UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA (Richmond Division) _______________________________________ ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) LESLIE RAYMOND SACHS, ) ) Defendant.

) _______________________________________) PATRICIA D. CORNWELL,

Civil Action No. 3:07cv00236

PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND INITIAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING, WITH FINDINGS Plaintiff Patricia Cornwell (Ms. Cornwell) submits this brief as a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of her Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and as the Initial Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Request for an Evidentiary Hearing, with findings of fact. As to the former, the brief is intended to respond to specific issues raised by the Court in the Memorandum Opinion and Order issued in connection with Ms. Cornwells request for a temporary restraining order. As to the latter, it is intended to address the legal and policy reasons militating in favor of an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact at this stage in the proceedings. Although the motions were presented separately, the legal analysis that they engender is interrelated: Entry of the requested injunction after the full and fair evidentiary adversarial1 proceeding that the plaintiff has requested obviates the legal impediments to the entry of an

Regardless of whether the defendant Dr. Leslie Sachs (Dr. Sachs) appears for the hearing, he has been given notice and the opportunity to do so. He has acknowledged receipt of that notice. See Exh. H to Aff. of Joan A. Lukey. He has responded with a pronouncement that he is not under the jurisdiction of the US courts and that he is never again returning to US territory. See Exh. A to Aff. of Joan A. Lukey, and Exh. A to Supp. Aff. of Joan A. Lukey.

injunction in the absence of such a proceeding. See, e.g., Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equipment Co., 352 N.W. 2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984) (upholding injunction entered after full adversarial proceedings restraining defendants from publishing libelous material). From the outset of this case, Ms. Cornwell has sought an injunction reaffirming the validity of the 2000 Injunction entered by the Honorable Robert Payne (Judge Payne),2 and expanding the terms of that injunction to include publications and websites other than those enumerated in the 2000 Injunction, as well as the defendants subsequent statements that Ms. Cornwell plagiarized from his novel The Virginia Ghost Murders.3 In that regard, the defendant should be collaterally estopped from challenging Judge Paynes 2000 holding that Sachs appeal to the First Amendment is illusory because he seeks to protect speech activity which is not protected by the First Amendment. Cornwell v. Sachs, 99 F. Supp.2d 695, 708 (E.D. Va. 2000). In addition, Ms. Cornwell seeks a new injunction prohibiting Dr. Sachs from alleging that she, in conjunction with Judge Payne, committed crimes relating to the 2000 litigation, including racketeering, conspiracy, court fraud and bribery, and that those crimes have resulted in the supposed imminent indictment of Ms. Cornwell by Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald. She also seeks to enjoin Dr. Sachs Jew hatred allegation, including the allegation that she has attempted, and is attempting, to have him murdered because of her hatred of Jews. The new injunction request is addressed to both (a) existing web postings, and (b) future postings or publications of the same false statements. Because Dr. Sachs is, like Ms. Cornwell, an author, Ms. Cornwell believes that a new injunction is necessary, not only to provide for the expanded terms as requested, but because (a) the defendant has contended that the first injunction was the product of a conspiracy between his counsel and the plaintiff, as well as Judge Payne, and (b) the plaintiff may need to seek enforcement of the injunction in a foreign court and does not wish it to be viewed as suspect because of the defendants allegations or as stale because of the passage of time. 3 The current Temporary Restraining Order meets this request; and the plaintiffs injunction request in this regard basically seeks a continuance of that Order. -22

and because his attacks all apparently stem from his effort to create a commercial advantage the parties do not know each other personally -- the plaintiff respectfully suggests that the analysis should all be with regard to commercial speech, although she believes that she can satisfy either standard. Part I: Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Request for Injunction A. The Traditional Principle of Extraordinary Circumstances As the Court noted in the Memorandum Opinion and Order (the Order) regarding the Temporary Restraining Order, [t]here are cases that mention that exceptions to the general rule [against enjoining libel] exist, but there is a dearth of case law actually explaining those exceptions. (Order 13.4) As the Court also noted, id., these exceptions are broadly characterized as extraordinary circumstances. Metro. Opera Assn v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Intl Union, 239 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2001). Simply stated, while the First Amendment strongly disfavors injunctions that impose a prior restraint on speech, 239 F.3d at 178, it does not prohibit them. Equity will enjoin a libel where extraordinary circumstances are found to exist. Id. at 177 (for almost a century the Second Circuit has subscribed to the majority view that, absent extraordinary circumstances, injunctions should not ordinarily issue in defamation cases) (emphasis added).5 The question to be answered in the context of the preliminary injunction hearing (if the Court chooses not to conduct a consolidated

