The Possibility of a Tillichian Eco-theology: A Recovery of Tillichs Concept of Nature by Zach Simpson

-forReconstructing Paul Tillich Phillip Clayton, Professor

December 15, 2003

Is nature not completely subjected to the will and wilfulness of man? This technical civilization, the pride of mankind, has brought about a tremendous devastation of original nature, of the land, of animals, of plants. It has kept genuine nature in small reservations and has occupied everything for domination and ruthless exploitation. And worse: many of us have lost the ability to live with nature. We fill it with the noise of empty talk, instead of listening to its many voices, and through them, to the voiceless music of the universe. Separated from soil by a machine, we speed through nature, catching glimpses of it, but never comprehending its greatness or feeling its power. Who is still able to penetrate, meditating and contemplating, the creative ground of nature?1 The above quote could have just as easily been uttered by Edward Abbey or Aldo Leopold, as from Paul Tillich, a Christian theologian. For the above quote is tinged with romanticism, deep ecology, an excoriation of modern techno-culture, and a seemingly prescriptive yearning for a return to the creative ground of nature. Not typical words for a Christian theologian, much less one as rigorously systematic as Paul Tillich. And yet they are there, and, arguably, wholly in conformity with one of the greatest theological edifices of the past hundred years. If this is the case, it immediately raises two questions: What is the systematic relationship of Tillichs thoughts on nature to his larger system? And, is such a connection or recovery even tenable or desirable? If in fact a systematic relationship can be drawn between the deep ecology expressed in the above quote and Tillichs overall system, there lies the great potential for what I have quixotically called a Tillichian eco-theology, (of which this paper will hopefully affirm), one whose desirability (or even practicality) will nonetheless remain open to question. This paper therefore posits itself as a recovery of the viable concepts within Tillichs thought which lend themselves to an eco-theology, or, to use Schellings term, a philosophy of nature. (Though Tillich certainly wouldnt have used the term philosophy, as it only asked the question, but did not supply the answers.) But what is an eco-theology? The term remains clouded in multiple meanings, and it certainly cannot be the task of this paper to clarify what an eco-theology is or isnt. In short, most contemporary environmental theologies or eco-theologies have as their starting point the current environmental crisis in which the possibility of human and animal existence is increasingly threatened by the possibility of gradual ecological destruction or catastrophic ecological destruction, wrought, most notably, by humans.

Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1948). Pg. 79.

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Philosophically, most environmental theologies presuppose that the impending environmental crisis is the ostensible result of structures of anthropocentrism, which, as theologians, they see as being fundamentally linked to religious and theological structures which have consistently validated their employment. For ecofeminists such as Rosemary Radford Ruether, structures of anthropocentrism are inevitably linked to structures of androcentrism, i.e., human-centeredness has typically been correlated with male-centeredness.2 The role of an ecofeminist such as Ruether, then, is to indicate structures of andro/anthropocentrism and to provide salient counter-alternatives to such structures which are typically theological in nature. Other more traditional accounts, such as one proffered by John Cobb, see anthropocentrism as a general derogation of human interrelatedness with the world itself, i.e., a directed separation from the ecological whole.3 Both Cobb and Ruethers accounts, as somewhat representative of environmental theologies as a whole, thus reveal a consistent admission of human anthropocentrism at the heart of the current ecological crisis, and are intent on producing structures, theologies, etc., which are directed at the elimination of said structures. A Tillichian eco-theology will not take the above tack, nor should it. Though a reconstruction of parts of Tillichs thought in light of a new ecological consciousness is certainly the intent of this paper (though such a modern consciousness may not differ all that greatly from Tillichs), it will not presuppose, as Cobb, Ruether, and others have done, that the root of the problem lies within structures of anthropocentrism. For Tillich, the problem and the answer, at base, would have to be ontological, and, only by extension, epistemological and/or socio-theological. Thus, this paper, though wishing to maintain the critical and prescriptive component of most eco-theologies, as well as their scientific starting point, cannot remain loyal to both Tillich and contemporary environmental theologians at the same time. Tillichs presuppositions and the answers he would potentially give are radically different than that of most contemporary environmental

2 See Rosemary Radford Ruether, Ecological Crisis: Gods Presence in Nature?, God and the Nations, eds., Douglas John Hall and Rosemary Radford Ruether (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), Pg. 84. Also see Ruether, Ecofeminism: The Challenge to Theology, Christianity and Ecology, eds., Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2000), Pg. 97.

John Cobb, Sustainability, (New York: Orbis Books, 1992), Pg. 22.

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theologians. Whether or not such an approach is desirable, countervailing as it may be, remains in question.4 It is therefore my view, along with Langdon Gilkeys, that a Tillichian philosopher/theologian has much that is relevant to say about the spiritual origins of the present ecological crisis and a good number of categories to offer that may be helpful in the rethinking of the relation of human being to nature.5 So what are the categories that a Tillichian philosopher/theologian might offer? The beginning quote, short as it is, crystallizes much of what a Tillichian eco-theology might offer both critically and prescriptively. First, there is the author himself, Tillich, and his seeming romantic preoccupation with nature. This cannot be disregarded, for it forms the backdrop against which one may view the rest of Tillichs theology, and, with an eye to ecological concerns, it causes one to be sympathetic to Tillichs theology in places where one otherwise wouldnt. Secondly, there is the blending of highly critical and prescriptive elements in the beginning quote, in which Tillich decries modern technical culture (and its attendant epistemological constraints) and poses viable counter-alternatives, namely, in general form, the call to penetrate the ground of nature. Specifically, and with regard to this paper, the concept of penetration gets played out in Tillichs notion of love, his ontology, and, finally, in his idea of greatness, an idea surrounded by a constellation of meanings. All of these ideas, and their complex interrelationships, form the basis for a recovered Tillichian environmental theology which reveres nature via. sacrament and value (i.e., through theology and ethics, as it would be generally construed), and rails against technological, religious, and epistemological attempts to debar the human connection with nature. Such a recovery is not entirely unproblematic, however, and Tillich himself affords considerable room for emendation.6 Such a critique has two components which this paper will consider, and which, in the end, may prove costly for a Tillichian environmental theology. The first set of critiques is internal, and can be
4 For an interesting note on Tillichs occupation of the boundary of current environmental discourse, see H.P. Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pg. 141.

