The Elimination of Metaphysics

Through Logical Analysis

:
of Language

BY RUDOLF CAR NAP

TRANSLATED BY ARTHUR PAP

INTRODUCTION

1/ THERE HAVE BEEN many' opponents of metaphysics from the Greek

If
Skeptics to the empiricists of the 19th century. Criticisms of very
diverse kinds have been set forth. Many have'declared that the doctrine
of metaphysics is false, since it contradicts our empirical knowledge.
Others have believed it to be uncertain, on the ground that its problems
transcend the limits of human knowledge: Many antimetaphysicians have
declared that occupation with metaphysical questions is sterile. Whether
or not these questions can be answered, iUs at any rate unnecessary to
worry about them; let us devote ourselves entirely to the practical tasks
which confront active men every day of their lives!
Thl3 development of modern logic has made it possible to give a new
and sharper answer to the question of the validity and justification of
metaphysics. The researches of applied logic or the theory of knowledge, //
which aim at clarifying the cognitive content of scientific statements 1/
and thereby the meanings of the terms that occur in the statements, by
means of logical analysis, lead to a positive and to a negative result.
The positive result is worked out in the domain of empirical science;
the various concepts of the various branches of science are clarified;
their formal-logical and epistemological connections are made explicit.
In the domain of metaphysics,
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This article, originally entitled "Uberwindung der
Metapl]ysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache," appeared in
Erkennrnis, Vol. 11 (1932). It is published here with the kind permission
of Professor Carnap. , ,

----..-----..-..---------------..-----------------------------------....--.............-----------...--------....------
including all philosophy of value and normative theory, logical'
analysis yields the negative result that the alleged statements in this
domain are entirely meaningless. Therewith a radical elimination of //
metaphysics is attained, which was not yet possible from the earlier
antimetaphysical standpoints. It is true that related ideas may be found
already in several earlier trains of thought, e.g. those of a
nominalistic kind; but it is only now when the development of logic
during recent decades provides us with a sufficiently sharp tool that the
decisive step can be taken.
II In saying that the so-called statements of metaphysics are
Q'meaningless, we intend this word in its strictest sense. In a loose
sense of the word a statement or a question is at times called
meaningless, if it is entirely sterile to assert or aslXit. We might say
this for instance about the question "what is the average weight of
those inhabitants of Vienna whose telephone number ends with '3'?" or
about a statement which is quite obviously false like "in 1910 Vienna
had 6 inhabitants" or about a statement which is not just empirically,
but logically false, a contradictary statement such as "persons A and B
are each a year older than the other." Such sentences are really#,
meaningful, though they are pointless or false; for it is only' V
meaningful sentences that are even divisible into (theoretically)
d fruitful and sterile, true and false. In the strict sense, however, a
sequence of words is meaningless if it does not, within a specified II
language, constitute a statement. It may happen that such a sequence of
words looks like a statement at first glance; in that case we call it a
 pseudo-statement. Our thesis, now, is that logical analysis reveals the//
alleged statements of metaphysics to be pseudo-statements. :I
A language consists of a vocabulary and a syntax, i.e. a set of words .
which have meanings and rules of sentence formation. These rules
indicate how sentences may.be formed out of the various sorts of words.
Accordingly, there are two kinds of pseudo-statements: either they
contain a word which is erroneously believed to have meaning, or the
constituent words are meaningful, yet are put together in a counter-
syntactical way, so that they do not yield a meaningful statement. We
shall show in terms of examples that pseudo-statements of both kinds
occur in metaphysics. Later we shall have to inquire into the reasons
that support our contention that metaphysics in. its entirely consists of
such pseudo-statements. 1/ !
2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A WORD

A word which (within a definite language) has a meaning, is usually

also said to designate a concept; if it only seems to have a meaning //
//
while it really does not, we speak of a "pseudo-concept." How is the
origin of a pseudo-concept to be explained? Has not every word been
introduced into the language for no other purpose than to express
something or other, so that it had a definite meaning from the very
beginning of its use? How, then, can a traditional language contain
meaningless words? To be sure, originally every word (excepting rare
cases which we shall illustrate later) had a meaning. In the course of
historical development a word frequently change its meaning. And it als
happens at times that a word loses its old sense without acquiring a new
one. It is thus that a pseudo-concept arises.

"
r
What, now, is the meaning of a wore!? What stipulations concerning
word must be made in order for it to be significant? (It does not
matter for our investigation whether these stipulations are explicitly
laid down, as in the case of some words and symbols of modern science,
or whether they have been tacitly agreed upon, as is the case for most
words of traditional language.) First, the syntax of the word must be
fixed, Le. the mode of its occurrence in the simplest sentence form in
which it is capable of occurring; we call this sentence form its
elementary sentence. The elementary sentence form for the word "stone"
e.g. is "x is a stone"; in sentences of this form some designation from
the category of things occupies the place of "x," e.g. "this diamond,"
"this apple." Secondly, for an elementary sentence S containing the word
an answer must be given the following question, which can be formulated
.
in various ways:
(1.) What sentences is S deducible from, and what sentences are
deducible from S?
(2.) Under what conditions is S supposed to be true, and under what
conditions false?
(3.) How is S to be verifee!?
(4.) What is the meaning of S?

