Real Property

REAL PROPERTY
REAL PROPERTY i.
REAL PROPERTY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
ESTATES IN LAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. IN GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. PRESENT POSSESSORY ESTATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Fee Simple Absolute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Defeasible Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Fee Simple Determinable (and Possibility of Reverter) . . . . . . . .
1) Correlative Future Interest in GrantorPossibility of Reverter
a) Possibility of Reverter Need Not Be Expressly Retained . .
b) Transferability of Possibility of Reverter . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Correlative Future Interest in Third PartyExecutory Interest
b. Fee Simple Subject to Condition Subsequent (and Right of Entry) . .
1) Correlative Future Interest in GrantorRight of Entry . . . . .
a) Failure to Reserve Right of Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Waiver of Right of Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1) Inaction by Itself Not a Waiver . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c) Transferability of Right of Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Correlative Future Interest in Third PartyExecutory Interest
3) CompareFee Simple Determinable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Construction of Ambiguous Language . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Fee Simple Subject to an Executory Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Limitations on Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry . . . . .
e. Conditions and Limitations Violating Public Policy . . . . . . . . . .
1) Restraints on Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Provisions Involving Separation or Divorce . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Fee Tail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Life Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Life Estates by Marital Right (Legal Life Estates) . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Conventional Life Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) For Life of Grantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Life Estate Pur Autre Vie (Life of Another) . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Inheritability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Rights and Duties of Life TenantDoctrine of Waste . . . . . . . . .
1) Affirmative (Voluntary) WasteNatural Resources . . . . . . .
a) Open Mines Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Permissive Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Obligation to Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Obligation to Pay Interest on Encumbrances . . . . . . . .
c) Obligation to Pay Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d) Special Assessments for Public Improvements . . . . . . . .
(1) Apportionment of Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e) No Obligation to Insure Premises . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f) No Liability for Third Partys Torts . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Ameliorative Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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ii. REAL PROPERTY
C.
a) CompareLeasehold Tenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) CompareWorthless Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Renunciation of Life Estates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Estates for Years, Periodic Estates, Estates at Will, Tenancies at Sufferance .
FUTURE INTERESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Reversionary InterestsFuture Interests in Transferor . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Reversions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. All Reversionary Interests Are Vested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Remainders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Indefeasibly Vested Remainder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Vested Remainder Subject to Open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Divesting Interests Are Executory Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Effect on Marketability of Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Vested Remainder Subject to Total Divestment . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Contingent Remainder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Subject to Condition Precedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Unborn or Unascertained Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Destructibility of Contingent Remainders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Rule Abolished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Related Doctrine of Merger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1) CompareInterests Created Simultaneously . . . . . . .
e. Rule in Shelleys Case (Rule Against Remainders in Grantees Heirs) . .
f. Doctrine of Worthier Title (Rule Against Remainders in Grantors
Heirs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Executory Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Shifting Executory InterestDivests a Transferee . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Springing Executory InterestFollows a Gap or Divests a
Transferor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Executory Interest Follows a Fee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Differences Between Executory Interests and Remainders . . . . . . . .
4. Importance of Classifying Interests In Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Transferability of Remainders and Executory Interests . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Vested Remainders Are Transferable, Devisable, and Descendible . . . .
b. Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests Are Transferable Inter
Vivos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests Are Usually Devisable
and Descendible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Any Transferable Future Interest Is Reachable by Creditors . . . . . . .
e. Practical Ability to Transfer Marketable Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Class Gifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Definitional Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Dispositions to Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Dispositions to Heirs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Dispositions to Issue or Descendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4) Class Members in Gestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. When the Class ClosesThe Rule of Convenience . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Outright GiftClass Closes at Time Gift Is Made . . . . . . . . . .
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REAL PROPERTY iii.
a)
D.
E.
No Class Members Alive at Testators DeathClass Stays

Open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Postponed GiftClass Closes at Time Fixed for Distribution . . .
3) Dispositions Subject to Condition of Reaching Given Age . . . . .
4) Rule of Convenience Is a Rule of Construction Only . . . . . . . .
7. Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Express Words of Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Implied Contingency of SurvivalGifts to Issue, Descendants, or
Heirs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TRUSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Private Trust Concepts and Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Settlor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Trustee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Beneficiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Res . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Application of Rule Against Perpetuities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Creation of Trusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Inter Vivos Conveyance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Inter Vivos Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Testamentary Conveyance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Pour-Over into Existing Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Charitable Trusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Beneficiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Application of Rule Against Perpetuities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Cy Pres Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Enforcement of Charitable Trusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Analysis of the Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. When the Perpetuities Period Begins to Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) WillsDate of Testators Death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Revocable TrustsDate Trust Becomes Irrevocable . . . . . . . .
3) Irrevocable TrustsDate Trust Is Created . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4) DeedsDate Deed Is Delivered with Intent to Pass Title . . . . .
b. Must Vest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Wait and See Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. If at All . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Lives in Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Who Can Be Used as Measuring Lives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Reasonable Number of Human Lives Can Be Used . . . . . . . . .
e. Interests Exempt from Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Gift Over to Second Charity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Vested Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) CompareClass Gifts Are Subject to Rule . . . . . . . . . .
3) Reversionary Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) CompareExecutory Interests Are Subject to Rule . . . . .
f. Consequence of Violating the RuleInterest Is Stricken . . . . . . . .
1) ExceptionInfectious Invalidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The Rule in OperationCommon Pitfall Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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iv. REAL PROPERTY
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Executory Interest Following Defeasible Fee Violates the Rule

Age Contingency Beyond Age Twenty-One in Open Class . . .
The Fertile Octogenarian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Unborn Widow or Widower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Administrative Contingency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Options and Rights of First Refusal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Reasonable Time Limit May Be Inferred . . . . . .
b) Options Connected to Leaseholds . . . . . . . . . .
2) Rights of First Refusal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Application of the Rule to Class Gifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Bad-as-to-One, Bad-as-to-All Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Class Closing Rules May Save Disposition . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Gift to Subclass Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Per Capita Gift Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Perpetuities Reform Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Technique for Analysis of Perpetuities Problems . . . . . . . . . .
a. Determine What Interests Are Created . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Apply the Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Apply Reform Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F. THE RULE AGAINST RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION . . . . . . .
1. Types of Restraints on Alienation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Restraints on a Fee Simple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Total Restraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Partial Restraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Reasonable Restraints Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Discriminatory Restraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Fourteenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Fair Housing Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Restraints on a Life Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Legal Life Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Equitable Life Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Restraints on Future Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Vested Remainders in Fee Simple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Vested Remainders for Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Contingent Remainders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Other Valid Restraints on Alienation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Reasonable Restrictions in Commercial Transactions . . . . .
b. Options and Rights of First Refusal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Restrictions on Transferability of Leaseholds . . . . . . . . .
G. CONCURRENT ESTATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Joint Tenancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Four Unities Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Modern Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Express Language Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Severance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Inter Vivos Conveyance by One Joint Tenant . . . . . . .
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REAL PROPERTY v.
a)
b)
2.
3.
4.
II.
When More than Two Joint Tenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transactions that May Not Result in Severance . . . . . . . .
(1) Judgment Liens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Mortgages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(3) Leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Death of Lessor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Contract to Convey by One Joint Tenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) CompareExecutory Contract by All Joint Tenants . . . . .
(1) Common Law ViewJoint Tenancy Continues . . . . .
(2) Other CourtsTenancy in Common . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Testamentary Disposition by One Joint Tenant Has No Effect . .
a) CompareSecret Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4) Effect of One Joint Tenants Murdering Another . . . . . . . . . .
Tenancy by the Entirety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Right of Survivorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Severance Limited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Individual Spouse Cannot Convey or Encumber . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tenancy in Common . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Incidents of Co-Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Rents and Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Effect of One Concurrent Owners Encumbering the Property . . . . .
d. Ouster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Remedy of Partition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Restraint on Partition by Co-Tenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f. Expenses for Preservation of PropertyContribution . . . . . . . . .
1) RepairsContribution May Be Compelled for Necessary Repairs
2) ImprovementsNo Contribution or Setoff . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Taxes and MortgagesContribution Can Be Compelled . . . . .
g. Duty of Fair Dealing Among Co-Tenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LANDLORD AND TENANT . . . . . . . . .

A. NATURE OF LEASEHOLD . . . . . . .
1. Tenancies for Years . . . . . . . . .
a. Fixed Period of Time . . . . . .
b. Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Termination . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Breach of Covenants . . .
a) Failure to Pay Rent .
2) Surrender . . . . . . . . .
2. Periodic Tenancies . . . . . . . . . .
a. Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) By Express Agreement . .
2) By Implication . . . . . . .
3) By Operation of Law . . .
a) Tenant Holds Over . .
b) Lease Invalid . . . . .
b. TerminationNotice Required
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vi. REAL PROPERTY
3.
B.
C.
D.
Tenancies at Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Tenancies at Sufferance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. The Hold-Over Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Eviction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Creation of Periodic Tenancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Altered Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. What Does Not Constitute Holding Over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Double Rent Jeopardy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Forcible Entry Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LEASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Common LawLease Covenants Independent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Modern TrendLease Covenants Dependent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TENANT DUTIES AND LANDLORD REMEDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Tenants Duty to Repair (Doctrine of Waste) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Types of Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Voluntary (Affirmative) Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Permissive Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Ameliorative Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) LiabilityCost of Restoration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Modern ExceptionValue of Premises Decreasing . . . . . .
b. Destruction of the Premises Without Fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Majority ViewTenant Can Terminate Lease . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Tenants Liability for Covenants to Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Rebuilding After Structural Damage or Casualty Destruction . .
2) Repairing Ordinary Wear and Tear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Duty to Not Use Premises for Illegal Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Occasional Unlawful Conduct Does Not Breach Duty . . . . . . . . . .
b. Landlord RemediesTerminate Lease, Recover Damages . . . . . . .
3. Duty to Pay Rent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. When Rent Accrues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Rent Deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Termination of Rent LiabilitySurrender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Landlord Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Tenant on Premises But Fails to Pay RentEvict or Sue for Rent . . .
1) DistressLandlords Lien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Tenant AbandonsDo Nothing or Repossess . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Landlord Does NothingTenant Remains Liable . . . . . . . . .
2) Landlord RepossessesTenants Liability Depends on Surrender
a) Acts that Constitute Acceptance of Surrender . . . . . . . . .
b) Acts that Do Not Constitute Acceptance of Surrender . . . .
LANDLORD DUTIES AND TENANT REMEDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Duty to Deliver Possession of Premises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Landlord DutyMust Deliver Actual Possession . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Tenant RemedyDamages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Quiet Enjoyment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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REAL PROPERTY vii.
a.
b.
Actual Eviction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Partial Actual Eviction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Partial Eviction by LandlordEntire Rent Obligation Relieved
2) Partial Eviction by Third PersonRent Apportioned . . . . . .
c. Constructive Eviction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Implied Warranty of Habitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. StandardReasonably Suitable for Human Residence . . . . . . . .
b. Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Retaliatory Eviction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. ASSIGNMENTS AND SUBLEASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Consequences of Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Covenants that Run with the Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Rent Covenant Runs with the Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Reassignment by AssigneePrivity of Estate with Landlord
Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Effect of Assignee Assuming Rent Obligation . . . . . . . .
2) Original Tenant Remains Liable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Consequences of Sublease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Liability of Sublessee for Rent and Other Covenants . . . . . . . . .
1) Termination for Breach of Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Assumption by Sublessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Rights of Sublessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Covenants Against Assignment or Sublease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Strictly Construed Against Landlord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Waiver of Covenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Continuing Waiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Transfer in Violation of Lease Not Void . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Reasonableness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Assignments by Landlords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Right to Assign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Rights of Assignee Against Tenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Liabilities of Assignee to Tenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F. CONDEMNATION OF LEASEHOLDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Entire Leasehold Taken by Eminent DomainRent Liability
Extinguished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Temporary or Partial TakingTenant Entitled to Compensation Only .
G. TORT LIABILITY OF LANDLORD AND TENANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Landlords Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Concealed Dangerous Condition (Latent Defect) . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Common Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Public Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Furnished Short-Term Residence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Negligent Repairs by Landlord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f. Landlord Contracts to Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Modern TrendGeneral Duty of Reasonable Care . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Defects Arising After Tenant Takes Possession . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Legal Duty to Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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viii. REAL PROPERTY
3.
III.
IV.
c. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Tenants Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
FIXTURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. IN GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. CHATTELS INCORPORATED INTO STRUCTURE ALWAYS BECOME
FIXTURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. COMMON OWNERSHIP CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Annexors Intent Controls in Common Ownership Cases . . . . . . . . .
a. Constructive Annexation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Vendor-Purchaser Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Mortgagor-Mortgagee Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Effect of Fixture Classication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Conveyance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Agreement to Contrary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. DIVIDED OWNERSHIP CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Landlord-Tenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. No Intent If Removal Does Not Cause Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Removal Must Occur Before End of Lease Term . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Tenant Has Duty to Repair Damages Resulting from Removal . . . .
2. Life Tenant and Remainderman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Licensee and Landowner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Trespasser and Landowner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Trespassers Recovery Limited to Value Added to Land . . . . . . .
E. THIRD-PARTY CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Third Person Claims Lien on Chattel Afxed to Land . . . . . . . . . . .
a. UCC Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Liability for Damages Caused by Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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RIGHTS IN THE LAND OF ANOTHEREASEMENTS, PROFITS, COVENANTS,

AND SERVITUDES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. IN GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. EASEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Types of Easements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Affirmative Easements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Negative Easements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Easement Appurtenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Use and Enjoyment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Benefit Attached to Possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Transfer of Dominant and Servient Estates . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Easement in Gross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Judicial Preference for Easements Appurtenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Creation of Easements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Express Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Express Reservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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REAL PROPERTY ix.
c.
3.
4.
5.
Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Easement Implied from Existing Use (Quasi-Easement)
a) Existing Use at Time Tract Divided . . . . . . . . . .
b) Reasonable Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c) Grant or Reservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Easements Implied Without Any Existing Use . . . . . . .
a) Subdivision Plat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Profit a Prendre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Easement by Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Prescription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Open and Notorious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Adverse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Continuous Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4) When Prescriptive Easements Cannot Be Acquired . . . .
Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. General Rules of Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Absence of Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Changes in Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Easements by Necessity or Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Use of Servient Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Duty to Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f. Intended BeneficiariesSubdivision of Dominant Parcel . . . .
g. Effect of Use Outside Scope of Easement . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Termination of Easements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Stated Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Unity of Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Complete Unity Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) No Revival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Easement Appurtenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Easement in Gross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Statute of Frauds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Abandonment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Physical Act Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Mere Words Insufficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Mere Nonuse Insufficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Estoppel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f. Prescription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
g. Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
h. Condemnation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i. Destruction of Servient Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CompareLicenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Assignability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Revocation and Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Public Amusement Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Breach of Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Failure to Create an Easement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Irrevocable Licenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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82
x. REAL PROPERTY
1)
2)
C.
D.
E.
Estoppel Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
License Coupled with an Interest . . . . . . . . . .
a) Vendee of a Chattel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Termination of Tenancy . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c) Inspection for Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PROFITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Alienability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Exclusive and Nonexclusive Prots Distinguished . . . . . .
4. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Apportionment of Profits Appurtenant . . . . . . . . . .
b. Apportionment of Profits in Gross . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND AT LAW (REAL
COVENANTS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Requirements for Burden to Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Horizontal Privity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Vertical Privity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Touch and Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Negative Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Affirmative Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Requirements for Benet to Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Vertical Privity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Touch and Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Modern Status of Running of Burden and Benet . . . . . .
a. Horizontal and Vertical Privity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Touch and Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Specic Situations Involving Real Covenants . . . . . . . . .
a. Promises to Pay Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Covenants Not to Compete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Racially Restrictive Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. RemediesDamages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EQUITABLE SERVITUDES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Servitudes Implied from Common Scheme . . . . . . . .
1) Common Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Requirements for Burden to Run . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Touch and Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Requirements for Benefit to Run . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Privity Not Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Implied Beneficiaries of CovenantsGeneral Scheme .
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91
REAL PROPERTY xi.
3.
Equitable Defenses to Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

a. Unclean Hands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Acquiescence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Estoppel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Changed Neighborhood Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Zoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Concept of the Entering Wedge . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F. RELATIONSHIP OF COVENANTS TO ZONING ORDINANCES .
G. PARTY WALLS AND COMMON DRIVEWAYS . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Running of Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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ADVERSE POSSESSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. IN GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Running of Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Actual and Exclusive Possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Actual Possession Gives Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Constructive Possession of Part . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Exclusive PossessionNo Sharing with Owner . . . . . . . . . .
3. Open and Notorious Possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Hostile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. If Possession Starts PermissivelyMust Communicate Hostility .
b. Co-TenantsOuster Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. If Grantor Stays in PossessionPermission Presumed . . . . . .
d. CompareBoundary Line Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Establishment Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Continuous Possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Intermittent Periods of Occupancy Not Sufficient . . . . . . . . .
b. Tacking Permitted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Privity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Formalities on Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Payment of Property Taxes Generally Not Required . . . . . . . . . .
C. DISABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Effect of DisabilitiesStatute Does Not Begin to Run . . . . . . . . .
2. No Tacking of Disabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Maximum Tolling Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. ADVERSE POSSESSION AND FUTURE INTERESTS . . . . . . . . . .
1. Possibility of ReverterStatute of Limitations Runs on Happening of
Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Right of EntryHappening of Event Does Not Trigger Statute of
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Grantor Must Act Within Reasonable Time to Avoid Laches . . .
E. EFFECT OF COVENANTS IN TRUE OWNERS DEED . . . . . . . . .
F. LAND THAT CANNOT BE ADVERSELY POSSESSED . . . . . . . . .
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xii. REAL PROPERTY
VI.
CONVEYANCING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. LAND SALE CONTRACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Statute of Frauds Applicable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Doctrine of Part Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Theories to Support the Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Evidentiary Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Hardship or Estoppel Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Acts of Part Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Can Seller Obtain Specific Performance Based on Buyers Acts?
a) Evidentiary Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Hardship or Estoppel Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Doctrine of Equitable Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Risk of Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Casualty Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Passage of Title on Death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Death of Seller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Death of Buyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Marketable Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Marketability DefinedTitle Reasonably Free from Doubt . . . .
1) Defects in Record Chain of Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Adverse Possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Future Interest Held by Unborn or Unascertained Parties .
2) Encumbrances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Mortgages and Liens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Easements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c) Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d) Encroachments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Zoning Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4) Waiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Quitclaim DeedNo Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Time of Marketability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Installment Land Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Remedy If Title Not Marketable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Rescission, Damages, Specific Performance . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Merger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Time of Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. PresumptionTime Not of the Essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. When Presumption Overcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Effect of Time of the Essence Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Liability When Time Not of the Essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Tender of Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. When Partys Tender Excused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Neither Party Tenders Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Buyer Finds Sellers Title Unmarketable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Remedies for Breach of the Sales Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Liquidated Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Specific Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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REAL PROPERTY xiii.
B.
C.
1) Buyers Remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Sellers Remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Special Rules for Unmarketable Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Sellers Liability for Defects on Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Warranty of Fitness or QualityNew Construction Only . . . . . .
b. Negligence of Builder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Liability for Sale of Existing Land and Buildings . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Misrepresentation (Fraud) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Active Concealment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Failure to Disclose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Disclaimers of Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) As Is Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Specific Disclaimers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Real Estate Brokers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9. Title Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DEEDSFORM AND CONTENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Formalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Statute of Frauds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Description of Land and Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Words of Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Consideration Not Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Seal Is Unnecessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f. Attestation and Acknowledgment Generally Unnecessary . . . . . .
g. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Defective Deeds and Fraudulent Conveyances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Void and Voidable Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Void Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Voidable Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Fraudulent Conveyances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Description of Land Conveyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Sufficient Description Provides a Good Lead . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Insufficient DescriptionTitle Remains in Grantor . . . . . . . . . .
c. Parol Evidence Admissible to Clear Up Ambiguity . . . . . . . . . .
1) CompareInadequate Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Rules of Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Land Bounded by Right-of-Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Title Presumed to Extend to Center of Right-of-Way . . . . . . .
a) Evidence to Rebut Presumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Measuring from Monument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Variable Boundary Line Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Slow Change in Course Changes Property Rights . . . . . .
b) Avulsion Does Not Change Property Rights . . . . . . . . .
c) Encroachment of Water Does Not Change Fixed Boundary
Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f. Reformation of Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. DeliveryIn General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Manual Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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xiv. REAL PROPERTY
b.
c.
d.
D.
Presumptions Relating to Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Delivery Cannot Be Canceled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parol Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Admissible to Prove Grantors Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Not Admissible to Show Delivery to Grantee Was Conditional .
3) Admissible to Show No Delivery Intended . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Deed Intended as Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Transfer of Deed to Bona Fide Purchaser . . . . . . . . . .
(1) Estoppel in Favor of Innocent Purchaser . . . . . . . .
4) Comment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Retention of Interest by Grantor or Conditional Delivery . . . . . . . . .
a. No DeliveryTitle Does Not Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. No RecordingTitle Passes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Express Condition of Death of Grantor Creates Future Interest . . .
d. Conditions Not Contained in Deed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. TestRelinquishment of Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Where Grantor Gives Deed to Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Transfer to Third Party with No Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Transfer to Third Party with Conditions (Commercial Transaction)
1) Parol Evidence Admissible to Show Conditions . . . . . . . . . .
2) Grantors Right to Recover Deed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Majority ViewCan Recover Only If No Written Contract
b) Minority ViewNo Right to Recover . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Breach of Escrow ConditionsTitle Does Not Pass . . . . . . .
a) Estoppel Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4) Relation-Back Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Not Applied If Intervening Party Is BFP or Mortgagee . . .
b) Not Applied in Favor of Escrow Grantee with Knowledge .
c. Transfer to Third Party with Conditions (Donative Transactions) . .
1) Condition Unrelated to Grantors Death . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Where Condition Is Grantors Death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) LimitationNo Delivery If Conditioned on Survival . . . .
4. Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Usually Presumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Usually Relates Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
COVENANTS FOR TITLE AND ESTOPPEL BY DEED . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Covenants for Title in a General Warranty Deed . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Usual Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Covenant of Seisin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Covenant of Right to Convey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Covenant Against Encumbrances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4) Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5) Covenant of Warranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6) Covenant for Further Assurances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7) No Implied Warranties or Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Breach of Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Covenants of Seisin and Right to Convey . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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REAL PROPERTY xv.
2)
3)
E.
Covenant Against Encumbrances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Covenants for Quiet Enjoyment, Warranty, and Further
Assurances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Covenant Runs to Successive Grantees . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Requirement of Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c) Any Disturbance of Possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Damages and Remote Grantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Statutory Special Warranty Deed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Quitclaim Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Estoppel by Deed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Applies to Warranty Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Rights of Subsequent Purchasers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Effect of Recordation by Original Grantee . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Remedies of Grantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RECORDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Recording ActsIn General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Purpose of RecordationNotice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Requirements for Recordation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) What Can Be RecordedInstrument Affecting an Interest in
Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Grantor Must Acknowledge Deed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Mechanics of Recording . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Filing Copy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Indexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Types of Recording Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Notice Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Race-Notice Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Race Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Who Is Protected by Recording Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Purchasers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Donees, Heirs, and Devisees Not Protected . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Purchaser from Donee, Heir, or Devisee . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Mortgagees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4) Judgment Creditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5) Transferees from Bona Fide PurchaserShelter Rule . . . . .
a) Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) ExceptionNo Shipping Through . . . . . . . . . . . .
6) Purchaser Under Installment Land Contract . . . . . . . . . .
a) ExceptionShelter Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Without Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Actual Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Record NoticeChain of Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Wild Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Deeds Recorded Late . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1) ExceptionShelter Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Lis Pendens Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c) Deeds Recorded Before Grantor Obtained Title . . . . . .
d) Deed in Chain Referring to Instrument Outside Chain . .
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xvi. REAL PROPERTY
e)
F.
VII.
Restrictive CovenantsDeeds from Common Grantor . . . .

(1) Subdivision Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Adjacent Lots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f) Marketable Title Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Inquiry Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Generally No Inquiry from Quitclaim Deed . . . . . . . . . .
b) Inquiry from References in Recorded Instruments . . . . . .
c) Inquiry from Unrecorded Instruments in Chain of Title . . .
d) Inquiry from Possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Valuable Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) TestSubstantial Pecuniary Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Property Received as Security for Antecedent Debts Is
Insufficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Title Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Tract Index Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Grantor and Grantee Index Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Other Instruments and Events Affecting Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Effect of Recordation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Does Not Validate Invalid Deed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Does Not Protect Against Interests Arising by Operation of Law . . . .
1) Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Recorders Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Effect of Recording Unacknowledged Instrument . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) No AcknowledgmentNo Constructive Notice . . . . . . . . . . .
2) CompareDefective Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONVEYANCE BY WILL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Ademption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Not Applicable to General Devises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Not Applicable to Land Under Executory Contract . . . . . . . . . . .
1) No Ademption If Decedent Incompetent When Contract Formed .
c. Other Proceeds Not Subject to Ademption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Partial Ademption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Exoneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Lapse and Anti-Lapse Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Degree of Relationship to Testator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Descendants Are Substituted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Application to Class Gifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Anti-Lapse Statute Does Not Apply If Contrary Will Provision . . . .
4. Abatement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SECURITY INTERESTS IN REAL ESTATE .

A. TYPES OF SECURITY INTERESTS . .
1. Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Deed of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Installment Land Contract . . . . . .
4. Absolute DeedEquitable Mortgage
5. Sale-Leaseback . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Equitable Vendors Lien . . . . . . .
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REAL PROPERTY xvii.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
TRANSFERS BY MORTGAGEE AND MORTGAGOR . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Transfer by Mortgagee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Transfer of Mortgage Without Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Transfer of Note Without Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Methods of Transferring the Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Holder in Due Course Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Benefits of Holder in Due Course Status . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Effect of Payment to Original Mortgagee After Transfer of Note
2. Transfer by MortgagorGrantee Takes Subject to Mortgage . . . . . .
a. Assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Nonassuming Grantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Due-on-Sale Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DEFENSES AND DISCHARGE OF THE MORTGAGE . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Defenses to Underlying Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Consumer Protection Defenses to Foreclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Discharge of the Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Merger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
POSSESSION BEFORE FORECLOSURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Theories of Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. The Lien Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. The Title Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. The Intermediate Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Mortgagor Consent and Abandonment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Risks of Mortgagee in Possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Receiverships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FORECLOSURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Redemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Redemption in Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Statutory Redemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Effect of Foreclosure on Various Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Junior Interests Destroyed by Foreclosure . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Senior Interests Not Affected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Modification of Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Failure to Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Subordination Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Purchase Money Mortgages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Vendor PMM vs. Third-Party PMM . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Third-Party PMM vs. Third-Party PMM . . . . . . . . . .
4) Modification of Senior Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5) Optional Future Advances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6) Subrogation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Proceeds of Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Deciency Judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Equity of Redemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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xviii. REAL PROPERTY
2.
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Restitution . . . . . .
Treat as a Mortgage .
Waiver . . . . . . . .
Election of Remedies
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VIII. RIGHTS INCIDENTAL TO OWNERSHIP OF LAND (NATURAL RIGHTS)

A. IN GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. RIGHT TO LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT OF LAND . . . .
1. Right to Lateral Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Support of Land in Natural State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Support of Buildings on Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Right to Subjacent Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Support of Land and Buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Interference with Underground Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. WATER RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Watercourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Riparian Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) What Land Is Riparian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Riparian Owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Doctrine Applies Only to Riparian Parcel . . . . . . . .
2) Nature of Riparian Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a) Natural Flow Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Reasonable Use Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1) Factors to Consider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c) Natural vs. Artificial Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Prior Appropriation Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Factors to Note for Bar Exam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Accretion and Avulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Groundwater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Absolute Ownership Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Reasonable Use Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Correlative Rights Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Appropriative Rights Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Restatement Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Surface Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Natural Flow Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Common Enemy Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Reasonable Use Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. CompareCapture of Surface Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. RIGHTS IN AIRSPACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. RIGHT TO EXCLUDEREMEDIES OF POSSESSOR . . . . . . . . . .
1. Trespass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Private Nuisance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. ComparePublic Nuisance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Continuing Trespass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Law or Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Ejectment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Unlawful Detainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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REAL PROPERTY xix.
IX.
COOPERATIVES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND ZONING . . . . . . .

A. COOPERATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Restriction on Transfer of Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Mortgages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Maintenance Expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. CONDOMINIUMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Restriction on Transfer of Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Mortgages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Maintenance Expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. ZONING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Nonconforming Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Special Use Permits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Unconstitutional Takings and Exactions . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Denial of All Economic Value of LandTaking . . . .
b. Denial of Nearly All Economic ValueBalancing Test
c. Unconstitutional Exactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1) Essential Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Rough Proportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Burden of Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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REAL PROPERTY 1.
REAL PROPERTY
I. ESTATES IN LAND
A.
IN GENERAL
Estates in land are possessory interests in land. These interests may be presently possessory
(present estates), or they may become possessory in the future (future interests). They may be
freeholds, which give possession under some legal title or right to hold (e.g., fees or life estates),
or they may be nonfreeholds, which give mere possession (i.e., leases). Estates in land may be
of potentially innite duration, as in the case of a fee simple, or they may be of limited duration,
as in the case of an estate for years. But whatever their characteristics, estates in land must be
distinguished from nonpossessory interests such as easements, prots, covenants, and servitudes.
This section of the outline will examine various estates in land. It divides the interests into two
classes: present interests and future interests. However, some future interests (those following
defeasible fees) will be considered with the present interests to which they are attached.
B.
PRESENT POSSESSORY ESTATES

1.
Fee Simple Absolute

An estate in fee simple absolute is the largest estate permitted by law. It invests the holder of
the fee with full possessory rights, now and in the future. The holder can sell it, divide it, or
devise it; and if she dies intestate, her heirs will inherit it. The fee simple has an indenite
and potentially innite duration. The common law rule requiring technical words of inheritance (and his heirs) has been abolished by statute in nearly all jurisdictions. Typically,
such statutes provide: A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a grant of real
property unless it appears from the grant that a lesser estate was intended.
Example:
A conveyance from O to A is presumed to pass a fee simple interest if O
owned one. At common law, absent the words of inheritance, even a conveyance to A in fee simple would convey only a life estate to A.
2.
Defeasible Fees
Defeasible fees are fee simple estates of potentially innite duration that can be terminated
by the happening of a specied event. Because defeasible fees can result in forfeitures, courts
will construe, where possible, a purported limitation as a mere declaration of the grantors
purpose or motive for making the grant (i.e., as precatory language). (See b.1)a), infra.)
a.
Fee Simple Determinable (and Possibility of Reverter)

A fee simple determinable, also called a determinable fee, is an estate that automatically terminates on the happening of a stated event and goes back to the grantor. (It
must be distinguished from the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, where the
grantor must take afrmative steps to terminate the estate of the grantee if the stated
event occurs.) It is created by the use of durational, adverbial language, such as for so
long as, while, during, or until. A fee simple determinable can be conveyed by
the owner thereof, but his grantee takes the land subject to the termination of the estate
by the happening of the event.
Example:
O conveys land to A for so long as no alcoholic beverages are
consumed on the premises. This gives A a fee simple because the estate
2. REAL PROPERTY
may last forever if no one ever quaffs a brew. If A conveys his fee simple
determinable estate to B, B will own the for so long as estate. If A
does not convey his estate, on As death it will pass by will or intestacy
to his successors, and so on. If, however, someone ever consumes an
alcoholic beverage on the premises, the estate will automatically come to
an end according to its own terms; and O will immediately and automatically become the owner of the fee simple, without taking any steps to
terminate As interest.
1)
2)
b.
Correlative Future Interest in GrantorPossibility of Reverter

Because the grantees estate may end upon the happening of the stated event, there
is a possibility that the land may revert back to the grantor. The interest that is left
in a grantor who conveys an estate in fee simple determinable is called a possibility of reverter. It is a future interest because it becomes possessory only upon
the occurrence of the stated event.
a)
Possibility of Reverter Need Not Be Expressly Retained

At common law and in nearly all states today, the grantor does not have to
expressly retain a possibility of reverter. It arises automatically in the grantor
as a consequence of his conveying a fee simple determinable estate, with its
built-in time limitation.
b)
Transferability of Possibility of Reverter

At early common law, the possibility of reverter could not be transferred inter
vivos or devised by will. An attempted transfer of the interest was invalid; but
the possibility of reverter was not extinguished by the attempted transfer and
would still descend to the heirs of the owner. Today, in most jurisdictions, the
possibility of reverter can be transferred inter vivos or devised by will, and
descends to the owners heirs if she dies intestate.
Correlative Future Interest in Third PartyExecutory Interest

A possibility of reverter arises only in the grantor, not in a third party. If a comparable interest is created in a third party, it is an executory interest. (See C.3., infra.)
Fee Simple Subject to Condition Subsequent (and Right of Entry)

A fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is created when the grantor retains the
power to terminate the estate of the grantee upon the happening of a specied event.
Upon the happening of the event stated in the conveyance, the estate of the grantee
continues until the grantor exercises her power of termination (right of entry) by
bringing suit or making reentry. The following words are usually held to create conditions subsequent: upon condition that, provided that, but if, and if it happens that.
Example:
O, owning Blackacre in fee simple, conveys it to A and his heirs, on
the express condition that the premises are never to be used by A for the
sale of liquor, and in the event that they are so used, then O or her heirs
may enter and terminate the estate hereby conveyed. A has a fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent. O has a right of entry. If the condition
is broken, O has a power to terminate the estate of A by asserting her
right of entry.
REAL PROPERTY 3.
1)
Correlative Future Interest in GrantorRight of Entry

A right of entry (also known as right of reentry or power of termination) is
the future interest retained by the transferor who conveys an estate on condition
subsequent. It is necessary to expressly reserve the right of entry in the grantor;
this retained interest does not automatically arise as in the case of a fee simple
determinable and possibility of reverter.
a)
Failure to Reserve Right of Entry

Courts often hold that words of condition, standing alone, create only
covenants, easements, or trusts, or are mere precatory terms.
Example:
O conveys land to A and his heirs, provided that liquor is
not sold on the premises. O has not used words indicating
the estate will terminate if liquor is sold on the premises. Nor
has O retained a right to reenter. Because a statement of the
grantors wishes as to how the property should be used does
not ordinarily imply a right retained by the grantor to enforce
the purpose, a court may construe the deed as giving A a fee
simple absolute. [Wood v. Board of County Commissioners,
759 P.2d 1250 (Wyo. 1988)]
b)
Waiver of Right of Entry

Because the grantor can elect whether or not to terminate the grantees estate,
she may waive her right or power to enforce a forfeiture by express agreement
or by her conduct. (Such is not the case with a fee simple determinable, where
the forfeiture is automatic.)
(1) Inaction by Itself Not a Waiver
The general rule is that when there is a breach of the condition and the
grantor simply does nothing about it, the power of termination is not
waived. (See also V.D.2., infra.) However, where there is any element of
detrimental reliance by the fee holder, many courts treat inaction as a
waiver on an estoppel or laches theory.
c)
2)
Transferability of Right of Entry

At common law, a right of entry was not devisable or transferable inter vivos
to a third person. The right of entry did, however, descend to the heirs of the
grantor on her death. Today, in most jurisdictions, a right of entry is still not
alienable inter vivos. (Indeed, in a handful of states, an attempted transfer
destroys it.) But in most states, rights of entry are devisable; and in all states,
they descend to the owners heirs.
Correlative Future Interest in Third PartyExecutory Interest

A right of entry can be created only in favor of the grantor and her heirs. If a
similar interest is created in favor of a third party, the interest is called an executory interest (e.g., if the property is ever used for other than church purposes, then
to B and his heirs). Unlike a right of entry, an executory interest is subject to the
Rule Against Perpetuities. (See E., infra.)
4. REAL PROPERTY
3)
CompareFee Simple Determinable

This estate is distinguished from a determinable fee in that the breach of the
condition does not itself terminate the estate and immediately revest the fee in the
grantor or her successor. The estate continues in the grantee or his successor unless
or until the grantor or her successor afrmatively elects to terminate it.
a)
c.
Construction of Ambiguous Language

The general policy of courts is to avoid forfeiture of estates. Thus, a conveyance that contains both durational language and a power of termination
may be construed as creating a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, because the forfeiture is optional at the grantors election rather than
automatic.
Example:
O conveys land to A so long as liquor is not sold on the
premises, and if liquor is sold, O has a right to reenter. The
words so long as point to a fee simple determinable. The
retained right of entry points to a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. The court can classify the language to create
either estate, but the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is preferred.
Fee Simple Subject to an Executory Interest

A fee simple subject to an executory interest is an estate that, upon the happening of
a stated event, is automatically divested in favor of a third person rather than the
grantor.
Examples:
1) O conveys land to Church; provided, however, that if the premises
shall ever cease to be used for church purposes, title shall pass to the
American Heart Association. Church has a fee simple subject to an
executory interest in favor of the Heart Association. O does not have
a right of entry because no such interest was reserved in the conveyance. The Heart Associations interest is not a right of entry because
that future interest can be reserved only in favor of a grantor. The Heart
Associations future interest is not a remainder because it divests a fee
simple. Therefore, it is an executory interest.
Note: Executory interests are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities,
but the Heart Associations interest is valid because of the charity-tocharity exception to the Rule. (See E.1.e.1), infra.)
2) O conveys land to Church for so long as the premises are used for
church purposes, and if they shall ever cease to be so used, then and in
that event to the American Red Cross. Church has a fee simple determinable subject to an executory interest in favor of the Red Cross. O has
no possibility of reverter because he has not retained any interest; he
has conveyed away his entire estate in the property. The future interest
in the Red Cross cannot be a possibility of reverter because that interest
arises only in a grantor, and the Red Cross is a grantee. It is an executory interest and not a remainder because it divests a fee simple. (Further
discussion of these points will come later.)
REAL PROPERTY 5.
Note: Were it not for the charity-to-charity exception to the Rule

Against Perpetuities, the executory interest in favor of the Red Cross
would violate the Rule.
d.
Limitations on Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry

In a few states, statutes limit the permissible duration of possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry to a certain number of years (usually 30) in order to foster marketability
of title. Other statutes (usually called marketable title acts) require the rerecording of
various future interests (including possibilities of reverter and rights of entry) every 20
to 40 years or they become unenforceable.
e.
Conditions and Limitations Violating Public Policy

Conditions and limitations that are designed to prevent the acquisition or retention of an
interest in land generally are struck down if they are contrary to public policy. Striking
such a condition will result in an interest different from that intended by the grantor.
(See also F., infra.)
1)
Restraints on Marriage
If the purpose of the condition or limitation is to penalize marriage, it likely
will be struck down. On the other hand, if the purpose is to give support until
marriage, when the new spouses obligation of support arises, the condition or
limitation generally is upheld.
Example:
O conveys land to A, but if she marries, to B. Absent any
evidence as to Os motive, the condition subsequent will be struck
down, leaving A with a fee simple absolute.
Compare:
2)
O conveys land to A for her support until she marries. Because O

intends to give A support only until the burden of support shifts to
As spouse, As fee simple determinable is valid.
Provisions Involving Separation or Divorce

Conditions and limitations meant to encourage separation or divorce are invalid.
On the other hand, conditions and limitations meant to give support in the event of
separation or divorce generally are valid.
Example:
O conveys land to A, provided that he divorces his current spouse
within one year; if he does not, to B. Absent any evidence as to Os
motive, the condition subsequent will be struck down, leaving A
with a fee simple absolute.
3.
Fee Tail
The fee tail, typically created by the words to A and the heirs of his body, limited inheritance to lineal descendants of the grantee. If no lineal descendants survived at the grantees
death, the property either reverted to the grantor or her successors or passed to a designated
remainderman. Today, most United States jurisdictions have abolished the fee tail and have
enacted statutes under which any attempt to create a fee tail results in the creation of a fee
simple.
4.
Life Estate
An estate for life is an estate that is not terminable at any xed or computable period of time,
6. REAL PROPERTY
but cannot last longer than the life or lives of one or more persons. It may arise by operation
of law or may be created by an act or agreement of the parties.
a.
Life Estates by Marital Right (Legal Life Estates)

Such estates arise under dower and curtesy, the common law interests of wife and
husband, respectively, in real property of which the other spouse was seized during
marriage (including property acquired before marriage). At common law, a surviving
wifes dower right entitled her to a life estate in an undivided one-third of her husbands
lands. A surviving husbands right of curtesy gave him a life estate in all of his wifes
lands if issue were born. For exam purposes, it is important to remember that a conveyance by a husband to a bona de purchaser does not defeat dower unless the wife joins
in the conveyance. Likewise, a husbands creditors cannot defeat a wifes dower rights.
Most states have abolished both dower and curtesy and have instead given the surviving
spouse a statutory right to take a portion of the deceased spouses estate. Community
property states do not recognize either dower or curtesy.
b.
Conventional Life Estate

1)
For Life of Grantee

The usual life estate is measured by the life of the grantee and is called simply
a life estate. It may be indefeasible (so that it will end only when the life tenant
dies), or it may be made defeasible in the same ways that fee estates can be defeasible (e.g., determinable, subject to a condition subsequent, subject to an executory interest). In such a case, the estate may end before the life tenant dies if the
limiting condition occurs. (See Example 5), below.)
Examples:
1) O conveys to A for life. In this case, A has an estate in the
land for as long as he lives. On his death, the land reverts to O, the
grantor.
2) To A for life, then to B. This is a life estate because it is
measured by the life of A and is not terminable at a xed period of
time.
3) To A for life, but in no event for more than 10 years. This is an
estate for years and not a life estate because the estate in A will end
in 10 years (i.e., a xed time period).
4) To A for 10 years if he lives so long. This is also an estate for
years and not a life estate because the estate in A will end in 10
years.
5) To A for life or until she remarries. This is a life estate subject
to a limitation, but nevertheless a life estate. The estate in A will
not end at any xed or computable time period. It can be termed a
life estate determinable, and is analogous to the fee simple determinable discussed above.
6) To B and C after the life of A. A has an implied life estate.
REAL PROPERTY 7.
2)
Life Estate Pur Autre Vie (Life of Another)

A life estate pur autre vie is a life estate measured by the life of someone other
than the life tenant. Such an estate can be created directly by the grantor, e.g., to
A for the life of B. As estate ends when B dies. It can also be created indirectly,
as where the grantor conveys to B for life, and B later conveys his interest to A.
A owns an estate measured by Bs life; it ends when B dies.
a)
c.
Inheritability
At common law, if A died before B, the property was regarded as without an
owner until B died. Today, statutes provide that such estates are devisable and
inheritable if no special occupant is named in the original grant. (A special
occupant is a person named by the grantor to take the balance of the term, if
any.)
Rights and Duties of Life TenantDoctrine of Waste

A tenant for life is entitled to all the ordinary uses and prots of the land; but he
cannot lawfully do any act that would injure the interests of the person who owns the
remainder or the reversion. If he does, the future interest holder may sue for damages
and/or to enjoin such acts.
1)
Afrmative (Voluntary) WasteNatural Resources

As a general rule, a life tenant may not consume or exploit natural resources on the
property (e.g., timber, minerals, oil). Exceptions to this rule allow exploitation in
the following circumstances:
(i)
In reasonable amounts where necessary for repair and maintenance of the

land;
(ii) When the life tenant is expressly given the right to exploit such resources in
the grant;
(iii) When prior to the grant, the land was used in exploitation of such natural
resources, so that in granting the life estate the grantor most likely intended
the life tenant to have the right to exploit (but see open mines doctrine,
below); and
(iv) In many states, where the land is suitable only for such exploitation (e.g., a
mine).
Note: There is a vague reasonableness limit on the amount of oil or coal a life
tenant can remove from the property.
a)
Open Mines Doctrine

If mining (extraction of minerals) was done on the land before the life estate
began, the life tenant may continue to mine the propertybut is limited to
the mines already open. The life tenant may not open any new mines. There
is a trend away from this limitation, applying instead the rule in (iii), above,
to all natural resources, including minerals.
8. REAL PROPERTY
2)
Permissive Waste
Absent a contrary provision in the instrument creating the life estate, a life tenant
has a duty to make repairs to the property to keep it from being damaged by the
weather, and to pay certain carrying charges (e.g., mortgage interest, property
taxes, and special assessments for public improvements). However, this duty is
limited to the extent of the income or prots derived from the land (or if there is
no actual income or prot, to the extent of the reasonable rental value of the land).
Failure to make required repairs or pay required carrying charges constitutes
permissive waste. A future interest holder who expends funds in satisfaction of
the life tenants obligations (e.g., pays the property taxes to avoid a tax foreclosure
sale) is entitled to reimbursement.
a)
Obligation to Repair
A life tenant is obligated to preserve the land and structures in a reasonable
state of repair (to the limited extent stated above). But the tenant is under no
obligation to make permanent improvements on the land, no matter how wise
it might seem to do so.
b)
Obligation to Pay Interest on Encumbrances

A life tenant is obligated to pay interest on any encumbrances on the land (to
the limited extent stated above). However, he does not have to pay anything
on the principal of the debt; reversioners or remaindermen must pay the
principal in order to protect their interests.
The foregoing applies to encumbrances on the entire fee simple estate. Of
course, a life tenant could place a mortgage on the life estate alone, and would
then be liable for both principal and interest payments.
c)
Obligation to Pay Taxes

The life tenant is obligated to pay all ordinary taxes on the land (to the
limited extent stated above).
d)
Special Assessments for Public Improvements

If the life of a public improvement on the land is shorter than the expected
duration of the life estate, the life tenant is obligated to pay all of the assessment (to the limited extent stated above). However, if the improvement is
likely to outlast the life estate (e.g., curbing, sewers, water mains, a change in
grade of a street), taxes and assessments are apportioned equitably between
the life tenant and the holders of all future interests.
(1) Apportionment of Costs
Costs are usually apportioned by using the ratio produced by the market
value of the life estate over the market value of the property.
e)
No Obligation to Insure Premises

The life tenant is under no obligation to insure the premises for the benet of
a remainderman. However, both the life tenant and the remainderman have an
insurable interest.
REAL PROPERTY 9.
f)
3)
No Liability for Third Partys Torts

Under the modern view, life tenants are not responsible to remaindermen (as
they were at common law) for damages caused by third-party tortfeasors. The
life tenants action against such third parties is limited to the damages to the
life estate.
Ameliorative Waste
Ameliorative waste consists of acts that economically benet the property.
Ameliorative waste occurs when the use of the property is substantially changed,
but the change increases the value of the property. At common law, any change
to existing buildings or other improvements was always actionable waste, even if
it improved the value of the property. Under modern authorities, however, a life
tenant can substantially alter or even demolish existing buildings if:
(i)
The market value of the future (or other nonpossessory) interests is not
diminished; and either
(ii) The remaindermen do not object; or

(iii) A substantial and permanent change in the neighborhood conditions has
deprived the property in its current form of reasonable productivity or usefulness.
Example:
d.
A holds a life estate in Blackacre, and B holds the remainder. The

premises consist of an old and somewhat shabby apartment building
that is nearly fully rented and produces a consistent income. The
surrounding neighborhood includes many similar buildings. A
proposes to demolish the building and construct a new shopping
center on the land, which will produce much higher income. B
objects to the change and brings an action to enjoin the demolition.
B will prevail even though As proposed changes would increase the
value of the property. Because the existing building is economically
productive and consistent with the neighborhood, As commission
of waste would not be justied.
a)
CompareLeasehold Tenant
Leasehold tenants are treated differently from life tenants. Most leasehold
tenants remain liable for ameliorative waste even if the neighborhood has
changed and the market value of the premises is increased. (See II.C.1.a.3),
infra.)
b)
CompareWorthless Property
Under modern authority, a life tenant may ask for a judicial sale in a partition
proceeding if it appears that the land is practically worthless in its present
state. The proceeds are put in trust with income to the life tenant.
Renunciation of Life Estates

A life tenant who receives the estate by will or intestacy may renounce it, perhaps
10. REAL PROPERTY
because owning it would be burdensome. If this occurs, the courts generally accelerate
the future interest that follows the life estate, allowing it to become possessory immediately.
5.
C.
Estates for Years, Periodic Estates, Estates at Will, Tenancies at Sufferance

These nonfreehold present estates in land are considered in the Landlord and Tenant section
of this outline (see II.A., infra).
FUTURE INTERESTS
A future interest is an estate that does not entitle the owner thereof to possession immediately,
but will or may give the owner possession in the future. A future interest is a present, legally
protected right in property; it is not an expectancy.
Examples:
1) O conveys land to A for life, and on As death to B in fee simple. A has a
present possessory life estate. B has a future interest. (Bs future interest is an
indefeasibly vested remainder.) Upon the termination of As possessory life estate,
Bs remainder in fee simple will become a present possessory estate in fee simple.
2) O conveys land to A for life, and on As death to B in fee simple if B survives
A. A has a present possessory life estate. B has a future interest. (It is a contingent
remainder.) Upon the termination of As life estate, Bs remainder in fee simple
may become a present possessory estate in fee simple. B must survive A in order
to take. (In this example, O also has a future interest. He has not conveyed away
the interest represented by the contingency that B may predecease A. If B does
predecease A, on the termination of As life estate title to the land will revert to O.
Os retained future interest is called a reversion.)
3) After the conveyance to A for life, and on As death to B, B can transfer his
remainder interest to another person. Alternatively, if B dies during As lifetime,
his vested remainder will pass to the devisees under his will or (if B left no will) to
his intestate heirs.
1.
Reversionary InterestsFuture Interests in Transferor

a.
Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry

These future interests are discussed above in connection with the present estates to
which they are attached.
b.
Reversions
A person owning an estate in real property can create and transfer a lesser estate (in the
durational sense). The residue left in the grantor, which arises by operation of law, is a
reversion.
Examples:
1) O, owning land in fee simple, conveys it (i) to A for life, or (ii) to
A for 99 years. In each case, O has a reversion in fee simple. She (or her
successors) will be entitled to present possession of the land when the
granted estate terminates.
2) O, owning a life estate in land, leases it to A for 20 years. O has a
reversion in a life estate. If O is still alive when As lease expires, title
REAL PROPERTY 11.
will revert to O for life. What happens if, 10 years after this transfer,
O dies? As lease will come to an end, for he was given a lease by one
holding only a life estate. O cannot convey a greater interest than she
has.
3) O, owning land in fee simple, conveys it to A for life, and on As
death to B if B survives A. A has a life estate, B has a contingent
remainder, and O has a reversion that will take in present possession at
As death if B predeceases A.
Reversions are transferable, devisable by will, and descendible by inheritance. The
holder of a reversion may sue a possessory owner for waste and may recover against
third-party wrongdoers for damages to the property (to the extent of the injury to the
reversion).
c.
2.
All Reversionary Interests Are Vested

Although a reversionary interest becomes possessory in the future, it is a vested interest,
not a contingent interest, because both the owner and the event upon which it will
become possessory are certain. This is true even if the reversionary interest is determinable or defeasible. Because it is a vested interest, a reversionary interest is not subject to
the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Remainders
A remainder is a future interest created in a transferee that is capable of taking in present
possession and enjoyment (i.e., capable of becoming a present interest) upon the natural
termination of the preceding estates created in the same disposition. Unlike a reversion,
which arises by operation of law from the fact that the transferor has not made a complete
disposition of his interest, a remainder must be expressly created in the instrument creating
the intermediate possessory estate. At common law, the only preceding estates that could
support a remainder were life estates and fee tails. Because nearly all American jurisdictions
have abolished the fee tail estate, a safe rule of thumb is that remainders always follow life
estates. (Note: According to the Restatement of Property, under modern law, a remainder
can also follow a term of years. However, there is very little case law on the point, and it is so
rare that it is extremely unlikely to be tested.)
Examples:
1) To A for life, and on As death to B and his heirs. A has a present possessory life estate. B has a remainder in fee simple. It is a remainder because
upon the expiration of As life estate (natural termination of the preceding
estate), B will be entitled to present possession and enjoyment of the property.
The term remainder derives from the consequence that when As life estate
comes to an end, title remains away from the transferor instead of reverting
back to him.
2) On Monday, O conveys Blackacre to A for life. On Wednesday, O
conveys all of my right, title, and interest in Blackacre to B. B holds a reversion, not a remainder. Bs future interest was not created in the same disposition that gave A a life estate. The Monday conveyance gave A a life estate and
raised a reversion in O. The Wednesday conveyance transferred Os reversion
to B. Once a reversion, always a reversion.
12. REAL PROPERTY
A remainder cannot cut short or divest a preceding estate prior to its normal expiration. Therefore, a remainder can never follow a fee simple, which has a potentially innite
duration. Future interests that cut short a preceding estate or follow a gap after it are called
executory interests. (See 3., infra.)
a.
Indefeasibly Vested Remainder

An indefeasibly vested remainder is a remainder that:
(i)
Can be created in and held only by an ascertained person or persons in being;
(ii) Must be certain to become possessory on termination of the prior estates (i.e.,
there is no condition that may operate to prevent the remainder from someday
becoming a present interest);
(iii) Must not be subject to being defeated or divested (compare the vested remainder
subject to total divestment, c., infra); and
(iv) Must not be subject to being diminished in size (compare the vested remainder
subject to open, b., infra).
Examples:
1) To A for life, and on As death to B. A has a life estate; B has an

indefeasibly vested remainder which is certain to take in possession on
the termination of As life estate.
What if B dies in As lifetime? There is no stated condition that B
survive A in order to take, and the courts do not imply such a condition. Bs indefeasibly vested remainder passes by will or intestacy to his
successors, who own an indefeasibly vested remainder.
2) To A for life, then to As rst-born son in fee. At the time of this
disposition, A has no children. The state of title: life estate in A, contingent remainder in the rst son to be born to A, reversion in fee simple in
the transferor. (The reversion will take in present possession if A never
has a son.) The remainder is not vested because it is not created in an
ascertained person in being. Also, it is subject to the condition that A
have a child.
Two years later A has a son, John. The state of title: life estate in A,
indefeasibly vested remainder in fee simple in John.
b.
Vested Remainder Subject to Open

This is a vested remainder created in a class of persons (e.g., children, brothers and
sisters) that is certain to take on the termination of the preceding estates, but is subject
to diminution by reason of other persons becoming entitled to share in the remainder. It
is also called a vested remainder subject to partial divestment.
Examples:
1) To A for life, and on As death to her children in equal shares. If at
the time of this disposition A has no children, the state of title is: life
estate in A; contingent remainder in the unborn children of A; reversion
REAL PROPERTY 13.
in fee in the transferor, which will take in possession if A never has any
children.
Suppose two years later a child, Bob, is born to A. The state of title
is: life estate in A, vested remainder subject to open in Bob. Bobs
remainder is vested because he is in existence and ascertained and his
taking is not subject to any contingency. But it is vested subject to open
because A may have more children.
Two years later another child, Ray, is born to A. Bobs remainder has
been partially divested in favor of Ray, who also meets the description children of A. Bob and Ray now hold the vested remainder as
tenants in common (each with an undivided one-half share) subject to
openi.e., their vested remainders will be partially divested if more
children are born to A.
Two years later Bob dies; shortly thereafter, A dies. Bobs successors (by
will or intestacy) and Ray are entitled to present possession and enjoyment of the property. Bobs share of the remainder was subject to partial
divestment, but it was not subject to being totally defeated. No condition
of survival was attached to Bobs interest. Bob (or his successors) was
certain to take; the only question was the size of his share.
2) Gift by will to my wife, Rowena, for life, and on her death to
my children in equal shares. T is survived by Rowena and by three
children. At rst blush this looks like a vested remainder subject to open
because it is a remainder to someones children. In reality, though, it is
indefeasibly vested. T, being dead, can have no more children. (Slight
qualication of answer: If Rowena is pregnant with Ts child at Ts
death, the posthumous child, if born alive, will share in the gift.)
c.
1)
Divesting Interests Are Executory Interests

Once the remainder vests in one existing member of the class, the divesting interest
in the unborn members of the class is called an executory interest.
2)
Effect on Marketability of Title

Note that where there are outstanding interests in the unborn children, the vested
remainderman and the life tenant cannot jointly convey good title.
Example:
O to A for life, remainder to Bs children. C wants to buy the
land, and desires to know if he can get good title if he purchases
from A and all of Bs living children. The answer is no, as long as
B is alive, because it is possible for B to have more children (no
matter what Bs age). Thus, there would be outstanding interests in
the unborn children of B, and C would not get good title.
Vested Remainder Subject to Total Divestment

