Government's Reply To Apple's Motion To Vacate

Case 5:16-cm-00010-SP Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 1 of 43 Page ID #:2094
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EILEEN M. DECKER
United States Attorney
PATRICIA A. DONAHUE
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, National Security Division
TRACY L. WILKISON (California Bar No. 184948)
Chief, Cyber and Intellectual Property Crimes Section
1500 United States Courthouse
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-2400
Facsimile: (213) 894-8601
Email:
[email protected]
Attorneys for Applicant
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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IN THE MATTER OF THE SEARCH

OF AN APPLE IPHONE SEIZED
DURING THE EXECUTION OF A
SEARCH WARRANT ON A BLACK
LEXUS IS300, CALIFORNIA
LICENSE PLATE #5KGD203
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ED No. CM 16-10 (SP)

GOVERNMENTS REPLY IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO COMPEL AND
OPPOSITION TO APPLE INC.S
MOTION TO VACATE ORDER
DECLARATIONS OF STACEY PERINO,
CHRISTOPHER PLUHAR, AND TRACY
WILKISON, AND EXHIBITS FILED
CONCURRENTLY
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Hearing Date:
Hearing Time:
Location:
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March 22, 2016

1:00 p.m.
Courtroom of the
Hon. Sheri Pym
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Applicant United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, the
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United States Attorney for the Central District of California, hereby files its Reply in
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Support of the Governments Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.s Motion
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to Vacate this Courts February 16, 2016 Order Compelling Apple To Assist Agents In
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Its Search.
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This Reply and Opposition is based upon the attached memorandum of points and
authorities, the concurrently filed declarations of Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Technical Director of the Cryptologic and Electronic Analysis Unit Stacey
Perino, FBI Supervisory Special Agent Christopher Pluhar, and Assistant United States
Attorney Tracy Wilkison, with attached exhibits, the files and records in this case, and
such further evidence and argument as this Court may permit.
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Dated: March 10, 2016
Respectfully submitted,
EILEEN M. DECKER
United States Attorney
PATRICIA A. DONAHUE
Chief, National Security Division
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TRACY L. WILKISON
Attorneys for Applicant
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DESCRIPTION
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. ii
I.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1
II.
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 3
A.
The All Writs Act Is an Integral Part of Our Justice System ........................ 3
B.
Through the All Writs Act, Congress Has Empowered the Court to
Decide the Fact-Specific Matter Before It .................................................... 6
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C.
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1.
This Case Must Be Decided on Its Facts ............................................ 6
2.
Congressional Inaction Does Not Preclude an AWA Order .............. 8
3.
CALEA Does Not Forbid the Order ................................................. 10
The Order Is Proper Under New York Telephone and the AWA............... 12
1.
Apple Is Closely Connected to the Underlying Controversy ........... 13
2.
The Burden Placed on Apple Is Not Undue and Unreasonable ....... 17
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a.
Writing Code Is Not a Per Se Undue Burden ......................... 18
b.
Apples Proffered Estimate of Employee Time Does Not

Establish an Undue Burden .................................................... 21
c.
Impinging on Apples Marketing of Its Products as

Search-Warrant-Proof Is Not an Undue Burden .................... 22
d.
Apples Speculation that Third Parties Could Be Harmed

in the Future if It Complies With the Order Does Not
Establish an Undue Burden on Apple .................................... 23
e.
Cumulative Future Compliance Costs Should Not Be

Considered and Are, In Any Event, Compensable ................. 27
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3.
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D.
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The Order Does Not Implicate, Let Alone Violate, the First and Fifth
Amendments ................................................................................................ 31
1.
Incidentally Requiring a Corporation to Add Functional Source

Code to a Commercial Product Does Not Violate the First
Amendment ....................................................................................... 31
2.
There Is No Due Process Right Not to Develop Source Code ......... 34
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III.
Apples Assistance Is Necessary ...................................................... 28
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 35
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i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
DESCRIPTION
Cases
Am. Council on Educ. v. F.C.C.,
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PAGE
451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006)................................................................................ 11

Application of United States,
610 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir. 1979) ................................................................................. 19
Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962).................................................................................................. 8
Bank of U.S. v. Halstead,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51 (1825) ................................................................... 3, 8, 9, 10
Bankers Life & Casualty Co v. Holland,
346 U.S. 379 (1953)................................................................................................ 10
Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 279 (1919)................................................................................................ 28
Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972)................................................................................................ 34
Carrington v. United States,
503 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................. 10
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court,
542 U.S. 367 (2004)................................................................................................ 13
Company v. United States,
349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................ 11
County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833 (1998)................................................................................................ 35
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980).................................................................................................. 7
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ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED)
1
2
DESCRIPTION
Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A.,
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PAGE
344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................. 33

F.T.C. v. Dean Foods Co.,
384 U.S. 597 (1966).................................................................................................. 9
Full Value Advisors, LLC v. S.E.C.,
633 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2011).............................................................................. 33
Gonzalez v. Google,
234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ........................................................................... 19
Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280 (1981)................................................................................................ 19
In re Access to Videotapes,
2003 WL 22053105 (D. Md. 2003) ........................................................................ 14
In re Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register,
538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976) ..................................................................................... 5
In re Under Seal,
749 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................. 22
In re XXX Inc.,
2014 WL 5510865 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ...................................................................... 13
Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist.,
526 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................. 34
Karn v. United States Department of State,
925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996)................................................................................. 32
Levine v. United States,
362 U.S. 610 (1960).................................................................................................. 3
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States,
565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977) .................................................................................... 5
iii
1
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DESCRIPTION
Murphy v. Waterfront Commn of New York Harbor,
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378 U.S. 52 (1964).................................................................................................. 31

Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,
474 U.S. 34 (1985).................................................................................................. 10
Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton,
608 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979) ................................................................................ 20
Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266 (1948)............................................................................................ 4, 10
Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi,
326 U.S. 88 (1945).............................................................................................. 6, 30
Riley v. California,
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).................................................................................... 1, 7, 31
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47 (2006)...................................................................................... 31, 33, 34
Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377 (1968)................................................................................................ 31
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In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing an In-Progress
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Trace of Wire Commcns over Tel. Facilities (Mountain Bell),
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616 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) ......................................................................... passim
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U.S. Telecom Assn v. F.C.C.,

227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000)................................................................................ 10
Application of the United States for Relief,
427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970) .................................................................................. 11
United States v. Balsys,
524 U.S. 666 (1998)................................................................................................ 32
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DESCRIPTION
United States v. Burr,
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PAGE
25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C. Va. 1807) ................................................................................ 20

United States v. Craft,
535 U.S. 274 (2002).............................................................................................. 8, 9
United States v. Elcom Ltd.,
203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).................................................................. 32
United States v. Fricosu,
841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012) ............................................................. 14, 20
United States v. Hall,
583 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Va. 1984) .......................................................................... 14
United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976) .................................................................................... 5
United States v. Koyomejian,
970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1992) .................................................................................. 11
United States v. New York Telephone Co.,
434 U.S. 159 (1977).........................................................................................passim
United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974)................................................................................................ 17
United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc.,
498 U.S. 292 (1991)............................................................................................... 17
United States v. Sindel,
53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................... 33
Univ. of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C.,
493 U.S. 182 (1990)................................................................................................ 23
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) ................................................................................... 32
v
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DESCRIPTION
Washington v. Glucksberg,
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PAGE
521 U.S. 702 (1997)................................................................................................ 35

West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943)................................................................................................ 31
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton,
132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).......................................................................................... 7, 8
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978)................................................................................................ 31
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Federal Statutes
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18 U.S.C. 3141-45........................................................................................................ 10
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28 U.S.C. 1291 ............................................................................................................... 10
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28 U.S.C. 1651 ................................................................................................................. 3
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28 U.S.C. 2241-55........................................................................................................ 10
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47 U.S.C. 1002 ......................................................................................................... 11, 12
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47 U.S.C. 1005 ............................................................................................................... 12
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48 U.SC. 1613a .............................................................................................................. 10
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Pub. L. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 944 (June 25, 1948) ....................................................... 4
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Federal Rules
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 .......................................................................... 5, 8
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 .................................................................................. 19
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Other Authorities
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In the Matter of Commcns Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
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& Broadband Access & Servs., 20 F.C.C. Rcd. 14989 (2005) ..................................... 12
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H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A46 (1947) ...................................................... 4
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Brief for Respondent, United States v. New York Telephone Co.,
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No. 76-835, 1977 WL 189311 (Apr. 18, 1977) ............................................................ 23

