Internationalization and Globalization
Internationalization and Globalization
Internationalization and Globalization
lobalization is often presented as the strategic effort to treat the world, or a significant part of it, as a single market in which to (io business. However, it is also potentially a single research and development laboratory, a single production center, a single logistics network, and a single headquarters site. For example, many of the major pharmaceutical firms, such as Merck or Johnson & Johnson, conduct major research in numerous research facilities located around the globe, and the international networking of these firms in research, production, and marketing have placed most of their activities inlo glohal contexts. If we look at the potential for competitive advantage through globalization from a strategic perspective, all of the value-adding activities of a business, not just the delivery of the product to the customer, may benefit dramatically from a "one-world" view. From this perspective, the world becomes an important source for new knowledge as well as new markets. Traditional market-focused models of multinational strategy may be inadequate to represent the activities of the firm in the global arena. Newer models of strategy driven by the search for sustained competitive advantage derived from the internal knowledge resources or capabilities of the firm rather than from its market position offer advantages in understanding strategy and structure among global firms. Strategists believe that sustained competitive advantage is found in the strategic resources of the firm, specifically in both the organizational knowledge and the capabilities of the firm. Capability-based frameworks have been found to have much power as general models of strategy and organization.' However, their application to multinational firms and their strategies has been limited.^ This article integrates the various findings of recent empirical and conceptual studies of capability development in multinational firms (and their subsidiaries) with traditional approaches to foreign direct investment, licensing.
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and exports that focus primarily on market-oriented strategies. The resulting framework is a useful guide to both academics and managers interested in global strategy. A concise example of the gap that needs to be bridged can be seen in two now-classic articles by Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad. The first proclaims that competitive advantage accrues to those multinational firms that have been able to extend their product lines into open market niches in foreign markets, take advantage of global economies and opportunities to tie markets together through cross-subsidies, and then extend their product lines globally.* The later article explains that competitive advantage is the consequence of holding and combining unique resources and capabilities and creating a strategic architecture that can apply the resulting core capabilities across product and business lines.'* While their examples in the latter case include companies from around the world, they do not make an explicit connection to their earlier work on multinational strategy processes. If we reconsider the multinational story in the light of these new organizational capability-driven models, then we will be able to improve our understanding of the drivers of competitive advantage in global markets. The framework presented here shows how multinational firms can gain sustained competitive advantage in the global marketplace by basing their strategies on building and leveraging their unique internal capabilities. The "dynamic capabilities" perspective presents an explicit argument for the importance to sustainable competitive advantage of both exploiting current capabilities and developing new capabilities.^ Applied to the activities of multinational firms, this perspective considers the different ways in which international market expansion and global integration of operations work to enhance long-term performance. It also reveals why multinational firms might not be successful in all cases, as various combinations of capabilities and environments might require particular strategies and organizations for success.
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of multinational strategy based on resource and capability opportunities and needs. On the other hand, our capability-driven framework of the multinational firm considers the firm's attempts to build, protect, and exploit a set of unique capabilities and resources as the key factors that determine performance levels and the key forces that drive firms into international and global strategies. Our focus is on how firms can create new value for themselves to increase their longterm profitability, rather than on how to divide markets and share profits among a group of undifferentiated, static companies.'" The framework provides explicit mechanisms that drive international expansion and integration and that build and leverage capabilities. The model begins by defining component or businesslevel capabilities and architectural or corporate-level capabilities as sources of competitive advantage (see Figure 1). These firm-specific complex resources are built and leveraged for long-term success in worldwide markets through strategies of international expansion and global integration.
Business, University of Utah and a visiting professor of strategy at the Cranfield School of Management in England.
<MGTSBT@business,utah.edu>
business concerns have been described 3S competencies, capabilities, or skills, depending on the level of specificity.'^ Such
I_-T.J f? j i i . ..
