FPSO Inspection Repair and Maintenance
FPSO Inspection Repair and Maintenance
FPSO Inspection Repair and Maintenance
R20821-5_UKOOA Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 2003
FPSO Inspection Repair & Maintenance
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Issue Date Comment Checked Authorised
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Summary 4
1 Acknowledgements 6
2 Findings 7
2.1 Ramform Banff ............................................................................7
2.2 Captain........................................................................................8
2.3 Curlew .........................................................................................8
2.4 MacCulloch .................................................................................9
2.5 Schiehallion...............................................................................10
2.6 Triton .........................................................................................10
3 Discussion and Conclusions 12
3.1 General Conclusions.................................................................12
3.2 Ballast Systems, (Pipework, Tanks, Pumps and Control Systems) 15
3.3 Oil Storage System ...................................................................16
3.4 Hull ............................................................................................17
3.5 Caissons ...................................................................................18
3.6 Deck Structures, Pallets, walkways, and upper deck plating ...18
3.7 Tank Venting System, Pipework, PV Valves and Seals ...........19
3.8 Cranes.......................................................................................19
3.9 Thrusters ...................................................................................19
3.10 Swivels and Drag-Chains..........................................................19
4 Recommended Practice 20
4.1 Ballast Systems........................................................................20
4.2 Cargo Systems..........................................................................21
4.3 Hull ............................................................................................22
4.4 Caissons ...................................................................................22
4.5 Deck Structures, Pallets, walkways, and upper deck plating ...22
4.6 Tank Venting System, Pipework, PV Valves and Seals ...........22
4.7 Cranes.......................................................................................22
4.8 Swivels, Drag-Chains................................................................22
5 Suppliers and Repairers 25
Appendix A– List of Repairers 26
Appendix B– Blank Questionnaire 31
Summary
This rep ort relates to a stu d y of Insp ection Rep air & Maintenance (IRM) Practice on Floating
Prod u ction Storage and Offtake u nits, (FPSOs), in service on th e UK Continental Shelf.
The stu d y, as d escribed in the invitation to tend er, w as intend ed to establish best p ractice in IRM by
means of a qu estionnaire am ong FPSO op erators, interview s w ith IRM p ersonnel and throu gh a
review of literatu re and an Internet search. The d eliverables w ere to be:
1. A register of vend ors, etc., to su p p ort each of the IRM categories id en tified in the tend er.
3. A d iscu ssion of the inform ation obtain ed , d ealing w ith exp erience on equ ip m ent, p roced u res and
system s from agreed selected p articip ants. This to inclu d e both the resu lts of the interview s and
d ata from other sou rces id entified in the cou rse of the stu d y.
4. A rep ort, id entifying for each of the strategic areas, the range of p ractices cu rrently ad op ted ,
together w ith recom m end ations on best p ractice to eliminate rep etition of failu res and re-d esign.
Early in the stu d y, a nu m ber of challenges w ere encou ntered inclu d ing a p atchy resp onse and resu lts
of the qu estionnaire w hich, w hile interesting in them selves, yield ed little in the w ay of general trend s.
The Internet search likew ise revealed little that cou ld be regard ed as novel. These challenges w ere
d iscu ssed at som e length w ith the steering grou p .
The stu d y set ou t to find an objective answ er to a large and su bjective qu estion. The on e com mon
trend w as that m ost op erators regard their own IRM strategies and p lans as good , even best, p ractice.
Alm ost w ithou t excep tion they regard the cond ition of p rojects as d elivered to be the root cau se of
failu re. N either Insp ection nor m aintenance featu red large in the history of failu res and rep airs.
With these interim find ings, and consid ering the original exp ectation in term s of d eliverables, it w as
agreed that the p roject shou ld be re-focu sed on areas more likely to yield u sefu l resu lts. A series of
second interview s w ere cond u cted with a n u mber of op erators. The nu mber w as not restricted : those
who resp ond ed w ere visited and the exercise consid ered six vessels. The interview s w ere aim ed at
su m m arising exp erience and establishing key factors relating to a nu mber of in-service failu res.
A p ilot stu d y w as u nd ertaken, com m encing w ith BP’s Schiehallion facility. This collected d ata on
IRM systems. This w as analysed in accord ance w ith the head ings taken from the original invitation to
tend er d ocu m ent. The d ata w as then com p ared and collated . Fin ally th e resu lts of the interview s
were d iscu ssed at length, both internally and w ith the Steering Grou p .
The stu d y conclu d es that m ost of the failu res consid ered w ou ld have been avoid ed had closer
attention been p aid to foreseeable op erating cond itions at the d esign stage. Fu rtherm ore, it is
op timistic, to say the least, to exp ect insp ection and m aintenance strategies, bu ilt as they are on the
assu mp tion of comp etent and com p rehensive d esign, to d etect early life w arranty-typ e d efects.
Finally w e have conclu d ed that u nd erstand ing of risk-based I&M p hilosop hies varies w id ely betw een
op erators. At their w orst they su ggest schem es that sim p ly accep t risk, rather than those that assess
and seek to m itigate or avoid risk.
1 Acknowledgements
The au thors are gratefu l for the assistance of the stu d y p articip ants in p rep aring this rep ort.
Their op enness in d ealing w ith m atters su ch as system failu res and lessons learned is very
m u ch ap p reciated . Th ese inclu d ed contribu tions from :
Am erad a H ess
Blu ew ater
BP Exp loration
Kerr McGee
Maersk Contractors
PGS
Pierce Prod u ction Com p an y
Shell UK
Texaco
Wood Grou p
Ou r th anks are also d u e to the m embers of the steering grou p , for their p atience and for
their invalu able contribu tions to a som etim es-contentiou s d iscu ssion, d ealing as it d id w ith
som e d early held view s on all sid es.
2 Findings
The Planned Maintenance Rou tine (PMR) system is controlled by the STAR p lanned
m aintenance and m anagem ent system. Those PMR’s relating to the SCE’s take into accou nt
the PFEER and DCR verification in ad d ition to Class/ IMO requ irem ents. The initial PMR’s
have been mod ified w ith op erating exp erience to ensu re all w ritten schem e of verification
(WSV’s) item s are d ealt w ith. The WSV’s now sp ecifically refer to the related PMR’s.
