THE IDEA OF BEING AND GOODNESS IN ST THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I, QQ 5-6

BY
MATTHEW-MARY S. F. OKEREKE [email protected]

Page 1 of 11

OUTLINE 1.0 2.0 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................3 BEING IN THE LIGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS.....................................3

3.0

GOODNESS IN THE LIGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS............................6

4.0

THE RELATION BETWEEN BEING AND GOODNESS IN THOMAS.8

5.0

CONCLUSION...............................................................................................10

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Page 2 of 11

1.0

INTRODUCTION Though a perusal of some of the works of St Thomas Aquinas somewhat

confronted a first-time-critical-reader of his works like us with a series of technical terms which express a number of pervading and difficult ideas, it now appears to us that, it is these ideas that coalesce into a comprehensive and all-ranging systema system which some have repeatedly argue offers an outstandingly favourable structure for the consideration of philosophical problems of almost all shades if not all. It is our aim in this work to primarily expose an aspect of the above system by presenting in a prcis form our understanding of Thomas notions on being, his understanding of goodness, and the eventual relationship of these terms as explained in his Summa Theologiae I, qq 5 6. To achieve our aim, our work shall be coloured with the examination of Thomas signification of being, his concept of goodness, and after these, we shall then present the connection between being and goodness in the light of this Common Doctor without forgetting to bear in mind the place of God in his understanding of these terms. We have chosen to tread this method so that we can put forth in a somewhat logical manner a building up of the core issues discussed by St Thomas in the text we have in view. 2.0 BEING IN THE LIGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS Etienne Gilsons interprets esse in Thomas Aquinas as being active and dynamic. W. Norris Clark in his book Person and Being approves of this1 and this idea is further presented in similar words in an article written by Robert Connor.2 It now appears to us that one of the dominating themes in the thought of Thomas Aquinas is his understanding of real being. A superficial reading of his works might not bring out this fact for it seems
1 2

Cf. W. Norris Clarke, Person and Being (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), pp. 6-13 Cf. Robert Connor, Relation, the Thomistic Esse, and American Culture: Toward a Metaphysic of Sanctity, Communio 17 (1990), pp. 455-464.

Page 3 of 11

to us, though from our imperfect familiarity with the works of St Thomas that it is never thematized as such as the formal question asked in any question or article. Despite this, his notion of real being permeates through his entire thought, both philosophical and theological, as one of the key mediating ideas in explanations and drawing of conclusions. When considering works on the idea of Being, Aquinas can be said to have revolutionized a thousand years of Christian tradition by rejecting Plato in favour of Aristotle.3 Plato maintained that ultimate reality consists of essence, whereas Aristotle maintained that existence is primary. For Plato, the world around us that we perceive with our senses contains nothing except impermanent, ever-changing objects. Plato reasoned that for our observations of the world to count as true knowledge and not just as anecdotal evidence, our minds need to make a conceptual leap from individual instances of things to general ideas. He concluded that there must be something permanent that lies behind and unites individual existences, and he referred to this something as essence. According to Plato, existence, or the everyday world of objects such as tables, chairs, and dogs, is inherently inferior to essence.4 Some early church thinkers saw in Platos ideas a parallel to their own division of the universe into the inherently imperfect, corrupt world of matter and everyday existence and the perfect and heavenly world of spirit. In the analysis of Platos theory, Aquinas follows Aristotle in concluding that Platos theory is deficient, in part because it is unable to account for the origin of existence and in part because it is unacceptably dismissive of existence. Holy Scripture states that after each of the six days of Creation, God saw that the fruit of his days work
3

Cf. Anthony Akinwale, Class Lecture Series Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. (27th April 2010) 4 Cf. Pantaleon Iroegbu, Metaphysics; The Kpim of Philosophy`. (Owerri: International Universities Press Ltd, 1995), pp. 136-138.

Page 4 of 11

was good or even very good.5 Furthermore, when Moses asks God how he should refer to him, God responds, I am that I am,6 thereby equating himself with being. In other words, God is pure existence or Being itself. In God there is no distinction between essence and existence; He does not receive his existence, but is His existence; His essence is to exist.7 Thomas further argues that mans purpose consists exactly in developing himself towards Being, not in attempting to escape Being. In the traditional church view prior to Thomas, the difference between God and his creatures was one of kind, as existence was something that in itself separated us from God. In Thomas view, the difference between God and his creatures is one of degree, for we are separate from God insofar as we do not have as much existence as God. In no creature is the distinction between essence and existence absent. We have noticed that it is a fundamental principle with Thomas that the perfections of creatures must be found in the creator in a super eminent manner.8 Prior to Aquinas, it seems traditional church thought maintained that existence was the chief impediment to the realization of our spiritual destiny. Aquinas held that our spiritual destiny consists precisely in the enhancement of our existence. Summarily, all we have tried to do majorly in this part of our work is to show that for Thomas Aquinas every being, as being, is good.9 However, we have deemed it fit, so as to put some order in our work, to discuss the distinction between being and goodness in the following headings ensuing this present heading.

