Tpa-Doctrine of Part Performance
Tpa-Doctrine of Part Performance
Tpa-Doctrine of Part Performance
INTRODUCTION
Property is one of the most fundamental elements of the socio-economic life of an individual. Juridically, property can be said to be a bundle of rights in a thing or a land. However, the word has gradually been given a wider meaning. Economic significance of the property, therefore, rests more on its dispositions. Property law has therefore become an important branch of civil law. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 deals with the transfer of immoveable property inter-vivos (although some provisions deal with the transfer of moveable as well as immovable property). Before this enactment, the transfers of immovable property were mostly governed by English equitable principles as applies by Anglo-Indian Courts. The doctrine of partperformance is one of the equitable doctrines applied by these Courts.
SOURCES OF DATA
The following secondary sources of data have been used in the project1. Articles 2. Books 3. Websites
METHOD OF WRITING
The method of writing followed in the course of this research paper is primarily analytical.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research work of this project is based on doctrinal method.
MODE OF CITATION
The researcher has followed a uniform mode of citation throughout this project.
Chapterization
The project have been divided into various chapters each dealing with different aspects of the topic.
PART PERFORMANCE
Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act provides that Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract then, notwithstanding that [..] 1 where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefore by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any other person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than the rights expressly provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this Section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof. The Section has been described by the Privy Council2, and by the Supreme Court3, as partial importation of the English of doctrine of part performance. By virtue of this Section part performance does not give rise to equity, as in England, but to a statutory right.4
The words the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered or has been omitted by Section 10 of the Registration and Other Related Laws Amendment Act 2001 (Act no. 48 of 2001) with effect from 24 September, 2001. 2 Mian Pir Bux v. Sardar Mahomed Tahar, AIR 1934 PC 235; AMA Sultan and Ors. v. Seydu Zohra Beevi, AIR 1990 Ker 186. 3 Maneklal Manuskhbahi v. Honnusji Jamshedji, AIR 1950 SC 1; Chaliagulla Ramchandrayya v. Boppana Satyanarayana, AIR 1964 SC 877; See also Nathu Lal v. Phoolchand, [1970] 2 SCR 854; Sardar Govindrao Mahadik & anr. v. Devi Sahai and ors., AIR 1982 SC 989. 4 Amrao v. Baburao, (1950) ILR Nag 25. See Hamida v. Smt Humer and ors. AIR 1992 All 346.
B was As servant. A had promised B a certain property as life estate, meaning B could enjoy the property during his life time. B served A for years upon this promised life estate. The will bequeathing such interest and property to B failed due to want for proper attestation. After A died, one of his heirs brought action to recover the property from B.
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It was held that the act of part performance could not be proof of the contract since the performance was a condition precedent to the contract. The heir of A was able to recover the said property.
WALSH vs. LONGSDALE8
Walsh took a cotton mill on lease for 7 years from Longsdale, the owner of the mill. The agreement was prepared but not signed. In the meantime, rent arrears started to accumulate as Walsh could not keep up with the quarterly payments of rent. An advance of one years rent could be demanded by Longsdale as per the contract. Lonsdale demanded the advance rent for one year and seized some goods of Walsh when he defaulted. Walsh sued for damages. The House of Lords decided in favour of Lonsdale stating that by running the mill, Walsh had admitted he was a lessee and evidence of his consent to the unsigned lease deed. The rule laid down in Walsh vs. Longsdale is not applicable in India as it did not constitute the doctrine of part performance. Before 1929 (when Section 53A was inserted in the Transfer of Property Act), the application of English equity of part-performance was neither certain nor uniform. In certain cases it was applied whereas in other cases it was not applied. The Privy Council in Mohd Musa vs. Aghor Kumar Ganguli9 held that doctrine of part performance is applicable in India. In this case there was a compromise deed which was in writing but not registered. Under this deed there was division of certain lands between the parties who had taken possession over their respective parts of the land on the basis of the compromise deed. The parties continued possession over their lands for many years. After about forty years, the heirs of the parties repudiated the compromise deed on the ground that it was not registered. The Privy Council applied the doctrine of partperformance as stated in Maddison v Alderson and held that although the compromise deed was unregistered but, since it was in writing, it was a valid document and cant be repudiated.