Langdon Gilkey, The Role of the Theologian in Contemporary Society, in The Thought of Paul Tillich, eds., James Luther Adams, Wilhelm Pauck, and Roger Lincoln Shinn (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), pg. 338.
6 It should be noted here briefly that most attempts at a Tillichian environmental theology, especially that of Drummy, (see Michael Drummy, Being and Earth: Paul Tillichs Theology of Nature, Lanham: University Press of America, 2000) are largely, if not entirely, apologetic to Tillichs theology. Most criticism, if any, remains almost fully within Tillichs system itself.

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leveled against some of the more dominant (though not exclusively so) tendencies in Tillichs work toward anthropocentrism or the utterly transcendent nature of God. The second set of critiques is external to Tillichs project itself, and could be valid for any environmental theology, though they apply even more so to Tillich due to his consistent attempt to be integrative. This second branch of critique relies heavily on Tillichian notions of value, and questions the capacity, using concepts from Nietzsche and from Tillichs own neoPlatonism, of a Tillichian environmental theology to actually place value on the earth as it is (read: intrinsic value), a critical aspect of any environmental ethic. However damaging it may be, this process of metacriticism should be instructive insomuch as it challenges the entire notion of an environmental theology, and, arguably, it may posit Tillichs environmental theology as the only one capable of answering to such a critique. Tillichs Own Love of Nature Tillichs own love of nature has been given considerable attention, both biographical and autobiographical. Tillichs chief biographers, Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, note with enthusiasm Tillichs love of gardening, taking walks, watching sunsets, and admiring the ocean.7 Tillich himself admitted to being a pagan worshiper of trees,8 and he was honored, on more than one occasion, to receive trees as gifts from both students and family. What is important here, though, is the way in which nature effectively molded Tillichs theology. His previously mentioned love of the ocean provided the backdrop for one of his most powerful insights, namely that nature is the finite expression of the infinite ground of all things.9 In seeing land bordering upon the abyss, Tillich was led to ponder the possibility of one of his most profound insights, that of being-itself.10
7

See Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought, Volume 1 (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pgs. 17, 180, and

207.
8

Pauck, 207.

This observation has had many commentators. The original quotation is in Tillichs Autobiographical Reflections, in The Theology of Paul Tillich, ed., Charles W. Kegley (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1982), pg. 4. For other responses, see Pauck, pgs. 17-18, Tillichs On the Boundary (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1966), pg. 18, and Roy D. Morrison, Science, Theology, and the Transcendental Horizon: Einstein, Kant, and Tillich, Number 67 in the American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994) pg. 128. Most agree that the ocean, and its abyss, form the ground for Tillichs ideas on being-itself.
10

Tillich, Autobiographical Reflections, 6-7.

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Moreover, in his Autobiographical Reflections, Tillich notes of his aesthetic-meditative11 attitude toward nature, an attitude he maintained his whole life. This attitude undoubtedly shaped Tillichs reflections not only on nature itself, but on his seminal ideas in culture, mysticism, ontology, and art. In keeping with his own romanticism, Tillich engaged most of philosophy and theology, especially early in his career, in its ability to accommodate his nascent but passionate views on the natural. To this end, Tillich wrote his dissertation on Schelling, whose Philosophy of Nature no doubt had an effect on Tillichs sense of the romantic. He also severely criticized Calvin and Zwinglis demonization of nature, and had tempered admiration for Luthers reflections on the natural.12 Tillichs reading of philosophy and theology was consistently molded by his attempt to see in the ideas of others his own admitted aesthetic-romantic attitude toward nature. When Tillich encountered opposition to his views on nature, as in the case of Zwingli, or later in Ritschl and Barth, his tone became increasingly polemical (as much as Tillich could be, that is). Rarely does one make biographical reflections regarding a philosopher or theologian, but, in the case of Tillich, it is important to see that Tillichs interest in nature is not merely academic. Tillichs interest in nature, or, rather, his participation in nature, is a consistent theme of his life which inevitably emerges both implicitly and explicitly in his theology, especially in his engagement with other Christian theologians who were not sympathetic to his own view of the natural. As we will see in the following sections, Tillichs own aesthetic-meditative attitude toward nature, coupled with an extreme respect, was to influence his most profound ideas on ontology, morality, and even the assertion of value. A close reading of such concepts will reveal that, to use Tillichs term, the natural is latent within all of his work. Tools for a Tillichian Eco-Theology Reason, Participation, Love, and Morality As indicated earlier, most contemporary eco-theologies have both a critical and a prescriptive component. My attempted recovery of elements of Tillichs theology for a viable eco-theology is no different.
11

Tillich, Autobiographical Reflections, 4.

12 See Drummy, pgs. 16-19 for an analysis of Tillichs ecological reading of both Luther and Zwingli. Drummy does an excellent job in laying out Tillichs consistent adherence to philosophies/theologies which can adapt his own admitted aesthetic-romantic view of nature.