The stru ctu ral insp ection schem e is based on the ou tcome of a d etailed risk assessm ent.
2. Su bstantial strengthening of p rocess p allet m ain d eck fou nd ations and su p p orts. This
work was u nd ertaken in resp onse to a stru ctu ral m otion stu d y that show ed accelerations
and forces attribu table to the vessel m ovem ent to be in excess of the original d esign
limits.
3. Su bstantial rew orking and strengthening of flare stru ctu re follow ing fatigu e failu re of
su rrou nd ing stru ctu re.
4. Strengthening of KO Dru m , H P, MP and Test Sep arators w ith stiffening rings to im p rove
fatigu e life in resp onse to vessel m otions in excess of those initially p red icted .
5. Extensive strength ening w ork on barriers and bu m p ers. With a congested d eck, the risk
of collision by sw inging load s w as high and this had not been ad equ ately ad d ressed in
the original d esign.
6. New air lock d oor m echanism s fitted to p ort sid e em ergency escap e tu nnel to ensu re
p ositive p ressu re m aintained . Tem p orary refu ge ou ter d oors p lann ed for refu rbishm ent
to m aintain integrity. Original m arine H VAC system was fou nd not to be su itable for
offshore op erations.
7. Rep airs and mod ification to main tu rbine fu el m anagem ent system. The situ ation
p reviou sly w as that, follow ing p rocess shu td ow ns, the change over from fu el gas to
d iesel often resu lted in p ow er ou tages. The change over system is now op erational and
p ow er availability has been significantly im p roved .
8. Grad u al ad ju stm ent of the p rocess instru m entation has im p roved d ow n tim e d u e to
vessel m ovem ents. The bilge keels have also help ed in this resp ect.
Resu lts and com m ents are fed back into the system to either mod ify the exam ination or to
p u t rem ed ial w ork into the p lanning for shu t d ow ns etc.
Maintenance sheets are p rod u ced to d etail the w ork to be u nd ertaken. These are w ell
d etailed as to what is requ ired and how it is to be carried ou t.
Resp onsibility is clearly laid ou t in d ecid ing w hat is to be d one. The overall im p ression is of
a risk-based p rogram w ith a sim p le fu nctional ap p roach.
2.2.1 Repairs
All of the rep airs listed below relate to d esign issu es, w ith a p ossible contribu tion of
w orkm anship to item 5.
1. Tu rret – this d esign has no sw ivel, relying on a system of hyd rau lically op erated grip p ers
instead . These have all been renew ed w ithin 3 years. The tu rning system is d eem ed to be
over-stressed and not fit for p u rp ose and is to be rep laced by a locally d esigned an d
manu factu red p ackage.
2. The hoses in the cu rrent system reach their minim u m bend rad iu s in u se. This has
resu lted in several failu res.
3. Prod u ction Sep arators – Internal grid s collap sed , requ iring com p lete ren ew al. This w as
attribu ted to wave m otions w ithin the sep arators cau sed by the FPSO’ s m otion in heavy
seas.
4. Sea Chests – the vessel has 11 sea chests, all of w hich w ere originally fitted w ith Stainless
Steel grid s. This arrangem ent led to severe bu ild u p of cru staceans and consequ ent
blockage: stainless steel p rovid es an u nu su ally cond u cive environm ent for marine life.
The sea valves w ere also not su itable for the p rolonged life exp ectancy in an offshore
u nit. The grid s w ere renew ed in carbon steel and the bu tterfly valves w ere rep laced w ith
conventional ship sid e globe valves.
5. Hu ll – variou s areas of p aint coating have failed . At this stage it is u nclear w hether the
root cau se is system selection or qu ality of ap p lication.
2.3 Curlew
The PMRs are risk based and takes accou nt of FMEA and RCM. The initial p eriod icity w as
based on five yearly class requ irements. The p lann ed maintenance strategy u tilises
MAXIMO.
Maintenance Rou tine Sheets d etail the p lant or equ ip m ent d escrip tion and each relates to a
p articu lar WSE & SCE, w ith cross-references to associated p roced u res and d ocu m entation.
The sheets d etail the equ ip m ent covered , the reference p roced u res, the p recau tions sp ecific
Defects are tracked via corrective maintenance w ork ord ers, d etailing p rop osals for d ealing
w ith d efects and su bsequ ent follow u p activities.
2.3.1 Repairs
1. Water Ballast Tank Fram es.
Fatigu e cracking in low er flu m e op enings w as d etected after 2-3 years of op eration as
FPSO. (There w as no evid ence of this failu re noted in 13 years as a trad ing tanker) The
cracks have been d rilled & grou nd . Rop e-access team s imp lem ented m od ifications.
These have been su ccessfu l and are now su bject to annu al monitoring.
2. Caissons
The u nit exp erienced extensive noble corrosion of seaw ater & firew ater caissons in the
water ballast tanks, cau sed by titaniu m su bm ersible p u mp bod y / caisson coating
breakd ow n. Rep airs by m eans of by external p lu gs an d re-coating w ere p artially
su ccessfu l. In the w orst case (SW caisson) rep airs w ere effected by re-coating & by
grou ting a larger annu lar sleeve. This rep air w as u nsu ccessfu l. The cem ent leaked into
and blocked base of caisson to a d ep th of 1-2m .
3. Steering Gear
The u nit su ffered severe d am age to the steering gear d u e to w ave slam on the ru d d er. At
the tim e the steering gear w as hyd rau lically locked and the slam torqu e on the
ru d d erstock cau sed a ru p tu re and consequ ent d am age d u e to u nrestrain ed m ovem ent.
Since then p erm anent m echanical locks h ave been installed to restrain the ru d d er.
