Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400

brill.nl/mnem

Aristotle on Soul and Soul-Parts in Semen (GA 2.1, 735a4-22)

Abstract Aristotle, Generation of Animals 2.1, 735a4-22 speaks about semen and soul. The passage speaks about the soul and the parts. Against all current interpretations it is argued that Aristotle means the soul in its entirety and the parts of the soul . It is proposed that the Greek text edited by Drossaart Lulofs in 735a22 be corrected by accepting the reading of ms Z. Keywords Aristotle, Generation of Animals, soul-theory, biology, procreation

1. Introduction Generation of Animals 2.1, 735a4-22 raises the question whether semen possesses soul. We could call it a study in semen-tics. The passage talks about the soul and the parts.1) Modern critics are clear on the meaning
1) Arist. GA 2.1, 735a4-22: , . . , . . . .

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009

DOI: 10.1163/156852509X339879

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of the passage, which they translate and explain along the same lines. According to this interpretation, the passage talks about the soul and the parts of the body. But the same text admits of an entirely dierent explanation. In this alternative interpretation Aristotle talks about the soul in its entirety and the parts of the soul . Below I reproduce the translation by Peck (1942, 155-7). A number of arguments are then oered which seem to support this explanation. But next I want to see which elements in Aristotles oeuvre could point in a dierent direction. Finally, I propose an alternative translation.
Translation by Peck: As for the question whether the semen possesses Soul or not, the same argument holds as for the parts of the body, viz., (a) no Soul will be present elsewhere than in that of which it is the Soul; (b) no part of the body will be such in more than name unless it has some Soul in it (e.g., the eye of a dead person). Hence it is clear both that semen possesses Soul, and that it is Soul, potentially. And there are varying degrees in which it may be potentially that which it is capable of beingit may be nearer to it or further removed from it (just as a sleeping geometer is at a further remove than one who is awake, and a waking one than one who is busy at his studies). So then, the cause of this process of formation is not any part of the body, but the external agent which rst set the movement goingfor of course nothing generates itself, though as soon as it has been formed a thing makes itself grow. That is why one part is formed rst, not all the parts simultaneously. And the part which must of necessity be formed rst is the one which possesses the principle of growth: be they plants or animals, this, the nutritive, faculty is present in all of them alike (this also is the faculty of generating another creature like itself, since this is a function which belongs to every animal and plant that is perfect in its nature). The reason why this must of necessity be so is that once a thing has been formed, it must of necessity grow. And though it was generated by another thing bearing the same name (e.g., a man is generated by a man), it grows by means of itself. So then, since it makes itself grow, it is something. (underlinings added)
. . , . . Text Drossaart Lulofs 1965. Underlinings added. In the following I will propose to read in 735a7: and in 735a22: .

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2005 saw the publication of an excellent Dutch translation by R. Ferwerda. The translations of Peck and Ferwerda are in complete agreement. Both translate the crucial elements as parts of the body and no part of the body. The same goes for the translation by P. Louis (1961, 56), who notes: les parties du corps. D. Lanza (1971, 888-9), Balme,2) and A. Platt3) read the parts but in fact make the same choice. Likewise the interpretation by C. Lefvre (1972, 58).

2. Arguments in Favour of the Traditional Interpretation (a) GA 2.1 uses the parts Fifteen Times to Denote the parts of the body Generation of Animals 2.1 talks constantly about parts. The chapter deals with the question how a plant or an animal is formed from seed and what entity is responsible for forming the parts. The heart, lungs, liver, eye are mentioned as examples of these parts (2.1, 734a17). The word part/parts is used fteen times in this sense in chapter 1, not including the passage quoted above.4) So it seems natural, when the passage mentions parts thrice, to assume that this again refers to parts of the body, though the Greek text does not explicitly indicate what parts are meant. (b) An eye is a Part of the Body, like a face or esh The interpretation of Peck and Ferwerda can also base itself on the fact that 2.1, 735a7-8 seems to repeat the more extensive passage in 734b24-7, where Aristotle also applies the principle of homonymy. In 734b25 he says that after fertilization each one of the parts gets formed and acquires Soul. It acquires Soul, because there is no such thing as face, or esh either,
Balme 1972, 61: And has the seed soul or not? The same reasoning applies to it as to the parts. For there can be no soul in anything except in that of which it is in fact the soul, nor can there be a part unless it has some soul, with commentary on p. 157. 3) In Barnes 1984, I 1140-1: Has the semen soul, or not? The same argument applies here as in the question concerning the parts. As no part, if it participate not in soul, will be a part except homonymously (. . .) so no soul will exist in anything except that of which it is soul; it is plain therefore that semen both has soul, and is soul, potentially (with only minor changes compared with the 1912 Oxford edition). 4) Both and occur. Peck (1942, xlvii-xlix) devotes an entry to the word, paying attention only to the meaning parts of the body. For parts of soul, cf. lviii.
2)

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without Soul in it; and though they are still said to be face and esh after they are dead, these terms will be names merely (homonyms), just as if the things were to turn into stone or wooden ones (transl. Peck).5) It is clear there that the parts are ensouled and therefore parts of the body. This is also the case in Generation of Animals 1.19, 726b22-4, where Aristotle states: For a hand or any part is not a hand or a part if it does not contain a soul or some other power: they only bear the same name.6) So it does not seem far-fetched to see the parts of 735a6 as harking back to what was just said, in almost the same way, about the parts of the body. Moreover, 735a8 talks about an eye. This can also be taken as a random example of a bodily part.

