IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

CASE NO. 11-13044-C

NATHAN DEAL, Governor of the State of Georgia, et aI., Defendants/Appellants,

v.

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, et aI., Plain tiffs/Appellees.

On Appeal From the United States District Court F or the Northern District of Georgia 1 :II-CV-1804- TWT

FI LE

PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

SAMUEL S. OLENS Attorney General NELS PETERSON So licitor General Please serve: Devon Orland 40 Capitol Square, SW Atlanta, GA 30334 (404) 463-8850 (404) 651-5304 (Facsimile) KATHLEEN M. PACIOUS Deputy Attorney General

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554301 DEVON ORLAND Senjor Assistant Attorney General

Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal DOCKET NO.: 11-13044-C

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The undersigned attorney for Appellants hereby certifies, pursuant to 11 th Cir. R. 26.1-1, that the following have an interest in the outcome of this case: Alterna, Plaintiffi'Appellee; Asian American Legal Advocacy Center, Plaintiff/Appellee; Bauer, Mary, Counsel for Appellees; Beatty, Mike, Defendant!Appellant; Blazer, Jonathon, Counsel for Appellees; Bridges, Paul, Plaintiff!Appellee; Broder, Tanya, Counsel for Appellees; Brooke, Samuel, Counsel for Appellees; Coalition of Latino Leaders, Plaintiff/Appellee; Coalition for the People's Agenda, Plaintiff/Appellee; Conley, Danielle, Counsel for Appellees; Davidson, Meghan R., (former)Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for

Defendants!Appellants Deal, Olens, Beatty and Reese; Deal, Nathan, Defendant!Appellant; Clof4

Tumlin, Karen c., Counsel for Appellees; Turner, Andrew, Counsel for Appellees; Tsu, Naomi, Counsel for Appellees; Wang, Cecillia, Counsel for Appellees; Werner, Daniel, Counsel for Appellees. Respect ly submitted,

Bar No. 554301 Devon Orland Senior Assistant Attorney General

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STATEMENT REGARDING EN BANC CONSIDERATION

1 express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment, that the panel decision is contrary to the following decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States or the precedents of this Circuit and that consideration by the

full court is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of decisions in this Court:
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.

, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)

Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,340 (1997) Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. _ _,131 S.Ct. 1632, 1642

(2011 )
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600; 99 S.Ct. 1905

(1979)
United States v. Lanza, 260

u.s. 377 (1922)

Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 187-88 (1959) United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,317 (1978)

In addition to the above, I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment, that this appeal involves one or more questions of exceptional impOliance: I) Whether the existence of a federal law criminalizing behavior, as part of a
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greater regulatory scheme, triggers implied field preemption and prevents states from creating similar criminal provisions with a mirrored purpose? 2) Whether private parties have a private right of action for a violation of the Supremacy Clause when the federal law in conflict with state law contains no rights-creating language?

Devon Orland Georgia Bar No. 554301 Sr. Assistant Attorney General Attorney of Record for Petitioners

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CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE

The body of the brief has been typed in "Times New Roman," 14 point.

III

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certity that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation set forth in FRAP 32(a)(7)(B). This brief contains 2,896 words according to the word processing system utilized by the Office oftH Attorney General.

DEVON ORLAND Georgia Bar No. 554301 Sr. Assistant Attorney General

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE DfSCLOSURE STATEMENT .................................... CI STATEMENT REGARDING EN BANC CONSIDERATION ................ .i CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE ................................... .iii CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................... .iv TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................. v TABLE OF CITATIONS ............................................................. vii STATEMENT REGARDING ADOPTION OF OTHER BRIEFS .............. ix STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ASSERTED TO MERIT EN BANC CONSIDERATION ...................................................... I I. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DfSPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW .......................... 2 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ...................................... 3 Relevant Statutory Provision .......................................... 3 Ill. ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY ............. 5 A. THE PANEL DECISION POTENTIALLY THREATENS THOUSANDS OF STATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS BY MISSTATING PREEMPTION LAW .............................................. 5 B. THE PANEL ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT CHALLENGERS CAN BRING A CAUSE OF ACTION DIRECTLY UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE ................................... 9

II.

IV.

CONCLUSION ......... ............................................... . 13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ... ................................................... .