(1) is the correct formulation; formulation (2) accords with the

phraseology of logic, (3) with the phraseology of the theory of
knowledge, (4) with that of philosophy (phenomenology) .
Wittgenstein has asserted that (2) expresses what philosophers mean by
(4): the meaning of a sentence consists in its truth-condition. ( (1) is
the "metalogical" formulation; it is planned to give elsewhere a
detailed exposition of metalogic as the theory of syntax and meaning,
Le., relations of deducibility
In the case of many words, specifically in the case of the
overwhelming majority of scientific words, it is possible to specify
their meaning by reduction to other words ("constitution," definition).
E.g. " 'arthropodes' are animals with segmented bodies and jointe-
 legs." Thereby the above-mentioned question for the elementary sentence
form of the word "arthropode," that is for the sentence form "the thing
x is an arthropode,. is answered: it has been stipulated that a sentence
of this form is deducible from premises of the form "x is an animal," "x
has a segmented body," "x has jointed legs," and that conversely each of
these sentences is deducible from the former sentence. By means of these
stipulations about deducibility (in other words: about the truth-
condition, about the method of verification, about the meaning) of the
elementary sentence about "arthrnpode" the meaning of the word
"arthropode" is fixed. In this way every word of the language is reduced
to other words and finally to the words which occur in the so-called
"observation sentences" or "protocol sentences." It is through this
reduction that the word acquires its meaning.
For our purposes we may ignore entirely the question concerning the
content and form of the primary sentences (protocol sentences) which
has not yet been definitely settled. In the theory of knowledge it is
customary to say that the primary sentences refer to "the given"; but
there is no unanimity on the question what it is that is given. At times
the position is taken that sentences about the given speak of the
simplest qualities of sense and feeling (e.g. "warm," "blue," "joy" and
so forth) ; others incline to the view that basic sentences refer to
total experiences and similarities between them; a still different view
has it that even the basic sentences speak of things. Rega"rdlessof this
diversity of opinion it is certain that a sequence of words has a
meaning only if its relations of deducibility to the protocol sentences
are fixed, whatever the characteristics of the protocol sentences may
be; and similarly, that a word is significant only if the sentences in
which it may occur are reducible to protocol sentences.
Since the meaning of a word is determined by its criterion of
application (in other words: by the relations of deducibility entered
into by its elementary sentence-form, by its truth-conditions, by the
method of its verification), the stipulation of the criterion takes
away one's freedom to decide what one wishes to "mean" by the word. I
the word is to receive an exact meaning, nothing less than the criterion
of application must be given; but one cannot, on the other hand, give
more than the criterion of application, for the latter is a sufficient
determination of meaning. The meaning is implicitly contained in the
criterion; all that remains to be done is to make the meaning explicit.
Let us suppose, by way of illustration, that someone invented the new
word "teavy" and maintained that there are things which are teavy and
things which are not teavy. In order to learn the meaning of this word,
we ask him about its criterion of application: how is one to ascertain
in a concrete case whether a given thing is teavy or not? Let us suppose
to begin with that we get no answer from him: there are no empirical
signs of teavyness,he says. In that case we would deny the legitimacy
of using this word. If the person who uses the word says that all the
same there are things which are teavy and there are things which are not
teavy, only it remains for the weak, finite intellect of man an eternal
secret which things are teavy and which are not, we shall regard this as
empty verbiage. But perhaps he will assure us that he means,after all, .
something by the word "teavy." But from this we only learn the
psychological fact that he associates some kind of images and feelings
with the word. The word does not acquire a meaning through SUCh
associations. If no criterion of application for the word is stipulated.

but pseudo-statements.
"
~
then nothing is asserted by the sentences in which it occurs, they are

Secondly, take the case when we are given a criterion of application

for a new word, say "toovy"; in particular, let the sentence "this thing
is toovy" be true if and only if the thing is quadrangular (It is
irrelevant in this context whether the criterion is explicitly stated or
whether we derive it by observing the affirmative and the negative uses
 of the word) . Then we will say: the word "toovy" is synonymous w.tn
tne word "quadrangular." And we will not allow its users to tell us that
nevertheless they "intended" something else by it than "quadrangu!ar";
that though every quadrangular thing is also toovy and conversely, this
is only because quadrangularity is the visible manifestation of
toovyness, but that the latter itself is a hidden, not itself observable
property. We would reply that after the criterion of application has
been fixed, the synonymy of "toovy" and "quadrangular" is likewise
. fixed, and that we are no further at liberty to "intend" this or that by
the word.
Let us briefly summarize the result of our analysis. Let "a" be any
word and "S (a) " the elementary sentence in which it occurs. Then the
sufficient and necessarv condition for "a" being meaningful may be given
by each of the following formulations, which ultimately say the same
thing:

1. The empirical criteria for a are known.

2. It has been stipulated from what protocol sentences "S(a)" is
deducible.
3. The truth-conditions for "S(a)" are fixed.
4. The method of verifcation of "S(a)" is known. [1]

3. METAPHYSICAL WORDS WITHOUT MEANING

Many words of metaphysics, now, can be shown not to fulfill the

above requirement, and therefore to be devoid of meaning.
Let us take as an example the metaphysical term "principle" (in the
sense of principle of being, not principle of knowledge or axiom) .
Various metaphysicians offer an answer to the question which is the
(highest) "principle of the world" (or of "things," of "existence," of
"being"), e.g. water, number, form, motion, life, the spirit, the idea,
the unconscious, activity, the good, and so forth. In order to discover
the meaning of the word .principle" in this metaphysical question we
must ask the metaphysician under what conditions a statement of the form
"x is the principle of y" would be true and under what conditions it
would be false. In other words we ask for the criteria of application or
for the definition of the word "principle." The metaphysician replies
approximately as follows "x is the principle of y" is to mean "y arises
out of x," "the being of y rests on the being of x," "y exists by virtue
of x" and so forth. But these words are ambiguous and vague. Frequently
they have a clear meaning; e.g., we say of a thing or process y that it
"arises out if" x when we observe that things or processes of kind x are
frequently or invariably followed by things or processes of kind y
(causal connection in the sense of a lawful succession) . But the
metaphysician tells us that he does not mean this empirically
observable relationship. For in that case his metaphysical theses would
be merely empirical propositions of the same kind as those of physics.
The expression "arising from" is not to mean here a relation of temporal
and causal sequence, which is what the word ordinarily means. Yet, no
criterion is specified for any other meaning. Consequently, the alleged
"metaphysical" meaning, which the word is supposed to have here in
contrast to the mentioned empirical meaning, does not exist. If we
reflect on the original meaning of the word "principium" (and of the
corresponding Greek word 4:rc»), we notice the same development. The
word is explicitly deprived of its original meaning "beginning"; it is
not supposed to mean the temporally prior any more, but the prior in
some other, specifically metaphysical, respect. The criteria for this
"metaphysical respect," however, are lacking. In both cases,