A vested remainder subject to total divestment arises when the remainderman is in
existence and ascertained and his interest is not subject to any condition precedent, but
14. REAL PROPERTY
his right to possession and enjoyment is subject to being defeated by the happening of
some condition subsequent.
Examples:
1) To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs, but if at Bs death he
is not survived by issue, to C and his heirs. Here, B has a vested
remainder in fee simple, but his fee simple interest is subject to being
divested if at his death he is not survived by issue. (C has a shifting
executory interest.)
2) To A for life, then to B for life. A has a life estate. B has a vested
remainder in a life estate subject to total divestment. The transferor has
a reversion in fee. Bs remainder is vested even though (as a practical
matter) he must survive A in order to take. But this practical requirement does not make Bs remainder contingent. The only condition to
Bs taking is the natural termination of As life estate, and this condition is inherent in any remainder life estate. There is no other condition
precedent. However, Bs remainder life estate is not indefeasibly vested,
for it will be defeated if he dies in As lifetime. Therefore, it is a vested
remainder subject to total divestment.
3) To A for life, and on As death to B; but if B predeceases A, on As
death to C. A has a life estate. B has a vested remainder subject to total
divestment. Although Bs taking is contingent on his surviving A, that
contingency is expressed as a condition subsequentmeaning that Bs
remainder is vested subject to total divestment. (C has a shifting executory interest.)
d.
Contingent Remainder
There are two ways to create a contingent remainder.
1)
Subject to Condition Precedent

A remainder will be classied as contingent if its taking in possession is subject to
a condition precedent (contingent as to event).
Examples:
1) To A for life, and on As death to B if B survives A. A has a
life estate; B has a contingent remainder in fee simple. The transferor has a reversion, which will become a possessory estate on the
termination of As life estate if B predeceases A. Here, Bs taking
is subject to a contingency, stated as a condition precedent, that he
must survive A in order to take.
Compare this with Example 3) in the preceding section. In that
example, Bs taking is also subject to a contingency: he must
survive A in order to take. Thus in substance, this example and
Example 3) are quite similar. But in classifying future interests,
the general rule is that it is form and not substance that counts.
In Example 3), the contingency of survival is expressed as a condition subsequent; therefore, Bs remainder is vested subject to total
divestment. But in this example, the contingency of survival is
expressed as a condition precedent; therefore, Bs remainder is a
contingent remainder.
REAL PROPERTY 15.
2) To A for life, and on As death to B if B marries C. Here,

B is an ascertained person, but there is a condition precedent to
Bs taking: he must marry C. If B marries C in As lifetime, his
remainder will become indefeasibly vested.
3) O conveys to A for life, then to B and his heirs if B survives A;
if B does not survive A, then to C and his heirs. Each remainder is
contingent because each is subject to a condition precedent. They
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive; i.e., only one can come into
possession, and when it does the other can never do so. These are
called alternative contingent remainders.
Compare:
2)
O conveys to A for life, then to B and his heirs, but if B marries

C, then to D and his heirs. Here B, an ascertained person, takes a
vested remainder because it is not limited on a condition precedent.
Bs remainder is ready to come into possession whenever A dies.
But the marriage condition is subsequentBs marriage to C will
forfeit his estate. Ds interest is called an executory interest.
Unborn or Unascertained Persons

A remainder is contingent if it is created in favor of unborn or unascertained
persons (contingent as to person), because until the remainderman is ascertained, there is no one ready to take possession should the preceding estate come
to an end.
Examples:
1) To A for life, and on As death, per stirpes to such of As
descendants as survive her. At the time of this disposition, A is
in poor health and she has two adult children (B and C) who are
very healthy. State of title: A has a life estate; there is a contingent
remainder in such of As descendants as survive A; the transferor
has a reversion (for A may not be survived by any descendants).
While the odds are in B and Cs favor that they will take the
remainder upon As death, they are not named as the remaindermen. The remainder is in such of As descendants as survive A,
and we will not be able to identify the remaindermen until A dies
and we can see which of As descendants survived her.
2) O transfers securities in trust to pay the income to A for life,
and on As death to distribute the trust corpus to As heirs. There is
a contingent remainder in As heirs. It is true that As heirs will be
determined the moment A dies and As life estate terminates. But
at the time O makes the transfer, the remaindermen are not ascertained, for nemo est haeres viventis (no one is heir of the living).
The persons who turn out to be As heirs will not be ascertained
until A dies.
3)
Destructibility of Contingent Remainders

At common law, a contingent remainder had to vest prior to or upon termination of
the preceding freehold estate or it was destroyed.
16. REAL PROPERTY
Examples:
1) O conveyed to A for life, then to the heirs of B. If A predeceased B, there were no heirs of B to take possession so the
remainder was destroyed and O or his estate retook possession.
2) O conveyed to A for life, then to B if she reaches age 21. If A
died before B reached 21, the remainder was destroyed. (Note that
whenever a grantor created a contingent remainder, he retained a
reversion, which was normally defeasible.)
Analysis: Why are the interests in the above examples remainders
and not executory interests? In each instance it is possible that the
future interest will take effect at the natural expiration of As life
estate (as remainders do), or that it will take effect following a gap
after As estate (as executory interests do). The rule is that if an
interest may operate as either a remainder or an executory interest
(depending on the circumstances at As death), it is a remainder.
Thus, at common law, if such a remainder was then called upon to
act as an executory interest, it could not do so and was destroyed.
a)
Rule Abolished
Today, the rule of destructibility has been abolished in all but a few states.
Thus, in the two examples given above, on As death, Os reversion would
take over, and would then give way to a springing executory interest on Bs
death in the rst example, and on Bs attaining age 21 in the second. (Note
that the contingent remainders are not destroyed when the preceding estate
ends, but instead become executory interests because they will divest the
transferors estate.)
b)
Related Doctrine of Merger

Whenever the same person acquires all of the existing interests in land,
present and future, a merger occurs. That person then holds a fee simple
absolute. For example, suppose O conveys by deed to A for life. O now has
a reversion. Subsequently, by a later deed, O conveys his reversion interest to
A. A will have a fee simple absolute by merger. (A similar result would follow
if A conveyed her life estate to O.) Moreover, the common law held (as an
aspect of the destructibility doctrine) that if a person acquired all of the interests in land except a contingent remainder, the merger would occur anyway,
and the contingent remainder would be destroyed! Contingent remainders
were considered to be such imsy, ephemeral interests that they would not
keep the merger from occurring. Note that this is still the rule in those few
states retaining the common law rule of destructibility.
Example:
In Example 1), above (O to A for life, then to the heirs of
B), title stands as a life estate in A, a contingent remainder in
the as yet unascertained heirs of B, and a reversion (if B is still
alive at the death of A) in O. If O then purchased As interest,
O would hold a life estate pur autre vie (for the life of A) and
a reversion. At common law, Os two interests on either side of
the contingent remainder merged, wiping out the contingent
remainder and giving O a fee simple.
REAL PROPERTY 17.
(1) CompareInterests Created Simultaneously

If a life estate and the next vested interest were created simultaneously
(by the same instrument), there would be no merger at that time because
that would defeat the grantors obvious intent to create a contingent
remainder. However, if the life tenant subsequently conveyed his interest
to the holder of the next vested estate, the contingent remainder would
then be destroyed.
e.
Rule in Shelleys Case (Rule Against Remainders in Grantees Heirs)

At common law, where a freehold estate (usually a life estate) was given to A (by will
or inter vivos transfer), and in the same instrument a remainder was limited to the
heirs or to the heirs of the body of A, and the freehold estate and the remainder
were both legal or both equitable, the purported remainder in the heirs was not recognized, and A took both the freehold estate and the remainder. The Rule operated
(regardless of the grantors intent) to convert what would otherwise have been a contingent remainder in the heirs into a remainder in the ancestor.
Examples:
1) O grants or devises land to A for life, and then to the heirs of A.
Apart from the Rule in Shelleys Case, the title would be: life estate
in A, contingent remainder in fee simple in As heirs. But by virtue
of the Rule, the title is: life estate in A, vested remainder in A in fee
simple. (Here, the law of merger causes As life estate to merge with his
remainder so that A gets a present estate in fee simple.)
2) O to A for life, then to B for life, then to the heirs of A. A has a
life estate, and the Rule in Shelleys Case transforms the contingent
remainder in the heirs of A into a vested remainder in fee simple in A.
But merger does not occur because of the intervening vested remainder
limited to B.
3) O to A for life, then to B for life, then to the heirs of B. The Rule in
Shelleys Case operates, as does merger, and B has a vested remainder in
fee simple.
4) O to A for life, then one day after As death to the heirs of A. The
Rule in Shelleys Case does not operate because the interest limited to
the heirs of A is not a remainder (it can never take over immediately at
the termination of the prior freehold estate), but rather is an executory
interest.
Compare:
O conveys land to A and his heirs. A takes a fee simplenot by

operation of the Rule in Shelleys Case, but because the words and
his heirs are words of limitation denoting that a fee simple estate has
been conveyed. (See I.B.1., supra.) (It is a common student error to
conclude, in this case, that A takes a fee simple because of the Rule in
Shelleys Case. This rule is triggered only by the attempted creation of a
remainder in the grantees heirs.)
Note: This Rule has been abolished in most states today, but arises occasionally where
a conveyance was executed prior to abolition of the Rule.
18. REAL PROPERTY
f.
Doctrine of Worthier Title (Rule Against Remainders in Grantors Heirs)

Under the Doctrine of Worthier Title (DOWT), a remainder limited to the grantors
heirs is invalid, and the grantor retains a reversion in the property. This doctrine is still
applied to inter vivos transfers in a majority of states, but most states treat it only as
a rule of construction (i.e., it does not apply if the grantor has clearly manifested an
intent to create a future interest in his heirs).
Example:
O deeds property to A for life, and on As death to my heirs at law,
or . . . and on As death to my next of kin. In most states, the disposition gives A a life estate and presumptively leaves a reversion in fee
simple in O. The burden of establishing that O really intended to create
a remainder in his heirs (or next of kin) would be on the parties so
contending. The litigation would arise after Os death, and would be
between (i) the persons designated as Os heirs under the states intestacy laws, claiming that they take on As death by remainder; and (ii) the
devisees under Os will, contending that O died owning a reversion.
In a state that has abolished the doctrine, the state of title is: life estate in
A; contingent remainder in Os heirs; reversion in O.
Compare:
1) O deeds property to A for life, and on As death to my children in

equal shares. On Os death, his children, X and Y, are Os sole heirs.
DOWT does not apply. The doctrine applies only when there is a disposition, following a life estate, to the transferors heirs or next of kin,
or words of like effect.
2) O deeds property to A for life, and on As death to the heirs born to
my wife Martha and me. DOWT does not apply; the disposition creates
a life estate in A and a vested remainder subject to open in the children
of O and Martha. Although O used the term heirs, it is clear from the
context that he was not using the term in its technical sense, but was
referring to his children by his wife Martha.
3.
Executory Interests
Here is a good shorthand rule for classifying executory interests. Remember that there are
two and only two future interests that can be created in a transferee: remainders and executory interests. If it is not a remainder because the preceding estate is not a life estate, then
it must be an executory interest. Thus, an executory interest is any future interest in a transferee that does not have the characteristics of a remainder, i.e., it is not capable of taking on
the natural termination of the preceding life estate. More specically, an executory interest is
an interest that divests the interest of another.
a.
Shifting Executory InterestDivests a Transferee

A shifting executory interest is one that divests the interest of another transferee; i.e., it
cuts short a prior estate created by the same conveyance.
Examples:
1) To A and her heirs; but if B returns from Canada, then and in that
event to B and his heirs. A has a fee simple subject to an executory
interest. Because the future interest is created in a transferee, it has to
be either a remainder or an executory interest. Bs future interest is not
a remainder because it does not follow the natural termination of the
REAL PROPERTY 19.
preceding estate (here, As fee simple estate). If Bs interest does take in

present possession, it will divest As fee simple, and title will shift to B.
2) O conveys to A for life, remainder to B and his heirs, but if B predeceases A, to C and his heirs. Cs interest does not await the expiration of
Bs vested remainder, but instead may cut it short.
b.
Springing Executory InterestFollows a Gap or Divests a Transferor

A springing executory interest is an interest that follows a gap in possession or divests
the estate of the transferor.
Examples:
1) O conveys property to A when and if A marries B. State of title: fee
simple subject to an executory interest in O; springing executory interest
in fee simple in A. As interest is not a remainder because if As future
interest becomes a present interest (if A marries B), it will divest Os
fee simple. Because it divests the estate of a transferor, it is a springing
executory interest.
2) O conveys property to A for life, and one year after As death to
B. A has a life estate. O has a reversion. B has a springing executory
interest in fee simple. Bs interest cannot be a remainder because of the
one-year gap; it is not capable of taking on the natural termination of the
preceding estate (As life estate). It is therefore an executory interest. It is
a springing executory interest because it springs out of the transferors
reversion.
c.
Executory Interest Follows a Fee

A remainder cannot follow a fee simple interest of any kind. Therefore, any interest
that follows a fee and is held by a third person is an executory interest.
Examples:
1) O conveys land to Church for so long as the premises are used for
church purposes, and if they shall ever cease to be so used, then and in
that event to the American Red Cross. Church has a fee simple determinable subject to an executory interest; the Red Cross has an executory
interest that is valid under the charity-to-charity exception to the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
2) O conveys to Church; provided, however, that if the premises shall
ever cease to be used for church purposes, then and in that event to the
American Red Cross. Church has a fee simple subject to an executory
interest; the Red Cross has an executory interest that is valid under the
charity-to-charity exception to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
d.
Differences Between Executory Interests and Remainders

It is important to be able to distinguish between executory interests and remainders
for the following reasons: (i) executory interests are not destructible, while contingent
remainders are still destructible in a few jurisdictions; (ii) executory interests are not
considered vested, whereas contingent remainders can become vested; and (iii) the Rule
in Shelleys Case does not apply to executory interests, but it does apply to remainders
limited to the heirs of the grantee.
20. REAL PROPERTY
4.
Importance of Classifying Interests In Order

Future interests are classied clause by clausewhich will often mean that the label
appended to the rst future interest created in a disposition will determine the label to be
appended to a second future interest created in the same disposition. For instance, if the rst
future interest is a contingent remainder, subsequent future interests must also be contingent
remainders. Similarly, if the rst future interest is a vested remainder subject to divestment,
the following future interests will be executory interests.
Examples:
1) O conveys land to A for life, and on As death to B if B survives A; but if
B does not survive A, on As death to C. A has a life estate. B has a contingent remainder because Bs taking is subject to a contingency (expressed in
condition precedent form) that B must survive A in order to take. C has an
alternative contingent remainder.
Because the contingency of Bs survival is expressed both as a condition
precedent and (in the next clause) as a condition subsequent, why is Bs
remainder classied as contingent rather than as vested subject to total divestment? The explanation is that interests are classied in order. Looking rst
at the clause giving an interest to B, here the contingency is expressed as a
condition precedent; therefore, Bs remainder is contingent. Then, having
classied Bs interest, we turn to Cs interest. But because Bs interest has
already been determined to be a contingent remainder, Cs interest is necessarily an alternative contingent remainder.
2) O conveys land to A for life, and on As death to B. But if B predeceases
A, on As death to C. Watch this one carefully, for the answer turns on the
principle that we classify interests in order. First of all, A has a life estate.
Next we classify Bs interest. It is a remainder, for it is capable of taking on
the natural termination of the preceding estate (As life estate). It is a vested
remainder in fee simple because B is an ascertained person and there is no
condition precedent to Bs taking other than the termination of As life estate.
Having classied it as a vested remainder, we read on (but if) and see
that Bs estate will be defeated if he predeceases A. Therefore, it is a vested
remainder subject to total divestment upon the happening of this condition,
which is expressed in condition subsequent form.
Having classied Bs remainder as vested subject to total divestment, we turn
to Cs interest. It cannot be a remainder, for a remainder follows the natural
termination of the preceding estateBs estate, which is a vested remainder
in fee simple. But no remainder can follow a fee simple, for a fee simple is
an estate of potentially innite duration. If C does take, it will cut short Bs
vested remainder in fee simple some time short of innity. Therefore, Cs
interest is an executory interesta shifting executory interest, because it
divests a transferee.
But isnt Cs interest capable of taking on the natural termination of As life
estate (if B predeceases A)? Yes, but that does not affect our classication.
A remainder is a future interest capable of taking on the termination of the
preceding estate, and here the preceding estate is Bs.
REAL PROPERTY 21.
Suppose, some years after this disposition, B dies during As lifetime.

What is the state of title? The answer: life estate in A, indefeasibly vested
remainder in C. Now that Bs estate is out of the way, the preceding estate
is As life estate, and so now we can change the label and call Cs interest a
remainder.
5.
6.
Transferability of Remainders and Executory Interests

a.
Vested Remainders Are Transferable, Devisable, and Descendible

At common law and in all jurisdictions today, vested remainders are fully transferable
during life, devisable by will, and descendible by inheritance. This is true of all types
of vested remainders: indefeasibly vested, vested subject to open, and vested subject to
total divestment.
b.
Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests Are Transferable Inter Vivos

At common law, contingent remainders and executory interests were not assignable.
While this is still the rule in a few states, most American courts hold that these interests
are freely transferable.
c.
Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests Are Usually Devisable and

Descendible
Whereas the rule at common law was that contingent remainders and executory interests were not transferable inter vivos, it has always been held that these interests are
devisable and descendibleunless, of course, the holders survival is a condition to the
interests taking.
Example:
To A for life, and on As death to B; but if B does not survive A, on As
death to C. State of title: life estate in A, vested remainder subject to
total divestment in B, and shifting executory interest in C. Suppose B
dies in As lifetime, leaving a will that devises all my property to Mrs.
B. Bs remainder interest does not pass under his will because, by the
terms of the disposition, that interest failed when B died in As lifetime.
d.
Any Transferable Future Interest Is Reachable by Creditors

The rule followed in nearly all states is this: If a future interest can, under the laws
of the state, be transferred voluntarily by its owner, it is also subject to involuntary
transfer; i.e., it can be reached by the owners creditors by appropriate process.
e.
Practical Ability to Transfer Marketable Title

Technically, most states consider all types of future interests transferable, but in practice
those interests held by unborn or unascertained persons are not transferable because
courts will not appoint a guardian for purposes of conveying land. (See VI.A.3.a.1)b),
infra.)
Class Gifts
A class is a group of persons having a common characteristic. Typically, they stand in the
same relation to each other or to some other person (e.g., children, grandchildren, descendants, nephews and nieces). In a gift to a class, the share of each member of the class is
determined by the number of persons in the class.
22. REAL PROPERTY
a.
b.
Denitional Problems
1)
Dispositions to Children
A gift to a persons children generally includes that persons children from all
marriages as well as adopted and nonmarital children. That persons stepchildren
and grandchildren are generally not included in the class.
2)
Dispositions to Heirs
A disposition to the heirs of someone presumptively includes those persons who
would take the named persons estate according to the laws of descent and distribution if she were to die without a will.
3)
Dispositions to Issue or Descendants

The terms issue and descendants refer to the lineal offspring of the designated
person, whatever the degree of relationship (children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc.). As a general principle, the issue or descendants take per stirpes.
4)
Class Members in Gestation

Persons in gestation at the time set for distribution are included in a class. The
common law presumption is that a child born within 10 lunar months or 280
calendar days after the necessary point in time was in gestation at that time.
When the Class ClosesThe Rule of Convenience

When a gift is made to a group of persons generically described as a class, such as to
someones children, there is the possibility that other persons may be born who meet
the class description. This raises the question, when does the class close; i.e., when is
the maximum membership of the class determined, such that persons born thereafter
are excluded from sharing in the gift? In resolving this problem, the common law courts
developed the rule of convenience. This is a rule of construction, not a rule of law. It is
applicable in the absence of an expression of intent to include all persons who meet the
class description regardless of when they are born. Under the rule, a class closes when
some member of the class can call for a distribution of her share of the class gift.
It is presumed that the ordinary transferor intends to include all members of the class,
whenever born, provided that this would not cause any undue inconvenience. Thus,
the rule of convenience is based on a policy of including as many persons in the class as
possible, consistent with permitting a distribution of the property at the rst opportunity
without the necessity of a future rebate.
1)
Outright GiftClass Closes at Time Gift Is Made

When a will makes an outright gift to a class, if any class members are alive at the
testators death, the class closes as of the date of the testators death.
Example:
Ts will devises property to the children of my good friend, John
Brown. John has three children (A, B, and C) at the time of Ts
death; another child (D) is born two years later. The class closes at
Ts death; A, B, and C share the gift. D is excluded by the rule of
convenience.
Here, additional members of the class are included up to the time
of Ts death because there is no inconvenience in doing so. But we
REAL PROPERTY 23.
close the class at Ts death because it is assumed that T would want

an immediate distribution, rather than postponing distribution until
John Browns death, which is the only time we will be sure that
John Brown will have no more children. If we were to include D,
we would also have to include E, F, and G, who might be born later.
Moreover, if we distributed one-third shares to A, B, and C at Ts
death, but required them to make rebates if more children should be
born later to their father, John, all sorts of practical problems would
arise. To avoid these problems, there is a strong constructional
preference to close the class at Ts death.
a)
2)
No Class Members Alive at Testators DeathClass Stays Open

If there are no members of the class living at the testators death, all afterborn
persons who come within the class designation are included. Thus, if T had
bequeathed $100,000 to the children of John, and John had no children
living at Ts death or born within the period of gestation thereafter, then all
of Johns children, whenever born, are included, regardless of any possible
inconvenience in keeping the class open this long.
Postponed GiftClass Closes at Time Fixed for Distribution

When possession and enjoyment of a gift are postponed, as where the gift follows
a life estate, the class remains open until the time xed for distribution (e.g., death
of the life tenant).
Example:
Ts will creates a trust to pay the income to W for life, and on Ws
death to pay the principal to the children of John. At the time T
executes his will, John has two children (A and B). After the will is
executed but before T dies, another child (C) is born to John. After
Ts death but during Ws lifetime, another child (D) is born to John.
W dies; two years later John has another child (E).
The class closes at Ws death; A, B, C, and D each take a
one-fourth share. E is excluded by the rule of convenience. There
was no inconvenience in leaving the class open until Ws death,
for the time had not yet come to distribute the corpus. But when W
dies, it is time to make a distribution; the class is closed in order to
determine the minimum shares going to each class member.
3)
Dispositions Subject to Condition of Reaching Given Age

When there is a gift to a class conditioned upon the members attaining a certain
age, the class closes when (i) the preceding estate, if any, terminates, and (ii) the
rst class member reaches the specied age. That class members minimum share
should be determined and distributed to her when she reaches the specied age.
Examples:
1) Ts will devises his residuary estate to the children of John who
live to attain the age of 21. At Ts death, John has three children:
A (age 22), B (age 16), and C (age 10). The class closes at Ts
death. A is entitled to immediate distribution of her share, and
the minimum size of that share must be xed as of Ts death, at
24. REAL PROPERTY
one-third. If B lives to attain age 21, but C dies before attaining that
age, on Cs death, A and Bs shares will be increased to one-half.
Two years after Ts death, another child (D) is born to John. D is
excluded by the rule of convenience. The class was closed at Ts
death in order to determine the minimum size of As share so that
this share could be distributed to her.
Suppose none of Johns children is 21 at Ts death. The class
remains open until a child of John reaches the designated age, at
which time the class closes.
2) Ts will devises his residuary estate to Wanda for life, and on
Wandas death to such of Johns children as live to attain the age
of 21. Here, the class will close, and the remaindermen who share
in the disposition will be determined, when two things occur: (i)
Wanda dies; and (ii) a child of John reaches age 21. If at Ts death
one of Johns children is over age 21, it does not matter; the class
remains open until Wandas life estate terminates. Likewise, if
at Wandas death no child of John has attained age 21, the class
remains open until one of Johns children reaches that age. If at
Wandas death a child has attained age 21, the class will close at
that time.
4)
7.
Rule of Convenience Is a Rule of Construction Only

The rule of convenience is a rule of construction only. If the transferor explicitly
sets forth the time when membership of the class is to be determined, or if he
provides that all members of the class, whenever born, are to share in the gift, then
his directions will govern. However, courts have a strong preference for application
of the rule of convenience unless there is a fairly clear indication that it is not to
govern.
Survival
As a general rule, all future interests can pass at death by will or inheritance; i.e., they are
descendible and devisable. This is true unless the interests taking is subject to an expressed
or implied contingency of survival.
Examples:
1) Ts will devises his residuary estate to my sister Sue for life, and on Sues
death to her children in equal shares. At the time of Ts death, Sue has
three children: A, B, and C. C dies, then Sue dies survived by A and B. The
remainder is shared by A, B, and the estate of C (i.e., the estate takes under
Cs will or by intestacy), each with one-third shares. Analysis: A, B, and C
had vested remainders subject to open, but their interests were not in terms
conditioned on surviving the life beneciaryand the law does not imply
such a condition of survival. On Cs death, his vested remainder subject to
open passes via his will or by intestacy. (Note: This example does not invoke
the lapsed gift doctrine of Wills law, for C was alive at the testators death.)
2) To A for life, and on As death to B if B is then living; but if B is not
then living, to C. C dies, then B dies, then A dies. Who takes? Answer: The
REAL PROPERTY 25.
takers under Cs will or by intestacy. B and C were given alternative contingent remainders. Bs remainder was contingent on his surviving A, and B did
not meet the condition; his estate was defeated. Cs remainder was contingent
on Bs not surviving A; it was not in terms contingent on Cs surviving A, and
the law does not imply such a condition.
a.
Express Words of Survival

In each of the following examples, the italicized language imposes a condition precedent that the remaindermen must survive the life tenant in order to take.
Examples:
1) To A for life, remainder to his surviving children.
2) To A for life, and should he die leaving children, to such children.
3) To A for life, and after the death of A, remainder to the children of A
then living.
b.
D.
Implied Contingency of SurvivalGifts to Issue, Descendants, or Heirs

Gifts to a persons issue, descendants, or heirs imply a condition of surviving the
named ancestor.
TRUSTS
An express trust involves the holding of title to property by a trustee, who has an equitable
duciary duty to deal with it for the benet of other persons (the beneciaries).
1.
Private Trust Concepts and Parties

a.
Settlor
The settlor is the person who creates the trust by manifesting an intent to do so. While
a trust of personal property may be expressed orally, the Statute of Frauds requires a
writing to create a trust of real property. The settlor must own the property at the time
the trust is created and must intend to make the trust effective immediately.
b.
Trustee
The trustee holds legal title to the property, but must act under the instructions of the
settlor who created the trust. The trustee has a duciary duty to use the highest care and
skill for the beneciaries. If the trustee has no duties at all, the trust will fail, and legal
title will vest immediately in the beneciaries. However, if the trustee dies, resigns, or
refuses to serve, the trust will not fail; a court of equity will appoint a substitute trustee.
c.
Beneciaries
The beneciaries are the persons for whose benet the trust is created and held;
they hold equitable title to the property. Every private trust must have at least one
beneciary, and the beneciaries must be denitely identiable by the time their
interest comes into enjoyment and, in all events, within the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Acceptance of the benets of the trust is normally presumed, but a beneciary may renounce his rights under the trust within a reasonable time after learning of
its creation. A trust may be for a class of beneciaries (e.g., all the living descendants
of Mary Jones), provided that the class is small enough to be reasonably denite.
26. REAL PROPERTY
2.
3.
d.
Res
The res is the property that is the subject of the trust. If there is no res, the trust fails.
The res may be real property or personal property (tangible or intangible), and it may
be either a present interest or a future interest (vested or contingent). The trust res must
be segregated from other property of the settlor, but this does not preclude a trust of a
fractional share interest, such as a trust of an undivided one-half interest in Blackacre,
where the settlor owns all of Blackacre.
e.
Application of Rule Against Perpetuities

The Rule Against Perpetuities (see E., infra) applies to the equitable future interests of
the beneciaries in a private trust just as it does to legal future interests.
Example:
O conveys land to T in trust for the benet of A so long as the existing
house on the land remains standing, and then for the benet of the then
living descendants of A. The equitable interest of the descendants of A
is void because it is not certain to vest or fail within 21 years after the
life of any person living at the time the trust is created.
Creation of Trusts
a.
Inter Vivos Conveyance

An inter vivos trust can be created by the settlors conveyance of the trust res to the
trustee while the settlor is alive. For real property, this must be done by a writing to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds; this is usually accomplished by delivery of a deed.
b.
Inter Vivos Declaration

The settlor may declare that he is now holding certain property (previously held outright
by the settlor) in trust for certain beneciaries. No deed or delivery is necessary, but if
the res is real property, the declaration must be in writing and signed by the settlor.
c.
Testamentary Conveyance
The settlor may create the trust by language in his will, and may also transfer the res
to the trustee by a devise in the will. The trust will come into existence only upon the
death of the settlor.
d.
Pour-Over into Existing Trust

The settlor may create an inter vivos trust before death. The settlors will may then
bequeath property to the trustpouring it over into the trust.
Charitable Trusts
a.
Beneciaries
A charitable trust, unlike the private trusts described above, must have an indenite
group of beneciaries. The beneciaries must be reasonably numerous and not individually identied. The trust may be for the benet of an established charity (e.g., the
American Red Cross) or for a group of persons (e.g., the victims of Hurricane Sandy).
b.
Application of Rule Against Perpetuities

The Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to trusts that are entirely charitable. Such
trusts may have innite life. This is true even if the trust benets two charities, one
with a present interest and the other with a future interest that would normally violate
REAL PROPERTY 27.
the Rule Against Perpetuities. Note, however, that if either the rst or second interest is
noncharitable, the exemption from the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply and the
second gift is void.
Examples:
1) O conveys land to T in trust for the benet of the victims of
Hurricane Sandy, and when all houses destroyed by the hurricane have
been rebuilt, then for the benet of the American Red Cross. The
interest of the Red Cross may not vest until more than 21 years after the
death of any person living when the trust is created, but it is still a valid
interest.
2) O conveys land to T in trust for the benet of my son John, whose
house was destroyed by Hurricane Sandy, and when his house has been
rebuilt, then for the benet of the American Red Cross. The interest of
the Red Cross may not vest until more than 21 years after the death of
any person living when the trust is created, and it is void.
E.
c.
Cy Pres Doctrine
If the purposes of a charitable trust are impossible to fulll, are illegal, or have been
completely fullled, a court may redirect the trust to a different purpose that is as near
as may be (a translation of the Latin cy pres) to the settlors original intent.
d.
Enforcement of Charitable Trusts

Charitable trusts may be enforced by an action of the attorney general of the state.
Under the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"), enacted by the majority of states, the settlor
and qualied beneciaries also have standing to enforce a charitable trust. [UTC 110,
405(c)]
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

The Rule Against Perpetuities may be stated as follows: No interest in property is valid unless
it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after one or more lives in being at the creation of the
interest. The Rule might be more easily understood if it had been expressed as an afrmative
proposition: An interest is void if there is any possibility, however remote, that the interest may
vest more than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. This paraphrase of
the Rule properly places the emphasis on the possibility of remote vesting, the test by which the
invalidity of an interest is shown. If a situation can be imagined in which the interest might not
vest within the perpetuities period, the interest is void. This is the result even though the circumstances that might bring about the remote vesting are unlikely to occur or are unrealistic. (All
kinds of unlikely things are considered capable of happening under the Rule.) The Rule applies to
the following legal and equitable future interests in personal or real property:
(i)
Contingent remainders;
(ii) Executory interests;

(iii) Class gifts (even if vested remainders);
(iv) Options and rights of rst refusal; and
(v) Powers of appointment.
28. REAL PROPERTY
1.
Analysis of the Rule

a.
b.
When the Perpetuities Period Begins to Run

The validity of interests under the Rule is determined at the time the interests are
created, taking into account the facts then existing. The lives in being plus 21 years
period begins to run, and the measuring lives used to show the validity of an interest
must be in existence, at that time.
1)
WillsDate of Testators Death

The perpetuities period in the case of a will begins to run on the date of the testators death.
2)
Revocable TrustsDate Trust Becomes Irrevocable

In the case of revocable trusts, the perpetuities period begins to run on the date
the trust becomes irrevocable. This will be at the settlors death unless the settlor
amends the trust, making it irrevocable, during his lifetime.
3)
Irrevocable TrustsDate Trust Is Created

The perpetuities period for irrevocable trusts begins to run on the date the trust is
created.
4)
DeedsDate Deed Is Delivered with Intent to Pass Title

In the case of a deed, the perpetuities period begins to run on the date the deed is
delivered with the intent to pass title.
Must Vest
To be valid under the Rule, it must be shown that the interest created in the transferee must vest, regardless of what might happen, within lives in being plus 21 years.
An interest becomes vested for purposes of the Rule when: (i) it becomes a present
possessory estate, or (ii) it becomes an indefeasibly vested remainder or a vested
remainder subject to total divestment. Remember that the Rule is applicable only to
future interests created in third persons; consequently, the Rule generally applies only to
contingent remainders, executory interests, and vested remainders subject to open.
Examples:
1) To A for life, then to As children for their lives, and on the death
of the last survivor of As children, to B in fee simple. At the time of
this disposition, A has two very young children and is quite capable of
having more children in the future. (i) A has a present possessory life
estate. As present children have vested remainders in life estates that
are subject to open in favor of any future children born to A. There is
a contingent remainder in a life estate in As unborn childrenbut this
interest is valid under the Rule because the childrens life estates will
vest at their birth, which will be in As lifetime. B has an indefeasibly
vested remainder in fee simple. (ii) Bs interest is valid under the Rule
even though it may be years before B (or her successors) is entitled to
present possession and enjoyment of the property, and even though B
(or her successors) may not succeed to present possession and enjoyment until the death of some person not now in being (i.e., a future-born
child of A may be the last survivor of As children). Despite all this,
REAL PROPERTY 29.
Bs interest is valid under the Rule because it is an indefeasibly vested

remainder from the time of its creation.
2) To A for life, then to B; but if at Bs death she is not survived by
children, then in that event to C. (i) A has a present possessory life
estate. B has a vested remainder subject to total divestment in fee simple.
C has a shifting executory interest in fee simple. (ii) Cs interest is valid
under the Rule. Bs is the relevant life that can be used to show that Cs
interest will vest within the perpetuities period. If B dies in As lifetime
not survived by children, Cs interest will become an indefeasibly vested
remainder. If B survives A and thereafter dies not survived by children,
Cs executory interest will become a present possessory estate. Of
course, B may die in As lifetime (or after As death) leaving children
surviving her, in which case Cs interest is extinguished. But that does
not matter; the Rule requires that an interest must vest, if it does vest (if
at all), within lives in being plus 21 years.
3) To A for life, and on her death to such of her children as attain the
age of 35. At the time this disposition takes effect, A is a 60-year-old
woman who has had a hysterectomy. She has two children, ages 30 and
25. Under the common law Rule, here is what might happen: A might
give birth to a child (defying medical science in the process). (See also
V.D.2., infra.) Then As other two children might die before attaining
age 35; then A might die before the afterborn attained his 14th birthday.
(Key: 35 minus 21 is 14.) The afterborn child lives on to attain age 35.
If these events were to occur, the remainder to such of As children as
attain age 35 would vest remotely. Because these events might occur, the
remainder violates the Rule; it is stricken.
1)
c.
Wait and See Rule

A majority of states have modied the must vest, if at all rule above. Under the
modied approach, these states suspend judgment as to whether the interest in
question is good or void. Potentially, they wait until the end of the perpetuities
period. If the interest in question actually vests during the period, it is good; if it
does not vest or fail during that period, it is void. Until the end of the perpetuities
period, it is impossible to know for sure whether the interest is good or not.
Example:
Consider Example 3), above: To A for life, and on her death to
such of her children as attain the age of 35. Under the wait and
see approach, the courts would inquire as to whether in fact any
child of A reaches the age of 35 within 21 years after As death. If
one or more of As children does so, the remainder is valid; if none
does so, the remainder is void.
If at All
This simply means that the interest does not have to vest within the perpetuities period
in order to be valid; after all, many contingent remainders never vest because the condition precedent to their taking is not satised.
Examples:
1) To A for life, and on As death to B if B is then living. A has a life
30. REAL PROPERTY
estate, B has a contingent remainder, and the transferor has a reversion.

B may never take, for she may predecease A. But if B does take (if at
all), her interest will vesthere, will become a possessory estateon
As death, when we will know whether B has survived A. In this case, B
is her own life in being, for the condition precedent to Bs taking must
occur, if it does occur, within Bs lifetime. Bs interest is valid under the
Rule.
2) To A in fee, but on the express condition that if marijuana is ever
smoked on the premises during Bs lifetime or within 21 years after Bs
death, then and in that event to B in fee. A has a fee simple subject to an
executory interest; B has an executory interest in fee simple. Bs interest
might not take, for marijuana might not be smoked on the premises
during Bs lifetime or within 21 years thereafter. But if Bs interest does
take, by the terms of the disposition it must take during Bs lifetime or
within 21 years thereafter. Bs interest is valid under the Rule.
d.
Lives in Being
The law allows any lives to be used to show the validity or invalidity of an interest,
but no lives are of any help unless they are somehow connected with the vesting of an
interest. The measuring lives need not be given a benecial interest in the property, and
they need not even be expressly referred to in the instrument, but there must be some
connection that insures vesting or failure of the interest within the perpetuities period.
Examples:
1) To A for life, then to such of As children as attain the age of 21.
Here, the relevant measuring life is A. All of As children are going to
attain age 21, if at all, within 21 years after As death. (This includes
a child in the mothers womb at As death, for the perpetuities period
includes any period of gestation actually involved.)
2) Ts will devises her residuary estate to such of my nephews and
nieces as attain the age of 21. At the time of Ts death, she has two
brothers and six nephews and nieces, all of whom are under age 21. Is
the gift valid under the Rule? The answer: It depends. Specically, it
depends on whether Ts parents are living. The relevant measuring
lives are Ts brothers and sisters, because all of Ts nephews and nieces
will attain age 21, if at all, within 21 years after their parents deaths.
If Ts parents are dead, her two brothers are all the brothers she is ever
going to have; and Ts nephews and nieces will be the children of these
brothers. The disposition is valid.
But if Ts parents are alive, they might have another child (call him
Excelsior), a brother or sister of T not alive at Ts death. Then Ts two
brothers and six nephews and nieces who were alive at Ts death might
die. Then Excelsior might have a child who lives to attain age 21more
than 21 years after any life in being. Because this might happen, the
disposition is invalid under the Rule.
1)
Who Can Be Used as Measuring Lives

In all the examples in this chapter, the measuring lives used to show the validity
REAL PROPERTY 31.
or invalidity of interests are referred to or are indirectly involved in the disposition itself. It is a common drafting practice to use a perpetuities saving clause
(i) to make sure that the Rule has not been accidentally violated, for the Rule
is difcult to master; and (ii) sometimes to extend the duration of trusts to the
maximum extent permitted under the Rule. The clause reads something like this:
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, any trust created hereunder
shall terminate, if it has not previously terminated, 21 years after the death of the
survivor of the following named persons:
; and the remaining
principal and undistributed income of such trusts shall be distributed to . . . .
In the blanks are inserted the names of the persons to be used as articial
measuring lives. Most commonly, the descendants then living of the transferor
are specically named. Alternatively, the clause might provide: after the death of
the survivor of all my descendants who shall be living at the time of my death
this clause works in a will but does not work in an irrevocable trust. A few more
aggressive draftsmen will name 10 healthy babies born in some local hospital on
the day the instrument is executedthe probability is that this will permit the trust
to run for 100 years.
2)
Reasonable Number of Human Lives Can Be Used

Animals and organizations cannot be used as measuring lives; only humans can be
used as measuring lives. Also, the number of measuring lives must be reasonable.
Examples:
1) The trust will terminate 21 years after the death of the survivor
of all persons listed in the Manhattan telephone directory. Clearly
impermissible.
2) The trust will terminate 21 years after the death of the survivor
of all the descendants of Queen Victoria who are alive at the
time of my death. This royal lives clause was widely used in
England shortly after the turn of the century, and the English courts
grudgingly sustained it. If the name of some currently famous
person were used in this fashion, it is highly questionable whether
American courts would sustain the disposition.
e.
Interests Exempt from Rule

1)
Gift Over to Second Charity

A charitable trust may last forever (i.e., neither the Rule Against Perpetuities nor
any analogous rule applies). However, like any other gift, a gift for charitable
purposes is void for remoteness if it is contingent upon the happening of an event
that may not occur within the perpetuity period. The only exception to this rule
is that if there is a gift to Charity A, followed by a gift over to Charity B upon
a possibly remote event, the gift over is valid. Remember, this is the charity-tocharity exception. The Rule Against Perpetuities applies to dispositions over from
a charity to an individual on a remote condition, and to dispositions over from an
individual to a charity on a remote condition.
Examples:
1) To the Georgetown YMCA for so long as the premises are used
for YMCA purposes; and when they shall cease to be so used, then
32. REAL PROPERTY
and in that event to the American Cancer Society. The YMCA has
a fee simple subject to an executory interest; the Cancer Society has
a shifting executory interest. The gift over to the Cancer Society is
valid under the charity-to-charity exception to the Rule.
2) To the Georgetown YMCA for so long as the premises are
used for YMCA purposes; and when they shall cease to be so
used, then and in that event to John Hancock, his heirs, successors, and assigns. Classifying the interests without regard to the
Rule, the YMCA would have a fee simple subject to an executory
interest; Hancock would have a shifting executory interestwhich
is stricken because it violates the Rule. The YMCA has a fee simple
determinable, and the transferor has a possibility of reverter.
3) To John Hancock, his heirs, successors, and assigns, provided
that no marijuana is ever smoked on the premises; and if marijuana
is ever smoked on the premises, to the Georgetown YMCA.
Classifying interests without regard to the Rule, Hancock would
have a fee simple subject to an executory interest; the YMCA would
have a shifting executory interestwhich is stricken because it
violates the Rule. Thus, Hancock has a fee simple absolute.
2)
Vested Interests
A vested remainder in an individual is not subject to the Rule. Thus, a devise to A
for life, then to As children for life, then to B in fee simple is wholly valid. B has
a presently vested remainder. It may vest in possession long after lives in being if
A leaves some surviving children born after the testators death, but the remainder
to B is presently vested in interest, and that is what counts.
a)
3)
CompareClass Gifts Are Subject to Rule

Vested remainders in a class, however, are subject to the Rule so long as the
class remains open.
Reversionary Interests
Reversions, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry are all vested in interest and
hence are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. (Even so, in many states,
there are statutes expressly limiting the duration of possibilities of reverter or rights
of entry.)
a)
CompareExecutory Interests Are Subject to Rule

Possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, which are exempt from the Rule,
must be carefully distinguished from executory interests, which are subject
to the Rule. Remember that executory interests are created in transferees;
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are created only in the grantor (or
the testators heirs if a will is involved). An understanding of this distinction
has frequently been tested by the bar examiners.
Example:
O conveys Blackacre to School so long as it is used for
educational purposes, and when it is no longer so used, to A.
REAL PROPERTY 33.
A has an executory interest that violates the Rule because it

may vest in possession many years after all lives in being are
dead. Because any interest that violates the Rule is void and
is stricken from the instrument, this leaves a determinable fee
in the school and a possibility of reverter in O. O can now,
by a second deed, transfer her possibility of reverter to A (if
possibilities of reverter have been made transferable by statute
in the jurisdiction). To get a possibility of reverter in A, two
pieces of paper are required: one creating the possibility of
reverter in O; the second transferring it to A.
f.
Consequence of Violating the RuleInterest Is Stricken

An interest that violates the Rule is void and is stricken (subject to the possible application of a perpetuities reform statute). However, all other interests created in the instrument of transfer that are valid under the Rule are given effect.
1)
2.
ExceptionInfectious Invalidity
There is an important exception to the preceding statement. Under the principle
of infectious invalidity, if the invalid gift is an essential part of the transferors
dispositive scheme, such that to strike this interest and give effect to the remaining
interests would be to subvert the transferors intentif it is determined that the
transferor would prefer that the entire disposition failthen the entire disposition
is void.
Example:
Irrevocable Trust A directs the trustee to pay the income to my
brothers children for life, and on the death of my brothers last
surviving child, to pay the principal to the issue of my brothers
children. The gift to the issue of my brothers children is void
because the brother might have a child born after the creation of
the trust (who would thus not be a life in being). That child might
not die within 21 years after the death of the last child living at the
time the trust was created. After the invalid interest is stricken, the
brothers children have a life estate in the income, and the settlor
has a reversion in the principal. However, Trust B provides that
if any provision of Trust A is invalid, any income and principal
from Trust A should be held in trust for the benet of the brothers
children and their issue. By striking out all the gifts in Trust A,
valid and invalid, and by giving effect to Trust B, the settlors
presumed intent to benet his brothers children and their issue may
be substantially carried out. [New England Trust Co. v. Sanger, 149
N.E.2d 598 (Mass. 1958)]
The Rule in OperationCommon Pitfall Cases

a.
Executory Interest Following Defeasible Fee Violates the Rule

An executory interest that follows a defeasible fee, with no limit on the time within
which it must vest, violates the Rule Against Perpetuities and is stricken. The effect on
the remaining fee estate depends on whether the estate is determinable or subject to a
condition subsequent. If the defeasible fee is phrased in durational terms (e.g., for so
34. REAL PROPERTY
long as, until), the estate will still terminate upon the happening of the stated event
and the grantor will have a possibility of reverter. In contrast, if the fee is subject to a
condition subsequent, the condition is also stricken and the estate becomes a fee simple
absolute.
Examples:
1) To John Brown for so long as no marijuana is smoked on the
premises; and if marijuana is ever smoked on the premises, then to
Candy Barr. (i) John Brown has a fee simple subject to an executory
interest; Candy Barr has an executory interest in fee simple. (ii) Candys
interest violates the Rule. Things may stay quiet for generations, long
beyond 21 years after the deaths of John and Candy (the only relevant
lives in this case). Then someone might light up, triggering the executory interest. Because this might happen, the executory interest might
vest (i.e., might become a possessory estate) long after lives in being plus
21 years. Candys interest violates the Rule, and it is stricken. This leaves
a fee simple determinable in John Brown, and a possibility of reverter in
the transferor. The possibility of reverter is valid; retained interests in the
transferor are not subject to the Rule.
What if marijuana is smoked on the premises within ve years after
the transfer, well within lives in being plus 21 years, meaning that in
actuality there was no remote vesting? It does not matter. Under the
Rule we do not wait and see. (But see 1.b.1), supra.) It is what might
happen that counts, viewing the facts as they exist at the time the
interest is created. What actually happens is irrelevant.
2) To John Brown; provided, however, that if marijuana is ever smoked
on the premises, then to Candy Barr. (i) John Brown has a fee simple
subject to an executory interest; Candy Barr has an executory interest
in fee simple. (ii) Candys interest violates the Rule, under the analysis
given in Example 1). Again we strike Candys interestleaving John
Brown with a fee simple absolute. (Contrast this with the result in
Example 1), where the transferor had a possibility of reverter. This is
the result of two different forms of expressing the gift to John Brown.
Whenever a fee simple determinable is created (so long as), the transferor automatically has a possibility of reverter. But when a fee on a
condition subsequent is created, the transferor does not have a right of
entry unless the right of entry is expressly raised.)
b.
Age Contingency Beyond Age Twenty-One in Open Class

A gift to an open class conditioned upon the members surviving to an age beyond 21
violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Example:
To A for life, then to such of As children as live to attain the age of
25. At the time of this disposition, A has two children: X (age 12) and
Y (age nine). (i) A has a life estate; there is a contingent remainder in
As children who live to attain age 25, and a reversion in the transferor
(for none of As children may ever reach age 25). (ii) The remainder to
As children violates the Rule. After this transfer, A might have another
child (Z); before this afterborn child (who cannot be used as a life in
REAL PROPERTY 35.
being) attains age four, A, X, and Y might die; then Z might live on to
age 25, at which time the remainder to As children would vest in Z. But
if this were to happen (and it might), the remainder would vest beyond
lives in being plus 21 years. Because the interest might vest remotely, it
is stricken.
c.
The Fertile Octogenarian

A woman is conclusively presumed to be capable of bearing children regardless of her
age or medical condition.
Example:
Suppose, in the preceding example, X and Y were age 24 and 22, respectively, and A was a 60-year-old woman who has undergone a hysterectomy. Under the remote possibilities test, it is possible for a woman,
of whatever age and medical condition, to bear children. Thus, A might
have another child, Z. The remainder to As children violates the Rule.
d.
The Unborn Widow or Widower

The problem is that the term widow (and widower), like heir, is a technical word
with a technical meaning: You do not know who a persons widow (or widower) is until
he dies and you can determine to whom he was married at his death.
Example:
To A for life, then to his widow for life; and on the death of As widow,
to such of As descendants as are then living. (i) A has a life estate;
there is a contingent remainder in a life estate in his widow; there is a
contingent remainder in fee simple in As descendants; and the transferor has a reversion. (ii) The remainder in the descendants violates the
Rule. Although A is now happily married, he might divorce his wife (or
she might die), and A might marry someone who was not alive at the
time the interest was created. A might have a child by this widow; then
everyone now on the scene might die; the widow might live for more
than 21 years after the death of all lives in being, then dieleaving the
afterborn child or children as As descendants then living.
Compare:
e.
"To A for life, then to his widow for life; and on the death of As widow,
to A's children." (i) A has a life estate; there is a contingent remainder in
a life estate in his widow; As present children have vested remainders
in fee simple that are subject to open in favor of any future children
born to A, and As unborn children have a contingent remainder in fee
simple. (ii) The remainder in A's children is valid under the Rule because
their interests will vest (and the class will close) within As lifetime. The
difference here is that the childrens interest was not contingent on their
surviving As widow, and the law does not imply such a condition.
The Administrative Contingency

A gift that is conditioned on an administrative contingency (e.g., admission of will to
probate) violates the Rule. The key question is under the facts as they existed at the
time of the gift, what might happen?
Example:
Disposition of residuary estate per stirpes to such of my descendants
as are living at the time my will is admitted to probate. Alternatively, a
will of a German national written during World War II: to such of my
36. REAL PROPERTY
relations in Germany as are living at the time World War II is ofcially

declared at an end. Under the what might happen approach of the
common law Rule, wills are not probated, wars do not come to an end,
decrees of distribution are never entered, etc. Moreover, because no
persons lifetime is connected to the condition attached to this type of
gift, we cannot use a life in being; we must use the period in gross of
21 years. And because the will might not be probated within 21 years,
the gift is void.
The fact that the testators will is in fact probated three weeks after her
death does not matter. We do not wait and see. (But see 1.b.1), supra.)
Rather, looking from the time of the testators death, and taking into
account facts as they existed at that time, the question is what might
happen.
f.
Options and Rights of First Refusal

1)
Options
An option creates in the optionee a right to purchase the property on terms
provided in the option. Options are typically considered to be assignable unless
the parties provide otherwise and thus are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities
(but see b), infra). If an option is structured so that it might be exercised later than
the end of the Rules period, it is usually held void.
Examples:
1) A is a subdivision developer and gives B an option to purchase a
lot in the subdivision to be exercised within 60 days after the City
Council grants approval for the ling of a subdivision plat. While
the parties may expect this to occur soon, it is possible that it will
not occur within 21 years after any life in being at the creation of
the option. Hence, the option may be held void.
2) O conveys to A and her heirs an option to purchase Blackacre
for $25,000. This option is not limited to As life, but can be
exercised by As heirs and their heirs long after As death. Thus, the
option is void.
a)
Reasonable Time Limit May Be Inferred

A signicant minority of courts, in applying the Rule to these interests, will
construe the option as lasting only for a reasonable time, which is invariably less than 21 years, and thus will uphold it. Under this view, the option
in Example 1), above, would be sustained on the ground that the parties
intended it to expire if the City Council failed to act within a reasonable time,
less than 21 years. Similarly, if the parties to the option are natural persons,
some courts construe the option as lasting only for their lifetimes; hence, it
is valid under the Rule. Furthermore, the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities (4.d., infra) excludes options in commercial transactions from the
Rules application.
b)
Options Connected to Leaseholds

If a tenant under a lease has an option to purchase the leased premises during
REAL PROPERTY 37.
the lease term, the Rule is not applied, no matter how long the term. If a
tenant assigns the leasehold, the option generally is considered a running
covenant, exercisable by the assignee in the absence of contrary intent.
However, a tenant may attempt to transfer the option to some other party,
thereby separating it from the leasehold estate. While some courts do not
permit the option to be transferred separately, most courts hold that the
transferability of the option depends on the original parties intent when
they entered into the lease and option agreement. If the court nds that the
option has been separated from the leasehold estate, so that it is no longer
exercisable by the tenant, the option becomes subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
2)
3.
Rights of First Refusal

A right of rst refusal (or preemptive right) gives the holder the right to purchase
the property if the seller receives a third partys offer to purchase, usually on the
same terms as that offer. In contrast to options, rights of rst refusal in many states
are presumed to be personal to the holder and thus not assignable unless the
instrument indicates otherwise. [Malone v. Flattery, 797 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 2011)]
Nonassignable rights of rst refusal are usually not subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities, but rather are governed by the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation
(see F.5.b., infra). In some states, however, rights of rst refusal are subject to the
Rule Against Perpetuities in the same manner as options.
Application of the Rule to Class Gifts

a.
Bad-as-to-One, Bad-as-to-All Rule

The general principle that the Rule does not invalidate interests that vest within the
perpetuities period does not apply to vested remainders subject to open. The class gift
rule, sometimes called the all-or-nothing rule, requires that:
(i)
The class must close within the perpetuities period; and
(ii) All conditions precedent for every member of the class must be satised, if at all,
within the perpetuities period.
If it is possible that a disposition might vest remotely with respect to any member of the
class, the entire class gift is invalid.
Examples:
1) To A for life, then to such of As children as live to attain the age of
35. At the time of this disposition, A has two children: X (age 38) and
Y (age 33). (i) A has a life estate. X has a vested remainder subject to
open. There is a contingent remainder in such of As other children as
live to attain the age of 35. (ii) The remainder to As children violates the
Rule; the transferor has a reversion in fee. While Xs remainder is vested
subject to open, it is not vested for purposes of the Rule. Here is what
might happen: A might have another child (Z); before Z attains age 14,
A, X, and Y might die, etc. The gift with respect to any afterborn child
of A clearly violates the Rule; under the bad-as-to-one, bad-as-to-all
class gift rule, the entire class gift is void.
38. REAL PROPERTY
Why does the class closing rule not save the gift? Because X is already
age 35, doesnt this mean that the class will close on the life tenants
death? The answer is: yes it does, but this does not help. Although we
will close the class at that point, the class as closed might include the
afterborn Z, who might be under age 14 at that time; and it still might be
more than lives in being plus 21 years before Zs interest might vest.
2) To A for life, then to As children for their lives, and on the death of
the last survivor of As children, to As grandchildren in fee. At the time
this disposition takes effect, A is alive and has two children and three
grandchildren. A has a life estate, the two children have vested remainders subject to open in a life estate, and the three grandchildren have
vested remainders subject to open in fee. The remainder to As grandchildren is void because every member of the class will not be ascertained until the death of the survivor of As children; and that surviving
child might be born to A after the date of this disposition. Then all of As
children and grandchildren who are lives in being might die and 21 years
after their deaths, this afterborn child might give birth to a child (GC-4);
although GC-4s interest would vest at birth, under the hypothesized
facts it would vest remotely.
b.
Class Closing Rules May Save Disposition

In some cases, the rule of convenience applicable to class gifts can be relied on to
save a gift from the Rule.
Example:
To A for life, and on her death to As grandchildren in fee. At the time
of this disposition, A has two children and three grandchildren. A has
a life estate and the grandchildren have vested remainders subject to
open. As in the preceding example, A might have an afterborn child who
might produce afterborn grandchildrenbut there is one difference.
Under the rule of convenience the class will be closed at the time any
member of the class can demand a distributionhere the death of
A, a life in being. Consequently, all members of the class who will be
permitted to share in the remainder will be determined on As death.
c.
Gift to Subclass Exception

