annulling the local elections thereat was but in keeping with its constitutionally ordained power of administration and enforcement of election laws and its main objective to insure free, orderly and honest elections. As it has been rightly said "an election return prepared at the point of a gun is no return at all; it is not one notch above a falsified and spurious return." The Comelec has the power to reject returns when in its opinion they were iIIeg~1and not authentic. In fact, it has the duty to disallow obviously false or fabricated returns as a falsified or spurious return amounts to no return at all. Admittedly, in Abes vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252 (1967), this Court had ruled that the COMELECis bereft of power to annul an election or to direct a new one. Then, we said: . "Enforcement and administration of all election laws by Comelec do not include the power to annul an election which may not have been free, orderly and honest, as such power is merely preventive, and not curative, and if it fails to accomplish that purpose, it is not for such body to cure or remedy the resulting evil, but for some other agencies of the Government: the senate Electoral Tribunal, the House Electoral Tribunal or the courts, as the case may be, who have the power to decide election contests (Nacionalista Party vs. Comelec, 85 Phil. 149, 155156)."

1st

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 53 of 110

That case was decided, however, under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution and the former Revised Election Code. Sincethen, the powers of the COMELEC have been considerably expanded. It is now "the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansaand elective provincial and city officials", where before the power to decide election contests was lodged with the Senate ElectoralTribunal, the House Electoral Tribunal, or the Courts, as the case may be. In other words, in line with the plenitude of its powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELECmust be deemed possessed of authority to annul elections where the will of the voters has been defeated and the purity of elections sullied. It would be unreasonable to state that the COMELEChas a legal duty to perform and at the same time deny it the wherewithal to fulfill that task. ". . . the Commission must be given considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created-to promote free, orderly and honest elections." As then Justice Enrique M.Fernando, now the Chief Justice, pointed out in his concurring opinion in
Jr., vs. COMELEC, 32 SCRA 319 (1970):

Antonio,

"Where majority of the voters of a province failed to cast their votes due to widespread terrorism committed the Commission on Elections should annul the canvass and the proclamation of the winning candidate.... " The fact that widespread terrorism occurred after the elections, and not in the casting of votes, should make no difference. ISSUE: Does the COMELEC have the authority to call for a special election?
HELD: As the laws now stand, however, COMELEChas been explicitly vested with the authority to "call for the holding or continuation of the election." Thus, section 5 of Batas PambansaBig. 52 explicitly provides:

"Sec. 5. Failure of Election. - Whenever for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure and other analogous cases of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible, the election for a local office fails to take place on the date fixed by law, or is suspended, or such election results in a failure to elect, the Commission on Elections shall, on the basis of a verified. petition and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election as soon as practicable." Section 7 of the Election Code of 1978 (PD No. 1296) similarly provides: "sec. 7. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, or fraud the election in any voting center has not been held on the date fixed or has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting and such failure or suspension of election in any voting center would affect the result of the election, the Commission may on the basis of a verified petition and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held or suspended." Section 8 of the same 1978 Election Code empowers the COMELEC to call a special election to fill a vacancy or a netviy created elective position. "SEC.8.call of special election. - Special elections shall be called by the Commission by proclamation on a date to be fixed by it, which shall specify the offices to be voted for, that it is for the purpose of filling a vacancy or a newly created elective position, as the case may be." Clearly, under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52, above-quoted, when the election "results in a failure to elect, the COMELECmay call for the' holding or continuation of the election as soon as practicable." We construe this to include the calling of a special election in the event of a failure to elect in order to make the COMELEC truly effective in the discharge of its functions. In fact, Section 8 of the 1978 Election Code, supra specifically allows the COMELECto call a special election for the purpose of filling a vacancy or a newly created position, as the case may be. There should be no reason, therefore, for not allowing it to call a special election when there is a failure to elect. .

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page S4 of 110

10. ACT AS NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR SENATORS EO 144, Sec. 2, March 2, 1987 Sec. 2. Board of Canvassers.-The Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections sitting en banc shall be the National Board of Canvassers for the election of Senators. It shall canvass all certificates of canvass coming from and prepared by the district, provincial, and city boards of canvassers (of those cities which comprise one or more legislative districts.)
Furthermore, there shall be a board of canvassers for each province, city, municipality and district of Metropolitan Manila, as follows: (a) Provincial board of canvassers.-- The provincial board of canvassers shall be composed of the provincial election supervisor or a senior lawyer in the regional office of the Commission, as chairman, the provincial fiscal, as vicechairman, and the provincial superintendent of schools, as members. This board shall canvass certificates of canvass from the municipalities and the cities which do not comprise at least one legislative district. It shall proclaim as elected the candidates for the House of Representatives who obtained the highest number of votes in the respective legislative districts. With respect to the election of senators, the provincial board of canvassers.shall prepare in duplicate a certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each municipality/ city, and transmit the first copy thereof to the Commission on Elections for canvassing. The second copy shall be kept by the provincial election supervisor.

(b) City Boards of Canvassers for cities comprlsmg one or more legislative districts.-- The city board of canvassers for cities comprising one or" more legislative districts shall be composed of the city election registrar or lawyer of the Commission, as chairman, the city fiscal, as vice-chairman, and the city superintendent of schools as member.
This board shall canvass election returns coming from the polling places within the jurisdiction of the city, and shall proclaim as elected the candidate or candidates for the House of Representatives who obtained the highest number of votes in the legislative district or respective legislative districts. With respect to the election of senators, this board shall prepare in duplicate certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each polling place and transmit the first copy to the Commission on Elections for canvassing. The second copy shall be kept by the city election registrar. (c) District Board of Canvassers.-- The district board of canvassers shall be composed of a lawyer of the Commission, as chairman, and a ranking fiscal in the district, as vice-chairman, and the most district school supervisor in the district, as member, to be appointed by the Commission upon consultation with the Department of Justice and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports respectively. This board shall canvass election returns coming from the polling places within the jurisdiction of the district and shall proclaim as elected the candidate for the House of Representatives who obtained the highest number of votes in the legislative district. With respect to the election for senators, the same procedure shall be followed by this board as that observed by the city board of canvassers for cities comprising one or more legislative districts. . (d) City/ Municipal Board of Canvassers.-The city (for cities not comprising at least one legislative district) or municipal board of canvassers shall

Hand Out NO.8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.u.P. College of Law Page 55 of 110 be composed of the city/ municipal election registrar, as chairman, the city fiscal! municipal treasurer, as the case may be, as vice-chairman, and the city superintendent/ district supervisor or in his absence any public school principal, as the case may be, as member. The board shall canvass election returns coming from the polling places within its jurisdiction, but shall not proclaim any winner in the election for Members of the House of Representatives or for Senators. This board shall prepare in triplicate a certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each polling place, and transmit the first copy thereof to the provincial board of canvassers for canvassing. The second copy shall be transmitted to the Commission for record purposes and the third copy shall be kept by the city/ municipal election registrar.

11. REVIEW OF COMELECDECISIONS, ORDERS, AND RESOLUTIONS

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

Art. IX, A, Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority of all

its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Flores v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484 (1990) FACTS: RF was proclaimed as punong barangay. His election was protested by NR. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court sustained NR & installed him as punong barangay. RF appealed to the RTC which affirmed the challenged decision. RF then went to the COMELECbut his appeal was dismissed on the ground that the COM,ELEC had no power to review the decision of the RTCbased in Sec. 9 of RA 6679 (Local Gov't Code)

ISSUE: Wlin the COMELEC has jurisdiction

HELD: Under Art IX-C, Sec 2(2) of the Constitution, the COMELEC shall have jurisdiction, hence, Sec. 9 of RA 6679 insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay case should be appealed to the RTCmust be declared unconstitutional.

P had a right to presume the law as valid. Hence his appeal to the RTCwould be considered as an appeal to the COMELEC. Decisionsof the COMELEC on election contests involving municipal & barangay officer shall be final & unappealable with respect to questions of fact & not of law. Art IX-6 Sec 2(2) of the Constitution was not intended to divert the SC of its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 56 of 110 Galido v. COMElEC, 193 SCRA 78 (1991) FACTS: In an election contest involving the elected mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. The COMELEC declared Galeon as the duly elected mayor. Fifteen ballots in the name of his rival, Galido, was invalidated for being marked ballots. Galido filed the petition for certiorari & injunction with a prayer for a restraining order. Galeon moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that according to the Constitution, Art IX (C) Sec 2 (2), final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final & executory & not appealable. Galido cited Art IX (A) Sec. 7 which said that the decision may be brought to the Sc. ISSUE:

WIn decisions of the COMELECare appealable

HElb: Yes. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELECin contests involving executory & not appealable does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action of certiorari. A study of the case would however show that the COMELECcommitted NO grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned decision. Rivera v. COMElEC, 199 SCRA 178 (1991) FACTS: Petitioner Rivera & private respondent Garcia were candidates for the position of mayor during the local elections in Jan 1988. In an election contest between, Garcia was proclaimed mayor. Rivera appealed the said decision but said decision was affirmed by the COMELEC. R filed a petition with the SC seeking annulment of the COMELEC decision. He contends that the decision has not yet become final & executory. G however contends that the decisions of the COMELECon election contests involving elective municipal & barangay officials are final, executory & not appealable. ISSUE: WIn decisions of the COMELEC on election contests involving elective municipal & barangay officials are unappealble
1

HELD: No. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the

COMELECin contests involving elective municipal & barangay officials are final, executory and not appealable does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way .of a special action of certiorari. (Galido v. Comelec.)

12. FISCAL AUTONOMY Art. IX, A, Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

C. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
1. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS Art. IX, D, Sec. 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession.
Art. VII, sec. 13. xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,

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chairmenor headsof bureausor offices, includinggovernmentownedor controlled corporations andtheir subsidiaries. Qualifications: 1. Natural born Filipino citizen 2. At least 35 years old 3. CPAwith not less than 10 years of auditing experienceor Lawyerswith at least 10 years of practice of law 4. Not have been candidates in the election immediately preceding his appointment

* A~no time shall all members belongto the same profession

2. APPOINTMENT AND TERM OF COMMISSIONERS Art. IX, D, Sec. 1. xxx (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In' no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or. acting capacity. 3. ~PPOINTMENT OF COA PERSONNEL Art. IX, A, Sec. 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law. 4. SALARY Art. IX, A, Sec. 3. The salary of the .Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and sha'il not be decreased during their tenure. Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise x x x and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions (shall receive), two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
I

The salary, of course, can be increasedand the increasecan take effect at once, since, like the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissionshave no part in the passageof such a law. 5. DISQUALIFICATIONS Art. IX, A, Sec. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

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No members of a Constitutional Commission shall during his "tenure": a. Hold any other office or employment. This is similar to the prohibition against executive officers. public and private offices and employment. b. Engage in the practice of any profession. c. Engage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office. d. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCsor their subsidiaries. 6. IMPEACHMENT Art. XI, Sec. 2. The members of the Constitutional Commissions may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes, or betraYill of public trust. 7. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS Art. IX, D, Sec. 2. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and .properties.
\

It applies to both

Art. IX, D, Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any

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investment of public Commission on Audit.

funds,

from

the

jurisdiction

of

the

Art. VI, Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each member. Q: What is the general function of the Commission on Audit? A: ~t is the function of the Commission on Audit to examine the accuracy of the records kept by accountable officers and to determine whether expenditures have been made in conformity with law. It is therefore through the Commission on Audit that the people can verify whether their money has been properly spent. Q: Classify the functions of the Commission on Audit. A: They may be classified thus: (1) to examine and audit all forms of government revenues; (2) to examine and audit all forms of government expenditures; (3) to settle government accounts; (4) to promulgate accounting and auditing rules "including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures;" and (5) to decide administrative cases involving expenditures of public funds.
OROCIO v. COA, 213 SCRA 109 (1992)
HELD: The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under the COA's audit power. Under the 1973 Constitution, which was the Constitution in force at the time the disallowance in question was made, the eOA had the power to, inter alia, examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations; and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds or property. The 1987 Constitution preserves this power and function and grants the COA: "... exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions conferred upon the COA a more active role and invested it with broader and more extensive powers. These were not meant to make it a toothless tiger, but a dynamic, effective, efficient and independent watchdog of the Government.