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.
INTRODUCTION
As Apple Inc. concedes in its Opposition, it is fully capable of complying with the
Courts Order. By Apples own reckoning, the corporationwhich grosses hundreds of
billions of dollars a yearwould need to set aside as few as six of its 100,000 employees
for perhaps as little as two weeks. This burden, which is not unreasonable, is the direct
result of Apples deliberate marketing decision to engineer its products so that the
government cannot search them, even with a warrant. Thus, the lawful warrant in this
caseissued by a neutral magistrate upon a finding of probable cause, pursuant to the
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procedure blessed by the Supreme Court just two years ago in Riley v. California, 134 S.
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Ct. 2473 (2014)will be frustrated unless Apple complies with the Order. In passing
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the All Writs Act, Congress gave courts a means of ensuring that their lawful warrants
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were not thwarted by third parties like Apple.
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The Courts Order is modest. It applies to a single iPhone, and it allows Apple to
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decide the least burdensome means of complying. As Apple well knows, the Order does
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not compel it to unlock other iPhones or to give the government a universal master key
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or back door. It is a narrow, targeted order that will produce a narrow, targeted piece
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of software capable of running on just one iPhone, in the security of Apples corporate
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headquarters. That iPhone belongs to the County of San Bernardino, which has
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consented to its being searched. The phone was used by the now-dead terrorist Syed
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Rizwan Farook, who also consented to its being searched as part of his employment
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agreement with the County. In short, the Order invades no ones privacy and raises no
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Fourth Amendment concerns.
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The government and the community need to know what is on the terrorists phone,
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and the government needs Apples assistance to find out. For that reason, the Court
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properly ordered Apple to disable the warrant-proof barriers it designed. Instead of
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complying, Apple attacked the All Writs Act as archaic, the Courts Order as leading to a
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police state, and the FBIs investigation as shoddy, while extolling itself as the primary
guardian of Americans privacy. (See Wilkison Decl. Ex. 1.) Apples rhetoric is not
only false, but also corrosive of the very institutions that are best able to safeguard our
liberty and our rights: the courts, the Fourth Amendment, longstanding precedent and
venerable laws, and the democratically elected branches of government.
Congress intended the All Writs Act to flexibly meet new problems like those
devised by Apple. As the Supreme Court held, the Act supplies a basis for a court to
order a third-party corporation to assist in gathering evidence. As the Ninth Circuit held,
that precedent permits a court to order a corporation to program a computer, even if the
corporation objects that doing so will cost it money, divert its technicians, and annoy its
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customers. That controlling precedent and the All Writs Actnot Apples technological
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fiatshould determine whether Farooks iPhone will be searched.
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Apple and its amici try to alarm this Court with issues of network security,
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encryption, back doors, and privacy, invoking larger debates before Congress and in the
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news media. That is a diversion. Apple desperately wantsdesperately needsthis
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case not to be about one isolated iPhone. But there is probable cause to believe there
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is evidence of a terrorist attack on that phone, and our legal system gives this Court the
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authority to see that it can be searched pursuant to a lawful warrant. And under the
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compelling circumstances here, the Court should exercise that authority, even if Apple
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would rather its products be warrant-proof.
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This caselike the three-factor Supreme Court test on which it must be decided
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is about specific facts, not broad generalities. Here, Apple deliberately raised
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technological barriers that now stand between a lawful warrant and an iPhone containing
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evidence related to the terrorist mass murder of 14 Americans. Apple alone can remove
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those barriers so that the FBI can search the phone, and it can do so without undue
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burden. Under those specific circumstances, Apple can be compelled to give aid. That
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is not lawless tyranny. Rather, it is ordered liberty vindicating the rule of law. This
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Court can, and should, stand by the Order. Apple can, and should, comply with it.
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II.
ARGUMENT
A.
The All Writs Act Is an Integral Part of Our Justice System
In both its Opposition and its public statements, Apple seeks to characterize the
All Writs Act (AWA or Act), codified at 28 U.S.C. 1651, as an obscure law
dredged up by the government to achieve unprecedented power. That premise is false.
The Act is a vital part of our legal system that is regularly invoked in a variety of
contexts. Congress intended for the Act to be broad and flexible, capable of rising to
meet new obstacles to the courts lawful exercise of jurisdiction. The Act is not a
judicial usurpation of congressional power, but rather an example of Congresss reliance
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upon the courts sound discretion and close familiarity with specific facts to ensure that
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justice is done.
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The AWA is indeed venerable. It was enacted by the First Congress at the very
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beginning of this Nation as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Levine v. United
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States, 362 U.S. 610, 615 (1960). The Act codified basic judicial powers critical to
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justice and the legal system, such as the power to issue writs of habeas corpus and
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mandamus. Like other foundational laws, it was framed not in a hypertechnical way to
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address the passing needs of 1789, but in broad, enduring terms that bestowed on the
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courts the power to issue . . . all . . . writs . . . which may be necessary for the exercise
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of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to principles and usages of law.
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The Supreme Court quickly recognized that [t]o limit the operation of [the Act]
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now, to that which it would have had in the year 1789, would open a door to many and
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great inconveniencies, which Congress seems to have foreseen, and to have guarded
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against, by giving ample powers to the Courts, so to mold their process, as to meet
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whatever changes might take place. Bank of U.S. v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51,
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62 (1825) (interpreting the phrase agreeable to the usages and principles of law to be a
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broad grant of power to the federal courts) (emphasis in original).
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In the centuries since, the Act has never fallen into disuse or disrepute. Indeed,
few laws are more vital. As the Supreme Court has explained:
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[T]he writ must be agreeable to the usages and principles of law, a term
which is unlimited by the common law or the English law. And since law
is not a static concept, but expands and develops as new problems arise, we
do not believe that the forms of [writs] authorized by [the AWA] are only
those recognized in this country in 1789, when the original Judiciary Act
containing the substance of this section came into existence. In short, we do
not read [the AWA] as an ossification of the practice and procedure of more
than a century and a half ago. Rather it is a legislatively approved source of
procedural instruments designed to achieve the rational ends of law.
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Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282-85 (1948) (discussing the scope of the writ of
habeas corpus under the AWA), overruled on other grounds by McCleskey v. Zant, 499
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U.S. 467 (1991). Price further held that because justice may on occasion require the
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use of a variation or a modification of the writ, and because Congress had chosen to
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provide broad powers in the AWA, it follows that we should not write in limitations
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which Congress did not see fit to make. Id. Just months after the Supreme Court
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decided Price, Congress responded not by chastening the Court or restricting the AWA,
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but by extend[ing] it: first, courts could now issue not just necessary writs but also
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appropriate writs; second, all courts, not just certain enumerated ones, would be
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empowered by the Act. See 80 Pub. L. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 944 (June 25, 1948);
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H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A46 (1947) (noting the revised section
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extends the power to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction).
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Apple portrays the AWA as dusty and forgotten so that application of the Act here
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might seem an unprecedented and congressionally unforeseen assumption of judicial
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power. This mischaracterization of the Act was rejected by the Supreme Court in United
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States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), which held that the AWA is
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properly used to compel a telecommunications company to supply personnel and
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equipment to support a government investigation by installing a pen register. The
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Courts conclusion was expressly based on Prices holding that the AWA must be
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fluid and evolving, id. at 173, thus foreclosing Apples current effort to confine New
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York Telephone to only pen registers.

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In deciding New York Telephone, the Supreme Court directly confronted and
expressly rejected the policy arguments Apple raises now. Like Apple, the telephone
company argued: that Congress had not given courts the power to issue such an order in
its prior legislation; that the AWA could not be read so broadly; that it was for Congress
to decide whether to provide such authority; and that relying on the AWA was a
dangerous step down a slippery slope ending in arbitrary police powers. See In re Order
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956, 962-63 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversed);
New York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court dismissed
these arguments in light of Price. See New York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 173-75 & n.23
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(maj. op.). In the forty years since that decision, it has become clear that the Court was
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correct because those fears have proved unfounded.
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The Supreme Courts approach to the AWA does not create an unlimited source of
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judicial power, as Apple contends. The Act is self-limiting because it can only be
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invoked in aid of a courts jurisdiction. Here, that jurisdiction rests on a lawful warrant,
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issued by a neutral magistrate pursuant to Rule 41. And New York Telephone provides a
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further safeguard, not through bright-line rules but rather through three factors courts
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must consider before exercising their discretion: (1) how far removed a party is from the
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investigative need; (2) how unreasonable a burden would be placed on that party; and (3)
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how necessary the partys assistance is to the government. This three-factor analysis
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respects Congresss mandate that the Act be flexible and adaptable, while eliminating the
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concern that random citizens will be forcibly deputized.
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Technology is constantly advancing, but these advances have never required the
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AWA to retreat. To the contrary, as the Supreme Court made clear in Halstead and
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Price, the Act must grow and develop to keep pace with whatever changes might take
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place. Courts used that common sense in applying the Act to programming and
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electronic data in the trap-and-trace context. See Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States,
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565 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809,
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813 (7th Cir. 1976). And this Court applied the same common sense in issuing the
Order. The AWA is a proper source of this Courts authority.
B.
Through the All Writs Act, Congress Has Empowered the Court to
Decide the Fact-Specific Matter Before It
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1.
This Case Must Be Decided on Its Facts
The Order applies to a single device and is based on the specific facts before this
Court. Those compelling facts justify ordering Apple to remove the barriers to executing
a warrant for an iPhone used by a terrorist who carried out a mass murder. Apple
demands that the Court should instead address the broad questions whether Apple should
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be required to unlock every iPhone in every instance, or whether Apple should be
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required to give the government the means to do so. Those questions are not before this
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Court. Indeed, if Apples compliance with the AWA in a single case were sufficient to
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require it to comply in all cases, there would be no dispute here: Apple routinely
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complied with AWA orders in the past. (See infra p. 27.) In the same respect, future
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cases involving other iPhones will be decided on their specific facts.
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The case or controversy before the Court is narrow and specific, as well it
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should be. [T]he very strength of our common law is its cautious advance and retreat
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a few steps at a time. Benjamin Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 6 (1924). It is
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precisely the rich facts of a particular case that provide the basis for a court to resolve it,
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and these same facts ensure that the laws growth is incremental and thoughtful. That is
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why courts resolve cases and controversies that are definite and concrete, not
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hypothetical or abstract. Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945).
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Only by stripping this case of its definite and concrete factsthe very facts that
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guide the AWA inquiryand by recasting the case as a hypothetical or abstract policy
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debate can Apple invoke separation of powers and the political-question doctrine. (Opp.
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18-19.) Apple urges the Court to focus on broader policy issues, and then proclaims that
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the Court is forbidden to resolve them. But the actual issue before this Courtwhether
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Apple can be directed under the AWA to provide specific technical assistanceis not a
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judicially imponderable question forbidden by separation of powers: courts resolve such
questions regularly, as in New York Telephone and In re Application of United States for
an Order Authorizing an In-Progress Trace of Wire Commcns over Tel. Facilities
(Mountain Bell), 616 F.2d 1122, 1126-29 (9th Cir. 1980). Nor must courts flee from
cases involving policy and privacy considerations related to searching smartphones.
Less than two years ago, the Supreme Court confronted just such issues in Riley v.
California. The Court, after carefully considering smartphones technology and their
role in society, held that an appropriate balance between privacy concerns and
investigative needs was struck by the governments obtaining a search warrant. 134 S.
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Ct. at 2484. The Court added that its holding, of course, is not that the information on a
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cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before
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such a search. Id. at 2493. Thus, Apples privacy questions, far from being
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unanswerable by any court, have already been answered by the Supreme Court, and the
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government complied with Riley by obtaining a warrant here.
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This case also does not present a political question, as suggested by Apple. The
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ongoing debate regarding law enforcement, national security needs, and privacy does not
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deprive this Court of authority to issue the Order. In fact, Apples argument is undone
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by the very authority it cites: Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). (Opp. 19.)
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Far from refusing to decide a case because of the policy implications before it, the
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Supreme Court explained that the grave risks and parade of horribles conjured up by
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the petitioner and his amici needed to be presented to Congress, while the Court would
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decide the case instead by applying the broad terms Congress used in 1930 Patent Act.
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Id. at 316-18. As Diamond shows, the political-question doctrine is a narrow
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exception to the general rule that the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases
25
properly before it. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427
26
(2012). It applies not in every case raising policy considerations but only in cases that
27
raise nothing but policy considerations, cases where there is a lack of judicially
28
7
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue. 1 Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Here, as in Diamond, the AWA standards already have been
judicially discover[ed] and have proven manageable for decadesindeed, for
centuries. The advent of iOS 9 does not alter the authority of the AWA or require this
Court to abstain, nor do public and political interest in this case.

