CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G.

De La Salle University College of Law

11284412

Topic: Equipoise Rule Eugenio vs. People G.R. No. 168163, March 26, 2008 Ponente: Carpio, J. FACTS: On 14 November 1995, herein petitioner Lolita Eugenio went to the house of private complainant Alfredo Mangali in Tonsuya, Malabon, Metro Manila and introduced Mangali to EpifaniaSaquitan, Amalia Ablaza, and another individual. The petitioner convinced Mangali to loan P100,000 to Saquitan with a parcel of land in Sta. Ana, Metro Manila as security for the loan and guaranteed Mangali that the land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 171602 issued in Saquitans name. Mangali asked petitioner to verify with the Register of Deeds of Manila the validity of the TCT which the latter confirmed when she saw the original of TCT on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila. With this assurance, Mangali agreed to extend the loan to Saquitan with its due on 21 December 1995. Afterward, the petitioner, on behalf of one Lourdes Ty sought another P100,000 loan from Mangali, payable in January 1996 with a parcel of land, TCT No. 92585, in Quezon City as security. Similarly, Mangali agreed to extend the loan to Ty under the condition that the latter execute a deed of sale over the lot in his favor. When the loans lapsed and remained unpaid, Mangali inquired from the Register Deeds of Manila and Quezon City on the status of both the TCTs. He discovered that TCT No. 171602 had been cancelled on 5 October 1995 while TCT No. 92585 is not registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.Mangali filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) who successfully executed an entrapment operation to arrest Eugenio, Ablaza and two (2) others. Petitioner, Ablaza and two other individuals were charged with Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. Petitioner denied taking part in any conspiracy to swindle Mangali as she had brokered check rediscounting and loan deals with complainant even before 14 November 1995. However, both the trial court convicted Eugenio and the Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the decision of the lower court which brought led to a petition for review to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Eugenio had been validly convicted with proof beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents HELD: No. Eugenio was invalidly convicted of the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. In criminal proceedings, the guilt of the accused should be established with proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. The trial court relied on the disputable legal presumption that the possessor of a falsified document who makes use of such to her advantage is presumed to be the author of the falsification. Thus, petitioners conviction rested on an implied conspiracy with her co-accused to swindle Mangali by relying on a disputable presumption of culpability. In order that the presumption of authorship of falsification to apply, the possessor must profit or had profited from the use of the falsified document which in this case, the prosecution have failed to prove. The prosecution failed to show any proof that petitioner received a portion of the loan Mangali extended to Ty, the same way as there is no proof on record that she received any share from the loan Mangali extended to Saquitan. It can be surmised that the evidence in the present case is equipoise. When the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are capable of two inferences, one favoring the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the inference for her innocence must prevail, consistent with the Constitutional presumption of her innocence. Therefore, the party having the burden of proof loses since the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and does not suffice to produce a conviction.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G. De La Salle University College of Law

