Israel and Jewish Community After World War II

Page 1 of 41 ISREAL , JWEISH COMMUNITY & MUSLIM WORLD
ISREAL , JWEISH COMMUNITY & MUSLIM WORLD
INDEX
1. Israel And Jewish Community After World War.
2. A list of UN Resolutions against Israel.

3. The Caricatures in Middle East Politics
• Denmark Center of Mossad Activity:
• Flemming ( or Flaming) Rose: Journalist with a cause
• Political Context for Action:
• Sayanim – Defenders of Western Civilization:
• Mossad War Propaganda and the “Cartoon Controversy”:
• Beyond Religious Blasphemy:
• Epilogue
4. Israel: consequences of ‘uniqueness’

• Creating a new system of clientage
• The invalid UN Resolution
5. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in a Nutshell

• Divisive History
• Occupation, Land & Settlements
• Palestinian State
• Refugees
• Palestinian Terror
• Israeli Repression
• Israeli Security
• Water
• Jerusalem
Malik M. Rizwan Yasin Research Report 0092 300 9289949

• Death of Yasser Arafat and Palestinian Democratization End of the Intifadeh

• Israeli Issues
• Peace Proposals
6. Lebanon and Israel Conflict

• Hezbollah attack
• Targeting of civilian areas
• Israeli-Lebanon conflict
• Previous prisoner exchanges
• precise number of casualties.
• Position of Lebanon
• Negotiations for ceasefire
7. The Strangely Parallel Careers of Israel and Pakistan

• Differences
• Pre-State Developments
• Nations In The Making
• Secularism Vs. Theocracy
• Views Of Each Other
• Conclusions

Israel And Jewish Community After World War II

Until the mid-1900's, when Israel became a state, it was inhabited mostly by Arabs. Israel became a state
in 1948, but the movement to create a Jewish homeland, called Zionism, started in the 1890's. One of the
trailblazers on this subject was Chaim Weizmann, a Russian-born chemist and Zionist leader, who in 1949
became the first president of modern Israel. Weizmann was a key factor in getting the Balfour Declaration
signed by the British. The Balfour Declaration was a letter issued in 1917, during World War I, by foreign
secretary and British statesman Arthur James Balfour. The letter expressed Britain's approval of Zionism and
also that the British government would make the" best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this
object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in
any other country." As an indirect result of the Balfour Declaration, Israel was established as "an
independent state" in 1948.(1) 1. Arthur Hertzberg, "Israel and American Jewry," Commentary (August
1967), 69.
In this paper I would like to observe the issue of Israel formation and what problems it caused for people in
this land. In 1920, the League of Nations, which later gave rise the United Nations, declared Palestine a
mandated territory of Great Britain, and gave the British the responsibility of keeping order between the
Jews and the Arabs, whose relationship had become increasingly hostile. Also, the mandate said that Britain
was to help in making a national homeland for Palestinian Jews. Many Zionists viewed the mandate as
helpful to their cause, but Britain, fearful of the hostile Arab population, proposed limits on the number of
Jewish immigrants allowed to enter Palestine. These limits were not enforced, but they helped to alleviate
the pressure being put on the British by Arab inhabitants of Palestine.
The mandate period lasted until 1948 and during that period the Jewish population in Palestine increased
tenfold. During the mandate uprisings were common and led to two major revolts, one by the Arabs, the
other led by the Zionists. As Jewish immigration to Palestine increased, so did the Arab opposition to
Zionism and British rule. Several uprisings occurred and they culminated in a general Arab revolt which
lasted from 1936 to 1939 and was finally quieted by British troops on the night before World War II (2).
About 6 million Jews were killed by German Nazis during World War II. Zionists soon realized that the need
for a Jewish homeland was growing and their efforts intensified towards getting one. By the end of WWII
most of the Jewish population in Palestine was revolting against British rule. In 1947, after seven years of
war and exhausted by the revolts, the British decided to withdraw from Palestine and handed the problems
in Palestine over to the United Nations, who on November 29, 1947, agreed to divide Palestine into an Arab
state and a Jewish state (2). Under the plan, Jerusalem was to be put under international control due to its
religious and ceremonial values to both Jews and Arabs.
The Jews accepted the idea, however it was not so for the Arabs. They protested against the partition and
the protests erupted in to violence which later led to a civil war between the Jews and the Arabs, a theme
which has plagued the state of Israel throughout its existence. The British did not get involved, as they

wished to leave Palestine by August 1, 1948, the date in the partition plan for the termination of the
mandate. As it 2. W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist: The American Jewish Committee, 1906-1966 (Philadelphia,
1972.)became clear that the British were going to leave by May 15, the leaders of the Jews in Palestine
decided to form a Jewish state, an idea that was a part of the partition plan. In Tel Aviv, on May 14, 1948,
the Provisional State Council, which had formerly been the National Council, proclaimed the "establishment
of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called Medinat Yisrael (the State of Israel) ...open to the immigration
of Jews from all the countries of their dispersion." Within 24 hours the armies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Iraq invaded the newly formed country and presented it with the first of many military
challenges that it would face.
Israel ended up victorious in the war that lasted some 15 months and claimed the lives of over 6,000
Israelis, about 1% of the country's Jewish population. The war became known as Israel's War of
Independence. During the early part of 1949 negotiations were conducted with the UN's help between Israel
and its invading countries, except for Iraq which has refused to negotiate with Israel to date. According to
the agreements Israel controlled the coastal plain, Galilee and the entire Negev, an area in the south of
Israel. Jerusalem was divided, with Israel controlling the western sector, while Jordan controlled the eastern
part, which included the Old City.
With the war over, Israel focused its efforts in building the state which it had fought for, for over fifty years.
The first job was to form a coherent and cohesive government system. A national election was held on
January 25, 1949, and soon after the first Knesset (Parliament) went into session (1). Two of the people
that had led Israel to its existence were elected President and Prime Minister. Chaim Weizmann was elected
as the country's first President and David Ben-Gurion, who had been head of the Jewish 1. Arthur
Hertzberg, "Israel and American Jewry," Commentary (August 1967), 69 Agency was elected as the first
Prime Minister. In the first months of independence some 50,000 newcomers entered Israel. By the end of
1951 687,000 people had arrived, mainly Jewish, thus doubling the Jewish population. In about sixty years
the State of Israel went from being one man's dream to a reality.
AJC (American Jewish Community) leaders were active Zionists, the majority were opposed to the
movement. To be sure, hardly anyone was against helping unfortunate Jews from benighted countries find
new homes in Palestine, the ancestral land of the Jewish people. In fact, many leading figures in the early
AJC, most notably Jacob Schiff, donated large sums of money for that purpose. But the concept of a Jewish
political entity was another matter entirely. In 1918 the Committee announced its support for the Balfour
Declaration, in which the British government said it would "look with favor" upon "a national home for the
Jewish People" in Palestine. AJC understood that document to mean only that the British government would
facilitate the settlement of Jews in Palestine without infringing on the rights of the Arabs and would
encourage the development of Jewish cultural life there.
Jewish sovereignty, whether in its minimalist form as a state for Jews who wanted to live there or, in its
more radical version, as the culmination of a complete "ingathering of the exiles" and liquidation of the
Diaspora, was anathema. Many in AJC were conditioned by the theology of Classical Reform Judaism to deny
a national or ethnic dimension to Judaism and to define their religion solely in terms of universalistic
monotheism and prophetic ethics. On practical grounds they feared that Jewish nationalism threatened the
status of Jews all over the world since anti-Semites would be able to argue that the Jews' allegiance was to
a Jewish state, not to their countries of residence. Furthermore, Zionism, like socialism and anarchism, was
an ideology commonly associated with the eastern European Jewish immigrants, and it reflected their
dangerous radicalism. The Committee's antipathy toward political Zionism became increasingly associated
with the organization's elitist identity. After World War I American Zionists and others among the eastern
European community criticized AJC for being a self-appointed aristocracy. With the announced aim of
bringing democracy to Jewish life, they initiated a movement for an elected "Congress" that would represent
the rank and file of American Jews. AJC fought hard against the imposition of such a "democracy" that, it
feared, would recklessly endanger American Jewry by foisting Zionism on it.
Despite the Committee's non-Zionism, its sympathy for Jewish settlement in Palestine, as expressed in its
approval for the Balfour Declaration, provided a basis for cooperation with the Zionist movement on practical

projects for building up the economy of Jewish Palestine. Thus in 1929, on the initiative of its president,
Louis Marshall, the AJC agreed to join with the Zionists in a reconstituted Jewish Agency for Palestine;
Zionists and non-Zionists would have equal representation (3). Thirteen years later, under the emergency
situation created by World War II, the AJC leadership went even further, working out an agreement with the
Zionists to back the creation of an "autonomous Jewish commonwealth" in Palestine if the Zionists, in turn,
would drop their previous insistence on nurturing Jewish nationalism in the Diaspora. But anti-Zionist
elements within the Committee scuttled this proposal.
More than anything else it was the Committee's resignation from the American 3. Tom Segev, the Seventh
Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York, 1993) Jewish Conference in 1943 that branded it for
years thereafter -- in some circles, even today--as inimical to Zionism. The Conference, an ad hoc body
organized to coordinate postwar planning, endorsed the Zionist demand for a Jewish state in Palestine. In
doing so it reflected the emerging consensus of American Jews, who, shocked by the horrors of the
Holocaust which were just beginning to come to their attention, had determined that a sovereign Jewish
state was needed to provide a haven for the survivors and some assurance that there was one spot on the
globe--their own country--where Jews would not have to confront anti-Semitism.
However the American Jewish Committee, insisting that a Jewish state was no panacea, and determined
once again to combat the notion that majorities could impose decisions in American Jewish life, walked out
of the Conference. Not only did this decision evoke denunciations from other sectors of the community, it
also precipitated the resignation of the Committee's remaining Zionists, some 10 percent of its membership
(). The AJC adjusted with the times. Motivated primarily by the plight of homeless Holocaust survivors after
the war, the AJC gradually moved from a position of advocating the admission of Jewish refugees into
Palestine to support for the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, especially once it saw the
inevitability of American endorsement of the plan. But this about-face led to a new series of defections from
the organization as die-hard anti-Zionists in the Committee joined the American Council for Judaism (ACJ),
founded In 1942 on the proposition that Judaism and Jewish nationalism were incompatible.(4) 4. Thomas
A. Kolsky, Jews against Zionism: The American Council for Judaism, 194.2-194 8 (Philadelphia, 1990).
Federal Republic of Germany, largely conducted by AJC President Jacob Blaustein,
With the establishment of the State of Israel, AJC fully accepted the new reality and mobilized diplomatic
and economic backing for the fledgling nation. AJC influence with administration officials was instrumental in
securing U.S. government loans and grants- in -aid for Israel which, by 1963, totaled some $879 million.
Negotiations with the secured for Israel about $773 million in reparations. Also, AJC contacts with the State
Department and with foreign diplomats ensured that Iran and Iraq allowed Jews to leave for Israel.
Blaustein, no longer AJC president and acting in a private capacity, played a role in the U.S. decision to
begin supplying arms to Israel during the Kennedy administration.(5) Israel publicly acknowledged AJC help.
Abba eban, who developed close relations with AJC during his years as Israel's ambassador to the UN, told
the Committee: "No one will ever forget how you stood in vigilant brotherhood at the cradle of our emergent
statehood; and how you helped lay the foundations of our international status and of our crucial friendship
with the Government and people of the American Republic."(5)
Nevertheless practical support did not imply acceptance of Zionist ideology. Both to underline its consistent
insistence that American Jews' sole political allegiance was to the U.S. and to refute American Council for
Judaism charges that the AJC had capitulated to Jewish nationalism, Committee leaders--most vocally Jacob
Blaustein-insisted that Israel explicitly renounce any claim to speak on behalf of anyone other than its own
citizens. The result was the Blaustein-Ben-Gurion Agreement of 1950. Reaffirmed several times in
subsequent years, this statement deflected the charge of dual loyalty by 5. Harman Interview, 19-20, Jacob
Blaustein Collection, AJC Oral History Library (OHL), New York Public Library. 6. Proceedings of the Fifty-
Second Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee, 84. declaring, in the name of the AJC and the
Israeli prime minister, that American Jews "owe no political allegiance to Israel." After many twists and
turns, and largely under the pressure of events, the AJC had made its peace with the existence of a Jewish
state but not with its Zionist ideological underpinning.
In the two decades after its founding Israel was of minimal interest to the AJC. For one thing the

organization tended to focus on domestic issues. As one long-time staff member, hired in 1966, recalled, "it
was very much of a civil rights agency" when he came on board. There was even talk of removing "Jewish"
from the organization's name and calling it the Institute for Human Relations.(7) On the assumption that
Jewish rights were safest when the rights of all were protected, AJC after World War II broadened its
interests from fighting anti-Semitism to promoting interreligious and interethnic understanding and
supporting equal rights for blacks. On the assumption that "science" might offer a cure for bigotry, the
Committee funded scholarly analyses of the psychodynamics of prejudice. In the international arena the AJC
was prominently identified with the cause of human rights. It also used its influence to aid Jewish
communities threatened by anti-Semitism--primarily in Latin America and the Middle east--and, regarding
what went on behind the Iron Curtain, where direct intervention was not possible, the Committee published
pathbreaking research that exposed communist anti-Semitism. In the early 1960s the AJC gave high priority
to securing a favorable statement on Catholic- Jewish relations from the Second Vatican Council. And around
the same time signs of an erosion of Jewishness among younger Jews led some in AJC to 7. Eugene DuBow
Interview, 1/38, 42-3, AJC OHL express interest in studying the dynamics of Jewish identity and possibly
developing forms of Jewish expression that might appeal to an American-born generation that had no
memory of immigrant life or personal contact with anti-Semitism. In the constellation of major American
Jewish organizations, AJC was distinguished for its scholarly tone, its programmatic moderation, and the
priority it gave to the successful integration of Jews into the American mainstream.
There was almost no AJC interest in Israel. AJC annual meetings before 1967 occasionally discussed Israel
-related issues-- the Arab economic boycott, worrisome arms sales to Arab states, and, of course, the Suez
War of 1956--but these matters were clearly tangential to the interests of most members. AJC annual
reports usually included the Middle east way down on a list of "Overseas Concerns." The annual addresses
of executive vice president John Slawson and of AJC presidents rarely discussed Israel in any substantive
way. The priorities of the agency were expressed accurately in a memo from the AJC program director.
Rejecting a piece on Israel for the front page of the September 1966 AJC Newsletter, he explained: "I'm not
clear as to what qualifies it as a lead article after a summer of Argentina, race riots, burgeoning
consciousness of Jewish identity, a Congress in session, and a growing rightwing extremism."(8)
Only a small group of top AJC leaders drew closer to Israel during these years. These were the officers and
board members who went on AJC missions to the Jewish state beginning in 1949. The official reports of
these missions, concerned primarily with policy issues, convey little of the emotional impact Israel had on
the visitors. An Israeli 8. Nathan Perlmutter to George Salomon, September 8, 1966, AJC Archives, JSX/66/
Israel. who witnessed the arrival of the first AJC group recalled, "they were so excited, these anti-Zionists."
Irving Engel, chairman of the AJC executive committee from 1949 to 1954 and president from 1954 to
1959, described all of the missions as "thrilling."(8)
But the effects of the visits to Israel were purely personal and did not trickle down to the rest of the
organization. Significantly, chapter leaders were not included on these missions till 1965. The meager
interest in Israel at AJC's national headquarters was even weaker at the grassroots level. One of the
founders of the Dallas chapter later remembered that the members "had a nothing feeling" about Israel.
"Nobody knew much, nobody was interested," recalled the professional who ran AJC's Westchester chapter
at the time: I remember once, I think it must have been in the winter of '66-'67, one of the meetings that I
arranged for AJC. It was a Sunday night Westchester chapter meeting. Got the assistant consul general of
the Israeli Consulate to come to give a speech. I mean we had no turnout. Nobody cared. Such apathy
toward Israel in Westchester, a suburb of New York City and surely one of the most jadishly sophisticated
and internationally oriented AJC chapters, spoke volumes about the situation in other communities. AJC
actions in the wake of Israel's Sinai campaign of 1956, though apparent exceptions to the overall pattern of
distancing from Israel actually fit right in. As defenders of the Jewish state, AJC leaders intervened
energetically in the highest circles of the American government to minimize the diplomatic damage to Israel
from its invasion of Egypt. But, as historian Naomi Cohen notes, AJC's involvement was not 8. Nathan
Perlmutter to George Salomon, September 8, 1966, AJC Archives, JSX/66/ Israel based on any strategic
vision of Israel's role in the Middle east or even on any legitimate security concerns of the Jewish state.
Rather, AJC was motivated by embarrassment at Israel's surprise move and the "grave public relations
issue" it created. Thus "the Committee worked to convince Israel to renounce any expansionist aims, and,