In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency or instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable,the COAshould not be bound by the opinion of the legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may have been the basis for the questioned disbyrsement; otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger and its auditing function would be a meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon lights then should be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its rules and regulations. In the instant case, on the basis of the pertinent documents attached to the pleadings, the COA auditor had every reason to believe that the disbursement of P53,802.26 by the NPCas a refund to the OPLGSfor the hospitalization expenses of Abodizo, on the theory that the NPCwas actually liable under the law on quasi-delict, as determined by the petitions, was irregular, if not illegal. Other than the report of Mapili and Barrera dated 27 May 1982, there is no competent evidence to show that either the NPCor any of its employees were responsible for the accident. ... We find petitioner's proposition to be a bit outlandish; he overrates the power of the General Counsel of the NPCand belittles the authority of the COA. While it may be true that Section 15-A of R.A. No. 639S (charter of the NPC)provides that all legal matters shall be handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation, it by no means follows that all legal opinions of the General Counsel are ex-cathedra and binding upon all. In short, said provision does not confer upon him any degree of infallibility. It would have been dangerous if it were otherwise for not only would he be able to inextricably and unjustly bind the corporation or compel it to abide by his legal opiniGmeven if it were wrong, he would also subordinate this Court to such opinion even if this Court is the final authority on how the law should be read. Petitioner's theory destroys the very essenceof the public trust character of a public office. He should be reminded - just as others in government service - of Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which reads: "Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
j

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U:P. College of Law Page 60 of 110 to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." The eOA, both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is a collegial body. It must resolve cases presented to it as such Its General Counsel cannot act for the Commission for he is not even a Commissioner thereof. He can only offer legal advice or render an opinion in order to aid the COA in the resolution of a case or a legal question. PAL v. COA, 245 SCRA 39 (1995) HELD: Pursuant to the government's privatization program, PAL'sshares of stock were bidded out early this year, resulting in the acquisition by PR Holdings, a private corporation, of 67% of PAL'soutstanding stocks. PAL,I having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has clearly become moot and academic. The eOA is clothed under 5ection 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution with the "exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules, and regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." The authority granted under this constitutional provision, being broad and comprehensive enough, enables COA to adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of repromulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may aiso expand the coverage thereof to agencies to instrumentalities under its audit jurisdiction. Mamaril v. Domingo, 227 SCRA 206 (1993) HELD: The responsibility for state audit is vested by the Constitution on the Commission on Audit. UndElrthe Constitution, the COA "shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts, pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, ... However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto." (Italics Supplied; Art. IX-D, Sec. 2, par. 1). Section 2(2) of the above article states that the eOA is given the "exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the technique and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, ... " (Italics supplied). . As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions of the Constitution, state audit is not limited to the auditing of the accountable officers and the settlement of accounts, but includes accounting functions and the adoption in the audited agencies of internal controls to see to it, among other matters, that the correct fees and penalties due the government are collected.
I

The'verification of the correctness of the evaluation and computation of the fees and penalties collectible under the Land Transportation Law (R.A. No. 4136) are parts of the functions of the COA, which examines and audits revenue accounts (The Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, P.O. No. 1445, sec. 60). When any person is indebted to any government agency, the COA may direct the proper officer to withhold the payment of any money due such person or his estate to be applied in satisfaction of the' indebtedness (P. D. No. 1445, sec. 37). Likewise, under the Manual on certificate of Settlement and Balances, a government auditor is empowered to order the withholding of the payment of any money due a person determined to be liable for disallowances, suspensions, and, other deficiencies in the accounts audited (sec. 39). Sambeli v. Province of lsabela, 210 SCRA 80 (1992) HELD: In the exercise of the regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution, the Commission on Audit adheres to the policy the government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. On the proposition that improper or wasteful spending of public funds or immoral use of government property, for being highly irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant,
I

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.o.P. College of Law Page 61 of 110 offends the sovereign people's will, it behooves the COmmissionon Audit to put a stop thereto. (Tantuico, State Audit Code Philippine~ p. 23S) In the cases of Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audi~ 17S SCRA701 (1989) and D.M. Consunji Inc. v. Commissionon Audi~ 199 SCRAS49 (1991), We defined the role of the COA in this wise: "... No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COAshall.have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or use of government funds and properties." (Art. IX ~ Sec. 2(2) 1987 Constitution of the Philippines} (emphasis supplied) Indeed, not only is the Commission on Audit (COA) vested with the power and authority, but is also charged with the duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to ... the expenditure or uses of funds ... owned by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities (Article IX (D-l) Section 2(1J 1987 Constitution). That authority extends to the accounts of all persons respecting,funds or properties received or held by them in any accountable capacity. (Section 2~ P.O. No. 144S). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal responsibility that rests directly with the head of the government agency has been properly and effectively discharged (Section 2S (1) ibid), and whether or not there has been loss or wastage of government resources. It is also empowered to review and evaluate contracts. (Section 18 (4J ibid.). And, after an audit has been made, its auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each officer whose account has been audited and settled in whole or in part, stating the balances found due thereon and certified, and the charges or differences arising from the settlement by reason of disallowances, charges or suspensions. (Sec. 82, ibid) (Dingcong v. Guingona 162 SCRA782) DBP v. COA, 373 SCRA 356 (2002) ISSUE: Is the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit government banks and agencies exclusive? Does it preclude a concurrent audit by a private external auditor?
HELD: The resolution of the primordial issue of whether or not the COA has the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit government banks involves an interpretation of Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 COnstitution. This Section provides as follows:

"Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authori~ and duty to examine, audi~ and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned and held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, x x x. "(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive authority, subjeq: to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." (Emphasis supplied) The eOA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2, the COA enjoys the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies, including the DBP. The COA contends this is similar to its sole and exclusive authority, under the same paragraph of the same section, to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, including rules on the disallowance of unnecessary expenditures of government agencies. The bare language of Section 2, however, shows that the COA'spower under the first paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph is expressly declared "exclusive." There is a significant reason for this marked difference in language. During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, COmmissioner Serafin Guingona proposed the addition of the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2, thereby granting the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies. However, the Constitutional Commission rejected the addition of the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2 and Guingona was forced to withdraw his proposal. X x x Xxx

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 62 of 110 In sharp contrast, the Constitutional Commission placed the word "exclusive" to qualify the authority of the COA under the second paragraph of the same Section 2. This word "exclusive" did not appear in the counterpart provisions of Section 2 in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. There is no dispute that the COA's authority under the second paragraph of Section 2 is exclusive as the language of the Constitution admits of no other meaning. Thus, the COA has the exclusive authority to decide on disallowances of unnecessary government expenditures. Other government agencies and their officials, as well as private auditors engaged by them, cannot in any way intrude into this exclusive function of the COA. The qualifying word "exclusive" in the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to the first paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A qualifying word is intended to refer only to the phrase to which it is immediately associated, and not to a phrase distantly located in another paragraph or sub-section. Thus, the first paragraph of Section 2 must be read the way it appears, without the word "exclusive," signifying that non-COAauditors can also examine and audit government agencies. Besides,the framers of the Constitution intentionally omitted the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audit by private external auditors. The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA'sauthority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessaryexpenditures is exclusive. Xxx Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad. . In these instances the government enters the marketplace and competes with the rest of the world in attracting investments or loans. To succeed, the government must abide with the reasonable business practices of the marketplace. Otherwise no investor or creditor will do business with the government, frustrating government efforts to attract investments or secure loans that maybe critical to stimulate moribund industries or resuscitate a badly shattered national economy as in the case at bar. By design the Constitution is flexible enough to meet these exigencies. Any attempt to nullify this flexibility in the instances mentioned, or in similar instances, will be ultra vires, in the absence of a statute limiting or removing such flexibility. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal eloquently the intent of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution. As this Court has ruled repeatedly, the intent of the law is the controlling factor in the interpretation of the law. If a law needs interpretation, the most dominant influence is the intent of the law. The intent of the law is that which is expressed in the words of the law, which should be discovered within its four corners aided, if necessary, by its legislative history. In the case of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the intent of the framers of the Constitution is evident from the bare language of Section 2 itself. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm expressly an<! even elucidate further this intent beyond any doubt whatsoever. There is another constitutional barrier to the COA's insistence of exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies. The COA's claim clashes directly with the central Bank's constitutional power of "suprrvision" over banks under Section 20, Article XII of the Constitution. X x x Historically, the Central Bank has been conducting periodic and special examination and audit of banks to determine the soundness of their operations and the safety of the deposits of the public. Undeniably, the Central Bank's power of "supervision" includes the power to examine and audit banks, as the banking laws have always recognized this power of the Central Bank. Hence, the COA's power to examine and audit government banks must be reconciled with the Central Bank's power to supervise the same banks. The inevitable conclusion is that the COA and the central Bank have concurrent jurisdiction, under the Constitution, to examine and audit government banks. However, despite the Central Bank's concurrent jurisdiction over government banks, the COA's audit still prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA is the constitutionally mandated auditor of government banks. And in matters falling under the second paragraph of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA'sjurisdiction is exclusive. Thus, the Central Bank is devoid of authority to allow or disallow expenditures of government banks since this function belongs exclusively to the COA.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 63 of 110
ISSUE: Between the CONs findings and conclusions and that of private auditors, which should prevail? HELD: Moreover, as the constitutionally-mandated auditor of all government agencies, the CONs findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned. The superiority or preponderance of the COA audit over private audit can be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission x x x. The findings and conclusions of the private auditor may guide private investors or creditors who require such private audit. Government agencies and officials, however, remain bound by the findings and conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls under the first or second paragraph of Section 2, unless of course such findings and conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts. ISSUE: May the power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies be validly taken away from it? HELD: The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while non-exclusive, take~ away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that: cannot be

"Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit." The mere fact that private auditors may audit government examine and audit the same government agencies. agencies does not divest the COA of its power to

Q: What is meant by the power of the Commission to "settle accounts?"

A: It means the power to settle liquidated accounts, that is, those accounts which may be adjusted simply by an arithmetical process. It does not include the power to fix the amount of an unfixed or undetermined debt. Compania Ge,neral de Tabacos v. French and Unson, 39 Phil. 34, 42 (1919). Another way of looking at this power was stated by Guevara v. Gimenez, 6 SCRA 807, 813 (1962) thus: Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor General, in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust by, the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof (Article XI, section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; Whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in conformity with said appropriation law;whether the goods or services covered by said contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisionsthereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials of the corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. It should be noted, however, that whereas under Article XI, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution the Auditor General could not correct "irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant" expenditures of public funds but could only "bring the matter to the attention of the proper administrative officer," under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions the Commission on Audit may "promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds and property." Hence, since the Commission on Audit must ultimately be responsible for the enforcement of these rules and regulations, it is submitted that failure to comply with these regulations can be a ground for disapproving the payment of a proposed expenditure. (Bernas)
Dingcong v. Guingona, 162 SeRA 782 (1988)
HELD: Not only is the Commission on Audit (COA) vested with the power and authority, but it is also charged with the duty, to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to ... the expenditures or uses of funds .. . owned ... by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities

-!

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.u.P. College of Law Page 64 of 110 (Article IX [DJ. Section 2 [1), 1987 Constitution). That authority extends to the accounts of all persons respecting funds or properties received or held by them in an accountable capacity (Section 26, P. D. No. 1445). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal responsibility that rests directly with the head of the government agency has been properly and effectively discharged (section 25[1], ibid.), and whether or not there has been loss or wastage of government resources. It is also empowered to review and ,evaluate contracts (Section 18 [4], ibid.). And, after an audit has been made, its auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each officer whose account has been audited and settled in whole or in part, stating the balances found due thereon and certified, and the charges or differences arising from the settlement by reason of disallowances, charges or suspensions(Section 82, ibid.) Maritime, Inc. v. COA, GR No. 85285, JulV 28, 1989
HELD: We see no reason to disturb the interpretation given by the CGAto the term "public bidding" and what constitutes its "failure." No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COAshall have exclusive authority to dj.!fine the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds and properties.

The phrase "public auction" or "public bidding" imports a sale to the highest bidder with absolute freedom for competitive bidding. Competitive bidding requires that there be at least two (2) bidders who shall compete with each other on an equal footing for winning the award. If there is only one participating bidder, the bidding is non-competitive and, hence, falls short of the requirement. There would, in fact, be no bidding at all since, obviously, the lone participant cannot compete against himself. ' Well settled is the rule that the construction by the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a statute should be given controlling weight. In the absence of error or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion already conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment creating or charging a governmental agency with the administration and enforcement thereof, the action of the agency would not be disturbed by the judicial department. Osmena v. COA, 238 SCRA 463 (1994)
I

HELD: The Court believes that public respondents' disallowance of the appropriation is indeed tainted by grave abuse of discretion and should be correspondingly rectified.