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Prescriptively, Tillich offers up a viable ontology, ethic, and morality, upon which an environmental theology can be built. Critically and exigently, Tillichs most critical engagement with the culture and philosophy with which he was contemporaneous comes in the form of his epistemological critique of technology, and, more specifically, technical reason. Engagement with this critique will more fully elucidate what specifically Tillich rejects in modern techno-culture as well as what moral or environmental agency would look like in a Tillichian eco-theology. Tillichs most sustained and potent critique of technical culture comes in the form of his polemics against what he calls technical reason. Technical reason, posited in dialectical polarity with ontological reason (namely in Volume 1 of the Systematic Theology), is responsible for structures of objectification and scientific knowledge. When in harmony with ontological reason, technical reason lends practical and intellectual credibility to ideas derived in the ontological reason. Left to its own devices, however, or when in imbalance with ontological reason, technical reason becomes the vehicle for what Tillich pejoratively calls thing-a-fication, i.e., the consistent reification and objectification of nature, humans, and life processes.13 Tillich wholly rejects any view or component of reason which mechanizes life itself, or, in Bubers terms, views people, animals, etc., as Its. In Tillichs eyes, this view is certainly not benign. In a section of Volume 2 of the Systematic Theology, Tillich inveighs against concupiscence (a moral vice for Tillich), or hubris, which attempts to take all things in the world into itself, as essentially the offshoot of technical reason.14 Similarly, in a typically balanced presentation, Tillich weighs in against the production of technical goods: The gadget itself is not evil, but gearing a whole economy to it and repressing the question of an ultimate end of production of technical goods is.15 Tillich thus sees technical reason (and technology) as

13 The consistency of Tillichs polemics against technical reason is astounding. For examples, though clearly not exhaustive, see Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), pg. 87, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pgs. 137 and 139, Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pgs. 73, 97-99, and 173. For an excellent commentary on Tillichs views of technical reason, also see J. Mark Thomas, Ethics and Technoculture (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), in which Thomas addresses Tillich, Marcuse, and Heideggers views on technology and technical reason, eventually siding with Tillichs view of theonomy as a counter-alternative to Heideggers primitivism and Marcuses outright approval of technology.

14

See Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pg. 50ff. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pg. 259.

15

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wholly ambiguous: when in balance with ontological reason, technical reason provides structures of objectivity and clarity; when not in balance with ontological reason, technical reason tends toward concupiscence, materialism, and repression. Through objectification, it interrupts the potential for grasping humans, animals, trees, etc., in their autonomous depth. In this way, as Michael Drummy has done, a line can clearly be drawn between Tillichs critique of contemporary epistemology and a potential critique of the human treatment of nature human destruction of nature is contingent upon processes of objectification and mechanization.16 As with most things in Tillich, though, such a critique does not stand in isolation, for, along with technical reason, Tillich rejects the epistemological subject which accompanies an overwhelming technical reason. Ostensibly, overwhelming technical reason leads either to a wholly autonomous self, a Cartesian/Kantian self, free from relations, or an utterly mechanized self and dissolute self, incapable of coherent moral agency. Tillich rejects both.17 In their stead, Tillich proposes both a Gestalt notion of selfhood and one which is wholly interrelated. The Gestalt dimension of the self presupposes a centered subject who acts out of, and towards, a state of centeredness.18 One is not a dissolute subject, pliable to signification, the needs of the community, or language. A Gestalt notion of selfhood recognizes an autonomous self capable of acting in a centered fashion to or from a stimulus. This is held in tension with a wholly relational self, which Tillich upholds as a necessary dimension of selfhood.19 Each individual self stands in relation to other selves as well as to other things, i.e., animals, nature, and life processes. The self, though individuated and centered, is fully relational, or, to use H.R. Niebuhrs term, responsive. Normatively, Tillichs rejection of technical reason leads to his articulation of the Gestalt-responsive self, one which is neither fully autonomous nor fully mechanized, and which makes possible coherent moral agency. Parallel to his rejection of the technical self, in the stead of technical reason Tillich asserts the

16

Drummy, pg. 44. For Tillichs rejection of the Cartesian self, see Courage to Be, pg. 131. See Dynamics of Faith, pgs. 28 and 38, as well as Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 185.

17

18

19 See Tillichs approval of Martin Bubers I-Thou in Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pg. 190ff, and Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 234.

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desirability of theonomous reason, as the dialectical mediation of both technical and ontological reason. Ontological reason, held in tension with technical reason grants a dimension of depth20 and grasps and shapes reality21 . In other words, ontological reason is posited as the intuitive, creative, and inexplicable element in human reason. In isolation, ontological reason runs the consistent risk of losing its lucidity, practicality, and ability to create meaningful intellectual structures for itself. Held in tension with technical reason, however, reason becomes theonomous, i.e., a mediation of the creative/intuitive elements and the more intellectualistic/objective elements found in the technical reason. Defined as such, reason becomes the meaningful structure of mind and reality; and not the...technical tool.22 Theonomous reason, in uniting the depth of ontological reason with the rigor of technical reason, becomes a genuine structure of reason capable of granting authentic knowledge apart from structures of objectification and mechanization. As J. Mark Thomas notes, theonomy is consistently invoked by Tillich as the only structure of reason capable of overcoming the epistemological alienation wrought by the ascendancy of technical reason.23 Theonomy, just as is the Gestalt-responsive self, is Tillichs reply to contemporary epistemological structures which seek to deny an inherent connectedness between humans and each other or the natural. This critical epistemological and ethical andante is furthered by Tillichs affirmation of participation and courage as desirable components of his theological and ethical system. In keeping with the language of ontological reason, Tillich states that participation in nature is indirect and mediated...insofar as he transcends nature by knowing and shaping it.24 Thus, the language of ontological reason, that of knowing and shaping, is blended with the concept of participation, which, logically, would entail the idea of self- and worldtranscendence. Moreover, participation, as a manifestation of ontological reason, encompasses all of ones

20

Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 80ff. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 76. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pg. 87. Thomas, pg. 229. Tillich, Courage to Be, pg. 91.

