Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 35 views

    Guzman-Ruiz v. Hernandez-Colon, 406 F.3d 31, 1st Cir. (2005)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    This document is a court ruling on a political discrimination case brought by 14 municipal employees against the municipality of Arecibo, Puerto Rico, its mayor, and director of human resources. The employees claimed they were terminated due to their political affiliation in violation of their constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the employees failed to rebut the defendants' evidence that the terminations were due to a financial crisis and a pre-existing layoff plan, not political discrimination. The court also found the employees' counsel was not diligent in pursuing discovery or opposing summary judgment, so it was not an abuse of discretion to rule against allowing belated discovery efforts.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd

    Guzman-Ruiz v. Hernandez-Colon, 406 F.3d 31, 1st Cir. (2005)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    35 views6 pages
    This document is a court ruling on a political discrimination case brought by 14 municipal employees against the municipality of Arecibo, Puerto Rico, its mayor, and director of human resources. The employees claimed they were terminated due to their political affiliation in violation of their constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the employees failed to rebut the defendants' evidence that the terminations were due to a financial crisis and a pre-existing layoff plan, not political discrimination. The court also found the employees' counsel was not diligent in pursuing discovery or opposing summary judgment, so it was not an abuse of discretion to rule against allowing belated discovery efforts.

    Original Description:

    Filed: 2005-04-27 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 406 F.3d 31 Docket: 04-1628

    Copyright

    © Public Domain

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    This document is a court ruling on a political discrimination case brought by 14 municipal employees against the municipality of Arecibo, Puerto Rico, its mayor, and director of human resources. The employees claimed they were terminated due to their political affiliation in violation of their constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the employees failed to rebut the defendants' evidence that the terminations were due to a financial crisis and a pre-existing layoff plan, not political discrimination. The court also found the employees' counsel was not diligent in pursuing discovery or opposing summary judgment, so it was not an abuse of discretion to rule against allowing belated discovery efforts.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    35 views6 pages

    Guzman-Ruiz v. Hernandez-Colon, 406 F.3d 31, 1st Cir. (2005)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    This document is a court ruling on a political discrimination case brought by 14 municipal employees against the municipality of Arecibo, Puerto Rico, its mayor, and director of human resources. The employees claimed they were terminated due to their political affiliation in violation of their constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the employees failed to rebut the defendants' evidence that the terminations were due to a financial crisis and a pre-existing layoff plan, not political discrimination. The court also found the employees' counsel was not diligent in pursuing discovery or opposing summary judgment, so it was not an abuse of discretion to rule against allowing belated discovery efforts.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    You are on page 1of 6

    406 F.

    3d 31

    Domingo GUZMN-RUZ, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants,


    v.
    Frankie HERNNDEZ-COLN, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
    No. 04-1628.

    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.


    Heard March 8, 2005.
    Decided April 27, 2005.

    COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Arturo Luciano Delgado for


    appellants.
    Luis Villares Sarmiento with whom Snchez-Betances, Sifre, MuozNoya & Rivera, P.S.C. was on brief for appellees Hernandez-Colon and
    Maldonado-Arrigoitia.
    Gary H. Montilla with whom Roberto Mrquez-Snchez was on brief for
    Arecibo.
    Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and
    LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
    COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

    This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of Puerto Rico defendant


    municipality, Arecibo, its mayor and its director of human resources, in a
    political discharge suit brought by fourteen employees. Plaintiffs are members
    of the New Progressive Party (NPP) and the individual defendants are members
    of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP), which was restored to power after the
    election of 2000. The newly elected mayor, Frankie Hernndez-Coln,
    allegedly facing a formidable municipal financial crisis, instigated the
    termination of many employees, including the plaintiffs.

    Plaintiffs' complaint, seeking both injunctive relief and damages, invoked 42


    U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3), and other federal causes of action, as well as several
    Commonwealth provisions. Defendants submitted motions for dismissal and

    summary judgment supported by statements of municipal officers evidencing


    not only financial stringency but also implementation of a seniority-based layoff
    plan devised in contemplation of such an emergency by the prior mayor, an
    NPP member. The district court accepted the recommendations of a magistrate
    judge that summary judgment be granted in favor of the defendants.
    3

    After reviewing the evidentiary state of the record in search of material issues
    of fact and noting a series of procedural defaults, we affirm the rulings of the
    district court rejecting belated requests for discovery and concluding that the
    record is bereft of any evidence of political animus motivating the discharges.
    We review the former ruling for abuse of discretion, Torres-Rosado v. RotgerSabat, 335 F.3d 1, 5 n. 2 (1st Cir.2003), and the latter de novo, Rodriguez v.
    American Int'l Ins. Co. of Puerto Rico, 402 F.3d 45, 46 (1st Cir.2005).

    We first consider plaintiffs' complaint, which the district court generously


    characterized as establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. The
    complaint described plaintiffs as NPP "activists," who served as NPP officers
    and delegates on election day in 2000 and assisted at rallies and meetings
    during the campaign. Their political beliefs were alleged, in conclusory terms,
    to be known by defendants. The fourteen plaintiffs were described as holding
    the following positions: carpenter (2), janitor (2), driver (2), clerk (3), secretary
    (2), coordinator, receptionist, and worker.

