Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

Section 13. Pleadings and Motions Disallowed. The court shall not allow the filing of the following pleadings, petitions or motions, to wit: (a) Motion to dismiss or to quash; (b) Motion for a bill of particulars;

G.R. No. 81969 September 26, 1988 (c) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings or any other paper; JOCELYN RULONA-AL AWADHI, petitioner, vs. HON. ABDULMAJID J. ASTIH, District Judge of the Fourth Sharia Judicial District Court and NABIL AL-AWADHI, respondents. Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner. Talib Umpar for private respondent. (f) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court; (g) Petition for relief from judgment; GRIO-AQUINO, J.: A petition for review on certiorari was filed by Jocelyn Rulona-Al Awadhi, assailing the order dated January 12, 1988 of the Sharia Judicial District Court of Marawi City which denied her motion to dismiss Special Proceedings No. 011-87, entitled "Nabil Al-Awadhi, Petitioner, vs. Jocelyn Rulonba, Respondent" for custody and guardianship of their minor children named Abdul Wahab Nabil, 5 years old, Adare Nabil, 3 years old, and Sabihab Al Abdullah Nabil, 6 months old. The petitioner and the private respondent were married in Kuwait on August 1, 1981. The petitioner is a Filipino nurse and a Roman Catholic. Her husband, the private respondent is a Kuwaiti student. The petitioner resides with her children in Sta. Cruz, Calape, Bohol, while the private respondent resides at 49-7 Pamaong Street, Tagbiliran City. On or about August 25, 1987, she filed an action for support and guardianship of her three (3) minor children (who are in her custody) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, in Tagbilaran City (Civil Case No. 4170, entitled "Jocelyn Rulona-Al Awadhi Petitioner, vs. Nabil Al-Awadhi Defendant"). Upon her motion, she was appointed the children's guardian by order of the court dated August 25, 1987 (Annex B, p. 20, Rollo). The defendant, her husband filed in the same court a motion to be allowed to exercise joint parental authority over their children (Annex C, p. 21, Rollo). However, without waiting for the action of the Tagbilaran Court, he filed on November 4, 1987 a petition for custody and guardianship of their minor children in the Fourth Sharia District Court in Marawi City (Annex A, p. 10, Rollo). It was docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 011-87. After having been summoned, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that: (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the petition, nor over the parties, least of all, herself; (2) there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (3) improper venue (Annex B, p. 45, Rollo). In its order dated November 20, 1987, the Sharia District Court denied her motion to dismiss (Annex C, p. 23, Rollo). Its order was based on Section 13 of the Special Rules of Procedure in the Sharia Courts which provides: (h) Motion for new trial or re-opening of trial; and (i) Any dilatory motion for postponement. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of that order (Annex D, p. 24, Rollo) was also denied by the court on January 12, 1988. Hence, this petition for review raising only the legal issue of jurisdiction, or lack of it, of the respondent Sharia District Court over the parties and the subject matter of the case. Only the Sharia District Judge filed a Comment on the petition; the private respondent did not. Article 13, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (PD 1083) provides: BOOK TWO TITLE II Chapter One APPLICABILITY CLAUSE Art. 13. Application (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim, and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. (2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply. (3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, (d) Motion to declare defendant in default; (e) Reply, third party complaints, or intervention;

guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws. (Emphasis supplied.) In view of the following admitted facts: (1) That the plaintiff husband in Spl. Proc. No. 011-87 is not a Philippine Muslim but a Kuwaiti national; (2) That he resides at 49-7 Pamaong Extension, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, not in Marawi City where the Sharia court sits; (3) That the defendant wife (herein petitioner Jocelyn Rulona) is a Filipino citizen and a nonMuslim (a Roman Catholic Christian); (4) That their Muslim marriage was not solemnized in any part of the Philippines, for they were married in Kuwait (Annex A, par. 2, p. 40, Rollo); and (5) That they do not reside within the Fourth Sharia District, embracing the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, and the cities of Iligan and Marawi (Art. 138-d, P.D. No. 1083), for both of them reside in the province of Bohol; it should have been self-evident to the Fourth Sharia District Court that it had no jurisdiction over the spouses of their marriage, nor over the custody and guardianship of their children (Art. 143, P.D. No. 1083). The Regional Trial Court, Branch II, at Tagbilaran City which had assumed jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint for support and guardianship of her children on August 25, 1987 (p. 19, Rollo), may not be divested of its jurisdiction over the parties (the husband having voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction by filing a motion therein for joint custody of his children) by the Fourth Sharia District Court in Marawi City by the husband's filing therein three (3) months later his own petition for custody and guardianship of his children (p.10, Rollo). The rule is that once a court has assumed jurisdiction of a case, its jurisdiction shall continue until the case is finished. It may not be ousted from its jurisdiction by a co-equal court (People vs. Layno, 111 SCRA 20; Denila vs. Bellosillo, 64 SCRA 63; Lat vs. PLDT, 67 SCRA 425; and People vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA 218). Moreover, Article 3 of the Muslim Code (P.D. No. 1083 expressly provides: Art. 3. Conflict of provisions ... (3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a NonMuslim. The application of the Muslim Code to the Christian wife will be prejudicial to her. The Code of Muslim Personal Laws was promulgated to fulfill "the aspiration of the Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws enforced in their communities" (Exec. Order No. 442, Dec. 23, 1974). Those communities are found in the ten (10) Mindanao provinces and six (6) cities comprised within the five (5) Sharia judicial districts which were created under Article 138 of the