21

22

23

24

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self, in fact, demands all of ones self.25 Tillichs epistemological concept of ontological reason is thus extended to the ethical sphere by means of his notion of total participation, a participation which, in turn, is self-transcendent and self-affirming. And yet Tillichs concepts of participation and self-transcendence, though they arise in conjunction with Tillichs discursus on human reason, can be directly linked to the biological. Therefore, it seems appropriate to reserve the term self-transcendence for that function of life in which this does occur in which life drives beyond itself as finite life.26 The concepts of participation and self-transcendence therefore are not wholly anthropogenic, but are available to all of life, that is, all animals which have a Gestalt self and are capable of self-transcendence. Nor is this concept limited, as Tillich in Courage to Be refers to biological self-affirmation in conjunction with his discussion of courage and fear.27 The seemingly limited concept of participation, and the ancillary notions of self-transcendence and self-affirmation, is extended to all beings in Tillichs ethical system. Participation thus becomes one of the core epistemological and ethical components of Tillichs system. Not only does participation, by its very linkage, negate the ascendancy of technical reason, it also relies upon a totally centered Gestalt self who recognizes her situatedness and responds with total participation to that stimulus. Also of significant note is Tillichs keen move to extend a potentially anthropocentric concept of reason and ethical agency to all beings, thus granting at least the possibility of significant participatory interaction between beings. This potently removes the desirability of a mechanistic worldview which emphasizes both objectification and individuation, a move which Tillich sees as being disastrous for modern society. The notion of participation is incomplete, however, if forced to stand on its own as an anchoring concept in Tillichs theology and ethics. Rather, the idea of participation can and should be seen as a

25

Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pg. 144. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 31. See Tillich, Courage to Be, pg. 78.

26

27

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necessary preliminary to one of Tillichs most engaging concepts, that of agape love. Building on Tillichs fundamental notion of estrangement, he articulates love (not agape love) as the drive toward the reunion of the separated.28 Love is thus a process, a synchronous movement between individuals toward each other.29 Going beyond this simple notion of love, Tillich articulates an amending concept, that of agape love, as the mutual participation of beings within, and yet apart from, each other.30 This simple identification is achieved partially by negation, in which Tillich states that agape love is not sexual, practical, or even emotional. It goes far deeper than any of those, and yet encompasses them at the same time. Agape love unites two individuals, as centered selves, in a mutual relation. The idea is inherently participatory: his complete centeredness enables him to participate in his world without limits; and love, as the dynamic power of life, drives him toward such participation.31 And, in keeping with the previous sentiments on the universality of participation, one can, as Michael Drummy has done, extend the notion of agape to all beings and being, forming what Drummy calls, bio-agape.32 In a final and poignant move, Tillich ties his idea of agape to that of morality, pinning the essence of morality on the mutual participation between centered and related selves. Tillich is worth quoting at some length here on the tie between participation, the other, and morality: But there is a limit to mans attempt to draw all content into himself the other self. One can subject and exploit another in his organic basis, including his psychological self, but not the other in the dimension of spirit [centered existence]....Therefore, the other self is the unconditional limit to the desire to assimilate ones whole world, and the experience of this limit is the experience of the ought-to-be, the moral imperative....Personal life emerges in

Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pgs. 130ff. Also see Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pgs. 279ff, as well as Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 134.
29 Though Tillich does not explicitly note this, it seems apparent, at least implicitly, that even the notion of love, short of agape implies individuation as well as Tillichs ideas of the centered and participatory selves.

28

30 It is unfortunate that Tillich gives no real pithy statements on agape love that are quotable here, for the concept is fairly elegant. For more extended discussions of agape love, see Tillichs Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pgs. 280ff, Morality and Beyond, in Main Works, Volume 3: Writings in Social Philosophy and Ethics, ed., Erdmann Sturm (New York: De Gruyter, 1998), pgs. 668ff, and Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 45.

31

Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 2, pg. 71.

32 Drummy, pg. 143. Though I dont believe Drummy fully fleshes out the idea of agape, he is correct in showing Tillichs intent not to limit the concept just to humans.

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the encounter of person with person and in no other way.33 Clearly, for Tillich, the other self, or, rather, participation in another centered self34 , forms the boundary for all coherent moral action. In another key passage, Tillich links the moral imperative found in the other with love and a seemingly Kantian notion of the categorical imperative: Love unites the unconditional of the formalized moral imperative with the conditional character of the ethical content. Love is unconditional in its essence, conditional in its existence.35 Love is therefore the bridge between the unconditional content of the moral imperative36 and the realized other. Moral action is determined by ones concrete and participatory encounter with other centered selves, an encounter which forms the limit of, and basis for, all action. Morality is wholly contingent on Tillichs evolving construction of a participatory and Gestalt-responsive ethic which actively encounters and seeks reunion with other selves. Ecologically, Tillichs concept of morality, and its antecedent concepts of theonomy, participation, and agape, are all necessary correctives for what Tillich saw as a culture largely dissociated from the earth and others. Tillichs morality calls upon mutual participation between centered selves, an idea which implores humans for both centered moral agency and constructive participation with not only humans, but other beings as well. Being, Dimensions, Ambiguity, and Greatness The second and equally important strand of Tillichs thought which is valuable for any ecological recovery of Tillichs theological system is that which deals with Tillichs ontology, and, by extension, the value which is placed on the natural by virtue of his ontology. Though the previous section deferred the question of ontology to this point, the affirmation or negation of Tillichs ontology, and the attendant notions of sacrament and value, is critical to any prospective ecological recovery of Tillichs system.

33

Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 40. Also see Morality and Beyond, pg. 658.