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Topic: Rule on Retroactivity People vs. Castro G.R. No. 172370, October 06, 2008 Ponente: Reyes, R.T., J. FACTS: On 17 May 1998, appellant Christopher Talita contracted the services of the victims Elpidio and Alfredo Castro for the installation of window grills at an unspecified location in Santol, Balagtas, Bulacan. The Castros agreed to do the job. They received instructions to proceed to Santol on the next day and to look for a certain Betty. But on the designated day, Alfredo Castro and his welder Jaime Carrazcal failed to find Betty in Santol. That same night, the appellant re-emerged at the Castro household and volunteered to accompany them to the job site the next morning. On 19 May 1998, appellant Talita arrived on schedule. Elpidio got their owner-type jeepney while Alfredo, together with her mother Lolita de Leon Castro, waited at the balcony of their home. As the Castros were about to board the vehicle, Christopher shot Alfredo in the head twice. He also shot Elpidio in the abdomen and thorax. Jaime was able to hide for cover at a nearby fence after the first show was fired. After the shooting incident, a mint green Nissan Sentra arrived where appellant Florenda Castro was seated behind the driver. Christopher Talitaboarded the car which left the scene of the crime. Both of the Castros died afterwards. On 11 December 1998, appellant Florenda was charged for parricide and murder for the death of her husband Alfredo and father-in-law Elpidio respectively. On the other hand, appellant Christopher was charged with two counts of murder. Both were convicted in the trial court of their respective charges and they were both sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death with civil indemnities, moral damages, exemplary damages, and actual damages. Likewise, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification to the damages prescribed by the lower court. On 24 June 2006, R.A. 9346 was enacted which proscribes the imposition of the capital punishment. Under Section 2 of the said law, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment would be applied in lieu of the death penalty. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9346 can be retroactively applied to the penalty of death of the convicted HELD: Yes. The court ruled that R.A. 9346 be retroactively applied to the penalties of the accused and that the penalty of death penalty would be changed and lowered to reclusion perpetua. The applicability of R.A. 9346 is undeniable. In criminal law, it is axiomatic that penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. Since death penalty afflicts a greater penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua given by R.A. 9346 should be applied to both the accused even if the statute has only been enacted on 24 June 2006 or roughly eight (8) years from the time the crime was committed.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G. De La Salle University College of Law

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Topic: Rule on Prospectivity of Penal Laws Valeroso vs. People G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008 Ponente: Reyes, R.T., J. FACTS: On 10 July 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco received a dispatched order to serve a warrant of arrest against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with ransom. After the briefing, the team conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan. When the team went to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Station at Quezon City, they saw the petitioner who was about to board a tricycle. They managed to put him under arrest, informed him of his rights, and bodily searched him. A Charter Arms with five (5) live ammunitions were found tucked in his waist. The verification of the firearm confiscated from Valerosowas revealed, by the records verifier of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine Nation Police, that it belonged to a person named Raul Palencia Salvatierra. The petitioner was charged with illegal possession of fire-arm and ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866. P.D. 1866 was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on 6 July 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court which changed the penalty of illegal possession of firearms or ammunitions from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua to prision correccional in its maximum and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000). He was convicted of the charge in the RTC. Likewise, the Court of Appeals affirmed the disposition of the RTC with modification on the penalty given. ISSUE: Whether or not Valeroso would be penalized under R.A. No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms HELD: Yes. The court affirmed the decision of the RTC and the CA of adopting the penalty imposed by R.A. No. 8294. As a general rule, penal laws should have prospective application. A penal law cannot make an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when committed. However, an exception to the rule is when the law is advantageous to the accused. The penalty under P.D. 1866 provided a penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. There is no doubt that the penalty provided in the said P.D. 1866 is greater than what has been provided in R.A. 8294. Although an additional fine of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) is imposed in R.A. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G. De La Salle University College of Law