Because temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are not necessarily the subject of District Court opinions designated for publication, there is no way to know all of the circumstances under which equitable relief has been allowed or denied. In addition, for the most part, the rulings at the preliminary stage are not discussed in opinions relating to final decisions or judgments, or in appellate decisions. Hence, the dearth of opinions relating to the preliminary injunction process, while unfortunate, is not surprising. 5 Although stated in broad terms, the right to free speech is not absolute. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 853 (Cal. 1999). -3-

trial or an evidentiary hearing with findings of fact)6 is, thus, whether this case falls within the extraordinary circumstances exception to the general rule disfavoring injunctive relief in libel cases. The plaintiff contends that the answer to that question, given the highly unusual facts of this case, must be in the affirmative. The plaintiff also contends, as argued below, that the test changes and the paradigm shifts once the determination is made after evidentiary hearing that the speech is unprotected by the First Amendment, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Commn on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973), and where the defendant has published his materials for a period of years so that a fact-finder can gauge its actual impact. Advanced Training Sys., 352 N.W. 2d at 11. Existing Definitions of Extraordinary Circumstances (1) Intimidation and Coercion Among the earliest cases to reference the extraordinary circumstances that would justify the issuance of an injunction against a libel is American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 F. 351, 356 (2d Cir. 1913), in which the Court included such factors as intimidation and coercion within the category of extraordinary circumstances.7 Ms. Cornwell submits that such factors are present in this case, as explained below:8 In at least two web postings dated March 22, 2007, each of which was deceptively presented in the format of a news article, Dr. Sachs falsely stated that Ms Cornwell was facing As discussed below, if the Court conducts a consolidated trial, or a full and fair evidentiary hearing with findings of fact, the standard for issuance of an injunction is no longer extraordinary circumstances. 7 Although this honorable Court suggested in the Order at p. 13 that even these [factors], however, may no longer be valid exceptions, the plaintiff respectfully disagrees. As noted in the Metropolitan Opera case, [t]he Supreme Court has expressly afforded a special breadth of protection to union speech that publicizes labor conflicts, such that intimidation and coercion might not justify an injunction in that context. 239 F.3d at 177 (emphasis added). Noting that intense provocative speech is a common hallmark of American labor conflicts, id., the Court did not extend this comment to any other type of case. 8 Ms. Cornwell presents this argument because it is necessary to the Courts analysis, but she does so with decided reluctance: As Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts will testify, acknowledging to an individual of Dr. Sachs profile that one is intimidated by his tactics regrettably has the effect of reinforcing such conduct. -46