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But there were divergent views a few years later stating that doctrine cannot be used to override statutory provisions. Finally in 1929, the Transfer of Property Act was amended and the English law of part performance became a part of Indian Laws though a little modified. The law contained in Section -53 A of the Act is almost same as laid by Privy Council in Mohammed Musas case, which had applied the English equity of part-performance with certain restrictions. The law incorporated in TPA is more restricted than English equity in two respects. Firstly, in England the equity protects the interest of also such defendant who has taken possession on the basis of oral agreement, whereas under Section 53-A, the agreement must be written. Secondly, in England the equity gives also a right of action against the evictor, but Section 53-A gives no such right.
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Nathulal supra note 3; Shrimat Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Prahlad Bhairoba Suryavanshi, AIR 2002 SC 960; Rambhao Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, (2004) 8 SCC 614; Ram Kumar Agarwal v. Thawar Das, (1999) 7 SCC 303; Jacobs Private Limited v. Thomas Jacob, AIR 1995 Ker 249. See also Damodaran v. Shekharan, AIR 1993 Ker 242, M. Mariappa v. A.K. Sathyanarayan Shetty, AIR 1984 Kant 58.
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LIMITATIONS OF SECTION 53 A
AVAILABLE ONLY AS A DEFENCE
The Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Das v. Dantmara Tea Co.11has held that the right conferred by Section 53A is a right available to the defendant to protect his possession. The Section is so framed so as to impose statutory bar on the transfer; it confers no active title to the transferee. The above law laid down has been followed with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Technicians Studio Pvt. Ltd. v. Leela Ghosh.12 It has been held that Section 53A is only a partial importation in the statute law of India of the English doctrine of part performance. Thus, a person who is lead into possession on the strength of a void lease does not acquire any interest in the property, but gets under Section 53A only a right to defend his possession. It can be used only as a defence.13 Following Probodh Kumar, the Supreme Court again in Delhi Motor Company v. U.A.Basrurkar14 has held that Section 53A is only available as defence to the lessee, and not as confirming a right as the basis of which the lessee can claim rights against the lessor. This Section does not confer title on the defendant in possession 15; and he cannot maintain a suit on title.16 The Supreme Court has approved this principle. Thus it can be concluded that this section does not create a title in the defendant but merely acts as a bar to the plaintiff in asserting his title. It is limited to the cases where the transferee has taken possession, and against whom the transferor is debarred from enforcing any right, other than that mentioned in the contract.
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AIR 1940 PC 1. AIR 1977 SC 324. 13 Ram Gopal Reddy v. Additional Custodian, Evacuee Property, AIR 1966 SC 1438. 14 AIR 1968 SC 794. 15 Kuchwar Lime Stone Co. v. Secretary of State, AIR 1936 Pat 372. 16 S.N.Banerjee v. Kuchwar Lime & Stone Co. Ltd., AIR 1941 PC 128.
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But the words of the Section do not warrant a conclusion that the plaintiff as such is necessarily debarred from the benefit of this Section.17 The true position as explained by Justice Subba Rao, in a case decided by Andhra Pradesh High Court is:
whether the transferee occupies the position of a plaintiff or a defendant, he can resist the transferors claim against the property. Conversely, whether the transferor is the plaintiff or the defendant, he cannot enforce his rights in respect of the property against the transferee. The utility of the Section or the rights conferred there under should not be made to depend upon the manoeuvring for positions in the court of law, otherwise a powerful transferor can always defeat the statutory provisions of the Section by dispossessing the transferee by force and compelling him to go to the court as plaintiff. Doubtless, the right conveyed under the Section can be relied upon only as a shield and not as a sword but the protection is available to the transferee both as a plaintiff and as a defendant so long as he uses it as a shield.18
Thus, the correct interpretation of this section is that this section gives to the transferee only the right to defend his possession; this defence of possession may be in the form of plaintiff or defendant.
