COLONIAL

LATIN AMERICA
FOURTH EDITION
Mark A. Burkholder
Lyman L. Johnson
New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
2001
TWO
THE AGE OF CONQUEST
The Conqlll'st oj Mexico
The conqllest of 1\1cxico gave sllbstance to the Spaniards' dreams of find-
ing great wf'alth in the New Wodd and initiated a frenzy of later expedi-
tiolls anxious to e11lulate this remarkable success. For the daring and imag-
inative EeIll<llJsLQ Cmtt's, the COli quest brought riches, a title of nobility,
and bille, and the Castilian Crown secured new lands, vassals, and IT\enue.
For the native population, in contrast, the conquest ushned in epidemic
diseases, depopulation, <md centuries of subsel"Vience to foreign masters.
Olganizillg the I,'x/Jedifiull
Bored by the study of law and fortunate to have escaped death at the hands
of a jealous husballd, Cortes chose to leave Spain and seek his fortune in
the New World. Reaching Hispaniola in 1504 at the age of nineteen, the
yOllng Extrellladulall benefited from peI'sonal connections and received
an 2lCOIII ie.lUta,_ I-Jc impressed Diego VeI,lzqllez and seryed as his clerk dur-
illg the expedition to conquer and settJe Cuba. Rewarded for his bra\'el,
and sen'ice with a sf'c()Jl(1 rnmmienria, Cortes himself to trade and
exploitation of his Indians once t.he island was pacifipcl. News frol11 the
west, howne!, disrupted this placid existence.
The rPlllnants of a coasting and trading expedition that had reached
Yucatan in 1517 returned to Cuba with \\'ol'd of a wealthy and populous
Indian civilization different from the indigenous cultures of the Caribbean.
Velazquez immediately placed a larger and better-equipped force
uncleI' the command of his cousin Juan de Grijalva and ordered it back to
the land of the Maya. Although the expedition suffered some military losses
as the four ships and two hUlldredmen made landings along the Gulf coast
to Tabasco, it managed to trade for enough gold to demonstrate the re-
gion's richlless. At the S,Il11e time, an emissary of Moctezuma made con-
tact with the expeditioll. Long before Grijalva retllrned to Cuba, the Aztec
elite was studying drawings of these strange men and their great ships. In
711" Age of Conquest 43
the following months l\Ioctezuma consulted with the priests and soothsay-
ers of Tenochtitlan to determine whether the long-awaited return of the
deity Quetzalcoatl was imminent.
Discouraged by his cousin's lack of audacity, Velazquez appointed Cortes,
his former secretary, to lead a third expedition. Cortes at once demonstrated
his energy and Ieadelship. Aided by the well-known stories of the earlier ex-
peditions and his own personal magnetism, he attracted more than five hun-
dred men, one of who Ill, BeruaLU(az_dcl later wrote a richly detailed
ami beautifully told history of the conquest. As the date of departure ap-
proached, Velazquez correctly sensed that Cortes was too ambitious and head-
strong to I'emain loyal. ,,\'arned that the governor wanted to remm'e him from
command, Cortes cut short his preparations and set sail on Februarl' 18, 1519,
with over five hundred men, eleven ships, sixteen horses, and some artmery.
First Contacts
vVithin weeks of landfall, Cortes had the good fortune to secure two trans-
lators. Jeronimo Aguilar, the victim of a 1511 shipwreck, had learned Maya
during his unplanned residence in Yucatan. An Indian woman, Malintzin,
who spoke both Maya and Nahuatl was offered to thp Spaniards as a gift.
Later kuowll as D0I1a Marina, she became Cortes's mistress and bore him
a SOIL Translating in tandem with Aguilar, she provided Cortes with a
tremendous political advantage over the Aztec emissaries forced to rely on
the Spani,ll'ds' translators. In addition, she gave Cortes crucial information
about the Aztec state and intentions, in sOllle cases saving the Spaniards
from milital, disaster.