US federal felony indictment for racketeering, court fraud, perjury, extortion [and] obstruction of justice by Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald, who supposedly possessed documents pointing to felony perjury by Cornwell and court fraud. These alleged crimes are in connection with the 2000 litigation, which resulted in the 2000 Injunction. See Exhs. B and C to Complaint. In a malicious example of hate mongering, Dr. Sachs continues: According to evidence with Special Prosecutor Fitzgerald, Cornwell is involved in threats to murder an author of Jewish heritage,9 with documents pointing to felony perjury by Cornwell, and court fraud by Cornwells hirelings with a fraudulent civil rights charity foundation which also implicates 4th circuit US federal judges. (Patricia Cornwell has expressed great personal hatred for Jews, and as a teenager grew up in the foster care of right wing preacher Billy Graham.) The dirty secret of this celebrity author Patricia Cornwell, beyond any criminal indictments, is perhaps ultimately the dirty secret of connections between the big media companies and the US government, even joining together in anti-semitic attacks and terror-type offences. (Exh. C to Complaint.) As recently as May 19, 2007, Dr. Sachs has revised his bannedinamerica web site to include the following statements: Patricia Cornwell and her gang have taken their Jew-hating roadshow once again to Europe, with new criminal acts of deception and stalking in Belgium.10 Patricia Cornwell seems hell-bent on finally succeeding on carrying out the murder of her biographer, Dr. Les Sachs Now, it is terrorism time again, with new crimes on European soil by the Patricia Cornwell gang, trying once again to silence and murder the stupid Jew, Dr. Les Sachs, who has dared to expose the truth about President Bushs rich friend. So now Patricia Cornwell goes back to the same judges who gladly accepted the bribes before, with fresh new legal papers, and all sorts of new lies about herself and her past crimes and, above all, about Dr. Sachs. Patricia Cornwell is very serious about following Adolf Hitler Cornwell supports the murder of Jews, the burning of books, Based on other web postings, the author is apparently Dr. Sachs himself, although he does not acknowledge that fact in his news article. 10 Dr. Sachs is apparently referring to the continuing efforts to locate Dr. Sachs, so that he can be served with papers in the traditional manner, and can be subject to a damages trial when appropriate. -59

the banning of free speech, the holding of fake trials, but Cornwell also takes Adolf Hitlers political advice: A Big Lie is better than a small one! (Exh. A. to Supp. Aff. of Joan A. Lukey.) Such hate mongering has an intimidating and coercive effect on Ms. Cornwell, forcing her to conduct herself more cautiously, to take extra precautions in public settings, and to live looking over her shoulder, all because of the fear that the haters in society will be incited by the false allegations of criminal conduct, Jew-hatred, and terrorism.11 Given that Ms. Cornwells alleged felonious activities supposedly involve bribery of, and conspiracy with, federal judges, that her alleged anti-Semitism extends to attempted murder, and that she is purportedly conducting herself in the mode of a terrorist, one can readily comprehend how readers of Dr. Sachs allegations who carry their own psychological burdens could be incited to do Ms. Cornwell harm. This constitutes an extraordinary circumstance as to which traditional damages remedies are woefully inadequate, and a preliminary injunction is decidedly appropriate with regard to the very specific, limited, and clearly identified libelous statements that Ms. Cornwell includes in her proposed injunction Order.12 (2) Unlawful Conduct Although not typically couched in the language of extraordinary circumstances, another example of such, nonetheless, is injunctions against unlawful conduct, generally comprised of violent conduct or conduct that incites violence. In NAACP v. Claiborne

If logistically feasible and permitted by the Court, Ms. Cornwell expects to offer by phone the expert testimony of Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts, a clinical professor of psychiatry and the Director of Forensic Psychiatry Services at the University of South Carolina Medical School. Dr. Schwartz-Watts is expected to testify that the writings would have the likely effect of intimidating Ms. Cornwell, and of inciting mentally unstable members of certain groups (e.g., anti-Americans, Jewish people). 12 Ms Cornwell does not waive her libel claim as to other false statements. However, recognizing that an injunction at this stage must be narrowly framed, she limits this request to false allegations of plagiarism, criminal conduct (including an alleged impending indictment) regarding the 2000 litigation, allegations of Jew-hatred, and allegations of terrorist-type behavior. -6-

11

Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), the Court remanded as impermissibly broad the lower courts expansive injunction prohibiting petitioners, who had been engaged in an economic boycott against white business owners, from stationing store watchers, persuading persons to withhold patronage, picketing or patrolling the premises of the respondents, and from using violence against any person or inflicting damage to any real or personal property. Id. at 893 (quoting injunction). After holding that the nonviolent elements of petitioners activities were entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, id. at 915, the Court went on to note that, if the Mississippi Supreme Court did not dissolve the injunction entirely because the boycott was over, it must modify the injunction to restrain only unlawful conduct and the persons responsible for conduct of that character. Id. at 924 n.67. As the Court noted, words that create an immediate panic are not entitled to constitutional protection, nor are fighting words that provoke immediate violence.13 Id. at 927. Hence, although the injunction arose in the context of protected First Amendment activity, the injunction was allowed to stand to the extent that it forbade unlawful conduct. Although the case at bar is not on all fours with the fighting words exception to the sanctity of the First Amendment, an analogy can certainly readily be drawn: As discussed above, Dr. Sachs postings threaten to provoke immediate violence against Ms. Cornwell, id., and such postings therefore should not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment. An injunction in such instances is warranted. See id. at 927.