2.4 MacCulloch
The PMR is risk based and takes accou nt of FMEA and RCM stu d ies w hich w ere intend ed
to refine and focu s maintenance activities. The initial p eriod icity w as based on five yearly
class requ irem ents (sp ecifically the IMO requ irem ent). The resu lts of initial insp ections
have been fed back into the system w ith the resu lt that rep airs have been requ ired and the
frequ ency of insp ections increased as p art of the rep air scenario. In 1999, the RCM stu d ies
and FMEA stu d ies w ere revisited to inclu d e later OREDA statistics w ith a view to red u cing
m aintenance w orkload & consequ ent backlog. Maxim o p rovid es th e CMMS.
Maintenance Rou tine Sheets d etail the p lant or equ ip m ent d escrip tion and each relates to a
p articu lar WSE & SCE, w ith cross-references to associated p roced u res and d ocu m entation.
The sheets d etail the equ ip m ent covered , the reference p roced u res, the p recau tions sp ecific
to the task to be u nd ertaken, w hat is to be d one and how it is to be d one. PMRs typ ically
have a hierarchy w hich varies from w eekly checks u p to 2 / 4 / 5 yearly interventions.
Defects are tracked via corrective maintenance w ork ord ers, d etailing p rop osals for d ealing
w ith d efects and su bsequ ent follow u p activities. The p lanned m aintenance strategy u tilises
MAXIMO.
Maintenance h istories are grou p ed by system tag nu m bers allow ing d efect trend s to be
highlighted .
2.4.1 Repairs
1. Water Ballast Tank Fram es
Fatigu e cracking in low er flu m e op enings after 2-3 years of op eration as FPSO. (N o
2.5 Schiehallion
PMRs are risk based and take accou nt of FMEA and RCM. Initial p eriod icity w as based on
five yearly class requ irem ents (sp ecifically the IMO requ irem ent). The resu lts of initial
insp ections have been fed back into the system with the resu lt that rep airs have been
requ ired and the frequ ency of insp ections increased as p art of the rep air scenario.
Schiehallion u ses EnGard e as the CMMS.
Maintenance Rou tine Sheets d etail the p lant or equ ip m ent d escrip tion and each relates to a
p articu lar WSE & SCE, w ith cross-references to associated p roced u res and d ocu m entation.
The sheets are sp lit into tw o p arts.
Part A d etails p recau tions sp ecific to the task to be u nd ertaken, p art B d etails w hat is to be
d one and how it is to be d one. It also instru cts as to w hom is resp onsible for rep air m ethod
or p rop osals for d ealing w ith d efects and su bsequ ent follow u p activities. This is fu rther set
ou t in the Op erations Safety Case referring to Defect Management Strategy.
2.5.1 Repairs
1. Bow Dam age
Heavy w eather d amage to vessels bow p lating and internals. Plating variou sly ind ented
betw een stiffeners w ith variou s internal brackets sp ru ng. Rep aired on location u sing
heavier section bu lb bar and larger softer brackets and strict w eld ing control.
Tears in w ay of inner d eck faired and re-w eld ed .
2.6 Triton
The initial PMR’ s have been revised d u ring the last 12 months to ensu re all those item s
requ ired by th e Written Schem es of Verification are inclu d ed . Triton u ses Maximo as its
CMMS.
Ballast Pumps
Ballast Tanks
Hull External
Hull Internal
P/V Valves
Thrusters
Caissons
Cranes
Seals
Banff ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Captain ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Curlew ✔ ✔ ✔
MacCulloch ✔ ✔
Schiehallion ✔ ✔ ✔
Triton ✔ ✔
facilitate installation ou tw ith the w orking rad iu s of the installation’ s m ain cranes. This
d esign was stu d ied to ensu re that there is not an u naccep table incend ive sp ark risk.
2. Jib exten sions to the m ain cranes are being p lanned . The rad iu s of op eration leaves
several “d ead ” areas, w hich can significantly increase maintenance/ change ou t times.
This is not to say that I&M have not a cru cial role to p lay in d etecting and rectifying
incip ient failu re. The safety of systems and equ ip m ent throu ghou t the op erational life of
the installation w ill d ep end ever m ore on the m aintenance and insp ection fu nction being
su itable and w ell imp lem ented . H ow ever I&M strategies tend to be based on an
assu m p tion of com p etent d esign and constru ction. It shou ld therefore com e as little
su rp rise that, w ith the excep tion of baseline insp ections, they have a p oor record in
d etecting the consequ ences of inad equ ate d esign and careless w orkm anship .
3.1.2 Design
If insp ection and maintenance cannot p revent early life failu res, w hat p art can d esign and
constru ction p lay? Almost all of the significan t, and exp ensive, failu res can be attribu ted to
one or the other. The table below show s som e exam p les.
Damage Cause
x Bow d am age Inad equ ate stru ctu ral d esign and inad equ ate consid eration of
en vironm ental load ings
x Caisson Dam age Material Selection
x Flare Damage Inad equ ate stru ctu ral d esign and inad equ ate consid eration of
en vironm ental load ings
x Tank d efects Inad equ ate consid eration of environ m ental load ings. Errors in
d esign p rocess
Unsatisfactory constru ction tech niqu es
Site sp ecific load ings not anticip ated in d esign p rocess (this is
p erh ap s the excep tion to the above ru le since the load ings had
been consid ered comp etently. The ou tcom e w as som ething of an
u nforeseen event.)
x Breakd ow n of Poor ap p lication and p oor selection
Coating System s
x Ru d d er & steering Inad equ ate consid eration of op erating and environm ental
gear d am age cond itions
While all conversions u nd ergo rep airs in th e cou rse of conversion, many have had little or
no fatigu e enhancem ent carried ou t.
3.1.4 New-build
Service exp erience show s little to choose betw een the overall p erform ance of p u rp ose-bu ilt
FPSOs and those d evelop ed from sp ecu lative new-bu ild hu lls. In the case of the hu ll, both
new and old vessels have exp erienced stru ctu ral failu res that w ou ld ind icate that site-
sp ecific environm ental load ings are in excess of those p red icted by either the d esign or the
hu ll strengthening rep ort.