2.
Congressional Inaction Does Not Preclude an AWA Order
As the Supreme Court has made clear, Congresss broad grant of judicial authority
under the AWA was designed to avoid the need for more specific, piecemeal legislation.
A lack of more specific legislation is thus no barrier to the Order. Apple insists that this
10
Court lost its power under the AWA because the executive branch chose not to propose
11
amendments to CALEA, and because Congress might someday pass other legislation.
12
(Opp. 8-10.) But the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that failed legislative
13
proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a
14
prior statute, reasoning that congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because
15
several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the
16
inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change. United
17
States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002).
18
Until very recently, there was widespread agreement that the AWA sufficed in this
19
area. As Apple itself has acknowledged, it seemed that this had been somewhat settled
20
views and settled authority from multiple judges. (Hanna Decl. Ex. DD at 56.) Indeed,
21
Apple has conceded that the recent decision of a Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District
22
of New York mark[ed] the first time a judge has questioned the authority of the All
23
Writs Act to grant supplemental orders to accompany . . . warrants to search iPhones.
24
1
25
26
27
28
A case can also be irresoluble in the rare event that there is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1427. But no such commitment exists here. The
issuance of writs is a traditional part of the courts authority. See Halstead, 23 U.S. at
61-62. The AWA exists to further a courts jurisdiction. Congress has indisputably
given this Court jurisdiction to issue search warrants through Rule 41(b), and power to
issue writs in furtherance of those warrants through the AWA.
8
(Wilkison Decl. Ex. 16 at 3; see Exhibit A to Apples Notice of Supplemental Authority
(New York Order).) Thus, there isat a minimuman equally tenable inferenc[e]
that existing legislation already incorporated the power to order Apple to assist in
executing search warrants. Craft, 535 U.S. at 287. That inference is all the more
powerful because there was never even a failed legislative proposal of a CALEA II
bill (Opp. 9), merely vague discussions about potential legislation that would have
placed broader obligations, not at issue here, on some communications service providers.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the prohibition on drawing meaning from
congressional silence in the AWA context. In F.T.C. v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597,
10
600 (1966), a circuit court dissolved an FTC restraining order on the ground that, in two
11
different Congresses, bills sponsored by the said Commission were introduced, which
12
bills if enacted into law would have conferred upon the Commission such authority as it
13
is attempting to exercise in the case now before this court. The Supreme Court
14
reversed, reaffirming two key principles: (1) congressional inaction, past or future, is
15
uninstructive; and (2) because the AWA creates power absent congressional legislation,
16
there is no need for Congress to specifically confer it. Congress neither enacted nor
17
rejected these proposals; it simply did not act on them. Even if it had, the legislation as
18
proposed would have had no affect whatever on the power that Congress granted the
19
courts by the All Writs Act. We cannot infer from the fact that Congress took no action
20
at all . . . an intent to circumscribe traditional judicial remedies. Id. at 609. That
21
holding was echoed in New York Telephone, which made clear that the AWA empowers
22
a court to act unless appropriately confined by Congress. 434 U.S. at 172-73.2
23
24
25
26
27
28
In a recent and first-of-its-kind ruling, the New York Orderwithout addressing