34 Though Tillich clearly uses the word person here, a sympathetic reading could see this notion as applying to animals as well as humans. Or, in a reconstructive spirit, one need merely see this as a moment for semantic clarification.

35

Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 273. Oddly, Tillich appears to want to hold onto Kants deontology here, while still maintaining his own more empathetic construction of

36

ethics.

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Ontologically, Tillichs system begins with an affirmation of being-itself, the fundamental ground of all things.37 Though simple, this concept becomes the guiding idea behind almost all of the current line of thought. For, logically flowing from this affirmation is the fact that, if being-itself is the ground of all things, then being-itself is also present in all things, a point which Tillich consistently points out.38 Being is permeated by being-itself, or God. In this way, Tillich can assert, as he does in the Systematic Theology, that being-itself participates in all of being: In the same way, Gods participation is not a spatial or temporal presence. It is meant not categorically but symbolically. It is the parousia, the being with of that which is neither here nor there.39 Tillichs ontology thus affirms the in-ness of being-itself with respect to being; God is participatory in being, and, by virtue of logic, all of being is participatory in God. The above ontological affirmation moves quickly in the direction of one of Tillichs most naturally directed essays, Nature and Sacrament, in which he asserts that all of nature can be held to be as sacramental with respect to God. As Tillich frequently points out in both Nature and Sacrament and elsewhere, everything secular can be holy, so long as it affirms the transcendence and divinity of God.40 All of being points beyond itself to God.41 As such, all of being can be held to be both holy and sacramental, as it participates in being-itself. The world, as it stands in relation to God, has sacramental power. In the Protestant Era, Tillich terms this view a realistic one, in which being is viewed as capable of healing as it is, that is, in its intrinsic relation to God.42 Uniting his notion of power (as a structure of being) with the ideas of sacrament and symbol, Tillich arrives at a realistic view of nature in which nature is seen as having its own healing force; animals, for example, can be seen as symbols of the intense energies of nature, the demonic

37 Though it is not fully pertinent here, Tillichs affirmation of being-itself is phenomenological, based on being-itself as it is revealed through experience.

38 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pgs. 191, 237ff, and 263, as well as Systematic Theology, Volume 2, pgs. 5ff and 20, and Theology of Culture, pg. 194.

39

Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 245. Also see pgs. 238ff. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 218.

40

41 Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pg. 53. This also leads Tillich at one point to quixotically assert that pantheism (not panentheism) is an essential component to the Christian faith, though it is trumped by austere monotheism. See Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 234.

42

Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans., James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pgs. 100ff.

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component of nature (as in the serpent), or beings whose power expiates human guilt (as in a sacrifice). Nature as power and symbol has its own sacramental force, one which is a hybrid of its holy (pointing beyond itself) nature and the power it possesses as a being. In this way, Tillich can affirm the sacramental power of nature, and can, as he does, see nature as a vehicle for revelation of being-itself.43 Ontologically, being-itself is embedded in nature, as it is in all things. Being-itself endows all of being with a power of being, which symbolically and realistically links all of nature to Gods self. If nature is interpreted in this realistic and, at the same time, historical way, natural objects can become bearers of transcendent power and meaning, they can become sacramental elements.44 Tillichs project of linking being with being-itself could not get off the ground, of course, with the historical attestation of Jesus as the Christ. Tillichs Christology is essential in affirming the sacramental power of nature, for it forms the ontological bridge between finitude and the infinite. Tillich is precise on this point: Mediating in Christianity means bridging the infinite gap between the infinite and the finite, between the unconditional and the conditioned.45 Tillichs principal ontological statement regarding Jesus as the Christ is his ultimate and historical affirmation of the interpenetration of being and being-itself. Jesus as the Christ is the illogical historical accident whereby the mutual participation of being and being-itself was attested to. Tillichs Christology is essential to my project in two ways. First, and most obviously, it forms the centerpiece of Tillichs linkage of being and being-itself, of God and nature. Secondly, and almost as important, it was in this forum that Tillich asserted, The Christ is God-for-us! But God is not only for us, he is for everything created.46 Christologically, then, Jesus as the Christs salvation was not merely for humans, but for all of creation. In Tillichs statements on the Kingdom of God, he states that the symbols of heaven

43 See Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pgs. 118-119, Shaking the Foundations, pg. 84, as well as Drummy, pg. 87, whose analysis is even clearer than Tillichs.

44

Tillich, The Protestant Era, pg. 100. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 2, pg. 93.

45

46 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 2, pg. 100. Also see pg. 123 where Tillich states asserts that Jesus conquered every force of estrangement. Drummy, pgs. 91ff, also has a good analysis of this notion.

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and earth indicates the universality of the blessedness of the fulfilled Kingdom of God.47 All of this flows in one direction, namely, the affirmation of Jesus universal testimony to the participation of all being in beingitself. Tillich does not reserve Jesus as the Christs mediating significance merely for humans: the notion of mediation, powerful as it is, is wholly universalized. Nature is not only given sacramental power, but it is ontologically and historically linked to Tillichs most seminal theological notion, that of Jesus as the Christ as ontological Mediator. This air of universality and equality is continued forcefully in Tillichs short remarks on the multidimensional unity of life. In his remarks, Tillich speaks out against hieararchizing life into levels, and, in its semantic stead, prefers to use the term dimensions. Dimensions, in Tillichs mind, more adequately express a newer, more humanistic (and, arguably, ecological) consciousness which does not think in levels.48 Rather, supplanting the hierarchical view and employing his notion of the centered self, Tillich prefers the term, multidimensional unity of life, a term which designates the unity of life as well as the multiple perspectives from which it can be viewed.49 Premodern dualisms, on Tillichs account, do not accurately capture a contemporary humanistic consciousness, nor are they true to the world in which we live. On Tillichs account, all of being is unified, centered, and equal, as all of being is still infinitely distant from the infinite. Hierarchical thinking not only reflects a distortion of consciousness, it reflects a fallacy of logic. The multidimensional unity of life further props up the preceding statements on Tillichs ontology. In the sections in which Tillich speaks of the multidimensional unity of life, Tillich also states that What happens in the microcosm happens by mutual participation in the macrocosmos.50 All of life is embodied in other lives. That which could be human is present in the fish, which is, by virtue of potentiality, that which could be part of the worm. The microcosm is a snapshot of the macrocosm. Or, as Tillich states, the whole

47

Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 405.

