Business Strategy Review, 2002, Volume 13 Issue 2, pp 41-50

Partnering with the Unfamiliar:

Lessons from the Case of
Renault and Nissan
Harry Korine, Kazuhiro Asakawa and Pierre-Yves Gomez

Companies are increasingly forming

alliances with unfamiliar, often even
unlikely, partners in the search for greater
geographic coverage and complementary
skills. How can such odd couples
effectively co-operate in practice? They
can if they put the formation of a
successful alliance at the centre of their
strategies.
In the wake of globalisation, industry convergence
and technological upheaval, companies are
increasingly concluding partnership agreements
outside their traditional spheres of familiarity. The
search for expanded geographic coverage, broader
service to clients and complementary skills has
yielded some extraordinary new alliances: AT&T
with NTT DoCoMo in telecommunications; Kaiser
Permanente with Fresenius in healthcare; and Renault
with Nissan in the automotive sector are just a few
prominent examples.
Odd couples abound. These are companies with little
or no previous experience of working together. Often
everything from management style to historic

trajectory suggests they should be kept apart. Yet, they

are joining their fortunes and establishing deep
strategic interdependence. While the theoretical gains
to be had from such combinations are evident, the
practice of creating partnerships between the
unfamiliar is fraught with difficulty.
In partnerships between the unfamiliar, where there
is no prior relationship to draw upon, the process of
alliance formation takes on very special significance.
How do you approach a stranger with a view to
building a long-lasting commitment?
Typically, there are cultural differences to be overcome
and diverging world views to be reconciled. The
initiator of the process worries about being seen as
too aggressive; the recipient of an alliance proposal
wonders how to play his or her cards. The process
may yield knowledge that leads to a more refined
evaluation of the alliance or it may hide knowledge
and result in wildly over-optimistic (or overpessimistic) projections. Most importantly, perhaps,
the alliance formation process in which executives
from both sides form relationships with each other
for the first time sets the tone for the partnership.
Negative routines established and bad precedents set
in the alliance formation process are very hard to
correct quickly later on, once the partnership is under
pressure to deliver results.

Summer 2002

42 Harry Korine, Kazuhiro Asakawa and Pierre-Yves Gomez

Unlikely partners
Of the many odd couples being created today, the
partnership between car-makers Renault from France
and Nissan from Japan was perhaps one of the least
likely to form. Although the case for an alliance
between Renault and Nissan might have looked
attractive on paper geographic complementarity in
market coverage, economies of scale in shared
production activities and potential for cross-learning
in areas of different competencies the obstacles to
actually achieving these benefits were formidable.
Renault and Nissan had no history of doing business
together, came from very different cultures, and had
both seen their reputations tarnished in recent years
Renault by a failed alliance with Volvo; Nissan by its
declining market share and great financial difficulty.
Against all expectations, however, these two giants
found each other and signed a far-reaching strategic
tie-up, with equity participation and exchange of
executives. Even more surprising, the partnership has
borne fruit. Thanks to the recovery plan launched
shortly after the alliance agreement was formalised,
Nissan has become profitable again for the first time
in six years and is developing
Renault and
an innovative new product lineNissan had no
up; over the same period, the
two companies have enjoyed
history of doing
business together mutual benefits from platform
sharing, technology transfer
and supply chain rationalisation. Renault has
increased its initial ownership stake in Nissan and
Nissan is about to take a significant equity
participation in Renault.
How did Renault and Nissan come together and what
can be learned from their success? We have studied
the nine-month Renault/Nissan alliance formation
process in great depth, from first contacts to the
signature of the alliance agreement, interviewing all
the principal participants in their native languages and
consulting archival material from the two companies.
Based on unique data from both parties to the
agreement, our study suggests how executives can
use the alliance formation process to overcome the
liability of unfamiliarity and sow the seeds for longlasting co-operation.
In the case of Renault and Nissan, successful
management of the alliance formation process hinged

Business Strategy Review

on the ability of the executives of the two firms to put

the alliance process at the centre of their respective
strategies. First, they took a long-term, encompassing
view at critical junctures in the process rather than a
short-term, bargaining perspective. And second, they
used the process itself to initiate strategic changes
within their firms rather than waiting to initiate change
until the signing of an agreement.
The alliance formation process: from
conceiving to closure
The formation of the alliance between Renault and
Nissan divided into four stages, with key events and
interim agreements marking clear signposts. We
label these stages conceiving, courting, commitment
and closure.

