Safe Schools

THE FINAL REPORT AND
FINDINGS OF THE
SAFE SCHOOL
INITIATIVE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE PREVENTION OF
SCHOOL ATTACKS IN
THE UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
May 2002
THE FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS
OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF
SCHOOL ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

AND
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
by
Bryan Vossekuil
Director
National Violence Prevention and Study Center
Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.

Director
National Violence Prevention and Study Center
Marisa Reddy, Ph.D.

Chief Research Psychologist and Research Coordinator
National Threat Assessment Center
U.S. Secret Service
Randy Borum, Psy.D.

Associate Professor
University of South Florida
William Modzeleski
Director
Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program
U.S. Department of Education
Washington, D. C.
May 2002
i
SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE FINAL REPORT
JOINT MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, AND THE DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET SERVICE
Littleton, Colorado; Springfield, Oregon; West Paducah, Kentucky; Jonesboro,

Arkansas. These communities have become familiar to many Americans as the
locations where school shootings have occurred in recent years. School shootings
are a rare, but significant, component of school violence in America. It is clear that
other kinds of problems are far more common than the targeted attacks that have
taken place in schools across this country. However, each school-based attack has
had a tremendous and lasting effect on the school in which it occurred, the
surrounding community, and the nation as a whole. In the aftermath of these tragic
events, educators, law enforcement officials, mental health professionals, parents,
and others have asked: "Could we have known that these attacks were being
planned?" and, "What can be done to prevent future attacks from occurring?"
In June 1999, following the attack at Columbine High School, our two agencies--the
U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education--launched a collaborative
effort to begin to answer these questions. The result was the Safe School Initiative,
an extensive examination of 37 incidents of targeted school shootings and school
attacks that have occurred in the United States beginning with the earliest identified
incident in 1974 through June 2000. The focus of the Safe School Initiative was on
examining the thinking, planning, and other behaviors engaged in by students who
carried out school attacks. Particular attention was given to identifying pre-attack
behaviors and communications that might be detectable--or "knowable"--and could
help in preventing some future attacks.
ii
PREFACE
The Safe School Initiative was implemented through the Secret Service’s National
Threat Assessment Center and the Department of Education’s Safe and Drug-Free
Schools Program. The Initiative drew from the Secret Service’s experience in
studying and preventing assassination and other types of targeted violence and the
Department of Education’s expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through
the creation of safe environments for students, faculty, and staff.
This document, the Safe School Initiative’s final report, details how our two agencies
studied school-based attacks and what we found. Some of the findings may surprise
you. It is clear that there is no simple explanation as to why these attacks have
occurred. Nor is there a simple solution to stop this problem. But the findings of
the Safe School Initiative do suggest that some future attacks may be preventable, if
those responsible for safety in schools know what questions to ask and where to
uncover information that may help with efforts to intervene before a school attack
can occur.
Since it began in June 1999, our partnership has been a tremendous asset to each of
our respective agencies and vital to the success of this study. It is our hope that the
information we present in this final report is useful to those of you on the front lines
of this problem–the administrators, educators, law enforcement officials, and others
with protective responsibilities in schools–and to anyone concerned with children’s
safety. We encourage all of you in your ef forts to keep our nation’s children safe in
school and hope this report helps you in those efforts.
Rod Paige Brian L. Stafford

Secretary Director
U.S. Department of Education U.S. Secret Service
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education are grateful to many
agencies and individuals for their assistance in planning and carrying out the Safe
School Initiative. First and foremost, the authors of this report owe a debt of
gratitude to the representatives of the numerous law enforcement and criminal
justice agencies that permitted Secret Service personnel to review investigative files
on the school attacks in their respective communities; provided other key
information and materials about these attacks; and assisted and supported Secret
Service personnel in seeking permission to interview 10 attackers. Moreover, the
authors are grateful to the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs’
National Institute of Justice for providing critical financial support that helped make
the study possible.
In addition, Secret Service and Department of Education personnel benefited

substantially from the contributions of several law enforcement, behavioral science
and mental health professionals whose collective experience and expertise helped to
inform the development of the project plan and research design. In alphabetical
order, these individuals are: Gerardo Blue, Frederick Calhoun, Charles Ewing,
Michael Gelles, Dennis McCarthy, Edward Mulvey, William Pollack, Larry Porte,
Pam Robbins, Raymond Smyth, Sara Strizzi and Andrew Vita.
This project would not have been possible without the support and guidance that the
authors received from se veral key officials and personnel at the Department of
Education and the Secret Service. Absent the expertise and insights of these
individuals, the Secret Service’s experience in researching and preventing targeted
violence could not have been translated into a useful study of targeted school
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
violence. At the Department of Education, these individuals are: Secretary of

Education Rod Paige, former Secretary of Education Richard Riley and Connie
Deshpande. Secret Service of ficials who provided guidance and support for this
project are: Director Brian Stafford, Assistant Director Terry Samway, Deputy
Assistant Directors Bob Byers and Tom Riopelle, Special Agent in Charge George
Luczko and Resident Agent in Charge John Berglund. Special thanks are extended
to Social Science Research Specialist Karissa Kumm who assisted with project data
collection and was instrumental in organizing information from the Safe School
Initiative kick-off meeting. Our thanks go also to Dean Terry, Michael Gelles and
Marty Allen for providing extensive assistance with project data collection.
The authors extend special thanks to Assistant Director Barbara Riggs, Office of
Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service, for her support of the Safe School Initiative
and the National Threat Assessment Center.
The authors wish to thank Assistant Special Agent in Charge Matt Doherty, Assistant
to the Special Agent in Charge Cindy Rubendall and Special Agent Ignacio Zamora
for giving generously of their time in reviewing earlier drafts of this document, and
former Special Agent Nancy Fogarty, Social Science Research Specialists Derricka
Dean and Megan Williams and interns Marissa Savastana, Becca Norwick and
Colleen Spokis for their invaluable assistance with data collection, data entry and
project management.
Finally, the Secret Service and the Department of Education gratefully acknowledge
the contributions of Paul Kelly and Gwen Holden of the Nauset Group, whose
insightful observations and comments helped to shape the Final Report. Special
thanks go out to Gwen Holden, who edited the Final Report.
Bryan Vossekuil
Robert Fein
Marisa Reddy
Randy Borum
William Modzeleski
Washington, D.C.
May 2002
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION: THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE . . . . . . . . .1

The Safe School Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Defining "Targeted" School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
The Secret Service Threat Assessment Approach . . . . . . . . . . . .4
The Prevalence of Violence in American Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
The Study Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Sources of Information on Incidents of
Targeted School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Coding of Primary Source Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Analysis of Responses to the Coded Study Questions . . . . . . . .10
Organization of the Final Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Overview of Safe School Initiative Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
CHAPTER II: CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENTS OF

TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Target and Victim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
CHAPTER III: FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE . . . . . . . . . . .17

Characterizing the Attacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Conceptualizing the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Signaling the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Advancing the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
Resolving the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
CHAPTER IV: IMPLICATIONS OF SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

FINDINGS FOR THE PREVENTION OF
TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
The Implications of Key Study Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION: THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A

PROMISING STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING
SCHOOL VIOLENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
Threat Assessment and Targeted School Violence Prevention . . . 41
APPENDIX A: INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE,

BY STATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
APPENDIX B: INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE,

BY YEAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
APPENDIX C: RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
CONTACT INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
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viii
CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:
THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