Muslim Code. As neither the petitioner nor the private respondent and their children live in or are members of those communities, they do not come within the ambit of the Sharia courts' jurisdiction. Instead of invoking a procedural technicality, the respondent court should have recognized its lack of jurisdiction over the parties and promptly dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be, as they were, a futile and invalid exercise. A summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss should not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction when the jurisdictional infirmity is patent on the face of the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental procedural doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court may be challenged at anytime and at any stage of the action (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36; Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54; Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 49 SCRA 1, 6; Nueva Vizcaya Chamber of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 856). WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. All the proceedings in special Proceeding No. 011-87 of the Fourth Sharia District Court at Marawi City are annulled and the petition therein is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 92557 September 27, 1990 SPOUSES HADJI ALI MAMADSUAL and HADJI SALIKA MAMADSUAL, petitioners, vs HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, SPOUSES KAGUI ABDULA MACARAPAN and KAGUI RAKMA MACARAPAN and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF COTABATO respondents. Lanang S. Ali for petitioners.

the annulment or cancellation of the certificates of title of the defendants and (3) that the action, being based on an implied trust, has already prescribed and could not therefore be maintained. Plaintiffs, through their counsel, vigorously opposed the motion, and in a nutshell, their opposition may be stated as follows: (1) On the issue of no title to the property which is the subject-matter of the case, plaintiffs contended that the title referred to by them in the complaint means the legal title or ownership or dominion over the land in dispute acquired by them from their ancestors by operation of the law on succession; (2) On the question of proper parties to ask for annulment, plaintiffs contended that they are real party in interest because they will be benefited by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit in their own right, independent of any other interest, but with the authority of the law; and (3) on the question of prescription, plaintiffs contended that since they are in possession of the land, an action to quiet title does not prescribe. Perusing the case from all angles, and without losing track of the brilliant arguments presented by both parties during the legal skirmishes the court finds that in order that an action for quieting of title shall prosper, it is necessary that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to the property which is the subject-matter of the action. On this score, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: "The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property." (Art. 477, Civil Code of the Philippines). In the case at bar, plaintiffs have no legal or equitable title to the land in question. Legal title means registered ownership and equitable title meant beneficial ownership. Since the plaintiffs have no legal or equitable title to the parcels of land in question, it is obvious that there is no cloud to be removed or to be prevented from being cast upon. The voice of judicial conscience calls for the dismissal of the instant action. Dwelling on the second question, even assuming for a moment that the action is for annulment of the certificates of title, the court finds that the plaintiffs are not the proper parties to bring the action, but rather the Solicitor General. And even assuming further that the plaintiffs are the proper parties, the action has already prescribed because the action partakes of the nature of reconveyance which prescribes after ten years. The argument that the action has not prescribed because plaintiffs are in possession of the property does not merit the consideration of the court. That argument holds true only if plaintiffs have the legal or equitable title to the property. WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. 1 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners of said order was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 29, 1990 that reads as follows: Submitted for resolution by this Court is the Motion by plaintiffs seeking reconsideration of the Order rendered on November 7, 1989, which order dismissed this case "for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action."

GANCAYCO, J.: The applicability of the regular rules of procedure and case law in this jurisdiction to civil cases before the District Shari'a Courts is the issue in this petition. On November 14, 1988, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint against private respondents for "Quieting of Title To Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P-138, and Damages, With Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" with the Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District at Cotabato City. Public respondent Register of Deeds of the same city was impleaded as a nominal party. Private respondents filed their answer dated December 1, 1988. The issues having been joined, a pre-trial conference was held on March 14, 1989 whereby Presiding Judge Hon. Corocoy D. Moson issued a pre-trial order defining the issues and directing the parties to submit statements (shudhud) of at least two (2) competent witnesses on the issues defined at the pre-trial conference and other evidence (bayyina) setting forth the facts and the law relied upon within ten (10) days from notice. Petitioners filed the required sworn statements on April 17, 1989 but private respondents failed to do so. The case was set for trial on the merits on May 22, 1989 but it was postponed at the instance of private respondents. Other settings were postponed for one reason or another. However, on July 4, 1989, private respondents filed a pleading designated as "Amplification of Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint On the Ground of Lack of Jurisdiction." On the basis thereof, the trial court issued an order on November 7, 1989 dismissing the complaint in this manner: Before this Court, is a motion filed by defendants, through their counsel, for amplification of affirmative or special defenses with prayer for dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiffs have no title to the property which is the subject of this suit, hence, their action to quiet title thereto is not proper; (2) that plaintiffs, are not the proper parties to ask for

The motion asserts that the aforementioned order "has no legal basis on the following grounds: a) That the Honorable Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the (case) on the merits; b) That the complaint has sufficient cause of action; and c) That the dismissal of the complaint is illegal." The first ground implies that this court is without alternative except to hear the case on the merits. This assertion has no legal leg to stand on, it being well-settled that the courts have the power to dismiss cases before them upon a finding that they have no jurisdiction over them or have lost the same, and that the act of dismissing the cases on that basis is a valid exercise of jurisdiction. Despite the lack or loss of jurisdiction the order of dismissal is nevertheless valid. On the second ground, the best test of the sufficiency of the cause of action is the allegation in the complaint. The title over the land is registered in the names of the defendants, and the annulment or cancellation thereof is legally possible only through an action for reversion by the state. If the case would be treated as one for reconveyance of title, the period within which the same could be brought had already prescribed. As regards the third ground, the defendants, in their opposition to the Motion, cited the case of Heirs of Olivas vs. Judge Flor, G.R. 78343, decided on May 21, 1988, in which the Supreme Court held that a motion to dismiss filed after the answer had already been submitted within the reglementary period is not the pleading prohibited by the Rules on Summary Procedure, and what the Rule proscribes is a motion to dismiss which would stop the running of the period to file an answer and cause undue delay. As observed by the defendants, Section 13 of the Ijra-at-al Mahakim Al Sharia's is lifted from the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure. WHEREFORE, finding no cogent and compelling reason to reconsider the Order of November 7, 1989, this Court hereby affirms the same and further denies plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. SO ORDERED. 2 Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein petitioners allege the following assignment of errors committed by the trial court: ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS I. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT, SUCH ORDER HAVING DEPARTED FROM THE SPECIAL RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE SHARI'A COURTS (IJRA-AT AL MAHAKIM AL SHARI'A);

II. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE PROPER PARTIES TO BRING THE ACTION AND/OR THE ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED; AND III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO LEGAL OR EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION. 3 Petitioners allege that the lower court should not have considered private respondents' pleading which was in effect, a motion to dismiss, as it is a pleading disallowed under Section 13 of the Ijra-At Al Mahakim Al Shari'a. However, under Section 16 of the Ijra-At Al Mahakim Al Shari'a, it is specifically provided that the "Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner" in civil cases. Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: SEC. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. From the foregoing, it is clear the trial court properly set the case for hearing on the affirmative defenses seeking dismissal of the complaint raised by the private respondents in their answer. What the Ijra-At Al Mahakim Al Shari'a proscribes is the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer which would stop the running of the period to file an answer and cause undue delay. The prohibition is intended to put a stop to the filing of dilatory pleadings with the end in view of expediting proceedings before Shari'a courts. The case of Heirs of Ricardo Olivas vs. Flor 4 involves the application of the Rules of Summary Procedure in special cases before the Metropolitan and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said Rules disallow the filing of motions to dismiss, wherein this Court held: In the guise of a position paper, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. While this is, indeed, a prohibited pleading (Section 15(1), Rule on Summary Proceeding) it should be noted that the motion was filed after an Answer had already been submitted within the reglementary period. In essence, therefore, it is not the pleading prohibited by the Rules on Summary Procedure. What the rule proscribes is a Motion to Dismiss, which would stop the running of the period to file an Answer and cause undue delay. Nevertheless, the Court finds the petition to be impressed with merit. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action had prescribed. The said court also observed that inasmuch as it is one for reversion to the state of the property, the same should be brought by the Solicitor General and not by the petitioners. The Court disagrees. A reading of the complaint shows that it is an action for quieting title. Therein, it is alleged that petitioners are in "actual, continuous, and adverse possession" of the land in question "since time immemorial" in the concept of owners. 5

An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property. 6 In Sapto, et al. vs. Fabiana, 7 this Court held: . . . it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L.R.A. 930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14). The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity in his favor to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complainant when he is in possession. One who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory period. (44 Am. Jur. p. 47) In the same complaint, petitioners allege that recently private respondents have disturbed their possession of the property by surreptitiously constructing dikes. 8 The rule is that the petitioners may wait until their possession is disturbed or their title is attacked before they may take steps to vindicate their right. The statute of limitation is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title over property in possession of the petitioners. The trial court held that in an action to quiet title the plaintiff "must" have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. 9 It interpreted legal title to mean registered ownership and equitable title to mean beneficial ownership. It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of the property in question. In Chacon, 10 this Court considered the action to be one for quieting of title where the plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual possession since time immemorial of the property in question by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, while defendants secured a certificate of title over said property through fraud, misrepresentation and deceit. Thus, "title" to property does not necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof. 11 Indeed, one who has an equitable right or interest in the property may also file an action to quiet title under the law. 12 Since the action in this case is one to quiet title to property whereby petitioners claim to have acquired title to the same by prescription, the property was thereby effectively withdrawn from the public domain and became property of private ownership. Thus, the ruling of the trial court that the action being one for reversion only the Solicitor General can institute the same has no cogent basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the trial court dated November 7, 1989 and January 23, 1990 are hereby reversed and set aside, and the records of the case are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 119064 August 22, 2000

Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban. Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Abdula; that his other legal heirs are his three children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of land, five (5) of which are titled i n Hadji Abdulas name "married to Neng P. Malang," and a pick-up jeepney. On February 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court ordered the publication of the petition. 1 After such publication2 or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang ("Hadji Mohammad", for brevity), the eldest son of Hadji Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition. He alleged among other matters that his fathers surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang, surviving spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e) oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also known as "Teng Abdula," son; (f) Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, also known as "Keto Abdula," son, (g) Fatima Malang, also known as "Kueng Malang," daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son, and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang alleged that since he and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had helped their father in his business, then they were more competent to be administrators of his estate. 3 On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang, Fatima Malang, Mabay Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai Malang filed an opposition to the petition, adopting as their own the written opposition of Hadji Mohammad. 4 On April 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court issued an Order appointing Hadji Mohammad administrator of his fathers properties outside Cotabato City. The same order named petitioner and Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang as joint administrators of the estate in Cotabato City. Each administrator was required to post a bond in the amount of P100,000.00. 5 On April 13, 1994, letters of administration were issued to Hadji Mohammad after he had posted the required bond. He took his oath on the same day.6 The following day, Hadji Ismael and petitioner likewise filed their respective bonds and hence, they were allowed to take their oath as administrators. 7 On April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994, petitioner filed two motions informing the court that Hadji Abdula had outstanding deposits with nine (9) major banks. 8 Petitioner prayed that the managers of each of those banks be ordered to submit a bank statement of the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula.9 The Sharia District Court having granted the motions, 10 Assistant Vice President Rockman O. Sampuha of United Coconut Planters Bank informed the court that as of April 24, 1994, the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula amounted to one million five hundred twenty thousand four hundred pesos and forty-eight centavos (P1,520,400.48).11 The Senior Manager of the Cotabato branch of Metrobank also certified that as of December 18, 1993, "Hadji Abdula Malang or Malindatu Malang" had on savings deposit the balance of three hundred seventy-eight thousand four hundred ninety-three pesos and 32/100 centavos (P378,493.32).12 PCIB likewise issued a certification that Hadji Abdula had a balance of eight hundred fifty pesos (P850.00) in his current account as of August 11, 1994. 13 During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered a congestive heart failure that required immediate medical treatment. On May 5, 1994, she filed a motion praying that on account of her ailment, she be allowed to withdraw from UCPB the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) that shall constitute her advance share in the estate of Hadji Abdula. 14 After due hearing, the Sharia District Court allowed petitioner to withdraw the sum of two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00).15 On May 12, 1994, the Sharia District Court required petitioner and Hadji Ismael as joint administrators to submit an inventory and appraisal of all properties of Hadji Abdula. 16 In compliance therewith, Hadji Ismael submitted an inventory showing that in Cotabato City, Hadji