Business, University of Utah, business s knowledge mvolve the vanous <[email protected] edu> complex but identifiable skills and activities ^^L needed to operate the business and constitute the bundles of strategic resources and capabilities that are unique to the firm.'** Component capabilities go beyond the realm of pure knowledge to include the broader set of actions and structures that are critical to competitive
REVIEW
Component Capabilities
Capability
Buiiding
Processes
advantage and to multinational strategy. For example, 3M is widely viewed as having strong routines and capabilities for remaining innovative in a wide variety of products and businesses. From the perspective of the multinational corporation, its business-level component capabilities would be the larger, but still identifiable, skills of its business units.'^ Corporate-Level Architectural Capabilities Architectural capabilities are defined as organization-wide routines for integrating the components of the organization to productive purposes.''^ They are the sources of the organizational synergies at the core of the firm.'^ In the
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multinational corporation, architectural capabilities involve identifying, replicating, integrating, and otherwise managing hard assets and business-level component capabilities effectively and efficiently. These capabilities are developed in the process of operating the firm, so they are strictly firm-specific and tied closely to the administrative history of the firm. Wal-Mart is widely regarding as a firm that has superior architectural capabilities. It has managed to grow from a small firm in Arkansas to the position of global retailer based on its abilities to coordinate and integrate its (equally strong) component capabifities. Internationally, Wal-Mart did have some initial difficulties in its entry into some South American markets, however, its strong architectural capabilities allowed it to revise and adjust its local strategies rapidly. McDonald's is another example of a firm that has been able to develop an extensive global empire based on capabilities for identifying, replicating, integrating, and managing assets globally. Corporate-level architectural capabilities allow the incorporation of new, even foreign-based, assets and capabilities while maintaining efficient management. At the same time, architectural knowledge coordinates the employment of pieces of component knowledge in ways that are newly effeaivetruly adding value, not just preventing its erosion. These capabilities relate to the ability of the firm to organize so as to function competitively in different contexts and apply its component capabilities in ways that successfully attain the firm's goals. This "macro-level" organizational knowledge'" is not simply a way to reduce opportunistic risk through less costly governance of transactions, but enhances the profit potential of the firm's component capabilities. Because these resources involve structures and action as well as know-how and understanding, we characterize them as architectural capabilities, not as pure knowledge.
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level component capabilities from the home market. All firms rely on their existing capabilities to gain the profits needed to provide returns to investors, to pay for further expansion, and to finance new assets and capabilities. Multinationals simply pursue these same leverage objectives across borders. As Kogut and Zander note, "the primary explanation for direa investment is the possession of...superior capabilities...responsible for the growth of the firm across international borders."^ Ferdows's framework of the strategic roles of foreign factories reflects this capability leverage concept.^' Factory types such as Offshore, Outpost, and Serverwith their need for lower site competencies and transfer of home-country skillsare examples of multinational firms' efforts to exploit existing capabilities. The leverage concept is most easily understood with respect to businesslevel component capabilities. Returns on investments in the combinations of resources and skills involved in business capabilities improve if the cost base established for the domestic market can be exploited in the broader international marketplace. Products and processes, brand names, marketing schemes, advertising programs, and other business-related resources and skills often can be leveraged across borders with minimal changesenough to fit the local context, but not typically so much as to change the basic capability.^^ Coca-Cola has been a classic example of a firm that excels at capability leverage. Traditionally, CocaCola took pride in its one world approach to its products and its marketing schemes, with some minor local adaptation. Interestingly, the most recent changes in the corporate approach to global systems allow much more local decision making on new product development along with very locally oriented advertising and marketing campaigns. Whether the company can maintain its success with this new strategy remains an open question today. Leveraging corporate-level architectural capabilities and appropriating their value added can drive international expansion as well.^* Resource-based models place great emphasis on managerial capabilities for organizing component knowledge into profit-generating bundles as drivers of firm expansion. New models of technological development in multinational firms treat architectural capabilities as essential to the coordination of technological efforts across boundaries. Architectural knowledge gained in managing multi-business domestic corporations can be extended to managing multi-country operations in international markets more effectively.^" In addition, corporate-level architectural capabilities appear likely to enhance the value of leveraging component knowledge by improving efficiency and effeaiveness in sharing technical or other business-specific knowledge.^^ Capability Building If leveraging capabilities in the marketplace is to continue generating competitive advantage and superior profits over time, new capabilities must be created as old ones are compromised. Building capabilities and developing resources must continue for the life of the firm. While capability-building strategies are not directly addressed by most models of the multinational firm.