VI

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases:

Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187(1959) .......................................................... 8 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) ................................... ...passim Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329(1997) ........................................................... i Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600 (1979) .......................................................... 13 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. OfS. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. ,132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) .................................... 11 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ......................................................... .ii Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) .................................................... i United States v. Lanza, 260 Us. 377 (1922) ........................................................ .i United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) .......................................................... i Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. ,131 S.Ct. 1632 (2011) .................................... .i

Statutes

O.e.G.A. 16-11-200 ............................................. .................. .passim O.C.G.A. 16-11-201 ............................................. .................. passim

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O.e.G.A. \6-\1-202 ............................................. ................... passim O.e.G.A. 16-12-100 ................................................................ 9 O.e.G.A. 16-12-10\.1 .............................................................. 9 O.e.G.A. \6-9-4 ..................................................................... 9 O.C.G.A. \6-14-2 ................................................................... 9 O.C.G.A. 16-14-3 ................................................................... 9 O.e.G.A. 16-14-4 ................................................................... 9 O.C.G.A. 16-14-5 ................................................................... 9 O.e.G.A. 16-5-46 ................................................................... 9 O.C.G.A. 16-13-20 through O.e.G.A 16-13-56 .............................. 9 8 U.S.e. 1324 ............................................................ viii, 5, 6, 8 18 U.S.e. 1028 ....................................................................... 9 18 U.S.e. 1461 ....................................................................... 9 18 U.S.e. 1961-64 ................................................................... 9 18 U.S.e. 2421 ........................................................................ 9 21 U.S.e. 851-865 ................................................................... 9 18 U.S.e. 921-931 ................................................................... 9 28 U.S.e. 1331.. ................................................................. 9,10 42 U.S.e. 1981 ....................................................................... 2 42 U.S.e. 1983 ..................................................................... 11
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STATEMENT REGARDING ADOPTION OF OTHER BRIEFS

Petitioners do not adopt the brief of any other party.

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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ASSERTED TO MERIT EN BANC CONSIDERATION

The panel decision in this case raises at least two issues that deserve consideration by the full Court because they conflict with existing precedents and would have significant and unintended consequences across a wide range of criminal statutes if followed to their logical conclusion. First, in holding that federal law preempts a Georgia law prohibiting individuals from harboring, transporting, or concealing illegal immigrants, the panel concluded that Congress has occupied this field merely by entering it as one part of a broader regulatory scheme, and thereby preempted all similar state regulation. This threatens to undermine the cooperative federalism found throughout state and federal criminal law, as well as thousands of criminal convictions for violations of state laws that mirror federal laws. Second, the panel found that a private right of action arises directly under the Supremacy Clause without performing any of the analysis required by precedents of this Court and the Supreme Court. Because previous courts have decided private lawsuits brought under the Supremacy Clause - without addressing whether such right of action exists - and because such a right of action would present a federal question that this Court has jurisdiction to decide, the panel held explicitly that such a right of action exists. This is an issue of first impression for I

this Circuit, the issue has broad implications for litigation of other issues, such as Medicaid, and before the issue is resolved in a manner that is binding on future panels ofthis Court, this Court should first conduct the necessary analysis.
I.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDlNGS AND DlSPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

A group of organizations and individuals filed the instant action on June 2, 20 II, challenging the constitutionality of Georgia's House Bill 87 ("HB8T) in its entirety ("Challengers"). (R. I). They challenged the statute based upon the

Supremacy Clause to the United States Constitution, the Fourth Amendment, the right to travel, the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.c. 1981, and the Georgia Constitution. 1 Challengers filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin enforcement or Sections 7, 8 and 19. (R. 29). Defendants Deal, Olens, Beatty and Reese ("State") filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint in its entirety. (R.47). Challengers responded. (R.76). The State filed a response to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (R. 70). The District Court entered an order on both of these motions, dismissed all claims except the challenges to 7 and 8 of HB87 based upon the Supremacy Clause to the United States Constitution, and enjoined the enforcement of these two provisions. (R. 93). The State timely filed a Notice or Appeal. (R. 97). After the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in , 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), this Court ordered

Ari::ona v. United States, 567 U.S.

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Challengers withdrew all state law claims.

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supplemental briefing and then issued a decision (I) finding that Challengers could file suit directly under the Supremacy Clause, (2) reversing the decision of the District Court as to Section 8, and (3) affirming the preliminary injunction as to Section 7. The State now seeks en bane review of the panel decision finding that an action may be brought directly under the Supremacy Clause and the finding that Challengers have a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of their facial challenge to 7.