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------..-------------------
[1] For the logical and epistemological conception which
underlies our exposition, but can only briefly be intimated here, cf.
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1922, and Carnap, Der
logische Aufbau der Welt, 1928.
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then, the word has been deprived of its earlier meaning without
being given a new meaning; there remains the word as an empty shell.
From an earlier period of significant use, it is still associatively
connected with various mental images; these in turn get associated with
new mental images and feelings in the new context of usage. But the word
does not thereby become meaningful; and it remains meaningless as long
as no method of verification can be described.
Another example is the word "God." Here we must, apart from the
variations of its usage within each domain, distinguish the linguistic
usage in three different contexts or historical epochs, which however
overiap temporally. In its mythological use the word has a clear
meaning. It, or parallel words in other languages, is sometimes used to
denote physical beings which are enthroned on Mount Olympus, in Heaven
or in Hades, and which are endowed with power, wisdom, goodness and
happiness to a greater or lesser extent. Sometimes the word also refers
to spiritual beings which, indeed, do not have manlike bodies, yet
manifest the'tTlselves nevertheless somehow in the things or processes of
the visible world and are therefore empirically verifiable. In its
metaphysical use, on the other hand, the word "God" refers to something
beyond experience. The word is deliberately divested of its reference to
a physical being or to a spiritual being that is immanent in the
physical. And as it is not given a new meaning, it becomes meaningless.
To be sure, it often looks as though the word "God" had a meaning even
in metaphysics. But the definitions which are set up prove on closer
inspection to be pseudo-definitions. They lead either to logically
illegitimate combinations of words (of which we shall treat later) or to
other metaphysical words (e.g. "primordial basis," "the absolute," "the
unconditioned," "the autonomous," ''the self-dependent" and so forth),
but in no case to the truth-conditions of its elementary sentences. In
the case of this word not even the first requirement of logic is met,
that is the requirement to specify its syntax, Le. the form of its
occurrence in elementary sentences. An elementary sentence would here .
have to be of the form "x is a God"; yet, the metaphysician either
rejects this form entirely without substituting another, or if he
accepts it he neglects to indicate the syntactical category of the
variable x. (Categories are, for example, material things, properties of
things. relations between things, numbers etc. ) .
The theological usage of the word "God" falls between its mythological
and its metaphysical usage. There is no distinctive meaning here, but an
oscillation from one of the mentioned two uses to the other. Several
theologians have a clearly empirical (in our terminology, "mythological" )
concept of God. In this case there are no pseudo-statements; but the
disadvantage for the theologian lies in the circumstance that according
to this interpretation the statements of theology are empirical and
hence are subject to the judgment of empirical science. The linguistic
usage of other theologians is clearly metaphysical. Others again do not
speak in any definite way, whether this is because they follow now this,
.
now that linguistic usage, or because they express themselves in terms
whose usage is not clearly classifiable since it tends towards both
sides.
Just like the examined examples "principle" and "God," most of the
other specifically metaphysical terms are devoid of meaning, e.g. "the-
Idea," "the Absolute," "the Unconditioned,. "the Infinite," "the
being of being," "non-being," "thing in itself," "absolute spirit"
"objective spirit," "essence," "being-in-itself," "being-in-and-
for-itself," "emanation," "manifestation," "articulation,"
"the Ego," "the non-ego," etc. These expressions are in the same boat
with "teavy," our previously fabricated example. The metaphysician tells
us that empirical truth-conditions cannot be specified; if he adds that
nevertheless he "means" something, we know that this is merely an
allusion to associated images and feelings which, however, do not bestow
a meaning on the word. The alleged statements of metaphysics which
contain such words have no sense, assert nothing, are mere pseudo-
statements. Into the explanation of their historical origin we shall
inquire later. ,