48 See Tillich, Dimensions, Levels, and the Unity of Life, in Main Works, Volume 6, ed., Gert Hummel (New York: De Gruyter Press, 1992), pgs. 403ff. Also see Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pgs. 12ff.

49

Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pgs. 121 and 323. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 261.

50

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universe is present in every individual, although limited by its individual limitations.51 Thus, not only is being-itself within all of being, but, using the multidimensional unity of life as a philosophical bridge, one can see that all of being is within all of being. The whole is integrated into the centered individual. Lest this assessment get too romantic, however, Tillichs assessment of nature is even-handed, and often reflects the valuelessness of nature itself. As Tillich himself points out, life is ambiguous.52 Though Tillichs notion of ambiguity is often articulated as the strain caused in being between its separation from what it essentially is, it can also be thought of in more simplistic terms as representing the evils, goods, and trivialities of existence. In this way, the idea of ambiguity forms the cornerstone for much of Tillichs thought, and he used it with specific reference to the ambiguities of technology53 as well as, for our purposes, nature. As Tillich asserts in Shaking of the Foundations, Nature is not only glorious; it is also tragic.54 As Tillich, a lover of nature, no doubt had witnessed, nature can be harsh, cruel, unabiding, and, as the modern evolution of the species concept shows, indifferent to the individual. Nature totters between self-creation and destruction, and thus finds itself as wholly ambiguous.55 The essential result of finitude, in Tillichs eyes, is ambiguity. Given the time in which Tillich wrote, it is striking how well the notion of ambiguity captures a modern ecological consciousness. As much of modern environmental ethics shows, and as Eduardo Cruz points out, Tillichs idea of ambiguity envisions the valuelessness of nature with striking clarity.56 Though nature may be perfect in Tillichs eyes, or at least the bearer of sacrament, its perfection is morally ambivalent its intent is neither good nor bad, perfection or the demonic.57 Nature, just as with the rest of life, is morally ambiguous in itself: its ambiguity is derived precisely from its finitude. This reflects a modern ecological
51

Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 176. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 29. Also see The Protestant Era, pgs. 104ff.

52

53 See Thomas, pgs. 230ff, for a thorough analysis of Tillichs thoughts on the ambiguity of technology. It is regrettable that more time cannot be devoted to this subject in this paper.

54

Tillich, Shaking of the Foundations, pg. 81. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 52, and Drummy, pg. 111.

55

56 Eduardo Cruz, The Quest for Perfection: Insights from Paul Tillich, in Is Nature Ever Evil?: Religion, Science, and Value, ed., Willem B. Drees (New York: Routledge, 2003), pgs. 215ff.

57

Cruz, pg. 219.

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consciousness which sees nature as valueless, and as largely anti-teleological, other than, of course, the need for species preservation. And yet, shortly following Tillichs striking encapsulation of the ambiguity of nature, he is still able to assert, Being as being is good.58 So which is it? Is nature both ambiguous and good? Conveniently, given Tillichs ontology, one can assert both ambiguity and the essential goodness of nature. For, the question of ambiguity relies on a principally existential/empirical observation, while, in Tillichs eyes, questions of value are inherently ontological.59 A distinction is thus made which allows Tillich to make value judgements based on his more forgiving ontology and neo-Platonism. In this way, Tillich can speak, without fear of contradiction, about the natural perfection of the subhuman creatures [though subhuman need not be seen as less than].60 This statement is a reflection of Tillichs neo-Platonism, and his consistent use of the concept of essential goodness. More preferable, however, given the potential problems with a neo-Platonist view of nature (see following sections), is the linkage between value judgements and Tillichs ontology, a linkage he formally calls greatness. The great in the qualitative sense shows a power of being and meaning that makes it a representative of ultimate being and meaning and gives it the dignity of such representation.61 Tillichs ontology is thus crowned with a value judgement which sees the inherent dignity in all of being, by virtue of its ontological (and Christological) connection to the ground of being. Fittingly, this dignity, or rather import, is called greatness. All of being, in its intrinsic relation to God, can and should be seen as great. The ontological affirmation of connectedness and interdependency between beings and God as well as beings and beings, flows smoothly into an ethical value statement regarding the inviolability and greatness of all being. This occurs in spite of the inherent ambiguity of life, a feature which Tillich sees not as essentially bound to life itself, but inevitable nonetheless.

58

Tillich, Theology of Culture, pg. 118. Tillich, Morality and Beyond, pg. 660. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 260. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 88.

