USCA1 Opinion

September 28, 1992

_________________________
No. 92-1342
CHRISTINE STOWELL, ETC., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
H. ROLLIN IVES, ETC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
_________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
________________________
Before
Selya, Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
______________
_________________________

James R. Crotteau, with whom Pine Tree Legal Assistance,

__________________
____________________________
Inc. was on brief, for appellants.
____
J. Paterson Rae and Hugh Calkins on joint brief for Robert
_______________
____________
Avanzato, Michelle Turcotte, Maine Civil Liberties Union, and
Maine Chapter of the National Organization for Women, amici
curiae (in support of the appeal).

Christopher C. Leighton, Deputy Attorney General, State of

_______________________
Maine, with whom Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General, and
_____________________
Thomas D. Warren, Deputy Attorney General, were on brief, for
_________________
appellee.
Richard
A. Olderman, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil
______________________
Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, with whom Stuart M. Gerson,
_________________
Assistant
Attorney General,
Barbara C.
Biddle, Attorney,
____________________
Appellate Staff, and Richard S. Cohen, United States Attorney,
_________________
were on brief, for the United States, amicus curiae (in support
of the judgment below).
_________________________

_________________________

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.
_____________
the

chaff, this

Once

apparently complex

the

wheat is

appeal can

shaken from

be resolved

by

deciding a threshold question (albeit one that has not previously

been

confronted by

the courts

affirm the district court's entry

on

the basis

Families

that

a recipient

with Dependent

of appeals).

Consequently, we

of judgment for the

of

benefits under

Children program

(AFDC), 42

defendant
the Aid

to

U.S.C.

601-615 (1988 & Supp. I 1989), cannot bring an action pursuant to

42

U.S.C.

1983 (1988)

to enforce

the terms

of 42

U.S.C.

1396a(c)(1) (1988).
I.
I.

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
Since

this

matter turns

redressability, our burden

We content
the

on

of exegesis is

discrete question

considerably reduced.

ourselves, therefore, with sketching

preliminary inquiry,

forgoing

of

detailed

the contours of

exposition of

the

facts and substantive issues.

We start with section 1396a(c)(1), a statute enacted on

July 1, 1988 as

part of the Medicare Catastrophic

Coverage Act.

The statute reads in pertinent part:

[T]he
Secretary
[of the
United States
Department of Health and Human Services]
shall not approve any State plan for medical
assistance if
(1) the State has in effect [AFDC]
payment levels that are less than the payment
levels in effect under such plan on May 1,
1988.
42 U.S.C.

1396a(c)(1).
On February

21, 1992,

Christine Stowell

brought suit

for declaratory and injunctive relief in Maine's federal district

2

court.

She

official as

invoked 42

U.S.C.

a defendant,1

section 1396a(c)(1).
economy measures

The

1983,

and claimed
claim

implemented by

named

that Maine

rested on

the

Maine state

had violated
premise

the Maine legislature

that

had gone

too far, resulting in a de facto reduction of AFDC payment levels

__ _____
below

those in

effect

Stowell's standing
levels had been
motion,

on May

to sue

1,

1988.

The State

and, moreover, asserted

increased rather than decreased.2

the trial

court certified

a plaintiff

contested

that payment

On Stowell's
class which

it

described as follows:
All families in the State of Maine who would
be
eligible
for
AFDC benefits
and/or
supplemental payments under 42
U.S.C.
602(a)(28) under the AFDC payment levels in
effect in Maine on May 1, 1988 and who would
receive
a
smaller
total
AFDC
plus
supplemental
602(a)(28) payment under the
AFDC payment levels proposed to be effective
March 1, 1992 than they would have received
under the May 1, 1988 payment levels.
Stowell v. Ives, 788 F. Supp. 40, 40 n.1 (D. Me. 1992).
_______
____
In

time, the case was

submitted to the district court

____________________

1Stowell
sued H.
Rollin Ives,
in his
capacity as
Commissioner of the Maine Department of Human Services.
Since
Maine is the real party in interest, we will sometimes refer to
Ives as "the State."
Stowell also sued a federal official, the
Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services
("Secretary").
However, she dropped the Secretary from the case
prior to the entry of judgment below.
Thus, although the
Secretary filed an amicus brief and argued before us in support
of the judgment, he is not a party to this appeal.