4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A SENTENCE

So far we have considered only those pseudo-statements which

contain a meaningless word. But there is a second kind of pseudo-
statement. They consist of meaningful words, but the words are put
together in such a way that nevertheless no meaning results. The syntax
of a language specifies which combinations of words are admissible and
which inadmissible. The grammatical syntax of natural languages,
however, does not fulfill the task of elimination of senseless
combinations of words in all cases. Let us take as examples the
following sequences of words:
1. "Caesar is and"
2. "Caesar is a prime number"
The word sequence (1) is formed countersyntactically; the rules of syntax
require that the third position be occupied, not by a conjunction, but by a
predicate, hence by a noun (with article) or by an adjective. The word
sequence "Caesar is a general," e.g is formed in accordance with the
rules of syntax. It is a meaningful word sequence, a genuine sentence.
But, now, word sequence (2) is likewise syntactically correct, for it has the
same grammatical form as the sentence just mentioned. Nevertheless (2)
is meaningless. "Prime number" is a predicate of numbers; it can be neither
affirmed nor denied of a person. Since (2) looks like a statement yet is
not a statement, does not assert anything, expresses neither a true nor
a false proposition, we call this word sequence a "pseudo-statement."
The fact that the rules of grammatical syntax are not violated easily
seduces one at first glance into the erroneous opinion that one still
has to do with a statement, albeit a false one. But "a is a prime
number" is false if and only if a is divisible by a natural number
different from a and from 1; evidently it is illicit to put here "Caesar"
for "a." This example has been so chosen that the nonsense is easily
detectable. Many so-called statements of metaphysics are not so easily
.
recognized to be pseudo-statements. The fact that natural languages
allow the formation of meaningless sequences of words without violating
the rules of grammar, indicates that grammatical syntax is, from a
logical point of view, inadequate. If grammatical syntax corresponded
exactly to logical syntax, pseudo-statements could not arise. If
grammatical syntax differentiated not only the word-categories of nouns,
adjectives, verbs, conjunctions etc., but within each of these
categories made the further distinctions that are logically
indispensable, then no pseudo-statements could b'e formed. If, e.g.,
nouns were grammatically subdivided into several kinds of words,
according as they designated properties of physical objects, of numbers
etc., then the words "general",and "prime number" wnuld belong to
grammatically different word-categones, and (2) would be just as
linguistically incorrect as (1) . In a correctly constructed language,
therefore, all nonsensical sequences of words would be of the kind of
example (1) . Considerations of grammar would already eliminate them
as it were automatically; Le. in order to avoid nonsense, it would be
unnecessary to pay attention to the meanings of the individual words
over and above their syntactical type (their "syntactical
category," e.g. thing, property of things, relation between things,
number, property of numbers, relation between numbers, and so forth) .
It follows that if our thesis that the statements of metaphysics are
pseudo-statements is justifiable, then metaphysics could not even be
expressed if')a logically constructed language. This is the great
philosophical importance of the task, which at present occupi~s the
logicians, of building a logical syntax. -

5. METAPHYSICAL PSEUDO-STATEMENTS

Let us now take a look at some examples of metaphysical

pseudostatements of a kind where the violation of logical syntax is
especially obvious, though they accord with historical-grammatical
syntax. We select a few sentences from that metaphysical school
which at present exerts the strongest influence in Germany. [2]
"What is to be investigated is being only and--nothing else; being
alone and further--nothing, solely being, and beyond being--nothing. What
about this Nothing? . . . Does the Nothing exist only because the Not,
i.e. the Negation, exists? Or is it the other way around? Does Negation
and the Not exist only because the Nothing exists? . . . We assert: the
Nothing is prior to the Not and the Negation. . . . Where do we seek the
Nothing? How do we find the Nothing...We know the Nothing. . . . Anxiety
reveals the Nothing. . . . That for which and because of which we were
anxious, was 'really'--nothing. Indeed: the Nothing itself-as such-was
present. . . . What about this Nothing?- The Nothing itself nothings."
In order to show that the possibility of forming pseudo-statements is
based on a logical defect of language, we set up the schema below. The
sentences under I are grammatically as well as logically impeccable,
hence meaningful. The sentences under II (excepting B3) are in
grammatical respects perfectly analogous to those under I. Sentence form
IIA (as question and answer) does not, indeed, satisfy the
requirements to be imposed on a logically correct language. But it is
nevertheless meaningful, because it is translatable into correct
language. This is shown by sentence iliA, which has the same meaning as
IIA. Sentence form IIA then proves to be undesirable because we can be
led from it, by means of grammatically faultless operations, to the
meaningless sentence forms liB, which are taken from the above
quotation. These forms cannot even be constructed in the correct
language of Column III. Nonetheless, their nonsensicality is not obvious
at first glance, because one is easily deceived by the analogy with the
meaningful sentences lB. The fault of our language identified here lies,
therefore, in the circumstance that, in contrast to a logically correct
language, it admits of the same grammatical form for meaningful and
meaningless word sequences. To each sentence in words we have added a
corresponding formula in the
------------------------------------------
2. The following quotations (original italics) are taken from
M. Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik? 1929. We could just as well have
selected passages from any other of the numerous metaphysicians of the
present ar of the past; yet the selected passages seem to us to
illustrate our thesis especially well.
------------------------------------------------------.------------------------------------------------------
notation of symbolic logic; these formulae facilitate recognition
of the undesirable analogy between IA and IIA and therewith of the
origin of the meaningless constructions liB.

I. II. III.

Transition from

Meaningful Sense to
Sentences of Nonsense in Logically
 Ordinary Ordinary Correct
Language Language Language

A. What is outside? A. What is outside? A. There is

nothing
Ou (?) Ou (?) ( does not exist
Rain is outside Nothing is outside anything)
which is
Ou(r) Ou(no) outside.

-(Ex).Ou(x)

B. What about this rain? B. "What about this B. None of these

(Le. what does the Nothing?" ?(no) forms can even
rain do? or: what be constructed
else can be said
about this rain?
?(r)

1. We know the rain 1. "We seek the

K(r) Nothing"
"We find the
Nothing"
.We know the
Nothing"
K(no)

2. The rain rains 2. "The Nothing

. R(r) nothings"
No(no)
3. "The Nothing
exists only
because . . ."
Ex(no)