NENG "KAGUI KADIGUIA" MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th Shari'a District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU MALANG, FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG and MABAY GANAP MALANG, respondents. DECISION GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Presented for resolution in this special civil action of certiorari is the issue of whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (hereafter, "P.D. 1083" or "Muslim Code"). The question is raised in connection with the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband. Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula Malang was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aidas dowry (mahr or majar). Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. Hadji Abdula and Aida already had two children when he married for the second time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No child was born out of Hadji Abdulas second marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula divorced her. In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao and soon they had a daughter named Fatima (Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in that place to farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in the business of buying and selling of rice, corn and other agricultural products. Not long after, Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but he eventually divorced them. Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married petitioner Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of buying and selling of agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City, some of which were cultivated by tenants. He deposited money in such banks as United Coconut Planters Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sharia District Court in

Abdula had seven (7) residential lots with assessed value ranging from P5,020.00 to P25,800.00, an agricultural land with assessed value of P860.00, three (3) one-storey residential buildings, and one (1) two-storey residential building.17 All these properties were declared for taxation purposes in Hadji Abdulas name. For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory showing that Hadji Abdula "married to Neng Malang" had seven (7) residential lots with a total assessed value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an Isuzu pick-up jeepney valued at P30,000.00 and bank deposits.18 In the Memorandum that she filed with the Sharia District Court, petitioner asserted that all the properties located in Cotabato City, including the vehicle and bank deposits, were conjugal properties in accordance with Article 160 of the Civil Code and Article 116 of the Family Code while properties located outside of Cotabato City were exclusive properties of the decedent. 19 On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their own Memorandum that all the properties left by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive properties for various reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal partnership with petitioner because his having contracted eight (8) marriages with different Muslim women was in violation of the Civil Code that provided for a monogamous marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a bigamous marriage or a common-law relationship. Second, the decedent adopted a "complete separation of property regime" in his marital relations; while his wives Jubaida Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis contributed to the decedents properties, there is no evidence that petitioner had contributed funds for the acquisition of such properties. Third, the presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties is inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties, the decedent was married to four (4) women. Fourth, the properties are not conjugal in nature notwithstanding that some of these properties were titled in the name of the decedent "married to Neng Malang" because such description is not conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property. Furthermore, because petitioner admitted in her verified petition that the properties belonged "to the estate of decedent," she was estopped from claiming, after formal offer of evidence, that the properties were conjugal in nature just because some of the properties were titled in Hadji Abdulas name "married to Neng Malang." Fifth, if it is true that the properties were conjugal properties, then these should have been registered in the names of both petitioner and the decedent.20 In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Sharia District Court presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson held that there was no conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and the decedent primarily because the latter married eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if there is more than one wife because "conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural marriage or a common-law relationship." The court further found that the decedent was "the chief, if not the sole, breadwinner of his families" and that petitioner did not contribute to the properties unlike the other wives named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The description "married to Neng Malang" in the titles to the real properties is no more than that -- the description of the relationship between petitioner and the decedent. Such description is insufficient to prove that the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of gains. The court stated: In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time he acquired the properties in question. To sustain the contention of the petitioner that the properties are her conjugal property with the decedent is doing violence to the provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that at the time of the marriage of the petitioner with the decedent, there were already three (3) existing marriages. Assuming for the moment that petitioner and the decedent had agreed that the property regime between them will be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership property, that agreement is null and void for it is against the law, public policy, public order, good moral(s) and customs.

Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements or any other contract (Article 38, P.D. 1083). There being no evidence of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court concludes as it had begun, that the properties in question, both real and personal, are not conjugal, but rather, exclusive property of the decedent.21 Thus, the Sharia District Court held that the Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of the estate of Hadji Abdula and accordingly disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court orders the following: 1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax, reimburse the funeral expenses in the amount of P50,000.00, and the judicial expenses in the amount of P2,040.80; 2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties, located in Talayan, Maguindanao and in Cotabato City, is hereby ordered to be distributed and adjudicated as follows: a) Jubaida Kado Malang ------------------------- 2/64 of the estate b) Nayo Omar Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do c) Mabai Aziz Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do d) Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang ------------------- 2/64 - do e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang-------------------------14/64 - do f) Ismael Malindatu Malang---------------------------14/64 - do g) Datulna Malang ------------------------- 14/64 - do h) Lawanbai Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do Total------------------------ 64/64 3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang by way of advance be charged against her share and if her share is not sufficient, to return the excess; and 4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their Project of Partition for approval, not later than three (3) months from receipt of this order. SO ORDERED.