at the same time, to prevent the United Nations, prompted by American initiative, from imposing sanctions
upon Israel." Confirmation for the AJC view that the reckless Israelis had gotten themselves into hot water
and needed the AJC to save them came from UN Ambassador Abba ebon: saying that he had been given no
advance warning that his nation was about to invade, ebon came to the AJC and requested help in dealing
with the American administration.(9) It was natural for AJC to see itself as the level-headed patron and
Israel as the headstrong dependent, a relationship that uncannily mirrored that between AJC and the newly
arrived Jewish immigrants from eastern Europe decades earlier.
Indeed, even after 1956 there persisted in the minds of many veteran AJCers remnants of pre-1948
uneasiness about a state claiming to be the Jewish national home. Such feelings sometimes came to the
surface. Jacob Blaustein, the AJC president who negotiated the agreement with David Ben-Gurion that
denied any Israeli claim to the political allegiance of American Jews, was ever on the alert for Israeli
"violations" of the accord, such as calls for American Jews to immigrate to Israel, Israeli attempts to speak
in the name of Diaspora communities, or statements implying that American Zionists were more
representative of American Jewry than non-Zionists. even positive AJC statements about Israel sometimes
sent a mixed message. Speaking at the 1958 annual 9. Cohen, Not Free to Desist, 323-4; Irving M. Engel
Interview, 2/16, AJC OH. meeting, President Irving Engel stated that "Israel was the world's answer to the
Romanov czars and their pogroms, to Adolf Hitler and his Auschwitz" but went on to complain that Israel did
not separate church and state, subordinated its Arab population, and discriminated against non-Jews
through the Law of Return. At the next annual meeting, with Israel's UN Ambassador Abba ebon sitting on
the dais, Engel called Israel "a merciful haven for the many Jews who need or wish to go there. But one
word of caution: we do not see exodus to Israel as the answer for those Jews--and they constitute a
majority--who are seeking equality and a secure future elsewhere."(9) When Israeli agents kidnapped Adolf
Eichmann in Argentina in 1960 and Israel prepared to put him on trial, AJC leaders sought privately to
convince Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to allow a trial by an international tribunal, both to head off potential
anti-Semitic charges that Jews believe in "eye-for-an-eye" justice and to emphasize to all the world that
Israel had no mandate to speak for world Jewry. Only when it became evident that Ben-Gurion would not
budge did the AJC publicly defend the trial in Israel on the ground that "if Eichmann were not tried in Israel,
he probably would not be tried at all."(9)
Ambivalence about the Jewish state was understandable. AJC leaders who grew up in the early part of the
century could hardly be expected to shed their conceptions of American Jewish identity or their notions of
what constituted a proper pluralistic democracy just because the State of Israel had become a fait
accomplish. These men had struggled to make it in a prewar American society rife with anti-Semitism, and
they had succeeded without renouncing their Jewishness. Accepting the historical necessity, and Cohen, Not
Free to Desist, 323-4; Irving M. Engel Interview, 2/16, AJC OH. Therefore the legitimacy, of a Jewish state,
they could not affirm that such a state, thousands of miles away and one which, unlike the U.S., gave
preferential status to one religion-ethnic group, had any Jewish implications for them.
Two AJC presidents--Irving Engel (born 1891, AJC president 1954-9) and Morris Abram (born 1918, AJC
president 1964-8)--have recounted the great difficulty they had in adjusting to a postwar world with a
sovereign Jewish nation in the Middle East. Both were successful lawyers who grew up in the South, where
Jewish identity was universally understood in religious terms and "Jewish nationalism" was an oxymoron. By
his own account, Irving Engel before 1948 "was opposed to the creation of a new state for the Jews," a
feeling reinforced by World War II, which convinced him "that nationalism, whatever purpose it had served
in previous history, had become a scourge to humanity; and I just assumed that after the world saw what
destruction and suffering had been caused by nationalism during the Hitler period, there would be a
lessening of nationalism after the war." Only when he saw that nationalism was still "rampant all over the
world" even after Hitler's defeat did Engel "become convinced, as the other leaders of the American Jewish
Committee did . . . that there was no reason why the Jews should be denied nationalism when all other
people had it, and that there should be some place on this earth where a Jew in distress could come without
having to get permission from somebody else."(10) A Jewish state, then, was justified for lack of any
alternative.
Morris Abram was a prominent advocate of racial Justice, and his ascension to the AJC presidency in 1964

reaffirmed the organization's liberal political stance. Abram recalled growing up in Georgia: "I was very anti-
Zionist, God, I was anti-Zionist." He 10. Irving M. Engel Interview, 3/3-4, AJC OHL. & American Jewish Year
Book, 1955, 631.considered Zionists "nuts who were going to interfere with this sweet and easy flow of
amity between Jewish Americans and other Americans by creating a state which was bound to create dual
loyalties and which was bound to create all kinds of questions in the minds of people who otherwise were
very sensible and had agreed to a peaceful coexistence with Jews in this country." Abram remembered
"making many, many anti-Zionist speeches; you couldn't tell the difference between me and the leading
members of the American Council for Judaism in those days." Only when Abram learned firsthand about the
Holocaust while serving on the prosecution team at the Nuremberg Trials did he recognize the need for a
Jewish state. And even in 1963, when he joined AJC, Abram could not bring himself to use the term "Jewish
people," referring to himself as "a Jew and an American-period."(10) Events would soon lead him to alter
that self-definition.
For all of AJC's lack of interest in, and lingering ambivalence toward Israel, it had to face the reality that its
orientation to the Jewish state would help determine the agency's success or failure as a force on the
American Jewish scene. In January 1954 President Engel described the Committee as situated at the center
between "ideological extremists--some Zionist leaders at one end, and some Council for Judaism members
at the other."(10) But choices had to be made. On the one hand, the Council, which had not gone out of
business with the establishment of the State of Israel, kept up a withering attack on the AJC for abandoning
anti-nationalist principles in 1948 and sought to recruit members from the AJC's traditional base of
support--wealthy and highly Americanized Reform Jews. On the other hand, any AJC attempt to soften its
elite image and broaden 10. Irving M. Engel Interview, 3/3-4, AJC OHL. & American Jewish Year Book,
1955, 631.its base--that is, to make AJC more of a mainstream Jewish organization--required a more
positive approach toward Zionism and Israel to counterbalance the memory of pre-1948 AJC policies.
Though drastically weakened by the success of Zionism in establishing a Jewish state, the American Council
for Judaism--led till 1955 by former AJC executive committee member Lessing Rosenwald--repeatedly
criticized AJC for ideological inconsistency. If the Committee still opposed Jewish nationalism, as it claimed,
why did it use its influence in high places to support a Middle eastern nation that not only called itself a
"Jewish State" but flagrantly discriminated against non-Jews? The ACJ pounced on every example of Israeli
backsliding from Ben-Gurion's 1950 agreement with Blaustein to urge the AJC to repudiate Israel. And in the
hope that the AJC might return to its pristine opposition to Zionism, the Council periodically sent out feelers
about the possibility of an organizational merger.
Distancing itself from the American Council for Judaism, then, was only one part of a broad AJC strategy in
the early 1960s to reposition the organization closer to the American Jewish mainstream by placing greater
emphasis on Israel. Several positive steps were taken. In 1961 John Slawson handpicked Theodore
Tannenwald to chair the organization's Israel Committee precisely because, unlike the great majority of
veteran AJC activists, Tannenwald "had very close relations with several of the top Israeli officials" as a
result of his service in the State Department during World War 11. Tannenwald was aware that Slawson's
purpose in reaching out to him was "to lose the anti-Zionist hue that the Committee had." At the same time
the Committee hired George Gruen, a recent Columbia University Ph.D., as the first staff person in AJC
history assigned specifically to Middle Eastern affairs. That Gruen was a traditionally observant Jew also
signaled a broadening of AJC's vision of the Jewish community. The most significant initiative in revising
AJC's image was the establishment in November 1961 of an Israel office in Tel Aviv, a decision that grew out
of AJC's leadership missions to Israel. Since such an office was a radical departure for the AJC, which had
been so indifferent to Zionism for so long, it was originally financed off budget on an experimental basis. In
1965 the Board of Governors voted to include the office in the regular budget; as one board member
explained, this was vital "in terms of AJC's image in certain segments of American Jewry who still think of us
as anti-Zionist, or, at best, neutral with respect to the future of Israel."(11) But in the history of
organizations, even significant shifts can carry over old assumptions. In setting up the Israel office, AJC
remained bound to its traditional discomfort with Zionism and its paternalism toward Israelis: The AJC-
IsraeI link was explained as an opportunity to teach the Jewish state how to run a civilized democracy.
Announcing the plan to open the office, Alan Stroock, chairman of the Israel Committee in 1960, noted that

some Israeli actions embarrassed the AJC and that the elimination of "anti-democratic practices and
attitudes" in Israel would make it easier for the AJC "to invoke principles of human rights and practices in
our country and abroad." Specifically, the projected AJC office would preach separation of church and state,
rights for the Arab minority, and the inadmissibility of Israel speaking for Jews outside its borders. There
was not the slightest suggestion that the State of Israel had anything to teach American Jewry, let alone the
American Jewish Committee. Establishing the office (10.) 10. Irving M. Engel Interview, 3/3-4, AJC OHL.
American Jewish Year Book, 1955, 631.in Israel was not a "changed" policy for AJC but an "expanded
program." The insistence that AJC had not shifted course on Zionism, as well as the self-congratulatory
Americanism and condescension toward Israel evident in the process of setting up an office there, reflected
common AJC attitudes.
In 1964 AJC produced a 70-page pamphlet on the same theme, In Vigilant Brotherhood: The American
Jewish Committee's Relationship to Palestine and Israel. In some detail this publication reiterated the
Committee's support for Israel, its friendliness for, though separation from, Zionism, its insistence on the
legitimacy of the American Jewish community, and its concern about aspects of Israeli life that it considered
less than fully democratic. The title "In Vigilant Brotherhood" was taken from the glowing description of the
AJC's relationship with Israel enunciated by Abba ebon at the 1959 annual meeting, and a larger quotation
from the ebon speech was printed on the inside front cover. It will prove helpful to you in clarifying to others
the role of the American Jewish Committee in the development of the Jewish community in Palestine and
the creation of the independent State of Israel. As you well know, these are subjects about which some
unfortunate popular misconceptions still exist.(11) In was in 1896 when Theodore Herzl published a book
titled The Jewish State, which analyzed the causes of anti-Semitism and proposed its cure-the formation of
a Jewish State. He proposed it to be a state where Jews from all over the world could unite if persecuted
elsewhere. Now Israel is the place that Herzl hoped it could be. Yes, it is still plagued by its Arab neighbors,
and has had wars, but like always Israel prevails as they hope it will in the next millennium and beyond.
Over four thousand years ago God (11.) Morris B. Abram to Members of the Board of Delegates, September
I, 1964, AJC Archives, JSX 64/Israel/"In Vigilant Brotherhood." promised a man who had a vision that his
descendants would have a land of their own
A list of UN Resolutions against Israel
Who is the outlaw nation here?

Here is a list of UN resolutions that Israel has not complied. As far as I know they have ignored every single
resolution. But the situation is far worse than would at first appear, it involves the serious distortion of the
official Security Council record by the profligate use by the United States of its veto power. (See Table)
Israel's, defiance goes back to its very beginnings. This collection of resolutions criticizing Israel is
unmatched by the record of any other nation.
A list of UN Resolutions against "Israel"
1955-1992:
* Resolution 106: " . . . 'condemns' Israel for Gaza raid".
* Resolution 111: " . . . 'condemns' Israel for raid on Syria that killed fifty-six people".
* Resolution 127: " . . . 'recommends' Israel suspends it's 'no-man's zone' in Jerusalem".
* Resolution 162: " . . . 'urges' Israel to comply with UN decisions".
* Resolution 171: " . . . determines flagrant violations' by Israel in its attack on Syria".
* Resolution 228: " . . . 'censures' Israel for its attack on Samu in the West Bank, then under Jordanian
control".
* Resolution 237: " . . . 'urges' Israel to allow return of new 1967 Palestinian refugees".
* Resolution 248: " . . . 'condemns' Israel for its massive attack on Karameh in Jordan".
* Resolution 250: " . . . 'calls' on Israel to refrain from holding military parade in Jerusalem".
* Resolution 251: " . . . 'deeply deplores' Israeli military parade in Jerusalem in defiance of Resolution 250".
* Resolution 252: " . . . 'declares invalid' Israel's acts to unify Jerusalem as Jewish capital".

* Resolution 256: " . . . 'condemns' Israeli raids on Jordan as 'flagrant violation".

* Resolution 259: " . . . 'deplores' Israel's refusal to accept UN mission to probe occupation".
* Resolution 262: " . . . 'condemns' Israel for attack on Beirut airport".
* Resolution 265: " . . . 'condemns' Israel for air attacks for Salt in Jordan".
* Resolution 267: " . . . 'censures' Israel for administrative acts to change the status of Jerusalem".
*Resolution 270: " . . . 'condemns' Israel for air attacks on villages in southern Lebanon".
* Resolution 271: " . . . 'condemns' Israel's failure to obey UN resolutions on Jerusalem".
* Resolution 279: " . . . 'demands' withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon".
* Resolution 280: " . . . 'condemns' Israeli's attacks against Lebanon".
* Resolution 285: " . . . 'demands' immediate Israeli withdrawal form Lebanon".
* Resolution 298: " . . . 'deplores' Israel's changing of the status of Jerusalem".
* Resolution 313: " . . . 'demands' that Israel stop attacks against Lebanon".
* Resolution 316: " . . . 'condemns' Israel for repeated attacks on Lebanon".
* Resolution 317: " . . . 'deplores' Israel's refusal to release Arabs abducted in Lebanon".
* Resolution 332: " . . . 'condemns' Israel's repeated attacks against Lebanon".
* Resolution 337: " . . . 'condemns' Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty".
* Resolution 347: " . . . 'condemns' Israeli attacks on Lebanon".
* Resolution 425: " . . . 'calls' on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon".
* Resolution 427: " . . . 'calls' on Israel to complete its withdrawal from Lebanon.
* Resolution 444: " . . . 'deplores' Israel's lack of cooperation with UN peacekeeping forces".
* Resolution 446: " . . . 'determines' that Israeli settlements are a 'serious
obstruction' to peace and calls on Israel to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention".
* Resolution 450: " . . . 'calls' on Israel to stop attacking Lebanon".
* Resolution 452: " . . . 'calls' on Israel to cease building settlements in occupied territories".
* Resolution 465: " . . . 'deplores' Israel's settlements and asks all member
states not to assist Israel's settlements program".
* Resolution 467: " . . . 'strongly deplores' Israel's military intervention in Lebanon".
* Resolution 468: " . . . 'calls' on Israel to rescind illegal expulsions of
two Palestinian mayors and a judge and to facilitate their return".
* Resolution 469: " . . . 'strongly deplores' Israel's failure to observe the
council's order not to deport Palestinians".
* Resolution 471: " . . . 'expresses deep concern' at Israel's failure to abide by the Fourth Geneva
Convention".
* Resolution 476: " . . . 'reiterates' that Israel's claim to Jerusalem are 'null and void'".
* Resolution 478: " . . . 'censures (Israel) in the strongest terms' for its claim to Jerusalem in its 'Basic
Law'".
* Resolution 484: " . . . 'declares it imperative' that Israel re-admit two deported Palestinian mayors".
* Resolution 487: " . . . 'strongly condemns' Israel for its attack on Iraq's nuclear facility".
* Resolution 497: " . . . 'decides' that Israel's annexation of Syria's Golan Heights is 'null and void' and
demands that Israel rescinds its decision forthwith".
* Resolution 498: " . . . 'calls' on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon".
* Resolution 501: " . . . 'calls' on Israel to stop attacks against Lebanon and withdraw its troops".
* Resolution 509: " . . . 'demands' that Israel withdraw its forces forthwith and unconditionally from
Lebanon".
* Resolution 515: " . . . 'demands' that Israel lift its siege of Beirut andallow food supplies to be brought in".
* Resolution 517: " . . . 'censures' Israel for failing to obey UN resolutions and demands that Israel
withdraw its forces from Lebanon".
* Resolution 518: " . . . 'demands' that Israel cooperate fully with UN forces in Lebanon".
* Resolution 520: " . . . 'condemns' Israel's attack into West Beirut".
* Resolution 573: " . . . 'condemns' Israel 'vigorously' for bombing Tunisia in attack on PLO headquarters.
* Resolution 587: " . . . 'takes note' of previous calls on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and
urges all parties to withdraw".
* Resolution 592: " . . . 'strongly deplores' the killing of Palestinian students at Bir Zeit University by Israeli
troops".
* Resolution 605: " . . . 'strongly deplores' Israel's policies and practices denying the human rights of

Palestinians.
* Resolution 607: " . . . 'calls' on Israel not to deport Palestinians and strongly requests it to abide by the
Fourth Geneva Convention.
* Resolution 608: " . . . 'deeply regrets' that Israel has defied the United Nations and deported Palestinian
civilians".
* Resolution 636: " . . . 'deeply regrets' Israeli deportation of Palestinian civilians.
* Resolution 641: " . . . 'deplores' Israel's continuing deportation of Palestinians.
* Resolution 672: " . . . 'condemns' Israel for violence against Palestinians at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount.
* Resolution 673: " . . . 'deplores' Israel's refusal to cooperate with the United Nations.
* Resolution 681: " . . . 'deplores' Israel's resumption of the deportation of Palestinians.
* Resolution 694: " . . . 'deplores' Israel's deportation of Palestinians and calls on it to ensure their safe and
immediate return.
* Resolution 726: " . . . 'strongly condemns' Israel's deportation of Palestinians.
* Resolution 799: ". . . 'strongly condemns' Israel's deportation of 413 Palestinians and calls for there
immediate return.
1993 to 1995
UNGA Res 50/21 - The Middle East Peace Process (Dec 12, 1995)
UNGA Res 50/22 - The Situation in the Middle East (Dec 12, 1995)
UNGA Res 49/35 - Assistance to Palestinian Refugees (Jan 30 1995) l
UNGA Res 49/36 - Human Rights of Palestinian Refugees (Jan 30 1995)
UNGA Res 49/62 - Question of Palestine (Feb 3 1995)
UNGA Res 49/78 - Nuclear Proliferation in Mideast (Jan 11 1995)
UNGA Res 49/87 - Situation in the Middle East (Feb 7 1995)
UNGA Res 49/88 - The Middle East Peace Process (Feb 7 1995)
UNGA Res 49/149- Palestinian Right- Self-Determination (Feb 7 1995)
UNGA Res 48/213 - Assistance to Palestinian Refugees (Mar 15, 1994)
UNGA Res 48/40 - UNRWA for Palestinian Refugees (Dec 13, 1993)
UNGA Res 48/41 - Human Rights in the Territories (Dec 10 1993)
UNGA Res 48/58 - The Middle East Peace Process (Dec 14 1993)
UNGA Res 48/59 - The Situation in the Middle East (Dec 14 1993)
UNGA Res 48/71 - Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Mideast (Dec 16 1993)
UNGA Res 48/78 - Israeli Nuclear Armanent (Dec 16 1993)
UNGA Res 48/94 - Self-Determination & Independence (Dec 20 1993)
UNGA Res 48/124- Non-interference in Elections (Dec 20 1993)

