2002 Kim V Lim
2002 Kim V Lim
2002 Kim V Lim
KIM et al. v. LIM et al. (appellants here) had no standing to bring their claim
because they had been excommunicated by proper
A01A1951 authority of the defendant-appellees. Concluding that
only a majority of the church members can decide the
SMITH, Presiding Judge disposition of the church property,
Here, the evidence is undisputed that the Siloam Court of Georgia considered whether the trial court could
Korean Church was founded as a wholly independent properly order a church to conduct annual meetings as
church, answering to no association, synod, convocation, provided by the general corporations code in OCGA §
bishop, or other ecclesiastical head. None of the church 14-3-701. In concluding that the internal governance of
documents in the record reflect any obligation or fealty the church did not provide for such annual meetings, the
court construed a "'ruling convocation or ecclesiastical
head'" as defined in Crumbley, supra, 243 Ga. at 344, to
630
include not only a religious hierarchy existing outside
to a higher church authority;(fn3) in fact, they state and above the individual church but also an executive
repeatedly that it is "an independent church" and that board and senior bishop elected by the congregation to
"this church is autonomous and no other church can manage the internal affairs of the individual church. From
interfere in its administration." The Siloam Korean this, the Supreme Court concluded that the church was
Church, therefore, is congregational in character. hierarchical because "[t]he Church constitution affords its
membership only indirect control over Church affairs
Appellants rely upon a decision of this court, Crocker
through the right to vote for the Executive Board and
v. Stevens, 210 Ga. App. 231 (435 SE2d 690) (1993), to
Senior Bishop at the Church General Assembly held
assert that the governance of the Siloam Korean Church
every four years." First Born, supra, 267 Ga. at 634 (1).
was not congregational but a "hybrid" form partaking of
Therefore, it concluded the trial court could not order
both congregational and hierarchical aspects. In Crocker,
annual meetings to be held because the order was "an
we found a church organized as a nonprofit corporation
unconstitutional judicial interference in the government
to represent a hybrid form of church governance. The
of the Church." Id.
only stated basis for this decision was that "the church
was organized as a nonprofit corporation, with articles of It may be argued that the distinction drawn by the
incorporation and by-laws" and that such organization Supreme Court in First Born was focused only on the
was inconsistent with the congregational form of church authority of the courts of this state to force a church to
government. Id. at 233 (2). But the article of the Georgia call a meeting in conflict with the church constitution and
Code governing corporations organized for religious that it was not intended to change the definition of a
purposes, OCGA § 14-5-40 et seq., includes a provision congregational church as established by the United States
addressing exclusively the rights and representation of Supreme Court in Watson, supra, and in Kedroff, supra.
those churches having a congregational form of Watson explicitly recognizes that a congregational church
government. OCGA § 14-5-43; see Jones v. Wolf, 244 may be governed "solely within itself, either by a
Ga. 388, 389 (3) (260 SE2d 84) (1979). Construing the majority of its members or by such other local organism
mere existence of a corporate form to extinguish the as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical
congregational character of a church would render government." (Emphasis supplied.) 80 U. S. at 724. But
OCGA § 14-5-43 completely meaningless, and it is not we need not reach that issue, because the original bylaws
presumed that the legislature intended to enact of the Siloam Korean Church as constituted upon
meaningless language. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. founding of the church in 1992, while providing for some
744, 747--748 (3) (452 SE2d 476) (1994). Such an managerial duties on the part of a board of deacons and
interpretation is also contrary to other decisions of the session, repose authority for decisions of church
Supreme Court of Georgia and this court treating some governance in the membership and state that "the
incorporated churches as congregational in character. administrative power of the church comes from the
See, e.g., Anderson v. Dowd, 268 Ga. 146, 147 (1) (485 membership." A later revision of these bylaws, identified
SE2d 764) (1997); First Rebecca Baptist Church v. by a deacon of the church in his affidavit, also calls for
Atlantic Cotton Mills &c. Church, 263 Ga. 688 (440 votes by the membership. The bylaws of the nonprofit
SE2d 159) (1993); Reddick v. Jones, 251 Ga. 195 (304 corporation also provide for decisions to be made by the
SE2d 389) (1983); Holmes v. Peebles, 251 Ga. App. 417 membership at both annual and special meetings. The
(554 SE2d 566) (2001). To the extent that Crocker can be membership of the Siloam Korean Church, through both
construed as holding that an incorporated church cannot its ecclesiastical and corporate enactments, therefore
be a congregational church, it is disapproved. Compare retains direct control over the affairs of the church.(fn4)
Kidist Mariam, supra, 219 Ga. App. at 473 (local church For this reason, First Born is inapplicable here.
"hybrid" because acknowledged authority of archbishop
of its denomination in matters of religious faith, practice,
632
and liturgy only, while reserving to itself control of
internal affairs of church corporation). 2. The court may not inquire into "'a controversy
relating to the faith, teaching, doctrine, and discipline of
Appellants also rely upon First Born Church of the the church'" such as expulsion from membership, internal
procedures, quorums, or determination of membership in courts of this state. The courts are authorized to
the church. United Baptist Church v. Holmes, 232 Ga. determine which of the disputing factions here represents
App. 253, 254 (500 SE2d 653) (1998). These "are a majority of the membership of the Siloam Korean
religious matters that the court shall not question, and ... Church, a finding of fact that may be established without
are beyond judicial review." Id. Thus, the relative import inquiring into religious doctrine or governance. Gervin v.