There is to be sure no question that under the Constitution, respondent CGA has the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of, and expenditures, and uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by" or pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. In the exercise of its broad powers, particularly its auditing functions, the COA is guided by certain principles and state policies to assure that "government funds shall be managed, expended, utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguard against loss or wastage . . . with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of government." There can thus be no question of the COA'scompetence to act on the supplemental budget for 1989 of the City of Cebu. Whether it acted in the exercise of sound discretion in respect thereto is another matter. It appears to the Court that respondent COA grievously misconstrued the undertaking of Cebu City to pay P30,pOO.00 to the heirs of the deceased Reynaldo de la Cerna. For some reason, perhaps partly because of the ,Imprecise phraseology of the Sangguniang Panlungsod's resolution, 10 respondent considered that undertaking as simply furnishing "monetary assistancethat would promote the economic condition and private interests of certain individuals only, ... said financial assistance ... definitely (having) no causal relation to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the community." The appropriation of P30,000.00 by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City was considered by respondent out of context; it was construed as intended only to promote the private interests of the de la Cerna family, as merely a form of financial assistanceto a bereaved family without causal relation to the general welfare of the community. In truth, as respondent was well aware, the appropriation was a part of the package agreed upon by all the parties in Civil case No. 4275 of the Cebu RTC for the amicable settlement of the controversy; it may not be considered independently of said amicable settlement; it would be meaningless unless considered in the context of the compromise of the case. The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P. U.P. College of Law Page 65 of 110 corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law. A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that it expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code and is therein dealt with in some detail. "A compromise," declares Article 2208 of said Code, "is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.
1I

x x x
That the City of cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated.by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure, particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30,000.00 to the de la cerna family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, as well as the obligption to pay just and valid claims against it. Obviously, respondent refused to take account of the foregoing legal principles in relation to the antecedents of the provision in the supplemental budget of the City for payment of P30,000.00. It failed to realize that payment thereof was part of the consideration, not merely for the settlement of a claim, but for the settlement of an actual controversy, and constituted one of the "reciprocal concessions" which the law considers "the very heart and life of every compromise," By making reciprocal concessions,the parties in Civil case No. 4275 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 23) put an end to the action in a manner acceptable to all of them. The City thus eliminated the contingency of being made to assume heavier liability in said suit for damages instituted against it in connection with its operation and management of the Cebu City Medical Center, activities being undertaken by it in its proprietary (as distinguished from its government) functions and in accordance with which it may be held liable ex contractu or ex delito, for the negligent performance of its corporate, proprietary or businessfunctions. It is noteworthy that the compromise in question was approved by, and embodied in the judgment of, the Court, which pronounced it "to be in conformity with law, morals and public policy" and enjoined the parties "to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof." This I judicial compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties, including the City of cebu. It is enforceable by execution, as above stressed. There was no reason whatever to object to it, much less disallow any disbursement therein stipulated. It should have been approved as a matter of course.
Bustamante v. COA, 216 SCRA 134 (1992)

FACTS: Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for the Northern Luzon Region Center covering the provinces of Rizal up to Batanes. As such he was issued a government vehicle with plate number SCC387. Pursuant to NPC policy as reflected in the Board Resolution No. 81-95 authOrizing the monthly disbursement of transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the use of Government vehicle, claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. On May 31, 1990, the petitioner received an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April 17, 1990 from respondent Regional Auditor Martha Roxana caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing afores?id transportation allowance. HELD: In the exercise of its power under Article IX - D, section 2 the COA promulgated COA.Circular No. 756 dated November 7, 1975, regulating the use of government motor vehicles, aircrafts and watercrafts, which, among others, provides:

"VI. Prohibition Against Use of transportation allowance -

Government Vehicles by Officials provided with

"No official who has been furnished motor transportation allowance by any government corporations or other office shall be allowed to use motor vehicle transportation operated and maintained from funds appropriated in the abovecited Decree. (Sec. 14, P.O. 733r The petitioner takes exception from the coverage of said circular contending that such circular did not mention the NPCas one of the corporations/offices covered by it. We do not agree with him for it is very patent that the circular is addressed, among others, to managing heads of Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, the NPCbeing held under such category of corporations. Petitioner goes on to argue that existing NPCpolicy grants transportation allowance to employees in the likes of petitioner. Under the NPC Charter, R.A. 6395, petitioner contends that the NPC has the power to formulate and adopt policies and measures for the management and operation ofthe NPC.3 Pursuant thereto, NPCpassed Resolution No. 81-95 dated April 20. 1981 authorizing the monthly reimbursement of representation and transportation allowance. This was

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 66 of 110

implemented by Circular 81-11 dated April 22, 1988. He then contends that the COA Circular Nos. 75-6 and 75-6A should be limited in their application to the NPC. We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's contention that the Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by the Constitution, usurped the statutory functions of the NPC,Board of Directors for it leads to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of a government-owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a resolution, can put to naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of the Filipino peopie. If We will not sustain the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to this particular expenditure or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC,We will be rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property. The factual finding of the Commission that petitioner was indeed assigned a government vehicle is conclusive upoc' this Court. The petitioner faults respondent Regional Auditor for relying on her serious doubts as to the nature of the use of the vehicle assigned to petitioner as basis for the disallowance. We hold, however, that such issue is immaterial in the case at bar for the COA circular, in prohibiting the use of motor vehicles .by officials receiving transportation allowance, is categorical. The use of government motor vehicle and the claim for transportation allowance are mutually exclusive. It is on this basis that the P1,250.00 transportation allowance was disallowed. Construed in the light of the applicable law and rules on the matter, the decision of the Commissioneron Audit disallowing the petitioner's claim for transportation allowance does not indicate a grave abuse of discretion which will warrant setting aside and nullifying the said COA ruling.

8. RULE MAKING

Art. IX, A, Sec. 6.

Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

9. OTHER FUNCTIONS

Art. IX, A, Sec. 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
10. REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COA

Art. IX, A, Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
10. FISCAL AUTONOMY The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

Art. IX, A, Sec. 5.

D. SANDIGANBAYAN
The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Art. XI, Sec. 4.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 67 of 110

The Sandiganbayan constitution

is only a statutory

court (created

by law) but mandated

by the

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606 REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS "SANDIGANBAYAN" AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS,the new Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust and ordains that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people;
I

WHEREAS, to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, Section 5, Article XIII of the New Constitution provides for the creation of a special court to be known as Sandiganbayan. NOW, THEREFORE,I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as follows: SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition; Qualifications; Tenure; Removal and Compensation. - A special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and processing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a presiding justice and fourteen associate justices who shall be appointed by the President. (As amended by RA 8249) No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan; unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age and for at least ten years has been a judge of a court of record or been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has heid office requiring admission to the bar as a pre-requisite for a like period.
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The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when the commissions of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their commissions have been issued by the President. The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices shall not be removed from office except on impeachment upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. The Presiding Justice shall receive an annual compensation of P60,000.00 and each Associate Justice P55,000.00 which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. They shall have the same rank, privileges and other emoluments, be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those provided for under existing laws of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals are Increased, such increases in salaries shall be correspondingly extended to and enjoyed by the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan. They shall hold office until they reach the age of 65 years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. SECTION 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. - The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of cases filed with it: Provided, however, That cases originating from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from Luzon, Visayas or Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of origin except only when the greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or other compelling considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one geographical region may be heard in another geographical region: Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall authorize any division or divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of facilities of the courts

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 68 of 110

or other government offices where any of the divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan. SECTION 3. Division of the Court; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5) division of three justices each. The five (5) may sit at the same time.

Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or .of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein. (as amended by RA 7975)
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SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. in all cases involving:

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No: 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the' diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
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Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.u.P. College of Law Page 69 of 110 In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNPofficer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Exeltutlve Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to . Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has' not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned. (As further amended by 8249) SECTION 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required. - The unanimous vote of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. In the event that the three justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Judge shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. SEOTION 6. Maximum period for termination of cases. - As far as practicable, the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision. . SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case. A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 70 of 110 Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed, the deCision shafl be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court. Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law. Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts. under this decree as well as those rendered by them in the exercise of their appellate'jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court in the proper exercise of their respective jurisdiction, is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not the accused filed an appeal. (As further amended by RA 8249) SECTION 8. Transfer of cases. - As of the date of the effectivity of this decree, any case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where none of the accused has been arraigned shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan. SECTION 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court which shall be enforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court. (As amended by RA 7975) SECTION 10. Authority over internal affairs. REPEALEDby RA 7975

SECTION 11. Proceeding free of charge. - All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant and/or his witnesses. No criminal information or complaint shall be entertained by the Sandiganbayan except upon a certification by the Investigating Prosecutor of the existence of a prima facie case to be determined after a preliminary investigation conducted in accordance with applicable laws and approved by the Chief Special Prosecutor. SECTION 12. Administrative personnel. - The Sandiganbayan shall reelect and appoint such personnel as it may deem necessary to discharge its functions under this Decree including a Clerk of Court and three (3) Deputy Clerks of Court who shall be members of the Bar. The Clerk of Court shall have an annual compensation of P36,OOO.OO and the Deputy Clerks of Court, P30,OOO.OO. All other subordinate employees of the Sandiganbayan shall be.governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law; Provided, that the Sandiganbayan may, by resolution en banc, remove any of them for cause. SECTION 13. Report to the President. - The Sandiganbayan shall submit an annual report to the President, including all disbursements of funds entrusted to it, within two months from the end of the Fiscal Year. SECTION 14. Funding. - There is hereby immediately appropriated the sum of Five Million Pesos (P5,OOO,OOO.OO) out of any funds in the National Treasury to carry out the provisions of this Decree and thereafter to be included in the general appropriations act. The appropriations for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with a schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan. SECTION 15. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason, any section or provision of this Decree is declared to be unconstitutional or invalid, other sections or provisions thereof which are not affected thereby, shall continue in full force and effect.
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Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 71 of 110 SECTION 16.Repealing Clause. - This Decree hereby repeals Presidential Decree Na. 1486 and all ather pravisians .of law, General Orders, Presidential Decrees, Letters .of Instructians, rules .or regulatians incansistent herewith. SECTION 17. Effectivity. - This Decree shall take effect immediately. Dane in the City .of Manila, this 10th day .of December, in the year .of Our Lard, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.

RULES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

Pursuant ta the pravisians .of Sectian 5 .of Article XIII .of the Canstitutian .of the Philippines, as implemented by Presidential Decree Na. 1606, the Sandiganbayan hereby adapts and pramulgates the fallawing rules ta gavern the canduct .of its business. RULE I Title and Canstructian SECTION 1. Title .of the Rules. - These Rules shall be knawn and cited as the Rules .of the Sandiganbayan. SECTION 2. Canstructian. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in .order ta pramate their .objectives and ta achieve a just, expeditiaus and inexpensive determinatian .ofevery actian and proceeding befare the Sandiganbayan. RULE II Cantral .ofFunctians and Successian SECTION 1. Exclusive Cantral. - Except as .otherwise pr0\7ided by the Canstitutian and Presidential Decree Na. 1606, the Sandiganbayim shall have exclusive cantral, directian and supervisian .ofall matters pertaining ta its internal affairs and the aperatian .of its business. SECTION 2. Successian in the Office of the Presiding Justice. - In case .ofvacancy in the pasiban .of Presiding Justice .of the Sandiganbayan .or his temparary incapacity ta exercise the pawers and perfarm the duties .of his .office, the same shall devalve upan the qualified mast seniar Assaciate Justices until such incapacity is remaved .or anather Presiding Justice is appainted and has duly qualified. RULE III Compasitian .of Divisians SECTION 1. How Divisians Canstituted. - The Sandiganbayan shall cansist .of three divisians which shall be knawn as the First Divisian, Secand Divisian, and Third Divisian, and shall each be campased .of the Presiding Justice and the first twa Assaciate Justices in the .order .of precedence as the respective Chairmen; the next three Assaciate Justices in the .order .of precedence as the respective seniar members; and the last three. Assaciate Justices in the .order .of precedence as the respective juniar members. Hawever, until the entire camplement .of the Sandiganbayan shall have been appainted and qualified, the Presiding Justice and the twa Assaciate Justices first appainted and qualified shall canstitute the First Divisian. SEGTION 2. Vacancy; Haw Filled. - In case .of any vacancy in the campasitian .of a divisian, whether permanent .or temparary, the Presiding Justice may designate an Assaciate Justice .of the Caurt, ta be determined by strict ratatian an the basis .ofthe reverse .order .of precedence, ta sit as a special member .of said divisian with all the rights and preragatives .of a regular member .of said divisian in the trial and determinatian .of cases assigned thereta, unless the aperatian .of the ather divisians .of the Caurt will be prejudiced thereby, in which case, the pracedure provided in Sectian 3, Rule VIII .ofthese Rules shall apply.