UNGA Res 48/158- Question of Palestine (Dec 20 1993)
UNGA Res 48/212- Repercussions of Israeli Settlements (Dec 21 1993)
The Caricatures in Middle East Politics
The center piece of the current explosive confrontation between Islamic and Arab protestors, political
leaders and governments and the US and Western European regimes and publishers is rooted in Israeli
efforts to polarize the world in its favor and to promote isolation, economic sanctions and/or a military
attack on Iran.
There are several key questions, which almost all commentators and analysts have failed to address. These
include: Why did the “cartoons” get published in Denmark? What is the political background of “Flemming
Rose” the cultural editor of Jyllands-Posten, who solicited, selected and published the cartoons?
What larger issues coincide with the timing of the cartoons publication and reproduction?Who “benefits”
from the publication of the cartoons and the ensuing confrontation between the Arabs/Islam and the West?
What is the contemporary political context of the Arab/Islam protests? How is the Israeli secret service,
Mossad, implicated in provoking the Western-Islamic/Arab conflict, and how do the consequences measure
up to their expectations?
A starting point for analyzing the cartoon controversy, which has been a focus for attacking Muslims and
Muslim countries as intolerant of Western ‘freedom of expression’ is the long-standing role of Denmark as a
major operation point for Mossad activity in Europe. Re-phrased: How could a tiny Scandinavian country of
5.4 citizens and residents (200,000 or less than 3% of whom are Muslim), renowned for fairy tales, ham
and cheese, have become a target for the fury of millions of practicing Muslims from Afghanistan to
Palestine, from Indonesia to Libya and into the streets of cities all over the world with significant Muslim
populations? Why, after the bombing of Baghdad, the tortures of Abu Ghariab, the massacres in Fallujah and
the utter destitution of the entire Iraqi and Afghan people…would Muslims turn their anger at symbols of
Denmark from its tinned cookies to its Embassies and overseas business offices?
The story, presented with straight faces, by television news-people, is of, Mr. ‘Flemming Rose’, a crusading
cultural editor of a widely read Danish daily newspaper who wanted to counter the growing ‘political
correctness’ of Europeans about criticizing Muslims and which he compared to the ‘self-censorship’ he had
witnessed in his native Soviet Union. The oddly named Ukrainian-born editor of the culture page of the
Jyllands-Posten commissioned Danish cartoonists to submit a series of cartoons depicting the Prophet
Mohammed as they (the Danish cartoonists) might imagine him. However four of the twelve cartoons
selected for publication were illustrated by ‘Rose’s’ own staff including the most controversial ‘bomb in the
turban’ one. Braving Denmark’s anti-blasphemy laws Mr. Rose published the cartoons on September 30,
2005 and the rest is history…
A huge world wide attack on the West’s “sacred right to free expression” erupted in the Muslim world with
millions of shocked Europeans and North Americans rushing to defend their cherished freedoms in this ‘clash
of civilizations’. Syria and Iran were prominently blamed for the stirring up of furious believers in the streets
of Damascus and Teheran, Beirut and in the slums of Gaza. According to US Secretary Rice, "Iran and Syria
have gone out of their way to inflame sentiments and to use this to their own purposes and the world ought
to call them on it." The Pakistani…authorities allied to the US fired on demonstrators killing and wounding
scores while numerous religious leaders were arrested. The Western governments urged their Arab and
Muslim allies to prevent more attacks on Danish products and property and blamed those unable to quell
the fury with complicity and instigation. All of this was over a series of cartoons, or so we are told.
The cultural editor, ‘Flemming Rose’, who soon tired of being surrounded by a team of Danish police and
security to protect him from assassination and missing his daily jogs through his tranquil Copenhagen

neighborhood, chose to seek safe haven in Miami, Florida (rather than his native Ukraine) among the Cuban
exiles, Israeli sayanim*(see footnote) and Mah Jong-playing retirees as the drama plays on.
Denmark Center of Mossad Activity:
Why Denmark? Could this crudely manufactured controversy have been generated on the pages of any
major London or New York paper? Who would wish to put Denmark at the center of this ‘clash of civilization’
– appearing as a script from some grade B Islamophobic thriller?
An interesting chapter in former Israeli Mossad agent, Victor J. Ostrovsky’s book, By Way of Deception
(1990 St. Martin’s Press), outlines the close relationship between the workings of the Danish intelligence
services and the Israeli Mossad over decades:
“The relationship between the Mossad and Danish intelligence is so intimate as to be indecent. But it is not
the Mossad’s virtue that is compromised by the arrangement; it’s Denmark’s. And that’s because the Danish
are under the mistaken impression that because they saved a lot of Jews in World War II, the Israelis are
grateful and they can trust the Mossad.”
The Mossad has the capacity to monitor the entire population of Arabs and especially Palestinians
(presumably including those with Danish citizenship) through their special relations with the Danes:
“…a Mossad man monitors “all Arabic and Palestinian-related messages(among Denmarks Arab community)
coming into their (the Danish Civil Security Service)headquarters…an extraordinary arrangement for a
foreign intelligence service.”
The Danish Intelligence officers’ high regard for their Israeli Mossad office mates is apparently not,
according to Ostrovsky, reciprocated:
“The Mossad have such contempt for their Danish counterparts that they refer to them as ‘fertsalach’, the
Hebrew term for a small burst of gas, a fart…they tell the Mossad everything they do.” Pp. 231-232
In return for their servility, the Danes get valuable ‘training’ from the Israelis:
Once every three years, Danish intelligence officials go to Israel for a seminar conducted by the Mossad”…
which generates useful contacts for the Mossad “while perpetuating the notion that no organization deals
with terrorism better than they (Mossad) do.”
In the wake of the US debacle in Iraq and the world’s resistance to a massive ‘preemptive military attack’ or
economic and diplomatic embargo of Iran, which could send oil prices to over $100 a barrel, Israel needed
to turn the war of ideas on its head. It would make sense that a campaign, aimed to further whip up
justifications to attack countries like Iran and Syria (Israel’s current enemy du jour), would emanate from
one of the US strongest European ally in the invasion and destruction of Iraq and Afghanistan and whose
national intelligence apparatus (so fondly known as ‘fertsalach’) would be eager to serve Israel’s interest.
Flemming ( or Flaming) Rose: Journalist with a cause
Given Mossad’s long-standing penetration of the Danish intelligence agencies, and their close working
relations with the right wing media, it is not surprising that a Ukranian Jew, operating under the name of
“Flemming Rose” with close working relations with the Israeli state (and in particular the far right Likud
regime) should be the center of the controversy over the cartoons. “Rose’s” ties to the Israeli state antedate
his well-know promotional “interview” with Daniel Pipes (2004), the notorious Arab-hating Zionist ideologue.
Prior to being placed as a cultural editor of a leading right-wing Danish daily, from 1990 to 1995 “Rose” was
a Moscow-based reporter who translated into Danish a self-serving auto-biography by Boris Yeltsin, godchild

of the pro-Israeli, post-communist Russian oligarchs, most of whom held dual citizenship and collaborated
with the Mossad in laundering illicit billions. Between 1996-1999 “Rose”, the journalist, worked the
Washington circuit (traveling with Clinton to China) before returning to Moscow 1999-2004 as a reporter for
Jyllands-Posten. In 2005 he became its cultural editor, despite few or any knowledge of the field and over
the head of other Danish journalists on the staff. In his new position “Rose” found a powerful platform to
incite and play on the growing hostility of conservative Danes to immigrants from the Middle East,
particularly practicing Muslims. Using the format of an ‘interview’ he published Pipes’ virulent anti-Islamic
diatribe, probably to “test the waters” before proceeding to the next stage in the Mossad strategy to polarize
a West-East confrontation.
Political Context for Action:
There is a great body of evidence demonstrating that Iraq war was largely a result of a massive
disinformation campaign by civilian militarists in the Pentagon and US Zionists in and out of high places in
the Pentagon and civil society, in coordination with the Israeli state, which wanted Iraq to be destroyed as a
viable nation. There is no evidence that the major US oil corporations pressured Congress or promoted the
war in Iraq or the current confrontation with Iran. There is plenty of evidence that they are very uneasy
about the losses that may result from an Israeli attack on Iran.
The Zionist succeeded in their goals in Iraq: establishing a beachhead in the northern Kurdish enclave
(‘Kurdistan’), and securing assets in the new “Iraqi” regime via Chalabi and others.
The major Jewish organizations mobilized to oppose any critics of the Zionist policymakers, predictably
accusing them of ‘anti-Semitism’. Nevertheless, over time, FBI investigations, CIA reports and judicial
indictments have pointed to key Israeli operatives and their domestic collaborators as Israeli spies. While
Israel benefited from the Bush-Blair invasion in Iraq, the same cannot be said for the United States. As
thousands of casualties mounted, and war spending skyrocketed to hundreds of billions of dollars,
opposition to the war escalated.
Israeli strategic plans to extend US military operations to Iran and Syria faced major challenges, from within
the US military and public and even sections of the mass media. Mossad assets in the New York Times, Wall
Street Journal and elsewhere had to settle for puff pieces on Iran’s non-existent nuclear weapon threat,
right after the same plot with regard to Iraq was exposed as a total fabrication. Another line of propaganda
was needed to silence war critics and heighten animosities to the Islamists/Arabs in general and Iran in
particular. This is where the “Flemming Rose”-Mossad operation came into the picture. The Islamic-hate
cartoons were published in Denmark in September 2005 as Israeli and US Zionists escalated their war
propaganda against Iran. The initial response from the Islamic countries however was limited. The story
wasn’t picked up in the International Herald Journal until late December 2005. By early January 2006,
Mossad “Katsas” (Hebrew for case officers) activated sayanim (volunteer Jewish collaborators outside of
Israel) throughout Western and Eastern European media to simultaneously reproduce the cartoons on Feb. 1
and 2, 1006. One such sayanim operation would have been the decision by France-Soir Senior Editor,
Arnaud Levy and Editor in Chief Serge Faubert, to publish the cartoons. The paper’s French Egyptian owner
almost immediately fired the paper’s Managing Editor, Jacques Lefranc, who, according to an interview with
CNN, had initially opposed their publications, without touching Levy and Faubert.
A strident campaign was launched in practically all the pro-Western mass media condemning the initial,
relatively moderate Islamic protests, which had occurred between September to December 2005 and rapidly
provoked the subsequent massive escalation, doubtlessly aided by covert Mossad operatives among Arab
populations. Mossad’s ‘little farts’, the Danish intelligence fanned the fires by advising Denmark’s rightwing
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen not to give way by refusing to apologize as the pro-Western Arab
regimes requested and even refusing a request for a meeting with a group of Denmark-based diplomats
from Arab and Muslim countries to discuss the ‘situation’.
“Flemming Rose”-Mossad tried one more gambit – to further heighten East-West tension. He publicly offered

to publish any Iranian cartoons which would mock the Holocaust in ‘his’ paper’. The senior editor of Jyllands-
Posten, apparently belatedly caught on to “Flemming Rose” hidden agenda and vetoed the ‘offer’ and asked
Rose to take a leave of absence. Rose left for Miami, not Tel Aviv – where his residency might raise
suspicions about his claim to be merely an opponent of “self-censorship”. In Miami, he no doubt will have
the protection of the locally based sayanin, armed and train for “self-defense” of threatened Zionists.
Sayanim – Defenders of Western Civilization:
The sayanim, derived, according to Victor Ostrovsky, from the Hebrew word ‘to help’ are a huge world-wide
network of Jews in strategic or useful places (real estate, mass media, finance, car dealerships etc…) who
have been agreed to help in Israeli Mossad actitivies within their own countries. This has been ascribed to
the supra-national loyalty sayanim offer to Israel, above and not always in the interest of their home
country. According to Gordon Thomas and Martin Dillon, in their detailed biography, Robert Maxwell, Israel’s
Superspy (Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2002), the notorious media mogul, Robert Maxwell, was a super-
sayanim, providing cover, offices, political connections, money-laundering services and planted stories in the
service of Israel at the Mossad’s beheast. Jonathan Pollard, the American Naval Researcher jailed for
espionage, is another notorious sayanim. The activities of these ‘helpers’ really range from the spectacular
to the more mundane and, according to Victor Ostrovsky, in his 1990 biography By Way of Deception, the
sayanim represent a pool of thousands of active and inactive individuals who can provide services discretely
out of loyalty to ‘the cause of Israel’ as defined by any current Mossad operation. The cynicism of this
arrangement is clear: It makes little difference to the Mossad if an operation, such as ‘Flemming Rose’,
jeopardizes the national and economic interests of the sayanim’s own country and , if exposed, might harm
the status of Jews in the diaspora. The standard response from the Mossad would be: “So what’s the worst
that could happen to those Jews? They’s all come to Israel? Great.” This recklessness clearly has
ramifications for Jews who have refused to be recruited as Mossad helpers in affected countries.
Mossad War Propaganda and the “Cartoon Controversy”:
Israeli leaders expressed their opposition to the Bush Administration’s diplomatic efforts to engage the
European powers in the Iran negotiations. Automatically and without question all the major Zionist and
Jewish organizations in the US (AIPAC, Presidents of the Major Jewish Organizations, ADL and others)
unleashed a sustained national campaign to mobilize congress and their “friends” in the executive branch to
take immediate military action or to impose economic sanctions on Iran. The Bush Administration however
while in agreement, lacked public support in the US and among his European allies and their national
electorates. The Mossad policy was to create a pretext to polarize public opinion between the Middle East
(and beyond) and the West in order to escalate tensions and demonize Islamic adversaries to its Middle East
hegemonis pretensions. “Rose” cartoons served the Mossad perfectly. The issue could be presented as a free
speech issue, a conflict of “values” not “interests”, between the “democratic West” and the fundamentalist
“totalitarian” (as characterized by Pipes-Rose) Islamists. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rose had
solicited and selected the Islamic caricatures while his paper had rejected similar cartoons of Jesus Christ in
an earlier context. The image of Rose as a “cultural iconoclast” - while working for a right wing daily whose
daily fare was publishing anti-(Mid-East)immigrant “news stories” and favorable interviews with Zionists
extremists - is prima facie not credible, although that image has been purveyed by all the major media
outlets. While “Rose” initiated the international tensions, liberal and neo-con colleagues and his comrades in
and out of the Mossad publicized his transgressions and provoked the ire of the Arab and Islamic world.
The cartoons, the subsequent insults and calumnies attacking the Islamic protestors and their secular allies
throughout Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe eventually provoked major peaceful and then violent
protests by millions of people. Visual images of violent protests and demonstrations were featured by the
Western mass media, successfully creating the intended fear and apprehension against Muslim countries
and minorities in Europe.
Islamophobia gained momentum. Zionist propagandists in Europe and the US linked the defense of “free

speech” issue to Israeli “security” policies. While the West turned its fury against the Islamic protestors,
Israel blockaded Gaza and the US and Europe cut off all funding to the Palestinians, threatening the
population with mass starvation for exercising its democratic right to elect its own leaders! “Rose’s” free
speech charade revived the discredited ZionCon doctrine of “Clash of Civilizations”. Playing on European
Islamophobia and the increasing sensibility of practicing Muslims and Arab nationalists to Western abuses, it
is likely that Israeli psych-war experts pinpointed the “free speech” issue as the ideal detonator for the
conflict.
The democratic electoral victory of Hamas – dubbed by Israel as a terrorist movement – accelerated Israeli
efforts to convince Western governments to insist that regimes in Muslim countries repress the ‘irrational
Islamic masses’ or face Western censure or elimination of aid. (The failure to crack down violently on
demonstrators was presented by the media as official approval or instigation) The major US Zionist
organizations were able to influence Secretary of State Rice into blaming Iran and Syria for fomenting the
worldwide demonstrations, from Gaza to the Philippines. The Israeli strategy was to use European outrage
to weaken opposition to a military attack or economic sanctions on Iran and Syria.
Beyond Religious Blasphemy:
While most establishment analysts have narrowly focused on the cartoon as the source and target of the
massive global demonstrations, in fact it is at best the immediate detonator of a whole series of ongoing
events of much greater political significance. From the “shock and awe” carpet bombing of Iraq, to the mass
torture and routine everyday humiliation in occupied countries, from the utter destruction of Fallujah (an
American example as Guernica was for the Nazis), to Israeli devastation of Jenin and Palestine, from the
everyday assassinations of Palestinians by the Israeli occupiers, to the smearing of the Koran with filth at
Guantanamo, Israel, the US and Europe have attempted to demonstrate that no Muslims are safe
anywhere- not in their schools, home, offices, fields, factories or mosques- and that nothing is sacred.
The reasons that millions are demonstrating against a caricature of Prophet Mohammed published in an
insignificant Scandinavian rightwing newspaper is that this is the last straw – the detonator – of a series of
deliberate violations of fundamental social and political rights of Muslim, Arab and colonized peoples. While
the Western media have focused exclusively on the religious content of the demonstrators, almost every
country, where massive sustained demonstrations have taken place, has been subject to recent Western
intervention, large-scale pillage of raw materials and/or experienced the destruction of their secular rights:
countries invaded, homes, schools, hospital, systems of health and clean water demolished, agriculture and
natural resources looted, museums, libraries and archeological sites pillaged and mosques desecrated. The
present condition for material existence has been a Western inferno for all the people (both secular and
observant) living in Arab or Islamic countries. Now their most profound, historic, spiritual reference point,
the Prophet Mohammed – the most cherished religious figure – has been repeatedly trampled with impunity
by arrogant imperialists, their media servants, aided and abetted by the Israeli state and its overseas
‘sayanin’ operatives. It is cynical to suggest that practicing Muslims could desecrate the figure of Jesus
Christ with impunity when that too is forbidden by the Koran.
As the Israeli strategists well knew in advance, the vilification of Islam was not taking place in a political
vacuum: The material conditions for an Islamic-Arab uprising were ripe: Hamas had swept the Palestinian
elections, the US military were aware that they were losing the war in Iraq, Iran was refusing to capitulate,
Bush was losing public support for ongoing and future Middle Eastern wars, AIPAC, Israel’s main political
instrument for influencing US policy was under criminal investigation…Israel’s strategy of having the US fight
its wars was boomeranging. There was a need to revive the political-military tensions which they had
exploited after September 11, 2001 to Israel’s advantage: hence the “Flemming Rose” provocation, hence
the coordinated, wide promotion of the act, hence the free speech agitation among Western ‘sayanin’,
liberals, conservatives and neocon ideologues, hence the predictable explosion of protest, hence the
‘recreation’ of Mid-East tension…and the advances of Israel’s agenda.
Clearly the burgeoning confrontation is more than a religious or free speech issue, more than the crude
provocations of an errant cultural editor coddled by the ‘little farts’ of a penetrated Danish intelligence