On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of that Order. The oppositors objected to that motion. On January 10, 1995, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.22Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.23 However, on January 19, 1995, she filed a manifestation withdrawing the notice of appeal on the strength of the following provisions of P.D. No. 1083: Art. 145. Finality of Decisions The decisions of the Sharia District Courts whether on appeal from the ShariaCircuit Court or not shall be final. Nothing herein contained shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution. Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing "an original action of certiorari with the Supreme Court."24 On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. She contends that the Sharia District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when she married Hadji Abdula Malang, the latter had three existing marriages with Jubaida Kado Malang, Nayo Omar Malang and Mabay Ganap Malang and therefore the properties acquired during her marriage could not be considered conjugal, and (b) holding that said properties are not conjugal because under Islamic Law, the regime of relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlement or any other contract.25 As petitioner sees it, "the law applicable on issues of marriage and property regime is the New Civil Code", under which all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The Sharia Court, meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership as incompatible with plural marriage, which is permitted under Muslim law, and held the applicable property regime to be complete separation of property under P.D. 1083. Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and the fact that the case is one of first impression --- this is a singular situation where the issue on what law governs the property regime of a Muslim marriage celebrated prior to the passage of the Muslim Code has been elevated from a Sharia court for the Courts resolution --- the Court decided to solicit the opinions of two amici curiae, Justice Ricardo C. Puno26 and former Congressman Michael O. Mastura27 . The Court extends its warmest thanks to the amici curiae for their valuable inputs in their written memoranda28 and in the hearing of June 27, 2000. Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that very few of the pertinent dates of birth, death, marriage and divorce are established by the record. This is because, traditionally, Muslims do not register acts, events or judicial decrees affecting civil status. 29 It also explains why the evidence in the instant case consisted substantially of oral testimonies. What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight marriages, counting the three which terminated in divorce; all eight marriages were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives --namely, Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai --- all divorces of which took place before the enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18, 1993, after the Muslim Code and Family Code took effect, survived by four wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five children, four of whom he begot with Aida and one with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws were in force, at some point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394 ("R.A. 394"), authorizing Muslim divorces, which was effective from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February 4, 1977; and the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988.

Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the record of the case is simply inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of the petition. To our mind, any attempt at this point to dispense with the basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence before us could result in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as well as cast profound implications on Muslim families similarly or analogously situated to the parties herein. Justice and accountability dictate a remand; trial must reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in Congressman Masturas words, "missing links", that would be the bases for judgment and accordingly, allow respondent court to resolve the instant case. In ordering thus, however, we take it as an imperative on our part to set out certain guidelines in the interpretation and application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent court. It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition --- concerning the property regime applicable to two Muslims married prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code --- was interposed in relation to the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband. Settlement of estates of Muslims whose civil acts predate the enactment of the Muslim Code may easily result in the application of the Civil Code and other personal laws, thus convincing the Court that it is but propitious to go beyond the issue squarely presented and identify such collateral issues as are required to be resolved in a settlement of estate case. As amicus curiae Congressman Mastura puts it, the Court does not often come by a case as the one herein, and jurisprudence will be greatly enriched by a discussion of the "watershed of collateral issues" that this case presents.30 The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we hereby present in question form: (1) What law governs the validity of a Muslim marriage celebrated under Muslim rites before the effectivity of the Muslim Code? (2) Are multiple marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code valid? (3) How do the Courts pronouncements in People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942), and People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935), affect Muslim marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code? (4) What laws govern the property relationship of Muslim multiple marriages celebrated before the Muslim Code? (5) What law governs the succession to the estate of a Muslim who died after the Muslim Code and the Family Code took effect? (6) What laws apply to the dissolution of property regimes in the cases of multiple marriages entered into before the Muslim Code but dissolved (by the husbands death) after the effectivity of the Muslim Code? and (7) Are Muslim divorces effected before the enactment of the Muslim Code valid? The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance of amicus curiae Justice Puno, are hereby laid down by the Court for the reference of respondent court, and for the direction of the bench and bar: First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were celebrated was during the effectivity of the Civil Code which, accordingly, governs the marriages. Article 78 of the Civil Code31 recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance with their customs and rites, by providing that --Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article 92. However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Muslims or other non-Christians shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code. But the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National

Integration, may at any time before the expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the nonChristian provinces. Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The enactment of the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of Article 78 of the Civil Code which provides that marriages between Muslims thirty years after the approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in accordance with said Code. Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs. Subano and People vs. Dumpo Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple marriages.32 It is also not to be disputed that the only law in force governing marriage relations between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950. The Muslim Code, which is the first comprehensive codification33 of Muslim personal laws,34 also provides in respect of acts that transpired prior to its enactment: Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --- (1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby. The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;35 accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive opertion of laws.36 Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code --- in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment. Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the provisions of the Civil Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage. "Bigamous or polygamous marriages" are considered void and inexistent from the time of their performance. 37 The Family Code which superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a subsequent marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void.38 These provisions illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is monogamous, and that subsequent marriages entered into by a person with others while the first one is subsisting is by no means countenanced. Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the enactment of the Muslim Code was touched upon in two criminal cases, the Court applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only one valid marriage can exist at any given time. In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the accused of homicide, not parricide, since -(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased, it appears that the defendant has three wives and that the deceased was the last in point of time. Although the practice of polygamy is approved by custom among these non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not

sanctioned by the Marriage Law39 , which merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime of parricide. In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy when, legally married to Moro Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second marriage with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the ground that it was not duly proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential requisites to make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. As it appears that the consent of the brides father is an indispensable requisite to the validity of a Muslim marriage, and as Mora Dumpos father categorically affirmed that he did not give his consent to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that such union could not be a marriage otherwise valid were it not for the existence of the first one, and resolved to acquit her of the charge of bigamy. The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been proven as a fact that the second marriage contained all the essential requisites to make it valid, a conviction for bigamy would have prospered. 40 Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In keeping with our holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant case is determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired from and after August 3, 1988. Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how the subject properties were acquired. Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires during the marriage, in accordance with article 148, is paraphernal. Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property. Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife. The Civil Code also provides in Article 144: When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry.41 Situating these rulings to the instant case, therefore, the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot apply to Hadji Abdulas marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the wives in such marriages are not precluded from proving that property acquired during their cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively.42 Absent such proof, however, the presumption is that property acquired during the subsistence of a valid marriage --- and in the Civil Code, there can only be one validly existing marriage at any given time --- is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage. 43 With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the following provisions of the said Code are pertinent: Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of the cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the parties "live together as husband and wife" the Family Code in Article 147 specifies that they "live exclusively with each other as husband and wife." Also, in contrast to Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence, Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage, provided that the parties prove their "actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry" and only to the extent of their proportionate interest therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306, Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, and related cases are embodied in the second paragraph of Article 148, which declares that the share of the party validly married to another shall accrue to the property regime of such existing marriage. Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and Dissolution of Property Regimes Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs. Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite. The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in point. Thus, the Civil Code provides: Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: (1) By the impotence of the husband; (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible; (3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Muslim Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code: Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of filiation is established by the evidence of valid marriage between the father and the mother at the time of the conception of the child. Art. 59. Legitimate children. --(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate. Whoever claims illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must prove his allegation. (2) Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within two years after the dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical impossibility of access between the parents at or about the time of the conception of the child. Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts another marriage after the expiration of her idda, the child born within six months from the dissolution of the prior marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter. Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that she is pregnant by her former husband, she shall, within thirty days from the time she became aware of her pregnancy, notify the former husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband or his heirs may ask the court to take measures to prevent a simulation of birth. Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing provisions, the provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply. Under Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers to an inheritance include: (a) The husband, the wife; (b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother; (c) The daughter and the sons daughter in the direct line; (d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother. When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedents son, she is entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such descendants, she shall inherit onefourth of the estate.44 The respective shares of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided for in Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083. Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the Muslim Code