    These allegations may very well describe plaintiffs' jobs as protected from
    politically motivated dismissal, see, e.g., Padilla-Garca v. Guillermo
    Rodrguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir.2000) (non-policymaking employees are
    protected from employment decisions based on political affiliation), but job
    terminations are not unconstitutional solely "because those affiliated with one
    political party are disproportionately impacted," Sanchez-Lopez v. FuentesPujols, 375 F.3d 121, 140 (1st Cir.2004).

    In Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir.1993), plaintiffs were


    described as playing prominent roles in "publicly and vocally supporting" a
    former mayor. Even so, we acknowledged that, "[s]tanding alone, even the
    circumstantial evidence that some plaintiffs were especially conspicuous
    targets for discriminatory employment action by defendants would give us
    serious pause." And, even more recently, in Gonzalez-De-Blasini v. Family
    Dep't, 377 F.3d 81, 85-86 (1st Cir.2004), we affirmed dismissal of a complaint,
    concluding that even though plaintiff was alleged to be a well known supporter
    of the NPP, had held a trust position under the previous NPP administration,
    and defendant had expressed interest in giving her position to a PDP member,
    this fell short of evidence that defendant knew of plaintiff's affiliation. See also

    Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodrguez, 360 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2004)


    (statement of PDP mayor of intent to rid town of NPP activists insufficient to
    generate genuine issue of material fact); Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio,
    221 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2000) (similar).
    7

    We note our doubt concerning whether plaintiffs had truly set forth a prima
    facie case to emphasize that it is at best not a strong one. Their task under the
    burden-shifting analysis applicable to political discrimination cases was to
    show that their constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or
    motivating factor for the adverse employment decision. See, e.g., PadillaGarca, 212 F.3d at 74 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
    Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). Assuming
    their skimpy showing met this standard, the allegations nonetheless lack any
    specific information that could bulwark a case for rejecting the genuineness of
    defendants' response that they "would have taken the same action regardless of
    the plaintiff's political beliefs," id. (referring to "the Mt. Healthy defense").

    This sets the stage for the critical assessment of defendants' proffered
    justification. After considerable jousting by the parties over service of process
    and plans for discovery, the court set the date of May 7, 2003 for a status
    conference. A few days before that date, defendants filed a motion for summary
    judgment with a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts and a motion to
    dismiss. Unaccountably, plaintiffs' counsel did not attend the May 7
    conference.

    This was only the beginning of missed cues. Plaintiffs responded on May 14 to
    the motion for summary judgment only by requesting an extension of time
    beyond the customary ten day limit to June 11 to oppose the motions. That date
    passed without any effort to secure a further extension, or to conduct discovery,
    and without any statement of opposition or opposing statement of material
    facts, as required by local rules. Accordingly, on July 14, the court referred the
    case to the magistrate judge for a report and recommendation, which was to be
    considered "unopposed." Under the applicable local rule, facts in a statement of
    material facts, if supported by record citations, are deemed admitted unless
    properly controverted. See D.P.R. R. 56(e).

    10

    Three weeks later, on August 8, plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for


    reconsideration of the order of reference. We have looked in vain for any
    support for such a motion except an appeal for sheer mercy. Counsel averred
    that it was "foreseeable that plaintiffs would need additional time [beyond June
    11] to conclude the discovery" but did not explain why preventive anticipatory
    action was not attempted. Counsel had "coordinated" the tentative deposition of

    defendant Mayor Hernndez but "the undersigner calendar [sic] during the
    months of June and July of 2003 prevented to do so." Finally, the request:
    "Plaintiffs deserve an opportunity to conduct further discovery .... It was our
    mistake not to request an additional extension of time to oppose said motion."
    11

    Counsel perhaps deserves high marks for candor, but to ask us to find that the
    district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant this motion is to ask us to
    use this sad case to make very bad law. Counsel for Arecibo appropriately calls
    our attention to Justice Harlan's thought in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.: "
    [K]eeping this suit alive merely because plaintiff should not be penalized for
    the omissions of his own attorney would be visiting the sins of plaintiff's
    lawyer upon the defendant." 370 U.S. 626, 634 n. 10, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d
    734 (1962) (emphasis in original). Now, if ever, are the teachings of such cases
    as Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assocs., 22 F.3d 1198 (1st Cir.
    1994), pertinent. There, we called attention to the safety valve of Fed.R.Civ.P.
    56(f), which gives a party with an authentic need the opportunity to buy more
    time to mount an opposition to summary judgment. Id. at 1203. But we
    emphasized that invoking the rule required "due diligence both in pursuing
    discovery before the summary judgment initiative surfaces and in pursuing an
    extension of time thereafter." Id. In addition to due diligence, we added:

    12

    When, as is often the case, the reason [for a requested extension] relates to
    incomplete discovery, the party's explanation must take a special form: it
    should show good cause for the failure to have discovered the facts sooner; it
    should set forth a plausible basis for believing that specified facts, susceptible
    of collection within a reasonable time frame, probably exist; and it should
    indicate how the emergent facts, if adduced, will influence the outcome of the
    pending summary judgment motion.