3. What is Aristotles Point in the Traditional Interpretation? So did Aristotle try to clarify the question Is there soul in semen? by posing the comparable question: Is there soul in a bodily part?? And did he solve this problem by saying that a soul is always the soul of a specic living creature, and that no part of it does not participate in the soul of the entire creature? And is he pointing out once again that a part of an animal or human being that does not participate in the soul of this animal or human being as a whole is not a part of such a living creature, that is to say, not a real hand or foot or eye? In that case it is only homonymously a foot or an eye. What argumentative force did Aristotle therefore attribute to the comparison? After all, semen is semen of the begetter and as such not a part of the new specimen. Does he mean that, just as all parts of the begetters body are ensouled, his semen is ensouled too? But then how are we to interpret the conclusion in 735a8? Is it a double conclusion on the soul or is it a two-part conclusion that talks about the soul and the parts of the
GA 2.1, 734b24-7: , , . Cf. 2.5, 741a10-3: .
5) 6)

Louis (1961, 215) refers to this text. Lefvre (1972, 57) notes that Nuyens saw these texts as evidence of the hylomorphistic character of the conception in GA, inasmuch as they argue the presence of soul in all parts of the body. Lefvre is sceptical (59) and points to 2.1, 734a14-6, which says explicitly that soul must always be in a part of the body.

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body? And how does the addition potentially function? Aristotles conciseness again demands a choice here. Does he mean: so it is clear that (semen) possesses (soul) and potentially is (soul)?7) Or: so it is clear that (semen) possesses (soul) and is (a bodily part) potentially (participating in soul)? The rst option is highly problematical. To have soul is quite dierent from being soul. According to De anima 2.1, 412a19; a27-8, the natural body of the soul can potentially possess life. But it cannot be life. So we should in any case consider the second option. But it is unclear why Aristotle would say of bodily parts that they potentially participate in soul.8) Had he not said in 734b24-5 that there is no face or esh of an embryo that does not possess soul? We should bear in mind, though, that Aristotle also says in De motu animalium 10 that the soul of a living creature is not present in all parts of the living creature, but only in its central part, i.e. in the heart (or its analogue). The other parts possess life because they are connected with it.9) An interesting text in this connection is Metaphysics Z 16, which asks what an ousia is. This status is denied to Earth or Water. More eligible candidates are said to be the parts of ensouled entities and the (parts) of the soul (1040b10-1). Because Aristotle claries this with a reference to the phenomenon that both parts of some animals, when bisected, live on, he seems to be thinking here of millipedes and the like.10) Could it be that
7) Thus Peck and Ferwerda. Lanza 1971, 888: perci chiaro che il seme possiede unanima e che potenzialmente anima and Vinci & Robert 2005, 216. Louis (1961, 56) goes o on a dierent tack: Il est vident que la semence a une me et que cette me est en puissance. Balme (1972, 61) reads here: Clearly therefore it does have soul and exists potentially. 8) It is striking that Aristotle here does not use to have, to possess (), but to share in, to participate (). For this, see GA 1.23, 731a32; 2.1, 732a11; a12; 732b29; de An. 2.1, 412a15 in contrast to a17; a20; a28. 9) MA 10, 703a14 and a36: , , . Aristotle had already stated in 9, 702b15 that the principle of motion is to be situated in the centre of the living creature. This is one of the reasons which led Nuyens and his followers to talk about development in Aristotles philosophy, and to assign MA to his transitional phase but GA and de An. to his late, hylomorphistic phase. 10) Metaph. 6.16, 1040b14. On the skolopendrai, cf. HA 4.2, 531b28 .; PA 4.6, 682b4; IA 7, 707b2-4 and Bos 2007.

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in our text, too, Aristotle is thinking of the phenomenon that, when some plants and insects (e.g. some worms) are cut into pieces, their parts live on and produce a new plant or insect? Aristotle explains this phenomenon by stating that these plants possess one soul actually, but many souls potentially.11) Is perhaps the point of comparison that both semen and the parts of visible bodies possess the soul dormantly, without the soul itself being activated? We should note, however, that such an explanation assumes extensive knowledge of Aristotles discussions in other writings. The context of this passage in itself does not suggest this avenue of approach. And it seems to be virtually ruled out by the examples of face and esh.