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multinationals cannot rely solely on home-country-derived capabilities to operate global networks.^^ A focus on "the world as a single market" marginalizes new technical and managerial knowledge to the role of overcoming "tbe liability of foreignness," making tbe application of "real knowledge" from tbe bome market more efficient in earning new profits from old capabilities. Capability building has been treated as an outcome of bome-country conditions of competition, factor availability, and consumption." Tbe multinational is assumed to be able to carry its strategic resources and capabilities into international markets, but not to be overly concerned with creating tbem "out tbere." However, botb business-level and corporate-level capabilities are subject to improvement, discovery, re-creation, or innovation tbrougb global learning. Forward-looking firms are finding tbat no region or country bas a monopoly on business-level component capabilities and firms that actively seek tbe latest resources and skills from around the world can build superior component knowledge. Strategy analysts bave sbown technological and business skills can be developed tbrougb international diversification into multiple markets^^ and by empbasizing strategic leadership roles for national subsidiaries.^^ Porter*" and otbers find that tbe ability of multinational firms to access foreign-based clusters of excellence is a clear source of advantage in gaining component knowledgebased advantage. Combined witb complementary resources based in their bome countries, sucb tecbnical know-how may have profit-earning potential in excess of what the local members of the regional cluster can generate. Tbe development of foreign manufacturing facilities to take advantage of bigb levels of local site competencies is a key step in tbis process. Hewlett-Packard's effort to upgrade its Singapore operations is a good example of tbe capability-building process. The factory began as a simple production facility for basic calculators and is now responsible for all aspects, including basic design, of portable printers." This process reflects the historical process of asset-seeking foreign direct investment, but witb a focus on business-related knowledge, rather than natural resources or other location-bound bard assets. The entire image of the national subsidiary as a simple conduit for bome-country-based knowledge is being reworked in favor of one as potential strategic site and source of new capabilities. Corporate-level arcbitectural capabilities must also undergo a process of capability building. Companies may learn new ways of organizing, rewarding, and communicating in foreign or international markets. A more important influence, though, seems to be the need to create new internal systems as the stria relationships of bierarcbies prove unable to handle the complex, changing environment characteristic of global businesses. The arcbitectural knowledge needed to identify, leverage, and build new component capabilities requires a level of managerial sopbistication tbat moves the firm toward real globalizationseeing one world, not just one world market. ABB, for example, had to develop entirely new internal processes for coordinating its global businesses during its transformation, including strategic human resource policies, accounting systems, and tbe creation of a new organizational culture.^^
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Global Integration Globalization is the managerial process of integrating worldwide activities into a single world strategy by managing a network of differentiated but integrated subsidiaries, affiliates, alliances, and associations. Porter'^ and Doz*" treat globalization of strategy as a response to industry pressures toward ever increasing efficiency tbrough economies of scale and scope. However, researchers have begun to move away from treating industry as the single driver of multinational strategy and toward identifying internal processes critical to the development of transnational (global) competitive advantage in many industries. In Bartlett and Ghoshal's Transnational Model, with its focus on the firm rather than the industry, globalization leads to integrating strategic demands for worldwide efficiency, local market responsiveness, and world-class technology across all national markets.'*' The Transnational Model also addresses the need for an organizational structure that is capable of controlling this integration without losing the unique qualities of the individual firm. Capability-based models show that advantage comes to the global firm that is able to decentralize operational responsibilities to differentiated subsidiaries while supporting strong integration among all affiliates/^ This process dramatically reduces the "command and control" role of the corporate center in favor of "coordination and coaching." Clearly, there has been an evolution of thinking about multinational firms from an industry-driven set of similar organizations to a resource- or capabihty-type model in which unique heritage and idiosyncratic capabilities are reflected in firms facing similar market demands but meeting these with individual responses. Leverage of capabilities is assisted by