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Topic: Conspiracy People vs. Dela Cruz G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008 Ponente: Brion, J. FACTS: On 28 July 1999 at around 2:00 a.m., a jeepney parked near the 7-Eleven Store at Mindanao Avenue corner Tandang Sora. Subsequently, the eight (8) appellants alighted from the jeepney and proceeded to the 7-Eleven Store. Appellants Joemari delos Reyes, Bernardo Ranara, and Robert Alfonso entered 7-Eleven Convenience Store acting as customers. Witness Kuraishi Makapundag entered the store and met appellant Bernardo, who was alleged to have carried a gun. At the same instance, Elmer Duque, who went out of his car to follow Kuraishi, was shot in the chest by Diosdado Recepcion who died as a result afterwards. On the other hand, appellant Fire Officer 1 Felipe dela Cruz (FO1 dela Cruz) fired at the security guard, Nestor Mayagma, through the glass door but missed. As a result, Nestor exchanged shots with FO1 dela Cruz. However, Diasdado was able aim at Nestor which delivered the fatal shot which killed him. Meanwhile, Joemari pulled down Edwin Gultiano, a delivery boy of Smackers Bakeshop, and took his wallet and watch and dragged himtowards the counter and told him to open the cash register but both was not able to open the cash register because they did not have the keys to it. Unable to open the cash registers, the appellants took these and rushed back to thejeepneywhich they had used to escape tothe house of FO1 dela Cruz at Paniqui, Tarlac. On 29 July 1999, the appellants where apprehended by the police at the house of FO1 dela Cruz. They were charged and convicted with conspiring having committed robbery with homicide. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court sentenced them to suffer the death penalty and requiring the appellants to pay for exemplary and moral damages. As a result of the penalty charged, the petitioners (appellants) appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can validly ascertain the existence of conspiracy in the present case HELD: Yes. The court ruled that Conspiracy exists. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. Given the circumstances in this case, there is no doubt that the appellants acted in conspiracy in committing the crime charged. The appellants were initially together in the jeepney when they robbed the 7-Eleven Store and were still together in the jeepney when they went to Tarlac to escape. From the time the appellants entered 7-Eleven Convenience Store and shot the stores security guard, up to the time they fled towards Tarlac, there can be no other conclusion than that they hatched a criminal scheme, synchronized their acts for unity in its execution, and aided each other for its consummation. When conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. Accordingly, the rule is well-established that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. In the present case, it has not been shown that the appellants tried to prevent the shooting of the two (2) victims. Thus, their cooperative acts toward their common criminal objective render them equally liable as conspirators.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G. De La Salle University College of Law

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Topic: Corpus delicti People vs. Gonzales G.R. No. 180448, July 28, 2008 Ponente: Tinga, J. FACTS: On 3 October 1996, herein appellant Budoy Gonzales went to the store of Salvacion Loresto where he threatened her that he would set her house on fire if she did not stop reporting to the police about the jueteng operations in the area. Gonzales apparently works for the suspected jueteng operator. Due to the incident, Salvacion sought assistance from the police. At around 8:00 pm, Salvacion was asked by the police to close her store because Gonzales was having a drinking session few houses away. On 4 October 1996 at about 3:30 am, Salvacion saw Gonzales emerge from the house, where the latter was last seen drinking, and was approaching her house. She claimed that Gonzales wrapped something inside an anahaw palm which he left in her store which had set her house on fire. When the fire broke up, she immediately woke up and shouted for help which alerted the policemen. The policemen had managed to run after the appellant. On 6 March 1997, Gonzales was charged with destructive arson under Article 320, Section 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 1613 and R.A. 7659. After the trial, Gonzales was found guilty by the trial court of arson in a decision dated 28 February 2001 and he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the sum of P50,000 for damages. In consideration of the penalty imposed, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was later transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. The CA affirmed the factual findings and the decision of the trial court but deleted the grant of actual damages, for failure to present receipts to prove such claim, which led to the appeal in the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant was validly convicted with arson given only the occurrence of the fire and the lone testimony of the private complainant HELD: Yes. The court ruled that the appellant was guilty of arson. In arson, proof of the corpus delicti (or the substance of the crime) and the proper identification of the perpetrator are indispensable pieces of evidence. The corpus delicti rule in arson is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire (e.g. the charred remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally cause). Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. In the instance case, the trial court found the testimony of Salvacion worthy of credence. Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of Salvacion to falsely testify against appellant, her categorical and positive identification of appellant prevails over alibi and denial. Moreover, appellants presence at the scene of the crime remained supported.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G. De La Salle University College of Law