Cf. Gen 1: 31 New Jerusalem Bible. (Hereafter: NJB) Cf. Ex 3:14 (NJB) 7 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy Vol 2 (New York: Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc, 1993), p. 361. 8 Ibid., p. 357 9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 5, a. 3.
6

Page 5 of 11

3.0

GOODNESS IN THE LIGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS Having established above that for Thomas, every being as being is good, we shall

now proceed to present Thomas concept of goodness. The quality of goodness follows perfection, for as will be said immediately, everything is good in so far as it is perfect.10 It is for this reason that St. Thomas treats of God's goodness before treating of His truth and unity even though unity and truth are predicated before goodness of being and the divine nature. St. Thomas inserts here the question of the divine goodness as being a part of the divine perfection. And he treats first of goodness in general. Following the structure of our text in view, we shall in this part of our work, attempt to put forth Thomas explanation of goodness in general and his explanation of the goodness of God as we now understand it. St Thomas asserts that goodness presents the aspect of desirableness which being does not present,11 however, it must be remembered that desirableness does not constitute the idea of goodness but presupposes it, as a property its essence. Furthermore, if the desirable is viewed not formally but fundamentally, then goodness is intrinsically desirable in so far as it is the foundation for desirableness. And this foundation is not really distinct from the desirableness, because it is a relation, not indeed real but logical as regards the appetite. Contrary to the opinions of Plato and Plotinus which placed good above being,12 Thomas, not only following Aristotle in correctly distinguishing between the final cause and the efficient cause but also unlike the neoplatonists who did not sufficiently distinguish between the agent and the end, maintains that good is diffusive of itself as the
10

11

Cf. Ibid., I, q. 5, a. 5. Ibid., I, q. 5, a. 1. 12 Cf. Ibid., I, q. 5, a. 2.

Page 6 of 11

end which attracts the agent to act,13 and the appetite to desire. In addition to this, by way of a of a logical sequence, goodness is in active diffusion inasmuch as the agent operates effectively because of the end intended, and this either by a necessity of nature, as the ox generates an ox, or else freely, as when man communicates his knowledge to others or exhorts them to good. Flowing from this background, St. Thomas asserts that: "It belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others..., so that it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by . . . [the incarnation of the Word]."14 Thus self-diffusion primarily belongs to the end as attracting, and afterward to the agent. It is from here that we understand that God is not necessitated, however, in His external operations, but is absolutely free, for He is in no need of finite goods and He operates to manifest His goodness. Though Aquinas seem to have argued that God is essentially good15, it does not seem totally out of place to hold that Aquinas also intended to assert that only God is the good essentially. With reference to Thomas treatment of whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant, we understand the question to be concerned with transcendental goodness, but in the formal and not in the material sense of the term. For Good is divided into ten categories when subjectively considered in the material sense so that we speak of a good substance, a good quantity, a good quality and so on. However in the formal sense, Goodness is divided according to the idea of goodness, namely as it is something perfect and desirable. But this division is the foundation for the
13

Cf. Ibid., Ia, q. 5, a.4; Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 4 ad 1 Ibid., IIIa, q. 1, a. 1. 15 Ibid., I, q. 6, a. 3.