Separate gifts vest at different times. Each gift to a subclass may be treated as a
separate gift under the Rule.
Example:
To pay the income to A for life, then to As children for their lives, and
as each child of A dies, to distribute the corpus to such childs issue
then living, per stirpes. A has two children at the time of this disposition. In this case, the remainder to issue has been made by a gift to
subclasses; as each child dies his issue are to take the share on which he
was receiving income. With respect to As two children now alive, the
class of issue then living will be determined on their deaths; the gift
is good. If A should have another child after the date of this disposition,
the remainder to such afterborn childs issue is void because it might
vest beyond the lives in being plus 21 years.
REAL PROPERTY 39.
d.
Per Capita Gift Exception

When there is a separate gift of a xed sum to each class member, each gift is tested
separately under the Rule.
Example:
Ts will bequeaths $1,000 each to such of As grandchildren as live to
attain the age of 21, whether alive at my death or born thereafter. At Ts
death, A has two children and ve grandchildren. Here, we have a per
capita gift to each member of the class; there is no problem of knowing
within the perpetuities period the number of class members who share
in an aggregate gift, and thus the size of each share. Here, the amount
to be received by each member is ascertainable without reference to the
number of persons in the class. The bequest is valid for all grandchildren by As two children who were alive at Ts death. (This includes all
future-born grandchildren as well as the ve now on the scene, for all
such grandchildren will reach 21, if at all, within 21 years after their
parents death.)
However, the bequest is void for any grandchildren by a child born to
A after Ts death. Such an afterborn child cannot be used as a life in
being.
4.
5.
Perpetuities Reform Legislation

Most states have enacted one of the following types of statutes designed to eliminate some of
the harsh results of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities:
a.
A wait and see statute, under which the validity of an interest following one or more
life estates is determined on the basis of facts existing at the end of the life estate rather
than at the creation of the interest (see 1.b.1), supra);
b.
A cy pres approach, borrowed from Trusts law, under which an invalid interest is
reformed to comply with the Rule and carry out the grantors intent as nearly as
possible;
c.
A statute dealing with specic perpetuities problems (e.g., age contingencies reduced to
age 21, women over age 55 presumed incapable of childbearing, gift to widow presumed
to mean the person who was the spouse on the date the gift was created); or
d.
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, which provides an alternative

90-year vesting period. The Uniform Rule takes a wait and see approach in determining whether an interest actually vests within 90 years.
Technique for Analysis of Perpetuities Problems

In applying the Rule Against Perpetuities, these three steps should be followed:
a.
Determine What Interests Are Created

First, determine what interests are created, applying the proper future interests labels, as
though there were no Rule Against Perpetuities.
b.
Apply the Rule

Determine the measuring life or lives that can be used to show either that the interest
40. REAL PROPERTY
must vest within lives in being plus 21 years or that the interest might not vest within
that period. At this step, assume that there is no such thing as a perpetuities reform
statute, for the statute is not brought into play unless there is a perpetuities problem.
c.
F.
Apply Reform Statute

If the particular jurisdiction has a perpetuities reform statute that is triggered by the
perpetuities violation, apply the statute to reform or save the gift.
THE RULE AGAINST RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

As a general rule, any restriction on the transferability of a legal (as distinguished from an
equitable) interest in property is void: The restriction violates the common law Rule Against
Restraints on Alienation. Restraint on alienation means an express restriction on the transferability of property. Like the Rule Against Perpetuities, this is a rule of public policy that is
designed to prevent property from being tied up and taken out of commerce.
1.
Types of Restraints on Alienation

There are three types of restraints on alienation: (i) disabling restraints, under which
any attempted transfer is ineffective; (ii) forfeiture restraints, under which an attempted
transfer results in a forfeiture of the interest; and (iii) promissory restraints, under which an
attempted transfer breaches a covenant. A disabling restraint on any legal interest is void.
Examples:
1) Property is transferred to A in fee simple, with the added proviso that
neither A nor any of her children shall have the right to transfer the land
or any interest therein. Under this restriction, if given effect (it is not), any
attempted transfer would simply be ineffective. This is a disabling restraint.
2) Property is transferred to A in fee simple, with the added proviso that if
A shall attempt to transfer the land or any interest therein during her lifetime,
her estate shall cease, and title therein shall vest in B. This is a forfeiture
restraint.
3) Property is transferred to A in fee simple, with the added proviso that A
hereby covenants that she will not transfer the land or any interest therein
without [the transferors] prior written consent. Under this promissory
restraint, if given effect, the remedy is injunction or damages for breach of
contract.
2.
Restraints on a Fee Simple

a.
Total Restraints
Any total restraint on a fee simpleeither forfeiture, disabling, or promissoryis void.
The grantee may ignore the restraint and freely transfer the property.
b.
Partial Restraints
A partial restraint is one that purports to restrict the power to transfer to specic
persons, or by a specic method, or until a specic time.
1)
Reasonable Restraints Doctrine

Although absolute restraints on fee simple estates are void, a forfeiture or
REAL PROPERTY 41.
promissory restraint for a limited time and for a reasonable purpose may be
upheld.
Example:
A owns and resides in a house. He conveys a one-half interest in
the house to his brother, B, including in the deed a covenant that
during their joint lifetimes, each party promises not to convey his
interest to any other person without the consent of the other party.
This promissory restraint is limited to the joint lifetimes of the
parties and is a reasonable way to ensure that neither party will be
faced with the prospect of residing with a stranger. The restraint
would probably be upheld.
2)
3.
Discriminatory Restraints
Restraints prohibiting the transfer or use of property to or by a person of a specied racial, religious, or ethnic group are not enforceable.
a)
Fourteenth Amendment
Judicial enforcement of a covenant forbidding use of property by persons of
a particular race is discriminatory state action forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948)]
Example:
O conveys Blackacre to A and his heirs, and A promises
that Blackacre will never be used or occupied by nonwhite
persons. Thereafter A sells to B, a black man, who moves
onto Blackacre. O sues for an injunction prohibiting B from
using Blackacre, and sues A for damages for having sold to B.
Injunction and damages are judicial remedies ordinarily available for breach of a covenant. The court cannot grant O either
an injunction or damages, because such judicial action would
be state action interfering with Bs right to enjoy property free
of racial discrimination. [Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953)]
b)
Fair Housing Act

Discriminatory restrictions may also violate the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
Recording a deed with a racial restriction is prohibited by the Act. [42 U.S.C.
3604(c)]
Restraints on a Life Estate

a.
Legal Life Estate

Forfeiture and promissory restraints on life estates are valid. A life estate is inalienable as a practical matter because few would be willing to pay full value for an estate
of uncertain duration; thus, little is lost by giving effect to the transferors intention to
restrict the estates transferability. (However, disabling restraints on legal life estates are
void.)
b.
Equitable Life Estate

The rule applicable to restrictions on equitable interests (i.e., those held in trust) is the
42. REAL PROPERTY
exact opposite of the rule applicable to legal interests. Spendthrift clauses, which are
true disabling restraints, are given effect in the great majority of American jurisdictions.
(See Trusts outline.)
4.
5.
Restraints on Future Interests

Restraints on vested future interests generally are valid only to the extent that restraints on
present interests of the same type are valid. Disabling restraints on all future interests are
void.
a.
Vested Remainders in Fee Simple

Any total restraint on a vested remainder in fee simpleeither forfeiture, disabling, or
promissoryis void (see 2.a., supra). Partial forfeiture and promissory restraints on
vested remainders in fee simple may be upheld if reasonable (see 2.b.1), supra).
b.
Vested Remainders for Life

Forfeiture and promissory restraints on vested remainders for life are valid (see 3.a.,
supra).
c.
Contingent Remainders
The law is unsettled as to the validity of forfeiture and promissory restraints on contingent remainders. Thus, this issue is not likely to be tested.
Other Valid Restraints on Alienation

a.
Reasonable Restrictions in Commercial Transactions

The courts tend to uphold restrictions on transferability that arise in the context of
a commercial transaction on the theory that the restriction appears in an agreement
entered into by the parties, it is a product of their bargaining, and presumably serves a
useful purpose in facilitating the parties objectives. Thus, restrictions on transferability
that are part of a bargained-for agreement, as distinguished from a donative transaction,
are valid.
Examples:
1) O borrows money from M Bank and gives the bank a mortgage on
land. The mortgage provides that the land shall not be transferable by O
without Ms consent, and that if the land is transferred without consent,
the entire indebtedness shall be accelerated and shall become immediately due and payable. This due on sale restriction on transferability
is reasonable because M has an interest in approving who shall be the
transferee of the land in which it has a security interest.
2) A, B, C, and D each own 25% of the stock in a closely held corporation. The articles of incorporation provide that no shareholder shall
transfer her stock without the consent of a majority of the other shareholders. This restriction on transferability is valid because, due to the
closely held nature of the business, the shareholders have a legitimate
concern over the identity of their associates.
b.
Options and Rights of First Refusal

The right to have the rst opportunity to purchase real estate when it becomes available,
REAL PROPERTY 43.
or the right to meet any offer, is valid if reasonable (e.g., by specifying fair market
value or other reasonable price). [Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 3.4]
c.
Restrictions on Transferability of Leaseholds

A provision in a lease prohibiting the lessees assignment or subletting of her leasehold interest without the consent of the landlord is given effect in all jurisdictions. (See
II.E.3., infra.)
G. CONCURRENT ESTATES
Any of the estates in land previously discussed can be held concurrently by several persons. These
persons all have the right to the enjoyment and possession of the land at the same time. Three of
the chief forms of concurrent ownership in land are discussed here: joint tenancy, tenancy by the
entirety, and tenancy in common.
1.
Joint Tenancy
A joint tenancy can be created between two or more co-tenants. Its distinguishing feature
is the right of survivorship. Conceptually, when one joint tenant dies, the property is freed
from his concurrent interest; the survivor or survivors retain an undivided right in the
property, which is no longer subject to the interest of the deceased co-tenant. The survivors
do not succeed to the decedents interest; they hold free of it.
a.
Creation
1)
Four Unities Required

At common law, four unities are required to create a joint tenancy:
a)
Unity of time (interests vested at the same time);
b)
Unity of title (interests acquired by the same instrument);
c)
Unity of interest (interests of the same type and duration); and
d)
Unity of possession (interests give identical rights to enjoyment).
2)
Modern Law
The above requirements have been eroded in some jurisdictions; e.g., by statute
in some states, an owner can create a joint tenancy in herself and another by a
single deed (she need not use a strawman conveyance), even though the unities
of time and title are not satised. Similarly, as indicated below, a number
of transactions are no longer found to sever a joint tenancy despite the seeming
absence of continued unities.
3)
Express Language Required

Under modern law, joint tenancies are disfavored. Hence, there must be a clear
expression of intent to create this estate, or it will not be recognized. The usual
language required is to A and B as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
Today, when two or more persons take property by a single conveyance, a tenancy
in common, not a joint tenancy, is presumed. A joint tenancy results only when an
intention to create a right of survivorship is clearly expressed.
44. REAL PROPERTY
b.
Severance
A joint tenancy can be terminated by a suit for partition, which can be brought by any
joint tenant. It may also be terminated by various acts by any joint tenant.
1)
Inter Vivos Conveyance by One Joint Tenant

An inter vivos conveyance by one joint tenant of her undivided interest destroys the
joint tenancy so that the transferee takes the interest as a tenant in common and not
as a joint tenant. This rule applies to both voluntary and involuntary conveyances
(even secret conveyances).
a)
When More than Two Joint Tenants

When property is held in joint tenancy by three or more joint tenants,
a conveyance by one of them destroys the joint tenancy only as to the
conveyors interest. The other joint tenants continue to hold in joint tenancy
as between themselves, while the grantee holds her interest as a tenant in
common with them.
b)
Transactions that May Not Result in Severance

(1) Judgment Liens
In most jurisdictions, when a plaintiff obtains a money judgment against
a defendant, that judgment becomes a lien on the defendants real
estate in the county where the judgment is docketed. (This is automatic
in some states; in others, the lien must be recorded in the real estate
records.) The lien then runs with the land, burdening it until the
judgment is paid or until the lien expires under a statute of limitations
(e.g., 10 years). Suppose such a lien is obtained against one of several
joint tenants but not against the others. Does it sever the joint tenancy,
converting it into a tenancy in common? The majority view is that it
does not; a lien is not considered a sufciently substantial conveyance
to destroy the unities of time and title. However, if the plaintiff who
obtained the judgment then proceeds to enforce it by foreclosure (often
termed a judgment sale), the sheriffs deed issued to the buyer at
that sale will sever the joint tenancy. That follows from the fact that the
sheriffs deed conveys the defendants full title.
Example:
A and B own land as joint tenants with right of survivorship. P sues A on a tort claim, and obtains and records a
judgment. If A dies at that point, B owns the entire land
(by virtue of the right of survivorship), and P has a lien
on nothing. However, assume that P has a judgment sale,
and a sheriffs deed is issued to X, who buys at the sale.
Then A dies. B and X each own a one-half interest in the
land as tenants in common.
(2) Mortgages
In the majority of states, a mortgage is regarded as a lien on title, and
one joint tenants execution of a mortgage on her interest does not
by itself cause a severance. (Rather, the severance occurs only if the
mortgage is foreclosed and the property sold.) But in the minority of
REAL PROPERTY 45.
states, which regard a mortgage as a transfer of title, the transfer destroys

the unity of title and severs the joint tenancy.
Example:
A, B, and C are joint tenants. A mortgages her interest
to Lender, who records. Thereafter, A dies and Lender
seeks to enforce her mortgage on an undivided one-third
interest in the property. In a state following the lien
theory of mortgages, Lender loses. As mortgage did not
sever the joint tenancy. Lenders rights were lost when A
died prior to foreclosure. As interest evaporated, and with
it Lenders security interest.
(3) Leases
Theoretically, when one joint tenant leases her interest in jointly held
property, the lease destroys the unities of interest and possession and
thereby should effect a severance (which is the view taken by some
states). But other states hold that the joint tenancy is not destroyed, and
is merely temporarily suspended (for the length of the lease).
(a) Death of Lessor
There is a split among the states following the latter view, on what
happens if the lessor/joint tenant dies before the end of the lease.
Some courts hold that because the lessors own right to possession
would cease on her death, so must the right of any lessee (i.e., the
lessor could not convey more than she had). Others hold that the
lease operates as a temporary severance, and the remaining joint
tenants survivorship rights are therefore postponed until the end of
the lease.
2)
Contract to Convey by One Joint Tenant

In most states, a severance also results where one joint tenant executes a valid
contract to convey her interest to another, even though no actual transfer of title
has yet been made. The contract to convey is enforceable in equity, and hence is
treated as an effective transfer of an equitable interest. Thus, if the vendor dies
before the title is transferred, the purchaser is entitled to a deed from the vendors
estate and becomes a tenant in common with the original joint tenant or tenants.
a)
CompareExecutory Contract by All Joint Tenants

There is a split as to whether an executory contract to sell, entered into by all
the joint tenants, will terminate the joint tenancy. Suppose that on January 1,
A and B, joint tenants, contract with X to sell and deliver title to Blackacre to
X on February 1. A dies on January 15. Two questions arise: (i) On February
1, is B entitled to the full sales proceeds as surviving joint tenant, or is As
estate entitled to one-half (on the theory that the January 1 contract worked
an equitable conversion, which created in the vendors a contract right to
receive money that was held in tenancy in common)? And, (ii) will X have to
obtain a deed not only from B but also from As administrator on the theory
that the retained legal title (for security purposes) was held in tenancy in
common?
46. REAL PROPERTY
(1) Common Law ViewJoint Tenancy Continues

The common law view, still followed by many courts, is that a joint
tenancy continues in both the right to the proceeds and the retained legal
title, meaning that B gets the full sales proceeds and can give good title.
(2) Other CourtsTenancy in Common
Other jurisdictions, however, proceed on the doctrine of equitable
conversion and hold that the executory contract converts A and Bs
land ownership rights to a mere contract right to receive the purchase
price (which they hold as tenants in common because of the statutory
presumption favoring such tenancies). Further, the legal title to the land,
retained for security purposes, is also held to be in tenancy in common.
3)
Testamentary Disposition by One Joint Tenant Has No Effect

A joint tenancy is not terminated where a joint tenant executes a will devising her
interest to another or dies with such a will in effect. The reason is that a will is
ambulatory (effective only at death) and hence is inoperative as to joint tenancy
property, because at the instant of death the decedents rights in the property
evaporate. (The result would be contra if all joint tenants had agreed that the
decedent could devise her interest; but in such a case, the agreement itself would
cause the severance.)
a)
4)
2.
CompareSecret Deeds
As indicated above, an inter vivos conveyance severs a joint tenancy. This is
true even though the deed is kept secret and the interest transferred is to
take effect only upon the death of the grantor. However, if the grantee does
not know about the deed, the grantees acceptance after the death of the
grantor does not relate back to defeat the right of survivorship. (See VI.C.4.b.,
infra.)
Effect of One Joint Tenants Murdering Another

Some states have passed statutes under which the felonious and intentional killing
of one joint tenant by another joint tenant operates as a severance. In other states,
the surviving joint tenant holds the ill-gained portion on a constructive trust for the
decedents estate. Thus, the homicidal survivor keeps her original share but does
not prot from her felony.
Tenancy by the Entirety

A tenancy by the entirety is a marital estate akin to a joint tenancy between husband and
wife. It is not recognized in community property states, but in some common law jurisdictions, it arises presumptively in any conveyance made to husband and wife.
a.
Right of Survivorship
The estate carries a right of survivorship, which operates in the same manner as the
right of survivorship incident to a joint tenancy.
b.
Severance Limited
The major distinction between a joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety concerns
REAL PROPERTY 47.
severance. A tenancy by the entirety cannot be terminated by involuntary partition.

It can be terminated only by: (i) the death of either spouse (leaving the survivor sole
owner of the fee); (ii) divorce (in most states leaving the parties as tenants in common
with no right of survivorship); (iii) mutual agreement; or (iv) execution by a joint
creditor of both husband and wife (a creditor of one or the other cannot execute).
c.
Individual Spouse Cannot Convey or Encumber

In most states, an individual spouse may not convey or encumber tenancy by the
entirety property. A deed or mortgage executed by only one spouse is ineffective.
3.
Tenancy in Common
A tenancy in common is a concurrent estate with no right of survivorship. Each owner has a
distinct, undivided interest in the property. This interest is freely alienable by inter vivos and
testamentary transfer, is inheritable, and is subject to claims of the tenants creditors. The
only unity involved is possession: Each tenant is entitled to possession of the whole estate.
Today, by statute, multiple grantees are presumed to take as tenants in common. The same is
true where multiple transferees take by descent.
4.
Incidents of Co-Ownership
a.
Possession
Each co-tenant has the right to possess all portions of the property; no co-tenant has the
right to exclusive possession of any part. A co-tenant out of possession cannot bring a
possessory action unless there has been an ouster by the tenant in possession. A claim
of right to exclusive possession can constitute an ouster.
b.
Rents and Prots

In most jurisdictions (but not all), a co-tenant in possession has the right to retain prots
gained by her use of the property. A co-tenant in possession need not share such prots
with co-tenants out of possession, nor reimburse them for the rental value of her use
of the land, unless there has been an ouster or an agreement to the contrary. However,
a co-tenant out of possession has a right to share in rents from third parties and in
prots derived from a use of the land that reduces its value (e.g., removal of minerals,
etc.).
c.
Effect of One Concurrent Owners Encumbering the Property

A joint tenant or tenant in common may place a mortgage on her interest, but may not,
of course, encumber the other co-tenants interest. If a tenancy in common is involved,
the mortgagee can foreclose only on the mortgaging co-tenants interest. Likewise, if
a joint tenancy is involved and the mortgage itself does not sever the joint tenancy (see
1.b.1)b)(2), supra), the mortgagee can foreclose on the mortgagor/co-tenants interest
and the foreclosure sale itself will cause a severance. But in the case of a joint tenancy,
the mortgagee runs the risk that the mortgaging co-tenant will die before foreclosure,
extinguishing the mortgagees interest. The same principles apply to judgment liens
obtained against an individual co-tenant.
Example:
A and B are joint tenants with right of survivorship. A injures P in an
accident, and P sues A, obtaining a personal injury judgment against A
for $1,000. This judgment is, by statute, a lien on As one-half interest
48. REAL PROPERTY
in the land, but it does not cause a severance. If A dies before the lien is
foreclosed and is survived by B, B owns the land free and clear of the
lien. But if P forecloses the lien before As death, the foreclosure sale will
cause a severance, and the buyer at the sale will own a one-half interest
in the land as a tenant in common with B.
d.
Ouster
Under the unity of possession, each co-tenant is entitled to possess and enjoy the whole
of the property subject to the equal right of her co-tenant. If one tenant wrongfully
excludes another co-tenant from possession of the whole or any part of the whole of
the premises, there is an ouster. The ousted co-tenant is entitled to receive his share of
the fair rental value of the property for the time he was wrongfully deprived of possession.
e.
Remedy of Partition
A joint tenant or tenant in common has a right to judicial partition, either in kind
(division of the tract into parcels) or by sale and division of the proceeds (in accordance with the ownership interests as modied by permitted recoupments for improvements, repairs, taxes, and the like). Although partition in kind is generally preferred,
partition by sale and division of the proceeds is permitted when a fair and equitable
physical division of the property cannot be made. [Nordhausen v. Christner, 338 N.W.2d
754 (Neb. 1983)]
Examples:
1) A and B own a single-family home as joint tenants. A brings an
appropriate action to partition the land. Because physical division of the
home is not feasible, the court will order a sale of the home and division
of the proceeds equally between A and B.
2) A owns a three-fourths interest and B owns a one-fourth interest
in a four-acre undeveloped parcel of land as tenants in common. The
applicable zoning ordinance requires that a buildable lot contain at least
two acres. A seeks to partition the land into a three-acre lot for himself
and a one-acre lot for B. B argues that the land should be sold and the
proceeds divided between A and B according to their respective shares.
B will prevail, because the zoning ordinance makes it impossible to
divide the land fairly.
1)
f.
Restraint on Partition by Co-Tenants

Although in general, a co-tenant has the right to demand a partition by judicial
sale at any time, courts give effect to a provision prohibiting partition by any
one co-tenant, provided that the restriction is to last for only a reasonable time.
The restriction is not considered to be an invalid restraint on alienation because
(i) any co-tenant can transfer her interest to a third person at any time, and (ii)
the restraint can be eliminated if the co-tenants join in a deed to a third person,
thereby terminating the co-tenancy relationship.
Expenses for Preservation of PropertyContribution

Under certain circumstances, equity courts will compel contribution between concurrent owners.
REAL PROPERTY 49.
1)
RepairsContribution May Be Compelled for Necessary Repairs

A co-tenant who pays more than her pro rata share of the cost of necessary repairs
is entitled to contribution from the other co-tenants in actions for accounting or
partition. Although the courts are split on whether a co-tenant who makes necessary repairs can maintain an independent action for contribution against the other
co-tenants, the majority view is that she can compel contribution, provided she has
notied the other co-tenants of the need for repairs. Moreover, several decisions
authorize contribution even without such notice.
The common law view was that because no co-tenant has a duty to make necessary repairs, a co-tenant who makes such repairs cannot bring an action to compel
contribution from the other co-tenants. This is now the minority view.
g.
2)
ImprovementsNo Contribution or Setoff

Generally, there is no right of contribution for the cost of improvements, nor can
they be set off in an action for accounting. Only in an action for partition can the
value of improvements be recouped.
3)
Taxes and MortgagesContribution Can Be Compelled

Each co-tenant has a duty to pay her share of taxes and payments due on
mortgages on the entire property. A tenant who is not in sole possession can pay
the taxes and mortgage payments and then compel contribution from the other
co-tenants. However, a co-tenant in sole possession will receive reimbursement
only for the amount that exceeds the rental value of the property.
Duty of Fair Dealing Among Co-Tenants

A condential relationship exists among co-tenants. Accordingly, the acquisition by
one co-tenant of any outstanding title or lien that might affect the estate held by all the
co-tenants is deemed to be an acquisition on behalf of all the other co-tenants as well.
Thus, when one co-tenant purchases or otherwise acquires a lienholders (mortgagees)
claim against the co-tenancy property, she must give the other co-tenants a reasonable
time to pay their share and acquire a proportionate interest. Courts carefully scrutinize
the fairness of transactions between co-tenants. Lastly, it is difcult for one co-tenant to
adversely possess against other co-tenants. (See V.B.4.b., infra.)
Example:
A and B own land as co-tenants. Neither pays the annual property taxes.
The county conducts a tax sale and A buys the property for $10,000.
If B is willing to pay A $5,000, many courts will compel A to put the
property in co-tenancy again.
II. LANDLORD AND TENANT

A.
NATURE OF LEASEHOLD
A leasehold is an estate in land. The tenant has a present possessory interest in the leased
premises, and the landlord has a future interest (reversion). Certain rights and liabilities ow from
this property relationship between landlord and tenant. The three major types of leasehold estates
are tenancies for years, periodic tenancies, and tenancies at will. There is a fourth category
called tenancies at sufferance.
50. REAL PROPERTY
1.
Tenancies for Years

a.
Fixed Period of Time

A tenancy for years is one that is to continue for a xed period of time. It may be for
more or less than a year (e.g., 10 days or 10 years); it may be determinable (similar to a
fee simple determinable) or on condition subsequent. The termination date of a tenancy
for years is usually certain. As a result, the tenancy expires at the end of the stated
period without either party giving notice to the other. Even if the date of termination is
uncertain (e.g., L leases the premises to T until the end of the war), most courts hold
that if the parties have attempted to state some period of duration, the lease creates a
tenancy for years.
b.
Creation
Tenancies for years are normally created by written leases. In most states, the Statute
of Frauds requires that a lease creating a tenancy for more than one year be memorialized in writing. In addition, most states have statutes that restrict the number of years
for which a leasehold estate may be created (e.g., 51 years for farm property and 99
years for urban property). When the lease term exceeds the statutory maximum, most
courts hold that the lease is entirely void. Likewise, where the lease contains an option
to renew for a period beyond the permitted maximum, most courts hold the entire lease
void.
c.
Termination
A tenancy for years ends automatically on its termination date.
1)
Breach of Covenants
In most tenancy for years leases, the landlord reserves the right to terminate if the
tenant breaches any of the leasehold covenants. This reserved power is called the
landlords right of entry.
a)
2)
2.
Failure to Pay Rent

In many jurisdictions, if the tenant fails to pay the promised rent, the landlord
has the right to terminate the lease even in the absence of a reserved right of
entry.
Surrender
A tenancy for years also terminates upon surrender. Surrender consists of the
tenant giving up his leasehold interest to the landlord and the landlord accepting.
Usually the same formalities are required for the surrender of a leasehold as are
necessary for its creation. Thus, a writing is necessary for the surrender of a leasehold if the unexpired term is more than one year.
Periodic Tenancies
A periodic tenancy is a tenancy that continues from year to year or for successive fractions of
a year (e.g., weekly or monthly) until terminated by proper notice by either party. The beginning date must be certain, but the termination date is always uncertain until notice is given.
All conditions and terms of the tenancy are carried over from one period to the next unless
there is a lease provision to the contrary. Periodic tenancies do not violate the rules limiting
REAL PROPERTY 51.
the length of leaseholds because each party retains the power to terminate upon giving
notice.
a.
Creation
Periodic tenancies can be created in three ways:
1)
By Express Agreement
Periodic tenancies can be created by express agreement (e.g., Landlord leases to
Tenant from month to month).
2)
By Implication
A periodic tenancy will be implied if the lease has no set termination but does
provide for the payment of rent at specic periods.
Example:
Landlord leases to Tenant at a rent of $1,000 payable monthly
in advance. The reservation of monthly rent will give rise to a
periodic tenancy from month to month.
Note: If the lease reserves an annual rent, payable monthly (e.g., $12,000 per
annum, payable $1,000 on the rst day of every month commencing January 1),
the majority view is that the periodic tenancy is from year to year.
3)
b.
By Operation of Law
A periodic tenancy may arise even without an express or implied agreement
between the parties.
a)
Tenant Holds Over

If a tenant for years remains in possession after the termination of his tenancy
period, the landlord may elect to treat the tenant as a periodic tenant on the
same terms as the original lease. (See 5.b., infra.)
b)
Lease Invalid
If a lease is invalid (e.g., because of failure to satisfy the Statute of Frauds)
and the tenant nonetheless goes into possession, the tenants periodic payment
of rent will convert what would otherwise be a tenancy at will into a periodic
tenancy. The period of the tenancy coincides with the period for which the
rent is paid.
TerminationNotice Required
A periodic tenancy is automatically renewed, from period to period, until proper notice
of termination is given by either party. Many jurisdictions have statutorily prescribed
the notice required to terminate a periodic tenancy. In general, the guidelines are as
follows:
(i)
The tenancy must end at the end of a natural lease period.
(ii) For a tenancy from year to year, six months notice is required.
52. REAL PROPERTY
(iii) For tenancies less than one year in duration, a full period in advance of the period
in question is required by way of notice (e.g., for a month-to-month periodic
tenancy, one full months notice is required).
In general, the notice required to terminate a periodic tenancy must be in writing and
must actually be delivered to the party in question or deposited at his residence in a
manner similar to that required for service of process.
3.
Tenancies at Will
A tenancy at will is an estate in land that is terminable at the will of either the landlord or the
tenant. To be a tenancy at will, both the landlord and the tenant must have the right to terminate the lease at will.
(i)
If the lease gives only the landlord the right to terminate at will, a similar right will
generally be implied in favor of the tenant so that the lease creates a tenancy at will.
(ii) If the lease is only at the will of the tenant (e.g., for so long as the tenant wishes),
courts usually do not imply a right to terminate in favor of the landlord. Rather, most
courts interpret the conveyance as creating a life estate or fee simple, either of which is
terminable by the tenant. (If the Statute of Frauds is not satised, the conveyance is a
tenancy at will.)
4.
a.
Creation
A tenancy at will generally arises from a specic understanding between the parties
that either party may terminate the tenancy at any time. Note that unless the parties
expressly agree to a tenancy at will, the payment of regular rent (e.g., monthly,
quarterly, etc.) will cause a court to treat the tenancy as a periodic tenancy. Thus, tenancies at will are quite rare. Although a tenancy at will can also arise when the lease is for
an indenite period (one that does not satisfy the requirements for creating a tenancy
for years), or when a tenant goes into possession under a lease that does not satisfy the
requisite formalities (usually the Statute of Frauds), rent payments will usually convert
it to a periodic tenancy.
b.
Termination
A tenancy at will may be terminated by either party. At common law, no notice was
required to terminate a tenancy at will. But the majority of states now require that a
party give the other notice of termination and a reasonable time to quit the premises. A
tenancy at will also terminates by operation of law if:
1)
Either party dies;
2)
The tenant commits waste;
3)
The tenant attempts to assign his tenancy;
4)
The landlord transfers his interest in the property; or
5)
The landlord executes a term lease to a third person.
Tenancies at Sufferance
A tenancy at sufferance (sometimes called occupancy at sufferance) arises when a tenant
REAL PROPERTY 53.
wrongfully remains in possession after the expiration of a lawful tenancy (e.g., after the
stipulated date for the termination of a tenancy for years; or after the landlord has exercised
a power of termination). Such a tenant is a wrongdoer and is liable for rent. The tenancy at
sufferance lasts only until the landlord takes steps to evict the tenant. No notice is required to
end the tenancy, and authorities are divided as to whether this is even an estate in land.
5.
The Hold-Over Doctrine

When a tenant continues in possession after the termination of his right to possession, the
landlord has two choices of action:
a.
Eviction
The landlord may treat the hold-over tenant as a trespasser and evict him under an
unlawful detainer statute.
b.
Creation of Periodic Tenancy

The landlord may, in his sole discretion, bind the tenant to a new periodic tenancy.
1)
Terms
The terms and conditions of the expired tenancy (e.g., rent, covenants, etc.) apply
to the new tenancy. In commercial leases, if the original lease term was for one
year or more, a year-to-year tenancy results from holding over. If the original
term was for less than one year, the periodic term is determined by the manner in
which the rent was due and payable under the prior tenancy. In residential leases,
however, most courts would rule the tenant a month-to-month tenant (or a weekto-week tenant if the tenant was a roomer paying weekly rent), irrespective of the
term of the original lease.
Example:
A nonresidential tenant was holding under a six-month term
tenancy with rent payable monthly. The tenant holds over and the
landlord binds him to a new tenancy. The new periodic tenancy is a
month-to-month tenancy.
2)
Altered Terms
If the landlord noties the tenant before termination of the tenancy that occupancy
after termination will be at an increased rent, the tenant will be held to have acquiesced to the new terms if he does not surrender. The tenant will be held to the new
terms even if he objects to the increased rent, provided that the rent increase is
reasonable.
c.
What Does Not Constitute Holding Over

The landlord cannot bind the tenant to a new tenancy under the hold-over doctrine
if: (i) the tenant remains in possession for only a few hours after termination of the
lease, or leaves a few articles of personal property on the premises; (ii) the delay is not
the tenants fault (e.g., because of severe illness); or (iii) it is a seasonal lease (e.g.,
summer cottage).
d.
Double Rent Jeopardy

Many state statutes provide that if a tenant willfully remains in possession after his term
expires and after the landlord makes a written demand for possession, the landlord
may collect double rent for the time the tenant in fact remains in possession.
54. REAL PROPERTY
e.
Forcible Entry Statutes

Most states by statute prohibit forcible entry, i.e., entry against the will of the possessor.
Under such statutes, a landlord must not use force or self-help to remove a hold-over
tenant. Some states also bar the landlord from more subtle methods of regaining possession, e.g., changing the locks and locking out the tenant.
The statutes allow the landlord to evict a tenant who has remained in possession after
his right to possession has terminated. The sole issue is who has the right to possession; questions of title must be litigated in ejectment actions rather than in eviction
actions.
B.
LEASES
A lease is a contract containing the promises of the parties. It governs the relationship between the
landlord and tenant over the term of the lease.
1.
Common LawLease Covenants Independent

At common law, covenants in a lease were independent of each other; i.e., one partys performance of his promise did not depend on the other partys performance of his promise. Thus,
if one party breached a covenant, the other party could recover damages, but still had to
perform his promises and could not terminate the landlord-tenant relationship.
Example:
L leases an ofce space to T for ve years. T covenants to pay $1,250 per
month, and L covenants to paint the ofce once each year. At the beginning
of the second year, L refuses to paint the ofce. At common law, T could
recover damages from L (the decrease in fair rental value or the cost of
painting), but T could not terminate the lease or refuse to pay his rent because
of Ls breach.
2.
Modern TrendLease Covenants Dependent

Exceptions to the common law rule developed over time. For example, a tenant may be
excused from his covenant to pay rent if the landlord actually or constructively evicts the
tenant (see D.2., infra) or breaches the implied warranty of habitability (see D.3., infra).
Similarly, in nearly all states a landlord may terminate the lease if the tenant breaches his
covenant to pay rent (see C.4.a., infra). Modern courts are also likely to construe other
covenants as dependent and excuse one partys performance (after proper notice and time to
cure) when the other partys breach relates to a material part of the lease (e.g., the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, which has been adopted in nearly half the states,
codies this rule for residential tenancies [URLTA 4.101, 4.201]).
Example:
L leases a retail space to T for four years to be used as a furniture store. T
covenants to pay $350 per month, and L covenants not to lease any other
space in the building for use as a furniture store. During the third year, L
leases the adjoining retail space to a rug store. If T sells rugs and would suffer
nancial loss as a result of the competition, Ls breach would be considered
material, allowing T to terminate the lease. [Kulawitz v. Pacic Woodenware
& Paper Co., 155 P.2d 24 (Cal. 1944)]
Compare:
In the example in 1., above, Ls breach of a covenant to paint likely would not
be considered material.
REAL PROPERTY 55.
C.
TENANT DUTIES AND LANDLORD REMEDIES

1.
Tenants Duty to Repair (Doctrine of Waste)

A tenant cannot damagecommit waste onthe leased premises. The rules governing
waste in the leasehold context are very much like those governing waste in the context of the
life estate.
a.
Types of Waste
1)
Voluntary (Afrmative) Waste

A tenant is liable to the landlord for voluntary waste. Voluntary waste results
when the tenant intentionally or negligently damages the premises. It also includes
exploiting minerals on the property unless the property was previously so used, or
unless the lease provides that the tenant may do so.
2)
Permissive Waste
Unless the lease provides otherwise, the tenant has no duty to the landlord to make
any substantial repairs (i.e., to keep the premises in good repair). However, the
tenant has a duty to make ordinary repairs to keep the property in the same condition as at the commencement of the lease term, excluding ordinary wear and tear
(unless the tenant covenanted to repair ordinary wear and tear; see c.2), infra).
For example, it is the tenants duty to repair broken windows or a leaking roof
and to take such other steps as are needed to prevent damage from the elements
(i.e., keep the premises wind and water tight). If the tenant fails to do so, he is
liable to the landlord for any resulting damage, but not for the cost of repair. Under
the URLTA, residential tenants have additional duties: (i) not to cause housing
code violations; (ii) to keep the premises clean and free of vermin; and (iii) to use
plumbing, appliances, etc., in a reasonable manner. Note that even when the burden
of repair is on the landlord, the tenant does have a duty to report deciencies
promptly to the landlord.
3)
Ameliorative Waste
A tenant is under an obligation to return the premises in the same nature and
character as received. Therefore, a tenant is not permitted to make substantial
alterations to leased structures even if the alteration increases the value of the
property.
a)
LiabilityCost of Restoration
The tenant is liable for the cost of restoration should he commit ameliorative
waste.
b)
Modern ExceptionValue of Premises Decreasing

When, through the passage of time, the demised premises have been signicantly reduced in value, courts will permit a change in the character of the
premises as long as:
(1) The change increases the value of the premises;
(2) The change is performed by a long-term tenant (e.g., 25 years); and
56. REAL PROPERTY
(3) The change reects a change in the nature and character of the neighborhood.
b.
Destruction of the Premises Without Fault

If the leased premises are destroyed (e.g., by re) without the fault of either the landlord
or the tenant, no waste is involved. In this situation, the common law held that the lease
continues in effect. In the absence of lease language, neither party has a duty to restore
the premises, but the tenant has a duty to continue paying the rent.
1)
c.
Majority ViewTenant Can Terminate Lease

In most states, statutes or case law now give the tenant an option to terminate the
lease if the premises are destroyed without the tenants fault, even in the presence
of an explicit covenant to repair (see below).
Tenants Liability for Covenants to Repair

In residential leases, even if the tenant covenants to repair, the landlord will usually
be obligated to repair (except for damages caused by the tenant) under the implied
warranty of habitability (see D.3., infra), because the landlords obligations under
that warranty are usually held not to be waivable. However, in nonresidential leases,
the tenants covenant to repair is enforceable, and a landlords claim that the tenant
breached the covenant will be assessed by comparing the propertys condition when the
lease terminates with its condition when the lease commenced.
1)
Rebuilding After Structural Damage or Casualty Destruction

A covenant requiring the tenant to repair is not usually construed by the modern
cases to include rebuilding of structural damage or destruction due to a casualty,
structural defects, or a third partys acts, unless the covenant expressly includes
these types of repairs.
Example:
L leases greenhouses to T, and the lease contains a covenant by T
to maintain said (greenhouses); and, upon expiration of the term
hereof surrender in as good a condition as it shall be when lessee
takes possession thereof. The greenhouses are destroyed by re,
and L sues T for the cost of rebuilding them. Held: Maintain or
repair does not include an obligation to rebuild after destruction by re. [Washington Hydroculture, Inc. v. Payne, 635 P.2d 138
(Wash. 1981)]
2)
Repairing Ordinary Wear and Tear

A covenant requiring the tenant to repair is usually construed to include even
repair of ordinary wear and tear if the covenant in the lease makes no specic
mention of ordinary wear and tear. However, repair covenants frequently exclude
repair of ordinary wear and tear, and such an exclusion is enforceable.
Example:
L leases a restaurant to T. T covenants to maintain, repair and
keep in good order the interior of the building. The covenant does
not contain the usual exclusion for ordinary wear and tear. Thus,
T is held liable for all needed repairs, including tears in booths
and chairs, worn ooring, and a damaged ceiling. [Santillanes v.
Property Management Services, Inc., 716 P.2d 1360 (Idaho 1986)]
REAL PROPERTY 57.
2.
3.
4.
Duty to Not Use Premises for Illegal Purpose

If the tenant uses the premises for an illegal purpose, and the landlord is not a party to the
illegal use, the landlord may terminate the lease or obtain damages and injunctive relief.
a.
Occasional Unlawful Conduct Does Not Breach Duty

Occasional unlawful conduct of the tenant does not breach this duty. The duty is
breached only when the illegal conduct is continuous (e.g., if the tenant operates a
gambling ring out of the leased premises).
b.
Landlord RemediesTerminate Lease, Recover Damages

If the conduct is continuous, the landlord may terminate the lease and recover the
damages. If the conduct has rst been stopped by a public authority, the landlord may
terminate and recover damages, but only if she acts within a reasonable time after the
use has been stopped. Alternatively, the landlord faced with unlawful tenant conduct
may keep the lease in force and seek injunctive or monetary relief.
Duty to Pay Rent

At common law, rent is due at the end of the leasehold term. However, leases usually contain
a provision making the rent payable at some other time (e.g., monthly in advance).
a.
When Rent Accrues

At common law, rent is not apportionable; i.e., it does not accrue from day to day,
but rather accrues all at once at the end of the term. However, most states today have
statutes that provide that if a leasehold terminates before the term originally agreed on,
the tenant must pay a proportionate amount of the agreed rent.
b.
Rent Deposits
Landlords often require a deposit by the tenant at the outset of the lease. If the money
is considered a security deposit, the landlord will not be permitted to retain it beyond
the extent of his recoverable damages. But if the deposit is denominated a bonus or a
future rent payment (e.g., the last months rent), then most courts permit the landlord to
retain it after the tenant has been evicted.
c.
Termination of Rent LiabilitySurrender

If a tenant effectively conveys back (surrenders) his leasehold to the landlord, the
tenants liability for future rent ends. Normally, this occurs when there is an agreement
between the landlord and tenant that the tenants interest in the demised premises will
end. If the unexpired term of the lease is more than one year, the surrender must be
memorialized in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
Landlord Remedies
a.
Tenant on Premises But Fails to Pay RentEvict or Sue for Rent

At common law, a breach, such as failure to pay rent, resulted only in a cause of action
for money damages; a breach by either party did not give rise to a right to terminate
the lease. Most leases, however, grant the nonbreaching party the right to terminate.
Furthermore, nearly all states have enacted an unlawful detainer statute, which permits
the landlord to evict a defaulting tenant. These statutes provide for a quick hearing, but
58. REAL PROPERTY
severely limit the issues that may be raised. Under most statutes, the only issue properly
before the court is the landlords right to rent and possession. The tenant cannot raise
counterclaims.
1)
b.
DistressLandlords Lien
In some states (especially in nonresidential leases), a landlord who does not receive
rent when due can assert a lien on the personal property found on the leased
premises. This applies to property owned by sublessees as well as by the original
tenant.
Tenant AbandonsDo Nothing or Repossess

If the tenant unjustiably abandons the property, the landlord has two options: she may
do nothing, or she may repossess.
1)
Landlord Does NothingTenant Remains Liable

Traditionally, a landlord had no duty to mitigate and could let the premises lie idle
if the abandoning tenant did not tender an acceptable substituting tenant. However,
the landlord could not sue for rent due in the future because the tenant still might
pay rent when it became due. Now, the majority view requires the landlord to make
reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages by reletting to a new tenant. Under this
view, the landlord may sue a tenant who has wrongfully terminated the lease for
damages equal to the difference between the unpaid rent under the lease and the
propertys fair market rental value. If the landlord could have done so but does not
attempt to relet, her recovery against the tenant will be reduced accordingly.
2)
Landlord RepossessesTenants Liability Depends on Surrender

If the landlord repossesses and/or relets the premises, the tenants liability will
depend on whether the landlord has accepted a surrender of the premises. If
surrender is not found, the tenant remains liable for the difference between the
promised rent and the fair rental value of the property (or, in the case of reletting,
between the promised rent and the rent received from the reletting). However, if
the landlords reletting or use of the premises for her own prot constitutes acceptance of surrender, the abandoning tenant is free from any rent liability accruing
after abandonment.
a)
Acts that Constitute Acceptance of Surrender

If the landlord resumes possession of the demised premises for herself, this
conduct usually constitutes acceptance of the surrender, and the tenant will be
relieved of any further liability.
b)
Acts that Do Not Constitute Acceptance of Surrender

The fact that the landlord enters the premises after abandonment to make
repairs, receives back the keys, or offers to attempt to relet the premises on
behalf of the tenant, does not by itself constitute an acceptance of the offered
surrender. Note that if the landlord has a duty to mitigate damages, she must
repossess the premises; thus, doing so does not constitute acceptance of the
tenants surrender so as to relieve the tenant of liability for future rent. In that
case, the tenant would be liable for past due rent as well as the difference
REAL PROPERTY 59.
between the future rent under the lease and the fair market or relet rental
value.
D.
LANDLORD DUTIES AND TENANT REMEDIES

At common law, a landlord had no duty to repair or maintain the premises. This rule has been
modied for residential tenancies in most states by statute (e.g., the URLTA) and the implied
warranty of habitability. Moreover, the lease itself commonly prescribes landlord liability to the
tenant in several areas. If a lease does not expressly prescribe landlord duties, some duties will be
implied.
1.
2.
Duty to Deliver Possession of Premises

a.
Landlord DutyMust Deliver Actual Possession

Statutes in most states require the landlord to put the tenant in actual possession of the
premises at the beginning of the leasehold term. In a minority of states, the landlords
obligation is merely to give the tenant the legal right to possession. The difference can
be important if the leased premises are occupied by a prior, hold-over tenant who has
not moved out. Under the majority view, the landlord is in breach if she has not evicted
the hold-over tenant by the beginning of the new tenants term. Under the minority
view, it is up to the new tenant to bring eviction proceedings against the hold-over
tenant.
b.
Tenant RemedyDamages
In states following the majority rule, a tenant is entitled to damages against a landlord
in breach of the duty to deliver possession. If, e.g., the tenant had to nd more expensive housing during the interim or suffered business losses as a consequence of the
landlords breach, he may recover for these items.
Quiet Enjoyment
There is implied in every lease a covenant that neither the landlord nor someone with
paramount title (e.g., a prior mortgagee of the landlord who forecloses) will interfere with
the tenants quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises. The covenant of quiet enjoyment may be breached in any one of three ways: actual eviction, partial actual eviction, or
constructive eviction.
a.
Actual Eviction
Actual eviction occurs when the landlord, a paramount title holder, or a hold-over tenant
excludes the tenant from the entire leased premises. Actual eviction terminates the
tenants obligation to pay rent.
b.
Partial Actual Eviction

Partial actual eviction occurs when the tenant is physically excluded from only part of
the leased premises. (The part from which the tenant is excluded need not be a substantial part of the premises for breach to occur.) The tenants remedies for breach will
differ depending on whether the partial eviction was caused by the landlord or by one
with paramount title.
1)
Partial Eviction by LandlordEntire Rent Obligation Relieved

Partial eviction by the landlord relieves the tenant of the obligation to pay rent
60. REAL PROPERTY
for the entire premises, even though the tenant continues in possession of the
remainder of the premises.
2)
c.
Partial Eviction by Third PersonRent Apportioned

Partial eviction by a third person with paramount title results in an apportionment
of rent; i.e., the tenant is liable for the reasonable rental value of the portion that he
continues to possess.
Constructive Eviction
Constructive eviction occurs when a landlords breach of duty renders the premises
untenantable (i.e., unsuitable for occupancy). To establish a claim for constructive
eviction, the tenant must prove:
(i)
The landlord, or persons acting for him, breached a duty to the tenant (acts of
neighbors or strangers will not sufce);
(ii) The breach substantially and materially deprived the tenant of her use and enjoyment of the premises (e.g., ooding, absence of heat in winter, loss of elevator
service in a warehouse);
(iii) The tenant gave the landlord notice and a reasonable time to repair; and
(iv) After such reasonable time, the tenant vacated the premises.
A tenant who has been constructively evicted may terminate the lease (i.e., is relieved
of her duty to pay rent from the date of abandonment) and may also seek damages.
Constructive eviction is often raised as a defense in a landlords suit for damages or rent.
3.
Implied Warranty of Habitability

More than half the states have now adopted by court decision or statute the implied warranty
of habitability for residential tenancies; it is clearly a growing trend. (It is rarely applied
to nonresidential cases, unlike constructive eviction.) The standards are more favorable to
tenants than in constructive eviction, and the range of remedies is much broader.
a.
StandardReasonably Suitable for Human Residence

The standard usually applied is the local housing code if one exists; if there is none, the
court asks whether the conditions are reasonably suitable for human residence.
b.
Remedies
The following remedies have been adopted by various courts for violation of the implied
warranty (although few courts have adopted all):
1)
Tenant may move out and terminate lease (as in a constructive eviction).
2)
Tenant may make repairs directly, and offset the cost against future rent obligations. (Some states limit this remedy by statute to a xed amount, such as one
months rent, or to only one occasion each year.)
3)
Tenant may reduce or abate rent to an amount equal to the fair rental value in
view of the defects in the property. (In many jurisdictions, the tenant may withhold
REAL PROPERTY 61.
all rent until the court determines the amount of this fair rental value, and may
then pay it without risk of the landlords terminating the lease for rent delinquency.)
4)
E.
Tenant may remain in possession, pay full rent, and seek damages against the
landlord.
4.
Retaliatory Eviction
If a tenant exercises the legal right to report housing or building code violations or other
rights provided by statute (e.g., a residential landlord-tenant act), the landlord is not permitted
to terminate the tenants lease in retaliation. The landlord is also barred from penalizing the
tenant in other ways, such as raising the rent or reducing tenant services. This protection is
recognized by residential landlord-tenant acts in nearly half the states. These statutes usually
presume a retaliatory motive if the landlord acts within, say, 90 to 180 days after the tenant
exercises his rights. In other states, the same conclusion is reached by judicial construction
of the eviction and code statutes. The protection generally applies to tenants under both
periodic leases when the landlord gives notice to terminate and xed-term leases when the
landlord refuses to renew. To overcome the presumption, the landlord must show a valid,
nonretaliatory reason for his actions.
5.
Discrimination
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 bars racial or ethnic discrimination in the sale or rental of
all property. The Fair Housing Act bars discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion,
national origin, gender, and disability in the sale or rental of a dwelling. Discrimination
against families with children is also barred except in senior citizen housing. The Act does
not apply to religious organizations, private clubs, and owners who have no more than three
single-family dwellings or who have an owner-occupied apartment with no more than four
units. [42 U.S.C. 3603(b), 3607]
ASSIGNMENTS AND SUBLEASES

Absent an express restriction in the lease, a tenant may freely transfer his leasehold interest, in
whole or in part. If he makes a complete transfer of the entire remaining term, he has made an
assignment. If he retains any part of the remaining term, the transfer is a sublease.
Example:
L leases property to T for a 10-year term. One month later, T transfers his interest
to T1 for nine years, retaining the right to retake the premises (reversion) after nine
years. The effect of his transfer is to create a sublease between T (sublessor) and
T1 (sublessee).
If, on the other hand, T had transferred to T1 for the remaining period of the lease,
reserving no rights, the transfer would constitute an assignment of the lease from T
(assignor) to T1 (assignee). (Note: It is not controlling that the parties denominate
the transfer an assignment or sublease. The court still examines what interest,
if any, is retained by T to determine the nature of the transaction.)
1.
Consequences of Assignment
The label given to a transferan assignment or subleasedetermines whether the landlord
can proceed directly against the transferee or only against the transferor. To be an assignment, the transfer must be on the same terms as the original lease except that the tenant
62. REAL PROPERTY
may reserve a right of termination (reentry) for breach of the terms of the original lease
that has been assigned; e.g., to A for the balance of the leasehold term. However, should A
fail to make the rental payments to the landlord, the right to reenter and reclaim the premises
is reserved. If the transfer is an assignment, the assignee stands in the shoes of the original
tenant in a direct relationship with the landlord. The assignee and the landlord are in privity
of estate, and each is liable to the other on all covenants in the lease that run with the land.
a.
Covenants that Run with the Land

A covenant runs if the original parties to the lease so intend, and if the covenant
touches and concerns the leased land; i.e., it benets the landlord and burdens the
tenant (or vice versa) with respect to their interests in the property. (These requirements are discussed in detail at IV.D., infra.) Covenants held to run with the land
(unless the parties specify otherwise) include: covenants to do or not do a physical act
(e.g., to repair, to conduct a business on the land in a specied manner, to supply heat);
covenants to pay money (e.g., rent, taxes, etc.); and covenants regarding the duration of
the lease (e.g., termination clauses).
b.
Rent Covenant Runs with the Land

Because the covenant to pay rent runs with the land, an assignee owes the rent directly
to the landlord. He does not owe rent for the period before the assignment, but only for
the time that he is in privity of estate, i.e., from the time of assignment until the end of
the lease or until the assignee himself reassigns.
1)
Reassignment by AssigneePrivity of Estate with Landlord Ends

If the assignee reassigns the leasehold interest, his privity of estate with the
landlord ends, and he is not liable for the subsequent assignees failure to pay rent.
However, if the rst assignee specically promised the landlord that he would be
liable for the rent for the remainder of the lease term, he may be obligated to pay
based on privity of contract, even though his reassignment ended the privity of
estate.
a)
2)
Effect of Assignee Assuming Rent Obligation

If the assignee made no promise to the landlord but did promise the original
tenant that he would pay all future rent, the landlord may be able to sue the
assignee as a third-party beneciary of the contract between the original
tenant and the assignee.
Original Tenant Remains Liable

After assignment, the original tenant is no longer in privity of estate with the
landlord. However, if (as is likely) the tenant promised to pay rent in his lease with
the landlord, he can still be held liable on his original contractual obligation to pay,
i.e., on privity of contract. This allows the landlord to sue the original tenant where
the assignee has disappeared, is judgment-proof, etc.
Example:
L rents to T for three years at $9,400 per year. After one year, T
assigns to T1. T1 pays the rent for one year, and then assigns to
T2. T2 fails to pay rent. L can collect from T or T2 but not from
T1 (unless T1 made some promise on the basis of which L can sue
him).
REAL PROPERTY 63.
2.
Consequences of Sublease
In a sublease, the sublessee is considered the tenant of the original lessee, and usually pays
rent directly to the original lessee, who in turn pays rent to the landlord under the main lease.
a.
Liability of Sublessee for Rent and Other Covenants

The sublessee is liable to the original lessee for whatever rent the two of them agreed to
in the sublease. However, the sublessee is not personally liable to the landlord for rent
or for the performance of any other covenants made by the original lessee in the main
lease. The reason is that the sublessee has no contractual relationship with the landlord
(no privity of contract), and does not hold the tenants full estate in the land (no privity
of estate); therefore, the covenants in the main lease do not run with the land to bind
the sublessee.
1)
3.
Termination for Breach of Covenants

Even though the sublessee is not personally liable to the landlord, the landlord can
still terminate the main lease for nonpayment of rent or, if so stated in the lease,
breach of other tenant covenants. If this occurs, the sublease will automatically
terminate at the same time.
b.
Assumption by Sublessee
It is possible for the sublessee to assume the rent covenant and other covenants in the
main lease. An assumption is not implied, but must be expressed. If this occurs, the
sublessee is bound by the assumption agreement and becomes personally liable to the
landlord on the covenants assumed. The landlord is considered a third-party beneciary
of the assumption agreement.
c.
Rights of Sublessee
The sublessee can enforce all covenants made by the original lessee in the sublease, but
has no direct right to enforce any covenants made by the landlord in the main lease.
However, it is likely (although there is very little case law on point) that a sublessee in
a residential lease would be permitted to enforce the implied warranty of habitability
against the landlord.
Covenants Against Assignment or Sublease

a.
Strictly Construed Against Landlord

Many leases contain covenants on the part of the tenant not to assign or sublease
without the consent of the landlord. These are strictly construed against the landlord.
Thus, a covenant prohibiting assignment does not prohibit subleasing and vice versa.
b.
Waiver of Covenant
Even if the lease has a valid covenant against assignment, the covenant may be held
waived if the landlord knows of the assignment and does not object. This often occurs
when the landlord knowingly accepts rent from the assignee.
c.
Continuing Waiver
If the landlord grants consent to one transfer, the Rule in Dumpors Case provides that
he waives his right to avoid future transfers unless he expressly reserves the right to do
so. Reservation of right must take place at the time of granting consent.
64. REAL PROPERTY
4.
F.
d.
Transfer in Violation of Lease Not Void