Littleton, Colorado; Springfield, Oregon; West Paducah, Kentucky; Jonesboro,

Arkansas. These communities have become familiar to many Americans as among
the locations of those schools where shootings have occurred nationwide in recent
years. In the aftermath of these tragic events, educators, law enforcement officials,
mental health professionals and parents have pressed for answers to two central
questions: "Could we have known that these attacks were being planned?" and, if so,
"What could we have done to prevent these attacks from occurring?"
This publication, The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative:
Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States, is a recent
product of an ongoing collaboration between the U. S. Secret Service and the U. S.
Department of Education to begin to answer these questions.1 It is the culmination
of an extensive examination of 37 incidents of targeted school violence that occurred
in the United States from December 1974 through May 2000. 2
The
Following the attack at Columbine High School in April 1999, the Secret Service and
the Department of Education initiated, in June 1999, a study of the thinking,
planning and other pre-attack behaviors engaged in by attackers who carried out
school shootings. That study, the Safe School Initiative, was pursued under a
partnership between the Secret Service and the Department of Education, and
implemented through the Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center and
the Department of Education’s Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program. In its
execution, the Safe School Initiative drew from the Secr et Service’s experience in
studying and preventing targeted violence and from the Department of Education’s
expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through the creation of safe
environments for students, faculty and staff.
The objective of the Safe School Initiative was to attempt to identify information that
could be obtainable, or "knowable," prior to an attack. That information would then
be analyzed and evaluated to produce a factual, accurate knowledge base on targeted
school attacks. This knowledge could be used to help communities across the
country to formulate policies and strategies aimed at preventing school-based attacks.
Key features of the Safe School Initiative were its focus on "targeted" school violence
and its adaptation of earlier Secret Service research on assassination for its
examination of incidents of school-based attacks.
1
This report is an update and expansion of the earlier Interim Report on the Prevention of Targeted
Violence in Schools, which was released in October 2000. This Final Report supercedes the Interim Report
and should be used and referenced in place of the Interim Report.
2
See Section I, "INTRODUCTION: THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE, Methodology," for a discussion of the
approach used by the Secret Service to identify incidents of school-based attacks.
3
The Safe School Initiative examined incidents of "targeted violence" in school

settings–school shootings and other school-based attacks where the school was
deliberately selected as the location for the attack and was not simply a random site
of opportunity. The term "targeted violence" evolved from the Secret Service’s five-
year study of the behavior of individuals who have carried out, or attempted, lethal
attacks on public of ficials or prominent individuals. That study, the Secret Service’s
Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP), was initiated in 1992 under funding provided
by the U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs’ National Institute of
Justice.
The focus of the ECSP study was an operational analysis of the thinking and behavior
of those who have assassinated, attacked or tried to attack a national public official
or public figure in the United States since 1949. The ECSP defined "targeted
violence" as any incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a
particular target prior to their violent attack.3 The purpose of the ECSP was to
generate a better understanding of attacks against public officials that, in turn, would
help Secret Service agents in their investigations of threats toward the president and
others they protect and in the prevention of harm to these protected officials.4
The ECSP sought to identify what information might be knowable prior to an attack
and to better enable intervention before an attack occurred. Findings from the ECSP
helped to dispel several myths and misconceptions about assassination.
In addition to the ECSP’s particular focus on incidents involving attacks on public

officials and prominent individuals, other types of violence in which a victim is
targeted specifically include assassinations, stalking, some forms of domestic
violence, some types of workplace violence, and some types of school violence. In
the case of targeted school violence, the target may be a specific individual, such as a
particular classmate or teacher, or a group or category of individuals, such as "jocks"
or "geeks." The target may even be the school itself.
The findings of the ECSP also led to the Secret Service’s development of a more
thorough and focused process for conducting threat assessment investigations. As
part of its mission, the Secret Service is responsible for protecting the president and
vice president of the United States and their families and certain national and
3
Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G. (1995). Threat assessment: An approach to prevent targeted
violence. National Institute of Justice: Research in Action, 1-7.
4
Fein, R., & Vossekuil, B. (1999). Assassination in the United States: An operational study of recent
assassins, attackers, and near-lethal approachers. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 44, 321-333.
4
international leaders, all of whom are referred to as "protectees." The Secret Service
provides this protection by means of two distinct yet complementary strategies: the
use of physical measures--including magnetometers, armored vehicles, perimeters of
armed agents, and canine units--that are designed to both deter potential attacks and
serve as protective barriers in the event someone tries to attack; and a second, far
less visible component known as threat assessment.
Threat assessment is a process of identifying, assessing and managing the threat that
certain persons may pose to Secret Service protectees. The goal of threat assessment
is to intervene before an attack can occur. The threat assessment process involves
three principal steps–all before the person has the opportunity to attack:
• identifying individuals who have the idea or intent of attacking a Secret

Service protectee;
• assessing whether the individual poses a risk to a protectee, after gathering
sufficient information from multiple sources; and,
• managing the threat the individual poses, in those cases where the individual
investigated is determined to pose a threat.
The Secret Service considers threat assessment to be as important to preventing

targeted violence as the physical measures it employs.
In 1998, the Secret Service established the National Threat Assessment Center, an
entity within the Secret Service that is dedicated to continuing efforts agency-wide to
better understand and prevent targeted violence, and to share this developing
knowledge with other constituencies responsible for public safety and violence
prevention. Adaptation of its threat assessment protocols for use in addressing the
problem of school-based attacks is the most recent of the Secret Service’s initiatives
to share this body of knowledge and expertise with other constituencies engaged in
developing strategies to address targeted violence issues. In the late 1990s, the
Secret Service and the Justice Department’s National Institute of Justice joined forces
to make information on the Secret Service’s threat assessment protocols available to
a wider law enforcement audience. Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment
Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, released in
July 1998, offers state and local police officials insights into the elements of carrying
out and evaluating the findings of threat assessment investigations.5
In addition, since the release of the Safe School Initiative Interim Report in October
2000, personnel from the Secret Service and the Department of Education have
given over 100 seminars and briefings on the study to thousands of educators, law
5
Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. (1998). Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for
State and Local Law Enforcement Officials. U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
National Institute of Justice: Washington, D.C.
5
enforcement officials, mental health professionals and others across the United
States. Several questions and discussion points raised by seminar attendees have
been addressed in this final report.
Finally, the Department of Education and the Secret Service cur rently are completing
work on a guide to investigating and responding to threats in schools. The guide is
scheduled for publication in 2002. The guide will include recommendations for
investigating and evaluating threats and other behaviors of concern in school;
address considerations for developing policies and capacity to support threat
assessment efforts in schools; and provide suggestions for approaches schools can
adopt to foster school environments that reduce threats of targeted violence.
The Prevalence of Violence in American Schools
Public policymakers, school administrators, police officials and parents continue to

search for explanations for the targeted violence that occur red at Columbine High
School and other schools across the country, and seek assurance that similar
incidents will not be repeated at educational institutions in their communities. While
the quest for solutions to the problem of targeted school violence is of critical
importance, reports from the Department of Education, the Justice Department and
other sources indicate that few children are likely to fall prey to life-threatening
violence in school settings. 6
To put the problem of targeted school-based attacks in context, from 1993 to 1997
the odds that a child in grades 9-12 would be threatened or injured with a weapon in
school were 7 to 8 percent, or 1 in 13 or 14; the odds of getting into a physical fight
at school were 15 percent, or 1 in 7.7 In contrast, the odds that a child would die in
school–by homicide or suicide–are, fortunately, no greater than 1 in 1 million.8 In
1998, students in grades 9-12 were the victims of 1.6 million thefts and 1.2 million
nonfatal violent crimes, while in this same period 60 school-associated violent deaths
were reported for this student population. 9
6
See, for example, Kaufman, P., et. al. (2000). Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2000. U. S.
Department of Education (NCES 2001-017) and U. S. Department of Justice (NCJ-184176): Washington,
D. C. Online Vers.: http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubinfo.asp?pubid=2001017; Anderson, M., et. al.
(2001). School-associated Violent Deaths in the United States, 1994-1999. Journal of the American
Medical Association, 286, 2695-2702; and, National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, Committee
on Law and Justice and Board on Children, Youth, and Families. (2001). Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice.
Panel on Juvenile Crime: Prevention, Treatment, and Control. McCord, J., et. al. (Eds.). National Academy
Press: Washington, D.C.
7
Snyder, H.N., & Sickmund, M. (1999). Juvenile offenders and victims: 1999 National Report.
Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.
Available online at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/index.html.
8
U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice (1999). 1999 Annual Report on School
Safety. Washington, D.C.: Authors.
9
Ibid.
6
The findings of the Safe School Initiative’s extensive search for recorded incidents of
targeted school-based attacks underscore the rarity of lethal attacks in school
settings. The Department of Education reports that nearly 60 million children
attend the nation’s 119,000+ schools. 10 The combined efforts of the Secret Service
and the Department of Education identified 37 incidents of targeted school-based
attacks, committed by 41 individuals over a 25-year period.11
Nevertheless, the impact of targeted school-based attacks cannot be measured in