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Topic: Conviction People vs. Notarion G.R. No. 181493, August 28, 2008 Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J. FACTS: On 25 July 2001, herein appellant Ricardo Notarion was alleged to have committed the special complex crime of rape with homicide. On 28 November 2001, an information was filed with the RTC charging the appellant of the said offense. When arraigned on 7 March 2002, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution presented three witnesses namely Dionilo Cabague, the victims husband, and Dr. George Galindez. The first witness, Cabague, testified that when he and his wife arrived at their house, he noticed that the buri leaves which served as the doors lock was untied. He saw the appellant putting on his shorts while the victim was sprawled on the floor motionless. The appellant warned him that he would take his life and his relatives the moment he reported to anyone what he saw. The second witness, the victims husband, testified that he met the appellant who was terrified upon seeing him when he had returned from fishing. The third witness, Dr. Galindez, testified the results of his post-mortem examination of the victim which pointed that the victim was raped and died because of strangulation. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of the appellant and Maricar Notarion, the daughter of the appellant. The conflicting testimonies given by Maricar and Ricardo led to the trial courts decision of convicting the appellant of the special complex crime of rape with homicide sentencing him to death coupled with damages. On 24 August 2007, The appellant took it up to the Court of Appeals which soon denied his petition but modifying the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua in pursuant to Section 2(a) of R.A. 9346. As a result, the appellant filed a notice on appeal to the Supreme Court on 11 September 2007. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant can be convicted of rape with homicide with circumstantial evidence HELD: Yes. The court ruled that circumstantial evidence in rape with homicide is usually accepted. In rape with homicide, the evidence against the accused is usually circumstantial. The nature of the crime makes the prosecution of the offense difficult because the victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inference is based on proven facts; (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. When the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are pieced together, the court held that it would lead to the conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime charged. It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces a conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G. De La Salle University College of Law

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Topic: Construction and Interpretation of Penal Laws Padua vs. People G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008 Ponente: Quisumbing, J. FACTS: On 16 June 2003, herein petitioner Michael Padua(a minor, seventeen years old) and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002, for selling dangerous drugs. On Paduas arraignment on 13 October 2003, he entered a not guilty plea. During the pre-trial conference on 2 February 2004, Paduas counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section 70 of R.A. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection. As a result, Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. On 10 February 2004, Padua filed a Petition for Probation alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under P.D. 968, or the Probation Law of 1976, and Section 70 of R.A. 9165. On that same day, the RTC directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to Conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation on the accused and soon after, the probation officer recommended that Padua be placed in probation. However, the RTC denied the Petition for probation on the ground of Section 24 of R.A. 9165 which provides that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. His motion for reconsideration to the RTC and his petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals were likewise denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Padua (a minor) can avail of the benefits of probation or suspension under P.D. 603; 2. Whether or not Padua can be placed under probation under Section 70 of R.A. 9165. HELD: 1. No. The court ruled that his application for probation cannot be availed under P.D. 603and suspension of sentence could no longer be retroactively applied to Padua. It is because there is no provision in P.D. 603 regarding the application for probation. P.D. 603, or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, only provides the suspension of the minors sentence and not of the minors probation. The suspension of sentence can no longer be applied because Padua has already reached twenty-one (21) years of age making which, under the law, no longer considers him as a child for purposes of applying R.A. 9344. 2. No. The court ruled in the Negative. Section 24 of R.A. 9165 provides that the Probation Law is not applicable to Drug Traffickers and Pushers. The section clearly provides that: Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. 968, as amended. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation (verbalegis). Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, is barred from the Probation Law.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G. De La Salle University College of Law