Conceiving: April 1998 to September 10, 1998

After failing to link up with Volvo in 1995, Renault
remained in search of a partner with which to achieve
broader geographic coverage and increased size. In
1998, the urgency of the search was heightened by
the DaimlerChrysler merger and Fords purchase of
Volvo Automobiles. As the musical chairs game in the
automobile industry speeded up, Asia appeared the
most promising hunting ground.
In spite of advice against a direct approach, in June
1998 Renault president Louis Schweitzer wrote to
Nissan president Yoshikazu Hanawa proposing broad
strategic co-operation. He sent a similar proposal to
the president of Mitsubishi Motor Cars.
While Mitsubishi was relatively slow to respond,
Nissans Hanawa answered quickly and positively.
[Bankers told us] if you write to them, thats the
best way to make sure of failure. Well, I wrote to
Hanawa in June saying I believe we should be thinking
strategically. Can we do that together? and he
answered in July, Schweitzer recalls. I was impressed
with Mr Schweitzers courageous decision to embrace
a new business opportunity, says Hanawa.
After a framework for co-operation was defined by
an advance team, Schweitzer and Hanawa held the
first of 12 one-to-one meetings they were to have over
the course of forming the alliance between Renault
and Nissan.
Mr Schweitzer and Mr Hanawa learned to trust each
other very quickly. I think that this trust between the

Partnering with the Unfamiliar: Lessons from the case of Renault and Nissan 43

chairmen has lasted all the way through, with no

stumbling blocks, deviations or betrayals, Renaults
head negotiator Guy Douin observes.
Hanawa himself stresses this point: With many
people around, it is difficult to tell each other the truth,
that is why I decided to negotiate alone. I think Mr
Schweitzer, on the other hand, was more careful about
opening up to me because of the previous experience
with Volvo. I believe the process leading up to an
alliance is all about telling the truth; dishonesty only
makes the process longer.
During July and August negotiators from the two firms
got to know each other and identified some 20 areas
of potential synergy. On September 10, 1998,
Schweitzer and Hanawa signed a memorandum
concerning the evaluation of technical and financial
synergies. The memorandum gave Renault negotiating
exclusivity for Nissan Motor and established 21 joint
study teams to examine the feasibility of the alliance.

Courting: September 10 1998 to October 1998

In a car company, when theres a problem, the
problem normally rises from the engineering
department. So engineers were selected from both sides
to work on research topics for three months. Similar
projects were performed for other departments as
well, says Hanawa.
During the courting stage, nearly 100 engineers and
business specialists from each side worked together
very closely, without any assurance of an outcome.
These joint study teams quickly became deeply involved
in sharing critical information about both firms. The
coverage of their work was comprehensive from

Renault

Both Renault and Nissan took a very open-minded

approach to partnership in the conceiving stage.
Rather than beginning with the most familiar

candidate in the pool of potential partners (for

Renault, Mitsubishi, because of a history of cooperation with Volvo; for Nissan, Ford, because of
shared van development experience), both
companies were prepared to start from scratch and
think outside existing frames of reference. With its
superior technology and size, Nissan was a huge
challenge for Renault. Renault, on the other hand,
could bring a true outsiders view to Nissans
organisation and operations.

Renault headquarters: growing through partnership

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44 Harry Korine, Kazuhiro Asakawa and Pierre-Yves Gomez

platform integration to joint geographic presence

and provided hard evidence for alliance synergies.
It was extraordinary in terms of synergies. We really
believed in it, or at least those taking part in the
negotiations did. Quite frankly, we were so
complementary in terms of geography, products,
personality...so we had great confidence, says Alain
Dassas, a member of Renaults lead negotiating team.
The spirit of discovery was shared among the top
negotiators on both sides. Toshiyuki Shiga of Nissan
notes: The kind of information that we were sharing
with each other prior to the alliance agreement was
a very rare casesince both sides had strong
individual needs to make themselves stronger, the
joint study took place sincerely. It was not just a
handshake between the top managers.
In order to maintain confidentiality and control in the
process, the teams did not communicate with each
other or to the outside but reported directly to the
head negotiators on both sides, who in turn kept
Schweitzer and Hanawa regularly informed.
Progressing from the conceiving to the courting stage
of the alliance formation process, the two companies
threw out stereotypes about France and Japan and
put big-company arrogance aside to concentrate on
hard business facts. The heavy resource allocation to
pre-agreement evaluation allowed the business
managers to begin to
Both companies
overcome unfamiliarity and
learned more about to find common ground, not
their own strengths in theoretical synergies but
in concrete terms such as
and weaknesses
access to the Latin American
market and sharing transmission technology. This
patient investment in process, when the ultimate
outcome of the alliance was still in doubt, yielded
discoveries about the prospective partner but also
provided a mirror for self-reflection. Both companies
learned more about their own strengths and weaknesses.