Op erators have long been ad vised to ap p ly site-sp ecific environm ental load ings d u ring the
d esign p rocess. This is d ifficu lt, bu t not imp ossible, in the case of sp ecu lative bu ilt hu lls;
however, it w as not im p lemented for at least one of the p u rp ose bu ilt hu lls.
Accep ting that in real life there are no d efect-free stru ctu res, it’ s nevertheless consid ered
likely that conscientiou s ap p lication of site sp ecific environm ental load ings w ill serve to
p rod u ce more robu st and resp onsive d esigns.
3.1.5 Classification
Of the six vessels consid ered in d etail, all w ere constru cted u nd er su rvey by a classification
society w ith on e being rem oved from class at the tim e of d elivery. It m ay be worth
enqu iring as to the relevance of class for FPSOs.
It’ s often stated that classification is a m inimu m stand ard for ship d esign. That vessels bu ilt
to class ru les su ffer stru ctu ral failu re d oes not in itself u nd erm ine the su itability of the ru les.
Where vessels are intend ed for p articu lar services, ad d itional requ irem ents m ay be ad op ted
by, thou gh not im p osed u p on, the ow ner. Vessels intend ed for op eration in ice can for
instance op t for one of three increasingly onerou s Ice Classes. Sim ilarly, some tanker
ow ners have volu ntarily ad op ted ES (enhanced scantling) d escrip tive notations, ind icating
that m aterial scantlin gs are in excess of ru le requ irem ents. It is u nclear to w hat extent FPSO
op erators elect to imp ose stand ard s higher than the basic level.
It’ s also w orth noting that the p rincip al comp laint abou t classification requ irem en ts is that
they are too onerou s on op erating FPSOs, not too lenient.
1. While som e FPSO op erators p u rsu e relatively bold insp ection strategies w ith ever-
lengthening intervals, ow ners of classed tankers are n ow requ ired to carry ou t a
d etailed assessm ent of the longitu d inal strength of th eir vessels after ten years.
2. Bu lk carriers are now requ ired to consid er fore-end im p rovem ents to p rotect from
green w ater. Like FPSOs, and u nlike m ost tankers, bu lk carriers have d eck-m ou nted
equ ip m ent that is su bject to d am age by green w ater.
3. Data is available 1 to ind icate that N E Atlantic m axim u m w ave heights have increased
by as m u ch as 1.5 m over the p ast 20 years. Protection & Ind emnity 2 clu bs rep ort
increased occu rrence of w eather d am age to vessels. FPSO op erators ad op t novel and
som ew hat u ntried bow and hu ll d esigns, and su ffer d amage. There is a grow ing gap
d evelop ing betw een ship p ing p ractice and that of FPSO op erators.
Classification ru les are continu ally being revised and d evelop ed in the face of increased
technical challenges and yet th ere is a com mon com p laint that they are too inflexible for
op erators. There is som e d iscu ssion that that Class is an in ad equ ate stand ard for FPSOs, yet
the w ond er is that op erators find it is so d ifficu lt to achieve the stand ard s requ ired by class,
never m ind exceed ing them . Class ru les certainly requ ire to be u p grad ed bu t no m atter
w hich classification society is involved , th ey d o ap p ear to p rovid e an op p ortu nity for
consistency and for p ooling exp erience.
xA system m od el, line list, asset inventory, d esign/ constru ction d ata, etc.
xA failu re analysis, strength and fatigu e assessm ent, FMEA, etc.
xA means of ranking the highest risk item s,
xA Maintenance Schem e focu sed on the highest risks AN D the related failu re m od es,
xA comp rehensive method for Event Id entification.
Many risk-based strategies take a very op tim istic ap p roach to th e am ou nt of effort requ ired
to carry ou t the above requ irem ents. It is therefore comm on to find th at the u nd erlying
assessm ents p rovid e insu fficient d etail as to the typ es of d efects and the m eans of d etecting
and m itigating failu res.
x Initial exam ination and resp onse to d evelop m ents can be largely d riven by generic
recom m end ations, p ooling exp erience and learning from a large fleet and bringing in
relevant p ractice from ou tsid e areas, e.g. tankers, foreign FPSOs, etc.
x Su bsequ ent tactics shou ld be d riven m ore d irectly by vessel–sp ecific exp erience.
x Mod elling and analysis shou ld be aim ed at id entifying a rational, thou gh not
necessarily a risk basis for exam ination and m aintenance. The form er is achievable, the
latter not alw ays so.
The rem aind er u se risk-based techniqu es to extend insp ection intervals, in som e cases to
seven years.
3.2.2 Tanks
Over 80% of op erators u se a 5 year cycle to p rogram their insp ection and m aintenance
rou tines, u sing close visu al insp ections - generally involving rop e access - backed u p w ith
u ltrasonic thickness m easu rem ent and su rface crack d etection in sp ecific areas. Tank coating
and anod es are exam ined generally for p ercentage d eterioration. H ow ever over 16% of
vessels are on a 7-year risk-based cycle. From this, it cou ld be inferred that som e of the
tanks w ou ld not be insp ected u ntil the end of this p eriod . While this long interval might be
ju stified as p art of an overall strategy, it offers no assu rance as to the effect on ind ivid u al
tanks of any d eterioration attribu table to constru ction d efects or to u nforeseen p rocess
effects. It’ s w orth bearing in m ind that p rocess cond itions on som e FPSOs are qu ite
d ynam ic, w hile the corrosion m od els often lag far behind . There is therefore the d anger that
neither insp ection nor m aintenance w ill intercep t a d eterioration p rocess in good tim e.
3.2.2.1 General Visual Examination (GVE) and Close Visual Inspection (CVI)
The typ e of insp ection ad op ted by m ost resp ond ents is Close Visu al Insp ection (CVI) and
not General Visu al Exam ination (GVE). This assertion is at variance w ith the exp erience of
the au thors. CVI is d efined as a visu al examination carried ou t w ithin arms reach or the
d istance at w hich a p erson w ou ld read a new sp ap er or book, illu m inated as necessary by
torch or other light sou rce. GVE is d efined as a visu al exam ination of a sp ace as a w hole
and at a d istance. While GVE w ill p erm it overall estim ation of coating failu re and bu ckling
of large m em bers, it cannot be exp ected to reveal crack like d efects.