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Topic: Stages of Execution of Crimes Rait vs. People G.R. No. 180425, July 31, 2008 Ponente: Nachura, J. FACTS: On 18 November 2003, AAA asked permission from her parents to go to her brothers house in Nazareth Street to get her athletic pants. When she was there, her brother requested her to buy cigarettes from a nearby store. While in the store, petitioner Rait and Janiter Pitago arrived. The two ordered beer and invited AAA to join them. She initially refused. However, when Aurora Raez, another neighbor, joined them, AAA was forced to drink beer. After drinking a glass of beer, she became drunk. When she was feeling weak, petitioner and his co-accused brought her out to 20th and 21st streets where the petitioner and his co-accused brought her to the side of the street and forcibly removed her pants and underwear. Petitioner then forcibly inserted his finger into her vagina. AAA tried to shout for help but petitioner covered her mouth while Pitago held her feet. Petitioner was on top of her and about to insert his penis into her vagina but she was able to kick both men and run away. On 26 May 1994, Rait and Pitago were charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. After the trial, the court rendered a decision finding Rait guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape. Petitioner filed an appeal to the CA-Cagayan de Oro but the former denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court which led to the filing of this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has been validly convicted with attempted rape HELD: Yes. The court ruled that the petitioner has been validly convicted with attempted rape. Under Article 6, in relation to Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Overt acts can necessarily lead to the intention of the offender. The court has held that an overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The petitioners claim that the jurisprudence in Baleros, Jr. v. People cannot be applied in the present case since the facts of both cases are different. Unlike in Baleros, the acts of the petitioner clearly establish his intention to commence the act of rape. Likewise, the said actsare the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations is made. The petitioner had already successfully removed the victims clothing and had inserted his finger into her vagina. It is not an empty speculation to conclude that these acts were preparatory to the act of raping her. Had it not been for the victims strong physical resistance, petitioners next step would, logically, be having carnal knowledge of the victim.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G. De La Salle University College of Law

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Topic: Principals Santos, Jr. vs. People G.R. No. 167671, September 3, 2008 Ponente: Corona, J. FACTS: Herein petitioner Ricardo Santos, Jr. was a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Lands. His functions as disbursing officer were limited to pay payees of treasury warrants and other cash vouchers or payrolls. His functions as disbursing officer did not include the duty to make or prepare travel expense vouchers. On 8 October 1969, four separate information for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents were filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (CFI) Branch V, Quezon City against petitioner and nine others. Subsequent to the trial, the CFI found petitioner Ricardo Santos, Jr. and his co-accused Pedro Velasco guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the complex crime of malversation thru falsification of public documents under Articles 217 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code. All of the accused who were convicted appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, all of them except petitioner died during the pendency of the appeal. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying the decisions of the Court of First Instance finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public documents only as a principal by inducement. Based from the testimony of the witness Henry Cruz, petitioner induced the witness to sign the falsified travel expense voucher in exchange for receiving a share of the proceeds of the claim even if the witness was not entitled thereto. However, petitioner claims that he could not have induced Cruz to falsify the travel expense voucher because he did not have the power of supervision or control over Cruz. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court has validly convicted the petitioner Ricardo Santos, Jr. as principal in the crime of malversation thru falsification of public documents HELD: Yes. The court ruled that the petitioner was guilty of the crime of malversation thru falsification of public documents as a principal by inducement. Falsification of documents under paragraph 1 Article 172 refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements enumerated in the said provision are: (1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and (3) that the falsification was committed in a public official or commercial document. The first element for the crime under paragraph 1 of Article 172 of the RPC was present for petitioner was a disbursing officer which, by his position, was not entitled to make and prepare travel expense vouchers. The second element was likewise present as petitioner committed the crime by causing it to appear that persons participated in an act or a proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The third element was also present as the travel voucher was a public document. In the present case, it was undisputed that the petitioner offered Cruz a share of the proceeds in exchange for his act of falsification even if Cruz was not entitled to it. The person may become principals by inducement in two ways namely (1) by giving a price or offering a reward or promise and (2) by using words of command. That promise made by the petitioner to Cruz was the inducement of falsification.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G. De La Salle University College of Law