agency. What is at stake is the deliberate racist stereotyping of Arab, Islamic and Third World people in
order to sustain and deepen their oppression, exploitation and subordination.
The most pervasive, prolific and influential source of racist Arab stereotypes are Israel and its overseas
(particularly US and European) academics, terror ‘experts’, psychologists at the most prestigious universities
and think tanks, who have provided the “psychological profile” to torture, humiliate, provoke and repress
the millions struggling for self-determination against colonial and imperial dominance.
Once again Israel and especially its overseas operatives have placed the expansion and militarist interests of
Israel above the interests of the people of the US and Europe. “Is it good for the Jews?”: A criterion as
defined by the Israeli state, has led to the blind alley of massive confrontations, deepening animosity
between Arabic/Muslim peoples and Western regimes. What appeared so clever to the ‘Roses’ of the world
and their Katsas and docile Sayanim, in provoking confrontation may once again boomerang: The uprisings
may go beyond protesting symbols of vilification to attacking the substance of power, including the Arab and
Muslim pro-consuls and collaborators of the Euro-American political and economic power. While the Mossad
is very astute in infiltrating and provoking oppressed groups, it has been singularly inept in controlling and
containing the resultant uprisings as the recent victory of Hamas demonstrates and the success of the Iraqi
resistance illustrates. The next controversial cartoon may show Moses leading his people into the desert.
Epilogue:
While the Mossad-provoked ‘free speech versus blasphemy’ controversy between the West and the Islamic
peoples continues to deepen, Israel proceeds to impose a Nazi-like economic siege over 4 million
Palestinians, intended to starve them into surrendering their democratic freedoms. Intended is the concise
term, Gideon Levy, star reporter for the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz (19/02/06) records Dov Weissglas,
advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister, jokingly telling top officials “Its (the economic blockage – which may
include electricity and water, as well as food) like an appointment with a dietician. The Palestinians will get a
lot thinner but won’t die.” The Israeli officials “rolled with laughter”. As Levy points out “more than half of all
Palestinians are already living in poverty…last year 37 had difficulties obtaining food… 54% of the residents
of Gaza cut back the amount of food they consume…child mortality rose by 15%…unemployment reached
28%.” Planned pre-meditated mass starvation of a ghettoized population, jokingly discarded by its
executioners as a ‘visit to the dietician’, is an exact replica of the internal policy discussion of the Nazi high
command over the population in the Warsaw Ghetto. Israel’s capacity to impose and implement a genocidal
policy has been greatly facilitated by the symbolic sideshow, which the Mossad-‘Rose’ orchestrated in
Western Europe. “Cultural” conflict at the service of genocide – is hardly a clever ruse or merely a violation
of Islamic sensibilities, it is a crime against humanity.
Israel: consequences of ‘uniqueness’

“If you can look into the seeds of time, And say which grain will grow and which will not, Speak then to me.”
—Shakespeare, Macbeth, I, 3
WHY did the creation of Israel engender such deep but opposing emotions in the Islamic world and the
West, leading to Arab wars against Israel and Israeli wars against its Arab neighbours, producing tensions
that have poisoned relations between Islam and the West, and, now, arguably, pushing the United States
into a direct occupation of two Muslim countries?
The Zionists claim that Israel is a ‘normal’ state, like India, Iraq or Indonesia. They equate their ‘struggle’ to
establish a Jewish state in Palestine with the movements for national liberation in Asia, Africa and elsewhere
during the 20th century. The hostility of Arab and Muslim peoples to Israel, they claim, is motivated by their
anti-Semitism, a hatred of Jews implanted by Islam itself. In recent years, this hostility has also been

explained as the result of an Arab or Islamic envy of Israeli democracy.
We face a difficult choice here between Israeli and Arab normalcy. If Israeli statehood is normal, then it
follows that there is perversity in the Islamic opposition to it. On the other hand, if Israel is not a normal
state — like India, Iraq or Indonesia — then we are justified in investigating this lack of normality, or
‘uniqueness,’ and probing into its consequences. It may turn out that Islamic hostility to Israel did not
proceed from perversity but, instead, is a legitimate response to the ‘unique’ conditions surrounding Israel’s
creation.
This Zionist claim to normalcy — that Israel belongs to the same species of states as India, Iraq or
Indonesia — is based on two superficial similarities. First, Israel was created as an independent state out of
Palestine, a British colony since 1917. Second, after 1945, some of the Jews in Palestine took up arms
against the British to force them out of Palestine. On the basis of these partial truths, the Israelis claim that
Zionism was a nationalist movement aimed at liberating Palestine from the British occupiers. Incidentally,
the Palestinians are completely missing from this narrative about Jewish statehood in Palestine.
This claim is not tenable: one intransigent fact militates against it. The Jews who created the state of Israel
in Palestine were not indigenous to Palestine. Indeed, more than 90 per cent of them were settlers from
Europe, having entered Palestine after its conquest by the British in 1917. In the 1940s, the European Jews
had a legitimate claim to our sympathy, but, as Europeans, they had no legitimate nationalist claim to
statehood in Palestine. In other words, Israel is a ‘unique’ case of nation building.
Sadly, the Jews of Europe could not have staked a nationalist claim to any part of Europe either. They did
not constitute a majority in any of the territories which they shared with other Europeans. This was the
unstated problem the ‘nationalist’ Jews confronted in Europe during the 1890s. The oppressed nations in
Europe could stake a valid claim to sovereign statehood. Not so the Jews: they may have been a distinct
people, and some of them were still oppressed, but they were not a nation.
In order to become ‘normal’ — that is, in order to transform themselves into a European nation — the Jews
of Europe would first have to create a Jewish majority in some part of Europe. This path of ‘normalization,’
however, was not open to Europe’s Jews. It would have been opposed. Indeed, it would have amounted to
courting disaster.
Nevertheless, there would be poetic justice in the creation of a Jewish state in Europe. After all, the Jews
were a European people; the history of their continuous presence in Europe goes back to the time of the
ancient Greeks. Since the European Jews — as minorities — have historically faced persecution, and, under
the Nazis, many Europeans participated in a fiendish attempt to exterminate them, one can argue that it
was Europe’s moral responsibility to accommodate the Jews as a nation inside Europe. The historical wrongs
done to a segment of the European population should have been corrected by Europeans inside the
geographical boundaries of Europe. At least, this might have been the right thing to do. But when has
Europe shown magnanimity of this order?
Unable to stake a nationalist claim in Europe, those European Jews who sought ‘normalization’ as a nation
had another idea. After all, this was the 19th century, the age of colonization and of settler-colonialism. If
the British and the French could establish settler-colonies in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and
Algeria, among other places, why not the Jews of Europe?
In its early stages, during the 1890s and 1900s, when the project to create a Jewish state was being
broached in some Jewish circles of Europe, several locations for this state were considered. Although
Palestine was his first choice, at various times Theodore Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, was willing
to settle for Uganda or Madagascar. Earlier, others had scouted Surinam, Argentina, Missouri and New York!
However, Palestine won easily. It would appeal to Jewish emotions associated with religious Zionism, and the
Messianic Christians would support the idea of a Jewish return for their own eschatological reasons.
If political Zionism does not qualify as a movement for national liberation, was it a scheme for establishing a

colonial-settler state similar to those being established or consolidated in the same era? I will argue that it
was, but with two differences that make Israel rather unique among states of this species. Unlike the other
colonial-settler states, Israel was not the creation of another state ethnically allied to it. Israel had no
mother country. A Jewish state did not yet exist.
Indeed, the Zionist movement sought to create such a state; this would be its end point, not its point of
departure. Secondly, there was an important difference in the goals of the colonial-settlers in Africa or
Australia and the political Zionists. The former intended to expropriate the natives so that they could use
them as cheap labour on the lands they would expropriate. In other words, they did not intend to expel the
natives from their colonies.
On the other hand, the Zionists intended to expropriate the Palestinians and remove them from Palestine.
They wanted a Palestine without the Palestinians; this was their goal, not the serendipitous consequence of
their settlement activity. In its conception, then, Zionism was a colonial-settler project with a difference.
This ‘unique’ project had several vital implications. First, in the absence of a Jewish mother country, the
Zionists had to find a surrogate, a western power that would use its military to implement their colonial-
settler project. This would not be too hard to find. For more than two hundred years several western powers
— in league with Christian messianic groups — had worked on various schemes to persuade the Jews of
Europe to establish a Jewish state in the Levant, a state that would serve as the staging post for their
colonial ambitions in that region and farther East.
Wisely, the Jews rejected these overtures, suspecting that that they were traps to get them out of Europe
and into greater trouble. However, the emergence of political Zionism in the late 19th century turned the
tables. Starting in 1897, after the First Zionist Congress, the Zionists began courting the ‘powers’ to take on
their cause.
Their efforts were directed primarily at Britain, the greatest colonial power of that era. Success in this
venture came almost exactly twenty years after the First Zionist Congress in the shape of the Balfour
Declaration of November 1917. This document stated that His Majesty’s Government “view with favour the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of this object...”
In fulfilment of this commitment, the British created the mandate (euphemism for colony) of Palestine.
Under the terms of this mandate, duly approved by the Council of League of Nations in July 1922, the
British administration in Palestine would work with the Zionist organization to “secure the cooperation of all
Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.” Thanks to British support,
the Zionist project was in motion.
The Zionists converted the absence of a Jewish mother country into an advantage. Political Zionism
appealed to the West for at least three reasons: messianic Christians saw the Jewish return as a prelude to
the Second Coming; western powers were eager to acquire control over the Middle East because of its
strategic value; and the West was still animated by an antipathy to Islam. In September 1922, the US
Congress passed a resolution endorsing the Balfour Declaration.
When British support for the creation of a Jewish state wavered in the 1940s — coincidentally, just when
British power was being superseded — the United States stepped into the breach, thanks to Jewish votes,
money and influence in that country. The western sponsorship of Zionism would evoke historical memories
in the Muslim world. In time, many Muslims would come to see the creation of Israel as the return of the
Crusaders, an escalation of western Christendom’s campaign to undermine their faith and civilization. This
was a dynamic that contained the seeds of a clash of civilizations.
The goal of a Jewish state in Palestine with a Jewish population had an unavoidable corollary. As the Jews
entered Palestine, the Palestinians would have to be ‘transferred’ out of Palestine. As early as 1895,
Theodore Herzl had figured this out in an entry in his diary: “We shall try to spirit the penniless population

across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment
in our own country.”
Others took a more direct approach: “As soon as we have a big settlement here we’ll seize the land, we’ll
become strong, and then we’ll take care of the Left Bank. We’ll expel them from there, too. Let them go
back to the Arab countries.” At some point, when a dominant Jewish presence had been established in
Palestine, and the Palestinians had departed or been marginalized, the British could end their mandate to
make room for the emergence of a Jewish state in Palestine.
This plan ran into two problems. The Palestinians would not cooperate: they refused to leave and very few
were willing to sell their lands. As a result, in 1948, the year that Israel was created, nearly all of Palestine’s
“penniless population” was still in place. In addition, more than 50 years after the launching of political
Zionism, the Jewish settlers owned only seven per cent of the lands in Palestine, not the best lands either.
During the Second World War, the Zionists ran into a problem with the British too. In order to rally Arab
support during the war, in 1939 the British decided to limit Jewish immigration into Palestine to 75,000 over
the next five years. However, these problems would not derail the Zionist project. The Zionists would
achieve under the fog of war what they had failed to achieve through money and discriminatory policies.
In cooperation with the British colonial authorities, the Zionists had been establishing since 1918 a parallel
government in Palestine, consisting of a network of Jewish organizations that brought in Jewish settlers,
acquired Palestinian lands, organized Jewish settlements, supported Jewish businesses, and established
Jewish educational institutions.
In addition, as early as 1920, the Zionists had set up the Haganah, a grass-roots military organization.
Fifteen years later, the Haganah consisted of 10,000 mobilized men and 40,000 reservists, equipped with
imported and locally manufactured weapons. When the British refused to lift the restrictions on Jewish
immigration after the war, the Jewish military organizations started a campaign of terror against them.
Partly in response to this terror, the British announced their premature departure from Palestine before the
conflict they had spawned could be resolved.
The Zionists found their opportunity in the British loss of nerve. On May 14, 1948, on the termination of the
British mandate in Palestine, they declared the emergence of the Jewish state of Israel under a UN partition
plan. Although the Jews in Palestine owned only seven percent of the land, the UN plan assigned 55 per cent
of Palestine to Israel. The Palestinians and neighbouring Arab states decided to resist the UN partition plan.
But the ranks of the Palestinian resistance had been decimated before by the British, and the Arab armies
were poorly equipped, poorly led, and their leaders lacked nerve and commitment. They were decisively
defeated. In the process, the Zionists occupied 78 per cent of Palestine, and 800,000 Palestinians were
expelled or left their homes under duress. Israel, Mark I, had arrived in the Middle East, a Jewish state in
Palestine with only ten per cent of its Palestinian population.
Creating a new system of clientage
THE creation of Israel had thrown a spanner in the wheel of Islamic history. In the aftermath of the First
World War, the western powers had dismantled the most powerful Islamic state — indeed the Core Islamic
state — by instigating and supporting the still marginal forces of Arab nationalism. At the same time, even
as they were using Arab nationalist feelings, they had made plans to fracture Arab unity by creating a
multiplicity of Arab fiefdoms, each of them subject to western powers.
Adding insult to injury, the western powers also worked with the Jews to establish a Jewish state in a
segment of the Islamic heartland. This restructuring of the Islamic world, imposed by western powers,
would not be easily swept under the rug of time. Indeed, the creation of Israel alone was pregnant with
consequences, much of it yet to unfold.

Quite apart from Israeli ambitions in the region, the logic of the Israeli state would almost inevitably propel
it to rapid demographic growth, military dominance and expansionism. At the time of its founding in 1949,
Israel contained only 5.6 per cent of the world’s Jewish population. In order to justify its creation as the
world’s only Jewish state, Israel would have to attract more Jews, perhaps even a majority of the world’s
Jews. Israel’s small population — relative to that of its Arab neighbours - also called for a rapid influx of
Jewish settlers.
Then there were the temptations of success: imagine what we can do if we brought a third or a half of the
world’s Jewish population into the region. The first large influx of Jews, doubling Israel’s population over the
next five years, came from the Arab countries. In large part, this was inevitable. The Arab Jews were
migrating to greener pastures; Arab defeat in 1948 and the expulsion of Palestinians from their lands
provoked hostility towards Jews in Arab countries; and Israel encouraged and facilitated their departure.
In addition, given the very high educational levels of Jewish settlers (especially those drawn from Europe
and the United States), the reparations from Germany, the financial contributions of world Jewry, and grants
and loans from western countries, Israel would soon acquire the characteristics of a developed country
whose capabilities in science and technology would rival the best in the world.
In itself, this enormous disparity between an advanced Israel and mostly backward Arab countries would
tempt Israel to seek military solutions to its conflict with its Arab neighbours. Indeed, Israel had within a
decade built a military capability that could defeat any combination of Arab states. Finally, Israel had
acquired a nuclear arsenal by the late 1960s — with French technology — thus securing the Samson option
against any potential Arab threat to its security.
At the same time, Israel would face hostility from Arab states that had gained independence under the aegis
of Arab nationalism. This was inevitable. The creation of Israel was an affront to Islamic peoples, in
particular to Arabs. In Israel’s victory, the Muslims had lost lands that had been Islamic since the first
century of Islam. Further, the Arabs feared that if allowed to consolidate itself, Israel, with western support,
would seek to dominate the region with new rounds of expansionary wars.
In the climate of the Cold War, the Arab nationalist states had reasons to believe that they had a chance to
roll back the insertion of Israel into Arab lands. In other words, the creation of Israel also charted,
inevitably, a history of hostility between this state and its neighbours.
Whether in response to this Arab hostility or using it as an excuse — as some would argue — for deepening
its assault on the Arabs, Israel would seek a new ‘mother country’ to replace Britain. This time, it would turn
to the United States. It was a natural choice, given the preeminence of the United States, and its large and
influential Jewish population.
It would appear that American commitment to Israel was not strong at first, if measured by the volume of
its military and economic assistance to Israel. Israel sought to change this by demonstrating its strategic
value to the United States. This happened in 1967, when in a pre-emptive war it simultaneously defeated
Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The defeat of Egypt and Syria, the two leading Arab nationalist states, both allied
to the Soviet Union, persuaded the US to enter into a deeper partnership with Israel, one that would only
grow with time, as Israel acquired greater influence over decision-making in the United States, and as US
backing for Israel would create Islamic hostility against the US.
Just as importantly, this second military defeat of the Arabs produced a new Israel. This was Israel, Mark II,
now in occupation of 100 per cent of the former British mandate of Palestine; this included the new
territories of Gaza and the West Bank with 1.1 million Palestinians. Inevitably, Israeli ambitions rose to
match the new opportunities created by the war of 1967. Immediately, plans were set in motion to make
the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza permanent. Israel began to appropriate Palestinian lands in the
occupied territories. It established fortified settlements all over the territories, in control of the main water
reservoirs, and sitting on hilltops overlooking Palestinian villages.