If a tenant transfers (assigns or sublets) in violation of a prohibition in the lease against
transfers, the transfer is not void. However, the landlord usually may terminate the lease
under either the lease terms or a statute. Alternatively, he may sue for damages if he can
prove any.
e.
Reasonableness
In a minority of states, the landlord may not unreasonably withhold consent to transfers
by the tenant. The majority imposes no such limitation.
Assignments by Landlords
a.
Right to Assign
A landlord may assign the rents and reversion interest that he owns. This is usually
done by an ordinary deed from the landlord to the new owner of the building. Unless
required by the lease (which is very unlikely), the consent of the tenants is not required.
b.
Rights of Assignee Against Tenants

Once the tenants are given reasonable evidence that the assignment has occurred, they
are legally obligated to recognize and pay rent to the new owner as their landlord. This
is called attornment. The benets of all other tenant covenants (e.g., to repair, to pay
taxes) also run with the landlords estate and benet the new landlord, provided that
they touch and concern the land.
c.
Liabilities of Assignee to Tenants

The assignee is liable to the tenants for performance of all covenants made by the
original landlord in the lease, provided that those covenants touch and concern the land.
The burdens of those covenants run with the landlords estate and become the burdens
of the new landlord. The original landlord also remains liable on all of the covenants
he made in the lease.
Example:
L leases to T, and in the lease covenants to repair and maintain the
premises. L then sells the building to L2, subject to the lease. Because
a covenant to repair and maintain touches and concerns the land, L2 is
personally liable to T if L2 fails to perform the covenant. L also remains
liable.
CONDEMNATION OF LEASEHOLDS
1.
Entire Leasehold Taken by Eminent DomainRent Liability Extinguished

If all of the leased land is condemned for the full balance of the lease term, the tenants
liability for rent is extinguished because both the leasehold and the reversion have merged
in the condemnor and there is no longer a leasehold estate. Absent a lease provision to the
contrary, the lessee is entitled to compensation for the taking of the leasehold estate.
2.
Temporary or Partial TakingTenant Entitled to Compensation Only

If the taking is temporary (i.e., for a period less than the remaining term), or if only a portion
of the leased property is condemned, the tenant is not discharged from the rent obligation but
is entitled to compensation (i.e., a share of the condemnation award) for the taking.
REAL PROPERTY 65.
G. TORT LIABILITY OF LANDLORD AND TENANT

1.
Landlords Liability
At common law, subject to a few exceptions, a landlord had no duty to make the premises
safe. Today there are six exceptions to this rule:
a.
Concealed Dangerous Condition (Latent Defect)

If, at the time the lease is entered into, the landlord knows (or should know) of a
dangerous condition that the tenant could not discover upon reasonable inspection, the
landlord has a duty to disclose the dangerous condition. Failure to disclose results in
liability for any injury resulting from the condition.
Once disclosure is made, if the tenant accepts the premises, she is considered to have
assumed the risk of injuries to herself or her guests (e.g., family members, invitees,
licensees); the landlord is no longer liable.
b.
Common Areas
The landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care over common areas, such as halls,
walks, elevators, etc., that remain under his control. The landlord is liable for any injury
resulting from a dangerous condition that could reasonably have been discovered and
made safe. This duty is the same as the duty an owner-occupier owes his guests (see
Multistate Torts outline).
c.
Public Use
A landlord is liable for injuries to members of the public if, at the time of the lease, he:
(i) knows or should know of a dangerous condition, (ii) has reason to believe that the
tenant may admit the public before repairing the condition (e.g., because of short lease
term), and (iii) fails to repair the condition. The landlords liability extends only to
people who enter the premises for the purpose for which the public is invited. Note that
the tenants promise to repair does not relieve the landlord of liability if the landlord has
reason to suspect that the tenant will admit the public before making the repair.
d.
Furnished Short-Term Residence

When a furnished house or apartment is leased for a short term (i.e., three months or
less) for immediate occupancy, many jurisdictions hold that the landlord is liable if the
premises are defective and cause injury to a tenant.
e.
Negligent Repairs by Landlord

Even if a landlord has no duty to make repairs, a landlord who actually attempts to
repair is liable if an injury results because the repairs are done negligently, or because
they give a deceptive appearance of safety. [Restatement (Second) of Property:
Landlord & Tenant 17.7]
Example:
L leases an apartment to T. Without obligation, L agrees to repair
sagging, rotted boards in the kitchen oor. The work appears to be done
correctly, but in fact is structurally unsound. T relies on the deceptive
appearance of safety thereby created and walks on the oor. L is subject
to liability for injuries to T when the oor collapses.
66. REAL PROPERTY
f.
2.
3.
Landlord Contracts to Repair

If a landlord covenants to repair, most courts hold that he is liable in tort for an injury to
the tenant or the tenants guests resulting from his failure to repair or negligent repair.
Modern TrendGeneral Duty of Reasonable Care

Increasingly, the courts are simply holding that landlords have a general duty of reasonable
care with respect to residential tenants, and that they will be held liable for personal injuries
of tenants and their guests resulting from the landlords ordinary negligence, without regard
to the exceptions discussed above. This duty is ordinarily not imposed until the landlord has
notice of a particular defect and a reasonable opportunity to repair it.
a.
Defects Arising After Tenant Takes Possession

A landlord will generally be held to have notice of defects that existed before the tenant
took possession. However, the landlord will not be liable for defects arising after the
tenant takes possession unless there is evidence that the landlord actually knew or
should have known of them.
b.
Legal Duty to Repair

If the landlord has a statutory duty to repair (e.g., under the housing code), he may be
liable to the tenant or the tenants guests for injuries resulting from his failure to repair.
Some courts hold that violation of the housing code (or similar statute) is negligence
per se, but most courts hold that it is merely evidence of negligence, which the jury
may or may not nd conclusive. The same analysis probably applies to a violation of the
implied warranty of habitability, but there are very few cases on point.
c.
Security
Some cases have held landlords liable for injuries inicted on tenants by third-party
criminals, where the landlord failed to comply with housing code provisions dealing
with security, or failed to maintain ordinary security measures (e.g., working locks on
apartment doors), or where he advertised extraordinary security measures (e.g., television surveillance, doormen, security patrols) and then failed to provide them.
Tenants Liability
The tenant, as occupier of the premises, may be liable in tort to third persons for dangerous
conditions or activities on the leased property. The duty of care owed by the tenant as an
occupier of land is discussed in the Multistate Torts outline.
III. FIXTURES
A.
IN GENERAL
A xture is a chattel that has been so afxed to land that it has ceased being personal property
and has become part of the realty. For example, S and B contract to sell and buy a house. Before
vacating, S removes a built-in refrigerator. B claims that the item was part of the house. Is the
refrigerator a xture? If so, B is entitled to its return or appropriate compensation.
It is important in dealing with xture problems to distinguish between common ownership
cases and divided ownership cases. Courts treat them differently even though they often purport
REAL PROPERTY 67.
to apply the same tests. Common ownership cases are those in which the person who brings
the chattel onto the land owns both the chattel and the realty (e.g., X installs a furnace in her own
home). Divided ownership cases are either ones where the person who owns and installs the
chattel does not own the land (e.g., T installs a furnace in her rented home, which belongs to L);
or the person owns the land but does not own the chattel (e.g., it is subject to a security interest
held by the seller). In addition, there are cases involving more than two persons (e.g., conicting
claims are made by the person having a security interest in the chattel and the mortgagee of the
land).
B.
CHATTELS INCORPORATED INTO STRUCTURE ALWAYS BECOME FIXTURES

In both common ownership and divided ownership cases, where the items become incorporated
into the realty so that they lose their identity, they become part of the realty. Examples include
bricks built into a building or concrete poured into a foundation. Similarly, where identication
is possible, but removal would occasion considerable loss or destruction, the items are considered
xtures, e.g., heating pipes embedded in the wall or oor of a house.
C.
COMMON OWNERSHIP CASES

1.
Annexors Intent Controls in Common Ownership Cases

In all common ownership cases where a chattel is not incorporated into a structure, whether
an item is a xture (i.e., part of the realty) depends upon the objective intention of the
party who made the annexation. This intention is determined by considering:
(i)
The nature of the article (i.e., how essential the item is to normal use of the premises);
(ii) The manner in which it is attached to the realty (the more substantially attached, the
more likely it was intended to be permanent);
(iii) The amount of damage that would be caused by its removal; and
(iv) The adaptation of the item to the use of the realty (e.g., custom window treatments,
wall-to-wall carpet).
a.
Constructive Annexation
In some cases, an article of personal property is considered a xture even though it is
not physically annexed to the real estate at all. This is because it is so uniquely adapted
to the real estate that it makes no sense to separate it. Examples include the keys to the
doors of a house; curtain rods that have been cut and sized to the brackets on the walls
of a house, even if the rods themselves are not presently installed; and a carpet that has
been cut to t an unusually shaped room, even if the carpet is not nailed or glued in
place.
b.
Vendor-Purchaser Cases
The typical situation is where the owner of land afxes chattels to the land and subsequently conveys the land without expressly providing whether the chattels are to pass
with the realty. The intention test works fairly well. The question boils down to whether
an owner bringing the disputed chattel to the realty would intend that it become part of
the realty. Or to put it another way, whether a reasonable purchaser would expect that
the disputed item was part of the realty.
68. REAL PROPERTY
c.
2.
D.
Mortgagor-Mortgagee Cases
The intention test is universally applied to determine whether the owner (mortgagor)
intended the chattels to become part of the realty. Where the mortgagor has made the
annexation prior to the giving of the mortgage, the question is what the reasonably
objective lender expects to come within the security of her lien. However, where the
annexation is made after the giving of the mortgage, the same considerations arguably
should not apply because each item that is added to the lien of the mortgage represents a windfall to the mortgagee should foreclosure occur. Nevertheless, courts universally apply the same intention test regardless of when the annexation was made. (Courts
also usually apply the intention test where items are annexed by one in possession of
land under an executory contract to purchase.)
Effect of Fixture Classication

a.
Conveyance
If a chattel has been categorized as a xture, it is part of the real estate. A conveyance
of the real estate, in the absence of any specic agreement to the contrary, passes the
xture with it. The xture, as part of the realty, passes to the new owner of the real
estate.
b.
Mortgage
To the extent that the owner of the real estate mortgages the realty, in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, the mortgage attaches to all xtures on the real estate.
c.
Agreement to Contrary
Even though the concept of xtures may apply and a chattel becomes a xture, an
agreement between a buyer and seller (similarly, between a mortgagor and mortgagee)
can cause a severance of title. For example, a buyer and seller may agree that the seller
will retain the right to remove xtures. Similarly, a mortgagor and mortgagee can agree
that the mortgage lien shall not attach to specied xtures. The effect of such an agreement is to de-annex, so far as relevant, the chattel from the realty and reconvert the
xture into a chattel.
DIVIDED OWNERSHIP CASES

In divided ownership cases, unlike the ones just discussed, the chattel is owned and brought to
the realty by someone who is not the landowner (e.g., by a tenant, a licensee, or a trespasser). The
question is whether the ownership of the chattel has passed to the landowner. Accession is the
term used to describe the intent of the annexor to make the chattels a permanent part of the real
estate, and courts often say that the intention test (C.1., supra) is to be applied in these cases too.
But the exceptions disprove the rule.
1.
Landlord-Tenant
Early English law favored the landlord. However, American law created a trade xtures
exception under which tradesmen-tenants could remove an item used in their trade or
business, that otherwise would have been a xture, unless its removal would cause substantial damage to the premises. Later, this exception was expanded to include all tenants
generally. Some courts have treated the trade xtures exception as consistent with the annexors-intention test; i.e., a tenants annexations are removable because it was not the intention
REAL PROPERTY 69.
of the tenant to make them permanent annexations to the freehold and thereby donations to
the owner of it.
a.
Agreement
An agreement between the landlord and tenant is controlling on whether the chattel
annexed to the premises was intended to become a xture. To the extent that the
landlord and tenant specically agree that such annexation is not to be deemed a xture,
the agreement controls.
b.
No Intent If Removal Does Not Cause Damage

In the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, a tenant may remove a chattel
that he has attached to the demised premises as long as the removal does not leave
unrepaired damage to the premises or cause the virtual destruction of the chattel. In
other words, the tenant will not have manifested an intention to permanently improve
the freehold (and the concept of xtures will be inapplicable) as long as the removal of
the chattel does not substantially damage the premises or destroy the chattel.
c.
Removal Must Occur Before End of Lease Term

Generally, a tenant must remove his annexed chattels before the termination of his
tenancy or they become the property of the landlord. If the duration of the tenancy is
indenite (e.g., tenancy at will), the removal must occur within a reasonable time after
the tenancy terminates. Similarly, a tenant has a reasonable time for removal if he holds
over during unsuccessful negotiations for a new lease.
d.
Tenant Has Duty to Repair Damages Resulting from Removal

Tenants are responsible for repairing damages caused by removal of xtures.
2.
Life Tenant and Remainderman

Generally, the same rules apply here as in the landlord-tenant caseswith one key distinction. The personal representative of a life tenant may remove the annexed chattel within a
reasonable time after the life tenants death.
3.
Licensee and Landowner

Licenses to bring items onto land usually contain agreements respecting removal. In the
absence of an agreement, licensees are permitted to remove the items subject to a duty to
repair damages caused thereby.
4.
Trespasser and Landowner

Trespassers (e.g., adverse possessors before the running of the statute of limitations)
normally lose their annexations whether installed in good faith or not. Moreover, the
trespasser can be held liable for the reasonable rental value of the property on which she
annexed the item for the period that she illegally occupied the land.
a.
Trespassers Recovery Limited to Value Added to Land

Some courts allow a good faith trespasser to recover for the improvement, but the
recovery is measured by the value added to the land, not the cost to construct the
improvement.
70. REAL PROPERTY
E.
THIRD-PARTY CASES
Any of the foregoing cases is complicated by the addition of third-person claimants.
1.
Third Person Claims Lien on Chattel Afxed to Land

Suppose Landowner purchases a furnace from Seller and installs it in her house. She owes a
balance on the purchase price of the furnace, and therefore grants Seller a security interest
in the furnace (in accordance with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)).
Suppose further that Landowner also executes a mortgage on her house, to Mortgagee.
If Landowner subsequently defaults on her payments, both on the furnace and the house,
is Seller or Mortgagee entitled to priority? (Same issue where Landowner sells the house
without mentioning the security interest.)
a.
UCC Rules
Normally, the rule is that whichever interest is rst recorded in the local real estate
records wins. (Thus, if the chattel security interest was recorded rst, it constitutes
constructive notice to all subsequent lenders or purchasers.) However, an exception
allows a purchase money security interest in an afxed chattel (here, the interest
given Seller to secure payment on the furnace) to prevail even over a prior recorded
mortgage on the land, as long as the chattel interest is recorded within 20 days after the
chattel is afxed to the land. [UCC 9-334]
The document used to record the chattel security interest is known as a xture ling.
(This is a separate instrument from the nancing statement, which is required to be
led to perfect the chattel security interest in the rst place.)
b.
Liability for Damages Caused by Removal

In the above example, if Seller were entitled to priority, she would be entitled to remove
the furnace. However, she would have to reimburse Mortgagee for any damages or
repair necessitated by the removal (but not for diminution in value of the property due
to the lack of a furnace).
IV. RIGHTS IN THE LAND OF ANOTHER

EASEMENTS, PROFITS, COVENANTS, AND SERVITUDES
A.
IN GENERAL
Easements, prots, covenants, and servitudes are nonpossessory interests in land. They create a
right to use land possessed by someone else. For example, A, the owner of Blackacre, grants to
B, the owner of an adjacent parcel, Whiteacre, the right to use a path over Blackacre connecting
Whiteacre to a public road. An easement has been created, giving B the right to usebut not to
possessthe pathway over Blackacre. Easements, prots, covenants, and servitudes have many
similarities in operation, coverage, creation, and termination. They also have important differences, mainly in the requirements that must be met for their enforcement.
B.
EASEMENTS
1.
Introduction
The holder of an easement has the right to use a tract of land (called the servient tenement)
REAL PROPERTY 71.
for a special purpose, but has no right to possess and enjoy the tract of land. The owner of
the servient tenement continues to have the right of full possession and enjoyment subject
only to the limitation that he cannot interfere with the right of special use created in the
easement holder. Typically, easements are created in order to give their holder the right of
access across a tract of land, e.g., the privilege of laying utility lines, or installing sewer pipes
and the like. Easements are either afrmative or negative, appurtenant or in gross.
a.
b.
Types of Easements
1)
Afrmative Easements
Afrmative easements entitle the holder to enter upon the servient tenement and
make an afrmative use of it for such purposes as laying and maintaining utility
lines, draining waters, and polluting the air over the servient estate. The right-ofway easement is another instance of an afrmative easement. Thus, an afrmative
easement privileges the holder of the benet to make a use of the servient estate
that, absent the easement, would be an unlawful trespass or nuisance.
2)
Negative Easements
A negative easement does not grant to its owner the right to enter upon the servient
tenement. It does, however, entitle the privilege holder to compel the possessor
of the servient tenement to refrain from engaging in activity upon the servient
tenement that, were it not for the existence of the easement, he would be privileged
to do. Courts historically recognized negative easements only for light, air, subjacent or lateral support, and for the ow of an articial stream. Today, a negative
easement is simply a restrictive covenant. (See D.1.e.1), infra.)
Example:
A owns Lot 6. By written instrument, he stipulates to B that he will
not build any structure upon Lot 6 within 35 feet of the lot line. B
has acquired a negative easement in Lot 6.
Easement Appurtenant
An easement is deemed appurtenant when the right of special use benets the holder of
the easement in his physical use or enjoyment of another tract of land. For an easement
appurtenant to exist, there must be two tracts of land. One is called the dominant
tenement, which has the benet of the easement. The second tract is the servient
tenement, which is subject to the easement right. One consequence of appurtenance
is that the benet passes with transfers of the beneted land, regardless of whether the
easement is mentioned in the conveyance.
Example:
A owns Lot 6 and B owns Lot 7, which are adjoining tracts of land. By a
written instrument, B grants to A the right to cross Bs tract (Lot 7). As
use and enjoyment of Lot 6 is beneted by virtue of the acquisition of
the right to use Lot 7 for this special purpose. The right is an easement
appurtenant. B remains the owner of Lot 7. A has only a right to use Lot
7 for a special purpose, i.e., the right to cross the tract.
1)
Use and Enjoyment

In an easement appurtenant, the benets to be realized by the easement must be
directly benecial to the possessor of the dominant tenement in his physical use
and enjoyment of that tract of land. It is not sufcient that the easement makes use
of the land more protable.
72. REAL PROPERTY
Example:
c.
A owns Lot 6 and B owns adjacent Lot 7. A grants to B the right to

use part of Lot 6 to mine coal. The right is not an easement appurtenant because the benet granted is not related to Bs physical use
and enjoyment of Lot 7.
2)
Benet Attached to Possession

The benet of an easement appurtenant becomes an incident of the possession of
the dominant tenement. All who possess or subsequently succeed to title to the
dominant tenement become, by virtue of the fact of possession, entitled to the
benet of the easement. There can be no conveyance of the easement right apart
from possession of the dominant tenement, except that the easement holder may
convey the easement to the owner of the servient tenement in order to extinguish
the easement (see 4.b., infra).
3)
Transfer of Dominant and Servient Estates

Both the dominant and servient parcels can be transferred. As discussed above,
if the dominant parcel is transferred, the benet of the easement goes with it
automaticallyeven if it is not mentioned in the deedand becomes the property
of the new owner. If the servient parcel is transferred, its new owner takes it
subject to the burden of the easement, unless she is a bona de purchaser (see
VI.E.3., infra) with no notice of the easement. There are three ways the person
who acquires the servient land might have notice of the easement: (i) actual knowledge, (ii) notice from the visible appearance of the easement on the land, and (iii)
notice from the fact that the document creating the easement is recorded in the
public records. Everyone who buys land is expected to inspect the land physically
and to examine the public records.
Example:
A owns Lot 6 and grants B (the owner of Lot 7) an easement for a
driveway across Lot 6 to benet adjacent Lot 7. The easement is not
recorded. Then A sells Lot 6 to X. The tire tracks of the driveway
are plainly visible at the time of the sale. X is therefore not a bona
de purchaser, and takes Lot 6 subject to the easement.
Easement in Gross
An easement in gross is created where the holder of the easement interest acquires a
right of special use in the servient tenement independent of his ownership or possession
of another tract of land. In an easement in gross, the easement holder is not beneted in
his use and enjoyment of a possessory estate by virtue of the acquisition of that privilege. There is no dominant tenement. An easement in gross passes entirely apart from
any transfer of land.
Example:
A owns Lot 6. By a written instrument, she grants to B the right to
build a pipeline across Lot 6. B receives the privilege independent of his
ownership or possession of a separate tract of land. B has acquired an
easement in gross.
Easements in gross can be either personal (e.g., O gives friend right to swim and boat on
lake) or commercial (e.g., utility or railroad track easements). Generally, an easement in
gross is transferable only if the easement is for a commercial or economic purpose.
REAL PROPERTY 73.
d.
2.
Judicial Preference for Easements Appurtenant

If an easement interest is created and its owner holds a corporeal (possessory) estate
that is or could be beneted in physical use or enjoyment by the acquisition of the
privilege, the easement will be deemed appurtenant. This is true even though the deed
creating the easement makes no reference to a dominant tenement.
Example:
A conveys to B, her heirs, successors, and assigns, the right to use a
strip 20 feet wide on the north edge of Blackacre for ingress and egress
to Whiteacre. Because there is ambiguity as to whether the benet was
intended to attach to Bs land, Whiteacre, or to B personally, a court
will apply the constructional preference and hold that the benet was
intended to be appurtenant, with the consequence that any conveyance
of Whiteacre by B will carry with it the right to use the strip across
Blackacre.
Creation of Easements
The basic methods of creating an easement are: express grant or reservation, implication, and
prescription.
a.
Express Grant
Because an easement is an interest in land, the Statute of Frauds applies. Therefore, any
easement must be memorialized in a writing that is signed by the grantor (the holder of
the servient tenement) unless its duration is brief enough (commonly one year or less)
to be outside the coverage of a particular states Statute of Frauds. An easement can be
created by conveyance. A grant of an easement must comply with all the formal requisites of a deed. An easement is presumed to be of perpetual duration unless the grant
specically limits the interest (e.g., for life, for 10 years).
b.
Express Reservation
An easement by reservation arises when the owner (of a present possessory interest) of a
tract of land conveys title but reserves the right to continue to use the tract for a special
purpose after the conveyance. In effect, the grantor passes title to the land but reserves
unto himself an easement interest. Note that, under the majority view, the easement can
be reserved only for the grantor; an attempt by the grantor to reserve an easement for
anyone else is void. (There is a growing trend to permit reservations in third parties, but
it remains a minority view.)
Example:
G owns Lot 6 and Lot 7, which are adjacent. G sells Lot 7 to B. Later,
when G is about to sell Lot 6 to A, B asks G to reserve an easement over
Lot 6 in favor of B. G agrees to do so, and executes a deed of Lot 6 to
A that contains the following language: Reserving an easement for a
driveway in favor of Lot 7, which is owned by B. The reservation clause
is void and no easement is created.
c.
Implication
An easement by implication is created by operation of law rather than by written
instrument. It is an exception to the Statute of Frauds. There are only three types of
implied easements: (i) an intended easement based on a use that existed when the
dominant and servient estates were severed, (ii) an easement implied from a recorded
subdivision plat or prot a prendre, and (iii) an easement by necessity.
74. REAL PROPERTY
1)
2)
3)
Easement Implied from Existing Use (Quasi-Easement)

An easement may be implied if, prior to the time the tract is divided, a use
exists on the servient part that is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of
the dominant part and a court determines that the parties intended the use to
continue after division of the property. It is sometimes called a quasi-easement
before the tract is divided because an owner cannot hold an easement on his own
land.
a)
Existing Use at Time Tract Divided

For a use to give rise to an easement, it must be apparent and continuous at
the time the tract is divided. Apparent means that a grantee could discover
the existence of the use upon reasonable inspection. A nonvisible use may still
be apparent if surface connections or the like would put a reasonable person
on notice of its existence.
b)
Reasonable Necessity
Whether a use is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant
parcel depends on many factors, including the cost and difculty of the alternatives and whether the price paid reects the expected continued use of the
servient portion of the tract.
c)
Grant or Reservation
An easement implied in favor of the grantee is said to be created by implied
grant, while an easement implied in favor of the grantor is said to be created
by implied reservation.
Easements Implied Without Any Existing Use

In two limited situations, easements are implied in a conveyance even though there
is no preexisting use.
a)
Subdivision Plat
When lots are sold in a subdivision with reference to a recorded plat or map
that also shows streets leading to the lots, buyers of the lots have implied
easements to use the streets in order to gain access to their lots. These
easements continue to exist even if the public easements held by the city or
county in the streets are later vacated.
b)
Prot a Prendre
When a landowner grants a prot a prendre to a person to remove a valuable
product of the soil (e.g., grass, asphalt, ore, etc.), the holder of the prot also
has an implied easement to pass over the surface of the land and to use it as
reasonably necessary to extract the product.
Easement by Necessity
When the owner of a tract of land sells a part of the tract and by this division
deprives one lot of access to a public road or utility line, a right-of-way by absolute
necessity is created by implied grant or reservation over the lot with access to the
public road or utility line. The owner of the servient parcel has the right to locate
REAL PROPERTY 75.
the easement, provided the location is reasonably convenient. An easement by

necessity terminates when the necessity ceases.
d.
3.
Prescription
Acquiring an easement by prescription is analogous to acquiring property by adverse
possession. (See V., infra.) Many of the requirements are the same: To acquire a
prescriptive easement, the use must be open and notorious, adverse, and continuous
and uninterrupted for the statutory period. Note that the public at large can acquire an
easement in private land if members of the public use the land in a way that meets the
requirements for prescription.
1)
Open and Notorious

The user must not attempt to conceal his use. Underground or other nonvisible
uses, such as pipes and electric lines, are considered open and notorious if the use
could be discovered (e.g., through surface connections) upon inspection.
2)
Adverse
The use must not be with the owners permission. Unlike adverse possession, the
use need not be exclusive. The user of a common driveway, e.g., may acquire a
prescriptive easement even though the owner uses it too.
3)
Continuous Use
Continuous adverse use does not mean constant use. A continuous claim of right
with periodic acts that put the owner on notice of the claimed easement fullls the
requirement. Note that tacking is permitted for prescriptive easements, just as for
adverse possession (see V.B.5.b., infra).
4)
When Prescriptive Easements Cannot Be Acquired

Negative easements cannot arise by prescription, nor generally may easements
in public lands. An easement by necessity cannot give rise to an easement by
prescription. However, if the necessity ends, so does the easement, and the use is
adverse from that point forward.
Scope
Courts enforcing easements are often called upon to interpret the arrangement in order to
determine the scope and intended beneciaries of the interest. The key to interpretation
employed in all these cases is the reasonable intent of the original parties. What would the
parties reasonably have provided had they contemplated the situation now before the court?
What result would reasonably serve the purposes of the arrangement?
a.
General Rules of Construction

If, as typically happens, the language used is general (e.g., a right-of-way over
Blackacre), the following rules of construction usually apply: (i) ambiguities are
resolved in favor of the grantee (unless the conveyance is gratuitous); (ii) subsequent
conduct of the parties respecting the arrangement is relevant; (iii) the parties are
assumed to have intended a scope that would reasonably serve the purposes of the grant
and to have foreseen reasonable changes in the use of the dominant estate. The rule of
reasonableness will be applied only to the extent that the governing language is general.
76. REAL PROPERTY
If the location or scope of the permitted use is spelled out in detail, the specics will
govern, and reasonable interpretation will be excluded.
Examples:
1) In 1890, A, the owner of Blackacre, granted to B, the owner of
Whiteacre, a right-of-way over Blackacre for purposes of ingress and
egress to Whiteacre from the public highway running along the western
boundary of Blackacre. At the time of the grant, there were only horses
and buggies, no automobiles. Applying a rule of reasonableness to the
general language creating the right-of-way, a court would probably nd
that the right-of-way could today be used for cars. If, however, the use
of cars would impose a substantially greater burden on Blackacre, the
court would probably nd against this use on grounds that it was outside
the scope reasonably contemplated by A and B.
2) If, in the example just given, the right-of-way was specically
dedicated (only to the use of horses and carriages), automobile use
would be excluded. Similarly, if the right-of-way was specically located
(e.g., over the southern 10 feet of Blackacre), the rule of reasonableness could not be invoked to change or enlarge the location.
b.
Absence of Location
If an easement is created but not specically located on the servient tenement, an
easement of sufcient width, height, and direction to make the intended use reasonably
convenient will be implied. The owner of the servient tenement may select the location
of the easement so long as her selection is reasonable.
c.
Changes in Use
In the absence of specic limitations in the deed creating an easement, the courts will
assume that the easement is intended by the parties to meet both present and future
reasonable needs of the dominant tenement.
Examples:
1) A roadway easement of unspecied width was created in 1920,
when cars were only six feet wide. Today, however, cars are considerably wider. Because the original roadway easement was not specically
limited in width, the easement will expand in size to accommodate the
changing and expanding needs of the owner of the dominant tenement.
2) But a basic change in the nature of the use is not allowed. Thus, a
telephone or power line may not be added on the roadway. (Many courts
are more liberal in allowing such additions if the roadway easement is
public rather than private.)
d.
Easements by Necessity or Implication

In the case of easements by necessity, the extent of the necessity determines the scope
of the easement. Because there is no underlying written instrument to interpret, courts
will look instead to the circumstances giving rise to the easement. Similarly, with
other implied easements, the quasi-easement will provide the starting point for the
courts construction of the scope of the easement. Modications in the easement will be
enforced to the extent that they are necessary for reasonably foreseeable changes in the
use of the dominant parcel.
REAL PROPERTY 77.
e.
Use of Servient Estate

Absent an express restriction in the original agreement, the owner of the servient estate
may use her land in any way she wishes so long as her conduct does not interfere with
performance of the easement, prot, covenant, or servitude.
Example:
A grants to B Water Company the right to lay water pipes in a specied
ve-foot right-of-way. A is not by this grant necessarily precluded from
granting similar rights in the same right-of-way to a competing company,
so long as the second grant does not interfere with the use made by B,
the original grantee. A may also build over the right-of-way so long as
the structure does not unreasonably interfere with Bs use.
1)
4.
Duty to Repair
If the holder of the benet is the only party making use of the easement, that party
has the duty to make repairs (e.g., ll in potholes on a right-of-way) and, absent
a special agreement, the servient owner has no duty to do so. If the easement is
nonexclusive and both the holder of the benet and the servient owner are making
use of the easement, the court will apportion the repair costs between them on the
basis of their relative use.
f.
Intended BeneciariesSubdivision of Dominant Parcel

When an easement is created for the benet of a landowner, and the landowner later
subdivides the parcel, there is a question whether each subdivision grantee will succeed
to the original benet. The answer will turn on whether the extension of the benet to
each of the subdivided parcels will burden the servient estate to a greater extent than
was contemplated by the original parties. Absent any other evidence on intent, a court
will not nd an intent to allow an extension if extending the benet to each parcel in the
subdivision will unreasonably overburden the servient estate. Weighing all the circumstances, a court could nd subdivision into four lots reasonable, but subdivision into 50
lots unreasonable; it is determined on a case-by-case basis.
Example:
A, the owner of Blackacre, grants to B, the owner of Whiteacre, a rightof-way easement of ingress and egress over Blackacre. B then subdivides
Whiteacre into 150 lots. If A and B had not contemplated the subdivision of Whiteacre, and if use of the right-of-way by all 150 lot owners
would substantially interfere with As use of Blackacre (in a way that Bs
use alone would not), a court would probably not nd an intent that the
benet of the right-of-way easement attach to each of the 150 parcels.
g.
Effect of Use Outside Scope of Easement

When the owner of an easement uses it in a way that exceeds its legal scope, the
easement is said to be surcharged. The remedy of the servient landowner is an
injunction of the excess use, and possibly damages if the servient land has been
harmed. However, the excess use does not terminate the easement or give the servient
landowner a power of termination.
Termination of Easements
An easement, like any other property interest, may be created to last in perpetuity or for a
limited period of time. To the extent the parties to its original creation provide for the natural
termination of the interest, such limitations will control.
78. REAL PROPERTY
a.
Stated Conditions
If the parties to the original creation of an easement set forth specic conditions upon
the happening of which the easement right will terminate, the conditions will be recognized. On this basis, the following conditions are valid: an easement granted so long
as repairs are maintained, an easement granted so long as X is the holder of the
dominant tenement, an easement granted until the dominant tenement is used for
commercial purposes, etc.
b.
Unity of Ownership
By denition, an easement is the right to use the lands of another for a special purpose.
On this basis, the ownership of the easement and of the servient tenement must be in
different persons. If ownership of the two comes together in one person, the easement is
extinguished.
1)
Complete Unity Required

For an easement to be extinguished by merger of dominant and servient tenements,
the duration of the servient tenement must be equal to or longer than the duration
of the dominant tenement (and therefore the easement) with which it is combined.
Examples:
1) A owns the servient tenement in fee simple. B owns the
dominant tenement in fee simple, and Bs dominant tenement has,
appurtenant to it, an access easement across the servient tenement.
A conveys a 10-year term tenancy in the servient tenement to
B. The duration of the conveyed interest in the servient estate is
shorter than the duration of the dominant estate (and therefore the
easement) with which it is combined. Thus, the easement is not
extinguished by merger.
2) A owns the servient tenement in fee simple. B holds a 10-year
term tenancy in the dominant tenement, and Bs xed-term tenancy
estate has, appurtenant to it, an access easement across the servient
tenement. A conveys the fee simple servient tenement to B (or B
conveys the 10-year term tenancy in the dominant tenement to A;
it doesnt matter). The duration of the servient estate is longer than
the duration of the dominant estate (and therefore the easement)
with which it is combined. Thus, the easement is extinguished by
merger.
2)
No Revival
If complete unity of title is acquired, the easement is extinguished. Even though
there may be later separation, the easement will not be automatically revived.
Example:
A owns Lot 6, the servient tenement. B owns adjacent Lot 7. A
grants to B the privilege of crossing Lot 6, i.e., grants an easement
appurtenant to B. Assume A conveys Lot 6 to B in fee simple. The
easement would be extinguished because B then holds both the
easement and title to the servient tenement. If, thereafter, B conveys
Lot 6 to C, the easement is not revived. Of course, it could be
created anew.
REAL PROPERTY 79.
c.
d.
Release
An easement may be terminated by a release given by the owner of the easement
interest to the owner of the servient tenement. A release requires the concurrence of
both owners and is, in effect, a conveyance. The release must be executed with all the
formalities that are required for the valid creation of an easement.
1)
Easement Appurtenant
The basic characteristic of an easement appurtenant is that it becomes, for the
purpose of succession, an incident of possession of the dominant tenement. This
basic characteristic requires that the easement interest not be conveyed independently of a conveyance of the dominant tenement. However, an easement appurtenant may be conveyed to the owner of the servient tenement without a conveyance
(to the same grantee) of the dominant tenement. This is an exception to the general
alienability characteristics of an easement appurtenant (see 1.b., supra).
2)
Easement in Gross
The basic characteristic of an easement in gross is that unless it is for a commercial purpose, it is inalienable. However, an easement in gross can be released; i.e.,
can be conveyed to the owner of the servient tenement. This is an exception to the
general characteristics of an easement in gross.
3)
Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds requires that every conveyance of an interest in land that
has a duration long enough to bring into play a particular states Statute of Frauds
(typically one year) must be evidenced by a writing. This writing requirement is
also applicable to a release of an easement interest. If the easement interest that
is being conveyed has a duration of greater than one year, a writing is required in
order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. An oral release is ineffective, although it may
become effective by estoppel.
Abandonment
It has become an established rule that an easement can be extinguished without conveyance where the owner of the privilege demonstrates by physical action an intention to
permanently abandon the easement. To work as an abandonment, the owner must have
manifested an intention never to make use of the easement again.
Example:
A owns Lot 6 and B owns Lot 7, which are immediately adjacent. A
grants to B an easement across Lot 6. This easement is specically
located on the servient tenement and is a walkway. Subsequently, B
constructs a house on Lot 7 that completely blocks his access to the
walkway. By the physical action of constructing the house in such a way
that access to the walkway (i.e., the easement) is denied, B has physically indicated an intent not to use the easement again. The easement is
extinguished by abandonment.
1)
Physical Act Required

An abandonment of an easement occurs when the easement holder physically
manifests an intention to permanently abandon the easement. Such physical action
brings about a termination of the easement by operation of law and therefore no
writing is required; i.e., the Statute of Frauds need not be complied with.
80. REAL PROPERTY
e.
2)
Mere Words Insufcient

The oral expressions of the owner of the easement that he does not intend to use
the easement again (i.e., he wishes to abandon it), by themselves, are insufcient to
constitute an abandonment of the easement. For words alone to operate as a termination, such expression will only be effective if it qualies as a release; i.e., the
Statute of Frauds must be complied with. Note, however, that oral expressions may
be sufcient if accompanied by a long period of nonuse (see 3), infra).
3)
Mere Nonuse Insufcient

An easement is not terminated merely because it is not used for a long period by
its owner. To terminate the easement, the nonuse must be combined with other
evidence of intent to abandon it. Nonuse itself is not considered sufcient evidence
of that intent.
Estoppel
While the assertions of the holder of the easement are insufcient to work a termination
unless there is valid compliance with the requirements of a release, an easement may be
extinguished by virtue of the reasonable reliance and change of position of the owner of
the servient tenement, based on assertions or conduct of the easement holder.
Example:
The owner of a right-of-way tells the owner of the servient tenement that
the owner of the servient tenement may build a building on the servient
tenement in such a way as to make the right-of-way no longer usable, and
the servient owner does in fact build the building. There will be an extinguishment of the easement by estoppel.
For an easement to be extinguished by estoppel, three requirements must be satised.
Namely, there must be (i) some conduct or assertion by the owner of the easement,
(ii) a reasonable reliance by the owner of the servient tenement, (iii) coupled with a
change of position. Even though there is an assertion by the easement holder, if the
owner of the servient tenement does not change her position based upon the assertion,
the easement will not be terminated.
f.
Prescription
An easement may be extinguished, as well as created, by prescription. Long continued
possession and enjoyment of the servient tenement in a way that would indicate to the
public that no easement right existed will end the easement right. Such long continued
use works as a statute of limitations precluding the whole world, including the easement
holder, from asserting that his privilege exists.
The termination of an easement by prescription is xed by analogy to the creation of
an easement by prescription. The owner of the servient tenement must so interfere with
the easement as to create a cause of action in favor of the easement holder. The interference must be open, notorious, continuous, and nonpermissive for the statutory period
(e.g., 20 years).
g.
Necessity
Easements created by necessity expire as soon as the necessity ends.
Example:
A, the owner of a tract of land, sells a portion of it that has no access to a
highway except over the remaining lands of A. B, the purchaser, acquires
REAL PROPERTY 81.
by necessity a right-of-way over the remaining lands of A. Some years

later, a highway is built so that B no longer needs the right-of-way across
As property. The easement ends because the necessity has disappeared.
5.
h.
Condemnation
Condemnation of the servient estate will extinguish the nonpossessory interest. Courts
are split, however, on whether the holder of the benet is entitled to compensation for
the value lost.
i.
Destruction of Servient Estate

If the easement is in a structure (e.g., a staircase), involuntary destruction of the structure (e.g., by re or ood) will extinguish the easement. Voluntary destruction (e.g.,
tearing down a building to erect a new one) will not, however, terminate the easement.
CompareLicenses
Licenses, like afrmative easements, privilege their holder to go upon the land of another
(the licensor). Unlike an afrmative easement, the license is not an interest in land. It is
merely a privilege, revocable at the will of the licensor. (Although licenses may acquire some
of the characteristics of easements through estoppel or by being coupled with an interest.)
The Statute of Frauds does not apply to licenses, and licensees are not entitled to compensation if the land is taken by eminent domain. Licenses are quite common; examples of
licensees include delivery persons, plumbers, party guests, etc.
a.
Assignability
An essential characteristic of a license is that it is personal to the licensee and therefore
not alienable. The holder of a license privilege cannot convey such right. In fact, most
courts have held that the license privilege is so closely tied to the individual parties that
it is revoked, by operation of law, upon an attempted transfer by the licensee.
b.
Revocation and Termination

Another essential characteristic of a license is that it is revocable by nature. It may be
revoked at any time by a manifestation of the licensors intent to end it. This manifestation may be by a formal notice of revocation or it may consist of conduct that obstructs
the licensees continued use. Similarly, the licensee can surrender the privilege
whenever he desires to do so. A license ends by operation of law upon the death of the
licensor. In addition, a conveyance of the servient tenement by the licensor terminates
the licensees privilege.
1)
Public Amusement Cases

Tickets issued by theaters, race courses, and other places of amusement have given
rise to some controversy. The traditional rule is that such tickets create a license.
Once describing the tickets as granting a license, the essential characteristic of a
license applies; i.e., it is revocable by nature. On this basis, the licensor may terminate the licensees privilege at will.
2)
Breach of Contract
A license may be granted pursuant to an express or implied contract between the
licensor and licensee. On this basis, the termination of the licensees privilege may
82. REAL PROPERTY
constitute a breach of contract. While many courts may grant a cause of action for
money damages for a revocation of a license in breach of contract, they continue
to sustain the licensors right to terminate the licensees privilege to continue to
remain on the servient tenement.
Example:
A pays a $70 greens fee to play 18 holes of golf on Bs property.
After A has played only nine holes, B terminates As right to be
on Bs property. Because A acquired a license and it is revocable
by its very nature, Bs action is not, in property terms, wrongful.
However, A may have a cause of action against B to recoup part or
all of As $70.
c.
Failure to Create an Easement

The Statute of Frauds requires that any conveyance of an interest in land (including an
easement interest) of duration greater than one year must be memorialized in writing to
be enforceable. If a party attempts to create an easement orally, the result is the creation
of a license, i.e., a revocable privilege. Note, however, that if an oral attempt to create
an easement is subsequently executed, to the extent that it would be inequitable to
permit its revocation (e.g., the licensee has expended substantial funds in reliance on the
license), the licensor may be estopped to revoke the license.
d.
Irrevocable Licenses
1)
Estoppel Theory
If a licensee invests substantial amounts of money or labor in reliance on a license,
the licensor may be estopped to revoke the license, and the license will thus
become the equivalent of an afrmative easement.
Example:
A orally licenses B to come onto Blackacre to excavate a drainage
ditch connected to Bs parcel, Whiteacre. B does so at substantial
expense. A will probably be estopped to revoke the license and
prevent B from using the ditch.
Under the majority view, such irrevocable licenses or easements by estoppel last
until the owner receives sufcient benet to reimburse himself for the expenditures
made in reliance on the license. A minority of courts treat easements by estoppel
like any other afrmative easements and give them a potentially innite duration.
2)
License Coupled with an Interest

If a license is coupled with an interest, it will be irrevocable as long as the interest
lasts.
a)
Vendee of a Chattel
The purchaser of a chattel located upon the sellers land is, in the absence of
an express stipulation to the contrary, given the privilege to enter upon the
sellers land for the purpose of removing the chattel. The purchasers right is
irrevocable. He must, however, enter at reasonable times and in a reasonable
manner.
Example:
A, the owner of Blackacre, sells 100 crates of oranges stored
in a shed on Blackacre and at the same time licenses B to
REAL PROPERTY 83.
come onto Blackacre to remove the crates of oranges. B has an

irrevocable license to enter Blackacre and remove the crates
within a reasonable time.
C.
b)
Termination of Tenancy
If a tenants right to possess land has been lawfully terminated, the tenant
may still reenter the land at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner for
the purpose of removing his chattels. This is an irrevocable privilege.
c)
Inspection for Waste

The owner of a future interest in land (e.g., a landlord, holder of a reversionary interest, or remainderman) is privileged to enter upon the land, at
reasonable times and in a reasonable manner, for the purpose of determining
whether waste is being committed by the holder of the present possessory
estate.
PROFITS
Like an easement, a prot (prot a prendre) is a nonpossessory interest in land. The holder of the
prot is entitled to enter upon the servient tenement and take the soil or a substance of the soil
(e.g., minerals, timber, oil, or game). Also, like an easement, a prot may be appurtenant or in
gross. In contrast to easements, however, there is a constructional preference for prots in gross
rather than appurtenant.
1.
Creation
Prots are created in the same way as easements.
2.
Alienability
A prot appurtenant follows the ownership of the dominant tenement. A prot in gross may
be assigned or transferred by the holder.
3.
Exclusive and Nonexclusive Prots Distinguished

When an owner grants the sole right to take a resource from her land, the grantee takes an
exclusive prot and is solely entitled to the resources, even to the exclusion of the owner of
the servient estate. By contrast, when a prot is nonexclusive, the owner of the servient estate
may grant similar rights to others or may take the resources herself. Ordinarily, prots (like
easements) are construed as nonexclusive.
4.
Scope
The extent and nature of the prot is determined by the words of the express grant (if there
was a grant), or by the nature of the use (if the prot was acquired by prescription). Note
that implied in every prot is an easement entitling the prot holder to enter the servient
estate to remove the resource.
Example:
A, the owner of Blackacre, grants B the right to come onto Blackacre to carry
off gravel from a pit on Blackacre. B has a prot with respect to the gravel
and also the benet of an implied afrmative easement to go onto Blackacre
by reasonable means to remove the gravel.
a.
Apportionment of Prots Appurtenant

Courts treat the subdivision of land with a prot appurtenant just as they treat the
84. REAL PROPERTY
subdivision of land with an easement appurtenant. The benet of the prot will attach
to each parcel in a subdivision only if the burden on the servient estate is not as a result
overly increased.
Example:
A, the owner of Blackacre, grants B, the owner of adjacent Whiteacre,
the right to remove rock from Blackacre. If the prot was to take the
rock for purposes of maintaining a boat launch on Whiteacre, then an
increase in use from one to 50 boat launches when Whiteacre is subdivided will probably be viewed as overburdensome to Blackacre.
If, however, the prot was to take rock for purposes of reinforcing
Whiteacres coastline to prevent erosion, apportionment would likely be
allowed because subdivision would not increase the number of acres to
be reinforced and consequently would not impose a greater burden on
Blackacre.
b.
5.
D.
Apportionment of Prots in Gross

Because prots are freely alienable, a question frequently arises as to whether the holder
of a prot can convey it to several people. If a prot is exclusive, the holder may transfer
the prot to as many transferees as he likes. Likewise, if the grant of the prot species
a limit on the prot (less than all), the right can be transferred to multiple transferees.
If, however, the prot is nonexclusive and not limited as to amount, it is generally not
divisible. Undue burden to the servient estate is again the benchmark, however, and a
nonexclusive prot may be assigned to a single person or to several persons jointly if
the multiple assignees work together and take no more resources than would have been
taken by the original benet holder.
Termination
Prots are terminated in the same way as easements. In addition, misuse of a prot, unduly
increasing the burden (typically through an improper apportionment), will be held to
surcharge the servient estate. The result of surcharge in this case is to extinguish the prot.
(Contrast this with the result when the benet of an afrmative easement is misused:
Improper or excessive use increasing the burden on the servient estate is enjoinable but, in
most jurisdictions, does not extinguish the easement; see B.3.g., supra.)
COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND AT LAW (REAL COVENANTS)

A real covenant, normally found in deeds, is a written promise to do something on the land
(e.g., maintain a fence) or a promise not to do something on the land (e.g., conduct commercial
business). Real covenants run with the land at law, which means that subsequent owners of the
land may enforce or be burdened by the covenant. To run with the land, however, the benet and
burden of the covenant must be analyzed separately to determine whether they meet the requirements for running.
1.
Requirements for Burden to Run

If all requirements are met for the burden to run, the successor in interest to the burdened
estate will be bound by the arrangement entered into by her predecessor as effectively as if
she had herself expressly agreed to be bound.
a.
Intent
The covenanting parties must have intended that successors in interest to the covenantor
REAL PROPERTY 85.
be bound by the terms of the covenant. The requisite intent may be inferred from
circumstances surrounding creation of the covenant, or it may be evidenced by language
in the conveyance creating the covenant (e.g., this covenant runs with the land, or
grantee covenants for herself, her heirs, successors, and assigns).
b.
Notice
Under the common law, a subsequent purchaser of land that was subject to a covenant
took the land burdened by the covenant, whether or not she had notice. However, under
American recording statutes (see VI.E., infra), if the covenant is not recorded, a bona
de purchaser who has no notice of the covenant and who records her own deed will
take free of the covenant. Hence, as a practical matter, if the subsequent purchaser
pays value and records (as will nearly always be true), she is not bound by covenants of
which she has no actual or constructive notice.
c.
Horizontal Privity
This requirement rests on the relationship between the original covenanting parties.
Specically, horizontal privity requires that, at the time the promisor entered into the
covenant with the promisee, the two shared some interest in the land independent of
the covenant (e.g., grantor-grantee, landlord-tenant, mortgagor-mortgagee).
Examples:
1) A and B are neighboring landowners, neither having any rights in
the others land. For good consideration, A promises B, for herself,
her heirs, successors, and assigns, that As parcel will never be used
for other than residential purposes. The horizontal privity requirement
is not met, and successors in interest to A will not be bound because
at the time A made this covenant, she and B shared no interest in land
independent of the covenant.
2) A, the owner of Blackacre in fee, promised B, the holder of a rightof-way easement over Blackacre, always to keep the right-of-way free
of snow or other impediment to Bs use of the right-of-way. Horizontal
privity is met because, at the time the covenant was made, A owned the
parcel in fee and B held the benet of an easement in it.
3) A, the owner of Blackacre and Whiteacre, deeds Whiteacre to B,
promising not to use Blackacre for other than residential purposes.
Horizontal privity exists here by virtue of the grantor-grantee relationship between A and B.
d.
Vertical Privity
To be bound, the successor in interest to the covenanting party must hold the entire
durational interest held by the covenantor at the time she made the covenant.
Example:
A, who owns Blackacre and Whiteacre in fee simple absolute, sells
Whiteacre to B and, in the deed, covenants for herself, her heirs, successors, and assigns to contribute one-half the expense of maintaining a
common driveway between Blackacre and Whiteacre. A then transfers
Blackacre to C for life, retaining a reversionary interest for herself. B
cannot enforce the covenant against C because C does not possess the
entire interest (fee simple absolute) held by her predecessor in interest,
A, at the time A made the promise.
86. REAL PROPERTY
e.
Touch and Concern

The covenant must be of the type that touches and concerns the land. The phrase
touch and concern the land is not susceptible to easy denition. It generally means
that the effect of the covenant is to make the land itself more useful or valuable to
the beneted party. The covenant must affect the legal relationship of the parties as
landowners and not merely as members of the community at large. Therefore, as a
general matter, for the burden of a covenant to run, performance of the burden must
diminish the landowners rights, privileges, and powers in connection with her enjoyment of the land.
1)
Negative Covenants
For the burden of a negative covenant to touch and concern the land, the covenant
must restrict the holder of the servient estate in his use of that parcel of land.
Examples:
1) A, who owned Blackacre and Whiteacre, covenanted with B, the
grantee of Whiteacre, that she would not erect a building of over
two stories on Blackacre. The burden of the covenant touches and
concerns Blackacre because it diminishes As rights in connection
with her enjoyment of Blackacre.
2) A, who owned Blackacre and Whiteacre, covenanted with B,
the grantee of Whiteacre, that she would never operate a shoe store
within a radius of one mile of Whiteacre. The covenant does not
touch and concern Blackacre because its performance is unconnected to the enjoyment of Blackacre.
2)
Afrmative Covenants
For the burden of an afrmative covenant to touch and concern the land, the
covenant must require the holder of the servient estate to do something, increasing
her obligations in connection with enjoyment of the land.
Examples:
1) A, who owned Blackacre and Whiteacre, covenanted with B,
the grantee of Whiteacre, to keep the building on Blackacre in
good repair. The covenant touches and concerns Blackacre because
it increases As obligations in connection with her enjoyment of
Blackacre.
2) A owned Blackacre and Whiteacre, which were several miles
apart. A covenanted with B, the grantee of Whiteacre, to keep the
building on Whiteacre in good repair. The covenant does not touch
and concern Blackacre because its performance is unconnected to
the use and enjoyment of Blackacre.
3) A, the grantee of a parcel in a residential subdivision, covenants
to pay an annual fee to a homeowners association for the maintenance of common ways, parks, and other facilities in the subdivision. At one time, it was thought that such covenants, because
physically unconnected to the land, did not touch and concern. The
prevailing view today is that the burden will run because the fees
are a charge on the land, increasing As obligations in connection
with the use and enjoyment of it. (See 4.a., infra.)
REAL PROPERTY 87.
2.
Requirements for Benet to Run

If all requirements for the benet to run are met, the successor in interest to the promisee
will be allowed to enjoy the benet (i.e., enforce the covenant).
a.
Intent
The covenanting parties must have intended that the successors in interest to the
covenantee be able to enforce the covenant. Surrounding evidence of intent, as well as
language in the instrument of conveyance, is admissible.
b.
Vertical Privity
The benet of a covenant runs to the assignees of the original estate or of any lesser
estate (e.g., a life estate). The owner of any succeeding possessory estate can enforce
the benet at law. In the majority of states today, horizontal privity is not required for
the benet to run. As a consequence, if horizontal privity is missing, the benet may
run to the successor in interest to the covenantee even though the burden is not enforceable against the successor in interest of the covenantor.
Example:
A, who owns Blackacre, covenants with her neighbor, B, who owns
Whiteacre, that A, her successors, and assigns will keep the building on
Blackacre in good repair. Horizontal privity is missing. B then conveys
Whiteacre, the dominant estate, to C. C can enforce the benet of the
afrmative covenant against A because horizontal privity is not needed
for the benet to run. If, however, A conveys Blackacre to D, neither
B nor C could enforce the covenant against D, for horizontal privity is
required for the burden to run.
c.
Touch and Concern

For the benet of a covenant to touch and concern the land, the promised performance
must benet the covenantee and her successors in their use and enjoyment of the
beneted land.
Examples:
1) A, who owns Blackacre and Whiteacre, covenants with B, the grantee
of Whiteacre, not to erect a building over two stories on Blackacre. The
benet of the covenant touches and concerns Whiteacre because, by
securing Bs view, it increases his enjoyment of Whiteacre.
2) A, who owns Blackacre and Whiteacre, covenants with B, the grantee
of Whiteacre, to keep the building on Blackacre freshly painted and in
good repair. The benet of the covenant touches and concerns Whiteacre
because, by assuring the view of an attractive house, it increases the
value of Whiteacre.
Compare:
3.
A, who owns Blackacre, covenants with B, a supermarket operator

owning no adjacent land, to erect and maintain on Blackacre a billboard
advertising Bs supermarkets. The benet of the covenant does not
touch and concern because it is not connected to and does not operate to
increase Bs enjoyment of any piece of land.
Modern Status of Running of Burden and Benet

a.
Horizontal and Vertical Privity

The Restatement of Property provides that horizontal privity is not required for running
88. REAL PROPERTY
of the burden, and further discards the requirement of vertical privity for running of
both the burden and the benet. Instead, the Restatement draws a distinction between
afrmative and negative covenants. Negative covenants are treated like easements,
which run to successors because they are interests in land. The burdens and benets of
afrmative covenants run to persons who succeed to an estate of the same duration as
owned by the original parties, including in most cases an adverse possessor. But afrmative covenants do not run to persons who hold lesser estates than those held by the
original parties to the covenant. Special rules are set forth for when afrmative burdens
run to lessees and life tenants, and when they can enforce the benets. [Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes 5.2 - 5.5]
b.
4.
Touch and Concern