Radhanath Swain v. Madhusudan, AIR 1956 Ori 58. Achayya v. Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1957 AP 854 19 Maneklal Mansukhbhai, supra note 3. 20 Ibid. 21 Ayyan Kunhi v. Krishna, AIR 1950 Tr&Coch 81; Rami Reddi v. Venkat Reddi, AIR 1963 AP 489. 22 Jileba v. Marmersa, AIR 1950 All 700. 23 Rashakretayya v. Sarasamma, AIR 1951 Mad 213.
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of the Section as not being willing to perform his part of the contract. so also where a lessee has already put in possession of certain premises in part performance of an unregistered lease, the lessor can enforce the term of the lease entitling him to re-enter, if there default in payment of six months rent.24 Similarly, if the unregistered lease was only for a term, there would be no right to continue in possession after the expiry of the term.25
PROVISO: NOTICE
TRANSFEREE
FOR
CONSIDERATION
WITHOUT
The proviso to this Section protects the rights of a subsequent transferee for value without notice of previous transferees rights of part-performance. Therefore, this Section does not affect the rights of transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract of sale or of part-performance. The purpose of the proviso is to defeat the claim which would otherwise, have succeeded under the main part of this Section.26 The question of proviso does not arise until and unless the claimant has substantiated his claim under the main part of this Section.27 The proviso to the Section saves the right of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or its part-performance. The burden for proving that he is a transferee for consideration without notice is on the transferee.28 This was so held prior to the enactment of Section 53A.
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Muralidhar v. Tara Dye, AIR 1953 Cal 349. Radha Charan Das v. Pranbati Dassi, (1959) 63 Cal WN 535. 26 SOLI J SORABJEE, DARASHAW J VAKILS COMMENTARIES ON THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 595 (2nd edn Wadhwa Nagpur 2004). 27 S Veerabadra Naicker v. S Sambanda Naicker, AIR 2003 Mad 19; Yasodammal v. Janaki Ammal, AIR 1968 Mad 294 28 Prova Rani v. Lalit Mohini, AIR 1960 Cal 541
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CONCLUSION
The doctrine of part performance is an equitable doctrine designed to relieve the rigor of the law and provide a remedy when a transfer or an agreement for transfer falls short of the requirements laid down by the law. In England the doctrine was developed by the Equity Courts. In a modified form it has been recognized statutorily in India being embodied in Section 53A. Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act applies to a person who contracts to transfer immovable property in writing. If the proposed transferee in agreement has taken possession of the property or he continues in possession thereof being already in possession, in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, the transferor shall be debarred from enforcing any right in respect of the property. Also, Section 53A does not confer any title or interest to the transferee in respect of the property in his possession. Furthermore, it does not give to the transferee any right of action. It provides merely a right of defence. This is the essence of the principle incorporated in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
1. Sarthi Vera P., G.C.V. Subba Raos Law of Transfer of Property (Easements, Trust and Wills), 6th edn, Alt Publications, Hyderabad, 2005 2. Singh Avtar, The Transfer of Property Act, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 2005 3. Sinha R.K., The Transfer of Property Act, 12th edn, Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 2011 CASE LAWS 1. Achayya v. Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1957 AP 854; 2. Probodh Kumar Das v. Dantmara Tea Co, AIR 1940 PC 1. 3. Delhi Motor Company v. U.A.Basrurkar, AIR 1968 SC 794. 4. Technicians Studio Pvt. Ltd. v. Leela Ghosh, AIR 1977 SC 324. 5. AMA Sultan and Ors. v. Seydu Zohra Beevi, AIR 1990 Ker 186. 6. Amrao v. Baburao, (1950) ILR Nag 25 7. Ariff v. Jadunath, AIR 1931 PC 79 8. Ayyan Kunhi v. Krishna, AIR 1950 Tr&Coch 81; 9. Balram Jairam v. Kewalram, AIR 1940 Nag 396 10. Bhabhi Dutt v. Ramlalbyamal, AIR 1934 Rang. 303. 11. Bhagwandas v. Surajmal, AIR 1961 MP 237. 12. Chaliagulla Ramchandrayya v. Boppana Satyanarayana, AIR 1964 SC 877 13. Chaman Lal v. Surinder Kumari, AIR 1983 P&H 323.