Dean Foodsheld that interpreting the AWA to empower courts absent specific
congressional authorization would violate separation-of-powers principles by bestowing
legislative functions on the courts. (New York Order 21-30.) The government has
sought review from the district court overseeing that matter, and the order has no
precedential value here. Moreover, its reasoning suffers from fatal flaws. First, this
argument was expressly rejected in Halstead, 23 U.S. at 61-62 (stating that Congresss
check on abusive writs by federal courts is for it to correct the evil by more specific
legislation rather than having Congress specifically authorize each exercise of the
courts authority), and was raised by the dissent in New York Telephone, in 434 U.S. at
(footnote contd on next page)
9
In short, the AWA does not require any additional legislation to empower the
courts. Rather, as Dean Foods and New York Telephone held, the courts retain the
flexible power bestowed by Congress through the AWA unless Congress expressly takes
it away. As explained below, Congress has not enacted legislation that specifically
confines the courts power here. Its silence says nothing.
6
7
3.
CALEA Does Not Forbid the Order
Contrary to Apples claims (Opp. 16-19), CALEA did not deprive this Court of its
power to issue the Order. Congresss intent in passing CALEA was not to weaken
existing judicial powers under the AWA, but to preserve the status quo regarding the
10
lawful interception of transmissions. U.S. Telecom Assn v. F.C.C., 227 F.3d 450, 455
11
(D.C. Cir. 2000). The statute does not address the particular issue before this Court.
12
As explained above, the AWA is controlling unless a statute specifically
13
addresses the particular issue at hand. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. U.S.
14
Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985) (emphases added). Put otherwise, it is not
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
179 & n.1 (arguing, for example, that, in light of the limits of Title III, any application of
the AWA to pen registers must await congressional deliberation), and rejected by the
majority, id. at 175 n.23 (maj. op.).
Second, the AWA codified the courts pre-existing, common-law power to issue
writs to enforce the courts jurisdiction. Thus, the idea that judges would continue to
determine the scope of these writs would neither surprise nor frighten the Framers. See
also Price, 334 U.S. at 282-85. That power is not legislative in a historical or modern
sense. See Halstead, 23 U.S. at 61-62 (It is said, however, that this is the exercise of
legislative power, which could not be delegated by Congress to the Courts of justice.
But this objection cannot be sustained.).
Third, the New York Order is too narrowly focused on the AWA in the context of
evidence gathering. The AWA also codifies, for example, the writs of mandamus and
coram nobis. In both of these areas (appellate jurisdiction and post-conviction relief),
there is extensive congressional legislation setting forth clear limits on the courts power,
defining not only what they may do but also when they may do it. Regarding appellate
jurisdiction, Congress has enacted, at a minimum, 28 U.S.C. 1291, 1292, 1295, 2255;
18 U.S.C. 3141-45, 3731, 3742; and 48 U.SC. 1613a. Nevertheless, pursuant to the
AWA, the courts maintain the power to hear any appeal, at any time, provided there is a
clear abuse of discretion by the district court. Bankers Life & Casualty Co v. Holland,
346 U.S. 379 (1953). Similarly, Congress has aggressively legislated in the area of postconviction relief, first in the Judiciary Act of 1948 and then in the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act. See 28 U.S.C. 2241-55. And yet, pursuant to the AWA,
the courts maintain the power to grant relief through the writ of coram nobis. See
Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 2007), opinion amended on
denial of rehg, 530 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2008).
10
enough for other laws to brush up against similar issues. Rather, Congress must legislate
so intricately as to leave no gap to fill. The Company v. United States, 349 F.3d
1132, 1145 n.26 (9th Cir. 2003). A rare instance of a court finding such pervasive
legislation is Application of the United States for Relief, 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970), in
which the Ninth Circuit held that Title III occupied the field of intercepted wire
communications and precluded use of the AWA to compel a telephone companys
assistance. But both Congress and the Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuits
decision was wrong. See New York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 178 n.25. Moreover, the
Supreme Court held that Title III had no effect on the exercise of the AWA in the
10
adjacent area of pen registers, id. at 166, rejecting the dissents arguments to the
11
contrary, id. at 179 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12
CALEA, passed in 1994, does not meticulously, intricately, or specifically
13
address when a court may order a smartphone manufacturer to remove barriers to
14
accessing stored data on a particular smartphone. Rather, it governs what steps
15
telecommunications carriers involved in transmission and switching must take in
16
advance of court orders to ensure their systems can isolate information to allow for the
17
real-time interception of network communications. 47 U.S.C. 1002(a)(1)-(4); see Am.
18
Council on Educ. v. F.C.C., 451 F.3d 226, 227-28 (D.C. Cir. 2006). As the Ninth Circuit
19
has recognized, regulation in a distinct area of law should not curtail the governments
20
powers in domestic law enforcement under the AWA. United States v. Koyomejian,
21
970 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). CALEA thus does not confine the Courts
22
power under the AWA here.
23
Apple points to a section in CALEA stating that this subchapter does not
24
authorize any law enforcement agency . . . to require any specific design of equipment,
25
facilities, services, features, or system configurations to be adopted by any provider of a
26
wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications
27
equipment, or any provider of telecommunications support services. (Opp. 16); 47
28
U.S.C. 1002(b)(1)(A), (B). Congresss wording here is clear and deliberate. The
11
provision does not destroy any existing authorityor even speak to courts power at all.
Nor does the provision have any effect outside of CALEA itself: it limits only the
authority given to law enforcement agenc[ies] by this subchapter. The purpose of
the provision is not to impliedly deprive the courts of power under the AWA, but to
clarify that the preceding subsection of CALEA, 47 U.S.C. 1002(a), does not permit
law enforcement to dictate the specific design of the listed items.
To apply that limitation to the Courts Order would defy both the statutory
language and Supreme Court precedent for four reasons: (1) the Order rests not on
CALEA, but on the AWA; (2) the Order is an exercise of judicial, not agency authority;
10
(3) the Order does not dictate any specific design; and (4) the Order is not directed at
11
an item or service provider listed in 1002(b)(1)(A), (B).3 Accordingly, this limitation
12
within CALEA does not restrict the Courts authority under the AWA, let alone dictate
13
the result in this case.
14
C.
The Order Is Proper Under New York Telephone and the AWA
15
This Court had authority to issue the Order pursuant to the AWA, and Apple has
16
demonstrated no discretionary reason to withdraw it. As Apple recognizes, this Court
17
must consider three equitable factors: (1) how far removed Apple is from the
18
underlying controversy; (2) how unreasonable [a] burden the Order would place on
19
Apple; and (3) how necessary its assistance is to searching Farooks iPhone. 4 See New
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
With regard to the development and control of iOS, Apple is not a provider of
wire or electronic communication services but a software developer and licensor. While
Apple may be a provider of electronic communication services in its capacity as provider
of FaceTime and iMessage, the Courts order does not bear at all upon the operation of
those programs on Farooks iPhone, let alone generally. See In the Matter of Commcns
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband Access & Servs. 20 F.C.C. Rcd.
14989, at 21 (2005) (recognizing that an entity could provide multiple kinds of
services, and holding that the CALEA analysis must be performed on individual
components, not the entity as a whole). Nor is Apple an equipment manufacturer as
that term is used in CALEA. In CALEA, that term refers to a manufacturer[] of []
telecommunications transmissions and switching equipment, see 47 U.S.C. 1005
carrier-level equipment, not end-user phones.
4
27
28
The New York Order wrongly posited that there were actually two three-part
tests: the New York Telephone test discussed here, and a statutory one based on the
AWAs text. The New York Order cited in support of its statutory test only cases which
(footnote contd on next page)
12
York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 172-75. This test appropriately guides a courts discretion
to ensure that the Act does not lead down the slippery slope Apple and amici imagine.
Here, the factors support the Courts Order.
4
5
1.
Apple Is Closely Connected to the Underlying Controversy
Apple is not so far removed from the underlying controversy that it should be
excused from assisting in the execution of the search warrant. In New York Telephone,
the phone company was sufficiently close to the controversy because the criminals used
its phone lines. See 434 U.S. at 174. The Court did not require that the phone company
know criminals were using its phone lines, or that it be involved in the crime. See id.
10
Here, as a neutral magistrate found, there is probable cause to believe that Farooks
11
iPhone contains evidence related to his crimes. That alone would be sufficient proximity
12
under the AWA and New York Telephone, even if Apple did not also own and control the
13
software on Farooks iPhone.
14
Apple attempts to distinguish itself from New York Telephone and companies that
15
have been compelled to provide technical assistance by claiming that (1) it is unlike a
16
telecommunications monopoly and (2) it has merely . . . placed a good into the stream
17
of commerce, as if Apple surrenders control over its iPhones upon selling them. (Opp.
18
21.) These distinctions fail on both the facts and the law.
19
To begin with, courts have already issued AWA orders to manufacturer[s] [such
20
as Apple] to attempt to unlock . . . cellphone[s] so that . . . warrant[s] may be executed.
21
See, e.g., In re XXX Inc., 2014 WL 5510865, at *1-*3 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States v.
22
Blake, No. 13-CR-80054, ECF No. 207 at 5 (S.D. Fl. July 14, 2014). These orders show
23
there is no bright-line rule that a third party must be a public utility to fall within the
24
25
26
27
28
predate New York Telephone. (New York Order at 11.) In fact, the New York Telephone
test was meant as a specific application of the general AWA standards, supplanting any
previous statutory tests. The Supreme Court has articulated a similar context-specific
three-factor test for the writ of mandamus which supplants any need to create a statutory
test. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004). The New York
Orders approach disregards not just New York Telephone, but also Halsteads
interpretation of usages and principles of law.
13
Acts reach. So do other cases. See, e.g., New York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 174
(collecting examples of individuals compelled via the AWA); United States v. Hall, 583
F. Supp. 717, 722 (E.D. Va. 1984) (credit card company); In re Access to Videotapes,
2003 WL 22053105, at *3 (D. Md. 2003) (landlord); United States v. Fricosu, 841 F.
Supp. 2d 1232, 1235 (D. Colo. 2012) (individual). Regardless, Apples size, technology,
and ubiquity make it akin to the companies in New York Telephone and Mountain Bell.
Moreover, Apple maintains a continued connection to its phones well beyond their
sale, and has deliberately developed its phones so that Apple alone holds the means for
courts search warrants to be carried out. As Apples business model and its
10
representations to its investors and customers make clear, Apple intentionally and for
11
commercial advantage retains exclusive control over the software that can be used on
12
iPhones, giving it monopoly-like control over the means of distributing software to the
13
phones. As detailed below, Apple does so by: (1) firmly controlling iPhones operating
14
systems and first-party software; (2) carefully managing and vetting third-party software
15
before authenticating it for use on iPhones; and (3) continually receiving information
16
from devices running its licensed software and its proprietary services, and retaining
17
continued access to data from those devices about how its customers are using them.
18
Having established suzerainty over its users phonesand control over the precise
19
features of the phones necessary for unlocking themApple cannot now pretend to be a
20
bystander, watching this investigation from afar.
21
First, Apple develops its own operating system, and is unique in that it designs
22
and develops nearly the entire solution for its products, including the hardware,
23
operating system, numerous software applications and related services. (Wilkison Decl.
24
Ex. 2 at 8 (Apple 10-K) (emphases added).) Apples business strategy leverages its
25
unique ability to design and develop its own operating systems, hardware, application
26
software and services. (Id. at 1.) The tight integration of hardware and software on
27
iOS devices ensures that each component of the system is trusted, and validates the
28
14
system as a whole. (Hanna Decl. Ex. K at 5 (describing how each step is analyzed and
vetted [f]rom initial boot-up to iOS software updates to third-party apps).)
Second, and pivotally, Apples devices will not run software that is not
electronically signed by Apple. (Id. at 6 (only Apple-signed code can be installed on
a device); Hanna Decl. Ex. DD at 64 (We agree with the government that the system
requires Apple authentication.).) Through its exclusive control of its electronic
signature, Apple carefully manages and vets both the software updates and all third-party
programs (apps) that can be used on its devices. This keeps Apple close to its phones
long after they are sold. As set forth in its licensing agreement, Apple willif allowed
10
by the userperiodically check with its devices to send signed updates, and will
11
automatically download and install [them] onto [the] device[s]. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 3
12
at 2(h).) Apple also permits only two kinds of apps to be loaded onto iOS devices
13
through Apples App Store: those developed . . . by Apple and those developed . . .
14
by a third party developer. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 4 at 15.) Apple exercises power over
15
both, because they must be signed by Apple. (Hanna Decl. Ex. K at 18; see also Perino
16
Decl. Ex. 30 at 1 (Before your app can integrate app services, be installed on a device,
17
or be submitted to the App Store, it must be signed with a certificate issued by Apple.).)
18
Third, Apple maintains a connection with its phones after sale by continuing to
19
receive information from the devices and continuing to access data about how its
20
customers are using their phones. Indeed, Apple requires its users to consent to Apples
21
continued use of data: When you use your device, your phone number and certain
22
unique identifiers for your iOS Device are sent to Apple in order to allow others to reach
23
you by your phone number when using various communication features of the iOS
24
Software, such as iMessage and FaceTime. . . . Other iOS Software features may require
25
information from your iOS Device. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 3 at 4.) Apple similarly
26
expects its customers to consent to its continual monitoring of information in order to get
27
28
15
and use certain apps and services. 5 Apples connection to its iPhones is not abstract: at a
minimum, Apple was communicating with Farooks iPhone as late as October 2015,
when it last backed up some of the phones data on its iCloud server. (Pluhar Decl. 8.)
Thus, by its own design, Apple remains close to its iPhones through careful
management and constant vigil over what software is on an iPhone and how that
software is used. Indeed, Apple is much less removed from the controversyin this
case, the governments inability to search Farooks iPhonethan was the New York
Telephone company because that company did not deliberately place its phone lines to
prevent inconspicuous government access. 434 U.S. at 161-62. Here, Apple has
10
deliberately used its control over its software to block law-enforcement requests for
11
access to the contents of its devices, and it has advertised that feature to sell its products.
12
As Apple put it: Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and
13
therefore cannot access this data. So its not technically feasible for us to respond to
14
government warrants for the extraction of this data from devices in their possession
15
running iOS 8.6 (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 5 at 2.)
16
In short, Apple is not some distant, disconnected third party unexpectedly and
17
arbitrarily dragooned into helping solve a problem for which it bears no responsibility.
18
Rather, Apple is intimately close to the barriers on Farooks locked iPhone because
19
Apple specifically designed the iPhone to create those barriers.
20
21
5
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(See, e.g., Wilkison Decl. Ex. 4 at 5 (providing that on any device, iOS or not,
that uses iTunes Match, Apple automatically scans the song files and collects other
information . . . to identify media in your iTunes library, and Apple will log
information such as the tracks you play, stop or skip, the devices you use, and the time
and duration of playback); id. at 22 (same for iCloud Music Library); id. at 5-6
(providing Apples Genius service will automatically collect information . . . such as
your play history and playlists); id. at 16 (When you opt in to Popular Near Me via
enabling Location Services, Apple will . . . automatically collect information related to
certain of your App Store Products, such as your time spent with each App Store Product
and the number of times each App Store Product is launched.).)
6
Apple later modified this language: Apple will not perform iOS data extractions
in response to government search warrants. (Hanna Decl. Ex. AA at 2.)
16
2.
The Burden Placed on Apple Is Not Undue and Unreasonable
In seeking to avoid compliance with this Courts Order, Apple must show that the
burden placed upon it is undue, unreasonable, and noncompensable. See Mountain Bell,
616 F.2d at 1122, 1132 (Appellants did not show that the trace . . . significantly
increased the possibility of a malfunction . . . . Nor did appellants prove that the
compensation provided for in the Order was in any way inadequate.); cf. United States
v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (Consequently, a grand jury subpoena
issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable, and the burden of showing
unreasonableness must be on the recipient who seeks to avoid compliance.). Apple has
10
shown none of those things. Neither coding software, nor facing speculative business
11
concerns, nor providing possible future compliance poses an undue burden for Apple.
12
Apple is one of the richest and most tech-savvy companies in the world, and it is
13
more than able to comply with the AWA order. Indeed, it concedes it can do so with
14
relatively little effort. Even this modest burden is largely a result of Apples own
15
decision to design and market a nearly warrant-proof phone. In evaluating whether the
16
burden on Apple is undue, this Court can and should recognize the fundamental
17
importance that access to evidence plays in the American system of justice. Given our
18
historic commitment to the rule of law and our view that the twofold aim (of criminal
19
justice) is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer, the Supreme Court has
20
recognized that [t]he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both
21
fundamental and comprehensive. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708-09
22
(1974). The Court further explained that [t]he ends of criminal justice would be
23
defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the
24
facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system
25
depend on full disclosure of all the facts. Id. at 709. Apples position that it cannot be
26
required to assist with the execution of a warrant for one of its phones flies in the face of
27
these principles and this tradition.
28
17
a.
Writing Code Is Not a Per Se Undue Burden
Apples primary argument regarding undue burden appears to be that it should not
be required to write any amount of code to assist the government. Apple insists that no
court has ever held that the AWA permits the government to conscript a private
company to build software for it. (Opp. 31.) Indeed, Apple proclaims that no company
has ever been asked via the Act to write even some amount of code to gather
information. (Opp. 27.) This claim is false. More than 35 years ago, in Mountain
Bella case binding here but unmentioned in the recent New York Orderthe Ninth
Circuit confronted and rejected exactly that argument. There, as here, appellant made
10
[a] great deal of the burden of coding, 616 F.2d at 1126, but the Circuit demurred. It
11
recognized that the AWA order at issue would need to be accomplished by
12
programming a control computer to trap incoming calls to the designated telephone
13
number. Computers that route the incoming calls from the exchange in which they
14
originate[d] from the dialing telephone [were] programmed. In this case twelve
15
computers were programmed, including those in the Phoenix metropolitan area. Id. at
16
1127 (emphases added). Further, this additional programming caused the phone
17
companys computers to operate much less efficiently. Id. Nevertheless, the Circuit
18
held that the lower court had the power to compel [the corporation] to perform the
19
programming because [t]he principles announced in New York Telephone . . . compel
20
the same result here. Id. at 1128-29 (emphasis added).
21
Like Apple, the corporation protested, arguing that the technological differences
22
between pen registers and trap-and-trace programming serve to distinguish this case.
23
Id. at 1129-30. The company also complained that the AWA order made it bear the
24
entire responsibility for the search. Id. at 1129. It further insisted that the requirement
25
to reprogram its computers (1) resulted in a serious drain upon existing personnel and
26
equipment; and (2) increased the likelihood of system malfunctions while at the same
27
time impairing the companys ability to correct such problems. Id. at 1132. It insisted
28
that the order would deprive it of irreplaceable services provided by key personnel and
18
[cause] the loss of use of various important pieces of equipment. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 6
at 24-25.) The Circuit was unpersuaded. [I]t appears to this court to make little
difference whether . . . company technicians acting at the behest of federal officials are
required to ensure that a computer is programmed to detect electronic impulses which,
when decoded [by the software], provide a list of telephone numbers. Id.7
Moreover, Mountain Bell was not even the first case to uphold an AWA order
compelling computer programming. The Third Circuit did the same in In Re Application
of the United States, 610 F.2d 1148, 1154 (3d Cir. 1979). There, as here and in
Mountain Bell, the corporation was ordered to program a computer to help gather data
10
for the government. Id. at 1152-53.8 The corporation, like Apple, complained that the
11
technical procedures of tracing require that telephone company personnel, not federal
12
officers, fully execute the traces. Id. at 1155. And, foreshadowing Apples arguments,
13
the company also complained that the work it was being asked to undertake require[d]
14
more extensive and more burdensome involvement on the part of the . . . company than
15
did the pen registers in New York Telephone. Id. at 1150. The Circuit rejected these
16
complaints because, among other things, the corporations refusal to help would
17
otherwise serve to frustrate the execution of the courts warrants and to obstruct
18
criminal investigations. Id. at 1155. Thus, there is nothing novel or per se unduly
19
burdensome about requiring Apple to write code.
20
7
21
22
23
24
25
26
Similarly, in the context of a motion to compel Google, Inc. to produce records