coordinating activities across multiple markets/^ Global flexibility, arbitrage possibilities, and cost optimization are all improved if the firm has integrated its activities and its decision-making apparatus. In a multi-market but not integrated company, new component knowledge is likely to stay in the country where it develops. An integrated global architeaure, on the other hand, can spread new technical capabilities throughout the worldwide firm, exploiting new assets while they are still unique. Research into international knowledge flows'" shows that cross-border movement of knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, is possible but not easy, and it is significantly assisted by formal and informal corporate mechanisms for integration. Building architectural capabilities through integration may come from internal synergies in re-bundling business-level component knowledge and complementary assets from various units of the company. It also may come from improved architectural knowledge of how to find such opportunities. "Global network" type firms, such as Hewlett-Packard or DuPont, add value by stimulating the exchange and recombination of resources in such a way that new capabilities are incorporated into the fabric of the networkeffectively generating profits from architectural knowledge. The process of creating architectural knowledge regarding efficient and effective operations in an integrated global organization must be understood as an idiosyncratic process tied closely to the historical order of events and decisions in the firm. Understanding these aspects of the modern multinational firm requires an explicitly capability-driven strategic approach.
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labihty-Based Mrategy
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Business-Level Component Capabilities Global product divisions Export strategies using global production platforms Local skills used in sales and marketing Internal trade of final goods mostly one direction from parent to subsidiary Corporate-Level Architectural Capabilities Geographically based organization and muHi-local approaches Expansion primarily through greenfield and wholly-owned subsidiaries Replication of home-country corporate systems
i Slobal 1 ntegration
Home-based global product divisions High levels of two way internal trade of intermediate goods between parent and subsidiaries
Global
Integration
Heavy use of strategic alliances with other MNEs World-wide internal joint ventures and alliances
World-wide functional and product divisions Foreign-based product divisions Extensive financial cross-subsidy Considerable direct intersubsidiary trade
Merger with or acquisition of other multinational firms or their subsidiaries and management as new independent business units Holding company
" Use of differentiated network organization Highly decentralized and geographically dispersed operations Multiple strategic leader subsidiaries
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industry structures, leveraging financial strength, exploiting brand names, and overwhelming, acquiring, or co-opting local competitors. For example, DuFont's initial motivation to move into Europe was the exploitation of U.S.-developed technical skills and capabilities to extend current competitive advantage in a larger market. Essentially, most of this firm's overseas activities related initially to strategies of exploiting component capabilities developed in the U.S. Accordingly, firms leveraging business-level component capabilities internationally are most likely to organize into global product divisions with export strategies based on global production platforms while seeking local skills only in sales and marketing. Internal trade will be one-way from the parent to subsidiaries and will focus on final goods. Most leverage strategies appear to focus on component capabilities, but the corporate-level architectural capabilities developed in home markets also may be leveraged in international expansion. Worldwide export strategies that exploit size advantages benefit from skills in the management of ever-larger plants, complex distribution, and cost-based marketing. The "mini-parent firm" structures found in multi-domestic firms with independent subsidiaries refiert the organizational strategies and structures of the home country (even when not strictly appropriate). Multi-country operations are, to a certain extent, an extension of multi-plant management problems in the home country. Many of the problems of running a large domestic company can be extended to international markets," and traditional models of the multinational firm assume that such firms are, in most cases, large firms. For example, in 1996, Amoco's commodity chemical group had moved its products, processes, human resource, marketing, and sales strategies to Europe in their totality. Its international capability strategy was to leverage capabilities developed in the United States. To accommodate this purpose, the architectural capabilities of the American parent were followed in detail despite the lack of local fit. For this company, internationalization provided a broader scope for the application of capabilities learned at home, as when it decided to use stock options to reward