59

60

61

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Complications My recovery of a Tillichian eco-theology is not without its complications, however, as there are salient and suspicious trends which emerge throughout his theology with regard to an ecological recovery. The first criticism is of Tillichs tendency (though this is certainly not unconditional) towards anthropocentrism, especially with respect to his epistemology. The second internal criticism of Tillichs system is of his use symbols and, specifically, the ability of a culture to replace broken myths which may no longer be theologically or ecologically satisfying. The first criticism, that of anthropocentrism, is potentially the most damaging. This trend is established, innocently enough, in Tillichs Dimensions, Levels, and the Unity of Life and is carried through to Volume 3 of the Systematic Theology. In Dimensions, Tillich establishes the independence of the multiple dimensions of life (as alluded to earlier). He also asserts that each dimension bears the others within itself as potentiality, and not actuality.62 This assertion is not problematic in itself, and is a rather astute recognition of the molecular and atomistic continuity of all life: that which makes me human, atomistically, could just as easily have made me a cactus. Tillichs logic becomes troublesome, however, in using this logic to establish, in Volume 3 of the Systematic Theology, a trinitarian view of the dimensions of life, namely the organic, inorganic, and human. Using the logic of Dimensions, each dimension is clearly demarcated from the next, and only bears the other dimensions as potentiality. Though Tillichs desire to distinguish the inorganic from the organic/human does not appear problematic, his desire to distinguish the human from the organic, and the grounds he uses to substantiate this claim, may lend itself to anthropocentrism: Divine Spirit appears in the ecstasy of human spirit but not in anything which conditions the appearance of spirit.63 Tillich thus limits the appearance of Spirit to humans, and, by doing so, clearly distinguishes the human from the organic.

62

Tillich, Dimensions, Levels, and the Unity of Life, pgs. 404-408.

63 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 275. A very apologetic view of Tillichs articulation of dimensions is also offered in Drummy, pgs. 77ff.

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Lest this tendency seem isolated, it is reiterated in similar fashion in Tillichs epistemology, where Tillich designates exclusivity of transcendence, reason, and intentionality to humans. In Courage to Be, Tillich states, Only man has complete vitality because he alone has complete intentionality.64 In Volume 1 of the Systematic Theology Tillich asserts that humans are that being in whom all levels of being are united and approachable.65 And, finally, This last and all-embracing dimension of life [that of history and spirit] comes to its full actualization only in man, in whom as the bearer of spirit the conditions for it are present.66 And these selections are certainly not isolated.67 But what are the grounds for the exclusive possession of the capacities for history, spirit, and transcendence by humans? In light of a more modern ecological consciousness, there are none, save possibly for neurological complexity. Biological complexity, memory (i.e, history), and even intentionality cannot be said to be exclusively in the domain of humans, and thus they do not appear to be sufficient ground for their separation into a separate dimension, however level-free or nonhierarchical such a term may be in Tillichs eyes.68 Tillich approaches this observation, which, prima facie, appears to be contradictory to his own, when he states, there is no realm of life in which the historical dimension is not present and actualized in an anticipatory way.69 As a consequence of Tillichs seemingly mixed views on the distinction between humans and the organic, he engenders a further troubling concept which he feels to be wholly in line with Biblical and theological thinking, namely that of creative stewardship.70 On this point, Tillich is at least fully consistent: the notion of stewardship does reflect the theological tradition in which Tillich found himself, and it does, to an extent, reify his seemingly well-stated ideas on the a priori primacy of human beings. Whether or not the

64

Tillich, Courage to Be, pg. 81. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 168. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 25. Though not exhaustive, other troubling references can be found in Volume 1, pg. 181, Volume 3, pgs. 17, 36, and 297. I am highly doubtful that Tillich uses the term in a non-hierarchical manner, though he states it as such. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 306. The best use of the term is found in Drummy, pgs. 5 and 63.

65

66

67

68

69

70

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notion of stewardship is satisfying is debatable, and not within the scope of this paper. However, what is important here is to see such a notion as wholly consistent and as validating the previously established tendency of Tillich toward an anthropocentrism of spirit, intentionality, and reason. So what of Tillichs anthropocentrism, then? There seems to be an irremediable tension between parts of Tillichs epistemology and his more forceful (and abundant) statements which would ultimately affirm an ecological recovery. Are we left, as was Drummy, in stating that Tillich mediates between an anthropocentrism of grace and a yearning for nature mysticism?71 Unfortunately, no careful synthesis can be attained, and an ecological recovery of Tillich has to be willing to sidestep Tillichs anthropocentrism in the articulation of an admittedly otherwise cogent and coherent environmental theology. Most importantly, those elements of Tillichs theology which are anthropocentric are ultimately inessential to his entire project: one need not assert the primacy of human spirit or revelation in order to make revelation more real or the Kingdom of God more available. Both clearly stand on their own despite the leveling of Tillichs distinction between the organic and the human. Finally, an ecological recovery of Tillichs system may be complicated by Tillichs insistence on validating potentially broken myths such as paternal or heroic images of God. As ecofeminists such as Sallie McFague and Rosemary Ruether have shown, classical paternalistic or aristocratic symbols of God are in need of serious reconstruction. Fatherly and aristocratic/kingly (e.g., Lord, King, etc.) images of God, on their account, have been socially and religiously disastrous, insomuch as they have created theologies in which the inequities in society are both validated and propagated. Oddly, likely cognizant of these difficulties, Tillich does not use his keen articulation of symbol and myth to propose more constructive or legitimate symbols for God; rather, he upholds images of God which have been, arguably, ecologically disastrous. God as Lord and the related symbols express the holy power of God.72 Admittedly, Tillich is attempting to correlate the old symbols of God to the new state of being in which he finds himself, or more probably, to his

71

See Drummy, pg. 3. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 287.