Commitment: October 1998 to December 23 1998

In October Schweitzer prepared a two-page mock
press release with the title Nissan and Renault join
forces outlining the full scope of the agreement he
envisioned. He discussed it with Hanawa at a face-toface meeting. We had to move closer strategically,
but it could not be a simple acquisition or a merger,
because a Franco-Japanese merger is no easy matter....

Business Strategy Review

I suggested to him [Hanawa] that three people from

Renault should become members of the Nissan board
of directors: the COO, the vice-president product
planning and the deputy chief financial officer. I only
asked for those three. I didnt ask for any other jobs
except those three, and he [Hanawa] didnt try to argue
about any of them, says Schweitzer.
I did not agree with it [the mock press release] from
the start, of course. But I was not surprised. Through
our discussions, I felt that Mr Schweitzer always had
a more comprehensive view of the partnership than I
did, Hanawa notes.
Their discussion culminated in Hanawas invitation
for Schweitzer to speak at Nissans Tokyo
headquarters.
On November 10, Schweitzer, Douin, and Carlos
Ghosn (who went on to become first COO, and then,
in 2000, CEO of Nissan) made what Renault called
the big picture presentation to the Nissan board.
Drawing on the findings of the joint study teams and
Renaults own experience in turnaround management,
Schweitzer described in detail the full benefit of a largescale collaboration for Nissan. No immediate response
was forthcoming from Nissan but work in the joint
study teams continued until mid-December.
In the commitment stage, both sides take make or
break risks in the words of Schweitzer, a passe,
ou a casse. We knew we were playing with fire.
We had the growing impression of being on slippery
ground, not to say enemy territory...We werent at all
sure we could pull it off, says Douin.
When Schweitzer had fully articulated Renaults
position, Hanawa invited him to show the Nissan
board what Renault could do. Why did both executives
act so boldly? With the personal relationship between
Schweitzer and Hanawa established and with the work
of the teams showing the hard benefits of an alliance,
the time appeared ripe to both executives to go beyond
talk and put stakes in the ground for Schweitzer visa-vis Nissan management and for Hanawa vis-a-vis
his own board.
At the presentation, the participants were informed
for the first time of the overall direction which the
joint studies might be leading towards, recalls
Hanawa. But, to be frank, I myself was amazed

Renault

Partnering with the Unfamiliar: Lessons from the case of Renault and Nissan 45

Consummation: Hanawa, left, and Schweitzer conceived, courted, commited and closed
atthe level of research as well as the level of
involvement with which Renault had progressed with
the alliance plans. Because at Nissan, the negotiation
was strictly kept between Mr Schweitzer and I. This
was the difference between Renault and Nissan.
Renault knew exactly what they wanted from the
beginning. I think our board only understood it as
one possibility.
Bold, public action took the alliance process to another
level of intimacy, making the co-operation much
harder to reverse.

Closure: December 1998 to March 11 1999

On December 23 1998, Hanawa asked Renault to
make an offer for both Nissan Motor (cars) and Nissan
Diesel (trucks), formally terminated the negotiating
exclusivity clause and set a deadline of March 30 1999
for concluding a deal. Nissan was effectively put in
play and DaimlerChrysler was mooted as Renaults
main rival.
Throughout the due diligence process that followed,
the lead negotiators continued to meet regularly. On
March 10 1999, DaimlerChrysler announced that it

was no longer in the running for Nissan. Meeting their

counterparts in Tokyo on the day after
DaimlerChryslers announcement, Renault negotiators
upheld the terms of their original offer.
Says Schweitzer: The decision we made during the
final negotiations was not to change our position. It
was an important choice on our part to say: Its not
because Daimler is no longer around that we are
changing our proposal. I decided not to [change the
proposal] because I felt it would destroy the
relationship of trust which was indispensable for us
to work together...It seemed more important to show
that we were loyal, stable and reliable partners.
The next day, Renault and Nissan went public with a
signed alliance agreement that very closely matched
Schweitzers October mock press release. The fact
that we had agreed on the terms of equal position
was important for me, as dominance destroys
motivation, notes Hanawa.
Despite the changed circumstances, negotiators at both
Renault and Nissan persevered. Renault continued its
fact finding and did not waver from the mode or the
Summer 2002

46 Harry Korine, Kazuhiro Asakawa and Pierre-Yves Gomez

spirit of interaction established earlier in the process.