European workers and managers, despite tax disadvantages not present in the United States. Firms leveraging home-country-based corporate-level architectural capabilhies through international expansion are more likely to use a geographically based organization and a multi-local strategy based on greenfield startups and whole ownership in an effort to reproduce home-country corporate structures and systems exaaly. Leverage and Global Integration Leverage is enhanced by the integration of markets. Not only are existing capabilities extended to foreign markets, they are applied to a world market. Given the need to adapt somewhat to local conditions,^^ core capabilities that can be targeted at global markets gain maximum benefits to size and market strength. Global integration permits each process technology to be pushed to its limit, global products provide the returns needed to push technology and quality as far as possible, and brand names take on a larger-than-life aura. Kogut describes advantages of matching competitive and comparative advantage and
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of arbitraging across markets and leveraging advantages from one market into another." Similarly, Hamel and Prahalad suggest that leveraging brand names, distribution capabilities, and financial resources are the key characteristics of global strategy.^'' Matching component capabilities to local economic conditions by differentiating activities across national locations and coordinating the value chain worldwide is the hallmark of the global firm. For example. Caterpillar has had extensive experience in international markets for fifty years as a dominant competitor in heavy equipment. As a result, it has considerable expertise in sourcing high-value components from the U.S. and less critical parts in low-cost areas, while focusing on local assembly and downstream activities. Firms leveraging business-level component capabilities globally are most likely to organize into home-based global product divisions that split their value-added activities across nnarkets based on matching firm-specific capabilities and location-specific resources. These firms will demonstrate high levels of two-way internal trade in intermediate goods between subsidiaries and the center. Leveraging component knowledge globally requires sophisticated capabilities in splitting and coordinating value-added activities, implying the need to replicate architectural capabilities. Managing a product-diversified domestic firm can be leveraged into managing an internationally diversified and globally integrated firm." It would seem that functional management skills, much as functional technical skills, can be brought from national to international to global competition through extension and exploitative learning.'^ Managers must learn to do what they do better, larger, faster, more efficiently, but do not really need to learn to do new things. The management systems of Matsushita have been leveraged globally, with coordination of the world-wide value chain looking much like that in Japan. Capabilities developed over the years in providing high quality goods, superior asset management, and highly competitive prices quickly and accurately were leveraged into all of the firm's worldwide markets.'^ Ultimately, firms leveraging corporate-level architectural capabilities globally are most likely to extend their primary functional or product division structure globally. However, such firms are more likely to base product divisions abroad, to use financial cross-subsidies, and to engage in inter-subsidiary trade (activities that require high levels of coordinating capabilities) than are firms leveraging component capabilities.
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level from the demands of capability building. First, advantage is dynamic, based on ability to create the new, not to exploit the old. Second, this implies the extensive use of joint ventures, alliances, and acquisitions to explore for new knowledge rather than a focus on whole ownership to protect old knowledge. Third, as component capabilities can best be developed where the local business environment favors them, a global search for new products and processes suggests product divisions based around the world, not controlled from home. Finally, component capabilities in leading firms must be shared inside as well as outside the firm to make use of them before new learning makes them obsolete. This implies that internal networks are critical, providing a much more active role for the subsidiaries and affiliates of the firm in working together directly. The central headquarters must develop skills at coordinating, not controlling, on a global basis. Thus, it becomes responsible for setting standards and building frameworks rather than actively managing operations on a daily basis. As a result, the corporate headquarters must know when to set standards {such as information systems and financial reporting) and when to stay out of transactions (as when subsidiaries share technology). While component capabilities can be found in new places and created by new combinations, architectural capabilities in integrating networks of differentiated affiliates must be built by managing such a network.