13

The Claiborne Hardware Court noted that the mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment, although the State may not proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. 458 U.S. at 927-28 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). -7-

(3) Irreparable Harm In his 2000 decision, 99 F. Supp.2d at 703, Judge Payne quoted with approval from the decision in Hughes Network Systems, Inc. v. InterDigital Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 694 (4th Cir. 1994), as follows: Where the harm suffered by the moving party may be compensated by an award of money damages at judgment, courts generally have refused to find that harm irreparable Even if a loss can be compensated by money damages at judgment, however, extraordinary circumstances may give rise to the irreparable harm required for a preliminary injunction. Judge Payne went on to hold that: [C]onceptually, the lost sales are remediable by an award of money damages, but the loss of reputation likely could not be remedied absent injunctive relief. Cornwell has made a clear showing of [the] irreparable harm that she would be likely to suffer absent the preliminary injunction she requests. Because Sachs has already engaged in activity which harms Cornwells reputation, Cornwell has also demonstrated that the irreparable harm is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent. Id. at 706-707 (internal citation omitted). Because Dr. Sachs reliance on the First Amendment was illusory in that he sought to protect speech that is not protected by the First Amendment, the Court went on to enter a preliminary injunction tailored to fit the facts of the particular case and only so broad as to achieve the results permitted by the record. Id. at 714. The irreparable harm that Ms. Cornwell suffered in 2000 is no less significant today. Not only has Dr. Sachs continued to post the plagiarism allegations and to use Ms. Cornwells name to promote his own works, but he has expanded his allegations in a manner that clearly causes even greater injury to her reputation. Allegations that she engaged in felonious conduct to achieve victory in the 2000 litigation, and that she is a Jew-hater and an attempted murderer, are at least as injurious as the earlier allegations of plagiarism. In addition, Dr. Sachs current vitriol has an intimidating effect upon her and a tendency to incite others to violent conduct.

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Under the circumstances, Ms. Cornwell has no adequate remedy at law. Money, even if Dr. Sachs could be located, and assuming that he is not judgment proof,14 cannot restore her reputation. Nor can it eliminate the intimidation or distress engendered by knowledge of the potential threat to her well-being engendered by Dr. Sachs inciting of those who are psychologically vulnerable. Most significantly, money provides no remedy at all if violence actually befalls her because of Dr. Sachs conduct. New Examples of Extraordinary Circumstances Every example of an extraordinary circumstance is, of course, new the first time that it is referenced by a Court. The circumstances in the case at bar are all the more extraordinary because they arise anew in a cyber-world that regularly presents the judicial system with novel issues that have never been decided before. Every court that is confronted with such cyberissues is compelled to attempt to fit facts into molds that did not exist when principles of law were initially enunciated. In attempting to determine whether extraordinary circumstances exist that justify granting an injunction in a libel case, the plaintiff respectfully suggests that the Court consider the following: 1. The defendant acknowledges that he fled to Europe in an attempt to avoid the jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts, and the Orders of the U.S. Courts. Dr. Sachs is indisputably causing serious injury to Ms. Cornwell, both in the commercial respects stated by Judge Payne in 2000, and for the hate-mongering reasons set forth above. Because she is a U.S. citizen and resident, the injury is occurring in very substantial part in the U.S. Having caused injury to a U.S. citizen by publishing his libelous vitriol on a medium that is widely disseminated in this country, Dr. Sachs should not be permitted to avoid the import of his

Judge Payne found him to be judgment proof in 2000. Id. at 707. Because the defendant cannot now be located, his circumstances, while presumably the same, cannot be confirmed. -9-