On closer inspection of the pseudo-statements under liB, we also

find some differences. The construction of sentence (1) is simply based
on the mistake of employing the word "nothing" as a noun because it is
customary in ordinary language to use it in this form in order to
construct a negative existential statement (see IIA) . In a correct
language, on the other hand, it is not a particular name but a certain
logical form of the sentence that serves this purpose (see iliA ) .
Sentence IIB2 adds something new, viz. the fabrication of the
meaningless word "to nothing." This sentence, therefore, is senseless
for a twofold reason. We pointed out before that the meaningless words
of metaphysics usually owe their origin to the fact that a meaningful
word is deprived of its meaning through its metaphorical use in
metaphysics. But here we confront one of those rare cases where a new
word is introduced which never had a meaning to begin with. Likewise
sentence IIB3 must be rejected for two reasons. In respect of the error
of using the word "nothing" as a noun, it is like the previous
sentences. But in addition it involves a contradiction. For even if it
were admissible to introduce "nothing" as a name or description of an
entity, still the existence of this entity would be denied in its very
definition, whereas sentence (3) goes on to affirm its existence. This
sentence, therefore, would be contradictory, hence absurd, even if it
were not already meaningless.
In view of the gross logical errors which we find in sentences liB, we
might be led to conjecture that perhaps the word "nothing" has in
Heidegger's treatise a meaning entirely different from the customary one.
And this presumption is further strengthened as we go on to read there
 that anxiety reveals the Nothing, that the Nothing itself is present as
such in anxiety. For here the word "nothing" seems to refer to a certain
emotional constitution, possibly of a religious sort, or something or
other that underlies such emotions. If such were the case, then the
mentioned logical errors in sentences 118would not be committed. But
the first sentence of the quotation at the beginning of this section
proves that this interpretation is not possible. The combination of
"only" and "nothing else" shows unmistakably that the word "nothing"
here has the usual meaning of a logical particle that serves for the
formulation of a negative existential statement. This introduction of
the word "nothing" is then immediately followed by the leading question
of the treatise: "What about ttiis Nothing?".
But our doubts as to a possible misinterpretation get completely
dissolved as we note that the author of the treatise is clearly aware of
the conflict between his questions and statements, and logic. "Question
and answer in regard to the Nothing are equally absurd in themselves. .
. . The fundamental rule of thinking commonly appealed to,.the law of
prohibited contradiction, general 'logic,' destroys this question." All
the worse for logic! We must abolish its sovereignty: "If thus the
power of the understanding in the field of questions concerning Nothing
and Being is broken, then the fate of the sovereignty of 'logic' within
philosophy is thereby decided as well. The very idea of 'logic'
dissolves in the whirl of a more basic questioning." But will sober
science condone the whirl of counterlogical questioning? To this
question too there is a ready answer: "The alleged sobriety and
superiority of science becomes ridiculous if it does not take the
Nothing seriously." Thus we find here a good confirmation of our thesis;
a metaphysician himself here states that his questions and answers are
irreconcilable with logic and the scientific way of thinking.
The difference between our thesis and that of the earlier
antimetaphysicians should now be clear. We do not regard metaphysics as
"mere speculation" or "fairy tales." The statements of a fairy tale do
not conflict with logic, but only with experience; they are perfectly
meaningful, although false. Metaphysics is not "superstition"; it is
possible to believe true and false propositions, but not to believe
meaningless sequences of words. Metaphysical statements are not even
acceptable as "working hypotheses'; for an hypothesis must be capable
of entering into relations of deducibility with (true or false) empirical
statements, which is just what pseudo-statements cannot do.
With reference to the so-called limitation of human knowledge an
attempt is sometimes made to save metaphysics by raising the following
objection: metaphysical statements are not, indeed, verifiable by man
nor by any other finite being; nevertheless they might be construed as
conjectures about the answers which a being with higher or even perfect
powers of knowledge would make to our questions, and as such conjectures
they would, after all, be meaningful. To counter this objection, let us
consider the following. If the meaning of a word cannot be specified, or
if the sequence of words does not accord with the rules of syntax, then
one has not even asked a question. (Just think of the pesudo-questions:
"Is this table teavy?", "is the number 7 holy?", "which numbers are
darker, the even or the odd ones?") . Where there is no question, not
even an omniscient being can give an answer. Now the objector may say:
just as one who can see may communicate new knowledge to the blind, so a
higher being might perhaps communicate to us metaphysical knowledge,
e.g. whether the visible world is the manifestation of a spirit. Here we
must reflect on the meaning of "new knowledge." It is, indeed,
conceivable that we might encounter animals who tell us about a new
sense. If these beings were to prove to us Fermat's theorem or were to
invent a new physical instrument or were to establish a hitherto unknown
law of nature, then our knowledge would be increased with their help.
For this sort of thing we can test, just the way even a blind man can
understand and test the whole of physics (and therewith any statement
made by those who can see) . But if those hypothetical beings tell us
something which we cannot verify, then we cannot understand it either;
in that case no information has been communicated to us, but mere verbal
sounds devoid of meaning though possibly associated with images. It
follows that our knowledge can only be quantitatively enlarged by other
beings, no matter whether they know more or less or everything, but no
knowledge of an essentially different kind can be added. What we do not
know for certain, we may come to know with greater certainty through the
assistance of other beings; but what is 'unintelligible, meaningless
for us, cannot become meaningful through someone else's assistance,
however vast his knowledge might be. Therefore no god and no devil can
give us metaphysical knowledge.