2The parties' differing views as to the practical effect of

Maine's regulations stem from their differing interpretations of
the term "payment levels." See Stowell v. Ives, 788 F. Supp. 40,
___ _______
____
41-42 (D. Me. 1992).
Because we do not reach the merits, we

express no opinion on the proper resolution of this interpretive

conundrum.
3

on

stipulated

complaint

failed to

section 1983.
II.
II.

record.

The

state a

Id. at 44.
___

court

cause of

ruled

that the

amended

action cognizable

under

This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
Section

1983 provides

a federal

cause of

action for

"the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by

the Constitution and [federal] laws."

prospective

42 U.S.C.

1983.3

plaintiff may bring suit under section 1983 not only

for a state actor's violation of his or her constitutional rights

but

also to

enforce

federal

infringing state officialdom.

statutory

law

See Maine v.
___ _____

in

the

face

of

Thiboutot, 448 U.S.

_________

1, 4-8 (1980).
Nevertheless,
rise to

not every violation of federal law gives

a section 1983 claim.

Los Angeles,
____________

493

U.S. 103,

See Golden State Transit Corp. v.

___ __________________________
106

(1989).

situations where "Congress has foreclosed such

Exceptions include

enforcement . . .

in

the enactment itself" or where "the statute [does] not create

enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within

of

1983."

(quoting

Suter v. Artist M., 112 S.

_____
__________

Wright v.
______

the meaning

Ct. 1360, 1366

(1992)

Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479

_______________________________________

U.S. 418, 423 (1987)); accord Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496
______ ______
____________________
U.S. 498, 508 (1990).
expressly

outlaw

Because 42 U.S.C.

section

1983

exceptions is inapposite here.

actions,

1396a(c)(1)
the

first

does not
of

these

Accordingly, we focus the lens of

____________________

3For ease in reference, we will henceforth use "rights" as a

shorthand abbreviation for "rights, privileges, or immunities."
4

our perlustration on the second exception, bent on determining to

what

extent

(if

at

all)

section

enforceable rights.

A.
A.
__

1396a(c)(1)

creates

any

Prior to 1992, cases

Ass'n, 479 U.S.
_____

418 (1990),

Halderman, 451 U.S.

_________

1983.

Pennhurst State School & Hosp.

_______________________________

1 (1981), and Rosado v. Wyman,

______
_____

(1970), guided judicial

or did not,

such as Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.

______
_______________

inquiry into whether a

create a right falling

397 U.S. 397

federal law did,

within the ambit

Under that framework, a court's

v.

of section

first duty was to satisfy

itself that "the [statutory] provision in question was intend[ed]

to

benefit the

(citations
benefit

putative plaintiff."

and internal quotation

could be

gleaned,

however, the court

bound to

496 U.S.

marks omitted).
court's

perceived an

find that

unless one of two

the

Wilder,
______

inquiry

intended benefit,

the provision created

conditions obtained:

If

no such

ended.

If,

then it

an enforceable

either (1)

at 509

was

right

the statute,

fairly read, "reflect[ed] merely a congressional preference for a

certain kind of conduct

rather than a binding obligation

governmental unit," or (2) the interest asserted by

plaintiff was so

Inc.
____

the putative

"vague and amorphous" that enforcement would be

"beyond the competence

and internal

on the

of the judiciary. . .

quotation marks omitted).

Id. (citations
___

Accord Playboy Enters.,

______ ________________

v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 906 F.2d 25,

____________________

denied, 111 S. Ct. 388 (1990).

______

."

32 (1st Cir.), cert.

_____

During
times.

the

last term,

The Court decided Suter,

_____

the

old regime

fell

112 S. Ct. 1360,

on hard

a case which

shed new light on this fuliginous area of the law.

Although some

respected jurists believe that Suter effected a sea change in the

_____
Court's
J.,

approach to section

dissenting) ("In

my

1983, e.g., id.

____ ___

view,

the

at 1371 (Blackmun,

[rationale

of

the

Suter
_____

majority] is plainly inconsistent with this Court's decision just

two years ago in
to post

Wilder . . . ."), we think it is much too early

______

epitaphs for Wilder and

______

its kin.

For

one thing, Suter

_____

offered no analytic framework to replace the structure erected in

the Court's

previous decisions.

Court, while
respects,

both

112 S.

Ct. at

Pennhurst, and Wright).

_________
______

prudent and possible

the Suter
_____

in certain

important

to overrule them.

relied on those precedents

e.g., Suter,
____ _____

Wilder,
______

another thing,

weakening earlier precedents

was careful not explicitly

the majority
See,
___

For

Indeed,

as pertinent authority.