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conduct by residing, in hiding, in another country. While it may well be virtually impossible to obtain damages from him, it is indeed possible to enjoin the continuing conduct.15 2. Because Dr. Sachs medium of choice is the Internet, no filter exists to ensure integrity and accuracy, or to prevent malice and ill will, in publications that remain widely available for an indefinite period of time. In due course, a new body of law will of necessity develop around libel via the Internet, but, at the moment, such law is sorely lacking. Internet postings differ from traditional publications in at least three important ways, all of which contribute to the extraordinary circumstances analysis: (1) unlike traditional media outlets, such publications involve no editorial review and no journalistic principles (i.e., they are totally unfiltered); (2) also unlike traditional media outlets, such publications are posted indefinitely, such that they will be available via search engine for months or years; and (3) literally millions of readers have access to the publications, free of charge and at any hour of the day or night. 3. As a matter of public policy, for the sake of the integrity of the U.S. Judiciary, blatantly false allegations regarding Ms. Cornwells alleged bribes of Judge Payne and other federal judges cannot be allowed to remain on the Internet. Ms. Cornwell is not the only party to suffer as a result of Dr. Sachs unchecked libelous publications: The American democratic system relies upon public confidence in the judiciary, which is often unable to speak on its own behalf. As a matter of public policy, false attacks on the integrity of the judiciary cannot be allowed to continue unchecked. Both as an individual who is personally under attack, and as a U.S. citizen who relies upon the independence and integrity of the judiciary, Ms. Cornwell has the standing to seek to put an end to statements that

15

While Dr. Sachs might be expected to ignore an Injunction Order, Internet Service Providers and web hosts would be unlikely to do so. - 10 -

undermine our judicial system, and as to which there is certainly no adequate remedy at law. Such statements include the following, uttered as recently as May 19, 2007: Working again with her old criminal partners, the Jew-hating judges in the racist and corrupt Southern district of the US where Cornwell herself grew up, Patricia Cornwell is now going back to those same judges who accepted bribes from her earlier. Patricia Cornwell, full of hatred of Jews and fury at her biographer, is seeking to get an immensely bizarre banning of freedom of speech of her biographer, even though he escaped to Europe three years ago and is now a European citizen. Cornwell doesnt like the idea of going to courts in Europe where her Jew-hating crimes would be exposed. Cornwell likes working with her old favourites, the corrupt Jewhating and racist judges of the Old South, like her old partner judge Robert Payne is my name, Federal bribery is my game. After all, when Patricia Cornwell bribed those same judges before, they gave her a lot of service. (Exh. A to Supp. Lukey Aff.) Whether Ms. Cornwell paid a bribe to buy her successful result in the 2000 litigation is not a matter of opinion. It is susceptible of determination as a matter of fact. She will testify that the allegation is false. If called as a witness, Judge Payne would do the same, as would his colleagues. Given the public policy ramifications of these false allegations, extraordinary circumstances indeed exist that warrant enjoining speech that is by no means protected under the First Amendment.16 Part 2: Memorandum in Support of Evidentiary Hearing, With Findings Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(a)(2) permits the Court, in its discretion, either to advance and consolidate the trial on the merits with the hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction, or to take evidence at the hearing without a consolidation. The plaintiff has requested that the Court either advance and consolidate, or, if the Court is unwilling to do so because the defendant has not yet filed his Answer, that the court conduct a full evidentiary hearing and

16

These same facts and arguments militate in favor of an injunction with regard to the final step in assessing the propriety of injunctive relief, to wit, the public interest. See Cornwell v. Sachs, 99 F. Supp.2d 695, 714 (E.D. Va. 2000). - 11 -