There ap p ear to be a nu m ber of interp retations of CVI in u se among resp ond ents, m any of
them vagu e. This d istinction is im p ortant since both techniqu es have their ad vantages.
Consid er coatings and their im p ortance, esp ecially in w ater ballast sp aces. Trad itionally,
vessel scantlings inclu d ed a margin that allow ed for u ncertainties and p rovid ed an effective
corrosion allow ance at the d esign stage. This is seld om the case now. Vessel d esigns are
now highly op timised and generally u se the m inim u m scantlings that the variou s class
societies state in their ru les. Und er these circu m stances, th e coatings are now vital to the
3.2.3 Pumps
The cu rrent p ractice on p u mp s is sp lit evenly betw een a 5-year p lanned m aintenance and
insp ection cycle and continu ou s cond ition monitoring (CM), u sing vibration-m easu ring
equ ip m ent.
CM u su ally com p rises visu al exam inations w ith p erformance m onitoring and vibration
m onitoring of one typ e or another. While bench marking for vibration m onitoring m ay be
m ore d ifficu lt on converted tankers, service exp erience ind icates that a satisfactory d egree of
ad vance w arning of failu re can be achieved . There w ere no rep orted su d d en failu res of
system s m onitored in this w ay.
The other general p ractice entails rou tine m aintenance, d ealing w ith tim e-based
d eterioration of the equ ip m ent.
3.3.2 Tanks
Over 65% of op erators u se a 5 year cycle w ith the rem aind er d ivid ed betw een 3, 7 and 10
years. Insp ection m ethod s are broad ly sim ilar to ballast tank insp ections w ith u ltrasonic
gau ging of p lates and exam ination of coatings and anod e w astage.
Initial exam ination p eriod s of u p to 10 years are view ed w ith som e d egree of ap p rehension
by the au thors and for tw o reasons. First, if tanks are not insp ected fu lly w ithin the first 3 to
5 years of service, no base line can be established . Second , a strategy that d elays insp ection
of a p articu lar tank for ten years im p lies a d egree of accu racy in the p red iction of the
behaviou r of the stru ctu re, coatings, anod es, and attachm ents not otherw ise ju stified by
exp erience.
The strategy for exam ining cargo tanks was qu ite sim ilar to that ad op ted for ballast tanks.
This ap p ears strange becau se, w hile both have sim ilar criticality in term s of hu ll gird er
strength, they often have very d ifferent su scep tibilities to corrosion and they d iffer
d ram atically in resp ect of the ease, exp ense, and im p lications of internal exam inations.
Coating system s vary from simp le coal tar ep oxy to high-grad e tw o p art system s. It was not
certain from the stu d y w hether the p red ominant factor in d eterminin g the su ccess of the
coating system w as the choice of coatin g or the stand ard of ap p lication. Anecd otal evid ence
ind icates that normal ship yard stand ard s of p rep aration and ap p lication w ill not ensu re
ad equ ate lifetim e p erformance in su ch a p rod u ction-critical and stru ctu rally critical area.
Slop tanks are generally d ifficu lt to isolate and to enter. This has d riven som e op erators to
em p loy external m eans of exam ination, u tilising thickness m easu rement at accessible
bou nd aries in ord er to interp ret the cond ition of the inaccessible bou nd aries, i.e.
m easu rem ent throu gh the forw ard cargo tank bu lkhead and throu gh the after p u mp room
bu lkhead , p articu larly at the bottom.
There w as a certain resignation at the instances of failu re in slop tanks. The failu re
m echanism is w ell u nd erstood and the cu re reasonably simp le, how ever m aintenance team s
are hamp ered by p oor initial d esign, first in failing to am eliorate the op erating cond itions
and second in p rovid ing inad equ ate facilities for isolation and rep air of the tank. The knock
on effect on p rod u ction of entering slop tanks for either su rvey or rep air is noted as a m ajor
p roblem for maintenance staff.
Cargo Oil tanks are u su ally p artially coated w ith a fu ll coating sp ecified for the bottom 3m
and top 3m .
3.4 Hull
External insp ections of the hu ll, w ind and w ater areas, sea chests and th e tu rret vary am ong
the op erators. 30% op erate a 2½-year cycle, wh ich equ ates to the m and atory International
Maritim e Organisations (IMO) requ irem ent for In-Water Su rvey tw ice in 5 years. 30%
insp ect on an annu al basis. The rem aind er w ere a little u nclear as to w hat they actu ally d o.
All op erators u se sim ilar insp ection techniqu es, external exam inations via an ROV, coating
and anod e insp ections, close visu al exam ination. The p rim ary d ifference is in the frequ ency
at w hich these activities take p lace. All op erators insp ect tu rrets at least annu ally, w ith the
extent of exam ination largely governed by m atters of ROV access. Imp ressed Cu rrent
Protection, w here fitted , is u su ally m onitored continu ou sly.
H yd rau lic locking of steering gear is never ad visable. While the relief valves w ill p erm it the
ru d d er to give u nd er w ave load ing, there is then no m eans of recovering p osition. The next
w ave can then force the tiller against its stop s and can cau se severe d am age, even
amou nting to total failu re of the steering gear. After the Am oco Cad iz d isaster in the 1970s,
m echanical stop s w ere requ ired in ord er to restrain the ru d d er in the event of hyd rau lic
failu re. Given the p hysical size of steering gears and the cond itions u nd er w hich these stop s
m ight be called u p on, these m echanical stop s have p rovid ed far m ore p sychological than
p hysical secu rity. It is d ifficu lt to conceive of a situ ation w here it w ou ld be feasible to install
these d evices in the event of failu re.
Mu ch is m ad e of the contention that ru d d ers exp erience greater forces in FPSO service than
in tanker service. This ignores the fact that the ru d d er failu res encou ntered have been as a
resu lt of single ep isod es, rath er than cu mu lative effects. Su ch instances of steering gear
overload are an u nnerving, bu t not entirely u nu su al, occu rrence on ship s; how ever they
rarely resu lt in d am age to the steering gear since the system s d esign ed to yield to the forces
and then to recover.