4. Objections to Pecks Explanation But there are also arguments against the explanation proposed by Peck and other modern exegetes. To start with, it is hard to understand why Aristotle believes that a reference to the ensouled parts of a living body could clarify why semen possesses soul. Next, a rst reading of the sentence in 735a5 on the parts may suggest that it is talking about the parts of the soul or about the parts of the semen referred to in the preceding interrogative clause. (a) The Semen and the Parts of the Semen It is not entirely unthinkable that Aristotle would talk about parts of the semen. He is familiar with the possibility of multiple births as the result of one fertilization (GA 1.18, 723b9-11). And he has proved in 2.1, 733b32734a16 that the parts of the new living creature are produced by a part of the embryo which must have been present in the semen. In 734a33-b3 he declares that the semen contains no part of the new specimen of a living creature. (b) The Entire Soul and the Parts of the Soul But it is also conceivable that Aristotle is referring to the parts of the soul . He makes it very clear that he is addressing a major problem in the theory
See Long. 6, 467a18-30, esp. a29: . Cf. de An. 2.2, 413b18-9: , (text quoted from Jannone 1966).
11)

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of reproduction, viz. the question by what entity specic plants and specic animals are formed,12) that is to say, the parts of these animals and plants (733b32). His thesis is that it must be something external, or something in the male semen and seed, either a part of a soul or a soul or something that possesses soul.13) Of these four options he goes on to exclude the option that something external is the productive principle, and then that it is something in the semen itself which does not form part of the semen (734a2-13). Only two options remain, that the productive entity is present in the semen and is either soul or a soul-part.14) This means that Aristotle speaks at least once in chapter 1 about a part in the sense of a soul-part, and does so, importantly, in the formulation of the problem that he proposes to solve and that amounts to the question whether the productive principle should be identied with soul or with a part of the soul. And this makes sense, because the question being asked is what entity is responsible for producing all parts of the body. Clearly this entity cannot itself be a bodily part. When he now asks in 735a4: Does semen possess soul or not?, he is determining whether the rst of the two remaining options from 733b33734a1 is valid. And when he continues: The same dilemma applies to the parts, it could be, and it is in fact natural to assume, that he is thinking of the second remaining option from 733b33-734a1, and is therefore asking whether semen possesses the parts of a soul. This turns out to be relevant, for it will become clear further on that the bodily part which is produced
12) GA 2.1, 733b23-4: , . In 2.3, 736b5 Aristotle seems to indicate a problem of even greater weight: . . . . . . . 13) GA 2.1, 733b32-734a1: , , . For parts of the soul, see also: de An. 1.1, 402b9; b10: , b12; 5, 411b2;

14; 16; 25; 2.2, 413b7; b14; b27; 3.9, 432a19; a23; 432b2-3; 10, 433b1; Sens. 1, 436a1; Mem. 1, 449b5; Juv. 1, 467b17; b21; b26; 2, 468a28; PA 1.1, 641b10; GA 2.1, 735a12 (see below); 3, 736a30; 737a22 (see below); 4, 741a2; Metaph. 6.16, 1040b11; EN 1.13, 1102b4; 6.2, 1139a9; b12; 5, 1140b25; Pol. 1.5, 1254b8-9; 13, 1260a11; Ph. 7.3, 247a6; 247b1; 248a8. See also Bonitz, Index 864b8-865a53 and Feola 2006; Bastit 1996; Whiting 2002. 14) This removes the basis of the entire argument put forward by Hinton (2006). This author states incorrectly on p. 370: the seed is not the type of thing that could bear any soul for it is just a residue of a living being and not itself a living being.

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rst, the heart or the analogue of the heart,15) is produced in all living creatures by the vegetative or procreative soul-part. If the semen of a cat possessed soul but not the vegetative/nutritive soul-part, the process of producing the bodily parts of young kittens would not get under way. And, conversely, Aristotle holds that chickens do pass on the nutritive/ vegetative soul-part to an egg they lay, but that the sensitive soul-part is contributed by the cock alone. That is why a wind egg (an unfertilized egg) does not yield a chicken (2.5, 741a6-32). In comparable fashion Aristotle in De anima 2.1, 412b6-17 rst postulates the unity of the soul and its instrumental sma; and in 412b17-3a5 explains the unity of the parts of the soul with the instrumental body of the soul.16) He contrasts there the eye as the visual facultys instrumental body with the entire sensitive body as the bearer of the faculty of sense in general17) and observes that it must be connected with the soul-body, even if this faculty is dormant in every respect. In this context Aristotle also notes that an axe which cannot be used for chopping is an axe only in a homonymous sense and a stone eye or a painted eye an eye only homonymously, because it cannot perform the function of seeing (of the soul-part which is called the anima sensitiva). Studying the consequences attendant on the bisection of insects, he also concludes that the various functions or parts of the soul do not occur separately from each other,18) as Plato had claimed.

We have already seen Aristotles repeated assertion that no part of the body is present in semen. He rejects the preformation theory and opts for the epigenesis theory. Cf. GA 1.17, 721b6 and 18, 725a21, and Bos 2003, 149-50. 16) There we also have a clear contrast between (412b10) and (412b13). Cf. Bos 2003, 103-9. All modern translators opt for parts of the body here too. Likewise Whiting 2002, 145 n. 4; Shields 2007, 290. But de An. 2.1, 413a4-5 shows clearly that Aristotle talked about the parts of the soul. 17) Aristotle there sets the single sense of sight with its bearer (the eye) against the entire faculty of sense (412b24) with the entire body which is the bearer of the faculty of sense. This must be connected with semen, he says there in 412b24-8, even though it is mere potentiality. 18) de An. 1.5, 411b24-6: , , . . . . Cf. 2.2, 413b19-24; 3, 415a1-3 and Whiting 2002, 142-50.