After facing yet another defeat in 1973, Egypt broke ranks with the Arab states and recognized Israel in
exchange for the return of the Sinai and an annual American subsidy. This capitulation of the core Arab
country sounded the death knell of Arab nationalism; it was also the signal for Israel to expand its military
operations. In June 1981 Israeli jets destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor under construction in Osirak. A year
later, it invaded Lebanon, occupied western Beirut, laid siege to Palestinian refugee camps, and forced the
exit of the Palestinian resistance from Lebanon. During the Israeli siege, the Phalangists, a Lebanese
Christian militia allied to Israel, massacred 3000 Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and
Shatilla.
At around the same time, in 1982, the World Zionist Organization, published a report in its official organ,
Kivunin, urging Israel to annex the West Bank and Gaza, reoccupy Sinai, convert Jordan into a Palestinian
state, expel all Palestinians west of the River Jordan, and split up the Arab states into ethnic and religious
micro-states. In order to dominate and control these micro-states, Israel would build garrisons on their
borders, military outposts for projecting their power over these states.
In addition, these states would be policed by local militias drawn from ethnic minorities in their population —
like the Christian militia created by Israel in Southern Lebanon. Once executed, this plan would establish
Israel as the dominant power in the Middle East, independent of the United States. What this plan reveals is
the reach of the dialectic inaugurated by the creation of Israel in 1948. In the 1980s, the World Zionist
Organization was urging Israel to take steps to dominate the region on its own.
The attacks of 9-11, the American invasion of Iraq, Israeli/American plans for attacking Iran’s nuclear
facilities, and American plans for restructuring the region, suggest that the dialectic that began with the rise
of political Zionism may have entered a new, perhaps final phase.
There are several forces operating behind these developments, whose provenance — in various degrees —
can be traced back to the pressures and inducements engendered by political Zionism. At many different
levels, 9-11 is a riposte to political Zionism and its chief accomplice over the past 60 years, the United
States.
Islamic anger over the insertion of a Jewish state in Islamic lands, the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians,
Palestinian suffering under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, Arab humiliation over repeated
defeats at the hands of Israel, the dismantling of Arab nationalism following these defeats, western support
for repressive Arab states, the sanctions against Iraq, the stationing of American troops in the Arabian
peninsula after the Gulf war, and the invasion of Iraq: each of these have contributed to the radicalization of
a small segment of the Islamic world, who, frustrated by the inertia of Islamic populations, have adopted
terrorist tactics; they see this as the only effective way in which they can leverage their small numbers into
a visible force.
Apart from America’s strategic interest in the Middle East’s oil — always a backdrop to US policies in the
region — the recent evolution of this policy towards a massive programme for restructuring the Middle East
owes much to two forces long in the making but which gained centre stage with the election of George W.
Bush. On the one hand, these are the forces of Christian evangelists in the United States, who have derived
strength from the creation of Israel and its victories over the Arabs, which they see as a necessary prelude
to the Second Coming. As the largest voting bloc in the Republic Party, they are now the most powerful
American supporters of Israeli Likudniks, seeking the expulsion of Palestinians from all of Israel. The
Zionists have not only welcomed this support but worked to deepen their alliance with the Evangelists.
The second group of actors — small but influential — are the neoconservatives in the Bush administration
who have for long, but especially since the early 1990s, urged the United States to use its military
dominance to prevent the emergence of a rival power. Many of the most influential neoconservatives, both
inside and outside the Bush administration, are Jews (but so are many of the most articulate members of
the left in America) who have been involved with right-wing Zionist think tanks in the United States and
Israel.

Some of these neoconservatives were advising the Netanyahu government in 1996 to make “a clean break”
from the Oslo Agreement. After 9-11, the neoconservatives became the principal intellectual backers of
America’s invasion of Iraq and the larger plan to restructure the Middle East. Could it be that this represents
the belated unfolding of the Kivunin plan, with the dismemberment of Iraq an imminent possibility now?
There is one difference, however. At least for now, Israel is taking a back seat.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, like the decision of the Young Turks in October 1914 to enter the First
World War against the Allied Powers, mark a new historical turning point for the relations between the West
and the Islamic world. The Turkish entry in the war offered Britain the opportunity to settle the age-old
Middle Eastern question. It invaded the Middle East to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, and laid the
foundations of a Jewish state and a system of colonies and client states in the region. Now, after 9-11, the
United States enters the region, in strategic partnership with Israel, to restructure the region. This is a pre-
emptive restructuring before the anti-imperialist forces in the region gain ascendancy.
At this point, there are few who are predicting with any confidence what will be the benefits and costs of this
attempted restructuring: or what will be its unintended outcomes. The law of unintended consequences
works surreptitiously, always hidden from the gaze of the stronger parties in a conflict whose power and
hubris blind them to the resilience and force of the human spirit.
It is unlikely that even the most prescient Zionists had foreseen in 1948 — after they had created a Jewish
state with a 90 per cent Jewish population — that the Palestinians would still be around some 57 years later,
causing existential anxiety, and still raising questions about the legitimacy of Israel as it is presently
constituted. Incidentally, Israel too was an unintended consequence of Hitler’s plan to exterminate the Jews.
There would have been no Israel without the Jews who fled the anti-Semitic horrors unleashed by the Nazis
in Europe.
In mounting their terrorist attack on the United States, most likely the Islamist radicals were not expecting
this to sting the United States into a hasty revision of its policies towards the Islamic world. It seems more
likely that what the United States did was what these Islamists wanted it to do — to invade the Islamic
heartlands.
The Islamists expect to turn this into a broader war against the United States to be fought on Islamic
territory. It is likely that the United States will deliver this too with an attack on Syria or Iran. Prodded by its
neoconservative ideologues, the Bush administration is eager to take on this challenge. They expect to use
the ‘war against terrorism’ to restructure the Islamic world, modernize (read: neutralize) Islam, defeat the
Islamists, and create a new and deeper system of clientage. The Islamists expect to defeat the United
States on their home turf, as the Vietnamese had done a generation before. At this point, it is hard to
predict where the chips will fall — or what unintended consequences this will produce for the United States,
Israel and the Islamic world.
The invalid UN Resolution
Neither the Palestinians nor the Arabs have ever accepted the resolution for the partition of Palestine. They
considered it to be invalid and of no effect. Their attitude is based upon political, historical and juridical
considerations.
Not only Palestinians and Arabs consider the UN resolution for the partition as invalid, everyone fails to see
on what legal basis a UN resolution, which is of no effect, could subsequently and retroactively acquire legal
effectiveness.
The first ground of invalidity of the resolution lies in the incompetence of the General Assembly of the UN to
recommend the partition of Palestine or to create the Jewish State in that country. The legal position is clear
in this regard. The UN is an organization of States, which was formed to perform certain purpose defined in
the Charter. At no time did this organization possess any sovereignty or any other right over Palestine.
Accordingly, UN possessed no power to decide the partition of Palestine, or to assign any part of its territory

to the religious minority of alien immigrants in order that they might establish a State of their own. The UN
could not give what it did not possess. Neither individually, nor collectively could the members of the UN
alienate, reduce or impair the sovereignty of the people of Palestine, or dispose of their territory, or destroy
by partition the territorial integrity of their country.
The UN also did not possess any power to administer the country. And the Charter of the UN did not give
the organization any right of supervision over exiting mandates. The General Assembly, however, paid no
heed to this fact. It might possibly be argued that the General Assembly could deal with the Palestine
question since it was placed on its agenda as a result of a request made by the Mandatory Power for the
recommendations to be made under Article 10 of the Charter concerning the future government of
Palestine.
However, the power given by Article 10 to the General Assembly to discuss any question or matter within
the scope of the Charter cannot be enlarged so as to imply the power to break up the territorial integrity of
a State or to create a new State. The General Assembly possesses no power to prescribe the future form of
the government of Palestine, a matter that was the sole concern and within the exclusive competence of the
people of Palestine. Such recommendations, unless accepted by the original inhabitants of the country,
possess no juridical value or obligatory force. Since the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine have
unequivocally expressed their opposition to partition, the resolution of the partition of Palestine was
therefore ultra vires and invalid.
Further more, the resolution of the partition of Palestine constituted an encroachment upon the sovereignty
of the people of Palestine. This encroachment not only was contrary to principles of law but also constituted
a violation of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which declares that nothing contained therein shall authorized
the UN to intervene in the matters that essentially fall within the scope of domestic jurisdiction of any State.
Another ground of invalidity of the partition resolution is that it violated the principles embodied in Article 22
of the Covenant of League of Nations and in the Charter of the UN. This violation was emphasized in the
report of Sub Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Palestine Question. The UN has no power to give
effect to the partition resolution because UN is bound by the Article 1 of the Charter to act “in conformity of
the principle of justice and international law and to respect the principle of equal rights and self
determination of the peoples.”
Under Article 73 concerning non self-governing territories and mandated areas the UN undertakes ‘to
promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories and to take due account of the
political aspirations of the peoples.’ The imposition of the partition of Palestine against the express wishes of
the people of Palestine can in no way be considered as respect for or compliance with any of the above-
mentioned principles of the Charter. In accordance with the principles of self-determination of peoples
recognized by the Charter, the people of Palestine were entitled to affirm their national identity and to
preserve the integrity of their territory. The carving out of the substantial area of Palestine for the creation
of the Jewish State and the subjection of parts of the original inhabitants of its dominion was a patent
violation of this principle.
One might perhaps argue that the existence of a Jewish minority in Palestine changed the situation. The
answer is obvious. What country does not possess in its midst a religion or racial minority? Nowhere is the
world can a dismemberment of a country be recognized as a legitimate method for guaranteeing the rights
of a minority.
In 1946 the total population of Palestine amounted to 1,972,000 inhabitants, comprising 1,203,000 Muslims
145,000 Christians and 608,000 Jews. Only one-tenth of these Jews were part of the original inhabitants
and belonged to Palestine. In fact, the original Jewish Palestinian community did not favour partition or the
establishment of the Jewish State. The rest of the Jewish population was composed of the foreign
immigrants, originating mostly from Poland, former USSR and Central Europe. Only one-third of these
Jewish immigrants had acquired the Palestinian citizenship.

In terms of the land ownership, the Jews owned only 5.6 percent of the total Palestinian land, and, in
contrast, the Arabs owned 47.8 percent of the total land and the rest comprise the public domain.
What did the partition plan do? It attributes to the Jews — who were less that one third of the population,
largely foreigners and owned less the 6 per cent of the land — an area exceeding 14,500 sq km and
representing 57 percent of the area of the Palestine. This meant that the Jews were given the territory,
which was ten times the area owned by them in the whole of Palestine. Moreover, the territory allocated to
the Jewish State included the coastal plain extending from Acre to Isdud and other fertile lands, while the
Palestinians were left with mountainous and sterile regions. In other words, it was not a partition, but
spoliation. Its enquiry is obvious.
It is evident that the grounds of nullity of the partition resolution, which we have reviewed, vitiate such a
resolution and make it null and void. The partition resolution was essentially a political decision, which was
conceived, engineered and adopted through the efforts and pressures of the Zionists and their friends in
violation of the principles of law, justice and democracy.
The nullity of the partition resolution should not be dismissed as a matter of the past. Although ethically
wrong, and legally void, these grave acts are still producing their effects. The present abnormal and
explosive situation, which exists in Palestine and in the Middle East, is directly related to the Balfour
Declaration, to its implementation under the mandate, and to its realization in the partition resolution.
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in a Nutshell

Divisive History
History's legacy created divisive issues between Palestinians and Israelis. Judea, home of the Jews in
ancient times, was conquered by the Romans and renamed Palestine. Palestine was later conquered and
inhabited by Arabs for over a thousand years. The Zionist movement arose to restore the Jews to Israel,
largely ignoring the existing Arab population. Following the Balfour Declaration in 1917, Palestine was
granted to Britain as a League of Nations mandate to build a national home for the Jewish people. The Arabs
resented the Jews coming in to take their land. Led by Grand Mufti Hajj Amin El Husseini, they rioted
repeatedly and later revolted, creating a history of enmity between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Britain
stopped Jewish immigration to Palestine. Following the Holocaust, in which 6 million Jews were killed by the
Nazis, pressure on Britain increased to allow Jewish immigration to Palestine. In 1947, the UN partitioned
the land into Arab and Jewish states. The Arabs did not accept the partition and war broke out. The Jews
won a decisive victory, expanded their state and created several hundred thousand Palestinian refugees. The
Arab states refused to recognize Israel or make peace with it. Wars broke out in 1956, 1967, 1973 and
1982, and there were many terror raids and Israeli reprisals. Each side believes different versions of the
same history. Each side views the conflict as wholly the fault of the other and expects an apology.
Occupation, Land & Settlements
Israel has occupied the West bank and Gaza Strip (about 2,200 square miles) since the 1967 6-day war, and
has built settlements with a population of about 220,000, mostly in the West Bank. Palestinians demand
withdrawal from all of the land conquered in the 1967 and evacuation of the settlements. Israel continued to
expand settlements throughout the peace process that began in 1993 and continues to do so today. In the
final status negotiations at Camp David and Taba, Israel offered to turn over 97% of the land in the West
Bank and all of Gaza, as well as Arab sections of Jerusalem. This offer was turned down by the Palestinians.
Palestinian State
Originally formed to regain all of Palestine for the Palestinian Arabs, the Palestine Liberation Organization

signaled that it would accept a two state solution in 1988. The Oslo accords were supposed to have led to a
peaceful resolution of the conflict, but continued Israeli settlement and Palestinian violence and incitement
degenerated into open conflict in September 2000.
Mainstream Palestinians demand a state in the West Bank and Gaza. Right wing Israelis are opposed to
creating a state, because, they claim, it would be a base for terror groups. In final status negotiations, the
Israeli government agreed to a demilitarized Palestinian state with limited control over its borders and
resources - a "state minus." The Palestinians have won a commitment for a state from the UN, and from US
President Bush. The Road Map peace plan is intended to result in a Palestinian state. The Oslo Accords and
the Road Map are opposed by Palestinian extremist groups like Hamas and by Zionist extremists.
Refugees
About 726,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled their homes in 1948 in the war that followed the creation
of Israel, and additional Palestinians fled in 1967. There are now about 4 million Palestinian refugees. Many
of them live in crowded refugee camps in poor conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, in Jordan, Syria,
Lebanon and Iraq. Palestinians demand that these refugees should have the right to return to their homes in
Israel under UN General Assembly Resolution 194. Israelis note that an almost equal number of Jews fled
Arab lands to Israel in 1948. Israelis oppose return of the refugees because that would create an Arab
Palestinian majority and would put an end to Israel as a Jewish state. Most Palestinian groups, including the
Fateh, agree, and openly proclaim that resolution of the refugee issue by granting right of return would
mean the end of Israel.
Palestinian Terror
Almost all Palestinian groups were founded with the declared aim of destroying Israel by violence, and had a
history of terrorist activities. Only the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) has renounced this aim
officially. In 1993, the PLO signed the Oslo Declaration of Principles, renouncing violence and agreeing to
honor UN SC Resolution 242, which implicitly recognizes the right of Israel to exist. In return, Israel allowed
the PLO to enter the West Bank and Gaza strip, and Palestinians gained autonomous control of most of the
population of these areas. Extremist Palestinian groups that objected to the agreements began a campaign
of ambushes and suicide bombings against Israel. The Palestine National Authority claimed they could not
control the dissident groups. Final status negotiations faltered in September 2000. Ariel Sharon visited the
Temple mount (Haram as Sharif), which includes the Al-Aqsa mosque on September 28, though he did not
enter either of the mosques.. This ignited violent riots, that were met with lethal force by the IDF. The
violence became generalized "resistance," called "the Intifadeh," and involving large sectors of the
population as well as the Palestine National Authority itself, and the Palestinian police force set up by the
Oslo agreements. Polls indicate that about half the Palestinians believe that the aim of the Intifadeh is to
destroy Israel. Since September 28, 2000, Palestinians have killed over a thousand Israelis in terror and
suicide attacks. Israelis have killed over 3,500 Palestinians in "defense" operations and reprisals, including
many civilians. The Intifadeh destroyed the belief of many Israelis in the possibility of peace, and destroyed
the credibility of Yasser Arafat and the PLO as peace partners. Israeli retaliation and repression further
embittered the Palestinians.
Israeli Repression
Israel responded to Palestinian violence at the beginning of the Oslo process by limiting the flow of
Palestinian workers to Israel to prevent infiltration of terrorists, and by strict checks at border checkpoints.
The border closing drastically reduced the Palestinian standard of living. Palestinians who did come to work
were often subjected to humiliating searches and very long waits at checkpoints. Following terror attacks at
the checkpoints, nervous IDF (Israel Defense Forces - the Israeli Army) soldiers sometimes were too quick
to open fire on suspicious vehicles, killing innocent civilians. Checkpoints around Jerusalem made it difficult

for Palestinians to get to work in Jerusalem and to travel between Palestinian towns.
After September 2000, Israeli reprisals for Palestinian terror raids became increasingly severe, including
assassinations of wanted terrorists that Palestinians refused to arrest. Following a series of deadly suicide
bombings in March of 2002, Israel launched operation Defensive Wall in the West Bank and has since
reoccupied most of the territories ceded to to the Palestinians in the West Bank. The IDF set up additional
checkpoints and has kept towns under virtual siege with extended periods of curfew, disrupting work,
education and daily life. Ditches surround towns, preventing people from leaving. The IDF has killed over
3,500 Palestinians, demolished houses and uprooted olive groves. After a recent IDF study showed that the
demolitions do not deter suicide bombings, demolitions of the houses of suicide bombers were discontinued,
but houses are still demolished for other reasons.
In addition to measures taken to ensure security, Israeli extremist settlers have harassed Palestinians,
destroyed property, uprooted olive trees and killed several Palestinians in doubtful circumstances. The
perpetrators are rarely identified and almost never prosecuted.
Israeli Security
The area of Israel within its pre-1967 armistice borders is slightly less than 8,000 square miles. The
distance from Tel Aviv to the green line border of Israel (West Bank) is about 11 miles.( see map of
distances ), Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and other Israeli cities are within artillery range of any Palestinian state.
Israel therefore insists on guarantees that a Palestinian state would be demilitarized. The West Bank has
enormous strategic importance to any country wishing to invade Israel. Israel therefore insists on
guarantees that the Palestinian state would not allow a foreign army to enter its borders, and has insisted
on bases within the West Bank.
Water
The land has always had a scarcity of water. The Israel National Water Carrier has made possible a high
population density and standard of living. The carrier pumps water from the Sea of Galilee and carries it to
areas in the center and south of Israel as well as for Palestinian areas. In one day it delivers the volume of
water used in all of 1948, but it is not enough. The aquifers that supply Israel's central area lie in the West
Bank. The Jordan river flows through territory that would be part of Palestine. Both sides need water for
survival and development and want to ensure an adequate water supply from the limited resources
available. Israel has reserved for its own use a large percentage of the water in West Bank aquifers.
Jerusalem
Jerusalem was to have been internationalized under the UN Partition plan. Both sides have claims on the
eastern part of Jerusalem. Jerusalem was the ancient capital of Judea and site of the Jewish holy temple, of
which only the West Wall remains (right). It is also the site of the Al-Aqsa mosque (left) - regarded by many
as the third holiest site in Islam. Jewish and Arab neighborhoods are closely interwoven and would be
difficult to separate.
Death of Yasser Arafat and Palestinian Democratization