R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces, in accordance with Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June 18, 1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969.45Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969. From the seven collateral issues that we discussed, we identify four corollary issues as to further situate the points of controversy in the instant case for the guidance of the lower court. Thus: 1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time of the opening of the succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993? The validly and legally existing marriage would be that marriage which was celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is because all of the marriages were celebrated during the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim divorce depends upon the time frame and the applicable law.1wphi1 A Muslim divorce under R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969, and void if it took place from June 14, 1969. 46 2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards the heirship of the children begotten from different marriages, who among the surviving children are legitimate and who are illegitimate?The children conceived and born of a validly existing marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are legitimate. The fact and time of conception or birth may be determined by proof or presumption depending upon the time frame and the applicable law. 3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his death on December 18, 1993?The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the following: a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code, this being the law in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death. b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code during the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful wife as determined under the first corollary issue may submit their respective evidence to prove that any of such property is theirs exclusively. c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code during the period from and after August 3, 1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership. d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding paragraphs and obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties. 4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in intestacy? The following are Hadji Abdulas legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife, as determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the children, as determined under the second corollary

issue. The Muslim Code, which was already in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death, will govern the determination of their respective shares. As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this case is inadequate to resolve in its entirety the main, collateral and corollary issues herein presented and a remand to the lower court is in order. Accordingly, evidence should be received to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact dates of the marriages performed in accordance with Muslim rites or practices; (2) the exact dates of the dissolutions of the marriages terminated by death or by divorce in accordance with Muslim rites and practices, thus indicating which marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under the criteria prescribed by the first, second, and third collateral issues and the first corollary issue; (3) the exact periods of actual cohabitation ("common life" under a "common roof") of each of the marriages during which time the parties lived together; (4) the identification of specific properties acquired during each of the periods of cohabitation referred to in paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of acquisition, indicating joint or individual effort, thus showing the asset as owned separately, conjugally or in co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the children (legitimate or illegitimate) begotten from the several unions, the dates of their respective conceptions or births in relation to paragraphs 1 and 2 above, thereby indicating their status as lawful heirs. Amicus curiae Congressman Mastura agrees that since the marriage of petitioner to decedent took place in 1972 the Civil Code is the law applicable on the issue of marriage settlement, 47 but espouses that customs or established practices among Muslims in Mindanao must also be applied with the force of law to the instant case. 48Congressman Masturas disquisition has proven extremely helpful in impressing upon us the background in which Islamic law and the Muslim Code need to be interpreted, particularly the interconnectedness of law and religion for Muslims49 and the impracticability of a strict application of the Civil Code to plural marriages recognized under Muslim law.50 Regrettably, the Court is duty-bound to resolve the instant case applying such laws and rights as are in existence at the time the pertinent civil acts took place. Corollarily, we are unable to supplant governing law with customs, albeit how widely observed. In the same manner, we cannot supply a perceived hiatus in P.D. 1083 concerning the distribution of property between divorced spouses upon one of the spouses death.51 WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Sharia District Court of Cotabato City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE, and the instant petition is REMANDED for the reception of additional evidence and the resolution of the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out in this Decision. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 2 or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent presiding judge of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and the 22 August 1995 order denying reconsideration thereof. In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the Court of Appeals for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a motion, which the Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other consolidated cases. The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari'a courts only when filed in places where there are shari'a court. But in places where there are no shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the shari'a court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.

G.R. No. 126603 June 29, 1998 ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano. On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur. On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullify of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent. Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action forannulment of marriage against the other spouse, 1 hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married

Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 3 Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. 4 Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. 5 There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case. 6 In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. 7 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. 8 Petitioner argues that the shari'a courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083, 9 which provides Art. 13. Application. (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. (2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.

(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws. As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions . . . WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be immediately remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings until terminated. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance in accordance with Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known (Ng Yao Siong v. Republic of the Philippines, L-20306, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA [483]; Go v. Republic of the Philippines, L-31760, May 25, 1977; Pabellar v. Republic, L-27298, march 4, 1976), the pleading must be rectified accordingly. WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the necessary amendment of the petition within one (1) week from receipt hereof so as to reflect the formal requirements adverted to. (Rollo, p. 9) Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the ground that the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname. Hence, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to the instant case. In his Comment dated June 14, 1991, the respondent court, among others, contends: 5. . . . (R)espondent court is of the honest opinion that the said petition is substantially one for change of name, particularly of surname Hatima C. Yasin to Hatima Centi y Saul, the latter being her maiden name and surname. Her reasons: The (1) dissolution of her marriage, and (2) her legal right to resume the use of her maiden name and surname. In effect, if petition is granted, it will result in the resumption of the use of her surname. Moreover, the use of surnames is governed by law (Arts. 364-380, Title XIII, New Civil Code). This is the substantive requirements. And as to procedural requirements, no person can change his name orsurname without judicial authority (Art. 376, Civil Code of the Philippines) (Emphasis supplied). Change of name under judicial authorization is governed by Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under Sec. 1 of said rule: "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province (now RTC) in which he resides, or in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." The State has an interest in the names borne by individual and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. Therefore, before a person can be authorized to change his name (given him either in his birth certificate or civil registry), he must show proper or compelling reason, which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oan v. Republic, 102 Phil. 468) (See: Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, 8th Ed., 1978, pp. 739-740). (Rollo, pp. 46-47)