15)

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(c) The Eye is the Instrument of the Sensitive Soul-Part We can note in this connection that the example of the eye of a dead person in 735a8 diers signicantly from the example in 734b24-5 of the face or esh. The eye is the instrument of one of the ve sensory faculties which together form the anima sensitiva,19) or the soul-part that is typical of an animal as opposed to a plant.20) So if Aristotle had used the example of the face or esh here in 735a8, it would be natural to assume that the parts in 735a6 refers to the parts of the body.21) But now that he uses the example of the eye, it may be, and is in fact likely, that his focus here, as in De anima 2.1, 412b17 ., is on the parts of the soul. In that case his argument is that semen which does not take part in the sensitive soul-part is no more semen than a stone eye is a bearer of sensitive soul-activity. (d) Philosophical Relevance We should note, too, that it is philosophically relevant if Aristotle in 735a4-6 poses the (new) question whether semen also possesses the parts of the soul, but not relevant if he mentions (again) the ensouled nature of the bodily parts. Living creatures of a higher order than plants possess more than one soul-part: horses at least two and human beings at least three (cf. 2.3, 736a35-b8). Because these soul-parts do not become operative at the same time, it makes sense to consider whether only one soulpart is initially present in semen and the others later, or whether they are all present in semen from the outset, but start to function successively and not at the same time. If this is right, we will have to take semen as the subject of in 735a7 and will then have to correct to . The erroneous reading of the manuscripts may be due to the fact that a scribe was still thinking of the passage 734b24-5, which talks about face and esh.

412b28-9 mentions sense () and sight () as the two conditions of actuality and potentiality for the anima sensitiva. 20) GA 2.3, 736a30: . 5, 741a9-13. Cf. de An. 2.3, 414a32-b3. 21) But even then we would have to take into account GA 2.5, 741a9-13.
19)

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(e) In what Way does Semen Possess Soul? It is worthwhile to look more closely at the question broached in 2 above. What does Aristotle exactly mean by the question: Does semen possess soul or not?22) He has given an explicit answer to this question in Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b29-737a5. Semen is not the instrumental body (sma organikon) of the soul. In De anima 2.1 Aristotle explains that the soul itself is not a sma, but something that is inextricably linked to a natural body. Semen, however, possesses soul inasmuch as it contains this soul plus its instrumental body. For this instrumental body is the vital heat or pneuma. Aristotle says this in as many words in Generation of Animals 2.3: The semen of all living creatures contains within itself its cause of being fertile, viz. the so-called vital heat. This vital heat is not re or any such power but the pneuma which is enclosed within the semen and in the foam-like stu; it is the active substance which is in pneuma, which is an analogue of the astral element.23) It is pneuma (or the vital heat) which is properly the bearer of the soul and possesses the soul actually or potentially. And it is semen as the container of pneuma that is compared by Aristotle in 734b9-17 to a winding mechanism of which the parts are successively set in motion. Semen is not properly the bearer of the (immaterial) soul, but is the container of pneuma.24) The heat and the quality of pneuma can dier in the semen of one animal species compared with that of another (GA 2.3, 737a1 .). As
22) On this important subject, see Longrigg 1985; Coles 1995. The above-mentioned article by Hinton (2006) fails to shed light on this subject. 23) GA 2.3, 736b33-737a1. Pneuma is an equivalent (analogon) of the astral element, because it is equally an instrumental body of the soul and a bearer of life-giving power. 24) Cf. Mu. 4, 394b9-11, where pneuma is described as: <> . Cf. Reale & Bos 1995, 285-8. The authorship of On the cosmos has always been hotly contested. The discussion has been radically aected by the conclusion of Barnes in his review of Reale, G. 1974. Aristotele. Trattato Sul cosmo per Alessandro (Napoli) in Classical Review 27 (1977), 440-3 that there are no intrinsic arguments left for denying Aristotles authorship. But he believes that vocabulary and style do invalidate it. Barnes considers the works likely date to be before 250 BC. Schenkeveld (1991, 221-55) argued for a date between 350-200 BC. But his dating of the work on the basis of language and style raises a new problem: which anonymous and highly skilled author in this period would want to present his own ideas as Aristotelian in this way and why? Today we are able to recognize that the rejection of On the cosmos and of De spiritu was the result of the same erroneous understanding of Aristotles psychology.

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a consequence, one instrumental body of a soul diers from that of another and one soul may display vital activity on a higher level than another. That is the gist of De anima 1.3, 407a13-26, where Aristotle explains that the level of functioning of the soul depends on the quality of the receiver ( , b21) of the soul.25) (f ) The Vegetative Soul-Part First It is essential to Aristotles argument in this passage that, in the process in which the new specimen is formed, not all bodily parts are formed at the same time, but one rst and then others. And the starting-point is that no part of the body is present in semen. The part of the body that is formed rst must therefore be produced, but it cannot be produced by a part of the body. This rst part of the body, like all subsequent parts of the body, is produced by the soul and its instrumental body. Aristotles point is that the production of the parts of a new specimen of the species man always involves the heart, the lungs, the eyes of a human being, and so this specic form of a human being must guide the production process as a rational (structural) principle (GA 2.1, 734a29-33).26) And it is a consequence of the dierence in quality of souls that the rst bodily part to be produced in the case of higher animals and man is the heart, and in the case of insects and plants an analogue. So the heart or very rst part, according to Aristotle, is that which possesses the principle of growth, or, in other words: which possesses the nutritive (part of the soul). This is the principle that begets a new specimen which is exactly like itself.27)

25) 26) 27)

Cf. Bos 2003, 31-46. This is entirely disregarded by Hinton (2006). GA 2.1, 735a15-22:

. . What Aristotle calls here is referred to in 2.3, 736a35 as . See also de An. 2.2, 413b7: and 4, 415a23: , , . , and 416a19: , and 416a19 and b15-8. So the heart

is the rst part of the body that is produced by the vegetative-procreative soul-part, but is not itself the nutritive principle.