The Restatement of Property also supersedes the touch and concern requirement by
providing that real covenants are presumed valid unless they are illegal, unconstitutional, or violate public policy. [Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 3.1, 3.2]
Specic Situations Involving Real Covenants

a.
Promises to Pay Money

The majority rule is that if the money is to be used in a way connected with the land,
the burden will run with the land. The most common example is a covenant to pay a
homeowners association an annual fee for maintenance of common ways, parks, etc., in
a subdivision.
b.
Covenants Not to Compete

Covenants not to compete have created several problems. Clearly, the burden of the
covenantrestricting the use to which the land may be puttouches and concerns
the land. However, the beneted land, while commercially enhanced, is not affected
in its physical use. Thus, some courts have refused to permit the benet of such
covenants to run with the land.
c.
Racially Restrictive Covenants

If a covenant purports to prohibit an owner from transferring land to persons of a
given race, no court (state or federal) is permitted to enforce the covenant. To do so
would involve the court in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (see I.F.2.b.2), supra).
5.
RemediesDamages
A breach of a real covenant generally is remedied by an award of money damages. If
equitable relief, such as an injunction, is sought, the promise may be enforced as an equitable
servitude (see E., infra). Note that a real covenant gives rise to personal liability only. The
damages are collectible out of the defendants general assets.
6.
Termination
As with all other nonpossessory interests in land, a real covenant may be terminated by: (i)
the holder of the benet executing a release in writing; (ii) merger (fee simple title to both
the beneted and burdened land comes into the hands of a single owner); and (iii) condemnation of the burdened property. (See B.4.b., c., h., supra.)
REAL PROPERTY 89.
E.
EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
If a plaintiff wants an injunction or specic performance, he may show that the covenant qualies as an equitable servitude. An equitable servitude is a covenant that, regardless of whether it
runs with the land at law, equity will enforce against the assignees of the burdened land who have
notice of the covenant. The usual remedy is an injunction against violation of the covenant.
1.
Creation
Generally, equitable servitudes are created by covenants contained in a writing that satises the Statute of Frauds. As with real covenants, acceptance of a deed signed only by the
grantor is sufcient to bind the grantee as promisor. There is one exception to the writing
requirement: Negative equitable servitudes may be implied from a common scheme for
development of a residential subdivision.
a.
Servitudes Implied from Common Scheme

When a developer subdivides land into several parcels and some of the deeds contain
negative covenants but some do not, negative covenants or equitable servitudes binding
all the parcels in the subdivision may be implied under the doctrine of reciprocal
negative servitudes. The doctrine applies only to negative covenants and equitable
servitudes and not to afrmative covenants. Two requirements must be met before
reciprocal negative covenants and servitudes will be implied: (i) a common scheme for
development, and (ii) notice of the covenants.
Example:
A subdivides her parcel into lots 1 through 50. She conveys lots 1
through 45 by deeds containing express covenants by the respective
grantees that they will use their lots only for residential purposes. A
orally assures the 45 grantees that all 50 lots will be used for residential purposes. Some time later, after the 45 lots have been developed as
residences, A conveys lot 46 to an oil company, which plans to operate
a service station on it. The deed to lot 46 contains no express residential
restriction. A court will nonetheless imply a negative covenant, prohibiting use for other than residential purposes on lot 46 because both
requirements have been met for an implied reciprocal negative servitude.
First, there was a common scheme, here evidenced by As statements to
the rst 45 buyers. Second, the oil company was on inquiry notice of
the negative covenant because of the uniform residential character of the
other lots in the subdivision development.
1)
Common Scheme
Reciprocal negative covenants will be implied only if at the time that sales of
parcels in the subdivision began, the developer had a plan that all parcels in the
subdivision be developed within the terms of the negative covenant. If the scheme
arises after some lots are sold, it cannot impose burdens on the lots previously sold
without the express covenants. The developers common scheme may be evidenced
by a recorded plat, by a general pattern of prior restrictions, or by oral representations, typically in the form of statements to early buyers that all parcels in the
development will be restricted by the same covenants that appear in their deeds.
On the basis of this scheme, it is inferred that purchasers bought their lots relying
on the fact that they would be able to enforce subsequently created equitable servitudes similar to the restrictions imposed in their deeds.
90. REAL PROPERTY
2)
2.
Notice
To be bound by the terms of a covenant that does not appear in his deed, a
grantee must, at the time he acquired his parcel, have had notice of the covenants
contained in the deeds of other buyers in the subdivision. The requisite notice may
be acquired through actual notice (direct knowledge of the covenants in the prior
deeds); inquiry notice (the neighborhood appears to conform to common restrictions); or record notice (if the prior deeds are in the grantees chain of title he will,
under the recording acts, have constructive notice of their contents).
Enforcement
For successors of the original promisee and promisor to enforce an equitable servitude,
certain requirements must be met.
a.
Requirements for Burden to Run

1)
Intent
The covenanting parties must have intended that the servitude be enforceable
by and against assignees. No technical words are required to express this intent.
In fact, the intent may be ascertained from the purpose of the covenant and the
surrounding circumstances.
2)
Notice
A subsequent purchaser of land burdened by a covenant is not bound by it in equity
unless she had actual or constructive notice of it when she acquired the land. This
rule is part of the law of equitable servitudes, and exists apart from the recording
acts.
3)
Touch and Concern

This is the same requirement as applies to real covenants (see D.1.e., supra).
b.
Requirements for Benet to Run

The benet of the equitable servitude will run with the land (and thus to successors
in interest of the original parties) if the original parties so intended and the servitude
touches and concerns the beneted property.
c.
Privity Not Required

The majority of courts enforce the servitude not as an in personam right against the
owner of the servient tenement, but as an equitable property interest in the land itself.
There is, therefore, no need for privity of estate.
Examples:
1) A acquires title to Blackacre by adverse possession. Even though he
is not in privity of estate with the original owner, he is subject to the
equitable servitude because the servitude is an interest in the land.
2) A and B are neighboring landowners, neither having any rights in
the others land. A promises B, for herself, her heirs, successors, and
assigns, that As parcel will never be used for other than residential
purposes. B records the agreement. A sells Blackacre to C. The burden
created by this promise would not run at law as a negative covenant
REAL PROPERTY 91.
because horizontal privity is missing. However, under an equitable servitude theory, the burden will run, and an injunction will issue against
other than residential uses.
3) Same as above, but A transfers only a life estate to C. Again, the
burden would not run at law because of the absence of vertical privity.
The burden would, however, be enforceable as an equitable servitude.
d.
Implied Beneciaries of CovenantsGeneral Scheme

If a covenant in a subdivision deed is silent as to who holds its benet, any neighbor in
the subdivision will be entitled to enforce the covenant if a general scheme or plan is
found to have existed at the time he purchased his lot.
Example:
A subdivides her parcel into Lots 1 through 10. She conveys Lot 1 to
B, who covenants to use the lot for residential purposes only. A then
conveys Lot 2 to C, who makes a similar covenant. Thereafter, A
conveys the balance of the lots to other grantees by deeds containing the
residential restriction. Can C enforce the restrictions against B? Can B
enforce against C?
Subsequent purchaser versus prior purchaser (C v. B): In most jurisdictions, C (the later grantee) can enforce the restriction against B if the
court nds a common plan of residential restrictions at the very outset of
As sales. (Evidence would be the similar covenant restrictions in all the
deeds.) The rationale is that Bs promise was made for the benet of the
land at that time retained by A, the grantor. Such land, Lots 2 through
10, became the dominant estate. When A thereafter conveyed Lot 2 to C,
the benet of Bs promise passed to C with the land.
Prior purchaser versus subsequent purchaser (B v. C): In most jurisdictions, B could likewise enforce the restriction against C, even though
A made no covenant in her deed to B that As retained land would be
subject to the residential restrictions.
There are two theories on which a prior purchaser can enforce a restriction in a subsequent deed from a common grantor. One theory is that
B is a third-party beneciary of Cs promise to A. The other theory is
that an implied reciprocal servitude attached to As retained land at the
moment she deeded Lot 1 to B. Under this theory, B is enforcing an
implied servitude on Lot 2 and not the express covenant later made by
C.
3.
Equitable Defenses to Enforcement

A court in equity is not bound to enforce a servitude if it cannot in good conscience do so.
a.
Unclean Hands
A court will not enforce a servitude if the person seeking enforcement is violating a
similar restriction on his own land. This defense will apply as long as the plaintiffs
violation is of the same general nature.
92. REAL PROPERTY
b.
Acquiescence
If a beneted party acquiesces in a violation of the servitude by one burdened party,
he may be deemed to have abandoned the servitude as to other burdened parties.
(Equitable servitudes, like easements, may be abandoned.) Note that this defense will
not apply if the prior violation occurred in a location so distant from the complainant
that it did not really affect his property.
c.
Estoppel
If the beneted party has acted in such a way that a reasonable person would believe
that the covenant was abandoned or waived, and the burdened party acts in reliance
thereon, the beneted party will be estopped to enforce the covenant. Similarly, if the
beneted party fails to bring suit against a violator within a reasonable time, the action
may be barred by laches.
d.
Changed Neighborhood Conditions

Changed neighborhood conditions may also operate to end an equitable servitude. If the
neighborhood has changed signicantly since the time the servitude was created, with
the result that it would be inequitable to enforce the restriction, injunctive relief will be
withheld. (Many courts, however, will allow the holder of the benet to bring an action
at law for damages.)
Example:
A, the owner of Blackacre and Whiteacre, adjacent parcels in an
undeveloped area, sells Blackacre to B, extracting a promise that
Blackacre will always be used only for residential purposes. Fifteen
years later, the neighborhood has developed as a commercial and industrial center. If B or her successors in interest to Blackacre now wish to
use the parcel for a store, an injunction will probably not issue. A may,
however, recover from B or her successors any damages that she may
suffer from termination of the residential restriction.
1)
Zoning
Zoning plays an important role in determining whether changed conditions will
be allowed as a defense to enforcement of an equitable servitude. Zoning that is
inconsistent with the private restriction imposed by the equitable servitude will
not of itself bar the injunction, but it will provide good evidence that neighborhood
conditions have changed sufciently to make the injunction unjust. Thus, in the
example above, the position of B or her successors would be fortied by a showing
that the area in which Blackacre is situated is presently zoned for commercial uses.
2)
Concept of the Entering Wedge

The concept of the entering wedge also plays an important role in changed
condition cases. If the equitable servitude is part of a general plan of restrictions in a subdivision, and if the parcel in question is located somewhere at the
outer edge of the subdivision, changed conditions outside of the subdivision will
not bar the injunction if it is shown that lifting the restriction on one parcel will
produce changed conditions for surrounding parcels, requiring that their restrictions also be lifted, and so on (the domino effect). Thus, in the example above,
if removing the restriction and allowing commercial development of Blackacre
would produce changed conditions for the neighboring, similarly restricted
REAL PROPERTY 93.
parcelWhiteacrewith the consequence that its servitude could not be equitably

enforced, the injunction against commercial use on Blackacre will probably be
allowed, notwithstanding the changed conditions.
4.
F.
Termination
Like other nonpossessory interests in land, an equitable servitude may be terminated by a
written release from the benet holder(s), merger of the beneted and burdened estates, or
condemnation of the burdened property. (See B.4.b., c., h., supra.)
RELATIONSHIP OF COVENANTS TO ZONING ORDINANCES

Both restrictive covenants and zoning ordinances (see IX.C., infra) may affect legally permissible uses of land. Both must be complied with, and neither provides any excuse for violating the
other. For example, if the zoning permits both residential and commercial use but an applicable
covenant allows only residential use, the covenant will control.
These two forms of land use restrictions are enforced differently. As discussed above, covenants
(if they meet the relevant requirements) can be enforced by nearby property owners at law or
in equity. Zoning, on the other hand, is not subject to enforcement by private suit, but can be
enforced only by local governmental ofcials.
G. PARTY WALLS AND COMMON DRIVEWAYS

Often, a single wall or driveway will be built partly on the property of each of two adjoining
landowners. Absent an agreement between the owners to the contrary, courts will treat the
wall as belonging to each owner to the extent that it rests upon her land. Courts will also imply
mutual cross-easements of support, with the result that each party has the right to use the wall or
driveway, and neither party can unilaterally destroy it.
1.
Creation
While a written agreement is required by the Statute of Frauds for the express creation of
a party wall or common driveway agreement, an irrevocable license can arise if there has
been detrimental reliance on a parol agreement. Party walls and common driveways can also
result from implication or prescription.
2.
Running of Covenants
If party wall or common driveway owners agree to be mutually responsible for maintaining
the wall or driveway, the burdens and benets of these covenants will run to successive owners of each parcel. The cross-easements for support satisfy the requirement of
horizontal privity because they are mutual interests in the same property. Each promise
touches and concerns the adjoining parcels, and the grantee will be charged with notice of
the covenant because of the visibility of the common wall or driveway.
V. ADVERSE POSSESSION
A.
IN GENERAL
Title to real property may be acquired by adverse possession. (Easements may also be acquired
by prescription.) Gaining title by adverse possession results from the operation of the statute of
94. REAL PROPERTY
limitations for ejectment, or recovery of real property. If an owner does not, within the statutory period, take legal action to eject a possessor who claims adversely to the owner, the owner
is thereafter barred from bringing suit for ejectment. Moreover, title to the property vests in the
possessor.
B.
REQUIREMENTS
To establish title by adverse possession, the possessor must show (i) an actual entry giving
exclusive possession that is (ii) open and notorious, (iii) adverse (hostile), and (iv) continuous
throughout the statutory period.
1.
Running of Statute
The statute of limitations begins to run when the claimant goes adversely into possession of
the true owners land (i.e., the point at which the true owner could rst bring suit). The ling
of suit by the true owner is not sufcient to stop the period from running; the suit must be
pursued to judgment. However, if the true owner les suit before the statutory period (e.g.,
20 years) runs out and the judgment is rendered after the statutory period, the judgment will
relate back to the time that the complaint was led.
2.
Actual and Exclusive Possession

a.
Actual Possession Gives Notice

The requirement of actual possession is designed to give the true owner notice that a
trespass is occurring. It is also designed to give her notice of the extent of the adverse
possessors claim. As a general rule, the adverse possessor will gain title only to the
land that she actually occupies.
1)
b.
3.
Constructive Possession of Part

Actual possession of a portion of a unitary tract of land is sufcient adverse
possession as to give title to the whole of the tract of land after the statutory
period, as long as there is a reasonable proportion between the portion actually
possessed and the whole of the unitary tract, and the possessor has color of title
to the whole tract. Color of title is a document that purports to give title, but for
reasons not apparent from its face does not. Usually, the proportion will be held
reasonable if possession of the portion was sufcient to put the owner or community on notice of the fact of possession.
Exclusive PossessionNo Sharing with Owner

Exclusive merely means that the possessor is not sharing with the true owner or
the public at large. This requirement does not prevent two or more individuals from
working together to obtain title by adverse possession. If they do so, they will obtain
the title as tenants in common.
Example:
A and B are next door neighbors. They decide to plant a vegetable
garden on the vacant lot behind both of their homes. A and B share
expenses and prots from the garden. If all other elements for adverse
possession are present, at the end of the statutory period, A and B will
own the lot as tenants in common.
Open and Notorious Possession

Possession is open and notorious when it is the kind of use the usual owner would make of
REAL PROPERTY 95.
the land. The adverse possessors occupation must be sufciently apparent to put the true
owner on notice that a trespass is occurring.
Examples:
1) Water Company runs a pipe under Owners land, and there is no indication
of the pipes existence from the surface of the land. Water Company cannot
gain title by adverse possession because there is nothing to put Owner on
notice of the trespass.
2) As use of Bs farmland for an occasional family picnic will not satisfy the
open and notorious requirement because picnicking is not necessarily an act
consistent with the ownership of farmland.
4.
Hostile
The possessors occupation of the property must be hostile (adverse). This means merely
that the possessor does not have the true owners permission to be on the land. It does not
mean anger or animosity. The state of mind of the adverse possessor is irrelevant. By the
large majority view, it does not matter whether the possessor believes she is on her own land,
knows she is trespassing on someone elses land, or has no idea who owns the land.
a.
If Possession Starts PermissivelyMust Communicate Hostility

If the possessor enters with permission of the true owner (e.g., under a lease or license),
the possession does not become adverse until the possessor makes clear to the true
owner the fact that she is claiming hostilely. This can be done by explicit notication,
by refusing to permit the true owner to come onto the land, or by other acts inconsistent
with the original permission.
b.
Co-TenantsOuster Required
Possession by one co-tenant is not ordinarily adverse to her co-tenants because each
co-tenant has a right to the possession of all the property. Thus, sole possession or use
by one co-tenant is not adverse, unless there is a clear repudiation of the co-tenancy;
e.g., one co-tenant ousts the others or makes an explicit declaration that he is claiming
exclusive dominion over the property.
c.
If Grantor Stays in PossessionPermission Presumed

If a grantor remains in possession of land after her conveyance, she is presumed to be
there with the permission of her grantee. Only the grantors open repudiation of the
conveyance will start the limitation period running against the grantee. Likewise, if the
tenant remains in possession after the expiration of her lease, she is presumed to have
the permission of the landlord.
d.
CompareBoundary Line Agreements

There is a separate but related doctrine that may be helpful here. It operates where a
boundary line (usually a fence) is xed by agreement of the adjoining landowners,
but later turns out not to be the true line. Most courts will x ownership as per the
agreed line, provided it is shown that: (i) there was original uncertainty as to the true
line; (ii) the agreed line was established (i.e., agreed upon); and (iii) there has been
lengthy acquiescence in the agreed line by the adjoining owners and/or their successors.
96. REAL PROPERTY
1)
5.
6.
Establishment Requirement
The establishment requirement can be implied by acquiescence. A past dispute is
not necessary to show uncertainty, although it can be good evidence of it. But a
showing of original uncertainty is required; otherwise, in a courts view, a parol
transfer of land would result.
Continuous Possession
The adverse claimants possession must be continuous throughout the statutory period.
Continuous possession requires only the degree of occupancy and use that the average owner
would make of the property.
a.
Intermittent Periods of Occupancy Not Sufcient

Intermittent periods of occupancy generally are not sufcient. However, constant use by
the claimant is not required so long as the possession is of the type that the usual owner
would make of the property. For example, the fact that the adverse possessor is using
the land for the intermittent grazing of cattle will probably not defeat continuity if the
land is normally used in this manner.
b.
Tacking Permitted
There need not be continuous possession by the same person. Ordinarily, an adverse
possessor can take advantage of the periods of adverse possession by her predecessor.
Separate periods of adverse possession may be tacked together to make up the full
statutory period with the result that the nal adverse possessor gets title, provided there
is privity between the successive adverse holders.
1)
Privity
Privity is satised if the subsequent possessor takes by descent, by devise, or
by deed purporting to convey title. Tacking is not permitted where one adverse
claimant ousts a preceding adverse claimant or where one adverse claimant
abandons and a new adverse claimant then goes into possession.
2)
Formalities on Transfer
Even an oral transfer of possession is sufcient to satisfy the privity requirement.
Example:
A received a deed describing Blackacre, but by mistake built a
house on an adjacent parcel, Whiteacre. A, after pointing the house
out to B and orally agreeing to sell the house and land to her,
conveyed to B, by a deed copied from her own deed, describing the
property as Blackacre. The true owner of Whiteacre argues that
there was no privity between A and B because the deed made no
reference to Whiteacre, the land actually possessed. Nonetheless,
the agreed oral transfer of actual possession is sufcient to permit
tacking.
Payment of Property Taxes Generally Not Required

Only a minority of states require the adverse possessor to pay taxes on the property.
However, in all states, payment of property taxes is good evidence of a claim of right.
REAL PROPERTY 97.
C.
DISABILITY
1.
Effect of DisabilitiesStatute Does Not Begin to Run

The statute of limitations does not begin to run for adverse possession (or easements by
prescription) if the true owner was under some disability to sue when the cause of action
rst accrued (i.e., the inception of the adverse possession). Typical disabilities are: minority,
imprisonment, and insanity.
Example:
O, the true owner, is ve years old when A goes into adverse possession. The
statute will not begin to run until O reaches the age of majority.
Compare:
2.
O, the true owner, is declared insane six months after A begins using a
pathway adversely. The statute has begun to run because Os disability arose
after As adverse use began.
No Tacking of Disabilities
Only a disability of the owner existing at the time the cause of action arose is considered.
Thus, disabilities of successors in interest or subsequent additional disabilities of the owner
have no effect on the statute.
Examples:
1) O is a minor at the time A goes into adverse possession of Os land. One
year before O reaches the age of majority, O is declared insane (a subsequent
disability). The statute begins to run from the date O reaches the age of
majority, whether she is then sane or insane.
2) O, the true owner, is insane when A begins an adverse use. Ten years later,
O dies intestate and the land goes to her heir, H, who is then 10 years old. The
statute of limitations begins to run upon Os death despite Hs minority. Hs
minority is a supervening disability and cannot be tacked to Os.
3.
D.
Maximum Tolling Periods

In some states, the maximum tolling period is 20 years; thus, the maximum period of the
statute of limitations would be the regular statute of limitations period plus the maximum
20-year tolling period.
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND FUTURE INTERESTS

The statute of limitations does not run against the holder of a future interest (e.g., a remainder)
until that interest becomes possessory. Until the prior present estate terminates, the holder of
the future interest has no right to possession, and thus no cause of action against a wrongful
possessor.
Examples:
1) O devises Blackacre to A for life and then to B. Thereafter, X goes into possession and possesses adversely for the statutory period. X has acquired As life estate
by adverse possession, but has not acquired any interests against B. Of course, if
following As death, X or her successor stays in possession for the statutory period,
X will have acquired Bs rights also.
2) X enters into adverse possession of Blackacre. Four years later, O devises
Blackacre to A for life and then to B. X continues her adverse possession for seven
more years. The statute of limitations is 10 years. In this case, X has acquired the
whole title by adverse possession. An adverse possession begun against the owner
98. REAL PROPERTY
of the fee simple absolute cannot be interrupted by a subsequent division of the

estate.
1.
Possibility of ReverterStatute of Limitations Runs on Happening of Event

In a conveyance to A for so long as some event occurs or fails to occur, on the happening
of the event the fee simple determinable automatically comes to an end and the grantor (or
his successors) is entitled to present possession. At that point, the grantor has a cause of
action to recover possession of the property. If he does not bring the action within the period
specied by the applicable statute of limitations (and if A or her successors have the requisite
open, notorious, continuous, and adverse possession), his action will be barred.
2.
Right of EntryHappening of Event Does Not Trigger Statute of Limitations

In the case of a right of entry, on the happening of the stated event the grantor (or his successors) has only a right to reenter the property, a power to terminate the grantees estate.
Until the grantor asserts his right of entry, no cause of action arises because the grantees
continued possession of the land is proper: her fee simple estate has not been terminated.
Thus (in most states), the statute of limitations does not operate to bar assertion of a right of
entry even though the condition triggering the right of entry has been breached.
a.
Grantor Must Act Within Reasonable Time to Avoid Laches

However, to avoid the title problems that might otherwise be presented, most courts
hold that the holder of the right of entry must bring his action within a reasonable time
after the event occurs. If he fails to do so, his action is barred by laches. As for what
constitutes a reasonable time, many courts look to the statute of limitations governing
actions for possession of real property.
E.
EFFECT OF COVENANTS IN TRUE OWNERS DEED

The exact nature of the title obtained depends on the possessors activities on the land. For
example, assume there is a recorded restrictive covenant limiting use of the land to a single-family
residence. If the possessor uses the land in violation of that covenant for the limitations period,
she takes title free of the covenant. But if she complies with the covenant, she takes title subject to
it, and it remains enforceable against her (at least in an equitable action).
F.
LAND THAT CANNOT BE ADVERSELY POSSESSED

The statute of limitations does not run against government-owned land (federal, state, or local) or
land registered under a Torrens system.
VI. CONVEYANCING
A.
LAND SALE CONTRACTS

Most transfers of land are preceded by contracts of sale. These normally contemplate escrows
(delivery of deed to a third person to be held until purchase price paid) before closing (exchange
of purchase price and deed).
1.
Statute of Frauds Applicable

To be enforceable, a land contract must be memorialized in a writing that is signed by the
REAL PROPERTY 99.
party to be charged. The writing need not be a formal contract; a memorandum sufces
e.g., escrow instructions or e-mails can be contracts of sale. The Statute of Frauds requires
that the writing contain all essential terms of the contract. These are: (i) a description of
the property (see B.3., infra), (ii) identication of the parties to the contract, and (iii) the
price and manner of payment (if agreed upon). Incidental matters (e.g., prorating of taxes,
furnishing of deeds, title insurance, etc.) can be determined by custom; they need not appear
in the writing nor even have been agreed upon.
a.
Doctrine of Part Performance

A court may give specic performance of a contract (though not damages) despite the
absence of a writing if additional facts are present.
1)
2)
Theories to Support the Doctrine

a)
Evidentiary Theory
Courts state that if acts done by a party can be explained only by reference
to an agreement, these acts unequivocally establish the existence of an oral
contract.
b)
Hardship or Estoppel Theory

If acts done by a party in reliance on the contract would result in hardship
to such an extent that it would be a fraud on that party were the contract not
specically enforced, the other party will be estopped from asserting the
Statute of Frauds as a defense.
Acts of Part Performance

In most states, two of the following are required:
(i)
Possession of the land by the purchaser;
(ii) Making of substantial improvements; and/or

(iii) Payment of all or part of the purchase price by the purchaser.
Some state courts will go beyond this list and will accept as part performance
other types of detrimental reliance by the purchaser, such as performance of
services or sale of other land.
3)
Can Seller Obtain Specic Performance Based on Buyers Acts?

a)
Evidentiary Theory
Under the evidentiary theory, it is immaterial who performed the acts constituting the part performance. Because they refer unequivocally to a contract,
the seller may obtain specic performance based on the buyers acts.
b)
Hardship or Estoppel Theory

Under the hardship or estoppel theory, however, the plaintiff must be the one
whose action would result in hardship if the Statute of Frauds were invoked.
Consequently, the seller normally cannot rely on the buyers acts. Even so,
100. REAL PROPERTY
make sure that you ascertain whether the seller has done anything that would
cause him a hardship if the Statute of Frauds were successfully asserted by
the buyer.
2.
Doctrine of Equitable Conversion

Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, once a contract is signed and each party is
entitled to specic performance, equity regards the purchaser as the owner of the real
property. The sellers interest, which consists of the right to the proceeds of sale, is considered to be personal property. The bare legal title that remains in the seller is considered to be
held in trust for the purchaser as security for the debt owed the seller. But note that possession follows the legal title; so even though the buyer is regarded as owning the property, the
seller is entitled to possession until the closing.
a.
Risk of Loss
If the property is destroyed (without fault of either party) before the date set for closing,
the majority rule is that, because the buyer is deemed the owner of the property, the risk
of loss is on the buyer. Thus, the buyer must pay the contract price despite a loss due
to re or other casualty, unless the contract provides otherwise. Some states, however,
have adopted the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act, which places the risk on the
seller unless the buyer has either legal title or possession of the property at the time of
the loss.
1)
b.
Casualty Insurance
Suppose the buyer has the risk of loss, as is true under the majority view, but
the seller has re or casualty insurance that covers the loss. In the event of loss,
allowing the seller to recover the full purchase price on the contract and to collect
the insurance proceeds would be unjust enrichment. Hence, the courts require
the seller to give the buyer credit, against the purchase price, in the amount of the
insurance proceeds.
Passage of Title on Death

The doctrine of equitable conversion also affects the passage of title when a party to a
contract of sale dies before the contract has been completed. In general, it holds that a
deceased sellers interest passes as personal property and a deceased buyers interest as
real property.
1)
Death of Seller
If the seller dies, the bare legal title passes to the takers of his real property,
but they must give up the title to the buyer when the contract closes. When the
purchase price is paid, the money passes as personal property to those who take
the sellers personal property. Note that if the property is specically devised, the
specic devisee may take the proceeds of the sale. (See F.1.b., infra.)
2)
Death of Buyer
If the buyer dies, the takers of his real property can demand a conveyance of the
land at the closing of the contract. Moreover, under the traditional common law
rule, they are entitled to exoneration out of the personal property estate (see F.2.,
infra). Thus, the takers of his personal property will have to pay the purchase price
REAL PROPERTY 101.
out of their share of the buyers estate. However, a majority of states have enacted
statutes abolishing the doctrine of exoneration, and in those states the takers of the
real property will take it subject to the vendors lien for the purchase price. In these
states, as a practical matter, the takers of the real property will have to pay the
price unless the testator specically provided to the contrary.
3.
Marketable Title
There is an implied covenant in every land sale contract that at closing the seller will provide
the buyer with a title that is marketable.
a.
Marketability DenedTitle Reasonably Free from Doubt

Marketable title is title reasonably free from doubt, i.e., title that a reasonably prudent
buyer would be willing to accept. It need not be a perfect title, but the title must be
free from questions that might present an unreasonable risk of litigation. Generally, this
means an unencumbered fee simple with good record title.
1)
Defects in Record Chain of Title

Title may be unmarketable because of a defect in the chain of title. Examples
include: a signicant variation in the description of the land from one deed to the
next, a deed in the chain that was defectively executed and thus fails to meet the
requirements for recordation, and evidence that a prior grantor lacked capacity
to convey the property. Many courts hold that an ancient lien or mortgage on the
record will not render title unmarketable if the seller has proof of its satisfaction or
the statute of limitations on the claim would have run under any possible circumstance, including tolling for disabilities.
a)
Adverse Possession
Historically, a title acquired by adverse possession was not considered
marketable because the purchaser might be later forced to defend in court the
facts that gave rise to the adverse possession against the record owner. On
the bar exam, title acquired by adverse possession is unmarketable, despite
the fact that most modern cases are contra. Most of the modern cases hold
adverse possession titles to be marketable if: (i) the possession has been for a
very lengthy period; (ii) the risk that the record owner will sue appears to be
very remote; and (iii) the probability of the record owners success in such a
suit appears to be minimal. Because the bar examiners have yet to recognize
this line of cases, the modern view should be considered only as a fallback
position on the bar exam.
b)
Future Interest Held by Unborn or Unascertained Parties

Even though most states consider all types of future interests to be transferable, it is often impossible for the owners of the present and future interests,
acting together, to transfer a marketable fee simple absolute title. This is
because the future interests are often held by persons who are unborn or
unascertainable.
Example:
To A for life, and upon As death to As eldest surviving
daughter. Assume that at the time of this conveyance A has
one daughter, B. State of title: A has a life estate, and B has a
102. REAL PROPERTY
contingent remainder. A and B together can transfer the land

to a purchaser, such as C, but the title is not marketable. It may
turn out that, upon As death, B will have predeceased A, and
some other daughter (perhaps not even yet born when A and
B transferred to C) will be As eldest surviving daughter.
Because that daughter did not join in the conveyance to C, she
is not bound by it, and she owns the land. On the other hand,
if B does turn out to be As eldest surviving daughter (which
cannot be determined until As death), then Cs title will
become a marketable fee simple at that time.
While most courts will appoint a guardian ad litem to represent unborn or
unascertained persons in litigation, the majority will not appoint such a
guardian for purposes of conveying the land.
2)
Encumbrances
Generally, mortgages, liens, easements, and covenants render title unmarketable
unless the buyer waives them.
a)
Mortgages and Liens

A seller has the right to satisfy a mortgage or lien at the closing with the
proceeds from the sale. Therefore, as long as the purchase price is sufcient
and this is accomplished simultaneously with the transfer of title (usually
through the use of escrows), the buyer cannot claim that the title is unmarketable; the closing will result in a marketable title.
b)
Easements
An easement that reduces the value of the property (e.g., an easement of way
for the benet of a neighbor) renders title unmarketable. The majority of
courts, however, have held that a benecial easement (e.g., utility easement
to service property) or one that was visible or known to the buyer does not
constitute an encumbrance. Some courts go so far as to hold that the buyer is
deemed to have agreed to take subject to any easement that was notorious or
known to the buyer when she entered into the contract.
c)
Covenants
Restrictive covenants render title unmarketable.
d)
Encroachments
A signicant encroachment constitutes a title defect, regardless of whether an
adjacent landowner is encroaching on the sellers land or vice versa. However,
the encroachment will not render title unmarketable if: (i) it is very slight
(only a few inches) and does not inconvenience the owner on whose land it
encroaches; (ii) the owner encroached upon has indicated that he will not sue
on it; or (iii) it has existed for so long (many decades) that it has become legal
by adverse possession, provided that the state recognizes adverse possession
titles as being marketable (see 1)a), supra).
REAL PROPERTY 103.
3)
Zoning Restrictions
Generally, zoning restrictions do not affect the marketability of title; they are not
considered encumbrances. An existing violation of a zoning ordinance, however,
does render title unmarketable.
4)
Waiver
Any of the above-mentioned title defects can be waived in the contract of sale.
b.
Quitclaim DeedNo Effect

The fact that a contract calls for a quitclaim deed, which does not contain any covenants
for title, does not affect the implied covenant to provide marketable title (unless so
provided in the contract).
c.
Time of Marketability
If, as is usual, the seller has agreed to furnish title at date of closing, the buyer cannot
rescind prior to that date on grounds that the sellers title is not marketable.
1)
d.
Installment Land Contract

Similarly, where an installment land contract is used, the sellers obligation is to
furnish marketable title when delivery is to occur, e.g., when the buyer has made
his nal payment. Therefore, a buyer cannot withhold payments or seek other
remedies (e.g., rescission) on grounds that the sellers title is unmarketable prior to
the date of promised delivery. The buyer might get rescissionary relief before the
date of delivery by showing that the seller cannot possibly cure the defects in time.
Or, under compelling circumstances, a court might require the seller to quiet title
during the contract period.
Remedy If Title Not Marketable

If the buyer determines that the sellers title is unmarketable, he must notify the seller
and give a reasonable time to cure the defects, even if this requires extension of the
closing date. The notice must specify the nature of the defects. If the seller fails to cure
the defects, the buyer may pursue several remedies.
1)
Rescission, Damages, Specic Performance

In the absence of a contractual stipulation to the contrary, if title is not marketable,
the buyer can rescind, sue for damages for breach, get specic performance with
an abatement of the purchase price, or, in some jurisdictions, require the seller to
quiet title. The seller cannot sue successfully for damages or specic performance.
2)
Merger
If the buyer permits the closing to occur, the contract is said to merge with the
deed (i.e., it disappears) and, in the absence of fraud, the seller is no longer liable
on the implied covenant of marketable title. However, the buyer may have an
action for violation of promises made in the deed, if any (see D., infra). Note: The
merger rule does not apply to most nontitle matters, such as covenants regarding
the physical condition of the property. [Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla.
1980)]
104. REAL PROPERTY
4.
5.
Time of Performance
a.
PresumptionTime Not of the Essence

In general, the courts assume that time is not of the essence in real estate contracts.
This means that the closing date stated in the contract is not absolutely binding in
equity, and that a party, even though late in tendering her own performance, can still
enforce the contract if she tenders within a reasonable time after the date. (A month or
two is typically considered a reasonable time.)
b.
When Presumption Overcome

Time will be considered of the essence if:
1)
The contract so states; or
2)
The circumstances indicate it was the parties intention; e.g., the land is rapidly
uctuating in value or a party must move from out of town and has no other place
to go; or
3)
One party gives the other notice that she desires to make time of the essence, and
does so within a reasonable time prior to the date designated for closing.
c.
Effect of Time of the Essence Construction

If time is of the essence, a party who fails to tender performance on the date set for
closing is in total breach and loses her right to enforce the contract.
d.
Liability When Time Not of the Essence

Even if time is not of the essence, a party who is late in tendering performance is
liable in damages for the incidental losses she has caused, such as additional mortgage
interest, taxes, etc.
Tender of Performance
In general, the buyers obligation to pay the purchase price and the sellers obligation to
convey the title are deemed to be concurrent conditions. This means that neither party is in
breach of the contract until the other party tenders her performance, even if the date designated for the closing has passed.
a.
When Partys Tender Excused

A partys tender is unnecessary and is excused if the party has repudiated the contract,
or if it is impossible for the other party to perform (e.g., if the seller does not have
marketable title and cannot get it).
b.
Neither Party Tenders Performance

If neither party tenders performance, the closing date is automatically extended indenitely until one of them does so.
c.
Buyer Finds Sellers Title Unmarketable

If the buyer determines that the sellers title is unmarketable, the buyer must give the
seller a reasonable time to cure title defects.
REAL PROPERTY 105.
6.
Remedies for Breach of the Sales Contract

a.
Damages
The usual measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the
market value of the land on the date of the breach. Incidental damages, such as title
examination and moving or storage costs, can also be recovered.
1)
b.
Liquidated Damages
Sales contracts usually require the buyer to deposit earnest money with the
seller, and provide that if the buyer defaults in performance, the seller may retain
this money as liquidated damages. The courts routinely uphold the sellers retention of the deposit if the amount appears to be reasonable in light of the sellers
anticipated and actual damages. Many courts will uphold a retention of a deposit of
up to 10% of the sales price without further inquiry into its reasonableness. Even
without a liquidated damages clause, courts may uphold retention of the deposit, on
the ground that giving restitution of the funds to the buyer would unjustly reward a
party in breach.
Specic Performance
1)
Buyers Remedy
A court of equity will order a seller to convey the title if the buyer tenders the
purchase price. The remedy at law (damages) is deemed inadequate because the
buyer is getting land and land is unique.
If the seller cannot give marketable title, but the buyer wishes to proceed with the
transaction, she can usually get specic performance with an abatement of the
purchase price in an amount reecting the title defect.
2)
c.
7.
Sellers Remedy
Somewhat illogically, the courts also generally will give a specic performance
decree for the seller if the buyer is in breach. This is sometimes explained as
necessary to have mutuality of remedy. A few courts in recent years have refused
to award specic performance to sellers if the property is not unique (e.g., if a
developer is selling a house in a large subdivision of similar houses).
Special Rules for Unmarketable Title

If the sellers title is unmarketable for reasons that do not indicate the sellers bad faith
(i.e., he did not realize that his title was defective when he signed the contract), about
half of the courts limit the buyers recovery of damages to incidental out-of-pocket costs
(title examination, etc.) and return of the buyers earnest money deposit. The other half
of the courts give the buyer the standard measure of contract damages mentioned above.
Sellers Liability for Defects on Property

a.
Warranty of Fitness or QualityNew Construction Only

The common law rule is that contracts of sale and deeds of real property, unlike
conveyances of personal property, carry no implied warranties of quality or tness for
106. REAL PROPERTY
the purpose intended. One exception is a contract for the sale of a residential building
under construction or to be constructed, on the ground that the buyer has no opportunity
to inspect. Most courts extend the implied warranty of tness or quality to the sale of
any new house by the builder. The warranty implied is that the new house is designed
and constructed in a reasonably workmanlike manner and suitable for human habitation. Courts are split, however, on whether a subsequent purchaser can recover from the
original builder because of the lack of privity. [See Speight v. Walters, 744 N.W.2d 108
(Iowa 2008); Conway v. Cutler Group, Inc., 2014 WL 4064261 (Pa. 2014)]
b.
Negligence of Builder
A person who contracts for construction may always sue a builder for negligence in
performing a building contract. Moreover, many courts now permit the ultimate vendee
(e.g., a subdivision buyer) to sue the builder despite the fact that the seller hired the
builder and the buyer thus lacks privity.
c.
Liability for Sale of Existing Land and Buildings

A seller of existing land and buildings (not new construction) may be liable to the
purchaser for defects in the improvements (e.g., a leaky roof or basement, termite infestation, a nonfunctioning septic system) on any of several different theories.
1)
Misrepresentation (Fraud)
This theory requires proof that the seller made a false statement of fact (oral or
written) to the buyer, that the buyer relied on the statement, and that it materially affected the value of the property. The seller must either have known that the
statement was false, or have made it negligently (without taking reasonable care to
determine its truth).
2)
Active Concealment
The seller is liable as above, even without making any statement, if the seller took
steps to conceal a defect in the property (e.g., paneling over a wall to conceal
cracks).
3)
Failure to Disclose
A majority of states now hold sellers liable for failure to disclose defects if the
following factors are present:
(i)
The seller knows or has reason to know of the defect;
(ii) The defect is not obvious or apparent, and the seller realizes that the buyer is
unlikely to discover it by ordinary inspection; and
(iii) The defect is serious and would probably cause the buyer to reconsider the
purchase if it were known.
These decisions are more likely to impose liability on the seller if the property is
a personal residence, if the defect is dangerous, and if the seller personally created
the defect or previously attempted to repair it and failed to do so.
REAL PROPERTY 107.
d.
B.
Disclaimers of Liability
Sellers sometimes attempt to avoid liability for property defects by inserting clauses in
sales contracts exculpating the seller.
1)
As Is Clauses
A general clause, such as property sold as is or with all defects, is not sufcient to overcome a sellers liability for fraud, concealment, or (in the states that
recognize it) failure to disclose.
2)
Specic Disclaimers
If the exculpatory clause identies and disclaims liability for specic types of
defects (e.g., seller is not liable for leaks in the roof), it is likely to be upheld.
8.
Real Estate Brokers

Most real estate sales contracts are negotiated by real estate brokers. The broker who obtains
the listing from the seller is the sellers agent. Other agents who participate in the sale
(e.g., through a multiple listing service) are also the sellers agents, unless they specically
agree to serve as the buyers agent. While these agents owe a duciary duty to the seller, they
also have a duty to the buyer to disclose material information about the property if they have
actual knowledge of it. Traditionally, the agents commission was earned when she found a
buyer who was ready, willing, and able to purchase the property, even if the buyer later
backed out of the contract. But the growing trend of the cases is to award the commission
only if the sale actually closes, or if it fails to close because of the sellers fault.
9.
Title Insurance
A title insurance policy insures that a good record title of the property exists as of the
policys date and agrees to defend the record title if litigated. The insurance can be taken out
by either the owner of the property or the mortgage lender. An owners policy protects only
the person who owns the policy (i.e., the property owner or the mortgage lender) and does
not run with the land to subsequent purchasers. In contrast, a lenders policy follows any
assignment of the mortgage loan.
DEEDSFORM AND CONTENT

Transfer of title to an interest in real property occasionally occurs through operation of law; but in
most circumstances, transfer can be accomplished only by a deed that satises various formalities
required by statute.
1.
Formalities
a.
Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds requires that a deed be in writing and signed by the grantor.
b.
Description of Land and Parties

A deed must identify the land. The description need not be formal, and it may incorporate extrinsic information, but it must be unambiguous. The parties (grantor and
grantee) must also be identied. This may be done by name, or by describing them in
some other way (e.g., I grant this land to my eldest daughter, or I convey this land
to the present members of the law review at State University). If the deed is delivered
108. REAL PROPERTY
with the identity of the grantee left blank, the courts will presume that the person taking
delivery has authority to ll in the name of the grantee, and if she does so, the deed is
valid. But if the land description is left blank, no such authority is presumed, and the
deed is void unless the grantee was explicitly given authority to ll in the description,
and did so.
2.
c.
Words of Intent
The deed must evidence an intention to transfer realty, but technical words are unnecessary. The word grant by itself is sufcient in many states.
d.
Consideration Not Required

The deed need not recite any consideration, nor must any consideration pass in order to
make a deed valid. A deed may validly convey real property by inter vivos gift so long
as the following requirements are met: (i) donative intent, (ii) delivery, and (iii) acceptance (see C., infra).
e.
Seal Is Unnecessary
A seal is unnecessary.
f.
Attestation and Acknowledgment Generally Unnecessary

Attestation by witnesses is generally unnecessary, as is an acknowledgment. But note:
Either or both might be required for the deed to be recorded.
g.
Signature
A deed must be signed by the grantor. The grantor may designate an agent to sign on
the grantors behalf, but if the signing is not done in the grantors presence, the Statute
of Frauds generally requires that the agents authority be written. In the case of deeds
by corporations, statutes usually provide for execution by two ofcers of the corporation and the afxing of the corporations seal. If the deed represents a conveyance of
all or a substantial part of the corporations assets, a resolution of the board of directors
approving the transfer may be necessary. The grantees signature is not necessary even
if the deed contains covenants on her part. Her acceptance of the deed (called a deed
poll when signed only by the grantor) is sufcient to make the covenants enforceable.
Defective Deeds and Fraudulent Conveyances

a.
Void and Voidable Deeds

A deed that is defective may be either void or voidable. Void implies that the deed
will be set aside by the court even if the property has passed to a bona de purchaser.
Voidable implies that the deed will be set aside only if the property has not passed to
a bona de purchaser.
1)
Void Deeds
Deeds considered void include those that are forged, were never delivered, were
issued to a nonexistent grantee (e.g., a grantee who is in fact dead at the time of
delivery, or a corporation that has not yet been legally formed), or were obtained
by fraud in the factum (i.e., the grantor was deceived and did not realize that he
was executing a deed).
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2)
b.
3.
Voidable Deeds
Deeds considered voidable include those executed by persons younger than the age
of majority or who otherwise lack capacity (e.g., because of insanity), and deeds
obtained through fraud in the inducement, duress, undue inuence, mistake, and
breach of duciary duty.
Fraudulent Conveyances
Even when a deed complies with the required formalities mentioned above, it may be
set aside by the grantors creditors if it is a fraudulent conveyance. Under the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, which nearly all states have adopted, a conveyance is fraudulent if it was made: (i) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of
the grantor; or (ii) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer, and the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfer.
However, the deed will not be set aside as against any grantee who took in good faith
and paid reasonably equivalent value.
Description of Land Conveyed

In land contracts and deeds, property may be described in various ways; i.e., by reference
to a government survey, by metes and bounds, by courses and angles, by references to a
recorded plat, by reference to adjacent properties, by the name of the property, or by a street
and number system.
a.
Sufcient Description Provides a Good Lead

A description is sufcient if it provides a good lead as to the identity of the property
sought to be conveyed.
Example:
A conveyance of all my land, or all my land in Alameda County,
provides a sufcient lead. The intention of the grantor is clear and the
meaning of this intention can be proved without difculty (by checking
the land records of Alameda County).
b.
Insufcient DescriptionTitle Remains in Grantor

If the description is too indenite, title remains in the grantor, subject to the possibility
of a suit for reformation of the deed.
Example:
A conveyance of one acre off the western end of my 30-acre tract (the
30-acre tract being adequately described) would probably fail for uncertainty. Off the western end is too vague to ascertain which acre, and
the admission of parol evidence here would be considered a violation of
the Statute of Frauds.
c.
Parol Evidence Admissible to Clear Up Ambiguity

The general rule is that parol evidence is admissible to explain or supplement a written
description or to clear up an ambiguity. If there is a patent ambiguityone appearing
on the face of the deedparol evidence is normally admissible to ascertain the parties
intent. For example, one part of the deed states that it is conveying Blackacre but later
it purports to convey an interest in Whiteacre. Parol evidence is admissible to show
which property the grantor intended to convey. Where the ambiguity is latentnot
apparent on the face of the deedparol evidence is generally admissible. For example,
if A grants to B my house in San Francisco, parol evidence is admissible to show
which house A owns.
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1)
d.
e.
CompareInadequate Description
If, however, A grants to B my house in San Francisco, and it turns out that A
owns three houses in that city, the conveyance would probably fail for lack of
adequate description. (But note: If there is an underlying original agreement in
which there was no mistake or ambiguity, and the only mistake was in the writing
of the instrument, relief might be available by way of reformation of the deed.)
Rules of Construction
Where there is a mistake or inconsistency in the description (as where the deed leaves
in doubt the exact location of a property line, or measurements give two different
locations for the line), the following rules of construction are applied to carry out the
parties probable intent. (These are not rules of law and will not be applied where
there is clear evidence showing a contrary intent.)
1)
Natural monuments prevail over other methods of description; i.e., articial

monuments, courses and distances, surfaces, acreage, or general descriptions (e.g.,
a call from Point X to the old oak tree, prevails over a call from Point X south
100 feet).
2)
Articial monuments (e.g., stakes, buildings, etc.) prevail over all but natural
monuments.
3)
Courses (e.g., angles) prevail over distances (e.g., west 90 degrees to Main St.
prevails over west 100 feet to Main St.).
4)
All of the foregoing prevail over general descriptions such as name (e.g., Walkers
Island) or quantity (e.g., being 300 acres).
Land Bounded by Right-of-Way

1)
Title Presumed to Extend to Center of Right-of-Way

If land is described as being bounded by a street, highway, or other right-of-way, or
if the land conveyed is otherwise described but actually is bounded by such, there
is a rebuttable presumption that the title of the grantee extends to the center of the
right-of-way (assuming that the grantor owns to the center), or to the full width of
it if the grantor retains no adjoining land. This presumption accords with (i) the
presumed intention of the parties, and (ii) the public policy that disfavors a grantors retention of thin strips of land.
a)
Evidence to Rebut Presumption

In many jurisdictions, a description such as running along the street has
been held sufcient to rebut the presumption that the grantee took title to the
center. (This is to be distinguished from the language bounded on the west
by the highway to which the presumption applies.)
But when the monument involved is a body of water, more denite language
is necessary to rebut the presumption that the grantee takes title to the center.
This is because, unlike streets, there are no public rights in most bodies of
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water abutting on land (except possible navigation easements), and because

a grantee of land adjoining water normally expects a right of access to the
water.
b)
2)
f.
C.
Measuring from Monument

Notwithstanding the general rule, and unless a contrary intention is expressed,
measurements from a right-of-way are presumed to start from the side and
not the center. Again, this is based on the parties presumed intent.
Variable Boundary Line Cases

a)
Slow Change in Course Changes Property Rights

The slow and imperceptible change in course of a river or stream serving as
a boundary operates to change the legal boundary. Where land is described
as abutting upon a body of water, any slow and imperceptible deposit of
soil (accretion) belongs to the owner of the abutting land (the riparian
owner). Where accretion builds up in an irregular pattern over the lands of
several adjacent property owners, courts determine title to it in a just and
equitable manner, either by (i) merely extending the property lines out into
the water with each landowner getting the property that falls within the lines
as extended; or (ii) dividing up the newly formed land in proportion to the
owners interests in the adjoining lands. Similarly, slow erosion of a streams
bank results in the owner losing title to the affected area.
b)
Avulsion Does Not Change Property Rights

A sudden, perceptible change of a watercourse (avulsion) does not change
property rights. Thus, if a river changes course suddenly, boundaries remain
where they were, even if someone who formerly had river access now nds
himself landlocked.
c)
Encroachment of Water Does Not Change Fixed Boundary Lines

According to the majority view, where property is encroached upon by a body
of water (e.g., lake enlarges), previously xed boundary lines do not change
and ownership rights are not affected. Indeed, the boundary lines can still be
proven even though the land is completely under water.
Reformation of Deeds
Reformation is an equitable action in which the court rewrites the deed to make it
conform to the intention of the parties. It will be granted if the deed does not express
what the parties agreed to, either because of their mutual mistake or a scriveners
(drafters) error. It will also be granted for unilateral mistake, but only if the party who
is not mistaken induced the mistake by misrepresentation or some other inequitable
conduct. If the property has passed to a bona de purchaser who relied on the original
language of the deed, the court will not reform it.
DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE

1.
DeliveryIn General
A deed is not effective to transfer an interest in realty unless it has been delivered. Physical
112. REAL PROPERTY
transfer of a deed is not necessary for a valid delivery. Nor does physical transfer alone establish delivery (although it might raise a presumption thereof). Rather, delivery refers to the
grantors intent; it is satised by words or conduct evidencing the grantors intention that
the deed have some present operative effect; i.e., that title pass immediately and irrevocably,
even though the right of possession may be postponed until some future time.
Examples:
1) O drafts an instrument conveying Blackacre to A and hands the instrument
to A for safekeeping. Although handed to the named grantee, this is not a
valid delivery. There is no evidence that O intended the instrument to have
any present operative effect.
2) O drafts an instrument conveying Blackacre to A. O attempts to give the
instrument to A personally but is unable to nd A; nevertheless, O quits
possession of Blackacre and thereafter treats A as the owner thereof. Nearly
all courts would hold that there has been a sufcient delivery.
Under some circumstances (i.e., when a third party is involved), conditional delivery is
permissible. This type of delivery becomes effective only upon the occurrence of a condition,
but the transfer then relates back to the time of the conditional delivery. The grantor has
only limited rights to revoke prior to the occurrence of the condition. (See further discussion
of conditional deliveries, 3., infra.)
a.
Manual Delivery
The delivery requirement will be satised where the grantor physically or manually
delivers the deed to the grantee. Manual delivery may be accomplished by means of
the mails, by the grantors agent or messenger, or by physical transfer by the grantors
attorney in the grantors presence.
b.
Presumptions Relating to Delivery

As a matter of theory, a deed may be delivered by words without an act of physical
transfer. Delivery is presumed if the deed is: (i) handed to the grantee, or (ii) acknowledged by the grantor before a notary and recorded. Unless there is some clear expression of intent that the grantor envisioned the passage of title to the grantee without
physical delivery, the continued possession of the deed by the grantor raises a presumption of nondelivery and therefore no passage of title. Conversely, possession by a grantee
of a properly executed deed raises a presumption that the delivery requirement has been
satised. Note, however, that the presumptions involved are rebuttable.
c.
Delivery Cannot Be Canceled

Title passes to the grantee upon effective delivery. Therefore, returning the deed to the
grantor has no effect; it constitutes neither a cancellation nor a reconveyance.
d.
Parol Evidence
1)
Admissible to Prove Grantors Intent

The majority rule is that any type of parol evidence, including conduct or statements made by the grantor before or after the alleged delivery, is admissible to
prove her intent.
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2)
Not Admissible to Show Delivery to Grantee Was Conditional

If a deed is unconditional on its face and is given directly to the grantee, in most
jurisdictions parol evidence is not admissible to show that the delivery was subject
to a condition.
Example:
O delivers an absolute deed of Blackacre to A, but tells A that
the deed is effective only if A pays off the encumbrance on the
property, or only if O does not return from the hospital. Under
the above rule, even if A never pays off the encumbrance or if
O returns from the hospital, A is the owner of Blackacre and O
cannot claim that there was no valid delivery. Rationale: The rule
is designed to avoid unsettling of land titles which appear to be in
the grantees name, and to protect both innocent third parties and
grantees from testimony fabricated by grantors.
3)
Admissible to Show No Delivery Intended

But while parol evidence is not admitted to prove that a delivery was subject to an
oral condition, parol evidence is admissible to prove that the grantor did not intend
the deed to have any present effect at all.
Example:
O tells A, I want you to have Blackacre when I die, and Im giving
you this deed to Blackacre so that you can have it at that time.
Most courts would hold that Os statements are admissible, and that
despite the unconditional nature of the deed itself, they show that O
did not intend the deed to have any present effect.
a)
Deed Intended as Mortgage

Parol evidence is always admissible to show that a deed absolute on its face
was intended by the parties to be a mortgage; i.e., there was no intent to
convey title outright. (See VII.A.4., infra.)
b)
Transfer of Deed to Bona Fide Purchaser

Suppose O gives A a deed for examination by As attorney (deed not intended
to be effective at this point). A wrongfully records it and sells to B, a bona
de purchaser (BFP). On these facts, O would prevail against B unless
estopped to assert lack of delivery (see below). In other words, absent
estoppel, a subsequent BFP is not protected; if there was no delivery, the
BFPs grantor had no power to convey.
(1) Estoppel in Favor of Innocent Purchaser
Even though the grantor is allowed to show that no delivery at all was
intended as against the grantee, he often is estopped to assert lack of
delivery against an innocent purchaser.
Example:
O gives A a deed but does not intend the deed to be
presently effective. A shows the deed to an innocent
purchaser, B, who buys the land in reliance thereon. B
will prevail in litigation with O, the original grantor, if it
appears that O negligently permitted A to have possession of the deed. Rationale: As between two innocent
parties, the one who contributed most directly to the loss
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must bear the burden of it, and in many cases O must be

deemed responsible for entrusting A with a deed absolute
on its face. The same result occurs where the grantee
records the deed and an innocent purchaser relies on the
recordation.
4)
2.
3.
Comment
Obviously, the above rules give the courts exibility to nd either delivery or
nondelivery in many situations. It is also evident that there exists a theoretical
inconsistency in admitting parol evidence to show that no delivery was intended,
but not to show that delivery was conditional. This inconsistency has been criticized by numerous commentators.
Retention of Interest by Grantor or Conditional Delivery

Problems arise when the grantor attempts to retain an interest in the property (e.g., a life
estate) or when he attempts to make the passage of title dependent upon the happening of a
condition or event other than delivery.
a.
No DeliveryTitle Does Not Pass

If the grantor executes a deed but fails to deliver it during his lifetime, no conveyance
of title takes place. Without adequate delivery, the title does not pass to the intended
grantee.
b.
No RecordingTitle Passes
If the grantor executes and delivers a deed but fails to have it recorded, title passes.
Therefore, an agreement between the grantor and grantee to the effect that the deed will
not be recorded until some event takes place in the future does not affect the passage of
title.
c.
Express Condition of Death of Grantor Creates Future Interest

When a deed, otherwise properly executed and delivered, contains an express provision that the title will not pass until the grantors death, the effect is to create a present
possessory life estate in the grantor and a future estate in the grantee. Note, however,
that this result follows only when the deed expressly contains such a provision.
d.
Conditions Not Contained in Deed

If a deed is absolute on its face, but is delivered to the grantee with an oral condition (e.g., title is not to pass until I return from the Orient), the traditional view was
that the condition dropped out and the delivery became absolute. A growing minority
of cases enforces the condition. Where the condition is the grantors death, the deed
is usually held testamentary and therefore void (unless executed with testamentary
formalities).
e.
TestRelinquishment of Control
To make an effective delivery, the grantor must relinquish absolute and unconditional
control.
Where Grantor Gives Deed to Third Party

In this situation, the rules are quite different; conditional delivery is permissible. Three
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situations should be distinguished: (i) where the grantor gives the deed to a third party, there
being no conditions appended; (ii) where the grantor in a commercial context gives such
a deed to a third party, there being conditions appended; and (iii) where the situation is the
same as in (ii), but the transaction is donative.
a.
Transfer to Third Party with No Conditions

If O (the grantor) gives B a deed naming A as grantee and instructs B to give the deed
to A, has a delivery occurred? Most courts say yes. Because O indicated an intent to
make the deed presently operative, A has a right to the deed and O should not be able
to get it back. However, if O told B to retain the deed and give it to A upon Os later
instructions, no delivery would have occurred.
When there are no specic instructions regarding delivery, the question is one of Os
intent. If B is As attorney, delivery seems clear. But if B is Os attorney, a court might
infer that B was merely Os agent and that O thus retained the power to recall the deed.
(A few courts hold that B is to be treated as Os agent in all circumstances, even if
O manifests a clear intention of present effectiveness, and consequently no delivery
occurs.)
b.
Transfer to Third Party with Conditions (Commercial Transaction)

Suppose that O gives B a deed naming A as grantee and tells B to transfer the deed to
A when A has paid $5,000 on Os account on or before September 1. This is the true
escrow situationthe true conditional delivery. Under the circumstances outlined
below, a valid conditional delivery has occurred. The deed has a present operative effect
in that title will transfer automatically upon the occurrence of the condition. O will
retain title only if the condition does not occur.
1)
Parol Evidence Admissible to Show Conditions

Even though a deed is unconditional, the general rule is that parol evidence is
admissible to show the conditions and terms upon which a deed was deposited
with the escrow. (This is contrary to the rule excluding parol evidence where
transfer is directly to the grantee.) If the escrow custodian has violated parol conditions, there will be no valid delivery. Once the condition occurs, whether parol or
not, title automatically vests in the grantee and the escrow holds the deed as the
grantees agent.
2)
Grantors Right to Recover Deed

a)
Majority ViewCan Recover Only If No Written Contract

Under the majority view, if the grantor seeks to recover the deed prior to the
occurrence of the condition, the grantee can object only if there is an enforceable written contract to convey. (On the other hand, once the condition occurs,
title passes even in the absence of an enforceable contract.)
(1) The requirement of a written contract is based on the Statute of Frauds
consideration that oral contracts to convey realty should not become
enforceable simply because the deed has been deposited with a third
party.
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(2) Ordinarily, the contract to convey will be a buy-sell land contract.