make appropriate findings of fact. While the plaintiff has no way of knowing with certainty whether Dr. Sachs will appear, she does know that he has received notice of the hearing, and that he has stated he will never return to the United States. (See Exh. A to Aff. of Joan A. Lukey, and Exh. A to Supp. Aff. of Joan A. Lukey.) Dr. Sachs has not requested any change in date; he has simply indicated that, all the orders of the new fake trial, will be so much worthless toilet paper, just like in the last fake trial to ban Dr. Sachs freedom of speech. Id. Hence, the defendant has been given a full opportunity to participate in the trial or evidentiary hearing, with notice of the plaintiffs Motion. Given his professed intention never to return, and the continuing harm that his libelous postings are causing the plaintiff, no reason exists to refrain from conducting, at very least, a full evidentiary hearing, followed by findings of fact. The Import of Specific Findings of Libel Once the Court makes a finding that statements are libelous following an evidentiary adversary hearing, the extraordinary circumstances doctrine is no longer applicable. At that point, an injunction may issue, so long as the suppression is limited to the precise statements found libelous after a full and fair adversary proceeding. Advanced Training Systems, Inc. v. Caswell Equipment Company, Inc., 352 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1984) (emphasis in original), citing with approval OBrien v. University Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St. 2d 242, 245, 327 N.E. 2d 743, 755 (1975) (Once speech has judicially been found libelous, if all the requirements for injunctive relief are met, an injunction for restraint of continued publication of that same speech may be proper.) (emphasis added). As the United States Supreme Court has stated, [f]alse statements of fact harm both the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement. There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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As recently as last month, the Supreme Court of California held that a properly limited injunction prohibiting defendant from repeating statements that were determined to be defamatory would not violate a defendants right to free speech. In Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 320, 339, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 336 (Cal. 2007), defendant lived across the alley from the plaintiff Village Inn, a restaurant and bar, and had been a vocal critic of that establishment. Id. at 322. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint; and evidence was introduced demonstrating that defendant approached customers and called them drunks, told customers the food is shitty, called the owners wife Madam Whore, told neighbors the Village Inn was involved with the Mafia, and collected signatures on a petition opposing the Village Inn while telling neighbors that inside the building, child pornography, prostitution, and the filming of sex videos were taking place. Id. at 322. Following a trial, the superior court entered judgment for plaintiff and granted a permanent injunction, prohibiting defendant from, inter alia, making certain defamatory statements, including that plaintiff distributes drugs, has Mafia connections, participates in prostitution, is involved in child pornography, and makes sex videos. Id. at 323. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California concluded that certain aspects of the injunction were overly broad, but remanded the case, concluding that a properly limited injunction prohibiting defendant from repeating to third persons statements about the Village Inn that were determined at trial to be defamatory would not violate defendants right to free speech. Id. In allowing an injunction to stand, the court emphasized that libelous speech is not constitutionally protected. See id. at 324. The court recognized the general prohibition against prior restraints but explained, preventing a person from speaking or publishing something that, allegedly, would constitute a libel if spoken or published is far different from issuing an - 13 -

injunction after a statement that already has been uttered has been found to constitute defamation. Id. at 326. Indeed, once specific messages are properly determined to be unprotected by the first amendment, there can be no objection to their subsequent suppression or prosecution. Id. at 331 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe (citation omitted)). Simply stated, statements judicially determined to be libelous do not trigger the traditional concerns relating to prior restraint on speech. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973) ([t]he special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment). In sum, if this Court finds after a full and fair evidentiary hearing that Dr. Sachs statements are libelous, neither the extraordinary circumstances test, nor the presumption against preliminary injunctions in libel cases, will any longer be applicable. An injunction is at that point appropriate if the traditional prerequisites are met, and the injunction is properly tailored to address the defamation. The Libelous Statements Although the defendant makes many defamatory statements, certain specific statements constitute libel per se. As discussed at greater length in the plaintiffs initial Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, words that are actionable as libel per se include those that impute to an individual the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which the individual, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished. Perk v. Vector Res. Group,

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Ltd., 485 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Va. 1997). The charge need not be made directly, but rather may be made by inference, implication, or insinuation. Id. In connection with the manner in which the 2000 litigation was conducted, Dr. Sachs makes the following statements that constitute libel per se: 1. That Ms. Cornwell has committed and is facing felony indictment for racketeering; 2. That Ms. Cornwell has committed and is facing felony indictment for court fraud; 3. That Ms. Cornwell has committed and is facing felony indictment for perjury; 4. That Ms. Cornwell has committed and is facing felony indictment for extortion; 5. That Ms. Cornwell has committed and is facing felony indictment for obstruction of justice; 6. That Ms. Cornwell bribed Judge Robert Payne; 7. That Ms. Cornwell is facing imminent indictment for the foregoing crimes by Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald. All of the foregoing statements are false, as will be demonstrated by Ms. Cornwells testimony, and by the written non-target letter of Patrick Fitzgerald. All were uttered with actual malice, as demonstrated by the defendants own words in his blogs and emails. All therefore constitute actionable libel per se. Not relating directly to the 2000 litigation, but nonetheless also constituting libel per se:

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8.