statistics alone. While it is clear that other kinds of problems in American schools are
far more common than the targeted violence that has taken place in schools in this
country, the high-profile shootings that have occurred in schools over the past decade
have resulted in increased fear among students, parents and educators. School
shootings are a rare, but significant, component of the problem of school violence.
Each school-based attack has had a tremendous and lasting effect on the school in
which it occurred, the surrounding community and the nation as a whole. In the
wake of these attacks, fear of future targeted school violence has become a driving
force behind the ef forts of school officials, law enforcement professionals and
parents to identify steps that can be taken to prevent incidents of violence in their
schools.
Methodology
The Secret Service and the Department of Education began work on the Safe School
Initiative study in June 1999. Research protocols employed in carrying out and
analyzing the findings of this work reflect an adaptation of the ECSP operational
approach to examining targeted attacks against public officials and prominent
individuals. Researchers used a similar operational focus for the Safe School
Initiative to develop information that could be useful to schools in better
understanding and preventing targeted violence in school settings. The emphasis of
the study was on examining the attackers’ pre-incident thinking and behavior, to
explore information that could aid in preventing future attacks.
For the purposes of this study, an incident of targeted school violence was defined as
any incident where (i) a current student or recent former student attacked someone
at his or her school with lethal means (e.g., a gun or knife); and, (ii) where the
student attacker purposefully chose his or her school as the location of the attack.
Consistent with this definition, incidents where the school was chosen simply as a
site of opportunity, such as incidents that were solely related to gang or drug trade
activity or to a violent interaction between individuals that just happened to occur at
the school, were not included.
10
U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics (2002). Digest of Education
Statistics 2000; Washington D.C.: Authors
11
Supra note 2.
7
Under the study’s research strategy, each incident of targeted violence was assigned
to a study review team comprised of criminal investigators and social science
researchers. At least two reviewers were assigned to each incident.
The Secret Service and the Department of Education made every effort to ensure
that the Safe School Initiative would produce information that would be useful for
school administrators, educators, law enforcement officials and others working with
schools. To that end, researchers consulted regularly with experts in the fields of
education, school violence and juvenile homicide, among others, in the course of
developing the study design and protocols. Feedback from these various experts was
incorporated into the final study design.
Researchers from the Secr et Service and the Department of Education initiated their
study of targeted school violence with an extensive search for information that would
identify incidents of targeted school violence that have occurred in the United States.
Beginning with June 2000 and working back in time, researchers explored all
relevant, searchable databases maintained in the public domain or available by
subscription, such as public news databases and professional publications, to identify
incidents meeting the definition of the study population. Researchers also consulted
with law enforcement officials and school violence experts to develop leads on
incidents of school violence that might meet the criteria for inclusion in the study
constituency.
In the end, researchers identified 37 incidents of targeted school violence involving

41 attackers that occurred in the United States from 1974, the year in which the
earliest incident identified took place, through June 2000, when data collection for
the study was completed.12 The school-based attacks included in the Safe School
Initiative represent all of the incidents of targeted school violence meeting the study
criteria that Secret Service and Department of Education researchers were able to
identify in that time frame.
Information on each incident of targeted school violence identified by Secret Service

and Department of Education researchers was drawn principally from primary
12
It is possible that incidents of targeted school violence other than those identified by Safe School Initiative
researchers might have occurred prior to the 1974 incident included in the study, or between 1974 and
the completion of data collection for the study in June 2000. For example, incidents that met the study
definition, but that were not identifiable under the study search strategy, or that were not reported as
school-based crimes, would have been unlikely to come to the attention of Secret Service and Department
of Education researchers. In addition, incidents of targeted school violence that have occurred since June
2000 were outside the scope of the study.
8
source materials concerning the incident. These primary source materials included
investigative, school, court, and mental health records.
In addition, study researchers conducted supplemental interviews with 10 of the

perpetrators of incidents of the school-based attacks identified by the Secret Service
and the Department of Education. These interviews provided researchers with
further opportunity to examine the incident from the point of view of the attacker
and to "walk through the process of the attack" from its conceptualization to its
execution. Insights gleaned from these interviews have been used by the Secret
Service primarily in training venues to illustrate particular aspects of incidents of
targeted school violence.
Coding of Primary Source Materials.
Each member of the review team assigned to a particular incident independently

answered several hundred questions about each case, entering his or her answers to
the questions in a codebook. Review team members were instructed to record
information gathered from primary sources as it appeared in those sources, and not
to engage in interpretation of facts presented.
Information gathered and reflected in incident reviewers’ responses to the coded

study questions included facts about:
• the attacker’s development of an idea to harm the target, and progression

from the original idea to the attack;
• the attacker ’s selection of the target(s);
• the attacker’s motive(s) for the incident;
• any communications made by the attacker about his or her ideas and intent,
including any threats made to the target(s) or about the target(s);
• evidence that the attacker planned the incident;
• the attacker’s mental health and substance abuse history, if any; and,
• the attacker’s life circumstances/situation at the time of the attack, including
relationships with parents and other family members; performance in school;
and treatment by fellow students.
Information regarding the attacker ’s demographic characteristics and personal

history, including criminal and school history, also were coded. When each reviewer
had completed his or her response to the questions, the review team met as a whole
to compare responses and produce a single "reconciled" coding of the incident.
9
Findings presented in Chapter III of this report reflect researchers’ careful analysis of
the coded responses to the extensive questionnaire employed in recording
information gathered on each of the 37 school-based attacks and 41 attackers that
were examined in the Safe School Initiative. Researchers were cautious not to
overreach in drawing conclusions from this information.
Primary source materials reviewed for the 37 incidents did not provide answers in
every case to all of the areas of inquiry covered in the questionnaire. In general,
researchers declined to draw a conclusion if information directly responsive to a
particular area of inquiry was available for fewer than half of the incidents reviewed.
Moreover, even when answers to a particular coded study question were available for
the majority of incidents, these responses collectively did not suggest in all cases a
common or shared characteristic. Here again, researchers were cautious not to draw
a conclusion in a particular area of inquiry if that conclusion was supported by fewer
than the majority of the responses to the subject question.
However, in some cases, researchers believed that the absence of a common or

shared characteristic or behavior in the coded responses to inquiries–most notably
with respect to the characteristics and behaviors of the attackers--was sufficiently
compelling to note those obser vations as findings as well.
Organization of the Final Repor t
The remainder of this report is organized into four chapters. Chapter II:
"Characteristics of Incidents of Targeted School Violence," presents basic descriptive
information about the attacks examined by the Safe School Initiative, including
incident, target and victim characteristics. Chapter III: "Findings of the Safe School
Initiative," describes the conclusions reached by Safe School Initiative researchers
after careful analysis of the facts and other information collected in the course of the
Secret Service’s and the Department of Education’s study of targeted school
violence.
Chapter IV: "Implications of Safe School Initiative Findings for the Prevention of
Targeted School Violence," will be of particular interest to educators, law
enforcement officials and others who are seeking guidance to inform efforts to
address the problem of targeted school violence. In this chapter, the authors focus in
on 10 key findings of the Safe School Initiative that appear to have implications for
10
the development of strategies to prevent targeted school violence. These findings

specifically concern what information was known–or knowable–about these incidents
prior to the attack, and that, in turn, might be relevant to efforts to prevent future
attacks. Discussion of these key findings also includes consideration of how this
information might be applicable to investigating threats and other behavior in schools
that may raise concerns.
In the final chapter of this report, Chapter V: "Threat Assessment as a Promising

Strategy for Preventing School Violence," the authors offer some concluding
observations on how threat assessment protocols might be incorporated into
strategies to prevent targeted violence in schools.
Overview of Findings
The findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that there are productive actions
that educators, law enforcement officials and others can pursue in response to the
problem of targeted school violence. Specifically, Initiative findings suggest that
these officials may wish to consider focusing their efforts to formulate strategies for
preventing these attacks in two principal areas:
• developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable

information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack;
and,
• employing the results of these risk evaluations or "threat assessments" in
developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring.
Support for these suggestions is found in 10 key findings of the Safe School Initiative
study. These findings are as follows:
• Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely were sudden, impulsive acts.

• Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or
plan to attack.
• Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the
attack.
• There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engaged in targeted
school violence.13
• Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused
others concern or indicated a need for help.
• Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal
failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.
13
Here the term "profile" refers to a set of demographic and other traits that a set of perpetrators of a crime
have in common. Please refer to "Characterizing the Attacker" in Chapter III and to Reddy et al. (2001),
"Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools" in the Resources section for further explanation of the term
"profile."
11
• Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted or injured by others prior to the

attack.
• Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
• In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
• Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were
stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.
12
CHAPTER II- CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENTS
CHAPTER II
CHARACTERISTICS OF
INCIDENTS OF TARGETED
SCHOOL VIOLENCE
CHAPTER II- CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE
The Safe School Initiative found that targeted school violence is not a new or recent
phenomenon. The earliest case that researchers were able to identify occurred in
1974. In that incident, a student brought guns and homemade bombs to his school;
set off the fire alarm; and shot at emergency and custodial personnel who responded
to the alarm.
The Safe School Initiative identified 37 incidents involving 41 attackers that met the
study definition of targeted school violence and occurred between 1974 and the end
of the 2000 school year.14 These incidents took place in 26 states, with more than
one incident occurring in Arkansas, California, Kentucky, Missouri and Tennessee.15
Analysis of the study findings identified the following characteristics of incidents of

targeted school violence:
• In almost three-quarters of the incidents, the attacker killed one or more

students, faculty or others at the school (73 percent, n=2716). In the
remaining incidents, the attackers used a weapon to injure at least one person
at school (24 percent, n=9). In one incident, a student killed his family and
then held his class hostage with a weapon.
• More than one-half of the attacks occurred during the school day (59 percent,
n=22), with fewer occurring before school (22 percent, n=8) or after school
(16 percent, n=6).
• Almost all of the attackers were current students at the school where they
carried out their attacks (95 percent, n=39). Only two attackers were former
students of the school where they carried out their attacks at the time of
those attacks (5 percent, n=2).
• All of the incidents of targeted school violence examined in the Safe School
Initiative were committed by boys or young men (100 percent, n=41).17
• In most of the incidents, the attackers carried out the attack alone (81
percent, n=30). In four of the incidents, the attacker engaged in the attack on
his own but had assistance in planning the attack (11 percent, n=4). In three
incidents, two or more attackers carried out the attack together (8 percent,
n=3).
14
See Appendix B for a list of the dates of the incidents of targeted school violence examined by the Safe
School Initiative.
15
See Appendix A for a list of the locations of the incidents of targeted school violence studied under the
Safe School Initiative.
16
"N" refers to the number of attackers that corresponds to the reported percentage. Unless indicated
otherwise, when the finding pertains to total attackers all N’s are out of a total of 41. When the finding
pertains to total incidents (i.e., school-based attacks) all N’s are out of a total of 37 incidents.
17
While all the attackers in this study were boys, it would be misleading to read the findings of this study as
suggesting that a girl could not or would not carry out a school-based attack. For example, an incident
occurred after the completion of this study in which a girl shot her classmate at a parochial school in
Williamsport, Pa. In addition, a well-publicized school shooting that occurred in San Diego, Calif., in 1976
was carried out by a woman. The San Diego incident was not included in this study because the attacker
was not a current or former student of the school where she conducted her attack, but, rather, lived across
the street from the school.
15
• Most attackers used some type of gun as their primary weapon, with over half
of the attackers using handguns (61 percent, n=25), and nearly half of them
using rifles or shotguns (49 percent, n=20).18 Three-quarters of the attackers
used only one weapon (76 percent, n=31) to harm their victims, although
almost half of the attackers had more than one weapon with them at time of
the attack (46 percent, n=19).
Target and Victim Characteristics
Perpetrators of incidents of targeted school violence chose a range of targets for their
attacks, including fellow students, faculty and staff, and the school itself. These
incidents were usually planned in advance and for most part included intent to harm
a specific, pre-selected target, whether or not the attacker’s execution of the incident,
in fact, resulted in harm to the target.
Target and victim characteristics identified by the Safe School Initiative were:
• In over half of the incidents (54 percent, n=22), the attacker had selected at
least one school administrator, faculty member or staff member as a target.
Students were chosen as targets in fewer than half of the incidents (41
percent, n=15).
• In nearly half of the incidents, the attackers were known to have chosen more
than one target prior to their attack (44 percent, n=16).
• Most attackers had a grievance against at least one of their targets prior to the
attack (73 percent, n=30). 19
• In almost half of the incidents (46 percent, n=17), individuals who were
targeted prior to the attack also became victims (i.e., individuals actually
harmed in the attack). However, other individuals at the school, who were
not identified as original targets of the attack, were injured or killed as well.
Among these non-targeted individuals, over half were other students (57
percent, n=21) and over one-third (39 percent, n=16) were school
administrators, faculty or staff.
18
These percentages include all weapons used (i.e., discharged) in the attack, and therefore total more
than 100 percent.
19
For the purposes of this study, "grievance" was defined as "a belief that some other person or
organization is directly or indirectly responsible for injury or harm to self and/or someone whom the
subject cares about."
16
CHAPTER III- FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE
CHAPTER III
FINDINGS OF THE SAFE

SCHOOL INITIATIVE
The findings of researchers’ analysis of the 37 incidents of targeted school violence

that were examined under the Safe School Initiative fall generally into five areas:
• characterizing the attacker;

• conceptualizing the attack;
• signaling the attack;
• advancing the attack; and,
• resolving the attack.
The findings in each of these areas are presented and explained below.
Characterizing the Attacker
Finding
There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engaged in targeted school

violence.20
Explanation
Although all of the attackers in this study were boys, there is no set of traits that
described all–or even most–of the attackers. Instead, they varied considerably in
demographic, background and other characteristics.
• The attackers ranged in age from 11 to 21, with most attackers between the
ages of 13 and 18 at the time of the attack (85 percent, n=35).
• Three-quarters of the attackers were white (76 percent, n=31). One-quarter
of the attackers came from other racial and ethnic backgrounds, including
African American (12 percent, n=5), Hispanic (5 percent, n=2), Native
Alaskan (2 percent, n=1), Native American (2 percent, n=1), and Asian (2
percent, n=1).
The attackers came from a variety of family situations, ranging from intact families
with numerous ties to the community, to foster homes with histories of neglect.
• Almost two-thirds of the attackers came from two-parent families (63 percent,
n=26), living either with both biological parents (44 percent, n=18) or with
one biological parent and one stepparent (19 percent, n=8).
• Some lived with one biological parent (19 percent, n=8) or split time between
two biological parents (2 percent, n=1).
• Very few lived with a foster parent or legal guardian (5 percent, n=2).
20
Supra note 13.
19
For those incidents for which information on the attackers’ school performance was
available, that information indicates that those attackers differed considerably from
one another in their academic achievement in school, with grades ranging from
excellent to failing (n=34).
• The attackers in the largest grouping were doing well in school at the time of
the attack, generally receiving As and Bs in their courses (41 percent; n=17);
some were even taking Advanced Placement courses at the time of the
incident or had been on the honor roll repeatedly.
• Fewer of the attackers were receiving Bs and Cs (15 percent, n=6), or Cs and
Ds (22 percent, n=9).
• Very few of the attackers were known to be failing in school (5 percent, n=2).
Attackers also varied in the types of social relationships they had established, ranging
from socially isolated to popular among their peers.
• The largest group of attackers for whom this information was available
appeared to socialize with mainstream students or were considered
mainstream students themselves (41 percent, n=17).
• One-quarter of the attackers (27 percent, n=11) socialized with fellow
students who were disliked by most mainstream students or were considered
to be part of a "fringe" group.
• Few attackers had no close friends (12 percent, n=5).
• One-third of attackers had been characterized by others as "loners," or felt
themselves to be loners (34 percent, n=14).
• However, nearly half of the attackers were involved in some organized social
activities in or outside of school (44 percent, n=18). These activities included
sports teams, school clubs, extracurricular activities and mainstream religious
groups.
Attackers’ histories of disciplinary problems at school also varied. Some attackers

had no observed behavioral problems, while others had multiple behaviors
warranting reprimand and/or discipline.
• Nearly two-thirds of the attackers had never been in trouble or rarely were in
trouble at school (63 percent, n=26).
• One-quarter of the attackers had ever been suspended from school (27
percent, n=11).
• Only a few attackers had ever been expelled from school (10 percent, n=4).
Most attackers showed no marked change in academic performance (56 percent,

n=23), friendship patterns (73 percent, n=30), interest in school (59 percent, n=24),
or school disciplinary problems (68 percent, n=28) prior to their attack.
20
• A few attackers even showed some improvements in academic performance (5

percent, n=2) or declines in disciplinary problems at school (7 percent, n=3)
prior to the attack. In one case, the dean of students had commended a
student a few weeks before he attacked his school for improvements in his
grades and a decline in the number of disciplinary problems involving that
student in school.
Finding
Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted or injured by others prior to the attack.
Explanation
Almost three-quarters of the attackers felt persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked

or injured by others prior to the incident (71percent, n=29).21
In several cases, individual attackers had experienced bullying and harassment that
was long-standing and severe. In some of these cases the experience of being bullied
seemed to have a significant impact on the attacker and appeared to have been a
factor in his decision to mount an attack at the school.22 In one case, most of the
attacker’s schoolmates described the attacker as "the kid everyone teased." In
witness statements from that incident, schoolmates alleged that nearly every child in
the school had at some point thrown the attacker against a locker, tripped him in the
hall, held his head under water in the pool or thrown things at him. Several
schoolmates had noted that the attacker seemed more annoyed by, and less tolerant
of, the teasing than usual in the days preceding the attack.
Finding
A history of having been the subject of a mental health evaluation, diagnosed with a
mental disorder, or involved in substance abuse did not appear to be prevalent
among attackers. However, most attackers showed some history of suicidal attempts
or thoughts, or a history of feeling extreme depression or desperation.
Explanation
• Only one-third of attackers had ever received a mental health evaluation (34
percent, n=14), and fewer than one-fifth had been diagnosed with mental
health or behavior disorder prior to the attack (17 percent, n=7).
21
It is important to note that the way in which information was gathered for the Safe School Initiative did
not permit researchers to determine the exact proportion of attackers who had been victims of bullying
specifically. Moreover, not every attacker in this study felt bullied.
22
The Safe School Initiative’s approach to gathering information concerning incidents of targeted school
violence did not permit researchers to determine conclusively whether the experience of being bullied--or
perceptions that they had been bullied--caused the attacker to engage in targeted school violence.
21
• Although most attackers had not received a formal mental health evaluation
or diagnosis, most attackers exhibited a history of suicide attempts or suicidal
thoughts at some point prior to their attack (78 percent, n=32). More than
half of the attackers had a documented history of feeling extremely depressed
or desperate (61 percent, n=25).
• Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had a known history of alcohol or
substance abuse (24 percent, n=10).
• The only information collected that would indicate whether attackers had
been prescribed psychiatric medications concerned medication non-
compliance (i.e., failure to take medication as prescribed). Ten percent of the
attackers (n=4) were known to be non-compliant with prescribed psychiatric
medications.
Finding
Over half of the attackers demonstrated some interest in violence, through movies,
video games, books, and other media (59 percent, n=24). However, there was no
one common type of interest in violence indicated. Instead, the attackers’ interest in
violent themes took various forms.
Explanation
• Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had exhibited an interest in violent

movies (27 percent, n=11).
• Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had exhibited an interest in violent
books (24 percent, n=10).
• One-eighth of the attackers exhibited an interest in violent video games (12
percent, n=5).
• The largest group of attackers exhibited an interest in violence in their own
writings, such as poems, essays or journal entries (37 percent, n=15).
Finding
Most attackers had no history of prior violent or criminal behavior.
Explanation
• Fewer than one-third of the attackers were known to have acted violently
toward others at some point prior to the incident (31 percent, n=13).
• Very few of the attackers were known to have harmed or killed an animal at
any time prior to the incident (12 percent, n=5).
• Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had a prior history of arrest (27
percent, n=11).
22
Finding
Most attackers were known to have had difficulty coping with significant losses or
personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.
Explanation
Most attackers appeared to have difficulty coping with losses, personal failures or
other difficult circumstances. Almost all of the attackers had experienced or
perceived some major loss prior to the attack (98 percent, n=40). These losses
included a perceived failure or loss of status (66 percent, n=27); loss of a loved one
or of a significant relationship, including a romantic relationship (51 percent, n=21);
and a major illness experienced by the attacker or someone significant to him (15
percent, n=6). In one case, the attacker, who was a former student at the school
where the attack occurred, was laid off from his job because he did not have a high
school diploma. The attacker blamed the job loss on the teacher who failed him in a
senior-year course, which kept him from graduating. He returned to the school a
year after leaving the school, killed his former teacher and two students, and then
held over 60 students hostage for 10 hours.
For most attackers, their outward behaviors suggested difficulty in coping with loss
(83 percent, n=34). For example, the mother, the brother and a friend of the
attacker who lost his job each had commented that the attacker became depressed
and withdrawn following the lay-off. The friend also reported that he knew that the
attacker blamed his former teacher for his problems and had begun planning how to
retaliate.
Conceptualizing the Attack
Finding
Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.
Explanation
Several findings of the Safe School Initiative indicate clearly that the school-based
attacks studied were rarely impulsive. Rather, these attacks typically were thought
out beforehand and involved some degree of advance planning. In many cases, the
attacker’s observable behavior prior to the attack suggested he might be planning or
preparing for a school attack.
In nearly all of the incidents for which information concerning the attacker’s
conceptualization of the attack was available, researchers found that the attacker had
23
developed his idea to harm the target(s) before the attack (95 percent, n=39). The
length of time that attackers held this idea prior to the actual attack varied
considerably. Some attackers conceived of the attack as few as one or two days prior
to advancing that attack; other attackers had held the idea of the attack for as long as
a year prior to carrying it out. For those incidents where information was available
to determine how long the attacker had an idea to harm the target (n=33), the
analysis showed that a little over half of the attackers developed their idea for the
incident at least a month prior to the attack (51 percent, n=17).
In addition, almost all of the attackers planned out the attack in advance of carrying
it out (93 percent; n=38). Moreover, there was evidence from the attacker’s behavior
prior to the attack that the attacker had a plan or was preparing to harm the target(s)
(93 percent, n=38). For example, one attacker asked his friends to help him get
ammunition for one of his weapons; sawed off the end of a rifle to make it easier to
conceal beneath his clothes; shopped for a long trench coat with his mother; and cut
the pockets out of the coat so that he could conceal the weapon within the coat while
holding the weapon through one of the cut-out pockets. That attacker had a well-
known fascination with weapons and had told his friends on several occasions that
he thought about killing certain students at school.
The length of time between the planning and execution of the attacks also varied
considerably for the targeted school violence incidents studied. Some attackers
developed their plans on the day of their attack or only one or two days prior; others
developed their plans between six and eight months prior to the attack. In cases
where there was information available to establish the date planning began (n=29),
analysis of available information revealed that most of the attackers developed a plan
at least two days prior to the attack (69 percent, n=21).
Revenge was a motive for more than half of the attackers (61 percent, n=25). Other
motives included trying to solve a problem (34 percent, n=14); suicide or desperation
(27 percent, n=11); and efforts to get attention or recognition (24 percent, n=10).
More than half of the attackers had multiple motives or reasons for their school-
based attacks (54 percent, n=22). In addition, most of the attackers held some sort
of grievance at the time of the attack, either against their target(s) or against
someone else (81 percent, n=33). Many attackers told other people about these
grievances prior to their attacks (66 percent, n=27).23
23
Supra note 19.
24
Signaling the Attack
Finding
Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to
attack.
Explanation
In most cases, other people knew about the attack before it took place. In over
three-quarters of the incidents, at least one person had information that the attacker
was thinking about or planning the school attack (81 percent, n=30). In nearly two-
thirds of the incidents, more than one person had information about the attack
before it occurred (59 percent, n=22). In nearly all of these cases, the person who
knew was a peer–a friend, schoolmate, or sibling (93 percent, n=28/30). Some
peers knew exactly what the attacker planned to do; others knew something "big" or
"bad" was going to happen, and in several cases knew the time and date it was to
occur. An adult had information about the idea or plan in only two cases.
In one incident, for example, the attacker had planned to shoot students in the lobby
of his school prior to the beginning of the school day. He told two friends exactly
what he had planned and asked three others to meet him that morning in the
mezzanine overlooking the lobby, ostensibly so that these students would be out of
harm’s way. On most mornings, usually only a few students would congregate on the
mezzanine before the school day began. However, by the time the attacker arrived at
school on the morning of the attack, word about what was going to happen had
spread to such an extent that 24 students were on the mezzanine waiting for the
attack to begin. One student who knew the attack was to occur brought a camera so
that he could take pictures of the event.
Finding
Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.
Explanation
The majority of the attackers in the targeted school violence incidents examined
under the Safe School Initiative did not threaten their target(s) directly, i.e., did not
tell the target they intended to harm them, whether in direct, indirect or conditional
language prior to the attack. Only one-sixth of the attackers threatened their
target(s) directly prior to the attack (17 percent, n=7).
25
Finding
Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others
concern or indicated a need for help.
Explanation
Almost all of the attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the attack that caused
others–school officials, parents, teachers, police, fellow students–to be concerned
(93 percent, n=38). In most of the cases, at least one adult was concerned by the
attacker’s behavior (88 percent, n=36). In three-quarters of the cases, at least three
people–adults and other children–were concerned by the attacker’s behavior (76
percent, n=31). In one case, for example, the attacker made comments to at least 24
friends and classmates about his interest in killing others kids, building bombs or
carrying out an attack at the school. A school counselor was so concerned about this
student’s behavior that the counselor asked to contact the attacker’s parents. The
attacker’s parents also knew of his interest in guns.
The behaviors that led other individuals to be concerned about the attacker included
both behaviors specifically related to the attack, such as efforts to get a gun, as well
as other disturbing behaviors not related to the subsequent attack. In one case, the
student’s English teacher became concerned about several poems and essays that the
student submitted for class assignments because they treated the themes of homicide
and suicide as possible solutions to his feelings of despair. In another case, the
student worried his friends by talking frequently about plans to put rat poison in the
cheese shakers at a popular pizza establishment. A friend of that student became so
concerned that the student was going to carry out the rat poison plan, that the friend
got out of bed late one night and left his house in search of his mother, who was not
home at the time, to ask her what to do.
Advancing the Attack
Finding
In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.
Explanation
Although most attackers car ried out their attacks on their own, many attackers were
influenced or encouraged by others to engage in the attacks. Nearly half of the
attackers were influenced by other individuals in deciding to mount an attack, dared
or encouraged by others to attack, or both (44 percent; n=18). For example, one
attacker’s original idea had been to bring a gun to school and let other students see
26
him with it. He wanted to look tough so that the students who had been harassing
him would leave him alone. When he shared this idea with two friends, however,
they convinced him that exhibiting the gun would not be sufficient and that he would
have to shoot at people at the school in order to get the other students to leave him
alone. It was af ter this conversation that this student decided to mount his school
attack.
In other cases, friends assisted the attacker in his efforts to acquire a weapon or
ammunition, discussed tactics for getting a weapon into school undetected, or helped
gather information about the whereabouts of a target at a particular time during the
school day.
Finding
Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
Explanation
Experience using weapons and access to them was common for many attackers.
Nearly two-thirds of the attackers had a known history of weapons use, including
knives, guns and bombs (63 percent, n=26). Over half of the attackers had some
experience specifically with a gun prior to the incident (59 percent, n=24), while
others had experience with bombs or explosives (15 percent, n=6). However, fewer
than half of the attackers demonstrated any fascination or excessive interest with
weapons (44 percent, n=18), and less than one-third showed a fascination with
explosives (32 percent, n=13) prior to their attacks. Over two-thirds of the attackers
acquired the gun (or guns) used in their attacks from their own home or that of a
relative (68 percent, n=28).
Resolving the Attack
Finding
Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means
other than law enforcement intervention.
Explanation
Most school-based attacks were stopped through intervention by school