However, written escrow instructions are often a sufcient memorandum
of the contract to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
b)
3)
Breach of Escrow ConditionsTitle Does Not Pass

When the grantee wrongfully acquires the deed from the escrow holder prior to
performance of the conditions of the escrow, title does not pass. Therefore, even
though the grantee is in possession of the deed, she cannot convey any interest in
the land to a subsequent transferee, even a BFP.
a)
4)
Minority ViewNo Right to Recover

A strong minority prohibits revocation even in the absence of an enforceable
underlying contract. Deposit of the deed with a third party on stated conditions is seen to obviate most possibilities of fraud.
Estoppel Cases
A few cases have held that where the escrow holder was chosen by the
grantor, the grantor is bound by the escrow holders acts and is estopped to
deny a valid delivery and passage of title to the grantee. Thus, an innocent
purchaser (BFP) from the grantee may acquire good title. An important
factor is whether the grantor has allowed the grantee to take possession of the
property prior to completion of the conditions of the escrow. If the grantor
has remained in possession, the purchaser may be held to have notice of the
grantors interest and cannot be a BFP.
Relation-Back Doctrine
In an escrow transaction, title does not pass to the grantee until performance of
the named conditions. However, where justice requires, the title of the grantee
will relate back to the time of the deposit of the deed in escrow. Generally, the
relation-back doctrine will be applied if:
(i)
The grantor dies (doctrine applied to avoid the rule that title must pass before
death if instrument is not a will);
(ii) The grantor becomes incompetent (doctrine applied to avoid the rule that an
incompetent cannot convey title); or
(iii) A creditor of the grantor (who is not a BFP or mortgagee) attaches the
grantors title (doctrine applied to cut off the creditors claim).
a)
Not Applied If Intervening Party Is BFP or Mortgagee

The relation-back doctrine is not applied where the intervening third party is
a BFP or mortgagee. However, if the sales contract is recorded, there can be
no intervening BFPs because its recordation gives constructive notice.
b)
Not Applied in Favor of Escrow Grantee with Knowledge

The relation-back doctrine will not be applied in favor of an escrow grantee
who, at the time she performs the terms and conditions of the escrow, has
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actual or constructive knowledge of prior equities of other persons (e.g., that

the grantor conveyed to another). But if the escrow grantee has performed
part of the conditions when she acquires such knowledge, she will be
protected against all but BFPs or mortgagees.
c.
Transfer to Third Party with Conditions (Donative Transactions)

If the grantor gives a deed to a third party with instructions to turn it over to the named
donee only when certain conditions occur, is there a valid delivery or can the grantor
change her mind and demand the deed back before the conditions occur?
1)
Condition Unrelated to Grantors Death

When O gives to B a deed naming A as grantee, and instructs B to give it to A
when A marries, etc., no true escrow will exist unless there is an underlying
contract of sale (which is extremely unlikely in a donative transaction such as this).
Hence, O can retrieve the deed from B upon request. Nevertheless, if O does not
do so, and B actually delivers the deed to A after the condition is satised, the
delivery will be effective to convey title to A as of that date.
2)
Where Condition Is Grantors Death

When O executes a deed to A and hands the deed to B with instructions to give it
to A upon the death of O, most courts hold that the grantor cannot get her deed
back because her intent was to presently convey a future interest to the grantee
(either a remainder, with a life estate reserved in the grantor, or an executory
interest). Note that this analysis also makes the gift inter vivos, not testamentary,
and thus not in conict with the Statute of Wills. Caution: In dealing with death
cases, make sure that it was the grantors intent that the deed be operative immediately to convey a future interest.
a)
4.
LimitationNo Delivery If Conditioned on Survival

When Os instructions to B are to deliver the deed to A only if A survives O,
it is generally held that there is no valid delivery because it was Os intent to
retain title and possession until her death.
Acceptance
a.
Usually Presumed
There must be an acceptance by the grantee in order to complete a conveyance. In most
states, acceptance is presumed if the conveyance is benecial to the grantee (whether
or not the grantee knows of it). In other states, acceptance is presumed only where the
grantee is shown to have knowledge of the grant and fails to indicate rejection of it.
Acceptance is presumed in all states if the grantee is an infant or an incompetent.
b.
Usually Relates Back

Acceptance (presumed or otherwise) usually relates back to the date of delivery of
the deed in escrow. However, many courts refuse to relate back an acceptance where
it would defeat the rights of intervening third parties such as BFPs, attaching creditors
of the grantor, or surviving joint tenants. A few states will not even relate back an
acceptance if doing so defeats the devisees of the grantor.
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5.
D.
Dedication
Land may be transferred to a public body (e.g., a city or county) by dedication. An offer of
dedication may be made by written or oral statement, submission of a map or plat showing
the dedication, or opening the land to public use. An acceptance by the public agency is
necessary. This may be accomplished by a formal resolution, approval of the map or plat, or
actual assumption of maintenance or construction of improvements by the agency.
COVENANTS FOR TITLE AND ESTOPPEL BY DEED

There are three types of deeds characteristically used to convey property interests other than
leaseholds: the general warranty deed, the special warranty deed (usually statutory), and the
quitclaim deed. The major difference between these deeds is the scope of assurances (covenants
for title) they give to the grantee and the grantees successors regarding the title being conveyed.
The general warranty deed normally contains six covenants for title (see 1.a.1) - 6), infra). The
special warranty deed contains fewer and more limited assurances. The quitclaim deed contains
no assurances; it releases to the grantee whatever interest the grantor happens to own. Covenants
for title must be distinguished from covenants for other than title (i.e., covenants running with the
land used for private land regulation).
1.
Covenants for Title in a General Warranty Deed

In this day of recording acts and title insurance, covenants for title are not much relied upon
for title assurance. A general warranty deed is one in which the grantor covenants against
title defects created both by himself and by all prior titleholders. In a special warranty deed,
however, the grantor covenants only that he himself did not create title defects; he represents
nothing about what prior owners might have done. General warranty deeds are a rarity in a
number of states where many conveyances are made with statutory form special warranty
deeds.
a.
Usual Covenants
A grantor may give any or all of the following covenants, which are classied as the
usual covenants for title. A deed containing such covenants is called a general
warranty deed.
1)
Covenant of Seisin
The covenant of seisin is a covenant that the grantor has the estate or interest that
she purports to convey. Both title and possession at the time of the grant are necessary to satisfy the covenant.
2)
Covenant of Right to Convey

The covenant of the right to convey is a covenant that the grantor has the power
and authority to make the grant. Title alone will ordinarily satisfy this covenant, as
will proof that the grantor was acting as the authorized agent of the titleholder.
3)
Covenant Against Encumbrances

The covenant against encumbrances is a covenant assuring that there are neither
visible encumbrances (easements, prots, etc.) nor invisible encumbrances
(mortgages, etc.) against the title or interest conveyed.
4)
Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment

The covenant for quiet enjoyment is a covenant that the grantee will not be
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disturbed in her possession or enjoyment of the property by a third partys lawful

claim of title.
b.
5)
Covenant of Warranty
The covenant of warranty is a covenant wherein the grantor agrees to defend on
behalf of the grantee any lawful or reasonable claims of title by a third party, and
to compensate the grantee for any loss sustained by the claim of superior title. This
covenant is generally considered to be similar to the covenant for quiet enjoyment.
6)
Covenant for Further Assurances

The covenant for further assurances is a covenant to perform whatever acts are
reasonably necessary to perfect the title conveyed if it turns out to be imperfect.
7)
No Implied Warranties or Covenants

In the absence of a statute, no covenants of title are implied in deeds. Moreover,
the implied (or express) covenant of marketable title found in contracts of sale of
real estate is no longer assertable once a deed has been delivered, unless fraud or
mistake is shown.
Breach of Covenants
Three of the covenants (seisin, right to convey, against encumbrances) are present
covenants and are breached, if at all, at the time of conveyance. Quiet enjoyment,
warranty, and further assurances are future covenants and are breached only upon
interference with the possession of the grantee or her successors. This distinction
is important in that it determines when the statute of limitations begins running and
whether a remote grantee of the covenantor can sue.
1)
Covenants of Seisin and Right to Convey

The covenants of seisin and right to convey are breached at the time of conveyance if the grantor is not the owner of the interest she purports to convey (or has
not been authorized to so convey). If there is a breach, the grantee has a cause of
action against which the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of conveyance. If the grantee reconveys, the general rule is that the subsequent grantee has
no right of action against the covenantor. In a few jurisdictions, it is implied that
the original grantee assigned the cause of action to the subsequent grantee, thus
permitting suit against the original grantor-covenantor. (The latter is probably the
better rule because the subsequent grantee most likely paid the original grantee the
market value.)
Example:
O conveys Blackacre to A by a deed containing a covenant of
seisin. O purports to convey a fee simple, but in fact X was the
owner of Blackacre. Soon thereafter, A conveys to B. Under the
usual view, A, but not B, may recover from O. In a few jurisdictions, it is implied that A assigned her cause of action to B.
2)
Covenant Against Encumbrances

The covenant against encumbrances is breached and a cause of action arises at
the time of conveyance if the property is encumbered. Most jurisdictions hold that
the covenant is breached even if the grantee knew of the encumbrance, whether it
120. REAL PROPERTY
be an encumbrance on title (e.g., a mortgage) or a physical encumbrance (e.g., an

easement or servitude), but others hold there is no breach if the grantee knew of a
physical encumbrance.
These jurisdictions charge grantees with constructive notice of visible physical
encumbrances (e.g., right-of-way). Several cases go so far as to hold that a covenant
against encumbrances is not breached where the encumbrance (visible or not)
is a benet to the land involved (e.g., an easement for a sewer or for an adjacent
street). As with the covenants of seisin and right to convey, this covenant cannot
be enforced by a remote grantee in the majority of states.
3)
c.
Covenants for Quiet Enjoyment, Warranty, and Further Assurances

Covenants for quiet enjoyment, warranty, and further assurances are not breached
until a third party interferes with the possession of the grantee or her successors.
(But note: A covenant for quiet enjoyment or of warranty is not breached by the
covenantors refusal to defend title against a wrongful claim or eviction by a third
party.)
a)
Covenant Runs to Successive Grantees

These covenants are viewed as continuous; i.e., they can be breached a
number of times. Their benet runs with the grantees estate (unlike the
present covenants discussed above).
Example:
O conveys to A by a deed containing a covenant of warranty.
A thereafter conveys to B and B to C, and then C is evicted by
a third party with title that was paramount when O conveyed
to A. C can successfully sue O.
b)
Requirement of Notice
The covenantor is not liable on her covenant of warranty or of further assurances unless the party seeking to hold her liable gives her notice of the claim
against the title she conveyed.
c)
Any Disturbance of Possession

Most courts hold that any disturbance of possession sufces to constitute a
breach. Thus, if the covenantee cannot obtain complete possession or pays
off an adverse, paramount claim in order to retain possession, this is a sufcient disturbance of possession. Compare: A disturbance of the covenantees possession is not required as a prerequisite to recovery for breach of
covenants of seisin, right to convey, or against encumbrances.
Damages and Remote Grantees

Suppose successive conveyances from O to A to B to C, each conveyance containing
full covenants. C is evicted by X, who was the true owner when O conveyed to A. C
may sue O, A, or B because each gave a covenant of warranty the benet of which ran
with the land. But what is the measure of Cs recovery? Is it the consideration the defendant (i.e., O, A, or B) received? Is it the consideration C paid (an indemnity theory) so
that if C was a donee, she gets nothing?
REAL PROPERTY 121.
Many states permit C to recover to the extent of the consideration received by the
defendant-covenantor (even though it exceeds the consideration paid by C). Under this
view, defendant-shopping is advisable (to sue whomever received most). The defendant who is held liable then has a cause of action against any prior covenantor, until
ultimately O is held liable. In other states, C can recover only the actual consideration
she paid (but not to exceed the amount received by the defendant-covenantor).
2.
Statutory Special Warranty Deed

Statutes in many states provide that (unless expressly negated) the use of the word grant in
a conveyance creates by implication the following two limited assurances against acts of the
grantor (not her predecessors): (i) that prior to the time of the execution of such conveyance,
the grantor has not conveyed the same estate or any interest therein to any person other
than the grantee; and (ii) that the estate conveyed is free from encumbrances made by the
grantor.
3.
Quitclaim Deeds
A quitclaim deed is basically a release of whatever interest, if any, the grantor has in the
property. Hence, the use of covenants warranting the grantors title is basically inconsistent
with this type of deed; i.e., if the deed contains warranties, it is not a quitclaim deed.
4.
Estoppel by Deed
If a grantor purports to convey an estate in property that she does not then own, her subsequent acquisition of title to the property will automatically inure to the benet of the
grantee. In other words, the grantor impliedly covenants that she will convey title immediately upon its acquisition.
Example:
On Day 1, A, who does not own Blackacre, purports to convey Blackacre to B
by general warranty deed. On Day 1, B has no interest in Blackacre. On Day
3, A acquires Blackacre from O. That interest automatically passes to B, so
that on Day 3 B owns Blackacre. As warranties will prevent her from denying
ownership when she executed the deed on Day 1.
a.
Applies to Warranty Deeds

The doctrine is most frequently applied where the conveyance is by warranty deed.
Regardless of covenants for title, many courts hold that if the deed expressly purports
to convey a fee simple or other particular estate, the grantee is entitled to that estate if
later acquired by the grantor. In most states, however, the doctrine will not be applied
when the conveyance is by a quitclaim deed.
b.
Rights of Subsequent Purchasers

The majority of courts hold that title inures to the benet of the grantee only as against
the grantor (who is estopped to deny that she acquired title on behalf of the grantee).
This is a personal estoppel only. Consequently, if the grantor transfers her after-acquired
title to an innocent purchaser for value, the BFP gets good title. (There is no basis for
invoking an estoppel against an innocent purchaser without notice.)
1)
Effect of Recordation by Original Grantee

If the original grantee records the deed she receives from the grantor, the question
arises as to whether this recordation imparts sufcient notice of the grantees
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interest, so as to prevent a subsequent purchaser from being a BFP. This depends

on the subsequent grantees burden of searching the title. (See E.4., infra.)
c.
E.
Remedies of Grantee
In jurisdictions following the estoppel rationale, the original grantee, at her election,
may accept title to the land or sue for damages for breach of covenants for title.
However, if an innocent purchaser of the after-acquired title is involved, the grantee has
no rights against the BFP.
RECORDING
At common law, in nearly all cases priority was given to the grantee rst in time. Thus, if O
conveyed Blackacre to A and then made an identical conveyance to B, A prevailed over B on the
theory that after the rst conveyance O had no interest left to convey.
1.
Recording ActsIn General

Statutes known as recording acts require a grantee to make some sort of recordation so
as to give notice to the world that title to certain property has already been conveyed, and
thus to put subsequent purchasers on guard. These statutes are in effect in some form in
every state. Basically, recording acts set up a system by which any instrument affecting title
to property located in a certain county can be recorded in that county. These acts seek to
protect all subsequent BFPs from secret, unrecorded interests of others.
a.
Purpose of RecordationNotice
Recordation is not essential to the validity of a deed, as between the grantor and
grantee. However, if a grantee does not record her instrument, she may lose out against
a subsequent BFP. By recording, the grantee gives constructive (or record) notice to
everyone. Hence, as stated earlier, proper recording prevents anyone from becoming a
subsequent BFP.
b.
Requirements for Recordation
c.
1)
What Can Be RecordedInstrument Affecting an Interest in Land

Practically every kind of deed, mortgage, contract to convey, or other instrument
creating or affecting an interest in land can be recorded. Note: A judgment or
decree affecting title to property can also be recorded. And, even before judgment,
where a lawsuit is pending that may affect title to property, any party to the
action can record a lis pendens (notice of pending action), which will effectively
put third parties on notice of all claims pending in the lawsuit.
2)
Grantor Must Acknowledge Deed

Most recording statutes provide that, in order to be recorded, a deed must be
acknowledged by the grantor before a notary public. This requirement offers some
protection against forgery. Problems may arise if the recorder records a deed that
has not been acknowledged or has been improperly acknowledged.
Mechanics of Recording
1)
Filing Copy
The grantee or her agent normally presents the deed to the county recorder, who
REAL PROPERTY 123.
photographs it and les the copy in the ofcial records. These records are kept
chronologically.
2)
2.
Indexing
The recorder also indexes the deed to permit title searches. The usual indexes
are the grantor-grantee and grantee-grantor indexes, which are arranged by reference to the parties to the conveyance. Tract indexes, which index the property by
location, exist in some urban localities.
Types of Recording Acts

There are three major types of recording acts, classied as notice, race-notice, and race
statutes. Note that the burden is on the subsequent taker to prove that he qualies for protection under the statute.
a.
Notice Statutes
Under a notice statute, a subsequent BFP (i.e., a person who gives valuable consideration and has no notice of the prior instrument) prevails over a prior grantee who failed
to record. The important fact under a notice statute is that the subsequent purchaser had
no actual or constructive notice at the time of the conveyance. Constructive notice
includes both record notice and inquiry notice (see 3.b.3), infra). A typical notice statute
provides:
A conveyance of an interest in land, other than a lease for less than one year,
shall not be valid against any subsequent purchaser for value, without notice
thereof, unless the conveyance is recorded.
Note also that the subsequent BFP is protected, regardless of whether she records at all.
Example:
On January 1, O conveys Blackacre to A. A does not record. On January

15, O conveys Blackacre to B, who gives valuable consideration and has
no notice of the deed from O to A. B prevails over A.
What if A records before B? Suppose in the example above that A
recorded on January 18, and B never recorded. This is irrelevant under a
notice statute, because B had no notice at the time of her conveyance
from O. B is protected against a prior purchaser even though B does
not record her deed (this is the difference between notice and racenotice statutes). Of course, if B does not record, she runs the risk that a
subsequent purchaser will prevail over her, just as she prevailed over A.
b.
Race-Notice Statutes
Under a race-notice statute, a subsequent BFP is protected only if she records before
the prior grantee. Rationale: The best evidence of which deed was delivered rst is to
determine who recorded rst. To obviate questions about the time of delivery and to add
an inducement to record promptly, race-notice statutes impose on the BFP the additional
requirement that she record rst. A typical race-notice statute provides:
Any conveyance of an interest in land, other than a lease for less than one
year, shall not be valid against any subsequent purchaser for value, without
notice thereof, whose conveyance is rst recorded.
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Example:
c.
3.

15, O conveys Blackacre to B. On January 18, A records. On January 20,
B records. A prevails over B because B did not record rst.
Race Statutes
Under a pure race statute, whoever records rst wins. Actual notice is irrelevant. The
rationale is that actual notice depends upon extrinsic evidence, which may be unreliable.
Very few states have race statutes.
Example:
15, O conveys Blackacre to B. B knows of the deed to A. B records.
Then A records. B prevails over A because she recorded rst. It is
immaterial that she had actual notice of As interest.
Who Is Protected by Recording Acts

Only bona de purchasers (BFPs) are entitled to prevail against a prior transferee under
notice and race-notice statutes. To attain this status, a person must satisfy three requirements (each of which is discussed in detail below). The person must:
(i)
Be a purchaser (or mortgagee or creditor if the statute so allows; see below);
(ii) Take without notice (actual, constructive, or inquiry) of the prior instrument; and
(iii) Pay valuable consideration.
Note: If these requirements are not met, the person is not protected by the recording acts, so
that the common law rule of rst in time prevails.
Example:
O, the owner of Blackacre, executes a contract of sale of the land to A on
Monday. A immediately records the contract. On Tuesday, O deeds the land
to B. B pays valuable consideration for the land, but is not a BFP because B is
held to have constructive notice of As rights. Result: A is entitled to enforce
the contract against B, paying B the rest of the price and compelling B to
deliver a deed to A. (If A had failed to record the contract, and B had no other
notice of it, B would have taken free of As contract rights. A would have
an action in damages against O for breach of contract, but would not have a
claim for specic performance against B.)
a.
Purchasers
All recording acts protect purchasers (of the fee or any lesser estate).
1)
Donees, Heirs, and Devisees Not Protected

Donees, heirs, and devisees are not protected because they do not give value for
their interests.
Example:
O, the owner of Blackacre, conveys it to A on Monday. A fails to
record. O dies on Tuesday and his heirs/devisees succeed to his
property interests. Even though Os heirs/devisees may be unaware
of the prior conveyance of Blackacre to A, A prevails.
2)
Purchaser from Donee, Heir, or Devisee

A person who buys land from the donee, heir, or devisee of the record owner is
protected against a prior unrecorded conveyance from the record owner.
REAL PROPERTY 125.
Example:
O conveys Blackacre to A, who does not record. O dies, leaving

H as her heir. (H does not prevail over A because he is not a
purchaser.) H conveys to B, a BFP, who records. B prevails over A
in nearly all jurisdictions.
An heir who purchases the interests of her co-heirs, without notice of the prior
unrecorded conveyance, is entitled to the same protection as any other purchaser to
the extent of her purchase.
3)
Mortgagees
Mortgagees for value are treated as purchasers, either expressly by the recording
act or by judicial classication.
Example:
O, the owner of a parcel in State X known as Blackacre, deeds the
parcel to A on Monday, but A fails to record the deed. On Tuesday,
O executes a mortgage to Bank. State X has a race-notice recording
statute. Bank is a good faith purchaser for value, and immediately
records its mortgage. Result: Bank has a valid mortgage on the
land, while the title to the land is held by A. (If Bank had not been
a BFP, or had failed to record, A would hold the title free of Banks
mortgage.)
4)
Judgment Creditors
In nearly all states, a plaintiff who obtains a money judgment can obtain, by
statute, a judgment lien on the defendants real estate. A typical statute reads as
follows:
Any judgment properly led shall, for 10 years from ling, be a lien on
the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person
against whom the judgment is rendered.
Is a plaintiff who obtains a judgment lien under such a statute protected by the
recording acts from a prior unrecorded conveyance made by the defendant? The
cases are split, but the majority holds that the judgment lienor is not protected.
These courts usually reason either (i) the plaintiff is not a BFP because he did not
pay value for the judgment, or (ii) the judgment attaches only to property owned
by the defendant, and not to property the defendant has previously conveyed away,
even if that conveyance was not recorded.
Example:
On January 1, O grants a mortgage on Blackacre to A. A does not
record the mortgage. On January 15, B, who had previously sued
O on a tort claim, obtains and properly les a judgment against O.
B has no knowledge of the mortgage from O to A. Which lien has
priority, As mortgage or Bs judgment lien? By the majority view,
A has priority despite As failure to record the mortgage. B is not
protected by the recording act.
5)
Transferees from Bona Fide PurchaserShelter Rule

A person who takes from a BFP will prevail against any interest that the transferor-BFP would have prevailed against. This is true even where the transferee had
actual knowledge of the prior unrecorded interest.
126. REAL PROPERTY
Example:
6)
O conveys to A, who fails to record. O then conveys to B, a BFP,

who records. B then conveys to C, who has actual knowledge of
the O to A deed. C prevails over A. (And this is true whether C is a
donee or purchaser.)
a)
Rationale
If the rule were otherwise, a BFP might not be able to convey an interest in
the land. The transferee is not protected for her own sake, but rather for the
sake of the BFP from whom she received title.
b)
ExceptionNo Shipping Through

This rule will not help someone who previously held title and had notice
of the unrecorded interest. In the example above, if O repurchased from B,
O would have notice of As interest and could not claim the benet of the
shelter rule.
Purchaser Under Installment Land Contract

In most states, a purchaser who has paid only part of the purchase price under an
installment land contract (see VII.A.3., infra) is protected by the recording acts
only to the extent of payment made. In a dispute between the contract purchaser
and a prior claimant, the court may:
(i)
Award the contract purchaser a share of the property as a tenant in common

equal to the proportion of payments made;
(ii) Award the land to the prior claimant, but give the contract purchaser a lien on
the property to the extent of the amount paid [Westpark, Inc. v. Seaton Land
Co., 171 A.2d 736 (Md. 1961)]; or
(iii) Award the land to the contract purchaser, but give the prior claimant a lien on
the property to the extent of the balance still owed [Sparks v. Taylor, 90 S.W.
485 (Tex. 1906)].
Example:
a)
O conveys Blackacre to A, who does not record. O then conveys

Blackacre to B as a gift. B, knowing nothing of the O-A conveyance, records her deed. B then sells Blackacre to C for $100,000
via an installment land contract. C is to make four payments of
$25,000. C makes the rst payment and records his deed. A learns
of the B-C conveyance and les suit against C to quiet title. Result:
The court may (i) award C a one-fourth interest in Blackacre as a
tenant in common; (ii) award Blackacre to A, but order A to pay
C $25,000; or (iii) award Blackacre to C, but order C to pay the
remaining $75,000 to A.
ExceptionShelter Rule
If B in the example above were a BFP, the shelter rule would apply and C
would be fully protected even though C had notice of the O-A conveyance
partway through Cs payments.
REAL PROPERTY 127.
b.
Without Notice
Without notice means that the purchaser had no actual, record, or inquiry notice of
the prior conveyance at the time she paid the consideration and received her interest
in the land. While no one has a legal duty to perform a title search, a subsequent
purchaser will be charged with the notice that such a search would provide, whether or
not she actually searches. However, the fact that the purchaser obtains knowledge of the
adverse claim after the conveyance but before she records it is immaterial; she only has
to be without notice at the time of the conveyance.
1)
Actual Notice
The subsequent purchaser must show that she did not actually know of any prior
unrecorded conveyance. Actual notice includes knowledge obtained from any
source (e.g., newspaper, word-of-mouth, etc.).
2)
Record NoticeChain of Title

The fact that a deed has been recorded does not always mean that a purchaser will
be charged with notice of it. A subsequent purchaser will be held to have record
notice only if the deed in question is recorded in the chain of title, which means
that it is recorded in a fashion that a searcher could reasonably nd it. There are
several situations in which a deed might be recorded, but very difcult or impossible for a search to locate.
a)
Wild Deeds
A wild deed is a recorded deed that is not connected to the chain of title. It
does not give constructive notice because the subsequent BFP cannot feasibly
nd it.
Example:
O owns Blackacre, which she contracts to sell to A. The
contract is not recorded, and O remains in possession. A
thereupon conveys Blackacre by deed to B, and B records.
O then conveys Blackacre by deed to C. Did Bs recordation
charge C with constructive notice of Bs claim to equitable title
to Blackacre derived through A? No. C is not charged with
notice because there was no way for him to nd the A-B deed.
Nothing related it to O. It was not in Os chain of title; it was a
wild deed.
Compare:
b)
If the jurisdiction maintained a tract index, it would not

be hard to nd that A-B deed. It would be indexed under
Blackacres block and lot number. But it is impossible to nd
in a grantor-grantee index without looking at the descriptions
of all the recorded properties.
Deeds Recorded Late

A deed recorded after the grantor therein is shown by the record to have
parted with title through another (subsequent) instrument is not constructive
notice in most states.
Example:
O conveys to A on May 1. O conveys to B, a donee, on May
15. B records on June 1. A records on June 15. B conveys to C
on July 1. C has no actual notice of the O-A deed.
128. REAL PROPERTY
B v. A: As between A and B, A would win because B (a

donee) was not a BFP.
C v. A: In notice statute jurisdictions, most courts hold that C
will prevail over A because the O-A deed was recorded late
and is not in Cs chain of title; i.e., the search burden is too
great if C is required to search down the grantor index to the
present time for each grantor in the chain.
In several race-notice jurisdictions, however, As recordation is
treated as giving constructive notice to any purchaser subsequent to such recordation. In these states, the title searcher
must search to the present date under the name of each
person who ever owned the property in order to pick up deeds
recorded late.
(1) ExceptionShelter Rule
If B in the example above were a BFP, C would win in any event, for
she would shelter under B. This result would be the same even if C
had actual knowledge of the O-A deed; otherwise Bs power to transfer
would be restricted.
(2) Lis Pendens Protection
What can A do to protect herself when she records her deed and nds
the O-B deed on record? She can bring suit against B to expunge Bs
deed and le a lis pendens (litigation pending) notice under Bs name, so
any purchaser from B will have notice of As claim.
c)
Deeds Recorded Before Grantor Obtained Title

There is a split of authority on whether a recorded deed, obtained from a
grantor who had no title at that time but who afterwards obtains title, is
constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser from the same grantor.
Example:
Suppose that on June 1, O owns Blackacre, but on that
same day, A conveys Blackacre by warranty deed to B who
promptly records. On July 2, O conveys Blackacre to A, and
this deed is also promptly recorded. On August 3, A conveys
Blackacre to C, a BFP who has no actual notice of the prior
A-B deed.
Majority view: Most courts protect C over B on the theory
that a deed from A that was recorded prior to the time title
came to A is not in the chain of title and so does not give C
constructive notice of Bs claim to Blackacre. Rationale: It
would put an excessive burden on the title searcher to have to
search the index under each grantors name prior to the date
the grantor acquired title.
Minority view: However, a minority of courts protect B over
C on the basis that as soon as A acquired title from O, it
REAL PROPERTY 129.
transferred automatically to B by virtue of As earlier deed to

B. Therefore, A had nothing to transfer to C. (Criticism: The
minority view sharply increases the costs of title search.)
d)
Deed in Chain Referring to Instrument Outside Chain

If a recorded document in the chain of title refers to another instrument, such
reference may be sufcient to impart constructive notice of the other instrument, even if it is unrecorded or is not itself in the chain of title.
Example:
O mortgages Blackacre to A, who does not record. Later, O
sells Blackacre to B by deed which recites that title is subject
to As mortgage. This deed is recorded. B then sells to C.
C takes subject to As mortgage, even though it was never
recorded, because of the reference to it in the OB deed.
e)
Restrictive CovenantsDeeds from Common Grantor

(1) Subdivision Restrictions
Suppose that O, a subdivider, is developing a residential subdivision.
She sells lot #1 to A, and the deed provides that lot #1 is restricted to
residential use. The deed also provides that O on behalf of herself, her
heirs, and assigns promises to use her remaining lots (#2, #3, etc.) for
residential purposes only. A records the deed. O then sells lot #2 to B.
The deed to B contains no restrictions. B wishes to erect a gas station.
Is B bound by the restrictions in the OA deed of which he had no actual
notice? The courts are split.
(a) Some charge B with reading all deeds given by a common grantor,
not just the deeds to his particular tract. Hence, B has constructive
notice and is bound by the restriction.
(b) However, the better view is contra; i.e., because the burden of title
search would be excessive, deeds to other lots given by a common
grantor are not in Bs chain of title. (But if B has actual or inquiry
notice of the restriction, it may be enforced as an equitable servitude; see IV.E., supra.)
(2) Adjacent Lots
Suppose that O owns lot #1 and lot #2. She grants lot #2 to A with an
easement of way over lot #1. The deed to A is indexed as a deed to lot
#2; no mention is made of lot #1. Subsequently, O conveys lot #1 to B
without mentioning the easement. As with subdivision restrictions, the
courts are split as to whether B is required to read Os deeds of adjoining
lots.
f)
Marketable Title Acts

In some states, a search cut-off date is established by statute; e.g., defects of
title reaching back farther than 40 years are barred (a title searcher need only
check the chain of title back 40 years). The exact cut-off point varies from
state to state.
130. REAL PROPERTY
3)
Inquiry Notice
Inquiry notice means that if the subsequent grantee is bound to make reasonable
inquiry, she will be held to have knowledge of any facts that such inquiry would
have revealed (even though she made none).
a)
Generally No Inquiry from Quitclaim Deed

In a majority of states, quitclaim grantees are treated the same as warranty
deed grantees under the recording system; i.e., they are not charged with
inquiry notice from the mere fact that a quitclaim deed was used.
b)
Inquiry from References in Recorded Instruments

If a recorded instrument makes reference to an unrecorded transaction, the
grantee is bound to make inquiry to discover the nature and character of the
unrecorded transaction.
Example:
O grants an easement in Blackacre to A, who does not record.
O thereafter conveys the fee to B and in the deed states
that the property is subject to an easement. B records. C
purchases Blackacre from B without any knowledge of the
easement. The reference to the easement in the OB deed
creates a duty to inquire concerning the easement. If a reasonable inquiry would have informed C of the easement, she has
notice of it even though the deed of the easement was never
recorded. (Remember the grantee is charged with constructive knowledge of the fruits of a reasonable inquiry even
though she made no inquiry.) Thus, C will take subject to As
unrecorded interest in Blackacre.
c)
Inquiry from Unrecorded Instruments in Chain of Title

Suppose O, the record owner, conveys a life estate to A by a deed that is not
recorded. Thereafter, A purports to convey a fee simple to B, a purchaser for
valuable consideration, without actual notice that A merely has a life estate.
O would prevail over B with respect to the remainder interest because when
a grantors deed is unrecorded, the grantee is expectedat her perilto
demand a viewing of her grantors title documents at the time of the purchase
and insist that they be recorded.
d)
Inquiry from Possession

A title search is not complete without an examination of possession. If the
possession is unexplained by the record, the subsequent purchaser is obligated
to make inquiry. The subsequent purchaser is charged with knowledge of
whatever an inspection of the property would have disclosed and anything
that would have been disclosed by inquiring of the possessor.
Example:
O, the owner of Blackacre, conveys it to A, who fails to record.
However, A goes into possession of Blackacre. Thereafter,
O executes an identical conveyance of Blackacre to B, who
purchases for valuable consideration and without actual notice
of the prior unrecorded conveyance to A. A majority of states
hold that B is placed on constructive notice of As interest. An
REAL PROPERTY 131.
examination of possession would have revealed As presence,

and As possession is inconsistent with Os ownership.
Similarly, the physical appearance of the land may give notice of an adverse
interest. For example, tire tracks passing over the land to an adjacent parcel
may give notice of an easement.
c.
4.
Valuable Consideration
A person is protected by the recording statute only from the time that valuable consideration was given. Thus, if a deed was delivered before the consideration was paid,
the purchaser will not prevail over deeds recorded before the consideration was given.
Valuable consideration must be more than merely nominal. A person who claims to be a
BFP must prove that real consideration was paid.
1)
TestSubstantial Pecuniary Value

The test is different from that of contract law, where any consideration sufces
to support a contract. Here, the claimant must show that he is not a donee but a
purchaser. The consideration need not be adequate, nor the market value of the
property, but it must be of substantial pecuniary value. (Love and affection is not
valuable consideration.)
2)
Property Received as Security for Antecedent Debts Is Insufcient

One who receives a deed or mortgage only as security for a preexisting debt has
not given valuable consideration.
Example:
O becomes indebted to A. O conveys Blackacre to B, who does
not record. O then gives A a mortgage on Blackacre to secure the
indebtedness, and A records. A did not give valuable consideration,
and B prevails over A.
Title Search
Suppose O has contracted to sell Blackacre to A. Prior to closing, A, the buyer, will have
a title search performed to assure herself that O really owns Blackacre and to determine if
there are any encumbrances on Os title. How will As title searcher(s) proceed?
a.
Tract Index Search

In a tract index jurisdiction, the job is comparatively easy. The searcher looks at the
page indexed by block and/or lot describing Blackacre and at a glance can see prior
recorded instruments conveying, mortgaging, or otherwise dealing with Blackacre.
b.
Grantor and Grantee Index Search

The search is much more complicated in a grantor and grantee index jurisdiction.
Examples:
1) V owned Blackacre in 1935. In 1965, V conveyed Blackacre to W. In
1990, W conveyed Blackacre to X. In 1995, X gave B Bank a mortgage
on the property. In 2005, X conveyed Blackacre to O. O contracts to sell
the land to A. As title searcher will look in the grantee index under Os
name from the present back to 2005, when she nds the deed from X,
then under Xs name from 2005 to 1990, when she nds the deed from
W to X, then under Ws name from 1990 to 1965, then under Vs name
132. REAL PROPERTY
from 1965 backward. The searcher will then look in the grantor index
under Vs name from 1935 to 1965, under Ws name from 1965 to 1990,
under Xs name from 1990 to 2005, and under Os name from 2005 to
the present. In this manner, she will pick up the mortgage to B Bank,
which was recorded in 1995 in the grantor index under Xs name.
2)
1990 B(R but Notice)
2014 C(R)
1980 A(N/R)
2000 A(R)
1980
O conveys to A.
1990
O executes an identical conveyance of Blackacre to B. B pays

valuable consideration, but B has actual knowledge of the prior
unrecorded conveyance to A. B records.
2000
A records.
2014
B conveys his interest in Blackacre to C, who purchases

without notice of the conveyance to A and who pays valuable
consideration.
In searching the title, C will rst look in the grantee index under Bs
name to discover if his seller, B, ever acquired title. He will nd that B
acquired title in 1990 from O. Next, he will look in the grantor index
under Bs name to discover if B made any prior conveyances, and then
will look in the grantee index once again, this time under Os name, to
discover if O ever acquired title. C will nd that O acquired title in 1970.
Then he will look in the grantor index under Os name to discover if O
made a conveyance prior to his conveyance to B. Under the majority
rule, C is required to look under Os name in the grantor index only
through 1990. C will nd no conveyances. In 1990, C will nd the
recorded conveyance to B and he need look no further. On this basis,
C will not nd the recorded conveyance to A because A recorded after
1990. As recording is out of the chain of title, and therefore C is not
charged with notice.
Under a pure notice or race-notice statute, as between A and B, A will
prevail because B, having knowledge of As unrecorded conveyance, is
not a protected party. However, as between A and C, many courts hold
REAL PROPERTY 133.
that C should prevail because As recording is out of the chain of title.

The cases are split. Because notice is irrelevant under pure race statutes,
B would prevail over A because B recorded rst. Once it is established
that B prevails over A, C obviously takes good title.
c.
5.
Other Instruments and Events Affecting Title

The title searchers job may be complicated by marriages and divorces (e.g., a womans
name may have changed between her appearance as grantee and her reappearance as
grantor) and by the fact that a number of interests in the land may be led and indexed
elsewhere than in the recording ofce (e.g., judgment liens may appear in the trial
courts judgment docket, and tax liens may be led only in the tax assessors ofce).
Similarly, discovering whether land has passed by will or intestacy rather than by
conveyance may require a search of probate records.
Effect of Recordation
Proper recordation gives all prospective subsequent grantees constructive notice of the
existence and contents of the recorded instruments; i.e., there can be no subsequent BFPs.
Recordation also raises presumptions that the instrument has been validly delivered and that
it is authentic. These presumptions are rebuttable, not conclusive.
a.
Does Not Validate Invalid Deed

As stated earlier, recordation is not necessary for a valid conveyance. Nor does recordation validate an invalid conveyance, such as a forged or undelivered deed.
b.
Does Not Protect Against Interests Arising by Operation of Law

Furthermore, recordation does not protect a subsequent purchaser against interests that
arise by operation of law, rather than from a recordable document (e.g., dower rights;
prescriptive and implied easements; title by adverse possession). Because there is no
instrument to record in order to perfect such interests, the recording acts do not apply,
and subsequent purchasers take subject to the interests. (Remember: If the recording act
is inapplicable, the common law priority rules apply.)
Example:
O is the record owner of Blackacre. X adversely possesses Blackacre
for the period of the statute of limitations. O then conveys Blackacre to
A, a BFP. Even though Xs interest has never been recorded, X prevails
against A.
1)
Exception
A court may protect a subsequent BFP from an unrecorded implied easement that
is not visible upon inspection of the premises (e.g., an underground sewer).
c.
Recorders Mistakes
An instrument is considered recorded from and after the time it is led at the recorders
ofce, irrespective of whether it is actually listed on the indexes. If the recorders ofce
has made an error in recording, the subsequent purchaser has an action against the
recorders ofce. There is a strong minority view that protects the searcher.
d.
Effect of Recording Unacknowledged Instrument

As discussed above, the recording acts require that before an instrument can be
recorded, it must be acknowledged by the grantor before a notary. What happens if
134. REAL PROPERTY
the recorder, by oversight, records a deed that has not been acknowledged or has been
defectively acknowledged?
F.
1)
No AcknowledgmentNo Constructive Notice

Because an unacknowledged deed does not qualify for recordation, it does not
give constructive notice to subsequent purchasers. Hence, unless the subsequent
purchaser has other notice of the earlier deed, the subsequent purchaser will
prevail.
Example:
O conveys Blackacre to A by a deed that is not acknowledged, but
the recorder nevertheless records it. Later, O conveys to B by an
acknowledged deed, which B records. B prevails over A unless B
had actual notice of the deed from O to A (which she might have if
she searched the title records) or inquiry notice (as she would have
if A was in possession of Blackacre).
2)
CompareDefective Acknowledgment
When a recorded instrument has been acknowledged, but the acknowledgment is
defective for some reason not apparent on the face of the instrument, the better
view is that the recordation does impart constructive notice. Rationale: A hidden
defect in the acknowledgment should not be allowed to destroy the constructive
notice that the document otherwise clearly imparts. Purchasers should be entitled
to rely on what appears to be a perfectly recorded document.
Example:
A deed bears what appears to be a valid acknowledgment but is in
fact invalid because the notary was disqualied to act or because
the grantor did not appear personally in front of the notary to
acknowledge her signature, as required by law.
CONVEYANCE BY WILL
A will is a conveyance that is prepared and executed by the property owner during life, but which
does not speak or operate until the date of the owners death. Thus, a will is ambulatory,
meaning that it can be revoked or modied so long as the testator is alive. Some special situations
arise when there is a change in the status of the property or beneciaries between the time the
will is executed and the testators death.
1.
Ademption
If property is specically devised or bequeathed in the testators will, but the testator no
longer owns that property at the time of death, the gift is adeemed. This means that the gift
fails and is not replaced by other property. The reason that the property is no longer owned
by the testator generally does not matter; i.e., it does not matter whether the testator sold the
property or it was accidentally destroyed.
Example:
T owns Blackacre and executes a will devising Blackacre to my daughter
Mary. Prior to his death, T sells Blackacre to A and deposits the proceeds of
the sale in a bank account. Upon Ts death, Mary is not entitled to Blackacre
or to its proceeds. Note that if the will had provided for Ts executor to sell
Blackacre and distribute the proceeds to Mary, she would be entitled to the
proceeds even though the sale occurred before Ts death.
a.
Not Applicable to General Devises

Ademption does not apply unless the gift mentioned specic property. A specic devise
REAL PROPERTY 135.
or legacy is one that can be satised only by the delivery of a particular item; it cannot
be satised by money. Thus, a bequest of $10,000, or even of $10,000 to be paid out
of the sale of my IBM stock cannot be adeemed.
b.
Not Applicable to Land Under Executory Contract

If the testator enters into an enforceable contract of sale of property after making a
specic devise of it by will, the doctrine of equitable conversion holds that the testators interest is converted into personal property. Logically, an ademption has occurred,
and the proceeds of sale when the closing occurs should not pass to the specic devisee
of the property. The traditional case law agrees, but the Uniform Probate Code and
statutes in many states have reversed this result. Then, when property subject to a
specic devise is placed under contract of sale before the decedents death, the proceeds
of the sale will pass to the specic devisee. [See UPC 2-606]
Example:
T owns Blackacre and executes a will devising Blackacre to my
daughter Mary. Prior to his death, T enters into a contract to sell
Blackacre to A. After Ts death the contract is completed, and A pays
the purchase price for the land. Mary is entitled to the purchase price in
substitution of the land itself.
1)
No Ademption If Decedent Incompetent When Contract Formed

If the decedent is unable to enter into the contract, and instead it is entered into by
a guardian, attorney in fact, or other representative, courts usually do not apply the
equitable doctrine, and they allow the proceeds of the sale to pass to the specic
devisee.
c.
Other Proceeds Not Subject to Ademption

When property is damaged or destroyed before the testators death but the casualty
insurance proceeds are not paid until after the testators death, ademption does not
usually apply. The beneciary of the specic bequest takes the insurance proceeds.
Similarly, ademption usually does not apply to property condemned by the government
when the taking was before death but the condemnation award was paid after death.
d.
Partial Ademption
If the testator specically devises property and then sells or gives away a part of that
property, only that portion is adeemed; the remainder passes to the devisee.
2.
Exoneration
At common law and in some states today, if a testator makes a specic devise of real estate
that is subject to a mortgage or other lien, the devisee is entitled to have the land exonerated by the payment of the lien from the testators residuary estate. Thus, the property will
pass to the devisee free of encumbrances. However, a majority of states have, by statute,
abolished the exoneration doctrine. In these states, the property will pass to the devisee
subject to a preexisting mortgage or other lien unless the will expressly provides for a payoff
of the lien. [See UPC 2-607]
3.
Lapse and Anti-Lapse Statutes

A lapse occurs when the beneciary of a gift in a will dies before the testator. Under the
common law, if a lapse occurred, the gift was void. However, nearly all states now have
136. REAL PROPERTY
statutes that prevent lapse by permitting the gift to pass to the predeceasing beneciarys
living descendants under certain circumstances. These statutes vary as to the scope of
beneciaries covered.
a.
Degree of Relationship to Testator

Many of the anti-lapse statutes apply only when the named beneciary is a descendant of the testator. Others apply if the beneciary is more remotely related, such as a
descendant of the testators grandparent. Others apply to any relative, and still others
apply to any beneciary at all.
1)
4.
Descendants Are Substituted

The anti-lapse statute does not save the gift for the predeceasing beneciarys
estate; rather it substitutes the beneciarys descendants for the beneciary. Thus,
property will never pass under the anti-lapse statute to a predeceasing beneciarys
spouse. The property passes to the beneciarys descendants under the method of
distribution (e.g., per stirpes, per capita) used by the states intestate succession
(inheritance) statute.
b.
Application to Class Gifts

Ordinarily, if a gift is made by will to a class (e.g., to my children, or to the descendants of my brother Bob), and some members of the class die before the testator, the
gift is simply given to the surviving members of the class. However, if class members
within the coverage of an anti-lapse statute predecease the testator leaving surviving
issue, the statute will apply, and the issue will take the deceased class members share
of the gift.
c.
Anti-Lapse Statute Does Not Apply If Contrary Will Provision

The anti-lapse statute does not apply if there is a contrary will provisione.g., if the
gift is contingent on the beneciarys surviving the testator.
Abatement
If the estate assets are not sufcient to pay all claims against the estate and satisfy all devises
and bequests, the gifts are abated (i.e., reduced). Absent a contrary will provision, estates
in most jurisdictions abate in the following order: (i) property passing by intestacy; (ii) the
residuary estate; (iii) general legacies, which abate pro rata; and (iv) specic devises and
bequests. Some states provide that within each category personal property abates before real
property.
VII. SECURITY INTERESTS IN REAL ESTATE

A.
TYPES OF SECURITY INTERESTS

A security interest in real estate operates to secure some other obligation, usually a promise to
repay a loan, which is represented by a promissory note. If the loan is not paid when due, the
holder of the security interest can either take title to the real estate or have it sold and use the
proceeds to pay the debt with accrued interest and any legal and court costs. Of the six types of
security interests, the rst three are most important.
REAL PROPERTY 137.
1.
Mortgage
The debtor/notemaker is usually the mortgagor; he gives the mortgage (along with the note)
to the lender, who is the mortgagee. But note that the debtor and mortgagor can be different
people (e.g., a mother agrees to place a mortgage on her house to secure a loan to her
daughter). Most states require that a lender realize on the real estate to satisfy the debt only
by having a judicial (court-ordered) foreclosure sale conducted by the sheriff.
2.
Deed of Trust
The debtor/notemaker is the trustor. The trustor gives the deed of trust to a third-party
trustee, who is usually closely connected with the lender (e.g., the lenders lawyer, afliated
corporation, or ofcer). In the event of default, the lender (termed the beneciary) instructs
the trustee to proceed with foreclosing the deed of trust by sale. Many states allow the sale
to be either judicial (as with a mortgage) or nonjudicial, under a power of sale clause that
authorizes the trustee to advertise, give appropriate notices, and conduct the sale personally.
3.
Installment Land Contract

In an installment land contract, the debtor is the purchaser of the land who signs a contract
with the vendor, agreeing to make regular installment payments until the full contract price
(including accruing interest) has been paid. Only at that time will the vendor give a deed
transferring legal title to the purchaser. In case of default, the contract may contain a forfeiture clause providing that the vendor may cancel the contract, retain all money paid to date,
and retake possession of the land. However, the defaulting purchaser may be entitled to restitution to the extent his payments exceed the vendor's damages. (See F., infra.)
4.
Absolute DeedEquitable Mortgage

A landowner needing to raise money may sell the land to a person who will pay cash
and may give the buyer an absolute deed rather than a mortgage. This may seem to be
safer than a mortgage loan to the creditor and may seem to have tax advantages. However,
if the court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that the deed was really given for
security purposes, they will treat it as an equitable mortgage and require that the creditor
foreclose it by judicial action, like any other mortgage. This result will be indicated by the
following factors: (i) the existence of a debt or promise of payment by the deeds grantor;
(ii) the grantees promise to return the land if the debt is paid; (iii) the fact that the amount
advanced to the grantor/debtor was much lower than the value of the property; (iv) the
degree of the grantors nancial distress; and (v) the parties prior negotiations.
5.
Sale-Leaseback
A landowner needing to raise money may sell her land to another for cash and may then
lease the land back for a long period of time. As in the case of the absolute deed, the grantor/
lessee may attack such a transaction later as a disguised mortgage. Factors that will lead the
court to such a result are: (i) the fact that the regular rent payments on the lease are virtually
identical to payments that would be due on a mortgage loan; (ii) the existence of an option
to repurchase by the grantor/lessee; and (iii) the fact that the repurchase option could be
exercised for much less than the probable value of the property at that time, so that the repurchase would be very likely to occur.
6.
Equitable Vendors Lien

In addition to an installment land contract (3., supra) and a purchase money mortgage
138. REAL PROPERTY
(E.2.b.3), infra), a seller may nance the buyers purchase of the land by an equitable
vendors lien. The lien does not result from an agreement, but rather arises by implication
of law when the seller transfers title to the buyer and the purchase price or a portion of the
purchase price remains unpaid.
B.
TRANSFERS BY MORTGAGEE AND MORTGAGOR

All parties to a mortgage or deed of trust can transfer their interests. Ordinarily, the mortgagor
transfers by deeding the property, while the mortgagee usually transfers by indorsing the note and
executing a separate assignment of the mortgage. The note and mortgage must pass to the same
person for the transfer to be complete.
1.
Transfer by Mortgagee
a.
Transfer of Mortgage Without Note

The case law is divided, with some states holding that the transfer of the mortgage
automatically transfers the note as well, unless the mortgagee-transferor expressly
reserves the rights to the note (which there would rarely be any reason for the
mortgagee to do). In these states, the transferee of the mortgage can then le an
equitable action and compel a transfer of the note as well. Other states hold that,
because the note is the principal evidence of the debt, a transfer of the mortgage without
the note is a nullity and is void.
b.
Transfer of Note Without Mortgage

The note can be transferred without the mortgage, but the mortgage will automatically
follow the properly transferred note, unless the mortgagee-transferor expressly reserves
the rights to the mortgage (which there would rarely be any reason for the mortgagee
to do). No separate written assignment of the mortgage is necessary, although it is
customary for the transferee to obtain and record an assignment of the mortgage.
1)
Methods of Transferring the Note

The note may be transferred either by indorsing it and delivering it to the transferee, or by a separate document of assignment. Only if the former method is used
can the transferee become a holder in due course under UCC Article 3.
a)
Holder in Due Course Status