RULE IV
Filing .ofCases SECTION 1. Praceedings Free .of Charge. - All praceedings in the Sandiganbayan be canducted at na cast ta the camplainant and/ar his witnesses.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 72 of 110 SECTION 2. Preliminary Investigation Necessary. - No criminal information or complaint shall be entertained by the Sandiganbayan except upon a certification by the investigating Prosecutor of the existence of a prima facie case to be determined after a preliminary investigation conducted in accordance with applicable laws and approved by the Chief Special Prosecutor. SECTION 3. Where Cases Filed. - All cases to be filed with the Sandiganbayan shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Sandiganbayan which shall be open for the purpose of receiving complaints, informations, motions and the like from eight to twelve o'clock in the morning and twelve thirty to four-thirty o'clock in the afternoon, 'on Mondays to Fridays, except on public or special holidays. aisa dc RULE V Distribution and Consolidation of Cases SECTION 1. Distribution of Cases. - All cases filed with the Sandiganbayan shall be allotted among the three divisions for hearing and decision by raffle to be conducted by a Raffle Committee composed of the Presiding Justice and the two most senior Associate Justices available, on such days as may hereafter be fixed by the Presiding Justice depending upon the need for such raffle to be mClde in view of the number of cases filed, with notice to the interested parties who may, if they so desire, be present therein by themselves or through counsel. SECTION 2. Consolidation of Cases. - Cases arising from the same incident on series of incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may, in the discretion of Sandiganbayan, be consolidated in only one division. Should the propriety of such consolidation appear upon the filing of the cases concerned and before they ar~ raffled, all such cases shall be considered as one case for purposes of the raffle; but, should the propriety of such consolidation become apparent only thereafter, consolidation may be effected upon motion of an interested party filed with the division taking cognizance of the case to be consolidated and, if granted, consolidation shall be made in the division before which the case with the lowest number is penl;Jing. In either case, the division in which consolidation is effected shall be entitled to be credited in the distribution of cases with the same number of cases transferred to it to the end that all divisions shall, as much as possible, receive more or less the same number of cases filed with the Sandiganbayan. SECTION 3. Assignment of Cases Permanent. - Cases assigned to a division of the Sandiganbayan in accordance with these Rules shall remain with said division notwithstanding changes in the composition thereof and all matters raised therein shall be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division aforesaid at the time said matters are taken up, irrespective of whether they were or were not members of the division aforesaid at the timesaid matters are taken up, irrespective of whether they were or were not members of the division at the time the case was first assigned thereto: Provided, however, That only such Justices who are members of the division at the time a case is submitted for decision shall take part in the' consideration and adjudication of said case, unless any such member thereafter ceases to be a member of the Sandiganbayan for any reason whatsoever in which case any Justice chosen to fill the vacancy in accordance with the manner provided in Section 2, Rule III, of these Rules shall participate in the consideration and adjudication of said case; Provided, lastly, that the Sandiganbayan en banc may, for special or compelling reasons, transfer cases from one division thereof to another. RULE VI Processes Processesand writs of the Sandiganbayan which by their nature or by provision of existing laws or the Rules of Court are to be issued under the signature of a Judge or a Justice shall be signed by the Chairman of the division concerned: Provided, That if there is an urgent necessity for the issuance thereof before the case is raffled to a division, the same shall be signed by the Presiding Justice. In the absence of the Presiding Justice or the Chairman aforesaid, the process or writ shall be signed by the senior Associate Justice in the Sandiganbayan or in the divisions concerned, respectively. All other processes or writs issued upon authority of the Sandiganbayan or a division thereof shall be signed by the Clerk of Court or, in his absence, by the Deputy Clerk of Court of the division concerned. . RULE VII

Hand Out No. 8 ~ Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 73 of 110 Bail SECTION 1. How Amount Fixed; Approval. - The amount of bail to be posted in cases in the Sandiganbayan shall be fixed by the Chairman of the division thereof to which they are assigned; and such bail may be approved by any Justice of the Sandiganbayan, but preferably by a Justice of the division concerned: Provided, however, That where the accused is arrested, detained or otherwise placed in custody outside the Metropolitan Manila area, any judge of the Court of First Instance or Circuit Criminal Court may accept and approve the bail for his appearance before the division to which his case is assigned and release him, and shall inform the division issuing the order of arrest of his action, forwarding thereto the papers in this case. SECTION 2. Condition of the Bail. - The condition of the bail is that the accused shall appear and answer the complaint or information in the division of the Sandiganbayan to which it is arsigned or transferred for trial and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof and, after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Supreme Court, that he will surrender himself for the execution of such judgment as the Supreme Court may render; or, that, in case the cause is to be tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the division to which it may be remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof. RULEvln Sessions and Trial SECTION 1. How Sessions Held. - The Sandiganbayan shall, for administrative purposes, sit en banc; and, for the trial and determination of cases, sit in three divisions of three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at the same time. SECTION 2. Presiding Officer. - Sessions of the Sandiganbayan en banc shall be presided by the Presiding Justice; whereas sessions in division shall be presided by the respective Chairman of each division. In the absence of the Presiding Justice or the Chairman of a division, as the case may be, the Associate Justice attending the session en banc or in division who is first in the order of precedence and able to preside, shall do so.
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SECTION 3. Quorum. - Five Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc, and three Justices for sessions in division: Provided, That when a quorum and/or the votes required for a resolution or decision of the Sandiganbayan, either en banc or in division, or the trial or hearing of cases cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the President shall, upon recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice of the Court of Appeals, Judge of the Court of First Instance or of the Circuit Criminal Court to sit temporarily therein. SECTION 4. Place of Holding Sessions. - Sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or in division, shall be held in the place of its principal office in the Metropolitan Manila area where it shall try and determine all cases filed with it irrespective of the place where they may have arisen: Provided, however, That the Presiding Justice may authorize any division or divisions of the Court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metropolitan Manila to hear and decide cases emanating therefrom. For this purpose and whenever necessary, the Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of the facilities of any agency of the Government, national or local, including the Courts of First Instance or Circuit Criminal Court of the province or city where any of the divisions is holding session, and those per~onnel of such agencies or courts shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan. SECTION 5. Time of HOlding Sessions. - Sessions of the Sandiganbayan en banc may be. called at any time by the Presiding Justice or at the instance at least five Associate Justices. Sessions for the trial of cases cognizable by it shall be held on such days and at such times as the divisions thereof may, by order and upon notice to the parties concerned, fix. SECTION 6. Pre-trial Inquest. - After the arraignment of an accused who pleads not guilty, the division concerned shall, without prejudice to the invocation by the accused of his constitutional rights, direct the prosecutor and the accused and his counsel to appear before any of the Justices thereof for a conference to consider. (a) (b) (c) (d) Admissions of facts about which there can be no dispute; Marking for identification of documentary or real evidence of the parties; Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; Procedure on objections where there are multiple counsel;

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 74 of 110
(e) Order of presentation of evidence and arguments where there are multiple accused; (f) Order of cross-examination where there are multiple accused; and (g) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious termination of the trial. After the pre-trial inquest, a pre-trial order shall be issued by the Associate Justice presiding the conference reciting the actions and/or proceedings taken thereat, the admissions of facts made, the documents and real evidence marked, and the agreement entered into by the parties as to any 'of the matters taken up therein. Such order shall limit the issues for trial to those not disposed of by the admissions or agreements of the parties and when entered shall blind the parties and control the course of the action during the trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction proceedings, unless modified by the division concerned before trial to prevent manif!'!st injustice. ! RULE IX Motions

SECTION 1. Motion Day. - The first hours of the morning session of the divisions every Friday shall be devoted to the hearing of motions, unless, upon motion of an interested party and for special reasons, the division concerned shall fix another day for the hearing of any particular motion. SECTION 2. Resolution on Interlocutory or Incidental Motions. - Rulings on all written motions submitted to the Sandiganbayan or any division thereof for resolution shall be reached in consultation among the Justices participating in the consideration thereof: Provided, however, That rulings on oral motions or on objections made in the course of the trial or hearing shall be hancJeddown by the Chairman of the division concerned. RULE X Judgment SECTION 1. Votes Necessary to Decide. - The unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or order. In the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designated by raffle two Justices from among the other members of the Sandiganbayan to sit temporarily with them forming a special division of five Justices, and the vote of a majority of such special division shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or order. aisa dc SECTION 2. Procedure in Deciding Cases. - The conclusions of a division of the Sandiganbayan in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Justice for the writing of the opinion of the division. Any Justice dissenting from a judgment shall state the reasons for his dissent. SECTION 3. Maximum Period to Decide Cases. - The judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision. SECTION 4. Form of judgment and final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of fact and a statement of the law on all issues properly raised before it. RULEXI Promulgation of Judgment A judgment of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of the accused and any Justice of the division which rendered the same: Provided, That, if the accused is confined or detained in a place outside Metropolitan Manila or of the city or province in which any division of the Sandiganbayan is sitting at the time of such promulgation, the judgment may, upon delegation by the division concerned be promulgated by any judge of the Court of First Instance or Circuit Criminal' Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention, in which event the Court so promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept and approve the appeal bond. RULE XII Petition for Reconsideration

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Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 75 of 110 Within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of a judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan, unless said judgment or order had in the meantime otherwise attained finality, a petition for the reconsideration thereof may be filed upon the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements, for motions for new trial in criminal cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, and such petition for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30 days from submission thereof.

RULE XIII . Review of Judgments and Final Orders SECTION 1. Method of Review. - A party may appeal from a judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari in accqrdance with Rule 45 of Rules of Court and by serving a copy thereof to the Sandiganbayan. , WtJenever, in any case decided, the death penalty shall have been imposed, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court, whether the accused shall have appealed or not, for review and judgment, as law and justice shall dictate. SECTION 2. Bail Pending Appeal. - An accused who has been released on bail shall not be committed to jail upon conviction pending the expiration of the period for appeal or pending an appeal seasonably taken, except when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or death, in which case, the accused may forthwith be committed to jail after promulgation of the sentence. The division of the Sandiganbayan concerned, however, may, for good cause, cancel the bond or increase the amount of bail and commit the accused into custody pending appeal, unless he gives bail in the increased amount. The surely shall also be responsible for the surrender of the accused after judgment shall have become final. RULE XIV Publication of Decisions Wit Ii the consent of the respective writers thereof, the decisions of the Sandiganbayan may be published in the Official Gazette in the language in which they have been originally written. The syllabi for the decisions shall be prepared by the Clerk of Court in consultation with writers thereof. RULE XV Applicability of the Rules of Court Except as otherwise herein provided or as may hereafter be modified from time to time by the Sandiganbayan and insofar as practicable, the Rules of Court shall govern proceedings in the Sandiganbayan. RULE XVI Seal of the Sandiganbayan

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The seal of the Sandiganbayan shall be of standard size, circular in form, consisting of two concentric circles as its margin, with the inscription, running from left to right, on the upper marpin of the word "Sandiganbayan" and on the lower margin of the words "Republika ng Pilipmas"; with 16 stars, representing the existing 16 judicial districts, immediately along the outer edge of the inner circle; and, with a design at the center of a triangle, with a trisected area composed of the national colors of white on its upper part, blue on the left and red on the right, with the words "KATAPATAN"on the right side, "KAPANAGUTAN"on the left side, and "KARANGALAN"on the base; a star in each corner of the triangle representing Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao; and a bolo inside the triangle on which is superimposed a balance. RULE XVII Separability Clause If, for any reason, any section or provision of these Rules shall be held to be unconstitutional or .invalid, no other section or provision thereof shall be effected thereby. RULE XVIII Effectivity

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Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 76 of 110 The Rules shall take effect upon approval. Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.

Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 {1982}

Decree Creating sandiganbayan Is Valid.

FACTS; The constitutionality of the law creating the Sandiganbayan was questioned as being violative of (a) due process and equal protection (since private persons charged with estafa or malversation are guaranteed the right to appeal first to the CA and thereafter to the SC, while private persons charged with public officers before the SB are allowed only one appeal, and that is, to the sq, and (b) no ex post facto rule (since before the promulgation of PD 1606, the right to appeal to the CA and then to the SC was already secured by Secs. 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948).
HELD: (1) The claim that PD 1606 deprives petitioner of the equal protection of the law is hardly convincing considering that the Decree is based on a valid classification. The Consti. provides for the creation of a special court, known as Sandiganbayan (SB), and the rule is settled that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, among wlc are the due process and equal protection clauses, must give way to specific provisions, such as the provision on the creation of the SB.

(2) It hardly can be argued that a particular mode of procedure provided in a statute can become the vested right of any person. "An accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure as in determining whether particular statutes by their operation take from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the Consti., as vital for the protection of life and liberty; and wlc he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him. Would the omission of the CA as an intermediate tribunal, deprive those, like the petitioner, who are charged in the SS, of a right that is vital to the protection of their liberty? Its answer must be in the negative. The innot.enceof guilt of the accused is passed upon by a 3-judge division of the SB. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, otherwise, the PresidingJustice designates two other Justices from among the members of the SB to sit temporarily in a division of 5 until a decision is rendered wi the concurrence of 3 Justices. If convicted, the accused can seek a review in the SCon a question of law or the substantiality of the evidence. Petitioner makes much of the facts that there is no review by the SCof facts. What cannot be too strongly emphasized is that the SC, in determining whether to give due course to a petition for review of a decision of the SB, must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. Thus, it cannot be said that there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for conviction in criminal cases have been satisfied. Makasiar,J., concurring and dissenting: The dissenting opinion noted the discrimination in treatment as contented by allowing only one appeal, and only by way of celtiorariwhich is based on mere substantial evidence and riot proof beyond reasonable doubt. Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324 {1984}
HELp: It is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that respondent court has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as may be determined by law. The intention of the framers of the New Constitution is patent from the explicit language thereof as well as from Section 1 of the same Article XIII_ titled "Accountability of Public Officers," which provides:.