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In 735a23 Aristotle goes on by establishing that in some animals the heart is the rst dierentiated part of the body. But this heart is not the principle of growth or the nutritive or that which begets a new specimen which is exactly like itself . The nutritive is the rst part of the soul. If the heart is the rst dierentiated part of the body, the nutritive soul-part must be present in it (just as the soul in its entirety resides in the heart according to Aristotle).28) But this means that the sentence: That is why one part is formed rst, not all their parts simultaneously (735a14-5), though referring to the heart that is formed as the rst part of the body, does so in an argument designed to show that the vegetative soul-part must be the rst to function and produces a bodily part specically geared to it, and that later the eyes and the ears are produced, because the sensitive soul-part is activated later than the vegetative.29) Summarizing: the heart, as the rst part of the body of the new living creature, while not yet being present in the semen of the begetter, is produced by the vegetative part of the soul, which therefore must have been present in the semen. (g) Not either . . . or but and . . . and The question with which Aristotle begins this intriguing text is a clear disjunction: Does semen possess soul or not? His answer is that the problem has not yet been correctly formulated: semen does and does not possess soul.30) For semen possesses soul, but not actually, only potentially. Semen passes on the soul-principle, but the soul is not yet activated in any way in this process. This cannot be said in the same sense of a bodily part, for
Cf. Peck 1942, 157 note d. In GA 2.1, 734a14 Aristotle had said: . See also MA 10, 703a14-6. 29) Cf. GA 2.3, 736a35-b5. By 736b2: Aristotle
28)

does not mean that the parts of the body are not formed simultaneously, but that the parts of the soul are not actualized at the same time. See also 2.5, 740b29-741a3. 30) Cf. Vinci & Robert 2005, 207. Aristotle applies the same procedure in 734b2-7, after stating that the entity responsible for producing the parts of the visible body must reside either in the semen or outside of it, and that it must needs be one or other of the two. His solution in 734b6 is: . Aristotle had solved the Eleatic problem of being and non-being in the same way in Ph. 1.3, 186a24: (sc. Parmenides), and 9, 192a4: , .

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instance an eye of a human being or animal; or of a face or of esh. An eye and a face or esh are always something of an animal or human being that is actually alive and that, even when asleep, carries out all kinds of vital processes (of digestion, respiration, etc.).31) But this might equally be said of the parts of the soul . Semen also does and does not possess the parts of the soul. For semen possesses the parts of the soul, but not actually, only potentially. This insight also sheds light on a passage in the important chapter 2.1 of De anima. Aristotle repeatedly talks there about the natural body of the soul as potentially possessing life.32) Aristotle is thinking here of a body which does not possess life actually on the one hand and potentially on the other (like the body of a dog that is asleep),33) but a body of which the entire soul and all the soul-parts are dormantly present.34) That is the situation in which the soul is the rst entelechy. Aristotle emphasizes this crucial point further on in the same chapter: though semen and karpos do not have soul in actuality, they dier essentially from a corpse because they do possess soul in potentiality.35) This text, in relation to the discussion in Generation of Animals, makes it crystal clear that Aristotle regards semen or a fruit (e.g. a grain of corn or a beech-nut) as a body that seems stone-dead, because no vital activity can be detected in it, but as diering essentially
Cf. Ph. 8.6, 259b8: , , . Cf. Whiting 2002, 152-3, who refers to Somn.Vig.
31)

1, 454b30-455a3 and 2, 456a25-7. de An. 2.1, 412a19-20: . Cf. 412a27: . 33) A similar situation is referred to in GA 2.5, 741a10-3. For this problem, see Hbner 1999. Polansky (2007, 154 n. 13) also takes Aristotle to speak about having life in potentiality when the living being is actually alive. 34) de An. 2.1, 412a23-4: . Barbotins translation is correct here: Car le fait dtre anim comporte les deux tats de veille et de sommeil. That of Ross (1961, 211) is wide of the mark: For both sleep and waking involve the presence of the soul. Just as misleading is Peck (1942, lvii): an animal can have Soul in it and yet be asleep. 35) de An. 2.1, 412b25-7: , . Cf. GA 2.3, 736a32:
32)