To be a holder in due course of the note, the following requirements must be
met:
(1) The note must be negotiable in form, which means that it must be
payable to bearer or to the order of the named payee. It must
contain a promise to pay a xed amount of money (although an adjustable interest rate is permitted), and no other promises, except that it may
contain an acceleration clause and an attorneys fee clause.
(2) The original note must be indorsed (i.e., signed) by the named payee.
Indorsement on a photocopy or some other document is not acceptable.
(3) The original note must be delivered to the transferee. Delivery of a
photocopy is not acceptable.
REAL PROPERTY 139.
(4) The transferee must take the note in good faith and must pay value for
it. (Value implies an amount that is more than nominal, although it
need not be as great as the notes fair market value.) The transferee must
not have any notice that the note is overdue or has been dishonored, or
that the maker has any defense to the duty to pay it.
b)
2)
2.
Benets of Holder in Due Course Status

A holder in due course will take the note free of any personal defenses that
the maker might raise. Personal defenses include failure of consideration,
fraud in the inducement, waiver, estoppel, and payment. The holder in due
course is, however, still subject to real defenses that the maker might raise.
These include infancy, other incapacity, duress, illegality, fraud in the execution, forgery, discharge in insolvency, and any other insolvency.
Effect of Payment to Original Mortgagee After Transfer of Note

Under the version of the UCC enacted in a large majority of states, if the original
payee transfers possession of a negotiable instrument, a payment to the original
payee will not count, and the holder of the instrument can still demand payment.
[See UCC 3-602 (1995)] However, many notes secured by mortgages on real
property are not negotiable in form (e.g., because their promise to pay is conditional or they are not payable to bearer or order). If the original mortgagee
transfers possession of a nonnegotiable note, the mortgagors payment to the
original mortgagee is effective against the transferee until the mortgagor receives
notice of the transfer. [Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages 5.5]
Example:
A borrows $50,000 from B and gives B a nonnegotiable note for
that amount, secured by a mortgage on Blackacre. One year later, B
assigns the note and mortgage to C, transferring actual possession
of the note to C. Two years thereafter, A, who does not realize that
B no longer holds the note, pays $50,000 plus interest to B. This
payment is effective against C. Cs recourse is against B.
Transfer by MortgagorGrantee Takes Subject to Mortgage

If the mortgagor sells the property and conveys a deed, the grantee takes subject to the
mortgage, which remains on the land. Unless there is a specic clause in the mortgage, the
mortgagee has no power to object to the transfer.
a.
Assumption
Often the grantee signs an assumption agreement, promising to pay the mortgage loan.
If she does so, she becomes primarily liable to the lender (usually considered a thirdparty beneciary), while the original mortgagor becomes secondarily liable as a surety.
Note, however, that the mortgagee may opt to sue either the grantee or the original
mortgagor on the debt. If the mortgagee and grantee modify the obligation, the original
mortgagor is completely discharged of liability.
b.
Nonassuming Grantee
A grantee who does not sign an assumption agreement does not become personally
liable on the loan. Instead, the original mortgagor remains primarily and personally
liable. However, if the grantee does not pay, the mortgage may be foreclosed, thus
wiping out the grantees investment in the land.
140. REAL PROPERTY
c.
C.
Due-on-Sale Clauses
Most modern mortgages contain due-on-sale clauses, which purport to allow the
lender to demand full payment of the loan if the mortgagor transfers any interest in the
property without the lenders consent. Such clauses are designed to both: (i) protect
the lender from sale by the mortgagor to a poor credit risk or to a person likely to
commit waste; and (ii) allow the lender to raise the interest rate or charge an assumption fee when the property is sold. Federal law preempts state law and makes due-onsale clauses enforceable for all types of institutional mortgage lenders on all types of
real estate. The preemption does not apply to isolated mortgage loans made by private
parties.
DEFENSES AND DISCHARGE OF THE MORTGAGE

1.
Defenses to Underlying Obligation

Because a mortgage is granted to secure an obligation, if the obligation is unenforceable so
is the mortgage. Therefore, defenses in an action on the underlying obligation are defenses
against an action on the mortgage, including: (i) failure of consideration, (ii) duress, (iii)
mistake, or (iv) fraud.
2.
Consumer Protection Defenses to Foreclosure

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)
requires residential mortgage lenders to determine a mortgagors ability to repay before
extending a loan. The terms of the loan must be understandable and not unfair, deceptive, or
abusive. The Act also prohibits a lender from steering mortgagors to transactions not in their
interest in an effort to increase the lenders compensation. [15 U.S.C. 1639b, 1639c] The
mortgagor can assert violations of the ability to repay or anti-steering provisions as a defense
in a foreclosure proceeding. [15 U.S.C. 1640(k)]
3.
Discharge of the Mortgage

A mortgagees right to foreclose is precluded by anything amounting to a discharge of the
mortgage, such as payment of the debt secured, merger of the legal and equitable interests, or
the acceptance by the mortgagee of a deed in lieu of foreclosure tendered by the mortgagor.
a.
Payment
Generally, full payment of the note discharges the mortgage lien. The agreement in the
note, however, will normally govern whether the mortgagor may prepay the obligation.
If the note or mortgage does not provide for prepayment, the mortgagor has no right to
prepayment. The mortgage may also provide for a prepayment fee or a total prohibition
of prepayment for part or all of the mortgage term. Note: The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits
prepayment penalties on certain loans (e.g., adjustable rate, interest-only). [15 U.S.C.
1639c(c)]
b.
Merger
A mortgage lien vests the mortgagee with either an equitable interest (lien theory) or
a legal interest (title theory), while the mortgagor retains the other interest (see D.1.,
infra). If the mortgagee subsequently acquires the mortgagors interest, the mortgage
is said to merge with the title, and the mortgagors personal liability on the underlying
debt is discharged up to the value of the land.
REAL PROPERTY 141.
c.
D.
Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure

The mortgagor may also tender to the mortgagee a deed in lieu of foreclosure. In
effect, the mortgagor simply turns over her equity of redemption (see E.1.a., infra) to
the mortgagee. Acceptance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure permits the mortgagee to
take immediate possession without the formalities of a foreclosure sale. Although it is
common to negotiate a complete release from the debt, the parties also have the option
to negotiate a mortgagors agreement to remain liable on some portion of the debt.
Mortgagors cannot be compelled to tender such a deed, and mortgagees have the right
to refuse the deed and proceed to foreclosure.
POSSESSION BEFORE FORECLOSURE

When a mortgagor defaults on his debt, the mortgagee can sue on the debt or foreclose on the
mortgage. A mortgagee may wish to take possession of the property, or begin receiving the rents
from the property, before foreclosure. This is especially important in states where foreclosure is a
lengthy process.
1.
Theories of Title
The mortgagee may have a right to take possession before foreclosure, depending on the
theory the state follows.
a.
The Lien Theory

According to the lien theory, the mortgagee is considered the holder of a security
interest only and the mortgagor is deemed the owner of the land until foreclosure. A
majority of the states follow this theory, which provides that the mortgagee may not
have possession before foreclosure.
b.
The Title Theory

Under the title theory, legal title is in the mortgagee until the mortgage has been
satised or foreclosed. A minority of states follow this theory, which provides that the
mortgagee is entitled to possession upon demand at any time. In practice, this means
that as soon as a default occurs, the mortgagee can take possession.
c.
The Intermediate Theory

The intermediate theory is a compromise position in which legal title is in the
mortgagor until default, and upon default, legal title is in the mortgagee. Only a
handful of states follow this theory, which provides that the mortgagee may demand
possession when a default occurs. There is little practical difference between this theory
and the title theory.
2.
Mortgagor Consent and Abandonment

All states agree that the mortgagee may take possession if the mortgagor gives consent to do
so, or if the mortgagor abandons the property.
3.
Risks of Mortgagee in Possession

The mortgagee who takes possession prior to foreclosure can intercept the rents, prevent
waste, make repairs, and lease out vacant space. However, despite these advantages, most
mortgagees do not wish to take possession because of the liability risks it presents. These
142. REAL PROPERTY
risks include a very strict duty to account for all rents received, a duty to manage the
property in a careful and prudent manner, and potential liability in tort to anyone injured on
the property.
4.
E.
Receiverships
Instead of becoming a mortgagee in possession, most mortgagees attempt to intercept the
rents before foreclosure by getting a receiver appointed by the court to manage the property.
Courts will generally appoint receivers for rental property upon a showing of some combination of three factors: (i) that waste is occurring, (ii) that the value of the property is inadequate to secure the debt, and (iii) that the mortgagor is insolvent.
FORECLOSURE
Foreclosure is a process by which the mortgagors interest in the property is terminated. The
property is generally sold to satisfy the debt in whole or in part (foreclosure by sale). Almost all
states require foreclosure by sale. All states allow judicial sale, while about one-half also allow
nonjudicial sale under a power of sale. The nonjudicial sale is often permitted with deeds of trust
but not with mortgages. Foreclosure sales are conducted by auction, with the highest bidder taking
the property. The lender may bid at the sale, and in many cases the lender is the sole bidder.
(Note: For convenience, the discussion below speaks of mortgagors and mortgagees, but the same
principles apply to deed-of-trust trustors and beneciaries.)
1.
2.
Redemption
a.
Redemption in Equity
At any time prior to the foreclosure sale, the mortgagor has the right to redeem the
land or free it of the mortgage by paying off the amount due, together with any accrued
interest. If the mortgagor has defaulted on a mortgage or note that contains an acceleration clause permitting the mortgagee to declare the full balance due in the event of
default, the full balance must be paid in order to redeem. A mortgagors right to redeem
her own mortgage cannot be waived in the mortgage itself; this is known as clogging
the equity of redemption and is prohibited. However, the right can be waived later for
consideration.
b.
Statutory Redemption
About half the states give the mortgagor (and sometimes junior lienors) a statutory right
to redeem for some xed period after the foreclosure sale has occurred; this period is
usually six months or one year. The amount to be paid is usually the foreclosure sale
price, rather than the amount of the original debt. Be careful to distinguish equitable
redemption, which is universally recognized (but only up to the date of the sale), from
statutory redemption, which is only recognized by about half the states and applies only
after foreclosure has occurred.
Priorities
Generally, the priority of a mortgage is determined by the time it was placed on the property.
When a mortgage is foreclosed, the buyer at the sale will take title as it existed when the
mortgage was placed on the property. Thus, foreclosure will terminate interests junior to the
mortgage being foreclosed but will not affect senior interests.
REAL PROPERTY 143.
a.
b.
Effect of Foreclosure on Various Interests

1)
Junior Interests Destroyed by Foreclosure

Foreclosure destroys all interests junior to the mortgage being foreclosed. In other
words, junior mortgages, liens, leases, easements, and all other types of interests will be wiped out. If a lien senior to that of the mortgagee is in default, the
junior mortgagee has the right to pay it off (i.e., redeem it) in order to avoid being
wiped out by its foreclosure. Thus, those with interests subordinate to those of the
foreclosing party are necessary parties to the foreclosure action. Failure to include
a necessary party results in the preservation of that partys interest despite foreclosure and sale.
2)
Senior Interests Not Affected

Foreclosure does not affect any interest senior to the mortgage being foreclosed.
The buyer at the sale takes subject to such interest. She does not become personally liable on such senior interests, but she will be forced to pay them in order to
prevent their foreclosure in the future.
Modication of Priority
As noted above, priorities among mortgages on the same real estate are normally
determined simply by chronology: the earliest mortgage placed on the property is rst
in priority, the next mortgage is second, and so on. However, the chronological priority
may be changed in the following ways:
1)
Failure to Record
If the rst mortgagee fails to record, and the second mortgagee records, gives
value, and takes without notice of the rst, the second mortgagee will have priority
over the rst by virtue of the normal operation of the recording acts.
2)
Subordination Agreement
A rst mortgagee may enter into an agreement with a junior mortgagee, subordinating its priority to the junior mortgagee. Such agreements are generally enforced.
However, a broad promise to subordinate to any mortgage (or a vaguely described
mortgage) to be placed on the property in the future may be considered too inequitable to enforce.
3)
Purchase Money Mortgages

A purchase money mortgage (PMM) is a mortgage given to:
(i)
The vendor of the property as a part of the purchase price; or
(ii) A third-party lender who is lending the funds to allow the buyer to purchase
the property.
A PMM, whether recorded or not, has priority over mortgages, liens, and other
claims against the mortgagor that arise prior to the mortgagors acquisition of title.
However, PMM priority is subject to being defeated by subsequent mortgages or
liens by operation of the recording acts or may be altered through a subordination
144. REAL PROPERTY
agreement. [Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages 7.2; Slodov v. United

States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978)]
Example:
A properly records a judgment lien against O (which will attach
to any after-acquired property of O). O nances the purchase
of Blackacre with a $250,000 loan from B. B does not record
its mortgage. A few months later, O borrows $10,000 from C in
exchange for a mortgage on Blackacre. C records her mortgage.
Bs PMM has priority over As lien because the lien arose before O
acquired title to Blackacre (i.e., the general priority rule governing
PMMs), but it is junior to Cs mortgage under any recording act
because C had no notice of Bs interest and recorded rst.
a)
Vendor PMM vs. Third-Party PMM

As between two PMMs, one to the vendor and one to a third-party lender,
the vendors mortgage is usually given priority over the third-party lenders.
Because both PMMs arise from the same transaction, neither is treated as
subsequent under the Restatement. Thus, the recording acts do not apply
unless only one party has notice of the other. However, some jurisdictions
that do not follow the Restatement allow the recording acts to determine
priority between all PMMs.
b)
Third-Party PMM vs. Third-Party PMM

If two PMMs are given to two third-party lenders, their priority is determined by the chronological order in which the mortgages were placed on the
property, the recording act, and a subordination agreement (if any). Note that
in these cases, the recording acts are often of no use because two purchase
money mortgagees will almost always know of each others existence and,
thus, have notice.
4)
Modication of Senior Mortgage

Suppose there are two mortgages on the land. The landowner enters into a modication agreement with the senior mortgagee, raising its interest rate or otherwise
making it more burdensome. The junior mortgage will be given priority over
the modication. For example, if the rst mortgage debt is larger because of the
modication, the second mortgage gains priority over the increase in the debt.
5)
Optional Future Advances

In general, a mortgage may obligate the lender to make further advances of funds
after the mortgage is executed, and such advances will have the same priority as
the original mortgage. However, if a junior mortgage is placed on the property
and the senior lender later makes an optional advance while having notice of the
junior lien, the advance will lose priority to the junior lien. An optional advance
is one that the senior lender is not contractually bound to make. Numerous states
have reversed this rule by statute, but it remains the majority view.
6)
Subrogation
A mortgage taken out for the purpose of renancing a preexisting senior mortgage
takes the priority position of the senior mortgage.
REAL PROPERTY 145.
Example:
Bank A holds a $100,000 senior mortgage on a tract of land owned

by O. Bank B holds a $50,000 second mortgage on the same land.
Bank C loans O $100,000, secured by a new mortgage, which O
immediately uses to pay off Bank As mortgage. Bank C now has
the senior mortgage, and Bank B still has the junior mortgage.
Note that Bank B has not been harmed: Bank C's mortgage simply
replaced Bank As.
3.
Proceeds of Sale
The proceeds of the foreclosure sale are used rst to pay expenses of the sale, attorneys
fees, and court costs; then to pay the principal and accrued interest on the loan that was
foreclosed; next to pay off any junior liens or other junior interests in the order of their
priority; and nally, any remaining proceeds are distributed to the mortgagor. In many
cases, there is no surplus remaining after the principal debt is paid off.
4.
Deciency Judgments
If the proceeds of the sale are insufcient to satisfy the mortgage debt, the mortgagee can
bring a personal action against the mortgagor/debtor for the deciency. However, a number
of states limit the deciency that can be recovered to the difference between the debt and the
propertys fair market value when the fair market value is higher than the foreclosure price.
Other states prohibit deciency judgments entirely on PMMs and on deeds of trust that are
foreclosed by power of sale.
Examples:
1) Assume that land has a fair market value of $50,000 and is subject to three
mortgages executed by its owner, whose name is MR. The mortgages have
priorities and secure outstanding debts in the amounts shown below, which
are owed to three different creditors, ME1, ME2, and ME3:
Mortgage 1
MR
$30,000
ME1
Mortgage 2
MR
$15,000
ME2
Mortgage 3
MR
$10,000
ME3
Assume that Mortgage 1 is foreclosed, and the bid at the sale is $50,000 (the
fair value of the land). How will the funds be distributed?
In an actual case, the funds would rst be used to pay any attorneys fees and
expenses of the foreclosure, and then to any accrued interest on Mortgage 1.
However, we will assume that these items are zero.
The $50,000 in funds from the sale will then be used to pay off the mortgages
in the order of their priority. Thus, $30,000 is applied to fully pay off
146. REAL PROPERTY
Mortgage 1. Then, $15,000 is applied to fully pay off Mortgage 2. There is

a remaining balance from the foreclosure sale of $5,000, which is applied
toward payment of Mortgage 3. Because this is not enough to discharge
Mortgage 3 fully, ME3 is left with a deciency of $5,000, and may sue MR
for a personal judgment in this amount unless state anti-deciency statutes
prohibit it.
2) Assume the same facts as above, except that the bid at the sale is $60,000
rather than $50,000. This will allow full payment of Mortgage 1 ($30,000),
Mortgage 2 ($15,000), and Mortgage 3 ($10,000), and will leave a surplus of
$5,000. Assuming there are no further liens or encumbrances on the property,
this $5,000 will be paid over to MR, the mortgagor.
3) Now assume the same facts as in the original problem, except that it is
Mortgage 2 that is being foreclosed. Mortgage 1 exists, but it is either not in
default or its holder has not yet taken action to foreclose it.
Recall from the outline above that foreclosure does not affect any interest
senior to the mortgage being foreclosed. Thus, foreclosure of Mortgage 2
will not affect Mortgage 1, which will continue to exist on the property in
the hands of the foreclosure sale purchaser. Such a purchaser will not be
personally liable to pay Mortgage 1 off, but as a practical matter, if Mortgage
1 is not paid, sooner or later ME1 will foreclose it. Hence, the buyer at the
foreclosure sale of Mortgage 2 will have a strong economic incentive to pay
Mortgage 1; otherwise, she will be subjected to the foreclosure action of ME1,
and may well lose much or all of her investment in the property.
What will a wise bidder at the foreclosure sale on Mortgage 2 bid? The
maximum is $20,000, which is the fair value of the land ($50,000) minus
the amount the successful bidder will subsequently have to pay to discharge
Mortgage 1 ($30,000).
If the bid at the foreclosure sale of Mortgage 2 is $20,000, how will the
money be distributed? None of it will go to ME1, because he still has his
mortgage on the property. $15,000 of the funds will be applied to fully pay
off Mortgage 2, and $5,000 will remain to be applied against the $10,000
balance owed on Mortgage 3 (which is, of course, wiped out by the foreclosure of Mortgage 2). ME3 will still have a $5,000 deciency, as in the rst
example above.
F.
INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS

Installment contracts may provide for forfeiture rather than foreclosure as the vendors remedy in
the event of default. However, because forfeiture is often a harsh remedy, the courts have tended to
resist enforcing forfeiture clauses and in doing so have developed the following theories:
1.
Equity of Redemption
Several states allow the contract purchaser who is in default to pay off the accelerated full
balance of the contract and to keep the land. In other words, they grant the purchaser a grace
REAL PROPERTY 147.
period. This is roughly analogous to the equity of redemption in mortgage law. A few states
have statutory schedules of grace periods, which often provide for a longer time if a greater
percentage of the total price has been paid.
2.
Restitution
A number of decisions allow actions by the vendor for forfeiture of the land but require her
to refund to the purchaser any amount by which his payments exceed the vendors damages.
The court may measure these damages by the propertys fair rental value while the purchaser
was in possession or by any drop in market value since the contract was executed.
3.
Treat as a Mortgage
A few states, by statute or case law, now treat installment contracts like mortgages, at least
for purposes of the vendors remedies. In effect, the vendor must foreclose the contract by
judicial sale in order to realize on the real estate, and she cannot simply reclaim the land.
4.
Waiver
Many cases hold that where a vendor has established a pattern of accepting late payments
from the purchaser, she cannot suddenly insist on strict on-time payment and declare a forfeiture if such payment is not forthcoming. Such a pattern is said to constitute a waiver of strict
performance. To reinstate strict performance, the vendor must send the purchaser a notice of
her intention to do so and must allow a reasonable time for the purchaser to make up any late
payments and to get back on stream.
5.
Election of Remedies
It is commonly held that the vendor who elects to pursue a forfeiture cannot also bring an
action for damages or for specic performance. The vendor must choose only one remedy
and forgo all others.
VIII. RIGHTS INCIDENTAL TO OWNERSHIP OF LAND (NATURAL RIGHTS)

A.
IN GENERAL
The owner of real property has the exclusive right to use and possess the surface, the airspace, and
the soil of the property. This right is subject to restrictions in the chain of title (e.g., easements and
covenants), to the law of nuisance, and to any valid laws or regulations that restrict the use of the
land (e.g., zoning ordinances).
B.
RIGHT TO LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT OF LAND

1.
Right to Lateral Support

Ownership of land carries with it the right to have the land supported in its natural state by
adjoining land. This normally means a right to have ones land undisturbed by withdrawal of
support (e.g., by excavations on adjoining land).
a.
Support of Land in Natural State

A landowner is strictly liable if his excavation causes adjacent land to subside (i.e., slip
or cave in). Thus, he will be liable even if he used the utmost care.
148. REAL PROPERTY
b.
2.
C.
Support of Buildings on Land

If land is improved by buildings and an adjacent landowners excavation causes subsidence, the adjacent landowner will be strictly liable for damages to the land and buildings caused by the excavation only if it is shown that the land would have collapsed in
its natural state (i.e., that it would have collapsed in the absence of the buildings and
improvements). Even if the land would not have collapsed in its natural state (i.e., the
collapse would not have occurred except for the weight of the buildings), the excavating
landowner is liable for loss or damage to the land and buildings if his excavation is
found to have been done negligently. (Tort rules apply here.)
Right to Subjacent Support

When a landowner conveys to a grantee the right to take minerals from beneath the land,
the grantor retains the right to have the surface supported unless the conveyance expressly
includes authority to destroy the surface if reasonably necessary to extract the mineral.
a.
Support of Land and Buildings

This right of support extends not only to the land in its natural state but also to all
buildings existing on the date when the subjacent estate is severed from the surface.
However, the underground occupant is liable for damages to subsequently erected buildings only if he was negligent.
b.
Interference with Underground Waters

Note that an underground occupant is liable for negligently damaging springs and wells,
whereas an adjoining landowner is not liable for interfering with underground percolating waters.
WATER RIGHTS
Different rules apply depending on whether the water rights claimed involve (i) water in watercourses (e.g., streams, rivers, and lakes, including underground watercourses); (ii) ground or
percolating water (e.g., water normally pumped or drawn from wells); or (iii) surface water (e.g.,
rainfall, seepage). Exam questions normally concern who has priority to use the water from
watercourses and from the ground, and to what extent a landowner may obstruct or divert the ow
of surface water.
1.
Watercourses
There are two major systems for allocation of water in watercourses: (i) the riparian
doctrine (generally applied in the eastern states where water is or was relatively abundant),
and (ii) the prior appropriation doctrine (generally used in the 17 western states where
water is relatively scarce).
a.
Riparian Doctrine
Under the riparian doctrine, water does not belong to the public generally or to the
state (with certain exceptions) but rather to the riparian proprietors who own land
bordering on the watercourse. All of these landowners have riparian rights and none
can use the water so as to deprive the others of these rights.
1)
What Land Is Riparian

Under the majority rule, all tracts held under unity of ownership are riparian if
the tracts are contiguous and any of them front on the water. Thus, if a riparian
REAL PROPERTY 149.
owner purchases a parcel which is contiguous to the riparian parcel, riparian rights
attach to the newly acquired parcel. The minority rule limits riparian rights to
the smallest tract of land ever owned abutting the water. Under this view, if a back
portion of a riparian tract is sold, it becomes nonriparian and can never regain
riparian rights.
2)
a)
Riparian Owner
Riparian owners include the fee owner of the abutting land and, to the extent
of their title, lessees and easement owners of such land.
b)
Doctrine Applies Only to Riparian Parcel

The riparian doctrine permits use of water only in connection with activities
carried out on the riparian parcel. Riparian rights cannot be conveyed for the
use of nonriparian land nor can they be lost by nonuse.
Nature of Riparian Right

a)
Natural Flow Theory

Under the natural ow theory, a riparian owner is entitled to the water
in the bordering stream or lake subject to the limitation that he may not
substantially or materially diminish its quantity, quality, or velocity. Thus,
a downstream owner can enjoin an upstream owners use even though the
downstream owner has plenty of water for his own use. No state appears to
adhere strictly to this theory because it operates to limit benecial upstream
use and leads to waste of the resource.
b)
Reasonable Use Theory

Under the more common theory, all riparian owners share the right of
reasonable use. The general idea is that the right of each riparian owner to
use the stream (e.g., to divert for irrigation, to pollute, etc.) is subject to a like
reasonable right in other riparian owners. Each riparian owner must submit
to reasonable use by other riparian owners, and a downstream owner cannot
enjoin such use by an upstream owner unless it substantially interferes with
the needs of those who have a like right (i.e., unless actual damage is shown).
(1) Factors to Consider
In determining whether an owners use of water is reasonable, courts
generally balance the utility of the use against the gravity of the harm.
(Note the analogy to nuisance law.) Six factors are helpful in this
balancing process: (i) the purpose of the questioned use; (ii) the destination to which the water is taken for use; (iii) the extent of the use; (iv)
the pollution of water by use; (v) whether the use involves an alteration
in the manner of ow; and (vi) miscellaneous types of conduct that may
give rise to litigation. (These factors may be remembered more easily by
using the acronym MAPPED.)
c)
Natural vs. Articial Use

Under either of the above theories, water use is categorized as natural or
articial. Natural uses include those necessary for the daily sustenance of
150. REAL PROPERTY
human beings (e.g., household consumption, gardening, minimal number of

livestock). All other uses, including irrigation and manufacturing, are articial. Natural uses prevail over articial. Upper riparians can take all that
they need for natural uses. However, they cannot take for articial purposes
unless there is enough water for the domestic wants of all.
b.
Prior Appropriation Doctrine

Under the prior appropriation doctrine, the water belongs initially to the state, but the
right to divert and use it can be acquired by an individual whether or not he is a riparian
owner. Initially, individual rights were established by actual use; thus, each appropriator
acquired a vested property right to divert a given quantity of water, at given times from
a given place, to use at a given place for a given purpose.
1)
c.
2.
Factors to Note for Bar Exam

Present day acquisition and governance of rights under this doctrine are largely
dealt with under complex state-administered permit systems that are too detailed
for coverage here. However, it is sufcient for bar examination purposes to note
that: (i) appropriative rights were originally determined simply by priority of
benecial use; (ii) if there is a decrease in stream ow, priority is accorded in
terms of time of appropriation (i.e., the junior appropriators in descending order
of priority must suffer); (iii) in many states, an appropriative right can be severed
from the land it serviced when acquired and transferred (i.e., can be sold to another
for use on other land), provided no injury is caused to existing uses; and (iv) an
appropriative right (unlike a riparian one) can be lost by abandonment (intent and
nonuse).
Accretion and Avulsion

A watercourse may affect a propertys boundary line through accretion or avulsion. (See
VI.B.3.e.2), supra.)
Groundwater
If water comes from an underground watercourse (e.g., a dened stream or river), the
riparian or prior appropriation doctrines apply. However, the presumption is that underground water is percolating (i.e., the water moves through the ground diffusely and is usually
withdrawn by wells from the underground water table). There are four different rules for
determining rights in underground water.
a.
Absolute Ownership Doctrine

The absolute ownership doctrine is followed by only a few states. The owner of the
land overlying the source basin may extract as much water as she wishes and use it for
whatever purpose she desires (including export). There is no rmly established system
for allocation among overlying owners.
b.
Reasonable Use Doctrine

The reasonable use doctrine, followed by many eastern states, allows the surface owner
to make reasonable use of the groundwater. This rule differs from the absolute ownership rule mainly with respect to exporting water off site: Exporting is allowed only to
the extent that it does not harm other owners who have rights in the same aquifer. On
REAL PROPERTY 151.
the other hand, virtually all benecial uses of water on the land are considered reasonable and are allowed.
3.
c.
Correlative Rights Doctrine

In some states, the owners of overlying land own the underground water basin as joint
tenants, and each is allowed a reasonable amount for her own use.
d.
Appropriative Rights Doctrine

In many western states, the prior appropriation doctrine applies to groundwater as well
as watercourses. Priority of use determines appropriative rights. In most western states,
rights to percolating water are now determined by a state water board which controls
annual yield, prohibits water waste, etc.
e.
Restatement Approach
A few states follow the Restatement approach, which is based on principles of nuisance
law. This approach allows the surface owner to pump groundwater for a benecial
purpose unless the withdrawal: (i) unreasonably causes harm to neighboring landowners
through lowering of the water table; (ii) exceeds the pumpers reasonable share of the
annual supply or total store of groundwater; or (iii) directly and substantially affects
surface waters and unreasonably causes harm to a surface water user. [Restatement
(Second) of Torts 858]
Surface Waters
Diffused surface waters are those that have no channel but pass over the surface of the land.
The source may be rainfall, melting snow, seepage, etc. A landowner can use surface waters
within her boundaries for any purpose she desires. Problems concern the right of a lower
owner to restrict a ow that would naturally cross his land (e.g., by dikes) and the right of
an upper owner to alter or divert a natural ow onto other lands (e.g., by drains, channels, or
sloughs). The acting landowners liability to other landowners depends upon which doctrine
the state follows.
a.
Natural Flow Theory

Under the natural ow theory, followed by many states, a landowner cannot refuse to
take natural drainage, cannot divert surface water onto the land of another, and cannot
alter the rate or manner of natural ow where such actions would injure others above or
below him. Because this theory imposes substantial impediments on development (e.g.,
no paving, large roofs, culverts, etc.), most states have softened the rule to permit
reasonable changes in natural ow. And a few states have held the doctrine inapplicable
to urban property (because development would otherwise be hindered).
b.
Common Enemy Theory

Under the common enemy theory, followed by many states, surface water is a common
enemy and any owner can build dikes or change drainage to get rid of it. However,
many courts have modied the doctrine and have held landowners to a standard of
ordinary care to avoid unnecessary and negligent injury to the land of others.
c.
Reasonable Use Theory

The growing trend is to apply the reasonable use doctrine which, as in nuisance and
152. REAL PROPERTY
watercourse cases, requires balancing the utility of the use against the gravity of the
harm. Judicial mitigation of both the natural ow and common enemy doctrines often
results in an approximation of the reasonable use theory.
d.
CompareCapture of Surface Water

A landowner can capture (e.g., by dam, rain barrels) as much surface water as he
wishes. It can be diverted to any purpose on or off the land. Owners below have no
cause of action unless the diversion is malicious.
D.
RIGHTS IN AIRSPACE
The right to the airspace above a parcel is not exclusive, but the owner is entitled to freedom
from excessive noise and transit by aircraft. If ights are so low as to be unreasonably disturbing,
they constitute a trespass or (if the airport is government-owned) a taking by inverse condemnation.
E.
RIGHT TO EXCLUDEREMEDIES OF POSSESSOR

1.
Trespass
If the land is invaded by a tangible physical object that interferes with the right of exclusive
possession, there is a trespass.
2.
Private Nuisance
If the land is invaded by intangibles (e.g., odors or noises) that substantially and unreasonably interfere with a private individuals use or enjoyment of her property, the possessor may
bring an action for private nuisance.
a.
ComparePublic Nuisance
Public nuisance is an invasion by intangibles that unreasonably interfere with the health,
safety, or property rights of the publici.e., a broad segment of the community, rather
than one or a few individuals.
3.
Continuing Trespass
If the land is repeatedly invaded by a trespasser (e.g., the invader repeatedly swings a crane
over the property), the possessor may sue for either trespass or nuisance.
4.
Law or Equity
If the possessor wants to force the invader to stop the invasion of the property, the remedy is
an injunction in equity. If the possessor wants damages, the remedy is an action at law.
a.
Ejectment
The remedy at common law to remove a trespasser from the property is ejectment.
b.
Unlawful Detainer
In the landlord-tenant situation, the landlord may force the tenant to vacate the premises
by the statutory remedy of unlawful detainer. (In some states, the term used to describe
this action is forcible detainer or summary ejectment.) The action may be joined with a
demand for money damages in rent due.
REAL PROPERTY 153.
IX. COOPERATIVES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND ZONING

A.
B.
C.
COOPERATIVES
In the most common form of housing cooperative, title to the land and buildings is held by a
corporation that leases the individual apartments to its shareholders. Thus, the residents in a
cooperative are both tenants of the cooperative (by virtue of their occupancy leases) and owners
of the cooperative (by virtue of their stock interests). Stock interests in the cooperative are not
transferable apart from the occupancy lease to which they are attached.
1.
Restriction on Transfer of Interests

Because the members of a cooperative are tenants, the cooperative may retain the same
controls over assignment and sublease of the apartments as may be exercised by any other
landlord.
2.
Mortgages
Permanent nancing is provided through a blanket mortgage on the entire property owned
by the cooperative corporation (land and buildings). This mortgage has priority over the
occupancy leases. Failure to meet the payments on the blanket mortgage may result in the
termination of the leases through foreclosure of the mortgage. Thus, each cooperative tenant
is vitally concerned that the other tenants pay their shares of the blanket mortgage.
3.
Maintenance Expenses
Ordinarily, cooperative tenants are not personally liable on the note or bond of the blanket
mortgage. However, under their occupancy leases, each tenant is liable for her proportionate
share of all of the expenses of the cooperative (including payments on the mortgage as well
as other operating expenses).
CONDOMINIUMS
In a condominium, each owner owns the interior of her individual unit plus an undivided interest
in the exterior and common elements.
1.
Restriction on Transfer of Interests

Because condominium unit ownership is treated as fee ownership, the ordinary rules against
restraints on alienation apply. A few jurisdictions (e.g., New York) by statute allow reasonable restraints on transfer of condominium units.
2.
Mortgages
Each unit owner nances the purchase of her unit by a separate mortgage on her unit.
Consequently, unit owners need not be as concerned about defaults by others as they must be
in a cooperative.
3.
Maintenance Expenses
Each unit owner is personally liable on her own mortgage and each pays her own taxes
(unlike the cooperative situation, but like any other homeowner). In addition, each unit
owner is liable to contribute her proportionate share to the common expenses of maintaining
the common elements, including insurance thereon.
ZONING
The state may enact statutes to reasonably control the use of land for the protection of the health,
154. REAL PROPERTY
safety, morals, and welfare of its citizens. Zoning is the division of a jurisdiction into districts in
which certain uses and developments are permitted or prohibited. The zoning power is based on
the states police power and is limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Other limitations are imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the no taking without just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment. (See Multistate
Constitutional Law outline.) Cities and counties can exercise zoning power only if authorized to
do so by state enabling acts. Ordinances that do not conform to such acts are ultra vires (beyond
the authority of the local body) and void.
1.
Nonconforming Use
A use that exists at the time of passage of a zoning act and that does not conform to the
statute cannot be eliminated at once. Some statutes provide for amortizationi.e., the
gradual elimination of such nonconforming uses (e.g., the use must end in 10 years).
2.
Special Use Permits

Some unusual uses (e.g., hospitals, funeral homes, etc.) require issuance of a special permit
even though the zoning of the particular district (e.g., commercial) allows that type of use.
3.
Variance
A variance from the literal restrictions of a zoning ordinance may be granted by administrative action. The property owner must show that the ordinance imposes a unique hardship on
him and that the variance will not be contrary to the public welfare.
4.
Unconstitutional Takings and Exactions

A zoning ordinance may so reduce the value of real property that it constitutes a taking
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If an ordinance constitutes a taking, the
local government must pay damages to the landowner equal to the value reduction. If the
ordinance regulates activity that would be considered a nuisance under common law principles, it will not be a taking even if it leaves the land with no economic value.
a.
Denial of All Economic Value of LandTaking

If a government regulation denies a landowner all economic use of his land, the regulation is equivalent to a physical appropriation and is thus a taking (unless the use was
prohibited by nuisance or property law when the owner acquired the land). [Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)states zoning ordinance,
adopted after owner purchased lots, was a taking because it prohibited owner from
erecting any permanent structures on the lots]
b.
Denial of Nearly All Economic ValueBalancing Test

If a regulation so decreases the value of the property that there is very little economic
value, the court will balance the following factors to determine whether there has been
a taking:
(i)
The social goals sought to be promoted;
(ii) The diminution in value to the owner; and

(iii) Whether the regulation substantially interferes with distinct, investment-backed
expectations of the owner.
REAL PROPERTY 155.
Generally, the regulation will be found to be a taking only if it unjustly reduces the
economic value of the property (e.g., greatly reduces the property value and only
slightly promotes the public welfare). [Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922); Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)]
c.
d.
Unconstitutional Exactions
Local governments often demand, in exchange for zoning approval for a new project,
that the landowner give up some land for a public purpose, such as street widening.
However, such demands are unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments unless they meet the tests set out below. [Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)]
1)
Essential Nexus
The local governments demand must be rationally connected to some additional
burden that the proposed project will place on public facilities or rights. Thus, a
city could demand land for a street widening upon a showing that the proposed
project would otherwise increase trafc congestion and pollution along the street in
question.
2)
Rough Proportionality
Even if the essential nexus test above is met, the local government must not
demand too much. The required dedication must be reasonably related, both in
nature (the essential nexus) and extent (the amount of the exaction), to the impact
of the proposed development.
3)
Burden of Proof
The local government has the burden of showing that both the essential nexus and
rough proportionality tests are met.
Remedy
If a property owner challenges a regulation and the court determines that there was
a taking, the government will be required to either: (i) compensate the owner for the
taking, or (ii) terminate the regulation and pay the owner for any damages that occurred
while the regulation was in effect. [First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)]
REAL PROPERTY CHARTS 1.
CMR
COMPARISON
CHART
CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP
Definition
Creation
Termination
Joint Tenancy
Each tenant has an

undivided interest in
the whole estate, and
the surviving
co-tenant has a right
to the whole estate
(right of survivorship).
To A and B as joint
tenants with the right
of survivorship.
(Without survivorship
language, it may be
construed as a
tenancy in common.)
Joint tenants must
take:
(i) identical interests;
(ii) from the same
instrument;
(iii) at the same time;
(iv) with an equal
right to possess
(the four unities).
The right of
survivorship may be
severed, and the
estate converted to a
tenancy in common,
by: a conveyance by
one joint tenant,
agreement of joint
tenants, murder of
one co-tenant by
another, or
simultaneous deaths
of co-tenants.
A joint tenancy can
be terminated by
partition (voluntary or
involuntary).
Tenancy by the
Entirety
Husband and wife

each has an
undivided interest in
the whole estate and
a right of
survivorship.
To H and W. Some
states presume a
tenancy by the
entirety in any joint
conveyance to
husband and wife
where the four unities
(above) are present.
The right of
survivorship may be
severed by death,
divorce, mutual
agreement, or
execution by a joint
creditor. Tenancy by
the entirety cannot be
terminated by
involuntary partition.
Tenancy in Common
Each tenant has a

distinct, proportionate, undivided interest in the property.
There is no right of
survivorship.
To A and B or,
sometimes, To A and
B as joint tenants.
Only unity required is
possession.
May be terminated by
partition.
Type of Tenancy
2. REAL PROPERTY CHARTS
CMR
COMPARISON
CHART
ASSIGNMENT VS. SUBLEASE

Assignment by
Landlord
Assignment by
Tenant
Sublease by
Tenant
Consent
Tenants consent not

required.
Landlords consent
may be required by
lease.
Landlords consent
may be required by
lease.
Privity of Estate
Assignee and tenant

are in privity of
estate.
Assignee and
landlord are in privity
of estate.
Sublessee and
landlord are not in
privity of estate.
Original tenant
remains in privity of
estate with landlord.
Privity of Contract
Assignee and tenant

are not in privity of
contract. Original
landlord and tenant
remain in privity of
contract.
Assignee and
landlord are not in
privity of contract.
Original tenant and
landlord remain in
Sublessee and
landlord are not in
Original tenant and
landlord remain in
Liability for
Covenants in Lease
Assignee liable to
tenant on all
covenants that run
with the land.
Assignee liable to
landlord on all
covenants that run
with the land.
Sublessee is not
personally liable on
any covenants in the
original lease and
cannot enforce the
landlords covenants.
Original landlord
remains liable on all
covenants in the
lease.
Original tenant
remains liable for rent
and all other
covenants in the
lease.
Original tenant
remains liable for rent
and all other
covenants in the
lease and can
enforce the landlords
covenants.
REAL PROPERTY CHARTS 3.
CMR
COMPARISON
CHART
Type of Leasehold
LEASEHOLD ESTATES
Definition
Creation
Termination
Tenancy for Years
Tenancy that lasts

for some fixed
period of time.
To T for 10 years.
Terminates at the
end of the stated
period without either
party giving notice.
Periodic Tenancy
Tenancy for some

fixed period that
continues for
succeeding periods
until either party
gives notice of
termination.
To T from month to
month.
Terminates by
notice from one
party at least equal
to the length of the
time period (e.g.,
one full month for a
month-to-month
tenancy). Exception:
Only six months
notice is required to
terminate a year-toyear tenancy.
or
To T, with rent
payable on the first
day of every month.
or
L elects to bind
hold-over T for an
additional term.
Tenancy at Will
Tenancy of no
stated duration that
lasts as long as
both parties desire.
To T for and during

the pleasure of L.
(Even though the
language gives only
L the right to
terminate, L or T
may terminate at
any time.)
or
Usually terminates
after one party
displays an intention
that the tenancy
should come to an
end. May also end
by operation of law
(e.g., death of a
party, attempt to
transfer interest).
To T for as many
years as T desires.
(Only T may
terminate.)
Tenancy at
Sufferance
Tenant wrongfully
holds over after
termination of the
tenancy.
Ts lease expires,
but T continues to
occupy the
premises.
Terminates when
landlord evicts
tenant or elects to
hold tenant to
another term.
4. REAL PROPERTY CHARTS
CMR
COMPARISON
CHART
NONPOSSESSORY INTERESTS
Easement
License
Profit
Real Covenant/
Equitable
Servitude
Definition
A grant of an
interest in land
that allows
someone to use
anothers land
0ERMISSIONTOGO 2IGHTTOTAKE
onto anothers
resources from
land
anothers land
0ROMISETODOOR
not to do
something on the
land
Example
Owner of parcel
A grants owner of
parcel B the right
to drive across
parcel A
O allows the
electrician to
come onto Os
land to fix an
outlet
O allows A to
come onto Os
land to cut and
REMOVETIMBER
O conveys an
adjoining parcel to
A. A promises not
TOBUILDA
swimming pool on
the property
Writing
Generally
required.
Exceptions:
s ,ESSTHANONE
year
s )MPLICATION
s .ECESSITY
s 0RESCRIPTION
.OTREQUIRED
Note: An invalid
oral easement is
a license
2EQUIRED
2EQUIRED
Exception:
%QUITABLE
SERVITUDEMAYBE
implied from
common scheme
of development of
residential
SUBDIVISION
Termination
s 3TATED
conditions
s 2ELEASE
s -ERGER
s !BANDONMENT
s %STOPPEL
s 0RESCRIPTION
s %NDOF
necessity
5SUALLYREVOCABLE 3AMEAS
ATWILL-AYBE
easement
IRREVOCABLEIF
coupled with an
interest or if
licensor estopped
BYLICENSEES
expenditures
s
s
s
s
2ELEASE
-ERGER
#ONDEMNATION
!LSOEQUITABLE
defenses may
apply to
enforcement of
servitude
REAL PROPERTY MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS 1.
REAL PROPERTY MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE
You can use the sample multiple-choice questions below to review the law and practice your understanding of important concepts that you will likely see on your law school exam. To do more questions,
access StudySmart Law School software from the BARBRI website.
Question 1
Question 2
A landowner conveyed his farm to my

daughter for life, and on her death to her children
in equal shares. At the time of the conveyance
the daughter had one child, the landowners
grandson. A few years later, the grandson struck
a pedestrian with his vehicle. The pedestrian
obtained a judgment against the grandson for
damages. The jurisdiction has no applicable
statute on the matter.
An owner devised his property by will to a

friend so long as one or more dogs are kept on
the property; if dogs are no longer kept on the
property, then to the American Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA).
The will also provided that the residuary estate
would go to the owners niece.
Is the grandsons interest in the farm subject to

sale to satisfy the pedestrians judgment?
(A) Yes, because the grandsons after-acquired
title inures to the benet of the pedestrian.
(B) Yes, because the grandsons interest is
subject to involuntary transfer.
(C) No, because the daughter may have more
children.
(D) No, because contingent remainders are not
transferable inter vivos.
In a jurisdiction that has not modied the

common law Rule Against Perpetuities, what
are the respective interests in the property on the
owners death?
(A) The friend has a fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent and the niece has a
right of entry.
(B) The friend has a fee simple determinable
and the niece has a possibility of reverter.
(C) The friend has a fee simple determinable
and the ASPCA has a remainder.
(D) The friend has a fee simple determinable
subject to an executory interest and the
ASPCA has a shifting executory interest.
2. REAL PROPERTY MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS
Question 3
Question 4
A tenant had been leasing an apartment from

a landlord for more than 10 years. There was no
written lease; however, the parties had agreed
orally, at the beginning of the rental, what the
rent would be per month. The tenant left a check
for each months rent in the landlords mailbox
on the rst day of that month, without fail. On
September 10, the landlord handed the tenant a
handwritten note stating that the lease was to be
terminated effective that October 1. On October
1, the tenant placed a check for the rent in the
landlords mailbox, and the landlord brought an
action for unlawful detainer against the tenant.
A landowner owned two adjoining parcels

of land containing a number of lakes. She
conveyed the eastern parcel, which contained a
campground, to a sherman. The deed transferring the parcel granted to the sherman and to
invited guests of the campground all hunting and
shing rights and use of the lakes on the western
parcel for the benet of the campground. Subsequently, the sherman assigned his hunting and
shing rights to a hunter. When the landowner
discovered the hunter hunting and shing on
her land, she brought an appropriate action to
declare his rights void.
Who is likely to prevail?

(A) The tenant, because in the absence of a
statute, six months notice of termination is
required.
(B) The tenant, because a full months notice is
required.
If the court rules for the landowner, it will be

because the shermans right to hunt and sh on
the western parcel is:
(A) A prot appurtenant.
(B) A prot in gross.
(C) An easement in gross.
(C) The landlord, because there is no written

lease, and therefore this is a tenancy at will
and only reasonable notice is required.
(D) The landlord, because this is a tenancy
at sufferance, and therefore no notice is
required to end the tenancy.
(D) A license.
Question 5
A developer owned several acres zoned for
mixed use development. The developer prepared
a subdivision of his various parcels, led a
subdivision map showing commercial lots,
obtained all the necessary approvals, and began
selling the lots. Each of the deeds conveying lots
sold by the developer contained the following:
It is hereby covenanted by the seller
that the property conveyed shall be
used for commercial or residential
purposes only, that no industrial,
warehouse, or other manufacturing
structures shall be erected or
maintained thereon, and that this
covenant shall bind the buyer, his heirs
and assigns, and their successors.
Two years later, after all but two of the lots
had been developed as small businesses, the
developer sold his remaining two lots to a real
estate speculation rm. The deed to the rm did
not contain any language restricting the use of
the property. The rm then sold the property to
a giant supermarket chain, which intended to
construct a warehouse and distribution center
thereon. A shopkeeper who had purchased a lot
from the developer located next to the proposed
warehouse brings suit against the supermarket
chain seeking to enjoin construction of the
warehouse. Her attorney argues that the lots
sold by the developer to the rm and then to
the supermarket chain are bound by the same
restrictions on use that are contained in the deed
by which the shopkeeper took her property.
Is the shopkeeper likely to win?
(A) Yes, because the developer established a
common development scheme for his entire
subdivision and the subdivision appeared to
conform to the scheme.
(B) No, because the rm and the supermarket
were not aware of the restrictions when they
purchased the property.
(C) No, because the restrictions in the shopkeepers deed bind only the purchaser of the land.
(D) No, because the deed by which the rm

took the property from the developer did
not contain any restrictions on use.
Question 6
A seller entered into an enforceable written
agreement to sell her house to a buyer for
$425,000. The agreement provided that closing
would take place on September 18, and on that
date the seller would provide marketable title,
free and clear of all encumbrances. The agreement was silent as to risk of loss if the house
was damaged prior to closing and as to any duty
to carry insurance. On August 31, the seller
cancelled her homeowners insurance when she
moved out of the house. Consequently, when the
house was destroyed by wildres on September
15, it was uninsured. The buyer refused to close
on September 18 and the seller immediately
brought an action against him for specic performance. The buyer countersued for the cancellation of the contract and return of his earnest
money. Both parties stipulate that the value of
the property without the house is $225,000.
In this jurisdiction, which has no applicable
statute, is the seller likely to prevail?
(A) Yes, but the price will be abated to
$225,000.
(B) Yes, for the full contract price.
(C) No, because the seller had a duty to carry
insurance until the closing date.
(D) No, because the seller could not convey
marketable title.
Question 7
Question 8
An owner purchased a parcel of property

adjoining a ve-foot-wide strip, which was a
private right-of-way. Unsure where the exact
boundaries of her property were located, the
owner planted a garden on the ve-foot right-ofway strip and enclosed it with a wire fence two
weeks after taking up occupancy. The owner
maintained the fence and garden for 20 years, at
which time she removed the fence and smoothed
out the ground where the garden had been
located. Five years later, the owner entered into
a written contract to sell the property to a buyer.
The description in the contract included the vefoot strip. After research in the county recorders
ofce, the buyer discovered that the strip was a
private right-of-way when the owner purchased
the property. After properly notifying the owner
of the problem prior to closing, the buyer refused
to tender the purchase money to the owner
when the closing day arrived. The owner sued
the buyer for specic performance of the real
estate sales contract. The jurisdictions statutory
adverse possession period is 15 years.
An elderly aunt devised her land to a charity

because my nephew has been stealing from
me. When the nephew, who had been caring
for the aunt, discovered the will, he threatened
to withdraw his care unless she conveyed the
land to him. The nephew obtained a blank deed
and lled in the description of the land and the
parties names. Under consideration he wrote,
past and future care. The aunt signed the deed
and the nephew recorded it. Subsequently, the
nephew sold the land for market value to a buyer
who was unaware of the nephews threat to the
aunt. The buyer recorded her deed. Last month,
the aunt died.
Who will prevail?