1366-68 (citing,

inter alia,
_____ ____

Because we believe

that it is

to synthesize the

teachings of Suter

_____
with the Court's prior
under

the

Wilder
______

precedents, we examine appellants' claims

framework

as reconfigured

by

the

neoteric

principles announced in Suter.

_____
B.
B.
__
AFDC
Supp. I 1989),
1989,

42

U.S.C.

as amended by Acts
__ _______ __

42 U.S.C.S.

programs
Both

and Medicaid,

of Nov. 5, 1990 and

1396-1396u

at issue

here, are

endeavors represent

1396-1396u (1988

(Law. Co-op. Supp.

part of

the Social

examples of

&

Dec. 19,

1992), the

Security Act.

cooperative federal-state

social service
or in part,
Choate,
______
Ives,
____

programs which, though federally

are administered

469 U.S.
947 F.2d

participation

287,
21,

in

23

[such

by the States.

289 n.1
(1st

funded in whole
See Alexander
___ _________

(1985) (Medicaid);
Cir.

programs]

1991)
is

(AFDC).

v.

Doucette v.
________

"Although

voluntary, participating

States

must

comply with

certain

requirements

[federal statutes] and regulations

of Health and Human Services."

imposed by

promulgated by the

the

Secretary

Wilder, 496 U.S. at 502; see also

______
___ ____

King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).

____
_____
To
explicitly
Social

be
held

sure, "the

Supreme

Court

has implicitly

and

that rights

under

various

provisions of

the

Security Act are enforceable under

v. Dukakis,
_______

719

F.2d

generality, without
Suter
_____

504,

510

(1st Cir.

more, does not boost

1983).

Lynch
_____

But

that

the appellants' stock.

reminded us that each provision of the Social Security Act

"must be interpreted
1367 n.8.

by its own

of the statute
Davenport,
_________

itself.

language

Suter,
_____

112 S. Ct.

at

495 U.S.

"assum[e] that
accurately

always starts with the language

Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare

___________________________________

552, 557-58

Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447

______
__________________
should

terms."

In performing this tamisage, the abecedarian principle

is that statutory interpretation

Morales
_______

section 1983."

(1990); Consumer Prod. Safety

______________________
U.S. 102, 108 (1980).

the ordinary
expresses

the

meaning of
legislative

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112

____________________________

(1992), and should "resort

v.

A court

[the statutory]
purpose,"

S. Ct.

to the legislative history

see
___

2031, 2036

and other

aids of statutory construction only when the literal words of the

statute

create ambiguity

an unreasonable

result."

United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d

_____________
____________________________

685, 688

(1st Cir. 1987) (citation

or

lead to

and internal quotation marks omitted);

accord Barnhill v. Johnson,

______ ________
_______

112 S. Ct. 1386, 1391

(1992); Toibb
_____

v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (1991).

_______
We discern
the

existence

plaintiff

must

of

no ambiguity here.
a right

allege that

constitutional provision)
See
___

Wilder, 498
______

redressable

U.S.

Playboy Enters., 906

________________

In order
under

particular

to establish

section 1983,

statute (or

imposes an obligation upon

at 509-10;
F.2d at

Pennhurst,
_________

32.

federal

the State.

451 U.S.

This statute

at

19;

imposes none.

Rather, it simply and forthrightly provides, in haec

____

verba, that
_____

"the

for medical

Secretary

assistance"
the
By

shall not

if the State

approve

has reduced AFDC

level prevailing on May

its express

government,

any State

1, 1988.

terms, section

in the person of

plan

payment levels below

42 U.S.C.

1396a(c)(1) obliges
the Secretary of

1396a(c)(1).

the federal

Health and Human

Services

not the State

to take

action.

The

statute could

scarcely be clearer.
Moreover,

there

is

nothing

unreasonable

Congress's choosing to work its will in this way.

obligated

by federal law to

to accept federal funds for

(1988);

see also
___ ____

1396a(c)(1),

Wilder,
______

without

States are not

sponsor medical assistance plans or

this purpose.
496

U.S.

mentioning

effectively gives them a

about

choice:

at

See 42 U.S.C.
___
502.

state

Thus,

officials

they may either

1396

section
at

all,

maintain AFDC

benefits at or above the May 1, 1988 payment levels,

reduce

benefits.