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from the corpse of a deceased animal or human being, because it has all the vital potentialities of its kind in it. And Aristotle says this in an exposition on the parts (412b18), which in 413a5 are said to be the parts of the soul . We shall therefore have to translate 735a8-9 as: Hence it is clear that (semen) has (soul) and that (semen) is (participatory in the parts of the soul), potentially.36) But the statement that semen has soul must of course tally with the denition of soul which Aristotle gives in De anima 2.1. This is another compelling argument against the translation of in De anima 2.1, 412a28 and 412b6 as equipped with organs, for there are no organs in semen. We shall have to interpret the pneuma in semen as the instrumental body of the soul.37) (h) Degrees of Potentiality Against the background of the fundamental distinctions in De anima 2.1 it is also easier to understand why Aristotle in Generation of Animals 2.1, 735a9-11 elaborates the distinction between potentiality and actuality in three steps, while in De anima 2.1 he connes this to two steps. In De anima 2.1, 412a9 Aristotle notes that the entelechy is the eidos of something that serves as matter. But he adds: Now there are two kinds of entelechy, corresponding to knowledge and to reecting. This is repeated in
36) GA 2.1, 735a8: () . In my view, this interpretation is more in line with Aristotles argument than <>, as the modern translations assume. Cf. Lefvre 1972, 71: le sperme a une me; il est me, en puissance. Semen is always a sma. It therefore cannot be soul in the sense of the eidos or the entelechy. Cf. de An. 2.1, 412a17; 2, 414a20. This could at most be said of pneuma. Semen is, however, the bearer of pneuma, and as such the bearer of the soul plus its instrumental body and of the parts of the soul, which can be present potentially or actually. This is also suggested by GA 2.3, 736b8-10: , . . ., b15: and 737a16-8:

, . Louis (1961, 56) seems to adopt the same view: Il est donc

vident que la semence a une me et que cette me est en puissance, following Nuyens. Peck (1942, xiii) leaves the question open: the females residue . . . is, or contains, Soul potentially. How Balme (1972, 61) can translate: Clearly therefore it does have soul and existspotentially, I do not understand. 37) Cf. Bos 2003, 85-94. See also Bos & Ferwerda 2007 and 2008.

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412a22-3 with the clarication that soul is rst present as potentiality. In De anima 2.1 Aristotle thus claries the distinction between the possession of a potentiality and the actualization of a potentiality of an existing soul. In Generation of Animals 2.1 he goes back a further step. Male semen which has not yet led to a complete embryo has a prior degree of potentiality. In 735a10-1 he distinguishes a sleeping from a waking and from a scientically active mathematician.38) In this way he tries to make it clear that a fully grown rabbit can use its eyes; that a newly born rabbit has the potential to see; but that the semen of a rabbit also possesses the potentiality of an anima sensitiva, though there is no question of an eye-to-be nor of a working eye. This addition, too, makes sense only if Aristotle is talking about the soul in its entirety and the parts of the soul in their varying degrees of potentiality and actualization. (i) The Argument of Homonymy The argument on the basis of homonymy39) that Aristotle uses in 735a7-8 seemed a decisive point in favour of the standard interpretation, as we argued in 2 under (b). For this argument is supported with reference to a part of the body, the eye. Yet such an interpretation of these lines is problematical. According to this interpretation, Aristotle starts by saying: The same argument applies here as in the case of the parts.40) And he continues with a two-part sentence, both parts of which start in Greek with not. The rst part reads: On the one hand a soul will not be present in something other than that of which it is the soul. But the second part reads: On the other hand a part will not not participate in it. If we follow the standard interpretation, however, this is not the same argument, but the opposite!
In view of de An. 2.1, 412a22: , it seems more natural to identify the of GA 2.1, 735a10 with a practitioner of the theoretical science of mathematics than with a traditional land surveyor, as Ferwerda proposes. Cf. Metaph. 5.1, 1026a7-29. 39) Anton (1968, 326) argues that Aristotle designated Platos Ideas and the concreta of the same name as homonyms. See now also Shields 1999. 40) For the expression , cf. Bonitz, Index 436a6 . MA 10, 703a16-8:
38)

, , and Cael. 1.3, 270a11-2: . GA 1.17, 721b7 and 18, 722a11: . de An.

2.11, 422b17.

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For it is said of the soul that it must always be present in something corporeal. But the part (of the body) is then said to participate in the soul. In my view, it is not easy to explain how this sentence can be interpreted as following a similar argument to the rst part of the sentence. Moreover, it is unclear why Aristotle uses the verb to participate here, whereas he had said possesses in 734b25.41) But the question remains whether the example of homonymy is in keeping with the previous statements. In my explanation this can be defended. In this alternative explanation Aristotle says: a soul can only be present in that of which it is the soul (so it must be present in semen), and (semen) is (participatory in the parts of the soul), potentially. This two-part statement, which follows the same argument for both halves of the sentence, is then stipulated by the remark about speaking homonymously. Semen that does not possess soul is semen in the way that a eunuch can be called a man.42) And semen of a human being that does not possess a sensitive soul-part would be like the eye of a dead person. This is still called an eye, but cannot perform the function of an eye. (j) The Genesis of the Soul and the Genesis of the Soul-Parts There is another passage which remains unclear in the text that formed our starting-point. It is 735a12-3. There, too, the standard interpretation is unanimous but disputable. In Pecks translation we read: So then, the cause of this process of formation is not any part of the body, but the external agent which rst set the movement going.43) Three things are remarkable here. First, the question why Aristotle would suggest here that a part of the body brings about the process in which a new living creature is formed. Second, why in Greek the word this is ve words removed from process of formation. Third, the introduction of this process of formation, though the preceding passage does not talk about a specic process of formation. Note, too, that Aristotle continues by indicating that, straight after the production of semen by the father gure, the soul of the living creature itself sets to work, and specically the primary, most
GA 2.1, 735a7: . 734b24-5: . On the eunuch, cf. Arist. GA 4.1, 766a24-30. 43) Likewise Lanza 1971, 889 and Ferwerda 2005. Balme (1972, 62) translates: Now this generative process is not caused by any of its parts.
41) 42)