Above all we tried even if we didnt manage it 100
per cent to avoid putting ourselves forward as the
company making an acquisition, the side that comes
out on top. We always wanted to have due regard for
form, to have due consideration for the Japanese...We
kept in mind the lessons that could be learned from
our previous experience [with Volvo], says De Andria
of Renaults negotiating team.

term health of the alliance. He did not want doubt to

enter into the relationship and sour the future.

Nissan continued to meet with Renault regularly and

responded quickly to requests and proposals. For
Nissan, the negotiations and the execution of the
alliance contract were a process and not an objective,
observes Sugino of Nissans negotiating team. The
objective was not to finalise the contract wording but
to examine how to share best practices.

Conceiving as believing in a shared future

In the conceiving stage, instead of narrowly pursuing
a deeper relationship with already familiar partners
(for Renault, Mitsubishi; for Nissan, Ford), both
Renault and Nissan actively encouraged novel
relationships. The universe of potential partners was
their opportunity space and they quickly got down to
business with an unfamiliar partner. It would appear
that both Schweitzer and Hanawa were less interested
in the initial conditions that guide most partner
searches than in the shape of a shared future.
Mitsubishi might have looked better to Renault (and
Ford to Nissan) from the point of view of prior
experience but the executives of Renault and Nissan
soon saw that the Renault/Nissan combination offered
unique possibilities.

Going against received wisdom

Both Schweitzer and Hanawa put the alliance process
at the centre of their respective strategies. This allowed
them to take a long-term perspective and go against
received wisdom in managing the four stages of the
alliance process.

The question of commitment was not raised again. In

effect, the long period of building familiarity between
the two companies could not be matched by any new
suitor. Determining an alliance partner actually involves
a lot of work, joint study teams, bottom-up reporting,
et ceteraIn view of all the work that was put into the
study process with Renault, I imagine that evaluating
another alliance deal at the same time would really be
a major undertaking, says Nissans Shiga.

Schweitzer already had a plan for bringing the two

companies together; Hanawa, despite not having
actively searched for a global strategic partner,

Schweitzer held on to the original proposal in the

strong belief that consistency was crucial for the longFigure 1

The Renault/Nissan alliance formation process: a timeline

CO-OPERATION

Nissan opens for offers:

Motor & Diesel

Joint studies
continue

Alliance
signed
Due diligence
Joint Study
Teams

Mock press release

Big Picture

Information
exchange
Schweitzer's letter
Hanawa's response

07/98

08

Conceiving

Business Strategy Review

09

10

Courting

11

12

Commitment

01/99

02

Closure

03

04

Partnering with the Unfamiliar: Lessons from the case of Renault and Nissan 47

enthusiastically took up the alliance process with

Renault. Believing in the possibilities of a shared
future, the two executives saw beyond unfavourable
initial conditions and allowed the process to proceed
at a faster speed than their low level of familiarity
would normally warrant. Rather than taking a wait
and see approach, they plunged right into the work of
shaping a common future.
Too often, in the conception stage of alliance
formation, executives focus almost exclusively on
initial conditions the current state of the other side.
However, initial conditions are indicators of the
independent past, not fail-safe predictors of a shared
future. The Renault/Nissan case shows that it can be
advantageous to approach the alliance formation
process with a view to the future. Belief in a shared
future allows even unfamiliar companies to move more
quickly into a stage of courting, where courting aims
at defining common advantage rather than exposing
individual weaknesses.
It should be stressed that taking a believing is seeing
approach rather than the more conventional seeing
is believing requires that both partners develop clear
frames of reference for continuously testing their
beliefs against reality. Both Renault and Nissan, both
Schweitzer and Hanawa, had clear ideas of what they
needed out of a strategic alliance and used the alliance
formation process to rigorously test the other sides
abilities to deliver on the promise of a shared future.