6. MEANINGLESSNESS OF ALL METAPHYSICS

The examples of metaphysical statements which we have analyzed

were all taken from just one treatise. But our results apply with equal
validity, in part even in verbally identical ways, to other metaphysical
systems. That treatise is completely in the right in citing approvingly
a statement by Hegel ("pure Being and pure Nothing, therefore, are one
and the same" ) . The metaphysics of Hegel has exactly the same logical
character as this modern system of metaphysics. And the same holds for
the rest of the metaphysical systems, though the kind of phraseology and
therewith the kind of logical errors that occur in them deviate more or
less from the kind that occurs in the examples we discussed.
It should not be necessary here to adduce further examples of specific
metaphysical sentences in diverse systems and submit them to analysis.
We confine ourselves to an indication of the most frequent kinds of
errors.
Perhaps the majority of the logical mistakes that are committed when
pseudo-statements are made, are based on the logical faults infecting
the use of the word "to be" in our language (and of the corresponding
words in other languages, at least in most European languages) . The
first fault is the ambiguity of the word "to be." It is sometimes used
as copula prefixed to a predicate ( "I am hungry" ) sometimes to
designate existence ("I am") . This mistake is aggravated by the fact
that metaphysicians often are not clear about this ambiguity. The second
fault lies in the form of the verb in its second meaning, the meaning of
existence. The verbal form feigns a predicate where there is none. To be
sure it has been known for a long time that existence is not a property
(cf. Kant's refutation of the ontological proof of the existence of God).
But it was not until the advent of modern logic that full consistency
on this point was reached: the syntactical form in which modern logic
introduces the sign for existence is such that it cannot, like a
predicate, be applied to signs for objects, but only to predicates (cf.
e.g. sentence iliA in the above table). Most metaphysicians since
antiquity have allowed themselves to be seduced into pseudo-statements
by the verbal, and therewith the predicative form of the word "to be,"
. .
e.g. "I am," "God is."
We meet an illustration of this error in Descartes' "cogito, ergo
sum." Let us disregard here the material objections that have been
raised against the premise--viz. whether the sentence "I think"
adequately expresses the intended state of affairs or contains perhaps
an hypostasis--and consider the two sentences only from the formal-
logical point of view. We notice at once two essential logical mistakes.
The first lies in the conclusion "( am." The verb "to be" is undoubtedly
meant in the sense of existence here; for a copula cannot be used
without predicate; indeed, Descartes' "I am" has always been interpreted
in this sense. But in that case this sentence violates the above-
mentioned logical rule that existence can be predicated only in
 conjunction with a predicate, not in conjunction with a name (subject,
proper name) . An existential statement does not have the form "a
exists" (as in "I am,. Le. "I exist"), but "there exists something of
such and such a kind." The second error lies in the transition from "I
think" to "I exist." If from the statement !'P(a)" ("a has the property
pOI) an existential statement is to be deduced, Then the latter can
assert existence only with respect to the predicate P, not with respect
to the subject a of the premise. What follows from "I am a European" is
not "I exist," but "a European exists." What follows from "I think" is
not "I am" but "there exists something that thinks."
The circumstance that our languages express existence by a verb
("to be" or "to exist") is not in itself a logical fault; it is only
inappropriate, dangerous. The verbal form easily misleads us into the
\ misconceptionthat existenceis a predicate. One then arrives at such
logically incorrect and hence senseless modes of expression as were just
examined. Likewise such forms as "Being" or "Not-Being," which from time
immemorial have played a great role in metaphysics, have the same
origin. In a logically correct language such forms cannot even be
constructed. It appears that in the Latin and the German languages the
forms "ens" or "das Seiende" were, perhaps under the seductive influence
of the Greek example, introduced specifically for use by metaphysicians;
in this way the language deteriorated logically whereas the addition
was believed to represent an improvement.
Another very frequent violation of logical syntax is the s6-called
"type confusion" of concepts. While the previously mentioned mistake
consists in the predicative use of a symbol with non-predicative meaning,
in this case a predicate is, indeed, used as predicate yet as predicate
of a different type. We have here a violation of the rules of the so-
called theory of types. An artificial example is the sentence we
discussed earlier: "Caesar is a prime number." Names of persons and
names of numbers belong to different logical types, and so do accordingly
predicates of persons (e.g. "general" ) and predicates of numbers
("prime number" ) . The error of type confusion is, unlike the previously
discussed usage of the verb ''to be," not the prerogative of metaphysics
but already occurs very otten in conversational language also. But here
it rarely leads to nonsense. The typical ambiguity of words is here of
such a kind that it can be easily removed.