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995 HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Zamboanga City,respondent. RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.: On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name" (Sp. Proc. No. 06-3). The petition reads: 1. That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga City, Philippines, and is duly represented in this act by her elder brother and attorney-in-fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI by virtue of an instrument of a Special Power of Attorney, original copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" hereof; 2. That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law, the divorce rites was officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated march 13, 1984, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B" to form an integral part hereof; 3. That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another woman; WHEREFORE, invoking the provisions of Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 in relation to Article 371 (2) of the New Civil Code, and after due notice and hearing, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that petitioner be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul. On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which reads as follows:

The basic issue to be resolved is: whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Stated otherwise, the issue is: whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name. The Court rules in the negative. The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register (Chomi v. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 [1956]; Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, 16 SCRA 483 [1966]; Rendora v. Republic, 35 SCRA 262 [1970]; Pabellar v. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 [1976]). While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil Register. Thus, this Court in Ng Yao Siong v. Republic (16 SCRA 483 [1966]), held: In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may crop up: What is the name to be changed? By Article 408 of the Civil Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it is, that the civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal purposes, is his real name. And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the civil status of persons. A name given to a person in the church record or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community when at variance with that entered in the civil register is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name. We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law. Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, as follows: Art. 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by: (a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq); xxx xxx xxx (c) Judicial decree ( faskh).

Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086 provides: Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it become irrevocable, shall have the following effects: (a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this Code; The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda (Art. 56, PD 1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of the marriage by divorce (Art. 57[b], PD 1083). Under Article 187, PD 1083, the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of Court and other existing laws, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code (the Code of Muslim Personal Laws), shall be applied suppletorily. Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person. According to Tolentino: . . . Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may" is used, indicating that the use of the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law which provides that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon marriage. This is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that a married woman may use only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 724, 1983 ed.)

When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. In view of the foregoing considerations, We find the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws. Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law. While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in matters of form and averment of concise statements of ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action, nevertheless, giving it a most liberal construction, the petition suffices to convey the petitioner's desire and prayer to resume her maiden surname on grounds of her divorce from her former husband and subsequent marriage of the latter to another woman. The remand of this case to the trial court would only delay the final disposition of this case and would not serve the public interest. We have consistently ruled that the remand of the case to a lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary if this Court can already resolve the dispute on the basis of the records before it (Dimayuga v. PCIB, 200 SCRA 143 [1991]; Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, 115 SCRA 548 [1982]: Quisumbing v. CA, 120 SCRA 703 [1983]). WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July 4, 1990 and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden name and surname. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City EN BANC

concerned, since such data are supplied by the passport applicants themselves. Neither would an uncertified late-registration certificate of live birth purportedly issued some thirty-five (35) years after the supposed date of birth.

RESOLUTION A.M. No. 91-10-160 May 15, 1996 RE: REQUEST OF JURISCONSULT SAMANODIN L. AMPASO FOR UPGRADING OF HIS POSITION TO SALARY GRADE 31, EQUIVALENT TO ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES; JURISCONSULT; CONSTRUED. Under P.D. 1083, a Jurisconsult in Islamic Law or Muffi is an officer who renders legal opinions on any question relating to Muslim law. He assists the Qadi or Judge, by giving him fatwas or legal opinions. The opinions thus rendered shall merely serve to enlighten the court or the parties concerned, who, however are not necessarily bound to follow the same. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST AT LEAST BE 40 YEARS OLD AT THE TIME OF APPOINTMENT; FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH AGE REQUIREMENT RENDERS APPOINTMENT INVALID. A cursory check by the Office of the Court Administrator into the 201 files of Mr. Ampaso revealed that he was born on January 2, 1952. This information regarding his date of birth was personally supplied by him in his Personal Data Sheet for judges and in the information sheet for membership in the GSIS which he personally filled up and filed on July 1, 1985. On the basis of such data, it is evident that when he took his oath as Jurisconsult on April 10, 1991, he was only 39 years, 3 months and 8 days, and that therefore, he failed to comply with the age requirement as provided under Article 165 of P.D. 1083. The foregoing premises considered, we are constrained to hold that the appointment of Mr. Ampaso as Jurisconsult was legally invalid from the beginning. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The Senior Deputy Court Administrator found the comment and explanation of Mr. Ampaso attributing to his brother the innocent misdeclaration of his year of birth, to be unacceptable. We hold that Mr. Ampasos claim is nothing but a lame excuse and a mere after-thought. It is very unlikely, improbable and unbecoming that a person aspiring for such a high office would request another to fill up and file such personal data forms. But granting that he did make such request, still, he himself had to sign the forms just the same prior to filing, and in the normal course of things, he should have read the documents before affixing his signature thereto. That he signed it without reading and/or understanding its contents is not excusable, nor credible. As an aspiring member of the Bench, it was incumbent upon Mr. Ampaso to check and double-check important personal data being supplied through such forms. It is thus no excuse to say that someone else prepared the forms or that his own brother must have forgotten (or was not aware of) his year of birth. 4. ID.; EVIDENCE; UNCERTIFIED LATE REGISTRATION OF BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND AFFIDAVITS, HEARSAY AND SELF-SERVING. The subsequent submission of what purports to be a late-registration birth certificate (uncertified), plus a passport and affidavits of disinterested person attesting to his actual date of birth did not cure the defect. Neither do they constitute adequate proof as to the actual date/year of his birth, since the affidavits are hearsay and self-serving, while passports by their very nature and process of issuance cannot pass as conclusive evidence insofar as the year and date of birth are PER CURIAM:p Samanodin L. Ampaso, former Judge of the Shari'a Circuit Court in Tubod, Lanao del Norte, was appointed as Juris-consult in Islamic Law on March 26, 1991 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, and took his oath of office on April 10,1991. The said position was created by virtue of Section 164, paragraph 2 of P. D. No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Thereafter, on May 2, 1991, the newly appointed Juris-consult requested this Court for the upgrading of his position to Salary Grade 31, equivalent to an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, claiming that under P.D. 1083 he is the highest Muslim Judicial Officer of the Philippines. He also submitted a proposed plaintilla calling for the creation of 209 staff positions for the Office of the Jurisconsult. Under P.D. 1083, a Jurisconsult in Islamic Law or Muffi is an officer who renders legal opinions on any question relating to Muslim law. He assist the Qadi or Judge, by giving him fatwas or legal opinions. The opinions thus rendered shall merely serve to enlighten the court or the parties concerned, who, however are not necessarily bound to follow the same. The pertinent provisions of P.D. 1083 are herein below reproduced for ease of reference: Title III. Jurisconsult in Islamic Law Art. 164. Creation of office and appointment. (1) There shall be a Jurisconsult in Islamic Law, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and hold office for a term of seven years, without prejudice to reappointment, unless sooner removed for cause or incapacitated to discharge the duties of his office. (2) The Office of the Jurisconsult shall be under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which shall also fix its permanent station, preferably in the City of Zamboanga. Art. 165. Qualifications. No person shall be appointed Jurisconsult in Islamic Law unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, at least forty years of age, of good moral character and proven integrity, and an eminent scholar in the Qur'an and Hadith and in Islamic jurisprudence as well as proficient in Arabic. Art. 166. Functions. (1) The Jurisconsult shall, on the written request of any interested party, have the authority to render legal opinions, based on