Courting as intensive fact finding

In the courting stage, where prudence advises a toplevel approach and careful guarding of company
secrets, Renault and Nissan got down to facts and,
through the joint study teams, deeply involved middle
managers in the alliance formation process. Although
they opened up the process to information sharing
and learning across company boundaries, Schweitzer
and Hanawa kept a very tight rein on their companies
negotiators and the joint study teams. The two
executives took an approach that can best be described
as both open and closely controlled.
It is worth noting that Daimler-Benz and Chrysler
followed a much more traditional path in coming
to their 1998 merger agreement: only a few top
executives were involved in the process and no
joint study teams were formed until many months
after signing.

The traditional path to partnership agreement can at

best confirm the two sides starting views of initial
conditions. There is just not enough information
sharing to go beyond a static evaluation. In the case
of Renault and Nissan, by contrast, the courting stage
allowed for discovery. In this kind of a process, more
facts come out, more people are involved and more
tacit knowledge is shared. The courting process
becomes a living experiment of working together
before signature and establishes the practical bases
for future co-operation.
In theory, any strategic partnership between unfamiliar
organisations can benefit from such an open exchange
of facts and experiences prior to signature. The
questions are how to ensure quality of information
sharing and how to protect
the process from leakage The courting
and unwanted publicity. For process becomes a
Renault and Nissan, clearly living experiment
defining the tasks of the of working together
joint study team tasks was
critical to information sharing. High priority, regular
involvement of top executives and the establishment
of specific internal reporting lines reinforced the
process and prevented it from getting out of control.

Commitment as risk taking

In the commitment stage, both sides opened up and
took big risks: Schweitzers mock press release;
Hanawas invitation to talk to the Nissan board in
Tokyo; and the big picture presentation. Rather than
inching towards a commitment bargain by bargain,
executives at Renault and Nissan explicitly
acknowledged the need for dramatic action to cement
the tie between the two companies.
Commitment is generally built incrementally, step by
verifying step. It is a time-consuming process, one that
takes place for the most part at the individual level of
analysis. That being said, there are junctures in the
life of a partnership relationship where it appears
necessary to take more radical action, articulating the
extent of progress made and making a public
statement. The transition sought by Schweitzer and
Hanawa was two-fold: from individual to
organisational commitment; and from knowledgebased trust to identification-based trust. The symbolic
and very public nature of the events at this stage were
clearly designed to bring the broader organisations
into the process.

Summer 2002

48 Harry Korine, Kazuhiro Asakawa and Pierre-Yves Gomez

The content of the mock press release and the big

picture presentation aimed at demonstrating that
Renault and Nissan had truly common interests in
the alliance not only did the two companies know
each other, they could identify with each other.
The majority of strategic alliances need at some point
to establish organisational commitment and
identification-based trust. Of course, previously
unfamiliar organisations cannot just jump from zero to
this level of partnership. Only when the initial belief
in a shared future has received sufficient corroboration
in facts and the level of interaction between the
partners is roughly symmetrical, does it make sense
to initiate dramatic commitment steps. In a sense, the
commitment stage is the time to put the relationship to
the test and, through the test of public articulation, to
establish a different, common base for going forward.

Closure as investment, not negotiation

In closure, finally, when negotiating practice would
suggest squeezing for better terms, Renault stayed the
course and gave up the unique opportunity provided
by DaimlerChryslers dropping out to take advantage
of Nissan. Rather than opening up negotiations again,
Renault closed them down. Nissan was to be a fully
motivated, equal partner, not a humiliated outpost of
a new automotive industry empire.

Alliance formation as an opportunity to

launch change
The guiding principle in managing critical junctures
in the four stages would appear to be the quest for
long-term gain on both sides. Their ultimate strategic
purpose(s) guides the executives through the ups and
downs of the process.
The long-term perspective is also apparent in the way
both companies used the alliance formation process
to change themselves the process of working with
the unfamiliar adds value, independent of the ultimate
outcome. Thus, Schweitzer used the alliance formation
process to build the organisations confidence and
enhance the companys standing in the automotive
world. The ambition to take on one of the biggest
names in the business and the mastery of challenges
in the process (ie, joint study teams, big picture
presentation) made the company a more serious player
in the automotive industry partnership stakes. The
process was not only concerned with learning more
about Nissan, it also served to build up Renault.

