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GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 2 6 2012
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
January 7, 1987
SUBJECT: Sentencing Affidavit for Jonathan Pollard --
ACTION MEMORANDUM
Attached is an affidavit prepared for your signature. It is
intended for use by the Court in assessing an appropriate
sentence for Jonathan Pollard. The affidavit has been approved
by CIA, DIA, NSA and Navy.
ThiS- document- is 1 engthi than- I would- approve- oro.:.
your signature. The reason for the length is consistent with the
scope of Pollard's espionage activities. Succinctly, he
disclosed an incredible quantity of intelligence publications
which encompassed a similarly broad scope and variety of
intelligence information. Even so, only a handful from among the
many.thousands compromised are described herein. Those described
are available for your review should you desire to do so.
It is the opinion of the intelligence agencies, and one
which I share, that we must describe Pollard's activities with
particularity. A lesser description of the damage he has done to
the national security would risk an erroneous assumption by the
sentencing judge that Pollard's disclosures to an ally have
really done little to harm the United States. Of course, the
probable consequence of such an assumption would be an
inappropriate sentence. The factual descriptions of Pollard's
activities contained in both the classified and unclassified
sentencing memoranda which will be submitted by the u.s. Attorney
are similarly lengthy.
This document will be handled in compartmented channels.
personnel will carry it to and from the judge, and one copy
W1ll be placed in the Department of Justice security vaults for
review by defense counsel who have been properly cleared. The
affidavit assumes that the Director of Naval Intelligence will
provide permanent storage for it in his office.
I strongly recommend that you sign the affidavit.
Attachment
:eLASSii fER UPON pm'QITAL
liiili@!IIflLUfo
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JONATHAN JAY POLLARD,
defendant.
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DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 2 6 2012
Criminal No. 86-0207
DECLARATION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER HEREBY DECLARES AND SAYS:
1. (U) I have been the secretary of Defense and the chief
executive officer of the Department of Defense (DOD), an
executive department of the United States, 10 u.s.c. 131, since
20 January 1981. As secretary of Defense, I have authority,
direction and control over the DOD, 10 u.s.c. 133(b), and am a
member of the National security council.
2. (U) As Secretary of Defense, I possess original
classification authority for TOP SECRET information, including
Sensitive compartmented Information (SCI}. SCI is information
Which derives from sources or methods which are especially
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stem from particularly fragile acquisition methodology, from
sources especially susceptible to counter measures or deception
techniques or even from danger to human life if the substantive
information obtained is exposed. The fact that I possess this
classification authority means that I am authorized to
determine the significance and the proper classification of
national security information, including TOP SECRET, SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI), on behalf of the United
states. The information I have prepared for the court is
submitted based upon my personal review of relevant information
and my discussions with personnel who are knowledgeable about
the data described herein.
DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Dat&:()CT 2 6 2012
3. (U) The information in this declaration is submitted for
use by the Court as an aid in determining an appropriate
sentence for the defendant, Jonathan Jay Pollard. It is my
purpose to explain the nature and significance of the
defendant's actions as I perceive them to have affected the
security of the United states. I have detailed a considerable
quantity of highly sensitive information, and therefore request
that the Court review this document and deliver it under court
seal back into the hands
of its bearer immediately upon
eompletion of review. I also request that no one else be
permitted to review this document unless it is necessary as a
matter of law to do so, and then only if proper clearance and
Copy J. of 'I Copies
Page 2 of 46 Pages
:l;d'P SEeRET iJMDRA
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access is ascertained. Should the document again be required
by the court, or by any court with jurisdiction over this case,
it will immediately be made available. I have directed that
this document be retained by the Director of Naval Intelligence
who will be responsible for its safekeeping and
delivery to the Court as required.
further
DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 2 6 2012
' 4. (U) I believe it is necessary to understand the purpose of
intelligence acquisition before one can comprehend the
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significance of its loss. There are two primary reasons for
gathering and analyzing intelligence information. The first,
and most important in my view, is to gain the information
required to direct u.s. resources as necessary to counter
threats of external aggression. The second reason is to obtain
the information necessary to efficiently and effectively direct
the foreign policy of the United States. It necessarily
follows that inappropriate disclosure of properly classified
intelligence information intended to serve these purposes can
be'used to frustrate both the defensive and foreign policy
goals of the United states, regardless of its recipient.
a. Intelligence information disclosed to a hostile foreign
power can be used to produce counter measures, promote
disinformation techniques, and even permit the more efficient
and effective utilization of resources in manners inimical to
Copy I of 1 Copies
Page 3 of 46 Pages