"SECITON1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."

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There is no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative of the provision of Section 5 of Article XIII of the New Constitution because the former enlarges what the latter limited. Said constitutional provision delegates to the lawmaking body the determination of "such other offenses" committed by public officers over which the sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the President of the Philippines, exercising his lawmaking authority and prerogative vested in him by the Constitution, issued Presidential Decree No. 1486 which mandates in Section 4(c) thereof that the

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Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporation, in relation to their office." (Emphasis supplied) When the lawmaking authority chose to include all public office-related offenses over which respondent court shall have jurisdiction, the courts will not review questions of legislative policy. It is enough that the act is within the constitutional power of the lawmaking body or authority and, if it is, the courts are bound to follow and apply. The original and amended information clearly alleged that petitioner took advantage of his position as mayor when he intimidated the gasoline station's owner in taking over the operation and control of the establishment, ordering his policemen to sell the gasoline therein and padlocking the dispensing pump thereof without legal authority. Stated differently, if petitioner were riot the mayor he would not have allegedly directed the policeman and the latter would not have followed his orders and instructions to sell Pedro Par's gasoline and padlocked the station. The fact that he is the mayor did not vest him with legal authority to take over/the operations and control of complainant's gasoline station and padlock the same without observing due process. Balmadrid v. sandiganbayan, 195 SCRA 497 (1991)
HELD: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessorieswith the public officers or employees, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees. (section 4, PD 1606).

Private persons may be charged together with public officers to avoid repeated and unnecessary presentation of witnesses and exhibits against conspirators in different venues, especially if the issues involved are the same. It follows therefore that if a private person may be tried jointly with public officers, he may also be convicted jointly with them, as in the case of the present petitioners. Azarcon v. sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747 (1997)
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HELD: The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have

jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. when the complaint charges the private individual either as a coprincipal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan'sjurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public officers: "Who are public officers. - For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of the book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer." ThuS!, "(to) be a public officer, one must be (1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee,.agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class; and (2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be a. by direct provision of the law, or b. by popular election, or c. by appointment by competent authority." Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298 (1999)

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HELD: A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt PracticesAct), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on iIIgotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office." The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender - that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, band c of the same Section 4 do not mak~ any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.O. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

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The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNPofficers. In People vs. Montejo (108 PhIl. 613), we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation bet;weenthe offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the information." As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates: "SECTION9. cause of accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarilyin the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment." As early as 1954, we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts." "The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information." The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in Phil. 223):

U.s.

v. Karelsen (3

''The object of this written accusations was - First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged." It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him, as "he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."

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Appl'ying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders. In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations for murder reads: "AMENDED INFORMATION ''The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses, CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SP04 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SP04 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SP02 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SP02 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SP01 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SP01 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SP01 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SP03 WILLY NUAS, SP03 CICERO S. BACOLOD, P02 NORBERTO LASAGA, P02 LEONARDO GLORIA and P02 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows: ''That on or about May 18, 1995, in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SP04 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SP04 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SP02 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SP02 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SP01 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SP01 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG and SP01 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring, with intent to kill and using firearms, with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantalleous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim. ''That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT . PANFILO M . LACSON, SENIOR SUPT . FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SP03 WILLY NUAS, SP03 CICERO S. BACOLOD, P02 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG, committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police, are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. "CONTRARY TO LAW" While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to their public office," there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as among the acceSsories after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concealed "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred "in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests" and shooting happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however,

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do npt see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in detenmining the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan. The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer "in relation to his office" is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties. In People vs. Magallanes (249 seRA 212), where the jurisdiction sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled: between the Regional Trial Court and the

"It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the result of evidence after trial. "In (People vs.) Montejo (108 Phil. 613 [1960]), where the amended information alleged:

Leroy 5. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and .. . special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp ... at Tipo-tipo, which is under his command . . . supervision and control, where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his co-defendants arrested and maltreated ,Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof. we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office; besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime; thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused. "Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped, and detained the tWo victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial." In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase "committed in relation to public office" does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the 5andiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended' informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial,Court, 73 not the 5andiganbayan.

Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan,

235 SCRA 103 (1994)

HELD: It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the 5andiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty

Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1,t Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.UP. College of Law Page 81 of 110 thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court. It is indeed true that in some of our decisions the expression "the maximum period of ninety (90) days" is used. But that is only for the purpose of emphasizing that the preventive suspension therein involved, which were for more than ninety (90) days, were excessive and unreasonable. It is to be noted that the ninety-day period of preventive suspension is not found in sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 but was adopted from sec. 42 of the Civil service Decree (P.O. No. 807), 7 which is not sec. 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. This latter provision states:

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sec. 52.Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligency or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
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The .duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is decided before ninety days, then the suspension will last less than ninety days, but if the case is not decided within ninety days, then the preventive suspension must be up to ninety days only. Similarly, as applied to criminal prosecutions under Republic Act No. 3019, preventive suspension iNiII last for less than ninety days only if the case is decided within that period: otherwise, it will continue for ninety days. The duration of preventive suspension will, therefore, vary to the extent that it is contingent on the time it takes the court to decide the case but not on account of any discretion lodged in the court, taking into account the probability that the accused may use his office to hamper his prosecution. Indeed, were the Sandiganbayangiven the discretion to impose a shorter period of suspension, say, 80, 70 or 60 days, as petitioner asserts, it would lie in its power. not to suspend the accused at all. That, of course, would be contrary to the command of sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. Our holding that, upon the filing of a valid information charging violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or fraud upon government or public property, it is the duty of the court to placEI' the accused under preventive suspension disposes of petitioner's other contention that since the trial in the Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution there is no longer any danger that petitioner would intimidate prosecution's witnesses. The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, as already stated, to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasancewhile in office. Finally, the fact that petitioner's preventive suspension may deprive the people of samar of the services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who has likewise been elected by them, will act as governor. Indeed, even the Constitution authorizes the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly behavior, thus rejecting the view expressed in one case 10 that members of the legislature could not be suspended because in the case of suspension, unlike in the case of remollal, the seat remains filled but the constituents are deprived of representation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayanacted according to law.

E. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

1. COMPOSITION

Art. XI, Sec. 5.

There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.

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2 .QUALIFICATIONS Art. XI, Sec.8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution. 3. f\PPOINTMENTAND TERM

Appointment
Art. XI, Sec. 9. . The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur . Term

Id., Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.
4. RANKAND SALARY

Id., Sec. 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank
of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be decreased during their term of office. S. DISQUALIFICATIONS Art. IX, Sec.8. xxx During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.

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Art. IX, A, Sec.2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. XI, Sec. 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly
Art.

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or indirectly by any government owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure. 6. JURISDICTION Id., Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of.the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Quhnpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 (1986)

Tanodbayan Has Jurisdiction over all Government Owned Firms Regardless of How Organized.

the Tanodbayan (TB) charging Greg Dimaano and Danny Remo, manager and analyst of Petrophil, wi viol. of RA 3019 for their refusal to pay Quimpo's fees as surveyor. The TB dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned corps organized under a special law. PETROPHILis a corp. organized under the Gen. Corp. Code; it was acquired by the govt to carry out its oil and gasoline programs. Quimpo filed a petition for certiorari, questioning the decision of the TB. The new TB confessedjudgment.
HELD: (1) In NHA v. Juco, 134 S 172 (1984), it was held that for purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt owned or controlled corps. whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the CS law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service. (This ruling has since been overruled.)
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FACTS: F. Quimpo filed a complaint

wi

(2) :The meaning thus given tb "govt-owned or controlled corps." for purposes of the CS [Art. IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] provision should likewise apply for purposes of the TB and the SB provisions [Art. XI, sees. 4 and 12], otherwise, incongruity would result; and a govt-owned corp. could create as many subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code as it wishes, wlc would then be free from strict accountability and could escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided for by law. xxx [T]here can be no gainsaying that as of the date of its acquisition by the Govt, utilizing public funds, PETROPHIL,while retaining its own corporate existence, became a govtowned or controlled corp. wlin the constitutional precept. Its employees, therefore are public servants falling wlin the investigatory and prosecutory jurisdiction of the TB for purposes of the RA 3019.
Leyson v. Ombudsman, 331"SCRA 227 (2000)

HELD: The definition of "government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The said definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corP'i'ration; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either whOlly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. Orap v. Sandiganbayan, 139 SCRA 2S2 (198S)

ISSUE: It is submitted by petitioner that under the old Tanodbayan Decree, the courts, judges and other appurtenant judicial staff, among others, are beyond the reach of the Tanodbayan, and that only administrative acts of agencies of the government, whether or not criminal in character, are within the powers of said official.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 84 of 110 HELD: We do not fully agree with the petitioner's view. Quite obviously, the argument overlooks the fact that under the decree, the Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well. As ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and personnel of administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of the law. To that extent, we agree with the petitioner's interpretation of the law that insofar as administrative complaints are concerned, the courts, judges and their appurtenant judicial staff are outside the Tanod bayan's investigatory power. The reason for such exclusion is quite evident: under Section 6, Article 10 of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court that exercises administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel and, therefore, is the proper forum to which administrative complaints involving judges and the court's personnel should be lodged. As prosecutor, however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is plenary and without exceptions. His powers are defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.O. 1607, as follows: "SEC.17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.- There is hereby created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor composed of a Chief Special Prosecutor, an Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor, and nine (9) Special Prosecutors, who shall have the same qualifications as provincial and city fiscals and who shall be appointed by the President; . . . . The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor, and the Special Prosecutors shall have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file informations therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein; Provided, however, that the Tanodbayan may, upon recommendation of the Chief Special Prosecutor, designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as Special Prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan who shall not receive any additional compensation except such allowances, per diems and travelling expenses as the Tanodbayan may determine in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations. xxx xxx xxx"

"SEC.19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.- If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency. In case of failure of justice, the Tanodbayan shall make the appropriate recommendations to the administrative agency concerned." Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief Special Prosecutor and the. Special Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel he outside the investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such nature against them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that the Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the government serVice."

7. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

j

Art. XI, Sec. 13.

The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate on its own or on complaint any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its official or employee of the Government, or instrumentality thereof, as well as of controlled corporation with original own instance, any public or any subdivision, agency any government-owned or charter; to perform and

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expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (4) Direct the officer concerned in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action. (5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents. (6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation circumstances so warrant and with due prudence. when

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency. (8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.

Tille functions of the Ombudsman may be divided into four: Prosecutory; (3) Disciplinary; and (4) Assistory.

(1)

Investigatory;

(2)

Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SeRA 545 (1990)

HELD: As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (sec. 12) and to "investigate ... any act or omission of any public official ... when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficienL" (Sec. 13 [1].) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official . . . and to recommend his prosecution" (sec. 13 [3]).

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
I

The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasancesand misfeasancescommitted by public officers. It was deemed necessary,therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Col/onto, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. Col/ege of Law Page 86 of 110

'

The murder of three persons, is, without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it was allegedly committed by the petitioner as provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of the Ombudsman's investigative authority. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 which took effect on December 7, 1989 (Sec. 15, R.A. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. "SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. the following powers, functions and duties: The Office of the Ombudsman shall have

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases." (p. 74, Rollo.) The .Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses co~mitted by public officials when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it. Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is in the investigation of the latter where the need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is greatest.