If they

choose the

or they may

former course

and we

emphasize, at this juncture, that Maine adamantly insists that it

has

maintained (or increased) AFDC

payment levels

the State's

medical assistance plan retains eligibility for continued federal

funding.

If state

officials choose the latter course,

continued federal funding will be jeopardized.

becomes

the

Congress's

Secretary's
directive

by

task,

in

due

In that event, it

season,

withholding approval

however,

of

to
the

implement

State's

medical assistance plan.

The State's role under the

statute is

purely procedural.
Phrased
incentives
name a

another

way,

not commands

to the

federal intermediary

federally created

section

1396a(c)(1)

States.

That Congress would

(the Secretary) to

incentives is

implement these

not surprising.

reasons for such a delegation are multifarious.

advantage
harness

of

uniform interpretation,

administrative

desirability
discussions

expertise

of maintaining
with state

The potential

They include the

yen

the

to develop
area,

agent capable

officials.

this fashion may neither

their litigating

an

the
in

provides

of

and

and

the

face-to-face

Structuring the

statute in

suit plaintiffs' preference nor advance

position

but there is

nothing unreasonable,

absurd, or irrational about the model.

In a

nutshell, then, a straightforward

statutory text ends this case.

intended recipient

In Suter, the Court

_____

of programmatic benefits could

reading of the

held that an

not sue under

section 1983

if the

federal

statute merely

required that

the

State

submit

criteria,

a plan

to

because such

federal agency

a "requirement

satisfying

only goes

certain

so far

as to

ensure that the State have a plan approved by the Secretary which
contains [the listed

criteria]."

Thus, Suter instructs that,

_____
to

Suter, 112 S.
_____

Ct. at

when a provision in a

1367.4

statute fails

impose a direct obligation on the States, instead placing the

onus of
the

compliance with the statute's

federal

section
___,

government, no

1983 can flourish.

___ (7th

substantially

Cir. 1992)
identical

delineating scope of
1983

in order

(1988)).

cause

substantive provisions on

of

action cognizable

under

Compare Clifton v. Schafer, ___ F.2d

_______ _______
_______
[1992 WL
view

of

164048 at

*6-*7] (adopting

Wilder/Suter
______ _____

interface

in

AFDC recipient's right to sue under section

to enforce

provisions of

42 U.S.C.

602(a)(4)

So it is here.
C.
C.
__

Our holding today finds additional support in a line of

cases

dealing with

rights of

action.

ascertaining whether
those
of

a closely
We are

related issue:

implied

cognizant that the tests

a section 1983

cause of action

utilized in determining the propriety

action are "analytically distinct."

private

utilized in

exists and

of an implied right

See Playboy Enters, 906

___ ______________

____________________
4In order to
provision before us

facilitate comparison with the statutory

today, we note that 42 U.S.C.
671(a), the

statute which was before the

Suter Court, read as follows:

"In
_____
order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it
shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which" satisfies
certain criteria.
10

F.2d at

31.

However, these two

resemblance.

legal theories

bear a

family

See Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718, 720 n.3 (5th

___ _________
______

Cir. 1987) ("Section 1983 . . . allows private parties to enforce

federal

laws against a special

municipal actors
action

permit

in much the
private

obligations against

action

under

770

rights of

of

F.2d

184,

Gorris, 714
______

federal

section

1983

"resembles

194

(D.C.

F.2d 749,

also
____

Cir.

1985)

751 (7th

a putative cause

the

analysis

cause of action may be

Congress"); see
___

statutory

private."); Samuels v.
_______

the inquiry concerning

determine whether a private

an enactment of

same way that implied

enforcement

Polchowski v.
__________

1983) (stating that

state and

any party, public or

District of Columbia,
______________________
(similar);

class of defendants

Wilder,
______

used

Cir.

of

to

implied from

496 U.S. at

526

(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (remarking on the "significant area

of overlap" between the two theories).5

In the context of implied rights of action, the Supreme

Court has held that "there
private remedy

in favor

rather than drafting the

on the benefitted

'would be far less reason to

of individual persons'

infer a

where Congress,

legislation 'with an unmistakable focus

class,' instead has framed

the statute simply

____________________

5The major difference between the two doctrines concerns the

way in which Congress's intent must be manifested. There is a
presumption against implied rights of action
a presumption that
will endure unless the plaintiff proffers adequate evidence of a
contrary congressional intent. The presumption works exactly the
other way in the section 1983 milieu; it is assumed that Congress
meant to allow such suits
an assumption which persists unless
the defendant musters adequate evidence of Congress's prohibitory
intent. See Victorian, 813 F.2d at 721; Samuels, 770 F.2d at
___ _________
_______
194; Boatowners & Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 716
__________________________________
________________
F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 1983).
11

as

a . . . command to

a federal agency."