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Relevant statutory provision

The Georgia Legislature adopted HB87 in 2011. The challenged provisions of 7 are codified in three different statutes, restated in relevant part below. O.CG.A. 16-11-200(b) provides that, "A person who, while committing another criminal offense, knowingly and intentionally transports or moves an illegal alien in a motor vehicle for the purpose of furthering the illegal presence of the alien in the United States shall be guilty of the offense of transporting or moving an illegal alien .... ,,2

Speci fically excluded from this provision are: (I) a government employee transporting or moving an illegal alien as a part of his or her official duties or to any person acting at the direction of such employee; (2) A person who transports an illegal alien to or from judicial or administrative proceeding when such illegal alien is required to
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O.e.G.A. 16-11-201 provides a penalty for harboring an illegal alien. '" Harboring or harbors' means any conduct that tends to substantially help an illegal alien to remain in the United States in violation of federal law but shall not include a person providing services to infants, children, or victims of a crime; a person providing privately funded social services; a person providing emergency medical service; or an attorney or his or her employees for the purpose of representing a criminal defendant." O.C.G.A. 16-11-201 (a)( 1).

This provision also provides that, "A person who is acting in violation of another criminal offense and who knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields an illegal alien from detection in any place in this state, including any building or means of transportation, when such person knows that the person being concealed, harbored, or shielded is an illegal alien, shall be guilty ofthe offense of concealing or harboring an illegal alien." O.e.G.A. 16-11-20 I (b).

(3) (4) (5)

appear pursuant to a summons, subpoena, court order, or other legal process; A person who transports an illegal alien to a law enforcement agency or ajudicial officer for official government purposes; An employer transporting an employee who was lawfully hired; or A person providing privately funded social services.

O.e.G.A. 16-11-202(b) provides that, "A person who is acting in violation of another criminal offense and who knowingly induces, entices, or assists an illegal alien to enter into this state, when such person knows that the person being induced, enticed or assisted to enter into this state is an illegal alien, shall be guilty of the offense of inducing an illegal alien to enter into this state." All three provisions require the commission of another criminal offense prior to being charged and specific knowledge by the offender of the alien status of the person transported, harbored or induced. All three provisions substantially

mirror federal provisions that appear in 8 U.S.e. 1324. The statutes do not provide for additional identification checks of passengers or cohabitants, nor do they provide for an enforcement mechanism against the illegal alien; rather, the statutes apply only to the individual who transports, harbors or induces the illegal alien. 3

III. ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY

A. THE PANEL DECISION POTENTIALLY THREATENS THOUSANDS OF STATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS BY MISSTATING PREEMPTION LAW The panel found t hat Challengers had a likelihood of prevailing on the merits because they lound that the provisions of 8 U.S.e. 1324 preempted the The statutes speci fically exclude from criminal liability persons who perform a prohibited act as part of the provision of social services under O.e.G.A. 16-11-200 and 16-11-201.
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field regulated by 7.

Specifically, the panel found that because "section 7

imposes criminal penalties on conduct that the INA in most instances already regulates. The end result of section 7 is to layer additional penalties atop federal law ... " (Slip. Op. 28). Relying on the Supreme Court's long standing and

uncontroversial precedent that Congress has occupied the field of alien registration, the panel concluded that because Congress also entered the field of regulating those who transport, move, harbor or encourage illegal aliens to enter the Country by creating criminal penalties for those cngaged in the activity, it has occupied that field and precluded the state from also prohibiting that behavior. (Slip Op. 20-23). This conclusion could jeopardize numerous prosecutions where the state and federal courts have traditionally recognized dual sovereignty. In reaching this

conclusion the panel compared 7 with 8 U.S.C. J 324, which provides a framework to penalize the transportation, concealment, and inducement of unlawfully present aliens. (Slip. Op. 19). The Court further noted that preemption exists where the plain wording of a state statute is the same or similar to its federal counterpart but differs from stated federal enforcement priorities or practice. (Slip Op. 25). In reaching its conclusion, the panel failed to acknowledge (1) the presumption against preemption, (2) dual sovereignty in the application of criminal statutes is the nonn, even where the criminal law is part of a detailed federal