pursuant to a civil subpoena, a district court held that creat[ing] new code to format and
extract query and URL data from many computer banks, in total requiring up to eight
full time days of engineering time was a burden that could be overcome through
compensation. Gonzalez v. Google, 234 F.R.D. 674, 683 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Although
the undue-burden analysis under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45 differs from
the analysis under the AWA, it is instructive that in a civil lawsuitwhere importance of
evidence gathering is certainly less compelling than in a criminal investigation of a
terrorist acta district court compelled a private company to create code. It is obvious
and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of
the Nation. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
8
27
28
While the tracing programs required little time to input once developed, as
likely is the case here, the programs undoubtedly took longer to develop in the first
place. See Application of the United States, 610 F.2d at 1152.
19
Contrary to Apples argument, the Order does not require it to provide decryption
services to the government. (Opp. 14.) But that would not be novel, either. Indeed, no
less an authority than Chief Justice Marshall held that Aaron Burrs clerk could be
forced to decipher a coded letter of Burrs, provided that doing so would not incriminate
the clerk. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 39-40 (C.C. Va. 1807). Or, to take a
more recent example, the court in Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1235, 1237, held that the
AWA empowered it to demand the decryption of a laptop, provided that the act of
decryption itself would not be used to incriminate the defendant. Here, Apple will not
incriminate itself by removing barriers to the lawful search of Farooks iPhone.
10
To the extent that Apple seeks to analogize its burden to the one in Plum Creek
11
Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979), it is mistaken. In Plum Creek, the
12
government sought to compel a company that was the target of an investigation to allow
13
its employees to wear a large monitoring device while working in its sawmill. Id. at
14
1285-86. In addition to distracting the workers, these devices could get caught in the
15
mills equipment, creating an obvious physical danger to the workers. Id. at 1289 & n.4.
16
As the district court explained, the company bore all the safety risks and [would] pay[]
17
the cost of all industrial accidents. Id. at 1286. Weighed against the danger to the
18
workers was the weaker interest of reducing the time required for the investigation: far
19
from being necessary, the devices were simply a convenience. Id. at 1289 & nn.5, 6.
20
Under those circumstances, the Court would not extend New York Telephone.
21
Simply put, none of the special considerations in Plum Creek are present here: the
22
Order does not put Apples employees in immediate physical peril; Apple is not being
23
required to assist in an investigation into itself; the government has offered to
24
compensate Apple; andas explained belowApples assistance is not a luxury in an
25
OSHA investigation but a necessity in investigating a terrorist attack. Mountain Bell,
26
which postdates Plum Creek and relates to a much closer factual scenario, provides
27
better guidance. And as in Mountain Bell, the burden on Apple is not undue.
28
20
b.
Apples Proffered Estimate of Employee Time Does Not