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basic soul-part, present in all living entities, the nutritive or vegetative soul-part. We should therefore consider an alternative explanation here too, in the sense that part here should again be taken as soul-part.44) In that case the demonstrative pronoun should not be connected with process of formation but with soul (of the semen). Aristotle is therefore saying: no part of this (soul in the semen) is the cause of formation, but the begetter is the cause. As soon as fertilization has taken place, however, the new specimen feeds itself independently thanks to its nutritive soul-part (which must therefore already be present in the semen).45) For Aristotle the generative and the nutritive functions are the same function. But this function starts as the function of the father (the external agent); it then continues to operate as the nutritive function of the embryo.46) The conclusion of this passage and this chapter also makes it clear that Aristotle has been talking about the rst moving and ecient principle of the soul.47) And his argument links up closely with what he had emphasized in 734b17-9: the begetter is always a living creature in actuality, of which all soul-parts are also operative in actuality; but he passes on a movement via his semen in such a way that the movement, though belonging to the entire soul of the mature specimen of the kind in question, is activated only on the vegetative level, and not yet on the higher levels.48) (k) The Greek Text of 735a22 In passing we arrive at a passage in which a striking textual variant has been passed down by, signicantly, manuscript Z, which is three centuries older

Louis (1961, 215 n. 6) suggested this possibility, but rejected it because he thought it more logical to interpret part here as partie du corps. 45) That is to say, Aristotle is taking for granted here what, according to my alternative interpretation, he posited in 735a4-9. 46) GA 2.4, 740b34: ,
. , . 47) GA 2.1, 735a27-9: , , . Aristotle is thus refer48)

44)

ring both to the begetter and to the form-producing movement of the begetters semen. GA 2.1, 734b17-9: , .

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than all the others. The edition by Drossaart Lulofs reads there: So, as soon as it exists, it causes itself to grow. But Z has an entirely dierent reading: .49) This alternative reading can be seen as decisive evidence for my alternative explanation. Aristotle says in 735a20: Something with the same name has begotten it, for instance a man a man. But it grows by itself. The Z reading now has: So there must be something which brings about growth.50) That is to say: as soon as the begetter has secreted his semen, a process of growth must be instigated which the begetter no longer carries out. But this means that, before a heart has been formed, a potential for growth must already have become operative. This can only be the potential for growth which, as the vegetative soul-part, is present in the semen. We must conclude that Drossaart Lulofs, very exceptionally, has chosen the wrong side. The text should be corrected in the way indicated by manuscript Z (as the obvious lectio dicilior). (l) The Menstrual Fluid also Potentially Contains all the parts A text from Generation of Animals 2.3 is also relevant to the text which formed our starting-point. The menstrual uid which the female contributes to the reproductive process, it is said there, contains all the parts potentially, though none in actuality, and all includes those parts which distinguish the both sexes (Peck 1942, 173-5).51) What is the purport of this text? The reading of all modern exegetes here is that all the parts of the body, including the male and female genitals, are potentially present in the menstrual uid.52) But this would be a totally irrelevant statement. And it would be just as bizarre as a statement along the lines: this one wooden beam potentially contains an entire house.
Drossaart Lulofs 1965, 56: . Likewise Louis 1961, 56. But Z, which hardly notes any accents or aspiration marks, has: . In the edition of the text this would be: . 50) Louis (1961, 56) translates strikingly: Il existe par consquent quelque chose qui le fait crotre, though he prints a Greek text which does not allow this! Lanza 1971, 889 has: Vi dunque qualche cosa che fa crescere. 51) GA 2.3, 737a22-5: ,
49)

. . On this, see Bos 2006.

Peck 1942, 175: all the parts of the body; Balme 1972, 165: the female material contains potentially both sets of parts by which the sexes are distinguished; Cooper 1990, 58: all the bodily parts; Ferwerda 2005, 87: alle lichaamsdelen.