of the various church documents in the record (some in Reddick, supra, 246 Ga. at 57 (2); Mitchell v. Dickey,
Korean and some in English), including the different 226 Ga. 218, 220--221 (2) (173 SE2d 695) (1970). In this
versions of the church's religious constitution, bylaws, context, "church documents will be considered only
and corporate documents, and the validity of the insofar as they determine or assist in the determination of
excommunication of appellants Steve Kim and Myong the persons who are entitled to possess and enjoy the
Ko by the church session, are beyond the power of the property." (Punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Wolf, supra,
Georgia courts to determine. Such matters of doctrine and 244 Ga. at 389 (3). This determination should resolve all
church discipline would bring "the Georgia courts into matters pending before the court pertaining to rights in
the heart of an ecclesiastical dispute, a position we are the church property, the only issue the courts are
eminently unqualified to take and are forbidden to take authorized to decide here. Once the trial court "resolve[s]
by the constitutional safeguard of separation of church the property issues by determining which group
and state." St. Mary of Egypt Orthodox Church v. represented the majority of the congregation," its
Townsend, 243 Ga. App. 188, 194 (532 SE2d 731) involvement must come to an end. Gervin v. Reddick,
(2000). supra, 246 Ga. at 59 (5). Since the question of majority
membership is a question hotly disputed by the Kim and
But the trier of fact is not forbidden to consider the Lim factions and therefore must be decided by the trier of
composition of the church membership for the limited fact, the grant of summary judgment by the trial court
purpose of determining standing to bring a claim on was inappropriate.
behalf of the church membership. Anderson, supra, 268
Ga. at 147. The trial court therefore properly considered 4. In view of our decision that the trial court's grant of
membership in the church in determining the standing of summary judgment must be reversed, we agree with
appellants to bring this action, but it did not complete its appellants' contention that the trial court erred in denying
analysis. It is true that an expelled or excommunicated their motion to add parties. "Parties may be dropped or
member cannot represent church members in a claim to added by order of the court on motion of any party or of
prevent diversion of church property, and it is also true its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
that we may not inquire into the validity of such an terms as are just." OCGA § 9-11-21. "Where a party
excommunication. Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 856 seeks to add a new party by amendment, OCGA §
(5), (6) (59 SE2d 368) (1950). But while the record 9-11-21 requires the exercise of discretion by the trial
reflects that appellants Steve Kim and Myong Ko were court. A trial court abuses that discretion, however, if it
excommunicated by resolution of the church session and denies the addition of a party based on delay alone."
acknowledged receiving the notice of excommunication, (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Shiver v.
although they disputed its validity, nothing shows that Norfolk-Southern R. Co., 220 Ga. App. 483, 484 (469
Keum Rhee, the third appellant, was excommunicated or SE2d 769) (1996). Here, the trial court denied appellants'
otherwise removed from membership in the church. She motion in one sentence without any explanation of the
therefore is qualified to bring an action in which she manner in which it exercised its discretion. We therefore
claims to represent a majority of the membership of the cannot review the propriety of the trial court's decision.
church. Gervin v. Reddick, 246 Ga. 56, 57 (2) (268 SE2d In view of the significantly altered posture of this case on
657) (1980); Sapp v. Callaway, 208 Ga. 805, hn. 2 (69 remand, we reverse the trial court's denial of appellants'
SE2d 734) (1952). motion to add parties and direct the trial court to
reconsider the motion in light of the limited issues to be
Moreover, without impinging upon religious or presented on remand. As we noted above, appellants'
doctrinal matters, the trial court may legitimately action may continue based upon appellant Keum Rhee's
consider matters involving distribution or disposition of allegation that she represents a majority of the church
tangible church property such as realty, bank accounts, membership.
and other temporal assets. "It is well-settled that a court
of equity will take jurisdiction over disputes involving Accordingly, the trial court's denial of appellants'
churches when property rights are involved and when the motion to add parties is reversed. The trial court's grant of
suit is brought on behalf of a majority of the summary judgment on the basis of lack of standing and
congregation." Gervin v. Reddick, supra, 246 Ga. at 57 First Amendment grounds is also reversed, and this case
(2). is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
633
3. We next consider the scope of permissible review 634
of the actions of a congregational church body by the Judgment reversed and remanded. Pope, P. J.,
Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., Ruffin, Barnes, Ellington, "by-laws" appear in the record, in Korean and in English
Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. Blackburn, C. J., Eldridge translation, as well as articles of incorporation and
and Miller, JJ., concur specially bylaws filed in connection with the nonprofit corporation
created by the church. Appellants and appellees differ
BLACKBURN, Chief Judge, concurring specially. strenuously as to which of these documents should be
given primacy over the others. But we limit our
I agree with the majority that some imprecise inspection of these records here to a determination of
language in Crocker v. Stevens, 210 Ga. App. 231 (435 whether the church government is congregational or
SE2d 690) (1993), merits clarification. Specifically, hierarchical in character.
Crocker indicates that the church involved therein was
hybrid in nature, neither congregational nor hierarchical, 4 As noted in First Born, the Georgia Nonprofit
although it would have been more accurate to state that Corporations Code provides that if any of its provisions is
the law applicable to that congregational church, not the inconsistent with religious doctrine governing a nonprofit
church's classification, was a hybrid blend of traditional corporation's affairs "on the same subject, the religious
congregational and hierarchical jurisprudence. In other doctrine shall control to the extent required by the
words, because the church was congregational in nature Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of
but a nonprofit corporation in form, analysis of its this state or both." OCGA § 14-3-180; First Born, supra,
internal bylaws using neutral principles of law (a 267 Ga. at 633.
hallmark of hierarchical jurisprudence) would be required
to adjudicate the claims brought by the controlling GA
majority faction (a hallmark of congregational
jurisprudence). This resulting hybrid jurisprudence, set Ga. App.
forth in Reddick v. Jones, 251 Ga. 195 (304 SE2d 389)
(1983), was appropriately applied to the facts in Crocker,
and, as such, its underlying premise remains sound.
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