Establish an Undue Burden
2
3
Apple asserts that it would take six to ten employees two to four weeks to develop
new code in order to carry out the Courts Order. (Opp. 13; Neuenschwander Decl.
22-25.) Even taking Apple at its word, this is not an undue burden, especially given
Apples vast resources and the governments willingness to find reasonable
compromises and provide reasonable reimbursement.
8
9
Apple is a Fortune 5 corporation with tremendous power and means: it has more
than 100,000 full-time-equivalent employees and had an annual income of over $200
10
billion dollars in fiscal year 2015more than the operating budget for California.
11
(Compare Wilkison Decl. Ex. 2 at 9, 24, 41 (Apple 10-K), with Ex. 7 (FY 2015-16
12
budget).) Indeed, Apples revenues exceed the nominal GDPs of two thirds of the
13
worlds nations. To build the ordered software, no more than ten employees would be
14
required to work for no more than four weeks, perhaps as little as two weeks. Just as in
15
Mountain Bellwhere the company complained it would lose irreplaceable services
16
provided by key personnel (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 6 at 24-25)the burden for Apple here
17
is not unreasonable. Moreover, the government has offered to compensate Apple for
18
such costs that this Court determines have been actually incurred and are reasonably
19
necessary for its efforts. See New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. at 175 (AWA order not
20
unduly burdensome in part because it provided for reimbursement for the companys
21
efforts); Mountain Bell, 616 F.2d at 1132 (same).
22
The government has always been willing to work with Apple to attempt to reduce
23
any burden of providing access to the evidence on Farooks iPhone. See Mountain Bell,
24
616 F.2d at 1124 (noting parties collaboration to reduce perceived burdens). Before
25
seeking the Order, the government requested voluntary technical assistance from Apple,
26
and provided the details of its proposal. (Supp. Pluhar Decl. 12.) Apple refused to
27
discuss the proposals feasibility and instead directed the FBI to methods of access that
28
the FBI had already tried without success. (Compare Neuenschwander Decl. 54-61,
21
with Supp. Pluhar Decl. 12.) The government turned to the Court only as a last resort
and sought relief on narrow grounds meant to reduce possible burdens on Apple. The
Order allows Apple flexibility in how to assist the FBI. (Order 4.) The government
remains willing to seek a modification of the Order, if Apple can propose a less
burdensome or more agreeable way for the FBI to access Farooks iPhone.9 In contrast,
Apple makes little effort to explain which parts of the courts order are burdensome, and
in what ways. Nor does Apple propose feasible alternatives that it would find less
burdensome. 10 Rather, relying on its exclusive knowledge of its software, Apple simply
asserts a single, complicated process, without any further elaboration.
10
11
In sum, Apple has failed to show that the only concrete burden it can identifya
relatively low amount of technical laboris undue, unreasonable, and noncompensable.
12
c.
Impinging on Apples Marketing of Its Products as SearchWarrant-Proof Is Not an Undue Burden
13
14
Apple next claims that complying with search warrants will undermine the
15
publics trust in the security of the companys products and servicesa reformulation of
16
its concern, raised in the Eastern District of New York, that compliance will tarnish its
17
brand. This is the same argument made by the corporations and rejected by the courts in
18
New York Telephone and Mountain Bell, 616 F.2d at 1128. Mountain Bell argued that
19
complying with the order would jeopardize its relationship with its customers, and that it
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
For the reasons discussed above, the FBI cannot itself modify the software on
Farooks iPhone without access to the source code and Apples private electronic
signature. The government did not seek to compel Apple to turn those over because it
believed such a request would be less palatable to Apple. If Apple would prefer that
course, however, that may provide an alternative that requires less labor by Apple
programmers. See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 281-83 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming
contempt sanctions imposed for failure to comply with order requiring the company to
assist law enforcement with effecting a pen register on encrypted e-mail content which
included producing private SSL encryption key).
10
For example, Apple suggests thatin complying with the Orderit would have
to undertake substantial programming to make the software suitable for consumer
interaction. (Neuenschwander Decl. 19.) But Apple does not explain why Farooks
iPhone would need to be ready for consumer interaction simply to perform forensic
data extraction, and does not address the existence of available tools that Apple could
use to perform some of the ordered functions. (Perino Decl. 6.b, 25-29.)
22
could not continue to operate if the public perceived the company as an extension of law
enforcement. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 6 at 32-33.) Those arguments did not persuade those
courts then, and they should not persuade this Court now. Cf. Univ. of Pennsylvania v.
E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 195-98 (1990) (rejecting universitys argument that producing
certain information to the government would have a chilling effect, and declining to
recognize a business-interest privilege for withholding the information).
Apple also argues that the Order is unduly burdensome because it is in Apples
basic interests to make the data on its phones as secure as possible. 11 (Opp. 23.) The
company in New York Telephone similarly asserted in its Supreme Court merits briefing
10
that [p]rotection of this privacy [i.e., the privacy of communications] is fundamental
11
to the telephone business. 1977 WL 189311, at *2. It added that its principal basis
12
for opposing the order was the danger of indiscriminate invasions of privacy. Id. at
13
*8. The Court rejected those arguments. 434 U.S. at 174. Moreover, programming
14
software is not offensive to Apple generally, New York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 174,
15
and here Apples own customer has asked to have the phone unlocked. Nor will
16
programming this particular software compromise the security of any Apple iPhone
17
other than Farooks for reasons explained below. (See infra pp. 24-25.)
d.
18
19
20
Apples Speculation that Third Parties Could Be Harmed in

the Future if It Complies With the Order Does Not Establish an
Undue Burden on Apple
Apple speculates that if it submits to a lawful order to assist with a constitutional,
21
warranted search of a consenting customers phone in America, Apple will have no
22
choice but to help totalitarian regimes suppress dissidents around the globe, and
23
hackers, criminals, and foreign agents will have access to the data on millions of
24
25
11
26
27
28
Apple insists that if this Court does not hold that it is a per se undue burden to
compel a corporation to act against its business interests, a parade of horribles will
ensue. (Opp. 26.) As noted above, this line of argument has been repeatedly rejected by
the courts. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment, the proximity and necessity factors, and
the courts ultimate discretion provide ample protection against executive overreaching.
23
iPhones. (Opp. 1-2, 28.) This putative public burden, Apple argues, is a basis to relieve
it from the Order. Apples fears are overblown for reasons both factual and legal. 12
To begin with, many of the most compelling examples of cybercrime that Apple
describes involve not breaches of physical-device security, but rather breaches of
network security. That is the the daily siege of hackers, cyber-criminals, and foreign
agents with which the government and victims contend. (Opp. 1.) Nothing in the
Courts Order affects Apples network security. Rather, the features at issue concern
only access to a physical device. Thus, for the government even to benefit from the
software set forth in the Order, it first had to recover Farooks iPhone itself. (Perino
10
11
Decl. 6.c, 31-36.) That fact alone eliminates much of Apples worry.
Next, contrary to Apples stated fears, there is no reason to think that the code
12
Apple writes in compliance with the Order will ever leave Apples possession. Nothing
13
in the Order requires Apple to provide that code to the government or to explain to the
14
government how it works. And Apple has shown it is amply capable of protecting code
15
that could compromise its security. For example, Apple currently protects (1) the source
16
code to iOS and other core Apple software and (2) Apples electronic signature, which as
17
described above allows software to be run on Apple hardware. (Hanna Decl. Ex. DD at
18
62-64 (code and signature are the most confidential trade secrets [Apple] has).) Those
19
which the government has not requestedare the keys to the kingdom. If Apple can
20
guard them, it can guard this.
21
22
12
23
24
25
26
27
28
Apple speculates that there is no law-enforcement benefit to removing barriers

to unlocking an iPhone because criminals and terrorists will encrypt their data in other
ways. (Opp. 25.) If this reasoning were correct, there would be no purpose to wire-taps,
either. But the reasoning is flawed, for three reasons. First, as the wire-tap context
illustrates, just because criminals can add another layer of security (such as talking in
code), they do not always do so. Second, even if there are further layers of encryption,
the government may be able to pierce that encryptionbut only if it can get into the
phone in the first place. Third, even assuming counterfactually that unlocking iPhones
would not be useful in the future due to changes in criminal and terrorist behavior, it is
useful today for gathering evidence related to the terrorist mass-murder in San
Bernardino.
24
Even if criminals, terrorists, and hackers somehow infiltrated Apple and stole
the software necessary to unlock Farooks iPhone (Opp. 25), the only thing that software
could be used to do is unlock Farooks iPhone. (Perino Decl. 6.a, 18-24.) Far from
being a master key, the software simply disarms a booby trap affixed to one door:
Farooks. The software will be coded by Apple with a unique identifier of the phone so
that the [software] would only load and execute on the SUBJECT DEVICE [i.e.,
Farooks iPhone]. (Order 3.) This phone-specific limitation was not dreamed up by
the government, but instead employs Apples well-publicized security paradigm. A
unique ID (ECID) associated with each physical iPhone is incorporated into the
10
phones operating system. (Perino Decl. 20; Hanna Decl. Ex. K at 6.) Adding the
11
ECID personalizes the authorization for the requesting device. (Id.) Apple has
12
designed its phones so that every operating system must pair with the phones ECID.
13
(Perino Decl. 18-24; Hanna Decl. Ex. K at 6 (describing how the Apple server adds
14
the ECID before it signs the iOS to be used for the upgrade).) The operating system
15
and ECID must correspond for the operating system to work. The ordered software
16
would rely upon the same limitation.
17
Apple implies that the code could be modified to run on other phones, but a
18
second Apple security layer prevents that from happening: Apple devices will only run
19
software that is electronically signed by Apple. (Hanna Decl. Ex. K at 6 (only Apple-
20
signed code can be installed on a device).) Signing the software described in the
21
Order will not release Apples signature to the government or anyone elseApple signs
22
all publicly available iOS software, but that does not disclose the signature itself.
23
(Perino Decl. 9, 13-17, 24, 28.) And if the code were modified to run on a phone with
24
a different ECID, it would lack a valid digital signature. Without that signature, the code
25
would not run at all on any iOS phone with intact security. (Id.) Thus, it is simply not
26
plausible that Apples complying with the Order would cripple iPhone security.
27
28
Similarly misleading is Apples argument that the Order will force Apple to
provide access to data to foreign governments. As a legal matter, the Order does not
25
could notcompel Apple to follow or disregard the laws of foreign countries. The
pressure of foreign law on Apple flows from its decision to do business in foreign
countries, not from the Order. Apple suggests that, as a practical matter, it will cease to
resist foreign governments efforts to obtain information on iPhone users if this Court
rules against it. It offers no evidence for this proposition, and the evidence in the public
record raises questions whether it is even resisting foreign governments now. For
example, according to Apples own data, China demanded information from Apple
regarding over 4,000 iPhones in the first half of 2015, and Apple produced data 74% of
the time. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 8 at 3.) Apple appears to have made special
10
accommodations in China as well: for example, moving Chinese user data to Chinese
11
government servers, and installing a different WiFi protocol for Chinese iPhones. (See
12
Wilkison Decl. Ex. 9 (reporting that in August 2014, Apple moved Chinese users
13
iCloud data onto state-owned servers); Ex. 10 (reporting that Apple produced a modified
14
iPhone for sale in mainland China that used a WAPI WiFi standard as required by the
15
Chinese government); Ex. 11 (reporting Apple was the first Western company to have its
16
products use WAPI and [t]hus, [Apple] is presumably sharing confidential information
17
with the [Chinese] government).) Such accommodations provide Apple with access to
18
a huge, and growing, market. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 12.) This Courts Order changes
19
neither the carrots nor the sticks that foreign governments can use on Apple. Thus, it
20
does not follow that if America forgoes Apples assistance in this terrorism investigation,
21
Apple will refuse to comply with the demands of foreign governments. Nor does it
22
follow that if the Court stands by its Order, Apple must yield to foreign demands, made
23
in different circumstances without the safeguards of American law.
24
Lawful process in America cannot be confined by potential lawless oppression
25
elsewhere merely because a corporation chooses to manufacture and market its products
26
globally, without regard to its host countries legal regimes. Apple identifies no case
27
holding that such a burden is cognizable under the AWA. The concerns Apple raises
28
26
are unproven, and in any event would not be an unreasonable burden on Apple created
by the Order, but an inevitable consequence of Apples own business decisions.