Tn battles along the coast of Yucatan and again on his march into the
interior, Cortes used fiis militalY assets with devastating effect. The natives
of Mesoamerica fought in massed ranks with slings, slwars, two-handed
swords edged with obsidian, and bows and arrows. But the mounted
Spaniards could quickly flank these native formations or ch'll'ge directly
and break them up. Even when unfavorable terrain limited the cavalry's
mobility, the firepower of artillery, steel swords, and armor gave the in-
yaders an advantage. \Vith each \'ictory, mOI'eover, Cortes incorporated into
his force the defeated warriors of the Aztec subject states. By the final stage
of his campaign, Indian auxiliaries vastly outnumbered the Spanish COI1-
quistadors and contributed immeasurably to Cortes's success.
The Spaniards also had the great advantage of realizing the political con-
sequences of their arrival. Cortes and many of his men had participated in
earlier conquests in the Caribbean, an expel'ience that gave them the con-
fidence to compromise and temporize with native leaders until the op-
portunity arose to impose their will. In addition, the Spaniards believed
they wPre inherpntly superior to the natives and that their Christian God
would lead them to victoll" The Indian leaders, not perceiving the general
threat to their indigenous culture, decided either to resist or allv them-
selves with the invaders in response to traditional, local concerns.'
44
Colonial Latin Amaica
:r" ,. .' ....
t . i" '.,
t' . -1';"'0'\ t; ""l..
\ '4\ 1-"1\('\.\
,J; \ ..", 1.'t.\
(tr'l .
Thc conqucror of Mcxico Fcrnando Carles
MoctezulIl<t and the Atec elite inlerpI'eted the Spaniards' arrival ac-
cording to the Mesoamerican tradition that viewed history as an ongoing
cycle o( creation and destruction, invasion and assimilation. The myt.h-
history o( the god Quetz;t!coatl reinforced this historical view and thus \'1r-
tllally jl<lralyzed Moctezllllla. This ruler shared the belief that
had left central Mexico for Yllcatan in the tenth centllry bllt would UltI-
mately return fmlll the east to reclailll his authority. According to Spanish
sources, when thc Aztec ruler met Cortes he affirmed, "\Ne have always
held that those \Iho descended frum him [Quetzalcoatl] would come and
conquer this land and take us as his vassals ... we believe and are certain
that he [the king of Sp<lin] is lHll' natuI'allord .... "1 Cortes, a political ge-
nius, used indigenous myths and bcliefs vvhenever possible to promotc a
sllpcrllatllr<ll interpretatioll of Spanish milital)' prowcss and invincibility.
Two incidents shortly after the Spaniards reached the Gulf coast illus-
trate Cortes's political skill. Because hc had left Cuba in rebellion against
Vel;lzqucz, Cortes lIceded to legitimize his command and neutralize the
disgrulltled mell still loyal to the governor. He solved this problem by
711f Age of Conquest 45
founding a city, Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz (today Veracmz), whose newly
elected town council then selected him its chief military and judicial offi-
cer. Ha\ing legitimized his independence {i'om Velazquez's authority,
Cortes furthcr solidified his power by ordering his small fleet destroyed.
Cut oiT from Cuba and facing Cortes's newly created local authority,
Velazquez's supporters accepted their defeat and joined thc march inland.
Indian Allies
Upon reaching Celllpoala, the Spaniards were greeted by a friendly and
generous cacique who provided them with firsthand information about
Tenochtitlan. Cortes thereupon began to realize the antipathy that subject
peoples felt toward the Aztec and resolved to turn some of these satellites
into allies. vVhen the Aztec tribute collectors arrivecl, Cortes convinced the
Cempoalans to arrest them. Terrified hy the possible repercussions of this
treason but reassurcd by clemonstrated Spanish military strength, the
Cempoalans complied. Cortes had gained his first native ally. Yet hc sought
also to avoid a direct confrontation with the Aztec. Playing a subtle strat-
egy, he released the prisoners and sent them to Moctezuma with protes-
tations of friendship.
Joined by their new ally, the Spaniards continued to march toward the
Valley of Mexico via the territOlY of the fiercely independent Tlaxcalans.