    13

    Id.

    14

    In this case, there was no diligence exercised during the three months of May,
    June, and July after the motion for summary judgment surfaced. And not only
    was no good cause shown for failure to have discovered facts sooner, but there
    was no indication of plausibly hoped for "specified facts" and the feasibility of
    their timely collection. We therefore have no alternative but to conclude that the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider and grant
    belated discovery. The magistrate judge therefore properly considered the
    defendants' statement of uncontested material facts as unopposed and,
    consequently, conceded to be true.
    Thus guided, the magistrate judge first noted the sworn statement of Arecibo's

    15

    Thus guided, the magistrate judge first noted the sworn statement of Arecibo's
    Finance Director stating that as of the beginning of Mayor Hernndez's
    administration in 2001 Arecibo had a deficit of twelve million dollars. The
    statement asserted that because of this extreme situation, and after considering
    other options such as personnel relocation and reduction of working hours, "the
    only option available to prevent a collapse of the Municipal economy was to
    implement layoff of personnel."

    16

    The report went on to consider the sworn statement of the municipality's


    Human Resources Director, referring to letters of dismissal (copies of which
    were included) informing employees of their impending dismissal, due to the
    economic crisis, under a dismissal plan based on seniority. Each letter notified
    the recipient of his right to appeal the dismissal to the Appeals Board of the
    Personnel System.

    17

    Finally, the magistrate judge found no evidence of pretext concealing a


    discriminatory animus. He then, apparently having given every favorable
    inference to the allegations in the complaint, recommended that summary
    judgment issue for defendants.

    18

    Plaintiffs made timely objections to this report and recommendation, which are
    really a replay of the plea for discovery made in the motion for reconsideration.
    They consist of two types of allegations. The first is a criticism of both the
    financial deficit information and the procedures followed in implementing the
    layoff plan. For example, the assertion is made that defendants' "fact"
    concerning financial crisis "can be easily questioned" by reviewing municipal
    financial statements and the "totality of the personnel actions." The demand is
    for unidentified more "reliable" documents than the affidavits of the Finance
    Director and the Human Resources Director.

    19

    The second set of allegations consists of categorical assertions lacking in any


    specificity, such as: "certain employees" have been excluded from dismissal
    and allowed to continue working; new personnel have been hired; "big
    spending" has taken place; all municipal appointed directors have received
    substantial pay increases. Plaintiffs assert that, if discovery is allowed, all this
    will be proven.

    20

    What all this comes down to is an outline of areas of hopeful inquiry,


    something that plaintiffs could have articulated and pursued months earlier.
    Ultimately, we come to the judgment of the district court when it adopted and
    approved the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge, granting
    summary judgment for defendants and dismissing all claims. Its key finding

    was that "[t]he record is void of evidence supporting allegations of political


    discrimination." While plaintiffs assert that the court placed an improper
    burden on them to show pretext affirmatively, we think the state of the record is
    such that there is no basis for a rational jury to conclude other than that
    plaintiffs' terminations were the result of "uniformly applied personnel
    practices[ ] predicated on legitimate reasons," Sanchez-Lopez, 375 F.3d at 140.
    21

    There are two remaining arguments of plaintiffs that claim our attention. On
    October 31, 2003, they filed an "Informative Motion and Request of Judicial
    Knowledge," asking the court to take judicial notice "for all legal purposes" of
    another case involving some two hundred dismissed employees in which
    plaintiffs had filed a motion for summary judgment before another judge. We
    note first that plaintiffs did not make this argument to the magistrate, and it is
    therefore waived. See Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co.,
    840 F.2d 985, 990-91 (1st Cir.1988). Moreover, plaintiffs made no attempt to
    specify what "adjudicable facts" met the requirements of Federal Rule of
    Evidence 201. Not only do pleadings, parties, issues, and facts differ in
    different cases, but plaintiffs cannot sidestep their neglect to offer evidence in
    this case by asking the court to rule on the basis of the record in another case.
    Finally, the district court's ruling in the other case finding that the seniority
    plan used by defendants "could not, as a matter of law, have formed the legal
    basis for Plaintiffs' dismissal" did not occur until March 2004, some four
    months after the Informative Motion was made and on the same day that the
    district court in this case signed its order. Refusal to take judicial notice was
    amply justified.

    22

    A final contention is that the district court improperly dismissed plaintiffs'


    claims based on Act No. 382 of May 11, 1950, 29 P.R. Laws Ann. 136-139.
    This argument dwindles in the face of the municipality's assertion, not denied
    by plaintiffs, that the provision was repealed by Act 121 of September 13,
    1997, before any events relating to this case took place.

    23

    Affirmed.

    You might also like