The situ ation regard ing thru sters ap p ears equ ivocal. Som e vessels have no p rovision, som e
have p rovision, bu t have not fitted them, and som e vessels have them fitted bu t are u nable
to maintain p osition by u sing thru sters alone. Tw o instances w ere d iscu ssed in the cou rse
of the stu d y: one w here a sw ivel bearin g failed and one w here it w as requ ired to examine
the sp id er at close range. In both cases, a tu g w as chartered to maintain the vessel on
station. Over the range of vessels consid ered , it is qu estionable w hether the comp lication or
exp ense of installing or maintaining thru sters is ju stified .
3.5 Caissons
N ot all vessels have caissons: of those that have, tw o u se a 5-year insp ection cycle and one 4
years. Insp ections are close visu al, su p p lem ented by u ltrasonic and ROV insp ections. One
op erator has a p rogram m e to m onitor coatings and anod es.
The only rep orted failu re w as d u e to a high p otential d ifference betw een a p u m p bod y and
the caisson m aterial. This shou ld have been anticip ated at the d esign stage when selecting
the m aterials to be u sed .
Where cracking has been fou nd , it has generally been attribu ted to inad equ ate d esign or
installation. Althou gh rep airs are norm ally relatively minor in scale, they can be d ifficu lt to
achieve w ith the u nit in p rod u ction.
Maintenance of seals and Pressu re/ Vacu u m (P/ V) Valves ap p ears to be w ell ad d ressed in
all cases. Op erational lessons ap p ear to have been learned from an incid ent of tank
bu ckling som e years ago.
3.8 Cranes
Cranes rep resent a significant safety risk and are comp lex, involving significant m echanical,
stru ctu ral, and control and safety asp ects. The m aintenance and insp ection arrangem ents
w ere how ever fou nd to be the most com p rehensive and consistent. The u se of a small
nu m ber of sp ecialist p rovid ers ap p ears to be a critical factor. Systems, record s, incid ent
rep orts, lessons learn ed , etc., all ap p ear to be m anaged com p etently.
The m aintenance criteria inclu d e comp liance w ith the requ irem ents of LOLER, SI
1998/ 2307, and variou s classification requ irem ents. All op erators carry ou t rocking tests
and grease analysis of slew rings as a m atter of rou tine.
3.9 Thrusters
Three op erators u se a 5-year cycle; one u ses a 2-½ year cycle and the rem aind er an annu al
cycle. In som e cases, fu nction tests are carried ou t w eekly and oil analysis comp leted w here
facilities p erm it.
Vibration m onitoring equ ip m ent is installed in som e instances and ROV insp ections carried
ou t on others. Their location and relative inaccessibility normally p reclu d es intru sive w ork.
Most op erators h ave p lans in p lace to d eal w ith su d d en breakd ow n or failu re, u sin g tu gs
w here necessary. Tw o op erators rep orted instances of thru ster m otor failu re d u e to thru st
bearing failu re. Being inactive for long p eriod s, these motors are su bject to brinelling
effects. In one case the coverage of vibration m onitoring w as increased to inclu d e these
m otors after the event.
At least one op erator has had to renew a set of swivel seals d u e to ingress of salt and grit
p articles. The exercise involved fitting a m ore robu st system, im p lying that the original
d esign m ay not have been equ al to the service requ irem ent.
4 Recommended Practice
a. Carry ou t a fu ll GVE of all tanks w ithin the first 5 years to p rovid e a baseline for the
vessel in term s of d esign and bu ild qu ality
b. Ensu re comp lete coating of ballast tank internals: p referably ligh t colou red or w hite.
This w ill p rovid e a high contrast backgrou nd and allow rap id d etection of coating
breakd ow n, incip ient cracking, and blisterin g.
c. Ensu re that ed d y cu rrent d etection is available as a first-line assessm ent tool. If there is
no ed d y cu rrent ind ication, there is seld om need for fu rther investigation.
d . Ensu re tanks are com p letely strip p ed p rior to entry. This w ill sp eed examination of
tank bottoms, p articu larly in w ay of bell m ou ths and m ou se holes.
e. Provid e good lighting, either installed or p ortable. This is seld om a consid eration on
tankers since the tim e elem ent w hen carrying ou t su rveys is not so critical, w hereas the
d eferm ent cost of FPSO tank entry is p articu larly high. Bear in m ind that air-d riven
lanterns can be d ifficu lt to m anoeu vre w ith ease and m ore inventive lighting solu tions
shou ld be consid ered .
With the above m easu res, it will generally be p ossible to carry ou t a comp rehen sive
examination and to have a high d egree of confid ence in the resu lts, in term s of bu ckling,
tearing, cracking, coating d am age and anod e w astage.
Thereafter examination intervals can be ad ju sted to take accou nt of the tank cond itions.
a. The insp ection strategy shou ld be fou nd ed on u nd erstand ing the threats to the integrity
of the tank stru ctu re and on p red icting the resp onse of the stru ctu re. The insp ection
p lan shou ld then be tailored to these threats. The extent of the analysis shou ld be
su fficient to id entify and rank critical areas of stress in the stru ctu re as w ell as fatigu e
sensitive locations.
b. Provid e a flexible and com p rehensive m eans of isolating, inerting, and ventilating
ind ivid u al tanks. Trad itional tanker p ractice w ill generally be insu fficient for this
p u rp ose since FPSOs su ffer from d ifferent tim e and resou rce constraints in exam ining
tanks. It shou ld be p ossible, at th e least, to isolate two ad jacent tanks withou t having to
shu t d ow n p rod u ction.
f. Carry ou t a fu ll assessm ent of all tanks w ithin the first 5 years to p rovid e a baseline for
the vessel in term s of d esign and bu ild qu ality. This shou ld inclu d e visu al exam ination
to an ap p rop riate extent to establish actu al cond itions at each frame interval along the
cargo area. There may be a case for inferring the cond ition of a p ort tank from th e
starboard and vice versa.
g. Where p ossible, u se high contrast coating on tank bottom and roof. This w ill allow
rap id d etection of coating breakd ow n, incip ient cracking and blistering.
i. Ensu re tanks are com p letely strip p ed p rior to entry. This w ill sp eed examination of
tank bottoms, p articu larly in w ay of bellm ou ths and m ou se holes.
j. Ensu re that tan ks are clean p rior to entry. This can best be achieved by retaining,
m aintaining and op erating tank-cleaning system s. This p ractice has the ad d itional
ad vantage of p reventing the bu ild -u p of slu d ge, w ith the associated risk of SRB attack.
k. Provid e good p ortable lighting. Tank entry d u ration can be shortened consid erably by
this sim p le m easu re.