^^ To a large extent, the very characteristics of successful leverage strategies create barriers to building innovative strategies.'^' Often firms seem to either focus on exploiting parent capabilities or on incorporating the rich experiences of newly developed networks. Where both strategies exist, they are tied to very distina business areas that appeared to offer little support for one another. In 1996, Manpower International, a large multinational promoter of personnel services, continued to provide its traditional, very locally organized, personnel services through one SBU, based in the U.S. At the same time, a separate division, headquartered in Europe and founded only a few years earlier, offered globally integrated services of greater variety to large, multinational, corporate accounts. Capability Building and International Expansion If capability leverage strategies seem most intensely tied to component capabilities and internationalization, capability building among multinationals appears to be more closely tied to globalization efforts and architectural capabilities. Internalization of significant new skills, while feasible, is not described commonly in the international business literature. Rather, home-country-derived tacit knowledge most often is treated as the strength of the firm.^** However, internationalization certainly provides access to new products, processes, and technologies that can be incorporated into the firm's array of technical capabilities. Many firms have come to the U.S. seeking technical skills to either outsource or incorporate in the search for international competitive advantage. However, even firms based in the U.S. are now discovering superior technological capabilities in European, East Asian, even former socialist countries. Global
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multinationals encourage major new businesses to develop in the most demanding foreign local markets. At the same time, barriers to multinational firms' investing in foreign locations to tap into local clusters of unique skills are diminishing around the world. An acquisition, alliance, or start-up in the right location can access skills and resources unavailable in the home country. Learning through international expansion confronts the problem of "sticky" or locationbound knowledge that multinational firms can incorporate only by establishing new units in the originating location. Stickiness of component capabilities suggests that a critical role for the multinational in the developing information age is to transmit internally information that would be tied to a single location in external market conditions.^^ For example, both Hewlett-Packard and Motorola Semiconductor have largely shifted from their capability exploitation strategies of earlier times to recently developed searches for new technology in situ. They have organized into global product divisions but have based these divisions in various foreign subsidiaries rather than relocating these "headquarters" operations to the United States. This approach is intended to take advantage of local capabilities in particular business areas and bring them into the organization through acquisition, alliance, or start-up. Of course, these firms have also moved to leverage their newly incorporated know-how, but the building strategy is what really distinguishes the internationalizing efforts of technology leaders. In another example, Sony moved to set up data storage labs in ihe U.S. as American technology surpassed Sony's original Japan-sourced storage technology, and the same company decided to form a joint venture with Qualcomm in San Diego as digital cellular telephone technology began to dominate Sony's original analog technology/'"' As a result, firms building business-level component capabilities through international expansion are more likely to acquire local firms or set up joint ventures with local partners in foreign locations that are known to have regional clusters with unique capabilities in that line of business. Separating component knowledge from architectural knowledge in international expansion is difficult. Building worldwide architectural capabilities is tied more to globalization than to internationalization. From the multinational corporate perspective, most of the skills related to a specific location appear to be components of a specific business. Firms such as DuPont have preferred to build new know-how through greenfield approaches or using alliances, reserving acquisition for major expansions into new business areas, usually buying an existing multinational firm rather than a local operation. Such acquisitions bring in not just technical skills in the new business area, but the industry-specific archhectural knowledge of the acquired firm. Primary targets are typically successful international competitors, not struggling takeover candidates, reinforcing the proposition that acquisitions by global firms are for the purpose of building architectural capabilities. Consequently, firms attempting to build corporate-level architectural capabilities through international expansion are more likely to acquire other multinational firms or their units rather than foreign local companies. These acquisitions also are more likely to be set up as new business units.