Universities Research
_____________________

Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 772 (1981) (quoting Cannon v.
___________
_____
______
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-92 (1979)).
_____________________
Circuit

has transposed

this reasoning

to section

The Seventh

1983 claims.

See Polchowski, 714 F.2d at 751.

___ __________
to

such

transplantation.

redressable

under

administrative in

We think the soil is hospitable

statute

section

1983

nature and

does

when

imposes an

not
it

create rights
is

essentially

obligation exclusively

upon federal officials, not upon state actors.

D.
__
Though their
struggle
buoyant

craft

is irreparably

gamely to stay afloat.

authorities.

tenaciously
Suter, 112
_____

to

a footnoted

S. Ct.

closely, they

First

We briefly
and

n.12.

But,

would have discerned that,

the

appellants

address their more

foremost,

example of

at 1369

holed,

appellants

cling

Suter Court.
_____

had appellants

See
___

looked

from their standpoint,

footnote 12 is more a hungry shark than a life raft.

In
attempt
a

this respect, appellants'

to analogize section 1396a(c)(1) to 42 U.S.C.

statute identified

by

the Court

provision that would support

S. Ct.

at 1369 n.12.

identical,
section
Court,
Court

argument hinges on their

In point of fact,

the

the sort

of

a section 1983 action.

in relevant respects,

671(a)(15)

as

not to

statutory

672(e)

statutory

Suter, 112
_____

section 1396a(c)(1) is
section 672(e)

provision

but to

that the

in footnote 12, was contrasting with section 672(e).

___________
deemed

it

noteworthy

that
12

section

Suter
_____

The

671(a)(15) requires

"submission

of a

plan to

section 672(e) provides

unless
Suter
_____

be approved

Secretary" while

that "[n]o Federal payment

certain conditions are

Court distinguished

met.

Id.
___

between cases

hand, a statutory provision

specific

by the

federal official

may be made"

In other
in which,

words, the
on

the one

is, in effect, a communication

whose approval

disbursement of federal funds

is required

to a

prior to

(section 671(a)(15)), and cases in

which, on the other hand, a

statutory provision is, in effect, a

communication from Congress

to those States that

for earmarked
sort

funds (section 672(e)).

such as

those at

issue

elect to apply

Provisions

here and

of the former

in Suter
_____

will

not

support a section 1983 action.

The other authorities
their contention that a right

cited by appellants

to buttress

enforceable under section 1983

inherent in section 1396a(c)(1)

are equally inapposite.

exception, those

statutes that

obligations on the

cases concern
States.

concluded that the Boren

In Wilder, for
______

Amendment, 42 U.S.C.

could support the maintenance of a

is

Without

pin hard-and-fast
example, the

Court

1396a(a)(13)(A),

section 1983 action.

But, as

the

Wilder
______

Court found,

participating

in the

the

Boren

Amendment requires

Medicaid program

rates vis-a-vis health-care providers

reasonable

to

States

devise reimbursement

which "the State finds are

and adequate" to meet the cost which must be incurred

by efficiently and economically operated facilities.

Wilder, 496
______

13

U.S.

at

512

(quoting

1396a(a)(13)(A)).6

previous

Similarly, in Rosado,
______

statutory provision that mandated

need equations
Rosado, 397
______

and

version

adjust

U.S. at 412.

42

U.S.C.

the Court dealt with a

the States to reevaluate their

levels of
As

of

need

accordingly.

we have explained,

See
___

no comparable

obligation is imposed on the States by section 1396a(c)(1).

III.
III.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
We need go no

further.

Having pegged our

analysis of

this case
prism,

on the Wilder framework, visualized

______

we

government
requirements

conclude that,

because

official, federal
of section

or

the

through the Suter

_____

Secretary is

state, directly

1396a(c)(1),

appellants

the

bound by
cannot

only

the

bring

their suit within the ambit of section 1983.

Affirmed.
Affirmed.
________

____________________

6The earlier version, 42 U.S.C.

1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 ed.,
Supp. V), mirrors the present version in all respects material to
the case at hand.
14