Thereafter examination intervals can be ad ju sted to take accou nt of the tank cond itions.
4.3 Hull
Best p ractice is consid ered a 2½-year ROV insp ection, m easu ring hu ll p otential. Op erators
shou ld have a m eans of cleaning sea chests grid s and shou ld retain blanking arrangem ents
for sea valve m aintenance. Consid eration shou ld be given to rem oving item s d u ring
conversion w hich are u nlikely to be u sed – ru d d ers, p rop ellers etc.
4.4 Caissons
A p rogram of thickness d eterm ination, u sin g variations on riser insp ection tools, can
p rovid e early d etection of w astage. Wastage rates can how ever be excep tionally high and
the cost of intervention m eans that a materials review wou ld be recom m end ed , taking
ap p rop riate action in resp ect of material change ou t insu lation, shield ing or other
p reventive m easu res.
4.7 Cranes
Total Vend or Maintenance p rogram s are recom m end ed . Service exp erience here u nd erlines
the benefits of em p loying exp erts w ith the associated critical m ass in investm ent in
technology and training.
Ultrasonic Examination
General Examination
Coating Examination
Anode Inspection
ROV Examination
Grease Analysis
Vibr Monitoring
General Visual
Rocking Test
Radiography
Close Visual
System Test
MPI
System Component
60
GRP 48 6 7%
Cunifer 48 1 7%
Pipework Carbon Steel 54 1 0 0% 8 3% 3 3% 17 %
Tanks WB Tanks 54 17 % 8 3% 10 0% 8 3% 1 00 % 1 00 % 17 %
WB Tanks 12 0 1 7%
Ballast Water System
Forepeak 54 17 % 8 3% 10 0% 8 3% 1 00 % 1 00 % 17 %
Forepeak 12 0 1 7%
Afterpeak 54 17 % 8 3% 10 0% 8 3% 1 00 % 1 00 % 17 %
Afterpeak 12 0 1 7%
Pumps 25 1 0 0% 10 0%
Control Systems 34 1 0 0% 1 00 %
Pipework Carbon Steel 54 1 0 0% 8 3% 5 0%
Cargo Tanks 53 17 % 8 3% 8 3% 8 3% 1 00 %
Cargo Tanks 12 0 1 7%
Oil Storage System Slops Tanks 43 17 % 8 3% 8 3% 8 3% 1 00 %
Tanks Slops Tanks 12 0 1 7%
Pumps 25 8 3% 8 3%
Control Systems 27 1 0 0% 1 00 %
Tanks & Above Water Continuous Survey Hull 72
Subsea 30
External Sea Chests 33 8 3% 8 3% 10 0 % 1 00 % 1 00 %
Hull Internal Sea Chests 45
Turret 27 1 0 0% 8 3% 1 00 % 50 %
Cathodic Protection 30 8 3% 83 %
External Wind & Water Area 25 1 0 0% 1 7% 1 00 %
Caissons 52 3 3% 3 3% 3 3% 1 7% 33 % 17 %
Pallets 33 1 0 0% 8 3% 17 %
Deck structures Walkways 33 1 0 0% 17 %
Deck Plating 38 1 0 0% 10 0% 17 %
Tank Venting System 19
Pipework 50 1 0 0% 8 3% 8 3%
P/V Valves 34 1 0 0% 17 %
Seals 26 1 0 0% 17 %
42 1 0 0% 3 3% 3 3%
Cranes Grease Sampling 3 10 0%
Rocking Test 6 1 00 %
Thrusters 33 6 7% 8 3% 17 % 1 7% 33 % 1 7%
21 6 7%
Swivels - Leak recuperation 1 33 % 3 3% 3 3%
Swivels & Drag Chains Swivels - Instrumentation 54 33 % 33 %
Swivel Stack (mechanical) 60 33 % 3 3%
Chains / stoppers / anchors 33 33 % 3 3% 3 3%
The table above gives an ind ication of the range of generic techniqu es This table considers
ap p lied to IRM on FPSOs. The conclu sion is that, w hile there are six vessels. The
som e ou tlying cases, op erators are relatively consistent in their percentage figures
relate to the number of
p ractices. The table also ind icates that general p ractice rem ains
vessels, not the
relatively conservative d esp ite the ap p arent novelty of some risk- number of
based strategies. This wou ld ap p ear to leave am p le scop e for owners/operators
d evelop m ent and im p rovem ent.
Ap p end ix A contains a list of IRM p rovid ers. The list is not extensive bu t it serves to
illu strate a range of service organisations w ith d irect exp erience of in-service rep air to
FPSOs.