Lastimoza v. Vasquez, 243 SeRA 497 (1995) HELD: The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:

931 of the

Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. - The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as' herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio I1ustrisimo. It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under 931 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.

x x x

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The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an information for attempted raPe against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the complaint in the case she found that he had committed only acts of lasciviousness. 915(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in character. Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, 93 of the Rules of Court is for respondents to determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it is important only to note the existence of the contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of ef)forcing his lawful orders. Acop vs. Ombudsman, 248 SeRA 566 (1995)
HELD: In the light of this Court's decision in Zaldivar, it is the Ombudsman, and not the Office of the Special

Prosecutor, which has Jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on the complaint filed against public officer. When one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article IX of the Constitution the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770. Through the said law, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was made an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman. In view of Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution and the law implementing it, R.A. No. 6975, the petitioners, who are officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP), are civilian personnel of the Government. It isthus suggested that the Deputy, Ombudsman for Military Affairs does not have jurisdiction over them, for by the description of his office, his authority is or must be confined to the military. At first blush, the suggestion seems logical. The proposal to have a separate Deputy Ombudsman for the military establishment came by way of an amendment by Commissioner Bias Ople. This was introduced during the period of individual amendments at the time the Commission deliberated on the proposed Article on Accountability of Public Officers. Commissioner Ople's on original idea was to authorize the Ombudsman to designate the said deputy; however, the amendment to the amendment introduced by this writer, who was then a member of the Commission, was to authorize the President to appoint the said deputy. The approved amendment is now found in Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, which reads: sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military or establishment may likewise be appointed. The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield conclusive evidence that such deputy is prohibited from performing other functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. On the contrary, a review of the relevant Constitutional provisions reveals otherwise. As previously established, the Ombudsman "may exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties" as Congress may prescribe through legislation. Therefore, nothing can prevent Conwess from giving the Ombudsman supervision and control over the Ombudsman's deputies, one being the deputy for the military establishment. As provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 6770. Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SeRA 645 (1993)
HELD: The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:

1st

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"Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by' the Office of . Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided."

x x x

x x

When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public officiill or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with: the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945); Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 185CRA 247 [1966}). section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges. Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
T

The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended. In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960}, this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty, said: "Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty."

x x

To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the phrase "suspend any officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate or empioyee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation .. :' Section 34 of the Civil service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority." However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the President, the Department Secretariesand the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his authority:' Therefore, section 41 of said law only

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 89 of 110 .mentions that the proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation ... " (Sec. 41). . The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation" (Sec. 51). The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read "suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation ... " The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word "subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his office" or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension. Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 335 SeRA 581 (2000)
I

HELD: Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which was in force and effect when Abaiio filed the

complaint against petitioner, provides: "SECTION12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof." The mandate to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government is restated in Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6770 ("The Ombudsman Act of 1989"), approved into law on November 17, 1989. The same authority to act on complaints "in any form, either verbal or in writing," is also reiterated in Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, which is embodied in Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8) of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 18, 23 and 27 of "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." In a~cordancewith the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, this Court, in Diaz v. sandiganbayan (219 SCRA 675), held valid charges that were not made in writing or under oath. This Court found as sufficient basis the Solicitor General's sworn testimony at the joint fact-finding investigation conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Ombudsman for the latter to conduct an investigation. On the other hand, in Olivas v. Office of the Ombudsman (239 5CRA 283), where the complaint against petitioner was initiated by anonymous letters, this Court held that the PCGG,to whom the letters were addressed and who became the complainant in the proceedings, should have reduced the evidence it had gathered into affidavits. The submission of affidavits, provided for in Rule II, Section 4 (a) of Administrative Order No. 07, is. also required by due process in adversary proceedings. However, the submission of affidavits is not mandatory and jurisdictional. Rule 1, Section 3 of the same administrative order merely states that it is "preferable" that the complaint "be in writing and under oath" for its speedier disposition. Clearly in consonance with the provision that the complaint may be in any form, the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure does not require that the complaint be subscribed only before the Ombudsman or his duly authorized representative. In any event, the issue.of the sufficiency in form of the complaint was rendered moot and'academic by petitioner's filing of a counter-affidavit wherein he controverted the allegations in the complaint. The referral of the complaint to the NBI does not mean that the Ombudsman abdicated its constitutional and statutory duty to conduct preliminary investigations. Article XI, section 13 of the 1987 Constitution vests in the Om~udsman the powers, functions and duties to: . "(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith."

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1" Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 90 of 110 Thus, by referring Abano's complaint to the NBI, the Ombudsman did not thereby delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the case to that investigative bureau. What was delegated was only the factfinding function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to be conducted by the Ombudsman. Notably, under Rule II, Section 2 (d) of Administrative Order No. 07, the investigating officer has the option to forward the complaint to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation. While Administrative Order No. 07 took effect in mid-1990 or after the complaint in this case was referred to the NBI, the inclusion of that constitutionally sanctioned practice in the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure lends validity to the Ombudsman's action in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, the Ombudsman's failure to personally administer oath to the complainant does not mean that the Ombudsman did not personally determine the existence of probable cause to warrant the filing of an information. Neither did the Sandiganbayan violate petitioner's right to due process of law by its failure to personally examine the complainant before it issued the warrant of arrest. In a preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a court is not required to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. What is required is that the judge "personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause." In the absence of evidence that the Sandiganbayan did not personally evaluate the necessary records of the case, the presumption of regularity in the conduct of its official business shall stand. At this juncture, it is apropos to state once again the nature of a preliminary investigation. In Cruz, Jr. v. People (233 SCRA 439), the Court said: "It must be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or infonmation. It is not a trial of the case on the merits, and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons against whom it is taken in jeopa'rdy. ''The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for ~he full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. xxx xxx xxx ''The main function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is merely to determine the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so. And, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." In determining probable cause, an inquiry into the sufficiency of evidence to warrant conviction is not required. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. The trial of a case is conducted precisely for the reception of evi~ence of the prosecution in support of the charge. In the performance of hIs task to determIne probable cause, the Ombudsman's discretion is paramount. Thus, in camanag v. Guerrero (268 SCRA 473), this Court said: ". . . (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish 'probable cause' for filing of information against the supposed offender."

8. FISCAL AUTONOMY Id., Sec. 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly release. 9. APPOINTMENT OF PERSONNEL

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[d., Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of theOmbudsman, other' than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.

AN ACT PROVIDING

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

SECTION 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the. people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. SECTION 3. Office of the Ombudsman . .;... The Office of the Ombudsman shall include the Office of the Overall Deputy, the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, ~he Office of the Deputy for the Visayas, the Office of the Deputy for Mindanao, the Office of the Deputy for the Armed Forces, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The President may appoint other Deputies as the necessity for it may arise, as recommended by the Ombudsman. SESTION 4. Appointment. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least twenty-one (21) nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three (3) nominees for each vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled within three (3) months after it occurs, each of which list shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation. In the organization of the Office of the Ombudsman for filling up of positions therein, regional, cultural or ethnic considerations shall be taken into account to the end that the Office shall be as much as possible representative of the regional, ethnic and cultural make-up of the Filipino nation. SECTION 5. Qualifications. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, at least forty (40) years old, of recognized probity and independence, members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective national or local office in the immediately preceding election whether regular or special. The Ombudsman must have, for ten (10) years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. SEC(TION6. Rank and Salary. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the same ranll:s, salaries and privileges as the Chairman and members, respectively, of a Constitutional Commission. Their salaries shall not be decreased during their term of office. The members of the prosecution, investigation and legal staff of the Office of the Ombudsman shall 'receive salaries which shall not be less than those given to comparable positions in any office in the Government. SECTION 7. Term of Office. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall serve for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment. . SECTION 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. - (1) In accordance with the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. (2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

(3) In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall serve as Acting

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 92 of 110 Ombudsman in a concurrent capacity until a new Ombudsman shall have been appointed for a full term. In case the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman, the President may designate any of the Deputies, or the Special Prosecutor, as Acting Ombudsman. (4) Ifl case of temporary absence or disability of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall perform the duties of the Ombudsman until the Ombudsman returns or is able to perform his duties. SECTION 9. Prohibitions and Disqualifications. - The Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Spetial Prosecutor shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office or employment. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately following their cessation from office. They shall not be allowed to appear or practice before the Ombudsman for two (2) years following their cessation from office. No spouse or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil business or professional partner or associate of the Ombudsman, his Prosecutor within one (1) year preceding the appointment may appear as any-matter pending before the Office of the Ombudsman or' transact. indirectly therewith. degree and no law, Deputies or Special counselor agent on business directly or

This disqualification shall apply during the tenure of the official concerned. This disqualification likev,viseextends to the law, business or professional firm for the same period. SECTION 10. Disclosure of Relationship. - It shall be the duty of the Ombudsman, his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor to make under oath, to the best of their knowledge and/or information, a public disclosure of the identities of, and their relationship with the persons referred to in the preceding section. The disclosure shall be filed with the Office of the President and the Office of the Ombudsman before the appointee assumes office and every year thereafter. The disclosures made pursuant to this section shall form part of the public records and shall be available to any person or entity upon request. SECTION 11. Structural Organization. - The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall. be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control of the said office. (1) The Office of the Ombudsman may organize such directorates for administration and allied services as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions. Those appointed as directors or heads shall have the rank and salary of line bureau directors. ! (2) The Office of the Overall Deputy shall oversee and administer the operations of the different offices under the Office of Ombudsman. It shall likewise perform such other functions and . duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman. (3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and his prosecution staff. The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman. (4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon the authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers: (a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; . (b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and (c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman. The Special Prosecutor shall have the rank and salary of a Deputy Ombudsman. I

1st

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 93 of 110

(5) The position structure and staffing pattern of the Office of the Ombudsman, including the Office of the Special Prosecutor, shall be approved and prescribed by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman shall appoint all officers and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, including those of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, in accordance with the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. SECTION 12. Official Stations. - The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon, and the Deputy for the Armed Forces shall hold office in Metropolitan Manila; the Deputy for the Visayas, in Cebu City; and the Deputy for Mindanao, in Davao City. The Ombudsman may! transfer their stations within their respective geographical regions, as public interest may reqlolire. SECTION 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people. SECTION 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. SECTION IS. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the folldwing powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; Direct, upon. complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties; Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure 1 compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer; Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case,.and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action; Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge . of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents; Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided, That the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not + be made public: Provided, further, That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be . balanced, fair and true;

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Hand aut No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 94 of 110 (7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tectlm, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records; (9)

Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein;

(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided; (11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.

- The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office. - In all hearings, inquiries, and proceedings of the Ombudsman, including preliminary investigations of offenses, nor person subpoenaed to testify as a witness shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and/or other records on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution: Provided, That no person shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any matter concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed the privilege against selfincrimination, to testify and produce evidence, documentary or otherwise.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office. Any refusal to appear or testify pursuant to the foregoing provisions shall be subject to punishment for contempt and removal of the immunity from criminal prosecution.

SECTION 16. Applicability.

SECTION17. Immunities.

SECTIONlS.Rules

of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its ruies of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.
(2) The rules of procedure shall include a provision whereby the Rules of Court are made suppletory.

(3) The rules shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication . in the Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, one of which is printed in the national language.

SECTION19. Administrative

Complaints. - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation; (2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 95 of 110 (4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. SECTION 20.Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that: (1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body; ~2)The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the . Ombudsman; (3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; (4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or (5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. SECTION 21.0fficial Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. SECTION 22.Investigatory Power. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation and proceed against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penaities and liabilities. SECTION 23.Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. (2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees, which shall be determined within the period prescribed in the civil service law. Any delay without just cause in acting on any referral made by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be a ground for administrative action against the officers or employees to whom such referrals are addressed and shall constitute a graft offense punishable by a fine of not exceeding Five thousand pesos (PS,OOO.OO). (3) in any investigation under this Act the Ombudsman may: (a) enter and inspect the premises of any office, agency, commission or tribunal; (b) examine and have access to any book, record, file, document or paper; and (c) hold private hearings with both the complaining individual and the official concerned. SECTION 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is teFminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
/

SECTION 25. Penalties. - (1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. S07, the penalties and rules provided therein shall be applied.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Cal!anta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 96 of 110 (2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one (1) year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from Five thousand pesos (PS,OOO.OO) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the d)scretion of the Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charges. SECTION 26. Inquiries. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall inquire into acts or omissions of a public officer, employee, office or agency which, from the reports or complaints it has !received, the Ombudsman or his Deputies consider to be: (a) contrary to law or regulation; (b) unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, irregular or inconsistent with the general course of the operations and functions of a public officer, employee, office or agency; (c) an error in the application or interpretation of law, rules or regulations, or a gross or palpable error in the appreciation of facts; (d) based on improper motives or corrupt considerations; (e) unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should have been revealed; or (f) inefficient performed or otherwise objectionable. (2) The Officer of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same andil;form the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt ~hereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case. (3) When the complaint consists in delay or refusal to perform a duty required by law, or when urgent action is necessary to protect or preserve the rights of the complainant, the Office of the Ombudsman shall take steps or measures and issue such orders directing the officer, employee, office or agency concerned to: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) expedite the performance of duty; cease or desist from the performance of a prejudicial act; correct the omission; explain fully the administrative act in question; or take any other steps as may be necessary under the circumstances to protect and preserve the rights of the complainant.

