Different orientation of debate between Hart and Devlin Debate on ‘Enforcement of (public) morals’ not on the Morality or Validity of ‘Oppressive laws’ as in Hart- Fuller debate In 1859 John Stuart Mill argued in On Liberty that society has no right to enforce its moral perceptions where their violation would not cause objectively verifiable harm to others Mill argued that, in the absence of harm, diversity is a positive factor to society which is dangerously inhibited by ‘moral’ repression Hart Devlin debate followed the publication of the Wolfenden Report : Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (1957) Excerpts: ‘.. To equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must be a realm (‘area’) of morality which in brief and crude terms is not the law’s business. To say this is not to condone or encourage private immorality.’ As a result starting from 1967 in the UK homosexual conduct between consenting persons over 21 years old is no longer criminalized. Comparisons: in US only in 2003 with the US Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v Texas is private homosexual activity between adults no longer a criminal offence in all US states In Fiji’s 1997 Constitution discrimination on grounds of ‘sexual orientation’ is prohibited but the consensual homosexual relations among adults is still a ‘criminal offence’ Australia’s Human Rights (Sexual Privacy) Act 1994 overrides Tasmanian Law which criminalizes homosexuality as a result of a UN Committee’s ruling in the Toonen Case Lord Devlin took issue with some parts of the report that there are private areas of morality into which the law should not intrude Society rests upon the base of ‘shared morality’ which can be legally defended exactly as a society may be defended from subversive action How is the ‘morality’ of a (certain) society to be determined for the purpose of its enforcement? Devlin seems to propose a ‘jury box’ morality that of the average ‘right- minded’ citizens (‘moral standards of behavior are the standards of behavior of a ‘reasonable man’) However Devlin did not say that ‘every immoral act’ is to be prohibited by law. The law should enforce morals only in those conditions which is required for the preservation of society Hart’s response to this was that (even in the context of UK and others even in the late 1950s) there is no such thing as broad and wide ‘shared morality’ Society is pluralistic. ‘amalgamation of tolerated moralities and not one shared morality’. Diverse views exist not only on matters of sex-morality but also on issues of capital punishment, abortion, surrogate motherhood, euthanasia, (active and passive), withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, One possible example of moral enforcement through a Constitutional amendment in the United States was the ‘Prohibition’, in 1920,by the Eighteenth Amendment to the US Constitution of the manufacture, transport and sale of alcohol in the United States. In 1933 the the Twenty-first Amendment repealed the Prohibition and the Eighteenth Amendment. Difficulty of enforcement of (morality) through laws Compare one criteria in Fuller’s inner morality of law that “laws must be possible to obey” Query: Can an extension of this argument be made, based on Prohibition lessons in the United States that (in the US) the use of say, marijuana for medicinal purposes should not be criminalized. (In the 1990s the US Supreme Court rejected that argument) How about morality of gun control in the context of the United States? Can the arguments for and against gun- control be made on moral grounds? On a less ‘legalistic basis’ can, say, industry-academy (University) cooperation which is touted as ‘unqualifiedly good’ be challenged on moral and ethical grounds? Two possible negative (immoral or unethical) examples of University and industry cooperation in Western Countries University medical research regarding the link between smoking and cancer was, in some instances subsidized by cigarette companies In the 1980s billions of dollars were misspent by research into US President Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ program supported by some academic funding now revived by former US president George W. Bush, during his administration In relation to Devlin’s ‘public morality’ as a ‘seamless web’ Hart questioned whether it really is, since certain moral issues are not all black or white. Morality should not always be based on ‘morality of the majority’ since majority’s morality could be wrong. If ‘popular’ morality is a basis for legal intervention and punishment then persecution of the ‘unpopular’ could follow (my comments as an extreme example compare the Nazis’ persecution of not only the Jews but also gypsies, homosexuals and disabled persons). It could be argued that the persecution itself is immoral but can one also argue that the persecution may be based on allegedly ‘moralistic’ reasons? Devlin’s equation of laws punishing ‘subversion’( in particular with treason) with those of laws punishing moral breaches has political undertones. Hart criticized the judicial enforcement of certain morals as ‘judicial moralism’ Hart criticized Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions [1962] AC 220 quoting a 1774 decision by Lord Mansfield stating that the King’s courts are ‘the general censor and guardian of the public manners’ I In the Shaw case conviction for publishing ‘for the conspiracy to corrupt morals’ of what would amount to a directory of prostitutes was upheld. Hart argues that law cannot (or should not) enforce morality through coercion as proposed or endorsed by Devlin Legal sanction is not the only or even effective disincentive from people doing allegedly immoral behaviour To be fair Devlin did not state that all morals should be given the imprimatur (‘sanction’) of law . The law should enforce morals only in those conditions which demand the preservation of society. . Devlin argues that in deciding whether to punish ‘moral wickedness’ the legislature must gauge the intensity with which a popular moral conviction is held only when the moral violations would become intolerable the criminal law can safely and properly be used. On the grounds of Devlin and Hart’s arguments would any or both approve or disapprove (actual, hypothetical or real) the following criminal laws : (a) prohibition against bigamy (b) prohibition against adultery (c) prohibition against blasphemy (of only the Christian religion as it used to be in UK) and blasphemy in Pakistan? (d) varying gun control laws (US very lax; Gun lobby and many others assert a constitutional and moral right to own guns by individuals) and the maximum of death sentence in Malaysia for unauthorized individual ownership of guns (e) a hypothetical law (apparently non- existent) in any country which criminalizes the manufacture, importation, and even the smoking of cigarettes Compare the ‘cultural relativism’ debate in human rights law Can rights and morals be the same in all societies? Compare the prevailing practice of female genital mutilation on cultural grounds in certain African societies. Devlin or supporters of enforcement of morals in relation to the issue of homosexuality continue to argue that the majority view of morality still prevails in decided cases even after 1967 when adult, consensual homosexual acts were decriminalized in UK. In R v Bishop (1974) 2 All. ER. 1206 it was held that an allegation of homosexuality was an imputation against character However in the 1990s a known homosexual was nominated and approved as a High Court Judge in Australia Hart: Moral standards change and therefore even within the same society ‘moral feelings’ may not be spread out evenly Enforcement of morals may create more social evils than prevent them Hart asserts that (mainly in the context of Western societies) bigamy and polygamy can be prohibited by law not on moral but on ‘paternalistic’ grounds Hart argues that bigamy and polygamy should be prohibited because they are (a) “affront to a public ceremony” (b) throws the legal obligations of the parties into confusion (c) bigamist should be punished not for being ‘irreligious’ or immoral but for being a nuisance Dias critiqued that if Hart would allow ‘paternalism’ in the case of polygamy and bigamy then why should the law not show paternalistic attitudes in other moral areas as well. Dworkin comments that Devlin’s moralism or moralistic attitudes are evident in what Devlin considered to be ‘immoral’ ‘what is shocking and wrong is not his idea that community’s morality counts but his idea of what counts as the community’s morality’ Many perhaps including some in the United States Supreme Court for example would consider Devlin’s views on abortion is old- fashioned (now) when in the late 1950s Devlin stated that “nowadays many people do not understand that abortion is wrong”: G. Hughes states If that is the case the morality here does not mean ‘shared morality’ but rather the morality of a church group. Compare the comments in text (page 364) that “Lord Devlin assumed a degree of moral solidarity in society which may have existed in earlier periods of our history which is hardly discernible today” My Comment: But that statement or critique of Devlin would not be applicable at all to societies like Saudi Arabia where religiously determined moral rules constitute the whole fiber of law and may not be fully applicable to quite a few other non-Western societies. The issue of enforcement of morals is also related to what role the State plays in its relation with and regulation of the conduct of the individual. Hart who was critical of Devlin’s views do not consider that Devlin is entirely a ‘moralist’ in the negative sense of the word but only critiqued Devlin’s ‘moderate moralism’ concerning enforcement of morals. Again as in the Hart-Fuller debate on the morality of oppressive and unjust laws Hart by no means deny the relevance or even in some cases the necessity for the enforcement of morals. The lines to be drawn in relation to the enforcement of morals is difference between Devlin’s philosophy (which has been described by McCoubrey and White as ‘moderate moralism’ -some like Ronald Dworkin may disagree- ) and Hart’s philosophy (which has been described as) ‘qualified liberalism’