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Capability Building and Global Integration Corporations appear to build most major capabilities in international markets through globalization. It is possible for the integrated global firm to find component and architectural capabilities in foreign locations that would otherwise not be available to the firm and then bring them into the broader set of corporate skills. As Nohria and Ghoshal observe, "a key advantage of the multinational arises from its ability to create new value through the accumulation, transfer, and integration of different kinds of knowledge, resources, and capabilities across its dispersed organizational units."^' In common with other studies,*^** these authors see that the organizational changes associated with global integration produce new component capabilities through the vehicle of network structures simultaneously developed for these purposes. Kogut and Zander show that in a final stage of the evolutionary process of international firm growth, "the teaming from the foreign market is transferred internationally and influences the accumulation and recombination of knowledge through the network of subsidiaries, including the home market."^^ Business-level component knowledge is built in global firms through a two-stage process. First, the firm conducts the same sort of search, identification, and incorporation process as noted above for international strategies. The second phase involves a process of combining resources and capabilities taken from various subsidiaries and alliances into new capability bundles not available to any one national affiliate. Thus, building capabilities through globalization is as much a creative process as an accumulation and translation process, which involves devising or acquiring major new technical capabilities and including both exploratory and exploitative learning elements. Building component knowledge through globally integrated activities is perhaps the best use of strategic alliances between multinational partners. Unique capabilities in a particular business area can be shared to the mutual benefit of all of the partners, yet can be exploited separately. Capability bundles that are otherwise not available to any individual firm can be assembled in an efficient and flexible manner through the alliance, where whole ownership would be a slow and expensive path to new capabilities. For example, Hewlett-Packard has set up a system of "internal joint ventures" to create coordinated strategies across several of its highly decentralized and highly specialized business units. In this way, it can present globally unique products and product lines that are unavailable from any single business unit or country unit. Ultimately, firms building business-level component capabilities through global integration will use a preponderance of strategic alliances, both external and internal, in their core businesses. The transfer of knowledge from subsidiary to network is difficult, but it is a key part of the architectural knowledge of the successful multinational network. Global integration is key to the development of new architectural capabilities. Hewlett-Packard's internal joint ventures pulled together component knowledge, but they required unique organizational skills (and most of the time of a corporate vice-president) to arrange. While international diversification appears to require similar elements to product diversification, the complexity
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of managing an integrated globai strategy through a complex firm structure is unique to the global firm. These capabilities are essential to the coordination of the technical capabilities described above, but also produce new methods of structuring all aspects of the firm's activities. Innovation becomes a product of internal R&D, research partnerships with various clients and suppliers, market scanning, and other processes pulled together through the network of relationships of the central firm. Global firms are able to combine products across product lines and business units to offer bundles of products and services around the world that involve intensive coordination, not just international access, and which provide significant competitive advantage over firms which focus on isolated component knowledge. For both Hewlett-Packard and Motorola Semiconductor, the use of internal and external partnerships was widespread in 1996, new basic research facilities were being added in new regions, and multiple business units spread around the world all retained new product development responsibilities in a decentralized network. Furthermore, production was located where most effective, then coordinated by various processes, including but not limited to hierarchical line management. Hewlett-Packard separated sales and marketing (organized on a geographical and product-line basis) from production and development (organized into independent profit centers) and yet was able to tightly coordinate all these activities. Significantly, this firm showed high levels of intra-firm (but international) movement of knowledge, particularly of tacit, complex knowledge. NCR and Hewlett-Packard also have been involved in efforts to globalize both their component and architectural capabilities through finding new combinations of businesses and business skills from their subsidiaries and alliances. Both of these firms have transformed some of their production facilities into "Lead" factories with responsibilities to truly innovate and create new technologies, processes, and products." Nobria and Ghoshal's vision of business-related capabilities arising from Schumpeterian insight within the global network firm has been quite evident in these companies.'^ In the process of pursuing these advantages, these firms have been involved in actively pursuing such architectural capabilities as internal joint venture development, corporate specialists in emerging economies, and active technology partnerships with multiple competing customers. In order to do this, decentralization of authority has been a goal of these firms, but continued non-authoritarian interventions by higher central authorities has also been important. Effectively, multinational firms that are building corporate-level architectural capabilities in global markets are most likely to be characterized as differentiated networks with "headquarters activities" that are highly decentralized and geographically dispersedi.e., true transnationals. Conclusions Capability-based theory provides a conceptually rigorous approach to the analysis of multinational strategies that can complement and augment