e.
Cumulative Future Compliance Costs Should Not Be

Considered and Are, In Any Event, Compensable
4
5
Next, Apple argues that the Order is unduly burdensome because, if it complies
here, it is likely to face other AWA orders in the future. By accumulating its
hypothetical future burdens, Apple suggests that because so much criminal evidence is
hidden on its warrant-proof iPhones, it should not be compelled to assist in gathering
evidence related to the terrorist attack in San Bernardino. (Opp. 26.) Apple is wrong.
10
To begin with, Apple has identified no precedent for considering possible
11
prospective burdens as a basis for withholding a narrow AWA order now. Neither the
12
Supreme Court in New York Telephone nor the Ninth Circuit in Mountain Bell
13
considered prospective cumulative costs, even though it [was] plain, given the
14
Companys policy of refusing to render voluntary assistance in installing pen registers
15
and the Governments determination to continue to utilize them, that the Company will
16
be subjected to similar orders in the future. New York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 165 n.6.
17
Instead, those courts looked only at the costs associated with the particular order. Id. at
18
174; Mountain Bell, 616 F.2d at 1133. This follows logically from the individualized,
19
fact-intensive nature of the AWA inquiry. Apples future costswhich can be
20
compensated in future casesare mere guesswork, especially since, without knowing
21
the facts, there is no way to predict how the courts in hypothetical future cases will
22
weigh the three New York Telephone factors. 13
23
Moreover, Apple has proven itself more than able to comply with a large volume
24
of law-enforcement requests. Apple has a dedicated team for doing so (Olle Decl. 2),
25
and it has published guidelines on how legal process will be handled (Wilkison Decl. Ex.
26
27
28
13
Apple is reportedly already working to re-design the iPhone to preclude

compliance with any similar future court orders, which is another reason to question its
claimed cumulative costs and its assertion that coding is an undue burden for the
company. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 14.)
27
13). In the first half of 2015 alone, Apple handled 27,000 device requestsoften
covering multiple devicesand provided data approximately 60% of the time.
(Wilkison Decl. Ex. 8 at 3-4.) If Apple can provide data from thousands of iPhones and
Apple users to China and other countries, it can comply with the AWA in America. (Id.)
This is not speculation because, in fact, Apple complied for years with American court
orders to extract data from passcode-locked iPhones, dedicating infrastructure and
personnel in order to do so. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 14 at 2-3; id. Ex. 16 at 3 n.3; Hanna
Decl. Ex. DD at 56.) It never objected or sought compensation. (Compare Olle Decl.
13, with Hanna Decl. Ex. DD 58 ([W]eve never required compensation.).) Apple
10
11
12
can handle, and has handled, this burden. 14

In sum, the only concrete, cognizable burdens Apple can identify are reasonable,
not undue, and the remaining burdens are speculative and unrecognized by precedent.
3.
13
Apples Assistance Is Necessary
14
Without Apples assistance, the government cannot carry out the search of
15
Farooks iPhone authorized by the search warrant. Apple has ensured that its assistance
16
is necessary by requiring its electronic signature to run any program on the iPhone.
17
Even if the Court ordered Apple to provide the government with Apples cryptographic
18
keys and source code, Apple itself has implied that the government could not disable the
19
requisite features because it would have insufficient knowledge of Apples software and
20
design protocols to be effective. (Neuenschwander Decl. 23.)
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
14
Apple also complains of having to testify about this back door as a government
witnesses at trial. (Opp. 26). The giving of testimony and the attendance upon court
or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which every person within the
jurisdiction of the government is bound to perform upon being properly summoned.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 279, 281 (1919). Moreover, Apple makes no attempt to
quantify such costs, instead relying on the implication that the crown jewels of its
intellectual property would be released to the world in court. Experience suggests that
this is more of a fear than a reality. During the years when Apple followed court orders
to extract data from passcode-locked iPhones, the vast majority of affiliated criminal
cases were resolved without any need for Apple to testify. (Hanna Decl. Ex. DD 24-25.)
Moreover, as Apple conceded, in cases in which testimony from an Apple representative
was necessary, no intellectual property was lost. (Id. 25.)
28
Rather than acknowledge this point, Apple instead blames the San Bernardino
County Department of Public Health and the FBI. Apple argues that the FBI could have
gained access to some of the information via a forced backup to Farooks iCloud
account, but since the FBI changed the iCloud password to gain quick access to what
was stored in previous backups in the immediate aftermath of the San Bernardino
shooting, this path was blocked. (Opp. 11.) That is both untrue and irrelevant.
For several reasons, a forced iCloud backup would not have been successful even
if the password had remained unchanged. Farooks iPhone was found powered off.
(Supp. Pluhar Decl. 2.) Subsequent testing has revealed that once powered off, an
10
iPhone will not back itself up to an iCloud account unless and until it has been unlocked
11
at least once by use of the passcode. (Perino Decl. 6.d, 37-39.) Moreover, the
12
evidence on Farooks iCloud account suggests that he had already changed his iCloud
13
password himself on October 22, 2015shortly after the last backupand that the auto-
14
backup feature was disabled. (Pluhar Decl. 8; Supp. Pluhar Decl. 9.) A forced
15
backup of Farooks iPhone was never going to be successful, and the decision to obtain
16
whatever iCloud evidence was immediately available via the password change was the
17
reasoned decision of experienced FBI agents investigating a deadly terrorist conspiracy.
18
Moreover, even ifcontrary to how Apple built and designed itFarooks
19
iPhone could have been forced to sync to Apples iCloud network, that would not be an
20
adequate substitute to unlocking and searching the phone itself. Both the FBIs testing
21
and Apples security documentation show that entire categories of evidenceincluding
22
device-level data such as the keyboard cache (which records recent keystrokes)
23
reside only on the iPhone and not on an iCloud backup, and that some of the backup data
24
would still have been encrypted. (Supp. Pluhar Decl. 10.) But that data remains on the
25
iPhone. Thus, even with a full set of backups, the government still would have needed to
26
search the phone itself in order to leave no stone unturned in this important investigation.
27
Most importantly, even assuming counterfactually that something could have been
28
recovered through a forced iCloud backup, there have been no backups since October 19,
29
2015, and Apple concedes there is no way to force a backup now. Thus, the only way to
recover any subsequent datawhether subject to backup or otherwiseis to unlock
Farooks iPhone. And for the FBI to do that, Apple must remove the barriers it put on
that phone.
Apple insists that under New York Telephone, the government must show there is
no conceivable way to search Farooks iPhone without Apples assistance, and
contends that the government has not borne this burden. (Opp. 30); 434 U.S. at 174.
Apples quoting of New York Telephone lacks context. There, the FBI could install the
pen register on its ownjust not in an inconspicuous location. Id. at 161. Moreover,
10
there is no indication that the FBI first enlisted the entire federal government in search of
11
investigative alternatives. Id. at 175 (The FBI . . . was unable to find a location where it
12
could install its own pen registers without tipping off the targets of the investigation.
13
(emphasis added)). The broader reasoning of New York Telephone further refutes an
14
absolute necessity standard: the Court expressly relied upon the necessary or
15
appropriate language in the All Writs Act. Id. at 172-74. Regardless, even if absolute
16
necessity were required, the undisputed evidence is that the FBI cannot unlock Farooks
17
phone without Apples assistance. (Wilkison Decl. Ex. 16 at 2-3; Pluhar Decl. 9.)
* * *
18
19
The definite and concrete facts of this caseas opposed to the hypothetical or
20
abstract future scenarios conjured up by Apple, see Corsi, 326 U.S. at 93amply
21
support the Courts Order. Apple deliberately established a security paradigm that keeps
22
Apple intimately connected to its iPhones. This same paradigm makes Apples
23
assistance necessary for executing the lawful warrant to search Farooks iPhone. Such
24
assistance imposes a burden that is not unreasonable, particularly for a company of
25
Apples wealth, size, and technical prowess. The Order does no more than require Apple
26
to unknot some of the tangle it has made, so that the court-authorized investigation into
27
Farooks iPhone can proceed.
28
30
1
2
3
4
5
6
D.
The Order Does Not Implicate, Let Alone Violate, the First and Fifth
Amendments
Apple begins its Opposition by insisting that the issues in this case should be left
to Congress (Opp. 9), and ends by insisting that the Constitution takes those issues off
the table (Opp. 32-34). Not so. The Order is constitutional, notwithstanding Apples
assertion of corporate speech rights and Lochner-era substantive due process.15
Incidentally Requiring a Corporation to Add Functional Source Code