Page 7 of 11

notion of moral goodness, which is virtuous goodness that is in conformity with the rules of moral action, that is, with the eternal law and right reason In further pursuit of the answer to the above question, we have come to realize that those things are properly called pleasant that are only pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Likewise those things are properly called useful that are only useful, as money and bitter medicine. St. Thomas shows elsewhere16 that the virtuous is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite; that the pleasant is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite, and that nothing repugnant to virtuous good is absolutely and truly useful, but relatively so. In conclusion to his discourse on the division of goodness into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant, Thomas asserts that Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous, then of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.17 4.0 THE RELATION BETWEEN BEING AND GOODNESS IN THOMAS A long and rich philosophical tradition stemming from ancient Greek Philosophy and running through the middle ages18 seem to have been guided by the intuition that there is some sort of interesting necessary connection between being and goodness. This intuition has come to the surface in various ways. Plato argued, for example, that there is a necessary metaphysical and causal dependence of being on goodness. In the Republic Plato asserted that all forms, and hence all being, participate in the Good, and in the
Ibid., IIa IIae, q.145, a. 3 Ibid., I, q. 5, a. 6 18 The word middle age (media aetas) was coined by the philologists, who in their intent to divide the history of the West into periods started from the principle of language evolution. Cf. M. D Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas. Transl. By A.-M Landry and D. Hughes. (USA: Henry Regnery Company, 1964), p. 104
17 16

Page 8 of 11

Timaeus he at least suggested that this account of the metaphysical priority of goodness could be developed into a cosmological theory explaining the origin of the universe. It was this idea that was developed especially by the neo-Platonists into a full-fledged cosmology involving the emanation of all things from the Good and their return to it; Aristotle on his part maintained that the good is spoken of in as many ways as being; Augustines famous doctrine quoted in the text of the Summa Theologiae19 which we have in view that evil is merely a privation of good20 is a corollary of his view that everything that has being is good insofar as it has being or in other words that each natural substance is good to the extent to which it realizes its nature21; and some of the thirteenth century philosophers like Thomas Aquinas held that the terms being and good are interchangeable (or convertible) and that goodness, like being transcends the categories. Taken by themselves, these claims appear extravagant and even paradoxical. But they are explained and justified within systematic, sophisticated, historically influential philosophical theories. For Aquinas, as earlier alluded to, being and good are the same in reference, differing only in sense.22 On this account, good essentially expresses the notion of an end or of desirability, whereas being essentially expresses the notion of actuality; hence the two terms differ in sense. But they are the same in reference because, with respect to any given thing, being and goodness both supervene on the same set of intrinsic, natural properties, viz., those properties in virtue of which that thing has actualized its specifying potentialitiesthat is to say, those potentialities that belong to it in virtue of its nature or substantial form. In other words, being and goodness are said to be devoid of any real
19 20 21 22

Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., I, q.5, a.1 St Augustine, City of God, Bk XI, Ch 9 Cf.Ibid., Bk XII, Ch 5 Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., I, q.5, a.1

Page 9 of 11

distinction for if two concepts are reducible to one concept, as animality and rationality are reduced to humanity, then there is no real distinction between them. However, having noted the above, we must also note that Thomas puts forth that goodness and being differ in idea for "goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present".23 In other words, being contains the notion of goodness actually and implicitly, but not actually and explicitly. Something explicitly is declared in the notion of goodness, which is only implicitly declared in the notion of being. Thus there is no addition of any extrinsic difference to being, but of an explicitly signified mode of being. Furthermore, in his explanation of the connection between being and goodness, Thomas appears to us to have set out in agreement with the Christian-Platonist representatives since he identified God with the Good and viewed creation as the outpouring of goodness itself but unlike some other philosophers who were his predecessors in speculation on the connection between being and goodness, Thomas went on to assert that created goods are good in virtue of some intrinsic forms inhering in the created goods themselves and not solely in virtue of their relation to some extrinsic or separate form. 5.0 CONCLUSION Having explored through the ideas of St. Thomas on being and goodness, the words being and goodness when sounded or when heard now makes more meaning to us. We have come to understand through this undertaking of ours that while every being as being is good, God is essentially good and the good essentially so that the goodness present in beings is that which has been communicated to it by the highest Good and through the highest manner.
23

Ibid., I, q. 5, a. 1

Page 10 of 11

BIBLIOGRAPHY Akinwale, Anthony. Class Lecture Series Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. 27th April 2010. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Volume I. Trans. by The Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benzinger Brothers Inc., 1948. Augustine, City of God, Trans. by Gerald G. Walsh et al. New York: Image Books, 1958. Chenu, M. D Toward Understanding Saint Thomas. Transl. By A.-M Landry and D. Hughes. USA: Henry Regnery Company, 1964. Clarke, W. Norris. Person and Being. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004 Connor, Robert. Relation, the Thomistic Esse, and American Culture: Toward a Metaphysic of Sanctity, Communio 17 (1990). Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy, Vol. 1and 2. New York: Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc, 1993. Iroegbu, Pantaleon. Metaphysics; The Kpim of Philosophy. Owerri: International Universities Press Ltd, 1995.

Page 11 of 11