That Ms. Cornwell has attempted, and is attempting, to have Dr. Sachs murdered, at

least in part because of her hatred of Jews; and 9. That Ms. Cornwell is a terrorist, or commits terrorist offenses. The foregoing statements are false, as will be demonstrated through Ms. Cornwells testimony. Again, Dr. Sachs actual malice is proven through his own written words. Dr. Sachs is collaterally estopped from contesting the express and implied findings relating to allegations of plagiarism against Ms. Cornwell covered by the 2000 Injunction. Such findings are sufficient to support the requested expansion of the injunction to subsequent websites and postings, but Ms. Cornwell will offer such testimony as may be required for this Court to make the necessary finding that the statements are libelous, and therefore outside the protection of the First Amendment. In addition to the examples of libel per se set forth above, Ms. Cornwell seeks to enjoin Dr. Sachs from falsely stating that she is a Jew hater and a follower of Adolf Hitler. To satisfy her evidentiary requirement for ordinary libel, or libel per quod, she must prove the (1) publication of (2) an actionable statement with (3) the requisite intent. Jordan v. Kollman, 612 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Va. 2005). An actionable statement is one that is both false and defamatory. Id. Proof as to the requisite intent depends upon the plaintiff's status as a public or private figure. Id. at 207. Public figures must demonstrate that the libelous statement was made with actual malice i.e., that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703,

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714 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)). Reckless disregard has in turn been defined as publishing a statement with a high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)).17 Virginia law requires that the plaintiff prove the actual malice, which includes subjectively entertaining serious doubt as to the truth of ones statements, by clear and convincing evidence. Jordan, 612 S.E.2d at 207. Ms. Cornwell is able to satisfy her burden that Dr. Sachs has acted, and continues to act, with actual malice simply by placing his writings, as well as Judge Paynes decision in 2000, before the Court. Embittered by his loss in the 2000 litigation and the financial opportunity to

market his book deceitfully using Ms. Cornwell's name Dr. Sachs has published one false statement after another about her. These statements have no basis in fact whatsoever and have been made with obvious animus toward Ms. Cornwell. Ms. Cornwell respectfully requests that the Court enter findings that the following statements are both false and libelous: (1) Currently appearing at the www.nnseek.com web site (Compl. Ex. B)18: Ms. Cornwell is facing US federal felony indictment for racketeering, court fraud, perjury, extortion, obstruction of justice; Ms. Cornwell is now facing federal felony indictment under evidence requested by White House Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald; Ms. Cornwell is stealing the private autopsy reports of murdered children;

17

18

The www.nnseek.com web site refers to http://www.nnseek.com/e/alt.celebrities/articles_re_author_patricia_cornwell_facing_us_federal _23287536m.html. An abbreviated version of this site is provided as Exhibit B to the Complaint. - 17 -

For purposes of this Motion, the plaintiff acknowledges that she is a public figure.

Ms.Cornwell is endlessly copying, stealing and imitating []things for her books, including receiving stolen FBI material back in the early 1990s;

(2) Currently appearing at http://www.dr-les-sachs.be/detailed-biography.html (Compl. Ex. D): Ms. Cornwell faxed Dr Sachs a Jew-baiting extortion letter, demanding the book-burning and destruction of Dr Sachs' books and writings, and his silence about Patricia Cornwell (already found to be false by Judge Payne); Cornwell takes a particular pleasure in financing neo-Nazis, threatening to burn books, and threatening to kill people of Jewish heritage (already partially found to be false by Judge Payne); Ms. Cornwell has the ability to bribe US judges and successfully commit extortion and other crimes; Patricia Cornwell . . . paid a reported half million dollars to finance a programme to ban, jail and murder Dr Sachs, and this criminal scheme was also backed by the Penguin Pearson publishing corporation that sells Cornwell's books; Ms. Cornwell, along with Judge Robert Payne, hired thugs, including a neo-Nazi from Germany, to fraudulently pose as lawyers for Dr Sachs himself. These thugs used threats of illegal jailing, torture by Cornwell's thugs, and murder, in order to keep Dr Sachs quiet, and to prevent the judge's illegal orders from being quickly appealed; After her threats to murder Dr Sachs, . . . Patricia Cornwell dropped a fresh USD $1 million bribe off with the Bush family;