to a Commercial Product Does Not Violate the First Amendment
Apple asserts that functional source code in a corporations commercial product is
1.
core protected speech, such that asking it to modify that software on one deviceto
10
permit the execution of a lawful warrantis compelled speech in violation of the First
11
Amendment. This claim trivializes the freedom protected in Barnette and Wooley.16
12
See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006).
13
Before reaching the specifics of Apples claim, it is important to start with a
14
threshold observation: the essential operations of the American legal system rest upon
15
people sometimes having to say things that they would rather not saysuch as when a
16
witness is subpoenaed and sworn to speak the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
17
West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring)
18
(compelled speech doctrine inapplicable to essential operations of government such
19
as in the case of compulsion to give evidence in court); see also Murphy v. Waterfront
20
15
21
22
23
24
The search of a smartphone does implicate the Fourth Amendment, see Riley,
134 S. Ct. at 2484, but the government has doubly satisfied the Fourth Amendment by
obtaining (1) a warrant, id., and (2) the consent of the phones owner. Moreover, Apple
cannot assert any privacy interests of the phones deceased user, the terrorist Farook.
See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968) ([R]ights assured by the Fourth
Amendment are personal rights, and that they may be enforced by exclusion of evidence
only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search.).
16
25
26
27
28
Apple rightly does not attempt to claim standing to assert the First Amendment
rights of iPhone users whose phones are not being searched. To the extent amici raise
such arguments, they are untethered to the issues actually before the Court and, in any
event, foreclosed by the Supreme Courts ruling in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547, 563-65 (1978), rejecting a newspapers claim that a search of its records would chill
its speech rights because it would resort to self-censorship to conceal its possession of
information of potential interest to the police.
31
Commn of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 93-94 (1964) (Among the necessary and
most important of the powers of . . . the Federal Government to assure the effective
functioning of government in an ordered society is the broad power to compel residents
to testify in court or before grand juries or agencies.), abrogated on other grounds by
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998). This form of compelled speech runs
throughout both the criminal and civil justice systems, from grand jury and trial
subpoenas to interrogatories and depositions. See, e.g., Apple Inc.s Motion to Compel
in Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics, Docket No. 467 in Case No. 11cv1846LHK, at
11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011) (Apples seeking court order compelling Samsung to
10
produce source code to facilitate its compelled deposition of witnesses about that source
11
code). If the First Amendment swept as broadly as Apple suggests, there would be no
12
need, for example, for the Fifth Amendments privilege against self-incrimination.
13
Apples claim is particularly weak because it does not involve a person being
14
compelled to speak publicly, but a for-profit corporation being asked to modify
15
commercial software that will be seen only by Apple. There is reason to doubt that
16
functional programming is even entitled to traditional speech protections. See, e.g.,
17
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing
18
that source codes functional capability is not speech within the meaning of the First
19
Amendment). [T]hat [programming] occurs at some level through expression does not
20
elevate all such conduct to the highest levels of First Amendment protection. Doing so
21
would turn centuries of our law and legal tradition on its head, eviscerating the carefully
22
crafted balance between free speech and permissible government regulation. United
23
States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1128-29 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
24
To the extent Apples software includes expressive elementssuch as variable
25
names and commentsthe Order permits Apple to express whatever it wants, so long as
26
the software functions. Cf. Karn v. United States Department of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9-
27
10 (D.D.C. 1996) (assuming, without deciding, that source code was speech because it
28
had English comments interspersed). Indeed, the Orders broad requirements do not
32
dictate any specific message, but leave it open to Apple to decide how to develop the
code. See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 344 F.3d 832, 849-51 (9th Cir. 2003).
And even assuming, arguendo, that the Order compels speech-like programming, there
is no audience: Apples code will be developed in the utmost secrecy and will never be
seen outside the corporation. Cf. Full Value Advisors, LLC v. S.E.C., 633 F.3d 1101,
1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (constitutional concerns with compelled public speech are
not triggered when government commission is [the] only audience); United States v.
Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1995) (lesser concern where compelled speech lacks
public dissemination). This stands in stark contrast to the cases cited by Apple, in
10
which software creators were forbidden from publicly sharing what they had written.
11
For all of these reasons, the Order simply does not compel speech.
12
At most, the Order compels conductnamely, the removal of barriers from
13
Farooks iPhonewith an incidental effect on speech (i.e., programming). That does
14
not amount to a First Amendment violation for the reasons explained by the Supreme
15
Court in Rumsfeld, which rejected a First Amendment challenge to the requirement that
16
law schools host and promote military recruitment even if the schools objected to
17
military policy. Like in Rumsfeld, [t]he compelled speech . . . is plainly incidental to
18
the [Orders] regulation of conduct. 547 U.S. at 62. The Order simply requires Apple
19
to remove barriers from Farooks phone. That is conduct, not speech. As the Supreme
20
Court explained, Congress, for example, can prohibit employers from discriminating in
21
hiring on the basis of race. The fact that this will require an employer to take down a
22
sign reading White Applicants Only hardly means that the law should be analyzed as
23
one regulating the employers speech rather than conduct. Id.
24
Further, how Apples software is engineered is not inherently expressive. Id. at
25
64. Code determining how many retries a user is permitted before the data on an iPhone
26
is permanently lost lack[s] the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the
27
editorial page of a newspaper. Id. As in Rumsfeld, any expressive dimension to
28
Apples compliance with the Order arises only because [Apple] accompanied [its]
33
conduct with speech explaining it. Id. at 66. Presumably, Apple will respond that if it
modifies Farooks iPhone to allow the government access to the phone, it could be
viewed as sending the message that [it] see[s] nothing wrong with [such access], when
[it] do[es]. Id. at 64-65. But the Supreme Court derided that argument in Rumsfeld,
explaining that [n]othing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any
speech by recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law
schools may say about the militarys policies. Id. at 65. So too here. And just as in
Rumsfeld, the public can appreciate the difference between speech [Apple] sponsors
and code Apple develops because [it is] legally required to do so. Id. It is extremely
10
unlikely that anyone could understand Apple to be expressing a message of hostility to
11
data security and the privacy of citizens (Opp. 33), given both the nature of [Apples]
12
activity and the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken. Jacobs v.
13
Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 438 (9th Cir. 2008).
14
Even if, despite the above, the Order placed some burden on Apples ability to
15
market itself as hostile to government searches, that would not establish a First
16
Amendment violation because the Order promotes a substantial government interest
17
that would [otherwise] be achieved less effectively. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 67. There is
18
no question that searching a terrorists phonefor which a neutral magistrate has found
19
probable causeis a compelling government interest. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
20
665, 700 (1972) (recognizing that the investigation of a crime and securing the
21
safety of citizens are fundamental interests for First Amendment purposes). As set
22
forth above, the FBI cannot search Farooks iPhone without Apples assistance, and
23
Apple has offered no less speech-burdensome manner for providing that assistance.
24
25
26
For all of these reasons, Apples First Amendment claim must fail.
2.
There Is No Due Process Right Not to Develop Source Code
Apple lastly asserts that the Order violates its Fifth Amendment right to due
27
process. Apple is currently availing itself of the considerable process our legal system
28
provides, and it is ludicrous to describe the governments actions here as arbitrary.

34
(Opp. 34); see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-49 (1998). If Apple is
asking for a Lochner-style holding that businesses have a substantive due process right
against interference with its marketing strategy or against being asked to develop source
code, that claim finds no support in any precedent, let alone in the traditions and
conscience of our people, the concept of ordered liberty, or this Nations history.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
III.
CONCLUSION
The All Writs Act empowered this Court to issue the Order, just as it empowered a
court to order a corporation to engage in computer programming and technical assistance
10
in Mountain Bell. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognizedand as Congresss
11
repeated reaffirmation and expansion of the Act have confirmedthe Acts flexibility in
12
confronting new problems shows the Framers foresight and genius, not a blind spot. As
13
the decades since New York Telephone have shown, as indeed the centuries since 1789
14
have proven, courts exercise of power under the Act does not lead to a headlong tumble
15
down a slippery slope to tyranny. That is because the Act itselfby relying upon the
16
sound discretion of federal judges and by being subordinate to specific congressional
17
legislation addressing the particular issuebuilds in the necessary safeguards.
18
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment, which Apple concedes has been satisfied here,
19
protects against unreasonable privacy invasions.
20
In short, the limits Apple seeks are already found in the Constitution, the Act, and
21
the three branches of government: congressional legislation, executive restraint, and
22
judicial discretion. The government respectfully submits that those authorities should be
23
entrusted to strike the balance between each citizens right to privacy and all citizens
24
right to safety and justice. The rule of law does not repose that power in a single
25
corporation, no matter how successful it has been in selling its products.
26
Accordingly, the government respectfully requests that this Court DENY Apples
27
motion to vacate this Courts February 16, 2016 Order, and compel Apple to assist the
28
FBI in unlocking Farooks iPhone.

35

Government's Reply To Apple's Motion To Vacate

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Case 5:16-cm-00010-SP Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 1 of 43 Page ID #:2094

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE SEARCH

ED No. CM 16-10 (SP)

March 22, 2016

Case 5:16-cm-00010-SP Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 2 of 43 Page ID #:2095

such further evidence and argument as this Court may permit.

Dated: March 10, 2016

Case 5:16-cm-00010-SP Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 3 of 43 Page ID #:2096

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. ii

This Case Must Be Decided on Its Facts ............................................ 6

Congressional Inaction Does Not Preclude an AWA Order .............. 8

CALEA Does Not Forbid the Order ................................................. 10

Apple Is Closely Connected to the Underlying Controversy ........... 13

The Burden Placed on Apple Is Not Undue and Unreasonable ....... 17

Writing Code Is Not a Per Se Undue Burden ......................... 18

Apples Proffered Estimate of Employee Time Does Not

Impinging on Apples Marketing of Its Products as

Apples Speculation that Third Parties Could Be Harmed

Cumulative Future Compliance Costs Should Not Be

Incidentally Requiring a Corporation to Add Functional Source

There Is No Due Process Right Not to Develop Source Code ......... 34

Apples Assistance Is Necessary ...................................................... 28

Case 5:16-cm-00010-SP Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 4 of 43 Page ID #:2097

Am. Council on Educ. v. F.C.C.,

451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006)................................................................................ 11

Case 5:16-cm-00010-SP Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 5 of 43 Page ID #:2098

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED)

Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A.,

344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................. 33

Case 5:16-cm-00010-SP Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 6 of 43 Page ID #:2099

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED)

Murphy v. Waterfront Commn of New York Harbor,

378 U.S. 52 (1964).................................................................................................. 31

In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing an In-Progress

Trace of Wire Commcns over Tel. Facilities (Mountain Bell),

616 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) ......................................................................... passim

U.S. Telecom Assn v. F.C.C.,

Case 5:16-cm-00010-SP Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 7 of 43 Page ID #:2100

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED)

United States v. Burr,

25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C. Va. 1807) ................................................................................ 20

Case 5:16-cm-00010-SP Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 8 of 43 Page ID #:2101

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED)

521 U.S. 702 (1997)................................................................................................ 35

28 U.S.C. 1291 ............................................................................................................... 10

28 U.S.C. 1651 ................................................................................................................. 3

47 U.S.C. 1002 ......................................................................................................... 11, 12

47 U.S.C. 1005 ............................................................................................................... 12

48 U.SC. 1613a .............................................................................................................. 10

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 .......................................................................... 5, 8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 .................................................................................. 19

In the Matter of Commcns Assistance for Law Enforcement Act

Brief for Respondent, United States v. New York Telephone Co.,

No. 76-835, 1977 WL 189311 (Apr. 18, 1977) ............................................................ 23

Case 5:16-cm-00010-SP Document 149 Filed 03/10/16 Page 9 of 43 Page ID #:2102

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Courts Order. By Apples own reckoning, the corporationwhich grosses hundreds of