administrators, educators and students-or by the attacker stopping on his own. In
about one-third of the incidents, the attacker was apprehended by or surrendered to
administrators, faculty, or school staff (27 percent, n=10) or to students (5 percent,
n=2). In just over one-fif th of the incidents, the attacker stopped on his own or left
27
the school (22 percent, n=8). In a few incidents, the attacker killed himself during
the course of the incident (13 percent, n=5).
Just over one-quarter of the incidents were stopped through law enforcement
intervention (27 percent, n=10). Law enforcement personnel dischar ged weapons in
only three of the incidents of targeted school violence studied (8 percent, n=3).
Close to half of the incidents were known to last 15 minutes or less from the
beginning of the shooting to the time the attacker was apprehended, surrendered or
stopped shooting (47 percent, n=16).24 One-quarter of the incidents were over within
five minutes of their inception (27 percent, n=9). The fact that it was not through
law enforcement intervention that most of the targeted school violence incidents
studied were stopped appears in large part to be a function of how brief most of
these incidents were in duration.
24
Information on incident duration was not available for seven of the incidents (19 percent).
28
CHAPTER IV- IMPLICATIONS OF INITIATIVE FINDINGS
CHAPTER IV
IMPLICATIONS OF SAFE
SCHOOL INITIATIVE FINDINGS
FOR THE PREVENTION OF
TARGETED SCHOOL
VIOLENCE
CHAPTER IV- IMPLICATIONS OF SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE FINDINGS
After careful review of the case histories of the 37 incidents of targeted school
violence examined under the Safe School Initiative, 10 key findings were identified
that highlight information that may have been known or knowable prior to school-
based attacks and that therefore might inform some type of intervention in or
prevention of future attacks. In this chapter, the authors discuss the implications
that these findings may have for schools and communities in developing strategies for
preventing targeted violence in schools.
In focusing in on these findings for their potential relevance to the de velopment of

prevention and inter vention strategies, the authors acknowledge that these findings
may raise other issues for consideration in addressing the problem of targeted school
violence beyond those noted here. Moreover, the authors recognize that the
conditions, circumstances and facts underlying the findings highlighted here may not
manifest themselves in the same way in every school. Schools and communities
therefore are in the best position to determine whether and how these findings and
the implications suggested may apply to their particular problems and needs.
The 10 key findings that the authors believe may have implications for the
development of strategies to address the problem of targeted school violence are as
follows:
• Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.

• Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or
plan to attack.
• Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the
attack.
• There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in targeted
school violence.
• Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused
others concern or indicated a need for help.
• Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal
failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.
• Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted or injured by others prior to the
attack.
• Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
• In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
• Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were
stopped by means other than law enforcement inter vention.
31
The Implications of Key Study Findings
Key Finding 1
Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.
Implications
Students who engaged in school-based attacks typically did not "just snap" and then
engage in impulsive or random acts of targeted school violence. Instead, the attack s
examined under the Safe School Initiative appeared to be the end result of a
comprehensible process of thinking and behavior: behavior that typically began with
an idea, progressed to the development of a plan, moved on to securing the means to
carry out the plan and culminated in an attack. This is a process that potentially may
be knowable or discernible from the attacker’s behaviors and communications.
To the extent that information about an attacker’s intent and planning is knowable
and may be uncovered before an incident, some attacks may be preventable.
However, findings from the Safe School Initiative suggest that the time span between
the attacker’s decision to mount an attack and the actual incident may be short.
Consequently, when indications that a student may pose a threat to the school
community arise in the form of revelations about a planned attack, school
administrators and law enforcement officials will need to move quickly to inquire
about and intervene in that plan.25
Key Finding 2
Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to
attack. In most cases, those who knew were other kids–friends, schoolmates,
siblings, and others. However, this information rarely made its way to an adult.
Implications
First and foremost, this finding suggests that students can be an important part of
prevention efforts. A friend or schoolmate may be the first person to hear that a
student is thinking about or planning to harm someone. Nevertheless, for a variety
of reasons, those who have information about a potential incident of tar geted school
violence may not alert an adult on their own. Schools can encourage students to
report this information in part by identifying and breaking down barriers in the
25
The Department of Education and the Secret Service have prepared a companion work to the Final
Report, Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and Creating Safe School
Climates. This guide is scheduled for publication in May 2002. The guide will include recommendations for
investigating and evaluating threats and other behaviors of concern in school; address considerations for
developing policies and the capacity to support threat assessment efforts in schools; and provide
suggestions for approaches schools can adopt to foster school environments that reduce violence.
32
school environment that inadvertently may discourage students from coming forward
with this information. Schools also may benefit from ensuring that they have a fair,
thoughtful and effective system to respond to whatever information students do bring
forward. If students have concerns about how adults will react to information that
they bring forward, they may be even less inclined to volunteer such information.
In addition, this finding highlights the importance in an inquiry of attempts to gather

all relevant information from anyone who may have contact with the student. Efforts
to gather all potentially relevant pieces of information, however innocuous they may
appear on their own, from all individuals with whom the student has contact may
help to develop a more comprehensive picture of the student’s ideas, activities and
plans. In the end, investigators may find that different people in the student’s life
have different pieces of the puzzle.
Key Finding 3
Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.
Implications
This finding underscores the importance of not waiting for a threat before beginning
an inquiry. The Safe School Initiative found that most attackers in fact did not
threaten their target directly and some made no threat at all. Instead, other
behaviors and communications that may prompt concern, such as hearing that a
child is talking about bringing a gun to school, are indicators that the child may pose
a threat and therefore should prompt the initiation of efforts to gather information.
School administrators should respond to all students who make threats. The lack of
response could be taken by the threatener as permission to proceed with carrying
out the threat. In the end, however, it is important to distinguish between someone
who makes a threat–tells people they intend to harm someone–and someone who
poses a threat–engages in behaviors that indicate an intent, planning or preparation
for an attack. Those conducting inquiries should focus particular attention on any
information that indicates that a student poses a threat, regardless of whether the
student has told a potential target he or she intends to do them harm.
Key Finding 4
There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in targeted school

violence.
Implications
The demographic, personality, school history, and social characteristics of the