End of the Intifadeh
Following the death of Yasser Arafat a new era began in Palestinian history and in Israeli-Palestinian
relations. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was elected President ("Rais") of the Palestinian National Authority
with a comfortable majority in free and democratic elections. Abbas vowed to put put an end to terror and
to negotiate peace based on Israeli withdrawal from all the lands of the West Bank and Gaza, and "return of
the Palestinian refugees." The Palestinians declared an end to the Intifadeh. A summit held in Sharm El
Sheikh in February 2005 brought promises of a renewed peace process between Palestinians and Israelis.
Amidst mounting chaos, the Palestinian government resigned in October of 2005.

Truce - Abbas tried to convince Palestinian militant groups to declare a truce and refrain from attacking
Israel, while Israel declared that it would refrain from assassinations and hunting down wanted terrorists
except in emergencies. The truce was kept imperfectly (October 2005).
Democracy and Corruption - Abbas vowed to fight corruption and introduce democratic reform. A
government crisis and showdown with former Arafat supporters led by PM Ahmed Qurei led to a victory for
reformers supporting Abbas, with most cabinet positions going to technocrats rather than political cronies.
Security - Abbas has declared again and again that he will not use force against armed groups. At the same
time, he has insisted that "the law will be enforced" and that the PNA would not permit chaos and
independent actions by armed groups. The year 2005 however, was plagued by attacks of Fatah and Hamas
factions against Palestinian institutions, as well as a suicide attack apparently instigated by the Syrian
branch of Islamic Jihad.
Hamas - The Hamas movement have been invited to participate in elections for the PLC (Palestine
Legislative Council). Since Hamas is not willing to recognize Israel or negotiate with it, Israel believes
Hamas participation in the government would violate the Oslo agreements and jeopardize continued peace
negotiations, and has threatened to disrupt elections if Hamas runs.
Provisional State versus Final Status - The quartet roadmap calls for considering a Palestinian state within
provisional borders as an option, which is favored by Israelis and the United States, while Abbas is insisting
on final status status negotiations and claims he does not want a state with provisional borders.
End of An Era - Hamas Wins PLC Elections
Recognizing Israel - About 75% of Palestinians want the radical Hamas movement which won an upset
victory over the Fateh in PLC elections in January to recognize Israel and negotiate peace. European and
American leaders pledged not to negotiate with Hamas and not to provide aid to the Palestinians until
Hamas agreed to disarm and recognize Israel. Hamas spokesmen sent mixed signals, but vowed never to
recognize Israel and never to give up their claim to all of Palestine, though a majority of Palestinians
apparently want them to follow the path of peace.
Israeli Issues
The "security barrier" (Apartheid Wall) - A "security barrier" being built inside the West Bank cuts off
Palestinians from their lands and from other towns, and destroys olive groves and other property according
to Palestinians. The route of the fence has been changed several times under international pressure. Today
(October 2005) it includes about 7% of West Bank territory on the Israeli side of the barrier. An
International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory ruling declares the barrier to be in violation of international law.
Since the barrier was built, Israeli casualties decreased dramatically, and the IDF claims that it is vital to
preventing terror attacks. An Israeli Supreme Court ruling declared that the fence is not illegal in principle,
but that the route must be changed to optimize the balance between security and humanitarian concerns.
More about the Security Barrier ("Apartheid Wall")
Israeli Security Handover - Israel is supposed to hand over security responsibilities in West Bank cities,
gradually lifting the siege and returning conditions to what they were before the start of the violence in
2000.
Prisoners - Israel holds thousands of Palestinian prisoners, of whom about 500 were released in February of
2005, and an additional group of over 450 are to be released soon. Palestinians want release of all
prisoners, especially women and minors. Israel is unwilling to release prisoners who have served less than
two-thirds of their sentence and those who were directly involved in attacks ("blood on their hands").
Disengagement - The Israeli Government decided to unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip and from 4

settlements in the West Bank, evacuating about 8,000 settlers. After the death of Yasser Arafat, it partially
coordinated the move with the Palestinians. Disengagement was completed without major incidents by
September of 2005, but was followed by considerable chaos within Gaza. (Click for Israel Disengagement
Map) (Click for more about disengagement).
Safe Passage and open borders - Palestinians living in Gaza have very restricted access to the outside world.
A safe passage for Gazans to the West Bank was supposed to have been implemented under the Oslo
accords but never came into being. Israel favors a rail link, while Palestinians want a motor road. Most
border crossings between Gaza and Israel have been closed since disengagement. The Rafah border
crossing with Egypt was supposed to be closed, but Palestinians overwhelmed the guards and Hamas
exploded a portion of the barrier, allowing Palestinians to cross freely for a brief time before the crossing
was closed again. Israel wanted the crossing to remain closed for several months, and wanted to open a
crossing at Kerem Shalom in Israeli territory, which unlike Rafah, would be partly under Israeli control. In
the fall of 2005, however, the Rafah Crossing was opened under European Union, Egyptian and Palestinian
supervision, with Israeli remote monitoring via TV cameras. Israel promised to implement safe passage but
did not do so.
Israeli Outposts - Under the roadmap, Israel had undertaken to evacuate illegal "outposts" set up by settlers
with government knowledge, but without formal approval, after March 2001. There are estimated to be
about 28 such outposts by the government. Peace Now estimates there are 53 such outposts. In all, there
are over 100 outposts, including those erected before the cutoff date. The Sasson report released March 9,
2005 catalogued extensive misuse of government funds for building settlements, though most of the
information had been known beforehand. Israeli PM Ariel Sharon promised once again to evacuate the
outposts.
Peace Proposals
Official peace plans include the quartet roadmap, and the Arab League initiative for Arab-Israeli peace.
Various informal initiatives for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been proposed. The most popular
is the Geneva Accord, under which Israel would return approximately the territories outside the current
route of the security fence, and cede parts of Jerusalem to the Palestinians, and Palestinian refugees would
return to the Palestinian state, but not to Israel. The Ayalon Nusseibeh Agreement incorporates similar
principles but is much less detailed. No informal accord has been approved by Israeli or Palestinian
governments.
Lebanon and Israel Conflict

The 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict is a series of ongoing military actions and clashes in northern Israel and Lebanon between
Hezbollah's armed wing and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). On 12 July 2006 Hezbollah initiated Operation Truthful
Promise, consisting of a cross-border raid resulting in the capture of two Israeli soldiers, including shelling into Israel. Israel
then responded with Operation Just Reward, later renamed Operation Change of Direction. To date, Israel's strike has
included massive bombing raids by the Israeli Air Force (IAF), an air and Israeli Sea Corps naval blockade of Lebanon
(especially southern Lebanon and Beirut), a force of tanks and armored personnel carriers, and some small raids into
southern Lebanon by IDF ground troops. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has engaged in artillery rocket bombardment of Israel's
northern cities and towns, including Haifa.
The Lebanese government has disavowed Hezbollah's actions while urgently calling for international peacemakers to end
the conflict by enforcing an immediate ceasefire.
The conflict has caused a heavy civilian death toll, widespread damage, large-scale displacement of populations and the
disruption of normal life across much of both Israel and Lebanon. The attacks on civilian population centers and
infrastructure by both sides have sparked sharp criticism internationally.
Background
Hezbollah attack
At 9:5 AM local time (06:5 CET), on 12 July 2006, Hezbollah initiated a Katyusha rocket and mortar attack on Israeli military

positions and villages of northern Israel as a diversionary tactic, injuring at least 8 Israelis. Afterwards, a ground contingent
of Hezbollah militants attacked two Israeli armored Humvees on a routine patrol along the Israel-Lebanon border near the
Israeli village of Zar'it with anti-tank rockets, capturing two Israeli soldiers, and killing eight. According to the Lebanese
police force and Hezbollah, the Israeli soldiers were attacked and captured on the Lebanese side of the border on 12 July
during a mission to infiltrate the Lebanese town of Ayta al-Sha`b, although remains of the Humvees were found in Israel.
The IDF confirmed the capture of the two Israeli soldiers on 13 July and identified them as Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad
Regev, both reservists who were on their last day of operational duty.
Hezbollah's attack was named after a "promise" by its leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah to capture Israeli soldiers and swap
them for Samir Kuntar and other Lebanese prisoners held by Israel.
Israeli response
According to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Israel responded within 2 hours.

"[A] force of tanks and armored personnel carriers was immediately sent into Lebanon in hot pursuit. It was during this
pursuit, at about 11:0 A.M. . . . [a] Merkava tank drove over a powerful bomb, containing an estimated 200 to 300 kilograms
(440–660 Lb) of explosives, about 70 meters (230 ft) north of the border fence. The tank was almost completely destroyed,
and all four crew members were killed instantly. Over the next several hours, IDF soldiers waged a fierce fight against
Hezbollah gunmen . . . During the course of this battle, at about 3:0 P.M., another soldier was killed and two were lightly
wounded."
Areas in Lebanon targeted by Israeli bombing, 12 July to 27 July 2006.

Hezbollah released a statement saying "Implementing our promise to free Arab prisoners in Israeli jails, our strugglers have
captured two Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon". Later on, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah declared that "No military operation
will return them… The prisoners will not be returned except through one way: indirect negotiations and a trade of prisoners."
According to CNN:
The Israeli Cabinet authorized "severe and harsh" retaliation on Lebanon . . . Israel's chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, told
Israel's Channel 10, "If the soldiers are not returned, we will turn Lebanon's clock back 20 years."
According to the Washington Post:

But retired Israeli army Col. Gal Luft, a former commander in the town of Ramallah, said, "Israel is attempting to create a rift
between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message
is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head
out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land."
Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Olmert declared the attack by Hezbollah’s military wing an “act of war”, and promised Lebanon
a “very painful and far-reaching response.” Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz also said that “the State of Israel sees itself
free to use all measures that it finds it needs, and the Israeli Forces have been given orders in that direction.”
Israel said it held the Beirut government responsible for the attack, but Prime Minister Fuad Siniora denied any knowledge
of the raid and stated that he did not condone it. An emergency meeting of the Lebanese government reaffirmed this
position.
Early on 13 July 2006 Israel sent IDF jets to bomb Lebanon's international airport near Beirut, forcing its closure and
diverting its arriving flights to Cyprus. Hezbollah then bombarded the Israeli towns of Nahariya and Safed, as well as
villages nearby with rocket fire. The attacks killed two civilians and wounded 29 more. Nahariya residents began leaving the
city en masse in fear of further Katyusha attacks. Israel is now imposing an air and sea blockade on Lebanon, and has
bombed the main Beirut–Damascus highway.
Israel's Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev claims the Hezbollah unit that captured the two soldiers is trying to transfer
them to Iran.
On 14 July, following Israeli bombing raids on Lebanon which result in killing 60 civilians Nasrallah said, addressing Israel:
"You wanted an open war, and we are heading for an open war. We are ready for it."[ Also on 14 July, the US Congress
was notified of a potential sale of $210 million worth of jet fuel to Israel. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency noted
that the sale of the JP-8 fuel, should it be completed, will "enable Israel to maintain the operational capability of its aircraft
inventory." and "The jet fuel will be consumed while the aircraft is in use to keep peace and security in the region."
On Sunday evening Hezbollah militants attempted to infiltrate an Israel Defense Forces post on the Lebanese Border.
Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Dan Halutz said that the ground operations would be limited
On 23 July 2006, Israeli land forces crossed into Lebanon in the Maroun al-Ras area, which overlooks several other sites

said to have been used as launch pads for Hezbollah rockets.

It was reported on 24 July that the United States was in the process of providing Israel with "bunker buster" bombs, which
would allegedly be used to target the leader of Lebanon's Hezbollah guerrilla group and destroy its trenches
On 25 July Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's secretary general, said the Israeli onslaught was an attempt by the US and Israel
to "impose a new Middle East" in which Lebanon would be under US hegemony
The EU has warned Israel about disproportionate attacks against Lebanon. In addition spokespersons from the United
Nations, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Conference and an assortment of human rights organizations
have condemned Israel for its ‘disproportionate’ response to Hezbollah’s attacks, although unprovoked by Israel. However,
speaking on Israeli army radio, Justice Minister Haim Ramon - a close confidant of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert - said
"everyone understands that a victory for Hezbollah is a victory for world terror". He said that in order to prevent casualties
amongst Israeli soldiers battling Hezbollah militants in southern Lebanon, villages should be flattened by the Israeli air force
before ground troops move in. "All those now in south Lebanon are terrorists who are related in some way to Hezbollah," Mr
Ramon said. Mr Ramon's call for the use of greater firepower came as the Israeli cabinet was set to decide whether to
broaden its military offensive.
Hezbollah rocket campaign
Map showing some of the Israeli localities attacked by rockets fired from Lebanese soil as of Monday 24 July.
After the Israeli initial response, Hezbollah declared an all-out military alert, and said it had 13,000 rockets capable of hitting
towns and installations far into northern Israel. As a result, Defense Minister Peretz told commanders to prepare civil
defense plans and many of the nearly 1,000,000 civilians living in Northern Israel have been sent to bomb shelters or fled
their homes to other parts of the country. Hezbollah continued to fire hundreds of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel's
towns and cities, including Nahariya, Safed, Hatzor HaGlilit, Rosh Pina, Kiryat Shmona, and Karmiel, and numerous small
agricultural villages.
Hezbollah attacks have penetrated as far south as Haifa, Israel's third largest city, as well as Atlit and the Jezreel Valley
cities of Nazareth and Afula. Al-Manar has reported that the Hezbollah attack included a Fajr-3 and a Ra'ad 1 liquid-fuel
missiles, developed by Iran. One of the attacks hit a railroad repair depot, killing eight workers; Hezbollah claimed that this
attack was aimed at a large Israeli fuel storage plant adjacent to the railway facility. Haifa is home to many strategically
valuable facilities such as shipyards and oil refineries, and their targeting by Hezbollah is seen as an escalation.
CNN reported that many of the rockets that missed hitting cities or populated areas often caused wildfire (forest fire) inside
Northern Israel.
Defence Minister Amir Peretz has declared martial law throughout northern Israel.
So far, Israeli Magen David Adom emergency teams have been called to 505 rocket landing sites in which they have treated
and evacuated 976 casualties (36 fatalities, 19 severely, 39 moderately and 278 lightly injured, and 604 anxiety attacks).
On 25 July Nasrallah has announced the launch of the "second phase of our struggle" in which his long-range rockets would
"go beyond Haifa," Israel's third-largest city. Israeli officials have been bracing for possible rocket attacks on Tel Aviv, which
would mark a major escalation in the conflict. On 27 July Hezbollah fulfilled this threat by launching 12 Khaibar-1 rockets at
the Israeli town of Afula. The Khaibar-1 rocket is estimated as having 4 times the power and range of the Katyusha rockets
Hezbollah had, up to that point, used, and is thought to be Iranian made Fajr-5 type rockets by the Israeli government. The
use of more powerful rockets was seen as yet another escalation in the 18 day old conflict.
On 26 July 2006, 60 Iranian volunteers and Basijis set off to join in what they termed a holy war against Israel in Lebanon[.
The 60 men prayed near Ayatollah Khomeini's mausoleum next to Hezbollah flags prior to departing. The Iranian
government has said that it won't deploy regular military personnel.
The Israeli newspaper Haaretz writes, "Hezbollah's goals are simple, perhaps even attainable. Continuing the rocket fire,
preventing Lebanon from becoming a step in the American vision for a new Middle East, and preventing its own
disarmament. The group has no intention of renouncing its weapons in any cease-fire. "
Targeting of civilian areas
The alleged targeting of civilian areas in Israel and Lebanon by combatants on both sides has figured prominently in the
conflict. Over one-third of Israeli casualties, and a majority of Lebanese casualties, have been civilians
In order to resolve article size issues, this entire section and subsections has been moved to Targeting of civilian areas in
the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict,
Israeli-Lebanon conflict