u.s. interests.
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DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13528
Chief, Records & Dtclass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 2 6 2012
b. unauthorized disclosures to friendly powers may cause as
great a harm to the national security as to hostile powers
because, once;the information is removed from secure control
systems, there is no enforceable requirement nor any incentive
to provide effective controls for its safekeeping. Moreover,
it is more probable than not that the information will be used
for unintended purposes. Finally, such disclosures will tend
to expose a-largerpicture ofu.s.capabilities and knowledge,
or lack thereof, than would be in the u.s. interest to reveal
to another power, even to a friendly one.
5. (U) In this case, the detendant has admitted passing to his
Israeli contacts an incredibly large quantity of classified
information. At the outset I must state that the defendant's
disclosures far exceed the limits of any official
.. exchange of intelligence information with Israel. That being
true, the damage to national security was complete the.moment
information was given over. Ideally, I would detail for
the Cburt all the information passed by the defendant to his
Israeli contacts, unfortunately, the volume of data we know to
have been passed is too great to permit that. Moreover, the
defendant admits to having passed to his Israeli handlers a
Copy I of
Page 4 of
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46 Pages
quantity of great enough' to occupy a six. feet
bY six feet by ten feet. I have chosen to present in three
j parts the data I consider significant. In the first part I
have detailed categories of information compromised and
given brief but specific examples of actual documents passed.
In the second part I explain the harm I perceive to have
occurred, again with specific examples.
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In the third part I
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capsulize the overall significance of the defendant's
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PART ONE
CATEGORIES OF' INFORMATIONDISCLOSED
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PART TWO
DAMAGE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
14 noted previously, the breadth of the
disclosures made by the defendant was incredibly large. Db)
Accordingly, the damage to u.s. national security interests. (Cc) .
resulting from those activities is similarly broad. I will
detail herein, the more pertinent aspects of damage to u.s.
security as I perceive them:
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a. Damage to Intelligence Sharing
Since the activities of the defendant impact directly on
u.s. intelligence activities, it is appropriate to begin with
intelligence. It should be obvious that the United State has
neither the opportunity nor the resources to unilaterally
all the intelligence information we require. We

with a variety of intelligence sharing agreements

.. other nations of the world. In some of these arrangements
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is virtually a full partnership which stems from
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fashioned on a quid pro quo basis. For example, the United