72

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ontological system. However, upholding such symbols, even in a vague fashion, must be done carefully, and the tendency still remains that such caution might not be taken. To this end, Tillichs system only admits that such symbols will arise out of a collective unconscious in order to more adequately fit the situation in which humans find themselves, and, moreover, that they cannot be artificially created (sorry Sallie McFague).73 Short of this happening, though, Tillich does give some hint at what an ontological/maternalistic symbol may look like: In so far as it is symbolical, it points to the mother-quality of giving birth, carrying, and embracing, and, at the same time, of calling back, resisting independence of the created, and swallowing it.74 Tillichs relation to the creation of more fitting ecological symbols is thus fairly ambiguous, granting no certain terms under which such symbols may be created, other than to say that they may arise. Given the urgency of ecological crises, this element of Tillichs system may require slight alteration which would allow for cultural symbols to be proactively linked to crises, not following in their wake. Synthesis This paper has consistently posited itself as a recovery of the significant concepts for a Tillichian eco-theology, rather than a reconstruction of Tillichs entire project. This is due in great part to my view that one can do significant work as an eco-theologian while being thoroughly Tillichian. Tillich, a nature lover himself, grants the environmental theologian significant resources from which she can draw in her articulation of a novel environmental theology. I have attempted, at least in fairly broad and incomplete strokes, to paint some picture of what those tools would be and how they could be systematically arranged in an eco-theology. Given Tillichs system, two defining strands of thought can be delineated which would lend themselves to an eco-theology, namely the Reason, Participation, Love, and Morality strand of Tillichs thought, as well as his ontological assertion of value and ambiguity in nature. Instead of a wholesale reconstruction of Tillichs thought, these two strands, as they stand in Tillichs system (though rearranged here to reflect their ability to

73

See Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pgs. 49ff, as well as John Carey, Paulus Then and Now (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2002),

pg. 76.
74

Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 294.

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work ecologically), show the viability of Tillichs system if merely seen from an ecological consciousness. Thus, what I have done here is not so much a reconstruction as it as a lifting up, as it were, of critical concepts in Tillichs thought which show a systematic relationship between ecological reality, socio-economic fact, and theological apparatus. Lifting up the critical strands of Tillichs thought, as was done here, shows its capacity to combat epistemological structures of alienation, abandoned moral agency, and a lost feeling of worth and value for the natural, while constructively proposing ontological, theological, Christological, and moral structures which are ecologically sensitive and proactive. Thus, a recovered Tillichian environmental theology looks much like Tillichs original theological system, with only minor deletions and adaptations. Wholly missing from such a system would be Tillichs already noted tendency toward anthropocentrism, a tendency which is countered in other parts of Tillichs system, but which nonetheless remains open for omission in a Tillichian eco-theology. In need of minor adaptation is Tillichs scheme for symbol construction, one which admits only of the possibility of some zeitgeist paradigm shift creating new symbols in due time. As thinkers such as McFague, Ruether, and Mark Wallace have shown, coherent attempts at symbol construction can be made while still being theologically and existentially relevant. On the whole, however, this paper has hopefully affirmed, even if in incomplete fashion, the desirability of a Tillichian environmental theology and its capacity for both a polemical engagement with modern techno-culture and in presenting a serious of viable, desirable, and ecologically affirming theological motifs. Complications II: A Meta-Critique and Appendix Unfortunately, this paper cannot end on an entirely cheery note, as there are questions which remain, though they are not limited entirely to a Tillichian eco-theology. This critique comes in variegated form from Friedrich Nietzsche, whose critique of the Christian religion, though now more than a hundred years old, seems fitting: All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an instinct of life some commandment of life is fulfilled through a certain canon of shall and shall not, some hindrance and hostile element on lifes road is thereby removed. Anti-natural morality,
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that is virtually every morality that has hitherto been taught, reverenced, and preached, turns on the contrary precisely against the instincts of life it is now a secret, now loud and impudent condemnation of these instincts. By saying God sees into the heart it denies the deepest and the highest desires of life and takes God for the enemy of life....Life is at end where the kingdom of God begins...75 Nietzsches question essentially is: how can one value that which is not seen as having value aside from God itself? For Nietzsche the question is certainly more than just value, but, for the purposes of any environmental theology, that is precisely what is at stake. The question is an ethical one: does the natural have any value intrinsically, aside from its relation to God? For Tillich and other environmental theologians, the answer is clearly in the negative, as Tillich states, But holy objects are not holy in and of themselves. They are holy only by negating themselves in pointing to the divine of which they are mediums.76 Tillich is at least philosophically consistent in admitting the natural consequences of his program, as other environmental theologians should be. Clearly, one cannot have a thoroughly theocentric vision, as does Tillich,77 and still hold onto the notion of intrinsic value. Nietzsches critique is illuminating at least in this respect. But Nietzsches critique, leveled throughout the latter part of his life, goes much deeper than the idea of intrinsic value. It points the essentially historical and theological problem of Christianity in general, namely, that of seeing any value at all in the world as it is. Tillichs neo-Platonism is an exemplar of a system in which existence, by its very nature, is seen as wholly separated from that which infinitely grants value. But this problem is certainly not limited to Tillich, who is probably more aware than most of the complications inherent in a neo-Platonic view of essence and existence (hence the persistent attempts to assert value and depth to being). An utter devaluation of the natural, as any survey of theology should reveal, is seemingly endemic to the Christian theological tradition. Rather than seeing this as happenstance or the outcome of socio-economic structures of oppression, Nietzsches critique points out the haunting possibility that any ethic founded on a theocentric vision cannot fully value the earth.

75

Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans., R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), pg. 55. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pg. 216. Also see Dynamics of Faith, pg. 69. See Systematic Theology, Volume 3, pg. 422, as well as Drummy, pg. 117.

76

77

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The Nietzschean critique poses, in my opinion, the most cogent philosophical affront to any potential environmental theology. That Tillich handles questions of value so delicately and so persistently reveals his attentiveness to this question, but, nevertheless, he gives no satisfactory reply, for the admission of the Nietzschean critique could undermine his entire theological enterprise. I am convinced, however, that no modern environmental theology can be satisfactory until it fully answers the daunting question of whether or not full value in nature can be affirmed while simultaneously affirming a radically transcendent God.

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