The history of conflict between Israel and Lebanon began in 1947, when Lebanon's founding Prime Minister Riad as-Solh
sparked the Arab League decision to enter the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and sent his army into Palestine. The army was
defeated, and retreated back into Lebanon, where it signed an armistice that lasted until shortly after the 1967 Six Day War.
[citation needed] After the war, and following the Black September in Jordan, over 110,000 Palestinian refugees migrated to
Lebanon, making up over 400,000 refugees today. . By 1975, they numbered more than 300,000, creating an informal state-
within-a-state in South Lebanon. The PLO became a powerful force and played an important role in the Lebanese Civil War.
In response to numerous attacks launched from southern Lebanon, Israel invaded in 1978 in an attempt to rout out
Palestinian militants. As a result the United Nations passed UN Resolutions 425 and 426, which called for the immediate
withdrawal of Israeli forces and an end to military action in Lebanon. At the end of the operation, Israeli forces withdrew from
Lebanon, leaving behind a UNIFIL force. Israel invaded again four years later in 1982, forcing PLO forces out of Lebanon
(mostly to Tunisia), and Israel occupied the southern part of the country. In 1985, Israel withdrew its forces from parts of
Lebanon and remained in a 4–6 kilometre (2.5–3.75 mi) deep strip of southern Lebanon named by Israel “The Security
Zone”, which Israel cited as a protective measure to defend its Northern towns against Katyusha rockets. This occupation
lasted until 2000. On 24 May 2000 after the collapse of the South Lebanon Army and the rapid advance of Hezbollah forces,
Israel withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon.
Since then, Hezbollah has repeatedly attacked Israeli military positions, whilst Israel has carried out numerous attacks
aimed at striking Hezbollah bases
Previous prisoner exchanges
During an attack in October 2000 on Shebaa Farms Hezbollah captured three IDF soldiers who were killed either during the
operation or in its immediate aftermath. Hezbollah sought to obtain the release of 14 Lebanese prisoners in exchange,
together with Palestinian prisoners. A prisoner swap was carried out on 29 January 2004: 30 Lebanese and Arab prisoners,
the remains of 59 Lebanese militants and civilians, 400 Palestinian prisoners, and maps showing Israeli mines in South
Lebanon were exchanged for an Israeli businessman and army reserve colonel Elchanan Tenenbaum captured in 2000 in a
business trip, and the remains of the three IDF soldiers mentioned above
Casualties
The ongoing nature of the conflict does not permit an accurate assessment of the precise number of casualties.
Lebanese
• According to various media, between 350 and 600 people are reported dead. Additionally, there have been between
480 and 1100 people wounded, and over 800,000 have been made refugees, with an unknown number of missing
civilians in the south.
• On 28 July Lebanese Health Minister Mohammad Khalifeh announced that hospitals in Lebanon had received 401
dead Lebanese people since 12 July. He also reportedly said: "On top of those victims, there are 150 to 200 bodies
still under the rubble. We have not been able to pull them out because the areas they died in are still under fire".
• Hezbollah acknowledges 27 killed. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. General Dan Halutz has claimed that close to 100
Hezbollah fighters have been killed at 22 July, in land fighting in South Lebanon. However he provided no evidence
for the claim.
Israeli
• 33 Israeli soldiers have been killed (including one pilot, killed in a collision between two helicopters, and two in
another helicopter crash, also 4 sailors were killed after INS Hanit was hit), and 95 more wounded.
• 19 civilians have been killed, while another 418 civilians were treated in hospitals, 19 of whom were seriously
injured, and another 875 treated for shock.[6] Many civilians have left their homes in northern Israel and went south.
Some Israeli cities and villages near the Israeli-Lebanese border have been deserted, such as Kiryat Shmona and
Nahariya, from fear of rockets and mortar fire.

• Over 1,200,000 Israeli civilians were evacuated to shelters and other safe locations in fear of Hezbollah's rocket
attacks. Over 1600 have been fired by Hezbollah on Israel leaving over 600 buildings in damaged condition.
Foreign nationals
• Seven Canadian members of a family from Montreal, including four children, were killed and six severely injured by
an Israeli attack on Aitaroun in South Lebanon on 16 July. An eighth member of the family died later from injuries
sustained in the blast.
• A family of four Brazilians, including two children, was killed in the Israeli bombings in Srifa, drawing condemnation
from foreign relations minister Celso Amorim. Another Brazilian child was killed in an Israeli strike in Tallousa.
• Four members of a German-Lebanese family, including two minors, from Mönchengladbach, Germany were killed in
an Israeli airstrike in Chehour in southern Lebanon while on vacation
• The Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry has reported that two Kuwaiti nationals have been killed by Israeli bombing.
• One Sri Lankan was killed in an Israeli bombing.
• A Nigerian couple was killed by Israeli bombing.[citation needed]
• One Iraqi was killed by Israeli bombing.
• One Jordanian was killed when Israeli missiles hit trucks near Zahleh in the mountains above the eastern Bekaa
Valley.
• A Brazilian businessman was killed in an IAF missile attack on a factory he owned in Lebanon.
• A Palestinian was killed in an Israeli bombing that hit a Palestinian refugee camp at Rashidiyeh.
• An Argentinean woman died 13 July in a Hezbollah rocket attack on Nahariya, Israel.
• A Nigerian domestic worker was killed during an airstrike as he rode his motorbike south of Tyre on 27 July.
• An Indian glass factory worker in Lebanon, Devendra Kumar Swain was killed on 21 July.
United Nations
• A UNIFIL international civilian staff member and his wife were killed after an IAF airstrike on the Hosh area of Tyre
where they lived on 17 July. Their bodies were recovered from the rubble on 26 July
• Four UNTSO unarmed observers (Austrian, Canadian, Chinese and Finnish) were killed in an Israeli air raid on 25
July.
Position of Lebanon
While Israel holds the Lebanese government responsible for the Hezbollah attacks, Lebanon disavows the Hezbollah raids
and states it does not condone them. An emergency meeting of the Lebanese government reaffirmed this position. Almost
immediately after hostilities began, Lebanon's Prime Minister Fouad Siniora called for a ceasefire. On 14 July, following a
phone call between Siniora and President Bush, the Prime Minister’s office issued the statement that “Prime Minister Siniora
called on President Bush to exert all his efforts on Israel to stop its aggression on Lebanon, reach a comprehensive
ceasefire and lift its blockade.”
The next day, in a televised message to the Lebanese people, and afterwards in an interview with CNN, Siniora said “We
call for an immediate ceasefire backed by the United Nations.”
On 16 July the Lebanese special envoy to the UN, Nouhad Mahmoud, claimed that the United States was obstructing the
Security Council's attempt to broker a ceasefire. In fact, "[t]he Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported the U.S. was the sole
member of the 15-nation UN body to oppose any council action at all at this time."[ Condoleezza Rice, speaking from St.
Petersburg on 16 July, seemed to oppose an immediate cessation of violence, claiming that the ceasefire demanded by
Siniora would be unworkable unless it addressed Hezbollah violence and the support it gets from Syria and Iran. She said
the only way to deal with the problem is “to deal with the extremists, isolate the extremists, and put in place moderate
democratic states”.
Many Lebanese feel the international community is not doing enough to end the conflict and consider Israel's attack to be

unjustly punishing a country that has hardly any control over Hezbollah. There is also anger at Hezbollah for provoking
Israel into attacking Lebanon. Due to a pro-American government coalition being in power in Lebanon since the
assassination of Rafik Hariri, and the partial purging of Syrian influences over Lebanese society, many now feel betrayed by
the reality of the American pro-Israeli response.[citation needed]
According to MSNBC, "Today, we sat down with Lebanon‘s prime minister. He said that in the last five days, Israel has set
his country back 50 years."
On 21 July Lebanese defense minister Elias Murr said that the Lebanese army would fight any ground invasion by Israel.
Lebanon's social affairs minister said: she sees "monstrous and disproportionate retaliation" of the Israeli military against her
country.
On 26 July a poll released by the "Beirut Center for Research and Information" and it shows 87 percent of Lebanese support
Hezbollah's fight with Israel, a rise of 29 percent on a similar poll conducted in February. More striking, however, is the level
of support for Hezbollah's resistance from non-Shiite communities. Eighty percent of Christians polled supported Hezbollah
along with 80 percent of Druze and 89 percent of Sunnis.[9]According to this poll, 70.1 percent of the Lebanese agreed with
the capture of two Israeli soldiers on 12 July. A full of 63.3 percent believed that Israel will fail to break down the Lebanese
resistance. Some 56.9 percent opined that Israel and the United States cannot impose their conditions for cease-fire on the
resistance movement Hezbollah and Lebanon while 89.5 percent said the U.S. cannot play the role of an impartial mediator
in the Israel-Lebanon war and 85.6 percent believed the U.S. has not adopted a positive stance toward Lebanon in this war.
Negotiations for ceasefire
Terms for a ceasefire have been drawn and revised several times, yet have not been successfully agreed upon by the two
sides. Hezbollah has maintained that it insists on an unconditional ceasefire , while Israel has insisted that it will agree to a
ceasefire only under certain conditions, including the return of two captured Israeli soldiers.
On 14 July BBC News reported that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert would agree to a ceasefire if Hezbollah returned the
two captured soldiers, stopped firing rockets at Israel, and if Lebanon implemented UN Security Council Resolution 1559,
which calls for the group’s disarmament. Two days later, it was reported that Israel would agree to a ceasefire under two
conditions:
1. The return of the two soldiers captured on 12 July and

2. The Army/Government of Lebanon would have to ensure that Hezbollah would pull back to the Litani River.
On Monday, 17 July Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said the fighting in Lebanon would end when Hezbollah guerrillas freed two
captured soldiers, rocket attacks on Israel stopped and the Lebanese army deployed along the border.
Hezbollah has continually refused all terms, calling for an unconditional cessation of Israeli military actions.
Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said that a prisoner exchange was the only way to secure the release of the
soldiers. Hezbollah has demanded that Israel trade three Lebanese prisoners for the two captured Israeli soldiers but Israel
has refused the offer.
On Saturday 15 July the United Nations Security Council again rejected pleas from Lebanon that it call for an immediate
ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported the U.S. was the sole member of the 15-
nation UN body to oppose any council action at all at this time.
On 19 July "The Bush administration has openly rejected calls for a ceasefire. The New York Times reports that U.S. and
Israeli officials have agreed the bombings will continue for another week."[118] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
rejected an immediate ceasefire and said one could only occur once certain conditions are met." John Bolton, the U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, rejected the call for a ceasefire: "The notion that you just declare a ceasefire and act as
if that is going to solve the problem, I think is simplistic."
On 26 July, foreign ministers from the United States, Europe and the Middle East meeting in Rome vowed "to work
immediately to reach with the utmost urgency a ceasefire that puts an end to the current violence and hostilities," though the
US maintained strong support for the Israeli campaign and the conference's results were reported to have fallen short of
Arab and European leaders' expectations.
One commentator suggested that it was time for the European Union to exercise its massive economic and political clout
not only to bring about a cessation of violence but to revive the idea of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. Brussels-
based journalist Khaled Diab believes that Europe possesses the kind of multilateral 'soft power' to make a tangible
difference in the Middle East. What it lacks is the political will and unity to exercise it. But without proactive and constructive
European involvement, conflicts in the region are likely to rage on.

"The European Union needs to realise that the Middle East with all its problems and challenges will not go away.
Pragmatism should dictate that they need to take a deep, engaged and sustained involvement in its problems. Justice
demands that Europe acknowledges and takes responsibility for the seeds it planted – both intentionally and accidentally –
during colonial times that contributed quite significantly to the current sorry state of affairs," he writes.
International reaction
International reactions to the conflict have included widespread concern over current damage and over the possible
escalation of the crisis, as well as mixed support and criticism of both Hezbollah and Israel. A number of nations, including
the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Canada, have asserted Israel's right to self-defense. Still others
have criticized Israel's response,which they fear may lead to war.
Neighboring Middle Eastern nations have been split in their response. Iran, Syria and Yemen have voice strong support for
Hezbollah, and the Arab League has issued a statement condemning Israel's response. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and Jordan criticized Hezbollah's actions, as well as Iran and Syria for extending support to the organization.
Protests and demonstrations have been held worldwide, in support of both Israel and Hezbollah.
Various foreign governments have stepped in to assist in the evacuation of civilians of their citizens from Lebanon.
The Strangely Parallel Careers of Israel and Pakistan

Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of
cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse.
-- Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan's ruler, December 19811
Pakistan and Israel share the unique heritage of having been created in the aftermath of World War II as
religiously defined states. In each case, the new state emerged as the result of a twentieth-century
ideological movement, came into existence accompanied by violence, and attracted a large immigrant
population. Both met with initial rejection from religious elements who more recently, on second thought,
aspired to gain political power. Despite these and many other similarities, the two states have hardly ever
been compared.2 We do so here in the hopes of understanding each one better by seeing it in the context of
the other.
DIFFERENCES
To begin with, however, it helps to note some of the outstanding differences between Israel and Pakistan,
starting with their historical backgrounds. With the single and marginal exception of the medieval Khazar
kingdom, Jews were never sovereign after a.d. 70. In contrast, Muslims in India had a grand tradition of
rule that began in the eleventh century and lasted until 1858 when India came under direct British rule.
While Jews learned how to adapt to rule by others, Muslims always expected to be in charge. "The Muslims
were, or had been, the ruling race. How could the former master now allow themselves to be ruled by ...
slaves?"3 Statehood in the 1940s thus had very dissimilar meaning for the two: to the Zionists, it appeared
as the only solution to two millennia of discrimination, destruction, and death; for the Muslim League, it
offered a return to exclusive political power. This difference lives on, for while Israel actively seeks to be the
homeland for its diaspora, Pakistan is even unwilling to absorb its own people stranded in Bangladesh
following the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.
The states that came into existence make an unlikely pair. They differ greatly in political structure, with one
a modern pluralistic society and the other wavering between military autocracy, feudalism, and democracy.
They differ in standard of living, with Israel now counted among the advanced economies and Pakistan still
mired with a per-capita income of about $415 a year. In international outlook, the former is a close ally of
the United States, the latter holds to a policy of non-alignment even after the demise of the cold war. Israel
has a population of 5 million, Pakistan one of 130 million. The Arabs who left Mandatory Palestine remain a
first-order political issue while the Hindus who left Pakistan have long since integrated into Indian society.
And, of course, one is predominantly Jewish, the other Muslim.
PRE-STATE DEVELOPMENTS
These differences notwithstanding, the Zionist and Pakistan movements shared much in common, including

their timetables, the irreligiosity of their leaders, the novel nature of their nationalist ideas, and the
challenge of a minority population gaining political power.
Origins. The "love of Zion" goes back to early Judaism but modern political Zionism began with the
publication in 1896 of Theodor Herzl's Jewish State4; it acquired political reality with the Balfour Declaration
of 1917 and only at the Biltmore Conference of May 1942 did Jewish nationalists formally declare their
intention to establish of a Jewish state in Palestine. Pakistan has a similarly recent history. Although
nationalist scholars and politicians tend to romanticize the notion of Pakistan, with some even tracing its
origins to the founding of Islam itself,5 the term Pakistan was coined only in 1933 by a Cambridge student,
Choudhary Rahmat Ali. "Pakistan is both a Persian and Urdu word," he wrote.
It is composed of letters taken from all our homelands- "Indian" and "Asian." That is, Punjab, Afghania
(North West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kutch and Kathiawar), Tukharistan,
Afghanistan and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks -- the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes
the religious beliefs and ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our
original Fatherland.6
In March 1942, almost simultaneous with the Biltmore meeting, the Muslim League (the organization
pushing for an independent Pakistan) met at Lahore and adopted the "Pakistan resolution," endorsing the
position of Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876?-1948) the founding father of Pakistan and a successful
Westernized lawyer, that Hindus and Muslims could "never evolve a common nationality" and any move that
disregarded this would inevitably lead to the destruction of any fabric of statehood.7
Irreligiosity. Ironically, the leaders of both these religiously defined national movements were personally
irreligious, and some even outspoken atheists. "Even Jews who opposed formal religion saw themselves or
at least were seen by others as having a common Jewish culture, with its own literature, language, and
modes of social relations."8 Zionism was not a religious doctrine; pioneers of the Jewish state like David
Ben-Gurion were motivated by non-religious socialist ideals, not by messianic dogma. Jewish manual labor,
not prayer, was their chosen means. Jinnah was anything but a religious person. Rather, he was known for
his aristocratic tastes and lifestyle. Mahatma Gandhi's grandson Rajmohan aptly sums up Jinnah's complex
personality:
He seemed on the way to leading India; he founded Pakistan instead. For much of his life he championed
Hindu-Muslim unity; later he demanded, obtained, and, for a year, ran a separate Muslim homeland. Neither
Sunni nor mainstream Shiite, his family belonged to the small Khoja or Ismaili community led by the Aga
Khan; yet Mohammed Ali Jinnah was in the end the leader of India's Muslims. Anglicized and aloof in
manner, incapable of oratory in an Indian tongue, keeping his distance from mosques, opposed to the
mixing of religion and politics, he yet became inseparable, in that final phase, from the cry of Islam in
danger.9
A nation? Zionist and Pakistani thinkers both had to cope with the same question: Did their religious
community qualify as a nation? How could Jews, dispersed for over two millennia, constitute a single people
analogous to the Portuguese or the Chinese? Why should Indians who converted to Islam make up a nation
distinct from their non-Muslim neighbors? In short, how could Jews from Berlin and Baghdad or Muslims
from Madras and Multan have enough in common to make up a single people?
In reply, Zionists held that history has treated the Jews as a separate and distinct entity and nation. Any
realistic solution to the prolonged "Jewish problem" lies not in looking for new rulers but for Jews to become
rulers themselves. Similarly, Jinnah held that Muslims are "a nation by any definition."10The Muslim League
argued that there were historical as well as cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims that neither
the passage of time nor interaction could satisfactorily bridge.
Neither was willing to live as a protected or tolerated minority in a post-British dispensation. Just as the
Zionists rejected the idea of a federal Palestine, the League turned down suggestions of autonomous Muslim
units within a unified India. Zionist arguments for a state shared much with Jinnah's justification of the
Muslim minority retaining its separate identity through the realization of a state.