Seeing the Ccmpoalans, the Tlaxcalalls presumed that the Spaniards wel'e
also allies of the hated rulers of Tenochtitlan and fought them ferociously.
For the first time the Spaniards lost vaillable horses, of which they had
brought only sixteen, and suffcred n umerOllS casualties. As related by
Bemal Diaz, the major battle was reminiscent of a medieval romance:
vVe were four hundred, of whom many were sick and wounded, and we stood in
the middle of a plain six miles long, and perhaps as broad, swarming with Indian
waniors. Moreover we kllCK that they had come determined to leave none of us
alive except those who were to be saClificed to their idols. \\'hen they began to
charge the stones sped like hail frolll their slings, and their barbed and fire-hard,
ened darts fclllike con1 on the threshing-Hoor, e;lLh olle capable of piercing any
al1nOllr or penetrating the unprotected \itals. Their swordsmen and spcarmen
pressed us hard, and closed with us bravely, shoul.ing and yelling as they came.
2
The intense pressure almost broke the Spanish formation, but in the cnd
Spanish weapons forced the Tlaxcalans to retire. After further days offierce
fighting, the Tlaxcalans at last sought peace and swore fealty to Charles 1.
Their loyalty to Spain and militalY assistance to Cortes proved as imprcs-
sive as their initial resistance.
Entering the Tlaxcalan capital Cortes saw for the first time the urban
devclopment of the Mesoamerican hcartland:
This city is so big and so remarkable [as to be 1 . almost unbelievable, for
the city is much larger than Granada and very much stronger, with as good
46 Co/rmin/ tn/ill Am(,-ica
buildings and many morc people than Granada bacl when it was taken, and
very much better supplied with the produce of the land, namely, bread, lowl
and game and Ii'esh-water fish and \'egetablcs and other things they eat which
are vel)' good. There is in this city a market where each and every day upward
of thirty thousand people come to buy and sell, without counting the other
trade which goes on elsewhere in the
noth the indigenous tribute system and the urban-based political order
suited perfectly the needs and resources of the conquistadors. A smallnum-
her of Spaniards could control an enormous area and draw off huge
amounts of wealth by usurping the traditional prerogatives of the native
UdJaT1 elite and rulers. Because Spanish colonial development would take
on this urban character, it was fitting that the military campaigns for COll-
trol ofTenochtitlall, the region's preeminent urban center, dominated the
remainder of the conquest.
Moctezuma's agents arrived soon after Tlaxcala's submission and at-
tempted to convince Cortes that the Tlaxcalans would betray him. Nowap-
preciating how serious the Spanish threat was, they presented :'vloctezuma's
offer to become a tribntal], of Charles I in return for Cortes's abandolling
his march. Cortes cleverly played off these traditional rivals. He replied po-
litely to ;\Ioctezuma's offer but informed the amhassadors that he would
greet their lord in Tenochtitlan. As the Spaniards marched toward the Mex-
ica capital, they were reinforced by thousands of Tlaxcalan warriors.
En route to Tenochtitlan, the Spaniards entered Cholllla, an Aztec trib-
utary. '\Then informed of a rumored surprise attack, the Spaniards and
their native allies responded by massacring some six thousand residents.
Convinced by this action that the invaders and their allies were militarily
invincible, Moctezurna henceforth made only halfheaned efforts to dis-
uade thelll from reaching the capital.
The Aztec Capital
Cortes led his force across the volcanic moulltain chain that forms the
southeastern boundaI], of the Valley of Mexico and stood looking down
on the splendid complex of cities, lakes, and canals that served as the me-
tropolis of Mesoamerican civilization. Bernal Diaz wrote years later:
And when we sawall those cities anel villages built in the IVa tel', and other great
towns Oil elry land, and that straight and level causeway leading to Mexico, we
were astounded. These grea't towns and cues [temples], and buildings rising
fro1ll the water, all made of stone, scttled like an enchanted vision from the
tale o[ Amadis. Indeed some of our soldiers asked whether it was all not a
dream .... It was all so wonderful that I do not know how to describe this first
glimpse or things nevel- heard of, scen or dreamed of before.