(4) Any delay or refusal to comply with the referral or directive of the Ombudsman or any of his Deputies, shall constitute a ground for administrative disciplinary action against the officer or employee to whom it was addressed. SECTION 27.Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the 'Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (S) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially decision; affects the order, directive or

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable. In ~Ii administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P. U.P. College of Law Page 97 of 110 motion for reconsideration (Unconstitutional) in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. SECTION 28. Investigation in Municipalities, Cities and Provinces. - The Office of the Ombudsman may establish offices in municipalities, cities and provinces outside Metropolitan Man!lIa , under the immediate supervision of the Deputies. for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, where necessary as determined by the Ombudsman. The investigation of complaints may be assigned to the regional or sectoral deputy concerned or to a special investigator who shall proceed in accordance with the rules or special instructions or directives of the Office of the Ombudsman. Pending investigation the deputy or investigator may issue orders and provisional remedies which are immediately executory subject to review by the Ombudsman. Within three (3) days after concluding the investigation, the deputy or investigator shall transmit, together with the entire records of the case, his report and conclusions to the Office of the Ombudsman. Within five (5) days .after receipt of said report, the Ombudsman shall render the appropriate order, directive or decision. SECTION 29.Change of Unjust Laws. - If the Ombudsman believes that a law or regulation is unfair or unjust, he shall recommend to the President and to Congress the necessary changes therein or the repeal thereof. SECTION 30. Transmittal/Publication of Decision. - In every case where the Ombudsman has reached a decision, conclusion or recommendation adverse to a public official or agency, he shall transmit his decision, conclusion, recommendation or suggestion to the head of the department, agency or instrumentality, or of the province, city or municipality concerned for such immediate action as may be necessary. When transmitting his adverse decision, conclusion or recommendation, he shall, unless excused by 'the agency or official affected, include the substance of any statement the public agency or official may have made to him by way of explaining past difficulties with or present rejection of the Ombudsman's proposals. SECTION 3i.Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. - The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. The Ombudsman and his investigators and prosecutors, whether regular members of his staff or designated by him as herein provided, shall have authority to administer oaths, to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, to summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify under oath before them and/or bring books, documents and other things under their control, and to secure the attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through application before the Sandiganbayan or before any inferior or superior court having jurisdiction of the place where the witness or evidence is found. SECTION 32.Rights and Duties of Witness. - (1) A person required by the Ombudsman to provide the information shall be paid the same fees and travel allowances as are extended to witnesses whose attendance has been required in the trial courts. Upon request of the witness, the Ombudsman shall also furnish him such security for his person and his family as may be warranted by the circumstances. For this purpose, the Ombudsman may, at its expense, call upon any police or constabulary unit to provide the said security. (2) A person who, with or without service or compulsory process, provides oral or documentary information requested by the Ombudsman shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities as are extended to witnesses in the courts, and !;hall likewise be entitled to the assistance of counsel while being questioned. ' (3) If a person refuses to respond to the Ombudsman's or his Deputy's subpoena, or refuses to be examined, or engages in obstructive conduct, the Ombudsman or his Deputy shall issue 'In order directing the person to appear before him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. The contempt proceedings shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 98 of 110 SECTION 33.Duty to Render Assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman. - Any officer or employee of any department, bureau or office, subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporiltions and local governments, when required by the Ombudsman, his Deputy or the Special Prosecutor shall render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman. SECTION 34.Annual Report. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall render an annual report of its ~ctivities and performance to the President and to Congress to be submitted within thirty (3D) days from the start of the regular session of Congress. SECTION 35. Malicious Prosecution. - Any person who, actuated by malice or gross bad faith, files a completely unwarranted or false complaint against any government official or employee shall be subject to a penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months imprisonment and a fine not exceeding Five thousand pesos (PS,OOO.OO). SECTION 36. Penalties for Obstruction. - Any person who willfully obstructs or hinders the proper exercise of the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman or who willfully misleads or attempts to mislead the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor in replying to their inquiries shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding Five thousand pesos (PS,OOO.OO). SECTION 37. Franking Privilege. - All official mail matters and telegrams of the Ombudsman addressed for delivery within the Philippines shall be received, transmitted, and delivered free of charge: Provided, That such mail matters when addressed to private persons or nongovernment offices shall not exceed one hundred and twenty (120) grams. All mail matters and telegrams sent through government telegraph facilities containing complaints to the Office of the Omlbudsman shall be transmitted free of charge, provided that the telegram shall contain not more than one hundred fifty (150) words. SECTION 38. Fiscal Autonomy. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Office of the Ombudsman may not be reduced below the amount appropriated for the previous years and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. SECTION 39. Appropriations. - The appropriation for the Office of the Special Prosecutor in the current General Appropriations Act is hereby transferred to the Office of the Ombudsman. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. SECTION 40. Separability Clause. - If any prOVISion of this Act is held unconstitutional, other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and binding. SECTION 41. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, exelfutive orders, rules and regulations insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act, are hereby repealed or amended as the case may be. SECTION 42. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Approved: November 17,1989
Uy

v. Sandiganbayan,354 SCRA651 (2001)

. HELD: The authority of the Ombudsmanto investigateand prosecuteoffensescommitted by public officers

and employeesis founded in section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. section 15 vests the Ombudsmanwith the powerto investigateand prosecuteany act or omissionof any publicofficer or employee,office or agency, when suchact or omissionappearsto be illegal,unjust, improperor inefficient,thus: "SECTION 15. Powers,Functionsand Duties. the following powers,functionsand duties: (1) The Office of the Ombudsmanshall have

Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission. of any publicofficer or employee,office or agency,when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over casescognizableby the sandiganbayan and, in the exerciseof this primaryjurisdiction,

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 99 of 110 it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; xxx xxx xxx. Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman under the latter's supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal caseswithin the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan. It states:

r
"SECTION11. Structural Organization. - ... xxx xxx xxx (3) . The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and his prosecution staff. The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman. (4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers: (a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan; (b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and (c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombl1dsman."

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 1S (1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases. Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction oF" cases involving public officers and empioyees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman 9f his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powrrs granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasanceand non-feasancecommitted by public officers and employees during their tenure of office. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. 5 The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with section 11 (4c) of RA 6770. Villavert v. Desierto, 326 SCRA 355 (2000) ! HEL1>: In Fabian VS. Desierto (2955O?A 470), sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of

1st

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 100 of 110

Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman. In both Fabian and Namuhe, the petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition considered as petitions for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. / On and

February 1999 this Court promulgated A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC thus In light of the decision in Fabian v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998), any appeal by way of petition for review from a decision or final resolution or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, or special civil action relative to such decision, resolution or order filed with the Court after 15 March 1999 shall no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but must be forthwith DENIED or DISMISSED, respectively.

As the instant petition was filed prior to 15 March 1999, its referral for final disposition to the Court of Appeals is still in order .

E. Office of the Special Prosecutor

Id., Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as
the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.
zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843 (1988) and Resolution, May 19, 1988 mandamus to restrain & hearing of criminal legal & constitutional to file cases with the

FACTS: Petitioner, governor of Antique, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and the Sandiganbayan & Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the prosecution cases against him on the ground that said cases were filed by the Tanodbayan w/o authority since under the 1987 Consti., it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority Sandiganbayan. HELD: Under the 1987 Constitution, charged with the duty to: the Ombudsman (as distinguished

from the incumbent Tanodbayan) .

is

"Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." (Sec. 13, par. 1) The Constitution likewise provides that:

The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." (Art XI, section 7) (Italics ours) Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been divested Of such authority. Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do sp by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims under section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to investigate. Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, May

19, 1988

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 101 of 110 (1) The power of investigationconferred on the Ombudsmancovers both administrativeand crim. offenses. Accordingly,the Sp Pros.cannot claim that he retainsthe specificpower of pre!. investigationwhile conceding the generalpower of investigationto the Ombudsman.The greater power embracesthe lesser. (2) The fact that the informations filed by the resp. from Feb. 2, 1987, were invalid bec. they were not authorized by the Ombudsman,is not a jurisdictionaldefect. The Informations could have beenchallengedin a m'i'tion to quash under R 117, ROCon the ground of lack of authority on the part of the officer filing the same. If this ground was not invoked,it is deemedwaived under Sec.8 of the same Rule. At any rate, to settle this question, we hereby rule that the decisionof this Court in this case shall be given prospectiveapplicationonly from April 27, 1988. xxx To recapitulate,the Court holdsthat, in the interest of justice, its ruling in 4/27/88 shall apply prospectivelyto cases filed in Court prior to said resolution and pending trial nor to convictions or acquittals pronounced therein. The exception is where there has been a timely objection and a specific challenge, as in this case, where the Court ordered the nullificationof the Info. filed for lack of authority on the part of resp. Gonzales.

See PO No. 16;JO,sees. 10, 12-15 (administrative

(criminal investigations) Sec. 10. Powers.--

investigations)

and sec. 17

The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers:

(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or

initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any criminal offense or not of any administrative agency including any government owned or controlled corporations;

(b) He may prescribe the methods by which complaints are to be made, received,
and acted upon; he may determine the scope and manner of investigations to be made; and, subject to the requirements of this Decree, he may determine the form, frequency, and distribution of his conclusions and recommendations; (c) He may request and unless as herein provided for he shall be given by each administrative agency the assistance and information he deems necessary to the discharge of his responsibilities; he may examine the records and documents of all administrative agencies; and he ,may enter and inspect premises within any administrative agency's control, provided, however, that, where the President in writing certifies that such information, examination or inspection might prejudice the national interest or violate existing law, the Tanodbayan shall desist. All information so obtained shall be confidential, unless the President, in the interest of public service, decides otherwise;

(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn
testimony, or produce documentary or other deems relevant to a matter under his inquiry; evidence the Tanodbayan

(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima facie case, he may file the necessary information or complaint with the Sandiganbayan or any proper court or administrative agency and prosecute the case; (f) He may file and prosecute civil and administrative cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or'controlled corporations, in relation to thei r office;

(g) He may undertake, participate in, or cooperate with general studies or inquiries, whether or not related to any particular administrative agency or any particular administrative act, if he believes that they may enhance knowledge about or lead to improvements in the functioning of administrative agencies.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 102 of 110
"

In carrying out his functions, the Tanodbayan may with the approval of the President, deputize or call upon any official or employee of the government or any agency or office and during such deputation the official or employee concerned shall be under the supervision and control of the Tanodbayan.

Sec. 12. Matters appropriate for Investigation.-- (a) In selecting matters for his attention, the Tanodbayan should also address himself to an administrative act that might be-1. contrary to law or regulation; 2. unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or inconsistent with the general course of an administrative agency's functioning; 3. mistaken in law or arbitrary in ascertainment of facts; 4. improper in motivation or based on irrelevant considerations; 5. unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should have been revealed; 6. inefficiently performed; or 7. otherwise objectionable (b) The Tanodbayan may concern himself also with strengthening procedures and
practices which lessen the administrative acts. risk of occurrence' of any objectionable

Sec. 13. Action on Complaints.-(a) The Tanodbayan may receive a complaint from any source concerning an administrative act. At no expense to the complainant, he may conduct a suitable investigation into the things complained of.
(b) After completing his consideration of a complaint, whether or not it has been investigated, the Tanodbayan shall suitably inform the complainant and, when appropriate, the administrative agency or agencies involved. (c) A letter to the Tanodbayan from a person in a place of detention or in a hospital or other institution under the control of an administrative agency shall be immediately forwarded, unopened to the Tanodbayan.

Sec. 14.

Consultation with Agency.-- Before announcing a conclusion or recommendation that criticizes an administrative agen~ or any person, the Tanodbayan shall consult with that agency or person.

Sec. 15. Recommendations.-- (a) If, having considered a complaint and whatever material he deems pertinent, the Tanodbayan is of the opinion that an administrative agency should (1) consider the matter further, (2) modify or cancel an administrative act, (3) alter a regulation or ruling, (4) explain fully the administrative act in question, or (5) take any other step, he shall state his recommendations to the administrative agency. If the Tanodbayan so requests, the agency shall, within the time he has specified, inform him about the action taken on his recommendations or the reasons for not complying with them.
(b) If the Tanodbayan believes that an administrative action has been dictated by laws whose results are unfair or otherwise objectionable, he shall bring to the of the President and the National Assembly (Congress) his views concerning desirable statutory change. Sec. 17. Investigation and Prosecution of Cases.-- The Office of the Tanodbayan shall have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to file information therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases. The Tanodbayan may utilize the personnel of his office and/ or with the approval of the President, designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist him in the investigation and prosecution of said cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 103 of 110 No publicity shall be allowed during the pendency of such preliminary investigation and the name of the complainant and the accused shall not be made public until an information is filed by the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan, his investigators and prosecutors, whether regular members of his staff or designated by him as herein provided, shall have the authority to administer oaths, to issue subpoena duces tecum, to summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify under oath before them and/ or to bring books, documents and other things under their control, and to secure the attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through application before the Sandiganbayan or before any inferior or superior court having jurisdiction of the place where the witnesses or evidence is found. The resolutions and actions of the Tanodbayan shall not be subject to review by any administrative agency.