In both cases, a substantial body of opinion argued against religiously based nationalism. Binationalists like
Martin Buber argued, vainly one might add, that instead of exclusive Jewish or Arab nations, Palestine could
become a multinational state. In their view such a state "represents a higher, more modern and more
hopeful idea than the universal sovereign independent state."11 Likewise, Muslim members of the Indian
National Congress belonged to an organization vehemently opposed to the idea of religious faith's defining a
person's nation.
Redefining the population. Palestine consisted of Arab and non-Arab populations, British India of Hindu and
non-Hindu populations; any other classifications ignored the prevailing demographic reality. But such
divisions had little appeal to Zionists or the Muslim League, who needed a demarcation that would
strengthen their respective constituencies. Both daringly and successfully reversed the formula: Palestine
was thus composed of Jews and non-Jews, India of Muslims and non-Muslims. Thus did the Balfour
Declaration promise to maintain civil and religious rights for the "non-Jewish communities in Palestine," as
though they were a minority, and not some 90 percent of the population. Although the League projected
itself as the sole spokesman of the Indian Muslims, in the first general elections in 1937, it won only 108 of
the 485 seats reserved for Muslims and was rejected by the Muslim majority areas which later became
Pakistan.
Cool to democracy. Zionists and Indian Muslims both suffered from being a minority; both had to deal with a
British administration inclined to handle cultural problems with elections. And both responded with
vehement opposition to the principle of determining the post-British political arrangement through
democratic means. The Zionists' rejection of self-determination in Palestine, plus their effort to link the fate
of Palestine to that of diaspora Jews, followed mainly from the minority Jewish position in Palestine; a one-
man-one-vote policy would have placed them under perpetual Arab control and domination. Muslims were
always very aware of their minority status in India and similarly shied away from democracy. For Jinnah,
"democracy can only mean Hindu Raj all over India. This is a position to which Muslims will never
submit."12 Muslims also feared that "Western representative institutions would place them under permanent
Hindu Raj."13
Parity. Instead of democracy, Zionists and Indian Muslims preferred a different formula, that of parity.
Demographic considerations delayed the Zionist demands for parity but the arrival of the fourth and fifth
wave of diaspora Jews making aliya enhanced the position of the Yishuv (Zionist community) to the point
that in 1936 Jews constituted over 28 percent of the Palestinian population. This improved demographic
situation enabled the Zionist leadership to seek parity in British consideration with the non-Jewish
population.
Likewise, the Muslim League demanded that Muslims be treated differently from non-Muslim Indians, then
projected itself as their exclusive representative.14 It thereby challenged the rights of other political parties
(the Congress Party in particular) to represent Muslim interests or even to include Muslims among their
delegations and representatives. Jinnah's "claim for parity developed steadily from simple political parity
between League and Congress to communal parity between Muslims and Hindus and culminated finally in
the demand for ideological parity between Muslims and non-Muslims."15
NATIONS IN THE MAKING
Once they came into existence as states, both Pakistan and Israel experienced similar sorts of problems as
nations in the making, involving boundaries, migration, language, identity, and the legal order.
Geography. Both states had awkward borders at their start. Israel's territory resulted from the
happenstance of war and led to such anomalies as a divided capital city and a country with a waist only nine
miles wide; only in 1967 did Israel end these irregularities. Pakistan had an even more bizarre geography,
for it consisted of west and east wings separated by a thousand-mile Indian territory. Those two halves
"were remote from each other in everything from language and high cultural tradition to diet, costume,
calendar, standard time and social customs."16 The cession of the east wing in 1971, though very painful,
did provide geographic contiguity and national focus to Pakistan.

In-migration. Between 1948-51, more than 600,000 immigrants arrived in Israel, doubling the Jewish
population and drastically altering Israel's cultural map, as most of the new immigrants came from Arab
countries. Pakistan's formation was accompanied by the influx and outflow of huge numbers of refugees,
estimated at fifteen million, the vast majority of whom arrived with little property (those with possessions
tended to stay behind in India). Absorbing this refugee population proved a monumental task for both Israel
and Pakistan (and India too). Besides having to provide for housing, employment, education, and
distribution of wealth and opportunities, and having to allow for social and cultural adjustments, each new
state had to provide a sense of belonging and national identity. The challenge was heightened in Israel's
case by the immigrants' worldwide origins and in Pakistan's by the ethnic diversity of its native population
as well as the Mohajirs (immigrants from India).
Language. In both countries, few spoke the language that served as official tongue. Hebrew, revived from
millennia past as a vernacular, had to be learned by nearly everyone. In many families, parents continued
with their diverse mother tongues while Hebrew became the language of the children. Had demographic
considerations predominated in Pakistan, Bengali would have been the national language, spoken as it was
by more than half of Pakistan's original population. Instead, Urdu -- spoken primarily in the Gangetic belt
that lay outside its borders17 and not the principal language of any province that composed Pakistan --
became the country's official language.18
Establishing a national identity. Internal disagreements among both Israelis and Pakistanis are acute. The
religious-secular debates are at times extremely intense and eventually could damage the state. Tensions
between the Ashkenazi (i.e., Europeans) and the Sephardi (Middle Easterners) has a lesser role but played a
crucial role in the defeat of the Labor alignment in 1977. Pakistan was anything but a homogeneous entity
at the time of its formation; other than being Muslims, the citizens had very little in common -- and even as
Muslims, the Sunnis, Shiìs, Ahmadis, and Ismaìlis differed ferociously among themselves. Establishing a
Pakistan identity among a divided population was the primary task of the new state, one not fully achieved,
for the country remains riven by these divisions, especially the Sunni-Shiì one.
Who is a Jew, a Muslim? Who is an Israeli or a Pakistani? What is a Jewish or Islamic state? Both states
have struggled to define their core identity. Internal divisions prevent a consensus on the question of who is
a Jew or Muslim. As a nation committed to "the ingathering of the exiles," one would expect a general
agreement on the Jewish identity. On the contrary, "who is a Jew?" has become among the most
controversial and contentious issues in Israel and the passage of time only intensifies the tension. For
example, the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union led to major disagreements when, on
halachic grounds, the religious establishment questioned the Jewish credentials of many immigrants.
Because of their questionable Judaism, those who fought and died in defense of the country have at times
been refused burial in Jewish cemeteries. Likewise, conversions to Judaism under Conservative or Reform
auspices are not accepted in Israel.
In Pakistan, a fundamentalist Jamaat-i Islami group put this issue on the national agenda in 1953 by
demanding that Ahmadis19 be declared non-Muslims. When the government rejected this demand, the
Jamaat engaged in anti-Ahmadi violence. The chief justice of the Supreme Court, Mohammed Munir, headed
an commission of inquiry that drew an interesting observation: the ulema (religious authorities) could not
agree on the question of who is a Muslim.20 The fundamentalists lost this battle but not the war; to retain
their support, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1973 conceded to include an amendment to the newly
promulgated constitution that declared the Ahmadis non-Muslims. Take the case of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla
Khan, a political and legal luminary who consciously opted to live in Pakistan and make it his home: he
served the new Islamic Republic as its first foreign minister, skillfully articulated Islamic positions in
international fora, took Pakistan into the SEATO alliance, and became the first Pakistani judge at the
International Court of Justice in the Hague. Yet the 1973 constitution of Pakistan declared Sir Zafrulla a non-
Muslim and he died in 1985 a kafir (infidel) in his own country.
Constitutions. In Israel, domestic differences impeded a written constitution; for the same reason, Pakistan
had too many of them. Conflict over the role and position of halacha (religious law) in the Jewish State

significantly inhibited Israel from enacting a constitution. What began as a compromise British model of not
having a written constitution gradually became a Pandora's box. With the growing influence of religious
parties, writing a constitution has become more distant than ever. In its five decades, Pakistan has had
seven constitutional arrangements -- those of 1935, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1969, 1973, and 1985.
SECULARISM VS. THEOCRACY
Secular movements. The parallel religious response to the new states holds particular interest. Supporters
of the Zionist and Pakistani enterprises came primarily from the secular middle-class and neither intended to
create a theocratic polity. Reflecting on the Declaration of Independence, David Ben-Gurion later remarked
that it
said something that I know conflicts with the Halacha, universal and equal suffrage without distinctions of
sex, religion, race or nationality; and this was adopted even though according to the Halacha women do not
have equal rights.... We must undoubtedly respect any Jew who is faithful to the Halacha, but the Halacha
does not obligate every Jew.21
At a press conference on July 4, 1947, just a month before partition, Jinnah remarked that it was "absurd"
to think that Pakistan would be a religious state.22 On the eve of partition, he categorically told members of
the Constituent Assembly,
You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in
this State of Pakistan.... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the
business of the State.... Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims --not in
the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens
of the State.23
According to first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, "Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by
the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory, however limited, where Islamic ideology and the way
of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world."[24] The recognition of the centrality of Islam in
the new state was not aimed at making its Sharià the guiding principal. In the words of Paul Brass,
The League leaders were oriented towards achieving secular political power in a modern constitutional-
bureaucratic state structure, in which the shari'a would be respected but would not prevent legislatures from
acting in a sovereign manner and in which secular political leaders would be dominant in a representative
regime. In both their goals and their political skills, the Muslim League leaders were more oriented towards
and ultimately more successful in the secular political arena in which the political choices had to be made.25
Early opposition. In both cases, religious leaders responded negatively to nationalist demands for a
religiously-based state. Orthodox Jewry found Zionism unattractive because it contradicted their view that
the Jewish state must be formed by the Messiah and not by some nonobservant Zionist mortals. Even today,
a substantial body of the Orthodox rejects the state, some going so far as to consort with its enemies. This
applies even to government functionaries: a former chief rabbi remains seated and studies a religious text
while the audience at an official function sings the national anthem; a deputy mayor of Jerusalem dismisses
the Israeli flag as a rag.
The idea of a separate Islamic political entity runs counter to the universal brotherhood preached by Islam;
if Islam is the authentic nationality of the Muslims everywhere, then political divisions within the Islamic
world can only be temporary. If were Pakistan somehow attained, it would confine the sway and glory of
Islam to mere corners of the country, Muslims remaining in India would be weakened, and Pakistan would
not be a truly Islamic state.26 Thus, the principal "opposition to the Pakistan demand and to the Muslim
League among Muslims came from that segment of the Muslim elite most concerned with the protection of
Islam and Muslim culture, from the ulama."27 In addition, their opposition had much to do with self-
interest; the ulema did not see in the Muslim League and in the Pakistan idea an appropriate leadership
position for themselves as the true protectors of Islam and Sharià.28 They also opposed Pakistan on the
grounds that Pakistan was an unrealistic goal.
As a result, influential elements of the ulema, especially the Jamiyyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, sided with the

Congress Party and against the Muslim League.29 Kifayatullah (1872-1952), mufti of Delhi and founder of
Jamiyyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, also raised doubts in his fatwas about Jinnah's Islamic credentials.30 He pointed
out that Jinnah was expert "of English law, not of Islamic law of British politics, not Islamic policies." He
lacked even an elementary acquaintance with Islamic jurisprudence. Other of the ulema of the Barelvi
school pointed out that as a Shiì, Jinnah should not lead the faithful. Even those who sought a theocratic
state in the sub-continent, like Maulana Abul A`la Maududi (1903-79), had reservations over Jinnah's non-
Islamic orientation and approach. Jinnah, whom Indian Muslims had hailed as Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader),
Maududi once dubbed Kafir-i-Azam (Great Unbeliever) because he felt Jinnah "was not a practising
Muslim."31
The religious reconsider. Oddly, some of those initially indifferent or even hostile to a state based on religion
latterly became among its most fervent advocates and then ambitious to seize control of it. The non-Zionist
Orthodox Jews "soon realized that, in a western style democracy, a determined minority has the power to
prevent the government from passing laws that ostensibly threaten their sacred principles."32 Before long,
they became key players in the Zionist Knesset and at times indispensable coalition partners. Once Pakistan
was created as a "homeland" for the subcontinent's Muslim minorities, religious elements would inevitably
try to take control of it.33Besides making Pakistan an Islamic Republic the ulema played a crucial role in the
legitimization of military rule. An otherwise powerful dictator like Ayub Khan had to make concessions to the
ulema and declare Pakistan an Islamic republic. Democracy has been good to the growing ambitions of the
religious, with elections enhancing their strength and influence as rival secular parties are compelled to
court and solicit the support of the religious leaders and establishment. Religious activists in both countries
want such personal and community functions as marriage, divorce, adoption, conversion, burials, and food
and travel regulations to come under religious control.
Religion's increased role. The year 1977 was a major landmark in the approach to religion in both countries,
as unprecedented political changes compelled rulers to be more accommodating to the religious
conservatives. The ninth Knesset elections of that year abruptly ended the Labor Party's perpetual
domination of Israeli politics and when Menachem Begin became prime minister, he was joined, after a gap
of over two decades, by the Agudat Israel, a non-Zionist party.34 Begin conceded various demands made by
the religious establishment that previous Israeli governments had hitherto denied. For example, he gave the
National Religious Party control of the coveted education ministry, with its ample financial resources and
extensive education network. Pakistan also underwent serious change in 1977 with the imposition of martial
law and the overthrow of Zulfiqar Bhutto by General Zia ul-Haq, who ruled until 1988. In need of ways to
legitimize his rule, Zia ul-Haq looked to Islam. Projecting himself as a pious Muslim seeking to promote the
cause of Islam, he introduced a series of legislative acts toward this end.
Today, both countries face severe fundamentalist pressures. Religious parties made significant gains in the
1996 elections, to the point that Binyamin Netanyahu, a secular, modern, and American-educated leader,
had to court the religious establishment to ensure his election as prime minister. The Oxford-educated
Benazir Bhutto's alienated the religious establishment in Pakistan partly contributed to her downfall as prime
minister on two occasions.
The historical circumstances of their creation mean that secularism is not an option for Israel or Pakistan;
that would question their very raison d'être. Israel and Pakistan both fall somewhere between theocracy and
secularism. Both engage in intrusive scrutiny of individual and collective behaviors; yet greater religious
influence would accentuate internal discord and divisions.
VIEWS OF EACH OTHER
Israelis spend little time publicly discussing Pakistan but are favorably disposed toward the country. The first
known Zionist contacts with the Indian sub-continent were with Muslim League rather than Congress
leaders: Chaim Weizman met Shaukat Ali in London in January 1931. Israel sees Pakistan as an important
Islamic state, a key player in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and a country with nuclear
capability. In the public sphere however, relations are not so good, as symbolized by Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto's abortive attempt to visit the Palestinian autonomous areas in Gaza in August 1994 without "any

contacts or coordination" with Israel; this drew sharp rebuttal from Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the
visit did not take place.
As this incident suggests, Pakistani leaders long placed themselves at the forefront of the "anti-Zionist"
struggle and saw their commitment to the Palestinian cause as a way to display their Islamic credentials. In
1947, Pakistan led Islamic opposition to the partition plan, and the passage of time only intensified this zeal.
No other Arab or Muslim figure could have presented a more vociferous defense in support of the
Palestinians than did Sir Zafrulla Khan, the first foreign minister of Pakistan, at the United Nations debate to
partition Palestine.35 He deemed any comparison between the partition of the Indian subcontinent and
similar demands in Palestine false, even preposterous, because unlike the Jews in Palestine, the Muslim
minority was part of the sub-continental population.36 Conspiracy theories are often used in Pakistani public
life to discredit political opponents as Zionist agents and spies; during the 1997 election campaign, some
have charged that "Jewish money and power" is trying to influence and control Pakistan's domestic and
foreign policies. That the father-in-law of former cricket star and founding leader of Imran Khan, founder of
the new political party Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf, is a British Jewish billionaire adds flavor to the debate.
Reacting to reports that Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations had attended a reception hosted by his
Israeli counterpart Gad Ya'acobi, one Urdu daily warned: "Any Muslim or patriotic Pakistani will consider
making contact, developing relations, or attending the receptions of Israeli leaders as a conspiracy against
the country and the community until the independence of Jerusalem is secured and a sovereign Palestine is
established."37
CONCLUSIONS
As states that came into existence to protect and promote the interests of religious minorities, Israel and
Pakistan have more in common than is generally recognized. Their histories overlapped in many ways. As
nations in the making, they had to create identities, impose languages, and contend with strange
boundaries. While both have consciously avoided theocracy, in both places an initially reluctant orthodox
segment has successfully gained disproportionate power. Although Israel and Pakistan came into existence
to serve as a homeland for all Jews and all Indian Muslims, both confront the fact that more Jews and Indian
Muslims live outside the new countries than in them, suggesting that these national enterprises are far from
complete.

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Page 1 of 41 ISREAL , JWEISH COMMUNITY & MUSLIM WORLD

ISREAL , JWEISH COMMUNITY & MUSLIM WORLD

1. Israel And Jewish Community After World War.

2. A list of UN Resolutions against Israel.

4. Israel: consequences of ‘uniqueness’

5. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in a Nutshell

Malik M. Rizwan Yasin Research Report 0092 300 9289949

• Death of Yasser Arafat and Palestinian Democratization End of the Intifadeh

6. Lebanon and Israel Conflict

7. The Strangely Parallel Careers of Israel and Pakistan

Malik M. Rizwan Yasin Research Report 0092 300 9289949