Stud
yintoBestPra
ctice
List of Repair Organisations
Glasgow
G52 4PQ
AJT Engineering Craigshaw Crescent +44 (0) 1224 +44 (0) 1224
Ltd West Tullos 871791 890251
Industrial Estate
Aberdeen
AB12 3TB
Alfa Laval Ltd., 6 Wellheads Road +44 (0) 1224 +44 (0) 1224
Oilfield Division Farburn Industrial 424300 725213
Estate
Aberdeen
AB21 7HG
Caledonian Unit 4 Howe Moss +44 (0) 1224 +44 (0) 1224
Petroleum Avenue 725345 725406
Services Ltd Kirkhill Industrial
Estate
Dyce
Aberdeen
AB21 0GP
Grayloc Hydropark +44 (0) 1224 +44 (0) 1224
Tern Place, 222790 222780
Denmore Road
Aberdeen
AB23 8JX
Hydra Tight Ltd Howe Moss +44 (0) 1224 +44 (0) 1224
Crescent 770739 724175
Kirkhill Industrial
Estate
Aberdeen
AB21 0GN
Mach-Ten Pitmedden Road +44 (0) 1224 +44 (0) 1224
Offshore Ltd Dyce 773565 773568
Aberdeen
AB21 0DP
Micron Eagle Blackburn Industrial +44 (0) 1224 +44 (0) 1224
Hydraulics Ltd Estate 790970 790970
Kinellar
Aberdeen
AB21 0RK
S&D Fabrications Greenbank Crescent +44 (0) 1224 +44 (0) 1224
Ltd East Tullos 895564 899065
Aberdeen
AB12 3BG
Pumps
Howe Moss Drive
Centrilift +44 (0) 1224 +44 (0) 1224
Kirkhill Industrial 772233 771021
Estate
Aberdeen
AB21 0ES
Unit 1, The
Buchan +44 (0) 1651 +44 (0) 1651
Meadows
Technical 872130 872133
Oldmeldrum
Services
Aberdeenshire
AB51 0EZ
CH - 8023 +41 / 1- 278 29 89
Sulzer Turbo Ltd +41 / 1-278 22 11
Zurich
Switzerland
149 Newlands Road
Weir Pumps Ltd +44 (0) 141 637 +44 (0) 141 637
Cathcart 7141 7358
Glasgow
G44 4EX
Thrusters / Electrical
Balfour Glasgow Road +44 (0) 141 885 +44 (0) 141 0717
Kilpatrick Ltd Deanside 4321
Renfrew
PA4 8XZ
Brush Electrical PO Box 18 +44 (0) 1509 611511 +44 (0) 1509
Machines Ltd Loughborough 610440
Leics.
List of Repair Organisations
LE11 1HJ
Deebridge Craigshaw Road +44 (0) 1224 871548 +44 (0) 1224
Electrical West Tullos Industrial 899910
Engineers Ltd Estate,
Tullos
Aberdeen
AB12 3AR
Dowding & Mills Lochlands Industrial +44 (0) 1324 556511 +44 (0) 1324
(Scotland) Ltd Estate 552830
Larbert Central
FK5 3NS
Kongsberg Campus 1 +44 (0) 1224 226500 +44 (0) 1224
Simrad Science & Technology 226501
Park
Bridge of Don
Aberdeen
AB22 8GT
Stephenson Wrecclesham +44 (0) 1252 714199 +44 (0) 1252
Marine Farnham 733662
Surrey
GU10 4JS
Inspection/Repair General
CAN Offshore Hareness Road +44 (0) 1224 870100 +44 (0) 12224 Also offer riser
Altens 870101 inspection tool
Aberdeen for caissons, as
AB12 3LE well as risers
CORE Technical Howe Moss Drive +44 (0) 1224 771118 +44 (0) 1224
Services Kirkhill Industrial 771112
Estate
Dyce
Aberdeen
AB21 0GL
E M & I Marine Wrecclesham +44 (0) 1224 771077 +44 (0) 1224
Ltd Farburn Terrace 771049
Dyce
Aberdeen
Hi-Rope Unit 8 Woodlands +44 (0) 1224 772161 +44 (0) 1224
Drive 772156
Kirkhill Industrial
Estate
Dyce
Aberdeen
AB21 0GW
TRAC Unit 2 Howe Moss +44 (0) 1224 725800 +44 (0) 1224
International Ltd Drive 725801
Kirkhill Industrial
Estate
Dyce
Aberdeen
Appendix B– Blank Questionnaire
FPSO Name
Duty Holder
Owner
Operator
License Holder
Field Name
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System Can
FPSO IRM Questionnaire
How was the maintenance and inspection regime derived (tick
Major failures / repairs Do you Do you use Do you use
maintenance more than one box if applicable)? encountered (yes / no) uses Failure Reliability condition
and inspection Note : for each major Mode and Centred monitoring in your
routines be Manufacturers Operational Risk -Based Class failure / repair please Effect Maintenanc maintenance
made available Recommendations Experience Require complete the Analysis e (RCM) in strategy
(yes / no) ments failure/repair (FMEA) in your
questionnaire your maintenanc
maintenanc e strategy
e strategy
1. Thrusters
Pipework
V
Pumps
V
Control Systems
V
8. Caisson systems
9. Cranes
M a i n t e n a n c e Sy s t e m
Who manages maintenance for the installation
Why
Have you changed your vendor/campaign strategy
Why
2. Hull Internal
4. Tank Venting
6. Hull External
7. Deck Structures
8. Caissons
9. Cranes
Comments
Note The matrix above should be filled in with respect to the effect that the items in the horizontal row (a to g)
have on the items in the vertical column (1 to 9).
Availability (Total Hrs in Period – (Scheduled Downtime + Unscheduled Downtime))/ Total Hrs in Period
Reliability (Total Hrs in Period – Unscheduled Downtime)/ Total Hrs in Period
Operability The degree to which the operation of the system is influenced by the factor, e.g. weather, vibration, etc.
Maintainability The degree to which the ease of maintenance of the system is influenced by the factor, e.g. weather,
vibration, etc.
Fa i l u r e s / Re p a i r s 1
I n r e s pe c t of s y s t e m f a i lu r es in t h e a re a s of in t e re st o n Pa g e 2 a b o v e …
What was the consequence of failure (tick more than one box if Safety or Environmental Incident
applicable)
Lost Production
- cost of repair
In the course of the repair/reinstatement, were you aware of any Verification and Classification
conflict between ……
Verification & North Sea Practice
Main contractor
Specialist Contractor
Local Vendor/Non-Specialist
Contractor
What recommendations did you feed back into design to eliminate
these failures
Have you an established “Lessons Learned/ Good Engineering
Practice” system to capture this information
Is this information available Internally