criminal enforcement scheme, as with illegal drugs, weapons, and human trafficking, and (3) this facial challenge requires that the challenged statute be unlawful in all applications, not just some possible future applications. The panel failed to apply a presumption against preemption. The Supreme Court reiterated the need to begin any preemption analysis with this presumption. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498-99. Despite this clear dictate, the panel concluded that where a state statute mirrors the priorities of a federal statute with no facial cont1ict, that a conflict in enforcement priorities is sufficient to trigger preemption where the enforcement of the federal and state criminal statutes could result in differing consequences. The panel recognized the facial nature of the challenge in its analysis of 8 when it refused to presume that the statute will be applied in a manner inconsistent with federal law. (Slip Op. n.12). The Court failed to apply this principle

consistently, however, and instead presumed that 7 would be applied in a manner inconsistent with federal law and federal enforcement priorities; accordingly, the Court improperly applied this analysis in finding that the field was preempted as a result of the existence of a similar federal criminal prohibition. Id. at 2510. The Court also looked to application of 1324 and the potential for the federal enforcement priorities related to this statute to differ from state priorities in the

enforcement of 7, and concluded that the field addressed by 1324 was preempted. This was crror. This holding could have significance well beyond the scope of the provision at issue and present a preemption issue for any state crime for which there is a federal counterpart. Courts have long recognized that both the state and federal government have the authority to prosecute individuals for the same or similar criminal behavior. Convictions on identical offenses with identical elements do not violate the double jeopardy clause or the due process clause when the charges arose in two separate sovereigns. United States v. Lanza, 260 Us. 377 (1922) (due process clause does not prohibit a state from prosecuting a defendant for same act for which he was acquitted in federal court); see also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 187-88 (1959) (prosecution by the United States and Mississippi for the conspiracy to destroy certain works, property, and material ... controlled by the United States does not violate the double jeopardy clause noting that the nature of our government allows the same act to be an offence against the laws ofthc United States and also of a state, and be punishable in both); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317 (1978) (holding that the States and Federal Government can punish the samc act because "it cannot be truly avcrred that the offender has becn twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable"). The Georgia Code (as well 8

as that of many other states) is replete with examples of prohibited activity which share a federal counterpart. 4 The holding of the panel calls into question any state statute which has a federal counterpart, especially where the federal statute is part of a broader statutory framework, such as the regulation of controlled substances, weapons, R.LC.O., human trafficking and many others. The reasoning of the panel could support a fmding that if the federal government chose to prioritize the prosecution of individuals who possessed only large amounts of illegal drugs or who only engaged in racketeering or financial crimes at the highest level then the states would be precluded from prosecuting individuals who have committed less significant criminal acts. Such a holding is not supported by precedent and should be reconsidered. B. THE PANEL ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT CHALLENGERS CAN BRING A CAUSE OF ACTION DIRECTLY UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE The panel decision held that Challengers had a private right of action for their challenge directly under the Supremacy Clause. The panel decision, while

recognizing that the propriety of bringing a challenge had gone largely

Compare 18 U.S.e. 1028 to O.e.G.A. 16-9-4 (identification fraud); 18 U.S.e. 1461 to O.e.G.A. 16-12-100,100.1 (distribution of obscenity); 18 U.S.e. 1961-64 to O.e.G.A. 16-14-2,3,4,5 (R.I.e.O.); 18 U.S.C. 2421 to O.e.G.A. 16-5-46 (trafficking of persons); 21 U.S.e. 851-865 to O.e.G.A. 16-13-20-56 (controlled substances); 18 U.S.C. 921-931 to O.e.G.A. 16-11-101.1 through 16-11-106 (fireanns).
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unquestioned, detennined that the claim in this case could proceed because many courts had considered claims brought directly under the Supremacy Clause and because the Court has jurisdiction to entertain such a claim under 28 V.S.c. 1331. (Slip. Op. 14). This reasoning confuses existence of jurisdiction to decide a claim with the analysis required to detennine whether there is a vehicle for such a claim; whether a federal court has jurisdiction to decide a claim has no bearing on whether that claim exists in the first place. The failure to engage in a thorough analysis of this issue could have a significant impact on a variety of programs, services and statutes where there is an existing federal regulatory scheme. See e.g. DouRlas v. Indep. Living Ctr. Q( S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. _ _ , 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2012) (noting potential impact on state Medicaid program). Moreover, the

panel erred by failing to consider binding decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court clarifying the limited availability of implied private remedies within the federal system. Indeed, four justices of the United States Supreme Court recently highlighted the impact of the failure to answer this question. Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1212 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In Douglas, the Chief Justice noted that "to say that there is a federal statutory right enforceable under the Supremacy Clause, when there is no such right under the pertinent statute
itselt~

would effect a

complete end-run around this Court's implied right of action and 42 V.S.c. 1983 10

jurisprudence. We have emphasized that where the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit..." Jd (internal cites omitted).5 The panel relegates this analysis to a footnote and highlights the dissent's reference to actions brought pursuant to Ex Parte Young and suggests that this case fits within that exception and therefore may proceed without question. The Court fails to acknowledge that
Ex Parte Young provides only an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, not

a stand-alone vehicle for a suit to be brought directly under a constitutional provision.