recognized authorities, regarding any question relating to Muslim Law. For this purpose, he may, if he deems it necessary, consult or ask for a consensus of the 'ulama. (2) The Jurisconsult shall consider and act on every such request unless, in his opinion and for good reason, the question need not be answered. (3) The Office of the Jurisconsult shall keep a compilation and cause the publication of all his legal opinions. Art. 167. Compensation. Until otherwise provided by law, the jurisconsult shall receive an annual compensation of forty-eight thousand pesos which shall not be diminished during his term of office. Art. 168. Office personnel. The Jurisconsult may, in accordance with the Civil Service Law and subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary for the performance of his functions. However, a cursory check by the Office of the Court Administrator into the 201 files of Mr. Ampaso revealed that he was born on January 2, 1952. This information regarding his date of birth was personally supplied by him in his Personal Data Sheet for judges and in the information sheet for membership in the GSIS which he personally filled up and filed on July 1, 1985. On the basis of such data, it is evident that when he took his oath as Jurisconsult on April 10, 1991, he was only 39 years, 3 months and 8 days, and that therefore, he failed to comply with the age requirement as provided under Article 165 of P.D. 1083. Thus, on March 31, 1992, the Court through an en banc resolution required Mr. Ampaso to show cause why he should not be removed from office for failing to fulfill the age requirement at the time he took his oath as Jurisconsult. In his comment, he claimed that his true birthdate is January 2, 1948 and not January 2, 1952 as appearing in his GSIS information sheet and personal data sheet, and that the latter documents were not personally prepared by him but by his brother who inadvertently mis-stated the year of his birth. To support his claim, he submitted various documentary proof, including the original of his passport issued on July 17, 1985, and a duplicate copy of his "Birth Certificate for Late Registration" issued on February 10, 1983. He alleged that the mis-statement in his year of birth was not done in bad faith nor was it intended to cause damage to any party, it having been the result of an honest mistake. Obviously, the issue of the validity of the appointment of Mr. Ampaso as Jurisconsult must first be resolved before determining whether or not his request for upgrading of salary is proper. The resolution of said primordial issue hinges on whether all the requirements for the appointment had been duly complied with or not. The Senior Deputy Court Administrator found the comment and explanation of Mr. Ampaso attributing to his brother the innocent mis-declaration of his year of birth, to be unacceptable. We hold that Mr. Ampaso's claim is nothing but a lame excuse and a mere after-thought. It is very unlikely, improbable and unbecoming that a person aspiring to such a high office would request another to fill up and file such personal data farms. But granting that he did make such request, still, he himself had to sign the forms just the same prior to filing, and in the normal course of things, he should have read the documents before affixing his signature thereto. That he signed it without reading and/or understanding its contents is not excusable, nor credible. As an aspiring member of the Bench, it was incumbent upon Mr. Ampaso to check and double-check important

personal data being supplied through such forms. It is thus no excuse to say that someone else prepared the forms or that his own brother must have forgotten. (or was not aware of) his year of birth. The subsequent submission of what purports to be a late-registration birth certificate (uncertified), plus a passport and affidavits of disinterested person attesting to his actual date of birth did not cure the defect. Neither do they constitute adequate proof as to the actual date/year of his birth, since the affidavits are hearsay and self-serving, while passports by their very nature and process of issurance cannot pass as conclusive evidence insofar as the year and date of birth are concerned, since such data are supplied by the passport applicants themselves. Neither would purportedly issued some thirty-five (35) years after the supposed date of birth. The foregoing premises considered, we are constrained to hold that the appointment of Mr. Ampaso as Jurisconsult was legally invalid from the beginning. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby Resolves to declare NULL and VOID ab initio the appointment of Samanodin Ampaso as Jurisconsult. SO ORDERED.