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transaction-effidency models and market power models of globalization. Our framework builds a coherent model of international expansion and global integration from two basic types of complex assets (component and architectural capabilities) and two basic capability processes (leverage and building). The influence of these strategic imperatives on decisions to internationalize and globalize in multinational firms is an outcome of organizational strategies based on fundamental drives for expansion of resources and extraction of profits, rather than an unspecified need for integration unique to multinational firms. On the other hand, we also use this inherently firm-level model to predict individual company outcomes that cannot be extracted from the macro-economic or industry-level theories common to foreign direct investment theory. Leading firms in technology-intensive industries are indeed globalizing, but they are doing so to build or discover new capabilities as much as to further lever their existing assets and skills. Other companies, however, can gain considerable economic benefit from the high leverage and low exploration inherent in more simple international strategies. In mature, cost-competitive industries, the complex organizations and high-opportunity-cost management techniques required to manage global capability building are not able to generate benefits that would justify their costs. One implication often drawn from the current literature is that all firms in all industries are moving toward an integrated global network. However, while of great value in innovation-driven businesses, these network forms are extremely expensive, in both real and opportunity costs, and may offer little value in more traditional cost-driven businesses. Our model provides managers of multinational firms with a framework to decide just how international or how global they might want to be. Ultimately, this decision needs to be based on the situation of the firm, not on generic industry recommendations or on standardized solutions to a complex set of issues. Notes
1. K.R. Conner, "A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based Theory and Five Schools of Thought within Industrial Organization Economics: Do We Have a New Theory ol ihe Firm?" Journal of Management, 17/1 (March 1991): 121-154; J.B. Barney, "Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage," Journal of Management, 17/1 (March 1991): 99-120; D. Teece, G. Pisano, and A. Shuen. "Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management," Stratesic Management Journal. 18/7 (August 1997): 509-533. 2. D.J. Collis, "A Resource-Based Analysis of Global Competition: The Case of the Bearings Industry," Strategic Management Journal, 12 (Summer 1991): 49-68; G. Hedlund and .1. Ridderstrale, "Toward the N-Form Corporation: Exploitation and Creation in the MNC," Institute of International Business, Stockholm School of Economics, RP 92/15, 1993; K. Fladmoe-Lindquisi and S. Tallman. "Resource-Based Strategy and Competitive Advantage among Multinationals," in P. Shrivastava, A. Huff, J. Dutton, eds.. Advances in Strategic Management. 10 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1994): B. Kogui. "The Evolutionary Theory of thtMultinational Corporation: Within and Across Country Options," in B. Toyne and D. Nigh, eds.. International Business: An Emerging Vision (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 470-488. 3. G. Hamel and C.K. Prahalad, "Do You Really Have a Global Strategy?' Harvard Business Review. 63/4 (July/August 1985): 139-148. 4. C.K. Prahalad and G. Hamel, "The Core Competence of the Corporation," Harvard Business Review. 68/3 (May/June 1990): 79-91. 5. Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, op. cit.
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47. Caves, op, cit.
48. Even in a dynamic learning environment, leverage works only with present capabilities rather than future prospects. 49. J. March, "Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,' Organization Science, 2/1 (1991): 71-87. 50. Buckley and Casson, op. cit. 51. Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim, op. dt. 52. Ohmae, op, cit. 53. Kogut (1985), op, dt. 54. Hamel and Prahalad, op. dt. 55. Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim, op. dt.; Cantwell and Pisdtello. op. dt. 56. March, op. dt. 57. Hamel and Prahalad, op, cit, 58. Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, op. dt. 59. Porter (1998), op, dt. 60. Birkinshaw and Hood (1998), op. cit. 61. Banlett and Ghoshal, op. cit. 62. Hedlund, op. dt, 63. Hedlund and Ridderstrale, op. dt, 64. B. Kogut, "Country Capabilities and the Permeability of Borders," Strategic Management Journal. 12 (Summer 1991): 33-48; Porter (1990), op, cit, 65. Kogut and Zander, op. cit,; Hedlund and Ridderstrale, op, cit. 66. M. Peng and Y. Wang, 'Innovation Capability and Foreign Direct Investment: Toward a Learning Option Perspective,' Management International Review. 40 (2000): 79-94. 67. Nohria and Ghoshal, op, cit. 68. Cantwell and Piscitello, op. cit. 69. Kogut and Zander, op. cit,, p, 636. 70. March, op, cit, 71. Ferdows, op. cit. 72. Nohria and Ghoshal, op. cit.
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