Lessons From Enron
Lessons From Enron
Lessons From Enron
Before I begin, I should note that the views I express are solely my own, and not necessarily those of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, its other members, or the staff.
It has always been recognized in the United States that auditors have important obligations to the investing
public. Many of the financial reporting failures that led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seemed to suggest that
auditors had forgotten their obligations to the public. Most auditors and most accounting firms performed their
work responsibly and professionally. But, during the early part of this decade, there were a series of highprofile financial reporting failures involving major companies and a large number of restatements of audited
financial reports. As a result, billions of dollars in market value disappeared. Investor losses caused a public
outcry. The bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom, and the collapse of Arthur Andersen, one of the worlds
most prestigious auditing firms, have become symbols of that era.
In every case in of inaccurate public company financial reporting, the question inevitably arose, "Where were
the auditors and why didnt they uncover these problems?" Let me list three factors that, in my view,
contributed to the loss of trust in auditing:
First, audit firms placed increased emphasis on performing consulting services for audit clients.
In many cases, clients were paying their auditors more for consulting than for the financial statement audit.
As a result, the business risks to the firm of angering the client if there was a disagreement about an
accounting issue during the audit became extremely high.
Accounting firms faced considerable pressure to keep the audit fees low. Companies began to view the
audit opinion as merely another commodity to be purchased as cheaply as possible.
The tactic of using the audit to gain access to additional, non-audit work, coupled with the difficulty in raising
audit fees, meant that the costs of auditing had to be controlled. That led to less emphasis on traditional
substantive testing. This approach can have disastrous consequences if the auditors judgments about
what to test and where the greatest risks are turn out to be incorrect.
As I mentioned a moment ago, the U.S. Congress responded to declining public confidence by passing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The law made four fundamental changes in the relationship between auditors and public
companies.
First, it sharply restricted the auditors ability to render consulting services to audit clients.
Second, it made the companys audit committee, composed of independent directors, rather than
management, responsible for hiring the auditor.
Third, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required both management and the auditor to report to the public on the
effectiveness of the companys internal control over financial reporting.
Finally, the new law ended the accounting professions long tradition of self-regulation. In its place, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
Instead, the Board is a private, non-profit corporation. As a result, we have more flexibility in hiring
and decision-making processes than does a government agency.
But, the Board is under the close oversight of a U.S. federal agency, the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The SEC appoints the Board members and must approve the Boards annual budget,
auditing standards, and other rules before they can take effect.
Second, the PCAOB is independent of the accounting profession and the business community.
The Board is not a membership organization of accountants. In fact, the law provides that no more
than two of the five Board members may be accountants. It is also not a self-regulatory organization like
the stock exchanges. The funds needed to operate the Board come mainly from fees charged to public
companies, based on their market capitalization.
The third key characteristic of the PCAOB is its very broad inspection authority.
The accountant oversight system we replaced, called peer review, relied on firms to inspect each
other. Peer review did not look at audits that were the subject of litigation or investigation. In contrast, we
have a full-time staff of experienced auditors to conduct our inspections. We are able to attract very talented
people because Congress authorized us to offer pay and benefits that are competitive with the firms we
inspect.
Further, the Board uses a risk-based approach to selecting audits for review. This means that we look
at the engagements in which the firm faced difficult auditing and accounting issues. We also focus on
internal management that is, how the firm seeks to maintain audit quality and professionalism in its
practice. That can include such things as training, the firms internal inspection program, partner
compensation principles, and the tone and communications of its top management.
At the end of each inspection, the Board must issue a public report. However, the part of the report
that criticizes, or suggests improvements in, a firms quality controls is not public.
The next characteristic of the PCAOB I would like to highlight is our responsibility to set auditing standards.
In many countries, the job of inspecting and overseeing accounting firms and the job of setting auditing
standards are performed by two separate bodies. In contrast, the PCAOB does both. Therefore, we are
able to learn, through our inspections, how auditing standards are being applied in practice and to use that
knowledge in future standard-setting.
Finally, the PCAOB has the power to take strong enforcement action against firms that violate professional
standards.
Firms and individual accountants must take the PCAOB seriously because the Board can impose
severe penalties. Those penalties include monetary fines and suspension or expulsion from public
company auditing. But, we also have discretion as to when to bring an enforcement action and when to rely
on other means to improve audit quality.
Since opening for business in January, 2003, the Board has made considerable progress in putting these
characteristics to work. For example -
We now have over 450 employees, including approximately 200 inspectors. Many of these inspectors
are CPAs with recent public accounting experience.
Over 1,600 accounting firms are registered with the Board, including over 700 non-U.S. firms located
in 81 countries. Thirteen Japanese firms have registered. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires us to annually
inspect the nine accounting firms that audit more than 100 public companies. Other firms must be
inspected once every three years, if they are actually engaged in auditing public companies.
We have conducted nearly 400 inspections and issued over 300 inspection reports, representing
reviews of over 1,800 public company audits.
We have issued four auditing standards, plus rules on auditor independence and rules governing
auditor tax services for audit clients.
situations, the Board must take the harsher enforcement approach. But deciding when to use inspections
reports to encourage improvement and when to use enforcement to punish violations requires careful
judgment.
The Board has announced that it will amend its internal control auditing standard. We want to make
sure that the auditors work focuses on the controls that prevent or detect the highest risks of material
misstatements in financial reports. We also want the financial statement audit and the internal control audit
to be integrated -- that is, performed as a single process. We are also looking for other ways to make sure
that internal control audits are as efficient as possible.
The Board has also announced that the 2006 inspections of large firms will focus on how firms are
conducting internal control audits. We know the inspection program is a powerful tool. We want to make
sure that we are using it to encourage auditors to do this new job effectively and efficiently.
We recognize that small audit firms may need training to help with the process. The Board plans to
develop guidance for auditors of small companies.
IV. Conclusion
I want to conclude by suggesting that, ultimately, all of us accountants, public company officials, or regulators
face the same challenge: to foster and maintain public confidence in financial reporting.
Those responsible for investor protection and auditor oversight in other countries may have different
approaches than does the U.S., and those who practice in other countries may face different problems than do
U.S. auditors. However, for all of us building the publics trust and confidence is the goal. Our markets and our
economies are critically dependent on reliable financial information. Therefore, the auditors role is too
important not to get right.