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14. Chetak Construction Ltd. v. Om Prakash, AIR 2003 MP 145. 15. Damodaran v. Shekharan AIR 1993 Ker 242, 16. Delhi Motor Co. v. Basurkar, AIR 1968 SC 794. 17. Gajdhar v. Bachan, AIR 1943 All 768. 18. Hamida v. Smt Humer and ors., AIR 1992 All 346. 19. Hazilal v. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1999 MP 104. 20. Hemraj v. Rustomji, AIR 1953 SC 503. 21. Jacobs Private Limited v. Thomas Jacob, AIR 1995 Ker 249 22. Jileba v. Marmersa, AIR 1950 All 700. 23. Kripa Ram v. Bishen Das, AIR 1944 Lah 179. 24. Kuchwar Lime Stone Co. v. Secretary of State, AIR 1936 Pat 372. 25. M. Mariappa v. A.K. Sathyanarayan Shetty, AIR 1984 Kant 58. 26. Madan Mohan v. Srinivas Prasad, AIR 1943 Pat 343. 27. Mahalakshmi v. Venkatareddi, AIR 1944 Mad 556. 28. Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar Ganguli, (1914) ILR 42 Cal 801 29. Maneklal Manuskhbahi v. Honnusji Jamshedji, AIR 1950 SC 1 30. Manjural Hoque v. Mewajan Bibi, AIR 1956 Cal 350. 31. Maruti v. Krishna, AIR 1967 Bom 34. 32. Mian Pir Bux v. Sardar Mahomed Tahar, AIR 1934 PC 235 33. Muralidhar v. Tara Dye, AIR 1953 Cal 349. 34. N.P.Tripathi v. Damayanti Devi & Anr, AIR 1988 Pat. 123 35. Nathu Lal v. Phoolchand, [1970] 2 SCR 854.
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36. Patel Natwarlal Rupji v. Kondh Group Kheti Vishayak, AIR 1996 SC 1088. 37. Prova Rani v. Lalit Mohini, AIR 1960 Cal 541 38. Radha Charan Das v. Pranbati Dassi, (1959) 63 Cal WN 535. 39. Radhanath Swain v. Madhusudan, AIR 1956 Ori 58. 40. Ram Gopal Reddy v. Additional Custodian, Evacuee Property, AIR 1966 SC 1438. 41. Ram Kumar Agarwal v. Thawar Das (1999) 7 SCC 303 42. Rambhao Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, (2004) 8 SCC 614 43. Rami Reddi v. Venkat Reddi, AIR 1963 AP 489. 44. Ranchhoddas Chhaganlal v. Devaji Supdu, AIR 1977 SC 1517. 45. Ranchod v. Zipru, AIR 1954 Bom 153. 46. Rashakretayya v. Sarasamma, AIR 1951 Mad 213. 47. S Veerabadra Naicker v. S Sambanda Naicker, AIR 2003 Mad 19 48. S.N.Banerjee v. Kuchwar Lime & Stone Co. Ltd., AIR 1941 PC 128. 49. Sadashiv Chander Bhamgare v. Eknath Pandharinath Nangude, AIR 2004 Bom 378. 50. Sardar Govindrao Mahadik & anr. v. Devi Sahai and ors., AIR 1982 SC 989. 51. Sham Lal v. Mathi, AIR 2002 HP 66 . 52. Shrimat Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Prahlad Bhairoba Suryavanshi, AIR 2002 SC 960 53. Shukla Malhotra v. Vyasa Bank Ltd., (1998) 45 DRJ 504. 54. State of Uttar Pradesh v. District Judge, AIR 1997 SC 53. 55. Sulleman v. Patel, AIR 1933 Bom. 381.
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56. Sunil Kumar Sarkar v. Aghor Kumar Basu, AIR 1989 Gau 39.