52)

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We should ask ourselves whether this traditional interpretation does not depend on the equally traditional (and erroneous) hylomorphistic interpretation of Generation of Animals. This view always sees the female contribution as providing the corporeal side of the new specimen. Only when we have abandoned this view, which goes back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, is it possible to understand that the menstrual uid provides the corporeal side of the soul (as a composite of entelechy and instrumental body). This puts a dierent complexion on all kinds of details. Inasmuch as part of the menstrual uid is used as food or matter for a part of the new specimen, its purpose is to form the very rst bodily part of the new specimen, the heart or its analogue.53) All other parts of the new specimen are produced from food that has been drawn from outside. But the proposition that the menstrual uid possesses all parts of the soul, including those to which it bears a dierent relationship from the (semen of the) male, is necessary to the course of the argument and is emphatically supported by the context. For though Aristotle has demonstrated that male semen must possess the entire soul and all parts of the soul, a problem arises because he also states that no physical substance of the male semen remains in the embryo. This leads once again to the question: can we be sure that the embryo possesses the entire soul and all parts of the soul, given that the female menstrual uid needs to be worked on by the male partner? For the male semen may possess soul and the parts of the soul, but crucial of course is that the embryo, thanks to the activity of the male, comes to possess these. And a condition for this is that the menstrual uid of the female shares in the soul-principle provided by the male via his semen.54) As in the case of semen, Aristotle must be talking here about parts of the soul .55) The female menstrual uid has the potential to become what the living creature is by nature.56) But not by itself. A female can produce life, but only up to a certain level. And she also has a potential for soul. But
53)

Cf. GA 2.4, 740b2-8 and 1.23, 731a8: GA 2.3, 737a33:

.
54)

The dierence between the male and the female with regard to the soul-parts is lucidly explained by Peck (1942, lxvii): semen possesses the principle of sentient Soul, menstrual uid possesses only nutritive Soul (potentially). 56) GA 2.4, 740b18: .

55)

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only for the most basic kind, the vegetative soul.57) The dierence between male semen and female menstrual uid is that the male semen potentially possesses the soul of the specic living creature, including all parts of the soul. But by itself the menstrual uid potentially possesses only the vegetative soul. It does have, besides, the potential for all the higher soul-parts of the animal of the specic kind. But for this it needs fertilization by the male.58) Here in Generation of Animals 2.5 we nd that the female diers from the male in lacking the animal and human soulfunctions as entelechy, and this is what Aristotle is referring to in his statement in 2.4, 737a24 about the parts regarding which the female diers from the male.59) And after fertilization the menstrual uid must dierentiate itself into a male or female embryo before it can produce male or female genitals. For only a female soul-principle plus instrumental body produces a female body. On this view the passage underlines the correctness of our explanation of the earlier passage in Generation of Animals 2.1. But we have yet to deal with a possible objection: the traditional explanation seems to be strongly supported by the passage in Generation of Animals 4.1, 766b3-5.60) Peck (1942, 393) reads there: As far, then, as the principle and the cause of male and female is concerned, this is what it is and where it is situated; a creature, however, really is male or female only from the time when it has got the parts by which female diers from male. Aristotle is in fact talking here about the parts of the visible body which dier in male and female specimens. And here, too, he uses the
57) GA 2.5, 741a17: , with 741a23: . . . 58) GA 2.5, 417a28: .

This could lead to the conclusion that Aristotle talks in two dierent ways about potentially possessing soul. The male semen possesses soul as rst entelechy but dormantly. The female menstrual uid possesses only the vegetative soul (dormantly) and not the entire soul, but has the potential, through the eect of the males movement, to become a bearer of the soul in actuality, including all parts of the soul, also the sensitive and dianoetic soul-parts which it does not possess of itself. 60) GA 4.1, 766b3-5: . . Cf. Ferwerda 2005, 156. Note the striking dierence between and in the texts of 2.1 and 4.1. See also 4.1, 766b26: .

59)

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unspecied term the parts. From the perspective of this passage in book 4.1, it seems wholly reasonable to follow the same line in book 2.1. Yet this train of thought is not compelling. The passage occurs in a much later part of the argumentation. In 2.1 Aristotle is still dealing with a prior issue. Establishing in 2.1, 766a34-6 that male and female are assigned as predicates on the basis of dierent sexual characteristics, he says that this distinction is determined much earlier by the real principle of dierentiation between a male and a female specimen, the vital heat of the souls instrumental body. In book 4.1 the reference to the dierence in genitals is wholly appropriate. If the same theme had already been addressed in book 2.1, the argument would have been much less structured than it is now.

5. Alternative Translation
Does semen possess soul or not? The same dilemma (holds) for the parts (of the soul). No soul will be present elsewhere than in that of which it is the soul; nor will (semen) not participate in parts (of the soul) unless homonymously, just as the eye of a dead person (is called an eye but does not participate in the sensitive soul-part). Hence it is clear both that (semen) possesses Soul, and that it is (participatory in the parts of the soul), potentially. There are varying degrees in which something may be potentially that which it is capable of beingit may be nearer to and further removed from it (just as a sleeping geometer is at a further remove than one who is awake, and a waking one than one who is busy at his studies). Of this (soul) no part is the cause of its coming-to-be, but the external agent which rst set the movement going. For nothing generates itself, but as soon as it has been formed a thing makes itself grow. That is why one part is formed rst, not all the parts simultaneously. And the part which must of necessity be formed rst is the one which possesses the principle of growth: be they plants or animals, this, the nutritive faculty (of soul), is present in all of them alike. This also is the faculty of generating another creature like itself, since this is a function which belongs to every animal and plant that is perfect in its nature. The reason why this must of necessity be so is that once a thing has been formed, it must of necessity grow. And though another thing bearing the same name does generate it (e.g. a man is generated by a man), it grows by means of itself. So there must be something which brings about growth.

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399

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