Example: 1 . "This table is larger than that." 2. "The height of

this table is larger than the height of that table." Here the word
"larger" is used in ( 1 ) for a relation between objects,. in (2) for
a relation between numbers, hence for two distinct syntactical
categories. The mistake is here unimportant; it could, e.g.,
be eliminated by writing "larger1" and "larger2"; "larger1" is then
defined in terms of "larger2" by declaring statement form (1)
to be synonymous with (2) (and others of a similar kind) .
Since the confusion of types causes no harm in conversational
language, it is usually ignored entirely. This is, indeed, expedient for
the ordinary use of language, but has had unfortunate consequences in
metaphysics. Here the conditioning by everyday language has led to
confusions of types which, unlike those in everyday language, are no
longer translatable into logically correct form. Pseudo-statements of
this kind are encountered in especially large quantity, e.g., in the
writings of Hegel and Heidegger. The latter has adopted many
peculiarities of the Hegelian idiom along with their logical faults
(e.g. predicates which should be applied to objects of a certain sort
are instead applied to predicates of these objects or to "being" or to
"existence" or to a relation between these objects) .
Having found that many metaphysical statements are meaningless, we
confront the question whether there is not perhaps a core of meaningful
statements in metaphysics which would remain after elimination of all the
meaningless ones.
Indeed, the results we have obtained so far might give rise to the
view that there are many dangers of falling into nonsense in
metaphysics, and that one must accordingly endeavor to avoid these traps
with great care if one wants to do metaphysics. But actually the
situation is that meaningful metaphysical statements are impossible.
This follows from the task which metaphysics sets itself: to discover
and formulate a kind of knowledge which is not accessible to empirical
- ~
science.
We have seen earlier that the meaning of a statement lies in the
method of its verification. A statement asserts only so much as is
-
verifiable with respect to it. Therefore a sentence can be used only to
assert an empirical proposition, if indeed it is used to assert anything
at aiL If something were to lie, in principle, beyond possible
experience, it could be neither said nor thought nor asked.
Meaningful statements are divided into the following kinds. First
there are statements which are true solely by virtue of their form
("tautologies" according to Wittgenstein; they correspond approximately
to Kant's "analytic judgments"). They say nothing about reality.
The formulae of logic and mathematics are of this kind. They are not
themselves factual statements, but serve for the transformation of such
statements. Secondly there are the negations of such statements
("contradictions'). They are self-contradictory, hence false by
virtue of their form. With respect to all other statements the decision
about truth or falsehood lies in the protocol sentences. They are
therefore (true or faise) empirical statements and belong to the domain
of empirical science. Any statement one desires to construct which does
not fall within these categories becomes automatically meaningless.
Since metaphysics does not want to assert analytic propositions, nor to
fall within the domain of empirical science, it is compelled to employ
words for which no criteria of application are specified and which are
therefore devoid of sense, or else to combine meaningful words in such a
way that neither an analytic (or contradictory) statement nor an
empirical statement is produced. In either case pseudo-statements are
the inevitable product.
Logical analysis, then, pronounces the verdict of meaninglessness on
any alleged knowledge that pretends to reach above or behind experience.
This verdict hits, in the first place, any speculative metaphysics, any
alleged knowledge by pure thinking or by pure intuition that pretends to
be able to do without experience. But the verdict equally applies to the
kind of metaphysics which, starting from experience, wants to acquire
knowledge about that which transcends experience by means of special
inferences (e.g. the neo-vitalist thesis of the directive presence of an
"entelechy" in organic processes, which supposedly cannot be understood
in terms of physics; the question concerning the "essence of
causa.lity," transcending the ascertainment of certain regularities of
succession; the talk about the "thing in itself") . Further, the same
judgment must be passed on all philosophy of norms, or philosophy of
value, on any ethics or esthetics as a normative discipline. 'For the
objective validity of a value or norm is (even on the view of the
philosophers of value) not empiricaily verifiable nor deducible from
empirical statements; hence it cannot be asserted (in a meaningful
statement) at all.. In other words: Either empirical criteria are
indicated for the use of "good" and "beautiful" and the rest of the
predicates that are employed in the normative sciences, or they are not.
In the first case, a statement containing such a predicate turns into a
factual judgment, but not a value judgment; in the second case, it
becomes a pseudo-statement. It is altogether unpossible to make a
statement that expresses a value judgment.
Finally, the verdict of meaninglessness also hits those metaphysical
movements whieh are usually called, improperly, epistemological
movements, that is realism (insofar as it claims to say more than the
empirical fact that the sequence of events exhibits a certain
regularity, which makes the application of the inductive method possible)
and its opponents: subjective idealism, solipsism, phenomenalism, and
positivism (in the earlier sense) . .
But what, then, is left over for philosophy, if all statements
whatever that assert something are of an empirical nature and belong to
factual science? What remains is not statements, nor a theory, nor a
system, but only a method: the method of logical analysis. The
foregoing discussion has illustrated the negative application of this
method: in that context it serves to eliminate meaningless words,
meaningless pseudo-statements. In its positive use it serves to clarify
meaningful concepts and propositions, to lay logical foundations for
factual science and for mathematics. The negative application of the
method is necessary and unportant in the present historical situation.
But even in its present practice, the positive application is more
fertile. We cannot here discuss it in greater detail. It is the
indicated task of logical analysis, inquiry into logical foundations,
that is meant by "scientific philosophy' in contrast to metaphysics.
The question regarding the logical character of the statements which
we obtain as the result of a logical analysis, e.g. the statements
occurring in this and other logical papers, can here be answered only
tentatively: such statements are partly analytic, partly empirical. For
these statements about statements and parts of statements belong in part
to pure metalogic (e.g. "a sequence consisting of the existence-symbol
and a noun, is not a sentence"), in part to descriptive metalogic
(e.g. "the word sequence at such and such a place in such and such a
book is meaningless" ) . Metalogic will be discussed elsewhere. It will
also be shown there that the metalogic which speaks about the sentences
of a given language can be formulated in that very language itself.