4
For the first time Cortes and his followers fully appreciated their momen-
tous undertaking.
17.e Age "l Conquest
47
Members of the royal court and finally l\Ioctezuma himself met the
Spaniards as they cmssed the broad causeway into the capital. After an ex-
of.ritual gifts in which the ruler stirred the invader's cupidity by
pmvldlllg Items of gold, the gifts he knew the Spaniards valuecl most, he
pel-sollally led Cones and his men to quarters in the palace of his father,
Axayacatl.
The. splendors of Moctezuma's COtIrt with its elaborate rituals and opu-
lence unpressed the Spaniards. Yet their precarious position ill the heart
of the Aztec capital was frightening. In a characteristically audacious move,
Cortes sought to strengthen his position by forcing Moctezuma uuuer the
threat of death to move to rooms in Axayacatl's palace.
The seizure of their ruler provoked a deep crisis among the highest lev-
els of Aztec society. Moctezum<1 's failure to resist the invaders militarily had
already angered many of his closest advisers and kinsmen. Once the undis-
puted ruler of Mesoamerica's greatest empire, the hostage was now merely
a pawn of the foreigners. But despite public signs of submission, Cortes
could not be certain that the traditional political discipline of this au-
thoritarian and hierarchical state would hold finll. Popular resistance
might still erupt.
From his fil-st contacts with urban centers of coastal Mesoamerica, Cones
encouraged proselytization among the Indian popUlation and sought to
demonstrate the impotence and futility of the native religious beliefs. Re-
peatedly he overrode the advice of Spanish clerics to proceed slowly in or-
der to avoid inflaming religious passions among the natives. Military vic-
tory whetted his efforts to promote Ch,-istianity, and the subsequent assaults
on indigenous beliefs were often unrestrained. Exuberant Spaniards drove
native pl'iests from temple precincts and threw down and dehlced religious
ornaments. After cleaning the temples of the stains and stench left from
human sacrifices and whitewashing their interiors, the Spaniards replaced
the stone image of Huitzilopochtli or another native god with a cross and
the image of the Virgin Mary. The political significance of symbols of the
conquerors' religion replacing those of the l\!esoameric<1l1 gods was ap-
parent to both the lllvaders and the vanqllished.
to Cortes
News that a large Spanish expedition loyal to the governor of Cuba had
arrived on the Gulf coast complicated Cones's plans. Yet with his usual de-
termination he turned the threat to his advantage. Leaving a garrison ill
Tenochtitlan under Pedro de Alvarado, Cortes marched rapidly to the coast
and in a night smashed the larger force of Panfilo de Narvaez. Then,
by treating the defeated men generously and promising great riches, he
succeeded in wi':lling most of then1 to his side. Quickly beginning the tl-ek
back to Tenochtltian, the enlarged force soon received the distressing news
that the Aztec had attacked the Spanish garrison.
48
Coloni"l Latill AIIl1'l1m
During a major religious celebration, Alvarado ord!,Ted his troops to at-
tack the unarmed crowd gathered in Tenochtitlan's central square. The
assault cost mallv Aztec nobles their lives, enraged the city's populace, and
provoked a popular uprising. Alvarado later claimed that the na-
tives had planned to use the celebration as cover for an attack on the weak-
ened galTison, but his attack, like the massacre that Cortes had ordered at
Cholllla, rf'lIlains onf' of the 1110st controversial e\'('nts of the conquest.
The Aztec made lIO effort to hinder the Spaniards' reentry into the cap-
ital, thlls trapping them where their horses and weapons were less effec-
tive. Cortes and his reinforced columll soon felt the full brunt of Aztec
rage. Although the Spaniards' harquebuses and small cannon claimed
many victims, the Aztec nearly succeeded iII forcing the palace walls de-
fended by the Spanish. Finally the Spaniards led Moctezulila onto the walls,
hoping his people would end the attack at the sight of their
ruler. However, the storm of stones, spears, and arrows contInued un-
abated. According to the lTlost widely accepted account, a stone struck
MoctezUllla on the head and led to his death three days later.