G. CENTRAL MONETARY AUTHORITY

1. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other .qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions.
Art. XII, Sec. 20.

Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines, operating under existing laws, shall function as the central monetary authority. An Independent
"independent." foreign or local. The important concept is This has reference to all forms of undue control or influence whether

Central

Monetary

Authority.--

As !envisioned, what seems to be envisioned is the diminution of govt control on monetary policy bec. the body will be composed of a majority from the private sector, w/c can include people from the labor and peasant sector.

2. Functions [d., Sec. 20, supra. [d., Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public. See RA 7653

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 104 of 110

H. ECONOMIC AND PLANNING

AGENCY

Id., Sec. 9. The Congress may establish an independent economic

and planning agency headed by the President, which shall, after consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units, recommend to Congress, and implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs and policies for national development. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and Development Authority shall function as the independent planning agency of the government. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporation or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage .as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority ovei' foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

Id., Sec. 10.

I. NATIONAL COMMISSIONS 1. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

A. Composition and Qualifications Art. XIII, Sec. 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights. (2) The Commission shall be composed of a Members who must be natural-born citizens of a majority of whom shall be members of the office and other qualifications and disabilities the Commission shall be provided by law. Chairman and four the Philippines and Bar. The term of of the Members of

(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers. (4) The approved annual appropriations be automatically and regularly released. of the Commission shall

B. Powers and Functions

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 105 of 110

Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions: (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial facilities; powers over jails, prisons, or detention

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; (6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance international treaty obligations on human rights; with

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conduced by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any department, agency in the performance of its functions; bureau, office, or

(10) Appoint its officers and employer in accordance with law; and (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

Id., Sec. 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations. Functions of the Commission.-- The principal functions of the CHR is investigatory. In fact, in terms of law enforcement, this pretty much is the limit of its function. Beyond investigation, it will have to rely on the Justice Dept. w/c has full control over pros,ecutions. Thus, under Sec. 18 (9), it can only request assistance from executive offices. Operational Measures.-The authority to set its "operational guidelines" was adopted in lieu of authority to "set its own priorities" in order to avoid the suspicion that the CHR might narrow the scope of its investigation to military violations of human rights only.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 106 of 110 What the legal measures are w/c the CHR may adopt under Sec. 18 (3) was explained as including the power to issue direc~ives for the preservation of "the body of the detainee and to. prevent the authorities from hiding it, or from torturing or transferring the body until further orders of the court, w/o prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ... " xxx The Commission, however, has no power to order the release of a detainee.
I

Legal Measures.--

carino v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 (1991) HELD: The threshold question is whether of not the CHR has the power under the Consti. to adjudicate; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares the CHR to have no such power xxx The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. xxx To be considered a judicial function, the faculty or receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the CHRdoes not have. Investigate. -- The legal meaning of "investigate" is "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or obse'rvation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into w/ care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry; to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of w/c ordinarily does not require a hearing xxx an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters. Adjudicate.-- In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous w/ adjudge in its strict sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn xxx Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of judgement." EPZA v. CHR, 208 SCRA 125 (1992) FACTS: On 5/30/80, PD 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and Gen. Trias cavite, as the "Cavite EPZA. For purposes of devt, the area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel in PhaseIV was bought by the Filoil Refinery Corp., w/c in turn sold it to EPZA. Bef. IEPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agrieultural products therein w/o permission from EPZA or its predecessor. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid P10,000 financial assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father or resp. Loreto Aledia. After 10 yrs., resp. T. Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordonez filed in the resp. CHRa joint complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies." On 5/17/91, the CHR issued an order of injunction commanding EPZA,the 125th PNPCo. and Gov. Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the CHR and to appear bef. the CHR. Subsequent orders of injunction were issued by CHR. The motion filed w/ EPZAfor the lifting of the order of injunction was denied. MFRwas likewise denied. Hence, petitioner filed in this Court a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition, w/ a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/ or prel. inj., alleging that CHR acted' in excess of its jurisdiction and w/ grave abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ xxx ISSUE: Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of.?

r
HEL'D: No. The constitutional provision directing the CHR directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the CHR to issue a restraining order or writ of

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 107 of 110 injunction for, if that were the intention, the Consti. would have expressly said so. conferred by the Consti. or by law." xxx Jurisdiction is only

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Consti. refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including prel. writ of injunction) w/c the CHRmay seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has not jurisdiction to issue the "t'rit, for a writ of pre. inj. may only be issued "by the judge of any court in w/c the action is pending (w/in his district), or by a Justice of the CA, or of the sc. It may also be granted by a judge of a RTC in any action pending in an inferior court w/in his district.

C. Fiscal Autonomy
Art. XII,

Sec. 17. (4)

Commission (on regularly released.

The approved annual appropriations of the Human Rights) shall be automatically and

2.

NATIONAL LANGUAGE COMMISSION

Art. XIV,

Sec. 9. The Congress shall establish a national language

commission composed of representatives of various regions and disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the development, propagation and presentation of Filipino and other languages.

3.

NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION

The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to . be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
Art. XVI,

Sec. 6.

Carpio v. E"xecutivesecretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992)

FACTS: The Petitioner, as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Phil. Bar, filed a petition to declare the unconstitutionality of RA 697S, "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized DILG and For Other Purposes:'
i

HEU): 1. As to the view that RA 697S emasculated the NPC by limiting its power to administrative control over the PNp' thus control remained wi the Dept. Sec. under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed.

It is an accepted principle in consti. law that the Pres. has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of govt extends over all executive officers xxx As a corollary rule is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the Pres. cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his cabinet members. Under this doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Exec. Dept., the heads of various exec. depts. are assistants and agents of the Chief Exec., and except in cases where the Chief Exec. is required by the Consti or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Exec. are performed by and through the exec. depts., and the acts of the Secretaries of such depts., performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Pres., presumptively the acts of the Chief Exec. Thus, the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the cabinet members who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the exec. dept.

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr . .ls'Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 108 of 110 Additionally, the circumstance that the NPCand the PNPare placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, locaiexecutives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under RA 6975, the funding of the PNPbeing in large part subsidized by the national govt. 2. As to the issue that in manifest derogation of the power of control of the NPC over the PNp' RA 697S vesti;!d the power to choose the PNP Prov'l Director and the Chief of Police in Governors and Mayors, respectively; the power of operational "supervisionand control" over police units in city and municipal mayors. There is no usurpation bec. under this very same provision, it is clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of the NPC. As such deputies, they are answerable to the NPC for their actions in the exercise of their functions under that section. 3. As to the issue that in manifest derogation of the power of control of the NPC over the PNp' RA 697S vested in the CSc, participation in appointments to the positions of Senior Supt. to Deputy Director Gen. as well as the administration. of qualifying entrance examinations. Sec. 31 (a), (b), (c) and Sec. 32 of said Act precisely underscores the civilian character of the PNP and will undoubtedly professionalizethe same. 4. As to the issue that in manifest derogation of the power of control of the NPC over the PNp' RA 697S vested disciplinary powers over the PNPmembers in the People's Law Enforcement Boards (PLEB)and in city and municipal mayors. Pursbant to Sec. 20 (c) of the Act, the NPC exercises appellate jurisdiction, through the regional appellate board, over decisions of both the PLEBand the said mayors. Further, it is the Commission w/c shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the PLEBfor the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign the NPChearing officer to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs. The purpose of the establishment of PLEBis to professionalizethe PNP. 5. As to the issue that Sec. 12 of the law constitutes an encroachment upon, intetference wI, and an abdication by the Pres. of exec. control and commander-in-chief powers. Sec. 12 gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the Pres.This is so since the police force, not being integrated w/ the military, is not part of the AFP. As a civilian agency of the govt, it properly corpes w/in the and is subject to the exercise by the Pres. of the power of exec. control. xxx 6. As to the issue that the creation of ';4 Special Oversight Committee" under Sec. 84 of the Act especially the inclusion of some legislators as members is an unconstitutional encroachment upon and diminution of the Prespent's power of control over all exec. depts., bureaus and offices.

The Commit is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tasked solely wI planning and overseeing the immediate transfer, merger, and/or absorption into the DILG of the "involved agencies." 7. The 3 Constitutional Commissions (CSC, COA & COMELEC) and the additional commission created by the Consti (CHR) are all independent of the Executive; but the NAPOLCOM is not. In fact, it was stressed during the CONCOMdeliberations that this commission would be under the Pres., and hence may be controlled by the Pres., through his or her alter ego, the sec. of the Interior and Local Govt.
NAPOLCOM

v. De Guzman, 229 SCRA 801 (1994)

FACTS: The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the compulsory retirement of PNPofficers as mandated in Sec. 39, RA 6975. Among others, the Act provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP members xxx for officer(s) and non-officer(s) upon the attainment of age 56. Based on Sec. 39 of the said Act, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private respondents who are all members of the defunct PC and have reached the age of 56.

In refSponse,pvt. resps. filed a complaint on 12/19/91 for declaratory order and/ or injunction bef. the RTC. In their complaint, resps. aver that the age of retirement set at 56 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. B9 of the same law w/c provided for a transition period of four yrs. following the effectivity of the Act in setting the retirement age. xxx It is the submission of resps. that the term "INP" includes both the former members of the PC and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the INP. On the other hand, the belief of the petitioners that the 4-yr. transition period provided in sec. 89

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 109 of 110 applies only to the local police forces who previously retired, compulsorily at age 60 for those in ranks of Policel FireLt. or higher; while the retirement age for the PChad already been set at 56 under the AFPlaw. ISSUE: Doesthe RA6975 distinguishINP from the PC?
HELD: From a careful perusalof some provisionsof the law (Sees.23, 85 and 86), it appearstherefore, that the ~se of the term INP is not synonymouswi the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just mace a uniform reference to the membersof the whole PNPfor retirement purposesand not just the INP. The law itself distinguishesINP from the PCand it cannot be construedthat "INP" as used in sec. 89 includes the membersof the PC.

As contrary to the pronouncementof resp.judge that the law failed to define who constitutesthe INP. Sec.90 of the law states that "xxx The Integrated NationalPolice,which is the civilian componentof the PC-INP xxx." The legislativeintent to classifythe INP in such manner that Sec.89 is applicableonly to the local police force is clear. The question now is win the classificationis valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform to the ff. requisites: (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equallyto all membersof the sameclass. The classificationis based upon substantialdistinctions. The PC,bef. the effectivity of the law, were already retirable at age 56 while the local police force at 60 and governed by different laws. The distinction is relevant for the purposeof the statute, wlc is to enable the local police force to plan for their retirement wlc woulp be earlier than usual bec. of the new law. Sec.89 is merely transitory, remedial in nature, and losesits force and effect oncethe 4-yr. transitory period haselapsed. Finally,it appliesto all local policeofficers. Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA S38 (1994) FACTS: Petitioner, a policeman assigned w/ the medical co. of the PNP HQ at Camp Catitigan, Davao City was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder and attempted murder were filed w/ the RTC, the trial court issued an order suspending petitioner until termination of the case on the basis of Sec. 47 of RA 6975, w/c provides: Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case.-- Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law;s six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on Sec. 42 of PD 807, that his suspension should be limited to 90 days and also, on our ruling in Deloso v. sa, and Layno v. sa. The motion and the subsequent MFR were denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
HELD:

We find the petition to be devoid of merit.

(1) The language of the first sentence is clear, plain and free from ambiguity.The second sentence providing the trial must be terminated wlin 90 days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The 2 can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The 2nd deals wi the time frame wlin w/c the trial should be finished. Suppose the trial is not terminated w/in the 90-day period, should the suspension of accused be lifted? Certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" bef. the phrase "be terminated w/in 90 days," there is nothing in the law that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated wlin that period. But this is wlo prejudice to the administrative sanctions, and, in appropriate cases where the facts so war~ant, to criminal or civil liability of the judge. Should the trial be unreasonably delayed w/o the .fault of the accused, he may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should this be refused, he can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by (2) Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of the preventive suspension in pending admin. investigation, not in crim. cases, as here. xxx Sec. 91 of RA 6975 w/c states that the CS law and its implementing

Hand Out No. 8 - Constitutional Commissions Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. 1st Semester, SY 2012-2013, P.U.P. College of Law Page 110 of 110 rules shall apply to members of the PNPinsofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent wi RA 6975. (3) The petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. xxx Sec. 13 of RA 3019 upon

wlc the preventive suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based was silent wi
res~ect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged wi murder under the RPCand it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 RA 6975 wlc categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated. (4) The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that became RA 6975 reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged wi grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six yrs. of imprisonment and wlc suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.

I,'

,I

4.

COMMISSION COMMUNITIES

ON

INDIGENOUS

CULTURAL

Art. XVI, Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the
President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such communities.