(A) The buyer, because the owner failed to
provide a marketable title.
(B) The buyer, because the owner surrendered
her adverse possession rights when she
removed the fence, as her possession was
no longer open, notorious, and continuous.
(C) The buyer, because one may not adversely
possess a right-of-way.
(D) The owner, because she held the right-ofway for a longer time than the minimum
required by the state adverse possession
statute.
If the charity brings suit to impose a constructive trust on the land, will it prevail?
(A) Yes, because past and future care is not
adequate consideration.
(B) Yes, because the deed to the nephew was
void.
(C) No, because the land has been adeemed.
(D) No, because the buyer is a bona de
purchaser.
Question 9
Question 10
An uncle validly executed and notarized a

deed conveying his beach house to his nephew,
and then validly recorded the deed. When the
nephew, who was experiencing nancial difculties, learned of the recordation of the deed,
he immediately told his uncle that he did not
want the beach house and could not accept
such an expensive gift anyway. Later, the
nephew led for bankruptcy and the trustee in
bankruptcy asserted an ownership interest in
the beach house on behalf of the debtors estate.
The bankruptcy court ruled that the property
belonged to the uncle and not to the nephew, and
thus was not part of the debtors estate subject to
distribution.
A buyer entered into a contract with a seller

to purchase the sellers farm. The contract of
sale referred to the farm as containing 250
acres. The agreed-on price was $1 million.
Before the date on which escrow was to close,
the buyer learned from a surveyor he had hired
that the farm actually contained 248 acres.
On the date the sale was to close, the buyer
instructed the escrow agent to release all but
$8,000 of the purchase money because he was
not getting what he bargained for. The seller
refused to proceed with the sale. The buyer
brings an action for specic performance and
also seeks an $8,000 reduction of the agreedupon contract price.
Which of the following is the strongest reason

in support of the bankruptcy courts ruling?
What will be the probable outcome of the

litigation?
(A) There was no presumption of delivery

created by recordation of the deed because
the nephew did not know of the recordation.
(A) The seller will win, because the buyer

refused to tender the contract price when
the seller tendered substantially what the
contract called for her to perform.
(B) The nephews statements to the uncle were

a constructive reconveyance of the property.
(C) There was never an effective acceptance of
delivery of the deed by the nephew.
(D) The recordation of the deed was invalid
because it was done without the nephews
permission.
(B) The seller will win, because both parties

had seen the farm before the contract was
formed.
(C) The buyer will win, because he is not
receiving what he bargained for under the
contract.
(D) The buyer will win, if the court nds that
the $8,000 reduction in price is a fair
reection of the title defect.
Question 11
Question 12
A retiree contracted to purchase her

hometown diner, which was struggling. She
borrowed the $80,000 purchase price from a
local bank, granting the bank a mortgage on
the diner. Due to a clerical error, the banks
mortgage was not recorded. Business remained
very slow after the purchase, so the retiree
decided to give the diner a makeover. To nance
the renovations, she applied for a $20,000 loan
from a credit union, offering to secure this
debt with a mortgage on the diner as well. To
encourage this opportunity, the bank executed an
agreement to subordinate its interest to the credit
unions mortgage. The credit union then loaned
the retiree the $20,000 but never recorded its
mortgage. Several months later, the bank discovered its clerical error and properly recorded its
mortgage on the diner. Unfortunately, the diners
nal renovations were garish and brought in few
customers. The retiree now has defaulted on both
mortgages. A statute in the jurisdiction provides:
No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of
real property shall be good against subsequent
purchasers for value without notice, who shall
rst record.
A buyer purchased a parcel of property

from a seller for $100,000, nancing the
purchase with a loan from the seller secured
by a mortgage on the property. The seller
promptly and properly recorded his mortgage.
Shortly thereafter, the buyer obtained a loan
from a credit union for remodeling secured by
a mortgage on the property. The credit union
promptly and properly recorded its mortgage.
One year later, the buyer obtained a home
equity loan from a bank secured by a mortgage
on the property. The bank promptly and
properly recorded its mortgage. A few months
later, the buyer stopped making payments
on the debt owed to the credit union. With
proper notice to all parties, the credit union
brought an action to foreclose on its mortgage.
At that time, the buyer owed $20,000 on the
sellers mortgage, $25,000 on the credit unions
mortgage, and $30,000 on the banks mortgage.
At the foreclosure sale, the property was sold for
$45,000. The jurisdiction in which the property
is located permits deciency judgments.
Whose mortgage has priority?
After the $25,000 debt owed to the credit

union is satised from the proceeds, which of
the following statements is most correct?
(A) The credit unions, because the banks

mortgage was unrecorded when the credit
unions mortgage was executed.
(A) The sellers mortgage and the banks

mortgage are both reduced by $10,000 and
remain on the property.
(B) The credit unions, because the bank agreed

to subordinate its interest.
(B) The sellers mortgage is satised in full and

extinguished, while the banks mortgage
remains on the property.
(C) The banks, because the credit union never

recorded its interest.
(D) The banks, because a purchase money
mortgage is senior to all competing liens.
(C) The sellers mortgage remains on the

property, while the banks mortgage is
reduced by $20,000 and extinguished,
leaving the buyer personally liable to the
bank for the deciency of $10,000.
(D) The sellers mortgage is satised in full and
extinguished, and the banks mortgage is
also extinguished, leaving the buyer personally liable to the bank for the deciency of
$30,000.
REAL PROPERTY MULTIPLE CHOICE ANSWERS 7.
ANSWERS TO MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS

Answer to Question 1
(B) The grandsons interest in the farm is subject to involuntary transfer to satisfy the pedestrians
judgment. If a future interest can be transferred voluntarily by its owner, it is also subject to
involuntary transfer; i.e., it can be reached by the owners creditors by appropriate process. At
common law and in all jurisdictions today, all types of vested remainders are fully transferable
during life. Here, the grandson has a vested remainder subject to open in the land. Because the
grandson could assign this interest, his creditors may also reach it. (A) is incorrect because the
doctrine of estoppel by deed is inapplicable here. Under the doctrine, the subsequent acquisition
of title by a debtor who had no interest in the land automatically inures to the benet of a creditor
if the creditor properly recorded her judgment. Here, however, the grandson has an interest in the
farma vested remainder subject to open. Although his possession is postponed until the daughters death, his interest is a present interest, reachable by creditors. (C) is incorrect because the
fact that the daughter may have more children, who would partially divest the grandsons interest,
does not affect the ability of the grandsons creditors to reach his interest in the farm. (D) is incorrect because, although contingent remainders are not transferable inter vivos at common law and
thus not subject to involuntary transfer, the grandsons interest in the farm, as discussed above, is
vested rather than contingent.
(B) The friend will have a fee simple determinable and the niece will have a possibility of reverter
on the owners death. A fee simple determinable is an estate that automatically terminates on the
happening of a stated event and goes back to the grantor. The interest that is left in a grantor who
conveys a fee simple determinable is a possibility of reverter, which arises automatically in the
grantor and can be devised by will in almost all jurisdictions. Here, the friend has a fee simple
that is subject to automatic termination if dogs are no longer kept on the property. As discussed
below, the ASPCAs interest is stricken because it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. This
leaves a possibility of reverter in the niece as the owners residuary devisee. (A) is incorrect
because the friends interest is a fee simple determinable (because it has so long as as part of
the conveyance) that terminates automatically when the event occurs. In contrast, a fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent is created when the grantor retains the power to terminate the
estate (the right of entry) on the happening of a stated event, but the estate continues until the
grantor exercises the power. (C) is incorrect because the ASPCAs interest, if it were valid, would
be an executory interest rather than a remainder. A remainder is a future interest that is capable
of taking possession on the natural termination of the preceding estates created in the same
disposition. Under modern law, this means that a remainder must always follow a life estate. If
the present interest is a defeasible fee that has potentially innite duration but can be cut short
by the happening of a stated event, as in this question, the future interest created in a third party
must be an executory interest. (D) is incorrect because the ASPCAs interest is void under the
Rule Against Perpetuities and is stricken; the charity-to-charity exception to the Rule does not
apply. The Rule Against Perpetuities provides that no interest in property is valid unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after one or more lives in being at the creation of the interest.
It applies to executory interests created in third persons but not to reversionary interests of the
grantor. Like any other gift, a gift for charitable purposes is void for remoteness if it is contingent
on the happening of an event that may not occur within the perpetuities period. The only exception is when there is a gift to one charity followed by a gift over to another charity upon a possibly
8. REAL PROPERTY MULTIPLE CHOICE ANSWERS
remote event (the charity-to-charity exception). Here, the rst gift is to an individual and the gift
over (a shifting executory interest) is to a charity; because the triggering event that will transfer
the property (no dogs kept on the property) may occur more than 21 years after lives in being at
the creation of the interest, the interest is stricken under the Rule Against Perpetuities.
(B) The tenant will prevail because a full months notice is required. In this case, there was no written
lease outlining the terms of the tenancy, but only an oral agreement regarding the payment of
monthly rent. That led to the creation of a periodichere, a monthlytenancy. The termination date of a periodic tenancy is uncertain, until notice of termination is given. For a tenancy
that is less than a year in duration, such as this, notice must be given a full period in advance of
the termination. Although the landlord gave notice, because the lease was monthly, the landlord
was required to provide a full months notice of termination. (A) is incorrect because six months
notice would be required for a tenancy from year to year, but this tenancy was a month-to-month
tenancy. (C) is incorrect. A tenancy at will arises from an agreement between the parties that
either party may terminate the tenancy at any time. However, in the absence of a specic agreement to create a tenancy at will, regular rent payments will lead to the tenancy being treated as a
periodic tenancy. (D) is incorrect. Tenancies at sufferance arise from a tenant wrongfully holding
over after the termination of a tenancy. It is true that no notice is necessary in order to terminate
such a tenancy. Nothing in the facts presented, however, allows the conclusion that the tenant was
wrongfully holding over when the landlord gave notice.
(A) If the court rules for the landowner, it will be because the shermans right to hunt and sh on the
western parcel is a prot appurtenant. A prot is a nonpossessory interest in land that entitles the
holder of the prot to enter on the servient tenement and take the soil or a substance of the soil
(e.g., minerals, timber, oil, or game). Like an easement, a prot may be appurtenant or in gross.
If the prot exists to serve a dominant estate, the prot is appurtenant and can only be transferred
along with the dominant estate. Conversely, if the prot does not exist to serve a dominant estate,
it is a prot in gross and may be transferred separate and apart from the dominant estate. Here,
the sherman has a prot with respect to the game on the western parcel. Because the prot is
for the benet of the campground on the eastern parcel, it is appurtenant rather than in gross
because it serves the dominant estate (the eastern parcel). Thus, the shermans assignment of
the prot to the hunter is void. (B) is incorrect because it supports the hunters rather than the
landowners claim. As discussed above, if the prot were in gross, it could have been transferred
to the hunter. (C) is incorrect because the sherman has a prot rather than an easement. Like a
prot, an easement is a nonpossessory interest in land. However, the holder of an easement only
has the right to use the servient land and not to remove the soil or products of the soil therefrom
(including game). (D) is incorrect because, as explained above, the shermans interest is alienable, whereas a license is personal to the licensee and therefore not alienable. The problem here
is that the sherman did not transfer the dominant parcel with the prot, and thus the attempted
transfer of the prot appurtenant alone is void.
(A) The shopkeeper will win because the developer established a common development scheme for the
entire subdivision and the subdivision appeared to conform to the scheme. An injunction against
breaching a covenant may be obtained by enforcing the covenant as an equitable servitude. An

equitable servitude can be created by a writing complying with the Statute of Frauds concerning
a promise that touches and concerns the land and indicates that the servitude exists, as long
as notice is given to the future owners of the burdened land. Here, there was a promise that
touched and concerned the land and indicated that a servitude existed (the deed restrictions),
but the promise was not contained in the supermarkets deed. Nevertheless, the court will imply
the covenant here. A court will imply a covenantknown as a reciprocal negative servitude
where evidence shows that the developer had a scheme for development when sales began and
the grantee in question had notice of the plan. The covenant protects the parties who purchased
in reliance on the scheme. Evidence of the scheme can be obtained from the general pattern of
other restrictions, and notice can be from actual notice, record notice, or inquiry notice. Here,
the supermarket had inquiry notice of the restriction regarding industrial use because of the
uniform residential and commercial character of the other lots in the development. Thus, the
covenant will be implied and (A) is correct. (B) is incorrect because actual awareness of the
restriction on the part of the rm and the supermarket is not essential; they have inquiry notice
(which is a type of constructive notice). On the other hand, mere notice of the restriction would
not be enough if the other elements for an implied negative servitude (common scheme when
sales began) are not present. (C) and (D) are incorrect because an implied negative servitude
would bind subsequent purchasers whether or not the restriction appeared in their deeds, and
despite the fact that the restrictive language in the shopkeepers deed purported to bind only the
buyer and her successors. Based on the developers representations, the shopkeeper was entitled
to rely on the fact that similar restrictions would be imposed on all other purchasers of the lots.
(B) The seller will most likely prevail for the full contract price. Although jurisdictions differ as to
which party has the risk of loss, the majority rule is that where property subject to an enforceable contract for sale is destroyed without the fault of either party before the date set for closing,
the risk of loss is on the buyer. Thus, the buyer must pay the contract price despite a loss due
to re, unless the contract provides otherwise. Here, the house was destroyed by re after the
seller and buyer entered into their contract for the sale of the house, but before the closing date.
The contract was silent regarding the risk of loss. Thus, under the majority rule, the risk of loss
is on the buyer. As a result, the seller is entitled to receive specic performance of the contract,
meaning that the buyer must pay the full contract price. (A) is incorrect because it allows the
buyer to tender less than the full contract price. With the buyer bearing the risk of loss, he must
pay the $425,000 contract price despite the decrease in the propertys value due to the re. (C)
and (D) are incorrect because they conclude that the seller is not entitled to specic performance. As explained above, the seller is entitled to specic performance because the risk of
loss is on the buyer. (C) is also incorrect because, absent a provision to the contrary, neither the
seller nor the buyer has a duty to carry insurance on the property. However, both the seller and
the buyer have insurable interests once the contract is signed (i.e., either or both could obtain
insurance). (D) is also incorrect because marketable title does not refer to whether the seller
would be able to sell a destroyed house. It refers to a deed free of any possible dispute as to who
is the owner of the property.
(A) Absent a judgment in an action to quiet title or other tangible proof that title to the ve-foot strip
has actually been acquired, most jurisdictions would not consider the owners title marketable. All
contracts for the sale of land contain, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise, an implied
covenant by the seller that she will deliver to the buyer a marketable title at the date of closing.
Marketability refers to freedom from the possibility of litigation concerning the title; title is
marketable if a reasonably prudent buyer, ready and able to purchase, will accept it in the exercise
of ordinary prudence. At times, sellers will rely on adverse possession to show that defects in title
have been cleared. However, courts generally will not permit such reliance when proof of adverse
possession rests only on oral evidence that will not be available to the buyer in the future. Here,
title to the property described in the contract is unmarketable because the ve-foot strip was a
private right-of-way and not part of the owners record title. The owners adverse possession of
the strip will not be sufcient by itself to establish marketable title; there is no longer any physical
evidence of the owners possession. Thus, at the least the owner must offer the buyer additional
proof that the buyer can use to defend any lawsuit challenging title. (B) is wrong because the
owner removed the fence after she had acquired title by adverse possession. While that makes
it more difcult for her to establish marketable title in selling the property, it does not affect
the ownership rights she gained by adverse possession. (C) is a misstatement of law. Although
government property, including public rights-of-way, is generally exempt from the operation of
statutes of limitations, the facts of this question specically state that this is a private right-of-way.
(D) is wrong because, as discussed above, the fact that the owner has title to the strip does not
mean that she has marketable title.
(D) The charity will not prevail in a suit to impose a constructive trust on the land because the buyer
is a bona de purchaser. A deed is voidable if it is executed by a minor or incapacitated person
or is obtained through fraud in the inducement, duress, undue inuence, mistake, or breach of
duciary duty. Undue inuence exists where (i) inuence is exerted on the grantor, (ii) the effect
of the inuence is to overpower the mind and free will of the grantor, and (iii) the product of the
inuence is a deed that would not have been executed but for the inuence. A voidable deed will
be set aside only if the property has not passed to a bona de purchaser (i.e., a purchaser who pays
valuable consideration and takes without notice). Here, although the nephews acts may not have
risen to the level of duress, they likely constitute undue inuence. His threat of cessation of care
caused the aunt to convey the land to him, when her desire was to devise the land to a charity.
Thus, the deed is voidable. However, because the buyer paid market value for the land without
notice of the circumstances surrounding the aunt-nephew deed, the deed will not be set aside.
(A) is incorrect because consideration is not required in order to make a deed valid. (B) is incorrect because the deed was voidable rather than void. Deeds considered void include those that are
forged, were never delivered, or were obtained by fraud in the factum; none of those apply here.
(C) is incorrect because, although specically devised property that is no longer in the testators
estate at her death is adeemed, the charity would have prevailed in its suit to impose a constructive trust on the land if it had not been conveyed to a bona de purchaser. A constructive trust
is an equitable remedy imposed by a court to prevent an unjust enrichment of one person at the
expense of another as the result of wrongful conduct, such as fraud, undue inuence, or breach of
duciary duty. Here, the nephew would have been unjustly enriched if he were allowed to retain
title to land he acquired through undue inuence. However, this remedy was cut off by the
nephews conveyance to the buyer, a bona de purchaser.
(C) The nephews express rejection of the deed was sufcient to rebut any presumption of acceptance. As a general rule, delivery of the deed is the nal operative act to complete a conveyance
of title to the grantee, because courts will infer the grantees acceptance if the conveyance is
benecial to him. However, all courts will consider evidence that is contrary to the presumption
or inference. Hence, the nephews express rejection of the gift is sufcient to establish that no
conveyance of the property took place. (A) is an incorrect statement of law. If the grantor intends
the recording of the deed to be the nal act in vesting title in the grantee, then such recording
creates a presumption of delivery even where the grantee did not know of the recordation. (B) is
wrong because there is no such thing as a constructive reconveyance. Had the nephew accepted
the gift (completing the conveyance) and later changed his mind, the nephew would have had to
execute a new deed to convey the property back to the uncle. (D) is wrong because knowledge
or permission of the grantee has no effect on the validity of the recordation; rather, it determines
whether there has been an effective acceptance.
(D) This answer states the traditional rule where the amount of land in a land sale contract is less than
as agreed. When a buyer has a remedy of specic performance in a land sale contract, a court of
equity will order a seller to convey the title if the buyer tenders the purchase price. If the seller
cannot provide marketable title under the terms of the contract, but the buyer wishes to proceed
with the transaction, the buyer can usually get specic performance with an abatement of the
purchase price in an amount reecting the title defect. A defect as to the quantity of land conveyed
is usually corrected by a pro rata abatement of the price. (D) states the factors that a court of
equity will look for when deciding whether to grant specic performance with abatement. (A) is
incorrect because the parties contract did not merely refer to the farm as a named parcel of land;
it recited that it contained 250 acres. Based on this recital, a court could readily conclude that the
difference of two acres is a material change in the terms of the contract and that the sellers tender
of 248 acres was not substantial performance. (B) is incorrect because viewing the property did
not put the buyer on notice as to the discrepancy; the buyer is not required to visually calculate the
amount of acreage a parcel of land contains. (C) is not as good an answer as (D) even though it
is probably a true statement. Not only must the defect as to quantity be material, so that the buyer
is not receiving what he bargained for, but the abatement amount must be appropriate and not an
excessive reduction of the purchase price, as choice (D) states.
(B) The credit unions mortgage has priority because the bank agreed to subordinate its interest.
Priority among mortgages on the same real estate is normally determined by chronology.
However, this may be modied by the operation of a recording act, special rules governing
purchase money mortgages, or the execution of a subordination agreement. A rst mortgagee
may enter into an agreement with a junior mortgagee to subordinate its priority to the junior
mortgagee, and such agreements generally are enforced if they are specic. (C) is incorrect
because a subordination agreement will determine priority despite the existence of a recording
act. This jurisdiction has a race-notice statute, under which a subsequent bona de purchaser
(i.e., a person, including a mortgagee, who gives valuable consideration and has no notice of the
prior instrument) prevails over a prior grantee only if he records before the prior grantee records.
Here, only the bank recorded its interest. Thus, the bank would prevail under the recording act if
there were no subordination agreement. (A) would state the priority rule for a notice jurisdiction,
in which a subsequent bona de purchaser prevails over a prior grantee regardless of whether the
subsequent purchaser records. However, a valid subordination agreement would govern in a notice
jurisdiction as well. Furthermore, the credit union had notice of the banks mortgage here because
the bank entered into a subordination agreement with the credit union. (D) is incorrect. A purchase
money mortgage, given when the mortgagor buys the property, has priority over non-purchase
money mortgages that arise prior to the mortgagors acquisition of title. However, priority can be
defeated by subsequent mortgages or liens through operation of the recording acts, and it can be
relinquished through a subordination agreement.
(C) The sellers mortgage remains on the property and the banks mortgage is extinguished, and
the buyer is personally liable to the bank for the deciency. As a general rule, the priority of a
mortgage is determined by the time it was placed on the property. When a mortgage is foreclosed,
the purchaser at the sale will take title as it existed when the mortgage was placed on the property.
Thus, foreclosure will terminate interests junior to the mortgage being foreclosed but will not
affect senior interests. The proceeds of the foreclosure sale are used rst (after expenses and
fees) to pay the principal and accrued interest on the loan that was foreclosed, and then to pay
off any junior interests in the order of priority. Where the proceeds of the sale are insufcient to
satisfy a mortgage debt, the mortgagee can bring a personal action against the mortgagor/debtor
for the deciency. Here, foreclosure by the credit union leaves the sellers senior purchase money
mortgage interest intact on the property; the purchaser at the foreclosure sale takes the property
subject to that mortgage. On the other hand, the banks mortgage interest, because it was junior
to the credit unions interest, was extinguished by the credit unions foreclosure action. After the
credit unions loan is paid off, the $20,000 that remains is used to reduce the amount of the debt
owed to the bank. The bank can recover the balance against the buyer personally in a deciency
action. (A) is wrong because the sellers mortgage and the banks mortgage are treated differently because of their priority in relation to the credit unions mortgage. (B) states the opposite
of the actual resultthe sellers mortgage (the senior interest) remains on the property and the
banks mortgage (the junior interest) is extinguished. (D) is wrong because, as discussed above,
the sellers mortgage remains on the land; thus, all of the remaining proceeds from the foreclosure
sale after the credit unions mortgage debt is satised go towards reducing the debt owed to the
bank.
APPROACH TO REAL PROPERTY 1.
APPROACH TO EXAMS
REAL PROPERTY
IN A NUTSHELL: The law of real property centers on a persons interest in land, which may be as
great as full ownership or as small as a right to enter. It governs how the land and those interests are
acquired and granted; bought and sold; rented and leased; and used as security for debts. Interests
in land arise through express creation (e.g., by a deed, will, or mortgage) and operation of law (e.g.,
through adverse possession). Realty may be owned by one individual or several, and an interest may
become possessory at once or in the future. However, when multiple parties claim conicting interests
in land, recording statutes dictate who will prevail. Real property law also governs items so afxed to
land that they are considered realty (i.e., xtures) and sets forth rights and responsibilities regarding the
use of water.
I. WHAT INTEREST IS INVOLVED?
A.
FreeholdsPresent Possessory Interests

1. Indefeasible interestsnot subject to early termination
a. Fee simple absolute (to A and his heirs or to A)
b. Life estate (to A for life or to A for the life B)
2. Defeasible interestsallows a fee simple or life estate to be terminated if a stated event
occurs
a. Determinable (for so long as, until, while, during)automatically reverts to the
grantor
b. Subject to condition subsequent (but if, upon condition that, provided that)
subject to the grantors right of entry, which must be exercised
c. Subject to an executory interest (to A for so long as . . . , and if not . . . , to B, to A,
but if . . . , to B)divests in favor of a third party
B.
FreeholdsFuture Possessory Interests

1. Interests retained by the grantor
a. Reversiongrantor transfers a shorter estate than she owns (grantor with a fee simple
transfers a life estate)
b. Possibility of revertergrantor transfers a determinable estate
c. Right of entry (power of termination)reserved on the grant of an estate subject to a
condition subsequent
2. Interests created in a transferee ( Note: Rule Against Perpetuities may apply)
a. Executory interestscut short the prior estate
b. Remainderspossessory only on the natural termination of the prior estate (e.g., death
of the life tenant)
1) Remainders are vested if made in an ascertained person and with no conditions
precedent; otherwise are contingent
c. Class giftsremainders in a class are contingent if no member of the class yet exists,
vested if all possible members exist, and vested subject to open if more members might
come to exist
1) Under the rule of convenience, an open class closes when any member can demand
possession
3. Rule Against Perpetuities
2. APPROACH TO REAL PROPERTY
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Any future interest that is not certain to vest or fail within a life in being plus 21 years
is void
Applies to contingent remainders, executory interests, class gifts (even if vested remainders), options and rights of rst refusal, and powers of appointment
Does not apply to vested interests, grantors reversionary interests, or gifts between
charities
Only the interest that violates the Rule is stricken (severed from the disposition)
Cases that always violate the common law Rule:
1) Executory interest following a defeasible feeexecutory interest is stricken
2) Gift to an open class conditioned on members surviving to an age beyond 21
entire class gift is stricken (bad as to one, bad as to all)
3) Remainder to As children living at his widows death (unborn widow
problem)contingent remainder is stricken
4) Gift conditioned on an administrative contingency is stricken
5) Options that might be exercised (not created) later than the Rules period are
stricken
At common law, a woman is conclusively presumed capable of bearing children (the
fertile octogenarian)
Departures from common law Rule:
1) Wait and see statutesvalidity of interest determined by actual future events
2) Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities90-year vesting period, wait and
see approach
3) Cy pres approachinvalid interests reformed to match grantors intent
C.
Leasehold Interests (Landlord and Tenant)

1. Types of tenancies
a. Tenancy for yearsfor a xed period of time (e.g., 10 days, 10 years)
1) Created expressly, ends automatically on its termination date (no notice)
b. Periodic tenancyfor a xed period that continues for succeeding periods (e.g., month
to month)
1) Created expressly or when a lease draws periodic rent payments, terminated on
proper notice (appropriate time period)
c. Tenancy at willno stated duration, as long as parties desire
1) Created expressly, terminated on proper notice
d. Tenancy at sufferance (hold-over doctrine)tenant remains in possession after tenancy
expires
1) Landlord may evict tenant or create a periodic tenancy by accepting rent
2. Rights and duties of landlord and tenant
a. Governed largely by the lease and tort law
b. Tenant must pay rent and may not commit waste
c. Landlord generally must repair, must deliver habitable premises, and may not interfere
with tenants possession
3. Both parties generally may assign their interests (transferring the entire term), and tenants
may also sublease (retaining part of the term)
D.
Nonpossessory Interests
1. Easements
a. Afrmative easementright to use someone elses land
2.
3.
4.
5.
b. Negative easementright to prevent something on anothers land

Easement appurtenantinvolves two tracts of land
1) Dominant parcel has the benet, which runs to grantees
2) Servient parcel has the burden, which runs to grantees with notice
a. Easement in grossinvolves one tract of land
b. Creation of easements
1) Express grant or reservation (Statute of Frauds applies)
a) An oral grant creates a license, which is not an interest in land
2) Implicationby operation of law
a) By use existing before a tract was divided
b) By necessity for a landlocked parcel
3) Prescriptionacquired through adverse, open and notorious, and continuous use
for the statutory period
c. Termination of easementscan end by stated condition, unity of ownership between
easement and servient estate, abandonment, estoppel, prescription, necessity, release, or
condemnation
Prots
a. Right to enter anothers land to remove products of the soil
Real covenants (run with the land at law)
a. Written promises to do or refrain from doing something on land, with a usual remedy of
money damages
b. Requirements for burden to run to later grantees: intent, notice, horizontal privity,
vertical privity, touch and concern
c. Requirements for benet to run: intent, vertical privity, touch and concern
Equitable servitudes
a. Covenants with equitable remedies (i.e., injunction, specic performance)
b. Implied from a common scheme for development if notice exists
c. Requirements for burden to run: intent, notice, touch and concern
d. Requirements for benet to run: intent, touch and concern
e. Equitable defenses apply (i.e., unclean hands, estoppel, acquiescence, changed neighborhood conditions)
II. HOW IS THE INTEREST BEING ACQUIRED?
A.
Conveyancing (Statute of Frauds AppliesRequires Writing Signed by Grantor)

1. Land sale contracts
a. Statute of Frauds exceptionno writing is required if buyer has partially performed
through possession, improvement, or payment
b. Time for performance presumed not of the essence
c. Marketable titlecontracts contain an implied covenant that seller will deliver title free
from an unreasonable risk of litigation at closing (i.e., when purchase price and deed
exchanged)
2. Deeds
a. Must evidence an intent to transfer land and adequately describe the land and parties
b. Effective on delivery (i.e., words or conduct showing the grantors intent to immediately
pass title) and acceptance (often presumed)
c. Types of deeds
4. APPROACH TO REAL PROPERTY
1)
3.
B.
General warranty deedcovenants against any title defects created by the grantor
or prior titleholders
Special warranty deedcovenants against title defects created by the grantor
Quitclaim deedno covenants; transfers whatever interest grantor has
2)
3)
Wills
a. Effective on the testators death
b. If, at the testators death, she no longer owns property that was specically devised, that
gift fails (i.e., is adeemed)
c. If, at the testators death, the beneciary has already died, his gift fails (i.e., lapses) or
might pass to the beneciarys descendants under an anti-lapse statute if he and the
testator were related
Adverse Possession
1. Possessor must show: (i) actual entry giving rise to exclusive possession that is (ii) open and
notorious, (iii) adverse/hostile (i.e., lacking the owners permission), and (iv) continuous
throughout the statutory period for an ejectment action (e.g., 20 years)
2. The statute does not begin to run if the owner is under a disability to sue (e.g., incapacity)
when the possession begins
III. WHO WILL HOLD THE INTEREST?
A.
Concurrent Interests
1. All co-tenants share the right to possession and enjoyment of the property
2. Joint tenantstwo or more co-tenants with rights of survivorship (i.e., the dead co-tenants
share passes to the remaining co-tenants)
a. Created expressly, severed by a tenants sale or suit for partition
3. Tenants by the entiretytwo spouses with rights of survivorship
a. Created expressly or presumed in some states by a grant to spouses, severed by divorce
4. Tenants in commontwo or more co-tenants, no right of survivorship
a. Created by the severance of the above tenancies
b. Default co-tenancy created if nothing else was specied
B.
Competing InterestsGrantor Transfers Same Land More than Once

1. Recording acts protect a bona de purchaser for value without actual, inquiry, or record
notice of the prior conveyance (BFP)
a. Actual noticewhat the grantee actually knows
b. Inquiry noticewhat a reasonable inquiry would have revealed
c. Record noticewhat a search of the real property records would have revealed
2. Types of recording acts
a. Notice statuteslater BFP wins if earlier grant was not recorded
b. Race-notice statuteslater BFP wins only if she records before the earlier grantee
records
c. Race statutesrst to record wins; actual notice is irrelevant
IV. IS THE LAND SUBJECT TO A SECURITY INTEREST?
A.
Mortgages (Land Is Collateral for a Debt)

1. Theories of title
2.
3.
4.
B.
a. Lien theorymortgagee holds a security interest only

b. Title theorymortgagee holds title until mortgage is satised
c. Intermediate theorymortgagee holds title only after default
If mortgagor transfers mortgaged land
a. Grantee may agree to assume the mortgage and become primarily liable to pay the
mortgage loan
b. Grantee who does not assume the mortgage is not personally liable for the loan but may
lose the land if the transferor defaults
Foreclosureafter default, property may be sold to satisfy the debt
a. Does not affect senior interests
b. Terminates junior interests
1) Junior interests are entitled to any surplus remaining after the foreclosing mortgage
is satised
c. The mortgagor may redeem the land by paying the amount due
If there is a deciencymortgagee can sue mortgagor if foreclosure sale proceeds do not
satisfy mortgage debt
Other Security Interests

1. Deed of trustsimilar to a mortgage, but a third-party trustee forecloses
2. Installment land contractseller retains the deed until buyer pays in full
3. Absolute deedtreated as an equitable mortgage when given for a debt
4. Sale-leasebackcourt may determine this was a disguised mortgage
V. DOES THE LAND HAVE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS?
A.
Fixtures
1. Fixtures are items so afxed to land that they become part of the realty
a. Constructive annexationitems not physically attached to land are xtures if they are
so uniquely adapted to the real estate that it makes no sense to separate them (e.g. keys
to doors)
2. Common ownership caseslandowner brings chattel onto land
a. Annexors objective intent determines whether items are xtures
3. Divided ownership caseslandowner does not bring chattel onto land
a. Items owner can remove it only if this would not leave unrepaired damage to the
premises
B.
Water
1. Rules vary by state and by source of water
a. Watercoursesrivers, streams, lakes
b. Groundwaterpercolating water from wells
c. Surface watersrainfall, melting snow, seepage
C.
Zoning
1. Governmental regulations that restrict the use of land
a. Existing zoning violations render title to land unmarketable
2. Variancepermission to depart from zoning restriction
REAL PROPERTY EXAM QUESTIONS 1.
ESSAY EXAM QUESTIONS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The essay questions that follow have been selected to provide you with an opportunity to experience
how the substantive law you have been reviewing may be tested in the hypothetical essay examination
question context. These sample essay questions are a valuable self-diagnostic tool designed to enable
you to enhance your issue-spotting ability and practice your exam writing skills.
It is suggested that you approach each question as though under actual examination conditions.
The time allowed for each question is 60 minutes. You should spend 15 to 20 minutes spotting issues,
underlining key facts and phrases, jotting notes in the margins, and outlining your answer. If you
organize your thoughts well, 40 minutes will be more than adequate for writing them down. Should
you prefer to forgo the actual writing involved on these questions, be sure to give yourself no more
time for issue-spotting than you would on the actual examination.
The BARBRI technique for writing a well-organized essay answer is to (i) spot the issues in a
question and then (ii) analyze and discuss each issue using the CIRAC method:
C State your conclusion rst. (In other words, you must think through your answer before you
start writing.)
I State the issue involved.
R Give the rule(s) of law involved.
A Apply the rule(s) of law to the facts.
C Finally, restate your conclusion.
After completing (or outlining) your own analysis of each question, compare it with the BARBRI
model answer provided herein. A passing answer does not have to match the model one, but it should
cover most of the issues presented and the law discussed and should apply the law to the facts of the
question. Use of the CIRAC method results in the best answer you can write.
2. REAL PROPERTY EXAM QUESTIONS
EXAM QUESTION NO. 1

Sixteen years ago, Olivia, owner of Blackacre, an 80-acre parcel, executed and delivered a deed
transferring two acres of Blackacre to X County. The relevant language of this deed stated:
Olivia hereby grants two acres of Blackacre [adequately described] to X County to be used
as the site of a highway weighing station. This deed is on the condition that if said use does
not commence within six months from this date, or, having commenced, ceases, the conveyance is to be null and void.
Five years ago, Olivia executed a deed to Blackacre and delivered it to David. This deed described
Blackacre as it had been described in the deed by which Olivia had acquired Blackacre. It made no
mention of the deed to X County. The following year, Olivia died intestate survived by Henry, her sole
heir.
The two-acre parcel conveyed to X County was improved as a highway weighing station site
within 60 days from the date of the Olivia-X County deed. It was continually used as such until
last year, when X County removed the weighing equipment and sold its interest in the land to Paul.
David learned of the countys action before Paul took possession. David removed the fences that had
separated the two-acre parcel from Davids land and fenced around the outside boundaries of Blackacre, including the two-acre parcel with his land.
Who is entitled to the two-acre parcel and why?
EXAM QUESTION NO. 2

Landlord rented an apartment in his building to Tenant for one year beginning June 1. On June 1,
Tenant was unable to move in because the apartment was still occupied by Betty, whose lease had
expired on May 31. Betty eventually moved out on June 30, and Tenant moved in on July 1.
During July, a hailstorm caused two broken windowpanes in Tenants apartment. Tenant demanded
that Landlord replace the windowpanes. Landlord replied that Tenant had to do it. Rain coming in
through the broken panes caused considerable damage to the wallpaper and oors.
The apartment directly above Tenants was occupied by Charlie, a member of the famous rock
group, The Charles River. The daily rehearsals of his group interfered with Tenants law studies and
sleep so much that she complained repeatedly to Landlord. On July 15, three of Charlies friends were
arrested in his apartment and charged with possession of narcotics. On August 31, Tenant moved out
without ever having paid any rent to Landlord.
What are Landlords rights, if any, against Tenant? His liabilities? Discuss.
EXAM QUESTION NO. 3

Adams owned Lot 1 on Azure Lake and lived in a house located on the west half. Baker owned Lot
2 behind Adamss lot, and his one-story house overlooked the east half of Lot 1.
Adams and Baker entered into a written agreement under which Baker paid Adams $2,000, and
Adams covenanted not to build a house or other structure on the east half of Lot 1. The agreement
recited that Baker has derived much pleasure from the view over Adamss land and that the parties
intend to assure an unobstructed view from Bakers house. The agreement was never recorded.
Five years later, re swept through Lot 2 and burned down Bakers house.
Two years after the re, Adams sold her house and lot to Down. Before committing himself to the
purchase, Down had a conversation with Baker in which Baker told Down that Adamss lot is subject
to a building restriction on the east side. Down asked Adams about the restriction, and Adams said,
Dont worry about it. It wont be binding on you.
Four years later, Baker sold his lot to Park, telling her of the restriction on Lot 1 and handing her the
original agreement signed by Adams and Baker.
While Park was out of the state, Down started building a two-story residence on the east half of his
lot. Upon her return, Park consulted you.
Advise Park as to her rights and remedies.
EXAM QUESTION NO. 4

Ollie owned Goldacre, an oil-rich ranch in the state of Lotus. Five years ago in January, Ollie
summoned his foreman, Art, handed Art a deed transferring Goldacre to Art, and said, I want you to
have Goldacre if I die before you.
In July that same year, Ollies accountant, Christy, reported that Art had been embezzling. Ollie
immediately discharged Art and, while Christy looked on, called in his bookkeeper, Bill, showed Bill
a deed to Goldacre and said: I am now giving Goldacre to you. You have the combination to my safe.
When I die, get this deed out of my safe and record it.
A month later, Ollie discharged Bill for incompetence. Before leaving, Bill removed his deed to
Goldacre from the safe and took it with him.
The following January, Ollie told Christy he had revoked his deeds to Art and Bill and that he
wanted to retire. On January 15, Ollie conveyed Goldacre to Christy for a valuable consideration.
Christy recorded the deed immediately.
Ollie died on February 22 of this year. Art recorded his deed on February 23. Bill recorded his deed
on February 24. At Ollies funeral, on February 25, Bill and Art informed Christy of their respective
recordations.
Christy mortgaged Goldacre on May 4 to Elk Mortgage Co., which recorded the same day. Lotus
has a recording act of the race-notice type.
Elk Mortgage Co. has brought an action in declaratory relief to determine the rights of Art, Bill,
Christy, and Elk Mortgage Co. in the property. What are their rights? Discuss.
EXAM QUESTION NO. 5

Buyer and Seller entered into a written contract by which Seller agreed to sell, and Buyer agreed to
buy, a parcel of land improved with a dwelling for a stipulated price, 10% of which was paid on signing
the agreement. The agreement stipulated that Seller would convey by quitclaim deed. Buyer intended
to raze the house and build a public garage on the land, but this may not have been known to Seller and
was not mentioned in the written contract.
In the process of examining title, Buyer learned that the area was restricted to residential uses both
by a municipal zoning ordinance and by covenants in the chain of title. Buyer also learned that, until
three weeks before the signing of the agreement, the land had been in possession of Possessor, who
had held possession for at least ve years and had made some improvements. Possessor had originally
taken possession under a contract with Seller to purchase the land for a price to be paid in monthly
installments over a period of 10 years. Title was to be conveyed when the nal payment was made.
The contract with Possessor was not recorded, but Seller has offered to certify a copy of the contract,
which provided that Seller was entitled to take possession after any default in any installment of the
purchase price continuing for more than 60 days, to terminate the rights of Possessor, and to retain all
payments received in compensation for the use and occupancy of the land. Seller has also shown Buyer
a letter that he received two days previously from Possessor in which Possessor admitted that he was in
arrears on his payments for six months and that he would not make any further payments for another
six months.
Would Buyer be entitled to terminate her contract with Seller, secure the return of the earnest
money, and recover the reasonable value of her title examination? Discuss.
REAL PROPERTY EXAM ANSWERS 1.
ANSWERS TO ESSAY EXAM QUESTIONS

ANSWER TO EXAM QUESTION NO. 1
David, Henry, and Paul each have plausible claims, which will be explored separately. At issue is
whether Olivia retained an interest in the two-acre parcel and, if so, whether she effectively conveyed
that interest to David.
Davids Claim: Olivia conveyed to X County either a fee simple determinable or a fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent. The conveyance is ambiguous because it uses both the phrase on
the condition that (indicating a condition subsequent) and the phrase conveyance is to be null and
void (indicating the automatic termination characteristic of a fee simple determinable). In cases of
ambiguity, courts will usually hold the interest to be a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent
because it does not involve an automatic forfeiture and also permits greater judicial control of the
result. However, a court might not do so here because no right of entry was expressly reserved to the
grantor by the terms of the grant. Generally, a right of entry must be raised expressly. There is a strong
constructional preference against nding a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent and a right of
entry if the right of entry is not explicitly provided for.
The conditions in the conveyance were (i) that the site be used for a weighing station within six
months of the conveyance (which was fullled), and (ii) that the land continue to be so used (which
was not fullled). The interest retained by Olivia was either a right of entry (if the conveyance is
construed to create a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent) or a possibility of reverter (if it is
construed as a fee simple determinable). In either case, Olivias retained interest was not subject to the
Rule Against Perpetuities because future interests retained by the grantor are considered to be vested
and thus exempt from the Rule.
When Olivia later conveyed Blackacre to David, she evidently intended to convey her reversionary
interest in the two-acre parcel to David. Under the majority rules in force today, the possibility of
reverter is transferable inter vivos, but the right of entry is not. Thus, David received Olivias future
interest only if (i) Olivias transfer to X County is held to be a fee simple determinable, or (ii) in the
event the court holds it to be a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, the jurisdiction follows the
modern, but still minority, rule that rights of entry are transferable inter vivos.
If Davids interest is characterized as a possibility of reverter, title reverted immediately to David
when X County violated the condition of continued use. Alternatively, if David took a right of entry (as
he could in only a minority of jurisdictions), he properly exercised that right by removing the fences
around the two-acre parcel.
David has no recording act argument because the countys possession of the two acres was sufciently obvious to put him on notice of its interest. And David has no claim to the two acres through
adverse possession, even though he held color of title to the parcel for more than ve years, because he
did not actually occupy any part of the two acres.
Henrys Claim: Henry has two arguments. First, he would claim that Davids deed did not include
Olivias reversionary interest in the two-acre parcel and that the interest descended to Henry as Olivias
sole heir when Olivia died intestate. Henry would argue that Olivia did not show an intent to convey
the reversionary interest merely by repeating the old description, and that David did not expect to
receive an interest in view of the obvious presence of the weighing station at the time of the conveyance.
Henrys best argument, however, is that Olivias conveyance to X County created a fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent (because of the on condition that language) and that, under the
majority rule, the right of entry retained by Olivia could not be transferred inter vivos to David. As a
result, the interest still arguably belonged to Olivia at her death and then passed by descent to Henry.
2. REAL PROPERTY EXAM ANSWERS
Pauls Claim: Paul also has two possible arguments. His rst would be that Olivias conveyance
to X County created neither a fee simple determinable nor a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, but rather a fee simple absolute with an afrmative covenant to use the two acres for a weighing
station. As a consequence, he would argue that X Countys transfer to Paul would not result in forfeiture of the land, but only in an action for damages against Paul for breach of covenant. While courts
will, in cases of substantial ambiguity, nd a covenant rather than a forfeitable interest, Paul will
probably lose on this argument because the condition and null and void language indicates that
forfeiture was clearly intended.
Alternatively, Paul would argue that Olivias conveyance created a fee simple subject to condition
subsequent, but failed to reserve a right of entry, resulting in a fee simple absolute in X County and,
consequently, a valid fee simple absolute in Paul. If, however, the court chooses to imply a right of
entry, Paul could then argue that the court should apply the common law rule, now in force in a small
number of states, that any attempt to transfer a right of entry inter vivos destroys the interest. As a
result, X Countys interest would be enlarged to a fee simple absolute because of the removal of the
condition subsequent, and Paul would now be the owner of a fee simple absolute.
Conclusions
David is entitled to the parcel if rights of entry and/or possibilities of reverter are transferable inter
vivos in the jurisdiction.
Henry wins if Olivias deed to David is construed not to transfer the reversionary interest (which is a
doubtful interpretation), or if the retained interest was a right of entry which, although descendible, is
not transferable inter vivos in a majority of states.
Paul wins if the condition in Olivias conveyance to X County is held to be a covenant (unlikely) or
if the retained interest was a right of entry and the common law rule barring transfer destroyed it (not
likely), thereby enlarging X Countys fee.

Landlords rights and liabilities with respect to Tenant can be analyzed in terms of three relevant
periods:
June 1 (When Tenants Term Began) to July 1 (When Tenants Occupancy Began)
Landlord has no right to receive rent from Tenant for this month. At issue is whether a tenants duty
to pay rent is suspended by the landlords failure to deliver actual possession of the premises to the
tenant at the beginning of the leasehold term. Under the majority rule, Landlord must deliver actual
possession of the premises to Tenant. Because Landlord failed to remove the hold-over tenant to make
room for Tenant, Landlord is subject to liability for any damages Tenant may have suffered. Tenant
may have waived her right to damages by failing to request reimbursement for any expenses incurred
during the month; but, because she did not pay rent to Landlord for June, she has not waived her
defense to Landlords action for rent for this month.
July 1 (When Tenant Went into Possession) to August 31 (When Tenant Moved Out)
Hailstorm: Landlords rights and liabilities as to the broken windowpane and subsequent damages
will be governed by the lease and/or statute. At issue is who has the duty to make ordinary repairs to
the leased premises. If common law governs, Tenants failure to repair the windows constitutes permissive waste, making her liable to Landlord for the value of the windows and any consequential damages.
If, however, Tenants duty has been shifted to Landlord by the lease or by a repair and deduct statute,
Landlord will be liable to Tenant for the damages owing from the broken windowpanes. Tenant has
met the requirement of giving Landlord timely notice of damage. Unless the lease provides otherwise,
Landlords only liability to Tenant will be for damages, and Tenant will not be excused from paying
rent because the covenant to repair is independent of the covenant to pay rent.
Tenant will fail in an argument that the broken window constitutes constructive eviction, because
Landlord was not responsible for the damage. Tenant will also fail in an argument that the covenant of
habitability has been breached, because the broken window did not represent a substantial threat to her
health or safety.
Rehearsals: Landlord will not be liable to Tenant for Charlies rehearsals, and Tenant will have no
defense to an action for rent during this period. At issue is whether a landlord breaches the implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment or warranty of habitability by permitting another tenant to conduct daily
rehearsals in his apartment.
(1) Constructive Eviction: If the landlord does an act or fails to provide some service that he
has a legal duty to provide, and thereby makes the premises uninhabitable, the tenant may terminate
the lease and seek damages if she gives the landlord notice and a reasonable time to repair and then
vacates within a reasonable time. While the rehearsals probably constituted a substantial interference
with Tenants use and enjoyment of her apartment, they were not caused by Landlord. Although a small
handful of courts have taken the position that, by permitting one tenant to interfere with anothers
enjoyment, the landlord is himself responsible for that interference, this is not the majority rule. And,
even if the requirement of landlord conduct were met, Tenant did not vacate the premises quickly
enough to take advantage of the constructive eviction defense.
(2) Warranty of Habitability: If the premises become unsuitable for human residence, the tenant
may: (i) move out and terminate the lease, (ii) make repairs and offset the cost against future rent,
(iii) abate rent, or (iv) seek damages. The rehearsals probably did not represent a sufcient threat to
Tenants health for a breach of this warranty to be found. If, however, a court nds that loss of sleep
constitutes a sufcient injury to health, Tenant may collect damages from Landlord, or possibly have a
defense to an action for nonpayment of rent.
Narcotics Arrests: Landlord will not be liable to Tenant for Charlies friends possession of
narcotics on the premises. At issue is whether a landlord has a duty to prevent unlawful conduct
on the premises. As with the rehearsals, Tenant will encounter difculties in pursuing constructive
eviction and warranty of habitability claims. She might, in arguing constructive eviction, claim that the
unlawful conduct in Charlies apartment gave Landlord the right to terminate Charlies lease and thus
causally connected Landlord to the narcotics arrests. The two problems with this argument are that a
landlord cannot terminate a lease when the unlawful conduct is only occasional, as it was here, and the
conduct was not that of his tenant, Charlie, but rather of Charlies friends.
August 31 (When Tenant Moved Out) to May 31 (When Tenants Lease Expires)
Landlord has a right to recover rent from Tenant. At issue are a landlords rights and liabilities when
a tenant abandons the premises. Because no defenses are available to Tenant, Landlord can recover rent
for two months, July 1 to August 31. For the remainder of the lease term, Landlord can:
(1) Relet the premises on Tenants account, holding Tenant liable for any difference between the
rental payment under her lease and the rental paid by the new tenant; or
(2) If the jurisdiction follows the traditional rule, let the premises remain vacant, recovering rent
from Tenant as it becomes due.

Park will probably be held to have the right to an unimpaired view over the east half of Lot 1. At
issue is whether the benet of the agreement runs to Park as successor to the original promisee, and
whether the burden runs against Down as a successor to the promisor. The requirements for benet and
burden to run will be met for purposes of enforcing the agreement as an equitable servitude but not as
a negative covenant.
Intent that Lot 2 Enjoy the Benet of an Unimpaired View: The Adams-Baker agreement raises
a threshold issue of who is to enjoy the benet of the view. The recitals statement that Baker has
derived much pleasure from the view might suggest that the benet was to be held by Baker personally, in which case Park would not succeed to it and would be unable to enforce it. Similarly, the
recitals statement that the parties intended to assure an unobstructed view from Bakers house might
suggest an intent that the benet attach to the house rather than to the land, with the consequence that,
because the house has been destroyed, the benet cannot be enforced by Park.
However, the general constructional preference is for appurtenant benets, rather than benets in
gross. Because either of the above two interpretations would create a benet in gross, they will give
way to the third possible interpretation, under which the benet would be appurtenant: that Adams and
Baker intended that the benet attach neither to Baker nor to his house, but to Lot 2. Under this interpretation, the successor in interest to Lot 2 (Park) is in a position to enforce the benet.
The Adams-Baker Agreement Is Enforceable as an Equitable Servitude: In order for the benet
and burden of an equitable servitude to run, the covenant must touch and concern the land. This
requirement is met because the agreement increases the value and enjoyment of Lot 2. The one other
requirement for the benet to runthat Adams and Baker intended that Bakers successor enjoy the
benet in connection with Lot 2is met on the basis of the assumption made above, that the parties
intended that the benet attach to Lot 2.
The two other requirements for the burden to run have also been met. Intent is meteven though
the traditional formula, heirs, successors, and assigns, is missingbecause successors to Adams
would have to be bound if the purpose of the agreement, assuring an unobstructed view, is to be met.
Further, Bakers subsequent statement to Down about the building restriction provides some evidence
of an original intent to bind Adamss successors. The notice requirement is met by Bakers statement
to Down, putting Down at least on inquiry notice, and possibly on actual notice, of the existence of the
restriction.
Three possible equitable defenses may be asserted by Downabandonment, acquiescence, and
estoppelall premised on Parks absence from the state at the time Down started building the
two-story residence. However, because Park was unaware of Downs investment of labor, none of these
defenses is likely to be upheld.
The Adams-Baker Agreement Is Not Enforceable as a Negative Covenant: All requirements are
met for the benet of a negative covenant to run: intent (as in the equitable servitude); vertical privity
(because Park holds the complete interest in land held by Baker at the time the covenant was made);
and touch and concern (because the covenant increases the value and enjoyment of Lot 2). However,
the burden of the covenant does not run against Down. Although intent, notice (as in the equitable
servitude), vertical privity, and touch and concern are all met, the horizontal privity requirement is
not met. At the time Adams and Baker entered into the agreement, no independent interest in the land
passed between theme.g., there was no grantor-grantee or landlord-tenant relationship.
This Agreement Would Not Be Enforced as a Negative Easement: Under the analysis already
pursued, the easement would be appurtenant and, because the intent and notice requirements are met,
Park would be entitled to enforce the easement against Down. However, a court is not likely to characterize this as a negative easement. First, promissory language was used in the agreement (Adams
covenanted)suggesting a covenant rather than an easement, which would have been created by
grant or reservation. Second, while negative easements historically were limited to only four types of
arrangements (for light, air, subjacent or lateral support, or ow of an articial stream), none of which
is exactly like the one in dispute, today a negative easement is simply a restrictive covenant.
Thus, Park can probably obtain an injunction against Down on an equitable servitude theory. She is
less likely to recover damages, on either a negative covenant or negative easement theory, because there
appear to be no provable damages as of yet and, more important, the burden of the negative covenant
will be held not to run against Down, and the arrangement will not be construed as creating a negative
easement.

Bill owns Goldacre subject to Elk Mortgage Co.s (Elks) mortgage. At issue are (i) whether Ollie
delivered the deed to Art and/or Bill, and (ii) the effect of the recording act.
Delivery: A deed is not effective unless it has been delivered. Delivery is satised by words or
conduct evidencing the grantors intention that the deed have some present operative effect; i.e., that
title pass immediately and irrevocably, although the right to possession may be postponed until some
future time. Ollie did not deliver the deed to Art and, as a result, Art has no interest in Goldacre.
While Ollies physical transfer of the deed to Art creates a presumption of delivery, the presumption
is rebutted by Ollies statement at the time. Although the statement, being parol, is not admissible to
prove that the delivery was conditional, it is admissible to show that no delivery (i.e., no present effect)
was intended. Ollies transfer to Art may also be ineffective because it is an invalid testamentary
transfer, possessing none of the formalities required for a testamentary instrument under the Statute of
Wills.
Ollie did deliver the deed to Bill, giving Bill a valid interest in Goldacre. There is, to be sure, a
presumption against delivery arising from the fact that Ollie retained the deed in his possession.
However, this presumption is rebutted by two facts. First, Ollies statement, I am now giving Goldacre
to you, clearly reects an intent to transfer an interest at once (and, because it bears on intent, the
statement is provable by parol). Second, while Ollie retained possession of the deed, it was kept in a
place to which Bill had ready access; as a result, the presumption arising from lack of physical transfer
is not particularly strong.
Bill was privileged to remove the deed from the safe, for the language restricting him was merely
precatory. Even if the statement is viewed as a condition, it is of no effect because conditions cannot be
proved by parol. Thus, Ollie could not revoke his transfer to Bill.
Recording Act: Because Art has no interest as a result of the ineffective transfer to him, the conict
here is between Bill, Christy, and Elk.
As between Bill and Christy, Bill will prevail under the recording act. Under a race-notice statute,
a subsequent bona de purchaser (i.e., a person who gives valuable consideration and has no notice
of the prior instrument) prevails over a prior grantee only if she records rst. Although Christy was
a purchaser for value (having paid consideration) and recorded before Bill, she was not a bona de
purchaser because, at the time she purchased, she had actual notice of Bills interest. Christy obtained
this actual notice by being present when Ollie conveyed Goldacre to Bill. She might try to argue that
the deed to Bill was invalid because it was not supported by consideration. This argument would fail
because a deed does not require consideration and because, under a race-notice statute, it is only the
subsequent purchasers status as a purchaser for value that matters.
As between Bill and Elk, Elk will prevail under the recording act. Presumably Elk gave value for
its mortgage interest (although the facts do not state this); if no value was given, Elk will lose to Bill.
Also, although Elk took its interest after Bill recorded, it will not lose out to Bill under a race-notice
statute, because Bills recorded instrument appeared outside the chain of title and thus would not have
shown up in the course of a reasonable title search by Elk. Thus, under the majority chain-of-title
doctrine, Elk would prevail over Bill.
Thus, Elk has rst rights to Goldacre, Bill is second in priority, Christy is third, and Art has no
interest at all.

Buyer would be entitled to terminate her contract with Possessor and secure the return of the earnest
money and expenses of the title examination. At issue are (i) whether Sellers title is unmarketable,
and (ii) whether the contract can be rescinded based on mutual mistake.
Marketability of Title: There is generally implied in all land sale contracts a covenant that the
seller will deliver marketable title at closing. Although in some states this condition is not implied
where the conveyance is to be by quitclaim deed, the majority rule is to the contrary.
Zoning regulations such as the one involved here do not affect marketability unless a violation of
the zoning ordinance exists at the time the land sale contract is rst entered into. No such violation is
indicated by the facts.
Enforceable restrictive covenants affect marketability. Restrictive covenants, such as the one in
this case, limiting use of the land to residential purposes, if enforceable, constitute encumbrances that
render title unmarketable.
The installment land contract does seriously impair marketability. Although the contract was not
recorded, Buyer had actual notice of it and so would take subject to any rights possessed by Possessor.
In many states, Seller could not enforce a forfeiture pursuant to his contract with Possessor, and
would have to foreclose Possessors equitable interest by a quiet title action and by paying restitution.
Moreover, because Possessor has apparently paid more than 50% of the purchase price and has erected
improvements on the property, most courts today would permit foreclosure of Possessors equitable
interest only by judicial decree and would condition relief upon restitution by Seller of the payments
received in excess of the reasonable value of Possessors use of the land and the cost of resale. Therefore, until Seller obtained such a decree, Possessors outstanding equitable interest would make Sellers
title unmarketable.
Marketable title will also be impaired by the possibility of litigation, even in those states in which
Seller could enforce the forfeiture without the necessity of judicial action. Such a possibility exists
here. Possessors letter would be good, but not conclusive, evidence upon which Buyer could rely in any
future litigation. Further, the possibility of litigation exists with respect to other defenses that may be
available to Possessor.
Buyers Intended Use: The facts are ambiguous as to whether Seller was aware of Buyers purposes
in purchasing the land. If Seller was or should have been aware of Buyers plan to erect a public garage,
Buyer would for this reason be entitled to equitable reliefrescission and restitution. On the other
hand, if Seller was not aware of Buyers plans in purchasing the land, Buyers unilateral mistake by
itself would not be a sufcient basis for such relief.
Remedies: If Sellers title is not marketable, or if Seller was aware of Buyers purpose for purchasing
the land, Buyer can get restitution of her earnest money and out-of-pocket costs.

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What are the different types of estates in land?

What are the different types of estates in land?

What rights and duties does a life tenant have?

What rights and duties does a life tenant have?

REAL PROPERTY

ii. REAL PROPERTY

REAL PROPERTY iii.

No Class Members Alive at Testators DeathClass Stays

iv. REAL PROPERTY

Executory Interest Following Defeasible Fee Violates the Rule

When More than Two Joint Tenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LANDLORD AND TENANT . . . . . . . . .

vi. REAL PROPERTY

REAL PROPERTY vii.

viii. REAL PROPERTY

RIGHTS IN THE LAND OF ANOTHEREASEMENTS, PROFITS, COVENANTS,

REAL PROPERTY ix.

REAL PROPERTY xi.

Equitable Defenses to Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xii. REAL PROPERTY

REAL PROPERTY xiii.

xiv. REAL PROPERTY

Presumptions Relating to Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

REAL PROPERTY xv.

Covenant Against Encumbrances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xvi. REAL PROPERTY

Restrictive CovenantsDeeds from Common Grantor . . . .

SECURITY INTERESTS IN REAL ESTATE .

REAL PROPERTY xvii.

TRANSFERS BY MORTGAGEE AND MORTGAGOR . . . . . . . . . . . .

xviii. REAL PROPERTY

VIII. RIGHTS INCIDENTAL TO OWNERSHIP OF LAND (NATURAL RIGHTS)

REAL PROPERTY xix.

COOPERATIVES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND ZONING . . . . . . .

PRESENT POSSESSORY ESTATES

Fee Simple Absolute

Fee Simple Determinable (and Possibility of Reverter)

Correlative Future Interest in GrantorPossibility of Reverter

Possibility of Reverter Need Not Be Expressly Retained

Transferability of Possibility of Reverter

Correlative Future Interest in Third PartyExecutory Interest

Fee Simple Subject to Condition Subsequent (and Right of Entry)

Correlative Future Interest in GrantorRight of Entry

Failure to Reserve Right of Entry

Waiver of Right of Entry

Transferability of Right of Entry

Correlative Future Interest in Third PartyExecutory Interest

CompareFee Simple Determinable

Construction of Ambiguous Language

Fee Simple Subject to an Executory Interest

Note: Were it not for the charity-to-charity exception to the Rule

Limitations on Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry

Conditions and Limitations Violating Public Policy

O conveys land to A for her support until she marries. Because O

Provisions Involving Separation or Divorce

Life Estates by Marital Right (Legal Life Estates)

Conventional Life Estate

For Life of Grantee

Life Estate Pur Autre Vie (Life of Another)