Convinced that his defeat was imminent, Cortes decided to flee under
cover of darkness. His men made careful preparations tn avoid detection,
covering the horses' hooves with cloth and constructing portable bridges
to span gaps cut in the causeway. Finally, they divided the loot they had
collected from Moctezuma and others since l-eaching Mexico. MallY of the
most recent arrivals loaded themselves down with gold and silver, sacrific-
ing physical mobility in flight for the promise of social mobility later. For
hUllch'eds their greed proved a deadly mistake.
Despite the Spaniards' efforts to escape undetected, the Aztec attacked
them frolll all sides before they had cleared the first causeway gap. All pre-
tense of discipline and military order collapsed under the onslaught. Cortes
lost more than [ollr hundred Spaniards, fOLlr thollsand native allies, and
lllallY horses before the fleeing Spanish force reached t.he mainland. June
30 .... ], 1020, truly had been La Noche Triste (the sorrowful night) for
the Spaniards. Confident of total victol)" Aztec warriors boasted to the harcl-
pressed Sp<mianls that they would soon sacrifice them. The Spaniards
could, in etct, look back across the causeway and see their captured com-
patriots being marched tip the steps of 11uitzilopochtli's temple for sacri-
lIce by the waiting prit"sts. Ikmal Diaz later related that before C?rtes
reached sanctuary in Tlaxcala following this defeat, over half the Spalllards
in Mexico had been killed.
Yet even this terrible defeat proved to be only a temporalJ' setback for
Cortes. The Tlaxcabns remained allies and provided a safe haven while he
rested and resupplied his forces. Native armies recruited fn)1l1 Tlaxcala and
other allied Indian states .ioined the Spaniards for a final assault Oil the
hated i\ztf'C capital. Alter La Noche Triste, Cortes realized that be must
turll Tenochtitlan's island location to his advantage. He ordered a fleet
constructed that would allow him to cut off the capital from its mainland
supplies of food alld water. Thineell small brigantines were built and then
Thr Agr oj COllqucst
49
disassembled. Once the Spaniards and their allies reached the shore of
Lake Texcoco, they quickly reassembled and launched these slllall \'essels
armed with three-quarters of their valuable anilleIY.
Final Conquest
Cortes divided his fOITe into three columns and hegan to move up the
broad callseways that 11l.lked the capital to the mainbnd. lIis brigantines
prm'ed their value by defeating a large force of Aztec warriors
III Despite the heroic resistance of the city's garrison and the stoic
suffenng of a. population denied adequate food and water by the block-
Spamards pushed toward the city center. At first they found
It dIffIcult to consolidate their gains, for each niaht the defenders retook
the b,uildings that.the Spaniards had occupied during the day. Accordingly,
Cortes orde.red IllS IndI.an auxiliaries to pull down the city's buildings to
prevent therr reoccupatlon.
. The Spaniards also had an unexpected and valuable ally. Smallpox was
mtroduced by one of Narvaez's soldiers who had joined Cortes. Previously
unknown to the l\Iesoamerican population, smallpox devastated it. In the
confined space of the besieged city, the disease killed many of the people,
already weakened by starvation. According to the Indian account of the
:onquest: "vVe were covered with agonizing SorTS from head to foot. The
Illness so dI:ead.fuI that no one could walk or 1110\e."5 Probably many
1110re Illchans dIed If1 the epidemic than i'OIll wounds received ill battle.
successor, Cuitlahuac, was among the first \;ctillls. Following
hIS death, authonty passed to his eighteen-year-old brother CuauhtelllOc.
the Spaniards sulIered no apparent effects from the disease, the
epld.el:llc sen'ed to .confirm the most pessimistic assessments of Spanish in-
VIl1Ublhty and the Impotence of native gods.
, Finally, on August 21, 152], the Spaniards breached the capital's last de-
fenses, and the remaining warriors surrendered. Cuauhtemoc attempted
to flee by canoe, but a brigantine captured him. Tenochtitlan, one of the
grandf'st achievements of the Mesoamerican world, was little more than a
pile of rubble. Bemal Diaz remembered that "we found the houses full of
corpses, and some poor Mexicans still in them who could not move awav.