attackers varied substantially. Knowing that a particular student shares
33
characteristics, behaviors, features or traits with prior school shooters does not help
in determining whether that student is thinking about or planning for a violent act.
The use of profiles in this way likewise is not an effective approach to identifying
students who may pose a risk for targeted school violence at school or for assessing
the risk that a particular student may pose for a school-based attack, once a
particular student has been identified. Reliance on profiles to predict future school
attacks carries two substantial risks: (1) the great majority of students who fit any
given profile of a "school shooter" will not actually pose a risk of targeted violence;
and, (2) using profiles will fail to identify some students who in fact pose a risk of
violence but share few if any characteristics with prior attackers.26
Rather than trying to determine the "type" of student who may engage in targeted
school violence, an inquiry should focus instead on a student’s behaviors and
communications to determine if that student appears to be planning or preparing for
an attack. Rather than asking whether a particular student "looks like" those who
have launched school-based attacks before, it is more productive to ask whether the
student is engaging in behaviors that suggest preparations for an attack, if so how
fast the student is moving toward attack, and where intervention may be possible.
Key Finding 5
Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others
concern or indicated a need for help.
Implications
Several key findings point to the fact that kids send signals–both directly and
indirectly–to others regarding their problems. The boys who engaged in the targeted
school violence examined by the Safe School Initiative were not "invisible" students.
In fact nearly all of these students engaged in behaviors--prior to their attacks--that
caused concern to at least one person, usually an adult, and most concerned at least
three people.
This finding highlights the range of behaviors in a student’s life that may be
noticeable and that could prompt some additional probing by a caring adult. A
student’s family, teachers, friends and others may have information regarding aspects
of a student’s behavior that has raised concern. As was true in some of the incidents
covered in this study, individuals in contact with the attacker may have observed
something of concern about that student’s behavior, but not of sufficient concern for
them to notify anyone in a position to respond.
26
Please refer to Reddy et al. (2001), "Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools: Comparing risk
assessment, threat assessment, and other approaches," for a full discussion of assessment approaches
currently available to schools. The full citation for the article is listed in Appendix C of this document.
34
Educators and other adults can learn how to pick up on these signals and make
appropriate referrals.27 By inquiring about any information that may have prompted
some concern, an investigator may be able to develop a more comprehensive picture
of the student’s past and current behavior, and identify any indications that the
student is intent on or planning to attack. However, discretion should be exercised
in determining whom to talk to about the student, so as not to alienate or stigmatize
the student of concern. A significant challenge facing schools is to determine how
best to respond to students who are already known to be in trouble or needing
assistance.
Key Finding 6
Most attackers had dif ficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures.
Many had considered or attempted suicide.
Implications
Many students, not just those who engaged in school-based attacks, experience or
perceive major losses in their lives. Most students who face a significant loss, or who
have difficulty coping with such a loss, are not going to be at risk for a school-based
attack. However, information that indicates a student is facing or having trouble
dealing with a significantly difficult situation may indicate a need to refer the student
to appropriate services and resources.
In cases where there is concern about the possibility that a student may engage in
targeted violence, attention should be given to any indication that a student is having
difficulty coping with major losses or perceived failures, particularly where these
losses or failures appear to have prompted feelings of desperation and hopelessness.
An inquiry also should anticipate changes in the life of a troubled student, and
consider whether these changes might increase–or decrease–the threat the student
poses.
Key Finding 7
Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
Implications
Bullying was not a factor in every case, and clearly not every child who is bullied in
school will pose a risk for targeted violence in school. Nevertheless, in a number of
the incidents of targeted school violence studied, attackers described being bullied in
terms that suggested that these experiences approached torment. These attackers
27
See "Early Warning, Timely Response," listed in Appendix C of this report, for more information about
how to identify students who may need assistance.
35
told of behaviors that, if they occurred in the workplace, likely would meet legal
definitions of harassment and/or assault.
The prevalence of bullying found in this and other recent studies should strongly
support ongoing efforts to reduce bullying in American schools.28 Educators can play
an important role in ensuring that students are not bullied in schools and that
schools not only do not permit bullying but also empower other students to let adults
in the school know if students are being bullied.
Key Finding 8
Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
Implications
Access to weapons among some students may be common. However, when the idea
of an attack exists, any effort to acquire, prepare or use a weapon or ammunition
may be a significant move in the attacker’s progression from idea to action. Any
inquiry should include investigation of and attention to weapon access and use and
communications about weapons. Attention should also be given to indications of any
efforts by a student to build a bomb or acquire bomb-making components.
The large proportion of attackers who acquired their guns from home points to the
need for schools and law enforcement officials to collaborate on policies and
procedures for responding when a student is thought to have a firearm in school. In
particular, schools should be aware of the provisions of the Federal Gun-Free
Schools Act, which requires that all schools expel students who bring a gun to school
and should report all violations to local law enforcement officials.29
Key Finding 9
In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.
Implications
This finding highlights the importance of considering what prom pting or

encouragement a student may receive from others in his life that influences his
intent, planning or preparations for a potential attack. Any investigation of potential
targeted school violence should include attention to the role that a student’s friends
or peers may be playing in that student’s thinking about and preparations for an
28
See, for example, Nansel, T., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R., Ruan, J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P. (2001).
Bullying behavior among U.S. youth. Journal of the American Medical Association, 285, pp. 2094-2100.
29
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,
Title IV, Part A, Subpart 3, Section 4141.
36
attack. It is possible that feedback from friends or others may help to move a
student from an unformed thought about attacking to developing and advancing a
plan to carry out the attack.
Key Finding 10
Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means
other than law enforcement inter vention and most were brief in duration.
Implications
The short duration of most incidents of targeted school violence argues for the
importance of developing preventive measures in addition to any emergency planning
for a school or school district. The preventive measures should include protocols
and procedures for responding to and managing threats and other behaviors of
concern.
37
38
CHAPTER V- CONCLUSION: A PROMISING STRATEGY
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: THREAT
ASSESSMENT AS A PROMISING
STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING
SCHOOL VIOLENCE
CHAPTER V- CONCLUSION: THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A PROMISING STRATEGY
Taken together, the findings from the Safe School Initiative suggest that some future
attacks may be preventable. Most incidents of targeted school violence were thought
out and planned in advance. The attackers’ behavior suggested that they wer e
planning or preparing for an attack. Prior to most incidents, the attackers’ peers
knew the attack was to occur. And most attackers were not "invisible," but already
were of concern to people in their lives.
In light of these findings, the use of a threat assessment approach may be a

promising strategy for preventing a school-based attack. Educators, law enforcement
officials and others with public safety responsibilities may be able to prevent some
incidents of targeted school violence if they know what information to look for and
what to do with such information when it is found. In sum, these officials may
benefit from focusing their efforts on formulating strategies for preventing these
attacks in two principal areas:
• developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable

information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack;
and,
• employing the results of these risk evaluations or "threat assessments" in
developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring.
Threat Assessment and Targeted School Violence Prevention
Threat assessment, as de veloped by the Secret Service and applied in the context of
targeted school violence, is a fact-based investigative and analytical approach that
focuses on what a particular student is doing and saying, and not on whether the
student "looks like" those who have attacked schools in the past. Threat assessment
emphasizes the importance of such behavior and communications for identifying,
evaluating and reducing the risk posed by a student who may be thinking about or
planning for a school-based attack. The Department of Education and the Secret
Service currently are completing work on a publication that will provide school
administrators and law enforcement officials with guidance on planning and
implementing a threat assessment approach within school settings.30
In relying on a fact-based threat assessment approach, school officials, law

enforcement professionals and others involved in the assessment will need tools,
mechanisms and legal processes that can facilitate their efforts to gather and analyze
information regarding a student’s behavior and communications. For example,
school and law enforcement personnel should be offered training regarding what
information to gather, how to gather and evaluate it, and how they might try to
intervene in cases where the information collected suggests a student may be
planning or preparing for a school-based attack.
30
Supra note 25.
41
Several states have enacted legislation that makes it easier for schools to share
student information with law enforcement agencies and others who are trying to
determine whether a student might be moving toward a school-based attack.31
Localities and states may wish to explore such options for supporting threat
assessment components in schools and facilitating sharing information across school,
law enforcement and community systems participating in the threat assessment
process.
Finally, educators can play a part in prevention by creating an environment where

students feel comfortable telling an adult whenever they hear about someone who is
considering doing harm to another person, or even whether the person is
considering harming themselves. Once such an environment is created, it will remain
important that the adults in that environment listen to students and handle the
information they receive in a fair and responsible manner.
31
See "Legal Issues" in Appendix C of this report for listings of documents that include descriptions of state
statutes in this area.
42
APPENDIX
Appendix A
INCIDENTS OF
TARGETED SCHOOL
VIOLENCE, BY STATE
Appendix B
INCIDENTS OF
TARGETED SCHOOL
VIOLENCE, BY YEAR
Appendix C
RESOURCES
Contact
Information
Appendix A - INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE, BY STATE
INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE,