agrees to share with an ally certain types of
\/;rintelligence information in exchange for desired information or
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valuable assistance. Further, once such agreements are
?./entered into, decisions to disclose particular classified
documents or items of intelligence information are made by high
level officials after careful evaluation of the costs of
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DEClASSiFIED IN PART
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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 2 6 2012
disclosure is.vitaliy important for interests because all
criteria must be balanced against one another.: For example,
the requirement to protect sources and methods of information
acquisition, as well as the requirement to protect the
substantive information received, must conform with the
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recipients need for that information and the expectation of
benefit for the Unitect states. This usually means that. lb)(l)/
substantive information. is redacted from the original documents
containing the information.prior to disclosure. The.. result, is
The defendant has specifically identified more than 800
u.s. classified publications and more than 1,000 u.s.
classified messages and cables which he
DECLASSIFIED IM PARl
Authority: EO 13526' .
Chief, Records & Dec lass DlV, WHS
Date: 0Cl2 6 201Z
sold'to Israel. Of
the best of my knowledge, the
e provided them was authorized for- official
releas&to Israel in unredacted form.
15. e actions of the defendant have jeopardized the
ntelligence information he provided to the'
Israelis, as well as the sources of that information, by
placing it outside of a u.s. controlled security environment.
The United States, and virtually all of those who cooperate
with us by sharing intelligence, have developed a system of
protecting classified information which depends on the
reliability of individuals for its effectiveness. It is also a
system which varies its requirments for protection with the
sensitivity of the information at All classified
material is required to be placed in proper storage,
appropriate to its classification level, and all personnel who
have custody are accountable for ensuring that proper
procedures for protecting it are followed. The system
necessarily depends on the integrity and reliability of the
individual. So long as an individual is accountable for
classified material in his custody, we can generally assume
that personal interest will guarantee its safekeeping. It is
when an individual obtains custody of classified material for
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which he is not responsible that safekeeping
In such an instance, there is no real incentive adequately
protect such information. One example of an occasion when this
happens in the normal course of business is the necessary use
of couriers to carry highly sensitive information from one
location to another. The defendant frequently acted as such a
courier, and it was his abuse of this system, a system
necessarily dependent on the integrity of the individual, which
permitted his espionage activities to occur. Moreover, in a
situation such as this one, there is every incentive to use the
acquired information in a person's self interest. Examples of
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Authority: EO 13526
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PART THREE
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE DISCLOSURES
HARM TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Dlv, WHS
oateucr 2 6 2012
In my opinion, the defendant's unlawful disclosures to the
government of Israel have harmed u.s. foreign policy. My
conclusions flow directly from the information I have discussed
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22. MPROMISED SOURCES AND METHODS:
not repeat the difficulties in reacquiring damaged
sources of intelligence acquisition which have been
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united states must expect some amount of risk
to accrue directly to u.s. persons from the defendants
oncomitant risk with which I,
as Secretary of am particularly concerned, is that
u.s. combat wherever they are deployed in the world,
could be endangered through successful
exploitation of this
24. (U} I have provided the foregoing statements to provide
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my harm. caused:tO"natlorta.t(security by
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the defendant.: and. as an aid to the Tltef datct'.provided
represents my opinions and conclusions stellll'Rincj. etcim m:t review
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of the data compromised, as well as from information obtained
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by me in my capacity as secretary of Defense ana as a member of
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tt1e National security councl.l. The defendant .. has substantially
harmed the united states, and in my view, his crimes demand
severe punishm*nt. Because it may not be clear to the court
that the defendant's activities have caused damage of the
magnitude realized, I felt it necessary to provide an informed
analysis to the court so that an appropriate sentence could be
fashioned.. My foregoing comments will, I hope, dispel any
presumption that disclosures to an ally are insignificant; to
the contrary, substantial and irrevocable damage has been done
to this nation. Punishment, of course, must be appropriate to
the crime, and in my opinion, no crime is more deserving of
severe punishment than conducting espionage activities against
one's own country. This is especially true when the individual
spy has voluntarily assumed the responsiblity of protecting the
nation's secrets. The defendant, of course, had full knowledge
and understanding of the sensitivities of the information
unlawfully disclosed. To demonstrate that knowledge, I have
attached copies non-disclosure agreements which he
voluntarilY executed. Should. the court. require further
OSD 3.3(b)( {
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Page 45 of 46
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informatioit' of anything you
may provide' the bearE:J,i:' of: this document yout, requirements .
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and I will to them.
Under penait:i.es of perjury, I hereby the foregoing
statement& tobe-true and.correct to thebestof my knowledge

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authorityt EO 13528;
Chief, Records & Declass Dlv, WHS
Date: OCT 2 6 2012
Copy I of ? copies.
Page 46 of 46 Pages.
GLOSSARY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
. Chief, Records & Declass Div. WHS
Date: OCT 2 6 2012 '
1. TOP SECRET (TS): Information which if inappropriately
disclosed would cause exceptionally grave damage to the
national security of the United States.
2. SECRET (S): Information which if inappropriately disclosed
would cause serious damage to the national security of the
united states.
3. (C): Information which if inappropriately
disclosed would cause damage to the national security of the
united States.
OSD 3.3(b)() )
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13528
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 2 6 2012