Renault

Schweitzer and his team never lost sight of their

fundamental objective, that is, to form a lasting,

significant strategic alliance with Nissan. The failure

to squeeze Nissan on terms is not a case of undue
generosity or insufficient aggressiveness in the final
hour. Rather, Renaults actions during closure
demonstrated consistency of purpose. Any negotiation
will have its twists and turns but negotiation tactics
should not take precedence over the gains to be
achieved through long-term co-operation.

Wise men: Carlos Ghosn, right, found the ground prepared at Nissan
Business Strategy Review

Hanawa, too, used the

alliance formation process to
effect change inside his
company. The work with
Renault served as a mirror for
demonstrating the full extent
of Nissans problems, helped
promote new, younger
managers
(the
lead
negotiators) and isolated a
board that had blocked major
change in the past (the big
picture presentation put the
board in front of a fait
accompli). Independent of the
final outcome of negotiations,
the alliance process with
Renault brought fundamental
changes to Nissan.

Partnering with the Unfamiliar: Lessons from the case of Renault and Nissan 49

The process behind the miracle

From the Wall Street Journal to the Harvard Business
Review, newspapers and business magazines around
the world have reported extensively in recent months
on the successful turn-around of Nissan. Ghosn and
his team have been described as miracle workers for
the speed and scope of the changes they have achieved
at Nissan. Based on our analysis of the alliance
formation process, we can shed further light on this
success. In effect, the alliance formation efforts
presaged and jump-started Nissans turnaround:
Deep knowledge was built up in the joint study teams.
Thanks to the very detailed engineering and marketing
work done over the last three months of 1998, the
true nature of the issues at Nissan was out in the open.
Strengths, weaknesses and complementarities had
been precisely evaluated. Moreover, the process of
working in joint study teams had helped establish a
common language and protocol it is no accident
that the joint team structure was replicated after the
signing of the alliance. In the process of becoming
familiar, the two companies developed a way of
learning from each other.

management. Continued resistance to change would

have implied severe loss of face, and the majority of
the executive board therefore stepped down after the
alliance agreement was signed.
Entrepreneurial spirit was infused into Nissan in the
course of building the alliance agreement. At a
company where lack of critical review and mechanical
agreement had been the norms of interaction for many
years, the key managers involved in the alliance
formation process saw themselves in the unflattering
mirror of reality and got used to challenging the status
quo. Moreover, through the work with Renault, these
technology-focused managers began to develop a
strategic view of the business. Most significantly,
perhaps, younger people were put in charge of running
the alliance formation process and gained the experience
necessary to begin to drive change from the inside.
In short, when Ghosn came on the scene in the late
spring of 1999, he knew what to do and found a group
of managers inside Nissan that was ready to follow
his dramatic remake of the company.

Resistance at Nissan was broken down during the

alliance formation process. Hanawa adroitly bypassed
the existing power structure by keeping the
negotiations to himself and his personal lieutenants.
When sufficient knowledge and confidence in the
alliance was built, he effectively used Renault to
present the truth about Nissan to his own executive
board. Working with Renault in this fashion publicly
exposed bureaucratic inefficiency and uncompetitive

The process of partnering with the unfamiliar

represents a unique opportunity to do things
differently to break with received wisdom about
inter-organisational negotiation processes and to
change the position and outlook of the organisation.
Partnering with the unfamiliar is both challenge and
opportunity. The case of Renault and Nissan the
ultimate odd couple demonstrates how challenge
can be turned into opportunity, if the alliance is put at
the centre of strategy.

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Harry Korine is teaching fellow in strategic and international management at London Business School
and senior research fellow at the Ecole de Management de Lyon. His current research focuses on
entrepreneurship in strategy and the management of the globalisation process.
Kazuhiro Asakawa is associate professor of organisation and strategy at the Graduate School of Business
Administration, Keio University, Japan. His current research focuses on global R&D management and
innovation by multinational corporations.
Pierre-Yves Gomez is professor of strategy and director of the Rodolphe Mrieux Foundation for
Entrepreneurial Management at the Ecole de Management de Lyon. His current research focuses on
corporate governance and the management of the globalisation process.
The financial support of the Strategic Leadership Research Programme at LBS, the Rodolphe Mrieux
Foundation for Entrepreneurial Management at EM Lyon and the R&D department at Keio Business
School are gratefully acknowledged. For teaching purposes, the case study series Renault/Nissan is
available in English, French, and Japanese.

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