BY STATE
STATE TOWN OR COUNTY
Alabama Lanett
Alaska Bethel
Arkansas Jonesboro, Stamps
California Anaheim, Napa, Olivehurst, Palo Alto, Redlands
Colorado Jefferson County (Littleton)
Florida Lake Worth
Georgia Conyers, Scottsdale
Idaho Notus
Iowa Manchester
Kansas Goddard
Kentucky Grayson, Union, West Paducah
Massachusetts Great Barrington
Mississippi Pearl
Missouri DeKalb, Patterson
Montana Lewistown
New Mexico Deming
New York Olean
North Carolina Greensboro
Oklahoma Fort Gibson
Oregon Springfield
Pennsylvania Edinboro
South Carolina Blacksville
Tennessee Fayetteville, Lynville
Texas Austin
Virginia Virginia Beach
Washington Moses Lake
Wisconsin Wauwatosa
45
46
Appendix B - INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE, BY YEAR
INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE,

BY YEAR
YEAR MONTH AND DAY
1974 December 30
1978 May 18, October 15
1985 January 21
1986 December 4
1987 March 2
1988 December 14
1989 October 5
1992 May 1, May 14, December 14

1993 January 18, December 1
1994 May 26, October 12, November 8
1995 January 23, October 12, November 15
1996 February 2, February 8, March 25, September 25
1997 February 19, October 1, December 1, December 15
1998 March 24, April 24, May 19, May 24
1999 April 16, April 20, May 20, November 19, December 6
2000 May 26
47
48
Appendix C - RESOURCES
RESOURCES
Boys and Violence

Pollack, W. (1998). Real boys: Rescuing our sons from the myths of boyhood.
New York: Henry Holt, Inc.
Pollack, W., & Cushman, K. (2001). Real boys workbook. New York: Villard.
Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. (2000). Real boys’ voices. New York: Random House.
Legal Issues
Medaris, M.L., Campbell, E., & James, B. (1997, June). Sharing information: A
guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and participation in juvenile
justice programs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention and U.S. Department of Education, Family Policy
Compliance Office.
Slayton, J. (2000, March). Establishing and maintaining interagency information
sharing. JAIBG Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
Thomerson, J. (2001, May). School violence: Sharing student information.
Denver, Colo.: National Conference of State Legislatures.
Related Research
Borum, R. (2000). Assessing violence risk among youth. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 56, 1263-1288.
Dwyer, K., Osher, D., & Wagner, C. (1998). Early warning, timely response: A
guide to safe schools. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education.
Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B.V. (1999). Assassination in the United States: An
operational study of recent assassins, attackers, and near-lethal approachers. Journal
of Forensic Sciences, 44, 321-333. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm
Threat Assessment
Borum, R., Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Berglund, J. (1999). Threat assessment:
Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence. Behavioral Sciences &
the Law, 17, 323-337. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm
Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B. (1998). Protective intelligence & threat assessment
investigations: A guide for state and local law enforcement officials (NIJ/OJP/DOJ
Publication No. 170612). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Available
at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm
Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G.A. (1995, September). Threat
assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence. National Institute of Justice:
Research in Action, 1-7. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm
Reddy, M., Borum, R., Berglund, J., Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., & Modzeleski, W.
(2001). Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools: Comparing risk assessment,
threat assessment, and other approaches. Psychology in the Schools, 38, 157-172.
Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm
49
Web Sites
United States Department of Education . . . . . . . . . .www.ed.gov
United States Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .www.secretservice.gov
50
CONTACT INFORMATION
CONTACT INFORMATION
United States Secret Service United States Department of Education

National Threat Assessment Center Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program
950 H Street NW, Suite 9100 400 Maryland Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20223 Washington, DC 20202-6123
Phone: 202-406-5470 Phone: 202-260-3954
Fax: 202-406-6180 Fax: 202-260-7767
Web site: www.secretservice.gov/ntac Web site: www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS
51
52
CONTACT INFORMATION
U.S. Department of Education

Rod Paige
Secretary
Office of Elementary and Secondary Education

Susan B. Neuman
Assistant Secretary
Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program

William Modzeleski
Director
U.S. Secret Service

Brian L. Stafford
Director
Office of Protective Research

Barbara S. Riggs
Assistant Director
National Threat Assessment Center

George P. Luczko
Special Agent in Charge
May 2002
This report is in the public domain. Authorization to reproduce it in whole or in

part is g ranted. While permission to reprint this publication is not necessary, the
citation should be: Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W.,
The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the
Prevention of School Attacks in the United States. U.S. Department of Education,
Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Program and U.S. Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center, Washington,
D.C., 2002.
To order copies of this report,
write to: ED Pubs, Education Publications Center, U.S. Department of Education,

P.O. Box 1398, Jessup, MD 20794-1398;
or fax your request to: (301) 470-1244;
or email your request to: [email protected] or [email protected].
53
or call in your request toll-free: 1-877-433-7827 (1-800-4-ED-Pubs). If 877 service is

not yet available in your area, call 1-800-872-5327 (1-800-USA-LEARN). Those who
use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) or a teletypewriter (TTY),
should call 1-800-437-0833.
or order online at: www.ed.gov/pubs/edpubs.html.
This report is also available on the Department of Education’s Web site at:
www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS and the U.S. Secr et Service Web site at:
www.secretservice.gov/ntac.
On request, this publication is available in alternate formats, such as Braille, large

print, audiotape, or computer diskette. For more information, please contact the
Department of Education’s Alternate Format Center (202) 260-9895 or (202) 205-
8113.
54

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THE FINAL REPORT AND

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.

Marisa Reddy, Ph.D.

Randy Borum, Psy.D.

JOINT MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

Littleton, Colorado; Springfield, Oregon; West Paducah, Kentucky; Jonesboro,

Rod Paige Brian L. Stafford

In addition, Secret Service and Department of Education personnel benefited

violence. At the Department of Education, these individuals are: Secretary of

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION: THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE . . . . . . . . .1

CHAPTER II: CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENTS OF

CHAPTER III: FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE . . . . . . . . . . .17

CHAPTER IV: IMPLICATIONS OF SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION: THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A

APPENDIX A: INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE,

APPENDIX B: INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE,

APPENDIX C: RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

CONTACT INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

Littleton, Colorado; Springfield, Oregon; West Paducah, Kentucky; Jonesboro,

The Safe School Initiative examined incidents of "targeted violence" in school

In addition to the ECSP’s particular focus on incidents involving attacks on public

• identifying individuals who have the idea or intent of attacking a Secret

The Secret Service considers threat assessment to be as important to preventing

The Prevalence of Violence in American Schools

Public policymakers, school administrators, police officials and parents continue to

Nevertheless, the impact of targeted school-based attacks cannot be measured in

In the end, researchers identified 37 incidents of targeted school violence involving

Information on each incident of targeted school violence identified by Secret Service

In addition, study researchers conducted supplemental interviews with 10 of the

Coding of Primary Source Materials.

Each member of the review team assigned to a particular incident independently

Information gathered and reflected in incident reviewers’ responses to the coded

• the attacker’s development of an idea to harm the target, and progression

Information regarding the attacker ’s demographic characteristics and personal

However, in some cases, researchers believed that the absence of a common or

Organization of the Final Repor t

the development of strategies to prevent targeted school violence. These findings

In the final chapter of this report, Chapter V: "Threat Assessment as a Promising

• developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable

• Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely were sudden, impulsive acts.

• Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted or injured by others prior to the

Analysis of the study findings identified the following characteristics of incidents of

• In almost three-quarters of the incidents, the attacker killed one or more

Target and Victim Characteristics

FINDINGS OF THE SAFE

The findings of researchers’ analysis of the 37 incidents of targeted school violence

• characterizing the attacker;

Characterizing the Attacker

There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engaged in targeted school

Attackers’ histories of disciplinary problems at school also varied. Some attackers

Most attackers showed no marked change in academic performance (56 percent,

• A few attackers even showed some improvements in academic performance (5

Almost three-quarters of the attackers felt persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked

• Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had exhibited an interest in violent

Most attackers had no history of prior violent or criminal behavior.

Conceptualizing the Attack