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Topic: Repeal Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Interport Resources Corporation G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008 Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J. FACTS: On 6 August 1994, the Board of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under the Memorandum of Agreement, IRC acquired the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI), which would own and operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine power-generating barge. The agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National Power Corporation. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44 million. Likewise, GHB shall extend a loan required to pay for the proposed acquisition by IRC of 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI). On 8 August 1994, IRC alleged that a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent through facsimile transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange and the SEC, but SEC only received it in the morning of 9 August 1994. The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. On 16 August 1994, the SEC Chairman issued a directive requiring to submit the SEC a copy of its Memorandum of Agreement with GHB and he further directed that all principal officers of IRC to appear at a hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges Department of the SEC to explain IRCs failure to immediately disclose information as required by the Rules on Disclosure on Material Facts. On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an order finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosures of Material Facts and that the officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act. On 25 January 1995, the SEC issued Omnibus Order which created a special investigating panel to hear and decide the instance case before the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED). However on 8 August 2000, the Securities Regulation Code was enacted which repealed the entire Revised Securities Act and the Presidential Decree No. 902-A which created the PED. ISSUE: Whether or not Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) can still be held liable for violating Section 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act even if it was repealed by the Securities Regulation Code HELD: Yes. The court ruled that Interport Resource Corporation can still be liable for the charges since Section 8, 30, and 36 was re-enacted in the Securities Regulation Code. The Securities and Regulations Code absolutely repealed the Revised Securities Act. While the absolute repeal of a law generally deprives a court of its authority to penalize the person charged with the violation of the old law prior to its appeal, an exception to this rule comes about when the repealing law punishes the act previously penalized under the old law such as in this case. Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act was expanded under Section 12, in connection with Section 8, of the Securities Regulations. Moreover, Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act has been re-enacted as Section 27 of the new Code. In addition, Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act is Section 23 of the Code. Undoubtedly, the legislature had not intended to deprive the court of their authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law that was repealed. Similarly, the SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Revised Securities Act, re-enacted in the Securities Regulations Code, despite the abolition of PED as stated in Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Atty. Dennis Villa-Ignacio) ASIDDAO, Mila Marciana G. De La Salle University College of Law

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Topic: Mala in se and Mala Prohibita Tan vs. Ballena G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008 Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J. FACTS: Herein petitioners Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo and Robert Lim were officers of Footjoy Industrial Corporation (Footjoy). On 4 February 2001, the buildings and equipment of the company were destroyed by fire which led to the cessation of the companys operations. Because of this, some of the employees of Footjoy tried to avail themselves of their SSS benefits but failed to do so. On 19 March 2001, respondent Amelito Ballena, and one hundred thirty-nine (139) other employees of Footjoy, filed a Joint-Affidavit before the Office of the Prosecutor of Bulacan against the company. They alleged that the company failed to report the respondent employees for membership at the Social Security System and that it likewise failed to remit their SSS contributions and payment for their SSS loan, which were already deducted from their wages. However, the petitioners admitted the allegations but blamed the economic distress that beset their company brought about by the fire. Likewise, the petitioners underlined their good faith and lack of criminal culpability when they acknowledged their fault and demonstrated their willingness to pay their obligations by executing a memorandum of agreement with the SSS to pay their obligations in installments. On 17 May 2001, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Joint resolution which found probable cause to charge Footjoy with violations of the SSS Law. Likewise, the Provincial Prosecutor approved the resolution and affirmed the filing of information against the petitioners. On the other hand, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice alleging that the Assistant Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion when he found probable cause to charge them with the alleged offenses. The DOJ granted the petitioners request and reversed the assailed decision which led respondents to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 30 September 2004, the CA reversed the DOJ resolutions and reaffirmed the resolutions of the Provincial Prosecutor which led to the filing of this petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners can claim good faith and lack of criminal intent in order not to incur criminal liability for violating the SSS Law HELD: No. The court ruled that they cannot claim good faith and lack of criminal intent because the SSS Law is a special law. The defenses of the petitioners of good faith and lack of criminal intent should not have been considered, inasmuch as the offenses charged were for violations of a special law and are therefore characterized as mala prohibita, in which the intent to commit is immaterial. The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves (mala in se); and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them (mala prohibita). The general rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal and is punished by a special law, the intent of the offender is immaterial. The petitioners admission of the non-remittance of the respondents contributions is more than enough to establish the existence of probable cause to prosecute the company, owners and officials of Footjoy.