tx

Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (claim brought pursuant to the

Equity Act for alleged violation of due process and equal protection). The decision of Va. Office/or Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. _ _ , 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1642 (2011) further highlights the flaw in the Court's analysis. Here, the Supreme Court explains that Ex Parte Young provides a legal fiction to provide an exception to the Eleventh Amendment. In doing so the Court decided the previously unanswered question of whether a federally-mandated state agency has the authority to sue another state agency to enforce federal law. In answering in the affirmative, the Court noted the novelty of such a question and relied on Ex 'Should the Court grant further review and determine that there is no right of action under the Supremacy Clause, it will then be necessary to decide the availability of 42 U.S.c. ~ 1983 as an alternate vehicle for this suit. Slip op. n.. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,283 (2002) Cit is rights, not the broader or vaguer 'benefits' or 'interests,' that may be enforced under the authority of ISection 1983 J.")( emphasis in original).

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Parte Young to find that the state had no Eleventh Amendment immunity from such a suit. This decision is significant for two reasons. First, it makes clear that Ex Parte Young creates a narrow exception to the Eleventh Amendment -- not, as found by the panel, a separate and distinct cause of action. Second, it does not presume that since a question has not previously been asked that it must necessarily be answered adversely to those posing the question. The analysis missing from the panel decision is what vehicle is utilized where a Supremacy Clause challenge is brought by individuals or collective entities where there is no federal right at issue. It is indisputable that the

Supremacy Clause is not the source of any independent constitutional right, but merely makes clear that federal law controls should a state adopt a statute that conflicts with federal law. See Chapman v. Houston We(fare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600; 99 S. Ct. 1905 (1979). The panel's failure fully to consider the availability of a private right of action warrants further review by this Court.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons Petitioners seek reconsideration and en
bane review of the panel's decision.

Respectfully submitted this 10 th day of September, 2012. SAMUEL S. OLENS Attorney General NELS PETERSON Solicitor General KATHLEEN M. PACIOUS Deputy Attorney General 551540

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DEVON ORLAND Senior Assistant Attorney General PLEASE ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO: DEVON ORLAND 40 Capitol Square Atlanta, Georgia 30341 (404) 463-8850 (404) 651-5304 (Facsimile)

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I do hereby certify that I have this date served the within and foregoing PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS prior to filing same, by depositing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, in the United States Mail, properly addressed upon:

Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tumlin Nora A. Preciado Melissa S. Keaney National Immigration Law Center 3435 Wilshire Boulevard - Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 900 I 0 Naomi Tsu Michelle R. Lapointe Daniel Werner Southern Poverty Law Center 233 Peachtree Street, NE - Suite 2150 Atlanta, GA 30303

Omar C. Jadwat Andre I. Segura Elora Mukherjee American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street-18 th Floor New York, NY 10004

Cecillia D. Wang Kenneth J. Sugarman Katherine Desormeau American Civil Liberties Union Foundation - Immigration Rights Project 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 Chara Fisher Jackson Azadeh N. Shahshahani ACLU of Georgia 1900 The Exchange - Suite 425 Atlanta, GA 30339 Tanya Broder Jonathan Blazer National Immigration Law Center 405 14th Street - Suite 1400 Oakland, CA 94612

Mary Bauer Andrew H. Turner Samuel Brooke Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 Sin Yen Ling Asian Law Caucus 55 Columbus Avenue San Francisco, CA 94 I II

Charles H. Kuck Danielle M. Conley Kuck Immigration Partners LLC 8010 Roswell Road - Suite 300 Atlanta, GA 30350 R. Keegan Federal, Jr. Federal & Hasson, LLP Two Ravinia Drive - Suite 1776 Atlanta, GA 30346 This 10 th day of September, 2012

G. Brian Spears 1126 Ponce de Leon Avenue, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30306

554301 Senior Assistant Attorney General