7.MET APHYSICS AS EXPRESSION OF

AN ATTITUDE TOWARD LIFE

Our claim that the statements of metaphysics are entirely

meaningless, that they do not assert anything, will leave even those
who agree intellectually with our results with a painful feeling of
strangeness: how could it be explained that so many men in all ages and
nations, among them eminent minds, spent so much energy, nay veritable
fervor, on metaphysics if the latter consisted of nothing but mere words,
nonsensically juxtaposed? And how could one account for the fact that
metaphysical books have exerted such a strong influence on readers up to
the present day, if they contained not even errors, but nothing at all?
These doubts are justified since metaphysics does indeed have a content;
only it is not theoretical content. The (pseudo )statements of
metaphysics do not serve for the description of states of affairs,
neither existing ones (in that case they would be true statements) nor
non-existing ones (in that case they would be at least false statements).
They serve for the expression of the general attitude of a person
towards life ( "Iebenseinstellung, Lebensgefuhl").
Perhaps we may assume that metaphysics originated from mythology.
The child is angry at the "wicked table" which hurt him. Primitive man
endeavors to conciliate the threatening demon of earthquakes, or he
worships the deity of the fertile rains in gratitude. Here we confront
personifications of natural phenomena, which are the quasi-poetic
expression of man's emotional relationship to his environment. The
heritage of mythology is bequeathed on the one hand to poetry, which
produces and intensifies the effects of mythology on life in a deliberate
way; on the other hand, it is handed down to theology, which develops
mythology into a system. Which, now, is the historical role of
 metaphysics? Perhaps we may regard it as a substitute for theology on
the level of systematic, conceptual thinking. The (supposedly)
transcendent sources of knowledge of theology are here replaced by
natural, yet supposedly trans-empirical sources of knowledge. On closer
inspection the same content as that of mythology is here still
recognizable behind the repeatedly varied dressing: we find that
metaphysics also arises from the need to give expression to a man's
attitude in life, his emotional and volitional reaction to the
environment, to society, to the tasks to which he devotes himself, to
the misfortunes that befall him. This attitude manifests itself,
unconsciously as a rule, in everything a man does or says. It also
impresses itself on his facial features, perhaps even on the character
of his gait. Many people, now, feel a desire to create over and above
these manifestations a special expression of their attitude, through
which it might become visible in a more succinct and penetrating way.
If they have artistic talent they are able to express themselves by
producing a work of art. Many writers have already clarified the way in
which the basic attitude is manifested through the style and manner of a
work of art (e.g. Dilthey and his students). [In this connection the
term "world view" ("Weltanschauung" ) is often used; we prefer to avoid
it bi;cause of its ambiguity, which blurs the difference between attitude
and theory a difference which is of decisive importance for our
analysis.] What is here essential for our considerations is only the
fact that art is an adequate, metaphysics an inadequate means for the
expression of the basic attitude. Of course, there need be no intrinsic
objection to one's using any means of expression one likes. But in the
case of metaphysics we find this situation: through the form of its
works it pretends to be something that it is not. The form in question
is that of a system of statements which are apparently related as
premises and conclusions, that is, the form of a theory. In this way the
fiction of theoretical content is generated, whereas, as we have seen,
there is no such content. It is not only the reader, but the
metaphysician himself who suffers from the illusion that the metaphysical
statements say something, describe states of affairs. The metaphysician
believes that he travels in territory in which truth and falsehood are at
stake. In reality, however, he has not asserted anything, but only
expressed something, like an artist. That the metaphysician is thus
deluding himself cannot be inferred from the fact that he selects
language ~s the medium of expression and declarative sentences as the
form of expression; for lyrical poets do the same without succumbing to
.
self-delusion.But the metaphysiciansupports his statementsby
arguments, he claims assent to their content, he polemicizes against
metaphysicians of divergent persuasion by attempting to refute their
assertions in his treatise. Lyrical poets, on the other hand, do not try
to refute in their poem the statements in a poem by some other lyrical
poet; for they know they are in the domain of art and not in the domain
of theory.
Perhaps music is the purest means of expression of the basic attitude
because it is entirely free from any reference to objects. The
harmonious feeling or attitude, which the metaphysician tries to express
in a monistic system, is more clearly expressed in the music of Mozart.
And when a metaphysician gives verbal expression to his dualistic-heroic
attitude towards life in a dualistic system, is it not perhaps because
he lacks the ability of a Beethoven to express this attitude in an
adequate medium? Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability.
Instead they have a strong inclination to work within the medium of
the theoretical, to connect concepts and thoughts. Now, instead of
activating, on the one hand, this inclination in the domain of science,
and satisfying, on the other hand, the need for expression in art, the
metaphysician confuses the two and produces a structure which achieves
nothing for knowledge and something inadequate for the expression of
attitude.
Our conjecture that metaphysics is a substitute, albeit an inadequate
one, for art, seems to be further confirmed by the fact that the
metaphysician who perhaps had artistic talent to the highest degree,
viz. Nietzsche, almost entirely avoided the error of that confusion. A
large part of his work has predominantly empirical ~ontent. We find
there, for instance, historical analyses of specific artistic phenomena,
or an historical-psychological analysis of morals. In the work, however,
in which he expresses most strongly that which others express through
metaphysics or ethics, in Thus Spake Zarathustra, he does not choose the
misleading theoretical form, but openly the form of art, of poetry.

REMARKS BY THE AUTHOR ( 1957 )

To section 1, "metaphysics. "This term is used in this paper,

as usually in Europe, for the field of alleged knowiedge of the essence
of things which transcends the realm of empirically founded, inductive
science. Metaphysics in this sense includes systems like those of
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger. But it does not include
endeavors towards a synthesis and generalization of the results of the
various sciences.
To section I, "meaning. "Today we distinguish various kinds of
meaning, in particvlar cognitive (designative, referential) meaning on
the one hand, and non-cognitive (expressive) meaning components,
e.g. emotive and motivative, on the other. In the present paper, the
word "meaning" is always understood in the sense of "cognitive meaning."
The thesis that the sentences of metaphysics are meaningless, is thus to
be understood in the sense that they have no cognitive meaning, no
assertive content. The obvious psychological fact that they have
expressive meaning is thereby not denied; this is explicitly stated in
Section 7.
To section 6, "metalogic. "This term refers to the theory of
expressions of a language and, in particular, of their logical
relations. Today we would distinguish between logical syntax as the
theory of purely formal relations and semantics as the theory of meaning
.
and truth conditions.
To section 6, realismand idealism.That both the affirmative and the
negative theses concerning the reality of the external world are
pseudostatements, I have tried to show in the monograph Scheinprobleme
in der Philosophie: Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit, Berlin,
1928. The similar nature of the ontological theses about the reality or
unreality of abstract entities, e.g., properties, relations,
propositions, is discussed in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,"
Revue Intern. de Philos. 4, 1950, 20-40, reprinted in: Meaning and
Necessity, second edition, Chicago, 1956.