. The city looked. as if it had been ploughed up. The roots of any e(li-
ble greenery had been dug out, boiled and eaten, and they had even cooked
the bark of s01l1e of the trees."6
Although Cortes emel'gecl victorious, the spoils were far less than antic-
ipated. During the debacle of La Noche Triste the Spaniards had lost much
of the treasure accumulated since their arrival in Mexico. Although valu-
able. booty was found 111 Tenochtitlan 's ruins, few of the Spaniards received
gold, silver, and rich encOIllimtias they had expected. Their
dlsaPFollltment produced some ugly confrontations among the victors, and
Cortes was able to quiet his followers only with difficulty. In order to still
these passions and proyide a controlled outlet for his men's destructive en-
50
Colonial Latin Amprica
d
" s to the south
'I ouraged and helped finance new expe Iuon,
ergles, le enc
and west. " ' 1524 ended the line of Mexica rulers,
The executHlll of Cuauhte,moc 111 '1" atural rulers" of Mex-
S
'd ontll1ued to recogJ1lze t Ie n
Although the pamar sCI I,d other allies maintained some
, ' I h t' and the T axca ans an
ICO In tIe sort ellll t arrivals from Spain and from
1
'stadors and more recen
autonomy, t le conqul. 'I b beellne the indisputable lords
Id I
, of the Can) ean soon L ' "
the 0 er co OJues 'd d first settlers took IndIan n11S-
I d M
'Jf these conqUlsta ors an .
of the an, an} < " D - a M'll'ina Cortes's mistress,
d
t narried IndIan wornen, on L L,
tresses, an a ew I 1 ber of earl)' colonial society and mar-
c I became a respectec meln I
lor examp e, , h'ld' that resulted from the onger-
ried one of his followers, The mestIZO c I I en d' I' 'OIl of their fathers
, 'fi d .. tl the culture an ! e Ig!
lived unions often ldenU Ie 1 k 'f S " h rule during the Indian re-
, ortant bulwar 0 pams
and became an lInp, B I 1550s Spanish authority was firmly
bellions of the follow1l1g decades, Y t;e , ' f New Spain, as the con-
established in the densely populate regIOnS 0 .
qllered te!Titory was known,
The Conquest of Pern
, ' 1 I initial era of Spanish expansion
The fall of the Inca EmpIre dunaxec t le ,. .' 1 FI Do-
, , x )editiol1s continued to pursue lunlOlec "
in the Americas, Late! e" I " " ft'" settled vast new regions,
IS' . lane! thnr mestIzo 0 Splll1g
rados, aile palllal < s" ',' I I 'k" d the Castillan Crown COII-
Yt't the participants, theIr Jac els'f:
n
von at an exorbitant hu-
. '\ ,1' f tl se new achle\'ements, 0 en'
sldere< eac 1 0 Ie.. , I . IF" ncisco Pizarro's spectacular
man cost, a failure when com pal ec WIt 1 1 a
success in Peru,
Earl)' Expeditions
d ' f a modest Extrnnaduran no-
The illegitimate ,mel poorly educate SOli 0 , c, After a hrief and
. ' , ,I ' he New \Vorld as a young man. '
ble, PlzalTO emlglatt.C to t I I " 1 11 eXIJeclition to the isthmus
, ' l,r anio a le JOIl1<':( a
unexceptIOnal stay III lSI:', t ',I '11' 111{11"'11 \"ars and slave I'aids. As an 1'11-
'1'1 ,I nrllclIJa e< I ",.
of Panama, leI{' 1e I ' [' I 't r p'lI1all1a Pizarro was by
d
,r the founders 0 t le CI yo, <, ,
collwldpro an 0 . . " f II and obscure city OJl Spalll S
his mid-life a fairly prosperous Citizen 0 a sma
expanding American frontier, " 'led in an exploratory expecli-
In 1522 Captain Pascual de oast and fighting the head
, p. , ' hl1ggll1g t le aCJ IC c " L ,
lion s01lth fronl .111 ,lilla, , ,,[ " I and IJOwerful kingdom
. _" 'Iuced onlv !'lUBOrS 0 a IIC 1 .