(3) Currently appearing at http://www.patricia-cornwell-biography.net/vaghostcom.html (Compl. Ex. E): reference to the felony crimes of Patricia Cornwell; Patricia Cornwell paid a reported half million dollars to finance a programme to ban, jail and murder Dr Sachs, a criminal scheme backed by the Penguin Pearson publishing corporation; reference to the bribed judge, and lawyers who are friends of the judge all working for Cornwell and on Cornwell's payroll; reference to the Jew-hating Patricia Cornwell specifically named the www.vaghost.com web page in her fake court order that she bought from the US 4th circuit bribed judges; and

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(4) Currently appearing at the www.bannedinamerica.blogspot.com (Exh. J to Aff. of Joan. A. Lukey): One new crime was that Cornwells friends at Americas corrupt FBI police agency attacked Dr. Sachs in the Netherlands, e-mailing him computer viruses, committing a clear act of international terrorism in support of Cornwell's threats to have Dr Sachs murdered. US Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald, working for the CIA and investigating the crimes connected to the Bush White House, requested the material on the crimes committed by Cornwell, as a prelude to possibly indicting Cornwell . . . .

On the basis of these findings, following the full and fair evidentiary adversary hearing, the plaintiff further requests, that the Court enter an injunction as follows: (1) That the defendant remove, or cause website administrators to remove, all content

from any website or other publication or through any other media that (a) references his book The Virginia Ghost Murders, whether by specific name or by any description that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant was describing that book, or (b) provides a hyperlink redirecting readers to any website at which readers could purchase The Virginia Ghost Murders, and (c) references Patricia Cornwell by specific name or by any description that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant was describing Patricia Cornwell; (2) That the defendant remove, or cause web site administrators to remove, all

content from any website or other publication or through any other media, that references Patricia Cornwells name or any description designed to identify Ms. Cornwell, as being the subject of an impending felony indictment, or as having committed any of the following crimes: racketeering, court fraud, perjury, extortion, bribery, conspiracy, obstruction of justice, attempted murder, and acts of terrorism;

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(3)

That the defendant remove, or cause web site administrators to remove, any

content from websites or other publications or through any other media, that describes Patricia Cornwell as an anti-Semite or follower of Adolf Hitler; and (4) That the defendant refrain from reposting or republishing any of the foregoing

libels hereafter. Respectfully submitted,

___________/s/_____________________________ James W. Morris, III Virginia State Bar #05740 Michael R. Ward, Esquire Virginia State Bar #41133 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Patricia D. Cornwell Morris & Morris, P.C. 1200 WyteStone Plaza 801 East Main Street Post Office Box 30 Richmond, Virginia 23218 (804) 344-8300 Telephone (804) 344-8539 Facsimile [email protected] [email protected] Joan A. Lukey (Admitted pro hac vice) Jonathan J. Thessin (Admitted pro hac vice) Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP 60 State Street Boston, MA 02109 (617) 526-6000 Date: May 15, 2007

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 21st day of May, 2007, I will electronically file the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will then send a notification of such filing (NEF) to counsel of record registered to use the CM/ECF system in this action. I further certify that I will email the foregoing to the following non-filing user: Dr. Leslie Raymond Sachs Email: [email protected]

___________/s/_____________________________ James W. Morris III Michael R. Ward Morris & Morris, P.C. WyteStone Plaza 801 E. Main Str., 12th Floor P.O. Box 30 Richmond, VA 23218-0030 (804) 344-6301 Counsel for Plaintiff Patricia D. Cornwell

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