wmcls. lhe \oy,lge [HOC .' ,', 1 e colonists in pursumg them.
to the south but spurred mtelest SOJ 1 '1 t, al'\lJers Diego de Al-
) ,,' d to let PIzarro ane "0 p, ., ,
Governor I eeli alIas agree \ ' L olore the region. Luque,
I
I " t Hernando {e uque, eXt .
magro ant t Ie plies, . , lthif"l' anel more prominent men, provided the
probably as an agel1t [01 "ea . II let' south in 1!J2,i but soon re-
. " " I Pi7arro led a sllla expel I 1011 . , . '
necessaf) capita.. . f' 'd InUles with hostile Inclians
turned 10 Pan,llll<l after hardship, allllne, an , c
yielded no ta\1gible gain,
, .
1718 A.ge of Conqul'sl 51
A second effort began even more disastrously, and Pizarro was forced to
seek shelter on the island of Gallo while f\lmagro retun1ed to Panama, Re-
filsing a later opportunity to turn back, Pizano and thirteen men remained,
When Almagro appeared with reinforcements and supplies seven months
later, the expedition's fortune improved, One of its ships captured a large
oceangoing raft laden with gold and silver jewelry, finely woven textiles,
and precious stones. Their greed amused by this irrefutable proof that the
rumored civilization existed, the adventurers pushed further south and dis-
covered Tumbez, a northern outpost of the Inca Empire.
Despite this evidence of a rich civilization, Pizarro and Almagro failed
to interest the new governor of Panama in supporting further exploration,
After borrowing more capital, the partners sent Pizarro to Spain to seek a
royal license for their next venture. There he secured a contract (capitu-
(acion) naming him governor of Peru, and the thirteen men who had per-
severed with him 011 the island of Gallo were ennobled. Significantly, Al-
magro received only the minor title of governor of Tumbez, Before
returning to Panama, Pizarro stopped in his birthplace, TnDillo, where he
recruited four brothers and a cousin, other kinsmen, and neighbors for
his expedition.
The unequal rt'wards spelled out in the royal contract strained Pizarro's
relations with Almagro. Finally, however, the partnel's resolved their dif-
ferences and in late December 1530, Pizarro set sail from Panama with
fewer than two hundred men, Almagro agreed to follow this vanguard with
reinforcements and supplies, After' advancing slowly down the coast, Pizarro
reached Tumbez, Here C\'idellce of destruction and depopulation revealed
that the Inca were engaged in civil waLJoined by a small force led by Her-
nando cle Soto, the expedition proceedecl about a hundred miles to the
south, Thel'e Pizarro founded the city of San Miguel de Piura and awarded
encomie1Zdas to the Spaniards he would leave behind as a garrison to pro-
tect communication with Panama.
Although Pizarro and his lieutenants did not immediately realize it, they
were challenging the Inca at a particularly propitiolls moment. In the late
1520s an t'pidemic had swept along tracle routes from the isthlllus of
Panama through the northt'rn reaches of the empire. Probably the first
smallpox to reach the region, the epidemic claimed countless victims, in-
cluding the extremely l-igorollS and effective Huayna Capac, the Sapa Inca,
and his heir apparent. As in Mexico, disease prm'Cd to be a powetful ally
to the Spaniards.
The deaths of Huayna Capac and his heir prm'okecl a deep political cri-
sis among the Inca. As he pushed the empire's frontier northward into
modern Colombia in a long and bitter conniet, Huayna Capac had de-
pended increasingly on professional troops and military advisers rather
than the traditional Inca bureaucracy. a result, the capital, Cuzco, had
lost both prestige and power. Thus wht'n news of the Sapa Inca's death
reached Cuz('o, the court elite immediately confirmed his S011 Huascar as
sllccessor. In Quito another SOI1, Atahualpa, controlled the professional